microsoft word 71517_1_11_chakravarttyandmills.docx chakravartty, p. and mills, m. (2018). virtual roundtable on “decolonial computing, 4(2), 1-4. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © paula chakravarty and mara mills. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary virtual roundtable on “decolonial computing”1 paula chakravartty new york university paula.chakravartty@nyu.edu mara mills new york university mmills@nyu.edu information and communication technologies (icts) are inseparable from the emergence and expansion of modern capitalism, colonialism, and racial regimes of militarized power, yet they have remained peripheral to decolonial critique.2 computer networks, digital media, and automated industrial systems underpin the economic imperialism of the united states. in the late nineteenth century, the first telecommunications firms, such as western union, not only aided mass production and global distribution for other industries, they instituted what business historian alfred chandler called managerial capitalism and the “modern multiunit business enterprise.”3 moreover, modern information technologies have long been deployed to rule over and govern colonial subjects through 2 chakravartty, p. and mills, m. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) surveillance, military interventions, and counterinsurgencies at “home” and abroad. as the us solidified its political economic hegemony in the long twentieth century, telecommunications and electricity were leading growth industries; they drove the american myth of progress-throughinnovation even though the upswing they participated in was enabled by social factors as much as technical ones.4 during the cold war, the us and its western allies promoted private and commercial media and information technologies of modernization at all costs, often in support of brutally authoritarian regimes across much of the third world.5 today, academic as well as popular accounts of electronics, telecommunications, and computing continue to reinforce the narrative of technological determinism and us exceptionalism. as we enter what many see as an era of us imperial decline, and the future of both democracy and unequal globalization seem uncertain if not in clear states of crises, what does it mean to decolonize this field of study? if computing technology is the embodiment of rational calculation and a driver of twenty-first century capitalism, can it indeed be “decolonized”— overhauled or appropriated for other ends? what alternatives exist to the dominant narratives of neutrality and progress, and how might we move beyond the developmentalist and entrepreneurial romance with technology as solution? the scholars in this virtual roundtable take on these questions through the perspective of decolonial theory and tactics from south america and india, and through critical approaches to english-language ict dominance. they expand on feminist, postcolonial and critical race studies that have challenged colonial knowledge economies, broadened our understanding of political technologies, and re-centered extant histories and practices from the vantage point of the global south. in response to the political moment in which we write, it seems wise to return to the praxis of the oppressed in order to, at the minimum, “decolonize our habits of explanation.”6 3 chakravartty, p. and mills, m. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) notes 1 this virtual roundtable on “decolonial computing” emerges from a workshop convened on november 4, 2016, in the department of media, culture, and communication at new york university, featuring scholars simone browne, anita say chan, lilly irani, lawrence liang, and jack qiu. 2 while “postcolonial computing” has received a great deal of attention over the last decade, spurred by the work of roundtable authors lilly irani and kavita philip, fewer scholars have raised the question of what decolonial theory might add to such analyses. see kristina lyons, juno salazar parrenas, and noah tamarkin, “roundtable: engaging decoloniality and decolonization in sts,” catalyst 3, 1 (2017) and ali, syed mustafa, “a brief introduction to decolonial computing,” xrds: crossroads, the acm magazine for students, 22, 4 (2016): 16–21. 3 chandler was more laudatory than critical of managerial “efficiency” in the history of us capitalism. alfred d. chandler, jr., the visible hand: the managerial revolution in american business (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1977), 6. 4 frederik nebeker, dawn of the electronic age: electrical technologies in the shaping of the modern world, 1914 to 1945 (hoboken, nj: john wiley & sons, 2009), 221-228. 5 amin alhassan and paula chakravartty, “postcolonial media policy and the long shadow of empire,” robin mansell and marc raboy (eds.) the handbook of global media and communication policy (chichester, gb: wiley-blackwell, 2011), 366-382. 6 sharad chari, “from exploitation to expropriation: geographies of racialization in historic capitalism,” economic geography, 94 (1) 2018: 18-22. 4 chakravartty, p. and mills, m. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) roundtable authors paula chakravartty, “decolonizing infrastructures of empire” mara mills, “the hard disciplines” hannah alpert-abrams, “colonial copying in an imperial age” anita say chan, “decolonial computing and networking beyond digital universalism” lilly irani and kavita phillip, “negotiating engines of difference” pulsifier review     review of teaching with feminist materialisms by petra hinton and pat treusch (utrecht: atgender, 2015)   rebecah pulsifer university of illinois at urbana-champaign pulsife2@illinois.edu the emergent area of scholarship invoked by the phrase “new materialisms,” most often identified with scholars such as karen barad, insists on the entanglement of matter and meaning. when paired with feminist theory’s concern for the relationship of embodied difference to forms of power, feminist engagements with the concept of new materialism invite reassessments of the relationships between theory and practice, epistemology and ontology, knowing and being. these reassessments have significant implications for the role of matter in pedagogy, as the nine essays in the edited collection teaching with feminist materialisms demonstrate. this collection, a part of the teaching with gender series published in utrecht by the european association for gender research, education, and documentation offers instructors of undergraduate and graduate students both an overview of feminist materialism’s core questions and tools for incorporating feminist materialism into their classrooms. these tools include specific course topics, assignments, and handouts. collectively, the essays in teaching with feminist materialisms explore how feminist materialism might be leveraged in the classroom, focusing on why and how instructors might use feminist materialism’s understanding of knowledge as indistinguishable from the environments, objects, and practices in which it emerges. the collection’s introduction by editors peta hinton and pat treusch offers a genealogy of feminist materialism, which will be especially generative for readers familiar with current debates in new materialism. hinton and treusch point out the links between, on the one hand, feminist theory’s “scrutiny of the nature/culture binary,” which “has left little room for any simple separation of an empirical world from an inquiring subject,” and, on the other hand, new materialism’s awareness of how “objects and subjects of inquiry are entangled, emergent, and contingent” (3). for hinton and treusch, feminist materialism is the sign under which these two critical traditions overlap. as a pedagogical practice, it reveals that text-based learning is “not animated by (human) studentor (human) teacher-led reading practices alone,” but rather that “the process of formulating ‘what matters’ in the text is a co-productive engagement of bodies, spaces, and wor[l]ds” (4). this critical account of feminist materialism raises questions about whether—and, if so, how— feminist materialism might be distinguished from new materialism more broadly, or from related areas of inquiry, such as feminist science studies. after all, hinton and treusch suggest that new materialism is always already feminist in that it emerges from feminist theory’s investigations into the ways in which embodied subjects and material worlds are mutually constitutive. their introduction, therefore, does not delineate feminist materialism from other forms of materialism so much as shed light on new materialism’s feminist backbone. although at times it claims to elucidate feminist materialism as “an emerging topic of feminist studies” (19), the introduction summons work by donna haraway, rosi braidotti, and others in revealing materialism to be fundamental to feminist studies. the chapters in teaching with feminist materialisms attend to feminist materialism’s insistence on the inseparability of practice and theory. the chapters can be broadly divided into those that focus on specific classroom practices and those that focus on larger theoretical questions of teaching with materiality in mind. several essays provide sample writing prompts, classroom handouts, and assignments, such as sofie sauzet’s “snaplog” assignment prompts, dagmar lorenz-meyer’s discussion questions for scaffolding “memory work,” and astrida neimanis’s handouts and workshop notes for teaching “weather writing.” the chapter by iris van der tuin and rick dolphijn, editors of the formative collection new materialism: interviews and cartographies (2012), will be of particular interest to new materialist scholars interested in questions of pedagogy. the chapter describes utrecht university’s thresholds project, a seminar format in which students spend ten weeks mapping alternatives to the binary oppositions of humanism in the context of student-selected course themes, including “naturecultures,” “immanent time, immanent space,” “science, humanities, and the ethics to come,” and “semblance and event” (23). van der tuin and dolphijn describe the thresholds project as a platform from which experiments with new materialism, including those focused on the intra-action of matter and discourse, can be conducted (32). like van der tuin and dolphijn, sigrid schmitz surveys specific course formats that work at the intersection of science studies, new materialism, and feminist theory; her chapter reflects on the importance of promoting “transcultural” dialogues that account for differences among student identities, learning styles, and disciplinary backgrounds. the essays focused on in-class practice are saturated with the heady theoretical apparatuses of new materialism and feminist theory. nevertheless, many of the in-class activities and assignments they describe will be recognizable to anyone familiar with student-centered pedagogy: close reading (van der tuin and dolphijn), visual and rhetorical analysis (sauzet), reflection papers (lorenz-meyer and neimanis), and group work (schmitz). in these accounts, feminist materialism recalibrates classroom content, but it is less clear how it transforms the means by which this content is received and practiced by students. more intriguing are the chapters that take a broad view on how feminist materialism might transform the contemporary academy. for beatriz revelles benavente, feminist materialism means “de-centering the figure of the teacher” and also teaching itself; she argues that the institutional realities of the contemporary academy still allow for the creation of “agential spaces,” in barad’s sense, which in turn can enable potential acts of resistance and change (61). hanna meißner, too, sees hope in the contemporary academy. she resists the nostalgia inherent in presentist pessimism by pointing out that “academia never was a paradise of critical pedagogy but, rather, an institution shaped by and mired in exclusionary practices and epistemic traditions founded on limiting dichotomies” (130). meißner optimistically reads what many call the current “crisis” in higher education as an opportunity for “new practices of knowing” (138). kathrin thiele, through her sensitive reading of hannah arendt, concurs that the academy might become a place “to practice thinking as action” (108). maya nitis, drawing primarily from jacques rancière and paulo freire, argues compellingly against “the pernicious norm of mastery” as the goal of higher education (115). “entering a class with a text, film, etc. without objectifying or instrumentalizing the material on hand,” nitis writes, “rewrites the presumed relationship of humans as subject-doers and material as passive object/s” (119). for nitis, the classroom should become a space in which teachers, students, and objects are reconfigured as “collaborators” in necessarily partial and contingent experiences of inquiry (120). these chapters demonstrate how feminist materialism can go beyond radical pedagogy’s challenge to the teacher/student binary and posthumanism’s displacement of the human by exploring the ways in which the academy exposes the politics of materiality. thinking hopefully, benavente, meissner, thiele, and nitis together suggest that thinking with, through, and about matter can be a way of acting against hierarchies of power. although the collection is pedagogically strong, teaching with feminist materialisms may leave readers wondering about another aspect of materiality; that is, the material constraints forced upon teachers and students by the contemporary neoliberal academy. to what extent can higher education instructors model their in-class activities, assignments, or course designs on the feminist materialist practices described in these essays, while still attending to requirements of their departments and disciplines? in other words, how can the pedagogical practices proposed by these authors be enacted by academics constrained by, for example, financial cuts to higher education, requirements for tenure, and administrative demands requiring the legibility of academic work? surely the possibility of doing so would be greater for tenured faculty in certain departmental, disciplinary, and national contexts. the volume’s relative silence on the topic of instructors’ and students’ material realities, and how these realities may affect their degrees of educational access, learning capacity, and pedagogical freedom, is emblematic of the ongoing challenge of attending to the interrelation of theory and practice, a point of contention among many critics and thinkers of feminist materialism. as a whole, teaching with feminist materialisms provides a welcome contribution to current conversations about how the mutuality of theory and practice that feminist materialism avows can come into being in the contemporary academy. to those already familiar with the core principles of new materialism and feminist theory, the collection’s introduction will be a welcome reminder of their mutual entanglement. admittedly, the collection does not radically alter ongoing discussions within new materialism, feminist studies, or pedagogy. the volume’s essays encourage thoughtfulness about teaching, even if they leave ambiguous how feminist materialism in particular can inform classroom practices. they do, however, show that holding these areas of inquiry in mind at the same time does open and extend up important questions about how, as teachers and students, we differently encounter and experience matter—how, indeed, we are matter. references barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. duke university press. dolphijn, r., & van der tuin, i. (2012). new materialism: interviews & cartographies. open humanities press. hinton, p., & treusch, p., eds. (2016). teaching with feminist materialisms. atgender press. bio rebecah pulsifer is a phd candidate in the english department at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. microsoft word 71613_1_11_bley.docx bley, k. (2018). review of: the economization of life by michelle murphy (duke university press, 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4 (2), 1-6. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kallista bley, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license review the economization of life by michelle murphy (duke university press, 2017) kallista bley university of wisconsin–madison kbley@wisc.edu in the economization of life, michelle murphy places reproduction and the (de)valuation of lives (and lives not yet lived) at the center of how we understand social science quantification, experimentation, and intervention, along with their corresponding necropolitical governance in the twentieth century. using archival methods, murphy shows how relations between economy and population have been historically and materially assembled and, in doing so, demonstrates the situatedness and contingencies of these assemblages, opening possibilities for other futures. the book, described by murphy as a “provocation” (p. 7), offers a compelling example of how to assess and analyze the material effects and affects of our capitalist environment (referred to as a “surround” (p. 1)), without precluding agency or the potential for “life otherwise” (p. 81). the economization of life is a thought-provoking contribution to feminist science and technology studies (sts) scholarship that builds — as noted by murphy — upon the recent efforts of those studying the 2 bley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) confluences of life and capital accumulation, particularly through the lens of reproduction (p. 13). furthering this work, murphy theorizes the economization of life as distinct from a commodification of life by considering how population is governed towards improving economic growth, while also maintaining conditions of precarity. murphy emphasizes the “macro” aspect of the economization of life that manages “aggregate life” for nation-state economies and global capitalism (p. 13; p. 125). rather than surplus value created through capitalist production, value is created in this system by managing overpopulation and controlling population “surplus” (p. 6). with examples from transnational non-governmental organizations (ngos) operating in bangladesh, murphy demonstrates how lives are counted and differentially valued as a form of racialized violence resulting from research interventions. in this context, murphy explores the social relations that are constitutive of quantification and often remain unexamined. even after eugenics was commonly disregarded, murphy shows how racialized devaluation of life persisted through the quantification of differential life worth, a valuation assessed in relation to economic productivity. alongside an introduction and a coda, murphy organizes the chapters into three sections (arcs i to iii) that trace the assemblage formations related to the economization of life from the early and midtwentieth century (arc i), the 1960s to the 1980s (arc ii), and through the 1990s (arc iii) (p. 9). murphy opens the book with iconic bottle images from drosophila experiments that contain populations of encased fruit flies. using raymond pearl’s research that population curves — whether of fruit flies or humans — can be managed, murphy poses the question of how “economy” became the “container for reproduction” (p. 14) and how we can think outside this surround (p. 1). examples from this text — informed by twentieth-century scientific research — span the drosophila experiments of pearl (introduction), calculations of gross domestic products (gdps) (arc i), transnational family planning efforts (arc ii), and gendered human capital investment campaigns (arc iii). across the arcs, practices of quantifying, monitoring, and differentially valuing life 3 bley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) “accumulate” as murphy documents their formation and layering over time (p. 103). murphy closes the book with a coda retheorizing reproduction as a “distributed process” with “uneven ... potentials” (p. 142). the book is short and yet dense with layers of meaning that can be revisited. murphy introduces many terms throughout the book such as “epistemic infrastructures,” “phantasmagram,” “thick data,” and “experimentality,” and in some cases the notes add extra description that is particularly helpful in navigating this lexicon. for example, murphy distinguishes the definition of “economization” from variations used by other authors and details the connection to a “regime of value.” according to murphy’s notes, this narrative evokes both the economic and cultural meanings of terms such as “value” (p. 149). these multiple meanings can be read across the text in language such as worth, accumulation, investment, production, consumption, futures, and reproduction. in arc i “phantasmagrams of population and economy,” murphy demonstrates how we come to understand “economy” through its quantification and affects, while highlighting the racist logics that underlie prominent economic and demographic arguments that link economic growth with reduced fertility and “averted births” (or lives not to be lived) (p. 47). following pearl’s experiments, the keynesian quantification, measurement, and modeling of the macroeconomy in the 1930s made economic interactions legible and amenable to governmental management and manipulation for the maximization of prosperity. murphy brings attention to the racialized lives not valued or not lived and the often unseen processes of data compilation that “haunt” calculations of gdp and demographic transitions (p. 26). in the case of gdp, these calculations reveal the ambiguities of a number that is usually taken for granted to be a mirror of economic activity. murphy draws attention to how estimations are calculated, including for example, the summation of results from sample surveys of individual hairdressers to generate population aggregates for the 4 bley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) “production of all hairdressers” (p. 23). particularly poignant is murphy’s analysis of how the economic is constituted by “delineating the extraeconomic,” where, in the case of the state war machine, “all the bullets, warheads, tanks, tear gas, and drones of war” are calculated as additions to the gdp, whereas the “loss of life and world” that occurs — whether through disaster, war, or policing — “produces no subtraction” (p. 27). in the second arc, “reproducing infrastructures,” murphy explores how the value of life is calculated, with differential valuations of those deserving (or not) to live, reproduce, and be human. murphy refers to “epistemic infrastructures” to indicate the materiality of social science research efforts (p. 6), and describes in this arc how these infrastructures have proliferated in bangladesh, while those related to basic utilities such as electricity and water languished. murphy considers how efforts to control reproduction have sought to manage “surplus life,” while in effect devaluing existing precarious lives and leaving the structures that create precarity intact (pp. 93-94). murphy explores how transnational ngo family planning trials in postcolonial settings created a form of governance or “experimentality” (using vinh-kim nguyen’s term) that encouraged repeated intervention and merged the provision and consumption of family planning services with participation in research studies (p. 79). in these contexts, accessing vital services, such as reproductive health care and immunizations, became contingent on research participation. alongside her critiques, murphy also presents examples of feminist experimentation and life-affirming research possibilities that serve as counterpoints and demonstrate potentials, as evidenced in the projects of farida akhter. the third arc, “investable life,” details how the valuation of life is monetized through gendered human capital investment campaigns. murphy shows how educational investment in girls is leveraged to “increase the value of life” through a process of “anticipatory calculations” where investment is envisioned to lead to future workers while reducing fertility rates and increasing gdps (pp. 113-114). rather 5 bley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) than limitations being placed on capitalist accumulation for the benefit of populations, evidence across the three arcs shows how populations have been controlled to improve economic growth. as murphy indicates, the analysis of this book could be furthered through ethnography and incorporation of voices capturing a breadth of lived experiences and ways of knowing and understanding (p. 7). how do we move away from population as a racialized calculation of differential life worth toward other forms of valuing and inhabiting collective life? murphy suggests a "distributed reproduction" that shifts the focus of reproduction from individual bodies and child birth (reflective of a modern definition of reproduction) and reorients toward reproduction as a "becoming-in-time of life with the many” (noted as more common to the 1700s and 1800s) (pp. 141-142). in this retheorization, murphy draws attention to understanding the “distribution of life chances, pasts, and futures,” the reproduction of infrastructures, and the “politics of redistribution” (p. 141). murphy’s book not only provides a powerful critique of the racialized violences of quantification but also creates new openings for a dreaming and imagining that extends beyond our capitalist surround. murphy considers the political potential of dreaming while awake as introduced by the feminist author of science fiction from the early 1900s, begum roquiah shekhawat hossein, and in doing so asks: “how does one awaken to the phantasma of economy and population?” (pp. 55-56). envisioning other formations of economy and population, murphy closes the book questioning: “what becomes possible if one breaks the bottle of economy and refuses the curve of population?” (p. 145). the argument in this book demonstrates that by showing the historical and material formation of economy and population, we can see these as assembled, as historically and temporarily formed, and as possibilities, among many, rather than inevitabilities. this creates potential for other formations, not only of other futures but also more liveable presents, of collective lives rather than aggregations, of life unbounded by economy. murphy tempers this with a vision for a politics that is “more than pessimistic and 6 bley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) less than optimistic” and that does not “reproduce” the unevenness it critiques (p. 145). bio kallista bley is a graduate student in the department of geography at the university of wisconsin–madison. microsoft word 33381_ingrid diran.docx dr nj edited.docx diran, i. (2020). review of the natural history of sexuality in early america, by greta lafleur (johns hopkins university press, 2018). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © ingrid diran, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license book review | the natural history of sexuality in early america, by greta lafleur (johns hopkins university press, 2018) ingrid diran university of michigan idiran@umich.edu fundamentally reimagining each of the terms of its title, greta lafleur’s the natural history of sexuality in early america offers an alternative archive and conceptual infrastructure that will prove groundbreaking for historians of sexuality, race, and settler colonialism alike. arguing that proto-racial conceptions of “human difference” were predicated upon a natural-historical or “environmental” lexicon of sexuality, this book occasions a fresh conversation among the three fields that promises to revitalize and reimagine each. it also offers a provocation to rethink the history of sexuality in light of what lafleur calls the “environmental body” of the early modern period. this body is one whose governance both precedes and informs the biopolitical body of modernity but, unlike the latter, is understood neither as self-contained nor as self-expressive. rather, the environmental body is organized by and in a field of susceptibility, operating at a remove from the interiority of a private individual. as such, the environmental body is governable by means other than subjectivity. without celebrating this body (which, after all, remains imbricated in the history of racial and settler colonial violence), lafleur offers its “alternative genealogy, one that began in a world without the modern subject and quietly entered into modernity alongside it” (p. 205). this genealogy not only includes the history of sexuality without and before sexology; it also disrupts sexuality’s conflation with book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) ingrid diran, 2020 2 interiority. indeed, this book’s “powerful refusal of the total reorganization of the sexual into the subjective” (p. 31) bears implications that we are likely to ponder and unfurl for years to come. for what, indeed, is the history of sexuality without a subject? lafleur’s answer: a history of racialization. her introduction sets the stage for what will be the book’s animating concern: namely, how environmental ideas of racial and sexual diversity fundamentally shaped, reflected, and constituted one another in early modern north america. sex and race are codetermined through the logic of natural history, a taxonomic epistemology of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. emblematized by carl linnaeus’s systema naturae, natural history modeled knowledge on the speciation of plants, classing all organisms, including humans, according to their modes of reproduction. in this way, natural history turns sexual behavior into a fundamental principle of differentiation among forms of life and, in the case of humans, turns sexuality into “something of a racial symptom” (p. 6). the importance of this logic cannot be overstated, since, as lafleur asserts, the “early modern rhetorical strategy of describing ethnic or cultural variety” operates “through the idiom of sexual aberrance” (p. 4). exploring the “sexual politics of racialization” (p. 25), lafleur’s first chapter shows how stories about the etiology of race came to double as theories of sexual variety. in addition to broadly reviewing the climatic, humoral, and stadial theories of human development in whose terms such narratives were promulgated, she also reads prominent natural historians (from comte de buffon to adam ferguson), concluding with an account of thomas jefferson’s notes on the state of virginia in which we see a “promiscuous[]” sampling of naturalhistorical arguments to justify subjugation of native americans and african slaves (p. 56). here, too, lafleur shows how an environmental idea of race allows sex to be thought as contextual, and hence, without provenance in any subject. in the eighteenth century, “sex—acts, desires, dispositions—was not entirely or even mostly theorized in privileged relation to the individual,” but, on the contrary, “theorizing sexual behaviors as driven...by environmental factors…demands a new set of definitions for sex and sexuality tout court” (p. 60). this set of definitions is racial—though race, too, is understood not as phenotypical but ambient, less corporeal than climatic. as a function of environment, race is thought to reflect itself in sexual practices. for example, in the barbary captivity narratives that lafleur discusses in her second chapter, the “sodomitical” (an environmental term irreducible to any one sex act) serves as a preeminent sign of both racial and religious difference. in book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) ingrid diran, 2020 3 these narratives, which detail the enslavement of christian sailors by barbary pirates and appear from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, “both natural historians and religious leaders turned to the figure of sodomy to stage their concerns about ever-increasing contact with the islamic world” (p. 68). here, “orientalist theories about islamic depravity, sensuality, and decadence were often themselves steeped in heliotropic or otherwise climate-based theories of human difference” (p. 69). to be sure, much comparative work should be done along the lines lafleur lays out—for instance, by reading barbary captivity narratives alongside two contemporary iterations of the genre: native american captivity stories (for instance, cotton mather’s the captivity of hannah duston) and slave narratives. such a comparison would link in crucial ways to mather’s role in lafleur’s reading of gallows literature in the subsequent chapter. this literature, she argues, imagines a different form of bondage: habit. an “articulating figure, binding contemporary understandings of racial difference and sexual aberrance together in emergent theories of the origin of vice” (p. 105), habit marks a node or “nexus of environmental influence and individual inclination” (p. 106), and evokes fundamental eighteenth-century questions about self-governance, and “who—or what—exerts sovereignty over individual bodies” (p. 106). as a case in point, lafleur reads an execution sermon that mather delivers concerning joseph hanno, a manumitted african slave who murdered his wife in 1721. deeming hanno an “ethiopian in wickedness,” mather’s sermon tightly yokes race and sin through the idiom of habit. lafleur argues that emerging discourses of criminal justice draw upon such narratives for a racialized lexicon of aberrant behavior. bad habits—which gallows literature consistently links to sexual deviance, whether they involve sex acts or not—morally and racially blacken the accused, indexing an incapacity for self-governance (and hence, a justification for detention). further linking the discourses of race and sex to emerging conceptions of biogovernance, lafleur’s fourth chapter, “botanical sexuality and the colonial landscape,” illuminates the sympathies between “the ‘sexual science’ of botany” and settler colonialism (p. 140). in a reading of herman mann’s the female review (a fictionalized biography of deborah sampson, a woman who lived as a man for over a year, joined the continental army, and murdered two native americans during the revolutionary war), lafleur argues that speculations about sampson’s sexuality constitute a strategy for naturalizing the “new and emergent forms of state governance and control” (p. 162) she represents. in a striking analysis, lafleur shows how mann’s speculations into sampson’s sexuality as different in some profound but as yet undefinable way enables him to describe her on the book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) ingrid diran, 2020 4 order of a new, unknown species of plant. precisely through the partial opacity of sampson’s sexuality, mann is able to present her whiteness (and the settler colonial violence it exemplifies) as a specimen indigenous to the land of the british settler colonies but distinct from its other native populations. if racial indigeneity can be achieved by sexuality, so too can space—as a habitat— be understood in racial terms. thus, the spatializing of race is the subject of lafleur’s last chapter, which demonstrates how, in a shift linked to the “development of sexology as an arm of the human sciences specifically devoted to the study of sex as a discrete item of inquiry” (p. 165), racialized environments are imagined to foster and even cause sexual aberrance. lafleur returns here to the issue of vice, asking how it is reconfigured in early nineteenth-century population science. if, at an earlier moment (for instance, in gallows literature), vice had been defined as a racialized trait expressed through sexual habit, it is now understood, scientifically, “as a social affliction that could compromise the economic and even literal health of an urban population” (p. 165). consulting early nineteenth-century studies and reform efforts aimed at sex workers in boston’s “negro hill,” lafleur shows how sexual vice was construed as a population-level effect of the hill’s blackness. as lafleur notes in her epilogue, these five chapters together contest the strict triangulation of sexuality, subjectivity, and the body that has become synonymous with biopolitics since the publication of michel foucault’s influential histories of sexuality. alongside foucault’s conception of productive disciplinary power, lafleur situates the history of environmental sexuality, suggesting that “as modern notions of the hermetic, biopoliticized body, fighting off its environment rather than coexisting ecologically with it, rose to dominance, eighteenth-century genealogies of the environmental body became harder to see” (p. 190, my emphasis). having taught us how to see these genealogies, the natural history of sexuality implies two related and profound reappraisals of the history of sexuality as we know it. first, it reveals alternative genealogies of sexuality’s governing concepts and frameworks, especially that of population science (which lafleur shows is deeply rooted in natural-historical notions of race). second, it helps to imagine sexuality otherwise, to “ask different questions about what it is, where it is, what it might mean, and how to better imagine its politics” (p. 191). without romanticizing environmental sexuality, lafleur concludes by citing its key discursive sites—natural history and population theory—as “two vocabularies for cataloging the long-eighteenth-century ways of understanding sex without or at a distance from the subject” (p. 198). at a time when queer politics has “been so effectively co-opted…against affinity, against book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) ingrid diran, 2020 5 collectivity, and against justice” (p. 206), this alternative genealogy contains the potential, perhaps, of an environmental, embodied counter-politics. such a potential is certainly elusive, given that, as lafleur cautions, “most histories of sexuality are ugly—violent, unbidden, unusable” (p. 206). just as quickly, though, she adds, “let us start there” (p. 206). this book teaches us how to see where “there” is—where it has been, where it could lead, and the grave political cost of overlooking where we already are. author bio ingrid diran is an assistant professor of comparative literature and environmental studies at the university of michigan, ann arbor. her work engages intersections of environmental, biopolitical, marxist, and critical race theories. terry article     introduction to attachments to war: violence and the production of biomedical knowledge in twenty-first century america    jennifer terry university of california, irvine jterry@uci.edu this article is an excerpt from the introduction to jennifer terry’s book, attachments to war: violence and the production of biomedical knowledge in twenty-first century america, forthcoming 2017. © duke university press, used with permission. war is now the new everyday. it is striking that the term “postwar” refers to the period after 1945 but is seldom used to describe the periods following the u.s. withdrawal from vietnam in the early 1970s or following the nation’s participation in the balkans conflicts of the 1990s. we now dwell in an ongoing condition of war at home and abroad, against a nebulous enemy called “terror” whose agents are “terrorists.” war need no longer be announced through an official declaration for the general population to know that we are in a continual state of attachment to war, phrased in a political grammar of xenophobic “security” against a racialized figure of “terror” and through which emotional attachment to the state of war permeates myriad affective ways of being. so being “at war” is a constant feeling and a continual state of being that is forged through many quotidian activities and made manifest in material and biomedical technologies of attachment. the united states and war are themselves inextricably attached to each other in the twenty-first century, as are war and biomedicine. there is no way to be unattached, no such thing as postwar society. attachments to war are phenomenological, ontological, and institutional matters.  they manifest in various senses of being and of experiencing life in our thoroughly militarized society. my particular focus is on biomedical practices and technoscientific innovations that are concerned with wounded or sick bodies and that produce complex connections to war. these linkages are contingent, sometimes expressed in registers of salvation through promissory gestures that speculate about the future and, in strange ways, honor war as a necessary condition for human advancement. but the promises of advancement are selective, sorted by unequal relations in an economy of life. some lives, as we will see, are valued more than others. some stand to benefit more from the biomedical war profiteering that is unleashed by the variously mobilized sentiments of fear, dread, sadness, and hope. some are left to die. attachments are relational. they can be strong, fragile, unstable, enduring, motivating, demoralizing, profitable, or devastating.  the attachments that animate this book are, centrally, that of ordinary people to war, which is itself forged through attachments to biomedicine, understood as both a tangible industry and a promising fantasy. these are tied to political ideologies and affective phenomena that, all together, comprise a biomedicine-war nexus. this nexus emerges from a complex set of cultural values and historical developments wherein pervasive and permanent preparedness for war occasions the conditions under which war and biomedicine are bound together in material, affective, ideological, and ethereal ways. war serves biomedicine by producing a steady stream of wounded veterans who become research subjects. national security is imagined as a disease-control surveillance apparatus for detecting deleterious agents, whether they are persons, pathogens, computer viruses, danger attitudes, or toxic assets. in turn, biomedicine serves as a discursive structure and an epistemological tool used by military strategists to draw up battle plans and invade and occupy enemy territory. the biomedicine-war nexus produces new subdisciplines and novel war-generated diagnoses and rehabilitative innovations, drawing figures of the american hero/martyr (troops) into a field of intimacy with teams of biomedical specialists represented as miracle workers in media stories about them. audiences are positioned to mourn the extreme damages done by war and to honor the bodies of wounded martyrs through beholding the experimental genius of rehabilitation and regeneration from the new medically codified diagnosis of polytrauma. military physicians classify polytrauma as a “signature injury.” as such, in my analysis, the devastating phenomenon indexes a particular kind of woundscape and requires special reading practices to interpret the significance that is attributed to the injury both in biomedical and political terms (appadurai, 1990). the woundscapes of significantly injured patients – american troops -prompt an indebtedness whereby the nation owes twice for the sacrifices made: once for the wound acquired as the warrior served the nation and again for the new knowledge that can be derived from medical treatment of the warrior’s suffering. this is one of several key ways that technoscientific and biomedical promises provide a means through which attachments to war persist. the biomedicine-war nexus manufactures knowledge which materializes in biomedical devices that are literally attachments, as in the case of bionic prosthetics, devices to which we attach major emotional, political, and health significance.  paradoxically, the bodies of severely wounded veterans of recent wars—those who would not, under previous conditions, have survived—are figured centrally in narratives of the future enhancement and the expanded potential of human bodies. their injuries afford the inventors of bionic prosthetics opportunities to demonstrate the promise of technoscientific innovations. their carefully crafted performances are presented to audiences who, often unwittingly, became further attached to war through what bioengineering promises not only for injured veterans but for everyone. by witnessing what can be done to restore amputees’ otherwise lost abilities, audiences are invited to look forward to a future when bioengineering may enable humanity to go beyond a host of bodily limitations.  another entanglement between biomedicine and war is evident in the deliberate development of pathogens to be exploited as weapons. in this case, the bodies of soldiers are not ultimately exceptional. instead, in the face of imminent and emergent pathogens developed for biological warfare and defense, all bodies are conceived as potentially threatened or threatening, and some more threatening than others. ordinary people become attached to war through a terrified sense of being quietly and covertly attacked at the micro level by new and more virulent mutating germs, viruses, and toxins, whether by intentional acts or accidental exposure. bodies are in this sense potentially both targets and weapons -victims and vectors -in the apocalyptic framing of ominous doom. war is waged on, through, and with microscopic pathogens. panic is a marketing tool. attachments may manifest as benefits. how does war become a benefit and even a necessity to our very lives and bodies? i attempt to reveal how war becomes a boon to the biomedical industry and its shareholders through a political grammar that emphasizes “quality of life,” and the “free” pursuit of “health,” “longevity,” “vitality,” “freedom,” and other cherished axioms of democracy, all of which are invoked in branding slogans that animate twenty-first-century biomedical war profiteering. of course, war’s biomedical and affective benefits are selectively distributed, available to those who can afford them and not to those who are destroyed in war. attachments to war come in the form of a disparate array of promises.  promises at one scale exist in an uneasy relationship to those at another: military recruitment officers are agents of promise when they describe the benefits offered by the g.i. bill to high school students in low-income and people of color communities. these benefits are based on the condition that recruited people are willing to risk their lives. promises offered to potential investors about the value of shares in biomedical companies are conditioned at least in part on the risks of injury faced by military enlistees. chances and calculated risks are taken all the time, but for some this is a gamble that could well lead to death or severe disability. it is important to remember that losing share value is not equivalent to losing one’s life or health. anticipating risks and benefits is all part of the deal. in war, some gain fame and fortune, others an existence of unrelenting pain. attachments are often evidenced in the positive affects of hope, opportunity, and belonging.  war galvanizes a sense of patriotic cohesion in some people. it offers economic advantages for weapons manufacturers and their investors as well as for workers employed in war-supported industries. young enlistees seeking to learn a skill or to get an education in exchange for military service become attached to war as a condition of these promised benefits. war also gives scientists the impetus and the massive funds to advance knowledge. to cite an historical example, consider the physicists, engineers, and mathematicians who participated in the manhattan project to develop the atomic bomb in the latter years of world war two and into the cold war. computational scientists funded to conduct cold war command-control projects produced the knowledge that gave rise to the internet. during the years surrounding world war two, researchers interested in infectious diseases were recruited to the fight against malaria with unprecedented funding. in these large-scale projects, scientists were attached to war through their labor and the public was urged to invest great hope in technoscience as a preeminent source of national strength.  medical science was tied to war at least a century earlier.  modern combat, dating from the napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century and the u.s. civil war of 1861-1965, is often credited as the necessary condition under which physicians and scientists made great medical advancements, whether these advancements are understood to have been in blood-banking procedures, surgical techniques, pain management, triage measures, or prosthetic rehabilitation. as problematic as this narrative is, it helps to account for the practical ways that ordinary people become attached to war as consumers of the products and beneficiaries of research funded by militaries and aimed at fighting wars. (enloe, 2000; kaplan, 2006; kaplan, loyer, daniels, 2013). it has been through the research, development, manufacture, and marketing of pharmaceuticals, implements, and treatments devised in the aftermath of combat to treat its damages that we ‘benefit’ from war as consumers of these products when they reach the medical market. attachments to war may involve pleasure and hope but they may also manifest in cathexes to pain, trauma, and dynamics of domination.  i am guided in this line of thinking by the work of critical theorists who probe the kinds of affective attachments that tie the personal to the political, taking into consideration especially how the experience of loss generates these ties (berlant, 2011, 2013; hartman, 2008; love, 2007; muñoz, 2009; sedgwick, 2002; stewart, 2007). “a relation of cruel optimism,” writes lauren berlant, “is a double-bind in which your attachment to an object sustains you in life at the same time as that object is actually a threat to your flourishing” (2013). attachments to war explores the apparent contradictions that arise when war is fought in the name of humanity and the resulting bodily devastation is re-membered through technoscience and biomedicine to recuperate war as a tragic but promising condition. i draw from berlant the important insight that much can be gained by understanding “how we learn to be in relation” to war  -i.e. how we are attached to it through what it damages as well as what it promises. attachments that make up the assemblage entangling biomedicine with war are emotional-political-ideological and human-technological. such attachments may hold out hope to the amputee while bringing profit to the prosthetic engineer. they may invest suffering with magical transformational power. they may reverberate with the dread of imminent and emergent dangers. they may reveal that attachments are fragile, as when the nearly destroyed war veteran’s patriotic spirit gives way to despair and suicide when the promised rehabilitation fails or never even commences. they may sunder some relationships in the process of building others; money and investment opportunities come before truly sustained care for the suffering while loved ones of the damaged lose faith. importantly and often, attachments of these sorts are experienced with a deep ambivalence whose symptoms fluctuate between patriotic bellicosity, honorific exaltation, emotional paralysis, and shady disavowal. some people and institutions benefit from their attachments to war and others do not. to be attached to war does not necessarily mean to be in support of war. my point is that these connections are not simply what a subject or group or society wants or expressly desires; they are, as a matter of some consequence, often what a subject, group, or society disavows, disregards, or denies because of unseemly implications. these connections may also manifest in latent symptoms of distress and cognitive dissonance. and they work to isolate certain persons, bodies, and communities who are cast as blameful targets of enmity or as subjects who are unwilling to comply with something called progress. this book looks at how attachments are generated by a complex matrix of the wounding and sickening capacities of war and at how these capacities haunt the social and psychic lives of sufferers and their sympathizers. it also considers how attachments to war authorize forms of professional prestige and generate speculative portfolios that bring profit to investors enabled by the suffering war causes.  in the book’s chapters i observe that acts of wounding provoke the expansion of medical knowledge to produce new techniques and technologies aimed at contending with and often exploiting the damage done by state-generated violence in the context of twenty-first-century warfare (asad, 2007). devastating physical trauma caused by improvised explosive devices can be “survived” now, thanks to advanced blood clotting products and rapid emergency evacuation procedures. mangled and destroyed limbs resulting from high-powered detonations offer the occasion for building bionic devices that rely on artificial intelligence to ambulate the survivor. deadly and rapidly mutating pathogens developed as weapons provide the impetus for massive research funding to develop “medical countermeasures,” which are also part of a growing and terrifying arsenal, engineered through recombinant genomic science. a destroy-and-build logic not only drives the efforts to remove an uncooperative regime and decimate targeted territories to ready the way for new business opportunities as occurred in the u.s. -led invasion of iraq in 2003, but also is evident in how a whole ensemble of new weapons systems maim bodies that are then subject to regeneration and enhancement. i focus on research and development done by physicians and scientists working in the medical biotechnology industry. this is where much of the “cutting-edge” research is being done in response to the severe injuries suffered by u.s. troops returning home from war. the industry is highly speculative and financially risky because it takes many years to bring a treatment to the market and many of the treatments fail in clinical trials. government contracts awarded to biotechnological and pharmaceutical products helped to infuse this troubled sector of the economy with bountiful funding. this is why biomedical war profiteering is a leitmotif that appears throughout the book. references appadurai, a. (1990). disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. theory, culture, & society 7, 295-310. asad, t. (2007). on suicide bombing. new york: columbia university press. berlant, l. (2011). cruel optimism. durham, n.c.: duke university press. berlant, l. (march 22, 2013). interview conducted by david setiz, society and space: an interdisciplinary journal. available at: http://societyandspace.com/2013/03/22/interview-with-lauren-berlant/, accessed january 1, 2014. enloe, c. 2000. “how do they militarize a can of soup?” from maneuvers: the international politics of militarizing women’s lives (university of california), pp. 1-14. hartman, s. (2008). lose your mother: a journey along the atlantic slave trade. new york: farrar, straus and giroux. kaplan, c. (september 2006). “precision targets: gps and the militarization of u.s. consumer identity.” american quarterly 58 (3): 693-714. kaplan, c. loyer, e. and claytan daniels, e. (2013). “precision targets: gps and the militarization of everyday life,” canadian journal of communication 38 (3): 397-420. love, h. (2007). feeling backward: loss and the politics of queer history. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. bios jennifer terry is a professor of gender & sexuality studies at the university of california at irvine. she authored an american obsession: science, medicine, and homosexuality in modern society (university of chicago press, 1999) and co-edited deviant bodies: critical perspectives on difference in science and popular culture (indiana university press, 1995) and processed lives: gender and technology in everyday life (routledge, 1997). she has written articles on reproductive politics, the history of sexual science, contemporary scientific approaches to the sex lives of animals, love of objects, signature injuries of war, and the relationship between war-making practices and entertainment. wilson   article depression, biology, and aggression: introduction to gut feminism elizabeth a. wilson emory university e.a.wilson@emory.edu this is an excerpt from elizabeth a. wilson's book, gut feminism, which was published in august, 2015. the excerpt is copyrighted by duke university press. the connections between gut and depression have been known, in the west, since ancient greece. it was the hippocratic writers who gave the name melancholia to states of dejection, hopelessness, and torpor. they understood such states to be caused by an accumulation of black bile (in greek, melaina chole), a substance secreted by the liver. for these writers, and for practitioners of medicine for another two thousand years, melancholia was both the name of one of the enteric humors and the name for a disruption to emotional equilibrium (jackson, 1986). one of the hippocratic aphorisms makes the affinity between these two modes of melancholia explicit: "the bowel should be treated in melancholics" (hippocrates, 1978, p. 217). the condensation of viscera and mood, exemplified in the term melancholia, is the subject of gut feminism. this book will explore the alliances of internal organs and minded states, not in relation to ancient texts but in the contemporary milieu where melancholias are organized as entanglements of affects, ideations, nerves, agitation, sociality, pills, and synaptic biochemistry. i am not proposing a theory of depression. rather, i want to extract from these analyses of depressed viscera and mood some gain for feminist theory. i have two ambitions. first, i seek some feminist theoretical gain in relation to how biological data can be used to think about minded and bodily states. what conceptual innovations would be possible if feminist theory wasn’t so instinctively antibiological? second, i seek some feminist theoretical gain in relation to thinking about the hostility (bile) intrinsic to our politics. what if feminist politics are necessarily more destructive than we are able to bear? this introduction offers some context for how feminist theory might approach these tough questions of biology and aggression. in the first instance, this book makes an argument that biological data can be enormously helpful for feminist theory. by "helpful" i mean "arresting, transforming, taxing." when the project began (with a paper titled "gut feminism" at the 2003 society for literature and science convention) my primary concern was to show that feminist theory could find conceptual insight in the biological and pharmacological research on depression. it had been clear to me for some time that there were significant gains to be made by reading biological, evolutionary, and cognitive research more closely (e. a. wilson, 1998, 2004). i wanted to show that data about the pharmaceutical treatment of depression need not always be the object of feminist suspicion; they could sometimes be the source of conceptual and methodological ingenuity. by 2003 many feminist science studies projects were expanding the ways in which biological data could be apprehended. in the wake of early influential work in feminist philosophy of science and biomedicine (e.g., ruth bleier, donna haraway, sandra harding, emily martin), anne fausto-sterling’s sexing the body (2000) and evelyn fox keller’s century of the gene (2000) brought to a wide audience the idea that biology was a site of important political and conceptual argumentation for feminism, and—in particular—that detailed understanding of biological processes was crucial to such feminist analyses. what followed were a number of important and engaging monographs on feminism, sex, gender, sexuality, capital, biotechnology, and biology: susan squier's liminal lives (2004), catherine waldby and robert mitchell's tissue economies (2006), sarah franklin's dolly mixtures (2007), melinda cooper's life as surplus (2008), marsha rosengarten's hiv interventions (2009), hannah landecker's culturing life (2010), rebecca jordan-young's brain storm (2010), michelle murphy's seizing the means of reproduction (2012), sarah richardson's sex itself (2013)—to name those most prominent on my bookshelves over this decade. however, my interests in gut feminism are less to do with that body of literature, which continues to flourish (and to provide sustenance for my own thinking), and more to do with the broader field of feminist theory, where biology remains something of a thorny conceptual and political issue and where antibiologism is still valued as currency. this book is less interested in what feminist theory might be able to say about biology than in what biology might be able to do for—do to—feminist theory. how do biological data arrest, transform, or tax the theoretical foundations of feminist theory? gut feminism begins with the conjecture that despite the burgeoning work in feminist science studies there is still something about biology that remains troublesome for feminist theory. take, for example, the feminist theoretical work on the body (which was very influential on my training and subsequent work). in the last thirty years, feminists have produced pioneering theories of the body—they have demonstrated how bodies vary across different cultural contexts and historical periods, how structures of gender and sexuality and race constitute bodies in very particular ways, how bodies are being fashioned by biomedical and technological invention. yet despite its avowed interest in the body, this feminist work is often reluctant to engage directly with biological data. most feminist research on the body has relied on the methods of social constructionism, which explore how cultural, social, symbolic, or linguistic constraints govern and sculpt the kinds of bodies we have. these theorists tend not to be very curious about the details of empirical claims in genetics, neurophysiology, evolutionary biology, pharmacology, or biochemistry. this has been true even when biology is the topic at hand. lynda birke (2000), for example, provides a thorough overview of the early feminist work on the body. like me, she is concerned that "the biological body has been peripheral to much feminist theory. . . . the emphasis in our theory was on the social construction of gender; the body hardly featured at all" (p. 1–2). like me, birke expresses a desire to look inside the body, at the "blood and guts" (p. 48). nonetheless, and despite her training in neurophysiology and despite her desire to "bring the biological back to feminism" (p. 175), birke almost entirely avoids discussion of empirical data and focuses her analysis on the gendered narratives, metaphors, and representations that are "etched deep" (p. 41) into biological knowledges. this aversion to biological data is widespread in feminist theories of all stripes. it bespeaks an ongoing discomfort with how to manage biological claims—as if biological data will overwhelm the ability of feminist theory to make cogent conceptual and political interventions. one thing feminist theory still needs, even after decades of feminist work on the life sciences, is a conceptual toolkit for reading biology. in psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body (2004) i thought at length about neurological data (the so-called gay brain, the neurophysiology of blushing, the peripheral neurology of neurosis) and their relation to feminist accounts of the body. however, i presumed too readily that lucid explication of biological detail would be enough to detach feminist theory from its conviction that social and discursive analysis are the primary or most powerful tools for engaging biological claims. my introduction to that book ends on a buoyant note: "it is the presumption of this book that sustained interest in biological detail will have a reorganizing effect on feminist theories of the body—that exploring the entanglements of biochemistry, affectivity, and the physiology of the internal organs will provide us with new avenues into the body.  attention to neurological detail . . . will enable feminist research to move past its dependency on social constructionism and generate more vibrant, biologically attuned account of the body" (wilson, 2004, p. 14). what i touched on in that book but did not pursue with any vigor was how important antibiologism has been to the successes of feminist theory. there is a powerful paradox in play: antibiologism both places significant conceptual limitations on feminist theory and has been one of the means by which feminist theory has prospered. even as it restricts what feminist arguments can be made, antibiologism still wields the rhetorical power to make a feminist argument seem right. because feminist theory has credentialed itself through these biological refusals, antibiologism is not something that can be easily relinquished. the opening two chapters of gut feminism tackle this problem directly. they describe this tendency to braid feminist theoretical innovation with antibiologism, and they discuss what legacies that leaves politically and conceptually. because antibiologism has done such important authorizing work for feminist theory, any intervention that takes a nonparanoid approach to biological and pharmaceutical claims is likely to breach long-standing, dearly held feminist convictions. i anticipate that for many readers gut feminism is occasionally going to feel politically erroneous, dangerous, or compromised. this book takes that path, assuming that risk, in order to examine the tangle of antibiologism and critical sophistication that underwrites so much feminist argumentation. as this project unfolded, another problem in relation to feminist theory and biology emerged. with the rise of the so-called neuroscientific turn in the critical humanities and social sciences in the last decade (fitzgerald & callard, 2014; littlefield & johnson, 2012), feminists and other critics began to take biological claims more seriously. however, they have often done so in a way that was overly credulous about the status of neuroscientific data. this is the coin of antibiologism flipped verso. where traditionally many feminists have preemptively dismissed biological claims, this new breed of neurologically informed critics want to swallow biological claims whole: "we are living at the hour of neuronal liberation" (malabou, 2008, p. 8). in analyses like this, engagement with biology has more often meant betrothal than battle. gut feminism will intervene into this broad problematic (not enough engagement with biology; too much belief in biology) by reading for what is peripheral in biological and pharmacological theories of depression, and for what the psychoanalyst sándor ferenczi called the biological unconscious. by focusing on the neurological periphery (the enteric nervous system that encases the gut) i aim to show that biology is much more dynamic than feminists have presumed and much less determinate than many neuro-critics currently suppose. specifically, this book contests the idea that neurological arguments are always about the central nervous system (the brain, the spinal cord): the neurological is not synonymous with the cerebral. this is one place, it seems to me, where the new neuro-critics have been too compliant with the convention that the neurology that counts is all above the neck. i want to show how some biological and pharmacological data about depression help us think about minded states as enacted not just by the brain but also by the distributed network of nerves that innervates the periphery (especially the gut). my argument is not that the gut contributes to minded states, but that the gut is an organ of mind: it ruminates, deliberates, comprehends. these concerns about how to read biology were the first and explicit goal of gut feminism. these were the key problems that i researched and intended to analyze. the second major consideration of this book emerged from the presentation, revision, and rereading of the manuscript, and it is not something that i had anticipated in the early parts of the project: i found myself making a strong case for the necessary place of aggression (bile) in feminist theory. there are some obvious intellectual antecedents for such a claim (feminist anger; deconstruction; kleinian psychoanalysis), but the most prominent of these for me has been the so-called antisocial thesis in queer theory. in the latter stages of this project i have been teaching the now canonical queer work of leo bersani and lee edelman, and i have had to work especially hard against the tendency in students to read self-shattering or negativity as an apolitical force that works to simply undo the coherence of the social or the subject. what bersani and edelman propose is not the punk sentiment that wants "to fail, to make a mess, to fuck shit up" (halberstam, 2006, p. 824), a sentiment that speaks only to consciously accessible parts of the social fabric and that sees negativity only in the realm of rebellion and antinormativity. one important pedagogical goal of these classes has been to make clear that negativity is intrinsic (rather than antagonistic) to sociality and subjectivity (berlant & edelman, 2013), and this makes a world of difference politically. this queer work isn't antisocial at all; rather, it wants to build theories that can stomach the fundamental involvement of negativity in sociality and subjectivity. the idea that negativity is indeed negative has been a hard lesson to learn. today (friday, june 13, 2014), as i sit down to rewrite this introduction, there is a one-day feminist and queer event called "radical negativity" at goldsmiths college, university of london (http://radicalnegativity.com). the byline for this event encapsulates a widespread conceptual problem with how to approach negativity and aggression. the conference website describes the event as "an interdisciplinary conference interrogating productive possibilities for negative states of being," and the description of the conference describes a shared hope to "valorise negative states" in order to "provide the potential to open up new possibilities for politics and connection." against this idea that the negative can be made valuable (productive, valorized, connected), gut feminism makes a case that we need to pay more attention to the destructive and damaging aspects of politics that cannot be repurposed to good ends. chapter 3 takes up this argument in depth. there i claim not only that depression is a more outwardly aggressive event than we usually think (it is not just the inward turn of aggression against oneself), but also that this outward turn of hostility is the mark of every political action.  in important, unavoidable ways, feminist politics attack and damage the things they love. this encounter with a negativity that stays negative continues to be an important thread through chapters 4, 5, and 6, where the particulars of antidepressant treatment are examined. feminist politics are most effective, i argue, not when they transform the destructive into the productive, but when they are able to tolerate their own capacity for harm. references birke, l. (2000). feminism and the biological body. new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. cooper, m. (2008). life as surplus: biotechnology and capitalism in the neoliberal era. seattle, wa: university of washington press. fausto-sterling, a. (2000). sexing the body. new york, ny: basic books. fitzgerald, d., & callard, f. (2014). social science and neuroscience beyond interdisciplinarity: experimental entanglements. theory, culture & society, 0(0), 1-30. doi: 0.1177/0263276414537319 franklin, s. (2007). dolly mixtures: the remaking of genealogy. durham, nc: duke university press. halberstam, j. (2006). the antisocial thesis in queer theory: the politics of negativity in recent queer theory. pmla, 121(3), 819-828. hippocrates. (1978). hippocratic writings. (g. e. r. lloyd & j. chadwick, trans.). new york, ny: penguin books. (original work published in 1950). jackson, s. w. (1986). melancholia and depression: from hippocratic times to modern times. new haven, ct: yale university press. jordan-young, r. m. (2010). brain storm. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. keller, e. f. (2000). the century of the gene. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. landecker, h. (2010). culturing life. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. littlefield, m. m., & johnson, j. (eds.). (2012). the neuroscientific turn: transdisciplinarity in the age of the brain. ann arbor, mi: university of michigan press. malabou, c. (2008). what should we do with our brain?. bronx, ny: fordham university press. murphy, m. (2012). seizing the means of reproduction: entanglements of feminism, health, and technoscience. durham, nc: duke university press. richardson, s. s. (2013). sex itself: the search for male and female in the human genome. chicago, il: university of chicago press. rosengarten, m. (2009). hiv interventions: biomedicine and the traffic between information and flesh. seattle, wa: university of washington press. squier, s. (2004). liminal lives: imagining the human at the frontiers of biomedicine. durham, nc: duke university press. waldby, c., & mitchell, r. (2006). tissue economies: blood, organs, and cell lines in late capitalism. durham, nc: duke university press. wilson, e. a. (1998). neural geographies: feminism and the microstructure of cognition. new york, ny: psychology press. wilson, e. a. (2004). psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body. durham, nc: duke university press. bio elizabeth a. wilson is professor and chair of the department of women's, gender, and sexuality studies, emory university. she is the author of psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body (duke university press, 2004) and affect and artificial intelligence (university of washington press, 2010).  she is co-writing (with adam frank) an introduction to the affect theory of silvan tomkins. introduction   editorial board   introduction to the inaugural issue   editorial board catalyst journal editor@catalystjournal.org welcome to the inaugural issue of catalyst, an international, peer-reviewed, open-source online journal published twice yearly. catalyst aims to gather together and extend the profoundly interdisciplinary and growing field of feminist science and technology studies (sts), for which there is no extant journal in circulation. the three words in the journal's subtitle—feminism, theory, and technoscience—matter to the vision of the intellectual and political mixings that this journal is designed to stimulate. in chemistry, a catalyst is an agent that sparks a reaction and increases its rate, stimulating shifts and changing outcomes. a catalyst galvanizes but also produces alternative pathways for actions to occur. in this spirit, the editorial board of catalyst aims to do more than provide a home for creative and critical feminist science studies scholarship. we want to provide a catalyst for research that is reflexively constituted through its upstream histories and downstream futures. thus feminist science studies is not the exclusive focus of catalyst; the journal also seeks to support and foster feminist science studies through expanded forms including mixtures with other critical traditions, research-based critical media practice, new orientations, and experiments that will continue to elaborate the future of the field.     catalyst is here to facilitate distributed chains of scholarly reactions, yielding new work that both synthesizes a range of feminist and critical intellectual legacies and transforms them in the process. while the journal foregrounds feminist science and technology studies, it also recognizes the plurality of traditions that have come into reaction with feminism and technoscience—reactions for which there is now a dedicated forum. manifesta for a journal of feminism, theory, and technoscience catalyst is conceived of as an experiment. experiment is a shared practice across the arts and the sciences and at the heart of sts. in a broad sense, experiments can be thought of as technical-social assemblies that arrange and intervene in the world towards the possibility of making something different happen. experiments, thus, are conjectural future-making assemblages. as an experiment, the launch of this journal invites the question: what might a future feminist sts become? this question is not merely academic. in a world infused with technoscience, the work of theorizing and inventing better relations and practices with technoscience remains urgent: from the ways in which scientific practices are built out of social hierarchies, to the ways in which new and old forms of militarisms propagate; from the ways that race relations build structural violence into the everyday, to the ways that new forms of life are being assembled in labs. feminist sts is a dispersed project, with work happening in formalized disciplinary sites of gender and sexuality studies, disability studies, ethnic studies, black studies, arts departments, architecture, and geography. but it also propagates through the biomedical sciences in labs and clinics and workshops, shaping experimental stakes, relationships, and pedagogies. the genealogies feeding into feminist sts include critiques of capital and its ecological manifestations, drawing from the works of rachel carson, silvia federici, shulamith firestone, c.l.r. james, catherine waldby, melinda cooper, aihwa ong, stefen helmreich, cori hayden, and anna tsing. scholars including adele clarke, donna haraway, sandra harding, evelynn hammonds, n. katherine hayles, elizabeth grosz, susan leigh star, lucy suchman, sarah franklin, karen barad, isabelle stengers, rosi braidotti, hannah landecker, paula a. treichler, evelyn fox keller, and anne fausto-sterling established conceptual and methodological tools that fleshed out the structures and workings of power in scientific discourse and practice, helping to break down persistent binaries between bodies and technologies, language and matter, and nature and culture. scholars such as dorothy roberts, audre lorde, sylvia wynter, paul gilroy, stuart hall, octavia butler, alondra nelson, jenny reardon, katherine mckittrick, anne pollock, and catherine bliss have theorized racial formations and racisms as they compose the relations and potentials of technoscience.  scholarship by frantz fanon, gayatri spivak, helen verran, kim tallbear, kavita philip, diane nelson, geeta patel, wendy hui kyong chun, lisa nakamura, laura briggs, lawrence cohen, kim fortun, gabrielle hecht, and nancy hunt has grappled with and against colonial and postcolonial conjunctures, as well as global itineraries and constellations. writing on embodied spectatorship and apparatuses of viewing as well as image making, scholars such as kara keeling, vivian sobchack, manthia diawara, homay king, constance penley, mary ann doane, teresa de lauretis, anne friedberg, laura marks, and lisa parks spurred greater focus on technologies and phenomenologies of representation in media studies and visual culture. in disability studies, rosemarie garland-thomson, alison kafer, robert mcruer, lennard j. davis, and mel chen among others interrogate reductive assumptions of normalcy and able-bodiedness, illustrating how medical models, built environments, and institutional mandates around care and public health (re)produce compulsory modes of living. and queer turns into technoscience have retheorized ontology, embodiment, power, and agencies through the interventions of scholars such as jasbir puar, elizabeth a. wilson, jennifer terry, and eva hayward, along with many others. catalyst offers opportunities for scholars and activists to recompose the histories that animate theory and technoscience across this spectrum that constitutes the expanded field. the journal does not aspire to crystalize a feminist sts as a singular field with fixed intellectual or disciplinary boundaries. instead, it aims to set in motion and mobilize the resources to foster needed encounters among critical traditions. as we write this, the various genealogies, some cited above, that have given shape to contemporary feminist sts over the past four decades are being remade as scholars discover neglected or ignored sources of inspiration, such as the turn-of-the century science fiction of muslim bengali feminist begum rokeya, or insert new kinds of embodiments into canonical texts, such as new readings of the work of sigmund freud, or invoke the works of feminist scientists such as lynn margulis and barbara mcclintock, or reposition the crucial work of postcolonial thinkers such as frantz fanon and saidiya hartman as constitutive of the field's intellectual and political directions. the launching of this journal both recognizes these diverse legacies and sites of work and offers a manifesta for the continued catalyzing of theory, practice, and feminist technoscience studies into the future. as a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to modeling as well as pushing the boundaries of theoretically and politically engaged scholarship, catalyst seeks to provide a point of convergence for what feminist sts might become as well as a platform from which to launch future iterations. forthcoming issues, for example, will explore themes including black studies and feminist technoscience, digital militarism, and disability and technoscience. and while critique is a crucial stimulant for routing technoscience into new pathways, feminist sts is also strongly formed through an affirmative tradition of imagining and conjuring better, less violent, more livable technoscientific worlds. as a site of experiment, catalyst is committed to bringing theory and practice together. this is because feminist sts has erupted in multiple artistic settings and activist collectivities, in digital practices, and in transnational circuits of making and doing that involves activists as well as practicing scientists who are grappling with shared theoretical issues. catalyst thus invites both conceptual and practical innovations—from creating speculative science fiction, to re-theorizing ontology, to fabricating new natures through bio-art, to transforming the curatorial ethos within digital projects, to decolonizing experimental practice, to situating multiple objectivities. furthermore, catalyst aims to thicken theoretical contributions to feminist sts as well as to feminist activism and politics in sciences and technology. catalyst's online platform differs from the traditional print journal format in that it provides space for exhibiting visual works not easily printed and prompts collaboration and criticism with the aim of developing research. it will both support the work of feminist scientists and offer a place where the scientific method can be read closely and critically in an effort to move closer towards shared objects of knowledge. in this sense, the journal hopes do more than translate across disciplines; it aims to be a platform that can generate dialogue between science practitioners and theoreticians by bringing feminist, anti-racist, and queer theory into biomedicine, or reimagining ecological frames, or designing social justice into existing and future infrastructures. what practices, we ask, might a future feminist sts contain? what encounters might compose and decompose it? and what tensions might be held together by it? these are some of the questions that drive forward this catalyst for disciplinary change in sts. experiments in practice catalyst has been designed to embody the editorial board's collective commitment to the politics of practice. a geographically and disciplinarily diverse editorial board has collectively organized and shared the labor of soliciting, editing, and publishing, relying on the expertise and guidance of an extended international advisory board of ~100 feminist sts scholars. this expanded network makes the vision behind catalyst possible. the editorial board currently operates on an independent platform outside of the structures of a university server or press, which also allows it to avoid for-profit publishing houses as well. the collective thus has tried to reassemble the modes of production associated with the traditional print journal. the journal expands this commitment to a politics of practice by adhering to labor practices that bring close attention to the politics and mechanisms of staffing. the editorial board has funded graduate student research positions and grants tied to university departments to bring the platform to life. built on an independent server space using the open-source software open journal systems developed by the public knowledge project, catalyst is locally installed and controlled by the research assistants and editorial board. with this move, software development, web design, and site management are conceptualized as research projects themselves, not merely the facilitation of others' intellectual exchanges. by valuing the ongoing labor of producing a journal as on par with other aspects of technoscientific research production, catalyst endeavors to continually and reflexively attend to issues raised in this first issue about digital technology and material labor. this commitment to a politics of practice is equally reflected in the board's attentiveness to modes of access, as laid out in catalyst's mission statement. the original development of catalyst began in 2012, sparked by elizabeth a. wilson and deboleena roy at emory university and lisa cartwright and david serlin at the university of california, san diego. an initial meeting of the editorial steering committee was held at emory in march 2013. the early vision was for a journal of theory in sts with feminism and sister theories and practices front and center. other crucial nodes in the journal's intellectual and political development, as reflected in the geographic distribution and support of the current editorial board include, in the us, kimberly juanita brown at mount holyoke, martha lampland at uc san diego, mara mills at new york university, rachel lee at ucla, and banu subramaniam at the university of massachusetts, amherst, and, in canada, michelle murphy at the university of toronto, and natasha myers at york university. as an ongoing experiment, we aspire for the journal's production to become more transnational over time, and thus better reflect the multi-sited creation of scholarship. this commitment to distributed production has further shaped the journal's international advisory board, the members of which provide expertise for vetting contributions, and who are invited to propose and craft thematic issues or journal sections. the journal has a dedicated managing editor position that is generously supported by the department of communication and the graduate science studies program at uc san diego, as well as an administrative office in the catalyst lab located in ucsd's department of visual arts. this first issue of catalyst has been brought to life through the on-the-ground labor of ucsd graduate students monika sengul-jones and m. cristina visperas, the journal's managing editors for 2014-16. visperas and sengul-jones, working closely with editorial board member lisa cartwright, have made the original vision for catalyst a reality in this first issue. visperas managed submissions and the juried review process with cartwright, guiding the editorial board through every phase of crafting the website's textual groundwork and the first issue's production. sengul-jones independently authored the journal's platform and saw the online journal's first issue to completion. mara mills and louise hickman worked with sengul-jones on web design and the first issue's format with respect to accessibility throughout the process of designing, developing, and launching the journal. the contributions along the way of nicholas hirsch, cat crowder ucsd, alec smecher at the public knowledge project, and the generous open journal systems users who responded to catalyst-related forum posts seeking advice also have been significant and timely. banu subramaniam (university of massachusetts, amherst) and deboleena roy (emory) led the "news in focus" and "lab meeting" sections in which we have bring into view ongoing work by science researchers and practitioners in the field. joanna zylinska and jackie orr have contributed innovative image-text pieces that demonstrate the journal's commitment to forging new styles and forms of peer-reviewed research practice. as the journal grows over time, we envision that editorial work will be distributed across a more dispersed set of local and transnational nodes that complement the administrative and digital infrastructures that have been built at uc san diego, and which have been supported by emory, nyu, and other institutions. in keeping with the journal's mission to address power and inequality in emerging technologies across the globe, including issues of gender, race, class, sexuality, nation, and ability, the website will reflexively take on the problem of access to the digital as an intellectual concern as well as a structural feature of the journal itself, publishing and archiving highly visual, multimedia works with a disability practice ethic. issue no. 1 catalyst's inaugural issue captures our vision of encounters between theory, feminism and technoscience. lindsey andrews's contribution offers a genealogy of black feminist empiricism that routes the counter-practices of empiricism through zora neale hurston and the combahee river collective. in doing so, andrews shows how opacity and subjectivity ground an itinerary of black feminist empiricism that critiques and counters legal and medico-scientific circumscription of black women's lives, thus troubling to the demands of positivist regimes. neda atanasoski's and kalindi vora's essay, "surrogate humanity: posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor," theorizes the global-racial erasures and disappearances undergirding techno-utopic fantasies of a post-labor society. theorizing with sylvia wynter, jeremy rifkin, and frantz fanon, the essay shows how digital labor infrastructures of humans and things (such as amazon's mechanical turk) are both racial and racializing. at stake are what can count as human and how the subject of labor is theorized. their article is paired with an interview by monika sengul-jones with lilly irani, a scholar and practitioner in digital labor intervention around systems including amazon's mechanical turk. jih-fei cheng's "'el tabaco se ha mulato': globalizing race, viruses, and scientific observation in the late-nineteenth-century" begins with the observation that the earliest recorded descriptor for viral infection, which was discovered in the tobacco plant, used the racialized spanish expression "el tabaco se ha mulato" ("the tobacco became mulatto"). cheng's essay takes up this fact to historicize virus discovery at the juncture between science, nation-building, global industrialization, and the disciplining of race and sex under the long shadow of euro-american empire, thereby offering a route towards the queer decolonizing of racial regimes and biological conceptions of life. it takes guts to do feminist theory, but few of us have thought deeply about the relationship of the gut to our emotions, intellect, and psychology. elizabeth wilson, one of our founding editorial board members, gives us a taste of the arguments in her recent book, gut feminism, in which she argues for a rethinking of feminist theory by taking seriously for and through feminist theory the gut-brain connection and the psychology and biology of guts and digestion as they impact our subjectivity and psychic conditions of being. in tension with wilson's essay, anne pollock theorizes with another organ laden with meaning for feminism: the heartpart of the body. in her "heart feminism," pollock offers speculations and provocations towards taking up the heart as way to repose questions of life and embodiment, especially ones inspired by neuroscience, for feminist theory. in addition to monographic feature articles, catalyst includes innovative and experimental new sections on topics that are both academically and temporally current in order to amplify the journal's engagement with ongoing politics. "news in brief," for example, invites scholars and activists to share short critical commentaries on pressing recent events. this inaugural issue's "news in brief" section, curated by editorial board members deboleena roy and banu subramaniam, is focused on ebola, and features critical commentary from microbiologist elke muhlberger, feminist and african studies scholar pamela scully, and cultural and queer studies scholar jennifer terry. another regular section, "lab meeting," also curated by banu subramaniam and deboleena roy, is devoted to supporting dialogue across science practice and feminist and critical theory. this inaugural issue's "lab meeting" brings together three practicing scientists—anelis kaiser, co-founder of the neurogenderings international network; daphna joel, a psychologist who researches neural mechanisms; and stacey ritz, who leads the biology working group of the cihr team in gender, environment, and health—in conversation with historian of science, sarah richardson. together they discuss the implications for experimental practices of the u.s. national institutes of health's proposed 2014 policy to promote "sex parity" in research. this inaugural issue also offers two examples of the kinds of exchanges for which catalyst hopes to provide a regular platform. the first is a dialogue between s. lochlann jain and jackie stacey, sparked after each of them read the other's book on cancer: jain's malignant: how cancer becomes us (2014) and stacey's teratologies: a cultural study of cancer (1997). together they unpack and make visible the layered  "grammar of cancer" and reflect on how they came to their methodological interventions shaped by their own cancer experiences. the second exchange, co-authored by jenny reardon, jacob metcalf, martha kenney, and karen barad, grapples with the pedagogical and social "trouble and promise" of the science & justice graduate training program located at university of california, santa cruz. the science & justice program offers an example of reassembling institutional spaces and re-forming the practices that make up feminist sts drawing on the creation of the training program which takes as its inspiration the recent feminist science studies re-workings of responsibility as response-ability. finally, because of the possibilities inherent in its born-digital format, catalyst is able to explore media not typically associated with academic journals (either physical or virtual) as part of its commitment to experimental practice. in this inaugural issue, we present video essays by jackie orr and joanna zylinska. orr's contribution rethinks oil politics through a video and written style that becomes a kind of fictocritical contribution to research. in her piece, orr invites us to contemplate the "subreal agencies" that are woven into the catastrophe of petro-capitalist technoscience and yet might also offer counter-enchantments for feminist technoscience studies. orr develops a performative mode of "magical subrealism" in which oil is an un-human that transmutes technoscience, time, and catastrophe into forms that are both material and fantastic. zylinska's work meditates on the changing ecology of our everyday technical infrastructures and workaday entanglements that support domestic devices. interweaving shots from underneath the artist's desk taken over a period of one month, zylinska offers a haunting installation of lines, grids, and traces that stimulate questions about past and future. both of these contributions were put through the peer review process as research, an approach considered by the editorial board as a contribution to the growing movement to advance what counts as research in a digital world. we are thrilled to be able to share this first issue of catalyst and look forward to future exchanges and collaborative futures. the journal is intended as a meeting place, a site in which the unevenly raced, gendered, queered, colonial, militarized, embodied, ecological, and political economic beings and doings of technoscience studies and practice meet and, by doing so, are ongoingly transformed. we hope you will join us in making these transformations into material realities. microsoft word 31947_xan sarah chacko_nj dr.docx xan, chacko s. (2019). digging up colonial roots: the less-known origins of the millennium seed bank partnership. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-9. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © xan s. chacko, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license digging up colonial roots: the less-known origins of the millennium seed bank partnership xan sarah chacko university of queensland x.chacko@uq.edu.au on 15 october 2009, the millennium seed bank partnership (msbp), based in wakehurst place in west sussex, england, announced that they had reached their target of banking the seeds of 10% of the plant species known to western science fourteen months earlier than they had expected— the goal was set for december 2010, as their campaign slogan “10 by 10” suggested. the accession that put them over the line were seeds of a rare pink banana found in southwest china, the yunnan banana (musa itinerans), collected by one of their partner organizations, the kunming institute of botany, chinese academy of sciences (vaughan, 2009). the msbp’s parent organization, the royal botanic gardens, kew (henceforth kew), used the case of the pink banana to highlight two key features of their banking project: biodiversity conservation and food security. while its pinkness was certainly novel, the yunnan’s rarity and the viability of its seeds made it worthy of collection. the cavendish banana (musa acuminata), the yellow, more familiar cousin that is eaten around the world, has been bred as a seedless clone and, according to kew, is vulnerable to changes in climate and disease (briggs, 2018). what makes the pink banana valuable is that it is “wild” and able to reproduce sexually, which, according to neo-darwinian logic, makes it more robust (becks & agarwal, 2010). kew’s action to work with its chinese partner to save the pink banana seeds at its millennium seed bank was cast as an investment in the future of banana breeding, as well as the conservation of an essential and threatened plant for all of humanity. while the msbp is a part of kew’s vision to stay at the cutting edge of conservation and environmental governance, its special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 2 relationship to colonial botany and political economy must also be interrogated in the light of its legacy. i revivify the origin story of the msbp to show how kew’s long tradition of plant extraction, accumulation, and exchange, admixed with a crisis in biosecurity, were integral to the rebranding of kew as the msbp. founded in 1840, the royal botanic gardens, kew is entrenched in the history of colonialism and has been well studied as the preeminent site of “colonial botany.”1 kew has been involved in the extraction, transport, systematization, propagation, and dissemination of plants around the globe.2 kew was also instrumental in the proliferation of botanical gardens—from less than 50 to 441 by 1901—where they funded, trained, and administered control over botanic futures (mccracken, 1997, pp. viii, 80). directors of kew secured administrative positions for naturalists from the united kingdom at botanic gardens around the world who would continue the accumulation and circulation to and from kew gardens in london. richard grove (1995) shows how these directors of botanical gardens became advisors to the newly forming colonial governments, making suggestions about how to best manage the land and natural resources of the area. from its foundation in 1840, kew maintained its position as powerhouse of botanic knowledge by staying at the forefront of research and by controlling access to the flow of plants. the turn of the twentieth century witnessed the weakening of imperial britain as colonies started agitating for self-rule. how would a deeply colonial institution such as kew gain legitimacy and maintain functionality in a decolonizing world that was growing critical of extractive practices? i argue that kew’s creation of the millennium seed bank partnership in 2000, as the “leading example of how best to approach and resolve global environmental problems” (fry, seddon, & vines, 2011, p. 53), was an attempt at rebranding. rather than referencing their legacy as a powerhouse of botanical knowledge gained through the colonial extraction and circulation of plants, the literature and publicity around the msbp evokes the depoliticized valence of “biodiversity conservation.” my engagement with the msbp follows the practices of extracting seeds from where they grow, moving them across the globe, rendering them legible through subjective laboratory practices, and putting them in freezers for long-term storage. i also study how scientists create new identities, meaning, and value for seeds through inscriptions of data and experimental practice. i am inspired by michelle murphy (2017) to uncover these stories because they demonstrate how colonialism endures as a system that structures the valuation of life. my research shows how concepts such as biodiversity, ecosystem services, food security, and extinction are evoked in an era of neoliberalism to continue the colonial practices of extraction, alienation, and re-inscription. co-opting plants special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 3 into “ecosystem services” de-natures them, and splits them into constituent characteristics that are variably valued by their promise of inclusion in breeding programs and commodity markets. murphy’s concept of “economization of life,” which links living things to their varied economic potentials, is useful to unravel the histories of the institutions in the twentieth century that converted plants from objects of study, comparison, and economy into genetic resources or “germplasm” to be harnessed (2017, pp. 5-6). while my research is ongoing, i want to convey that the published history of the msbp does not capture the depth or particularities that led to its creation but instead flattens the history of kew to narrow our imaginary about ways of responding to the created crises of climate change and plant life extinction. while their publicized origin story locates the creation of the msbp as a response to a global crisis in plant diversity, the institutional archives tell a different story. this path, drawn in the swirl of interdepartmental memoranda, passes signposts of identity crisis, bureaucratic drama, funding scarcity, and nationalist fervor. it starts in the middle of the twentieth century, when kew’s access to plants was threatened by new administrations in the former colonies that did not recognize their authority. kew’s capacity to control the movement of plants, and thus control the knowledge produced about plants, hinged on the maintenance of their two-hundred-year-old collection in london. this collection was split between live plants in the garden, dried specimens in the herbarium, and a cold store of extra seeds that was saved from one year to the next. kept cool and dry, these seeds could last a year or two before they would have to be used, discarded, or distributed through kew’s extensive network of gardens around the uk and abroad. a seed list with nearly 5,000 entries kept a record and provided an index for anyone interested in ordering from this cache of seeds. to run this list and conduct studies on the physiology of seeds, a new department, the seed unit, was formed in 1964, headed by dr. peter thompson. shortly after starting his job, thompson received complaints from administrators of gardens that the seeds that were being provided from the existing store were of inferior quality (they did not germinate), and that they were inaccurately identified (a sacrilegious offense at kew). this was not a problem restricted to kew’s list. in a 1964 article in taxon, botanists complained that seed lists that were circulating from their institutions ⁠ and others “fail[ed] to justify the expense involved, let alone meet the modern requirements of accuracy, efficiency, and horticultural value” (howard, green, baker, & yeo, 1964, p. 90).3 to revitalize and maintain their collection of seeds acquired through kew’s long history of colonial extraction, thompson petitioned, in 1972, for the creation of a state-of-the-art seed banking facility (see figure 1) special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 4 based on what his own research concluded was the best way to secure seeds in freezers (thompson, 1970). figure 1. plan for the seed unit (thompson & brown, 1972, p. 446). although it was the gardens and herbarium departments that were reluctant to relinquish control over the seeds, thompson was told that a lack of funds inhibited any such endeavors. thompson knew that the director of kew, dr. john heslop-harrison, had been meeting with representatives of government agencies to solicit funds for the creation of a national gene bank, but it was not until a nationally treasured tree, the elm (ulmus), was threatened by a disease that the funding bodies paid any attention to the value of banking seeds. dutch elm disease was discovered in the early twentieth century and had been confined to mainland european countries, which saw a 10% to 40% reduction of elms in the 1940s. similar outbreaks in the united states had also been noted, but in the late 1960s there were signs that it had started spreading to elms in southern england. the disease was caused by a micro-fungus, ophiostoma ulmi, in the first outbreak in the 1940s, and a more virulent ophiostoma novo-ulmi in the 1960s, which was transmitted by two species of elm-bark beetle (scolytus) acting as vectors. it took a few years to kill a tree but the leaves of the elms were the first to exhibit symptoms; they turned yellow and wilted first on individual branches, and then turned brown, curled up, and fell, exposing the bark. the pathogen affects the vascular integrity of the leaves, which causes the roots to block the flow of water through the vascular system (xylem). fast growing and hardy, elms had been a good endemic choice for garden landscapes in the united kingdom.4 mature elms, recognizable by their bifurcating trunks, globular treetops, and heights of 115 feet, were considered special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 5 aesthetically pleasing and provided abundant shade. as the disease spread, elms seemed to shrivel up as their leaves curled and fell away. the eyesore of elms dying in gardens and avenues threatened to disrupt the vision of control over the environment and signified a sick nation. “dutch elm disease has assaulted the charm of our shady lanes, depleted our parks, and permanently altered the character of the countryside,” wrote dr. gerald n. lanier, a professor of forest entomology (1975, p. x41). what bothered the botanic sensibility was not only that the trees were dying, but that, before they died, the trees first got ugly, marring the pristine land—or city—scape. lanier continued, in addition to “this aesthetic profanity, the removal of dead and diseased elms (and their replacement) has been an almost intolerable economic burden” (1975, p. x41). as the inevitability of overwhelming loss and increasing cost loomed large, from kew, peter thompson announced hope. having inherited a collection of elm seeds from kew’s historic collecting projects, thompson pointed out that since they had been acquired before the spread of the disease, they were likely to be uncontaminated. he showed that only the seeds that had already been stored in the cold store before the trees showed signs of sickness were safe. furthermore, thompson used this collection to legitimate and invigorate the importance of promptly mounting a collection of the seeds of all extant varieties of elm in the british isles that had not yet been affected by the contagion. this preemptive safeguarding would secure the future possibility of elms to be grown after either the ravages of the fungi had passed, or a cure was found. by 1975, administrators of forestry and horticulture were impressed by this proof of concept and agreed that collecting british flora from the wild was to be made a priority. the national crisis was thus leveraged into a large-scale uk “native” flora-collecting project that was to be the first of many ongoing collections of the seed bank. within a year, the project grew and turned outward; the crisis in species loss was, after all, global. identifying reasons encompassing the biological, financial, and political, in a subsequent memorandum thompson (1974) showed with alacrity that building on the heels of the elm project, foreign collecting was the imperative next step. as the bank grew, they needed more space and required new facilities to house their rimy collections. fortuitously, in 1963 kew had been given responsibility over a vast garden, wakehurst place, in west sussex. thompson used the availability of this new space and their growing need for expansion to argue for the relocation of the seed unit, which had the benefit of being just far enough from the powerful departments at kew that had opposed his initial plans. by 1975, the seed unit was moved to wakehurst place, and funding was secured for future collecting special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 6 projects, starting local but soon moving to broad-scoped collecting abroad (kew 1973). the early collecting expeditions of the seed unit were used as starting points and frameworks upon which all future collecting regimes, including that of the msbp, were built; expeditions are now mounted for a targeted specific collection such as a geographical area (west africa), or a kind of plant across several spaces (orchids), or even more broadly defined “endangered species.” the choice of where to target seed collection is another example of what murphy (2017) calls the “economization of life,” where plant life is selected for “saving” based on a calculus of endangerment, funding, and future worth. thompson and his successor, dr. roger smith, who became head of the seed research and banking in 1980, and eventually the first director of the msbp, built on networks that had been established during the long history of kew but had waned in the post-wwii slump in kew’s outward activities (fry, seddon, & vines, 2011, p. 189). they were armed with a new impetus for collecting that they co-opted from international movements in nature conservation. the colonial legacy allowed them to reengage the services and access to people and places by promising exchanges of laboratory material and expertise in seed handling, which was very different from the preparation of saplings or cuttings for propagation. when transporting live plants and cuttings, pains needed to be taken to ensure that they would survive their journeys to kew. adequate hydration, warmth, and nutrients would need to be packed with the delicately prepared samples into specialized containers, such as wardian cases, which were invented specifically for transporting living things. while extracting seeds from plants may be laborious and time-consuming, their resilience and natural dormancy makes transporting them comparatively simpler and cheaper; collectors usually just put seeds in cloth or paper bags and send them in the mail. funding came to the bank from sources as diverse as the popular department store marks & spencer, who supported a full-time seed collector position in 1989; the telecom company orange, which was a significant donor to the newest iteration of the bank as the msbp; and the wellcome trust, which provided a bulk of the funding for the current, eponymously named, wellcome trust millennium building. murphy has shown an example of corporations investing in socially responsible causes (in her case, nike’s girl campaign in bangladesh) not just to augment their branding by demonstrating that they “care” but also to preempt and mitigate future risks to their own supply chain (2017, p. 126). for marks & spencer, the department store that also has a grocery section, investing in the future of plants as food fulfills both targets of brand amelioration and securing the future of food. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 7 since it opened in 2000, the msbp has rebuilt—through networks inherited from kew—its partnerships between local seed collectors and organizations active in over eighty countries (kew 2015). now only in their second decade post rebranding, the msbp claims to have banked the seeds of the largest proportion of plant species in the world and hopes to bank 25% by 2020 (vaugh 2009). what is effaced in these numerical goals is that the seed collection at the msbp was built from over two centuries of collections in the gardens at kew, as well as bespoke seed collecting expeditions throughout the latter half of the twentieth century for the seed unit. connecting the story of the msbp to kew's longer history of plant extraction situates the success of their banking 10% of the known plant species within their inherited collections. thompson’s use of the growing international demand for conservation to spearhead a local and then global collecting regime shows how colonial logics of paternalism and responsibility undergird the foundations of projects like the msbp. using numbers to represent success in conservation creates an imaginary in which all plants can be counted. hidden behind the numbers is the imperialist fervor of extraction, the choices of which seeds are banked, what banking entails, from where the seeds come, whether the seeds will be viable when they are retrieved, and, crucially, who names the seeds and will have access to them in the future. all these choices that scaffold seed banking as a means for securing access to plants in the future need to be thoroughly investigated. i, for one, am up to the challenge. acknowledgements this research was generously funded by a nsf dissertation grant, an aauw international fellowship and the kathryn conway preyer fellowship from wellesley college. i am thankful to kew archivist kiri ross-jones for their guidance in sifting through the rich archive. joe dumit, mario biagioli, jim griesemer, and natasha myers read and commented on earlier versions of the paper, for which i am grateful. i would like to extend a special thanks to banu subramaniam and to the anonymous reviewers at the journal for their feedback and encouragement in writing this paper. notes 1 for discussion of kew's continued commitment to botanical acquisition, see desmond (1982, 1998); grove (1995); and mccraken (1997). 2 between 1871 and 1880, kew received 2,632 packets of seeds and 32 wardian cases (sealed glass containers that kept plants alive), and in turn sent 39 wardian cases and 3,615 packets of seeds to various institutions around the world special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 8 (mccracken, 1997, p. 85). 3 the ubiquity of this problem is made tangible by the collaboration across the arnold arboretum in jamaica plain, boston, the university botanical garden in berkeley, california, and the university botanic garden, cambridge. 4 in the 1799 publication of the british garden, lady charlotte murray’s entries for british elms includes five local varieties that provided a range of options of leaf shape, seasonality, and robustness for use in british gardens (1799, p. 213). references becks, l., & agrawal, a. f. (2010). higher rates of sex evolve in spatially heterogeneous environments. nature, 468(7320), 89-92. briggs, h. (2018, july 5). yes! we have no bananas: why the song may come true again. bbc news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment44712034 desmond, r. (1982). the indian museum, 1801–1879. london: the stationery office. desmond, r. (1998). the history of the royal botanic gardens, kew. london: random house. fry, c., seddon, s., & vines, g. (2011). the last great plant hunt: the story of kew’s millennium seed bank. london: kew publishing. grove, r. (1995). green imperialism: colonial expansion, tropical island edens and the origins of environmentalism, 1600-1860. cambridge: cambridge university press. howard, r. a., green, p. s., baker, h. g., & yeo, p. f. (1964). comments on “seed lists.” taxon, 13(3), 90-94. kew (1973) administration, seed bank development & policy [folder of memoranda, letters, and receipts] kew archive (qa 0793), kew library, london. kew (2015, january) a global resource for plant and fungal knowledge retrieved from: https://www.kew.org/sites/default/files/kew%20science% 20strategy%2020152020%20single%20pages.pdf lanier, g. n. (1975, march 16). bright prospects for control of dutch elm disease. new york times. mccracken, d. p. (1997). gardens of empire: botanical institutions of the victorian british empire. london: leicester university press. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) xan s. chacko, 2019 9 murphy, m. (2017). the economization of life. durham, nc: duke university press. murray, c. (1799). the british garden. a descriptive catalogue of hardy plants, indigenous, or cultivated in the climate of great-britain. with their generic and specific characters, latin and english names, native country, and time of flowering. with introductory remarks.... bath: s hazard. thompson, p. a. (1970). seed banks as a means of improving the quality of seed lists. taxon, 19(1), 59-62. thompson, p. a. (1974, august 8). proposal for seed collecting expedition to west africa (nigeria), [memorandum from peter thompson to j. heslop-harrison]. nominal national seed development organisation (file qa 351), kew archives, london. thompson, p. a., & brown, g. e. (1972). the seed unit at the royal botanic gardens, kew. kew bulletin, 26, 445-456. vaughan, a. (2009, october 14). kew gardens hits target for “noah’s ark” seed bank with a pink banana. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/oct/15/kew-millennium-seed-bankhits-target author bio xan chacko is a research fellow on the australian research council laureate project 'harnessing intellectual property to build food security' at the university of queensland. she studies how the history and practices of the production and diffusion of botanical knowledge in the twentieth century reinscribes colonial power. she has published scholarship in history of science, fieldsights in cultural anthropology, and other venues. her current monograph compares different approaches to seed banking by studying the everyday tasks of collecting, sorting, and saving seeds, as well as, the history of the organisation of physical, digital, and intellectual property of banked seeds. microsoft word 71523-1-11-chakravartty.docx chakravartty, p. 2018). decolonizing infrastructures of empire. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © paula chakravartty. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary decolonizing infrastructures of empire paula chakravartty new york university paula.chakravartty@nyu.edu our collection of essays appears as we approach the two-year mark of an election that delivered a white supremacist populist as president and unsettled the united states of america’s self-conception as the planetary role model of liberal democracy. as political theorist mahmoud mamdani reminds us, “america is not just the first new nation; it is also the first modern settler state. what is exceptional about america, the usa, is that it has yet to pose the question of decolonization in the public sphere (2015, p. 608).” given the deep imprint of the us as the normative center that shapes the overwhelming majority of social theories of media and technology across the globe, we feel it is an opportune time to foreground the question of the decolonization of the social studies of computing and digital media. in a 2016 special issue of the journal media, culture and society, miriam aouragh and i raised the question of why the arab spring of 2011 spurred such a flurry of interest in the “gift of the internet” as a force to fuel social change through cultivation of liberal democratic values, with 2 chakravartty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) little reflection upon the us's and other western colonial powers’ legacy of occupation, ongoing violence and strategic interests across the middle east, north africa and south and central asia. we found that histories of colonial inequality and violence have always been at the margins of communication and media studies as a discipline.1 the battle lines were drawn in the period between the late 1960s until the early 1980s, between cold war expansionists touting the inherent value of what political scientist ithiel de sola pool (1983) called the “technologies of freedom,” versus a critical group of scholars, many calling for a democratic communications world order. the latter group included now largely forgotten argentinian, bolivian, chilean and venezuelan communications scholars such as antonio pasquali, luis ramiro beltrán, fernando reyes matta and mario kaplún, who at the time were responding to the us-led expansion of transnational corporations into the region alongside overt and covert military operations that culminated in the 1973 coup and assassination of the democratically elected salvador allende of chile (roach, 1997). the european and north american scholars most recognized today as advocates of the “media imperialism” or “media propaganda” theses, such as armand mattelart, herbert schiller, dallas smythe, edward herman and noam chomsky were surely inspired by anti-colonial and socialist writers and activists in the third world. it was through these movements for decolonization and racial and economic justice where we first see calls for self-reliance and ultimately “liberated media infrastructures to combat colonial propaganda and build transnational circuits of transport and communication (radio and newspapers) in the service of the commons (arough & chakravartty, 2016, p. 563)”. at stake in these early discussions over us cultural and media imperialism were questions of the growing domination of the us culture industries, the near monopoly in global newsgathering, and growing unease in the third world about technological reliance if not dependence (schiller, 1992). the turn away from media imperialism to critical theories of cultural globalization, hybridity and difference — popular in the 1990s 3 chakravartty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and early 2000s — drew inspiration from a range of postcolonial theoretical influences including the work of edward said, stuart hall, homi bhabha, gayatri spivak, among many others, who rightly critiqued eurocentric theories of knowledge production. here, we might ask what the unintended extension of this theoretical trajectory has been in the last two decades of studies of global media and society? what was lost in the afterglow of the proliferation of a more optimistic media and globalization studies emanating from the clinton-blair era and beyond? the post-cold war era of a seemingly peaceful global order alongside the worldwide proliferation of neo-liberal media and computer infrastructure has further shifted interest in the fields of communication and media studies away from engagement with colonial violence and what political scientist cedric robinson termed "racial capitalism” (1983). the more limited scholarly interest in questions of us imperialism in studies of computing and digital media is surely puzzling given the very fact of the longest digitally mediatized war in global history and the growing significance of racialized inequalities unleashing ethno-nationalist populisms across much of the globe. there is thus much to be gained from engaging the black radical theoretical tradition alongside indigenous and decolonial critiques, which have focused on the long history of european enslavement and colonization of indigenous settler societies, and more systematic attention paid to the centrality of global racial/ethnic hierarchies and gendered modalities of domination and resistance. the works of cedric robinson, sylvia wynter (mckittrick, 2014), maria lugones (2007), aníbal quijano (2005), jodi byrd (2011) to name but a few key scholars, help us move beyond the question of knowledge production alone as the focal point of our scholarship. what is perhaps the most productive drawing from these theoretical traditions at this particular political conjuncture, is the ways in which this body of scholarship connects back to anti-colonial thinkers and writers who were as concerned with re-writing histories from the perspective of the subaltern to as in creating the terms for collective emancipation. 4 chakravartty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) notes 1 there are of course exceptions to this general recurring lacuna in the field which include (among others) said (2008) mattelart (1994) boydbarrett (1977, 2016) and herman and chomsky who have been active in these debates since the 1970s. there are also a number of more recent works on media that focus on 21st century u.s. imperialism by abu lughod (2015), butler (2016), kumar (2012), mirzoeff (2006) and parks and caplan (2017), among others. references abu-lughod, l. (2013). do muslim women need saving? cambridge, ma: harvard university press. aouragh, m. and p. chakravartty (2016). "infrastructures of empire: towards a critical geopolitics of media and information studies." media, culture & society 38 (4), 559-575. boyd-barrett, o. (2016). media imperialism. thousand oaks, ca: sage. butler, j. (2016). frames of war: when is life grievable?. new york, ny: verso books. byrd, j. a. (2011). the transit of empire: indigenous critiques of colonialism. minneapolis, ms: u of minnesota press. de sola pool, i. (1983). technologies of freedom. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. dyer-witheford, n., & de peuter, g. (2009). games of empire: global capitalism and video games (vol. 29). u of minnesota press. herman, e. s., & chomsky, n. (2010). manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media. new york: random house. kumar, d. (2012). islamophobia and the politics of empire. chicago, il: haymarket books. lugones, m. (2007). heterosexualism and the colonial/modern gender system. hypatia, 22(1), 186-219. 5 chakravartty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) mamdani, m. (2015) “settler colonialism then and now,” critical inquiry, 41 (spring, 596-614. mattelart, a. (1994) mapping world communication: war, progress, culture. minneapolis, mn: u of minnesota press. mckittrick, k. (ed) (2014) sylvia wynter: on being human as praxis. durham, n.c. duke university press. mirzoeff, n. (2006). invisible empire: visual culture, embodied spectacle, and abu ghraib. radical history review, 95, 21. parks, l., & kaplan, c. (2018). life in the age of drone warfare. durham, n.c. duke university press. quijano, a. (2005). "the challenge of the “indigenous movement” in latin america." socialism and democracy 19(3) 55-78. roach, c. (1997) "cultural imperialism and resistance in media theory and literary theory." media, culture & society 19 (1), 47-66. robinson, c. j. (1983) black marxism: the making of the black radical tradition. chapel hill, nc: university of north carolina press. said, e. w. (2008). covering islam: how the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world. new york: random house. schiller, h. i. (1992). mass communications and american empire.2nd edition. new york, ny. avalon bio paula chakravartty is associate professor, department of media, culture and communication (mcc) and the gallatin school at nyu. she is a member of the nyu sanctuary coalition and the nyu coalition for fair labor. microsoft word 31966_sarah montoya_nj dr.docx montoya, sarah a. (2019). review of network sovereignty: building the internet across indian country, by marisa elena duarte (university of washington press, 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-4. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sarah a. montoya, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license book review | network sovereignty: building the internet across indian country, by marisa elena duarte (university of washington press, 2017) sarah alyssa montoya university of california at los angeles smontoya@g.ucla.edu countless computer science and information studies texts describe the world wide web and the internet as a new, electronic frontier. the invocation of “frontier” and terra nullius is often coupled with histories of computational development that de-emphasize the role of the nation-state in the creation of internet infrastructures and instead rhapsodize on the intent of its architects and their visions. there is recognition of the role of advanced research projects agency or arpa (now known as the united states defense advanced research projects agency) in developing the functionality of arpanet—the foundations of which form the technical backbone of the internet (abbate, 1999, pp. 36-38). however, there is little work that explicitly links these technical projects with colonialism and settler colonialism. critiques on the corporatization of the internet and representations of race online abound, yet both of these areas within critical information studies fail to consider how the dispossession of native peoples animates settler ontologies embedded within information structures and facilitates the creation of internet infrastructures. dominant representations of “the internet” as a singular, democratic, disembodied space work towards concealing the logics of colonialism and settler colonialism, specifically those related to the territory and land—what patrick wolfe calls the “irreducible element” of settler colonialism (2006, p. 388). special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah a. montoya, 2019 2 duarte’s work attempts to “land” discussions of the internet as she addresses how native peoples have engaged with information and communication technologies (icts) across indian country. where dominant narratives de-emphasize land and material infrastructures, she highlights how digital technologies are dependent on local topographies. duarte identifies her intention as threefold: to integrate native and indigenous approaches into the field of information studies, introduce the field and language of information studies to native peoples and scholars, and consider how native communities and tribal governments have negotiated both the complexities of representation online and the creation of internet and communications infrastructures (pp. 6-7). duarte begins network sovereignty with a rumination on information flows and power that explicates how colonialism serves as the major socio-political context through which settler society understands technological advancement. duarte adds, “in the modern settler imaginary, any native or indigenous use of modern technologies was unexpected precisely because native and indigenous peoples themselves were unexpected in the subjugated, mediated landscape” (p. 11). network sovereignty attempts to refute settler colonial stereotypes that associate native communities and spaces with primitivism. duarte explores how communities have created and navigated modern technoinfrastructures through an exploration of several sites, including pascua yaqui’s kpyt-lpfm radio station where she interviews hector youtsey, the manager who aided the tribe in setting up their station and helped them negotiate the fcc licensing regulations (pp. 38-39). she also briefly interviews richard alum davis, the station manager at kuyi hopi radio and describes how station employees must also meet the needs of their local communities based on the “seasonal rhythms” and cultural protocols of its listeners (p. 46). duarte meets with police chief joseph delgado at the tohono o’odham police department to address the telecommunications network that must negotiate the borders of two settler states (p. 41). her work also examines the creation and maintenance of tvdnet and the southern california tribal technologies sctt, as well as how the cheyenne river sioux tribe and the navajo nation leverage and navigate tribal sovereignty through colonial juridical structures. duarte’s research points to how each area holds its own particular cultural and physical topographies. as such, duarte argues that there is no totalizing discourse that can adequately address the needs of all native communities. in fact, framing the politics of the internet as an issue of mere access allows for the settler state to paternalistically deploy itself as a benevolent savior. instead, each community must be allowed the right to self-govern and create an ict infrastructure that special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah a. montoya, 2019 3 reflects the contours of its specific, geopolitical ecologies and histories (p. 43). the text closes with a two-pronged approach to building icts through indian country. in the first, duarte suggests that new policies around native icts must reflect the right to self-governance. she states that improving network functionality and navigating broadband policies mark just two areas that communities need to consider. in her second approach, she posits the decolonial potentials of flows of information. duarte writes, “understanding how native and indigenous people use analog and digital systems to share knowledge toward self-governance and self-determination gives us insight into the subversive ways that native and indigenous people...[create] forms of resistance, endurance, and liberation” (p. 130). she adds that it is crucial to begin reframing discourses of technological access. she claims this decolonial reframing “reorients the technique of applied science toward meeting the goals of tribal communities” (p. 136). while duarte’s text promises a necessary intervention into thinking about computer technologies and the politics of sovereignty, the text favors a descriptive approach. in some areas, this approach is useful—most notably when duarte breaks down technological jargon and techno-infrastructures. in other areas, the description results in sparse engagement with theory or feminist theory, which is evidenced throughout her selective citational practices in the field of native studies and information studies. this lack of engagement often results in organizational issues in which core concepts are either reiterated throughout several chapters or are oversimplified. for instance, definitions and theorizations of sovereignty—a fraught concept in fields such native studies, critical indigenous studies, and native feminist studies—are represented with little complexity. the fieldwork itself, in particular, the interviews, provide little clarity or momentum within the work. in its shining moments, network sovereignty offers readers the opportunity to begin a critical conversation on the role of colonialism and settler colonialism in the creation of communication infrastructures, but the text’s uneven development makes it difficult to appreciate duarte’s intervention. references abbate, j. (1999). inventing the internet. cambridge, ma: mit press. wolfe, p. (2006). settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. journal of genocide research, 8(4), 387-409. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah a. montoya, 2019 4 author bio sarah montoya is doctoral student and settler on the ancestral and unceeded lands of the tongva at ucla’s gender studies program. her work situates colonialism and settler colonialism as central to the creation and maintenance of computer and internet technologies and their material infrastructures. microsoft word commentary-myers.docx myers, n. (2017). ungrid-able ecologies: decolonizing the ecological sensorium in a 10,000 year-old naturalcultural happening. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2) 1-24 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © natasha myers, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license commentary ungrid-able ecologies: decolonizing the ecological sensorium in a 10,000 year-old naturalcultural happening natasha myers york university nmyers@yorku.ca abstract in the photo essay that follows, i share some field notes two years into a longterm research-creation collaboration with award-winning dancer and filmmaker ayelen liberona. becoming sensor mixes art, ecology, and anthropology in an attempt to do ecology otherwise. part of a long-term ethnographic research project on an urban park in toronto, becoming sensor speculates on protocols for an ungrid-able ecology of a 10,000 year-old naturalcultural happening. in this project, ayelen and i engage the expansive mediations of art and the artful attentions of ethnography to remake the naturalist’s notebook. this more-thannatural history of an oak savannah in toronto’s high park offers one approach to cultivating a robust mode of knowing grounded in queer, feminist, decolonial politics. 2 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) introduction: decolonizing feminist knowledge projects in this post-truth world order, where alternative facts threaten to unravel even the most stably constructed scientific claims, it may seem utterly blasphemous to question whether more science or even better science are what we need in order to respond to the dire circumstances unfurling all around us. it is clear that scientific institutions, research programs, and data are under serious threat.1 and at the same time, what should be concerning to scholars of feminist technoscience is that it is precisely in this climate that many appear to be clamping down more fiercely on the myth of science as the exercise of disinterested objectivity in service of securing universal truths. note the protests against the “politicization of science” around the april 2017 march for science, and against efforts to make that march more inclusive. feminist technoscience scholars have long known that science is more and other than what it has claimed to be. but many scientists and their publics still hold on to mythical ideas that assume a clean divide between science and politics. and so perhaps we could take a moment to trouble the desire for a feminist knowledge project that aspires to the status of a science. yes, we need sciences grounded in intersectional feminisms. but we also need to invest our efforts in generating robust forms of knowing (and not knowing)2 that can stand both alongside and athwart science. in what follows, i speculate on the possibilities of a decolonial feminist mode of inquiry that can build on the best parts of science – its situated, embodied, and responsively attuned forms of knowing3 – while simultaneously refusing its foundational logics: the colonial, capitalist, military, mechanistic, and neo-darwinian forms through which science has gained its traction as the sole arbiter of truth. this is a call for a robust mode of knowing that can break from the very forces that science was designed to serve: those capitalist and colonial desires for knowledge forms that facilitate the management of lands and bodies.4 for too long these forces have shaped what we can and cannot know about 3 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the world. i am looking for ways of knowing that can expose the colonial and extractive logics of the sciences, while holding scientists, their publics, governments, and industry accountable to asking better questions and cultivating more robust modes of inquiry.5 i am holding out hope for a mode of inquiry that can be responsive to the needs of communities, such as those living downstream from the toxic flows of late industrialism, and in the wake of climate change.6 i want to support the creation of knowledge forms that can help us to contest constrained regimes of evidence, unsettle ideas about what modes of attention, objects, methods and data forms are proper to the sciences, and disrupt assumptions about whose knowledge counts.7 perhaps this is what feminist technoscience already does. do we want to call that science? science has commitments not aligned with feminist projects. the regimes of evidence currently marshaled by states and industries operate within a constrained discursive field in which all claims to truth must appeal to a mechanistic world view, one in which forms of life and death are made alienable, extractable, commodifiable and reducible to their parts. other forms of knowing, most especially local and indigenous knowledges, are forced to make themselves legible to this scientific rationalism. other knowledges are either “tolerated” as a matter of liberalism’s bureaucratic principles of “inclusion” and “consultation”, just glossed over, or outright ignored.8 i wonder then whether calls for knowledge under the banner of science will keep us entrenched in forms of knowing that institute hierarchies among life forms, reaffirm western conceptions of the separateness of humans from nature, continue to mechanize and commodify living processes, propagate militarized narratives and technologies, and ensure the continued silencing of indigenous and local knowledges. if this is so, i want to try my hand at inventing forms of knowing otherwise. in order to imagine a robust form of knowing that could stand alongside science – and push back on widespread desires for totalizing, universal truths – it might be generative to begin by building on elements 4 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) of scientific practice that are consistent with intersectional feminist ethics. my long-term ethnographic research among protein modelers who render visible the stuff of life taught me that science is more and other than what we long though it was.9 practitioners of the arts of protein modeling showed that it was possible to eschew idealizations of mechanical objectivity and cultivate a practice of situated knowledge in the laboratory.10 they showed me how scientific rigor has less to do with conventional ideas about detachment, disembodied objectivity, or routinization, and more to do with improvised regimes of care and affective labor. these practitioners showed me their willingness to get lured by phenomena they study, and to get entangled and attuned to the liveliness of matter.11 they also taught me that their best attempts at asserting a mechanical worldview consistently failed to disenchant the living world. in spite of their best efforts at deanimation, in their hands matter remained lively and excitable.12 i saw glimmers of a feminist science in their loves and labors. but scientists working in this field and those working across many other disciplines, and especially in ecology, also insistently show me the mundane ways that colonial and economizing logics still have a tenacious a grip on our imaginations about lands and bodies.13 so while scientific practitioners share so much with artists and anthropologists (especially when you look closely at the affective entanglements that take shape in the course of inquiry), too often scientists are constrained to modes of attention and regimes of evidence dictated by colonialism, capitalism and heteropatriarchy. just as i want to affirm the potential scientists have to render the world otherwise, it clear that decolonial feminist projects must find a way to break from the sciences’ founding logics. if the aim is to break with the colonial ecological imaginary, why not start with the disruptive potential of art? arts-based inquiry, in the form of researchcreation projects that tie thinking together with making and doing, can break the frame.14 art can alter how we sense, feel, and know; arts-based inquiry can expose and subvert the colonial ecological sensorium, and in the process, open up perceptions of more-than-human worlds. 5 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) in the photo essay that follows, i share some field notes two years into a long-term research-creation collaboration with award-winning dancer and filmmaker ayelen liberona.15 becoming sensor mixes art, ecology, and anthropology in an attempt to do ecology otherwise. part of a long-term ethnographic research project on an urban park in toronto, becoming sensor speculates on protocols for an ungrid-able ecology of a 10,000 year-old naturalcultural happening. in this project, ayelen and i engage the expansive mediations of art and the artful attentions of ethnography to remake the naturalist’s notebook. this more-than-natural history of an oak savannah in toronto’s high park offers one approach to cultivating a robust mode of knowing grounded in queer, feminist, decolonial politics. a more-than-natural history of an oak savannah figure 1: high park’s oak savannah. photograph by the author 6 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) becoming sensor experiments with ways to decolonize ecology in a 400acre urban parkland in toronto, which is currently under intensive ecological restoration. the lands in question are remnants of the ancient oak savannahs that used to stretch out across this region. oak savannahs are remarkable happenings that ingather many kinds of beings, becomings, and comings undone. they are composed of widely spaced oak trees, tall prairie grasses, and wildflowers that love to take root in sandy soils. and yet the composition of these lands is not only dependent on “natural” forces. oak savannahs depend on the disruptive force of fire to keep the grasslands thriving and to promote the regeneration of oaks. and for that reason, they depend on people with knowledge of fire and the skills to use this disruptive force to care for the lands. oak savannahs are in this sense naturalcultural formations par excellence.16 their very existence is a record of indigenous peoples’ use of fire to care for these lands over millennia.17 these lands have suffered significantly under settler colonialism. only one percent of the oak savannahs that once stretched out across this region have survived settlers’ grazing sheep, lawn mowers, and development projects. the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands and attempts to decimate their cultures through residential school systems and forced assimilation has had and continues to have devastating effects on individuals and their communities across canada. high park’s oak savannahs provoke another line of inquiry into this history: can we simultaneously ask how this violence impacts the wellbeing of the land? what does a land lose when it is dispossessed of its people? oak savannahs do not survive without people. after years of settlers grazing sheep and mowing the grasses to sculpt the lands into a pleasure park, these lands are now recognized as rare ecosystems, sites of natural and scientific interest. toronto’s urban forestry team has brought in controlled burns in an effort to save the oak savannahs. however, saving the oak savannah’s “nature” seems to be prioritized over addressing the lasting legacies of colonial violence that contributed 7 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) to the degradation of these lands. the lands struggle to survive today precisely because the indigenous peoples who gave this land its contours and significance were removed and their fires suppressed. working without the inclusion of indigenous people, the intensive ecological restoration efforts under way in the park today participate in an ongoing colonial project that continues to enforce the dispossession of indigenous peoples from their lands. can we do ecology otherwise? decolonizing the ecological sensorium one of the most totalizing erasures of colonial ecology has been the disavowal of indigenous articulations of the sentience of lands and bodies, and their inextricable relations.18 affirmations of more-thanhuman sentience are blasphemous to a colonial ecology whose data forms and modes of inquiry tacitly and explicitly assume that bodies and lands must be managed as property, resource and commodity.19 decolonizing ecology demands disrupting our well-rehearsed retorts to the suggestion of more-than-human sentience. we are all familiar with that quick dismissal that reduces claims about nonhuman sentience to primitive expressions of animism or anthropomorphism. consider for a moment however, that the very taboos against animism and anthropomorphism are grounded in colonial imaginations of nature and culture, and that this disavowal of nonhuman sentience is intimately bound up in colonial projects that have taken shape under the guise of the ecological sciences.20 becoming sensor invites us to consider that ongoing protests against the very conception of nonhuman sentiences risk re-colonizing the past, reviving a colonial present, and ensuring that colonial rule over settled lands and bodies endures well into the future. to become better allies to indigenous resurgence projects,21 settlers could start by forgetting everything we thought we knew about nonhuman lives and worlds. this takes serious work. becoming sensor invites us to forget what we thought “nature” was; to forget how we thought life “worked”; and to forget, too, the naturalizing tropes that 8 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) made us believe that living beings “work” like machines, or that forests perform “ecosystems services,” or that “reproduction” and “fitness” were the only valuable and recordable measures of a life.22 it demands cultivating new modes of embodiment, attention, imagination, and new ways of telling stories about lands and bodies. figure 2: sensing, sensitive and sentient. photograph by the author. 9 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 3: decompositions. photographs by the author. returning again and again to this work of de-tuning and re-tuning our sensoria through our work in the oak savannah has inspired the invention an ungrid-able ecology for a more-than-natural history up to the task of documenting this naturalcultural happening 10,000 years in-the-making. it is in high park’s oak savannahs that ayelen and i are learning that it is possible to invent new modes of attention and inquiry for a decolonial, 10 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) queer, feminist ecology. perhaps this will become a place where ecological restoration might get disarticulated from incentivized management schemes that aim to maximize a land’s ecosystems services. perhaps it will become a place where neocolonial moralizing discourses about invasive and native species might start to lose their traction. i imagine that this is also land on which the reproductive imperatives and heteronormative, militarized, and productivist tropes of neo-darwinian survival stories might someday become less salient. two years in, our first attunements are just beginning to sensitize us to what this land is mattering, and what matters to this land.23 doing ecology otherwise: protocols for an ungrid-able ecology figure 4: green flames. photographs by the author. toronto’s urban forestry team has put up signs throughout the park to mark “monitoring plots” where they have done ecological restoration work. these are sites to which parks workers return once every few years to take photographs and record changes, storing the images in an archive at city hall. we take seriously the idea that these monitoring plots are sites where we need to pay very close attention. what is involved in 11 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) monitoring an environment? what would it take to really pay attention to what is happening here? and what modes of attention might be required for a decolonized account of this land? and what, ayelen and i ask, would we have to do to really tune in? becoming sensor in this already sentient world, we are experimenting with modes of attention to learn how to pay attention to this land that has been paying very close attention to all the transformations taking shape around it for so many years.24 plants and trees are themselves remarkably sensitive sensors.25 how can our sensing practices do justice to documenting the beings and doings of an oak tree, let alone the vast numbers of trees and other creatures taking root together across this wide swath of ancient land? we are learning that becoming sensor in the savannah demands subtle attunements of our always already synesthetic sensoria. as long-time dancers our attunements to these lands are always already kinaesthetically inflected and profoundly attentive to rhythm, temporality, momentum, and more-than-human movements of all kinds. our protocols for this ungrid-able ecology are especially attuned to the bodies and movements of the creatures around us, including the plants, trees, fungi, insects, birds, squirrels, dogs, machines, and people, and all forms of living and dying, becoming and coming undone. it is important to note that our protocols are not intended to recolonize these lands with yet more settler colonial stories. rather, these techniques offer an example of some ways to break the consensus of a colonial ecology that is indebted to economizing, militarized, mechanistic, and neo-darwinian logics. these protocols demonstrate how one might begin to refuse the colonial norms and logics of conventional ecology in order to open up to sensing other sentiences. in so doing, they aim to expand the discursive field in which stories about bodies and lands can be told. the aim is to make more space, to push up against the conventional ecological sensorium, so that the sciences do not have the only or final say. perhaps these protocols will help us learn how to ask better questions about what matters to the land, so that in the future we can work alongside ecologists to transform the ways they apprehend the 12 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) world, the questions they ask, and their methods of inquiry. it is by making more room for other ways of telling stories about lands and bodies that, as settlers, we are allying ourselves with the remarkable work of indigenous activists and scholars in the name of decolonization.26 kinesthetic imaging: rendering sentient bodies in an affective ecology we begin from the premise that we are not the only observers on these lands. what changes when we start from the assumption that we are being watched by the trees? what do the trees know? if we learned how to listen, what stories might they tell? if traditional nature photography captures living bodies and turns them into objects of scientific interest, the kinesthetic images ayelen and i compose in the field render the world otherwise. we hack in to our cameras to disrupt the conventional ecologist’s desire to capture clean, clear, legible data. we hold open the aperture long enough to keep our moving bodies in the frame, allowing us to register the moods and energies of the land relationally as we pull at light and color, and participate in the vibration of each happening. as situated knowledges these relational images document the energetics of an encounter, the push and pull between bodies, human, more-than-human, and machine. generated in the act of moving with and being moved by the beings and doings of these lands, these images register ephemeral happenings and offer records of the momentum of our active involution in this affectivelycharged ecology.27 (see figures 1-7) in the act of making kinesthetic images with digital cameras, the photographer does not capture the phenomenon so much as get caught up with it, hitching a ride on what is becoming and coming undone.28 the rotting logs, frilled mushrooms, crumbling leaves, ancient sands, and greening grasses of these lands are not discrete things, they are happenings taking shape through deep time and in the ephemera of now, and now, and now. it is by hitching a ride on the growth movements of 13 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) trees and plants, letting their slow movements lure our bodies, that our kinesthetic images blur the distinction between animator and animated.29 letting the wild arc lines of tree limbs set our bodies and cameras in motion, we experiment with ways to intra-animate with the trees.30 laying these still images out in sequence allows us to animate these dances (see figure 5). these images appear to conjure the otherwise imperceptibly slow movements of tree growth as a dance, with the trees as gestural and expressive dancers. in this sense, our kinesthetic images are what deleuze might call “time images” 31: they animate temporalities otherwise imperceptible or unimaginable, conjuring uncanny planty agencies in a blur of light, color, and movement. our imaging experiments with ways of tuning into what matters to these lands. to reach toward the unknown and unknowable of morethan-human worlds, our images open up speculative modes of attention suggestive of the speeds and slownesses of the light, color, and vibration that a plant or tree might perceive of the urban world racing around it (see figure 6).32 these renderings insist that the glass, metal, plastic, concrete, salt and petrochemicals of the roadways are also inextricable participants in the vibratory milieu of this ecological happening. kinesthetic images of growing grasses can also reveal the energetics of growth, combustion, and decomposition: blades of grass alight in flames in ways that also invoke the fires that these lands so long for (see figure 4). image making in this way allows us to participate in processes of decomposition by refusing to hold still for a focused image. by pulling at time and light we experiment with ways to conjure the unseen, ineffable, and numinous energies unfurling in processes of decomposition (see figure 3). they also help us document the infolding of urban life and park life, teaching us in new ways the impossibility of disentangling nature from culture. taking walks through the oak savannah at night, holding the camera’s aperture open for up to 25 seconds, we are able to render the ways that our moving and mediated sensorium plays with the city lights, generating tracers and tailings from the flickering lights that cut incessantly through the night (see figure 7). it is by playing with excess and fabulation, that 14 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) our ungrid-able data forms toy with desires for scientific legibility while generating ways to channel, transduce, and story the remarkable forms of involutionary momentum taking shape in this affectively-charged ecology. figure 5: dances with oak. photographs by the author. 15 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 6: glass, metal, plastic, concrete, and petrochemicals. photographs by the author. 16 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 7: night walks in the savannah. photographs by the author. notes 1 see the remarkable work of michelle murphy, matt price, nick shapiro and many others at the environmental data governance initiative launched to save environmental data from the trump administration’s 17 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) efforts to shut down the epa. https://envirodatagov.org 2 see de la cadena (2015) 3 see haraway (1997), barad (2007), and myers (2015a) 4 see for example murphy (2017). 5 see for example the write2know project (http://write2know.ca), a social and environmental justice research collaboration with max liboiron and the politics of evidence working group (http://politicsofevidence.wordpress.com), which contested the defunding of science and the muzzling of federal scientists under the harper government in canada, while simultaneously taking a stand for forms of public inquiry responsive to the needs of marginalized communities and for regimes of evidence that expand whose knowledge gets to count in policy making. 6 see for example, fortun (2012), shapiro (2015), liboiron (2016), and murphy (2013). 7 see for example the efforts of the politics of evidence working group (http://politicsofevidence.wordpress.com). 8 see povinelli (2002, 2011) on liberalism and the politics of recognition, and stengers (2010) on the curse of tolerance. 9 see myers (2015a). 10 haraway (1988) 11 this approach resonates with the works of puig de la bellacasa (2011) stengers (2010), and despret (2013). 18 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 12 see also myers (2015b). 13 hustak and myers (2012) 14 see for example campbell (in press), loveless (in press), and myers (in press b). 15 for more on ayelen liberona’s work see http://ayelenliberona.com 16 on naturecultures see tsing (2015) 17 see johnson (2015) and riley (2013). 18 see for example simpson (2014), geniusz (2009), and kimmerer (2015). 19 on the colonial history of ecology see for example kingsland (2008). see hustak and myers (2012) for more on the functionalist, mechanistic, militarized, and economizing tropes that shape ecological perception. 20 see myers (in press a) 21 thinking with eve tuck and k. wayne yang (2012), and exploring ways to work as a white settler ally to indigenous resurgence projects, i am not employing decolonization as a metaphor: decolonizing ecology requires repatriation of lands to indigenous people. see for example, simpson (2008), simpson and ladner (2010), simpson (2011, 2014), and coultard (2014). see also geniusz (2009) for an indigenous scholar’s approach to decolonizing botanical knowledge. see mastnak et al. (2014) for ways of decolonizing understandings of “native” and “invasive” species. 22 see hustak and myers (2012). 19 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 23 see myers (in press) and the becoming sensor website (http://becomingsensor.com ) for descriptions of this and other protocols including those for sniffing out chemical ecologies and sounding out the savannah. to tune in on our experiments with kinesthetic listening and imaging see https://becomingsensor.com/portfolio/kinesthetic-imaging/ 24 note that i am deliberately blurring the distinctions here between human and nonhuman modes of attention. there are crucial differences and incommensurabilities among human and nonhuman sensoria, to be sure. but perhaps there are also possible resonances that we have not yet fully grasped. 25 see hustak and myers (2012) and myers (2015b) for reviews of literature on the sciences of plant sensing. 26 see for example todd (2016a &b), l. simpson (2008, 2011, 2014), a. simpson (2007), and tallbear (2013). 27 on “involutionary momentum” and “affective ecologies” see hustak and myers (2012). 28 donna haraway’s (1987) figure of the cyborg reminds us to reckon with the non-innocence of our technologically-mediated sensorium. our cameras are indeed inheritances of militarism and more, and so the work of an ungrid-able ecologist is not without its trouble. “staying with the trouble” (haraway 2016) in the oak savannah requires reckoning with, rather than disavowing, the tricky nature of our always already cyborg sensoria. good cyborgs learn how to hack into and jam hegemonic systems. what would it take to interrupt and reimagine the conventional ecological sensorium? how can we think and work beyond grid-logics, especially when the surface of this very document/page, itself digitally mediated, is bound to a grid? some figures in this photoessay make selfconscious use of automated digital rendering algorithms that make it 20 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) seem like these images were printed, arrayed on a white surface and imaged as tentative, temporary groupings. i treat this as a simulation of a way of one might interact with these kinesthetic images as data forms and expose the limits of grid-thinking; that is by shuffling them together, arranging and rearranging them to make aesthetic and conceptual arguments, always tentatively, to see what stories take shape in between. 29 see stacey and suchman (2012) and myers (2012). 30 see myers (2015a) on “intra-animacy.” 31 see deleuze (1986). 32 for insight into a range of ways plants perceive the world see myers (2014 and 2015b). references barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham: duke university press. coultard, g. (2014). red skin, white masks: rejecting the colonial politics of recognition: university of minnesota press. de la cadena, m. (2015). uncommoning nature. retrieved may 4, 2016, from http://supercommunity.e-flux.com/authors/marisol-de-la-cadena/ deleuze, g. (1989). cinema 2: the time image. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. despret, v. (2013). from secret agents to interagency. history and theory, 52(4), 29–44. fortun, k. (2012). ethnography in late industrialism. cultural anthropology, 27(3), 446–464. geniusz, w. d. (2009). our knowledge is not primitive: decolonizing botanical anishinaabe teachings. syracuse university press. 21 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) haraway, d.j. (1987). a manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s. australian feminist studies, 2(4), 1–42. haraway, d. j. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspectives. feminist studies, 14(3), 575–599. haraway, d. j. (1997). modest_witness@second_millennium.femaleman_meets_oncomouse: feminism and technoscience. new york: routledge. haraway, d. j. (2016). staying with the trouble: making kin in the chthulucene. duke university press. hustak, c., & myers, n. (2012). involutionary momentum: affective ecologies and the sciences of plant/insect encounters. differences, 23(3), 74–118. johnson, j. (2015). pathways to the eighth fire: indigenous knowledge and storytelling in toronto (doctoral dissertation). communication and culture graduate program, york university, toronto. kimmerer, r. w. (2015). braiding sweetgrass: indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge and the teachings of plants. milkweed editions. kingsland, s. e. (2008). the evolution of american ecology, 1890-2000. baltimore: hopkins fulfillment service. liboiron, m. (2016). redefining pollution and action: the matter of plastics. journal of material culture, 21(1), 87–110. mastnak, t., elyachar, j., & boellstorff, t. (2014). botanical decolonization: rethinking native plants. environment and planning d, 32(2), 363–380. murphy, m. (2017). the economization of life. duke university press. murphy, m. (2013). distributed reproduction, chemical violence, and latency. retrieved september 18, 2016, from http://sfonline.barnard.edu/life-un-ltd-feminism-biosciencerace/distributed-reproduction-chemical-violence-and-latency/ 22 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) myers, n. (2015). rendering life molecular: models, modelers, and excitable matter. duke university press. myers, n. (2015). conversations on plant sensing: notes from the field. natureculture, 3 (acting with nonhuman entities), 35–66. myers, n. (in press, a). becoming sensor in sentient worlds: a morethan-natural history of a black oak savannah. in g. bakke & m. peterson (eds.), toward an artful anthropology: between matter and method. london: bloomsbury academic. myers, n. (in press, b). anthropologist as transducer in a field of affects. in n. loveless (ed.), art and/as research. edmonton: university of alberta. povinelli, e. a. (2002). the cunning of recognition: indigenous alterities and the making of australian multiculturalism. durham: duke university press. povinelli, e. a. (2011). economies of abandonment: social belonging and endurance in late liberalism. durham: duke university press. bellacasa, m. puig de la. (2011). matters of care in technoscience: assembling neglected things. social studies of science, 41(1), 85–106. riley, j. l. (2013). the once and future great lakes country: an ecological history. mcgill-queen’s press. shapiro, n. (2015). attuning to the chemosphere: domestic formaldehyde, bodily reasoning, and the chemical sublime. cultural anthropology, 30(3), 368–393. simpson, a. (2007). on ethnographic refusal: indigeneity,‘voice’ and colonial citizenship. junctures: the journal for thematic dialogue (9): 6780. simpson, l. (ed.). (2008). lighting the eighth fire: the liberation, resurgence, and protection of indigenous nations (1 edition). winnipeg: arbeiter ring publishing. simpson, l. (2011). dancing on our turtle’s back: stories of nishnaabeg 23 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) re-creation, resurgence, and a new emergence. arbeiter ring pub. simpson, l. b. (2014). land as pedagogy: nishnaabeg intelligence and rebellious transformation. decolonization: indigeneity, education & society, 3(3). retrieved from http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/22170 simpson, l., & ladner, k. (eds.). (2010). this is an honour song: twenty years since the blockades. winnipeg: arbeiter ring publishing. stacey, j., & suchman, l. (2012). animation and automation: the liveliness and labours of bodies and machines. body & society, 18(1), 1–46. stengers, i. (2010). cosmopolitics, vols. 1& 2. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. tallbear, k. (2013). native american dna: tribal belonging and the false promise of genetic science. university of minnesota press. todd, z. (2016). an indigenous feminist’s take on the ontological turn: ‘ontology’ is just another word for colonialism. journal of historical sociology, 29(1), 4–22. todd, z. (2016). from a fishy place: examining canadian state law applied in the daniels decision from the perspective of métis legal orders. topia: canadian journal of cultural studies, 36: 43-57. tsing, a. l. (2015). the mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins. princeton university press. tuck, e., & yang, k. w. (2012). decolonization is not a metaphor. decolonization: indigeneity, education & society, 1(1), 1–40. bio natasha myers is an associate professor in the department of anthropology at york university, the convenor of the politics of evidence working group, director of the plant studies collaboratory, and on the editorial board of the journal catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience. 24 myers catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) i work alongside michelle murphy as co-organizer of toronto’s technoscience salon, and am co-founder of the write2know project with max liboiron. chandler article     a drone manifesto    katherine f. chandler georgetown university kfc9@georgetown.edu division and asymmetry are hallmarks of drone aircraft. the purported legality of targeted assassinations carried out through unmanned systems depends on the assumption that the onscreen enemy poses an imminent threat, delineating “us” from “them.” as surveillance networks, used to see over the hill or from tens of thousands of meters above, drones separate watcher and watched, reworking the existential quandary between the self and the world for military purposes. drones are imagined as technologies and their teleology determined by factors that exceed what is human, even as the aircraft are accounted for as mere tools (see department of defense, 2013; obama, 2013). they are named “unmanned,” a variation on the gender binary between men and women, even as they disavow the human. conceived as such, drones play into oppositional logics that remain central to western thinking, lethally layered over the question of who is human and what is other. attempts to counter drone aircraft similarly mirror dualisms that frame their use. critics count targets as civilians, whose lives “we” must protect. for some opposed to drones, the images onscreen are akin to video games that become the operator’s framework for engaging with the world, while the machinelike system is the ghostly counterpart of once-courageous soldiers (see benjamin, 2013; chamayou, 2014; singer, 2010). paradigmatic of the failures of drone aircraft are targeted strikes attacking wedding parties, which also reinscribe a separation between the personal and domestic, opposed to the geopolitics of war. efforts to counteract drones continue distinctions between human and machine, combatant and civilian, men and women, and domestic and international. drones, however, insistently fail to fit into the frameworks that overlay them, as discussed by theorists of technoscience and feminism (see asaro, 2013; blanchard, 2011; suchman & weber, in press). networked operations between human and technology underlay the operation of unmanned aircraft. decisions in these networks rely on multiple actors that extend beyond the individual. the transnational cooperation implied by drone missions challenges territorial boundaries and reworks sovereignty, just as the strikes transform the limits of war and who is a target. looking closely at drones reveals their connection to a myriad of changing parts: sensor operators, image analysts, legal counsel, ground forces (see gregory, 2014). more than an aircraft, it might be better thought of as an information system, reliant on satellite, video, radio, and data exchange. drones are not unique in the ways they network together parts that defy coherent selves, strict boundaries, or territorial limits, though their poignancy may stem from the ways they make apparent the political and ethical challenges produced by these crossings and limitations of current frameworks for addressing such confusions. given that drones are irreducible to human and machine, “us” and “them,” “here” and “there,” why do these divisions persist in discussions of and responses to unmanned aircraft? why dissociate the connected parts? i turn to donna haraway’s 1985 [1991] essay “a cyborg manifesto” to explore how its call to reform binary worldviews might be applied to unmanning. indeed, today’s drones might be cyborgs, a point that underscores the text’s cautionary reminder that the synthesis between human and machine it celebrates is first and foremost a product of the cold war military-industrial complex. yet cyborgs and drones remain bastards, never acknowledged for their mixtures. haraway asserts: in the traditions of “western” science and politics—the traditions of racist, male-dominated capitalism; the tradition of progress . . . the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other—the relation between organism and machine has been a border war. (p. 150) the cyborg myth she proposes instead calls for “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities” (p. 154), articulating a politics that works against the ideals of identity, gender binaries, claims to human singularity, and political divisions between public and private. that drones and the warfare waged with them might characterize the “dangerous possibilities” called for by “a cyborg manifesto” causes me to read the two in tandem, even if this may be a perversion of the political potentials found in the manifesto. transgressed boundaries, however, cannot be disentangled from the military-indsutrial complex and the state, although it is salient that both never recognize drones or cyborgs for their violations. even public responses to drones often rely on these same dualisms, if only in reverse, underscoring their dehumanizing effects. rather than reproducing boundaries between human and other to counter drone aircraft, i instead articulate more thoroughly the connections and confusions unmanned systems create. they make manifest how humans and technologies are coproduced in ways that transform, extend, and refashion limits. by reading drones as cyborgs and situating the history of the systems within the discourse of cybernetics, i explore how drones are not dualistic but instead dissociate the connected parts they link. i argue an effective challenge to the problems raised by unmanned aircraft must explore the contradictory logics that make targeted killing possible, as well as the disconnections they produce. this analysis has two parts. the first examines the jet-powered drone aircraft known as the firebee, developed in the cold war and used as training targets for aerial combat. i show how, by borrowing from the cybernetic discourse of the period, drone aircraft are presented as automata even though humans remain necessary for their functioning. this disjuncture persists as unmanned aircraft develop in the following decades and contemporary drones proliferate. turning to two contemporary responses to unmanned aircraft—george brant’s play grounded (2013) and an action by the feminist antiwar organization codepink, “drone strike on white house wedding” (2014b)—the second part of the paper explores how the separation between human and other also frames reactions against drones, as well as the gendered corollaries layered into this binary. finally, i consider how the human-machine synthesis haraway proposes might offer another approach to the critique of targeted killing. drone disassociations: cybernetic monads and so-called unmanned aircraft experimental efforts to build drones have paralleled the development of flight in the twentieth century (armitage, 1988; chandler, in press; mitchell, 2010; newcome, 2004). notwithstanding the term’s ubiquity today, the name “drone” within the military referred to target planes that trained antiaircraft gunners, an ongoing use dating to the 1930s. whereas early military designations classified guided missiles, target drones, and pilotless aircraft in the same category, designations provided by us congress during efforts to oversee unmanned aircraft between 1987 and 1988 established differences between unmanned platforms and missiles (see mosier, 1988; parsach, 2016). today’s unmanned aircraft differ significantly from earlier systems, incorporating digital computing, composite materials, and satellite communications into the platforms, yet drones from the cold war provide a figure for human and machine relations that presages those of today. most cybernetic research from the science’s mid-century height focused on the analogy between humans, animals, and machines, not the fusion between them (see bowker, 1993; galison, 1994; kline, 2009). early efforts to promote drone aircraft in the cold war borrowed from these analogies, using figures of machine and animal to attempt to emphasize the autonomy of the unmanned plane, minimizing the role of the engineers, technicians, and operators necessary for their functioning. conceived as machine replacements for piloted planes, drones are presented as if they operate in response to their environment as automata. below, i examine this history to consider how drones dissociate human and machine—both integral to their operation—and the ways that “black box” controls hide these relations.  a key example of cold war drones is firebee targets, which are used to this day by all branches of the us military for training surface-to-air, sea-to-air, and air-to-air defenses. the unmanned targets were initially designed in 1948 and built by ryan aeronautical in san diego, california. “the bee with an electronic brain,” an article published by the manufacturer on 15 march 1953, introduces the drone to the american public in the company’s magazine. as the article describes it, “the spectacular ryan ‘firebee,’ from which the curtain of secrecy was recently lifted by the department of defense, is america’s newest turbo-jet, pilotless target drone, capable of near sonic speeds at high altitudes” (1953, p. 12). the jet-powered drone was produced as military aircraft engineered during world war ii became obsolete. as a training target, the unmanned aircraft was used to simulate air attack by high-speed jets built to fly faster than the speed of sound. unlike drones from the world war ii era that were either based on model airplanes or modified piloted aircraft, ryan target drones were designed and engineered to be operated without a pilot. “the bee with an electronic brain” builds on the likeness between unmanned aircraft and the bee established by military researchers working on drones during world war ii, but adds an “electronic brain,” further analogizing machine and organism through the drone’s programmed responses.  although the firebee was engineered as if it would fly on its own, the article explains that “by use of the ground remote control station, the ‘nolo’ (no live operator) aircraft can be flown out-of-sight at high altitudes, while other men on the ground track it by electronic devices” (p. 12). significantly, when the author introduces humans, they are described as being on “the ground,” their relation to the drone is mediated through information. control of the firebee is explained in the following passage: “responding to ghostlike controls that may be miles away, ryan firebee flashes across the sky, ready to simulate fighter plane tactics in sharpening anti-aircraft defenses” (pp. 12–13). a passive controller—presumably a human being—is figured as a phantasm, motivating the action of the firebee flashing across the sky. the description registers the operator as at once distant and disembodied. the firebee apparently acts on its own even though the specter of human involvement remains. as the article later explains, a black box, not the human operator, organizes the electronic transmissions sent to the drone, “governing” the mechanical functions of the firebee. the use of the terms “black box” and “electronic brain,” as well as the naturalized description of a technological system, all draw from cybernetics. “behavior, purpose and teleology” (rosenblueth et al., 1943) served as a foundational text for the theory, and one of this paper’s authors, norbert wiener, later proposed the term, drawing on the greek word for “steersman” to name the new science. wiener positioned cybernetics as a multidisciplinary approach to the study of control and communication. aligning organisms and technologies, cybernetics studies how systems of inputs and outputs act in response to their environment. historian of science peter galison argues that cybernetics articulates humans, animals and machines as “a universe of black box monads” (1994, p. 265). i examine how the monadic unit ties to the firebee’s flight, showing how it is described as if it were governed by inputs and outputs, and indicating how these relations elide human and machine. this analysis adds to previous accounts of the “black box” in cybernetics, showing how the firebee's control system produces a confusion between who or what responds to external conditions. drone action was explained as a machine’s response to its environment, even through the ghostly human operator was integral to its operation. another press image and caption (figure 1), also produced by ryan aeronautical in 1953, linked the black-box control of the firebee to the system’s onboard electronic brain. like a released parasite, the ryan q-2 pilotless drone target plane is launched from its b-26 “mother” plane and streaks out over the desert under its own power during u.s. air force development tests at holloman air development center, alamogordo, n.m. speed and maneuverability of the “firebee” are controlled from the ground by means of a black box remote control which transmits command signals to its electronic “brain.” (ryan aeronuatical, 1953) the caption presents the drone as at once a bee, a parasite, and a baby before explaining how the “electronic brain” and “black box” operate. the firebee was either catapulted from the ground or released from pylons on a converted cargo plane (as shown in figure 1) and landed by parachute. it might have been characterized as a parasite or a baby because the drone cannot perform two of the functions most basic to piloted aircraft—takeoff and landing. after presenting the system as a parasitical technology, though, the next part of the caption ties the firebee to the desert below and seems to presume its separation from its “mother.” written in the passive voice, the “black box,” not a human operator, transmits command signals to the drone’s “electronic brain,” suggesting the system’s apparent autonomy. here, the reader is invited to think of the drone as behaving in response to inputs and outputs, transmitted from the ethereal landscape. the dependency implied in the first sentence of the caption is cycled into the cybernetic operation that occurs in the second sentence. responding to the inputs the firebee parasitically uses, the aircraft streaks across the desert, as if it were controlled by an electronic brain. figure 1. a/bqm-34 technical files, smithsonian national air and space museum, nasm-9a13518 nasm-9a13518-a. in “behavior, purpose and teleology” (rosenblueth et al., 1943), the authors observe that “a torpedo with a heat-seeking mechanism” might be “intrinsically purposeful” (p. 19) as its response is guided by reaction to heat. cybernetics describes action relationally, between object and environment. the focus is on the singular relation between the organism or machine and its environment, rather than their fusion. in the description of firebee, the black box transferred information between operators and the drone. the drone’s movement displaced this interaction, which made the system seem self-propelled, separate from the controller on the ground guiding its flight. “black-boxing” has been widely discussed in science and technology studies. donald mackenzie (1993) provided one commonly used framework for the concept. he defined “black box” through a quote by charles draper, founder and director of the massachusetts institute of technology’s instrumentation laboratory. draper explained that the black box was an ideal arrangement of a self-contained unit that would not be affected by external conditions. for mackenzie, the more specific meaning proposed by draper ties to a broader definition of the black box: “it is a technical artifact—or, more loosely, any process or program—that is regarded as just performing its function without any need for, or perhaps any possibility of, awareness of its internal workings on the part of users” (1993, p. 26). mackenzie comes to this definition by showing how the guidance system developed in draper’s laboratory troubled the idea of an apparently self-contained system, arguing that the guidance technologies were inextricable from their social, scientific, military, and political context. extrapolating from this analysis, mackenzie writes that “the more deeply one looks inside the black box, the more one realizes that ‘the technical’ is no clear-cut and simple world of facts isolated from politics” (p. 381). i want to add to an analysis of the obfuscation that occurs through “black-boxing” by considering the cybernetic system of inputs and outputs that ostensibly controlled the firebee. “behavior, purpose and teleology” explains organism and mechanism as monadic units responding to their environments through inputs and outputs. in this case, the black box does not stand for just self-containment; it is also a system for organizing information. a dictionary definition of the black box explains that it is a “device which performs intricate functions but whose internal mechanism may not readily be inspected or understood; [hence] any component of a system specified only in terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs” (oed online, 2016). what is important about these black boxes is that they do not only propose the self-containment that draper emphasizes, but a singular relation to external conditions. the black box controls on the firebee isolate the technical from the political by displacing human control onto the action of the organism-like machine and vice versa. the firebee acts as if it responded to its environment, even though examination of the inputs and outputs shows that this feedback loop conflates human and machine to produce these reactions. returning to “the bee with an electronic brain,” the article explains that the “push button heart of the firebee project is a small ‘black box’ containing a control stick and switches to govern engine speed and other flight conditions, and to transmit control signals to the drone” (1953, p. 13). here, the black box organizes the inputs and outputs between human and machine to set up the behavior of an apparently singular unit. described as “the heart” of the firebee, the control unit linked the output of the drone, “any change produced in the surroundings by the object,” to the input, “any event external to the object that modifies this behavior in any way” (rosenblueth, et.al., 1943, p. 17), relayed by radio transmission from the operator. the black box created a cybernetic system, even as the control unit, which linked human and machine, undid its “monadic” structure. the pre-programmed “electronic brain” added another layer to the firebee’s operation, automatically stabilizing the response of the aircraft to the input of the controller, as determined by calculations made beforehand. programs and signals that layered together human and technical control made the aircraft's flight possible, even as the firebee apparently “streaked out” across the sky on its own. the controls of the firebee organized human and nonhuman behaviors to create a cybernetic system, even as the “black box” functioned to separate human control from technological action. the elision of human engineering, design, and control with a behavioristic model of technology provided the conditions for the concept of “unmanned” to emerge. the name shows how remotely operated aircraft were distinguished from piloted flight by acting as if no "man" were necessary, though both rely on interactions between humans and machines. the drone is a cyborg, yet the connection between operator and aircraft is obscured, understood instead as inputs and outputs filtered through a black box. haraway (1991) asks the reader to imagine and realize human-machine fusions in ways that escape categorical understandings of these terms. in her essay, the cyborg is slippery and ironic, a bionic man and a woman of color. responses to "a cyborg manifesto" as such have articulated the critical limitations of these fusions, notably in galison’s (1994) analysis of cybernetics and its wartime origins. yet these reactions reproduce divisions between human and machine, rather than working through the stakes of their confusion. in the development of early drone aircraft, interconnections between human and machine are obscured through the monadic rationale of cybernetics. while organism and machine were analogized, connections between humans and machines were literally black-boxed and the role of the operator became ghostlike and spectral. drone syntheses: beyond the “domestic” critique in this section, i take up how dissociation between human and machine has continued in contemporary unmanned systems, extending my analysis to gender and how these categorizations map onto characterizations of drones in domestic and international politics. the contribution of haraway’s cyborg myth is not to mitigate the lethal potential of drone aircraft, but to insist these challenges can only be addressed by considering the networked connections they both produce and are formed by. “a cyborg manifesto,” by turning away from origins and wholes, calls for a politics that does not resolve but rather is parsed out through the complexity of socio-technical relations. above, i indicate how “black-box” controls hide the operation of unmanned systems, which enable drones to act as though they were autonomous. the cyborg approach i advocate, on the other hand, considers how humans and machines act in concert and underscores contradictions that come about when they are separated. contemporary headlines, like the early press releases for target drones, portray the aircraft as if unmanned systems act on their own. consider a recent article, “hacker killed by drone was islamic state’s ‘secret weapon’” (coker et al., 2015). the headline describes how a "drone" targeted and killed suspected islamic state operative junaid hussain, naming him not as a person but as a weapon. here the entire drone strike is figured as a black box, described as machine-like response. of course there are human operators involved in the drone’s mission, but their role and that of intelligence personnel, likely from the united states and britain, remain obscure, as do connections to image analysts, legal counsel, and commanders, and the regulations that underwrite such a strike. according to the article, “the drone” apparently responds to the target, rather than to a network of people and information, which includes participants from the united states, britain, and likely beyond. such accounts continue the cybernetic framework of a singular feedback loop set up between “drone” and “target,” erasing the involvement of human operators and their role in killing junaid hussain. a similar logic is at play in efforts to counter the use of drone aircraft, which also divide between human and machine, here and there, “us” and others. below, i examine two responses to the military use of unmanned aircraft: brant’s play grounded (2013) and codepink’s “drone strike on white house wedding” (2014b). these pieces both raise important questions about the use of drones, reflecting on post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) experienced by operators and the death of civilians in missile strikes carried out by unmanned systems (see also brandt, 2013). the counternarratives they propose have received widespread attention and challenge the purported success the us government claims for the drone program. the attempts to counter drone aircraft nonetheless reproduce dissociations explored in the previous section. by emphasizing how “drones” negatively affect “humans,” the accounts underscore divisions between human and machine rather than addressing the networked connections that are the basis of unmanning. further, these challenges to drones and the global asymmetries they make manifest rely on images of women, children, and the nuclear family that conform with ideals of western, white subjects and “others” they envision. they mirror in these way rather than undermine logics that make drone war possible brant’s play, grounded, first performed in 2013, is a one-woman show about a fighter pilot turned drone operator. the work challenges gendered assumptions about both professions, portraying a female character who by turns is tough, driven, and loyal. after becoming pregnant, she leaves her career as a fighter pilot and joins the “chair force,” flying a reaper mq-9 unmanned aircraft from creech air force base in nevada. over the course of the play, the protagonist becomes increasingly troubled by her new position. she is caught in the monotony of grey-toned surveillance, watching for the enemy for months on end and tapped out by other pilots who participate in the continuous shift work that characterizes drone missions. she develops ptsd, which affects her relationship with her husband and daughter before she is jailed, at the end of the play, for refusing to carry out a strike against an enemy target when she sees a child in the field of attack. the conditions enacted in the play are symptomatic of the experiences of contemporary drone pilots and the dissociative relation between the battlefield and home that they must negotiate. as p. w. singer (2010) notes: [drone] operations have created the novel situation of pilots experiencing the psychological disconnect of being “at war” while still dealing with the pressures of home. in the words of one predator pilot . . . “you are going to war for 12 hours, shooting weapons at targets, directing kills on enemy combatants, and then you get in your car, drive home, and within 20 minutes you are sitting at the dinner table talking to your kids about their homework.” (p. 32) significantly, though, these concerns take a separation between international conflict and domestic life as given. it is their proximity that raises challenges, suggesting the presumption that war, at least for american military personnel, is not “here.” obviously, this disassociation stands in stark contrast with the experiences of people under wartime occupation, who are exposed to war on a daily basis regardless of their status as military personnel or civilians. why is it presumed that war can be waged in such a way that it will not transform the fabric of one’s life? i raise this question not to minimize the significance of challenges for military personnel who move between war and home on a daily basis, like drone pilots. rather, i suggest that to understand this situation as a problem brought about by drone technology is to miss the particular ideas of wartime distance that it assumes. this can only be seen as a consequence of drone technology if one takes as given divisions between international and domestic spheres and the work and politics with which each is associated. in grounded, blue and grey code the experiences of flying a fighter plane and a drone aircraft, which illustrate how the play reproduces asymmetries between wartime actions “abroad” and what happens “here.” speaking to tiger, the fighter plane, at the beginning of the play, the protagonist says: you are alone in the vastness and you are the blue / astronauts / they have eternity / but i have color / i have blue / i’m in the blue for a reason / i have missiles to launch / i have sidewinders / i have mavericks / i rain them down on the minarets and concrete below me. (2013) as a fighter pilot stationed overseas—“in the blue”—she feels no remorse for her wartime actions. compare her affect to the account of the reaper she flies. no longer speaking to the plane, she has become the system: “back to the grey / it’s funny / the screen isn’t that big / but it becomes your world / like the tv i guess / or the computer / but the grey is / it definitely” (2013). this contrast between blue and grey marks the final moments of the play. caught in the grey images, she confuses the child she sees onscreen for her daughter. watching as another pilot carries out the strike that she has refused to undertake, she says: the team cheers as my daughter dies / as her arms and legs fly off in separate directions / as her pulp is mixed with the car and the prophet and / the sand / as her pulp dissolves into the grey/ there is only grey now / only the grey. (2013) what strikes me about this contrast between blue and grey, here and there, fighter plane and drone is how easy it is for the protagonist to fire missiles against “minarets and concrete.” only seeing the child killed onscreen as her own child precipitates her crisis. why does “blue” not seem equally chilling and problematic? performed as an extended monologue, the play centers on the sole female performer and her trauma, which registers in her domestic life. the only people named in grounded are the pilot’s husband and daughter. the politics that brought about her involvement in the unnamed war, as well as her association with the military hierarchy, are spectral, as is “the prophet,” the target she watches onscreen. the play relies on a solitary woman to stand in for a network of transnational relations imbricated by drone warfare, a negative corollary to media accounts that black-box what happens in military strikes by ascribing the action to the “drone.” grounded reduces the protagonist’s reaction to the political and ethical challenges she experiences in a war to an individual response marked as grey, in which she sees the death of another child as that of her own. the world enacted by the play remains persistently “here” and offers no exploration of the global political relations that are central to the system she operates. this oversight extends to activist actions that have challenged drone warfare. on sunday, 4 may 2014, codepink carried out a performance in front of the white house that became a short youtube video, “drone strike on white house wedding” (2014b). the website explains that the concept came from a hellfire missile strike launched from drone aircraft against a procession of vehicles for celebrating a wedding in yemen on 13 december 2013 that killed twelve civilians (2014a). in the reenactment, a group of participants gather for a staged wedding. a large, two-sided sign features the slogan “here comes the bride” on one side and “here comes the drone” on the other (2014b). for the performance, the blonde bride wears a simple white dress and a crown of pink flowers; her groom is dressed in a suit with a pink bow tie. they exchange vows and rings, kissing each other before reacting to a simulated attack from the sky. the participants in the action fall to the ground, prominent among them the bride and groom, who are covered in white sheets with fake bloodstains. according to a codepink press release, the performance aimed “to educate the public about how terrifying it would be to have the same thing happen in the us, and motivate people to take action against the drones” (2014a).  the concern about the strike is significant and their action builds on a report by human rights watch documenting the deaths (2014).  the purported legality of these targeted killings should be questioned and i support ongoing efforts to hold the united states' government responsible for civilian deaths caused by attacks from unmanned aircraft. however, it’s striking that in raising awareness about drone warfare, the performance replaced the bodies of the targeted yemenis with white americans and modeled the strikes as terror in the midst of marital bliss. why should this typify the challenges of drone warfare for people in the united states? and how is it possible that this scene is conceived as the “same thing” as what happened in yemen? the codepink action, like the final sequence of grounded, uses a domestic scene premised on relations “here” to question drone strikes. what this risks doing is erasing the significant asymmetries and substantially different challenges that confront people being attacked through drone aircraft, in this case in yemen. to understand what happened on 13 december 2013 might call for closer analysis of the wedding attacked, presumably in a way that would emphasize yemeni traditions, not those of the united states. such an examination would also address how the drone strikes may have played into what has now become a civil war in the country, drawing on historical separations between the northern and southern regions, as well as the competing regional influences of iran, saudi arabia, and the islamic state. conceiving the drone as cyborg would show how the networked system challenges the territorial limits of countries. unofficially, the american military has indicated that the strikes were carried out through intelligence provided by the yemeni government (reuters, 2015). given the myriad interests in the region, this cooperation may have extended beyond these two nations. these complications do not absolve the united states of responsibility for the death of civilians. however, they do highlight how critical responses to drone aircraft should address the ways that human and machine networks linked through unmanned aircraft undo straightforward divisions. a us attack on yemeni territory, in this case, seems indicative of the two countries’ cooperation (at least at that time), not their enmity. correspondingly, critical responses to the targeted killings must also work between these categories. a cyborg response to the deaths of yemeni civilians targeted during a wedding might ask how this tragedy fits into what has become a widespread humanitarian emergency, affecting up to 80 percent of yemen’s population (see bbc, 2015). seeing the attack as a strike against a us wedding does not help to understand this context, which more than “the drone” is cause for concern. “i am not not a drone” the closing sentence of “a cyborg manifesto” proclaims, “i would rather be a cyborg than a goddess” (haraway, 1991, p. 181)—a refrain that charted a new course for feminisms, machines and others, emphasizing their entanglement. reading this work in the face of human and machine fusions enacted by drone aircraft, however, i want to take seriously that this assertion for the cyborg carries with it the challenges and contradictions of the military-industrial complex, which the manifesto also outlines. haraway offers short, dense commentary on the socio-technologies she thinks will come to characterize the cyborg state: decentralization with increased surveillance and control; citizenship by telematics; imperialism and political power broadly in the form of information rich / information poor differentiation; increased high-tech militarization increasingly opposed by many social groups . . . close integration of privatization and militarization, the high-tech forms of bourgeois capitalist personal and public life; invisibility of different social groups to each other, linked to psychological mechanisms of belief in abstract enemies. (1991, p. 171) i take this depiction as providing alternative avenues to critique how increasingly intricate human and machine systems are used to wage war, drones being a case in point. “a cyborg manifesto” insists that it is not possible to divide “us” from unmanned aircraft, instead calling for a more thorough engagement with drone networks. this means tracing out how drones deploy distinctions between “information rich” and “information poor” to justify the asymmetrical structure between who targets and who is targeted, just as it also suggests a reconsideration of critiques that emphasize “domestic” impacts of drones or innocent civilian bodies, turning instead to the permeability of boundaries between the “personal body and the body politic” (p. 170). the drone as cyborg undoes the newness attributed to a system that was the subject of press releases during the height of cybernetics and in the early period of the cold war. the cyborg reminds us that the problem is not drone aircraft per se, but the ways drone systems tie into ongoing practices of patriarchal capitalism, the legacy of colonialism, and techno-determinism. insisting on the syntheses that are the basis of drones shows how popular accounts dissociate between human and machine, war and home, friend and enemy, men and women, even as the networked operations of so-called unmanned aircraft undo these categories. examining how drones cause deaths, challenge boundaries, and rework practices of governance asks for a more intricate interrogation of the “potent fusions” they incorporate. the negation proposed by “unmanning,” which separates “us” from the drone might instead be replaced by the space of the double negative—“i am not not a drone”—and the responsibility for the human and machine synthesis that would be taken up through such a statement. acknowledgements i am grateful for feedback and commentary on this article from the worldly matters faculty seminar, supported through a global engagement grant from georgetown university, as well as comments from other participants in this issue, especially marisa brandt, and the anonymous reviewers. any errors remain my own. references asaro, p.m. (2013). the labor of surveillance and bureaucratized killing: new subjectivities of military drone operators. social semiotics, 23(2), 196-224. armitage, m. (1998). unmanned aircraft. london, uk: brassey’s defence publishers. bbc. (2015, 15 december). yemen crisis: how bad is the humanitarian situation?. bbc news. retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34011187/ benjamin, m. (2013). drone warfare: killing by remote control. london, uk: verso. blanchard, e. (2011). the technoscience question in feminist international relations: unmanning the us war on terror. in j.a. tickner & l. sjoberg (eds.), feminism and international relations: conversations about the past, present, and future (146-163). new york, ny: routledge. bowker, g. (1993). how to be universal: some cybernetic strategies, 1943-70. social studies of science, 23(1), 107-127. brandt, m. (2013). cyborg agency and individual trauma: what ender’s game teaches us about killing in the age of drone warfare. a journal of media and culture, 16(6). retrieved from http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/718 brant, g. (2013). grounded. croydon, uk: oberon books, kindle edition. chamayou, g. (2014). a theory of the drone. (j. lloyd, trans.). new york, ny: the new press. chandler, k. (in press). american kamikaze: television guided assault drones in world war ii. in c. kaplan & l. parks (eds.), life in the age of drones. durham, nc: duke university press. codepink. (2014a). activists stage dramatic simulation of drone strike on yemen wedding in front of white house. codepink: women for peace. retrieved from http://www.codepinkarchive.org/article.php?id=6717 codepink. (2014b). codepink: drone strike on white house wedding. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hizvcnl2xqe coker, m. et al. (2015, 27 august). hacker killed by drone was islamic state’s ‘secret weapon.’ wall street journal. retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/hacker-killed-by-drone-was-secret-weapon-1440718560 department of defense. (2013). unmanned systems integrated roadmap fy 2013–2038. retrieved from http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/dod-usrm-2013.pdf ehrhard, t. (2010). air force uavs: the secret history. mitchell institute study. retrieved from http://robotpig.net/robotics-news/air-force-uavs-the-secret-history-_1895 galison, p. (1994). the ontology of the enemy: norbert weiner and the cybernetic vision. critical inquiry, 21(1), 228-266. gregory, d. (2014). drone geographies. radical philosophy, (183), 7-19 haraway, d. (1991). a cyborg manifesto: science, technology and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. in d. haraway (ed.), simians, cyborgs and natures: the re-invention of nature (pp. 149-181). new york, ny: routledge. human rights watch (2014, 19 february). us: yemen drone strike may violate obama policy. human rights watch. retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/us-yemen-drone-strike-may-violate-obama-policy kline, r. (2009). where are the cyborgs in cybernetics? social studies of science, 39(3), 331-362. mackenzie, d. (1993). inventing accuracy: a historical sociology of nuclear missile guidance. cambridge, ma: the mit press. mosier, r. (1988). dod joint unmanned aerial vehicle program master plan–1988. washington, dc: tactical intelligence systems directorate. retrieved from http://www.uadrones.net/military/research/acrobat/880627.pdf nasm-9a13518 nasm-9a13518-a newcome, l. (2004). unmanned aviation: a brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles. reston, va: american institute of aeronautics and astronautics, inc. obama, b. (2013, 23 may). the future of our fight against terrorism. national defense university, washington, dc. retrieved from https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-presidents-speech-afternoon parsch, a. (2016). current designations of us unmanned military aerospace vehicles. directory of us military rockets and missiles. retrieved from http://www.designationsystems.net/usmilav/missiles.html#_system reuters. (2015, 29 january). exclusive: us armed drone program in yemen facing intelligence gaps. reuters, us edition. retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-exclusive-iduskbn0l22ul20150129 rosenblueth, a. et al. (1943). behavior, purpose and teleology. philosophy of science, 10(1), 18-24. ryan aeronautical. (1953, 26 february). photograph and caption, a/bqm-34 technical files, national air and space museum archives, washington, dc. ryan reporter. (1953, 12 march). the bee with an electronic brain. a/bqm-34technical files, national air and space museum archives, washington, dc. singer, p.w. (2010). wired for war: the robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. new york, ny: penguin press. suchman, l. & & weber, j. (2016). human-machine autonomies. in n. bhuta, s. beck, r. geis, h.-y. liu, & c. kreis (eds.), autonomous weapons systems (pp. 75-102). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. bio katherine f. chandler is assistant professor of culture and politics in the edmund a. walsh school of foreign service at georgetown university. her research is at the intersection of social and political theory, science and technology studies and new media. she is recipient of the townsend center for the humanities fellowship and the peter lyman fellowship for new media. her current book project is titled “the techno-politics of unmanning: how humans, machines and media assemble drone flight and failure.” microsoft word 71532-1-11-alpert-abrams.docx alpert-abrams, h. (2018). colonial copying in an imperial age. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-6. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © hannah alpert-abrams. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary colonial copying in an imperial age hannah alpert-abrams university of texas at austin halperta@gmail.com in the context of colonial studies, digitization is sometimes hailed as an opportunity for liberation. by digitizing the artifacts of colonial history, we can diversify the cultural record, drawing attention to the ways that contact and conflict are embedded in the everyday practice of textual and material production. given that many colonial artifacts have multiple cultural affiliations, digitization can also break down the barriers of access that have kept many cultural producers – including those from indigenous, enslaved, and immigrant communities, among others – from engaging with their cultural and intellectual history. because digitization is largely replicative and descriptive rather than analytic, we might imagine that digitization workers play a relatively neutral role in the freeing of colonial information. but digitization also always enmeshes cultural objects in a new framework of imperial knowledge production. as we digitize, we call on a sequence of mechanisms for replication, description, dissemination, and display that were designed by and for imperial systems and global capitalist 2 alpert-abrams catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) corporations. because the workings of these systems are often opaque, our complicity in these larger systems is difficult to discern. the colonial zapotec twitterbot @diidxayooxho, for example, tweets dictionary definitions from the sixteenth-century vocabulario en lengua çapoteca.1 in situating these definitions within a social media context, it is making fun of the presentism of social media even as it joins other (human) #usatuvoz tweeters in adding indigenous languages to our daily streams. at the same time, the logic that enables @diidxayooxho to serve as a critique of colonialism is dependent on structures created by and for a neo-imperial corporate entity. what does that mean for the creators of @diidxayooxho? for its followers? figure 1. a facsimile of the 1578 imprint of the vocabulario, with associated tweet (córdova, 1578, p.332 verso; diidza’ yooxho’, 2017). colonial digitization projects invite us to think about our relationship with the ways that discourse has been negotiated in the past and in the present. in the sixteenth century, when juan de córdova developed an orthography and a grammar for inscribing zapotec, a language of southern mexico, he treated it as a derivative of latin. some linguists have interpreted his use of accents as indicating an imperfect 3 alpert-abrams catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) sensitivity to the presence of glottal stops and other non-european features. smith-stark (2003, p. 188) argued, however, that the diacritics have no linguistic meaning. he attributed variations in their use to differences in taste between the two compositors who were responsible for setting the type. digitization has further distorted these transcriptive features. in the twitter version, the diacritics have been eliminated entirely to facilitate digital search, and shortened to fit twitter’s rigid character limits (“acerca del proyecto,” 2015).2 cultural conflict (anglophone, spanish, and zapotec) and technological contingencies (typesetting, search, and twitter) shape these transcriptions, both in the colonial dictionary and in its digital instantiation. while these contingencies may appear neutral, they are founded on basic assumptions about language that come from latin (in the sixteenth century) and english (in the twenty-first). we see the same mechanisms at work in the case of optical character recognition (ocr), the process by which digital facsimiles are converted into machine-readable text. ocr is one of the many unseen processes that shape a digital edition. it works by combining an analysis of the pixels on the page with a statistical model of language use in order to identify sequences of characters. in the computing world, ocr has been described as a solved problem because the theory that informs it has been proven sound in the case of modern printed documents. ocr is less effective, however, when faced with documents that deviate visually or linguistically from the expectations built into the system. visual deviation can refer to uncommon typesetting or layout; linguistic deviation refers to character sequences that differ from the statistical norm. consider, for example, the following line of text, taken from a document in the primeros libros collection of books printed prior to 1601 in the americas. the text begins in spanish and then switches to nahuatl, an indigenous language of central mexico. 4 alpert-abrams catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) figure 2. a text in spanish and nahuatl. now consider three automatic transcriptions of the same line: 1. reſp pool a may or parte. ca yeſtnat win ſit 2. reſponſortia mayor paris chairman analyſts 3. reſpi por la mayor parte. ca yehuatzin in each of these lines was automatically transcribed using ocr. the first two were created using language models based on english, the system’s default language. in the first example, the writings of lewis carroll, author of alice's adventures in wonderland and through the looking-glass, were set as the statistical norm. here we can see a transcription that is visually spanish and nahuatl, but linguistically english: a jabberwockylike gibberish. in the second example, which uses the wall street journal as a statistical norm, the language and places of capitalism are insinuated into the colonial document. the third example, which uses a model i developed in collaboration with computer scientists, is based on historical examples of spanish and nahuatl. the misplaced “i” in the first word is caused by the historical use of “resp.” in place of the longer spanish “responden” or even the latin “respondit”. even with our improved model, historical shorthand remains an unreadable deviation from the norm. it has been argued that spanish transliterations of indigenous languages like juan de córdova’s zapotec dictionary changed the very shape of indigenous historical memory.3 the same can be said of automatic transcription, which seeks a compromise between cultural variation and the efficiency of inscription systems. when deviant writing is transcribed with less accuracy than more common linguistic forms, it “dirties” a corpus. this negatively impacts the quality of scholarship on multilingual texts, and places an unequal burden of labor on projects seeking to transcribe deviant texts, like those in indigenous languages. it reinforces the modern, anglophone status quo for digital projects. 5 alpert-abrams catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) one way to address the colonial implications of automatic transcription is to develop more flexible ocr software. projects such as reading the first books, which i managed, are working toward that goal.4 by collaborating with developers, we hoped to help alleviate some of the ways colonial ideas about language are introduced into digital corpora and to develop tools more sensitive to historical memory. like the twitter bot, however, we did so by following procedures and utilizing mechanisms designed to standardize human information for mechanical consumption. disentangling our work from these procedures and mechanisms, and the beliefs that ground them, is a problem that remains unsolved. acknowledgments thanks to everyone who had an editorial hand in this project, including the entire decolonial roundtable, especially mara mills and paula chakravartty; the anonymous reviewers; and the editors at catalyst. the work based on the reading the first books project wouldn’t have been possible without: matt cohen, kelly mcdonough, kent norsworthy, maria victoria fernández, taylor berg-kirkpatrick, and dan garrette. notes 1 1 diidxa' yooxho' (@diidxayooxho) is the creation of rael albert. see: http://www.iifilologicas.unam.mx/cordova/ 2 “as the website explains: “[oudijk] observó que todas las etiquetas, marcadores y signos que se habían introducido en las entradas, así como los diacríticos que se habían transcrito del texto original, representaron un problema para las búsquedas. debido a lo anterior, oudijk eliminó todos los marcadores, etiquetas y signos…” (“acerca del proyecto,” 2015). 3 among many researchers who have considered the history of alphabetization in mesoamerica are kathryn burns, josé rabasa, camilla townsend, and yanna yannakakis. for a useful survey of recent approaches, see gabriela ramos and yanna yannakakis’ edited volume indigenous intellectuals: knowledge, power, and colonial culture in 6 alpert-abrams catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) mexico and the andes. 4 the reading the first books project is funded in part by a national endowment for the humanities digital implementation grant. any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the national endowment for the humanities. you can learn more about the project at sites.utexas.edu/firstbooks. references instituto de investigaciones filológicas. (2015). “acerca del proyecto.” retrieved from http://www.iifilologicas.unam.mx/cordova/acerca.php córdova, j. (1578). vocabulario en lengua çapoteca. mexico: pedro ocharte and antonio ricardo. john carter brown library. archive.org ramos, g. and yannakakis, y. (eds.). (2014). indigenous intellectuals: knowledge, power, and colonial culture in mexico and the andes. durham: duke university press. smith-stark, t. c. (2003). “la ortografía del zapoteco en el vocabulario de fray juan de córdova.” in m. de los ángeles romero frizzi (ed.), escritura zapoteca. mexico: editorial miguel ángel porrúa. bio hannah alpert-abrams is a clir postdoctoral fellow in data curation and latin american studies at llilas benson latin american studies and collections, the university of texas at austin. www.halperta.com. microsoft word giordano-122-1232-1.docx giordano, s. (2017). those who can’t, teach: critical science literacy as a queer science of failure. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), 1-21 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sara giordano, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article those who can’t, teach: critical science literacy as a queer science of failure sara giordano university of california, davis sgiordano@ucdavis.edu abstract in this paper, i argue that those of us who have left the sciences proper and moved to feminist studies spaces have continued to do science through our teaching. in a moment when the impulse to do real science is palpitating in our feminist hearts, i suggest that we critically examine the political stakes of our affective attachments and detachments from s/science(s). i consider what it means to be attached to a science that earned its epistemic authority through its co-constitution with colonization and slavery. i argue that passion for science may act to strengthen the relationship between science and truth and conversely, willful refusal and failure may be used to break the bond. i offer critical science literacy as a practice that can directly challenge the epistemic authority of science and be read as "doing science" or more broadly as "rewriting knowledge." 2 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) “we contend that feminist thought can do more than offer us resources for the sciences, rather, we wish to demonstrate that sometimes feminist thought *is* science.” —banu subramaniam and angela willey (2016) “we should be asking the question, asking ourselves, about the aspiration to power that is inherent in the claim to being a science.” —michel foucault, society must be defended (2003) “under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world.” —judith halberstam, the queer art of failure (2011) for decades, feminist science studies (fss) scholars have debated the possibilities of doing feminist science (giordano, 2014; longino, 1990; roy, 2004; spanier, 1986). one site of interest for these conversations has the “feminist scientist,” that is, the self-identified feminist who is trained as a scientist. here, i turn to this subject-figure but instead of looking for ways to keep the feminist scientist in the traditional science laboratory, i focus on those who have left the sciences proper and found new interdisciplinary homes in feminist studies. i bring together banu subramaniam’s (2009) rethinking of the leaky pipeline metaphor with judith halberstam’s (2011) queer art of failure and sarah ahmed’s (2014) reading of willfulness to rethink how those of us who “failed” at science proper have found ways to produce new kinds of science through our teaching in feminist studies classrooms. i read this kind of “failure” as useful for challenging science’s epistemic authority while also producing new kinds of science. i use this formulation to offer ways of doing feminist science cognizant of critiques of its epistemic authority. indeed, “failure” at science might disrupt that bind by opening up possibilities of practicing feminist critical science literacy as doing science itself. the cfp for this special issue proposes that feminist thought itself is sometimes science. i argue that we must carefully analyze why we might want to make such a claim. simply using a lowercase s and 3 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) pluralizing “science” does not resolve its relation to the epistemic authority established by capital s science from its colonial foundation. that is, i argue that the use of lower case plural “sciences” in part remains attached to that epistemic authority. although we may on occasion want to exploit those benefits, if we do not critically examine our relationship to such privilege, we risk reifying it. in the second epigraph, michel foucault argues that any theory (using marxism as his example) trying to claim the title of “science” must carefully analyze what kind of knowledge and whose knowledge it is trying to delegitimize. he argues that we must be aware of the dangers that come with attempting to benefit from “the power-effects that the west has, ever since the middle ages, ascribed to a science and reserved for those who speak a scientific discourse” (foucault, 2003, p. 10). here it is important that foucault locates the beginning of this epistemic authority in the beginning of western colonization. sylvia wynter (2003) draws on foucault and anibal quijano’s conceptions of power to explain that the colonial and capitalist roots and development of the sciences have produced “man,” thoroughly embedded in a racial hierarchy, through what she calls the “coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom.” we can read foucault and wynter together to understand that claiming inclusion in science risks strengthening and relying on a colonial and racialized form of power that is produced by and produces the possibilities for knowledge and life itself. these genealogies demonstrate the co-construction of science with the globalization of racial hierarchy, both of which together naturalize and justify domination through acts of genocide, slavery, and other forms of exploitation. at the root of the justification for social inequality then is western science (together with philosophy and other modern disciplines). by producing the categories of human/nonhuman as forms of natural (yet flexible) racial difference, capitalism becomes justified as a natural (yet flexible) economic system (melamed, 2015). i begin from this understanding of s/science as always political and implicated in these histories of exploitation. that is, the goal of science is not the innocent goal of “understanding nature” but rather a 4 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) political project of producing “nature.” the question i raise in this article is how to keep central the political justifications and potential consequences of working towards feminist sciences. in this article, i analyze our affective relationships to science. i suggest that the ways we describe science and our feelings about it can reinforce or destabilize the epistemic authority usually conferred upon it. i end with a focus on critical science literacy as one example of how “failing” at doing science research proper may be seen as a feminist science practice that explicitly unsticks science from truth and therefore opens up possibilities to unstick being/power/truth/freedom from coloniality. i argue that critical science literacy can be seen as a practice in “rewriting knowledge” (wynter, 1984, 1994). i use literacy to mean the ability to both read and write (produce). i use critical (as in feminist) to signal the “re”-writing of science through the practice of this kind of literacy. i offer this as a “failure,” as a rejection of capital s science, maybe even an anti-science, a willful refusal, perhaps the heretical turn we need to disrupt the epistemic authority of science (that is, the assumption that science = truth). affect—specifically passion, desire, and fear—polices the bounds of proper science and the questions appropriate to it. i suggest here that a big part of our desire to engage with science is our desire to prove that we (women and feminists) can do it. i explore the importance of proving that we can do science at the same time as i examine the possibilities of embracing a can’t-do attitude toward science. sara ahmed (2004) argues that emotions are political, not simply individual psychic truths, and that emotions “do things.” she introduces the idea of affect as “sticky” in her analysis of how happiness is used to maintain the assumption of the family as a social good. she argues that “affect is what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects” (p. 29). rehearsing happiness as the appropriate affective response to the family creates a stronger attachment between the family and social good through what she calls “affective economies.” to succeed in this economy of happiness, then, is 5 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) to be happy about the family and participate in circulating more happiness through love of your family and/or the idea of the family. ahmed argues that when one is unhappy about the family, they are seen as the problem—the source of unhappiness for all. however, she also posits that we might analyze unhappiness to show that the family is not necessarily a social good. in this way, unhappiness might be able to unstick this relationship. she labels those who disturb these attachments as “affect aliens” or “feminist killjoys.” for the love of science: we can do it! in recent years, we have seen a growth in feminist science studies faculty positions and curricular innovations in feminist and women’s studies departments. as a feminist studies professor trained as a scientist, this has been good news. i noticed something of interest in recent years as i have interviewed, worked, attended conferences, and retrained in feminist studies. my humanitiesand social science-trained colleagues are not just impressed by my science credentials but often explicitly interested in hearing the “real” scientific details of my research. as i have worked in feminist circles, i have noted that when giving talks i am assured that “we can understand it [science]” and asked to share more graphs and data so that my colleagues might engage with the science of my work. in some ways this marks an exciting shift in women’s studies. feminist scientists have much lamented that our colleagues sometimes act as if there is no way that they can understand science or technology (fausto-sterling, 1992; subramaniam, 2005). at the same time, i wonder what is at stake in claiming that we can understand science and how, in such claims, “real” science is being defined. in an exemplary case, anne fausto-sterling (1992) concludes her notable essay “building two-way streets: the case for feminism and science” by naming her affection for science and then saying she is not going to spend time on it. she also states that she believes we should be talking about love and pleasure as it relates to science. fausto-sterling lets us know that she takes great “pleasure from observing the natural world” and is “distressed” (p. 347) to see students not care about the physical world. i agree we should be (carefully) discussing our affective relationships to science, nature, and our physical worlds. by introducing this side note about her love of science but not exploring it in detail, this affective claim is left as evidence of a certain kind of unexamined truth about a natural draw to science. as a highly influential treatise on fss, 6 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) this casual mention of science-loving naturalizes this discourse for the field. drawing on ahmed (2004), i explore here what work “passion for science” does in feminist communities. enthusiasm for science is an important feature of popular understandings of who is capable of doing science in this moment. therefore, showing passion towards science individually and collectively as feminists is part of showing that we have the aptitude to do science. but who can do science? in the latter part of the twentieth century, we see a move away from the figure of the dispassionate scientist to one that “could be celebrated as passionate, motivated, socially networked, energetic, and creative—virtues of entrepreneurialism” (murphy, 2012, p. 71). today, the popular image of the scientist (inevitably white and male) has become a fun, nerdy, brainy subject who is passionate about data, numbers, and problem solving through science while simultaneously remaining socially unaccountable (willey & subramaniam, 2017). indeed, as i have argued previously, the passion to do science acts as a colorblind and gender-blind correction to discriminatory assumptions of natural aptitude (giordano, 2017). however, the idea of a natural predisposition has always gone hand-inhand with having the passion to do science (willey & subramaniam, 2017). just as feminists may question the political utility of arguing that women are as smart as men, instead of challenging the idea of intelligence itself, i argue here that we as feminists may have fallen into the same trap with passion for science. the many stories of budding feminist scientific passions squashed by sexist teachers, parents, or the “system” are repeatedly invoked to explain the underrepresentation of women in science careers. feminists must do more than show that we too have this passion for science and instead question more deeply what this passion is, how is it produced, how it operates, and what it means that it is directed towards this object called science. feminist scientists who have moved to feminist studies programs from the sciences can play a particular role in telling stories about how and why we left the sciences proper. even those of us who succeeded to the point of receiving phds in the sciences, thereby forever holding paper rights to the title “scientist,” but who do not continue to practice science are part of the statistics of women who leaked out of the pipeline. many of us begin with stories of passion and love for science and discovery of our natural and physical worlds (clarke, 2001; faustosterling, 1992; fox keller, 1977; weasel, 2001). reading narratives of feminist scientists’ complicated love affairs with science may help us to understand more about the political meaning of our affection. for example, evelyn hammonds, now a historian of science who began her phd training in physics, responds to aimee sands in the often-taught 7 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) interview published as “never meant to survive: a black woman’s journey” (hammonds & sands, 1993) by saying that she always liked science and wanted to do more after being exposed to doing science on her own through a chemistry set that her father bought her when she was a child . however, she also says that she had an interest in doing as much science and math as possible because she knew that would help her get into a “good college” (p. 208). science’s deep imbrications in networks of power make it impossible to tease out a pure love or passion for scientific discovery outside of the desire for access to power. hammonds retells the story of how during what was supposed to be a “fun” summer math program, she and the two other black students were not having fun because they were not able to keep up due to differences in previous education compared to the white students. this is an example of how passion and exhibiting a desire to do science cannot be considered separate from the ways racism, sexism, and other systems of power differently educate and expose people to what are considered the proper objects and backgrounds in science. ruth hubbard further points out that taking pleasure in observing our “natural world” is classand race-based, as many people grow up without “nature” around them (hubbard et al., 1993). i have argued here that feminists circulate stories about having childhood passions for science to disrupt the idea that the numbers of boys and girls in science reflect their natural aptitude or interests. but a careful political analysis of our passions also reveals the danger in relying on a naturalized idea of passion rather than investigating the epistemic power of science. i wonder if we risk reifying the idea that science is the best truth-telling method. that is, do we read all desires to investigate the world around us, our bodies, and our communities as scientific passion? drawing on hubbard et al. (1993), i ask, when other options for truthtelling are available, what choices could we make? how might we think about the ways that we continued those passions for discovery without proper science? how might we strategically and ethically develop our feminist scientific passions? as i move towards offering some answers to these questions, i suggest we explore the possibility that we can’t do science. we can’t do science: reading ignorance, fear and failure as willful resistance if we read our reasons for loving science as more complicated than evidence of our innate attraction to the field, what might fear, hatred, or mistrust of science, or even scientific illiteracy and ignorance of scientific 8 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) facts, mean? now that i have explored and critiqued claims that we can do science, i turn my attention to reasons why we can’t do science. i look at ways that we can’t in two senses: first, being unwilling to, and second, having been stopped from pursuing our scientific dreams. i continue with my argument from the last section about the unequal power between science and feminism and explore what some uncommon forms of resistance to that power imbalance might look like. in the last section, i read the relationship between science and passion or love for science through ahmed’s concept of sticky affect to argue that passion and love for science attach science to truth. i argue that the absence of that “proper” affective relationship to science, through hate, disinterest, and willful refusal, may detach science from truth (similarly to how unhappiness may unstick the family from the social good). fear and ignorance of science are often cited as the primary ways in which women’s studies contributes to the impossibility of feminist sciences. where individuals express an anti-science position as a political response, there is often contempt for it. for example, in discussing the importance of a scientifically literate feminist studies, fausto-sterling (1992) shares that “at the extreme (but not particularly uncommon) are students who view a refusal of scientific knowledge as an appropriate political stance. to say i find such attitudes distressing is to vastly understate my feelings on the matter” (p. 338). she continues: “i often experience my students’ refusal to explore certain aspects of human knowledge as a willful anti-intellectualism” (p. 339). feminist science studies scholar banu subramaniam also uses “willful” to describe the pattern of her women’s studies colleagues’ refusal to be scientifically literate. she describes a colleague coming to her office to ask about breast milk production as an example. she continues to express frustration at the entire field’s ignorance of science as a systematic “willful refusal to be scientifically and technologically literate” (2005, p. 235). the example of asking a evolutionary biologist who studied plants about breast milk shows us not only a misunderstanding of how science works but an assumption that scientists know about everything having to do with science and health—a good example of “reverent disdain” (willey & subramaniam, 2017). i am not as interested in teasing out the specifics of this illiteracy problem here, but i will note the significance of an intentional, willful refusal to engage with science. what might a willful refusal offer? i suggest we have focused more on how it does not serve feminism than how this refusal might also serve the goals of feminist science. the willfulness that fausto-sterling and subramaniam lament might be read instead as an important, political resistance to science. 9 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ahmed (2014) argues for the political value of willfulness, producing a willfulness archive of how this charge has been made against those who threaten the social order or who are disobedient, as a way to dismiss and/or discipline them. therefore, her popular feminist killjoy figure may be read as a politically willful subject. although she cautions us that not all acts of self-proclaimed willfulness are politically righteous, she does give us a reason to pause before denouncing and dismissing an act as willful. a common metaphor used to discuss feminism and science is that of two cultures (subramaniam, 2005). if we consider the power differences between different cultures, we might see how a non-english speaker living in an english-speaking country and refusing to speak or learn english may be read as a political act of willful refusal against cultural imperialism. to be illiterate in this case might be an important act of resistance. how might we use this analogy to think about scientific illiteracy? in jean barr and lynda birke’s (1998) work on women and adult science education, they describe what is commonly seen as “ignorance” of science as potentially resistant. barr and birke found that sometimes the women they interviewed chose non-scientific explanations to describe the “natural” world even though they knew the scientific ones. they also point out that emily martin (2001) has similarly argued that what might at first appear as scientific illiteracy among working class women was actually a resistance to medical authority on the subject of menstruation. therefore, barr and birke (1994) argue that women are not just “alienated” from science, but also actively resist science. next i explore some of the reasons why we might need or want to resist the power of science. both ruth hubbard, a trained biologist and the first woman tenured in biology at harvard university, and feminist philosopher sandra harding respond to fausto-sterling’s “building twoway streets” essay by taking issue with the way fausto-sterling talks about women’s chosen ignorance about science (hubbard et al., 1993). hubbard argues that she is also concerned that feminists do not know enough about science but explains this as a consequence of women’s exclusion. she points to the systematic ways that those disenfranchised are kept ignorant about science and kept away from its epistemic power (p. 45-48). sandra harding demonstrates the deep historical roots of this exclusion and makes a call for us to interrogate those legacies for western sciences (p. 49-55). these points are relevant to how we judge scientific illiteracy by feminists or by populations that have been systemically harmed and/or kept out of science. they are also important to how we move forward in engaging with science. it is vitally important to remember that many of us were unable to do science because it we were denied full access. feminist studies 10 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) scholars who were trained as scientists have documented how we were unable to do science in proper science spaces because of direct discrimination or because we asked questions that were inappropriate for science spaces (fox-keller, 1977; roy, 2004; giordano, 2014). hubbard et al. (1993) discuss the ways that once you start to analyze science itself and ask questions, you are not welcome. this points to a problem. we can’t do science the way we need to once we begin to be exposed to feminist critiques of science. there are systematic ways that we are stopped from pursuing feminist science questions and feminist methodologies. toward a queer science of failure: embracing science literacy and illiteracy in the undoing of science and doing of new queer sciences in the queer art of failure, judith halberstam argues that “under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world” (2011, pp. 2–3). i draw on this idea to propose a queer science of failure that is focused on the ways that failing, unmaking, undoing, and not knowing science may lead to a more just world. i use the word queer to suggest not only a challenge to capitalism but also a challenge to the categories of human/nonhuman and normal/abnormal that science has enforced and drawn on for success. halberstam argues that we can read a history of successes and failures under capitalism in multiple ways and suggests reading the history of failures as “a tale of anticapitalist, queer struggle” (2011, p. 88). however, drawing on foucault’s (1976) earlier example of marxism, we must remember that a new anti-capitalist science in and of itself will not necessarily “unsettle” (wynter, 2003) colonial, racial, and gendered power. i find usefulness in wynter’s emphasis on not only the coloniality of power but also the merging of being/power/truth/freedom because what is at stake in unsettling coloniality is the definition of the human itself. this point is an important place of shared concern between feminist science studies and decolonial and postcolonial studies (pollock & subramaniam, 2016). i read wynter’s call for a new science (2003) to produce a new descriptive statement of the human as similar to the stated purposes of this special issue to read feminism as “doing science.” however, i suggest we hesitate before embracing the term “science” and go back to wynter’s (1984) earlier calls for “rewriting knowledge.” this new science/rewriting of knowledge is about undoing the disciplinary boundaries and truth that produce “narratively 11 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) condemned status[es]” of others/nonhuman humans (wynter, 1994). it is also about “unsettling” the relationships between being, power, truth, and freedom that were stuck together through processes of colonization (wynter, 2003). what can we gain from reading feminist scientific “failures” differently? in critiquing the much-used metaphor of a science pipeline, banu subramaniam (2009) questions our obsession with plugging the leaks and wonders whether the metaphor of the pipe itself may be the problem. she asks whether a reorientation to the metaphor might have us celebrating escape from the pipe instead. birke also critiques the practice of using scientific education to make people fit better into a science that is not meeting our needs: “many people perceive things to be not quite right in the science camp, while scientists and educationalists are wondering how to persuade more people to pitch tents there” (1991, p. 17). reading this together with halberstam’s (2011) queer art of failure, we might ask, have feminist scientist “defectors”1 left the science camp, broken out of the pipeline and produced a “queer science of failure” that we should celebrate? and if so, then how should we read desires and calls for laboratories of our own so that we do not simply continue building that same pipeline through new territories, colonizing more area by pitching science tents? i argue that if we focus on the political consequences of our arguments we can use them to say we need laboratories of our own to fulfill our passions to produce knowledges about our worlds and bodies. this would mean broadening science rather than simply gaining inclusion in science as it is. in defense of scientific illiteracy, and unknowing science independent artist, filmmaker, and activist lucía egaña rojas writes in “notes on a transfeminist technology” (2013) that “a transfeminist technology will value illiteracy for its improductiveness for industry, as a way of finding paths unimagined by speed and productivity.” rojas advocates creating new worlds by being gender illiterate and acknowledging how the positive relationship between epistemic power/authority and literacy devalues the knowledge of many of the world’s poorest inhabitants. i draw on rojas’s exploration of illiteracy before i delve into an argument for critical science literacy to leave space open for the importance of scientific illiteracy as a failure that threatens the supremacy of scientific knowledges. although it is not the goal of this article, i hope this opens up questions about what kinds of scientific illiteracy we might embrace to destabilize science and remake knowledge 12 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) production. decolonial activists in south africa who were part of the fees must fall movement (that stemmed from the rhodes must fall movement) came under intense fire when some suggested a total abolishment of science was necessary to remake new sciences. a video of one activist speaking at a university event about science went viral in october 2016 with the hashtag #sciencemustfall. the online commentaries showed how attacks on science were used to delegitimize the activists’ movement. the activist’s description of science as a colonial project that needed to be abandoned was not just rejected but taken as evidence of ignorance. yet, the activist also mentioned in her brief comments that she was once a science student and suggested that it is because of the boundaries of what counts as real science that she did not continue in the sciences. she is another one of the science failures that i suggest we listen to and engage with as we rethink feminist engagement with science. my point here is to foreground what might be called an antiscience approach to creating new knowledges before i move into reclaiming science teaching as science, to argue for undoing and unknowing science—failing at science. “those who can, do. those who can’t, teach”: teaching critical science literacy here i come back to those of us trained as scientists who have ultimately failed to continue in science proper. i use these case studies to develop the idea of teaching critical science literacy as part of a queer science of failure. i use “queer science of failure” to attach science to both “queer” and “failure” and claim the practices i outline below as knowledge production activities themselves, as always political, and always challenging capital s science. many of us defectors are not able to return to lab bench science for the reasons mentioned above. however, i posit here that we continue to engage in science through our teaching. we might further read the popular saying meant to devalue teachers through ahmed’s (2014) work on willing and willful subjects. the failure to “do” science then might be seen as a willful political gesture against a science that reproduces injustices. i argue that the defectors among us can’t do it any longer. we often try to stay in the sciences and make change from within. at some point, however, we realize the limits of our work from within as feminist spies.2 when being feminist spies is not enough, we have to imagine other ways of becoming knowledge producers. i argue that many of us, when we just can’t take it any longer, turn to teaching critical science studies, thus creating our own feminist science labs in 13 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) women’s studies classrooms. and by turning to teaching, specifically teaching in women’s studies, we not only fail at being a part of science proper but also fail at capitalism. halberstam’s goal in the queer art of failure is to use examples of art “to think about ways of being and knowing that stand outside of conventional understandings of success,” arguing “that success in a heteronormative, capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation” (2011, p. 2). we defect and choose to take lower-paying jobs, devalued in not only economic terms but in social status and power. perhaps claiming that we choose this route of failure (teaching) is giving too much agency to us without acknowledging the historic ways that people of color and women are overrepresented in these underpaid professions. as i point out in the previous section, many of us can’t do science because we are systematically kept out of the practice. while acknowledging this, here i collapse these reasons for not being able to do science into one failure to examine. i suggest we pause to embrace this queer failure. this failure might lead us to undo science through our teaching of critical science literacy or “und” the legitimacy of science as a neutral method or set of disciplines that can be compatible with feminism/feminists. at the same time, i argue that through this kind of teaching and delegitimizing of science, we create new definitions of science—ones that are politically grounded in social justice and the politics of location—so we are therefore also “doing” or creating new sciences (lower case, plural). subramaniam (2005) asks “what would it mean for women’s studies to engage with the sciences as its own? not at arms length, not with fear, not with paranoia, but owning it as ours to shape, to empower? what would it mean for us to have laboratories of our own?” (p. 238). to answer this question, first, i argue that we need to acknowledge that the reasons people fear of science are real and not paranoid delusions of potential harm. i also like the idea of owning science as our own. how might we then move forward in utilizing science, then, while holding on to why we should be fearful and so as to not reify unjust power? here i outline how we can move forward with an ethical and politically strategic engagement with science through critical science literacy. there are two parts to this. first, we must undo science by expanding access to a kind of knowledge that is traditionally kept out of the hands of marginalized groups so that we might better critique the epistemic authority of science. second, we must do new sciences by expanding or changing the definition of science to include our pedagogical approaches as part of “doing science.” throughout, it is important that we leave space for resistance through non-engagement so 14 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) that we are not positioning ourselves in opposition to those willfully resisting engaging science through illiteracy. we must instead understand the importance of multiple strategies of resistance. i posit there is a disjuncture between what we are saying and doing. we keep saying we need to do science. but what if we stop and see what we are already doing? we can be politically strategic about how we redistribute power—particularly epistemic privilege—through our feminist critiques of science and critical science literacy work. nearly all science-trained feminists have published on education or pedagogy in some form since leaving the sciences (including barad, birke, faustosterling, hubbard, roy, weasel, whatley, and myself). if we give up on the metaphors of two-way streets and two parallel worlds that each need to equally change and instead take up the idea of science and feminism as an unequal pairing, with science occupying a privileged place, we might go back to feminist antiracist politics instead. coming from this position we might see our role as feminists trained in the sciences as helping to teach critical science literacy skills based on our first-hand knowledge of the sciences. and through this understanding we might take this parallel further and find a more liberatory science laboratory practice focused on redefining sciences both inside and outside the academy. this brings me to the first part of my proposal for a politically just, critical science literacy project: our teaching is about producing new scientific knowledges. many of us scienceand non-science-trained women’s studies professors may be teaching and engaging with science without realizing it. for example, as part of the national science foundation (nsf)-funded two-way streets project, bates college faculty (baker, shulman, & tobin, 2001) found that women’s studies faculty at first saw science as something that needed to come from outside their classes and research. however, they found to the surprise of organizers and faculty participants that the feminist studies faculty were able to produce critical science studies curriculum from science that they were already engaging with in their teaching and research. that is, there was an assumption shared by the feminist scholars that they did not really do science or understand science. i am making a claim here that critical science literacy is not simply learning how to read or engage with science but is doing science itself. to make this claim, i use feminist science studies and a basic definition of literacy to define the terms “science” and “literacy.” i begin by going back to the foundational science studies tenet that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. that is, science is not ever simply produced in scientific laboratories.3 feminist philosopher helen longino (1990) uses this principle to argue that we cannot have feminist science 15 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) until we make culture itself feminist. i suggest here that we read critical engagement with science as a more direct form of intentional scientific knowledge making. the second definition we must understand is that of “literacy.” literacy is not simply the act of reading but is defined by the ability to write. although basic science literacy is usually taught as a way for the public to engage in science believing rather than science making, feminist critical science literacy is part of a tradition of producing responsible scientific actors across disciplines (giordano, 2017). why do we see science literacy as simply reading or understanding science rather than the ability to write it? in this case, i identify critical science literacy as re-writing scientific knowledge. the idea of broadening the responsible actors of science is popular among feminist science studies scholars. for example, in karen barad’s (2001) work on agential literacy she explains that one of her courses “was designed to enable students to learn science while thinking about science, and to learn that thinking about science is part of doing science” (p. 240). similarly, in common science barr and birke (1998) define a critical science education as one that broadens our definition of those responsible for and those who should take part in science: “a critical science education would, in consequence, involve working with women’s groups in the community, drawing on their own agendas, whether to do with housing, health, roads or the environment, in an effort to develop more broadly based ‘scientific communities.’ the kind of science education we envisage here is an aspect of citizenship education of ‘pedagogy through politics’ rather than a pedagogy centered solely on the classroom” (p. 136). the point here is that science education, which i argue is science making, is not simply about discovering truths but instead is about producing politically and socially directed knowledge— knowledge that is about intentionally redefining ourselves, the human, and our world. this brings me to my second point, which is that we must carefully define the need for science literacy. i argue that we should see it as producing knowledge about our worlds and bodies through a redistribution of epistemic authority. a queer science of failure that is based in science literacy would allows us to challenge old knowledges and create new knowledges. one way to question science is to critique the philosophical aspects of the field. another is to learn to read science and critique the methods and results of specific studies (whatley, 1986; barr & birke, 1994). in part, science maintains a special status because its products are not accessible to a wide range of people. there are physical barriers to finding science articles as well linguistic barriers to reading science writing. one practical and useful role for science studies scholars, 16 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) especially those trained as scientists, is to make it possible for more people to understand scientific practice and writing. once again, this is not a new idea. here we might want to think about returning to teaching and critique as queer failure at producing the “new.” whatley (1986) argues that “what is more crucial than just supplying more accurate information to use as ammunition in debates is to help students develop alternative hypotheses, to see the roles social, cultural, and political factors can play in what appear at first to be biological issues” (pp. 186-187). she gives examples of how this can be incorporated into physical education classes to help students develop an understanding of physical ability, hormones, strength, and the social aspects that co-produce each of these concepts. more recently, deboleena roy’s (2012) detailed methodology for reading and engaging with science was included in a handbook for feminist methodologies. in my own teaching and research i have developed a kind of critical science literacy practice (giordano, 2017). my students learn about the process of how science moves from the laboratory to publication, how to track down the primary science publications that popular news report on in brevity, and how to apply feminist critiques of science to understand and engage with scientific results. in upper-level classes, students draw on these skills while bringing together a wide variety of knowledge sources to collaboratively produce zines about science and health topics. this practice has produced organic engagements with science. for example, in one semester students used the skills developed in the course to produce a strategic collective response to anti-immigrant population control environmentalism propaganda that was circulating on campus and in the larger community around earth day. in this case, the relationships between who counts as “human” and how scientific discourses are mobilized in environmental discourse to control the movement of bodies and capital was clear. in this way, queer critiques of science allowed the students to challenge racist, anti-immigrant arguments, thereby producing new knowledge about our bodies and worlds. i argue that each of these examples illustrates not simply reading and critiquing science but important engagements and the doing of science in women’s studies classrooms. i argue for a queer science of failure in which we revalue teaching and education and redefine science as not simply what is done in proper wet labs. although i have focused on those of us with science phds in this article, i conclude by suggesting we consider counting all of us as “failures”—including those of us who dropped out of the pipeline in elementary school, those of us who never found our way to the pipeline to begin with, and those of us who had to hack our way out later downstream. this means that we must make room 17 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) in feminist spaces for those without science phds to be legitimate critical science literacy educators and producers of scientific knowledge. critical science literacy and teaching is but one form of many possibilities for new sciences. i suggest we embrace an irreverent disdain for traditional science and instead practice feminist science by always keeping central the epistemic power that we are challenging, using, and risk reifying through our claims to “do science.” i encourage others to build their own archives of queer sciences of failure. what might willful resistance look like within and outside of feminist classrooms? how might we create space in these times for a much needed anti-science, antiracist, feminist approach to knowledge production? notes 1 those of us who left the sciences proper do not universally embrace the term defector. 2 deboleena roy (2004) uses the term “feminist spy” in passing to describe the challenge of being a feminist pursuing her phd in the natural sciences. 3 also, much of the work done by scientists in proper science spaces is not conducted in laboratories either. lead researchers spend much of their time writing grants and journal articles and supervising student workers and laboratory assistants, rather than working directly with hands-on experimentation. references ahmed, s. 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(2005). “laboratories of our own: new productions of gender and science.” in e.l. kennedy & a. beins (eds.), women’s studies for the future: foundations, interrogations, politics (pp. 229–42). new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. 21 giordano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ———. (2009). moored metamorphoses: a retrospective essay on feminist science studies. signs, 34(4), 951–980. doi:10.1086/597147. subramaniam, b. & a. willey (2016). call for papers, special issue: science out of feminist theory, catalyst:feminism, theory, technoscience. whatley, m. (1986). “taking feminist science to the classroom: where do we go from here.” in r. bleier (ed.), feminist approaches to science (pp. 181–190). new york, ny: pergamon press. willey, a. & b. subramaniam. (2017). “inside the social world of asocials: nerd masculinity, science, and the politics of reverent disdain. feminist studies, 43(1), 13–41. wynter, s. (1984). the ceremony must be found: after humanism. boundary 2, 12–13(1): 19–70. ______. (1994). “‘no humans involved’: an open letter to my colleagues. forum n.h.i.: knowledge for the 21st century, 1(1), 42–73. ______. (2003). unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—an argument. cr: the new centennial review, 3(3), 257–337. bio sara giordano is an assistant professor with a specialty in feminist science studies. dr. giordano received a phd in neuroscience from emory university in 2008. dr. giordano has worked as an ethics consultant for the centers for disease control and prevention. their research focuses on critical science literacy, the democratization of science and questions of scientific accountability more generally. microsoft word 199-1504-1-jacobson.docx jacobson, s. (2018). among the metavivors: social media and illness narratives of stage iv breast cancer patients. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-24. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © susan jacobson, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article among the metavivors: social media and illness narratives of stage iv breast cancer patients susan jacobson florida international university susanjacobson@gmail.com abstract dominant breast cancer narratives equate early detection and screening with “cure,” advocate for “awareness,” and identify women who undergo treatment for early stage disease as “survivors.” left out of these narratives are the “metavivors”: women and men diagnosed with “incurable” metastatic breast cancer, also known as stage iv. this article uses case studies to profile four women living with metastatic breast cancer who turn to social media to tell their stories: sally, a former civil rights attorney turned breast cancer activist, who uses social media platforms to organize and mobilize stage iv patients to advocate on their own behalf; jane, who plows through databases of dense medical research to find treatments to save her own life; jenny, a young mother dying of metastatic breast cancer who shares her experiences on a youtube channel; and grace, who participates in an early-stage clinical trial that she believes “cured” her, a term eschewed by both the medical establishment and fellow metavivors. 2 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) dominant breast cancer narratives, found in both clinical as well as popular literatures, tend to equate early detection and screening with “cure,” advocate for “awareness,” and identify women who undergo treatment for early stage disease with the heroic language of the “survivor.” these narratives, galvanized by the public activities of organizations like susan g. komen for the cure (hill & thompson-hayes, 2017), are fundamental to the ubiquitous culture of pink ribbons, postage stamps, and fashion merchandising (king 2008). frequently left out of these narratives, however, are what have often been called “metavivors”: that is, women and men who have been diagnosed with “incurable” metastatic breast cancer, also known as stage iv.1 the average life expectancy of stage iv patients is 2-3 years (“living with metastatic breast cancer,” 2010), although new treatments, like herceptin, are extending this timeline for a few (lewis, 2011; mukherjee, 2010). the existence of metavivors challenge the aforementioned “pink” narratives by taking up a critical position that began among feminist intellectuals in the 1970s. these include susan sontag’s questioning the military metaphor of the breast cancer “battle,” which she said fostered a culture that blames the patient for the disease (1978), followed by audre lorde warning breast cancer patients that silence and compliance would not save them, after her own mastectomy in the 1980s (2006), bartbara ehrenreich’s questioning the “cancer industrial complex” after her own diagnosis (2001: 52), and judy segal’s warning that the breast cancer narrative was designed to “evaluate and govern” its victims to the extent that “some stories have become more permissible, and more speakable, than others” (segal 2007). much of this criticism emerges in relation to what donna haraway has interrogated in her examination of the nature of institutional science itself, questioning the claim to objectivity granted to and taken by “masculinist scientists and philosophers replete with grants and laboratories.” she called for “an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different-and power-differentiated-communities” (haraway 1988, 575). 3 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) interestingly, haraway’s words presciently echo the ideas of the early days of social media, which, like the internet itself, was initially theorized as facilitating access to knowledge from multiple sources and multiple perspectives (barlow, 1996; gillmor, 2004; lee & so, 2001; negroponte, 1996). dozens of online forums and chat rooms, facebook groups, youtube channels, instagram pages, and other social media channels are dedicated to conversations among the metavivors, where they exchange information about treatment options, side effects, clinical trials and offer emotional support. social media may provide an outlet for metastatic breast cancer patients to tell their stories, exchange information and, in a meaningful way, circumvent the traditional top-down communication of doctor-to-patient (dray & papen, 2004; klawiter, 200) to potentially enable what haraway (1998, p. 590) describes as a community of situated knowledges, where “partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims.” in other words, metavivors articulate, share, and validate their collective experiences among each other in addition to receiving information about their illness from professionals in white coats. this article uses case studies to explore metavivor communities, profiling four women living with metastatic breast cancer who use social media to tell their stories, and by doing so, expand the characteristics of what arthur frank (2013) has identified as “illness narratives” of restitution, chaos, and quest to include a network of readers, responders and reciprocal influencers. in the following pages, we will meet sally, a former civil rights attorney turned breast cancer activist, who uses social media platforms to organize and mobilize stage iv patients to advocate on their own behalf; jane, who plows through databases of dense medical research to find treatments to save her own life; jenny, a young mother dying of metastatic breast cancer who shares her experiences on a youtube channel; and grace, who participates in an early-stage clinical trial that she believes “cured” her, a term eschewed by both the medical establishment and fellow metavivors. 4 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) illness narratives: restitution, chaos and quest in the wounded storyteller, frank (2013) outlines a framework of three archetypal illness narratives: the restitution narrative, the chaos narrative and the quest narrative. restitution follows a simple narrative arc: “yesterday i was healthy, today i am sick, but tomorrow i will be healthy again” (p. 77). scholars have noted that the early stage breast cancer narrative is most frequently associated with the restitution narrative: women get breast cancer, undergo difficult treatments, including chemotherapy and hair loss, and then slowly get better, putting cancer behind them (e.g., wong & king, 2008). but the stage iv cycle of “scantreat-repeat,”2 where the metastatic patient is never done with treatment, is seemingly at odds with the story of restitution. the second narrative type is the chaos narrative, which frank describes as being the opposite of restitution, as “its plot imagines life never getting better” (p. 97). chaos stories are anti-narratives, “an incessant present with no memorable past and no future worth anticipating” (p. 99), where the subject does not have the ability to engage in reflection. these are stories that cannot be told but can only be lived, frank tells us. the third narrative is the quest. “quest stories meet suffering head on; they accept illness and seek to use it. illness is the occasion of a journey that becomes a quest,” frank writes, noting that “most published illness stories are quest stories” (p.115). frank is not the only scholar to investigate illness narratives. bury (2001, p. 263) also identifies three categories of illness narratives: contingent narratives, which concern the origins of disease, the causes, and the effects on everyday life; moral narratives that account for “changes between the person, the illness and social identity;” and core narratives that “reveal connections between the lay person's experiences and deeper cultural levels of meaning attached to suffering and illness.” kleinman (1988, p. 96) urges doctors to listen “empathetically” to patients’ stories to better understand and manage their treatment. “each 5 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) patient brings to the practitioner a story. that story enmeshes the disease in a web of meanings that make sense only in the context of a particular life,” kleinman writes. he encourages medical practitioners to think “beyond the languages of molecules and drugs to include the language of experience and meanings,” in order to address quality and meaning of life issues of the chronically ill (p.266). kleinman’s approach to the chronically ill may be particularly resonant with metastatic breast cancer patients, who may live with their illness for several years before succumbing to the inevitable. two of the stage iv breast cancer patients profiled here, for instance, adopt the quest narrative when telling their stories on social media. while frank draws parallels between the quest narrative and campbell’s (1972) “hero’s journey,” the analogy goes only so far: drop into any online discussion by metavivors and you will see disdain for the concept of cancer as a “journey,” a description that implies that the narrator takes part willingly. of course, metavivors are not the only patients on social media. indeed, social media create spaces for all people diagnosed with terminal illness to become “wounded storytellers.” nearly eighty percent of internet users have sought health information online, and about sixty percent of americans with chronic health conditions have sought information about their condition online (fox & duggan, 2013). some, like the four women profiled in this article, are motivated to tell their story as full-throated narratives, in detail, to a public or semi-public audience. others choose to lurk around the edges of social media spaces, posting occasional updates, sharing links to potentially useful resources and commenting on the contributions of others. about 99% of breast cancer patients are women, and research has shown that women participate more on social networking sites and that social networks are more influential among same-sex members (hargittai, 2007; christakis & fowler, 2008). internet users are no longer solely passive consumers of online health content; they are active producers as well. social media, such as social networking sites, are increasingly being used as online venues for the exchange of health-related information and advice. 6 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) however, little is known about how participation on health-related social networking sites affects users (hether, murphy & valente, 2014). the women selected for this study are high-profile participants in the breast cancer social media realm, who engage on multiple intertwining platforms, and engage in “produsage,” or the production and consumption of user-generated content (bruns, 2008). as postill and pink outline (2012, pp. 124-125), while the two main methods used to analyze social media are web content analysis of large data sets (agichtein et al., 2008; honeycutt and herring, 2009; oulasvirta et al., 2010) and social network analysis (gilbert and karahalios, 2009; java et al., 2007; prieur et al., 2009), these methods are “less suited to responding to research questions … that seek to understand how, why and with what consequences” subjects like stage iv breast cancer patients use social media. methods associated with conventional ethnographic practice, such as interviews or participant observation (cox et al., 2008; humphreys, 2007; komito, 2011; miller, 2011) provide greater freedom to answer these questions, and “allow us to refigure social media as a fieldwork environment that is social, experiential and mobile” (postill & pink, 2012, p. 125). by taking an ethnographic approach to the social media activities of four terminal breast cancer patients, this article aims to help fill the gap in knowledge about the potential impact of social networking sites on stage iv breast cancer patients. the goal is to help illuminate the less frequently told narrative of metastatic breast cancer in an effort to better understand how social media may affect the way metastatic breast cancer patients live with their illness, and to what extent, if any, the expression of their stories in social media may shift the edges of illness narratives. the four women profiled here use social media to publicly share their experience living with metastatic breast cancer. their motivations vary but include: helping other metavivors cope with their illness; advocating for breast cancer research (and against “awareness”); and furthering their own understanding and response to a terminal diagnosis. using critical ethnography as method and example,3 the goal 7 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) of this work is to “challenge institutions, regimes of knowledge, and social practices that limit choices, constrain meaning, and denigrate identities and communities. … to make accessible … the voices and experiences of subjects whose stories are otherwise restrained and out of reach” (madison, 2011). among the metavivors this section summarizes the illness narratives of the four subjects: sally, jane, jenny, and grace. frank (2013) acknowledges that everyone’s illness narrative has elements from each of the three archetypal stories. this is also true of the four stories recounted here, but each woman’s experience has an overall trajectory that fits best within one of the three categories of quest, chaos and restitution. i reviewed the public and “friends-only” social media postings of the three women who graciously gave consent to use their material, but was unable to get a signed consent form from jenny before she passed away. the material in this article is based on jenny’s public youtube video archive.4 i am a metastatic breast cancer patient who became aware of all four women in social media fora dedicated to discussions among metastatic breast cancer patients. each of these women was like a beacon of light in the fog when i was newly diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer. i had never really been sick before, i knew absolutely nothing about cancer, and i had no idea what “metastatic” meant, except that it was bad (a clue i picked up from the tone of my oncologist). as a single, 50-year-old college professor from the east coast of the us, i believed that i had little in common with jenny, a 32-year-old housewife and mother from central texas. and yet the honesty with which she spoke of her disease and its relentless progression (she died less than 3 years after diagnosis) gave me hope: if she can carry on despite these terrible things, then perhaps so can i. i met grace at a breast cancer conference, and we struck up a friendship. she has shared her miraculous story on several online communities – she may have been 8 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) “cured” of metastatic breast cancer. sally inspired me with her sharp wit and her drive to do something, compelling me to become involved in breast cancer patient advocacy. jane and i share a similar diagnosis of her2-positive metastatic breast cancer, although she has had progression in her brain while i continue to be ned (“no evidence of disease,” a temporary state that indicates neither pet-ct nor tumor marker blood tests can detect any cancer in my body, but does not mean that it won’t come back, and it is not the same thing as “cured”). we found ourselves comparing notes in the same online communities. sally: the quest to survive a plague yet another woman with metastatic breast cancer has died. sally publishes a video on social media, her expressive features made more prominent by her bald head. she is crying. “every time this happens it kicks me in the gut. her family is going through exactly what i know my family is going to go through very soon.” as sally and every other metastatic breast cancer patient knows, the drawback of joining online communities comprised of people living with a terminal disease is that announcements of death occur with alarming frequency. in one large facebook group with more than 2,500 members, several people may die in a single week, a fact that is perhaps made more depressing by the introduction of the freshly diagnosed into the club, which keeps the membership numbers stable. in the spring of 2015, sally attended her first metastatic breast cancer conference where the participants organized an impromptu “die-in” by laying in the hallways of the hotel, pretending to be dead. after the conference was over, sally reflected on the realities of her new-found friends: “i may never see these women again. i love them, and i don’t want them to die, but there is no cure for metastatic breast cancer. and so i know that next year, some of them won’t be back to the conference. and it won’t be because their lives are too full. it will be because their lives were too short.” before her diagnosis, sally was a successful civil rights attorney 9 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) who had built a following as a “mommy blogger.” she has chronicled her life with breast cancer and as a breast cancer advocate with the same smart and direct approach that attracted the alt-mommy audience. she found a lump during a breast self-exam in the shower and was diagnosed stage iv from the start in 2014. she often criticizes breast cancer money spent on prevention and early detection: “none of that research led to the detection of my cancer. i had to find that tumor myself. and now it would be pretty awesome if some of those research dollars that did me no good could be spent on saving my life instead.” sally often compares metastatic breast cancer advocacy to the aids movement, and encourages her audience to help “[end] this plague that has taken too many of my friends and will take too many more of them before a cure can come.” she co-founded a metastatic breast cancer advocacy organization with women she had met through social media. she saw the need for an organization similar to the aids activist groups that helped convert aids from a death sentence to a chronic illness. she writes about the similarities between metastatic breast cancer and the aids epidemic as depicted in movies like and the band played on and how to survive a plague: she has a lot of friends who die; their deaths are not reflected on the evening news; she worries that every ache and pain could be a symptom of cancer; researchers seem more interested in preventing metastatic breast cancer than curing people who have it; and people at risk for developing metastatic disease, particularly early stage breast cancer patients, are not warned of the possibility. “it’s not set in stone that people have to keep dying this way. what has to happen is research,” sally writes. “only by demanding that researchers save our lives will we have a shot at living a full lifespan.” it is easy to see why sally looked to aids as an advocacy model to save the metavivors. a movement that started in a new york apartment as the gay men’s health crisis in 1981 evolved into a worldwide campaign where the demands of patients drove scientific research in support of treatment for what was then a death sentence. epstein (1996, p. 8) writes that aids drove “the first social movement in the united 10 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) states to accomplish the large-scale conversion of disease ‘victims’ into activist-experts.” the gay men who were the primary victims of aids in the 1980s had been schooled by the culture wars against them in the u.s. in the 1970s, and were uniquely prepared to fight social ostracism, medical bureaucracy and governmental indifference to force an agenda of scientific research and medical treatment. lay aids activists, outsiders to the medical establishment, became medical researchers. they funded traditional paths of medical research, and raised money to investigate new ones. unhappy with the long processes of drug testing and approval, the aids activists insisted on change, often employing noisy and even violent protests to make their point. through these nontraditional channels, epstein finds, aids activists gained enough of a voice in the scientific world to influence nih–sponsored research. while the aids movement is the most successful model for creating patient-activists, breast cancer advocacy does not face the same challenges. led by susan g. komen for the cure, which draws in more than $250 million per year in donations (barrett, 2017), breast cancer is the beneficiary of what is perhaps the most-successful us public health campaign ever, with the entire month of october dedicated to walks, remembrances, fund-raising and other awareness activities (hill & thompson-hayes, 2017). breast cancer receives more media coverage than any other cancer (hurley, riles, & sangalang, 2014). breast cancer research receives the largest amount of funding for any disease, $120 million per year, from the u.s. department of defense’s $1.1 billion congressionally directed medical research program (department of defense, 2017). it is not a lack of awareness, lack of social support or lack of funding for breast cancer that prevents metastatic breast cancer from becoming a chronic disease, advocates like sally would say. rather, it is a lack of focus. the awareness campaigns of “pinktober” often overlook or exclude stage iv patients because they fail to meet the standard restitution narrative. news organizations are also slow to cover stage iv patients for the same reasons; celebrities with breast cancer are less willing to reveal a metastatic diagnosis. on average, less than 5% of 11 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) money raised by the popular breast cancer fundraising movements goes to research that will benefit metastatic breast cancer patients (“why we need you,” n.d.). “metastatic patients are just fundamentally different from early stage patients,” sally writes. “we aren’t part of the pink party narrative, and we’re never going to be. …imagine if nci had a dedicated metastasis research program, with metastatic patient advocates and doctors specializing in metastatic cancer treatment and bench researchers focused on understanding metastasis. instead of trying to incorporate metastatic cancers into the existing organ-of-origin structures of cancer research, give us our own programs.” sally eventually succumbed to metastatic breast cancer, 3.5 years after being diagnosed. she continued her advocacy work until the end, sending written remarks to a gathering of metastatic breast cancer patients at a washington, dc, die-in just 3 weeks before her death. she put her hope in scientific research to find a cure, or at least a treatment to keep her, and others, alive a little longer and a little longer more, until a cure could be found. jane: the quest to save your own life research has proven a fruitful avenue for jane, who, even in a photo, radiates intensity from piercing blue eyes. narrowly escaping death by brain tumor, recovering only to be handed the grim diagnosis of leptomeningeal metastasis (“basically, cancerous meningitis”), she undertook a quest to save herself through the power of research and selfobservation. “i call this my epic battle,” she writes. two years later, she is still alive, thanks to a regimen she negotiated with her medical team, who credit her with stabilizing her disease and extending her life. jane is the first to post dense peer-reviewed medical journal articles in the social media circles of metastatic breast cancer patients. for example, she posted a link to this article: “dexamethasone interferes with trastuzumab-induced cell growth inhibition through restoration of akt activity in bt-474 breast cancer cells.” 5 fortunately, she also offered a 12 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) helpful translation: “gals, unless you are getting chemo, there is no reason to be taking dexamethasone/decadron (steroids) with her2 targeted therapies. … [i]t might actually prevent herceptin from working well.” this post generated a fair number of reactions and comments, and is an example of jane’s role as an “explainer,” a social media participant who helps others navigate dense medical research (jacobson & kashian, 2018). like the aids activists before her, jane does not trust the scientists and researchers to save her, but takes matters into her own hands. jane was pronounced “cured” of early-stage breast cancer after undergoing chemotherapy, surgery and radiation. but she started having odd symptoms, including migraines, muscle aches and dizziness. she contacted her medical team, but none of them connected her symptoms to a potential brain tumor. six months after finishing early stage breast cancer treatment, jane underwent an emergency craniotomy to remove a 5cm metastatic breast cancer tumor in her brain. “basically anyone with brain [metastasis] is dealing with an under-researched condition,” jane writes. while recovering from brain surgery, she felt the onset of neurological symptoms. again, her doctors told her her symptoms did not seem to be related to her condition, and, six months after her craniotomy, an mri showed that the cancer had spread to the lining of her brain, a condition referred to as leptomeningeal disease. “an absolute worst-case scenario,” jane writes. she waited for a plan from her oncology team that never materialized. she took matters into her own hands. she checked herself into the er, where she convinced her team that, based on her research, the best treatment for her would be to receive the anti-cancer drug herceptin intrathecally, directly into her brain. at the time, this was a novel treatment for breast cancer patients that had been given to only a handful of people, but had shown promise for treating leptomeningeal disease. “[this situation] further reinforces to me that i need to be my own advocate because on their own [the medical establishment] will try to kill me with the same-old, same-old and the path is littered with corpses 13 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) to attest to that,” jane writes. like sally, jane believes that research is the best hope to save her. like some of the aids activists, jane works with information and treatments that are already available, making her own evaluations of therapies that her doctors would not have suggested for her, and making connections to complementary therapies, like hyperbaric oxygen therapy, which some research suggests can help improve the efficacy of radiation to the brain (stępień, ostrowski, & matyja, 2016). it is perhaps because of the legacy of the aids movement that jane was able to find members of the medical establishment willing to treat her based on her selfresearched recommendations. jane’s protocol has been a model for other patients with leptomeningial disease. breast cancer patients on social media who receive a diagnosis of leptomeningial metastasis know to look for jane for advice. she is being cared for by several major cancer hospitals in her area, “so all of these facilities are being schooled by me at the same time. as if almost dying three times wasn’t enough, this only adds to how surreal it all feels.” frank sees parallels between the quest narrative and campbell’s hero’s journey. but many stage iv patients abhor the idea that cancer is a “journey,” a description that implies that the narrator takes part willingly. neither jane nor sally chose to become cancer advocates, although this turned out to be a quest that both were equipped to undertake. they might both say that the research and advocacy quests are not theirs alone (although it might help them), but rather it is one that they share with and on behalf of other metavivors. sally founded an aids activisminspired advocacy group to fight for research to effect a cure for herself and other metavivors. her group has shaken up some of the complacency of metastatic patients and the organizations serving them to push for more money for research and a cure. jane is known among the metavivors for her skills in researching medical and biological factors that may impact her treatment and the treatment of other patients. both sally and jane have heeded lorde’s advice about not keeping silent, sometimes coming into conflict with the established breast cancer 14 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) philanthropies or the medical establishment itself. lorde’s (2006) words are fitting here: “but for every real word spoken, for every attempt i had ever made to speak those truths for which i am still seeking, i had made contact with other women while we examined the words to fit a world in which we all believed, bridging our differences.” chaos: a public death if you watch jenny cooper’s youtube videos before she was diagnosed with breast cancer, you see a happy-go-lucky 32-year-old mom of two who enjoyed making goofy videos to share with her friends. in 2013 she adopted a fitness regime, changing diet, changing exercise habits, and documenting a significant weight loss that left her feeling good and optimistic about the future. her youtube habit was consistent, and her small audience grew from double-digits to triple-digits. then, one year and 98 videos into her youtube project, she recounts the familiar story of feeling a lump in her breast. less than three years later she was dead, having reached the median survival of 2-3 years. in her very first breast cancer video, she describes how she felt a lump, confers with her family, gets a mammogram, followed by a sonogram, then an mri and a biopsy. in a single 14-minute take, she recounts her conversation with the diagnostician, as she struggles to keep her composure. “i don’t mind getting breast cancer. i knew that i was going to get it. i just am scared of being sick, and i don’t want my kids to see me sick,” she says. “and i don’t want to cry because i have been crying a lot all day. and my face hurts, and my eyes are all blurry, and my face burns. the tears burn my face today.” one week and two videos later, she tells us that the doctors are waiting for the pathology report to determine what kind of breast cancer it is so that they can create a plan for treatment. fatefully, she says: “hopefully it will come back and it will not be triple negative. triple negative is a very, very hard cancer to fight. it does not respond well to chemotherapy. the average lifespan of a triple-negative is five years.” in 15 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) the next video we learn: “it’s triple negative breast cancer.” we follow her journey through treatment for early-stage breast cancer: surgery for placement of a port for chemotherapy, 12 rounds of chemotherapy, a hysterectomy, surgery for mastectomy and radiation. then, 47 videos and just over a year later, the results of a ct scan finds evidence of incurable metastatic disease in her diaphragm and lymph nodes. the mother of two says: “i will do chemotherapy until i physically, or emotionally, cannot do it anymore.” the rapid downward spiral of jenny’s health is reminiscent of a reality tv program edited for maximum dramatic effect. less than one month later, she finds a bump on her head – the cancer has metastasized to her skull. two months later they find a small lesion in her brain. one month later an mri shows her brain tumors have quintupled size. jenny recounts the clinical information that she has received from her doctors – size of tumors, method of radiation. “i’ve had so much chemotherapy, i’ve had my breasts cut off, i’ve had a hysterectomy. but this is the scariest thing i have to do. the reality of this is that i could lose a lot of who i am to this treatment…. it’s like you are damned if you do and you’re damned if you don’t.” she wipes away the tears. “man, walking into this is terrifying.” jenny’s story underscores the loss of control characteristic of the chaos narrative. her internet audience watches helplessly as the aggressive nature of her disease takes away first the hope for a cure, then hope for successful treatment, and finally the possibility of a future. the audience bears witness to jenny bearing witness to her approaching death. she takes what control she can of the situation. jenny never used social media to investigate complementary therapies or search for clinical trials. but she did use her platform to address her audience on topics like death with dignity and what it was like to be a parent dying of cancer. unlike sally and jane, jenny does not believe in the power of research to save her. as jenny herself knew, triple-negative breast cancer can be difficult to treat, and while only 10-20% of breast cancers are triple-negative, it has the poorest survival prognosis (fallahpour, et. 16 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) al., 2017). she does not research possible existing treatment or complementary therapies as jane does. jenny lives the chaos narrative, but she takes control where she can, like on her youtube channel. she recorded her last video about six weeks before her death. “[i]f you’re watching this video… i’ve passed away. i never thought that i would die at the age of 34. i certainly never thought that i would be leaving behind two children and a husband. … the last two years have been the most intense two years of my life. when you get cancer, it is such an eyeopener as to what is important and what’s not important… if you see my kids, please tell them, always, it does not matter how often you see them or how old they get. please tell them that i loved them oh, oh, oh so very much. and that the idea of leaving them broke my heart.” restitution: the “c” word grace is a down-to-earth mother of two boys and a recently retired engineer. she is extremely active and healthy. her diagnosis of stage iv breast cancer in 2013 put a hold on her plans to pursue a second, “retirement” career as a nurse. in her soft texas twang, she is happy to tell you how she went from being “a goner” to “i think i’m cured.” grace participated in a clinical trial that has shown excellent results for a handful of patients. she has become a poster patient – what she calls “a prize guinea pig” – for cancer research. her case was cited in congressional testimony as an example of how research may lead to cures for cancer that were once thought incurable. grace was initially diagnosed with dcis (ductal carcinoma in situ) in 2003. dcis is sometimes referred to as “stage 0,” a pre-cancerous condition. she had a modified mastectomy with no chemo or radiation. “my oncologist at the time pronounced me ‘cured,’” grace says. “for years, i eschewed the pink ribbons because i did not consider myself a ‘survivor.’… so, while i had surgery, i did not have chemotherapy or radiation. i didn’t feel like a ‘real’ cancer patient.” most early stage breast cancer patients are told they are “cured” when they finish treatment. 17 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) unfortunately, about 20-30% of them, like grace, will develop metastatic breast cancer, sometimes months, sometimes years or decades later (“incidence and incidence rates,” n.d.). the restitution narrative so strongly associated with early stage breast cancer does not allow for relapses, and many metastatic breast cancer patients who were first diagnosed with “curable” early stage disease are ill-prepared to face a “terminal” diagnosis. in 2013, the cancer came back. it spread from her breast to her lymph nodes to her chest wall and sternum. her cancer proved to be virulent, and grace blew through a dozen drug combinations in two years. in summer 2015, grace learned that her disease had progressed on her 10th drug combination. “i would probably be a little more desperate as i know that there is really nothing conventional left for me,” grace wrote. “fortunately, i have a plan.” grace had attended a breast cancer advocacy meeting and met a doctor who was involved with breast cancer immunotherapy. “she thought that i would be eligible for one of their trials.” the treatment worked. grace has continuously posted updates of her progress. by march 2017 grace was going on hiking expeditions and solo kayaking excursions. in grace’s case, research does seem to have saved her. the medical establishment is reluctant to apply the term “cure” to stage iv cancer patients, as stage iv is defined by contemporary medical institutions as incurable. metavivors are also often reluctant to accept the status of “cured” for one of their own, as they fear it may further the popular misconception that all breast cancer is “curable.” jenny, grace and jane were all first diagnosed with early-stage disease. if the pink restitution narrative may be applied to stage 0-iii, why not to those few stage iv patients who beat the odds? the metavivor experience includes the possibility of cure, even if the narrative is one of inescapable death. surely the “restitution” story is grace’s to tell, as today she is healthy again, but tomorrow she and, eventually, all of us, will be gone. 18 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) conclusion the tropes of restitution, chaos, and quest outlined by frank are poetic archetypes for people living through and seeking to understand the impact of illness. metavivors occupy a liminal position between a fatal disease and one that may become a chronic condition in their lifetimes, thanks to rapid advances in medicine. but it is their willingness to share their stories on social media that enables these stories to press against the edges of the three narrative types. these stories are not told solely for the benefit of the tellers; rather they are told for the benefit of others, for the social networks, real and virtual, that make up these women’s lives. in turn, the social networks send feedback to each of our metavivors, shaping their quest, providing support in the face of chaos or creating a following for a story of a potential cure with both hope and suspicion. the metavivors use social media to tell their stories to one another in real time. their stories shape-shift as they interact with each other, as the “produsage” model of social media turns readers into responders who in turn influence the storytellers. one shift the metavivors create in frank’s paradigm of the quest narrative is the emergence of the theme that “research will save us.” this is a logical development inspired by the success of the aids movement, which gave patient-advocates a seat at the table where biomedical research agendas are made. however, while it is true that only new treatments will slow or reverse the course of metastatic disease, a focus on research perhaps invites an over-emphasis on “the languages of molecules and drugs,” as kleinman (1988, p. 266) has noted in the treatment of chronic illness. sulik (2009, p. 1063) found that patients dealing with a chronic illness may develop what she calls a “technoscientific identity” for managing their illness that increases their “reliance on medical authority and technoscience,” and may limit “the full range of discourses available to patients.” metastatic breast cancer complicates the restitution narrative of early-stage disease on two fronts: first, some “survivors” of the pink 19 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) narrative go on to develop metastatic breast cancer, and a small number of stage iv patients may die with their disease instead of it. “[i]gnorance about cancer is maintained, in part, by the rehearsal of stories that have standard plots and features, and that suppress or displace other stories,” segal (2007, p. 3) writes. suppressing the metavivor story does a disservice to the “survivors,” who are doubly wounded by a terminal diagnosis and the lack of information about the possibility of recurrence, and the metavivors, who find themselves outside of the pink survivor movement, armed with less readily available information and fewer resources dedicated to their disease. social media may create spaces for these stories to be told in communities of situated knowledges, but these spaces still sit outside the mainstream. meanwhile, treatment advances that continue to extend the lives of these patients and the proliferation of social media that make it possible for the metavivors to share their experiences with each other may yet refashion the archetypes for metastatic disease. notes 1 “metavivor” is a term coined by the advocacy group metavivor.org to differentiate people living with metastatic breast cancer from the “survivor” rhetoric that surrounds early-stage breast cancer. the term “metavivor” is used here to differentiate stage iv from early-stage breast cancer patients and is not used as a direct reference to metavivor.org. “scan, treat, repeat” is a trademark of the metastatic breast cancer network http://www.mbcn.org/ 2 “scan, treat, repeat” is a trademark of the metastatic breast cancer network http://www.mbcn.org/ 3 the author is a breast cancer patient who has, to paraphrase hammersley & atkinson’s (2007, p.3) definition of ethnography, participated in the subjects’ postings on social media for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions and collecting documents. 4 you can see jenny’s youtube video archive at: https://www.youtube.com/user/jparcoop. it must be noted that jenny’s 20 jacobson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) youtube account name is “coopdizzle,” a portmanteau of her name and an appropriation of language from hip-hop culture. 5 sumikawa t, et al. 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(2016) hyperbaric oxygen as an adjunctive therapy in treatment of malignancies, including brain tumours. medical oncology, 33(101). doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12032-016-0814-0 sulik, g. (2009) managing biomedical uncertainty: the technoscientific illness identity. sociology of health & illness, 30(7): 1059–1076. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9566.2009.01183.x why we need you (n.d.) metavivor.org. available online: http://www.metavivor.org/take-action/why-we-need-you/ wong, n. & king, t. (2008) the cultural construction of risk: understandings through illness narratives. the journal of consumer research, 34. bio susan jacobson is assistant professor in the department of journalism and media at flordia international university. lab meeting   lab meeting     a discussion on experiments and experimentation: nih to balance sex in cell and animal studies     daphna joel tel-aviv university djoel@post.tau.ac.il anelis kaiser university of bern anelis.kaiser@psy.unibe.ch sarah s. richardson harvard university srichard@fas.harvard.edu stacey a. ritz northern ontario school of medicine ritzsa@mcmaster.ca deboleena roy emory university droy2@emory.edu banu subramaniam umass amherst banu@wost.umass.edu in 2014, the national institutes of health (nih) proposed a new policy to promote "sex parity" in research. as an extension to the 1993 nih revitalization act which mandated the inclusion of women and minorities in clinical trials, the new nih policy will require scientists to include "sex" as a variable in both animal model and in vitro cell line-based research. the end goal is to ensure that nih funded scientists "balance male and female cells and animals in preclinical studies in all future applications" (clayton and collins 2014, 283). janine clayton and francis collins described this proposed policy in their article: "nih to balance sex in cell and animal studies." nature, 509 (2014), p. 282-283. we asked four interdisciplinary scholars to discuss this proposed policy.                                     ~curated by deboleena roy and banu subramaniam male-female comparisons are not adequate for addressing sex in cell culture research stacey a. ritz, medical sciences division, northern ontario school of medicine, sudbury, ontario, canada as a feminist laboratory scientist, my reaction to the nih’s move (clayton & collins, 2014) is decidedly mixed. i emphatically agree that we must meaningfully account for sex in our laboratory work, but i would argue that male-female comparisons are insufficient for developing rigorous understandings of how sex affects health, and will likely serve to perpetuate unhelpful notions of biological determinism and essentialism (ritz et al., 2014). moreover, although it may seem straightforward to require that studies include both male and female animals or cells, the realities of laboratory research mean that this is not always possible or useful. for example, much cell culture research uses transformed cell lines, which are derived from cells that have lost their ability to regulate cell division and have adapted to laboratory growing conditions. 'equivalent' male and female transformed cell lines are not available and would be virtually impossible to produce, and even if such a thing were possible, comparing a 'male' to a 'female' cell line would be a deeply flawed approach to addressing sex. certainly transformed cell lines from a male donor can't be said to 'represent' women, but they shouldn't be understood to 'represent' men either, since a transformed cell line is derived from a single donor, and the methods for producing them mean that they are not 'normal' cells at all. transformed cell lines must be understood as a model, and like all models they have strengths and limitations that must be matched to the purposes of the research; they are extraordinarily useful models in many ways, but 'sex' is not something they model well. furthermore, i am increasingly skeptical about the extent to which sex can be adequately represented in in vitro systems at all. although it has become common to say 'every cell has a sex' (wizeman & pardue, 2001), it doesn't follow that the totality of what we mean by 'sex' can be understood at the cellular level. although the sex of the donor of the cells might be identifiable, understanding 'sex' as a trait that individual cells can 'possess' is, i believe, a conceptual slippage from accepting that chromosomal and genetic factors are decisive in sex determination into the misapprehension that these constitute sex (richardson, 2013). when a cell is taken out of the body and placed in a dish, it is deprived of the myriad dynamic interactions in the body that are part of what we understand as 'sex'. thus, any time research is done with cells outside of the body, at best the researcher can claim to be investigating aspects of sex, but not sex 'itself' (whatever that may be). although i agree that preclinical research should attend to sex/gender issues, mandating inclusion of both male and female cells or animals is not as simple a matter as it may first appear, and raises a host of theoretical and practical issues. addressing sex is a complex challenge that demands a more nuanced approach than to simply compare males and females. the nih call to consider sex as a biological variable is conceptually "captured" in the "sex differences" paradigm daphna joel, school of psychological sciences and sagol school of neuroscience, tel aviv university, tel aviv, israel janine a. clayton and francis s. collins from the national institute of health (nih) have recently argued that sex should be considered as a biological variable in basic research, by including both males and females and examining sex differences in every study (clayton & collins, 2014). clearly, the aim of the nih is not to study sex differences. the aim is to promote the health of all humans by ensuring that scientific findings are relevant to all. however, the formulation of this call in terms of a search for sex differences does not serve the aim of promoting health for all, but is rather a reflection of a dominant paradigm which assumes that males and females belong to two distinct categories and views sex almost exclusively through the lens of "sex differences." i discussed elsewhere data that challenge this dimorphic view of sex (joel, 2011, 2012; joel & yankelevitch-yahav, 2014). here i want to focus on how the conceptual "capture" of the nih call in the "sex differences" dogma interferes with achieving the aim of fostering the health of all humans. achieving this aim depends on including males and females in every study, as requested in the call,1 and looking for interactions between 'sex' and other independent variables.  it is not achieved by searching for the main effect of 'sex', that is, for sex differences. this is because if the effects of an independent variable, for example 'treatment a', do not interact with 'sex', then even if there are sex differences (for example, if females are on average more resilient than males in all treatment conditions), this has no relevance for the study's question regarding the effectiveness of treatment a. obviously, finding such a sex difference, provided that the effect size is large, may form the basis for a new study with a new aim, namely, unraveling the mechanisms that make females more resilient than males in this model.  understanding this has direct implications for one of the major objections to including both males and females in every study—the belief that this necessarily entails doubling the number of animals. but doubling the number of animals would be needed only if the category of 'sex' interacts with other variables. if such interactions are not found, the number of subjects in a study that includes both sexes will be the same as in a single-sex study. the challenge we face is how to support the nih call as it has the potential for improving the health of all humans, while making sure it is not abused to reinforce the "men from mars, women from venus" dogma. i believe this challenge can be met by supporting the justified request to include both females and males in every study while at the same time objecting to the practice of listing sex differences. this objection should be accompanied by developing new methods of analysis that are not based on comparing differences between means and on treating variability as noise, but that rather focus on individual differences. considering sex in experiments vs. producing sex differences anelis kaiser, social psychology and social neuroscience, department of psychology, university of bern, switzerland it is indeed very important to include both females and males (as well as any other modes of sex expression) into biomedical and psychological studies in order to ensure that we consider all variation that concerns sex/gender.  thus, the nih is doing the right thing in aiming to "balance sex" (clayton and collins, 2014, p. 282) in cell and animal studies. many scientists are critical about this and claim that the estrous cycle in animal studies will introduce variability and thus the sample sizes (n) required will have to be larger in order to obtain significant effects, making experiments more complex and expensive. since only very few studies, particularly in preclinical research, focus primarily on potential "sex differences" but rather on other independent variables (usually drugs), the required sample size (n) actually does not have to be much larger just because we include individuals from the two common sexes/genders.  so far so good. the problem arises when "considering sex" (clayton and collins, 2014, p. 282) compulsory means the operationalization of two fundamentally distinctive sexes/genders, forcing all researchers to categorize humans into one of two groups and report the results (see also rippon, jordan-young, kaiser, & fine, 2014). this is precisely what you do when you treat women and men as independent variables. when looking and reporting about "sex differences" without any concise a priori hypothesis, you are obliged to categorize these groups as if they were essential categories—which they are not—rather than recognizing that they belong to a hormonal, behavioral and even genetic continuum.2 by unproblematically embracing a binary sex/gender, the researchers reduce human variation into just two categories, blurring the singularity of individuals by reducing complex biological, behavioral, cognitive and identity related processes into a binary mode of female/male differences. further the nih protocol paper by clayton and collins (2014) unfortunately does not always use the term "sex," "gender," "female/male" appropriately (kaiser, 2012). they also seamlessly move between evidence from animal research and human studies as if it was unquestionable to compare these entities for one and the same purpose. these are precisely the points that feminists who have studied sex/gender have long raised.  the nih protocol ignores thirty years of scholarship in feminist science studies. the absence of a feminist voice in these debates is striking. since the 1980's, feminist and sex/gender research within and outside biomedicine has worked to analyze the naturalized "evidence" of a fixed, invariant and discrete conceptualization of sex/gender in biology. in turn, gender studies and feminist scholars have pointed to, among others, the many assumptions and inaccuracies within the processes of creating knowledge through biomedicine, including the overemphasis of sex/gender differences as compared to sex/gender similarities in body and behavior, the confusion of sex/gender dimorphism with sex/gender difference, the certitude of a dichotomous and permanent sex/gender identity, the inconclusiveness of results, the methodological uncertainties, the contextual influences during experimentation and the bias towards a perceived abundance of sex/gender differences within scientific publications. although the nih claims that it "plans to address the issue of sex and gender inclusion across biomedical research multi-dimensionally—through program oversight, review and policy, as well as through collaboration with stakeholders including publishers" (clayton & collins, 2014, p. 282), i really wonder why feminist science studies and feminist scholars of sex/gender, especially scientists, are absent as co-players in this multidimensional approach, at a time when cooperation is urgent and necessary. is the new nih policy good for women? sarah s. richardson, history of science and committee on the studies of women, gender, and sexuality, harvard university when the new nih policy was first announced in may, comedian stephen colbert featured the news next to an image of a lab rat "co-ed" wearing lipstick and mascara (the colbert report, 2014).but a female rat—not to mention a cell line— s not an embodied woman living in a richly textured social world. rodents have sex differences, but they are different than human sex differences. for example, female rats bear large litters, males play no role in rearing, and males and females cannot be caged together in the lab (ritz et al., 2014). in humans, sex is a composite of many biological systems—chromosomes, genes, gonads, genitals and hormones—and it is deeply entangled with culture. sex difference research is complex and requires great care to do well (schiebinger, klinge, sánchez de madariaga, schraudner, & stefanick, 2011-2013). a journal of the american medical association study reanalyzing 432 published, peer reviewed claims of genetic sex differences found only 14% of them to be adequately documented, nominally statistically significant, and internally valid (patsopoulos, tatsioni, & ioannidis, 2007). outside of the reproductive system, most sex differences are overlapping, small and highly variable (joel, 2012; springer, mager stellman, & jordan-young, 2012). sex interacts with age, weight, and sociocultural variables. when clinical research suggests that sex is plausibly relevant to health outcomes, we should investigate the contribution of biological aspects of sex and the cultural factors that may drive female-male differences in health. but requiring all scientists to look for sex differences in their basic research will produce a proliferation of sex difference findings that are hard to interpret and in many cases will be meaningless. the reality is that differences in health outcomes between women are much starker than those between male and female-derived cells in the petri dish. in the us, for example, the breast cancer death rate is 60% higher for black women than for white women ("black women's health imperative," n.d.), and a louisiana woman has a 27% likelihood of having a cesarean section compared to just 12.5% in utah (osterman & martin, 2014). globally, a woman living in japan has an average life expectancy of 84.5 compared to 58 in liberia (central intelligence agency, 2014). demanding more non-hypothesis-driven sex difference research in basic laboratory materials is not a wise use of resources in the face of these overwhelming women's health challenges. as i argue in sex itself, "sex-based biology," the philosophy and movement underlying the new nih policy, represents an elite vision of women's health that is disconnected from feminist science studies frameworks (richardson, 2013). in its essentialist focus on sex, the new nih policy diverges strongly from feminist interactional analyses of gender, sex, and the body. it also neglects feminist intersectional understandings of the subjects of women's health activism that would include not just xx and xy bodies (or cells) but diversely sexed and gendered individuals inflected by race, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, class and age.  the mantra to study sex in every cell leaps over the conceptual sophistication of sex-gender analysis. it displaces the core values that motivated a women's health movement in the first place: addressing urgent issues of health inequity in the real lives of women and sexual minorities. from this perspective, the policy, if implemented, is a travesty. yet it is also an opportunity for reinvigorated debate, to which i hope feminist science studies scholars will avidly attend, about the methods and aims of the women's health movement in our present moment. notes 1 including males and females in every study is a critical component of the nih call because it ensures that more of a species' variability is included compared to a situation in which only one sex is used. this is true regardless of whether males and females belong to two distinct categories or not. 2 see http://www.nature.com/news/sex-redefined-1.16943.   references black women's health imperative. 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(2014). reconceptualizing sex, brain and psychopathology: interaction, interaction, interaction. br. j. pharmacology, 171, 4620-4635. kaiser, a. (2012). re-conceptualizing sex and gender in the human brain. journal of psychology, 220(2), 130-136. osterman, m., & martin, j. (2014). primary cesarean delivery rates, by state: results from the revised birth certificate, 2006–2012. national vital statistics reports, 63(1), 1–11. retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_01.pdf patsopoulos, n. a., tatsioni, a., & ioannidis, j. p. a. (2007). claims of sex differences: an empirical assessment in genetic associations. jama, 298(8), 880–93. doi:10.1001/jama.298.8.880 richardson, s. s. (2013). sex itself: the search for male and female in the human genome. chicago, london: the university of chicago press. rippon, g., jordan-young, r., kaiser, a., fine, c. (2014). recommendations for sex/gender neuroimaging research: key principles and implications for research design, analysis and interpretation. frontiers in human neuroscience, 8(650), 1-6. doi: 103389/fnhum.2014.00650 ritz, s. a., antle, d. m., côté, j., deroy, k., fraleigh, n., messing, k., … mergler, d. (2014). first steps for integrating sex and gender considerations into basic experimental biomedical research. the faseb journal, 28(1), 4–13. doi:10.1096/fj.13-233395 schiebinger, l., klinge, i., sánchez de madariaga, i., schraudner, m., & stefanick, m. (eds.). (n.d.). analyzing sex. gendered innovations in science, health & medicine, engineering and environment. retrieved may 21, 2015, from http://genderedinnovations.stanford.edu/methods/sex.html springer, k. w., mager stellman, j., & jordan-young, r. m. (2012). beyond a catalogue of differences: a theoretical frame and good practice guidelines for researching sex/gender in human health. social science & medicine (1982), 74(11), 1817–24. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.05.033 the colbert report. (2014). co-ed lab rats. u.s.a.: comedy central. retrieved from http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/el90zp/co-ed-lab-rats wizeman, t. m., & pardue, m.-l. (eds.). (2001). exploring the biological contributions to human health: does sex matter?. washington dc: national academy press. first (2001). maruis mattis. oxford university press: london bios daphna joel received her ph.d. in psychology in tel-aviv university in 1998, and joined the faculty of tau, after receiving the alon fellowship for young israeli scientists. joel is presently the head of the psychobiology graduate program and the chair of the phd committee at the school of psychological sciences and a member of the sagol school of neuroscience. joel studies the neural mechanisms of normal and abnormal behavior, using mainly animal models of psychopathology. more recently she has expanded her work to research questions related to brain, sex, and gender, including the complex interplay between sex and environment in the development ofpsychopathalogy. anelis kaiser, ph.d., a co-founder of the international research network, neurogenderings, is a marie heim-vögtlin fellow at the university of bern, switzerland, where she is working on the classification and registration of sex/gender in fmri human science. kaiser has examined sex/gender in the brain as it relates to exploring the existence of paradigmatic, methodological, and statistical defaults that interfere with assessing the presence or absence of sex/gender differences. she studied psychology and received her ph.d. from university of basel, switzerland. sarah s. richardson is john l. loeb associate professor of the social sciences at harvard university. she is jointly appointed in the department of the history of science and the committee on degrees in studies of women, gender, and sexuality. a historian and philosopher of science, her research focuses on race and gender in the biosciences and on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. she is the author of sex itself: the search for male and female in the human genome (chicago, 2013) and co-editor of revisiting race in a genomic age (rutgers, 2008) and postgenomics (duke, 2015). stacey a. ritz is an associate professor in the medical sciences division at the northern ontario school of medicine. her background in laboratory sciences focused on experimental studies on allergy, immunology, and air pollution. since 2009, ritz has led the biology working group of the cihr team in gender, environment, & health, exploring how biomedical laboratory scientists can address sex/gender issues in their work. deboleena roy is associate professor of women's, gender, and sexuality studies and neuroscience and behavioral biology at emory university.  she received her phd in reproductive neuroendocrinology and molecular biology from the institute of medical science at the university of toronto. she is currently associate faculty in the neuroscience program, graduate division of biological and biomedical sciences and senior faculty fellow at the center for ethics at emory university. her fields of interest include feminist theory, feminist science and technology studies, neuroscience, molecular biology, postcolonial theory, and reproductive justice movements. her research and scholarship attempt to create a shift from feminist critiques of science to the development of feminist practices that contribute to scientific inquiry in the lab. she has published articles in signs: journal of women in culture and society; hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy; neuroethics; australian feminist studies; rhizomes: cultural studies of emerging knowledge; endocrinology; neuroendocrinology; and the journal of biological chemistry.  she has also contributed to several anthologies including handbook for feminist research: theory and praxis (2011); neurofeminism: issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science (2012); gendered neurocultures: feminist and queer perspectives on current brain discourses (2014); and mattering: feminism, science, and materialities (2016). banu subramaniam is professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts, amherst. trained as a plant evolutionary biologist, she seeks to engage the feminist studies of science in the practices of experimental biology. she is author of ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity (university of illinois press 2014), and coeditor of feminist science studies: a new generation (routledge, 2001) and making threats: biofears and environmental anxieties (rowman and littlefield, 2005). spanning the humanities, social, and natural sciences, she works at the intersections of biology, women's studies, ethnic studies and postcolonial studies. her current work focuses on the xenophobia and nativism that haunt invasive plant species, and the relationship of science and religious nationalism in india. microsoft word weaver-133-1116-4.docx weaver, h.e. (2017). feminisms, fuzzy sciences, and interspecies intersectionalities: the promises and perils of contemporary dog training. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (1), 1-27 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © weaver, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article feminisms, fuzzy sciences, and interspecies intersectionalities: the promises and perils of contemporary dog training harlan eugene weaver kansas state university harlanweaver@ksu.edu abstract tracing histories of interventions in dog training, this paper examines the contemporary divide between "dominance" and "positive reinforcement" training practices. drawing from writings by scientists and trainers, this article traces the many ways that the doings of much contemporary dog training embody "fuzzy sciences." examples from ethnographic fieldwork conducted in an animal shelter help demonstrate the ways specific fuzzy sciences of training are feminist, while others are not. the article closes with a consideration of the ways that relationships between humans and animals not only reflect but also shape experiences of race, gender, sexuality, nation, species, and breed, or "interspecies intersectionalities." the article concludes by thinking through the lens of "interspecies intersectionalities" in order to elucidate a promising expansion of the feminist fuzzy sciences of dog training. 2 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) introduction in november 2002 i adopted my first dog, haley, a brown-and-white pit bull–type whose cropped ears and proclivity for swimming gave her the appearance of a landbound seal. like many a new dog owner, i was eager to embark on the task of building and shaping our relationship and asked others for training tips.1 i was also a novice when it came to reading dog body language. these practices came to a head one afternoon when haley and i were at the dog beach and i intervened in her play with another dog when i thought she was getting aggressive by “rolling” her—flipping her over onto her back. the appalled looks on the faces of those around us quickly demonstrated what my earlier research missed—in this space, “rolling” was not condoned. ashamed, i collected haley and left. later, when we returned to the beach, a red-haired white woman in a hat approached me and gently steered our conversation toward training and behavior. the woman, alice, summoned her dog, ghana, a dark-brown pit bull–type, and rewarded him with a treat from a pouch strapped to her waist, then walked around the park with us while casually demonstrating the basic elements of positive-reinforcementbased training.2 i began to meet with alice and ghana regularly, acquired my own treats pouch, and eventually took classes with alice’s trainer, alex, a white butch woman whose business card featured a pit bull in profile. this process introduced me to a divide that is central to today’s dog worlds, one into which haley and i had unwittingly tumbled through that roll on the sand, which i will term positive reinforcement versus dominance. the language of positive reinforcement and dominance identifies a contentious division in contemporary worlds of dog training. while terms such as positive training, force-free training, old school, traditional, pack leader, and more also mark this divide, i center my writing in positive reinforcement and dominance because these terms index not only the unclear, fuzzy, role of capital-s sciences in these discussions but also the complex moral and philosophical stakes involved in their practice. 3 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the association for professional dog trainers (n.d.) demonstrates this fuzzy role, noting that “those individuals employed as dog trainers are largely ‘self educated’”; the majority of today’s professional dog training experiences involve someone without any formal scientific schooling, regardless of training approach. contrasting affective politics figure in the divide itself; training celebrity victoria stilwell’s catchphrase— “kindness is powerful. pass it on”—shapes her positively training approach, while dominance expert cesar millan (“does your dog respect you?” n.d.) pushes people to ask not “whether their dogs give them ‘unconditional love’” but rather whether their dogs respect them. further, as i learned through years of following training debates and doing ethnographic fieldwork at an animal shelter, the doings of most training approaches rarely align with textbook methods. yet i contend that the people i spoke to and witnessed do practice a science in their work with dogs; these, i argue, are the “fuzzy sciences” of dog training. my intervention in this article explores how the doings of contemporary dog training not only reveal “fuzzy sciences,” a deliberately lowercased and multiple sense of science, but also how feminisms shape these fuzzy sciences, yielding sciences out of feminisms and, more specifically, what i term “feminist fuzzy sciences.” these feminisms are multiple, in part because what feminisms are involves their own fuzziness; understandings of feminisms emerge from buttons and bumper stickers as well as rigorous academic study, and often draw from both in a coconstitutive praxis and theory where lived experiences are theorizing and theorizing is activism. in this sense, while this piece draws from the work of scholars such as donna haraway (2008) and maria puig de la bellacasa (2012), it also involves more prosaic feminisms. further, i elaborate a concept here that draws from kimberlé crenshaw’s (1991) work on intersectionality in order to interrogate the ways relationships between humans and nonhuman animals not only reflect but actively shape experiences of differences such as gender, race, sexuality, species, and breed: what i term “interspecies intersectionalities.” the following article explores feminist fuzzy sciences and 4 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) interspecies intersectionalities by combining my fieldwork and autoethnographic examples with published and publicly available materials on training and writings in feminist science studies and humananimal studies. beginning with the positive reinforcement (hereon referred to as r+) and dominance divide, i turn to questions of care, epistemology, and relationality to articulate how and why some fuzzy sciences are feminist. i join this discussion with questions of interspecies intersectionalities in training worlds, which i follow with an exploration of the fuzziness of on-the-ground work through ethnographic examples from my fieldwork site. i close with an examination of fuzziness as a concept and the kinds of disruptions and connections, fuzzy and otherwise, that thinking feminist fuzzy sciences together with interspecies intersectionalities yields; these, i hope, are the promising sciences out of feminisms this article details. science and training readers less familiar with today’s training debates are no doubt wondering what r+ and dominance mean, so here i delve into some of the key players and thinkers, beginning with r+. rooted in behavioral scientist and psychologist b.f. skinner’s (1938) research into “operant conditioning,” r+ is one of four quadrants skinner outlined, which include positive and negative reinforcement and punishment. in skinner’s schema, positive and negative indicate adding or taking something away, while reinforcement and punishment, respectively, increase and decrease the future occurrence of a behavior. translated, r+ would be when a dog gets a reward for presenting her paw to “shake” in order to encourage future “shakes,” and positive punishment occurs when a dog gets a shock from an electronic collar when she barks in order to discourage future barks. negative reinforcement occurs when the pinching of a prong collar lessens because a dog stops pulling on a leash; negative punishment happens when i withhold kisses from my dog until she approaches me calmly. 5 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) skinner’s work was not widely disseminated in dog worlds until karen pryor’s 1984 book don’t shoot the dog. littered with practical examples comparing training approaches from the different quadrants— “roommate leaves dirty laundry all over the place,” which might be positively punished through yelling and scolding or, conversely, reshaped using r+ through buying “beer and [inviting] over members of the opposite sex whenever quarters are tidy”—pryor’s book deliberately emphasized r+ (pryor, 1984, pp. 104, 124). in this, pryor translated the science of skinner’s behaviorism into a local, practical science for regular dog owners and handlers. patricia mcconnell, an ethologist and applied animal behaviorist, echoes this approach in her book the other end of the leash (2003), in which chapters subtitled “how your body ‘talks’ to your dog and how to make sure it says what you want” translate the science of ethology into practical tips on human versus dog body language. for example, mcconnell’s training tips involve rather doggish bodily signals: “the best way i know to visually ‘call’ a dog to come is to bend down as if in a doggie play bow, turn away from your dog, and clap” (p. 23). notably, mcconnell’s advanced degree and pryor’s lack thereof highlight a norm in dog worlds; while many of the field’s luminaries claim postgraduate scientific degrees, many others do not. indeed, one notable figure in the dominance school who has written in adamant disagreement with what she called the “new behaviorists” while lacking a scientific degree is poet, philosopher, and obedience trainer vicki hearne. before outlining hearne’s work, i want to give a brief etiology of dominance training. loosely based in thinking derived from research by animal behaviorist rudolph schenkel (1947) on captive wolves, in which problem behaviors denote a dog’s need to ascend the pack hierarchy to “alpha” status, dominance training also draws from the 1950s work of trainer william koehler, who used “corrections”—“a sharp upward jerk on the training lead, performed as impersonally as possible”—to teach a dog and earn his/her respect (hearne, 1986, p. 45). however, dominance training also emerges from policeand military-dog training approaches 6 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) utilized in the early to mid-twentieth century and, more broadly, from cultural narratives about wolves, such as stephenie meyer’s twilight series. a close follower and friend of koehler, hearne (1986) desires complete obedience as a means to confer “nobility, character, and dignity on the dog” (p. 43). hearne’s work with salty demonstrates her approach. she begins by first “placing,” or moving, salty’s limbs into position and saying “salty, sit!” hearne soon gives the command without placing, noting, “if she refuses to sit, or just doesn’t think to sit, i give her a harsh, emphatic sit correction” (p. 55). for hearne, corrections act as a language that respects salty’s “moral and intellectual capacities” by giving her a means of communication: the bodily movements of obedience (p. 45). when salty later presents a “clean-edged,” formal, obedience-style sit, compelling hearne’s response, hearne delights in salty’s enlarging “the context” of their language. she exults that “understanding has been enlarged by enforced obedience!” (pp. 56, 30, 45). popular s/sciences: millan and stilwell while the above figures stand in for a plethora of professionals involved in today’s training debates, their names and approaches are less familiar to laypeople who encounter the r+/dominance divide.3 in this section i take up two celebrity trainers whose contrasting approaches illustrate the roles of sciences, sciences, affective politics, and feminisms in the more popular version of the divide: cesar millan, television’s “dog whisperer” and a firm proponent of dominance methods; and victoria stilwell, whose television show “it’s me or the dog,” publications, and public appearances feature her own training brand, positively. famously self-taught as a trainer, millan focuses on two key tenets in his work: “pack leadership” and “energy” (“cesar’s essentials,” n.d.). while pack leadership rests in the insistence that a human needs to be at the top of a perceived hierarchy, implicitly drawing on schenkel—an understanding repudiated by more recent scientific work, such as that of 7 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) wildlife biologist l. david mech (1999)—millan’s sense of energy is decidedly non-scientific: “energy = intention × emotion.” millan’s explanation of these concepts underscores this distance: “because dogs communicate with energy…they instinctually seek and follow pack leaders who exhibit both calm and assertive energy” (“pack leadership technique 1,” n.d.). and while millan’s training facility, the dog psychology center, invokes the science of psychology in its name, my research has not unearthed evidence of any trained psychologists employed there. in fact, millan’s materials include only one overt mention of science, an article by j. bastian (n.d.) titled “science catches up to cesar” that points to a study where gps devices were used to track social ranking and personality traits in a pack of hunting dogs. positing that this “first hard evidence that social hierarchy does exist” bolsters millan’s approach to training, the article also evokes a temporal distance from science, positioning millan ahead of and apart from such research. like millan, stilwell’s beginnings as a trainer were informal—she worked as a dog walker before taking seminars with trainers and branching out into her own brand. unlike millan, stilwell counters dominance narratives, noting that “instead of looking to become alpha, top dog or pack leader over us, most dogs simply want safety, security and those things which generally make them feel good” (“myth versus fact,” n.d.). unlike millan, stilwell embraces science, pointing out that r+ “has been universally endorsed by the behavioral scientific community at large as the most effective, long-lasting, humane and safest method in dog training.” however, stilwell notes that “positive training is not a scientific term,” for her philosophy is more affective than scientific: “for most of us, it does not take scientific journals to tell us what our instincts have already said: it is more humane to reward than to punish” (“what is positive training?” n.d.). combined with her 2016 “kindness is powerful” joint campaign with state farm insurance, stilwell’s claim of not practicing a science emerges from the way her methods mix behaviorism with care and kindness. 8 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) thinking-with feminisms stilwell’s affective politics reveals a mix of morals and emotions in the training debates i outline here. indeed, caveats like stilwell’s are part of why i name these sciences of translation and practice as lowercase and fairly fuzzy sciences. however, caveats like stilwell’s also point to one of this piece’s key interventions, for differences in moral-affective politics between adherents to r+ versus dominance methods underscore a key distinction in how i read their respective fuzzy sciences: their feminisms. a critical disparity in the r+ versus dominance debates involves different understandings of the roles of love, happiness, and respect in training. as noted earlier, millan desires respect rather than love from a dog. similarly, while hearne (1986) mentions the need to respect the “superior knowledge” of a tracking dog who makes an unexpected turn, a less mutualistic respect shapes her larger body of work, evident in her liberal references to the importance of human “mastery” and a dog’s need to “surrender” to the language of “enforced obedience” (pp. 24, 57). conversely, r+ adherents point to the importance of pleasure; pryor (2009) comments on the “happy, cooperative, attentive clicker dogs” involved in her clicker academies, while mcconnell (2016) proclaims, “i want each of my dogs to be as happy as they can be.” the disparity between the approaches seemingly hinges on the ways that r+ involves a caring cultivation of happiness that can be easily, if loosely, connected to feminist ethics, while dominance leans more heavily on respect in the form of obedience. in many ways, the materialities of the practices i examine seem to bear out an admittedly facile alignment between a prosaic feminism involving care and r+ in contrast to dominance tied to respect and obedience. for example, millan is widely derided for his punitive practices; one blogger, in response to a video in which millan strikes a dog’s abdomen, notes that he “doesn’t whisper to dogs. he kicks them” (hoffman, 2014). similarly punitive, if not as extreme, hearne’s “corrections” involve the application of pain to a dog’s neck. in contrast, 9 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) pryor’s r+ interventions come out of work with marine mammals where collars, leashes, and kicking are impossible, so that the only option for shaping behaviors is to proffer carefully timed rewards (author field notes, 8 june 2013). then there are mcconnell’s body-based teachings, as with her encouragement to think about how human and dog bodies “talk”; hers is a different kind of affective politics, one more in keeping with the bodily capacity “to affect and be affected” but which nonetheless affirms and rewards behaviors (massumi, 1987, p. xvi).4 in these ways, the materialities of these training practices align with the division of r+ on the side of a fuzzy but feminist ethics, in contrast to dominance as a painful form of respect. however, tracing care and kindness in these practices is not quite so simple. for example, a jerk on a prong collar will not kill, but it might teach a dog to associate running at another dog, a neighbor’s house, or into the street with bad consequences and may well be the only teaching a dog experiences. in this sense, there is a form of care, but one geared more toward protecting a dog from missteps in a larger world of vehicles, neighbors, and social relationships. further, both millan and hearne are known for their outspoken pit bull advocacy and interest in rehabilitating dogs—indeed, such narratives are central to much of millan’s television work and hearne’s writings, as with her 2007 book bandit: the heartwarming true story of one dog’s rescue from death row. in addition, and as fellow training enthusiast haraway commented on an earlier draft of this article, there are plenty of cases where dogs in dominance-style training relationships “learn fast and well and live companionable lives with very little coercion—maybe less than in relationships where r+ methods are done badly and result in confusion, leash pulling forever, frustration, and ultimately a fair amount of positive punishment” (personal communication, 23 february 2017). claims to care and kindness run throughout and across the training divide, albeit in different forms and with material disparities, which is why i now turn to another key interlocutor in order to propose a more precise affective ethics in thinking feminist fuzzy sciences. 10 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) feminist science and technology studies (sts) scholar maria puig de la bellacasa (2012) frames care as “an affective state, an ethical obligation, and a practical labor,” one that inheres in the spaces between us, for “not only do relations involve care, care is itself relational” (pp. 197–198). puig’s relational care involves what she terms “thinking-with,” a connective sensibility that marks how the sharing of caring through relationality involves a shared commitment to mutuality. for example, “thinking-with care” includes a responsibility to speak-with others rather than speaking-for or speaking-about them; this is a proximity of shared stakes and worlds rather than the distance of officious pronouncements on the desires of others. in this sense of -withness, puig articulates a need for epistemic proximity through mutuality rather than, say, erasure. the proximity upon which puig insists demarcates the distinction i read between r+ and dominance; thinkingand speaking-with require a reach toward a mutual language, not the imposition of that of one party onto another. in the context of this writing, i would argue that thinkingwith a dog involves labor like that mcconnell encourages, wherein a human literally positions their body in a way that is more easily legible to the dog in “calling” the dog with their body. indeed, thinking-with dogs through training involves communication through a shared language of bodies and bodily movements rather than a human-centric language of verbal obedience. importantly, this is a form of care absent from dominance training, where obedience to a human-centric language of collar jerks and spoken commands make the -withness elaborated here impossible. importantly, this is a form of care that denotes the feminist ethics i seek in the feminist fuzzy sciences of training. in highlighting the mutuality of the relationships puig poses through thinking-with, i am invested in the ethical obligations that she traces, so here i turn to haraway (2008). describing how practices of training animals “to cooperate actively with people in scientific protocols and husbandry facilitate a mutual engagement rather than the transmission of a language of obedience”—one can think here of zoo animals trained through r+ methods for medical procedures—haraway 11 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) notes that “trained animals are subject to less coercion of either physical or pharmaceutical kind.” however, this is not an argument for just any kind of training, for haraway posits that such “training involves an asymmetrical relationship between responsive partners,” where the term responsive transmutes into “response-able,” which indexes a willingness “to learn to know more,” or “to learn to learn” (p. 336). this sense of response-ability demarcates training that functions as a practice of learning rather than coercion, training motivated by curiosity rather than unquestioning obedience. much like puig’s thinking-with, response-ability decenters the human, for the learning through training that haraway describes travels both ways. distinct from the rote application of a particular method or gear, response-ability requires a learning to learn that is a learning to discern. this is a learning that finds language in widened eyes and yawns, one that holds as valid and seeks to better understand nonhuman ways of communicating and understanding. i see much of response-ability in r+ training that i do not find in dominance approaches. even as the roles remain unequal—there is a human holding a leash, after all—the simple fact that most r+ approaches do not seek a relationship in which the human is an ascendant “alpha” whose language of respect a dog must learn underscores my larger point: r+ training, in its orientation towards thinking-with dogs and response-ability to them, reveals a promisingly feminist fuzzy science that challenges human exceptionalism. while thinking-with care and response-ability are central to my claiming of r+ training as a feminist fuzzy science, another feminist intervention shapes this writing: interspecies intersectionalities. in this, i draw from feminist and legal theorist kimberlé crenshaw’s (1991) landmark formulation of intersectionality, which highlights the inextricability of a range of oppressions related to race, ethnicity, ability, gender identity, class, sexuality, citizenship, and more. for example, intersectionality challenges claims made on behalf of “women’s rights” by pointing out how disparate experiences of “women” yield different political needs—the concerns of a working-class, able-bodied trans 12 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) woman of color are not the same as those of a middle-class, white, disabled cisgender woman. while there are numerous definitions of interspecies, i am fond of the one given by jasbir puar and julie livingston (2011) to “refer to relationships between different forms of biosocial life and their political effects” (p. 3). conjoined, interspecies and intersectionalities describe how relationships between humans and nonhuman animals not only reflect but also shape experiences of gender, race, sexuality, class, nation, species, and breed. while many of the discourses i examine in this piece lend themselves to analysis through interspecies intersectionalities, i want to clarify the term first. consider my relationship with haley. when she came into my life, i identified as female, an identification that changed. as i began the process of medically transitioning to present as more masculine, i noticed that, even when i was not easily legible as either male or female, i was safe with haley at my side, while my whiteness, queerness, and middle-class status tended to make other humans read her as not dangerous despite her breed and clipped ears. read through the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities, our relationship involved a mutualistic becoming in which our identities were articulated through and made possible by each other and our disparate connections to “political effects.” importantly, interspecies intersectionalities also highlight how disparities in power and discursive erasures figure in human-animal relationships. for example, consider hearne’s (2007) subtitle for bandit: “the heart-warming story of one dog’s rescue from death row.” much of today’s discourses surrounding pit bull–type dogs like bandit connect to race—terms such as “dog racism” are frequently bandied about among advocates protesting anti-pit-bull legislation, while others are quick to point to the problems posed by “thugs” and their pit bulls (holland, 2013; “mymind,” 2013). meant to garner sympathy by leaning on a connection with prisons and injustice, hearne’s title also reveals a whiteness that emerges through narratives of salvation involving a dog’s body marked by association as brown/black that might be paraphrased as “white 13 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) femininity to the rescue.” notably, this story of salvation erases the violences that affect humans, mostly of color, caged within prisons today, for hearne does not critique the racism of the prison-industrial complex. read through the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities, hearne’s and similar pit-bull advocacy work builds on “like race” thinking that ignores how the assertion of proximities between people of color and nonhuman animals—as when, say, president obama is likened to an ape—are a key tactic in race-related oppressions. the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities applies to many of the readings i present here. consider critiques of millan’s lack of formal credentials that claim that “his machismo” as part of the problem (rafkin, 2016); read through interspecies intersectionalities, this sense of his race and masculinity as distancing him from science reveals how racism shapes perceptions of his relationships with animals. there is also pryor’s casual heteronormativity in her explanation of r+ training—a roommate gets rewarded with alcohol and the presence of members of the opposite sex when they clean. read through interspecies intersectionalities, we can see how (presumably white) heterosexuality informs the larger logic of r+ training and the human-animal relationships it shapes. further, there are the literal spaces of training themselves; seminars such as mcconnell’s (2003) both ends of the leash run into the hundreds and even thousands of dollars to register and attend and are overwhelmingly populated by white and presumably cisgender women; class and whiteness both shape access to and are shaped by these spaces. both stilwell’s and millan’s respective television work underscores these dynamics, for in-person access involves literal and cultural capital out of the reach of most, such that both spaces of training reify class norms and/or the rescue narratives critiqued above, even as television comes to demarcate such practices as norms while it functions as a low-cost means of teaching. read through the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities, the training discourses i examine here are overwhelmingly white, racist, classist, and often heteronormative. the above readings draw from interspecies intersectionalities as 14 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) an analytic, one that troubles the ways i have drawn from thinking-with care and response-ability in this article thus far by demonstrating how race, gender, class, sexuality, and more are formative to the training practices, fuzzily feminist and no, that i describe. however, interspecies intersectionalities also works as a sensibility in this writing. less exact than an analytic, the sensibility of interspecies intersectionalities functions as a way of feeling, an alertness sensitive to the troublesome dynamics i note above but one that also, inexactly, pushes me not just to think but to feel towards ways of knowing and doing these human-dog worlds differently, to sense alternate connections and imagine otherwise. in this sense, and in keeping with the prosaic feminisms this piece references, interspecies intersectionalities attune me differently, pushing me to notice how, say, the politics of a dog-rescue group’s facebook post connecting the oppression of migrant workers with pit bulls is messed up, but also pressing me to feel for and toward different imaginings wherein other feminist and fuzzy interventions join with rather than erase the work of poor, indigent, and marginalized people so that different human-dog worlds might be built that disrupt rather than solidify human-animal oppressions. in order to begin to think through this sensibility, i turn to a training site rife with its own complex interworkings of race, gender, class, sexuality, species, and breed: an animal shelter. fuzzy shelter sciences my fieldwork site, an open-admission california shelter with a high volume of pit bull– and chihuahua-type dogs, demonstrates another form of fuzziness, for its employees and volunteers evince significant disparities in their applications and interpretations of different training approaches. when i began my fieldwork, i was surprised to learn that one of the shelter workers with whom i interacted frequently was a millan fan. bethany, a brown-haired white woman who served as one of the main coordinators for dog adoptions, even lent me her copy of malcolm gladwell’s what the dog saw (2009), which contains a laudatory profile of 15 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) millan. like many of the staff, bethany brought her own dog, simone—a calm black-and-brown mixed breed—to the shelter with her. i witnessed bethany’s millan-influenced approach through simone. for example, one afternoon simone was interested in lying down in the largest of the dog beds, as was another staff dog, pharaoh, a spindly, fawn-colored greyhound cross. growling softly, a stiff simone body-blocked pharaoh and then leisurely curled in three tight circles before settling down on the bed. hearing this, bethany walked over and grabbed simone by the muzzle, pulling her off the bed while staring at her with hard, unblinking eyes, and said “no” in a low, threatening voice. she then made simone lie on the floor near her feet and returned to her conversation (author field notes, 26 may 2013). other shelter workers who were not overt millan aficionados also employed dominance-style interpretations. for example, ben, a gruff white man who came out to me as gay by noting that his favorite color as a kid was purple and “my parents should have known then,” explained to me why they tended to use simone rather than pharaoh to test shelter dogs to see if they were okay with other dogs. “pharaoh’s too dominant,” he explained as i helped him move several tubs of kibble. when i asked what he meant, he replied, “he’s just not that into new dogs.” “so, he doesn’t stay relaxed when other dogs approach?” “sort of.” i tried again: “so he tolerates new dogs, but doesn’t really enjoy it?” ben: “yes!” (author field notes, 1 march 2013). interchanges like this, where dominance figured as a catch-all to explain and interpret quite varied behaviors, were frequent throughout my fieldwork. of course, many at the shelter were adamantly opposed to dominance-style methods and interpretations, and among them was another volunteer, cora, a white woman in her late thirties who often wore clothing featuring local animal rescues. while shelter dogs were not usually permitted to meet other dogs while on leash, trusted volunteers such as cora and, eventually, me were encouraged to take dogs out on “tandem” walks in order to gauge their dog-dog sociability. one afternoon, cora and i went out with two male pit bull–type dogs, josh 16 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) and tucker, both outfitted in harnesses. i started off with tucker, a large, block-headed, brown-and-white intact male, who spent the initial part of our walk mostly ignoring me and my treats, while cora began with josh, a lean and leggy brindle intact male. we warily observed as, initially, josh barked and lunged at tucker. however, he settled quickly and cora and i slowly began to walk them closer and closer to each other, watching for any telltale signs such as bodily stiffness, hard eyes, or a forward lean. eventually, we let josh smell tucker’s butt, which went well, but tucker found it fairly exciting and started to try and drag me along, oblivious to my many and varied attempts to get his attention (treats, talking to him, tugs on the leash, etc.). cora and i then switched dogs, which was when we learned that josh was not as attentive to me as he was to cora, who had been heaping verbal praise on him in contrast with my less vocal and more treats-oriented approach. tucker, on the other hand, continued to pull cora, who signaled to me that she wanted to turn around. the walk back went smoothly, with josh continuing to be mildly interested in me and tucker slowly ramping down into sniffing (author field notes, 4 june 2013). notably, the gear used at my fieldwork site adds additional fuzziness. gear choices make one’s position in the training divide easily legible to others—prong collars, choke chains, and electronic collars are tools of the dominance school, while harnesses, head halters, and treats pouches telegraph an r+ approach. however, because shelter volunteers often work with strong and unruly dogs with whom they are not able to develop lasting relationships, many contemporary us shelters mandate the use of prong collars. in addition, prong policies accommodate the skill sets of shelter volunteers with fuzzy understandings of training sciences. for example, one volunteer at my fieldwork site, paisley, emphatically approved of the mandated prong, stating that “positive on a prong” was, in her opinion, the only way to help dogs who bark and lunge at other dogs and/or humans on leash, a behavior known as leashreactivity (author field notes, 4 july 2013). of course, the pain of a prong collar marks such training interactions as positive punishment, not r+; 17 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) understandings like paisley’s of r+, which were quite common at the shelter, underscore the prevalence of volunteers’ own fuzziness regarding training sciences more broadly. then there were those like cora and me, who found ourselves clicking and treating dogs while controlling their bodies with collars we abhorred; even while we were both fairly adept with r+ methods, the mandated gear necessarily mixed our approaches with dominance-style practices. feministly fuzzy shelter spaces as the above examples demonstrate, most of the training that goes on in the space of my fieldwork site is, in practice, rather fuzzy. i will return to fuzziness as a concept momentarily, but first i want to trace how these examples fit into my larger discussion, beginning with the methods practiced by bethany, ben, and paisley, which draw from dominance methods and which are certainly fuzzily scientific, but not particularly feminist. for example, bethany’s reprimanding of simone follows a millan-style approach of controlling the dog, but her “no” comes too late to preclude the interaction, another of millan’s edicts (“how to handle a territorial dog,” n.d.). bodily details matter here too, for the interaction ends when simone looks away from bethany’s hard stare and obediently goes “down.” bethany is interested in submission and obedience, not curiosity or response-ability. then there is ben, whose reading of pharaoh as dominant is certainly effective in the decision not to use him to test other dogs, but whose use of dominance as a catch-all to describe an emotional behavior—dislike of new dogs—misunderstands pharaoh’s motives; this thinking not only poses the possibility for potentially grave future misunderstandings of dog behaviors, but also fails to take up a deeper curiosity or thinking-with. finally, paisley’s misunderstanding of the admittedly confusing language of skinner’s quadrants leads her to endorse prong collars to treat leash-reactivity in a way that mcconnell (mcconnell & london, 2003), among others, would consider one of the worst ways possible. this is because dogs who react on leash almost always do so out of fear, such that they can learn to associate pain with 18 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the approach of a dog or human (or bicycle or skateboard), making them more reactive and fearful rather than less. in paisley’s approach i read a failure to be response-able, for she seems incurious about how a dog’s emotional experience shapes such interactions in a way that may lead to future training issues. conversely, i find much of feminist fuzzy sciences in cora’s and my interaction with josh and tucker. in terms of fuzzy sciences, while cora and i use r+ methods throughout our interaction, giving the dogs treats when they pay attention and cueing the interaction around their body language, neither of us employs textbook methods, for our motive is not training but curiosity. cora and i set up the interaction in order to gauge the dogs’ interest, to see what they wanted to do, a desire we read through their bodies and bodily interactions. in doing so, we engage in thinking-with the language of their bodies and attempt to be responseable to their needs and desires. i realize that it is a bit odd to propose in an academic article that the method in which i participate, however loosely, is the method for which i am rather firmly arguing. i therefore want to note here that my use of cora’s and my example stands in for fairly widespread practices at my fieldwork site; there were many folks sporting treats pouches and the like at the shelter. this is to say that there are many people who try to think-with animals at my fieldwork site, people who are curious about and try to be response-able to the animals there in the best ways they know. however, even as i find the prevalence of these practices promising, i am less sanguine about the shelter when viewing it through the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities, for my fieldwork site, much like that of the training discourses, is undeniably a space of whiteness. its demographics—most of the volunteers and staff are white, straight, middle-class women—are only part of this dynamic. for example, many of my interlocutors enthusiastically embraced the language of “rescue” in their work, a term whose history denotes the “civilizing mission” of many an imperialist project. echoing hearne’s bandit, there were frequent references to shelter dogs experiencing a form of “prison,” including 19 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) appeals for rescues to step in on behalf of dogs on “death row,” with no mention of the race-related injustices ongoing in today’s prison industrial complex (author field notes, 29 march 2013). then there were the dogs’ names: “ghana” and “pharaoh,” not to mention “apache,” were fairly typical, even as they clearly communicated unconscious white fantasies about connections between animality and racialized otherness. the goal of most shelter-based interventions, the attainment of a dog’s “forever home,” also merits scrutiny. automatically precluding the houseless and most undocumented folks, shelter adoption policies tend to center on that imaginary ideal: the family dog. while this approach includes a practical component—in that dogs who would not share their toys, for example, would not be adopted out to households with children—it also informs a related and larger heteronormative ideal. put simply, like many locales in the united states today, it was understood that “family” stood in for the presence of children, which is to say that polyamorous kin groups of queer folks were not what the staff was asking for when they told potential adopters to bring the rest of the family back to meet the dog. the analytic of interspecies intersectionalities renders these relatings troublesome, for they all reify norms of whiteness, family, heteronormativity, and more. however, interspecies intersectionalities as a sensibility thought-with feminist fuzzy sciences promises an interruption and possibly different ways to take up these doings; i explore this promise in my concluding section. conclusion the uses of fuzzy that have come up in this article include fuzziness in the sense that the role of science in dog training is often unclear, fuzziness in the mix of formal and informal scientific credentials and training of experts and celebrities in the field, fuzziness in the ways that feminisms are understood and practiced, fuzziness in that the sciences in question are deeply involved in moral and affective politics, fuzziness in the inexact practice of either the science or sciences of training, and fuzziness in the 20 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) mix of approaches used and even required by the policies of my fieldwork site. there is also, of course, the obvious and delightful way that dogs themselves are fuzzy. i use fuzzy more as a descriptor than an analytic, in order to identify a primary characteristic of the complex congeries of discourses involved in us-based dog training and shelter work, which is that there are unclear boundaries among knowledge practices in a number of ways and that, thinking-with the very last sense of fuzzy i note above, at least some of these boundary-bridgings productively de-center the human. importantly, fuzzy also neutrally characterizes what many in scientific and/or more rigorous dog-training worlds dismiss, which is the on-theground work done by nonprofessionals. as a modifier of lowercase sciences, the adjective fuzzy does not diminish them but numbers them among an array of sciences and scientific practices. i want to recognize an additional fuzziness: that of the worlds of dog “rescue” and their overlap with the training worlds i highlight here. for example, i obtained haley’s successor, annie, a black-and-white pit bull–type dog, from an african american woman, anne, who was deeply involved in her neighborhood’s “fix our ferals” campaign. anne had taken annie in when she was sick and anne’s neighbors had intended to put her down. however, anne struggled with annie, who had lived all six months of her life in an eight-by-eight-foot concrete backyard and had not been house-trained or socialized extensively with other dogs; annie joined my household the weekend after she ate anne’s phone. this example speaks to two larger and common dynamics. the first is that the us world of animal rescue and shelters is only partially represented by the dynamics of my fieldwork site; in fact, much of the work of animal sheltering is done well outside of the official shelter. unlike my fieldwork site, this labor is undertaken in the main by middleand working-class people of multiple racial and ethnic identities who frequently cobble together efforts to rehome dogs in which the main goal is to keep them out of the space of the shelter, prioritizing other forms of shelter instead. the second notable dynamic, which became clear to me over the course 21 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) of both my fieldwork and ongoing contacts with these types of networks, is that these worlds of “rescue” quite often do not involve much in the way of formal training work, feminist or no; i frequently encounter people who are experts in moving dogs across states but lack the know-how to help them learn the behaviors necessary to do well in their new spaces. this is a fuzziness in terms of shelter as a verb and act of care, and this is a fuzziness in terms of a frequently incomplete linkage between the practices involved in keeping animals alive and helping them thrive. in pointing to these dynamics of fuzziness, i am invested in their potential to disrupt the norms of whiteness, class, and “family values” of the more official shelter space—the folks doing this work do not fit the norms i critique in the shelter—and the promise of possibly joining this work with more overtly feminist fuzzy training practices. these fuzzinesses also involve the sensibility of interspecies intersectionalities, for they help me feel toward new connections that promise alternate ways of building human-animal worlds. in other writings, i have put forward on-the-ground work of free and low-cost veterinary care based on harm-reduction models that strives to keep humans and animals together as a way to undertake variations on this type of work; such efforts interrupt the whiteness and family values of “rescue” while building and affirming different kinds of interspecies intersectionalities. however, in researching this piece, i have come to realize that there are few to no free, sliding-scale, or low-cost resources for humans who love their animals but also need help in terms of training them to better rest or thrive in their homes, in or outside of houses. drawing from interspecies intersectionalities as a sensibility, i am certainly alert to the colonialist overtones of such potential work; having mostly white people do training outreach to mostly lower-income people, many of them people of color, is not the kind of imagining that would answer well here. this is to say that the disruption i hope for and the invocation of interspecies intersectionalities as a sensibility that might facilitate better and different connections between feminist fuzzy sciences and larger worlds of “rescue” will be difficult to put into practice for a host of reasons. 22 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) in closing, i turn to what are, at this point, speculative conversations borne out of extended joint musings with several interlocutors. one of my co-musers is jane, a chinese american woman and fellow pit-bull aficionado whom i met during my fieldwork and who now works in a more formal capacity at another shelter. critical of the implicit whiteness and missionary rhetoric of dog “rescue” worlds, jane is also invested in addressing the lack of low-cost training services. she is also aware of the fuzziness of the on-the-ground work undertaken by most handlers and that r+ interventions take time that may not be available to many humans. cora has also pointed out practical difficulties to me, including the investment of time involved in teaching humans how to read and “speak dog.” another interlocutor, maggie, a middle-aged white woman who has participated for many years in nose-work trials, has been quick to note that the language of training is its own art, one not easily taught. i name these conversations not to underscore the difficulty of practically imagining feminist fuzzy sciences together with interspecies intersectionalities, but rather to point out how they reveal a jointness, an investment in a shared world-building that reaches well beyond my own efforts to think-with and towards disparate and multitudinous connections among the many worlds and people this article includes— prosaic feminisms, feminist sts, animal sheltering, and training discourses, especially r+. my hope is that those of us in those worlds, and others who are undoubtedly sharing similar conversations, can carefully and response-ably think-with the importance of interspecies intersectionalities as an analytic and sensibility in order to facilitate the crucial work of keeping animals together with the humans that they have often very mutually chosen, and that we can begin to do this together in the way most prosaic feminist movements would have it—as group work, with shared imaginings and deeply collective response-abilities. in proposing this collective work in my conclusion, i hope that it points to the possibility of the propagation of feminist fuzzy sciences as part of the larger world-building projects of what this issue terms “science out of feminisms.” 23 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) acknowledgements research for this article was supported by nsf grant number 1230743. notes 1 i deliberately use the language of owner rather than guardian here as part of my broader politics regarding pit bull-type dogs, for claims to ownership provide better legal protection than guardianship when such dogs are legislated against. 2 the names and characteristics of the humans and dogs in this piece have been changed to protect anonymity (except for my own). 3 notably, these discourses also bear a striking resemblance to parenting debates, which is to say that the fuzzy sciences i describe here, feminist and otherwise, are certainly not limited to dog training worlds. 4 despret (2013) also points to this affect in ethologists’ “embodied empathy.” references association of professional dog trainers. 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(2003). both ends of the leash (video). dog’s best friend, tawzer dog videos. 25 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ——— (2003). the other end of the leash. new york, ny: random house. ——— (2016, 4 january). what makes your dog happy? the other end of the leash. retrieved from http://www.patriciamcconnell.com/theotherendoftheleash/what-makes-adog-happy mcconnell, p., & london, k. (2003). feisty fido: help for the leashaggressive dog. black earth, wi: dog’s best friend. mech, l.d. (1999). alpha status, dominance, and division of labor in wolf packs. canadian journal of zoology, 77(8): 1196–1203. millan, c. 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(1984). don’t shoot the dog: the new art of teaching and training. gloucestershire, uk: ringpress books. ——— (2009, august 11). debunking dominance theory. karen pryor clicker training. retrieved from http://www.clickertraining.com/node/2297 puig de la bellacasa, m. (2012). “nothing comes without its world”: thinking with care. sociological review, 60(2), 197–216. rafkin, l. (2016, october 15). the anti-cesar millan. sfgate. retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/the-anti-cesar-millan-ian dunbar-s-been-2550043.php schenkel, r. (1946). expression studies on wolves: captivity observations. davemech.org. retrieved from http://www.davemech.org/schenkel/ skinner, b.f. (1938). the behavior of organisms: an experimental analysis. new york, ny: appleton-century. stilwell, v. (n.d.). myth versus fact. positively. retrieved from https://positively.com/dog-training/myths-truths/myth-vs-fact/ ——— (n.d.). what is positive training? positively. retrieved from https://positively.com/dog-training/positive-training/what-is-positivetraining/ bio harlan eugene weaver is an assistant professor of gender, women, and 27 weaver catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) sexuality studies at kansas state university. weaver works in the interstices of trans studies, affect theories, critical race studies, queer studies, multi-species ethnography, and feminist science and technology studies; he is currently writing a book titled bad dog. microsoft word 71505-1-11_fitschandfriedrich.docx fitsch, h. and friedrich, k. (2018). digital matters: processes of normalization in medical imaging. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-31. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © hannah fitsch and kathrin friedrich. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article digital matters: processes of normalization in medical imaging hannah fitsch technische universität berlin hannah.fitsch@tu-berlin.de kathrin friedrich humboldt-universität zu berlin kathrin.friedrich@hu-berlin.de abstract with the introduction of advanced computing technologies, medical imaging increasingly entails normalization through procedures that create, shape, and adjust comparable variables deduced from processes in the living body. the computational rationalities of imaging technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) and computed tomography (ct) not only determine how human bodies are envisioned and visualized, but also how they need to be aligned with apparatuses to answer experimental and diagnostic questions. by drawing on the theoretical concepts of computational rationality and intra-action as well as on ethnographic observations, we aim to disentangle the processes of normalization and the intra-actions of bodies and technologies in medical imaging on three levels. first, we show how, in the history of theoretical mathematics, dynamic processes were conceptualized as discrete and hence calculable, in particular how the ideas of joseph fourier informed the development of the fmri algorithms currently applied in experimental contexts. second, we analyze how the application of these algorithms enables and 2 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) determines practices in fmri-based research. third, we explore how bodies and technologies are aligned with tomography scanners and thereby demonstrate the conceptual and physical convergence of digitalization and materialization, which opens up possibilities for visualizing and understanding human bodies. in a theoretical and analytical perspective, we argue that a critical analysis of digital imaging processes calls for scrutiny of the epistemic and operational preconditions that are actualized but concealed in the application of imaging technologies. introduction contemporary digital medical imaging processes, for example in magnetic resonance imaging (mri) or computed tomography (ct), are based on mathematical models of the human body. because these models relate to characteristics such as tissue density or average morphologies of organs, they determine the subsequent measurement, computation, and imaging of anatomical and functional characteristics. mathematical paradigms for calculating physical properties and image reconstruction algorithms inform different stages of the imaging process and thereby not only dictate the epistemological conditions for the representation of bodies via images and the perception of aspects of bodies, but also impose very material constraints such as straps for immobilization and the use of contrast agents on patients during data acquisition. the algorithmization of bodily processes in digital imaging serves to prepare and generate specific concepts of “normal materiality” in such a way that the individual body is standardized through algorithms that provide specific body standards and average values. in this respect, mathematical models of the human body are normalizing in two ways. first, models can describe only a certain range of a paradigm that represents the object under investigation. the parameter set to designate an object is always already the average of a large group. second, this average, which initially framed a phenomenon technically in the laboratory, is epistemologically and materially translated back onto the body (daston & galison, 2010, pp. 183-190). both these aspects of 3 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) normalization are subject to “co-evolutionary” technologies (slavin, 2011), resulting in a statistical body. here normality must be understood as conceptually distinct from normativity (link, 2013, p. 202; link, 2014). normativity describes all ethical, legal, and political principles of desirable human actions in a specific society. normality by contrast is a historical phenomenon that arose with the ubiquitous datacizing of society and its individuals. the terms “datacized” or “datacizing” describe the mathematical translation processes from wetware (the human body) to hardware through apparatuses and back again. these processes oscillate in the high-tension alternating field of the organic and veer between standardization and individualization, normalization and appropriation. the “normal” in this case is the average of a mass; everything over or under its mean value is not part of normality (link, 2013, p. 202). normalization therefore describes the processual steps required to constitute normality. transforming the physical world into discrete and hence computable frequencies and functions means deciding and operationalizing what constitutes a part of, for example, the human body, and what does not. this begs the fundamental question of how the mathematical and computational foundations of technology enable and simultaneously provide knowledge of the body that is part of imaging processes as processes of normalization. software studies scholar david berry coined the term “computational rationality” to describe “a special sort of knowledge, [which] is essentially vicarious, taking place within other actors or combinations and networks of actors (which may be human or non-human) and formally algorithmic” (berry, 2011, p. 13). in contrast to instrumental rationality, computational rationality denotes a “special sort of knowledge” that, through processes of algorithmization such as in digital medical imaging, codifies how bodies become visible and comprehensible, but also how they must be configured to produce contextually significant knowledge. to disentangle the algorithmic and material processes at work in digital medical imaging, we focus on the intra-actions of imaging 4 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) technology and the human body in order to analyze how normalization is encoded and operationalized. the theoretical concept of intra-action was introduced by the physicist karen barad who employed the notion as an example of quantum physics. barad analyzed the interplay between a technological procedure and an object of investigation and used the term “intra-action” to describe “the inseparability of ‘observed object’ and ‘agencies of observation’” (barad, 2003, p. 814). she further explains the concept of intra-action: a specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the ‘apparatus of observation’) enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the cartesian cut – an inherent distinction – between subject and object) effecting a separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object’.... in other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata within phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions. (barad, 2003, p. 815) with barad’s notion of specific intra-actions, we can retrace and understand how agential cuts enact and constitute both relata and their relations in a material fashion, not only in terms of the material configuration of the “apparatus of observation” as barad writes, but also with regard to the “living materiality” of human bodies, which is subjected to normalizing programs through computational rationalities. to investigate the processes of normalization at work in digital imaging, we draw on barad’s notion of intra-action because it enables us to focus analytically on the applied technical apparatuses and their operational relations to bodies in order to explore the conditions of computational rationality and its agency in the two examples of fmri and ct. these imaging technologies represent the currently most widely applied forms of digital imaging in medicine and illustrate important agential cuts. with the concept of agential cut, barad describes the framework of a technical apparatuses that establishes a scientific phenomenon as well as who is observer and what is observed, who is subject and what is object. in this article, we explore the epistemological and material 5 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) preconditions of fmri and ct. we do not intend to compare the two technologies, but rather to emphasize their very similar "apparatus of observation" of preconditioning digital data generation, especially since both fmri and ct technologies are based on the cartesian co-ordinate system. physically aligning human bodies (even if only aspects are visualized) to the affordances of scanners illustrates how conceptual and material preconditions must converge in order to initiate the digital imaging process. against the background of our critical expertise in these two imaging technologies, we here analytically and methodologically draw an “agential cut” in, as we hope to show, the conceptual and operational overlaps and similarities between these imaging processes.1 we refer both to historical sources produced by developers and contemporary literature on medical imaging as well as to participant observations and interviews.2 we start by scrutinizing the conceptual codifications of physical bodies in the history of mathematics and imaging algorithms that inform the field of fmri. to show how these kinds of conception of a computational rationality are applied in ct, we then shift our focus to the rather material codification of bodies that enables the data generation process. i. conceptual codification: calculable models of the body digital imaging technologies transform the material human body into a visual medium through numbers (balsamo, 1999, p. 223) so that the body becomes data (balsamo, 2011; halpern, 2014; schinzel, 2009). by datacizing the organic, the body is turned into a consistent, endlessly reproducible and transportable “immutable mobile,” as bruno latour describes it (latour, 1990, p. 27). immutable mobile refers to the translation process from x-dimensional physical phenomena to twodimensional laboratory objects: [t]he two-dimensional character of inscriptions allows them to merge with geometry.... the result is that we can work on paper with rulers and numbers, but still manipulate three-dimensional 6 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) objects ‘out there’.... you cannot measure the sun, but you can measure the photograph of the sun with the ruler (latour, 1990, p. 46). historically, different analogies and models have been employed to imagine human bodily processes. in the eighteenth century, at the very beginning of the industrial revolution the human body was first imagined as a machine by the french physician julien offray de la mettrie in his essay l’homme machine [1748] (borck, 2010, p. 6). the human brain and its reasoning abilities were later compared to the computer and computer processes (engel & gold, 1998) while contemporary discourses often use the metaphor of dynamic networks (halpern, 2014). in this article we use the term “model” not as a metaphor of how the human life sciences visualize their concepts of bodies and their functions; we limit our investigation to mathematical models as they provide the basis for the digitalization of the human body (mehrtens, 2004). models in this sense aim to describe dynamic processes by reducing a phenomenon to finite paradigms that can be measured and expressed in equations and algorithms. the process of imaging living matter in the lab requires various preliminary decisions to manage the translation process from wetware (the human body) to hardware (the technical apparatus) by means of mathematical modeling. this is where models and average values of the wetware come into play. these models represent clinical and laboratory concepts and ideas relating to biological matter. with the introduction of advanced computing technologies, medical imaging increasingly entails normalization through procedures that create, shape, and adjust comparable variables “extracted” from living processes and processes of living. the idea of codifying living processes (in particular, cranial processes) as discrete, subdivided but self-contained entities (and hence computable forms that can be rendered into images) can be traced back to early experiments in physiology. codifying applies especially to the discipline currently known as neuroscience. in the nineteenth century, 7 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) anatomists worked alongside physiologists who wanted to identify the essence of the human being/humanity in a laboratory setting but needed new ways of measuring what was deemed to be “living” on dead bodies (hagner, 1997, p. 95). physiologists began to measure (invisible) body processes such as blood flow, metabolism, reproduction processes, etc., at the molecular level (raichle, 2008; hagner, 1997). wavelengths with this objective in mind, the work of physicist and mathematician jean-baptiste joseph fourier proved very helpful in the description and comparison of physical processes in the form of mathematical equations. through the study of heat flows in his théorie analytique de la chaleur (1822/1878), fourier developed the method of dimensional analysis which enabled him to codify objects or natural phenomena by conceptually fragmenting them into different properties characterized by their wavelengths. his analytical theory had an enormous impact on physics, mathematics, and, ultimately, on digitalization today. fourier’s initial and innovative thesis was “that we may develop in convergent series, or express by definite integrals, functions which are not subject to a constant law, and which represent the ordinates of irregular or discontinuous lines” (fourier, 1878, p. 22). the epistemological impact of fourier’s theory was groundbreaking in that it not only overturned previous ideas on the calculation of material properties, but also called for a more application-oriented mathematics. fourier included in this mathematics the description and differentiation of the physical characteristics of objects such as waveforms of heat in his attempt to find a baseline for calculating and comparing corresponding properties in different objects. this allowed him to conceptually transform the physical world into discrete (and hence calculable) frequencies and functions. for him, such mathematical descriptions were equivalent to the laws of nature. mathematical analysis has therefore necessary relations with 8 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) sensible phenomena; its object is not created by human intelligence; it is a pre-existent element of the universal order, and is not in any way contingent or fortuitous; it is imprinted throughout all nature. (fourier, 1878, p. 25) the basic assumption underlying fourier’s method is that a small number of invariable and simple natural laws exist and that, by considering objects as an assemblage of different properties, the object as a whole can be rendered amenable to measurement and computation. fourier proclaimed nothing less than the absolute countability of objects and physical reality. the shift from an atomistic concept of materiality to an oscillatory and process-driven idea of physical phenomena was the actual epistemic turn and the reason why fourier is seen as the pioneer of digitalization (siegert, 2003, pp. 17-18; donner, 2006). this led to a completely different understanding of the analytical frameworks in physics. it was fourier’s analytical toolkit and his idea of fragmenting and transforming material objects into wavelengths and frequencies that enabled the interweaving of analysis with calculability and predictability. the entanglement of calculability and predictability ultimately resulted in an era of risk assessment typical of digital processes. risk assessment here refers to the scientific collection of data to generate epistemic value from not just describing, but also prognostically evaluating, its future meaning. fourier understood that he had established a way to mathematize the human body because, for him, “mathematical analysis has outrun observation, it has supplemented our senses, and has made us in a manner witnesses of regular and harmonic vibrations in the interior of bodies” (fourier, 1878, p. 24). for fourier, the application of his mathematical theorem to physical objects not only led to the conclusion that natural laws could be calculated, but also that their mathematical description could be used to forecast possible behaviors. 9 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) axioms at the end of nineteenth century, theoretical mathematicians started another revolutionary (in mathematical terms) discussion about the meaning and the intentions of axioms in mathematical theory: what does it take for an axiomatic rule to be deemed to be true? an axiom is a mathematical principle presented as evident and taken to be true. axioms serve as starting points for further reasoning and as arguments for mathematical problems. at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the meaning of axioms in mathematics changed fundamentally owing to the work of mathematician david hilbert (1862-1943), who invented a new axiomatic system for euclidean geometry (hilbert, 1899; heintz, 1993). as the mathematician and philosopher eva müller-hill writes, this new notion came up in response to the questions of what are the features that make the availability of mathematical proof a necessary or sufficient condition for mathematical knowledge? what is the role of formalizability in this context? in what sense of ‘formalizable’ is formalizability essential for the epistemic significance of mathematical proof? (müller-hill, 2011). the debate triggered by hilbert’s work not only provided the foundations of theoretical mathematics, but also gave rise to its paradoxes. and as axioms no longer needed to have any relevance to, or justification in, practical experience, therefore the question of what makes an axiom true had a new answer: it is self-evident and true as long as no other axiom holds that its meaning is false. through this formal understanding of axioms, mathematics developed its own language, not simply on the basis of numbers or classifications of mathematical parameters, but through the interrelation of mathematical objects as points, lines, planes, and surfaces. with hilbert’s principle, the objects defined by the axioms can also become true if no contradictions to them can be stated. for hilbert, this was the new criterion for defining truth and existence in mathematics (heintz, 1993, p. 28). this new mathematical freedom from materialization and empirical 10 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) experience allowed mathematical equations to become very productive in the creation of new worlds (heintz, 1993, p. 27). with this second shift, we witness the loss of reference to practical and empirical experience. the decision problem the discussion of axioms in theoretical mathematics was accompanied by new forms of application-oriented endeavors in practical mathematics. alan turing (1912-1954) found an answer that applies this new conception of axioms to algorithms and computing, by solving the entscheidungsproblem (decision problem). the decision problem refers to the difficulty of identifying the generality of expressions mechanically. a general procedure had to be established to decide whether or not a theoretical sentence could be proved. in formal mathematics, there are two main types of algorithm: questions requiring a “yes/no” answer (decision algorithms) and “what” questions (calculation algorithms) (heintz, 1993, p. 74). alan turing shaped the concept of algorithms by suggesting a solution to the decision problem, which was the subject of much discussion in the mathematical research community, in particular within the circle at göttingen university that gathered around hilbert. in his paper on computable numbers (1936), turing provided a new interpretation of the entscheidungsproblem, which, instead of suggesting a new axiom, proposed a concrete construction: an apparatus. turing gave expression to the new mathematical language through the invention of a formal machine that could process a couple of “yes/no” questions. implementing formal logic in a machine allowed turing to limit the decision process to “yes/no” questions and thereby reduce the number of human decisions at the outset. turing was aware that computing is based on mathematical regulations and that the very human decision problem had to be solved for algorithmic processing, so in argumentum e contrario it was clear that human beings who follow a regulatory requirement are performing in a mechanical way. an algorithm is not necessarily mathematical; it can be a pattern of specific steps to be 11 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) performed mechanically, without thought. and vice versa: something that can be performed mechanically can also be performed by a machine. through this new understanding of the algorithm, turing turned the idea of mathematical calculation upside down and accorded a major role to the technical apparatus (turing, 1936). turing did not choose an abstract physical quantity as the starting point for computable functions; rather, he took the concept of the calculation process itself as the basis for an algorithmic procedure. but it was the detection of fourier series and continuous fourier transforms that marked the mathematical shift from analysis to synthesis, which remains to this day the source for every digital media-based system. this is also true for fmri where several fourier transforms produce the picture of a “thinking” (i.e., blinking) brain map. it is not possible in this article to outline the whole history of brain imaging, nor the epistemic shifts that occurred in neuroscience and cognition theory from the mind-brain dualism to contemporary computational neuroscientific methods. what we want to show with our brief review of the changes in theoretical mathematics and applicationoriented physics is the intertwining of the logics of methodological approaches and the knowledge of physical properties produced through them. with the birth of computational logic, the human brain and its thought processes have always been related to the computer metaphor, and this has accompanied all the changes the concept of the computer has undergone over the last hundred years. orit halpern describes the current neuroscientific understanding of the computer metaphor for cognition in the human brain: “reframing memory and decision making in terms of information, recoding, and data compression, the psychologist george miller created a new account of psychology, arguing cognition was an algorithmic process that could be manipulated” (halpern, 2014, p. 201). to summarize: fourier reduced physical values and qualities to wavelengths so that physical characteristics could be represented in mathematical equations. a turn in theoretical mathematics at the 12 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) beginning of twentieth century transformed the idea of algebraic truth and the concept of an axiom. from now on, the concept of an axiom held to be true no longer need rely on experiential or physical reality; an axiom was now effective when no other axioms contradicted it. with this shift, theoretical mathematics became self-referential and the essence of empirical proof as preconditions for the calculation process. turing enabled the sequential calculation of a chain of algorithms without human intervention by building a machine that proposed subsequent options after one algorithm had been answered. every answer to a “yes/no” question led to a new “yes/no” question. turing used human courses of action as templates for computed actions. to do so, he reduced mechanical courses of action to simple steps in order to minimize their complexity and store them in a schematic order. this epistemic change served as the foundation for the development of digital imaging processes and thus formed the basis for images of processes. fragmenting the body to understand the logic of medical digital images of the inner human body in particular parts such as the brain as an object of investigation, this logic must be related to the mathematical approaches of these datacizing processes. in the generation of medical visualization technology that followed, the human body and brain was modeled and virtually fragmented into small entities that could be measured and made amenable to further computerization and normalization. today, brain processes in modern computed neuroscience are framed as dynamic neural networks. the idea of the neuronal network is based on mathematical equations of synaptic growth (i.e. deep learning) and an operationalized definition of characteristic processes. that means the concept of a computer is still a metaphor for the brain. however, with the development of high performance processors and complex networks, the idea of the brain also changed. algorithm-based methodological ideas for analyzing the brain became the overall representation of the brain as 13 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) such: “most broadly, looking through the lens of computer science can teach us about the nature of the human mind” (christian & griffiths, 2016, p. 4). through this epistemic change in the neurosciences, the brain is seen as a network handling a bunch of calculable processes. ii. algorithmic codification to measure the brain fourier’s investigations paved the way for the digital codification and production of images of the human brain in fmri. the computational rationality paradigm that fourier provided is part of a new epistemic framework of materiality produced in natural scientific laboratories. in the last thirty years, digitalization procedures have been implemented more broadly in technical equipment and laboratory apparatuses which are not only used for measuring or examining existing entities, but also announce a new logic of scientific enquiry. following on from the long scientific tradition involving observation and description of natural phenomena, technical laboratory practice has turned toward the creation of referential and ideal reality (cetina, 1997). the human brain as a computational network in this section, we examine how the computational rationality of fmri is conceptualized by understanding the human brain as a computational network that can be measured using digital imaging technologies. in particular, the algorithms involved in the multiple transformation processes required to visualize the brain in the field of fmri are interesting in terms of how the brain is algorithmically codified and which agential cuts are enacted through and in laboratory practices. keeping in mind that a number of non-visible computational steps must be taken to articulate the human brain as a physical object in the form of visual data, we explore the underlying mathematical steps necessary to render the brain in this form, including (but not limited to) those steps that involve categorizing different aspects of the physical brain. by exploring the 14 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) epistemic dimension of algorithms in brain imaging, we seek to understand its resulting effects on conceptions of the brain as such. to accommodate the human body in fmri measurement procedures, various steps are required. empirical science is mostly hypothesis-driven and demands that the complexity of the object of investigation be reduced to paradigms that can be examined by apparatuses (dumit, 2004; fitsch, 2012). even if they are not explicitly articulated, certain assumptions guide the research, expectations, and interpretation of its outcome. the trained psychologist tyler lorig, who teaches in an interdisciplinary neuroscience program, maintains that the fundamental theoretical and, in particular, epistemological question of functional brain research is the where question because any localization of physiological activity must apply an anatomical map of the brain (lorig, 2009, p. 18). to measure the functional activity of a human brain with a magnetic resonance tomograph (basically a huge magnetic field), the brain is treated conceptually as if it consisted of small entities of information, so-called voxels. the magnetic resonance scanner applies a cartesian co-ordinate system to divide the brain virtually: first into slices and then to subdivide each slice into a grid along the x and y axes. single slices are scanned one after the other and aligned on a z axis in order to represent a third dimension. the next step in producing data and creating an image is to manipulate the magnetic field strength using changing gradient fields. the mr signal is actually produced by the clever use of electromagnetic coils that generate and receive electromagnetic fields at the resonant frequencies of the atomic nuclei within the static magnetic field. this process gives the name “resonance” to magnetic resonance imaging. because most atomic nuclei of interest for mri studies have resonant frequencies in the radiofrequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum (at typical field strengths for mri), these coils are also called radiofrequency coils. unlike the static magnetic field, the radiofrequency fields are turned on during small portions of the image acquisition process 15 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and remain off the rest of the time. (huettel, 2009, p. 35) through several algorithmic steps, such as fourier transforms, the datacized frequencies are translated into numbers, and every located voxel in the cartesian coordinate system is arranged as a grey tone that indicates its activity value. after the measurement of, and translation into, grey values, several preprocessing steps follow. the data has to be cleansed to remove artifacts, for instance motion corrections or slice scan time corrections to name just two kinds of preprocessing corrections among others.3 to compare individual brain data, the researcher must standardize the scanned brains in terms of size and shape, average activity, etc. this standardization step is called “normalization” and describes the process of adjusting the anatomical brain data to a unified brain; each individual brain is thus adapted to the size of standardized brain coordinates. the “normalization” of the anatomical brain data is necessary to superimpose and reconnect the functional brain data on and to the anatomical data in order to provide evidence for the functional data by locating it in the anatomical cartography of the brain. an interesting ambivalence arises here in the data analysis process. there are algorithms in brain imaging analysis software that co-register functional data on the anatomical, but most neuroscientists prefer to do this manually because they do not trust software-based templates: so there is also an algorithm for computational co-registration, but when i see how badly this co-registration of functional and anatomical data works, i have no confidence in using algorithms; instead i want to see the data and do the co-registration myself. (interview 2009: 19 min., translation hf)4 once the data has been prepared by following the relevant statistical preprocessing steps (cleansing the data of noise and setting average qualities for the greyscale shading), the process of analyzing the functional data can start (fitsch, 2014, p. 93). 16 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) intuitive intention to return to the ambivalent behavior highlighted in the above interview extract: what is at stake when researchers analyze computed imaging data but simultaneously question the quality of algorithmic processing? what is the impact of algorithmic codification on the analytical process, especially if the researchers do not have confidence in the algorithms? how does the use of imaging processes change our understanding of living matter if imaging technologies seemingly allow us to open up the human body to analysis in real time? the interview extract indicates that the process of analyzing algorithmic data relies on human interpretation. the evaluation and interpretation process is based on implicit, tacit knowledge (polanyi, 1966) influenced by the research question and personal everyday circumstances, and how the images of the scanned brain are used to adapt the research results or reject them as inappropriate. this also includes how scientists remember the probands (i.e., particular subjects being studied). for example, lower activity levels are accepted without problematization as the data can be explained by the fact that the subject was a woman, and thus lower activity is expected. this process-driven characteristic can be described with the term intuitive intention (fitsch, 2014, p. 217), a concept that enables the articulation of the entanglement of the scientific community’s presumptions and daily-life knowledge on the one hand, and the digitalized and visualized data produced through apparatuses in measuring and calculating processes in fmri on the other. the terms “intuitive” and “intention” are not intended as fixed concepts of opposing positions; on the contrary, bringing these two concepts together demonstrates how intertwined the two notions are. when speaking of intuitive intention, the computer-driven analytical process is understood as an interplay of apparently “objective computational data” (generated by standardized technologies and algorithms in the measuring processes) with subjective, everyday knowledge and aesthetic decisions. 17 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) neuroscientists working with brain data describe the production and mediation of knowledge through computed images as highly intuitive. the word “intuitive” is used an appreciative way, in the sense of the “most natural,” the most intelligible form of knowledge representation for human perception. by “intuitive” it is meant, that the data can be understood straightforwardly. the word “intuitive” links the objective technique of imaging with an evaluation based on subjective decisions, which can, however, take on an objectified status through the appeal to the images – which is the most natural way of making nature speak. this brings together that which ultimately constitutes the status of the image in the laboratory: the image holds the promise of a scientific fact that only has to be interpreted correctly. the term “intention” outlines the overall formalization and mathematization process we described earlier in this article (starting with fourier and turing), and incorporates the entire computed knowledge production, which berry defines as “computational rationality” (berry, 2011). algorithmically and aesthetically guided intentions enter into the images through the highly preconditioned apparatuses and formalized processes, but they are read as expressions of the phenomenon itself and thus seemingly neutral. as a result, implicit knowledge structures find their way into the interpretation of the algorithmically produced images. they are read as “objective factuality” but power and power relations are inscribed. interpreting brain maps leads scientists to rely on aesthetic and subjective assessments when reading and working with the visual logics of the brain image. this means normative comparisons relating to aesthetic ideas enter into the analysis process and are heavily influenced by common-sense notions of gender, sexuality, or ethnicity. as we see in the next section, the body to be scanned, or the brain as a more specific part, needs to be normalized in line with the program of computational rationality that guides the scanner’s operation, in this case a ct scanner. 18 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) iii. intra-actions in/of diagnostic imaging in this section we shift our focus to the material and technological preconditions of a digital imaging process using ct as an example. in a scanner suite, the conceptual codifications of measurement and visualization need to be materially aligned with the patient’s physical body. the operational and material basis for acquiring and visually comparing image data as described above are the actions undertaken in the scanner suite. they physically enact agential cuts to establish context-specific processual and, especially, spatial relations between body, technology, and image. in this respect, the differences between radiological scanning technologies remain largely insignificant, even though mri and ct employ different physical properties and serve different epistemic functions. yet the dispositives of mri and ct scanning suites share similar features when embedding human bodies in scanners. in the field of ct scanning, the computational rationality constituted conceptually and algorithmically entails very material prerequisites for the imaging process. current practices for imaging living human bodies in ct are based on a fundamental precondition that the body’s mobility must be framed and immobilized before any imaging process can start. in this section we show how, with today’s radiological imaging technologies, this prerequisite becomes a force with highly practical consequences for the body. in the initial data acquisition phase using an mri or ct scanner, the body is aligned with the affordances of the scanner. by following the protocols of positioning the patient inside the scanner ring, technicians adjust the space of the body to the space of the cartesian co-ordinate system, which determines the geometric references for tomographic scanning. some of the positioning procedures also entail rigid immobilization of the patient with the aid of straps in order to prevent motion artifacts in the subsequent images. in order to generate and process a contextually 19 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) significant image, body and machine need to be materially and spatially intra-acting.5 only by adjusting and aligning the somatic and technological spaces can the transformation between digital and physical processes (and hence their normalization) be initiated so as to activate the computational rationality of radiological scanning. as mentioned above, karen barad coined the terms “intra-action” and “agential cut” to shift the analytical focus toward the situated interplay between a technological procedure and an object of investigation that established both the relata and their relations for a specific epistemological and operational regime – in this case, a diagnostic insight. while barad’s analysis is directed toward intra-actions that enact agential cuts during an experiment, transferring the concept of intra-action to diagnostic contexts in medical imaging is productive as a means of examining the more routine measures that need to be taken before an imaging process can be initiated in a non-invasive and therefore seemingly immaterial procedure. barad offers a method for critical thinking about technologically configured sets of apparatus and practices that generate knowledge about bodies and their dynamic materiality. the apparatuses’ own logic mutually (re)generates and aligns paradigms derived from mathematical epistemology and hence operating according to a processual logic of normalization, in both the sense of conceptualization prior to technological applications and the reconfiguration of materiality in the course of applying digital technologies. materiality in this sense must be understood not only as the physicality of a body or a technical apparatus, but also as a conceptual codification or epistemic program, which is inseparably linked to, or inscribed in, materiality. media studies scholar scott curtis identified the tension between dynamic liveliness and diagnostic epistemology as a basic struggle of medical hermeneutics: the human body is … frustratingly resistant to contemplation, study, and interpretation …. in this sense, medicine’s foundational hermeneutic dilemma rests on a dialectic of movement and 20 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) stillness that is mimicked by the use of motion pictures in medicine and is re-enacted in digital medical imaging techniques. (curtis, 2004, pp. 220-221) but before the bodies’ movements can be reconstructed using moving images or functional imaging, a paradox must be solved: how is an agential cut drawn that transforms the properties of a dynamic process into discrete and computable entities that can be fed into a mechanical process of abstraction?6 by focusing on two different material measures taken in the process of the data acquisition in diagnostic ct imaging, we demonstrate how agential cuts are physically enacted and targeted to produce codes of material substances (i.e., digital images of tissue densities). the examples of material measures we use to illustrate this intra-action are techniques for positioning the patient in the scanner and applying contrast media. these particular procedures are designed to bridge the operational gaps between living bodies and computational rationalities such as scanning algorithms by enacting agential cuts between them and mediating their intra-actions to generate a valid diagnostic image. by analyzing historical texts written by the developers of ct and drawing on our own and secondary participant observations in scanning suites, we attempt to disentangle the material operations aimed at establishing the intra-actions between bodies and scanner technology so as to enable the agential cuts for digital images. this analysis reveals the obstacles and resistances to aligning somatic and technological materialities. positioning the patient the techniques for positioning the patient in a scanner are designed to align the patient’s body with the technology’s cartesian co-ordinate system and thereby establish common spatial reference points that enable the transformation and identification of spatial measurements through both algorithmic processes during computation and human actions in the course of producing images. positioning techniques mainly 21 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) concern the position the patient needs to adopt on the bench when inside the scanner ring (saunders, 2008, pp. 111-113). in order to compare anatomical landmarks and the geometric reference system projected automatically by the scanner onto the body, technicians must align the reference systems by instructing or moving the patient. the basic geometric and mathematical reference of the cartesian co-ordinate system, which is the basis for the scanner’s operation (as in the mri scanner) and guides the measurement and imaging processes, becomes manifest and quite instructive in this positioning phase. the human body becomes part of an operational geometry that affects its own physical configuration and imposes a process of normalization derived from the computational rationality of ct since each body must be measured according to the same reference system. in the early experimental phase of ct scanning, neuroradiologist james ambrose emphasized the need for stillness during the phase of data acquisition: a small amount of movement will introduce aberrations into the readings. this will reduce the quality of the pictures. a considerable amount of patient co-operation is therefore required and … four minutes is a long time for a patient to remain perfectly still, and some small movements nearly always occur. (ambrose, 1973, pp. 1038-1039). scanning was a longer process in the technology’s early days. however, remaining immobile and in some cases also holding one’s breath during scanning are still prerequisites for the generation of clinically valid images. contrast media a further example of the codification of somatic materiality and, in particular, the vivacity of the patient in line with the rationalities of the imaging process, is the use of contrast media. contrast media such as bariumor iodine-based substances are used to enhance the “extraction” 22 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) of diagnostically significant signals from the large quantity of measurements taken by the scanner. the assumption that body and contrast media will intra-act in a standardized and hence reliable manner demonstrates the expectation that images generated in this way will have “enhanced visibility.” contrast media will adhere to highly specific parts of tissue or aggregate in cavities and thereby indicate malfunctions or pathologies. in such locations, the x-ray beams of the ct scanner are attenuated in a different way and therefore highlight a certain condition in the body. the contrast medium as a material substance is intended to change the body’s own materiality in intra-action with the x-rays; measurements can then be digitally presented and diagnostically reviewed. as with the use of positioning techniques, the use of contrast media is intended to prepare the patient’s body to reflect the computational rationality of medical imaging before any image is even generated. the mathematical system applied by establishing a spatial reference frame for both technology and body (i.e., the cartesian coordinate system) also enables specific material properties such as tissue density to be addressed. thus technology and body intra-act to enact an agential cut that stems from the computational rationality encoded by imaging algorithms that enable radiological diagnostics. iv. conclusion normalization processes and intra-actions of bodies and technologies in medical imaging can be traced on different levels. as we have argued throughout this article, a critical analysis of digital imaging processes calls for scrutiny of the epistemic and operational preconditions actualized but concealed in the application of imaging technologies. they are effective on multiple levels: conceptual, applied algorithmic, and material. as we have shown, the idea of digitizing dynamic processes has inscribed itself into the algorithms that operate inside tomography scanners. by shifting the analytical focus to the modes and conditions of 23 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) the computational rationality of certain technologies and to the operational and epistemological gaps entailed in the transformation of living entities into algorithmic processes (e.g., the role of intuitive knowledge in image interpretation), we have shown that it is not only formal and deterministic processes that are operative. thought processes “translated into a mechanical process of action” (trogemann, 2010, p. 43) also guide the intra-action of these thought processes, their algorithmic codification, and the material forms they take as they retroact at another level on a material, cultural, and social world evidently affected by them (trogemann, 2010, p. 44). in this section, to connect the two case studies we analyzed in this article, we employ an example based on the practice of fmri but utilize material constraints similar to those illustrated with the example of ct: the fmri head coil. the fmri head coil exemplifies the convergence of epistemic and operational preconditions of imaging in a single object. it also enables further discussion of our notion of agential cuts in the context of normalization within and through different levels of digital imaging processes. as we outlined above, the magnetic resonance tomograph is based on a huge static magnetic field that aligns the hydrogen protons in human tissue (mri) or in blood (fmri) in one direction. under normal conditions, nuclear magnetic dipoles in the body are randomly arranged; but, if a strong external magnetic field is applied, the molecules inside the body become polarized. the head coil is responsible for activating the radiofrequency fields to distract the protons for a short period of time in order to measure how long they need to return to their previous (i.e., aligned) position (see also the description in section ii). in the coil placed over the head to measure the so-called functional activity of the brain, the operative-technical normalization is aligned with mathematical-epistemic knowledge. what is measured through the magnetic resonance and the nuclear spinning movement is essentially the assumption that the presence of fresh blood is an indicator of brain activity: “neural activity is linked to susceptibility changes in the following way: it increases local metabolic demands, and these are 24 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) compensated for by an increase in local blood flow and capillary volume” (roskies, 2008, p. 23). there are many presuppositions in the fmri head coil technique. these start with general body regulations: people with a wider body volume do not fit into the scanner and under the head coil; people with claustrophobia are unable to take part in the experiment because the scanner and the head coil are very tight, and patients have to lie still for one to two hours during the experiment, due to the risk of producing motion artifacts. the frequency rate depends on various conditions. for example, to start the scanner, a technician has to enter the patient’s gender, which is coded as a binary option of female/male. the frequency rates refer to different gender standards in the specific absorption rate of the brain material (dimbylow, 2005). by analytically tracing three agential cuts, we have sought to disentangle the intra-actions in digital processes on the above-mentioned three levels (i.e., conceptual, applied algorithmic, and material). examining the history of theoretical mathematics and its effects on experimental imaging practices demonstrated that this computational rationality constitutes an ontological “space of possibilities.” the shift initiated with fourier’s new understanding of “nature” (i.e., the change from an atomistic concept of materiality to an oscillatory and processdriven idea of physical phenomena) is merely a methodological shift in digital medical surveying technologies. the translation process from wetware to hardware has to convert complex physical matter into wavelengths in order to subdivide and describe their characteristics through sine and cosine functions. however, for visualization, diagnostic or analytical purposes, these wavelengths have to be resituated onto a digital map of the body or the brain. this digital and visual (re)localization of bodily characteristics constitutes a new digital matter: they create statistical maps that combine the virtual and visual object, yet are at once a representation of something (i.e., the “thinking” brain) and its quantification. mapping defines a landscape and is always necessarily a project to install a norm. through this “tendency to convert abstract 25 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) concepts into entities” (gould, 1996, p. 56) (i.e., by locating them in the human brain), digital medical images such as fmri images become highly relevant to society’s normalizing discourses, for instance, by constructing what a gendered brain looks like and the kinds of behavior it supposedly gives rise to. their becoming actual and plausible takes place in the application of imaging technologies whose logics of quantification are enclosed and completed but nevertheless shape our perception and understanding of brains and bodies. thus the experimental and diagnostic inquiries that can be addressed to these imaging technologies are inherently limited by their computational rationalities. only the questions and decisions that were conceptually and algorithmically encoded in the scanner’s software and hardware can be addressed and answered by employing imaging technologies. a critical analysis of digital imaging processes must therefore extend the scope of study to the epistemic preconditions that encode and actualize the agential cuts and intra-actions that generate experimental knowledge and lead to diagnostic decisions. technologies themselves hide the agential cuts, they enact and obfuscate the difference and agency of subjects and objects; that means, to uncover inherent normalization processes, the analytical disentanglement of intra-actions that precede visualizations are a fundamental attempt. notes 1 to focus on conceptual codifications, we take the brain as a more specific part of the body as it is also the focus of attention in the context of the experimental research we explored. 2 we refer to a research corpus generated through field studies that included interviews and participant observation in 2008 and 2009 at the max planck institute for brain science in germany. 3 for a broader introduction to the technique of fmri see toga & mazziotta (2000), gallagher (2008), and fitsch (2014). 4 fitsch used technografie, see rammert & schubert (2006) (i.e., an 26 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) ethnography with a focus on technology) as a methodology based on qualitative methods such as participant observation, interviews with experts, and document analysis, see fitsch (2014). 5 for the collective and perceptual dispositions activated when reading ct scans, see friedrich (2010). 6 for more on the visual culture and visual history of medicine, see holtzmann kevles (1997) and cartwright (1995). references ambrose, j. 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(2008). functional neuroimaging: a historical and physiological perspective. in r. cabeza & a. kingstone (eds.), handbook of functional neuroimaging of cognition (pp. 3-20), cambridge, ma: mit press. rammert, w., & schubert, c. (eds.) (2006). technografie. zur mikrosoziologie der technik [technography for a microsociology of technology]. frankfurt, de: campus. roskies, a. (2008). neuroimaging and inferential distance. neuroethics, 1, 19-30. saunders, b. f. (2008). ct suite. the work of diagnosis in the age of 30 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) noninvasive cutting. durham, nc: duke university press. siegert, b. (2003). passage des digitalen. zeichenpraktiken der neuzeitlichen wissenschaften 1500-1900 [passage of the digital: use of symbols in modern science 1500-1900]. berlin, de: brinkmann & bose. slavin, k. (2011). how algorithms shape our world. ted talk. retrieved from https://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_slavin_how_algorithms_shape_our_worl d?language=de schinzel, b. (2009). recognisability and visual evidence in medical imaging versus scientific objectivity. in b. huppauf & c. wulf (eds.): dynamics and performativity of imagination: the image between the visible and the invisible (pp. 339-356). new york, ny: routledge. toga, a. w., & mazziotta, j. c. (eds.). (2000). brain mapping. the systems. san diego, ca: academic press. trogemann, g. (2010). code and machine. in a. gleiniger & g. vrachliotis (eds.). code: between operation and narration (pp. 41-54). basel, ch: birkhäuser. turing, a. (1936). on computable numbers, with an application to the entscheidungsproblem. in proceedings of the london mathematical society, 42/2, 230-265. bios dr. hannah fitsch works at the center for interdisciplinary women's and gender studies at technische universität berlin with her project how bodies turn into numbers and numbers into images. on algorithms in brain research and the logic of standardization. she is postdoc at the berlin graduate program digital transformation digital. before, she realized the project gender technik museum. strategies of gender balanced practices in technical museums funded by the german ministry of research and education www.gendertechnikmuseum.de. dr. des. kathrin friedrich works as a postdoc research associate at the cluster of excellence “image knowledge gestaltung. an interdisciplinary laboratory” at humboldt university in berlin. previously she was a research associate at the academy of media arts in cologne after 31 fitsch and friedrich catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) studying media studies, law and sociology at the university of marburg. bailey article    misogynoir in medical media: on caster semenya and r. kelly    moya bailey northeastern university m.bailey@northeastern.edu as philosopher linda alcoff (2005) asserts, racism depends on perceptible difference to determine which bodies are expendable—and in this cultural moment of black hypervisibility, black women are particularly vulnerable. i use two cultural examples to explore the real-life impact of misogynoir in medical media, particularly the ways in which the biomedical knowledge produced by physicians reinforces certain bodies as normal and others as pathological. the case of athlete caster semenya and the trial of r&b star r. kelly allow me to introduce black feminist health-science studies as a critical intervention into current medical curriculum-reform conversations. the 2009 controversy surrounding world-class runner caster semenya illustrates the unique synergy between socially constructed biases and medically derived standards, which collude to pathologize some bodies more than others. by focusing on the misogynoir-istic representation of semenya in global media, i highlight the importance of aesthetics in both medicine and social logics, a correlation that is rooted in the origins of medical education. the prosecution team in the r. kelly trial tried to adapt the didactic medical medium of the tanner scale to prove the age of the girl in the video, raising important questions about how observation becomes science and science becomes medicine that can be evaluated in a court of law (vineyard, 2004). i argue toward a theory of black feminist health-science studies that builds on social-justice science focused and centered on the health and well-being of marginalized groups. misogynoir describes the co-constitutive, anti-black, and misogynistic racism directed at black women, particularly in visual and digital culture (bailey, 2010).  the term is a combination of misogyny, “the hatred of women,” and noir, which means “black” but also carries film and media connotations.  it is the particular amalgamation of anti-black racism and misogyny in popular media and culture that targets black trans and cis women.  representational images contribute to negative societal perceptions about black women, which can precipitate racist gendered violence that harms health and can even result in death.  i see racism and sexism as public health concerns that critically impact medical treatment and medical science, as they touch all aspects of our culture and society. i discuss the misogynoir that animates these stories within popular media that rely on medical media to communicate to the lay public. in these examples we see deeply rooted biomedical beliefs that stem from, as well as inform, sociocultural ideas about the bodies of black women and reveal medical practitioners’ anxieties, which raises lingering questions for me about our expectations of justice and the amelioration of health disparities for those multiply marginalized in our world. caster’s case on august 19, 2009, south african runner caster semenya competed in the track and field world championships and vaulted into the headlines with a world-record-breaking time in the women’s 800-meter race. shortly after her win, semenya went into hiding and was placed on suicide watch. her genitalia, sexual organs, and hormone levels became the subject of global discussion, seemingly before she had been able to make sense of the speculations herself. semenya, then eighteen, said a few days after the firestorm erupted that south african athletic officials “should have left me in my village at home” (bbc news, 2009). how did a record-breaking athlete at the height of her career become suicidal in the course of a few days? semenya is one of many women who find themselves and their bodies caught in the crux of what science says exists and what society says should be, with little regard for what actually is. caster semenya was exposed as intersex, a person with a so-called “disorder of sexual differentiation,” meaning her body does not fit neatly into sociomedical categories of male and female (fausto-sterling, 2000, p. 45). it is unclear whether semenya was aware of her non-normative female anatomy before it was brought to global attention through the leaked results of a gender test by the international association of athletics federations (iaaf).1 semenya had completed the required gender test for female athletes in her home country, but protests from fellow competitors prompted the iaaf to investigate further. she consented to the additional testing, although she was not initially informed of its purpose. her genitals were photographed and examined, her internal organs x-rayed. genetic and chromosomal analysis were conducted all to determine if she was in fact a she, according to a multipronged medical rubric designed to identify “true” sex through a process misleadingly called “gender testing” (hart, “caster semenya’s gender test results force iaaf to call in outside help,” 2009).  in addition to the invasion of semenya’s privacy, the test itself inspired headlines around the world, which proclaimed “she’s a he!” or the more dubious “is she really a he?”—sparking a global media frenzy with expert and lay opinions on semenya’s case (hurst, 2009; jacobson, 2009). the amount of publicity semenya’s story received, and is still generating seven years later at the 2016 olympic games, overwhelms any commensurate reporting on other women athletes’ stories in the past (hurst, 2009). a database search reveals over a hundred times as many listings for semenya as for any other female athlete whose sex has been called into question. after semenya won a silver medal at the 2012 london olympic games, journalists speculated that she purposely avoided the gold because she did not want to deal with the glare of the spotlight, effectively bringing her into the center of a media storm they said she was trying to escape (thomas, 2012). what makes her different? there is something about caster semenya that makes for a good news story. the intersections of race, sex, and nationality all come to bear in the marketability of semenya’s triumph-turned-tragedy in the global media. the specter of the black woman’s body at the intersections of socially constructed and medically reinforced hierarchies of biological difference remains a trope in contemporary media and dates back to our earliest uses of mass communications. i explore the feedback loop between popular media representation and medical media to tease out the undergirding structures that support their interconnection and the impact on semenya. it is through biomedical discourse that societal norms are solidified and rendered objective science. by examining the misogynoir embedded in this biomedical rhetoric accompanying media that is used to disburse it, i hope to offer sites for intervention and transformation that challenge hegemonic perceptions of black women. gender testing developed in relation to professional sports to ensure that no men could pretend to be women to win competitions, the assumption being that men would easily defeat women in any sport (fausto-sterling, 2000, p. 3). since the first international testing began in 1966, no male (assigned at birth) person has been discovered pretending to be a woman. however, women with non-normative female anatomy have had their identities challenged and their lives altered. many have lost their careers and endorsements, been barred from competition, and had their personal lives ripped apart when biomedical science reveals that they are “really” male. western science proposes a dichotomous and streamlined relationship between sex, gender, and, ultimately, sexuality. gender testing relies on the prevailing biomedical logic, which acknowledges two discrete sexes in the human species:  male and female (fausto-sterling, 2000). the bifurcation of human sex into male and female is a constant feature of medical texts. the sexes are differentiated by the chromosomes that inform their development, with an xx chromosomal pairing for females and xy for males. chromosomes dictate certain patterns of maturation that manifest as secondary sex characteristics, such as breast tissue, muscle mass, and facial hair. these physiological features of sex difference affect behavioral patterns that are then socially codified as gender roles. the logic then follows that these two gender identities are what drive sexual attraction, so that heterosexuals are people who desire the “opposite” gender. feminist science studies theorists expose dominant sociocultural scripts in objective science. biologists like anne fausto-sterling have challenged the linear explanation of sex, gender, and sexuality by identifying the societal factors that inform the narratives that their colleagues create. in sexing the body: gender politics and the construction of sexuality (2000, p. 48), fausto-sterling states that approximately one in two thousand children are born with genitalia that place them outside the normative boxes of male and female. in the united states, babies with ambiguous genitalia are routinely given corrective surgery that makes them physically appear more male or female, a practice that serves to obscure the prevalence of intersex individuals; such individuals have self-reported devastating effects on their lives. in some intersex cases, internal testes (testes that have not descended) are more prone to developing cancer. this is a fact that the intersex society of north america (2011) reports is overstated in medical literature; however, as it is used to coerce fearful parents into surgery for their infants. additionally, infants with genitalia that do not meet or exceed average sizes for their respective sexes are subject to surgery. the operations maintain the socially accepted idea of two sexes at the expense of the biodiversity that exists within humanity. deborah findlay (1995, p. 36) expounds on the social production of biological sex and explores the relatively recent assertion that there are two “opposite” sexes. these findings have been extremely useful in supporting the intersex and transgender movements, which are based on the lived experiences of people around the world who find themselves butting up against the medical establishment’s dichotomy and subsequently not receiving the kind of care they need or desire. ruth bleier, one of the first self-named feminist scientists, offered harsh criticism of sociobiology, a field that asserts that many human behaviors have evolved and are tied to our genetic make-up (bleier, 1986). many such behaviors, which are claimed to be universal, simply mirror behavior patterns in the white western world. bleier also critiques the science involved in sociobiology, as it omits animal data that does not support its theories. for example, evidence of same-sex sexual activity or male nurturing in species is often obscured or minimized in scientific research to support homonormative and sexist beliefs about humans. these interventions have remained largely ensconced within the field of feminist science studies. the degree to which they have influenced biomedical science literature is unclear (fausto-sterling, 2000, p. 17). not all scientists believe that these biases exist; some see these findings as individual cases of “bad science” evidence or shoddy work rather than culturally embedded beliefs emerging in research. the prevalence and pattern of these findings belie this belief, with marginalized categories of social identity corresponding with biomedical determinations of subordinate qualities.  biomedicine’s use of terms like normal and average has the effect of marginalizing minority forms of embodiment so that bodily diversity is pathologized. lennard davis (2006, p. 1) posits that “normal” is a relatively new concept, borne of nineteenth-century state and industrial demands for universal citizens and workers. normal transitioned from being understood in strictly statistical terms to becoming a way to think about the body itself. these discourses of the normal body travel from science to society, reinforcing medicalized knowledge that is already culturally produced. because of societal investments in medical authority, the public does not critically interpret the medical media that carries these messages. i do not suggest that this trust is misplaced, but that it is largely unquestioned. those who attempt inquiries are often dismissed because they do not have the credentialing that would lend their arguments support in this context of medical authority. representations of gender and health: who is fit to be consumed? after performing gender tests, lying about what it was doing, and then leaking the results, the governing body of the international association of athletic federations revealed that it had not informed semenya of its findings. the delay was particularly alarming after the leaked report employed the rhetoric of medical urgency to describe the apparent “risks” associated with semenya’s “rare medical condition,” her health as a world-class athlete notwithstanding (hunter, 2013). iaaf officials had already accepted the south african certification of her sex required for competition. her physical appearance, particularly in relation to her white competitors, and the significant amount of time she shaved off her personal best were the impetus for the re-test, which was explained to her as a drug test. this led to charges of racist and imperialist ideology by athletics south africa (asa). leonard cheue, then president of asa, remarked, “who are white people to question the makeup of an african girl?…i say this is racism, pure and simple.…it is outrageous for people from other countries to tell us ‘we want to take her to a laboratory because we don’t like her nose, or her figure’” (smith, 2009). cheue’s words speak to the ways in which our notions of health are enmeshed with beauty ideals. a strip club in south africa called teazers created a billboard shortly following semenya’s gender testing controversy (fourle, 2009). owner lolly jackson claimed that the club was not referencing semenya when it created the advertisement, although jackson gave semenya 20,000 rand as a “gift” from the establishment, saying, “she gave me a lot of mileage.” the billboard reads “no need for gender testing!” as the owner wanted to assure the patrons of his establishment that the dancers are “100% women” (fourle, 2009). it seems unlikely that this billboard is not referencing semenya, since the phrase “gender testing” is only used within the context of professional sports and in the time frame with her name attached (jacobson, 2009). additionally, the establishment’s monetary overture to semenya belies any innocence on the part of jackson. the woman in the billboard fits mainstream western conceptions of feminine beauty. she is white with long, straight blonde hair and very noticeable curves. the photograph draws attention to her large breasts. she has no visible hair on her body and her skin is tanned and oiled. her nails are manicured and she wears high heels that are visible in her prone position. her eyebrows are arched and she has makeup on her face. the viewer is instructed to regard her body as the epitome of femininity—no gender testing needed. onlookers are invited to use their sense of sight to validate her femininity. the implicit comparison delegitimizes the black female body through a visual omission but a literal referent. though we do not see semenya’s body, the text of the ad calls forth her image, inviting viewers to assess the gender of the woman in the advertisement and semenya’s visually, at the same time.  semenya’s womanhood is up for debate and, comparatively, is deemed insufficient. there is no question about the woman in the advertisement. what is advertised is visually affirmed as real, 100% woman, and authentic, while semenya’s image, so far from the one projected, remains in question. the blonde model’s manicured and augmented body is feminine because it is desirable and attractive as articulated through white western standards of beauty. her body is fit for consumption. representations derived from western aesthetic preferences of the female body are used to promote the spending of capital (gilman, 1999, p. 326). the ad instructs viewers that the model’s body sells and implies that semenya’s does not.  not only is semenya’s body unfit for athletics, it is unfit for public consumption. in sharp contrast to the model, semenya has features that have been publicly labeled masculine and unattractive. her short, non-dyed, tightly curled hair; dark skin; and natural breasts are in stark opposition to the model’s long, blonde hair; tanned skin; and what are likely breast implants. it is precisely semenya’s fitness and natural body that make her unfit for consumption. her muscled physique is not the desired way women should look. likewise, the model that completes the juxtaposition is labeled “100% woman” because of body modifications that make her desirable. gender testing is invoked because semenya is not performing femininity well. the biological basis of sex takes a backseat to gender standards that regulate our understanding of what is real. semenya’s appearance prompted the gender testing she endured and the public notoriety she experienced in popular media. her physically fit body and athletic prowess were the source of medical speculation about her “health” and furthered media representations of athletic black women as less than appropriately feminine. she was the victim of “surveillance medicine” that marked her as potentially ill because of social investment in discrete sexes (clark & olesen, 1999, p. 22). rather than seeing semenya’s body as her own, she was implicitly and then explicitly measured by an unarticulated, though agreed upon, sociomedical standard. black women have long been portrayed as masculine and inappropriately feminine in popular media; athletes are popular targets for this negative attention because of their muscles and physical prowess (hooks, 1999, p. 21). venus and serena williams, the black us tennis champions, are frequent targets of such sentiments; it has often been speculated that they are too aggressive and too masculine to compete with other (read: white) competitors. like semenya, they are implicitly masculinized because of their skin color and physiological difference. in 2009, other coaches and players harassed sarah gronert, a white professional tennis player, because she was believed to be intersex. calls were made for her to be removed from competition, but no such action occurred. “there is no girl who can hit serves like that, not even venus williams,” said the coach of one of her rivals, alluding to the superor more-than-feminine attributes of williams (johnston, 2009). gronert, though described as “beautiful” in more than one article, surpassed the limit of what was considered feminine. despite being ranked lower than many other women, charges that her physical prowess surpasses that of a “normal” woman, thereby giving her an unfair advantage, were levied. gronert’s difficulties, however, remained ensconced in the world of women’s tennis, never becoming an international news story like semenya’s. in an attempt to properly feminize the athlete, the south african magazine you! provided semenya with a makeover that included doing her nails, curling her hair, applying makeup, and wearing more feminine attire.  the result was heralded with its own incredulous headline:  “wow, look at caster now!” (you!, 2009).  semenya’s outward make over was a cultural way to put her back into the appropriate box of femininity, something the iaaf offered to do medically. the benevolently paternalistic concern of the iaaf regarding semenya’s health contrastingly painted the asa as antagonistic and insensitive. some newspapers suggested that asa was responsible for the fiasco by not alerting the iaaf to semenya’s condition in the first place. the iaaf’s own rules at the time allowed intersex and transsexual athletes who have been using hormones for two years to compete, troubling their own justification for gender-testing semenya. the iaaf announced in late november 2009 that it would not release the test results publicly, a decision that came after the south african parliament expressed outrage regarding the invasion of semenya’s privacy (hart, 2009, september 8). the generally held rule of doctor-patient confidentiality had to be rearticulated, since it had already been violated by an international media firestorm (see holloway, 2011, for more on issues of privacy and patient rights). a panel of doctors, including gynecologists, internists, endocrinologists, and sex specialists, reviewed semenya’s case, and in december more information was leaked to the press. the iaaf had apparently agreed to pay for semenya’s corrective surgery, should she fail the gender test (hart, 2009, december 11). while black south africans called out the racism, imperialism, and some of the sexism that swirled in the press, ableist language that indicated a certain distancing from female masculinity and a subtle heteronormativity was simultaneously present. the asa defended semenya against the racist gender standards that created the controversy by highlighting the ways her blackness played a role in her coming to the world’s attention, but their arguments often relied on the same biological determinism that they were questioning. for example, the south african minister of sport remarked, “there’s no scientific evidence. you can’t say somebody’s child is not a girl. you denounce my child as a boy when she’s a girl? if you did that to my child, i’d shoot you” (dixon, 2009). another official suggested that semenya was being depicted as a monster, which was the kind of thing that drives someone to suicide. in the minds of those trying to protect her, affirming semenya’s femininity and womanhood was essential to her humanity, suggesting their own fear of the non-normative body. the iaaf failed to acknowledge the social norms that drove its urgent and bold offer to pay for semenya’s surgery. the warnings about the potential “risks” associated with her “condition” repositioned a socially constructed panic as a medical one. despite its concern, the iaaf was unable to properly protect semenya from a global media inquest that remains interested in uncovering her “true” sex. in 2012, semenya competed in the london summer olympic games and won a silver medal after she was cleared to compete (epstein, 2012). she won gold in the 2016 olympic games in rio de janeiro, brazil, but her participation caused a stir again, this time because she was allowed to compete without testosterone blockers. fellow world-class runner dutee chand argued in court that it was unfair to block her naturally occurring levels of testosterone and won, creating a two-year suspension of blockers for female athletes (samuel, 2016). joanna jozowik who came in 5th in the women’s 800 meter final in rio said of her finish, “i'm glad i'm the first european, the second white…” commenting on the fact that the three medal winners were black (flanagan 2016). she went on to talk about how her body does not measure up to the size and unfeminine nature of the black women runners, invoking all the misogynoir semenya experienced in 2009. caster semenya’s experience demonstrates on an international level the trouble with fixed scientific categories that are not representative of the lived reality of people’s bodies. how do we understand bodies as they exist, without pathologizing those that are different from a standard rendering of what we imagine a body should be? and how does a standard body come to exist in the first place? “age ain’t nothin’ but a number”: lessons from the r. kelly trial on june 13, 2008, r&b artist r. kelly was acquitted on fourteen charges of felony child pornography possession and soliciting a minor (streitfeld, 2008). a video of kelly and a thirteen-year-old black girl engaged in a myriad of sexual activities surfaced on the internet at the same time that social workers were following leads regarding the illicit nature of their relationship. this prompted an official police investigation beginning in 2002. the jury’s reported reasoning for acquitting kelly is what makes the salacious celebrity scandal of interest to black feminist health-studies science: when interviewed, several jurors voiced doubt that the girl was a minor. the jurors claimed to have been in agreement that it was r. kelly in the video, but could not agree that the girl in question was underage (abc news, 2008). the girl would not testify, although friends and family identified her as the person in the video.  jurors thought the unidentified girl looked “too developed” to be thirteen. the case against kelly hinged on the jury’s ability to ascertain the age of the girl on tape visually. if she was of age, then a crime was not committed.  but how does one visually assess someone’s age? what, in fact, does a thirteen-year-old black girl look like? rather, as was the question in this case, what should a thirteen-year-old black girl look like? with stakes as high as thirty years of jail time, age becomes more than a number; it is the marker that determines guilt or innocence.2 the intersection of racial and gender stereotypes, as enacted through the perception of the body of a thirteen-year-old black girl, raises important questions about how the medico-juridical system in this country utilizes didactic medical media. the models and figures within medical materials are produced for healthcare providers as examples of health and disease, and as representations of who they are in relation to their patients. i label these representations didactic medical media as they are created with the intent to educate healthcare professionals and students about health and disease. didactic medical media provides doctors with representations of bodily function and anatomy that assist them in assessing health, as well as in offering constructions of their own role and place in the medical interaction. the standardization of these figures is valued because it supports consistency across the practice of medicine. however, this modeling can elide the abnormal with the pathological, making structures in real people that do not fit textbook examples not only different but aberrant. my research shows that “normal” is aggregated through some bodies and not others, creating a standard that does not include all who will be measured against the rubric. this elision contributes to the creation of disparate care for marginalized patient populations in a medical system that assumes a white standard of “health” and “normality.” i look at the controversy surrounding kelly to demonstrate how these precepts from the moment of standardization of medical education play out in our contemporary world. the girl at the center of kelly’s trial is less important than the work her body does as medicalized media. in this context, her body is a tool for the prosecution to prove that she is underage. despite fourteen witnesses’ testimony that the girl in the video was thirteen, the prosecution faced an uphill battle trying kelly, a man with at least six other legal skirmishes connected to his relationships with underage girls (associated press, 2008). the prosecution procured a forensic physician to demonstrate to the jury that the girl in the videos with r. kelly was thirteen. dr. sharon cooper of the university of north carolina used the tanner scale to show that the girl on the tape was in her early teens (vineyard 2008, june 13). developed by james mourilyan tanner (1962), the five stage tanner scale marks different phases in human physical sexual maturation. each phase or stage of development corresponds to an age. by examining the primary and secondary sex characteristics of the girl in the video, prosecutors hoped this “scientific evidence” would “prove” the girl was under the legal age of consent. tanner created the scale in the early 1960s through examining boys and girls of european and north american ancestry, i.e. white children (tanner, 1962). in the 1970s he completed a project that estimated global averages of development, noting the significant variation in developmental physiology across regions, ethnicity, and even within group populations (eveleth & tanner, 1990). despite this subsequent work, all current representations of the tanner scale in medical textbooks depict thin white bodies or use colorless sketches that reflect european facial features and hair characteristics. tanner gathered previously produced growth studies and traveled across the world, measuring children on multiple continents. they grouped them into only three racial categories, europeans, africans, and asians. tanner’s research showed that growth varied significantly across regional, racial, and ethnic groups. in his 1990 book, world-wide variation in human growth, he writes: there is no guarantee however that all populations have the same growth potential. there are certainly large differences between populations, in height, weight, the age of puberty for example, and at present it is not clear how much of them is due to heredity and how much is due to environment. (eveleth & tanner, 1990, p. 1) the scale has not been modified to reflect tanner’s own findings across racial categories, nor does it have the elasticity to work independently of knowing the child’s age. key to the scale’s development and use within medicine is knowledge of the child’s age, which is how “normal” development can be assessed (rosenbloom & tanner, 1998). children’s bodies are compared to the average lengths, size, and width of sex characteristics of the white children tanner studied years ago. in this context, age may or may not be correlated with the “appropriate” level of maturation. by attempting to estimate chronologic age through observable sex characteristics, biomedical visualization is privileged over testimony by people in the girl’s life. the body of the girl in question is measured against a scale she may or may not exceed, an interesting choice for the prosecution given this possibility. the tanner scale is an incorrect match for the facts of the r. kelly case, as it fails to account for the potentially different development timelines of black children. a 1997 study in the journal pediatrics, found that 50% of black girls in the united states were beginning puberty by age eight, compared to less than 15% of white girls (herman-giddens et al., 1997). studies in 2002, 2011, and 2012 support these findings as well (wu, mendola, & buck, 2002; reagan et al., 2012; dorn & biro, 2011). black children are discussed as developing primary and secondary sex characteristics earlier than their white counterparts. because tanner created the scale using the measurements of white european and north american children, black children are understood to develop sooner. if black children were the implicit standard, then the reporting would reflect that white children mature later. the studies could, however, discuss the differences without attributing a value to the maturation. these semantic choices reflect subtle power differentials that invoke the social hierarchies of our lived realities. ultimately, cooper’s expert testimony was deemed inadmissible. the presiding judge stated that the scale had no legal precedent and that the high-profile nature of the case made him reluctant to allow it as evidence (singersroom.com, 2007). tanner himself was opposed to his scale being utilized within the legal system. in a 1998 editorial in the journal of pediatrics, tanner and his colleague wrote: we wish to caution pediatricians and other physicians to refrain from providing “expert” testimony as to chronologic age based on tanner staging, which was designed for estimating development or physiologic age for medical, educational, and sports purposes—in other words, identifying early and late maturers. the method is appropriate for this, provided chronologic age is known. it is not designed for estimating chronologic age and, therefore, not properly used for this purpose.  (rosenbloom & tanner, 1998) tanner’s own words make it clear that the stages should not be used to surmise age, but rather to decide if a child of known age is maturing properly. its appropriation for the r. kelly trial and subsequent legal cases raise additional questions about medical media’s import in the lives of those accused and those victimized. when bodies are centered over the people who have them, questions of “health” and “harm” become unclear. the purpose of the tanner scale is reimagined without consideration of its limitations. cooper’s attempt to use the scale had the unintended effect of overshadowing the identifications made by fourteen witnesses, including the girl’s friends, teachers, and family, who had already testified that she was the person in the video (associated press, 2008). an eyewitness is no longer enough in the current legal system, where the burden of proof is escalated by the desire for seemingly objective scientific evidence. crime-drama shows have increased jury expectations of forensic evidence, resulting in eyewitness testimony no longer being as convincing (read: entertaining) as medically corroborated evidence. the “csi effect,” as it is known in the field, forces lawyers to push for forensic tests at the expense of less costly and more obviously subjective testimony (schweitzer & saks, 2006). tanner’s understanding of his work differs from how it is being appropriated in other contexts. i want to make clear that recognizing bodily diversity does not invalidate all uses of the scale in its original context, nor does it imply that there should be separate scales for different races. in a moment where medical and corporate interests are attuned to the need to address issues of disparate treatment of people in color, the pharmaceutical industry has responded with race-specific medicine. drugs like bidil, which has been approved to treat heart failure in african americans, attempt to medicalize physical disparities that are actually aggravated by social inequities. dorothy roberts and evelynn hammonds work on the way that healthcare has turned to the market to attempt to ameliorate inequality, and identifies a significant moment in reevaluating how we mobilize social justice in the sciences (roberts, 2008; shields et al., 2005). i signal a need to rethink medical media that relies on standards and norms for bodies that disproportionately affect marginalized groups, and instead approach an ethic of care that focuses on people’s full selves and well-being. black feminist theory clearly articulates the power of the image to serve the hegemony of “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” by controlling the way society views marginalized groups and how we view ourselves (hooks, 1989, p. 14). bell hooks discusses the importance of producing images that counter the normalizing force of stereotypes, but also exposes the danger of reactionary positive images that can also constrain and confine. we need complex images that break the good/bad, white/black dichotomy. similarly, patricia hill collins (2005, p. 85) argues against “controlling images” that attempt to delimit the potential ways of being for black women in the world. both scholars offer endless insight into this dilemma by also exposing the link between these images and real-world consequences for black women and others. however, uncovering this link is not the same as demystifying its production. a crucial next step is grappling with the link’s formation in an effort to change outcomes. black feminist health-science studies is a way to engage the complexity of a situation like the r. kelly trial and move conversations beyond guilt and innocence. rather than addressing the performance of justice through our legal system’s appropriations of some scientific tools, i would like to move toward a social-justice science that understands the health and well-being of people to be its central purpose—which requires more arenas of rectification to be addressed. this formulation of black feminist health-science studies, when focused on this trial, provides evidence of the co-constitutive nature of medical science and popular perception, underscoring the need to engage them simultaneously. social-justice science attempts to interrupt the linear progression of observations turned scientific facts that are then used in medicine to guide rubrics of health and normal body representation. it is important for medical students to encounter a critique of positivist science, particularly as it relates to the perceived objectivity of the western medical establishment. this practice goes beyond the surface level correctives usually deployed in invocations of “culturally competent medicine” or calls to “diversify” the healthcare professions. students must understand that simply adding race, sex, ability, and sexuality as categories of analysis does not necessarily penetrate the deeply seated ideological structures of western medicine and culture. a radical—meaning “from the roots”—approach is needed. the ethnocentrism of their medical-school environment informs the ways students understand themselves as future doctors and how they see their patients. medical-school instruction assumes a white patient and practitioner, prompting marginalized groups to seek to understand how these assumptions affect care outcomes. embedded within the r. kelly trial is another tale, one of age-old constructs of the hypersexual nature of black women. when questioned about the case, local-news interviewees felt that the girl’s active participation precluded all talk of a crime having been committed. some blamed the victim, asking where her mother was and insinuating that her actions made her age irrelevant. they insisted that she did not look thirteen doing what she was doing in the video. in these comments, we see the simultaneous engendering of the girl in question as a child with an unfit black mother and as a hypersexual black woman grown enough to engage in “disgusting” behavior. the maturity of her body, coupled with the taboo nature of her sexual activities with kelly, was channeled through stereotypes about black women and obscured readings of her participation as coerced. like sarah baartman experienced centuries before her, the girl’s physiology was used to suggest something freakish about her sexuality (see crais & scully, 2011; gilman, 1989; tuvel, 2011; willis, 2010). her body was too developed to be that of someone thirteen and her actions were too explicit to be those of a minor. as cultural critic mark anthony neal (2008) notes, by the time of the trial, that thirteen-year-old girl was now a mature nineteen-year-old, a feat accomplished by the defense’s brilliant six-year delay of the trial. and what of r. kelly himself? what does it mean that his reportedly inappropriate and consistent relationships with girls, the subject of repeated legal actions, remain unchallenged? his brushes with the legal system have not curtailed his behavior. in an infamous interview with music journalist touré following the acquittal, when asked if he liked teenage girls, kelly paused and asks for clarification, “when you say teenage, how old are we talking?” (vineland, 2008, september 17). kelly seemed oblivious to the problems with his actions. what kind of social justice does the use of the tanner scale provide for the girls solicited by kelly?  what would a conviction have accomplished for them or for girls whom kelly may solicit in the future? these questions suggest a need for a social-justice science that actually poses different questions and has different objects of study. i am arguing for a social-justice science that informs medicine and does not assume that healing exists solely or even primarily within the reconfiguration of the doctor-patient interaction. for black mothers who negotiate violent environments, the doctor-patient interaction is several times removed from the types of interventions that would produce useful outcomes for them and their families (see beth richie’s discussion of the stereotype of the “immoral” black mother in clarke & olesen, 1999, pp. 283-299; see also mouton et al., 1997). issues of access and time, as well as the erosion of faith in doctors to treat black women patients fairly make the clinical encounter a low priority or something to be avoided all together (holmes, 1989, p. 1).  black women are also more than twice as likely to be murdered than their white counterparts, a health reality that demands more intersectional remedies than can be theorized or even executed by healthcare professionals alone (ruzek, olesen, & clarke, 1997, p. 32). a more collaborative effort between the biomedical sciences and humanities might lead to different sites of inquiry that are much more beneficial to the project of creating a socially just world. in r. kelly’s case, we see that the threat of a punitive judiciary system is not an adequate deterrent to his behavior and has yet to produce any accountability for his actions other than financial compensation to a few survivors. a conversation among social-justice activists working to end the prison-industrial complex, social scientists studying the impact of imprisonment on communities, and psychologists who study the impact of child sexual abuse on survivors might result in a new accountability structure that supports the healing of both kelly and the girl in question.  my vision for black feminist health-science studies involves this more collaborative approach to addressing the questions of our day, as it draws from multiple bodies of knowledge and attempts to focus both the macro and micro sociocultural factors that inform our notions of justice. r. kelly is rumored to be a survivor of childhood sexual abuse himself, raising additional questions about punitive state practices that do not address the reality that many abusers are survivors themselves (neal, 2008).  i hope that this newly formulated lens of feminist health-science studies, when focused on this trial, provides evidence of the co-constitutive nature of medical science and popular perception, underscoring the need to engage them simultaneously. interventions that address misogynoir must operate on multiple levels. this means not only working to change the behaviors of biomedical practitioners in different arenas of our society but also looking closely at the ways that bias and prejudice are institutionalized in their institutions of professionalization.  essential to this work is intervening in the culture of medical legal and scientific institutions that allow members of the community to feel as though they are objective and removed from the biases and prejudices that pervade our society, particularly in media. this requires shifts in our cultural understandings of certain professionals as automatically objective and requires examining the ways in which media perpetuates the hierarchy of oppression even when people believe their training makes them immune. cultural competence, cultural proficiency, and cultural brokerage are all terms healthcare professionals use to describe the necessary skills, sensitivity and knowledge to treat diverse patient populations (betancourt et al., 2003; brannigan, 2012; burchum, 2002; koehn & swick, 2006; kosoko-lasaki, cook, & o’brien, 2009). this research pushes contemporary conversations about how to ameliorate healthcare disparities further by centering the cultural component of medical education materialized in representational media. the system of meaning that students share by virtue of their matriculation is an important but largely underinterrogated aspect of the medical education process (wachtler & troein, 2003). by examining the culture of medical education, i identify the components of the hidden curriculum within medical education that supersede contemporary cultural competence instruction. i locate the sites within medical education that need to be more seriously interrogated for a more efficacious addressing of disparities in care for black women. i expose the limits of cultural competence as the primary strategy for ameliorating health care disparities by recognizing the need to address doctors’ identities in future solutions. for medical education to shift, more attention to the hidden curriculum embedded in the sociocultural aspects of edication is needed. a few classes in culturally competent medicine are not enough to counter a deeply embedded ethos that is tied up in the very identities and anxiety-management practices of future physicians. doctors need not only to see their patients differently but also to hear them.3 listening to patients requires doctors to see their patients’ humanity as somehow connected to their own (charon, 2006, pp. 99-103). cultural humility, as opposed to cultural competence, is self-reflexive by definition. the power imbalance between doctors and patients is identified as a problem to be redressed (tervalon & murray-garcía, 1998). while some hierarchy is attendant to the education required to become a doctor, the way in which doctors negotiate it needs to change.  medical-school faculty members must be leaders in the cultural shift as they are the ones who subtly shape the way that medical students understand their role over time. by allowing time and space for the culture of medicine to shift, we make room for more compassionate providers who are better able to serve patient populations across a wide spectrum of diversity. like black feminist theorists, whose written work often makes me feel like i’m dropping in on a continued conversation among friends, i imagine black feminist health-science scholars talking with and across (as opposed to to or down) disciplinary divisions. my understanding of black feminist health-science studies is that it creates the space for cooperative theorizing. black feminist health-science studies incorporates epistemic frames outside the west, particularly african diasporic understandings of health, the body, and healing that explode the already faltering binaries endemic in western thought. by centering health, my alteration of feminist science studies attempts to reframe the discussion by focusing on the interplay between medical media and the well-being of people, not primarily the theoretical investment in challenging western scientific practices. medical imagery asserts a healthy body that is visually conveyed in medical training and subsequently influences doctor-patient interactions. the power of these images affects multiple marginalized populations and shows the need for an intersectional analysis of the medical system. medicine holds a venerable position in the american cultural imagination, such that a doctor’s treatment of certain bodies informs societal treatment of those bodies as well. this is not a unidirectional exchange; societal ideas also hold sway over doctors. in order to change how we think about bodies, we need to change the way we represent them, particularly in the educational spaces of those sectors of our society that purport to treat us at our most vulnerable moments. a more nuanced and impassioned theoretical position is possible with the fusion of the multiple theoretical perspectives that inflect feminist health-science studies. i imagine a field of study acknowledging the need for a cooperative and symbiotic relationship between multiple scholastic locations, united with an expanded understanding of how the biomedical model informs notions of “health” in society. what if we drew on multiple epistemic frames in discourse of the body? what if we did not privilege western dualisms? we might create a community of scholars attuned to issues on the global and local levels, with the collaborative strength to push for the changes they wish to see. an efficacious coming to the table around biomedical hegemony would serve as a model of the productivity that an interdisciplinary approach can bring to scholarship. notes 1 this was the second such test, as semenya had already been tested in south africa in order to compete. 2 r. kelly had a relationship with his protégé, aaliyah. she was fifteen when they began their relationship and were married. the union was dissolved, but kelly wrote and produced all the tracks on her debut album, ominously titled age ain’t nothin’ but a number. see neal, 2001, p. 16. 3 in sander gilman’s seeing the insane (2014), he begins with the statement, “we do not see the world, rather we are taught by representations of the world about us to conceive of it in a culturally acceptable manner.” this idea of mediating seeing works together with the medical connotation of seeing to create possibilities for useful metaphors. references abc news. 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(2009, august 21). runner caster semenya has heard the gender comments all her life. los angeles times. retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/21/world/fg-south-africa-runner21 dorn, l. d., & biro, f. m. (2011). puberty and its measurement: a decade in review. journal of research on adolescence, 21(1), 180-195. epstein, d. (2012, august 11). silver medal in 800 meters offers little clarity in semenya speculation. sports illustrated. retrieved from http://www.si.com/more-sports/2012/08/11/caster-semenya-800-meters eveleth, p. b., & tanner, j. m. (1990). worldwide variation in human growth. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. fausto-sterling, a. (2000). sexing the body: gender politics and the construction of sexuality. new york, ny: basic books. findlay, d. (1995). discovering sex: medical science, feminism and intersexuality. canadian review of sociology and anthropology, 32, 25-52. flanagan, jane. (2016, august 25). “i was second white”: polish runner sorry for uproar over her claims she was 'white silver medallist' in olympic 800m final won by caster semenya. daily mail. retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3756509/i-came-second-white-race-polish-runner-says-sorry-uproar-claims-white-silver-medallist-olympic-800m-final-won-caster-semenya.html fourle, m. (2009, september 30). storm over teazers billboard. news24. retrieved from http://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/storm-over-teazers-billboard-20090930 gilman, s. l. (1989). sexuality: an illustrated history. new york, ny: wiley. gilman, s. l. (1999). making the body beautiful: a cultural history of aesthetic surgery. princeton, nj: princeton university press. gilman, s. l. (2014). seeing the insane. brattleboro, vt: echo point books. hart, s. (2009, september 8). caster semenya’s gender test results force iaaf to call in outside help. telegraph. retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/6158424/caster-semenyas-gender-test-results-force-iaaf-to-call-in-outside-help.html hart, s. (2009, december 11). iaaf offers to pay for caster semenya’s gender surgery if she fails verification test. telegraph. retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/6791558/iaaf-offers-to-pay-for-caster-semenyas-gender-surgery-if-she-fails-verification-test.html herman-giddens, m. e., slora, e. j., wasserman, r. c., bourdony, c. j., bhapkar, m. v., koch, g. g., & hasemeier, c. m. (1997). secondary sexual characteristics and menses in young girls seen in office practice. pediatrics, 99(4), 505-12. holmes, h. b. (1989). a call to heal medicine. hypatia, 4(2), 1-8. holloway, k. (2011). private bodies, public texts: race, gender, and a cultural bioethics. durham, nc: duke university press. hooks, b. (1999). black looks: race and representation. boston, ma: south end press. hooks, b. (1989). talking back: thinking feminist, thinking black. boston, ma: south end press. hunter, a. (2013, june 30). caster semenya can run with the women; it’s official. cbs news. retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/caster-semenya-can-run-with-the-women-its-official/ hurst, m. (2009, september 11). caster semenya is a hermaphrodite. news.com.au. retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/world/caster-semenya-is-a-hermaphrodite/story-e6frfkyi-1225771726260 intersex society of north america. (2011). what’s isna’s position on surgery? faq. retrieved from http://www.isna.org/faq/surgery jacobson, c. (2009, september 11). caster semenya gender test: outrage, worry in south africa over report. huffington post. retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/11/caster-semenya-outrage-wo_n_283441.html johnston, l. (2009, march 20). german tennis player sarah gronert embroiled in gender controversy. new york daily news. retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/german-tennis-player-sarah-gronert-embroiled-gender-controversy-article-1.370527 koehn, p. h., & swick, h. m. (2006). medical education for a changing world: moving beyond cultural competence into transnational competence. academic medicine, 81(6), 548-56. kosoko-lasaki, s., cook, c. t., & o’brien, r. l. (2009). cultural proficiency in addressing health disparities. burlington, ma: jones & bartlett. mouton, c. p., harris, s., rovi, s., solorzano, p., & johnson, m. s. (1997). barriers to black women’s participation in cancer clinical trials. journal of the national medical association, 89(11), 721-727. neal, m. a. (2001). soul babies: black popular culture and the post-soul aesthetic. new york, ny: routledge. neal, m. a. (2008). mark anthony on soul men and r. kelly, part 3. speech delivered at theorizing blackness conference, new york, april 4. youtube video. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aui63gb8ljq reagan, p. b., salsberry, p. j., fang, m. z., gardner, w. p., & pajer, k. (2012). african-american/white differences in the age of menarche: accounting for the difference. social science and medicine, 75(7), 1263-1270. roberts, d. e. (2008). is race-based medicine good for us?: african american approaches to race, biomedicine, and equality. journal of law, medicine and ethics, 36(3), 537-545. rosenbloom, a. l., & tanner, j. m. (1998). misuse of tanner puberty stages to estimate chronologic age. pediatrics, 102(6), 1494. ruzek, s. b., olesen, v. l., and clarke, a. (eds.) (1997). women’s health: complexities and differences. columbus, oh: ohio state university press. samuel, m. (2016, may 10). caster semenya on track for rio gold but she’s running in an ethical minefield. daily mail. retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/article-3583472/caster-semenya-track-rio-gold-s-running-ethical-minefield.html schweitzer, n. j., & saks, m. j. (2006). the csi effect: popular fiction about forensic science affects the public’s expectations about real forensic science. jurimetrics, 47, 357-364. shields, a. e., fortun, m., hammonds, e. m., king, p. a., lerman, c., rapp, r., sullivan, p. f.  (2005). the use of race variables in genetic studies of complex traits and the goal of reducing health disparities: a transdisciplinary perspective. american psychologist, 60(1), 77-103. singersroom.com. (2007, november 4). update: judge tosses pediatrician witness in r. kelly case. singersroom.com. retrieved from http://singersroom.com/content/2007-11-04/update-judge-tosses-pediatrician-witness-in-r-kelly-case/ smith, d. (2009, august 22). caster semenya row: “who are white people to question the makeup of an african girl? it is racism.” guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2009/aug/23/caster-semenya-athletics-gender streitfeld, d. (2008, june 14). r. kelly is acquitted in child pornography case. new york times. retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/arts/music/14kell.html tanner, j. m. (1962). growth at adolescence: with a general consideration of the effects of hereditary and environmental factors upon growth and maturation from birth to maturity. hoboken, nj: blackwell. tervalon, m., & murray-garcía, j. (1998). cultural humility versus cultural competence: a critical distinction in defining physician training outcomes in multicultural education. journal of health care for the poor and underserved, 9(2), 117-125. thomas, j. (2012, august 11). did caster semenya lose the women’s 800 meters on purpose? slate. retrieved from http://www.slate.com/blogs/five_ring_circus/2012/08/11/caster_semenya_2012_olympics_did_the_south_african_runner_lose_the_women_s_800_meters_on_purpose_.html tuvel, r. (2011). “veil of shame”: derrida, sarah baartmann and animality. journal for critical animal studies, 19(1-2), 209-229. vineyard, j. (2004, november 4). hearing to determine age of girl in alleged r. kelly sex tape. mtv.com. retrieved from http://www.mtv.com/news/1493457/hearing-to-determine-age-of-girl-in-alleged-r-kelly-sex-tape/ vineyard, j. (2008, june 13). r. kelly walks: jury finds him not guilty of child pornography. mtv.com. retrieved from http://www.mtv.com/news/1589304/r-kelly-walks-jury-finds-him-not-guilty-of-child-pornography/ vineyard, j. (2008, september 17). r. kelly speaks out about child-pornography trial for first—and possibly last—time. mtv.com. retrieved from http://www.mtv.com/news/1594938/r-kelly-speaks-out-about-child-pornography-trial-for-first-and-possibly-last-time/ wachtler, c., & troein, m. (2003) . a hidden curriculum: mapping cultural competency in a medical programme. medical education, 37(10), 861-868. willis, d. (2010) black venus 2010: they called her “hottentot.” philadelphia, pa: temple university press. wu, t., mendola, p., & buck, g. m. (2002) . ethnic differences in the presence of secondary sex characteristics and menarche among us girls: the third national health and nutrition examination survey, 1988–1994. pediatrics, 110(4), 752-757. you!. (2009, september 10). look at caster now! cover. bio dr. moya bailey is an assistant professor in the department of cultures, societies, and global studies and the program in women's, gender, and sexuality studies at northeastern university. her work focuses on black women's use of digital media to promote social justice as acts of self-affirmation and health promotion. she is interested in how race, gender, and sexuality are represented in media and medicine. she currently curates the #transformdh tumblr initiative in digital humanities (dh). she is a monthly sustainer of the allied media conference, through which she is able to bridge her passion for social justice and her work in dh. microsoft word 29619_denielle elliot dr (1).docx elliott, denielle (2019). neurological disturbances and time travel. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-27. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © denielle elliott, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license neurological disturbances and time travel denielle elliott york university dae@yorku.ca abstract this paper, positioned at the intersection of anthropology, science and technology studies, and feminist affect theory, considers shifts in memory and neurological disturbances that accompany traumatic brain injuries. anomia, or anomic aphasia, is the inability to recall certain words, names, or colors caused by damage to the parietal or temporal lobes in the brain. anomia is a disorder ‘on the verge’ – there but not quite, a forgotten memory, reluctant to be conjured. how might experimental ethnographic memoir help us uncover such forgotten memories and make sense of neurological disturbances pathologized by science and medicine? my account contributes to a growing body of literature that uses ethnographic memoir as political critique, blending the personal and theoretical, situating the intimate within larger historical and social contexts. it suggests that ethnographic memoir, with attention to the affective interiority of memories, merged with theoretical analyses and political critiques of medicine and/or therapeutic interventions, offer new understandings of being and temporality. neurological disturbances we must not allow the fear of forgetting to overwhelm us. and then perhaps it is time to remember the future, rather than only worry about the future of memory. —andreas huyssen, “present pasts: media, politics, amnesia” special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 2 my mom, talking about a summer past when we had been in kamloops, prods me, “don’t you remember? you were eleven. there was that wild horse…” she continues, trying to fill in all the details, hoping she will trigger my memory with cues, that the images, sounds, smells, feelings from that summer will fall into place and that i will be able to share in this memory with her as she, now a senior who spends more time in the before, makes these temporal journeys into the past. there are many occasions like this. i try hard to remember. sometimes her strategies work, and with each sensorial detail, the memory comes back into focus. at other times, i am at a loss and nothing emerges in my imagination. it is so clearly a memory that i do not share that i wonder if she remembers it correctly. maybe i wasn’t even there. maybe she has dreamt it. she gets annoyed with me sometimes when i tell her i cannot remember. “honestly, how can you not remember that?” she will say hastily, frustrated. of course, she knows why i do not remember. i live with the permanent effects of a brain injury that left my frontal lobe reconfigured. january 2008, letter (excerpt) from neurologist, vancouver, bc assessment: right frontal head injury, depressed skull fracture with epidural hematoma, and right frontal contusion. concussive symptoms with minimal evident cognitive impairment. she’s actually made a rather remarkable recovery. i did have a rather miraculous recovery. a combination of pure luck, hardheadedness (in more than one sense), and skilled neurosurgeons who alleviated the pressure on my brain and rebuilt my skull. and yet, i live with a range of neurological “disturbances,” sensorial sensations, and memory slippages. my memory loss seems to bother my mom, and others. a friend working in an allied “psy” field says to me in the sort of hushed tone once reserved for talking about things like cancer in the 1950s, “i hate to tell you this but people with acquired traumatic brain injuries are more likely to suffer from early onset dementia.” afterwards, i somewhat compulsively search medline for papers on “increased incidence of dementia due to brain injuries” to find there are differing opinions. i ask my neurologist who immediately dismisses the psy fields as “quackery” and tells me that she thinks i might be protected from dementia due to the resiliency (i.e., “plasticity”) of my brain matter.1 whether it is true or not though is beside the point. i am left wondering why we are so bothered by forgetfulness, by memories mis/dis-placed? this article is part memoir, part ethnography, part social study of medicine.2 as an experiment in ethnographic memoir, the autobiographical story i am going to tell special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 3 should not be understood as straightforwardly biographical, nor perhaps even real since, according to neuroscientist anil seth (2016), the experience of self is a “controlled hallucination generated by the brain.” the neuro fields, and some of the allied psy fields (i.e., psychology, psychiatry, neuropsychology), have a narrow understanding of brain injuries, one that does not resonate with my own. my understanding: the perspective of a social scientist, a critical ethnographer, a feminist scholar wanting to unsettle, disrupt, question neuroscientific ways of knowing and the academy more generally. but my understanding is deeper than that, not just analytical, nor “arm-chair.” i write as someone who lives with an injured mind, the permanent, mostly invisible, afterlife of a traumatic brain injury. this semi-fictionalized, autobiographical experiment considers the texture of temporality, reflecting on how we know what is real, unreal, a hallucination, a memory, a confabulation (luhrmann & fortier, 2017, p. 25; also see pandian, 2012). as a critical ethnographer who studies medicine and science, i feel uniquely positioned to explore the fracture between these two different worlds of knowing and being, the embodied felt experience and the scientific gaze distorted through digital scans and standardized clinical measures.3 my field notes, medical data (including clinical records, ct and mri imaging, surgery notes and summaries), and records of correspondence from the injury and care with medical professionals inform this memoir account. specifically, i focus on memory “disturbances” that often accompany brain injuries. acquired brain injuries, whether traumatic or milder concussions, may result in what the neurosciences typically define as memory impairments, deficits, or disorders. yet these transformations in memory are diverse, and neurologists are challenged to find explanations to understand such disparate symptoms reported by patients. from retrograde amnesia to déjà vu experiences, like an old vinyl record player our memories skip, repeat, and sometimes get stuck in one place. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 4 a sense of self figure 1. released from the hospital, march 2009. credit: aldo bonato. (photograph still of author with staples after surgery.) i am constantly reminded of my injury, of the event, by migraines, fatigue, tender scalp, memory disturbances, and a range of sensorial sensitivities to touch, smell, noise, and light (reminding me that this is not a purely intellectual exercise). thus, any attempt to know brain injuries or memory changes, without attention to the sensorial, are seriously incomplete. informed by the work of lauren berlant (2008; 2011; 2014), specifically her “sensing of history” and her attention to “affective intensities,” i suggest this methodological experiment as a way to get at the inner transformations resulting from memory changes, what i experience as a state of “being otherwise” (pandian & mclean, 2017, p. 19). in her recent work, sara ahmed (2017) has suggested that we think of remembering events as a type of sensory act, and this reminds us to think about the complex relations between our senses, memories, and time (also see berbeek & van campen, 2015). if we ascribe to affect theory in an approach to memory loss and brain injuries, we must consider the sensorial for the physiological, symbolic, and mnemonic affects. i write this in that tradition but in a spirit of playfulness and creativity. (i am a time traveler.) an ethnographic memoir that accounts for the multi-sensorial of neurological disturbances and is attentive to the ephemerality of time and memories might offer more accurate or at least complicated accounts of being special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 5 after traumatic brain injuries. i suggest that memory disturbances like anomia and déjà vu need novel ethnographic methods of investigation that can account for their evanescence and the way in which time ricochets through memory (pandian & mclean, 2017). such a project demands attention to the complex interiority of the mind and memory, forcing us to consider the imperceptible shifts in the act of remembering that are largely missed or glossed over in conventional scientific accounts of brain injuries and memory disruptions. my aim is to refine and enhance ethnographic memoir—attentive to multiple senses of knowing, and at once experimental, interventionist, performative, and speculative (ingersoll, 2016).4 this approach moves away from traditional fieldwork practices to a way of knowing and remembering non-discursively (massumi, 1995), a way to capture the hidden life of mind and memory. i suggest that this type of ethnographic memoir creates spaces of creativity, allows for travels in time and memory, and for the wondrous and frightening hallucinatory imagination to emerge. i imagine it as a way to investigate and convey that which feels indescribable, the “radical shifts in inner expression and aesthetic perception” (irving, 2017, p. 26).5 such opening up to the sorts of things we usually delete, or ignore, or don’t have access to in our research, permits us insight into human consciousness, the imagination, and other ways of being, like those marked by changes in mind and memory.6 if cultivated, a multisensorial ethnographic memoir permits us to see and theorize that which lies beyond what we can only see in participant observation or hear in interviews; it gives us access to “muted registers of being and becoming” of the self (myers, 2017, p. xii), including inventories of “intensity,” as states of suspension and disruption (massumi, 1995). multiple temporalities i understand memories not as cultural artifacts or isolated objects of possession, but as temporal practice that we can trace through experiences in the past, present, and future, preoccupied all along by the forgotten (dib, 2012).7 lina dib elaborates on what it means to treat memory as practice or as an experience rather than as a thing we hold: a memory enacted is then seen no longer as a discreet whole but rather as constantly shifting in its boundaries. once more, as with proust’s madeleine, memory is synesthetic, involving an intertwining of visual, aural, haptic, and even olfactory senses in measurement and treatment. (2012, p. 67) special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 6 memory is also, as andreas huyssen (2000) argues, “always transitory, notoriously unreliable, and haunted by forgetting—in short, human and social” (p. 38). conceptualizing memories in these ways allows for more freedom in thinking about the ever-shifting and retreating nature of biological memories.8 following, i imagine that if we reframe memory disturbances such as anomia and déjà vu as of another temporal dimension, and we approach them sensitive to the fleeting, sensorial, and affective, we might understand such changes not as pathologies or disorders, but as a rupture in temporality, another way of moving through time.9 time travel. a multiplicity of temporalities emerge with traumatic brain injuries and with memory changes more generally. forgetfulness, forgetting, and the forgetful are subjects of the popular imagination as seen in movies such as memento (nolan, todd, & todd, 2000), the film noir whose main character is unable to form new memories (suffering from anterograde amnesia) and tattoos reminders all over his body as he tries to solve the murder of his wife and the attack that left him with amnesia. in still alice (glatzer & westmoreland, 2014) the audience watches as a professor copes with early onset dementia as she begins to forget all the details in her life. she is portrayed as tormented by the loss of memories, which compels her to write a reminder to her future self that she should eventually take her own life because she doesn’t want to live without memories of herself and her family. in eternal sunshine of the spotless mind (gondry, 2004) the future offers biotechnological innovations that allow us to wipe our disturbing memories clean, to start fresh without remembering painful pasts and traumatic events (also see vassanji, 2016).10 in all three, the act of forgetting (even when chosen in the case of the last film) is portrayed as something to mourn, a loss too great to bear. similarly, neurologists and allied psy fields generally understand changes in how we remember or what we remember as loss, a deficit, a pathology, an impairment. these are states demanding intervention as treatment or cure, whether it is pharmaceutical (medicines, vitamins, or nutritional supplements that help us remember), psychological (hypnosis, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, or cognitive behavioural therapy), or biotechnological innovations (biofeedback, use of digital devices). michael kahana, a neuroscientist at the university of pennsylvania, suggests that the future includes surgically implanting a small device into “the cranium or chest” with “electrodes penetrating into the brain” that decode and stimulate the brain’s centers responsible for memory. in explaining why such a device is necessary, kahana said, “losing one's ability to function in terms of cognition is one of the scariest things imaginable” (cbc radio one, 2018, emphasis added). such fear of forgetting or being forgetful has driven special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 7 a multimillion-dollar industry of “brain games” such as luminosity, peak, or elevate, in spite of contradictory evidence about whether they actually improve memory (boot & kramer, 2014; owen et al., 2010).11 this fear also feeds a new industry of digital technoscientific projects that aim to capture and record our memories. for instance, mayer-schönberger (2009) warns us that new digital medias such as memories for life are working towards a social world where we are unable to forget. “e-memories,” those digitally recorded, mean that memories now live on forever, even after the death of the rememberer (dib, 2012, p. 52). focusing on gordon bell’s digital memory project (mylifebits software), dib highlights how e-memories are marketed as superior from “biological memories” as more reliable, factual, and unalterable.12 and, like the recent new television series on hbo, altered carbon, e-memories are not stored in the brain but on a technological device, a “cortical stack” (kalogridis & lenic, 2018) that transcends time, offering a “virtual immortality” (dib, 2012, p. 60) through digital memories. in the future, memories are downloaded, stored, and eternal. as someone who is forgetful with a range of memory disturbances and as a researcher interested in memory, i find it curious how concerned people and popular culture generally are with memory loss or change. as others have pointed out, our obsession with forgetfulness is with a particular type of memory—individual, embodied. at other times, we embrace and encourage amnesia.13 colonialism prefers you forget, and thus an anti-colonial critique similarly demands remembering (liebert, 2017; rothberg, 2013).14 colonialism haunts stories and histories of neurology and the brain sciences. remember the role of anthropologists collecting skulls for museum displays (roque, 2010), studying brain matter for disease (anderson, 2008), or their role in the development of anthropometric practices (anderson, 2003)? measuring skulls, probing brain physiology, and the development of racial classifications based on those measurements are a part of the colonial history of the discipline we try to disassociate from, the sorts of things we wish we could forget. does the future include an anti-colonial neurology (savares, 2010)? or, in other words, how does one reconcile a critical disability studies approach (which argues forgetfulness should not be pathologized, nor remembering valorised) with an anti-colonial approach that demands we collectively remember these violent, colonial pasts? just because we want to remember, or need to remember, doesn’t necessarily mean we have to pathologize forgetfulness. though beyond the scope of this paper, these questions nevertheless are my travel companions in time. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 8 being the kenya police medical examination report date: february 2009 from: dcs kisumu police station to the: aga khan hospital name: dr. denielle elliott address: university of british columbia… general physical examination: sick looking with swollen scalp and face. details of site, situation, shape and depth of injuries sustained: severe head injury with compound, depressed skull fracture of the right frontal parietal temporal region with extradural haematoma. linear fracture at the right orbit. blunt trauma to posterior upper neck with gross oedema. what were the immediate clinical results of the injury sustained and the assessed degree: grievious harm at the core of this paper are questions about epistemologies of being, the way we experience slippages in time, before/now/after, resulting from brain injury. for the purpose of this paper, i want to focus primarily on a specific type of memory change associated with acquired brain injuries: anomia. anomia, or anomic aphasia (one form of aphasia), is the inability to recall certain words, names, or colors caused by damage to the parietal or temporal lobes in the brain. i experience anomia on a regular basis, daily in fact. i also experience a number of other memory disturbances, all of which have developed since i ended up with an acquired traumatic brain injury. during postdoctoral fieldwork in east africa in 2009 i sustained serious bodily and head trauma. my skull was fractured in multiple locations, i had facial compression fractures, massive bruising on my neck, ribs, arm, and legs. in spite of the severity of the head trauma, i did not lose consciousness. if i had, i would not have been able to telephone a friend for help and i would have been left there, in a remote rural village plot of east africa, to bleed to death alone. my friend rushed me to a small local private hospital where a ct scan was done after i started to vomit (a reliable clinical indicator of brain injury). it was timely that this small private hospital had recently acquired a “new” ct scanner, which in fact was an older, used model donated from russia. the scan clearly indicated a number of hematomas that needed to be drained because of the pressure building within my skull. an orthopedic surgeon conducted a cranioplasty, a procedure involving the removal of bone fragments to allow my special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 9 swollen brain to expand and pools of blood trapped between the skull and the dura mater to drain, while a locally stationed american doctor from the centers for disease control and prevention looked on. using a small, specialized drill, a burr hole was created in the skull so that the brain could swell without too much pressure. months later, colleagues hesitantly told me that the drill had fallen to the floor during my surgery, and since the hospital only had one, they had to stand there awkwardly in the operating theatre for fifteen minutes while the piece that had fallen was re-sterilized for use again. the following day in recovery, an american neurologist who was in the region working on an hiv-related neurology clinical trial, came in to offer an assessment (since there was no neurologist available in western kenya).15 at that time, she noted that my cognitive function was declining and so a decision was made, in consultation with the canadian embassy in nairobi, to send me for follow-up care to johannesburg, south africa. an air ambulance was arranged and i was flown out the following day with two nurses, a doctor, and a colleague who volunteered to travel with me. kisumulusaka-johannesburg. a few days later, after additional tests and another ct scan, another craniotomy was performed, along with a cranioplasty to rebuild the right side of my skull, which had fractured and splintered into shards. since then, i have been negotiating the dissonance between my experience of the injury and the expectations and understandings of a range of medical professionals. june 28, 2011 letter (excerpt) from neurologist, vancouver, bc investigations: she had an mri scan performed which we reviewed together. this showed an area of encephalomalacia, and gliotic changes in the right prefrontal region. she had a craniotomy deficit but no other abnormalities were seen. status post traumatic brain injury: again, i think denielle is doing remarkably well. i reported to my neurologist a few months after the injury that i was forgetting words but he gently assured me that i had not forgotten the words; they were there, just reluctant, and with time the condition would disappear or lessen. he named it—anomia—and i went home to investigate and wrote the word down, repeated it dozens and dozens of times so i would not forget my forgetful condition. i still experience anomia, on a daily basis, but far less often than when i was first injured. since anomia is generally associated with the left hemisphere where language capabilities are reportedly localized, my neurologists dismiss my reports of what i perceived as an ongoing struggle with word retrieval. they explain that since the physical trauma and damage was largely to the right hemisphere of my brain, it is unlikely that i would continue to experience anomia. their cognitive tests (like the montreal cognitive assessment) suggest my special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 10 memory is within “normal range.” in a clinical assessment in february 2016, i scored 29/30 on the montreal cognitive assessment. i lost one point because i could not remember which hand did what on a traditional clock.16 such assessments are notoriously poor reflections of those with above-average education and memory loss. for instance, educated individuals with early dementia are often missed on such tests because they score within the normal range. in march 2009, just weeks after the two neurosurgeries, i also scored normal on the same test. the intake worker at the brain injury support centre where i had been referred told me she did not quite know how to deal with me since their measures indicated i did not have a brain injury, even though she could clearly see the long scar across my head on my recently shaven head, where fortyfour staples had only just been removed (see figure 1). my experience of a brain injury was not typical according to their measures: i did not have post-traumatic stress disorder, i was not having seizures, and i was not having problems with language. but i felt dramatically changed and felt many, albeit subtle and invisible, affects from the injuries. their measures did not account for these elusive, sensorial, invisible, and often ephemeral changes. i experience other changes since the brain injury that i feel are clearly related to the brain injury, but, similarly, when i have reported these to neurologists or health care professionals working in brain injury support, these symptoms are often dismissed as inconsequential or not related to the injury. their logic is that the types of changes i am reporting are associated with other areas of my brain, areas that were not directly injured.17 yet what i also know about my brain injury is that the blows to my head were so significant, so powerful, that imagers note in my medical records a 3.0 mm midline shift of my brain (observable in early ct scans) and displaced ventricles. a concussion, considered a “mild brain injury,” results when the brain bounces around within the skull, resulting in metabolic and/or structural damage to brain tissue. the displaced ventricles visualized on my ct scan indicated how intensely swollen my brain was, raising concern that it would also affect my brain stem. for weeks after, i was left literally off-balance. it is difficult to make sense of diagnoses in such situations that focus solely on specific regions of the brain with direct trauma. while the actual fracture to my skull and the impact may have occurred on the right frontal and temporal lobes, the force of the blow to my head impacted other regions and the brain as a whole, yet there is no mention of anomia in any of my neurological clinical records. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 11 anomia eeg laboratory activation procedures: photic stimulation produces a symmetrical driving response. hyperventilation is not performed in this record. impression: this record is mildly abnormal. the changes present in this record are consistent with mild and nonspecific electroencephalographic changes. comments: this study is obtained with the patient awake, drowsy and asleep. this study is abnormal. this study is abnormal due to the presence of sharply contoured slowing present over the right frontal and right anterior temporal regions. we know that memory is unreliable in the best of circumstances. my memory seems increasingly volatile, fractured, partial, sometimes even proving false. and thus, the very process of researching memories, a memoir of forgetfulness, opens up questions about the real and imagined, my own recollection of the events, as my memory undergoes constant revision. michael taussig (2011) declares, “i swear i saw this.” i think i did, but i no longer remember what “this” was. or i think i saw it, but turns out i didn’t. reluctant memories, lost memories, false memories—they demand novel ethnographic approaches that allow such shifting, impermanent thoughts and memories to still mean something, even as they represent me being otherwise. they are “real,” at least as much anything else in my life is real, even when they are false, incomplete, or hidden memories. though i reported (and continue to report) my experiences of anomia and other memory changes to my neurologists, i do so for record and understanding, less than expecting “a cure” or solution to my forgetfulness.18 as an academic, anomia can be embarrassing. it strikes me when i am particularly worn out, or overtired at work. i suffer from emotional and intellectual exhaustion, “brain fatigue,” more than most (or more than most who do not live with the permanent effects of brain injuries). and like everyone else, my ability to remember and recall is also shaped by age, overstimulation, an overreliance on technology, and other factors. these exacerbate the neuro conditions i live with as a result of the brain injury. i have adapted to the changes in my memory. this includes a reliance on lists, notes to self, electronic reminders, and calendars. in teaching, it means a lot of preparation, so i write out detailed lectures in full before class. i make a substantial effort to make up for the changes in my memory so that it does not affect my work, but this effort is exhausting and certainly not failproof. i forget, or—in the case of anomia—i fail to retrieve important material deep inside my brain matter all the time. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 12 but anomia offers a different way to understand memory disruptions that result from injuries. i realized, once i moved past the frustration and embarrassment, that anomia offered an interesting intellectual experience in the temporal. lauren berlant (2014) again shapes my thinking, but here it is drawing on her engagement with the ellipsis, which she has theorized as “infrastructures of relation.” building on dib’s definition of memory as practice and as a process, i am thinking about memories and anomia as similarly “infrastructures of relation.” thinking with ellipses / as elliptical offers a way to get at anomia, memory disturbances, and brain injuries in a more productive way, as a process not necessarily negative. berlant (2014) has talked about her own thinking as elliptical: that is to say, it both tracks concepts and allows for unfinishedness, inducing itself to become misshapen in the hope that by the time you return to the point of departure, so many things will have come into contact that the contours of the concept and the forms associated with its movement will have changed. anomia, and other memory changes, are like an ellipsis in that it is in the process of emerging; both the ellipses and anomia are marked by an “affective expectation of the experience of watching something unfold” (berlant, 2011, p. 6) as our brain matter continually reconfigures itself with age and injury. berlant (2014) clarifies her approach to the elliptical: the thing about an ellipsis is that it has a set of contradictory meanings. an ellipsis is a sentence that i don’t end because…i don’t know how to. an ellipsis is a sentence i don’t end because…you know what i mean. an ellipsis is a figure of return that isn’t symmetrical. ellipses might be a figure of loss or plenitude: sometimes it is more efficient to go dot dot dot. sometimes it’s also a way of signaling an elision. sometimes the referent is beyond words. the ellipsis allows us to refer to something that might be “beyond words.” anomia and other memory disturbances might be understood as the escape of words—slippery, mischievous—hiding in our memory, forcing us to end midsentence, mid-thought, or to find alternatives that are good enough replacements. these moments when the word is on the tip of our tongue are moments of both elision and emergence. it’s also a moment of suspension—i find myself caught in time. this sense of emergence opens up new ways of thinking about memory loss, neurological disturbances, and distortions of time. not simply incoherent, or incomplete narratives, but narratives in formation, productive, speculative…the word is coming. for berlant, the ellipsis represents a sense of being where one is left with questions rather than answers. for me, memory disruptions work the same way. too often my thoughts, and memories, end with special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 13 more questions than answers. i’m using anomia here as just one example where the neurological rendering of memory disruptions chafe up against the patient’s experience (or specifically my experience as patient). in the first few months after my injury, i was very frustrated by what felt like to me a type of memory loss. i couldn’t find the words that i needed. anomia is a condition “on the verge”—there but not quite, a forgotten memory, reluctant to be conjured. considered a “disorder of naming” and a “disorder of word retrieval” (goodglass & wingfield, 1997, p. 8), anomia is particularly common among those who have left-hemisphere damage or lesions. although it may feel as if one has forgotten the word, and thus assume that there is a loss of data from the memory, in fact the words are not lost from memory. the issue is in recall. one is unable to retrieve the information or word even though it exists in the memory, just there, on the tip of the tongue. it is not considered the same sort of difficulty experienced by those individuals with dementia, or alzheimer’s, due to an actual loss of semantic memory. there are many kinds of aphasia; anomic aphasia is just one of the many memory impairments categorized under aphasia (head, 1921). nineteenth-century neurologists paul broca, carl wernicke, and ludwig lichtheim are attributed with outlining the classical understanding of aphasia (eling, 2011). it is associated with three different lesion sites within the brain: the temporo-parietal junction, the anterior periventricular region of the frontal lobe, and the inferior temporal lobe. circumlocutions are common among those with anomic aphasia—that is, describing the word to the listener without ever actually saying the word. in those moments, we find generic fillers (“thingy” is one i frequently rely on) or other nonspecific words that are good enough, or act as temporary replacements until we find the word we were searching for. i can often identify the first letter (it starts with b…), but still the word itself escapes me. too often, that missing word comes to me hours later, maybe in the middle of the night as i toss and turn, its retrieval too late for any conversation or lecture that it was intended for. the definition and diagnosis of anomia relies on localization theory. localization theories have a long history in neurosciences starting in the seventeenth century, arising from phrenology (and indirectly related to studies of race and anatomy conducted by physical anthropologists) in the nineteenth century. paul broca, franz joseph gall, carl wernicke, and john hughlings jackson, among many others, were all proponents of localization theory, though in very different ways.19 susan leigh star (1985) explored the development of the phrenology brain map and the theory of localization of the late nineteenth century in the face of special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 14 scientific uncertainty. localization theory understood particular functions to be associated with specific zones of neural anatomy.20 for instance, broca’s area is associated with speech, and the frontal lobe associated with emotions. recently, localization theories have been revised away from a strict localized/functional approach to a more “systems” approach (with an emphasis on multiple memory systems), emphasizing a distributed neural network (uttal, 2002; squire, 2004), yet localization theory continues to shape neurosciences and clinical neurology. localization theory has been questioned by those such as william uttal, who suggests that the very logic behind localization theory relies on two assumptions, neither without epistemological challenges. he explains, the first problem is that we assume that the cognitive processes being explored (and localized on the brain map) are “defined in a sufficiently precise manner for them to be dealt with as separable and distinct modules” (uttal, 2002, p. 222). second, this approach to understanding the brain assumes brain functions “are actually localized (i.e., represented or encoded) by neuronal activity in circumscribed regions of the brain as opposed to being broadly distributed throughout the brain” (uttal, 2002, p. 223). he is very critical of localization theories, suggesting that the attribution of modules and faculties to the mind has always been “arbitrary and idiosyncratic” (uttal, 2002, p. 225), and that research design has been “self-fulfilling and selfsupporting” (uttal, 2002, p. 223). tremblay and dick (2016) echo this sentiment, arguing that theories that localize speech and language skills in particular regions of the brain are outdated and do not reflect current neurobiological understandings. they explain, “our emerging understanding of brain function is of mutual interactions and common control mechanisms” (tremblay & dick, 2016, p. 9). uttal (2001) also emphasizes how new visual technologies of seeing may limit neurology’s capacity to make sense of that which is invisible or cognitive abilities that are complexly interconnected. although neuroimages are now more and more complex (conventional x-rays replaced with fmri and ct imaging, for instance), they simultaneously create blind spots in brain injury assessments. the focus on relatively new brain imaging technologies discounts forms of knowing that are non-word and non-image based. the new visual images produced by ct, pet, and mri technologies are believed to be more accurate representations of reality, yet the visual process has become increasingly artificial (borck, 2008). this technological visualization has intensified the trend in neurology to understand brain lesions and injuries as localized in specific parts of the brain, thus affecting certain functions (for instance, frontal lobe lesions/injuries are associated with personality changes), rarely accounting for the complex ways in which the mind, brain, and body work special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 15 together, or the ways in which the brain is a sum of its parts. the contemporary focus on the localization of brain injuries and trauma and the visualization of evidence renders other kinds of evidence and experience as immaterial, or designates it as non-evidence. neurologists are rigorously trained to understand brain injuries within these paradigms of knowing—visual and localized—yet experiences of brain trauma like my own suggest the importance of accounting for that which falls outside of the specific localized diagnostics for traumatic brain injuries and for a more systems-based or holistic, or felt (million 2013), approach. time travel figure 2. auditory hallucinations 2. illustration credit: leslee lazar. [montage illustration of auditory hallucinations by artist/neuroscientist leslee lazar.] special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 16 though certainly frustrating at times, even embarrassing, anomia offers possibilities. it is not a failed act of retrieval, but a slow movement through time, through a (stalled) process of retrieval where one is remembering and forgetting all at once. ideas of temporality are critical to questions of memory as our sense of time—what is past, present, or future—blurs with these memory disturbances. as elizabeth grosz (2004) notes, temporality or time is one of the most obscure and elusive concepts for social theorists and physicists alike (see also grosz, 2005; rovelli, 2018).21 temporality works then on parallel if not multiple levels in the acts of remembering, forgetting, and imagining through anomia. if we abandon the obsession with remembering the past, we can focus on questions of being and becoming, possibilities, and “time travel.” i mean this both literally and conceptually—for anomia and other memory disruptions such as déjà vu disrupt conventional understandings of temporality. anomia—without name—and déjà vu—caught in time—force us to rethink how we conceptualize memories, being, and temporality. grosz (2004) suggests that we can only think of time “in passing moments, through ruptures, nicks, cuts, in instances of dislocation,” but she also argues “it contains no moments or ruptures and has no being or presence, functioning only as continuous becoming” (p. 5). i want to argue differently, that we consider anomia and other memory disturbances as these very ruptures she denies. and to further suggest that a sensorial ethnographic memoir might allow us to understand these disruptions, this other temporal dimension, and the embodied (body and mind as one) experiences of being otherwise. if we take seriously phenomenological experiences of memory disturbances like anomia, as something more than a “disorder of naming,” what might we learn about the textures of temporality experienced by the injured and noninjured? last night, i woke up surprised to find myself back in my own bedroom in toronto. i was sure i had been at a friend’s cottage, hundreds of miles away. it takes me a few minutes to place myself, to account for lost time. during moments like this, a few minutes seem like an eternity as i struggle to remember how i arrived at this place, when i arrived at this place. this happens with increasing frequency. minutes, the odd day, lost or misplaced, slow to recover. in these moments, it feels as if i have literally been traveling through time, hurdled forward into the future, arriving discombobulated, out of place. time lost. i lose time as i lose memory to forgetfulness. as mahmoud darwish (1995/2013) eloquently argues, memory is for forgetfulness. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 17 conclusion in his study of multiple personality disorder, ian hacking (1995) writes, “i intend instead to find out why it is so taken for granted, by both sides, that memory is the key to the soul” (p. 20). if the memory is understood as the “key to the soul,” to the self, and as defining our identity, what does it say about people like me whose memory is unreliable, filled with disjointed, disordered memories?22 for those of us with missing, displaced, or simply stubborn memories unwilling to be brought forth, are we no longer ourselves? or is there another way to understand the transformations in our abilities to record, store, and recall the information of our lives? hacking’s work reminds us that approaches to memories, how memories are formed, retained, recollected, are not shared between the sciences and the social sciences/humanities. if we consider this type of embodied knowledge from patients, with idiosyncratic experiences, that fall outside the typical clinical guidelines for neurology, if we make room for the subtle, invisible, quirky sensations reported, our understandings of brain injuries, the process of memory, and forgetfulness might be better understood. perhaps the lived embodied, felt accounts of brain injury and memory disturbances can bridge the gaps between the social and scientific in understanding brain trauma and forgetfulness. in a very real way, such accounts make visible the processes of knowing (in the self and in scientific disciplines that study the self or mind). but more than that, attention to such embodied affective accounts of memory can shift how we understand memory changes from something inherently negative, a loss mourned, to simply another way of being and knowing the world, and perhaps, one’s self. like others who have written about their own experiences with disabilities or neurodiversities, i do not assume that my experience of memory disruptions, loss, or the brain injury apply to anyone else (wendell, 1993). but i do not generally miss the memories that have disappeared or been displaced, or those that stubbornly refuse to be retrieved. i do not feel lesser than, i do not feel like my identity has been lost. i know who i am without remembering a lost summer, or a name, a publication or place mid-lecture. the angst of forgetting (like that portrayed in the films i discussed earlier) is shaped by cultural and social ideals about memory and by corporate interests creating markets for tools, games, pharmaceuticals, and other biotechnologies. the obsession with memories and remembering disparages against the forgetful. i suggest instead that we understand these conditions for their generative special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 18 possibilities and productivity, something emerging, as simply another state of being; as a type of time travel that once you get used to it, and eschew the reductive neurological understandings of brain injuries, allows for embracing a state of being otherwise, one which is very grounded in the now and the future (wilson, 2004). am i a time traveler? well, perhaps no, at least not in the sense of the 1980s science fiction film back to the future or the british cult classic doctor who. but i certainly experience time and the world around me differently as a result of neural reconfigurations and the disruptions in my memory. acknowledgements a wenner-gren foundation for anthropological post-phd award, for which i am grateful, funds this project. i am also thankful to banu subramaniam, editor at catalyst, joanne muzak for her editorial craftsmanship, and two superb anonymous reviewers for their suggestions on this paper. i also owe special thanks to cristina moretti for providing important suggestions on questions of time and leslee lazar for his illustration. alex rewegan, matthew-wolf-meyer, and elsa fan have all also contributed to this project in very different ways for which i greatly appreciate. notes 1see tobias rees’s (2016) intriguing ethnography of parisian neurobiologists and plasticity. plasticity is also taken up in the edited collection by bates and bassiri (2016). 2 the paper aims to contribute to a growing body of literature like that of anne cvetkovich (2012) who writes about depression and the mental illness complex as someone who lives within that arrangement, as someone who experiences the mind/body betrayals and institutional logics that shape our experience of being ill or injured, in body or mind. similarly, anthropologist robert murphy (2001) wrote about his own experience of being diagnosed with a tumour on his spinal cord and the subsequent transformation of his body as he made sense of becoming quadriplegic. these accounts approach changing bodies, institutional structures, epistemological logics, and popular imaginings through the critical analytics of the anthropological and the embodied first-person account. also see these scholarly memoir accounts of illness: berube (2016); clare (2017); mclean (2007); orr (2006); stoller (2005); and trivelli (2014). 3 memory loss as a cultural phenomenon has also garnered much attention in the sciences and social sciences, due to the aging baby boomer generation and the special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 19 concern with dementia. anthropologists lawrence cohen (1998; leibing & cohen, 2006), margaret lock (2013), and janelle taylor (2008) have all written about memory loss, dementia research, and cultural understandings and institutional arrangements surrounding aging and “senility.” yet there is very little literature on the social study of forgetting (in the individual, biological sense, rather than the collective act of forgetting) outside of dementia or the aged. also see antze & lambek (1996). 4 on methodological approaches in anthropology that demand attention to the sensorial, see culhane (2017). 5 andrew irving makes a compelling case for an “imperiled anthropology,” which aims to explore and represent “the streams of inner dialogue and reverie” usually ignored by anthropology (2017, p. 74). he builds on the work of vincent crapazano (2004), who similarly has argued for a type of anthropological inquiry that takes seriously the imagination, reverie, and inner thoughts. such work inspires my thinking on this project. 6 i see this paper also working to answer the question posted by biehl and locke (2017): “how can we ethnographically apprehend these worldly fabrications and the lives therein, constituted as they are by that which is unresolved?” (p. 10) 7 dib’s approach to memory is largely influenced by karen barad’s (2003) work on “agential realism” and temporality. current research in neurosciences place memories in the engram at the deeply neural and cellular level (josselyn, köhler, & frankland, 2017; poo et al., 2016). 8 furthermore, i want to suggest here that changes in memory from physical trauma, such as concussions or traumatic brain injuries, might be better understood as memory “disturbances” or “disruptions” in the productive sense, where disrupting narratives or disturbing conventional ways of knowing, produce alternative, sometimes more nuanced, accounts of neurodiversity. 9 such changes might even be understood as “hopeful” in the massumi (1995) sense of the affective. matthew wolf-meyer’s (n.d.) most recent manuscript, unraveling, also critically examines the relationships between the self, the neurological disorder, and conceptions of the brain as the “basis of the self.” 10 in nostalgia, the fictional novel by vassanji (2016), individuals suffer from “leaked memory syndrome,” a type of nostalgia where “reminders of discarded special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 20 lives” leak into the conscious minds, requiring intervention from “nostalgia doctors.” in this fictional future, past lives and the memories are replaced with artificial memories, as new personalities replace old ones, leaving traumatic pasts behind. 11 boot and kramer (2014) suggest that by 2020 the industry will be valued at more than us$6 billion. 12 for more on gordon bell, see total recall (bell & gemmell, 2009). on digital and/or e-memories and their affect on biological and cultural memories, see van dijck (2007). 13 for instance, on various forms of cultural amnesia encouraged or fostered by states, see choudry (2010), haaken (2002), and luker (2005). we see cultural amnesia as dangerous, and counterproductive to anti-colonial or indigenous movements, yet i do think that some people want to forget. this is related in some senses to the work of dian million (2013), who critiques trauma discourses as they are taken up by indigenous groups in canada and fields of psychology and then celebrated by the colonial canadian state. 14 i thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 15 i was in western kenya working on an ethnography of a prep clinical trial for hiv that was being conducted by researchers at the university of washington and university of california, san francisco. the region at that time had one of the highest rates of hiv infection in sub-saharan africa, and as a result there were multiple hiv/aids clinical trials being conducted by state and non-governmental organizations, largely from the united states. 16 i contested and argued that such a question was no longer fair given that we are largely surrounded by digital clocks and rarely see a traditional clock with a big hand and little hand. my neurologist responded by saying, “that’s the point.” 17 for instance, my experience with hiccups after the brain injury, which i have written about elsewhere; see elliott (2016). 18 there are no cures, and rarely certainty about my ongoing symptoms. the “uncertainty” of neurosciences has been discussed by a number of scholars. see fitzgerald (2017); star (1985); and wolf-meyer (2018). special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 21 19 for more details on their contributions to localization theory and the neurosciences, see lanczik & keil (1991) and kaitaro (2001). on franz gall’s influence and the three time periods of localization theory, see zola-morgan (1995). 20 for more detailed social studies of localization, see abraham (2003, 2012); borck (2008); dumit (1999, 2004); rose (2007); and saunders (2008). 21 see the ethnographic accounts of time by bear (2016); davis (2017); majumder (2017) in conversation with zee; peteet (2018); pandian (2012); and zee (2017). 22 see ian hacking’s rewriting the soul (1995) for his archeology of the memory sciences and the politicization of memories. references abraham, t. 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(1993). feminism, disability and transcendence of the body. canadian woman studies, 13(4), 116-122. wilson, e. a. (2004). psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body. durham, nc: duke university press. wolf-meyer, m. (n.d.) unraveling: remaking american personhood in a neurological age. [unpublished manuscript]. wolf-meyer, m. (2018, february 6). what can we do with uncertainty? somatosphere. retrieved from http://somatosphere.net/forumpost/what-can-we-do-withuncertainty zee, jerry c. (2017). holding patterns: sand and political time at china’s desert special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | original research | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) denielle elliott, 2019 27 shores. cultural anthropology, 32(2), 215-241. zola-morgan, s. (1995). localization of brain function: the legacy of franz joseph gall (1758-1828). annual review of neurosciences, 18, 359-383. author bio denielle elliott is a cultural anthropologist who teaches on postcolonial and indigenous science studies, the anthropology of biomedicine, and social suffering in the departments of social science and anthropology at york university in toronto. she is co-founder and co-curator of the centre for imaginative ethnography, coeditor of a different kind of ethnography: imaginative practices and creative methodologies (2016, university of toronto press), and the author of reimagining science and statecraft in postcolonial kenya: stories from an african scientist (2018, routledge). microsoft word asher-132-1121-4.docx asher, k. (2017). thinking fragments: adisciplinary reflections on feminisms and environmental justice. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2), 1-28 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kiran asher, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article thinking fragments: adisciplinary reflections on feminisms and environmental justice kiran asher wgss, university of massachusetts, amherst kasher@umass.edu abstract feminisms and environmental justice are some of the names of struggles to understand nature-culture linkages and conceptualize just worlds for nonhumans and their human kin. in this paper, i revisit my journey of doing environmental justice research, i.e. of my feminist scientific practice in asia and latin america. in this retrospective telling i highlight how gender, political economy, and race were and remain fundamental in producing the subjects and objects of my research and analysis. i discuss how an implicit feminism helped me grapple with the complex nature-culture linkages i observed in the field. postcolonial and marxist insights supplement and complement feminisms in the questions i pose as we attempt to imagine new nature-cultures. 2 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) so nature is not a physical place to which one can go, nor a treasure to fence in or bank, nor as essence to be saved, or violated. nature is not hidden and so does not need to be unveiled. nature is not a text to be read. (haraway, 1992, p. 296) when we find ourselves in the subject position of two determinate decisions, both right (or both wrong), one of which cancels the other, we are in an aporia which by definition cannot be crossed, a double bind. it is not a logical or philosophical problem like a contradiction, a dilemma, a paradox, an antinomy.…again, it must be insisted that this is the condition of the possibility of deciding. in the aporia or the double bind, to decide is the burden of responsibility. the typecase of the ethical sentiment is regret, not self-congratulations. (spivak, 2012, pp. 104–105) the idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history. (williams, 2005, p. 67) feminisms and environmental justice as scientific practice in the twenty-first century, the need to imagine different relationships between humans, and between humans and nature, is on agendas across the globe amidst fears of the social and environmental impacts of climate change, rising economic inequities, and continuing racial, gender, and sexual violence. the question driving this special issue—what are the resources within feminist thought that might allow us to imagine new nature-cultural worlds?—is both timely and urgent. in their attempt to know the world and change it for the better, feminist pursuits of new nature-cultures are by definition modern and scientific. but although rising to the conceit of modern science, they do not share its hubris of universal rationality or the idea that “one size fits all.” rather, feminist perspectives are as diverse as the world, and include those not associated with feminism, the properly named movement. feminists’ quests for worlds that are just and livable lead them to traverse the terrains of social change along disciplinary, political, historical, activist, and many other paths. in this article, i outline my path and ongoing struggle to understand nature-culture linkages. i trace the genealogy of my intellectual formation, which began in my childhood home, includes 3 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) formal academic training in natural and social science disciplines, and self-education through critical readings in various fields. revisiting the journey of my environmental justice research, i realized that the journey itself embodies a feminist scientific praxis, often an implicit one. in this article, i make explicit the parameters of a feminist scientific praxis and show that it is one that is attentive to relationality and multiple logics, and necessarily anti-sexist, anti-capitalist and anti-colonial. in this retrospective telling, i highlight how gender, political economy, and race (coded as caste and nationalism) were fundamental in producing the subjects, objects, and analyses of my early environmental conservation research. yet these key mediating factors of knowledge production were the “present absences” in the methods and approaches i drew on. still, an underlying sensibility i would now call “postcolonial feminism” made it impossible to ignore the busy traffic between nature and culture that was everywhere. in the language of my field, i realized that the environment, ecology, and sustainability were closely connected to economic and political development. race, gender, history, and political economy are present absences in mainstream social science approaches to “sustainable development.” however, they were at the forefront of afro-colombian ethnic and territorial claims over the pacific lowlands of colombia—a region slated for economic modernization and biodiversity conservation in the 1990s and overrun by violence since the turn of the twenty-first century. over a decade of critical solidarity with afro-colombian movements for social and environmental justice forced me to grapple with the heterogeneities and contradictions of culture-nature connections, including the ferocious and fluid dynamics of capitalist globalization. to account for them adequately in analytical terms, i drew from many wells of critical theories, especially feminisms, postcolonialisms, and marxisms. i can never repay my debts to those whose intellectual and political labors enable mine.⁠1 risking an inadequate accounting, i note that the writings of donna haraway, karl marx, and gayatri chakravorty spivak frame my understanding of feminisms, postcolonialisms, and marxisms. based on 4 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) their work and that of others, i show that ethical scientific practice entails persistent critique and requires wrestling with the dilemmas and ambiguities it generates. i use a first person narrative to flag the dilemmas and ambiguities of research practice. parallels and resonances with the scientific practice of others may foster collective knowledge about feminist environmental justice. however, these practices do not necessarily represent a generalizable or replicable form of feminist scientific research. similarly, the seven biographical notes below that chronicle my encounters with nature-cultures are less a memoir than a method emphasizing the partial nature of evidence and the unpredictable and contingent answers to one’s research questions. the notes also show the conjunctural nature of research and the far-from-seamless ways through which we gain insights into knotty problems. academic writing norms, which stress clear transitions, often obscure the choppy and idiosyncratic paths to discovery and the fact that “ah-ha” moments are often buried under the rubble of many thoughts. this form of writing, then, is an experiment in the spirit of feminist and scientific inquiry. i trust that it does not sacrifice clarity and brings some pleasure to the reading. note 1: a conversation with my mother about god me: do you believe in god? ma: yes. me: why? ma: because we [humans] made gods. me: really? why? ma: because we could not understand nature. 5 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) me: so who made nature? ma: gods. me: if gods made nature and humans made gods, did humans make nature too? ma: no, nature made humans. such complex and non-causal logics also defined the relations among divine and mortal characters in the folk tales and epic stories i heard from my mother and grandparents. furthermore, these characters were shape-shifting, and the boundaries between human and non-human were fluid and dynamic. such fluidity also underlay the spirited debates about nature and culture, science and superstition, modernity and tradition, colonialism and nationalism, philosophy and religion, power and politics, and spirituality and materialism that i witnessed during my childhood in 1970s post-independence india. a motley crew of mostly uneducated but literate members of the extended family, neighbors, sadhus and seers from different sects and religions, and friends (mine and my parents) animatedly discussed these themes of national importance. the family dog and strays of various species were at the center of these gatherings and, indeed, of my world. i wistfully compared our household to that of gerald durrell, british naturalist and zookeeper, but i always found us coming up short. for one, our menageries were never as wild as durrell’s, and our tiny apartment in bombay (now mumbai) could never match the romance of his teenage home on the island of corfu. but more importantly, durrell’s narratives of even the most chaotic situations were rooted in a coherent, light-hearted present and signaled a bright future. in contrast, the realm of the past, glorious yet beleaguered, always seemed to weigh down the multilingual and cacophonous conversations at home. they meandered through the labyrinths of india’s ancient and colonial history, and lamented its 6 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) currently underdeveloped and backward society’s floundering on the path to the future. i could discern no singular logic or teleological arc to these discussions. with no place for multiple logics or polyvocal oral cultures in any imaginable future, reading science was the over-determined choice for a curious child yearning for durrellian romance. science held two intertwined promises: the thrill of discovery and a certainty of method— verifiable, tangible, unfettered by traditional beliefs, beyond dispute, and universally intelligible. paradoxically, science’s key appeal was that it was premised on questioning all certainties. it was also the beacon of progress that would bring india’s multitudes into a modernity on par with the west. note 2: angsting about ungulates in the semi-arid regions of india by the 1980s, environmental issues were becoming issues of global concern and proper objects of science. ecology and conservation biology were seeking disciplinary status by moving beyond the descriptive domain of natural history to establish scientific methods and theories for the study of flora and fauna, ecosystems, and environmental changes. although these fields were not considered as prestigious or as important as other stem (science, technology, math, and engineering) fields, i felt i could legitimately move from the lab to the field to conduct research on the wildlife i loved as long as i did it with the prerequisite degree of objectivity and scientific distance. among other things, this meant keeping “culture” (as in, anything to do with humans) separate from the study of nature. my undergraduate advisor and professors fully supported my honors research on wildlife biology.2 however, they could not help with identifying a research project or the appropriate theories and methods through which to approach it. with the help of the bombay natural history society (bnhs) and world wildlife fund (wwf)-india, i finally found my research object: the endangered indian antelope or blackbuck 7 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) (antilope cervicapra) in rehekuri, a small forest reserve (2.17 sq. kms.) in a semi-arid region of western india. the antelope, whose numbers had dwindled due to hunting and the loss of their grassland habitat, were wandering into the surrounding unfenced fields and damaging crops. my objective was to understand ungulate (hoofed mammal) behavioral ecology and assess the extent of crop damage around rehekuri. my broader goal was to contribute data to help address the issue of “humanwildlife” conflicts in national parks and protected areas in india. access to the forest reserve, in terms of distance from mumbai and research permits from the indian forest department, was a serious logistical hurdle. members of bnhs and wwf finally facilitated research permits. these members and amateur naturalists were often part of india’s upper-middle class of urban professionals. among them was a medical doctor and wildlife photographer who also served as my advisor. this vanguard was eager to build on indian natural history (rudyard kipling’s the jungle book is an example) to develop a scientific basis for wildlife conservation in india. this imperative arose as much from the specificities of economic development and conservation in postindependence india as from the international conservation biology debates of the time (see note 3 below). caste, gender, and class were also at play in our attempts to access the research site. when a young urban woman with a stilted command of the local language showed up alone in a rickety public bus at an isolated part of rural india one hot morning, the forest officers and guards were at a loss. eventually, i was taken to speak with the district forest officer’s wife, who ascertained that i had a sound “moral character,” appropriate caste background, and parental consent to be there. i was then left alone to do my fieldwork, though it took a letter from my advisor for me to stay in the forest guesthouse. the hospitality and graciousness of the guesthouse guard’s wife saved me from going hungry during fieldwork, but not from burning my mouth and insides with the spicy food. when i visited the field in the company of the doctor and other urban naturalists, we were served bland or mildly spicy food. but 8 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) during my solo field trips, no amount of begging led to any significant decline in the spice level of the meals. what i cannot know for sure is whether the cook was asserting her agency and resisting my presence (respectable young women do not wander in rural areas alone), or claiming me as kin (we appeared to be the same age). having cleared these logistical hurdles, the next ones were of the textbook variety: identifying and accomplishing my specific research goals within money and time constraints. neither advisors nor books on wildlife biology had any useful advice on navigating such methodological dilemmas as: • the appropriate census methods to obtain an accurate antelope count • identifying and classifying grasses and sedges that antelope ate • assessing the extent of “crop damage” (i asked the farmers how much crop damage antelope caused, when, how. their answers: lots of damage, anytime the crops are in the field.) equally complicated was the issue of habitat loss. colonial legacies shaped the bureaucratic structure and functions of the indian forest department. their mandates included “afforestation,” (establishing tree cover on bare or tree-less land) which meant that plantations of fastgrowing eucalyptus trees were reducing the antelope’s already small open grassland habitat and lowering the water table. the afforestation mandate thus conflicted with the forest department’s added mandate of conserving wildlife. to resolve this, the deputy forest officers often fudged the counts by increasing the number of animals by a certain percentage every year, never mind that they exceeded the tiny reserve’s carrying capacity. forest personnel also created havoc, albeit unintentionally, when they removed all the dung piles of antelope droppings to use as fertilizer. i had painstakingly mapped these dung piles after observing that they were markers of antelope territories and governed the herd dynamics of these highly social animals. their removal disrupted herd patterns and drove the animals further outside the reserve’s unmarked boundaries. 9 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) keeping people out of the reserve was just as difficult as keeping antelope in. villagers, often women, collected firewood, fodder, and other non-timber forest products (ntfps) “illegally” from the reserve. such examples of what from haraway (1989) we understand as the busy traffic between nature and culture were everywhere and haunted the margins of my field notes. but neither these hauntings nor the many fieldwork dilemmas made it into my thesis or the scientific publication based on this research. attributing my dilemmas to inadequate methodological skills to study nature separate from culture, i came to the united states to do graduate work in environmental conservation. note 3: iguanas and other fauna, or old dilemmas in the new world different colonial and national histories, political economies, and grammars of race, place, and gender structure environmental science in the united states. the 7000-acre duke forest in the north carolina piedmont was an important research and teaching site for students at the school of forestry and environmental studies. what were now regenerated forests were formerly fields and tobacco plantations. never once in my course of study was there a discussion of who worked those fields and how slave labor contributed to the past and present “resources” we were learning to manage rationally for timber and other uses. not only was the past another country, there was little sense of internationalism or curiosity about the larger world among my us peers and professors. this meant that there was neither intellectual mentorship nor research funding for me to return to india to conduct fieldwork for my master’s project. while i did not know it then, cold war politics and the absence of bilateral relations between india and the united states also had something to do with my inability to return. my sense of such history and politics was inchoate at best. but an inherited anti-colonial sentiment made me want to continue research in the “third world,” and led me to the neotropics. it also became evident that although there were well10 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) developed approaches to understanding temperate zone ecologies, they were not applicable in the tropics. hence, over the next five years (from 1987 to 1991), i spent as much time in the field as academic calendars, funding, and visas would allow. conservation and evolutionary biologists had begun arguing that the fate of the living world depended on biodiversity, the diversity of living nature (soulé, 1986; kramer, van schaik, & johnson, 1997). as much of this biodiversity is concentrated in the tropics, john terborgh, one of the leading figures in tropical ecology, extols: the special scientific value of tropical forests is that they offer our last chance to study nature in its prehistoric condition, nature as it evolved over eons past....pristine ecosystems still exist in parts of south america, central africa, indonesia, new guinea, and some other pacific islands. these ecosystems are priceless and irreplaceable assets, for they constitute some of the few remaining controls for biological science. (1992, p. 29) with its marked absence of human presence or sense of history, this statement is representative of the views of classical tropical conservation ecology. no surprise then that in one of the first awkwardly expressed examples of public concern about biodiversity loss, the 1986 national teleconference on biodiversity (the national academies, 2011), there is no analysis of the links between international political economy and the rising rates of tropical deforestation. similarly, deforestation and resource exploitation were uncritically blamed on poor, local people and “resource scarcity” due to “overpopulation” (peluso & watts, 2001). such views persist despite extensive evidence to the contrary.3 i was disturbed, yet influenced, by these discourses and sought neutral knowledge of tropical flora and fauna for the formulation of modern environmental policies and sound management practices. i studied agroecology, agroforestry, population ecology, black-bellied whistling ducks, and green iguanas in costa rica. in north carolina, i mapped the piedmont forests for the purpose of “ground truthing” remotely sensed data on forest cover. later i repeated the exercise in the 11 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) forests of belize. i also studied advanced wildlife management techniques in southern china before spending six months in the brazilian amazon studying aquatic and avian biology. my research questions and the sites of my investigation were as over-determined as my ability to learn new languages. across them, messy meshing of nature and culture, ecology and economics, and geography and politics shaped my research objects. yet, i had no tools to account for them nor to assess observations, such as women regularly fishing in mamiraua (the region of the western brazilian state of amazonas where i lived) while asserting that only men fished; a famous english scientist whose fungal infection had just been effectively treated with local remedies lecturing caboclos (indigenous or mestizo peasants living along the rivers) about the miracles and superiority of western medicine; and a “poacher”—the wiry eighty-year-old who was my field father—single handedly capturing and killing a caiman the same size as him. any lingering doubts that flora and fauna were literally and metaphorically entangled with humans, the environment, and political economy drowned in the rising waters of the varzea forests of the amazon in june 1991. a few months later, i started doctoral work at the university of florida with funding from the tropical conservation and development (tcd) program. at tcd, faculty and students from the natural and social sciences (but none from the humanities) came together to develop interdisciplinary approaches to environment and development concerns. my degree-granting department was political science. note 4: linking ecology and economy through sustainable development courses in comparative politics, international development and environmental policy, and an internship at the world bank as a “biodiversity conservation” consultant, soon made it clear that the standard approaches of the social sciences emulated the ahistorical, 12 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) apolitical empiricism of the natural sciences. it took rather longer and much wandering across literal and disciplinary (political theory, history, area studies, literature, feminist theory, and more) fields to learn that all sciences have roots in enlightenment ideals of progress through science and reason (hall, held, hubert, & thompson, 1996). science and technology studies (sts) was concerned with modernity and progress in europe and the west, and “development” was their non-western counterpart. the west and “the rest” emerged in relation to each other in colonial times. within my comparative politics textbooks, however, there were no signs of such connections until the post-world war ii period and the launch of the development project in the 1950s. the goals of development were to eradicate poverty in the third world and overcome political and economic underdevelopment under the tutelage of the west (edelman & haugerud, 2005). governed by cold war anti-communist rhetoric, theories of political modernization and development posited that economic growth (through industrialization, infrastructure, and development) in the newly-independent (african and asian) and currentlyunderdeveloped (latin american) countries would help them “catch-up” with the developed world. capitalist accumulation was the “natural” or inevitable path to progress, the benefits of which were supposed to “trickle down” and lead to development and liberal democracy. when underdevelopment and poverty continued to plague the third world, their causes were traced to internal roadblocks to national capitalist accumulation and progress, such as corruption, overpopulation, and the pesky, persistent “traditional values” of its backward people. such eurocentric views prevail in conventional thinking about science, technology, and development. development was not without its critics. marxist-inspired dependency and world-systems theorists saw the struggle for development as part of anti-imperialism and nationalism. writing in the 1960s and 1970s, they argued that capitalist expansion depended on complex and unequal connections—between colonies, nations, regions, 13 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and world markets—and offered structural explanations of persistent inequalities and uneven economic growth (edelman & haugerud, 2005). in political science classrooms, however, such critiques were discredited as “ideological” and were seldom given time or analytical attention. but both modernization and marxist-inspired theories of development were similar in their humanism and consideration of “nature” as the de facto source of raw material for economic growth and human development. both also relegated rural populations and women to the “economically unproductive” subsistence and domestic sectors. from the perspectives of marxist comrades and world bank policy pundits, the work of the women in rehekuri and mamiraua could only be invisible or unproductive, even to the women themselves. since the 1970s, a broad spectrum of gender professionals and feminists scholars from the global north and global south has also been examining the causes and consequences of women’s exclusion and exploitation within development (braidotti, charkiewicz, häusler, & wieringa, 1994; saunders, 2002). scholars rooted in western, liberal feminism blamed public and private patriarchy for women’s oppression and sought equal economic and political rights for women. integrating women into the formal economy, they argued, would also promote economic growth. marxist and socialist feminists extended structural critiques of uneven development and argued that capitalist accumulation systematically depended on and undervalued subsistence production and women’s labor. thus, they saw gender inequities as part of a continuum of inequalities between countries, classes, regions, and ethnic groups. their critiques show the need to rethink the structures of capitalist development, and the power relations of class, race, and gender. the application of their critiques is a call for a “rights-based” approach to human development and welfare. a parallel set of discussions was taking place at the same time regarding women’s roles and gender relations in natural resource management and the environment (braidotti, charkiewicz, häusler, & wieringa, 1994). most famously, “ecofeminists” such as vandana shiva 14 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) from india and wangari maathai from kenya highlighted that poor rural women in the third world depended on nature for their survival and were more likely to be knowledgeable “resource guardians" rather than "resource degraders” or hapless victims of development. viewed through these lenses, rural women’s work—collecting firewood, fishing, farming, and more—takes on different value. but the analytical insights and questions raised by feminists in the extensive literature on “women, gender, development, and the environment” seldom make it into most classrooms or policy boardrooms. feminists do deserve a degree of credit for getting scientists and policy makers to see that economic and environmental issues are two sides of the same green coin. in 1987, the world commission on environment and development (wced) published a report titled our common future. published under the direction of gro harlem brundtland (then prime minister of norway), the wced report famously introduced the concept of "sustainable development," which it defines as: development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. it contains within it two key concepts: the concept of “needs,” in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. (wced 1987, p. 43) the report and the wced laid the groundwork for the united nations conference on the environment and development (unced) and the parallel earth summit, held in rio de janeiro in 1992. the linkages between environmental-ecological issues and their correlate "economic development,” were consolidated at unced. an action plan for the twenty-first century (agenda 21) was outlined and a commission on sustainable development (un department of economic and social affairs, n.d. (a)) was established. it was charged with following up on agenda 21 and the various accords signed at the earth summit. 15 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) ecological and economic sustainability became the focus of debate in a wide range of disciplinary and organizational realms (kramer, van schaik, & johnson, 1997), including in the tcd program at the university of florida. following unced, many states, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral institutions engaged with sustainability, the environment, women, and gender. this institutionalization of sustainability paralleled the globalization of development. after the unexpected end of the cold war, a neoliberal phase of development emerged in the 1990s that emphasizes economic globalization through free trade and markets. it persists to this day. this phase of economic globalization suffers from amnesia about the natural and cultural bases of its past ascendancy and the uneven negative impacts of market capitalism. according to neoliberalism, empowering women, peasants, indigenous peoples, afro-descendant communities, and marginal groups to become consumers and entrepreneurs in global markets can overcome their social and economic exclusion. in this framework, environmental problems are anomalies or externalities to be addressed through market integration. in 1992, i did not yet know the analytical parameters of this logic but saw it at play when i was an intern with the global environmental facility at the world bank. their approach to biodiversity management and conservation in latin america was premised on pricing it correctly. that is, biodiversity was understood as an economic commodity in which its ecological characteristics had no bearing. economic logic also governed the millennium development goals (mdgs) (millennium project, 2006). the mdgs aimed to reduce poverty by half between 2000 and 2015, but were based on a narrow and centrally-defined set of targets and indicators. issues of equity or sustainability were virtually absent from the mdgs. opinions are divided about whether the mdgs were successful even by their own shifting criteria (the baseline of measurement was moved from 2000 to 1990). in 2012, twenty years after unced in rio de janeiro, the call for sustainable development and poverty eradication needed to be renewed at the un 16 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) conference on sustainable development (un department of social and economic affairs, n.d. (c)). in 2015, more broadly defined sustainable development goals (sdgs) (un department of social and economic affairs, n.d. (b)) replaced the mdgs. but in those too the various state agencies and multilateral institutions concerned with the sdgs and other global issues (now appearing as subsets of climate change) lauded the virtues of the “green economy” and “green growth,” despite the lack of conceptual clarity or agreements about the applicability or desirability of these terms. persistent inequalities (including those of gender, race, and class) remain subject to management through pragmatic and depoliticized projects to “empower women” and “mainstream gender.” such attempts not only ignore structural factors driving existing inequalities and unsustainable development but undermine public action for social and environmental justice (un women, 2014). note 5: economy, environment, and ethnic rights in the pacific lowlands of colombia needless to say, these standard approaches to environment and development linkages provided inadequate accounts of the complex socio-natures that i had first observed as a field biologist. nor could they help explain the dynamic interrelations between economic, environmental and local struggles i began witnessing in the biodiverse pacific lowlands of colombia in the 1990s while conducting doctoral research there. my time in the field coincided with the “cultural turn” in the social sciences and poststructural and postcolonial critiques of modernity and science. scholarship from a range of fields—anthropology, sociology, geography, and environmental history—were contesting the technical, apolitical, and ahistorical nature of modernization and opening up conversations about the meanings, production, and effects of scientific knowledge and development interventions (crush, 1995; saunders, 2002). feminist, queer, and other critical perspectives were also reframing 17 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) debates about the nature of subjectivity, domination, and resistance and positing that reclaiming different identities and subjugated experiences is a form of politics. new ideas about knowledge and power were leading to new evaluations of these kinds of grassroots struggles and “new social movements” (nsms). in latin america, nsms described the looselyorganized coalitions of factory workers, peasants, women, urban squatters, and ethnic groups who rose up in protest against the state and forces of late capitalism starting in the 1980s (escobar & alvarez, 1992). marked by a diversity of interests, identities, and organizing strategies, these nsms drew on idioms of traditional or popular culture to seek democratic participation and imagine alternatives forms of politics beyond liberal (equality) and marxist (class-based exploitation) claims. in conjunction with this scholarship, many activists and professionals from the third world denounced development as a tool of hegemonic, eurocentric modernity, which imposed western rationality and marginalized non-western systems of knowledge (sachs, 1992). these writers argued that the traditional lifestyles and livelihood practices of marginalized local communities suggested sustainable alternatives to development and heralded a “post-development” era. such postmodernist, postcolonial, and anti-modernist perspectives keenly shaped my observations of afro-colombian struggles for ethnic and territorial rights. in a first approximation (my dissertation), i interpreted these black movements as resisting the state and institutionalized development and these activists as reclaiming their identities and experiences as afro-colombians. i uncomfortably echoed post-development claims that the assertion of cultural practices closely linked to nature could be the basis of economic alternatives. such an explanation of afro-colombian ethnocultural politics, however, did little justice to the heterogeneity of black movements and experiences. it was as rooted in nature-culture binaries as the standard approaches of my disciplines. extended fieldwork with social movements obliged me to grapple with how capitalist development (as a practice of science) and struggles 18 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) for social change were intertwined in contradictory, complex, and contingent ways. rather than autonomous expressions of resistance, black struggles, including black women’s expressions, were at least partially shaped by and through the very discourses of political and economic modernity they opposed. a decade after my first interpretation and aided by critical (re)readings of critical scholarship, my second interpretation of afro-colombian struggles theorized the dynamics between development and struggles for change beyond such binaries as tradition vs. modernity, exploitation vs. resistance, global vs. local, theory vs. practice, cooptation vs. autonomy, and development vs. alternatives (asher, 2009). as with all projects of knowledge production, this one generated many questions. these questions have since structured my scholarship and activism. how are processes of differentiations (of class, race, ethnicity, gender, nation, nature, and regional origin) shaped by the state and society, and shape them in turn? how can we grasp the ferocious yet fluid onslaught of capitalist globalization and its constitutive intersections with nature and culture? that is, how are the subjects and objects of analysis, attention, and intervention constituted as such? how can we eschew romantic understanding of subaltern agency while accounting adequately for their power and resistance? how can we be in critical solidarity with struggles for social and environmental justice? insights into these questions came from the challenges of teaching in the us academy. i began to learn what i was trying to teach: the slow, unguaranteed labor of persistent critique as ethical practice, which is the abiding concern of feminisms, postcolonialisms, and marxisms. note 6: feminism as science among ecofeminists and foresters feminism was implicit in my early research on nature, even though women were absent. in my current work on the raced and gendered dynamics of environmental change in the global south, feminism and women are explicitly central. as part of that work in march 2011, i 19 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) attended the inaugural activities of a three-day grandmothers university at the beej vidyapith, vandana shiva’s organic farm and training center, located a few hours from dehra dun in the garhwal hills of northern india. among the attendees were young students, mostly white euro-americans but also some from latin america, and many thirty-to-forty-somethings from the indian diaspora, who had come to learn organic and sustainable agricultural techniques from garhwali women. the speakers at the flowerdraped podium included shiva (a world-renowned activist and critic of mainstream agriculture and development, who trained as a physicist), sunderlal bahuguna of chipko fame, and margaret alva, then-governor of uttar pradesh. the garhwali teachers—a dozen grandmothers, mothers, daughters, and daughters-in-laws—were at the edges of the crowd, barely visible behind governor alva’s black-suited bodyguards. in their inaugural remarks, alva and shiva extolled the many virtues of grandmothers: their long view of what is called “sustainability” now, their traditional knowledge and wisdom about the earth, and their advice to practice love and compassion. shiva noted that, “because most of our grandmothers have not gone to school, they have a holistic knowledge of the world, not the broken knowledge of textbooks. they teach us prudence and not to run after money. grandmothers seek wealth of nature in harmony, and of social relations.” shiva’s powerful and charismatic remarks focused on valorizing knowledges heretofore undervalued in scientific discourses. i had heard similar things from my grandmothers and mother, and shared many of shiva’s claims. yet, i was uneasy with her reversals. her simplistic representations seemed to be missing the opportunity to invite her audience to engage with gender– environment relations in all their complications. i first learned about such complications from my mother, and they underlie haraway’s (1989) admonition that in feminisms simple reversals will not do and spivak’s (1999) argument that postcolonialism cannot simply recover subaltern agency or reveal the hidden. my unease became tinged with irony upon observing that notions of “traditional knowledge” shape not only “post-development” 20 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) alternatives but also policies of mainstream development institutions that once deemed such knowledge an impediment to progress. the world bank’s operational directive 4.2 to integrate gender, indigenous peoples and afro-descendant communities into development is perhaps one of the most notable examples of such policies. the impact of these policies is highly debatable. but my concern here is to convey the complications of nature-cultures that get sidestepped or, worse, recreated in binary representations of tradition vs. science. i had an opportunity to grapple with this task a few years after i heard shiva’s remarks in dehra dun. with gender and forests re-emerging as central to the global sustainable development agenda, environmental organizations were also attempting to integrate gender into their research and actions. diverse professional networks and coincidences led me to work at one such organization, the center for international forestry research (cifor) from 2013 to 2015. after two decades i once again found myself working with natural scientists who prided themselves on their “sound science.” they implicitly and explicitly rejected any form of advocacy or politics. thus, feminist insights were suspect, but women’s contributions to forestry or natural resource management were valid as long as they were empirically and objectively verified. unsurprisingly, attempts to talk about gender beyond a natural, neutral, biologically-determined difference between women and men were dismal failures. a momentary connection occurred in science@10, a weekly event where cifor scientists gave ten-minute presentations on their research to their colleagues. these presentations and the discussions afterwards were recorded for wider dissemination. in my presentation, titled "women are to gender what trees are to forests” (center for international forestry research, 2015), i made an analogy between the heterogeneity of forests and the diversity of women to draw attention to the lessons from forty years of scholarship on gender, development, and the environment. i reviewed some of the fundamental points of departure of forestry research, including that forests are complex biophysical and ecological entities, that there are many kinds of forests, and a collection 21 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) of trees does not automatically make a forest. i juxtaposed those with some insights from “gender” research, including that gender is not simply a relation between men and women, and that a focus on the heterogeneity of women and their social roles is necessary but provides insufficient accounts of inequities and power. through such juxtaposition, i argued that gender in forestry research means not just adding women but asking questions about our assumptions, approaches, and explanations about gender and forests. this short presentation generated many questions about women and—or in—forests. it even skirted the edges of the question, “what are forests?” in a limited way, it was more successful than any of my previous conversations with my colleagues about gender or, indeed, any social issue. yet, it fell short of an engagement with the social and political nature of all research and scientific knowledge production. animating such conversations is part of the ongoing challenge of feminist environmental work. it was clearly one of the objectives at the grandmothers university at beej vidyapith. note 7: re-encountering nature-cultures in the context of the early twenty-first century, when fears of climate change catastrophes are linked to indices of social inequalities, the need for different relationships between humans and nature is on agendas across the globe. attempts to imagine new nature-culture relationships within feminist sts, and this special issue, remind me of that conversation long ago with my mother. i invoke her not to reveal her agency or “give her voice.” rather, her formulation of nature-culture was my introduction to the idea that subjects emerge in relation to each other. this idea of subjects in relation is prevalent in many cultures and ways of thinking. this does not mean that relations are simple, outside of power, value-free, or uncontested. it is certainly not easy to understand or act upon this idea. but it stands in contrast to a key assumption of modern sciences, including the social or human sciences—that subjects of inquiry 22 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and action are discrete, a priori entities (individuals, animals, societies, countries, etc.) by obscuring the multiple relations that constitute and bind the socio-natural world, mainstream, disciplinary, scientific thinking provides inadequate accounts of it, and cannot strive for a better world or achieve development. as the anthropologist eric wolf notes in the opening lines of his book europe and the people without history, the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries that dissemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality. concepts like “nation,” “society,” and “culture” name bits and threaten to turn names into things. only by understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding. (1992, p. 3) my attempts to understand the “bundles of relationships” between the environment (which i understood to be non-human nature) and human development (which i understood to be social and cultural) led me to wander purposefully through various fields of scientific inquiry. my wanderings convince me that suturing the many severed connections between nature-cultures and imagining a more livable world for all requires methodological and epistemic multilingualism. that is, it requires learning the different grammars of actual and analytical languages or approaches. in closing, i sketch why and how the grammars of feminisms, anti-colonialism, and marxisms crucially inform my struggles for environmental justice. feminist theorists of various persuasions have asked, who counts as a legitimate subject of knowledge production (science) and action (politics)? who/what is relegated to object status? how are such subjects produced in space and time? how are sex/gender constitutive of subjectivity and vice versa? what are the implications of exclusion and inclusion? aside from the key issues of sex/gender, such questions have also been central to numerous variants of postcolonial scholarship. that is, anti-colonial scholars from early nationalists to current postcolonial 23 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and decolonial thinkers have interrogated and contested the relationship between those people and places deemed “civilized” (generally from the west or developed societies) and those seen as unable to govern themselves (generally aborigines or those from “the rest” of the world). since the enlightenment, the gendered and raced bodies of women and the colonized have been equated with nature and made into objects of western science and governmentality. what feminist and postcolonial projects have in common is a concern for how to respond to this reductionism. the projects of social change within contemporary feminist and anti-colonial politics then are not only about claiming the status of knowing and legitimate subjects but asking fundamental questions about how subjects and objects (culture, nature, nations, colonies, etc.) emerge in relation to each other within specific historical and geographic contexts. since the processes of (colonial) capitalism have been key in shaping the modern world, understanding the political economy of capitalist production is a necessary (but not sufficient) labor. that a critical engagement with the work of karl marx, one of capitalism’s greatest critics, might be fruitful for nature-culture thinking is something i learned from wolf and haraway. in his chapter outlining the parameters of various modes of production, wolf (1992) begins by flagging marx’s axiomatic understandings of the human condition—that humans being are part of nature but also change it to survive. in the process, they change their own nature. that is, humans and nonhumans are linked together in a dialectic and mutually constitutive relationship. within the capitalist mode of production, that relationship is both governed and hidden by the commodity form. as haraway explains, marx, of course, taught us about the fetishism of commodities. commodity fetishism is a specific kind of reification of historical human integrations with each other and with an unquiet multitude of non-humans, which are called nature in western conventions. in the circulation of commodities within capitalism, these interactions 24 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) appear in the form of, and are mistaken for, things. (1997, p. 135; my emphasis) it is a consensus among many fields that truly just relations cannot emerge from within enlightenment thinking and colonial capitalist modernity (which constitutes and rests on gendered, raced, classed, and sexed inequities). but it would be a mistake to think that we can simply reject them and have recourse to “traditional” alternatives. we must take the knowledges of grandmothers and indigenous peoples seriously but we cannot romanticize or fetishize them. i suggest that spivak offers useful insights into how to mobilize or operationalize this insight. in the afterword to imaginary maps, her translation of mahasweta devi’s short stories about tribals in india, she notes: i have no doubt that we must learn to learn from the original practical ecological philosophers of the world, through slow, attentive, mind-changing (on both sides), ethical singularity that deserves the name of “love”—to supplement necessary collective efforts to change laws, modes of production, systems of education and health care.…indeed, in the general predicament today, such a supplementation must become the relationship between the silent gift of the subaltern and the thunderous imperative of the enlightenment to “the public use of reason,” however hopeless that undertaking might seem. one filling the other’s gap. (1995, p. 201; emphasis in original) spivak’s postcolonialism is often dismissed as mere critique that does not offer a roadmap for a different future. but i read in her call “to learn from below” an invitation to engage in the slow, unguaranteed labor of careful critique and patient undoing of the problematic of development or science. paraphrasing and summarizing her complex formulations (1999), i suggest that her methodology entails mobilizing a historico-political perspective to supplement science in service of feminist, anti-racist and anti-colonial efforts. for social and environmental justice work, this supplementing involves tracing how rural communities, third-world 25 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) women, and nature are inserted into the circuits of global capitalism. that is, it means tracing their complex and contradictory relations with the state, nationalism, development, and environmental politics. such tracings reveal the gaps and fissures of dominant logic and the traces of other logics that are always already there. these are some of the radical but unromantic tasks that we must necessarily undertake to imagine new feminist sts nature-cultures. notes 1for this reason, i have mostly cited anthologies and edited collections that contain the scholarship i draw on or that focus on the debates i engage, rather than books or articles by individual authors. for this same reason, i have kept self-citation to a minimum. 2 i will be forever grateful to my mother and my undergraduate advisor dr. sam waugh (who passed away at a young age a few years later) for enabling me to pursue what was an unusual venture. they and my science teachers at st. xavier’s college were truly remarkable in their willingness to let their students follow their curiosity beyond the college curriculum. this was no small thing in indian science then. 3 see, for example, the journal different takes (population and development program, n.d.). references asher, k. (2009). black and green: afro-colombians, development, and nature in the pacific lowlands. durham, nc: duke university press. braidotti, r., charkiewicz, e., häusler, s., & wieringa, s. (1994). women, the environment and sustainable development: towards a theoretical synthesis. london, uk: zed books. 26 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) center for international forestry research (2015, february 25). kiran asher—women are to gender what trees are to forests. youtube. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkiygnapqly crush, j. (1995). power of development. new york, ny: routledge. edelman, m., & haugerud, a. (eds.) (2005). the anthropology of development and globalization: from classic political economy to contemporary neoliberalism. malden, ma: blackwell. escobar a., & alvarez, s. (eds.) (1992). the making of new social movements in latin america: identity, strategy, and democracy. boulder, co: westview. hall, s., held, d., hubert, d., & thompson, k. (1996). modernity: an introduction to modern societies. malden, ma: blackwell. haraway, d. (1989). primate visions: gender, race and nature in the world of modern science. new york: ny: routledge. haraway, d. (1992). “the promises of monsters: a regenerative politics of inappropriate/d others.” in l. grossberg, c. nelson, & p. treichler (eds.), cultural studies (pp. 295–337). new york: ny: routledge. haraway, d. (1997). modest_witness@second_millennium.femaleman©_ meets_oncomouse™. new york, ny: routledge. kramer, r., van schaik, c., & johnson, j. (eds.) (1997). last stand: protected areas and the defense of tropical biodiversity. oxford, uk: oxford university press. millennium project (2006). mdgs: what they are. millennium project. retrieved from http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/ 27 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the national academies. (2011, august 10). biodiversity. retrieved from https://vimeo.com/27542629 peluso, n., & watts, m. (eds.) (2001). violent environments. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. population and development program. (n.d.) different takes. retrieved from http://sites.hampshire.edu/popdev/different-takes/ sachs, w. (ed.) (1992). the development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power. london, uk: zed books saunders, k. (ed.) (2002). feminist post-development thought: rethinking modernity, post-colonialism, and representation. london, uk: zed books. soulé, m.e. (ed.) (1986). conservation biology: the science of scarcity and diversity. sunderland, ma: sinauer press. spivak, g.c. (1995). imaginary maps: three stories by mahasweta devi. new york: ny: routledge. spivak, g.c. (1999). a critique of postcolonial reason: toward a history of the vanishing present. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. spivak, g.c. (2012). an aesthetic education in the era of globalization. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. terborgh, j. t. (1992). diversity and the tropical rain forest. new york: ny: scientific american library. un department of economic and social affairs (n.d. (a)). commission on sustainable development (csd). sustainable development knowledge 28 asher catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) platform. retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/csd.html un department of economic and social affairs (n.d. (b)). sustainable development goals. sustainable development knowledge platform. retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs un department of economic and social affairs (n.d. (c)). united nations conference on sustainable development, rio+20. sustainable development knowledge platform. retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rio20 un women. (2014). the world survey on the role of women in development 2014: gender equality and sustainable development. retrieved from http://www.unwomen.org/en/digitallibrary/publications/2014/10/worldsurvey-2014 wced (world commission on environment and development). (1987). our common future. oxford, uk: oxford university press. williams, r. (2005). materialism and culture. verso: london. wolf, e. (1992). europe and the people without history. berkeley, ca:university of california press. bio kiran asher is an associate professor in the women, gender, and sexuality studies department at the university of massachusetts, amherst. grounded in two decades of field-based research in latin america and south asia, her diverse research interests focus on the gendered and raced dimensions of social and environmental change in the global south. microsoft word 274-1552-2-thakor.docx thakor, m. (2018). digital apprehensions: policing, child pornography, and the algorithmic management of innocence, catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-16. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © mitali thakor 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives digital apprehensions: policing, child pornography, and the algorithmic management of innocence mitali thakor northwestern university mitali@northwestern.edu abstract this paper examines how racial bias plays out in the algorithmic detection and classification of child pornography images by police and non-police actors, including computer scientists and content moderators at technology companies. i employ the concept of “digital apprehension” to argue that the way programmers and moderators understand child pornography is always already oriented toward the arrest of virtual offenders. as image recognition algorithms—which are used to detect both victims and offenders—rely on white skin tones as defaults, with reduced accuracy with nonwhite skin tones, innocence is brought into close proximity with whiteness. perceptive and algorithmic bias bear high stakes for police-work, as policing expands into a global network carried by the issue of child pornography. 2 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) introduction i peered over linda’s shoulder as she sat in her office cubicle looking at her computer. her screen displayed an array of photos of young boys in different positions and clothing, their heads and faces blurred. on the top left of her screen was the image she had originally uploaded (a white boy in a blue baseball cap) to see if any matches of similar photos could be found in her database. many of the resultant images clearly showed the same child but in different clothes and poses. she pointed at her screen and looked up at me. “see? take a look at that.” linda is an analyst with the child victim identification program at the national center for missing and exploited children (ncmec) in alexandria, va. under a 2008 federal bill, ncmec serves as the official clearinghouse for all child pornography and sexual exploitation content reported by electronic communication service providers in the united states. ncmec is a nonprofit that works as an intermediary between companies and federal law enforcement to review reported images and produce case files for criminal investigation. in 2016, for example, ncmec reported that they had reviewed over 500,000 image and video files suspected to contain child abuse (ncmec, 2016). the software linda was using was photodna, one of several popular programs for the automated detection of child pornography and the matching of new images across existing databases. in this paper, i discuss the embodied labor of policing child pornography through the ways in which algorithms and human reviewers like linda view and sort abuse images. i employ the concept of “apprehension” to suggest that the ways reviewers “see” child pornography is always already oriented toward the capture and arrest of suspected offenders. as i have argued elsewhere (thakor 2017; forthcoming), the use of new digital techniques to find child pornography has fundamentally transformed and expanded policing into a distributed network of labor increasingly done by computer scientists and technology companies. rather than suggest that new software is the 3 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) cause of these transformations, i draw attention to the constitutive and mutually defining relation between computing and corporality, or how image detection algorithms need the work of human perception to put their image detection skills to work. i argue further still that the case study of child pornography detection offers an entry point into examining the algorithmic management of race. i suggest that childhood innocence is coded as whiteness, and whiteness as innocence, in the algorithmic detection of victims and abusers. by taking "detection" as a dynamic practice between human and machine, i make an intervention into critical algorithm studies that have tended to focus solely on the programming of racial bias into software. the algorithmic detection of child pornography hinges, crucially, upon practice and the tacit observation of human reviewers whose instinctual feelings about child protection and offender apprehension become embedded within the reviewing and reporting process as cases escalate for law enforcement. digital forensics in the past decade many scientists in computer vision have begun directing their research projects beyond facial recognition to full body and scene analysis. their publications describe the promise of such research for detecting crime scenes and pornographic images. these scenes can be sorted through for skin-color detection, nudity (i.e., the percentage of skin-color pigments visible within a proportion of an image), lighting, scene object recognition, age detection, affect recognition, and kinship matching with known biological relatives. photodna uses visual mapping and exchangeable image file data ─ a photo’s "dna," according to its designers ─ from an uploaded image and compares it to other uploaded images. the software uses a form of source identification, allowing “new” images to be compared with images from known databases of child pornography, missing persons, or sex offender registries. the images in the database are assigned a hash value or digital signature. every file that 4 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) has the same data will contain the same hash value. comparing hash values can provide sufficient evidence that an image is an actual piece of child pornography rather than a fake or an altered photo of an adult. computer scientists are working on improving the accuracy of such programs (e.g., to rectify distortions or adjust for a tilted face or body through pose correction techniques). some research teams also work on age progression issues, especially salient for children who may go missing at a young age. a team at the university of washington has described the craft of interpolating how a person will have aged as “part art, part science and a little intuition” (kemelmacher-shlizerman, 2014). newer digital forensics projects have their roots in older forms of representational craft in criminal investigations, such as the use of forensic image sketching. the designer of photodna, dr. hany farid, has been called “the sherlock holmes of digital misdeeds” (adler and mcewen, 2017). policing institutions have long maintained artists on forensic teams to assist in producing composite images through oral description, to do age progressions on missing persons, or to produce facial reconstructions based on skeletal remains. the composite sketches produced of a victim or a suspected offender are the result of a collaborative and discursive process between investigators, lab experts, witnesses, and family members before becoming manifest through the artist’s pencil. the production of a forensic sketch is thus a highly collectivized task, one oriented toward the “apprehension” of a potential victim or offender. apprehension implies the prospect of arrest or rescue and simultaneously the process of making identities apparent through the procurement of incriminating data. i add to this that in order to know what to detect one must become knowledgeable about the object (data, face, person) sought. forensic investigations have become so increasingly specialized that they fall into the domains of technical personnel. scholars in science, technology and society (sts) have described this process of professionalization as a “scientification” of the police, with the division of policing into public safety and criminal investigations (ericson and 5 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) shearing, 1986). while “street cops” devoted to public safety regularly patrol routine areas and occasionally have breakthrough hunches, investigative police are trained to work more acutely on long-term cases and to use forensic technologies, from fingerprinting to dna testing, to obtain evidence and bolster claims in legal proceedings. however, the way this idealization actually works out is a combination of automated searches with human reviewing. the accumulation and sifting through such images ─ photos and videos of child abuse and abusers ─ is explained by social media companies and law enforcement as in some ways a necessary evil to get at the truth. social media companies hire their own content review teams both onsite and offshore to reach individual and group decisions on the content of specific photos in “borderline” cases they may want to escalate. these viewers rely on a combination of their tacit knowledge and accumulated expertise as they sift through child abuse image content to identify faces and bodies. apprehension i return to the moment of peering over linda’s shoulder. what was interesting to me was the ways in which she would signal various intervals in the software’s detection. she would gesture and make side comments on what the program was doing. linda scrolled down the results display and paused to point out a couple of photos. “see, the child looks a little older here, or at least larger. so this is a problem.” it is a problem in the sense that if the child seems to have aged during the course of the reporting, and various photos at different ages are on file, it is more likely the child is still being abused and coerced into posing for such photos. despite the automated matches, she still continued to pause and point out her own data points in the images. her remark that “this is a problem” indicated a gut feeling ─ her tacit knowledge ─ that some images represented possible other ages and the need for further investigation. as the anthropologist charles goodwin has noted, gestures like 6 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) linda’s pointing and verbal cues are embodied communicative modes that structure practice and indicate expertise (goodwin, 2003). harry collins, similarly, points out that interactional expertise helps us understand the dynamic relationship between software and human, and that such expertise is highly embodied and corporeal (collins, 2016). image content review is perceptive, interpretive work and also trainable. once linda’s search query results in several hundred photos, she searches to disqualify any images that are very obviously ─ to her eye ─ not a match or do not belong in the set. in doing this disqualification, she helps train the software to produce more accurate results in its next search query, which will be based on the classification elements of the qualifying and disqualifying images. such work entails skilled vision, “a capacity to look in a certain way as a result of training” (grasseni, 2004, p. 41). my understanding of apprehension, then, takes into account how “viewing” becomes a skillful practice through trainings that establish shared ways of "seeing" childexploitation images.1 cristina grasseni emphasizes that “one never simply looks. one learns how to look” (2012, p. 47). such ways of seeing, distributed and honed across human and computer vision, become manifest as ways of accessing the world and managing it. as police forensic investigations have become increasingly specialized, investigative police are trained to work more acutely on long-term cases and to use forensic technologies, from fingerprinting to dna testing to image detection software, to obtain evidence and bolster claims in legal proceedings. i attended one of these training sessions at the crimes against children conference in dallas, tx, in august 2014. the conference organizers had coordinated the first annual “digital crime scene challenge” workshop. in teams of three, participants were instructed to execute a search warrant on a suspected possessor of child pornography in a mock crime scene and produce as much evidence as possible in the fastest time. the game was set up by a special agent from the us department of homeland security and sponsored by a software firm. 7 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) success in the game depended upon a specific visual acuity, recall memory of past cases, efficient collaboration with teammates, and working knowledge of software to analyze confiscated image files. a group of three investigators from oklahoma won the crime scene challenge, interviewing a person role-playing as a suspect, issuing a search warrant, cataloging evidence in the room, and coordinating next steps for the investigation, including running the confiscated files through a software program to test for any known images of missing or abused children. the use of such training games by police and tech companies focuses the eye to produce shared idioms and ways of seeing, embedding skilled vision into the professional practice of policing. viewing economies seeing is also tiered, or classed, so that certain perceptions are afforded higher authority. in these perceptive regimes (cf. goodwin, 1994), there is an entire viewing economy for how photos of child abuse get “found” and reported: from content moderators in the philippines or india, to reviewers at tech companies, to ncmec and federal investigators, and perhaps eventually to international liaisons and interpol. indeed, two content moderators working for an agency contracted through microsoft recently filed a lawsuit against microsoft, claiming post traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) from the viewing of violent images in their work (chen, 2017). recent work by sarah t. roberts and others working in critical digital labor studies have called into question the psychic and emotional costs of monitoring images such as terrorist propaganda, live-streamed executions, and sexual violence against children that get uploaded to sites like facebook and twitter every day (roberts, 2016). this emotional cost is disproportionately borne by people of color working in contingent and precarious contract-labor sites in the global south and lower-income rural zones in the global north. their work is difficult and disposable, with contracts easily dropped and new moderators quickly replacing them. 8 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) many researchers working on image detection algorithms capitalize on this reported trauma to emphasize the possibility of a future where humans may not need to see child abuse images for legal content review, and that it might be entirely mechanized. the marketing of image forensics and classification software often touts its high accuracy and low rate of false positive results; that it will attain a speed and accuracy not possibly by the human eye alone. digital racial matter nonetheless, child pornography detection can never be a fully automated process ─ despite what digital forensic designers might claim ─ and will always rely upon human perception and gut since the end goal will always be oriented toward the apprehension of a suspected offender. designers of algorithms explicitly understand the ways in which certain content reviewers, such as linda, will use and train the software based on their preexisting expertise, and the content reviewers (or their managers, rather), understand the ownership they have over decisions to escalate an investigation. i thus call the network of various investigators involved in viewing and policing child pornography “algorithmic detectives.” algorithmic detectives symbolize the expansion of policing from traditional law enforcement to a coordinated network of content reviewers, technology specialists, computer programmers, and social media companies who participate in establishing ways of seeing child pornography. algorithmic detectives do the work of apprehension through training in technical and perceptive skills. there is a constitutive relationship between human vision and computer vision, between computing and corporality. image detection algorithms need the work of human perception to put their detective skills to work. this work must combine human and machine vision with an orientation toward arrest. recent work in sts and the social study of algorithms has pointed out, critically, that algorithms have embedded values and biases that can 9 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) lead to potential discrimination as well as the erasure of human analysis and input. the accuracy of machine-learning algorithms like image detection is dependent upon the data sets from which algorithms learn. algorithmic detectives, through their pointing, selecting, and validating of image matches, help train the software to better detect. in the case study of child pornography detection, digital forensics designers use certain training sets to improve their algorithm’s ability to detect faces, genders, and races. historically these training sets have treated the white, male, adult face as a default against which computer vision algorithms are trained (cf. crawford, 2016). databases of missing and abused children held by ncmec in the us disproportionately contain images of white children; non-white children are statistically less likely to be reported as missing or have extensive case files of data. so what happens when certain data and faces are less easily detected, or less accurately matched? for whom might these errors or elisions be of grave consequence? first, certainly, fewer non-white children might be detected as rapidly as white children, a possibility echoing investigation biases that have persisted since long before the implementation of new software. in the course of my fieldwork, computer vision researchers would often remark that they earnestly wanted to address the “problem” of underdetectability, or even un-detectability, of darker skin tones, black and east asian features, and younger ages. while they were researching detectability across color tones, light exposures, and eye shape and size, the simpler, more immediate solution they offered was to expand the data set of available faces, an example of what andrejevic and gates (2014) have called a “catch all” approach to big data. indeed, a recent project launched by facebook in australia has asked users to submit their nude selfies for facebook to hash and add to their secure data repository in order to better combat "revenge porn" by ensuring its removal before someone might even post it (solon, 2017). but in addition, child victim identification is always conjoined with the imperative to detect suspected offenders. i note that computer vision 10 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) researchers’ use of the word “problem” might differ from social scientists’ perspective on the issue of detectability. as simone browne has argued, the inability of computer vision software to distinguish dark skin tones is perilously paired with a hypervisibility tying the history of surveillance to the history of the surveillance of blackness (browne, 2014). are non-white adults, for example, more likely to be marked as suspects because their facial nuances are less accurately detected than white offenders' faces? steve anderson urges historians of visual culture to root any analysis of “new” image technologies in the knowledge that visibility has always been tied to logics of colonial control and capture (anderson, 2017). if certain groups are less accurately detectable, more indistinguishable, and more likely to generate false positives, offender recognition in child pornography cases may be just as capable of producing biases similar to those leading to prejudiced arrests in anti-trafficking cases. as bernstein (2007) and woods (2013) have documented, legislation designed to combat sex trafficking has disproportionately resulted in the arrests and prosecutions of black and latino men, repeating the carceral logics of other forms of policing and investigation. proximity to innocence critically, the expansion of policing practice is made permissible through its use in the case of child protection. the protection of the child hinges upon defining its other (i.e., that which threatens childhood). i argue that algorithmic detectives must thus embody a certain proximity to child victims, to innocence itself, while simultaneously engaging a closeness to culpability, to imagined abusers. underlying any support of image recognition software is an assumed universal understanding that sexual exploiters of children must be "othered" ─ located, corralled, and arrested ─ and are deserving of punishment. it is also understood, then, that investigators who wish to locate and apprehend offenders must first become intimately knowledgeable about sexual abuse ─ bring it close, in a sense ─ before arresting and enacting punishment. the othering of 11 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) potential offenders is a form of extension (cf. ahmed, 2006), a reaching toward those who must be kept away. carceral technologies perform this act of extension ─ apprehending and making proximate violent others ─ by extending the corpus of policing power in order to seek certain bodies. we might consider them as what sandy stone has called a “prosthetic technological self” (stone, 1991), an extension of a punitive impulse to entrap those who might offend. the digital forensics software programs i am discussing here are also surveillance technologies. they sort through the massive amounts of text, image, and video data uploaded online every day and work in collaboration with content moderators to keep the internet secure and "clean." the software itself maintains proximity to innocence. there is a certain pleasure (magnet and rodgers 2011) in this mode of surveillance. that is, i am not suggesting that algorithmic detectives gain pleasure from looking at child exploitation images themselves ─ the pleasure is instead rooted in a moment of recognition toward arrest, the seeing of images for the purpose of policing. image recognition algorithms, and all the forms of data gathering and surveillance they induce, are justified through the pressing moral obligation and urgency to find and stop child exploitation online. this software has promissory value as a tool for a particular view of safety and security ─ for some, not all. recent work in queer feminist social theory has considered how sex offenders have emerged as people who are “despised and disposable” (horowitz, 2015) or even othered “beyond the pale of humanness” (borneman, 2015). child protection surveillance campaigns hinge upon securitizing normative humans through the crafting of insecurity for inhuman others. non-police actors who take part in police work strengthen the carceral state by reaffirming the production of insecurity as an exposing practice to shame those labeled criminals or potential offenders. further still, this exposing practice gets recoded as technical knowledge and moral obligation. such projects magnify the "stranger danger" panic2 motivating understandings of sex offenders ─ the assumption that unknown others are constantly lying in wait to 12 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) assault innocent children, an assumption that acquires even more fearful resonances in digital space. this innocence is becoming quite literally encoded as whiteness, with white children’s faces better detected, and non-white suspected adult faces more likely to be indistinguishable and less accurately documented. the public effortlessly approves of the capillary forms of surveillance needed to enforce algorithmic detection of child pornography, from facebook photo albums to increasing partnerships between law enforcement and technology companies. this approval hinges upon the tacit preservation of an imagined docile and innocent symbolic child figure. by bringing child protection close, this dispersed network encourages computer scientists, humanitarian professionals, and the general public who view anti-exploitation publicity campaigns to support indiscriminate carceral punishment of sexual exploiters and offenders. in addition, such distributed apprehension expands the policing infrastructure and security thinking of the global north, by working to make race material as digital data, while simultaneously rendering invisible the racialized labor of outsourced content moderators who increasingly bear the emotional toll of human-performed digital janitorial work. my research suggests that new algorithmic developments fall under a broader phenomenon of expanded digital surveillance that has become amplified by efforts to fight child pornography and trafficking. new digital experts entering into anti-exploitation work have bolstered the child protection agenda traditionally held by law enforcement and antitrafficking activists, namely, that protection is best achieved through punitive measures. by following the historical trajectory of scientification within law enforcement, as well as current collaborative efforts, we can trace how these actors may embed punitive logic into the investigative process through dual forms of apprehension: image detection software for identifying and locating abuse photos and videos online, and the actual arrests of abusers made possible through partnerships between law enforcement and software companies. apprehension is justifiable 13 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) through an attachment to child innocence. the protection of such innocence relies upon the specter of harm, and entails maintaining a carefully curated proximity to the imagined offenders who might destroy it, in order to locate and arrest these offenders. by examining the particular digital data-sets and legal manifestations of these attachments to protection and punishment, we might begin to see that “the child,” in all its virtual and symbolic sense, has perhaps always been white, and the linchpin in the management of whiteness. acknowledgements thank you to the panel organizers for inviting me to participate in this project, the editors of catalyst for their support, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. notes 1 as goodwin explains, “crucial work in many different occupations takes the form of classifying and constructing visual phenomena in ways that help shape the objects of knowledge that are the focus of the work of a profession” (167). different actors—be they law enforcement investigators, digital forensic startups, social media company reviewer teams, or the outsourced content review workers who are contracted by larger corporations to make the first reviews of potentially abusive images—learn to adapt shared ways of seeing images. 2 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(2013). surrogate selves: notes on anti-trafficking and anti16 thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) blackness. social identities, 19(1), 120-134. bio mitali thakor is a postdoctoral fellow in the sexualities project at northwestern, with affiliations in anthropology and gender & sexuality studies. her research and teaching cover issues of policing, computing, surveillance, sexual violence, and queer studies of robotics. she is currently working on her book manuscript, facing the child, an ethnography of artifice, evidence, and the global policing of child pornography. mitali earned her ph.d. in 2016 from mit's program in history, anthropology, and science, technology, & society. in fall 2018, mitali will join the faculty at wesleyan university as an assistant professor in the science in society program. you can read more about her work at http://www.mitalithakor.com and on twitter at @mitalithakor. microsoft word 76931-1-11-felt.docx felt, l. d. (2019). cyberpunk’s other hackers: the girls who were plugged in. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-38. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © lindsey dolich felt, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article cyberpunk’s other hackers: the girls who were plugged in lindsey dolich felt stanford university ldolich@stanford.edu abstract this article locates an alternate paradigm of hacking in feminist cyberfiction, notably, james tiptree, jr.’s proto-cyberpunk novella, “the girl who was plugged in” (1973). i argue this story critically reorients our understanding of how information technologies and their material artifacts construct and reinforce norms of able-bodiedness and ability. drawing on archival materials from bell system, early information theory, and crip theory, my reading reveals that tiptree’s portrayal of disability is tied to a cybernetic conception of error and noise. these frictions between users and their machine interfaces materialize unexamined performances of critical labor and noncompliance that i link to the emerging field of crip technoscience. tracking these disruptions in cybernetic feedback across “the girl who was plugged in” and in historical accounts of the telephone switchboard operator, i show that error and noise underpin an early example of a feminist hacking ethos, and also crip accounts of electronic disembodiment often imputed to information society and cyberpunk fiction. in 2017, the silicon valley non-profit organization girls in tech announced “hacking for humanity,” a global initiative that focuses on “solving problems for the benefit of the greater community,” rolling out hackathons from san francisco to melbourne. the rise of tech empowerment programs, such as girls who code, hackbright, girl develop it, and intersectional feminist felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 hackerspaces across the united states has brought further attention to the effort to “hack the gap.” even as the gender disparity persists in the tech industry, in recent years scholars have recovered women’s contributions to the history of computing and network culture as a cause célèbre, such as janet abbate’s recoding gender (2012), amy sue bix’s girls coming to tech! (2014), and liza mundy’s code girls (2017).1 by abbate’s reckoning, “female programmers and computer scientists leveraged their status as professionals to fashion new personal identities that united femininity with technical expertise” since the electronic numerical integrator and computer (eniac) “girls” and the origins of digital computing (p. 4). however important this critical reorientation is, these accounts stop short of examining how information technologies construct and reinforce norms of able-bodiedness and ability, or where we might find alternate models of the hacker ethic outside of traditional hackerspaces and histories. in 2013, liz henry, a silicon valley programmer who works for mozilla debugging firefox’s web browser, helped co-found san francisco’s feminist hacker/makerspace double union. henry is a woman hacktivist and a powerful “coder grrrl” in san francisco’s tech circles, yet she serves as a striking reminder of how disability advocacy in feminist and intersectional hacker communities is largely absent. henry’s passion project at double union—compiling data on the battery lives of her mobility scooters and electric wheelchairs—indicates signs of change. “my ultimate goal [is] to design open source hardware for electric scooters,” henry says, “so people with disabilities can actually specify what we need” (as cited in garretón, 2013).2 henry models a feminist hacker ethic that prioritizes values of care and inclusion, drawing on her position of “emancipatory alterity,” a term i borrow from lilly nguyen, sophie toupin, and shaowen bardzell (2016), to shed light on the invisible and gendered “infra/structures of power that render technological achievement possible.” yet as a woman with a disability, henry operates bilaterally from a position of “emancipatory alterity” to expose not only the gendering of techno-labor but also how disability can interrogate notions of technological access (see ellcessor, 2016). favoring the logic of user-driven, epistemic open access, henry felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 refuses the assumed narrative of forced normalization. her project importantly reflects a crip resistance to “delimiting the kinds of bodies and abilities that are acceptable or that will bring about change” (mcruer, 2006, p. 31). this is precisely the charge of “disability hacktivism” that melanie yergeau (2014) proposes, calling on crip allies and activists to “cultivate hacking into a disability-positive practice” centered on participatory design. henry’s story, as i situate it within the collective effort to reinstall “girls” as skilled practitioners of technology, reminds us that this movement has yet to fully acknowledge the role of disabled users and crip politics within the legacy of hacking in popular culture and in academic scholarship. this elision is somewhat surprising considering that feminist cyberfiction, notably, james tiptree jr.’s 1973 novella, “the girl who was plugged in,” provided cyberpunk fiction with its iconic image of the hacker, while simultaneously coding an alternate paradigm of hacking rooted in the lived experiences of disability. in her story, alice b. sheldon, who began writing under her more familiar alias tiptree in the late 1960s, provides a contemporary reimagining of telephone switchboard operators, or “hello girls” in the early twentieth century who were debilitated by their work.3 writing in 1915, the us commission on industrial relations reported some of these deleterious effects, which the bell telephone system subsequently denied. exposing this cover-up, field investigator nellie b. curry detailed the “nervous spasmodic movements” and frequent “nervous collapses at the switchboard” that operators experienced (as cited in green, p. 79). the adverse mental and physical strains on women’s health detailed in these accounts help uncover the disabling effects of switchboard work. these conditions are noticeably absent in archival advertising materials and training pamphlets from bell telephone system (later known as at&t) from the 1930s to 1960s, which reinforced a normative body for the telephone operator. tiptree’s narrative, i argue, redresses the oversight of disability and the exigencies of women’s labor in histories of science and technology by highlighting the unseen effects of electronic communication on women’s bodies. this critique is rendered through the figure of a disabled female protagonist named philadelphia burke (p. burke), who is selected to felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 undergo a radical procedure that enables her to remotely operate a beautiful synthetic body named delphi. p. burke agrees to “plug in” to the global transmissions corporation’s (gtx) network under the premise that, as delphi, she will become an instant media celebrity. in this future global media economy, gtx is poised to overtake at&t, yet p. burke thwarts gtx’s information system by hacking her own networked biofeedback. asking what this portrayal reveals about the story’s historically specific construction of “girls,” i examine how this characterization points to sheldon’s misgivings about the rise of digital communication culture and her own disabled and inconspicuously absent female body.4 in what follows, my reading explores how “the girl who was plugged in” interlaces the dual histories of telephone switchboard operators and the role of disability in early cybernetics. placing tiptree’s text in conversation with archival materials from bell system and early information theory, i show that her portrayal of disability is tied to a cybernetic conception of error and noise as valuable byproducts of a body’s encounter with communication devices. tiptree’s narrative, as bears witness to these frictions between users and their machine interfaces, materializes unexamined performances of critical labor and noncompliance that we can link to the emerging field of crip technoscience. tracking these disruptions in cybernetic feedback across “the girl who was plugged in” and in historical accounts of the switchboard operator, i argue error and noise underpin an early example of a feminist hacking ethos, and also crip accounts of electronic disembodiment often imputed to cyberpunk fiction and information culture. as manual telephone switching and its design embedded information theory, the vital presence of disability in this system effectively rewrites ableist narratives of the “hello girl” and her switchboard, and the network society they helped usher in. “absent mothers”: (re)coding hacker history widely fêted by her contemporaries and critics, tiptree’s novella received a hugo award in 1974 and influenced a new generation of science fiction writers in the 1980s, including william gibson, who helped inaugurate the felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 cyberpunk movement. “the girl who was plugged in” portends the topoi taken up by gibson and his cyberpunk brethren, as it explores consumer culture and human-cybernetic systems from a proximate future. tiptree’s novella, as it participates in the tradition of women’s cyberfiction, also imagines creative and embodied forms of resistance in technological society that reorient existing definitions of the hacker as well as the disabled body. feminist theorists offer invaluable analyses of cyberpunk fiction that interrogate how technology mediates women’s bodies and socio-historical constructions of identity (haraway, 1991; hayles, 2005; balsamo, 1996). these scholars offer compelling critiques, and thus provide strategies for reading feminist science fiction (sf) alongside cyberpunk literature.5 samuel r. delany (1994) described feminist sf as an “absent mother” to cyberpunk; without it, he writes, “there wouldn’t be any cyberpunk” (p. 177). exploring the political consequences of delany’s claim, austin booth (2002) argues women’s cyberfiction “deromanticizes the hacker ethos”: women are better than men at their technical work “but a discriminatory gap (similar to our own) exists between the elite who control the networks and those that are plugged in” (p. 28). these heroines, booth adds, operate through less sophisticated technologies that mark them as inferior (p. 28). as in other contemporary scholarship, this critique echoes ableist constructions of the technologically enhanced body; that is, through the impetus of supplementation, technological prostheses either transcend one’s given abilities, or render the unenhanced body disabled. these dual portrayals frequently taint the hacker’s representation in cyberpunk literature and in popular discourse. this rhetoric similarly runs through historiographies of hacker culture, which often conflate two distinct genealogies: one draws on the subculture of youth who delighted in the technical exploration of computer systems through experimentation, and the other on the mass media’s iconization of criminals—or security “crackers”—who hijack corporate and military systems. commentators of digital culture (krapp, 2011; thomas, 2002) are keen to note the original meaning of hacker was sublated into the felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 populist male fantasy of the outlaw who “jacks in” to the information matrix, which cyberpunk authors and journalists helped disseminate. cultural critics and technologists have embraced this notion of bodiless transcendence, but this idea is troubling not just because it professes to erase bodies in information culture, but also because it elides intersectional, non-normative bodies that disability and feminist studies scholars have made visible. a closer look at the hacker’s original set of liberal values, however, reveals a challenge to this patrilineality and its ableist vision. in its early beginnings, the hacker was a hobbyist and an idealist who believed in dismantling machines to understand how they worked, and applied this knowledge to create more functional devices and software for the advancement of society (levy, 1984, p. 7). this philosophy informed the hacker ethic, a code of conduct that championed the free sharing of information, decentralization, radical individualism, and a “hands-on imperative” to lower barriers to access (p. 40). these principles surprisingly align with feminist practice, supporting what laura forlano (2016) calls a “participatory and open form of engagement.” theorizing one manifestation of this practice, forlano describes hacking as a way of upending the rules of a technological system—its norms of race, class, gender, and sexuality— and producing her own knowledge about her body’s attendant technological devices. this ethos similarly resonates with disability studies and crip theory for its attention to the ways built environments place limits on our (mind)bodies. a commitment to access, both local and physical, animates crip theory’s critique of the structural inequalities of spaces (mcruer, 2006). aimi hamraie’s (2017) historical account of disability activists’ guerilla curbcutting—which remade berkeley’s urban spaces—embodies one instance of this critical agenda. such an experimental practice, hamraie argues, represents the rise of crip technoscience, an “anti-assimilationist” stance that “challenge[s] hierarchies and power relations with the field of accessknowledge by shifting expertise to those with lived experiences of disability and away from outside experts often designing in their name” (p. 99). more recently, exploring questions of technological access in computers and felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 virtual spaces, recent scholarship also illuminates how “digital youth” with disabilities can participate in hacking, tinkering, geeking and making without constraints (petrick, 2015; alper, 2014).6 this idea can be traced to an earlier instantiation of a “hack” in the 1960s and 1970s with “phone phreaking,” a playful manipulation of a complex telecommunications system performed through vocalization. joe engressia, who was congenitally blind, and a “gawky, buck-toothed little girl” with a slight speech impediment named susan thunder, both altered the operation of at&t’s system using their unique physical characteristics (hafner & markoff, 1991, p. 16. joe’s pitch perfect whistle, for example, which imitated the 2600-hertz at&t signal, gave him a backdoor into telephone operating systems (p. 19). thunder, on the other hand, was revered for her ability to manipulate people—particularly telephone switchboard operators and technicians—into sharing proprietary passwords, a form of social engineering that mirrored the ingenuity of some early twentieth-century “hello girls.” these operators, i will later show, subverted company protocol in ways that prefigure thunder’s legacy. by the time phreakers mechanized these techniques with a blue box, enabling them to freely access at&t’s call centers in the 1980s, they called themselves computer hackers (hafner & markoff, 1991; lapsley, 2013). if the hacker effects a “‘return to the origin’ whereby the entire discourse of technology is continually reinvented” (thomas, 2002, p. 61), then phreakers—and their technological foremothers (both real and imagined)— offer a more inclusive account of hacking that productively makes use of embodied knowledge and transgression. literary mediations of technoscience in donna haraway’s “a cyborg manifesto” (1991) she speculates, “perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices” (p. 178). this minor observation—both in the sense that it is left unexplained in haraway’s own text and displaces the felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 experience of one with a “severe disability” with the “trance state experienced by many computer users” (p. 178)—represents a seemingly endless point of provocation for disability scholars, and is often invoked in emerging conversations on crip technoscience. alison kafer (2013) argues that cyborg theory has been misunderstood within both disability and feminist scholarship as promoting an ideology of “wholeness” through a future vision of intervention and normalization rather than social transformation or political action (p. 22). kafer positions disabled people not as beholden to adaptive technology, but as cyborgs for the way they reimagine interdependence, collective affinities, and networks. “a cyborged disability politics,” she writes, offers a necessary theoretical framework for examining how “disabled people are positioned in terms of efficiency, productivity, and ability to work, or lack thereof” (p. 119). among disability scholars (ott, 2002; serlin, 2004; orr, 2006; alper, 2014; petrick, 2015; hamraie, 2017) who bring this critical lens to science and technology studies, jonathan sterne (2003) and mara mills (2011) have shown how deafness was integral to the development of sound reproduction technologies and the telephone. in the context of this study’s focus on modern telecommunications, of particular interest is mills’s work, which documents helen keller’s and deaf electronic engineers’ contributions to communication engineering in early twentieth-century telephony. though mills establishes how noise and deafness shaped the telecommunications industry, there is another, parallel narrative about how feedback error and disability informed the origins of information theory. this account is surprisingly preserved within contemporary fiction like tiptree’s, suggesting that literature gives testimony to previously untold histories of disability in technoscience. tracking the complex entanglements between bodies and texts alongside different media, my approach is informed jointly by mills and sterne’s (2017) “dismediation,” a comparative methodology that studies disability’s centrality to media histories, and katherine n. hayles’s (2005) concept of “intermediation” (p. 7). as literature registers “the impact of information in its materiality” (p. 7) contemporary fiction—especially cyberpunk and its feminist sf antecedent—becomes a felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 valuable resource for giving voice to the often-silenced subjectivities that get written out of cultural histories of machine systems. this impetus to bring the unseen and unheard to light underpins the metanarrative conceit of “the girl who was plugged in.” this conceit is introduced at the story’s outset, when an unnamed narrator commands the reader to “listen, zombie” (p. 43), colloquially naming the reader as an auditor in a telephone system. later acknowledged to be a minor character who works for gtx, this “sharp sneering operator’s voice telling about the future,” wrote tiptree to editor damon knight in june 1969, hints at her interest in the switchboard operator. this interpellation, i argue, calls upon the audience to remember the unseen extensions we once communicated through: the erasure of sheldon’s body through her pseudonym and the narrators’ masculine voice; the forgotten bodies of telephone switchboard operators; even the deaf maternal body that helped produce the telephone (sterne, 2003). in the discussion that follows, i offer an entry point for reading tiptree’s novella through a crip/disability studies lens, looking at p. burke’s narrative representation and the ways the story’s language and its imagined cybertechnologies uphold and simultaneously dismantle the social model of disability. cripping the terminal subject though the telephone seemingly erases the visible markers of users’ bodies—working from the cybernetic principle that information must be extracted from its medium to be transmitted—“the girl who was plugged in” actively resists this disembodied understanding of telephony. the narrator ironically counters his aural command with “look…see that rotten girl?” (p. 43). “the funky girl on the streets” stands on the fringes of a crowd of spectators who throng around a group of beautiful celebrities (p. 43). jostled against the narrow walkway, burke presents a striking contrast to the subjects of her admiration: “you can now see she’s the ugly of the world. a tall monument to pituitary dystrophy. no surgeon would touch her. when felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 she smiles, her jaw—it’s half purple—almost bites her left eye out” (p. 44). from the narrator’s vantage point, we are treated to glimpses of “her jumbled torso, her mismatched legs” (p. 44). this striking depiction of burke fits the model of what disability scholar rosemarie garland-thomson (1997) calls “an extraordinary body” that is essential to cultural constructions of the norm and conventions of narrative representation (p. 5). burke’s exaggerated physical characteristics foreground the way disability becomes an emblem of difference in a patriarchal society that values order, aesthetic conformity, and coherence. at the same time, this description of p. burke situates her body as a product of social relations, attitudes, and built environments. it invokes social constructionism, a paradigm disability scholars developed to counter the medical model, which pathologizes disability as a condition to be cured, treated, or institutionally controlled.7 put another way, the social model advocates for disability as a cultural invention rather than a biological deficit. the narrator’s language here, though it draws attention to p. burke as a site of spectacular aberrancy both in her physical otherness and ugliness, carefully places the protagonist within a space that marks her as such. the “sharp-faced lad” knowingly hints at the way burke’s body is re-presented and denigrated through social power structures such as celebrity culture and media consumption. this interpretation gains credence when we read this moment alongside other representations of p. burke’s body that appear later in the text. in addition to providing a new lens for literary and feminist scholars to read tiptree’s work, a disability studies critique of p. burke has important implications for the story’s visionary portrait of the terminal subject it lends to cyberpunk fiction. to date, tiptree’s critics have understood p. burke as “an extravagant staging of an entirely distasteful version of female embodiment” in which bodies are devalued in a postindustrial system (hicks, 1996, p. 70), or as a bitter caricature of “the body in a state of putrescence” (bukatman, 1993, p. 317). hayles (2005) offers a slightly more optimistic appraisal, referring to p. burke as a “distributed subject” in an information system that manifests the limits of female participation in a capitalist society (p. 81). within these interpretative frameworks, burke’s felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 abject body conjures the cyberpunk hacker’s nightmare of his own loathsome flesh. such judgments rely on a flawed logic that stigmatizes disability and parses non-normative female bodies as disabled. even sheldon’s biographer, julie phillips (2006), citing evidence that sheldon struggled with chronic depression and various physical aliments, maintains that “the girl who was plugged in” is a parable of sheldon’s antipathy for her progressively deteriorating physical state in real life. sheldon’s lifelong use of dexedrine—a drug also used to treat adhd—intensified her uneasy relationship with her own body, an addiction sheldon confided in her letters was fueled by an increasing resistance to “being my body…although i know perfectly well that i am it and it is me” (as cited in phillips, 2006, p. 260). phillips’s reading, which is heavily favored by literary critics, does not fully explain the role of information technology in the story, or consider how social discourse might create a compulsory female and abled-body. sheldon (1975) excoriated the cultural norms of femininity at various points in her career, but it is worth noting that she understood this compulsory body that “no women escapes” as a product of “being told that ‘girls’ can’t do this or that” (p. 2). a woman’s abilities, by sheldon’s rationale, was prescribed by her social environment and configurations of knowledge/power. the robust presence of physical disability in the narrative, and its fluid and at times contradictory constructions, suggest that burke articulates a more complex model of disability born out of sheldon’s feminist critique. elsewhere in the story, burke is characterized as an inhuman “cast-up, a pumped-out hulk” (p. 46), a “girl-brute” (p. 46), a “rancid girl-body” (p. 47), a “grim carcass” (p. 55), an “ill-shaped thing” (p. 58), and even a “she-golem” (p. 76). such aesthetic qualifiers seem to reproduce the visual rhetoric of disgust and freakery projected upon disabled bodies within some cultural settings, as garland-thomson (1997) has shown. yet these appellations continue to follow p. burke even after she is integrated with her technological apparatus. when burke is relocated from an above-ground location in her naturalized state, to an underground laboratory from which she operates delphi sight unseen, both gtx’s and the narrator’s attempt to jettison her body fail spectacularly. the persistence of these abject felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 characteristics suggests that p. burke visibly shuns the “cure” narrative that cyborg technologies may impose on the disabled body.8 to further complicate this reading, one might note how these signifiers depart from burke’s initial representation as an assemblage of body parts, instead working to evacuate her body of specific identifying characteristics that might be medically pathologized. that is, in calling burke a “she-golem” or an “ill-shaped thing,” the narrator invokes gender and disability as a process of endless remaking, becoming, and knowing, a crip feminist ontoepistemology that exposes the limits of linguistic representation.9 put another way, this descriptive catalog “talks back to able-bodied terms,” as crip theorist robert mcruer (2006) would say, implying that “crips cannot be contained; even the words most intended to keep disability in its place” (p. 40). even assimilationist cyborg systems cannot contain crips, as the progressive unintelligibility of p. burke’s body foreshadows. though corporeal materialism and embodied ways of knowing are some of the principal arguments of feminist technoscience (haraway, 1991; balsalmo, 1996; kafer, 2013), these values demand further revision as they presume an able-bodied phenomenology. read this way, p. burke contravenes haraway’s example of another fictional female cyborg character from anne mccaffrey’s the ship who sang, whom she describes as a “severely handicapped child.” in this story, helva’s brain is removed and her body is discarded, transforming her into a class of “shell-people” whose brains are implanted into spaceships. in her critique of “a cyborg manifesto,” kafer (2013) explains how haraway’s use of helva to illustrate cyborgian boundary-blurring “echoes longstanding ableist assumptions about the uselessness of physically disabled bodies and the necessity of a technological fix” (p. 112). a non-ableist cyborg politics, kafer proposes, is rooted in a more ambivalent relationship with technology (p. 119). “the girl who was plugged in” responds to this call as it remains committed to the lived experience of burke within her human-machine system. choosing instead “to explore the creation of such categories and the moments in which they fail to hold” (p. 10), as kafer’s political/relational model recommends, the story enacts a site for witnessing the blurring of human felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 and technology. in so doing, tiptree’s narrative recognizes “such moments of excess or failure [as] key to imagining disability, and disability futures [and, i would add, histories], differently” (p. 10). bell system’s “ideologies of ability” and switchboard operators by the story’s publication date in 1973, telephone operators had long departed from the method of manually connecting calls through a switchboard, rendered obsolete by automatic telephone switches.10 though tiptree (1969) never acknowledged this specific transformation, she explicitly stated in her letter to editor damon knight—who later rejected the story—that the novella was a critique of “current trends in monopoly of communications,” citing gtx as an “extrapolation” of this trend “if you merge, say, at&t, the networks, and the aerospace industry” (p. 2).11 as the lifeblood of the telephone system, the switchboard operator best epitomized the human toll at&t’s rapid expansion had on its workforce. following the introduction of the first telephone switchboard in 1878, the american telephone and telegraph company (at&t), formerly known as the bell telephone company, began hiring “girl operators (typically between 17 and 26 years old, according to industry guidelines)” because they were thought to be “naturally more patient, polite and ‘amenable to discipline’” (middeljans, 2010, p. 39).12 these operators were ostensibly “girls” by dint of their age, demeanor, and marital status.”13 “ma bell,” as the bell system was known, initially only hired young women who fit a distinct set of physical guidelines, rejecting minorities, people with disabilities, and women who were deemed unattractive. read alongside a gendered history of communication technology, tiptree’s girls reveal new possibilities for critical interpretation, demonstrating how the switchboard privileges and excludes specific bodies. as the bell telephone quarterly explains, “essential qualifications” for telephone girls included “intelligence, health, sight, hearing, voice, size, temperament, character, appearance, and previous record” (lachance, 1931, p. 13). the quarterly neglects to mention that staff physicians conducted pre-employment screening felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 examinations, a practice inaugurated in 1913 under at&t’s employee benefit plan. the emergence of bell system’s medical department— notably run by men—coincided with this plan, which oversaw sickness and disability benefits, and helped maintain the ideal of its girls: middle-class, single, hardworking, docile, and, perhaps most importantly, intellectually and physically “able” women. there were other ways at&t sought to normalize its core workforce’s bodies. though the barriers to entry-level switchboard work were already high for aspiring telephone girls, a general personnel board report suggests that at&t persisted in its corporeal surveillance over new operators: “many of the girls with minor defects, such as poor teeth, undernourishment, defective vision, overweight [sic], colds, etc.” might more readily be induced to “correct” or prevent these physical ailments after a health talk (as cited in cooper, 1997, p. 492). attributing poor health among operators as “the fault of the young women themselves,” physicians implemented the health talk as part of the operator’s training program in the 1920s in response to high turnover rates due to illness (one out of three operators remained after a year on the job) (p. 492). if we respond to mills’s (2011) invitation to “read” communication machines and their histories as devices with defined physiological parameters, then, the telephone switchboard similarly stages an “unavoidabl[e] encounter [with] the material interfaces of communication, and the ways media systems incorporate bodies of users” (p. 81). through its sanguine corporate discourse and medical assessments, at&t fastidiously preserved these norms. such practices inscribe what elizabeth ellcessor (2016) calls a “preferred user position” that reinforces “ideologies of ability” and devalues disability (p. 69). yet the switchboard, as i will show, undermined these corporate tactics by constraining female embodiment in ways that might be understood as disabling. as the demands for operators increased, the training itself became more regimented. switchboard operators were trained to be a “human machine, the exponent of speed and courtesy” (middeljans, 2010, p. 42). they endured intensive drills to locate switchboard lines, interpret faint or felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 distorted speech patterns, and to push plugs into answering jacks hundreds of times an hour (maddox, 1977, p. 271). in turn, certain gestures, behaviors, and physical idiosyncrasies such as foreign accents or poor eyesight were not coded into switchboard operation. these standardizations represent a continuation of at&t’s commitment to industrial efficiency in regulating the telephone’s signal and noise. following karin bijsterveld, mills (2011) explains how telecommunications companies like at&t helped introduce the idea of noise as “determined by the capacity of a system and the susceptibility of its receiver to information loss, or deafening,” thereby pathologizing noise as a defective mode of communication (pp. 123-124). this inference was surprisingly cultivated through collaboration between telephone engineers and people with hearing loss, even as it sought to erase those whose ears fell outside the “normal” threshold (p. 122). like other communication devices, the switchboard is an artifact of information theory that “prioritized certain kinds and arrangements of bodies above and beyond the sheer isolation or transfer of information” (p. 82). women workers who deviated from bell system’s productivity standards—from rates of calls connected to acceptable operator decorum—were sent for remedial training, or at worst, were taken off line. the girls who were “plugged in” an evocative trope, “plugging in” explains how female bodies were incorporated into (and even unincorporated) from telecommunications systems. in the story’s opening sequence, p. burke is fully “transistorized” after a series of surgical modifications that leave her looking—“if possible, worse than before”—with “electrode jacks peeping out of her sparse hair, and there are other meldings of flesh and metal” (p. 47).14 these connective devices allow her to plug into delphi, a genetically engineered “waldo” without a brain that can be remotely manipulated.15 with her extruded nervous system, burke syncs her afferent perceptions with delphi through gtx’s communication network. the brain-child of advertising executives, felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 delphi is by all appearances a fifteen-year-old girl whose glamorous lifestyle is in fact an elaborate ruse of product placement for gtx. burke’s real body remains hidden underground in a warehouse where her physiological responses are carefully monitored by a team of male technicians. this enclosure is significant insofar as it reimagines at&t’s techno-labor system where telephone operators were wired to a series of hulking, wall-length machines, with hawk-eyed managers peering over their shoulders and male physicians overseeing the health of female employees, while their “voice(s) with a smile” traveled over the wires (as cited in middlejans, 41). the intractable logic of “plugging in”—in which one is simultaneously a controller and conduit for information transmission—dictates how human operators work alongside their machines. just as the telephone girls of the bell system underwent rigorous training in preparation for manual switching, gtx requires burke to perform a similar degree of competence: the training takes place in her suite and is exactly what you’d call a charm course. how to walk, sit, eat, speak, blow her nose, how to stumble, to urinate, to hiccup—deliciously…as the man said, it’s hard work. but p. burke proves apt. somewhere in that horrible body is a gazelle, a houri, who would have been buried forever without this crazy chance…only it isn’t precisely p. burke who’s stepping, laughing, shaking out her shining hair. how could it be? p. burke is doing it all right, but she’s doing it through something. (p. 47) while the narrator ridicules p. burke’s training, these embodied actions reflect the telephone operator’s drills in vocal inflection, posture, and hand gestures. though seemingly trivial, such prerequisites were viewed as cornerstones of the switchboard operator’s skillset up through the midtwentieth century. telephone operators worked in pairs during their training (clark, 1950, p. 121). burke, too, also learns through her double: she is, after all, “doing it through something.” as the details of her training emerge, burke’s exceptional performance slowly erodes the narrative’s initial emphasis on her disabilities. this particular scene underscores the physical work and display of technological virtuosity burke enacts as a “remote” esteemed for her “terrific aptitude” (p. 58), and foreshadows how later, she felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 will use this mastery to disrupt gtx’s own information system. figure 1. bell telephone system advertisement, 1935. figure 2. at&t advertisement, 1933. felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 the vision gtx has for p. burke and her exquisite double eerily resonates with the bell system’s idealization of telephone girls. championing the “weavers of speech” in the early twentieth century who “sit silently at the switchboards, swiftly and skillfully interlacing the cords [that] guide human voices over the country in all directions” (“weavers,” 1915), bell system extolled the switchboard operator. while p. burke has been described in no less than abhorrent terms thus far, the narrative suggests that as a cybersystem she is a superlative model. fittingly, this sentiment is expressed through joe, p. burke’s console operator, who considers her “system matrices” to be “beautiful” (p. 48). bell system similarly romanticized the human-machine interface as a cybernetic system of control, communication, and above all, efficiency. emphasizing the operator’s enclosure within the switchboard room, the advertisement above (figure 1) illustrates how the operator’s sensory perceptions were folded into and co-determined by these devices. she is, as another print ad paints imaginatively, a terminal node in a global network (figure 2). with the world at her fingertips, calling-cords radiating from her torso and hand, this image of the switchboard operator constitutes an extraordinary literalization of plugging in. yet, even as she is picturesquely drawn within bell system’s idealistic ethos, this operator—with her back to the viewer—is an anonymous figure. the 1935 campaign (figure 1), in contrast, overtly commercializes the operator’s friendly countenance to humanize its system. read side by side, these advertisements show how women operators helped realize at&t’s vision of a global communication network. popular images of women “participating in the sound-reproduction network” were not metaphoric but literal, as sterne (2003) notes, and highlight the role they played in emerging telephonic systems (p. 228). “the girl who was plugged in” similarly exposes the dual, often conflicting portrayals of telephone operators. burke’s work encodes a process the story’s narrator analogizes to switchboard routing: “the next time she plugs in to open delphi’s eyes it’s no different—do you notice which relay boards your phone calls go through?” (p. 56). the narrator remarks felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 how, as contemporary observers, readers fail to discern “the relay boards,” or telephone girls through which our calls are transmitted. this crucial moment reveals the conceit behind the girls who were plugged in, forging a powerful connection between p. burke and bell system’s anonymous switchboard operator. burke may be the invisible operator as we see with the faceless figure, and delphi her fictional ideal as the popular “hello girl” bell system often invoked. the narrator’s jibe thus offers a course correction to bell system’s ableist rhetoric and commercial imagery, calling out the hypocrisy of its exploitative practices and extreme vigilance over operators’ feminine aesthetics and abilities. crip strategies within the “integrated circuit”: noise and error burke and delphi, subject to gtx’s “real-time response-sensor readouts from every receiver in the world” (p. 61), depict cautionary models of the way information systems control women’s bodies. haraway’s (1991) concept of the “integrated circuit” is applicable here: it highlights the consequences women and others experience when their bodies are “dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways” within digital networks (p. 163). the “integrated circuit” in haraway’s manifesto refers specifically to information networks that exploit women, especially third-world laborers who toil in electronics-dependent jobs. without overlooking this important cultural history, i argue this conceit can also be used to describe the work of switchboard operators in north america. like gtx, at&t systematically integrated operators into their global system without consideration for women’s biological well-being. earlier, i discussed bell system’s extreme vigilance over operators’ appearances and health, yet such practices highlight the horrors of ableism in the real world, just as tiptree does by writing of the rotting flesh of burke made immobile by her long hours of interfacing with delphi. the operator thus exemplifies one overlooked example of how “cybertechnologies rely on disabling labor practices across the globe” (kafer, 2013, p. 118). in spite of at&t’s later efforts to ameliorate these effects through sickness and disability benefits felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 and more regimented training, debility and human error became common side effects of switchboard work. for this reason, the telephone operator presents a surprising point of concurrence for disability studies, media studies, and feminist technoscience. an investigation by the us commission on industrial relations (1915) found the working conditions of telephone operators to be “subject to grave criticism,” and the “nervous strain incident to the service are so very severe” (p. 106) that physicians observed a high incidence of mental and physical collapses among operators. the repetitive strains of switchboard operation and “the perpetual jumping up and down and stretching” to plug in cords, brenda maddox (1977) maintains, often became debilitating (p. 269). a report by ethelbert stewart, an agent for the secretary of labor and commerce, found the actions required by telephone switching to cause spinal curvature and prodigious strain on the nervous system (cooper, 1997, p. 494). these combined symptoms became so closely associated with telephone switching that they became known as “telephone shock” (p. 495). even by the late twentieth century after the introduction of automatic switching and video terminals, operators faced workplace hazards such as eyestrain, carpal tunnel syndrome, miscarriages, and other mental health stresses (green, 2001, p. 219). these counter-narratives expose the damaging effects of manual switching on women. such atrocities are called into account with the figure of delphi, who embodies the paradox of at&t’s unattainable bodily norms for its operators. suffering the stresses of their respective cybersystems, burke and delphi demonstrate the switchboard’s remediation of physical ability and health. earlier, i proposed that burke’s disability grounds her body’s physical presence in an information system. yet disability becomes more fluid in delphi, who as an extended nervous system or “prosthesis” for burke, recursively mirrors her disability and deteriorating health. famously defining media as “extensions,” among which the telephone network was included, marshall mcluhan (1964) warned that technological prostheses put american citizens at risk of “narcosis,” or “autoamputation” (p. 45). felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 under mcluhan’s rubric, media produced new sensory ratios to the detriment of some senses, and to the benefit of others. this sensory reconfiguration is mapped onto the story’s characters: while delphi endures the loss of sensation in exchange for her global travels, p. burke on the other hand falls ill with “necroses under her grisly sit-down” from her prolonged immobility (p. 58). these experiences point to the myriad, and often conflicting technological conditions in which disability is situated. this crucial detail redefines disability as the product of encounters and actions between interdependent bodies and technological networks, bridging kafer’s political/relational model and crip technoscience. the tangible effects of gtx’s system on p. burke further manifest when she begins to realize there are discrepancies in her ability to perceive touch through delphi. this oversight is intentionally built into the system’s design: gtx engineers bypassed sensory information such as taste, smell, and touch due to limited network bandwidth. burke is particularly grieved to discover her lack of tactility during her budding romantic relationship with her paramour, paul. gtx’s brash neglect of p. burke’s functional needs results in its user’s disclosure of increasing technological ambivalence. as a cyborg, burke’s relationship to her interface is anything but a wellintegrated, smooth circuit; she “holds in tension the need for access or function with frictions, limitations and failures inherent in the technoscientific design process” (hamraie, 2017, p. 107). in one of the story’s more poignant moments, readers get a rare glimpse into p. burke’s subjectivity as she tries “over twenty-double-thousand miles of hard vacuum to reach her beloved through the girl—flesh numbed by an invisible film…to love him back with a body that goes dead in the heart of the fire” (p. 68). these episodes of sensory disjunction emphasize the difference between delphi and her own body: “she’s slow about discovering there’s certain definite places where her beastly p. burke body feels things that delphi’s dainty flesh does not” (p. 55). the failures of sensory fidelity experienced by p. burke are what cybernetic parlance calls “noise,” or distortions in information feedback. noise is often defined as the signal’s opposite, that which threatens the felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 order of a system; the narrative’s focus, however, suggests that noise is a result of an imbalanced ratio input-output. when communication breaks down, as it does between delphi and burke, this failure confers a space “to recognize the difference between self and other” (haraway, 1991, p. 164). this space of recognition exemplifies haraway’s feminist cyborg politics because it privileges noise over perfect communication (p. 176). as a company that values having “things orderly, especially their communication,” noise is gtx’s greatest adversary, for “their nightmares are about hemorrhages of information; channels screwed up…garble creeping in” (p. 45). noise is not simply inevitable in cybernetic systems that incorporate human agents as part of its operational interface, as bell system’s management against human error illustrates. noise, if we follow media historian peter krapp’s definition, also allows the system in burke’s hands to learn and make room for error (2011, p. 92) as she explores the limits of her two bodies. in cybernetics, norbert wiener (1948) analogized learning to the process of automatic telephone switching: humans and machines could adjust their behaviors, or outputs, through information feedback. wiener’s theory of control and communication took shape through his research with subjects who had neurological and motor disorders, a study he details in his chapter “feedback and oscillation.” wiener was interested in these disabilities—among others like deafness and amputation (mills, 2011; serlin, 2004)—as physical manifestations of the body’s performance as a cybernetic feedback system. his observation of error as an essential component of information feedback and machine behavior was not intended purely as an engineering fix; it helped him understand the inherent messiness of communication. rather than theorizing “human fallibility [as] what keeps systems from achieving their full potential,” as krapp (2011) suggests, through noise, “people, citizens, and individuals in fact become realized for each other and for themselves in unprecedented ways through networks of computer-mediated communication” (p. 91). to extend krapp’s idea further, if we conceptualize cybernetic error from a queer and crip theory standpoint as a kind of failure of compliance between users and felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 systems, a more inclusive picture emerges. within this framework, i propose error and noise can be understood as a form of critique that “recognizes that alternatives are embedded already in the dominant” (halberstam, 2011, p. 88). that is, information loss and communication failure are resources for new ways of knowing disability, and thus become instruments of crip technoscience. the uncanny concurrence between the way disabled bodies haunt wiener’s cybernetic conceptions of noise, telephone switchboard systems, and gtx’s media network, provides a flashpoint for rethinking crip theory. in the same way that error and noise express the material frictions of a system, they also continually insist in the same way that crip theory does that “such a system is never as good as it gets” (mcruer, 2006, p. 32). as disability scholar jay dolmage (2007) explains, “to crip is to expose and reproduce disjunction, to refuse order and embrace messiness” (p. 849). one could easily substitute error and noise into this equation: like “cripping,” error and noise also reproduce disjunction and refuse order. this comparison is imperfect (the conditions of error and cripping are unique), but it helps us see the cross-pollination between cybernetics and crip theory, and how affordances for unruly bodies or partial communication are encoded—and even preserved—in cybernetic systems. noise and error too, in tiptree’s hands and in at&t’s rhetoric, expose how information theory is falsely predicated on an able body. equally as important, in the hands of skilled users error and noise can be co-opted as a crip technique, a practice of identifying alternative points of access in a network. this critique is perhaps one of the story’s most significant contributions as a feminist sf text, recognizing the subversive power of disability within communication systems. towards a crip feminist hacker ethic in this final section, i explore how burke’s experience of noise—the corruption of her sensory feedback—becomes useful insofar as it reveals the inaccessibility of gtx’s system, and compels her to hack delphi. "the felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 24 girl who was plugged in” reimagines error as a crip strategy of resistance against the rhetoric and practice of control within the “integrated circuit.” error similarly becomes an alternate ideology of technological mastery and disobedience in laura forlano’s (2016) “hacking the feminist disabled body,” an ethnographic account of living with type 1 diabetes with an insulin pump and a continuous glucose monitor. she writes, “it is only through my own body’s failure and breakdown that i have come to participate in and redefine the socio-technical practices that constitute hacking.” as such, she introduces a crip feminist hacker ethic in which her disability is reconceptualized as the “everyday rituals” of her glucose monitor’s glitches, and hacking as “the invisible labor [that] contributes to its maintenance and repair.” though forlano’s feminist hacker ethic situates her body within a network of medical devices and quantification, her claim that participation is defined by “inherent frictions, failures, limitations, breakdowns and interruptions” can be more broadly used to describe human-machine interaction within networked communication systems. this articulation not only draws a link between disability and rituals of error that wiener observed in cybernetic feedback and in my account of at&t switchboard operators, but also characterizes p. burke and delphi’s electronic connection. toward the novella’s end, burke discovers how to surpass the boundaries of gtx’s system. her connection with delphi—in spite of the tactile inconsistencies—is so strong that her prosthetic half begins to exhibit its own autonomy when unplugged. now and again in the narrative, unbeknownst to even p. burke, delphi “all by herself smiles a bit or stirs in her ‘sleep’” (p. 60). once, she “breathed a sound: ‘yes’” (p. 60). such acts are all the more remarkable, the narrator claims, because delphi is disconnected from burke. these indiscretions foreshadow delphi’s increasingly powerful expressions of individual subjectivity, and as technical impossibilities, these actions pose a real problem for gtx. viewing these irregularities as symptomatic of a nervous breakdown and a potential massive system error, the corporation resorts to disciplining delphi’s body through electric shocks. her neural system disarmed, a convulsive delphi now, too, becomes marked as inhuman. this conundrum is dramatized in felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 25 the narrative’s final moments when paul, believing that delphi can be freed from her “electronic shackles” (p. 70), escorts her back to gtx’s facilities for medical assistance. in doing so, he confronts burke for the first time. no longer concealed by her interface, burke hopes paul will reciprocate her feelings when she moves to embrace him. as she does, paul accidentally knocks her wired nervous system askew, killing her in the process. burke’s termination seems to circle back to the narrator’s deep-seated cynicism, mocking the reader’s expectations that burke’s love for paul can transcend her imperfect body. though scholars have read this narrative resolution as foreshadowing cyberpunk’s rejection of the body, we might instead view burke’s terminal disconnection as consistent with the crip instrumentalization of error. her noncompliance is a form of antiproduction in the sense of queer failure: she wields it an oppositional tool that “turns on the impossible, the improbable, the unlikely,” imagining other ways of being (halberstam, 2011, p. 88). this failure reroutes us into another way of reading burke’s death: as a transgressive act against gtx’s circuit. in spite of being disconnected from burke by the story’s conclusion, delphi persists, remaining animated: placing “one foot before the other, not moving very well—but moving” (p. 76). in this brief moment, delphi hacks her own cybersystem, and by correlation, gtx’s network. her display of physical agency enables delphi to claim her liberation from gtx’s “integrated circuit” through a powerful speech-act: “i’m delphi” (p. 77). her rebellion against gtx is not without precedent: telephone operators, as april middeljans (2010) notes, used the power of the switchboard to “regulate society and engineer their own lives,” subverting cultural codes and corporate regulations out of their own sense of moral duty (p. 39). operators admitted they routinely resisted bell system’s regime of efficiency by scrambling connections and redistributing nickels by taking them from rude callers (p. 41). in rare cases, they gave friends access to other callers’ private conversations (“diary,” 1907, 30), playfully rewriting the system’s rules to enable free access to information. although delphi is for all intents and purposes electronically untethered or “turned off” (p. 60), she similarly challenges gtx’s system from this position. delphi, along with felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 26 burke, doesn’t perpetrate this insurgency by hacking a corporate firewall in cyberspace, or by navigating computer programs to steal money and information. on the contrary, p. burke and delphi hack their electronically networked nervous systems so that they might feel more human in their wired-up world. they situate the hacker within a social space rather than the pure space of data in order to make gtx’s system more accommodating to other bodies that operate according to their own idiosyncratic rules. their performance of user-motivated design embodies what yergeau (2014) calls a “criptastic version of hacking” that is disabled-led and process-based, focusing on rewriting the rules of access rather than a finished product or software. this portrayal implicitly performs a broader commentary about contemporary technoculture whereby burke seemingly exemplifies but ultimately fails to live up to the metonymy of plugged-in bodies as disabled bodies. for example, in depicting burke as a “paraplegic,” and later, as a “blind mole-woman” buried underground, the narrator aligns her portrayal with her interface and the way it physically suspends her body (pp. 64, 67). in these moments, burke ostensibly allegorizes what paul virilio (1993) describes as “the growing inertia” of bodies wrought by the telecommunications industry, in which the “plugged-in human being” functionally becomes a “well-equipped invalid” (pp. 11, 4). virilio views the individual’s loss of natural mobility for a greater degree of control in an information network as an untenable exchange. but this conception merely rehearses the myth of the disabled cyborg, as kafer (2013) would point out. by shifting the definitions of wholeness and “validity” toward access—which privileges hacking as form of movement (yergeau, 2014), albeit perhaps imperfect or incomplete—tiptree’s girls provide a rejoinder to virilio’s argument. they introduce a non-ableist, crip understanding of technoculture that untethers information control and navigation from physical mobility or cognitive aptitude. these terminal subjects, i argue, represent a crystalline example of how technological systems remediate ability, thus redressing ableist ideas about how humans operate and work within their electronic networks. as a felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 27 failure not of the body, but of prescriptive top-down systems designed to contain bodies, error announces the fallacy of smooth integration, whether it be a cyborg system or a switchboard network. through the medium of the story’s imaginary future, tiptree makes this recognition possible by effectively reinserting telephone girls back into a history of communication technologies that registers information in its noisy materiality. we not only see the material effects of technology on the female information worker’s body in cyberpunk fiction, but also how the same laborer can short-circuit this conduit through her embodied knowledge of the system.16 the girls who plug in—and their coalitions of women who plug into insulin pumps, breathing machines, wheelchair battery chargers, cochlear implants (as does this author), and the like—offer enticing possibilities for how we might rewrite and crip hacker futures. acknowledgements i would like to thank the editorial team at catalyst for their valuable insights, especially the editors of this special issue, kelly fritsch, aimi hamraie, mara mills, and david serlin. notes 1 see also, m. hicks (2017). 2 henry’s project echoes the work of ida brinkman and other “electric moms”—women with disabilities in the postwar era, who, as bess williamson (2012) has shown, adapted medical and assistive equipment to move beyond the home and medical treatments of disability. sara hendren and caitrin lynch’s (2016) engineering at home similarly celebrates one woman’s engineering hacks derived from repurposing “unlikely things” such as cable ties and wall hooks; hendren and lynch’s project exemplifies contemporary instances of user-centered design. 3 in the mid-1970s before she was unmasked as a women writer, sheldon began writing as raccoona sheldon to tackle themes outside of tiptree’s felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 28 “masculine” purview. 4 when discussing sheldon’s written work published under her pseudonym, i will refer to her as james tiptree jr., otherwise, alice sheldon will be used in personal contexts. 5 for other feminist technoscience critiques, see balsamo (1996), vint (2007), and stone (1991). 6 accessible tech in employment hackathon, and diyability, which invite people with disabilities to develop solutions to barriers in access, contravene ableist approaches advocated by non-profit companies such as hacking autism or mit’s athack, which views disability as a “challenge” to be “solved.” see yergeau’s (2014) critique of the hackathon’s charity-driven ideologies, though she cautions against fully ascribing these principles to conceptions of hacking. 7 see siebers (2011) on social constructionism in disability studies. 8 see allan (2013) for further study of sf’s treatment of disability. 9 following kelly fritsch’s (2015) explanation of disability as a material practice of knowing, a crip feminist onto-epistemology appropriates the discursive and material practices of representing disability to reroute the power relations that constitute this body. 10 bell telephone began incorporating automatic telephone switches in 1915. these were ubiquitous by 1972, signaling bell system’s transition to a “cyber-mechanical-human endeavor: a mix of operators and machines” (lapsley, 2013, p. 26). early switchboards were a primitive collage of metal and wood, but by 1903, roughly 3 million switchboard connected phones. behind these lines were warehouses of human beings who manually switched calls (p. 24). by the late nineteenth century, switchboards became more complex, and electrical cords connected to “cordboards” enabled operators to connect calls more quickly. 11 tiptree lived to see the divestiture of bell system in 1983, though it was one year after the publication of “the girl” in 1973 that the us department of justice filed its antitrust suit against the company. 12 though the first switchboard operators were boys, they were quickly replaced by women (lapsley, 2013, p. 21). felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 29 13 see grier (2005) for a similar categorization of female labor, when “computers became ‘girls’” (p. 276) as they tabulated numbers for wartime research projects. grier suggests that “girls” became an expansive term that included those with racial, religious, socioeconomic, and physical differences, “joined by african americans, jews, the irish, the handicapped, and the merely poor” (p. 276). 14 in spite of haraway’s claim that cyborgs have “no truck with gender,” there is a long line of female cyborgs in science fiction. see flanagan and booth (2003) for a more extensive catalog of cyborgs in women’s cyberfiction. 15 first mentioned in robert heinlein’s (1942/1999) story of the same name, a “waldo” is an industrial lathe that synchronizes the gestures of two bodies across space through sensory input and output. heinlein’s story also imagined the “waldo” as a prosthetic extension of a disabled body. 16 see other disabled cyberpunk female hackers such as lise in william gibson’s “the winter market” (1986). sam in pat cadigan’s synners (1986/1991) hacks computer networks through a modded insulin-pump chip reader connected to her belly. references abbate, j. 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(2017). code girls: the untold story of the american code breakers of world war ii. new york, ny: hachette books. nguyen, l., toupin, s., & bardzell, s. (january 2016). feminist hacking/making: exploring new gender horizons of possibility. journal of peer production, 8. retrieved from http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue8-feminism-and-unhacking/feminist-hackingmaking-exploring-new-genderhorizons-of-possibility/ orr, j. (2006). panic diaries: a genealogy of panic disorder. durham, nc: duke university press. ott, k. (2002). the sum of its parts: an introduction to modern histories of prosthetics. in k. ott, d. serlin, & s. mihm (eds.), artificial parts, practical lives: modern histories of prosthetics (pp. 1-42). new york, ny: nyu press. petrick, e. (2015). making computers accessible: disability rights and digital technology. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. phillips, j. 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(1969, june 20). note to dk re the girl who was plugged in. alice b. sheldon, pen name james tiptree, jr., papers (coll. 455, box 9, folder 9). university of oregon libraries, special collections and university archives, eugene, or. tiptree, j., jr. (1975). a note on the question of self-esteem. alice b. sheldon, pen name james tiptree, jr., papers (coll. 455, box 12, folder 1). university of oregon libraries, special collections and university archives, eugene, or. us commission on industrial relations. (1915). final report of the commission on industrial relations. washington, dc: government printing office. vint, s. (2007). bodies of tomorrow: technology, subjectivity, science fiction. toronto, on: university of toronto press. virilio, p. (1993). the third interval: a critical transition. in v.a. conley (ed.) re-thinking technologies (pp. 3-12). minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. wiener, n. (1948). cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine. cambridge, ma: mit press. williamson, b. (2012). electric moms and quad drivers: people with disabilities buying, making, and using technology in postwar america. american studies, 52(1), 5-29. yergeau, m. (2014). disability hacktivism. in m. hocks & j. sayers (eds.), hacking the classroom: eight perspectives. computers and composition online. retrieved from http://www2.bgsu.edu/departments/english/cconline/hacking/#yergeau felt catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 35 bio lindsey dolich felt is a lecturer at stanford university in the program in writing and rhetoric. her current research examines how post-war american literature recovers to a little known history in which disability crucially shaped the development of information theory and electronic communication. pollock   article   heart feminism   anne pollock georgia tech apollock@gatech.edu when feminist theorizations of the body have foregrounded particular body parts, whether the uterus (martin, 1987), the gut (wilson, 2004a), or bones (fausto-sterling, 2005), they have rendered feminism and the body in distinct ways. the same goes for feminist analyses of ways of understanding messaging and signals, such as hormones (roberts, 2007) and epigenetics and metabolism (landecker, 2011). in what has broadly been characterized as the "age of the brain," the "neuroscientific turn" has been a particularly rich area for transdisciplinary scholarship (littlefield & johnson, 2012). in this paper, i consider wide-ranging heart-centered approaches and put them into tension with other ways of understanding life, the body, and personhood, particularly those focusing on the brain, to argue that thinking with the heart has value for feminist theory. heart feminism both complements and challenges neurologically inspired theorizations, and i draw especially on these to put my own project into relief as i ask: what might an analysis starting from the heart and circulatory system offer?  drawing the heart into feminist theory is of course not completely novel. feminist biologists lynda birke (1999) and anne fausto-sterling (2004) have led some way toward theorizing feminism and the biological body through the heart. they do so by interrogating metaphors in early modern medicine and contemporary pop medical books (birke), and by attending to the ways that the body's hypertensive response to the stress of racism can be a resource for theorizing the body beyond genetic determinism (fausto-sterling). other theorists usefully draw together patient accounts and ontological questions within biomedical understandings (mol, 2002; shildrick, 2012). my own consideration follows from theirs—not replacing social inquiry with physiological inquiry, but bringing the biological body productively into the scope of feminist analysis through foregrounding the heart. as the title of my paper suggests, i am inspired by elizabeth wilson's "gut feminism" method: "a feminism that is able to think innovatively and organically at the same time" (wilson, 2004a, p. 86). wilson's engagement with the neurological body through the gut is tremendously generative, not least because it decenters the brain (a theme i will return to in this paper's conclusion). my project is necessarily historically situated, but its periodization is somewhat ambiguous: i draw on current biomedical knowledge of the heart, which is itself a product of layered historical periods, as present-day biological understandings of the heart have great continuity with earlier periods. notably, none of the biology that i describe is cutting edge or contested within the field.1 i also seek a more epistemologically eclectic mode of engaging with the body than wilson does, engaging with mundane clinical encounters and broader intuitions about aliveness that can become enrolled in public debates. as angie willey has argued, biological data is one way among many that feminists can engage with the body (willey forthcoming). from my perspective, the mundane intimacy of knowledge of the heartbeat is as worthy of attention as are scientific understandings of the heart. the heart that is accessible to directly embodied experience and to clinical encounters matters as much as the one that comes into view in cardiopathophysiology. heart feminism's mode thus also resonates with hillary rose's early eighties argument that feminists should ground our epistemology in "hand, brain, and heart": which is to say not only in the "abstraction of male and bourgeois thought," but also in activism and caring labor (rose, 1983). this paper emerges out of and in conversation with object-oriented feminism (behar, forthcoming). like much of that emerging body of work, i am interested both in nonanthropocentric materiality and in actually existing women and feminist politics. i draw on knowledge gleaned from science, but also from debates in mass media, and from mundane knowledge—of our own heartbeats, of those with whom we are intimate, and of heartbeats that ground clinical encounters. object-oriented feminism (oof) tends to analyze blatantly artificial objects, of engineering or of art, which facilitates a foregrounding of both the importance of matter and the inseparability of matter and meaning. indeed, oof does not assume the need to take sides on or overcome the matter/meaning divide that has been a founding "imaginary prohibition" of new feminist materialisms (ahmed, 2008), perhaps because in art and engineering, matter and meaning are not divided in the first place. even though my object of analysis here is the undeniably real and material heart, it is also the symbolic and socially situated heart, and my approach to it is an oof-inspired one. biological understandings of the heart fascinate me, but they do not provide the grounding for my understanding the world. instead, my method is to draw on physiology to raise questions as an artist might: in light of a specific and particular materiality to hand, what if we see the world like this? the heart that is my object traverses scale, and is in a sense a series of objects—ranging from heart cells, to hearts and circulatory systems, to women interpellated into heart health, to public debates on personhood that mobilize fetal heartbeats and contested cases of women on life support. i am interested in the heart both as an object itself and an object within a network of objects, and think that the tension between its boundedness and its permeability can provide analytical resources for speculative engagement with how objects relate to each other in a nonanthropocentric posthumanist philosophy. new feminist materialists tend to look at scientific accounts and find the world as they would have it be: boundaries are always being broken down, whether by microbes (hird, 2009a) or by quantum entanglements (barad, 2007). yet i am also interested in how ways of understanding the body through the heart can push back against rhizomatic and egalitarian aspirations and challenge us to account for contours of power in more nuanced ways.2 i want to consider how the heart can articulate the body.3 etymologically, "articulation" is derived from the ancient greek arthroi, which, as shigehisa kuriyama (1999, p. 135) points out, referred to both the divisions of the body into distinct form and of sounds into lucid language. for ancient greeks, breaking down the body into muscles and bones rendered the articulated body. many in both contemporary medicine and feminism have articulated women's bodies through our reproductive and affective parts. this paper takes up the heart, a nonreproductive somatic organ, as an opportunity to articulate women's bodies in new ways. starting with the heart of course does not replace articulations of the body that start elsewhere. i am not suggesting that we forgo analysis of breasts, brains, or uteruses to focus on the heart. open-ended processes of articulation are far more interesting than efforts toward authority and accuracy that seek to close discussion down (see latour, 2004). this is an important difference between analogic thinking made possible through this type of articulation, and ontological arguments that promise unifying explanations-of-everything. scientific knowledge is always mediated and partial, and so feminist engagement with biological knowledge claims about the body should both avoid ceding too much epistemic authority to them, and avoid making totalizing claims of our own (haraway, 1988). thinking with the heart the conventional admonition against thinking with the heart makes me think that there must be something interesting going on in there. the phrase "thinking with the heart" is, after all, often used to belittle stereotypical ideas about how women think. when evelyn fox keller's (1985) foundational feminist science studies critiqued the ways that "thinking like a scientist" gets conflated with "thinking like a man," she framed it around a binary of alienation from the object versus empathy with the object. this might well be characterized as thinking with the head of cool rationality versus thinking with the heart of emotion. the head is (conceptually) able to disconnect from others who make demands on the subject; the heart is not.  neither the head nor the heart is as local as this opposition between them implies.  elizabeth wilson (2004a) has alerted us to the fact that the neurological system extends well beyond the brain, calling us to pay attention to the neurons outside the brain, especially in the gut. the dispersed nervous system that wilson is interested in is itself an aspect of the heart: the heart, too, is fully innervated—a major site of autonomic nerves. moreover, the pervasiveness of the neuro and circulatory systems are linked, because the arteries and their small branches that lead to the capillaries (arterioles) are innervated as well. the capillary network is distributed even further than this, proximate to every cell in the body. the domain of the heart is thus much larger than that instantly recognizable organ: the circulatory system makes the heart's work necessarily dispersed. the heart is at once a well-bounded organ and one that is easily recognizable even if grown in tissue culture: heart cells in culture beat. but at the same time, the heart is crucially a transit point—its function is deeply integrated with the peripheral artery system and also the body as a whole. and the environment. and behavior. the heart's function is constantly modifying in light of everything. an articulation of the body through the heart should be fragmented and emergent.  electrical one thing that is distinct about heart cells is the phenomenon of atrial and ventricular syncytium. a network of muscle cells is interconnected by contiguous bridges of cytoplasm, so electrical excitation can travel between cells. this is part of what stefan helmreich (2013) has emphasized as the "excitable" nature of heart cells. when one cell contracts, it can transmit electricity so that cells in its area all contract together. this is why heart cells grown in petri dishes will beat in unison.4 although popular perception of electricity is as something that comes from a power grid and out of a socket in a wall rather than something that courses through our bodies, the heart's electrical aspect plays a more important role in how the heart is generally understood than it might seem. electrical impulses of the heart make possible the instantly recognizable inscriptions of electrocardiograms (referred to as ecgs or ekgs). this mode of understanding the heart emerges out of a particular history: ecgs were among the inscription devices that emerged in the nineteenth century "to translate bodily movements or sounds into readable, visual graphics" (van dijck, 2005, p. 5), and ecgs are one of the founding technologies of cardiology as a field and 20th century scientific medicine more broadly (lawrence, 1992). as composer and theorist tara rodgers has pointed out, "by the turn of the twentieth century, electrocardiographic waveforms presented the heart's electrical activity as, quite literally, signs of life. medical experts could determine from the shape of waveforms whether electrical activities in the body were normal or pathological (as in cases of cardiac arrhythmia); moreover, an unvarying baseline (or flatline) symbolized life's absence" (rodgers, 2011, p. 519). ecgs do not provide a direct representation of the heart, but they remain a commonplace way of visualizing both the heart and life. the ecg's readout is a highly constructed inscription that pervades medical care and media images, and has become a more common way to visualize the work of the heart than images of the organ itself. any of the ordinary heart cells has an intrinsic rhythm and could set the rhythm for the organ, but the electrical excitation that spurs contraction generally follows a particular conductive route.5 the sinoatrial (sa) node will induce contraction more quickly than any given heart cell would, and since heart cells' rates are linked, the sa node's rate becomes the effective rate, following a pathway from the atria, through the atrioventricular node, to the ventricles. this is something that gives the heart a bit of a hierarchical reputation, this sa node acting as the "pacemaker." to draw on the terms of deleuze and guattari (1987), this articulates the heart as principally striated space, not smooth.  yet there is again a tension here. broadly, too much regularity in the ecg trace can be a sign of pathology, too (malik, 1996)—small variations in pacing suggest responsivity and vitality. on a deeper level, since there are backup nodes and any heart cell could conceivably set the rhythm, there is an underlying democratic aspect to the electrical network of the heart as well. there is a slow-beating rhizomatic system beneath the unidirectional directed flow of electricity. now, that underlying rate only becomes perceptible in pathological situations, for example when the sa node fails. it is generally too slow to be "productive," which is to say, to meet the needs of the organism. here, the democratic impulses of both deleuze and guattari and of radical feminist theory are checked. in relationships among equal objects, is a recognized benevolent dictator a means of promoting productive order amid the tyranny of structurelessness (pace joreen, 1972)? or, to read the same phenomenon more negatively, is underlying democracy only possible in states of pathology?   hydraulic moving out a layer in scale from the cellular to the organ and the circulatory system, the heart is also in an important sense hydraulic—that is, fluid mechanics is part of how it can be understood. hydraulics pertains to liquids in motion under pressure, and the heart pumps liquids under pressure. it consists of two positive displacement pumps (right and left, pulmonary and systemic circulation) operating together. the pumping chambers are collapsible and have a more-or-less fixed volume, with some flexibility. when healthy, the two pumps work in tandem, both pumping out the same quantity so that there is no accumulation or starving. hydraulic systems are oddly retro in our cyber moment: they are not where the hot questions are, for feminists or for scientists. the flow of blood through this pump and the circulatory system is relentlessly unidirectional. lynda birke (1999) has pointed out that the ways that the heart is understood—in terms of the industrial revolution's steam power—make it an interesting question what the heart would have looked like if engineering had taken a different direction. the availability of replacement valves for this organ at the center of life gives it a deeply cyborg quality, a site of what donna haraway (1991, p. 152) has canonically flagged as a contemporary "leaky distinction" between organism and machine.  there is an odd duality here: the heart is an exemplar both of an autocratic boss and a replaceable brute laborer (birke, 1999) in a flexible economy era that has little room for acknowledging either of those kinds of work. for barbara ehrenreich (1983), cardiology narratives of the 1950s provided a script for critiquing masculinity of that era, brimming with moralistic assumptions about stressed-out breadwinners and demanding housewives. these narratives have little purchase in today's post-fordism, and our understandings of the body and medicine have transformed along with our economy (cooper, 2008; martin, 1994). in a neoliberal era characterized by "the dual movement of capital and life toward flexibility" (sunder rajan, 2012, p. 9), the heart is not up to speed.  the high level of feminist interest in the neurocompared with the cardiomight be not only a reflection of the trendiness of the neuro broadly, but also the resonance of the heart and cardiovascular system with old-school engineering. feminist and neuroscientist deboleena roy gives a chapter on feminism and neuroscience an epigraph from deleuze and guattari in which they argue that "the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree" (as cited in roy, 2012, p. 175). so treelike in its figurations, the heart and circulatory system can be well-indicted in deleuze and guattari's (1987) terms as the rhizomatic's opposite, the arborescent. of course, the unidirectional ideal is not perfectly achieved—regurgitation can happen in pathological situations, for example when valves do not fully close and blood flows back into the chamber from which it came. but the heart overwhelmingly privileges unidirectional flows that have retrograde connotations to a postmodern sensibility.  in an era in which the heart becomes seen as a replaceable part through artificial valves and pacemakers or xenotransplantation (birke, 1999), the heart's hydraulic aspect makes it something of an old-fashioned machine. there is something almost steampunk about dwelling on an organ so visibly mechanical.  the hydraulics of the heart combine masculine and feminine, active and passive.  on the one hand, the heart is a muscular organ, and as such, macho. william harvey, the influential 17th century physician who characterized the systemic circulation of the blood, strove to describe the heart mechanistically, eschewing the sensual—and yet he used metaphors not only of gears, but also of the lord and the sun (see otis, 2011). according to bryan turner (2003), for harvey the heart's function as a pumping muscular organ operated according to a phallic model, patriarchally ministering to a feminine body. yet heart-as-sovereign is only part of the story. in contrast to the penis, the heart must not only send out its principal fluid, it must also receive it. the heart sends blood out by contracting, and because the system is in a loop it need not suck blood back in. it just sends it away, no need of beckoning it to return. by opening again, the blood flows on back. the hospitality of this opening, making space for blood to return, should be understood as agential (cf. aristarkhova, 2012). not making enough space for blood to return is a major cause of heart failure. so, physiologically, the heart's receptivity is as important as its thrust. in this way, paying attention to the heart can present an opportunity for theory: thinking about receptivity beyond democratic exchange or domination. what if receptivity is understood as a central component of an object's action? theoretical approaches that foreground the agency of objects, such as actor-network theory, tend to be action-oriented. how can a passivity that is not submission be appreciated? responsiveness and responsibility when we speak of the burdens on our hearts, that phrasing generally connotes affect rather than physiology. but of course the demands on the heart are not merely emotional. one of the disease processes that i am most interested in is heart failure—this is a key disease category in my previous work about race and heart disease (pollock, 2012). the heart is emblematically responsive to load. it changes its rate and volume according to the demands of the body beyond it, and its responsiveness can get it into trouble. it generally cannot grow new cells in response to injury (claycomb, 1992)—this is why heart cancer is so extraordinarily rare—and so its cells enlarge and "remodel" to accomplish more work. for example, if blockages in the vessels or high peripheral pressure make it harder to circulate the blood, the heart's cells will increase in size and the heart's capacity will also increase. but this is a temporary fix. it is called compensating. as soon as this cellular remodeling and hypertrophy starts, it is a sign of problems to come. compensating is a prelude to decompensating.  decompensation means that after the temporary respite offered by the heart's compensatory efforts, the success starts to break down. either not enough blood can be accommodated by the chambers within the heart's now bulky muscle, or not enough can be expelled from the enlarged chambers, and insufficient oxygenation of the peripheral body leads to shortness of breath and fatigue, first with activity and then even at rest. from the perspective of the human organism, this is "heart failure," and becomes a leading cause of death. but from the perspective of the heart, it is the excess burden of the human organism, rarely intrinsic to the heart, which causes the failure. the obligation to respond to load and the hopelessness of being able to do so forever is fundamental to characterizing the heart's action. what if the heart and its failure can become ways of thinking about objects in the world? what does a model of an object that is intrinsically burdened and thus doomed do for an object-oriented analysis, and for feminist theory? this inevitably doomed character of the heart might also inform our affective relationship to thinking with the organ. one primary affective valence of the heart—sentimentality—is another way in which the heart seems retro. carol emslie and her colleagues (2001) have characterized a gap between "the feminine image of the heart as the centre of emotional life" and "the masculine representation of the heart as a machine" (p. 208) and, indeed, as a metaphor for the fordist body. since both sentiment and fordism are out of fashion in both economy and biology, contemplation of how the heart works can thus jar contemporary common sense about the nature of the body. as margrit shildrick (2012) has richly explored, for patients who have received heart transplants, biomedical framings of the heart as an unproblematically transplantable pump can be hard to square with questions of identity provoked by the experience of incorporating the heart of another. the heart as hydraulic is inextricable from metaphors of other hydraulic systems.  plumbing metaphors have informed medical understandings of what should be done to reduce the risk of heart attack—such that angioplasty is powerfully analogized with cleaning out pipes (jones, 2013, p. 26). lynda birke points out the constant analogies with household plumbing, a domestic space that one must manage, often with outside help but which in theory one could manage oneself. when the heart goes wrong, she suggests, it does so in ways that are like the mishaps in otherwise flowing domestic plumbing and happy marriages. individual responsibility for maintaining the heart is an onerous burden that ignores race, class, and other social inequalities, in a way that is not dissimilar from the burden of maintaining a home and a marriage moralistically placed on the poor—and especially poor women—in a neoconservative state.  although this individual burden of responsibility for disease is not unique to heart disease, "narratives about [heart disease] are especially individualized and moralized" (weiner, 2011, 1766). coronary artery disease (cad) is the dominant mode of understanding blockages in the plumbing of the heart, and cad is surgicalized and pharmaceuticalized in ways that individualize obligations to address risk factors in a terrain of stratified exposure to harms and unequal access to care (pollock & jones, 2015). in her analysis of lay and epidemiological understandings of race and heart disease, sociologist janet shim describes a conversation with an epidemiologist who explains the disproportionately high cardiovascular risk of black women using evocative terms that conflate poor household management with inadequate care for the heart: "there is a black culture—welfare moms, or whatever—with low education who maybe missed out on the public health messages of the past ten years" (shim, 2014, p. 3). the hydraulic heart is thus loaded with pressure, and grappling with that is inseparable from consideration of broader ways of understanding both industrial and domestic spheres. just as individuals are burdened with the obligation of maintaining the heart as a plumbing system, they are also burdened with maintaining it as an electrical system. whereas the maintenance of the hydraulic system of the heart generally involves lifestyle interventions, pharmaceuticals, or surgeries, the maintenance of the electrical system of the heart generally involves the implantation of devices. these include pacemakers, which maintain a minimum heart rate, and internal defibrillators, which are designed to detect dangerous arrhythmias and automatically shock the heart into regular rhythm. these devices transform the lives that they prolong, and rejection of them is often framed as tantamount to suicide (pollock, 2008). amid unequal exposure to social environments that diminish heart health, there are constant demands to take individual responsibility to bolster cardiovascular fitness and to use pharmaceuticals, procedures, and devices to extend the heart's function as long as possible. at the same time that we might use cardiovascular disease incidence as a window into structural inequality, we must also be critical of health discourse as a moralistic imperative and driver of neoliberal medicine. drawing on the position that jonathan metzl and anna kirkland have provocatively framed as "against health" (2010), might heart feminism need to be for thinking with the heart, but against heart health? vital sign because we can feel our own heartbeat, and that of others with whom we are intimate, the heartbeat has been and will remain powerful as a way for lay people to answer the question of who is alive. in medicine, the centrality of the taking of the pulse has ancient roots (kuriyama, 1999, pp. 18-35), and in ordinary clinical encounters, the pulse remains a primary "vital sign." contemporary american personhood is generally solidly brain-centric. as joe dumit (2003) has argued, the brain is normally the organ that defines our personhood in our "form of life:" when we ask a question about identity and find an answer that we can locate in the brain, we are generally satisfied that we are in the right place. yet, at the beginning and end of life, cardiological criteria and neurological criteria can come to bear on personhood as a feminist issue. when those criteria conflict, or when the heartbeat is perceptible but neurological data is not, the salience of the heart as the locus of life and personhood is renewed. this is true in intimate contexts, as the perception of the beating heart informs how we relate to each other as organisms and beings, and in public contexts, as the heartbeat is compellingly and problematically enrolled in discourses of "right to life" and "right to die."  listening to the fetal heartbeat several recent proposed anti-abortion laws in numerous u.s. states have had a peculiar characteristic: they have foregrounded the fetal heartbeat (culp-ressler, 2013). feminist scholars have long highlighted the way that the ultrasound image of the fetus has been important in conceptualizing the independent personhood of the fetus (for example newman, 1997; petchesky, 1987), and many anti-choice laws have been enacted to capitalize on that association, by requiring women seeking abortions to undergo a sonogram first. these fetal heartbeat laws are novel in that they privilege sound rather than (or in addition to) the image.  historians of sound have argued that "sound has power and is woven into a host of other social, political, and economic power relations" and that "mediation introduces other elements of power" (suisman, 2009, p. 3). fetal heartbeat legislation is a dramatic instantiation of this. in this legislation, the dividing line is not when the fetal heartbeat is understood to exist, but rather, when it is "detectable," by abdominal ultrasound or more controversially by transvaginal ultrasound (in which the technician inserts a condom-covered wand-like probe into the vagina, a mode of governmentality that can evoke sexual assault). the process of detecting fetal heartbeats is called auscultation, like listening with a stethoscope, but the fetal heartbeat isn't really "heard"— it is a sound produced by the devices of listening, for a specific audience.6 the fetal heartbeat as heard through ultrasound devices is as completely mediated as fetal images, but, especially in early pregnancy, can be experienced by the pregnant woman as more intuitively legible (howes-mischel, 2015). in the sonic effect of the fetal heartbeat, there is an effective and affective articulation of an individualized fetal heart. although the fetus's circulatory system is completely intertwined with that of the mother, the individuation of that proto-organ is a compelling line for the individuation of the fetus as a person.   comparative literature scholar laura otis (2011) connects the appeal of seeing the heart as the source of life and consciousness with the borges story "the circular ruins," in which the main character wants to dream a man into existence. he first dreams an audience of students and selects one to focus on, but that method fails to produce a full-formed man. it is not until he tries a new method, starting with the beating heart and working his way out, that he is successful. the anti-abortion activists who support fetal heartbeat legislation and borges are both, from very different starting points, pointing us to a deep observation: the appeal of the heart as the location of the phantasmic origin of personhood.  although the fetal heartbeat must be technologically mediated, using heartbeat to determine life is not newfangled in the least. as otis argues, even though the brain generally is thought of as the locus of personhood, the heart ultimately trumps because knowledge about the brain is just too new. a central part of the appeal of the heart as the center of life is what otis (2011) calls "the principle of movement" (der prinzip bewegung): that which we can perceive as moving is, in the absence of other evidence, that which is alive, and even before we do research or learn science that tells us that this wobbly weird object, the brain, is the center of life and consciousness, the heart is an intuitively appealing locus of life because it perceptibly moves. in this way, i would argue that the recent focus on the perceptibility of the fetal heartbeat hearkens to the medieval idea that quickening marks the entry of the soul into the fetus.7 monitoring fetal heartbeat during childbirth has long been part of choreographing the process of literal separation of mother and baby (cartwright, 1998). this fetal heartbeat legislation capitalizes on that deep intuition and conventional clinical relation, and it marshals technology to force that perception to an earlier stage. at the same time that we oppose the anti-feminist ends toward which the fetal heartbeat is being mobilized, how can we maintain curiosity about the evocative power of that technologically mediated sound? waiting for cardiopulmonary death as much as the presence and absence of a heartbeat signifies life and death, it is not the ultimate arbiter of it. to a significant degree, the brain has won as the ultimate arbiter of death, even though that goes against the common sense of most people who have spent time in a room with bodies categorized as "brain dead." family members and even medical personnel can struggle to align a strongly held belief that the person is no longer there with the warm body before them (lock, 2004). in bioethical debates about end-of-life issues, the gap between brain death and cardiological death is often front and center. the category of "brain death" is unnecessary in the overwhelming majority of deaths because cardiopulmonary death and brain death do generally coincide. the need for criteria to articulate death in these rare ambiguous cases helps to reopen questions about where we understand life and personhood to be located. in widely discussed "right-to-die" cases, the "personhood" and "life" of women are in fraught relation. occasionally this is intertwined with the beginning-of-life questions addressed above, as in the 2014 case of marlise muñoz, a woman in texas who was kept on life support even after being declared "brain dead" because of the hospital's interpretation of a texas law stating that life support may not be withdrawn from a woman known to be pregnant.8 more broadly, as karla holloway (2011) points out, public conflicts over the question of whether personhood survives the loss of brain function are deeply intertwined with gender.9 holloway observes that all of the memorable right-to-die cases are about women: "it is certainly true that men have faced the same medical dilemma. but it is the stories of women that make it from the private to public consumption" (holloway, 2011, p. 18). it makes sense that it is the cases of women in which private bodies on life support become what holloway calls "public texts": women are the ones whose independent personhood—and so whose ability to make decisions for themselves—is in question. thus, it is up for debate whether our personhood continues when the brain does not function but the heart still beats. in our era, the brain has almost completely superseded the heart as the locus of life and personhood. and yet, the heart has not been completely eclipsed. every now and then, the heart re-emerges as the locus of life and personhood—especially at the beginning of life, and at the end—and it behooves feminists to pay attention. in these "right to life" and "right to die" cases, the heart is generally enrolled on the reactionary political side, so heart feminism cannot mean taking the heart's side. it does, however, necessitate taking the heart seriously. the political right draws on the power of the sonic effect of the heartbeat. the right does not invent that power, but it enrolls it toward particular social and political ends that are not inevitable. how does the beating heart inform how we understand aliveness and relate to each other as organisms? how might we enroll it in other modes of relationality? cardiocuriosity, or why "i heart feminism" as i come toward an end, if not quite a conclusion, i would like to underscore the value of thinking with the heart by returning to the complementarity and contrast between the cardioand the neuro-. as noted in the opening, the title of my paper hearkens to elizabeth wilson's "gut feminism" (2004a), a text that is part of her body of work about feminism and the neurological body (2004b). in wilson's important work on neurological feminism, she argues that feminists should critically engage with biology. she critiqued feminism's tendency toward astuteness about "the body" but ignorance about anatomy, arguing: "feminism's relations to biological data have tended to be skeptical or indifferent rather than speculative, engaged, fascinated, surprised, enthusiastic, amused, or astonished" (wilson, 2004a, p. 69). in the decade since the publication of "gut feminism," engagement with biological data has become more prominent in feminist theory, especially in work that considers cutting edge life sciences (such as the special issue of differences edited by roosth and schrader (2012)) and neurofeminism (bluhm, jacobson, & maibom, 2012).   i too believe that there is value in these modes of engagement, and i want to suggest that feminist neurocuriosity can be complemented by cardiocuriosity. for example, when i approach heart disease, i share wilson's interest in moving beyond soma/psyche binaries – neither soma nor psyche is prior and acting in relationship with the alien other part. wilson (2004a) convincingly argues that even sigmund freud's work posited that "hysterical paralysis" happens in the body at the same time that it happens in the psyche. on one level, feminist attention to the psycho-somatic nature of heart disease offers an interesting complement to this case, in part because of associations between heart disease and maleness (pollock, 2010; riska, 2004). and yet i also think that, more fundamentally, the heart may offer a less closed-down site for analysis of the immanence of the psyche and the soma than the brain does.  the heart and heart disease provide particularly apt venues for feminist engagement with the body in medicine because they offer opportunities to critique medicine not at its contested mental illness fringes, but at its stable somatic illness core. wilson's intervention is founded on a critique of feminists' adoption of a particular kind of freudian model that allowed "feminists to think of bodily transformation ideationally and symbolically, without reference to biological constraints" (2004a, p. 69). wilson is centrally interested in countering the notion, which she describes as dominant in feminist theorizing, that organic processes—including mental illnesses such as bulimia—are "purely ideational" (2004a). in contrast to mental illness, heart disease cannot be said to be purely ideational. mental illness is less contested now than it used to be, but it still lacks the epistemic solidity of heart disease. in contrast to psychiatric disease, critiques of medicalization of heart disease do not extend to challenging its very existence, to denying that problems with our hearts can make us sick and die. at the same time, a scan of my heart cannot mechanize my very subjectivity in the way that a scan of my brain can. for both the cardioand the neuro-, any account that separates the emotional from the machine-like will be inadequate. heart attacks due to plaque buildup in the arteries or due to stress and strain might have an analogous relationship between organic versus hysterical paralysis in wilson's analysis of freud (2004a), but without the anxiety about "is it real?" or, to be fairer to freud, who did consider the psychological to be real, without getting tripped up by the question "is it biological?" heart attacks, no matter their cause, are biological events. the undeniability of the existence of some biological reality to heart disease is one reason that thinking through the nature of the immanence of soma and psyche here can be particularly productive. where arguments about the complicatedly psycho/somatic character of psychiatric disease can be misinterpreted as suggesting their spontaneous invention or unreality, or alternatively can give the impression of a biological basis of mental states that diminishes the role of the social, heart disease can foreground embodied experience that is at once social and biological. the neurohas become a prominent way for theorists to grapple with embodiment, around which has formed a growing body of work that often interestingly inverts notions of control that have long been associated with the brain, and highlights instead distributed networks. in this paper, i have striven to eschew the tendency to debunk or celebrate scientific knowledge claims, and to see whether another organ with other ways of articulating the body can open up new insights.  heart feminism as i have articulated it here has been quite speculative. in my discussion of the heart as focal point for object-oriented feminist theorizing, i have highlighted just a few aspects of the heart: containing certain dualities— bounded and dispersed, autocratic and receptive, emotional and machine-like, and operating according to plural models—as an electrical system, as a hydraulic system, and as a vital sign. the heart provides powerful ways of understanding bodies simultaneously as somatic, symbolic, and political-economic entities. these understandings are sometimes hierarchical and even oppressive, but it behooves feminists to take the heart seriously. grappling with the heart in these ways both complements and challenges feminist analyses that draw on other ways of understanding the body. this is not an exhaustive list of characteristics of the heart, nor of how cardiologically engaged theorizing can contribute to feminist conversations. there are more opportunities here, if other feminists take up the call to think with the heart. starting with the heart, what more can be done? acknowledgements this paper benefited greatly from presentation and discussion at two venues: a panel on object oriented feminism at the society for literature, science, and the arts in 2010, and a cultural studies colloquium at the university of california at davis in 2013. thank you to the many people have provided feedback on iterations along the way: irina aristarkhova, katherine behar, ian bogost, colleen clancy, nihad farooq, stefan helmreich, david jones, nassim jafarinaimi, lauren klein, mary mcdonald, jennifer singh, and angie willey. notes 1 textbooks, such as lilly (2003), are fine points of reference. 2 hird (2009b) provides a good overview of new feminist materialisms, though i would not include haraway in the list, as she does. as anthropologists heather paxson and stefan helmreich (2014) point out, "new materialist tactics often veer toward universalizing metaphysical claims about the nature of ‘matter' as such and also, at times, take scientific truth claims about the world at face value – a move that we consider a step backward for sts" (p. 169). the universalizing tendencies of ontology and the tendency to take scientific accounts as representations of the world as it is are also a step backward for feminist theory.  3 this is a concept that i began developing in pollock (2010). 4 this is something that made this cell type particularly appealing to early tissue culture scientists seeking to understand vitality outside the organism (landecker, 2007). 5 by reading cardiophysiology and critical theory together in this section and the next, my approach resonates with what sophia roosth and astrid schrader (2012) have called "feminist theory out of science," which for them "does not imply that feminist theory emerges from science," but "rather, that the world is already theory all the way down" (pp. 1-2). my project, too, works "by holding scientific theory in tension with critical theory," "send[ing] relays between the critical and the empirical, the semiotic and the material" (roosth & schrader, 2012, p. 2).  6 consider the contrast with the pinard horn or "midwife's trumpet:" when a practitioner puts one side of this simple amplifying device on a pregnant woman's body and their own ear to the other side, the practitioner can directly both hear and feel the fetal heartbeat (kitzinger, 1997, p. 223). the pregnant woman cannot share this experience hearing and feeling of the heartbeat with a midwife's trumpet, but with ultrasound she, together with the practitioner operating the device, becomes part of the heartbeat's audience. listening by ultrasound is indirect for all concerned, and even when the media product is a sonic beat, it is not an amplification but a sonogram: whether sound or image, it is a representation made from inaudible echo. ultrasound is by definition outside the range of human hearing. its frequencies cannot be heard unless it is translated into our range, in this case through medical imaging.  7 this moment of "quickening" corresponds to the contemporary notion of feeling the baby kick for the first time – the first time that the pregnant woman can directly sense fetal movement. this moment broadly receives less focal attention today as other forms of fetal individuation precede it, but remains an important part of how pregnant women experience the individuation of the fetus. 8 here, the decision to privilege cardiovascular death over brain death palpably instantiated the denial of the woman's personhood. as a column in the new england journal of medicine noted, "many observers had a hard time escaping the conclusion that texas was using this woman's dead body as the ultimate incubator, treating her as a means to an end rather than an end in herself" (ecker, 2014, p. 890).  9 in her book private bodies, public texts, karla fc holloway writes about the case of terri schiavo, a florida woman living in a persistent vegetative state whose case became the site of a sensational legal battle between her husband and parents over what was framed as "right to die" versus "right to life." the case reached its apex in 2005 when schiavo's feeding tube was removed in accordance with her husband's wishes. 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(2004b). psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body. durham, n.c.: duke university press. bio anne pollock is an associate professor of science and technology studies in the school of literature, media, and communication at georgia tech.  her research and teaching focus on biomedicine and culture, theories of race and gender, and how science and medicine are mobilized in social justice projects.  she is the author of medicating race: heart disease and durable preoccupations with difference (duke university press, 2012), and is engaged in ongoing projects in three areas: feminist theory and the heart; american health disparities and citizenship claims; and drug discovery efforts by and for the global south (specifically south africa). zylinska image & text      the vanishing object of technology                 joanna zylinska goldsmiths, university of london j.zylinska@gold.ac.uk view the author's notes on the vanishing object of technology. bio joanna zylinska is professor of new media and communications at goldsmiths, university of london.  she is the author and editor of many books on technology, culture, art and ethics, including bioethics in the age of new media (mit press, 2009), life after new media: mediation as a vital process (mit press, 2012, with sarah kember), and minimal ethics for the anthropocene (open humanities press, 2014).  she is also a fine art photographer and a curator.  her current projects involve experimenting with the concept of ‘open curating’ via the open platform photomediations machine and writing a book on nonhuman photography. microsoft word forlano-130-1238-1.docx forlano, l. (2017). data rituals in intimate infrastructures: crip time and the disabled cyborg body as an epistemic site of feminist science catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (2), 1-28 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © laura forlano, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article data rituals in intimate infrastructures: crip time and the disabled cyborg body as an epistemic site of feminist science laura forlano illinois institute of technology lforlano@id.iit.edu abstract while much feminist science and technology studies (sts) has focused on science and laboratories as sites of critical engagement, feminism and feminist theory have recognized alternative sites of knowledge production and engagement. these alternative sites of doing science out of feminist theory can sometimes, but not always, turn inward onto a careful reflection on the lived, intimate, and personal experiences of scholars themselves. this essay draws on new materialism and on feminist theories of materiality, temporality, embodiment, and technology in order to analyze the disabled cyborg body as an epistemic site of feminist science. in particular, i analyze my own experience of adopting and using networked technologies—specifically, an insulin pump and glucose monitor—to manage type 1 diabetes and the kinds of practices that i engage in on a daily basis. these intimate human-machine relations, as well as the spatio-temporal practices that are performed along with them, deserve attention in terms of what they can teach us about common discourses around science, innovation, and infrastructure and, ultimately, about ourselves. this article introduces the concept of data rituals as a feminist data practice. data rituals include the quantitative tracking, measurement, and transmission of data 2 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) along with phenomenological lived experiences and labor around these practices. together, these practices expand notions of crip time, illustrating the ways in which the disabled cyborg body is experienced as out of sync with the normative temporal orders of everyday life. i argue that a deeper understanding of the temporal aspects of the lived experience of difference in the case of type 1 diabetes is an important example of doing science out of feminist theory. on thursday, march 30, the alarm clock on my iphone stopped working. i woke up with the sun in my eyes—piercing through the metal slats of the blinds—a few minutes after my alarm was set to ring. i was puzzled. i have been using my iphone as an alarm clock since 2007, when the phone was first released. usually it is on my nightstand but sometimes i even keep it under my pillow. i googled for a fix. i followed various recommendations from tech websites. i closed and re-opened all the apps, i restarted the phone, i tested the various features of the clock app, i upgraded to the latest operating system. nothing seemed to work. if anything, after several hours of troubleshooting, my actions seemed only to cause even more problems. after an appointment with the apple genius bar, i restored the phone from a backup. when i restarted the phone, i found that the data from a few applications had been erased. i also needed to log back into more than 240 applications; for the most part, i had forgotten my usernames and passwords. the alarm clock still did not work. the following day, the dexcom g5 mobile app, which i use to check my blood glucose in real time, began to fail. screeeeech. screeeeech. the app let out a high-pitched sound, crashed, and needed to be 3 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) reset every few minutes. this was distressing. as a type 1 diabetic, i need to check my blood sugar regularly throughout the day. introduction this article begins with a narrative about a clock and its participation in a system of technologies—the other applications, the operating system, the hardware, the satellites, the sensor embedded under my skin, and the transmitter (to name the most obvious digital and material components). the narrative is rich with the many temporalities, materialities, meanings, affects, and contingencies that are ever present in these systems as well as in my lived experience as a disabled cyborg. as such, my body is networked and dependent on a system of technologies that is fragile, vulnerable, and prone to breaking down. like the iphone nestled under my pillow, the disabled cyborg exists within, between, and out of sync with intimate infrastructures in which the world collapses onto the body and, at the same time, the body expands out into the world. from these personal narratives, we can begin to understand, in new and different ways (and in ways more faithful to feminist science), questions about data, infrastructure, and the multiple human experiences of time. the ways in which it is possible to see the self in the system (slavin, 2016). as alondra nelson (2008) writes in her ethnographic work on race and genetic testing, such scalar projects “take form at the interplay of macro-, meso-, and micro-level processes” (p. 776). as a disabled cyborg, two medical devices—the insulin pump and continuous glucose monitor (cgm)—mediate my experience of the world. one might argue that this is no different than wearing eyeglasses, a prosthetic leg, or a hearing aid. but i am a networked hybrid, wirelessly sending and receiving data through a patchwork of analog and digital objects. i cannot go more than an hour without being plugged in. i can be no more than twenty feet from the cgm receiver. such intimacies keep the system functioning, however imperfectly. when i spend too long in the bathroom—for example, when washing my face or brushing my 4 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) teeth—the cgm loses track of me. i wait fifteen minutes and it rediscovers the streams of data flowing from my body. i am not a set of parts fused together as one. rather, i am a living system in which capabilities are distributed and shared in a human-machine collaboration. these devices introduce industrial clock time to my internal biological processes and thereby mediate my social interactions as well. this lived experience allows me to challenge the binaries of nature and culture in line with much feminist science. the insulin pump regulates the amounts and times of day that insulin is circulated into my bloodstream. the cgm provides me with real-time data about my blood glucose. in the healthcare field as well as in the quantified self movement, there is much focus on the transmission, sending, receiving, and protection of data. data is tracked, measured, and transmitted in order to manage chronic disease and disability. it is used to actualize self-knowledge and safeguarded around privacy concerns. drawing on alison kafer’s notion of crip time (2013), i describe the everyday rituals that emerge when living with real-time data around sociocultural norms. this is significant because, as kafer points out, diabetes has been understudied and overlooked in disability studies and, in addition, many diabetics themselves shun the association with disability. while i have adopted the disabled identity in my previous writing on this topic (forlano, 2016), temporality is not one of the most obvious aspects of the lived experience of diabetics. in this article, building on james carey’s ritual view of communications (1988), i advance the concept of data rituals as a feminist data practice—a way of doing science out of feminist theory. data rituals operate at the intersection of qualitative, quantitative, and technocentric ways of knowing. these rituals reintroduce the lived experience of the disabled cyborg to the practice of data gathering, interpretation, and knowing. the labor of caring for and attending to data and devices as a significant part of everyday activities mediates humanmachine relations as well as social relations. exploring data rituals as feminist science complicates and critiques common techno-deterministic 5 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) promises of the control of humans and culture over (and separation from) the environment and nature, which are pervasive in studies of systems, technologies, and infrastructures. this line of reasoning opens up questions around posthuman subjectivities with respect to experiences of time. becoming as knowing differently i began this research in march 2011 but, unlike my other projects, i did not choose it. instead, it chose me. with this investigation, the site was not a scientific laboratory, a design studio, or an urban space: i conducted this research on my own body and in my own domestic space. it followed me wherever i went. i did not have any theories, notes, questions, or arguments. for many months (if not years), i wished it would just go away. march 2011 was the month i received my diagnosis: i had become [type 1] diabetic.1 the exact details of the months and years that followed were frustrating and complex. the diagnosis was alarming. i was born in a macrobiotic “study house” (some might say commune) in brookline, massachusetts. yet here i am with noticeable traces of a somewhat thorny love affair with networked medical devices written all over my body: a round, purplish bruise here; a crusty scar, still clotted with blood, there; a tube protruding from my stomach (in what i like to call a “port” in order to emphasize the cyborg qualities of this existence). nearby is a small, brick-like transmitter about half the size of a box of matches. my original excitement about writing on this topic was to expose the daily comedy around the lived experience of chronic disease and disability. after all, laughter is thought to be therapeutic. i take my own partial, situated (haraway, 1991a), and intersectional (crenshaw, 1991) perspective as a disabled cyborg body as an epistemic site. yet my first attempts to publish on this topic met with resistance. even the most experimental journals and platforms demanded that i write my body out of the narrative. feminist science studies holds space for these concerns 6 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and perspectives in ways that science turns away from and often outright rejects. according to science, this way of knowing the world differently as a mode of knowledge production is highly suspect. becoming diabetic is a way of knowing the world differently. we must know the world differently in order to design multiple possible alternative futures that advance feminist concerns around social justice. there are many temporal questions suggested by the empirical case of the disabled cyborg as a way of doing science out of feminism. click. click. click. like the clock, these questions are ticking away in the mind during the most mundane moments of everyday life. for example, what kinds of intimate relations are present in the everyday life of the disabled cyborg? how can multiple subjectivities align and realign around networked medical devices? in what ways does the disabled cyborg “keep up or fall behind” around sociocultural norms? in what ways do these spatiotemporal relations traverse different scales and lived realities (pollock & subramaniam, 2016)? how is this knowledge cooperatively and collaboratively produced—by human and nonhuman actors—in everyday interactions and practices? who might benefit if we validate these forms of knowledge? who might be left out? for me, the answers to these questions as well as the knowledge that i gain from reflection is a necessity of living-dying (to trouble the binaries and “stay with the trouble” of life itself) (haraway, 2016). cyborg intimacies science fiction films are rife with accounts of cyborgs, a term that emerged in the 1960s as a blend between cyber and organism. the oxford english dictionary defines cyborg as “a fictional or hypothetical person whose physical abilities are extended beyond normal human limitations by mechanical elements built into the body.” here, images of 7 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) humanistic robots and “supercrip” athletes come to mind. yet, while the cyborg has traveled widely in science fiction as a representational, discursive, or linguistic object, feminist scholars argue that there has been little attention to the material-semiotic realities of living as a cyborg. the embodied material-semiotic relationships were intended by haraway’s reframing of the cyborg as “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (haraway, 1991b). she describes three boundaries that are transgressed by the cyborg: human and animal, animal-human (organism) and machine, and physical and nonphysical. according to haraway: from one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a star wars apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war….from another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. the political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. (pg. 154) despite this reframing and haraway’s desire to overcome all manner of binaries, the cyborg cannot escape racialization and the associations between race, structural inequality and injustice. specifically, alexander weheliye (2014) argues that race has been overlooked in discussions of the cyborg and the posthuman in the humanities and social sciences: the volatile rapport between race and the human is defined above all by two constellations: first, there exists no portion of the modern human that is not subject to racialization, which determines the hierarchical ordering of the homo sapiens species into humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans; second, as a result, humanity has held a very different status for the traditions of 8 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the racially oppressed. (p. 8) in order to account for race in sociotechnical assemblages, weheliye introduces the notion of habeas viscus, which attends to the ways the oppressed occupy “distinct assemblages of what it means to be human in the modern world” and to the importance of miniscule movements, glimmers of hope, scraps of food, the interrupted dreams of freedom found in those spaces deemed devoid of full human life (guantanamo bay, internment camps, maximum security prisons, indian reservations, concentration camps, slave plantations, or colonial outposts, for instance)…habeas viscus, as an idea, networks bodies, forces, velocities, intensities, institutions, interests, ideologies, and desires in racializing assemblages, which are simultaneously territorializing and deterritorializing. (p. 12) weheliye does not specifically use the figure of haraway’s cyborg in his discussion; rather, he draws on rosi braidotti’s notion of the posthuman (2013). while the cyborg is a useful shorthand through which to navigate my own experience, in fact, the technologies i use do not allow me to transcend “normal” human limitations but restore abilities that i previously had. these technologies merely attempt to simulate the work that my pancreas once did on its own. while i do not explicitly address questions of race (or the racial experiences of temporality) in detail my account of the disabled cyborg, implicitly, i am speaking about my own experience as someone who “reads” as white, along with the associated privileges within a society that is infected with deep structural inequalities. at the same time, i believe that my experience of disability and difference aligns with weheliye’s critique. i acknowledge the extreme privileges that i have in reflecting on these experiences from a position of relative power, including a tenured position at a university; health insurance with a preexisting condition (at least for the time being); the finances to be able to afford the thousands of dollars for doctors’ appointments, insulin, medical supplies, and device upgrades that it costs per year to stay alive; 9 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) a committed partner who takes good care of me; an apartment located in a downtown neighborhood in chicago just five minutes’ walking distance from my endocrinologist; and a higher education that demonstrated to my doctor that i was intelligent, responsible, and well-organized enough to manage my condition independently. none of these privileges have been earned through meritocracy; they are the product of structural inequalities that illustrate the benefit of having been born white and growing up in a nice college town in upstate new york. this is very significant, since diabetes disproportionately affects people of color—especially latinx and african americans—and, furthermore, can lead to many other complications and disabilities, such as stroke, heart attack, blindness, or the amputation of a limb. with respect to race, in my previous feminist scholarship and design practice, i have attempted to hack, trouble, and question racial binaries and my own relationships to structural inequality (forlano & halpern, 2016; forlano & jungnickel, 2015). some of these realizations have come more slowly than others. elite university training fosters many interrelated cultures of oppression, based not only on race but also gender, class, ability, sexuality, and age—not to mention speciesism, the overattention to human needs and the human condition. like the words cyborg and posthuman and their critiques, the word intimate has a number of definitions that are relevant to unpacking feminist science. these include associations with related terms such as close, familiar, private, and personal (oxford english dictionary, 2017). it is also used to understand the possession of detailed or thorough knowledge. this term appears frequently in feminist technoscience with respect to its characterization of embodied, located, situated, and multiple sociotechnical and multispecies relations. in donna haraway’s latest book, staying with the trouble, she discusses the making and conjugation of kin with an example about pharmaceuticals that are used for menopause. she states: the relations of intimate [emphasis mine] care yoking together one woman and one dog rampaged virally into all sorts of publics. sheer contagion. companion species infect each other all the time. 10 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bodily ethical and political obligations are infectious, or they should be. before my dog and i could get out of the story, we were in the nonoptional company of—and accountable to—heifers in labs, beef cattle in feedlots, pregnant women in all sorts of places, daughters and sons and granddaughters and grandsons of once pregnant women, angry and well-informed women’s health movement activists, dogs with heart disease, and bevies of other spayed leaky bitches and their people in vet clinics and on beds. (haraway, 2016, chapter 5, section 4, paragraph 2) according to lucie dalibert, sts has considered the ways in which “tools and technologies shape and (re)configure our actions, intentions, and subjectivities—our lives—they have scarcely accounted for implanted technologies and their ever more intimate [emphasis mine] relations with humans” (2016, p. 2). her study of neuromodulation technologies, which are invisible implants illustrates the importance of the concept of intimacy. specifically, she writes: concerned with the ways in which technological artifacts mediate the relations between humans and their world, the concepts of script and technical mediation are silent about the ways in which these technological artifacts might transform bodies and the relations between someone and his or her body. while they enable us to apprehend how technologies affect our actions in and perceptions of the world, they tend to ignore the matter of intimate human–technology relations: bodies. (p. 9) oudshoorn (2016) draws on feminist studies to give an account of heart defibrillators and the internal forms of vulnerability experienced by hybrid bodies. she discusses the “lived intimate relationships between bodies and technologies” made up of “sensory experiences, material practices, and cartographies of power” (p. 1). these experiences of intimacy described in human-machine relations can also be extended to alternative ways of doing feminist science. for example, in the essay, “a new form of collaboration in cultural anthropology,” the matsutake worlds research group offers an 11 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) alternative mode of doing anthropology that can draw on collaboration for the purpose of understanding into account global, multisited phenomenon. unlike big science, which requires universal, standardized methods, matsutake’s approach allows the project to grow generatively, shift, and expand. the authors write: one way to plot such diversity might be to contrast big-science and intimate-authorship arrangements [emphasis mine]….in practice, a good deal of heterogeneous territory lies between big science and creative authorship. the matsutake worlds research group is an experiment in making one piece of this territory livable. (choy et al., 2009) they enact this experiment through joint fieldwork, simultaneous analysis, and collaborative writing. in my engagement with cyborg intimacies as ways of doing science out of feminist theory, i attend to the visual, temporal, and material-semiotic aspects of my lived experiences. one aspect of material-semiotics that is particularly relevant is my active participation in processes of calculation, which require access to, interpretation of, and even sharing of real-time data. quantifying multiple selves, against our will many recent empirical accounts about big data, the quantified self, and the internet of things from both academic research and the mainstream media focus primarily on the transmission, storage, and analysis of large quantities of data. with type 1 diabetes, measuring, counting, and tracking became a necessary part of everyday life. but, for me, they were not a welcome part. more recently, cultural anthropologists and qualitative researches have turned their attention to gaining a deeper understanding of the sociocultural, political and economic aspects of self-tracking and sensors (dow schüll, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; howard, 2015; neff & nafus, 2016). in order to describe the more qualitative ways these data practices are 12 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) being experienced, researchers have developed a rich language around thick data (wang, 2013), the qualified self (humphreys, forthcoming) and, lived data (kaziunas, lindtner, ackerman, & lee, 2017). here, carey’s ritual view of communication is valuable for understanding differences between the lived experiences around data (rather than merely the transmission of data). he writes: a ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension of messages in space but the maintenance of society in time (even if some find this maintenance characterized by domination and therefore illegitimate); not the act of imparting information or influence but the creation, representation, and celebration of shared even if illusory beliefs. if a transmission view of communication centers on the extension of messages across geography for purposes of control, a ritual view centers on the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality. (carey, 1988) building on this definition, i argue that data rituals allow for the creation of human and nonhuman fellowship as a feminist data practice in line with related modes of engagement such as feminist data visualization (d’ignazio & klein, 2016) and feminist human-computer interaction (bardzell, 2010). clock time and crip time in fall 2013, i opened a flat, white, rectangular box with a minimalist design, the kind that usually contains an apple device. the experience screams: “designed by apple in california. assembled in china.” it’s the embodiment of high-tech, silicon valley culture. inside was not a new iphone or a red ipod, but an upgrade for a medical device: the minimed 530g, an insulin pump produced by the medical technology company medtronic. while these technologies differ from those commonly invoked in silicon valley rhetoric and innovation discourses, they are deliberately marketed, packaged, and branded in order to fit in with other high-tech 13 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) products. as a researcher of emerging technologies, i am interested in the ways in which technological language, meanings, and metaphors— such as a particular white box and its telltale sans serif font—are translated and replicated throughout seemingly disparate realms of society. shortly after receiving the box, i received an email from medtronic’s head of customer experience: earlier today, my team received positive comments on the packaging for our new minimed 530g with enlite from a customer on twitter, “nice set with the packaging of the new pumps @mdtdiabetes! it reminded me of opening a new apple device.” this compliment came after we worked to put ourselves in the shoes of our customers and understand the overwhelming experience they had opening their first shipment from us. (j. anglin, personal communication, nov. 7, 2013). the minimed 530g—approved by the food and drug administration (fda) on september 26, 2013—is a system of technologies that includes the pump, a cgm, a glucose meter, test strips, and software. the cgm is comprised of a sensor, a transmitter, and a receiver. the glucose meter communicates wirelessly with the pump and the transmitter communicates wirelessly with the receiver. while medtronic markets its own proprietary system that includes a cgm, i use a monitor that is produced by another company, dexcom. the two proprietary systems do not interoperate, except through third-party applications that allow the uploading of data from both devices. while insulin pumps have been used to manage type 1 diabetes since the early 1980s, they often go unnoticed in everyday life; today’s models are relatively small and resemble other mobile technologies— many people do not want to call attention to their medical conditions. according to the american diabetes association, an insulin pump is: an insulin-delivering device about the size of a deck of cards that can be worn on a belt or kept in a pocket. an insulin pump connects to narrow, flexible plastic tubing that ends with a needle 14 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) inserted just under the skin. users set the pump to give a steady trickle or basal amount of insulin continuously throughout the day. pumps release bolus doses of insulin (several units at a time) at meals and at times when blood glucose is too high, based on programming done by the user. (american diabetes association, 2015) the first wearable insulin pumps—invented in 1976 by dean kamen— were very large and impractical (deka research, 2017). the minimed insulin pump is produced by medtronic, a company that was founded as a medical equipment repair shop in 1949 and soon after created the first wearable, battery-operated pacemaker. in 1979 the company began to develop plans for an insulin pump when it was learned that heart problems are linked to diabetes; in 1983, it created the first minimed pump. in the past thirty years, medtronic has made many incremental improvements to both the software and physical design of the pump. these upgrades include the ability to detach the pump from the body temporarily without having to completely change the infusion set (the tubes that connect the pump to the body). in 1999 the fda approved the first physician-use glucose monitoring system, which relies on inserting a sensor into the body (medtronic, 2015). the minimed 530g is the first insulin pump in the united states that can be called an “automatic pancreas” (also known as an “artificial pancreas” or “smart pump”). its defining feature is that it can automatically shut itself off when one of its monitored biometrics drops below a set threshold: for example, in the middle of the night. the menus—bold black lettering on a glowing green background, navigated by buttons marked with up and down arrows—seem archaic when compared to today’s interactive touch screens and voice-controlled artificial intelligence. they are reminiscent of a 1980s casio calculator watch. but the pump itself is actually a sophisticated computer that can wirelessly receive information about blood glucose from a special meter and calculate the proper amount of insulin to administer. in order to “deliver” insulin, it turns a small screw inside the device, which pushes 15 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the insulin through a long tube that has been inserted into the body. with only five buttons, it is simple enough for a diabetic of any age to use. my insulin pump is on clock time. it leaks insulin into my body at set times and in set amounts: 12 am, 3 am, 6 am, 4:30 pm. when i eat, another set of times, conversions, and amounts. when i make adjustments, another set. according to these settings, the insulin remains active in my body for precisely four hours. here are two examples of how the clock time of devices interrupts lived experience. on march 16 at 7:49 pm, my pump displayed a “low reservoir” alert. at 11 pm, when i returned home from dinner at an italian restaurant with a new writing group, i checked to find that only 2.9 units of insulin remained, which would last just over five hours, according to the pump’s settings. i decided to refill and reset the pump before i went to sleep rather than getting up in the middle of the night or very, very early. my glucose monitor, on the other hand, announces with a highpitched alert that it will need to be reset in two hours. never mind that i am teaching on wednesdays and am in the middle of a lecture in my designing futures class. i dismiss it but again, about ten minutes later, a shrill beeping sound and no way to silence it. it seems to sound louder and louder every time, unaware of its surroundings. in contrast to clock time or lived experience, according to kafer, there are several reasons for developing the notion of crip time. for example, the medical field frequently describes disability in relation to time as well as duration of symptoms. yet there are also other, more generative reasons to explore crip time in order to understand different experiences of time. this might mean expecting things to take more time due to slower physical mobility, or requiring more time on a test. kafer (2013) argues that crip time is in fact “a reorientation to time” characterized by the need for flexibility, since the speed of everyday life is determined by normative 16 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bodies. “rather than bend disabled bodies and minds to meet the clock, crip time bends the clock to meet disabled bodies and minds” (p. 45). data rituals and “fitting in with the flow of things” like crip time’s proverbial bending of the clock, data rituals envision the ways in which both medical devices and the broader society might more deliberately accommodate disabled bodies and related socio-cultural contexts. in this section, i will describe the social practices and my own lived experiences around tracking, measurement, and calculation over the past five years. during this time, i learned to manage a complex mesh of calculations, routines, and relationships that make life possible—and sometimes quite impossible. these narratives represent different phases and contexts with distinct features that configure unique temporal relations between people, technologies, and spaces. briefly, these can be characterized as: pre-insulin-pump (spring 2012 to summer 2013), pump and cgm device (fall 2013 to spring 2016) and pump and cgm iphone application (summer 2016 to present). in the pre-pump phase, it was necessary to use both a glucose meter to check my blood glucose (bg) and an insulin pen in order to administer the correct dosage at mealtime. in the pump and cgm device phase, i could check the monitor and administer the insulin via the pump. finally, in the current phase with the pump and cgm iphone application, my husband can also access the data from the cgm in real time. waiting, interruptions, delays, and cold pizza once, when dining out with a group of (newish) european friends, i waited for the food to arrive, sized it up quickly so as not to attract attention, did some calculations in my head, and rushed off to the restroom. there i tested my blood sugar with the glucose monitor. i took a small test strip out of a plastic canister and inserted it into the monitor. next, i pushed a small blue lancet into the lancing 17 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) device, replaced the cap, and pierced my left pinky. now i had the information that i needed in order to determine the correct amount of insulin to administer: my blood glucose and the amount of carbohydrates i was planning to eat. i was always good at math in high school, but i was an awful bank teller and cocktail waitress, often coming up short at the end of my shift. for me, doing calculations on the fly did not come easily. i stood in the bathroom stall, trying to balance a glucose monitor, the insulin pen, and my iphone while repeating my calculations until i was sure that i had reached the right result. then, to inject the insulin, i took the protective seal off of the needle and attached the needle to the pen. next, i took out an alcohol swab and wiped the area of my stomach where i was planning to inject the insulin. finally, i lifted my shirt while twisting the cap of the insulin pen. i returned to the table having administered what i hoped was the correct dosage. meanwhile, my friends were gritting their teeth and watching the pizza grow cold. sociocultural norms, temporal patterns, and rituals around food and eating are very specific, relational, and situated (suchman, 1987) with respect to the type of food, time of day, and context (including the diner’s gender, race, age, and class). it is difficult when one falls out of sync. in this context, prior to adopting the insulin pump and cgm, crip time refers to the slowing down, interrupting, and violating of the social norms around dining in order to accommodate processes of measurement and calculation. by abruptly leaving the table as soon as the food arrived, i had violated a social norm that indicates that when the food arrives, it is customary to begin eating together as a group, sometimes after uttering a culturally appropriate phrase such as “bon appétit.” here, data rituals are the embodied processes—inserting, pushing, holding, balancing, lifting— required to access the data, create meaning around it, and act on it in the context of eating a meal. when using medical devices such as insulin 18 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) pens, glucose meters, and lancets along with everyday digital technologies such as iphones, one is managing a complex set of interactions that are required in order to proceed with the meal. i was trying to manage these interactions accurately while feeling rushed and stressed. i wanted to complete these tasks quickly so as not to delay the meal further and attract attention. this attention to the affective state around data and calculation exemplifies how these mundane, everyday activities can be understood as feminist data practices. as ways of doing science out of feminist theory, we can develop deeper understandings of the temporal experiences of difference in order to allow for flexibility around social norms. to avoid these social interruptions, i eventually developed some shortcuts and skipped some of the doctor-recommended steps. instead, i relied on my own situated knowledge of cleanliness, safety, and risk. for example, to save time, i stopped using alcohol swabs altogether and only replaced needles once a day (rather than every time i needed to inject insulin). both steps are time-consuming and awkward. in particular, many public bathrooms are not well suited for procedures of this kind, because they are often poorly lit and lack clean flat surfaces (especially within private stalls). since these processes require so many different devices and parts, it is also not unusual to drop things onto the floor. this is especially gross in a dimly lit bar with purple mood lighting (likely to intentionally discourage needle users of another kind) or an airport bathroom. due to bad lighting, i have often stabbed myself in the finger with the needle or dropped the pink plastic cap on the grimy floor with my pants down around my knees. trying to pick up small parts while simultaneously holding my pants and not touching anything became something of an art—one for which no doctor, nurse, or medical professional ever prepared me. eventually i started doing my injections under the dining table, but this was really only possible if i was wearing a skirt. now, with the insulin pump and cgm, i can check my blood glucose on the monitor screen, glance down at my pump before i eat, 19 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and administer the correct dose of insulin without getting up from the table or managing many different devices and parts. technology “fits in” in public settings much better than needles, vials, and other medical devices. most people scarcely notice when i take out my insulin pump and begin quickly punching the buttons. in the worst case, i am mistaken for a very important doctor (which i am, but not that kind of doctor) or, even, a kind of modern steampunk luddite. some of the calculations (namely, the insulin to carbohydrate ratios) are built into the device so i only need to compute the number of carbohydrates that i am planning to eat (rather than needing to multiply them). in addition, i can manage this process more easily with only three buttons that i can press with my thumb using one hand. this is much faster, but still requires some thought and takes my gaze away from the conversation. slowing down/speeding up i chew very slowly when my blood sugar is too high. i try to delay every bite for just a few minutes. i want to give the insulin more time to kick in. this can happen when i’ve just had breakfast or, really, for any number of reasons that can cause blood sugar to spike upward: drinking coffee, exercising, coming down with a cold, being stressed, having your period. insulin works better when you allow at least fifteen minutes before eating. but, much like my slow chewing, this is a noticeable interruption in a meal. on the other hand, when my blood sugar is too low, i eat more quickly—starting with fruit or anything that is high glycemic (absorbed quickly) and high in carbohydrates. i frantically grab for orange juice, lemonade, or even, in desperation, a coke. in the worst case, i can take four orange-flavored glucose tablets, but i prefer to avoid them. i detest their chalky texture on my teeth like the interruption described in the previous section, my need to slow down or speed up based on my bg (or, even abstain from eating 20 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) completely) can sometimes feel like an awkward pause, an inconsiderate manner or an inability to “fit in” with the flow of things. when i check my bg on my monitor, i can see the speed at which it is rising or falling. if it is rising quickly, i might try to eat more slowly. as described in the narrative above, in this case, crip time denotes a slowing down of social norms around meals—for example, during a one-hour lunch meeting, if my dining companion has already finished their meal but i have only eaten a few bites. in this case, the data rituals relate to checking the data and having a sharp awareness of the speed at which i am chewing. while movements such as slow food might celebrate slowing down, these breaks in daily interactions can also signal a misunderstanding of social cues around dining. in the united states, a professional lunch meeting is often limited to an hour. the inability to eat quickly (in order to avoid an additional spike in blood glucose) can result in anxiety around not being able to keep up with professional norms. on the other hand, if my bg is falling very quickly, sometimes, i am quite fearful that it will drop much too low. i will become sweaty, uncomfortable, confused, and pale. i hope that drinking or eating something high glycemic will allow me to recover quickly enough to carry on a conversation without causing attention. whereas, in some cases, crip time can be about slowing down or needing more time, this example illustrates that it can also be applied to speeding things up. of course, if my bg does suddenly go much too low, sometimes i need to rest for a few minutes, an hour or even several hours, due to feeling exhausted by the extreme fluctuation. this results in an interruption or a need to slow down again, which unveils how crip time and data rituals are configured differently in different situations and contexts. things that go “buzz” and flash in the night in may 2016, i upgraded to the latest version of the cgm, which connects the data from the transmitter directly to an iphone application. the integration of the data into an existing device means that the data 21 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and alerts are quieter, less noticeable, and hidden. the previous cgm device had loud alarms and buzzers that would go off to signify low or high bg, low battery, sensor disconnection, and the need for sensor replacement. these alerts were particularly intrusive in public settings (faculty meetings, advising meetings, class sessions, conferences) as well as during the middle of the night. one of the more distressing features of the system is its disruption of sleep cycles. while i have always been a very good sleeper, the cgm has consistently interrupted my ability to sleep through the night (as well as my husband’s). some nights, the cgm would repeatedly go off because my “number” was too low. this happened even if it was only slightly low (or even incorrect altogether). other nights, it would go off because my bg was very, very low, prompting the need to chew glucose tablets or get up to drink juice. here is an example: the other night, i found myself standing in the kitchen drinking juice in the middle of the night in order to keep my monitor from continually beeping. it signals that my blood sugar is 52, which is very, very low. too low. “it is 4:11 am and my monitor needs juice,” i think to myself. but, i am feeling just fine. i check my blood sugar with a glucose meter to verify that it is low. at 4:30 am, it reads 65. while 65 is indeed a low reading, there are other times in which the application might signal a low bg but, when i test with a meter, my actual bg is twenty to sixty points higher; there had been no need for the device to wake me up in the middle of the night. on other nights, the cgm alerts me that my “number” is too high—–usually after heavier meals eaten late at night or meals that combine a lot of protein or fat with a lot of carbohydrates or sugar—meaning that i need to administer additional insulin via the pump while squinting, bleary-eyed, at the glowing green screen. sometimes the cgm wakes my husband but not me, and he crawls out of bed to pour me half a cup of orange juice. the iphone application version of the cgm allows more customization of the loudness, type of alert, and frequency of alert. while 22 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) there are still some annoying features—like the fact that it makes a faint buzzing sound (rather than merely flashing an image of a drop of blood as in the previous version)2 if you do not input new bg data every twelve hours—it fades into the background more easily. it limits the number of devices i need to carry around and calls less attention to my disability. here, crip time is about sleepless nights and the data rituals around attending to the maintenance, repair, and care of the devices (forlano, 2017). it is about a temporality that considers the calibration of internal processes with machine processes. rather than clock time or lived time, the data creates a liminal time that mediates bodies, data, and technologies in the middle of the night.3 with frequent sleep interruptions, i find myself irritable and have difficulty concentrating the following day. love notes made of (blood) sugar a final temporal feature of the cgm iphone application version worth discussing is the availability of real-time data sharing. while the previous device was typically in my control—for example, in my purse or pocket— now my husband can check the application on his phone. when my bg is too low, it affects my mood and my ability to get through everyday tasks and situations, such as walking quickly down the street in a hurry to get somewhere, doing household chores, exercising, or working. my husband’s access to the data allows him to participate more actively in the practice of care (mol, 2008). for example, soon after we started using this feature, he spontaneously texted me with the following note: “bg holding @ 134.” i was sitting nearby reading, in the same room, but this act of care was about much more than the transmission of data or information. similarly, sometimes on a busy day when my husband cannot reach me by phone, he can check the application and “see” one measure of how i am doing. he might text me to let me know that he is checking. in this example, crip time can be shared time: the creation of empathy, community and care through data rituals of a partner, friend, or 23 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) family member checking in on a loved one. in this case, rather than an isolating disjuncture in everyday life, crip time can be a way of creating a shared experience or worlding (haraway, 2011) together. in addition, data-sharing practices distribute the invisible labor of constantly checking bg. while the sharing feature could be viewed as an attempt to control or surveil the day-to-day life of a diabetic—for example, scolding a person for eating something that might have caused blood sugar to rise too quickly—in my experience, it is more of a demonstration of everyday care. conclusion this article argues that lived experience of type 1 diabetes—partial, situated, and embodied —can be understood as a feminist data practice. specifically, this article expands on the notion of crip time in order to understand four different ways time is experienced around data practices: slowing down, speeding up, liminal time, and sharing time. i introduce the concept of data rituals to describe how the transmission of data is not (or not only) all that is required to engage in everyday activities such as eating, sleeping, and being in the world. instead, i describe the day-today rituals required to participate in social norms, care for oneself, rest and recuperate, and even maintain relationships with loved ones. this subtle awareness of the temporal constraints and affordances of disability allows for the rethinking of existing categories, a way of doing science out of feminist theory. in writing this, i have expanded my own understandings of the experience of difference—but, after nearly two months, i still have not been able to fix the alarm clock on my iphone. notes 1 in fact, my original diagnosis was type 2. it was not until july 2012— nearly eighteen months later—that i received the type 1 diagnosis. 24 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 2 this feature has been fixed in the latest version. now, rather than buzzing, it merely lights up the screen every few minutes with an alert. while less intrusive, sometimes the screen itself is enough to wake me in a dark room. 3 before using the cgm, i often woke up in the middle of the night alone, drenched in sweat, and too weak to get out of bed for juice. when bg is too low or too high, diabetics face a risk of coma. for nearly two years, i went to sleep just hoping that i would wake up in the morning. references american diabetes association. (2015). how do insulin pumps work? arlington, va: american diabetes association. retrieved from http://www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/treatment-andcare/medication/insulin/how-do-insulin-pumps-work.html. bardzell, s. (2010). feminist hci: taking stock and outlining an agenda for design. paper presented at the proceedings of the sigchi conference on human factors in computing systems, atlanta, ga. braidotti, r. (2013). the posthuman. boston, ma: polity. carey, j.w. (1988). communication as culture: essays on media and society. new york, ny: unwin hyman, inc. choy, t.k, faier, l., hathaway, m.j., inoue, m., satsuka, s., & tsing, a. (2009). a new form of collaboration in cultural anthropology: matsutake worlds. american ethnologist, 36(2), 380–403. crenshaw, k. (1991). mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. stanford law review, 43(6), 1241–1299. 25 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) d’ignazio, c., & klein, l.f. (2016). feminist data visualization. paper presented at the vis4dh: 2016 workshop on visualization for the digital humanities, baltimore, md. dalibert, l. (2016). living with spinal cord stimulation: doing embodiment and incorporation. science, technology, & human values, 41(4), 635– 659. deka research. (2017). about us. manchester, nh: deka research. retrieved from http://www.dekaresearch.com/about-deka/. dow schüll, n. (2016a). data for life: wearable technology and the design of self-care. biosocieties, 11(3), 317-333. dow schüll, n. (2016b). sensor technology and the time-series self. continent, 5(1), 24–29. ——— (2017). our metrics, ourselves. public books, http://www.publicbooks.org/our-metrics-ourselves/. forlano, l. (2017). maintaining, repairing and caring for the multiple subject. continent, 6(1), 30–35. forlano, l. (2016). hacking the feminist disabled body. journal of peer production, 8, http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-8-feminism-andunhacking/peer-reviewed-papers/hacking-the-feminist-disabled-body/. forlano, l., & halpern, m. (2016). reimagining work: entanglements and frictions around future of work narratives. fibreculture, 26, 32-59. forlano, l., & jungnickel, k. (2015). hacking binaries/hacking hybrids: understanding the black/white binary as a socio-technical practice. ada, 26 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 6, http://adanewmedia.org/2015/01/issue6-forlano-jungnickel/. haraway, d.j. (2016). staying with the trouble: making kin in the chthulucene. durham, nc: duke university press. ——— (2011). sf: science fiction, speculative fabulation, string figures, so far. ada, 3, http://adanewmedia.org/2013/11/issue3-haraway/. ——— (1991a). simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature. new york, ny: routledge. ——— (1991b). a cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and socialistfeminism in the late twentieth century. in simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature (pp. 149–181). new york: routledge. howard, p.n. (2015). pax technica: how the internet of things may set us free or lock us up. new haven, ct: yale university press. humphreys, l. (in press). the qualified self: social media and the cataloguing of everyday life. cambridge, ma: mit press. kafer, a. (2013). feminist, queer, crip. bloomington, in: indiana university press. kaziunas, e., lindtner, s., ackerman, m.s., & lee, j.m. (2017). lived data: tinkering with bodies, code and care work. human–computer interaction, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370024.2017.1307749. medtronic. (2015). innovation milestones. dublin, ireland: medtronic. retrieved from: http://www.medtronicdiabetes.net/about-medtronicinnovation/milestone-timeline. mol, a. (2008). the logic of care: health and the problem of patient 27 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) choice. new york, ny: routledge. neff, g., & nafus, d. (2016). self-tracking. cambridge, ma: mit press. nelson, a. (2008). bio science: genetic genealogy testing and the pursuit of african ancestry. social studies of science, 38(5), pp. 759–783. oudshoorn, n. (2016). the vulnerability of cyborgs: the case of icd shocks. science, technology, & human values, 41(5), 767–792. oxford dictionaries. (2017). intimate. oxford english dictionary. retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intimate pollock, a., & subramaniam, b.. (2016). resisting power, retooling justice: promises of feminist postcolonial technosciences. science, technology & human values, 41(6), 1-16. slavin, k. (2016). design as participation. journal of design and science, 1(1), https://www.pubpub.org/pub/design-as-participation?context=jods. suchman, l. (1987). plans and situated actions. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. wang, t. (2013). big data needs thick data. ethnography matters, 13, http://ethnographymatters.net/blog/2013/05/13/big-data-needs-thickdata/. weheliye, a.g. (2014). habeas viscus: racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human. durham, nc: duke university press. 28 forlano catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bio laura forlano is a social scientist and design researcher. she is an associate professor of design at the institute of design and affiliated faculty in the college of architecture at the illinois institute of technology, where she is director of the critical futures lab. her research is focused on the intersection between design and emerging technologies, material practices and the future of cities. she is co-editor with marcus foth, christine satchell and martin gibbs of from social butterfly to engaged citizen (mit press 2011). she received her ph.d. in communications from columbia university. andrews   article    black feminism’s minor empiricism: hurston, combahee, and the experience of evidence     lindsey andrews duke university lindsey.andrews@duke.edu as a major result of the historical realities which brought us enslaved to this continent, we have been kept separated in every way possible from organized intellectual work. [...] what our multilayered oppression does not explain are the ways in which we have created and maintained our own intellectual traditions as black women, without either the recognition or support of white-male society." -gloria t. hull and barbara smith, all of the women are white, all of the blacks are men, but some of us are brave: black women's studies "we smile and we tell [our questioner something that satisfies the white person because, knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing. [...] the negro offers a feather-bed resistance. that is, we let the probe enter but it never comes out. it gets smothered under a lot of laughter and pleasantries." -zora neale hurston, zora neale hurston: folklore, memoirs, and other writings when zora neale hurston completed her first ethnography, mules and men, it did not look much like the work of franz boas's other students. although boas famously made cultural rather than biological (racial) difference the analytic focus of anthropology, he nevertheless wanted to understand culture scientifically. throughout the first half of the twentieth century, as an idea of "science" as methodical and objective gained cultural cachet, the social sciences increasingly modeled themselves on the procedures and values of the natural sciences.1  boas advocated this scientific turn for anthropology, developing an empirical approach to ethnographic inquiry grounded in the same "dispassionate" standpoint imagined to govern natural science inquiry.2 his most famous student, margaret mead, evinced the anthropological goal of disinterested empiricism when she described her first book, coming of age in samoa, as a "human experiment," conducted in the "controlled conditions" of "primitive culture," modeled after and comparable to a laboratory experiment (1928/2001, p. 7). in mules and men, hurston made no such claims. her standpoint was undeniably passionate, her ethnography overtly interested. while the question of a feminist standpoint, particularly a black feminist standpoint, would not become central to academic debate until almost half a century later, hurston's ethnographic work was inconsonant with dominant white and masculinist scientific and social scientific epistemologies of the mid-twentieth century. as part of her anthropological training at barnard college in the 1930s, hurston (1935/1995) returned to her hometown of eatonville, florida, to collect the negro folklore that had given her a "love of talk and song" (p. 13). mules and men documents over seventy examples of stories about brer rabbit and john henry, gator and god, as well as accounts of numerous hoodoo rituals. in the text, hurston described herself as looking through "the spy-glass of anthropology" (p. 9), but she did not observe at a remove. throughout, hurston emphasized her shared blackness with the community she studied, marking a difference from other anthropologists in the boasian tradition, even feminists such as margaret mead. where mead's work was full of explanations about comparative adolescent development and meanings of social practices, hurston's early work largely avoided causal explanations or political imperatives. instead of "objectively" imparting cultural "information" and "facts" to her reader, hurston used vernacular black english as the language of both the tales and her own writing in order to recount her decidedly sexed experience of folk-telling and listening. there existed few retrospective conclusions in her text; instead, the performance and reproduction of experience were primary, and knowledge was not the result of accumulated evidence, but embodied in experience itself, constantly (re)produced. perhaps for these reasons, as well as the general exclusion of black women from dominant scientific and social scientific practices until late in the century, hurston's ethnographic work is rarely cited for its contributions to empirical method or scientific epistemologies, and is instead most often taken up for its literary and historical significance.3 even though she did not directly call for a black feminist empiricism, hurston developed an approach that countered dominant, exoticizing, and primitivizing anthropological practices of her moment. almost fifty years later, concurrent with hurston's rediscovery by second wave black feminists, the first book dedicated exclusively to black women's studies was published. it explicitly articulated the urgent need for such an approach in order to refute the racialized and gendered manifestations of dominant social science knowledge in social and legal policy. the essay collection, titled all of the women are white, all of the blacks are men, but some of us are brave: black women's studies (1982), both made a claim for the importance of hurston's contributions to black feminist thought and also imagined a reconfigured social science practice that centralized the experiences of black women.4 but despite this simultaneity, the more than forty mentions of hurston—a number greater than any other single figure in the text—still refer primarily to her 1937 novel, their eyes were watching god.  even among black feminists of that generation, hurston's contributions to empiricist methodologies remained tacit. both hurston's rediscovery and the publication of but some of us are brave were the result of black feminist literary investments. shortly after alice walker helped bring hurston back to cultural prominence,5 the combahee river collective, a group of self-identified black lesbian feminists, made publishing black women's writing a central focus of their study group, which operated from 1974-1980 (harris, 2009; norman, 2007). the collective's "black feminist statement," first published in zillah eisenstein's (1978) capitalist patriarchy and the case for socialist feminism, was republished in the collection, and one of the statement's primary authors, barbara smith, served as an editor of the book. for the next thirty years, the statement stood as a foundational articulation of black feminism. in it, the collective detailed their development from an ad hoc political group for black women dissatisfied with existing organizations into a study group focused on analyzing the specific life conditions of black lesbians operating at the juncture of "interlocking" systems of race, gender, class, and sexual oppression (combahee, 1982). the statement offered the first use of the term "identity politics," and also laid the theoretical ground for both the analytic of "intersectionality" and a specifically black feminist standpoint, which would become two signal and entangled contributions of black feminism to feminist epistemology and social science practice, altering the terrain of feminist standpoint theory through an intersectional imperative.6 despite this, combahee's statement, like hurston's work, has been considered almost exclusively outside the purview of scientific epistemology, understood primarily instead as a political document. this elision is somewhat surprising considering that combahee's statement helped pave the way for black feminism's contributions to feminist standpoint theories, which have been crucial for revising and expanding methods in both the sciences and social sciences, demonstrating how those fields remain inextricable from politics. several scholars have noted combahee's direct engagement with scientific themes—including their critique of the legacies of biological determinism and their activism against technoscientific innovations that pathologized and circumscribed the lives of women of color.7 yet, combahee's account of experience as epistemological, as itself a form of empiricist thought, has not been considered in critical relation to the evidentiary demands of contemporary knowledge-production in the sciences and social sciences. in what follows, however, i argue that combahee and hurston challenged the epistemological structure of dominant (white, masculinist) science by deploying not only a distinctive black feminist standpoint, but also an alternative empiricism grounded in the aesthetic values inhered in the lived experience of blackness and femininity. they developed what i call a "minor empiricism," which rejects the "positivism" that elizabeth grosz (1993) has derisively described as the approach of contemporary social sciences, a positivism characterized by datafication, information production, and technicality. a number of minor empiricisms emerged over the course of the twentieth century to contest dominant scientific assumptions and practices.8 although minor empiricisms, like empiricism more generally, produce knowledge from the senses, they do not take the organization of the senses, and especially the privileging of vision, as given for converting perception to knowledge. nor do they assume the value-neutrality of machine mediation and quantification.9 minor empiricisms, instead, reflexively constitute or reorganize the senses as they experience sensation. in using the term "minor" to denote these epistemologies, i follow the lead of contemporary scholars interested in the intersections of race, aesthetics, and epistemology, such as josé muñoz (1999) and fred moten (2003), who draw on philosophers gilles deleuze and felix guattari's (1986) concept of the "minor" as an aesthetic mode with epistemological and aesthetic force. according to deleuze, minor literature is tasked with using a "bastard language" to produce a "minor people, eternally minor, taken up on the task of becoming-revolutionary" (deleuze, 1998, p. 5). the "eternal" temporality of the minor—a non-teleological temporality in which the experience of minority is perpetuated rather than resolving into a major form—suggests that minor experience functions rather than explains; it "matters" (in physical and epistemological senses) in excess of isolatable (taxonomic, quantifiable) meaning. attention to the experience of the literary composition of a minor language—an experience found in both writing and reading—gives one way of making links among a submerged genealogy of minor empiricisms, and in particular, black feminist empiricism. feminist anthropologist kamala visweswaran (1994) initiated consideration of the relationships between the literary and the scientific in hurston's work, arguing that hurston's blurring of the fictional and the ethnographic, as well as the autobiographical and the novelistic, served as an early feminist intervention in the increasingly scientized field of anthropology, offering "an implicit critique of positivist assumptions" (p. 23).10 rather than focusing on the fictive and representational aspects of hurston's work, however, i argue that by bringing hurston into conversation with combahee, we can see the ways in which the particular stylistic and compositional features of black feminism's minor empiricism offer an alternative empiricist epistemology. focusing on literary composition, rather than representation, highlights the ways in which these thinkers have been able to reject the temporality of science that stills the object of inquiry through vision and fixes it in time through taxonomy and teleological developmental narratives. by deploying black english and what combahee (1978/1982) calls "black women's style" as the formal grounds for their empiricism, these thinkers brought to science what moten (2003) has called "the aesthetics of the black radical tradition." these aesthetics emerge from black culture to produce "blackness" as an "ongoing performance" characterized by an "improvisational immanence...a disruptive surprise" that is always material and epistemological, requiring a revision of the values through which we live and think (p. 163, 210). participating in this often unseen tradition, hurston and combahee took blackness itself (in multiple valences, physical and cultural) as an epistemological virtue, and mobilized aesthetic values such as opacity, indiscernibility, improvisation, and flux in order to compose an alternative scientific legacy that does not primarily value experience retrospectively as the "evidence" of/for knowledge and expertise, but instead values it as the ongoing condition of thought, as immanent, performative, embodied knowledge. in what follows, i trace the ways in which hurston's and combahee's thought critiqued the value of positivist empirical evidence and in doing so composed an alternative science. i first outline the role of minor empiricisms in intervening against twentieth-century positivism as well as the specific role of black feminism's minor empiricism in relation to feminist scientific interventions. i then explore how attention to literary history, narrative temporality, and linguistic epistemology—especially with regards to hurston's black vernacular novel, their eyes were watching god—helps to clarify the values underpinning the seemingly illegible history of an alternative empiricism deployed through black english and what combahee called "black women's style." building on this performative aesthetic understanding of empiricism, i show how black feminist empiricism is especially useful for understanding the problematic interface between science and law—often negotiated through social science analyses—that has tended to circumscribe and pathologize the lives of black women. finally, i highlight how understanding both the literary and the empiricist as modes of temporal composition enables us to see one of black feminism's most crucial scientific interventions: imagining a scientific temporality immanent to experience. thus, we can see how black feminism has developed, through literary performance, new empiricist methods and possibilities for the study and production of social life. the rise of positivism and feminist interventions the twentieth-century dominance of positivist scientific values and their application in the social sciences was not the predetermined effect of empiricism's philosophical emergence. despite early twentieth-century anti-positivist movements, by the mid-twentieth century, positivist empiricism was firmly established as the epistemological underpinning for most institutional science.  positivism's institutional entrenchment can be attributed to the early twentieth-century rise of scientific technicality, expertise culture, and the pedagogical popularization of the idea of a "method" shared by all the sciences (porter, 2009; rudolph, 2005). even though natural and physical scientists rejected the applicability of the so-called "scientific method" (invented by john dewey) to their laboratory practices, the professional publications of science began to demand organization that resembled exactly what harvard scientists, describing mid-century science education in 1946, derisively called the "tabular progression" of the "scientific method," which was often at odds with more ad hoc research practices (as cited in porter, 2009, p. 341). as the social sciences aspired to the authority of scientific "expertise," they based their data collection and analytic practices on the highly quantitative and machine-mediated models employed for natural and physical science research, deploying those methods as evidence of their "objectivity": code for both technicality and value neutrality (porter, 2009, p. 305). in short, they evinced a positivist approach to the sciences of social life. this conception also began to pervade the legal sphere, as technically mediated and quantified "empirical evidence" increasingly became the primary form of juridical evidence.11 the imposition of "value neutral" knowledge—which is to say, largely white and masculinist science—on all aspects of social life often had pernicious effects on the lives of women and people of color, especially at the intersection of those identities. women of color in particular bore the brunt of the legal and policy spheres' dependence on positivist empiricism. they often constituted the objects of biomedically justified research and punishments (involving, for example, sterilization), and were the primary sources of support for communities targeted by highly technical and often race-based forensic techniques and discriminatory social policies.12 this paper reads hurston's and combahee's work as evidence of a twentieth-century minor empiricism that refused the conversion of experience into "knowledge" understood as "information." in addition to rethinking the positivist legacy of science, this reading also has important implications for contemporary feminist theory, and in particular its rethinking of science. standpoint theory, as the primary ground of feminist scientific interventions, has taken disciplinary science and social science, especially at their intersection with law and policy, as vital political battlegrounds in need of epistemological correctives. as sandra harding (2004a) notes, "standpoint theory challenged the assumption [... that] politics can only obstruct and damage the production of scientific knowledge" (p. 1). instead, through the creative "confla[tion] of fields standardly kept distinct," it demonstrated that "mainstream, purportedly only descriptive and explanatory, theories about science [were] also—perhaps always—normative" (p. 3, 2). in harding's account, however, the primary function of standpoint has been dialectical: "remed[ying...] the inadequate philosophies of science, epistemologies, and methodologies justifying and guiding mainstream research" (p. 6) while aspiring to incorporation within them. for example, she argues that one of the contributions of feminist standpoint has been to correct and augment the existing epistemic virtue of "objectivity" by producing a "strong objectivity" that takes into account multiple perspectives from which socially-determined observations are made, thus allowing alternative (feminist) knowledges to contribute to scientific knowledge.13 this conception of feminist standpoint has often privileged the value of knowledge (an end retrospectively produced from experience) over the immanent value of the experience of embodiment itself. in the last decade, new material feminisms on the whole left behind standpoint concerns as a legacy of a postmodern discursive turn that spoke about bodies without attending to material embodiment (alaimo & heckman, 2008, p. 3). black feminism, which offered some of the most important contributions to standpoint theory, largely dropped out of the purview of contemporary feminist science studies, and identity experience as the grounds for knowledge about both discourse and power took a back seat to material agency and the "matter of matter" itself (alaimo & heckman, 2008, p. 5). the matter of matter itself, however, is precisely the concern of black feminism's minor empiricism. by refusing an "informational" model of knowledge, and thereby refuting the possibility (or desirability) of "transferring" experiential knowledge, combahee and hurston developed a form of study invested in the continued embodiment of experiential thought (the materiality of both individual and collective thought) in excess of cognition and signification, a performative empiricism that is especially difficult to incorporate back into traditional scientific epistemologies. indeed, hurston and combahee composed their minor empiricism, often invisibly or illegibly, both within and across the margins of disciplinary sites. importantly, rather than revising or correcting dominant scientific epistemology, black feminism's minor empiricism as practiced by hurston and combahee has largely resisted the compulsion to make black women's knowledge transparent or legible. its opacity and indiscernibility have often been its condition of possibility. empiricism, femininity, and black language: black women's style in taking themselves as simultaneously an object and subject of knowledge—reflexively analyzing the construction of their perceptions as they perceived—hurston and combahee produced a form of immanent, ongoing study that does not comport itself to traditional demands for separation between observer and observed or the retrospective construction of facts. their empiricism was therefore comprised of and invested in alternative scientific values such as opacity, indiscernibility, improvisation, and subjectivity. these values were generally anathema to enlightenment scientific thought but, as both daphne brooks (2006) and britt rusert (2012) have noted, they characterized the nineteenth-century history of black women's engagement with both science in particular and knowledge projects more generally. drawing on brooks's conceptual apparatus, rusert argues that, in a context in which us science was virtually inextricable from performance (with both scientific demonstrations and experiments often deployed on stage), "spectacular opacity" (brooks, 2006) allowed black women performers to "refuse racial science's attempts to make race fully transparent—and knowable," thereby disrupting dominant (scientific) ideas about race (rusert, 2012, p. 295). disruption through spectacular opacity was particularly important for "black women, who were subjected to harsher regimes of visibility and exploitation on transatlantic stages" (rusert, 2012, p. 295). not only have these values been disruptive of dominant knowledge practices, however; they have also been productive of new compositional possibilities, serving throughout the twentieth century as the aesthetic foundation for black feminism's minor empiricism, which thrived on its illegibility to dominant science. the critique of science as an aesthetic task has a long history, one that is prevalent not only in the performance histories outlined by brooks and rusert, but also in black literary traditions.  throughout the first half of the century, hurston joined a number of black writers and thinkers such as w.e.b. du bois, alain locke, and nella larson, who sought to disavow the powerful indictments of blackness implicit in the new sciences.14 as with the feminist standpoint theorists mentioned above, however, the majority of these black intellectuals primarily aimed to correct errors in the application of scientific methods (an ongoing project of black studies more generally, and especially its current emphasis on social science). but hurston's, and later combahee's, approach was less straightforwardly confrontational or ameliorative. far from "correcting" the empirical approaches of medical and social sciences, hurston capitalized on the imagined transparency and facticity of empiricism to produce an anthropology of "lies," the value of which lay not in the "truth" coded beneath them, but in the connective surface of their ongoing performance. although mules and men provides an extended account (and performance) of hurston's empiricist practice, turning to the more narrative structure of her novel helps to expose the method she otherwise seemed to hide—perhaps strategically—in her science. hurston's use of opacity—which, in the opening epigraph to this article, she described as the "feather bed resistance" of the negro—as well as the general lack of conclusions or "facts" throughout her work make it difficult to understand or even see her empiricism, especially in a contemporary context that values empirical data in the form of what porter (2009) calls "thin description" (a practice in which data is imagined to be transparent, allowing it to bypass interpretation and emerge uncritically as "fact") (p. 308). however, her 1937 novel, their eyes were watching god, clarifies something of her empiricist practice, enacting standpoint knowledge's capacity to "conflate fields standardly kept distinct" (harding, 2004a). peppered with the folktales that also pervade her anthropology, hurston's novel offers a third-person, black vernacular account of the life of janie crawford. told from janie to her friend phoeby—as though anticipating combahee's affirmation of the forms of thought found in "black women's style of talking/testifying in black english"—the novel describes janie's negotiation of the post-slavery era, passing from adolescence through two oppressive and socially-prescriptive marriages, and finally embarking on an unorthodox relationship with the much younger drifter, teacake, with whom she leaves the black town of eatonville to work side-by-side in the "muck" of the everglades. invoking the genre of the bildungsroman, early in the novel janie enters into both sexuality and what she calls her "conscious life," a moment which highlights the distinctive aspects of feminine embodiment as janie inquires about her experience of sensation in order to make sense of her own experience. hurston (1937/2006) writes: it had called her to come and gaze on a mystery. from barren brown stems to glistening leaf-buds [...] to snowy virginity of bloom. it stirred her tremendously. [...] what? how? why? this singing she heard [...] connected itself with other vaguely felt matters that had struck her outside observation and buried themselves in her flesh. now they emerged and quested about her consciousness. [she gazed] up and down the road. looking, waiting, breathing short with impatience. waiting for the world to be made.  (p. 11) although the scene appears as a moment of transition characteristic of the literary genre of the bildungsroman, it also links hurston to a history of empiricism. here, the strange sensuality of sexual awakening—the mystery of feeling—induces synaesthesia: a disorganization and reorientation of the sensorium. as janie is "stirred," her senses are stirred and mixed. singing resounds somewhere other than her ears; smell and touch, breath and caress are simultaneously activated. she is connected to "vaguely felt matters," the sensation of impressions of which she has yet to make sense, which "struck her outside observation," not brought to vision, instead "buried [...] in her flesh." she irrupts with half-formed questions—what? how? why?—questions in search of their objects. and the occasion of world-making for which she waits becomes an occasion for making the world, organizing her perceptions anew—in her first moments of "consciousness." this description of janie's emergence into reflexive self-inquiry enacts an ongoing struggle that is central to a submerged strain of empiricism, returning to it an anoriginal and philosophical indetermination of the senses, found not only in the work of empiricism's nominal founder, hume, but also in the irruptions of minor empiricisms that both precede him and follow in his wake—thus disrupting a linear narrative of empiricism's development. that is to say, the experimenter's reflexive inquiry into his/her own mind—questions about how he/she makes sense of sensation—have characterized multiple strains of minor empiricism that contest dominant, positivist empiricism. as hurston's novel shows, however, these empiricisms do not necessarily bring us closer to a totalizing scientific vision (or a unified, complete science); instead, they are iterative emergences of reflexive self-study specific to the subjectivities they constitute while simultaneously being constituted. as part of this genealogy of minor empiricism, hurston and combahee—affected as they were by the positivist empiricism that characterized twentieth-century science—offer an immanent (and often invisible) critique, from the grounds of empiricism itself. this minor empiricism does not end with surety about what constitutes data or about the utility, let alone possibility, of quantification. instead, empiricism appears as the immanent study of the experience of sensation; it is an attempt in the midst of sensing to understand how the mind makes sense of sensation. . . and, as deleuze (1953/1991) observed of hume's empiricism, how the senses constitute subjectivity. crucially, hurston's description affirms the value of belief in the world and its capacity to be composed. minor empiricism, then, far from discovering a given world, is first and foremost creative. through hurston, black feminism's minor empiricism highlights the experience of sensation as an occasion already engaged in sense-making, producing immanent knowledge in the phenomenological composition of sensational experience that is neither passive nor given, but instead always produced—performed—in concert with the world that touches back as it is touched. black feminism's minor empiricism, then, offers a particularly feminine emphasis on sensational embodiment as a performative form of thought and consciousness that augments du bois's understanding of black "double consciousness" as a psychic phenomenon. black feminism's minor empiricism is shaped not only by the specificity of the female body (as both harding and grosz have attributed to feminist science more generally),15 but it is also formed by the embodied deployment of an epistemology that inheres in "black women's style of talking/testifying in black english" (combahee, 1978/1982, p. 17).  according to poet june jordan (1988), a contemporary of combahee's, the epistemology of black english derives from "a distinctive black value system" (p. 191), perpetuated in the very syntax of language, and necessitated by conditions of black life in the us. black english emerged to counter the material reality of the "constant[...] threat of annihilation" inflicted on black life. it therefore "abhors abstraction" because it is "a system constructed by people constantly needing to insist that we exist" (jordan, 1988, p. 191). in her essay, "nobody mean more to me than you, and the future life of willie jordan," jordan (1988) goes on to detail the ontological assumptions that guide the construction of black english, which she and students in her english class, most of whom were black, discovered through the collective study of hurston's work. they came to understand that black english was characterized by "the presence of life, voice, and clarity," and therefore assumed "the living and active participation of at least two human beings, the speaker and the listener" (jordan, 1988, p. 191). as she explained it, this means "there is no passive voice construction possible in black english. [...] for example, you cannot say ‘black english is being eliminated.' you must say, instead, ‘white people eliminating black english'" (jordan, 1988, p. 191). against standard english, the onto-epistemology of black english operates in ways conducive to the reality and perpetuation of black life in the us. illegible experience: resistance to evidence when jordan and her students wrote letters to local newspapers in black english to protest ongoing police violence against black men in their community, the newspapers declined to print them—thus evincing the epistemological difference between black english and standard english. in advance, jordan and her students recognized that black english would make their letters illegible and illegitimate for a publication intended to distill and transmit information. the brutal incompatibility between the epistemologically-specific empiricist community jordan and her students formed in their self-study of black english and the larger structures of information dissemination found in the newspapers threatened to devalue black knowledge precisely at its interface with dominant knowledge. but, as jordan affirmed, the value of her students' endeavor was immanent to their shared act of study as a mode of community formation, a valuation that resonates with the value systems described and performed by both hurston and combahee. understanding scientific virtues as aesthetic values, magnified through attention to the literary, allows us to trace the counter-history of black feminist empiricism that operates by way of an insistent opacity, and for which the condition of possibility is precisely its ongoing illegibility as science, its eternal minority.16 hortense spillers's essay, "mama's baby, papa's maybe: an american grammar book," raised this incompatibility as a central problem that has threatened black women's thought and existence, from the first moments of african colonization to the present, precisely at this interface. as she described it, the scientific invention of ethnicity that stilled and codified blackness as race, as well as the trans-atlantic slave trade it helped justify, led to the historical loss of language and of gender differentiation for black people in the u.s. as a result, black women have been plagued by an ongoing, overdetermined, externally imposed nominalism (a litany of often pejorative names and types), codified at the intersections of science, law, and economy, and at odds with their ontological existence (spillers, 1987). however, the interstices between racial classification grids and fluid life, between black women's typology and their existence, continually evinced a disconnect between representation and ontology, thus calling for an alternative onto-epistemology, such as the one produced through black feminism's minor empiricism. combahee's statement operated at the problematic interface historicized by spillers and encountered by jordan and her students: between autonomous, uncodified knowledge and the brutal reality of violence engendered by dominant knowledges and the latter's social institutions that necessitated such illegible knowledge in the first place. combahee was acutely aware of the imbrications of science and law, and in particular the ways they impinged on the lives of women of color. although the group included several practicing social scientists (for example, beverly smith was a professor of women's health), their relationship to social scientific evidence and medical interventions in the legal system varied on a case-by-case basis. combahee (1978/1982) clearly reject "biological determinism" in their statement (p. 17), list "sterilization and abortion rights campaigns" as among the activities in which they participated, and protested with regards to at least three high-profile court cases that mobilized medical, scientific, or technoscientific interventions (p. 20-21). far from uncritical supporters of social science, they saw it as a tool—never value-neutral—that could be wielded in multiple ways and for multiple agendas.17 they therefore protested against the use of an "insanity" defense in the case of inez garcia, which pathologized female victimhood as insanity, while supporting the use of "scientific jury selection" to gain favorable trial conditions for joan little, who had killed her rapist, and backing the release of kenneth edelin, a black doctor imprisoned for conducting legal abortions (p. 20). in each instance, combahee did not express faith in the legal system to bring women of color to justice; instead, they found it necessary to fight on behalf of women whose experiences had been put on trial. they could not and did not defer to the accuracy of scientific knowledge as given in positivist representation; instead they made use of the interstices between ontology and dominant epistemologies and institutions, mobilizing seemingly representational practices (such as science writing and their own writing) to create performative spaces of study and community formation. this has been an ongoing challenge for black feminist knowledges, as they move from what bell hooks (1984/2000) has described as their autonomous origins on the social "margin" to the "center," in order to intercede against policies, legal decisions, and institutional practices that were often backed by the kinds of positivist social science described above, and appearing in forms such as the moynihan report. in this light, it has been necessary for black women to harness the cultural power of dominant social science practices while offering correctives to its methodological and taxonomic assumptions—a problematic urgently detailed by patricia bell scott in but some of us are brave.18  building on these second wave black feminist articulations, the most prominent black feminist response in the later part of the twentieth century was the development of intersectionality theory by legal theorists such as kimberle crenshaw (1989, 1991) and patricia hill collins (1990/2000), which was subsequently taken up by the social sciences. from the moment that intersectionality theory proposed a turn to the empirical study of black women's experience, the question of experience and its evidentiary value emerged as a vexed question for feminist researchers across disciplines.19  combahee's statement, however, seemed to also offer a different path, one already trod by hurston in her re-linking of subjective experience and empiricism.  as hazel carby (1991) notes, hurston's work does not operate within given representational frameworks; it instead "rewrite[s] the geographical boundaries of representation" (p. 126).  this places her work squarely within an alternative genealogy of black feminist geography, one in which black women's bodies traverse what katherine mckittrick (2006) has called "demonic"— shifting or undetermined—ground. in hurston's novel, this shifting ground makes black women's submission to law, with law's imagined external and objective viewpoint assumed to engender justice through empiricism, an often dangerous endeavor. indeed, the concern with legal evidence—which in the twentieth century began to depend on similar values evinced by the dominant idea of science—was of central concern to hurston. as hurston's janie reminds us, for black women, being compelled to make evidence of one's experience, compelled to comport one's self to the legal apparatus, has often meant being exposed to the violence of a judgment that never brings justice. while living in the everglades, janie and teacake are caught in the apocalyptic terror of a hurricane. when a rabid dog bites teacake, negligent governmental intervention, which focuses on white survivors, leaves him unable to get the serum that will treat him. here, janie and teacake embody a blackness already abandoned, dispossessed by the promise of the civic medical establishment. as teacake goes mad, janie is forced to kill her greatest love in self-defense. her experience is then put on trial. in the context of a novel in which janie repeatedly rejects models for appropriate black female adulthood, and moreover, rejects the compulsive desirability of civil society by leaving eatonville for the muck, janie's legal subjection takes on a spectacularly and excruciatingly violent force. she is denied what she calls "de poor man's trial" of community mourning and is instead subjected to a sham white judicial system that papers over its own racist culpability through its pronouncements of judgment (hurston, 1937/2006, p. 314). in some ways it might seem that janie is better off being judged by the "disinterested" judge and jury—especially as the black community is none too kind to her in the moment. but where the community operates through altered and continually mutating social relations (often motivated by economic disparity), the judicial system instead proposes to make medico-scientific disparity the individual fault of janie. it is precisely the law's "disinterest" in her personal life that makes it capable of pronouncing judgment while invisibilizing the structures of abandonment that forced her into personal crisis.    in this scene, where janie's experience is submitted for evaluation to an all white male jury, for whom she will always be more and less than legible, hurston makes visible the unfulfillable promise of law. put another way, the trial can never be a site of justice for janie because the jury's hermeneutic practice is inevitably disconnected from the vernacular text of her experience, which, composed in an incommensurable language, cannot be made into a text for them. but, as rizvana bradley (2013) emphasizes, before and beyond law's "violation" of janie and teacake's "vernacular space" there is also "the fashioning of a common project, or simply a commons, possibilized under the rubric of care, concern, devotion, and interest." linking the "commonness" of their country speech to common or shared life makes sensible the value not of objectivity but of interest that both precedes and exceeds the invocation of judgment. for janie and teacake, inhabiting the marginal or minor is preferable to interpolation in majority social structures, which would write over their vernacular values and common life.   identity politics and the time of empiricism literary modes and improvisational composition enable not only further perpetuation of the ontologically shifting and epistemologically strategic geographical terrain of black womanhood. they also make possible the alternative temporality mobilized for black feminist empiricism. through formal strategies of composition and recomposition, hurston and combahee demonstrate the inextricability of the aesthetic from the empirical, thus reconfiguring the time of science through the autonomous production of new value systems, and wresting empiricism from the violent grip of twentieth-century positivism and deploying it in the revolutionary construction of collective life. they revalue sensorial and embodied experience—how we come to know the world through our senses, aesthesis—as an ongoing process of reflexive study. in doing so, black feminist empiricism appears as a performative—experimental—site of collective study in which blackness, femininity, and queerness are not intersecting coordinates of oppression to be mapped and analyzed, but additive aesthetic strategies of composition and creation. for combahee, literary-compositional modes enabled them to improvise on science writing by mobilizing multiple, seemingly non-scientific forms in order to resist the particular evidentiary demands of positivist science and social science. the statement was modeled after social science reportage while drastically altering its content. their sections therefore resembled the function of traditional social science organization (offering a literature review, for example, or outlining the problems addressed by research), while emphasizing the importance of "belief" and their own position as both the subject and object of study. they therefore referenced the social science model while rejecting the conventions of science writing that retrospectively constructs the time of research as teleological by composing reports that erase the messiness of research in order to present positive results.20 where conventional science writing assumes an always-already given existence of ontological reality that can appear as "fact," in contrast, combahee refused the conventions of twentieth-century scientific practices that demand the separation of subject and object or developmental progress. focusing on combahee's temporal intervention helps us to understand the concept of "identity" at issue between the body and the flesh, between subjugating taxonomy and productive possibility. combahee's statement included the first use of the term "identity politics," which, contrary to popular understandings of the term, entailed not a solidification of competing identities, but a disidentification from any singular or authentic identity position (murphy, 2012). this allowed them to produce the multiple coalitions necessary as part of what they called their "whole life situation" (combahee 1978/1982, p. 14). in this sense, while "politics" named the play of competing interests that result from divisions enforced by multiple systems of oppression, including racism, sexism, and capitalism, it also named an entire field of existing and possible social relations. identity politics offered a way of expanding the field of the social through meaningful and shared struggle, which "sprang from the shared belief that black women are inherently valuable" (p. 13), even against a legacy of their scientific objectification and legal erasure. belief, rather than "knowledge," not only gave force to their political commitments, but also served as the grounds for their study. combahee write, "we are committed to a continual examination of our politics as they develop through criticism and self-criticism as an essential aspect of our practice. [...we] are ready for the lifetime of work and struggle before us" (p. 13-14). study, internal accountability, and projects focused on eliminating their own oppression—"as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression"—were central to their political project. through self-study of their own forms of organization—study of how they make sense of experience—they emerge in both their speech and their writing as a "we."21  combahee's statement, then, became a performative site, enacting the production of not merely individual value and subjectivity, but also collective subjectivity. in this way, they imagined a non-teleological relationship to collective time, which is both actualized in the duration of activist tasks and also endured as an ongoing, never-ending revolutionary practice. in order to understand the value of an autonomously produced and personally-grounded science, rather than one that seeks its force through "education" and epistemological unification, it is helpful to pay attention to combahee's description of their self-formation. over several years time, the group shifted, becoming increasingly interested in class analysis and simultaneously struggling over internal differences with regards to sexuality and class. finally, in 1976, they write, "those of us who were still meeting had determined the need to do political work and to move beyond consciousness-raising and serving exclusively as an emotional support group. [. . . ] we decided at that time [. . . ] to become a study group" (p. 12, emphasis mine). the establishment of a collective organized around study—around the value of being a student rather than an expert—is a break not only from leftists groups whose goals were to eliminate false consciousness through education in proper ideology, but also from the value systems that organized time in ways that valorize the events of life as a means to an ending, to the production of history and knowledge. decidedly, the ongoing event of continuous struggle was the durational occasion for combahee's self-production. they suggested that their position at "the bottom" of the social hierarchy disenabled access to the procedures of civic reform—especially those to be found in science and law—because those procedures would require them to accept a progressive narrative of modernity that positioned them against the world, requiring them to therefore "fight the world." for them, "fighting the world" was undesirable, although they acknowledged that it is perhaps "realistic" rather than "pessimistic" (combahee, 1978/1982, p. 12). more hopefully, and more importantly, they claimed that their position at the bottom enabled the thought of an alternative not limited to reform; it allowed them "to make a clear leap into revolutionary action." but revolutionary action here did not indicate a (singular, temporally contained) revolution to be won; rather, combahee saw their "revolutionary task" as engaging in a "lifetime of work." revolution is a lifetime practice that includes not only their own lifetimes, but also the "countless" (both infinite and uncountable) "generations" of women that preceded and followed them, including a legacy of black women thinker-activists with which they see themselves participating, such as harriet tubman, ida b. wells, and their contemporary, angela davis (combahee, 1978/1982, p. 14). rather then fighting the world, combahee materialized a genealogy of black women as an eternal and resistant flux of flesh, an ongoing flow with which they connect. combahee's insistence on the value of belief, the value of belief in their own value, inaugurated their radical epistemological revision, and connects them to an eternal history of black female resistance: "there have always been black women activists," they write (combahee, 1978/1982, p. 14). and because revolution is an enduring event, they invent revolutionary time as immanent to the materiality of the revolution, one that continues on in the ongoing constitution of a "we" who studies—including those who study combahee's writing. in this way, the performative act of collective reading becomes an empirical practice that can produce a people, a collective. but that performative is also always made possible in performance, and performance indicates a style. the actual manifestation of the collective act of study, for combahee, materializes in "black women's style of talking/testifying in black language about what we have experienced" (p. 13). the aesthetics of epistemology take form as style, in the ways in which black women "talk/testify" to each other, constructing their "own intellectual traditions as black women" (hull and smith, 1982). crucially, combahee insist on the importance of this style and of black language, while keeping both opaque, largely hidden from view of the reader. the document, written in standard english, insists on the value of black english without making it transparent, while improvising on the formal strategies of science and mobilizing the honest trickery—the visible truth of the surface of folkloric "lies"— found in hurston's work. identity politics and the time of empiricism that hurston's anthropological work is most often read as part of literary rather than scientific history points to the opacity of black women's style, but also hints at its possibilities engendered through such opacity. putting hurston in conversation with combahee's much later interventions, we might, through hurston's work, take stock of the value of black women's style of talking/testifying in english, a value that highlights the interplay between scientific and literary temporality. indeed, it is precisely through attention to the literary reconfiguration of time in both combahee's and hurston's work that "minor" becomes a useful alternative to "identity." this is especially true when thinking of hurston's invocation of the bildungsroman—a genre concerned with ending minority and entering into majority—in order to historicize the use of "minority" in terms of age, which has served as a means for pathologizing multiple iterations of identity. in franco moretti's (1987) by now traditional account, the bildungsroman takes youth as its central theme, and coming-of-age through education is its central mode for producing a dialectical resolution of life experiences, culminating in autonomous individuality or proper socialization. bildung is the story of the protagonist's leaving behind minority and entering into majority, into proper citizen-subjectivity. it imagines both the inevitability and desirability of coming into majority, which the early twentieth-century science of the new psychology would suggest to be a "natural" fact of development and thus enable scientific pathologization of extended minority. holly brewer (2007) traced the longer history of the denigration of minority, showing that in the rigid paternalism of anglo-american culture in the seventeenth century, the minor child was considered irrational and therefore not capable of participating in democracy or political decision-making. the same rhetoric was repeatedly applied to other "minor" groups—based on race or sex—as a justification for patriarchal and colonial control. the collective irrationality of minority was then frequently and conveniently "proven" through sciences, including anthropology, anthropometry, and craniology. from our twentieth-first century vantage, it becomes easy to see the "interest" or invested values that governed the eighteenthand nineteenth-century iterations of those sciences, allowing us to dismiss them as "pseudoscience." but it would be a mistake to imagine that a truly "objective" or "value-neutral" science is possible. . . and, more importantly, as combahee and hurston show us, it would be a mistake to imagine that such an "objective" science would be desirable. in this light, we might think of hurston's novel—and janie's rejection of given models for adulthood—as something like an anti-bildungsroman that also rejects the related scientific values of development, objectivity (externality/value neutrality), and majority; hurston rejects the drudgery of a compulsive adulthood that would compel her and her characters to submit to citizen-subjecthood while never being allowed full access. her critiques of science along with combahee's are grounded in revealing the consistent interests of science that are not their interests. indeed, they show that the invention of the concept of "value-neutral science" is not an inevitable outgrowth of the progress of empiricist methodology, but is instead a concept mobilized precisely in the interested denigration of minority and the enforcement of social division. and it is from these grounds, then, that we can understand the intervention that hurston's anthropology makes. mules and men is valuable in hurston's valuation of her own interest—as a participant observer studying the very town in which she grew up—and in her refusal to capitulate that experience to the demands of evidence. hurston wrote mules and men in a fledgling moment of american anthropology, and so was able to invent a science that neither depended on the stilling of evidence into fact, nor the value of an external observer to judge and evaluate meaning. her science therefore put her vernacular sensibility in the service of an affirmation of the autonomous and immanent value of experience. in her ethnography, hurston places her own experience of, and pleasure in, collecting that evidence on center stage. mules and men is a playful recounting of "negro folklore," which she points out is composed through a tactic of excess and evasion, a "feather bed resistance" against the white gaze (hurston, 1935/1995, p. 10). often seeming to be mere nonsense or whimsy to a white listener, negro folklore communicates and makes community with other black folks through meaning that rides on the excess of these tales and the shared experience of the pleasure of telling. although hurston reveals that negro folklore is tactical, her main goal in writing is not to unmask the hidden meaning of the tales, stilling them through a hermeneutic enterprise. instead, she asserts their value as is: "they are a lot more valuable than you think," she writes. "we want to set them down before it's too late" (p. 14). mules and men becomes an occasion for repeating the experience of vernacular telling and listening as radical acts of community formation, which hurston would also deploy in public performances of folktales, folk songs, and several plays.22 hurston's refusal to make meaning in the collection resonates with her novel's refusal of the values of bildung. the main section of mules and men—the recounting of folklore—ends somewhat arbitrarily with a brief account of a fight she herself is involved in, leading her to skip town, rather than with any closing meditation on what she had learned. it then reopens with a completely different topic, hoodoo, which she is hurrying to new orleans to study due to lack of funds. the arbitrary first ending gives way, then, to another double ending of the hoodoo section: first she kills a cat in a hoodoo ceremony, and then she awakens as a cat.  through this doubling or tripling of endings, which never resolve into fact, mules and men celebrates the impropriety of the minor—it ends with the scientist as a cat!—as a means of rejecting both the value of the coming into majority in the bildungsroman or of making meaning and garnering of bourgeois respectability in the sciences. impropriety and performance and a performative act are hurston's empirical interventions. the final ending of mules and men acts as something of an allegory about the joy of deception and the strategic post-facto construction of respectability following indulgence. hurston writes: sis cat was mighty hungry, but she hate for de rat to think she ain't got no manners, so she went to de water and washed her face and hands and when she got back de rat was gone. [when the next rat she caught] askes "where's yo' manners at, sis cat?" [she] tol' ‘im, "oh, ah got plenty manners, but ah eats mah dinner and washes mah face and uses mah manners afterwards.  i'm sittin' here like sis cat, washing my face and usin' my manners. (p. 112) in the end, hurston reveals that her ethnography of lies is itself a lie, but it is not deceptive because it gives false information, so much as it simply does not lend itself to the usual scientific results of information or meaning-making at all. coda taken in light of june jordan's essay, in which her students chose the obstinate and opaque value of black english as a form of shared thought and solidarity against dominant and politically expedient modes, we might see that hurston's refusal to make too concrete a "meaning" or conclusion out of the endless retelling of black folklore—told between slices of gingercake and the labor-performance of toe parties—speaks back to what was happening with janie in the courtroom. the tales are iterations of each other, actualized for particular moments. although one can take them more generally as evidence of the persistence of black life made available through a kind of coded telling, that code does not break down in a one-to-one correspondence with informational meaning or discrete sensory data.  where standard english comports itself to positivist empiricism's evidentiary demands, in hurston's minor empiricism, composed in black english in black women's style, neither quantification nor datafication accounts for experience. the tales do not "end" in order to be interpreted for a closed meaning, nor do they comport themselves to the burden of hermeneutic "evidence." instead they proliferate in their own composition, decomposition, and recomposition, making use of the material they can loosen up enough to construct in new ways. we see then that janie's life experience cannot be read as evidence of a particular juridical meaning by the white male judge and jury, not only because it is composed of a language they do not read, but more specifically, because the epistemology that found that language is always-already resistant to the abstraction of "meaning" that could be imagined to matter more than matter itself. and combahee's statement, too, speaks to the value of the immanent study of experience as a particularly black feminist practice. hurston's work, janie's life, and combahee's collective study compose new perceptions and impressions from the disorganized, non-quantifiable experience of sensation and sense-making, over and against any evidentiary function that would close them off in the service of "fact." notes 1 see grosz (1993) on the social science's positivism as a result of its aspiration to "a natural science model of knowledge" (p. 192), as well as porter (2009) on the rise of "expertise" culture, in which twentieth-century us social scientists took up the mantle of "science" to make claims to "objectivity," "detached from the rhetorical fray of ideology and politics" (p. 306). 2 see a. kroeber (1949), in which kroeber, one of boas's students, outlined the principles of boasian empirical anthropology. 3 one notable exception is visweswaran (1994). 4 see section three: dispelling the myths: black women and the social sciences. 5 see walker (1983), which describes walker's attempts to recover hurston's legacy, as well as hurston (1979), a collection of hurston's writing edited by walker and published shortly before but some of us are brave. 6 see p. h. collins (1990/2000; 2004) for a discussion of the role of intersectionality in black feminist standpoint. 7 see, for example, murphy (2012) on combahee's role in reproductive justice struggles. 8 most notably, william james's "radical empiricism."  see james (1909/1995). 9 perhaps most famously, at the turn of the twentieth-century, as part of his "radical empiricism," william james (1890) suggested that we might understand the "unclassified residuum"—or experiences that were sensed while seeming to be extra-sensorial—as important sites for revising and producing human knowledge. 10 carby (1991) also suggests that hurston's work contributes to the imperialist project of early twentieth-century us anthropology. to my mind, this is perhaps more true of hurston's later anthropological tracts, which tend to come to more numerous (and more moralizing) anthropological conclusions. 11 see keenan and weizman (2012) and "part ii: irreductions" in latour (1993) on the use of technoscience forensics in legal decision-making. 12 see washington (2006). 13 in their account of the historical emergence of the scientific concept of "objectivity," daston and galison (2007) describe epistemic virtues as the values that guide scientific thought; "objectivity" is the exemplar virtue. 14 for example, see ahad (2010) for black modernist critiques of psychiatry.  see ellison (1964/1995) and ellison (1952/1994) for an example of blacks' mid-century critiques of sociology, in particular as it emerged out of burgess and park (1921). 15 see pages 202-205 in grosz (1993). 16 in feminist theory: from margin to center (1984/2000) and "choosing the margin as a space of radical openness" (2004), bell hooks (2004) articulates the desirability of continuing to occupy a marginal subject position as a space from which to develop standpoint knowledge; hurston's and combahee's thought suggests that such marginality is desirable not only for the subjects of knowledge, but also for epistemology itself. 17 kenneth edelin, a black obstetrician, had been arrested and convicted in 1973 after performing a legal abortion. his case was later overturned (edelin, 2007). joan little, who was black, was put on trial in 1974 for killing a white prison guard who had raped her. following the invention of "scientific jury selection" just two years earlier, her defense team employed it in her trial to have her case moved from the rural county of beaufort, where polled residents had exhibited racist attitudes, to the state capitol of raleigh (abramson, 2000). inez garcia was a latina woman who also killed her rapist. after an unsuccessful insanity/diminished capacity defense, she was later exonerated by way of a self-defense (salter, 1976). 18 see p. b. scott (1982) on the importance of revising social science practice for black women. 19 see k. crenshaw (1989, 1991) and j. w. scott (1988) on the evidentiary function of experience. 20 see latour and woolgar (1986) on the ways in which scientific fact production elides its own construction through inscription and publication practices. on the controversy surrounding the publication of almost exclusively positive results, see ioannidis (2006) and collins (2014) among others. 21 see norman (2007) on combahee's use of "we" as an ongoing performative act. 22 see brooks (2010). references abramson, j. 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(2006). medical apartheid: the dark history of medical experimentation on black americans from colonial times to the present. new york, ny: doubleday. bio lindsey andrews is a visiting scholar of english in the center for interdisciplinary studies in science and cultural theory at duke university.  she received her ph.d. in english and certificate in feminist studies from duke university in 2013.  she is currently at work on a manuscript entitled "experimental subjects: minor empiricisms and the aesthetics of science." in it, she draws on black and queer aesthetic and political theory to investigate the shared epistemological problems confronted by non-normative experimentation in science and literature in the united states in the 20th century. microsoft word lab meeting-schrader and johnson.docx schrader, a. and johnson, e. (2017). considering killability: experiments in unsettling life and death. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2) 1-15 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © astrid schrader and elizabeth johnson, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license lab meeting considering killability: experiments in unsettling life and death curated by astrid schrader and elizabeth johnson henry buller university of exeter h.buller@exeter.ac.uk elizabeth r. johnson hobart and william smith colleges ejohnson@hws.edu deborah robinson plymouth university deborah.robinson@plymouth.ac.uk simon rundle plymouth university s.rundle@plymouth.ac.uk dorion sagan gradientor@yahoo.com 2 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) susanne schmitt ludwig-maximilians university info@movingnaturalhistorymuseums.com astrid schrader university of exeter a.schrader@exeter.ac.uk john spicer plymouth university j.i.spicer@plymouth.ac.uk in february of 2015 we held a workshop at the university of exeter with the goal of creating a conversation among marine biologists, social scientist, and artists around the relationship between life and death. as sts scholars, we had both worked on the study of marine invertebrates [astrid has written on algae blooms (schrader 2012) and elizabeth has worked with scientists researching jellyfish (johnson 2016)]. we found ourselves similarly interested in how these organisms trouble conventional narratives of life and its linear progression into death. together with the scientists and other scholars at our workshop, we struggled to articulate the patterns of life and death witnessed in marine invertebrates. in the scientific literature, these narratives conformed to human experience and expectations. jellyfish with cyclical life patterns became “immortal” the mass death of microbial colonies is labeled “suicide” (schrader forthcoming). the workshop introduced us to other narratives of life and death that in addition to the im/mortality of invertebrates included the killability of farm animals, life and death on display in an aquarium exhibits, and life after death in human burials. our discussions from the workshop sought to express the relationships between life and death in less anthropocentric terms, but attended to the entanglements of human and animals agencies in the laboratory and in artistic practice. continuing that conversation, we 3 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) prompted our workshop participant to articulate the relationships between life and death of their research subjects in relationship to what donna haraway has called their “killability.” morally distinct from killing-which, according to haraway, is an integral part of life--killability pertains to the categorization of nonhuman animals in such a way that makes their killing automatically permissible. this is in contrast to what haraway would call taking responsibility for necessary killing. for example laboratory mice and livestock are killable while, for many in the west, dogs and cats are not. the resulting reflections take insights from feminism (haraway’s in this case) to re-articulate scientific practices, reversing the more common traffic between feminism and science that take scientific contributions as a resource for feminist theory. thinking with this notion of killability allows for a more reflective account of laboratory practices, calling on our participants to articulate their own response-ability in relation to their research subjects. with this in mind, we asked our participants: what are we to make of “killability” with regards to organisms whose deaths are not so easily pinpointed? how do we make sense of our relationship to the deaths not of individuals, but masses, such as populations of phytoplankton? and what are we to make of the deaths that have already passed, whose killings either haunt or animate our present? what might come to matter if our attention shifts from killability to the circulation of many forms of death and dying? the contributions problematize the categorization of animals as killable as a solely human activity based on an easy distinguishability of life and death. not all animals can be killed with the same ease as john spicer points out; other lives i.e. that of livestock are dependent on their very killablity. in both of these cases human capacities to categorize have been limited. in other cases their killabilty changes with the setting, so-called justifiable sacrifices in the laboratory become matters of concern in museum settings for the same kinds of animals. simon rundle considers how our responsibility to the world seems 4 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) to necessitate the killing of animals as a means of developing knowledge about the effects of ecological degradation. rundle’s research subjects snail embryos to different conditions of life to test the viability of development amid conditions that humans have imposed. reporting on the ‘hidden effects’ of anthropogenic environmental changes on life stages before birth in snails as model species, he reflects on the lack of responsibility for killing in his own laboratory practice. in this way, he is making visible not only what needs special cameras and microscopes but also a different mode of attention in the laboratory, namely that killing comes with an obligation to respond (see haraway 2008, 80). why are we reluctant to reveal how we make use of these organisms and render some automatically killable, he asks. visual artist deborah robinson further explores the theme of making visible in relation to killability. robinson uses rundle’s work to create “the sensation of being connected to” the world. but, as she writes, the techniques of seeing that she and rundle both use simultaneously engender a sense of intimacy with and distance from their nonhuman subjects of art and research. rather than highlighting the hidden effects of anthropogenic pollution on snail embryo development, robinson pays attention to the disappeared human subject. her visualizations allow for embodied seeing, a becoming present through looking; however as rundle notes, knowledge of embryo deaths is often deferred--realized only through a viewing of recordings weeks later. susanne schmitt draws our attention to the management and making of the undead. schmitt provides us with a sense of the choreography of death that accompanies attempts to represent the living through the dead. in making forms of life more visible through taxonomy, the lively processes that take place on bodies post-mortem must be managed and mitigated through the active killing of bacteria and insects. john spicer opens his account with the paradox of loving and killing that are threaded through each of these texts. being response-able to the earth’s other organisms seems, for spicer, to necessitate knowing 5 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) through killing. but he also provides us with organisms to think with that, while killable in haraway’s sense, are not actually killable. the jellyfish, flatworms, and sponges that make up his research are often either indifferent to our (violent) manipulations or, like the flatworms, respond by producing an excess of life. henry buller contribution seems to challenge the ethical grounds of haraway’s important distinction between killing and making killable. what’s left of life when you are born killable? in the case of farm animals, produced for consumption, it is no longer clear “whether their killing [is] an act of ending or of beginning,” like the immortal jellyfish, livestock does not seem to be allowed to die. their liminal existence reminds us of the ethical importance of letting live responsibly. dorion sagan challenges the anthropocentrism and zoocentrism of killability. drawing on research on pre-animal life forms (bacteria and protoctists) and some animals, sagan suggests there may be killability before death. killability under a microscope and under wraps simon rundle, school of marine science and engineering, plymouth university, plymouth, uk predicting the biological effects of the anthropocene is now a pressing research agenda. hence, many environmental scientists are carrying out laboratory experiments that investigate how ‘model’ species respond when subjected to increased levels of environmental stressors such as hypoxia or warming, either alone or in combination. these experiments often, and perhaps inevitably, involve killing animals – in fact the terms lethal and sub-lethal for categorising responses juxtapose the use of death versus a change in physiology as endpoints for gauging effects and predicting sensitivity. my research focuses on the ‘hidden’ effects of the anthropocene – those 6 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) that affect early life stages of aquatic invertebrates. these effects of environmental stressors such as warmer temperatures, ‘dead zones’ that lack oxygen and pollutants on embryos have typically been ignored by biologists who efforts are usually focused on later life stages, which are usually larger and more conspicuous; the killability of fully-grown animals is more obvious compared with that of embryos that can only be viewed using high power microscopy. responses of microscopic embryos are often captured first as video and then revealed later – their deaths—and corresponding killability--may be unnoticed for several weeks, remaining stored digitally on hard drives to be examined, measured and analysed at a later date. my interdisciplinary collaborations with artists and social scientists have allowed me to think more deeply about my relationship with the animals on which i work. the bio-imaging technology that has been developed in my laboratory serves to magnify and accentuate the process of development – it brings researchers closer to the tiny embryos that they use for observation. the resulting video recordings have been displayed in several different contexts: art galleries, museums, conferences, web sites. they have also been transposed into sound and displayed as immersive art installations. so far, the videos chosen for display are for healthy embryos. these celebrate the coming into being of life, the ontogeny of the snails which are the objects of scientific investigation – from single cells, through organogenesis to fully functional juveniles. we have not displayed the videos that depict dying and malformed embryos; these have been kept ‘under wraps’. why are we reluctant to reveal how we make use of these organisms’ killability? will the public be hostile to the idea of killing animals to understand their sensitivity – even within the context of protecting the planet from the anthropocene? the process of decontexturalisation of animals used in research was also part of an installation ‘wandering snail’ at the fields exhibition and art+communication festival (riga, 2014). live snails from the laboratory were transported to a gallery. some of these animals died in captivity, 7 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) revealing their killability within a public space rather than the laboratory. visual processes, empathy and the experimental animal deborah robinson, school of art, design, and architecture, university of plymouth, uk killability can be facilitated by rendering an animal invisible, in some sense choosing to overlook the visceral/material/living presence of the animal in the laboratory. slipping instead into an action associated with research function. i think that an awareness of the part of the self that is brought into being whilst looking outwards is important – we can shift our looking to simultaneously looking outwards and inwards, or at least shifting between modes. as an artist my training taught me to move beyond a differentiation between background/foreground relationships thus not focusing on the object primarily (ie the model as in taught in traditional life class drawing exercises, and not without its own problems) and so i take an interest in how processes of visual engagement are constituted when i work in laboratories. for example, a long term interest in ‘embodied seeing’ that originated for me with ideas found in irigaray’s late writings. i am also interested in how we become present to the experience of looking. becoming present to looking means not screening out my own body, nor negating the deeper sensory atmosphere within which the ‘research object’ is integrated. sometimes, whilst in the field, this broader object of which i and my cross disciplinary researchers are a part, is amplified. the scientific goal of looking in the laboratory context enables focus on a discreet area/function within a snail and this (necessarily?) will also operate as a filter that screens out the sensation of being connected to, and a part of the vitality of life. this filtering enables killing for research purposes. research carried out by simon’s group using highly sophisticated imaging technology depicts the high level of questing, a 8 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) kind of quivering hunger for life, within the development of the snail embryo. the lenses and technology that reveal this vitality of life also serve to distance the observer and this is a problem i currently identify within my research through practice. looking back, i can see that formative in my practice and thinking was an experience when i first worked in a laboratory where fish were used in pigment cell experimentation. i was invited to pop a fish out of its embryo sack (a very delicate operation) and to view this under the microscope. after doing this i was told that, to be in line with lab ethics, i needed to kill the baby fish. the phd student made me very aware of the killing as a ritual: i was required to put the fish into a glass container, and then administer an overdose of anaesthetic. i actually found this experience quite profound, resting as it did in the peculiar intimacy of visual scrutiny under the microscope followed by killing as an affect on both organism and self. the phd student told me he had never lost his sense of feeling--of respect and closeness to the organism--when in engaged in everyday lab actions, that he tried to bring the newness of experience to each encounter whilst experimenting. i wonder if this is describable as intra-action where ethical thinking can take place (barad 2007). taxidermy specimens never really stop dying – or living susanne schmitt, rachel carson center for environment and society, ludwig-maximilians university, germany much care goes into the process of keeping other forms of life, usually insect and microbial life, at bay, away from them. within the framework of our project how to not be a stuffed animal, choreographer and dancer laurie young and i discover the lives and deaths of taxidermy animals in museums of natural history across the globe and translate our findings into choreographic, participatory audiowalks. today’s shared fieldwork introduced us to the central storage for 9 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) museum objects of the city of freiburg. it is a large, state of the art complex in the industrial outskirts that has been constructed to guarantee two things: that nothing is stolen, and that nothing is rotting. to guard against the latter, we wear blue disposable plastic shoebooties. todays’ experimental task consists of exploring smell across the taxidermy storage rooms. smells of old wood, fur, animal glands become present once we have attuned to being guided by our noses. the air is cold, and the whole building is painted bright white and in a very light grey. this is, of course, so that no bug may escape the scrutiny of the staff’s gaze. a bug here would be a catastrophe for the collection, at least from humancentred view. the building is cold to slow down potential organic processes. its breathing, beating heart is a large nitrogen chamber, the closed off and deadly quarantine unit. museum specimens (momentarily including a row of galliformes for the taxidermy collection) stay in quarantine here for months to ensure no trace of outside life travels along to the inside. taxidermy captures organisms, mostly birds and mammals, in the moment. killable insect and microbial life is kept at bay so taxidermy animals can animate our present. during the preparation process, the muscular body with all its intestines is discharged, all traces of grease carefully removed, the remaining skin carefully washed and mounted on a handmade mannequin according to the desired shape. life, now, becomes a question of lifelike movement. in the diorama, the taxidermy animals are shown as if the nitrogen chamber had never happened: stretching, patiently waiting, sniffing, climbing and presented as charged with happy affects (ahmed 2010). the exhibition space itself again entangles different histories of killability, even if taxidermy animals that carry them moved through the nitrogen chamber together: some animals are rarer than others, some bred for human consumption, some utterly protected by international conventions. 10 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) waiting for podo john spicer, school of marine science and engineering, university of plymouth, uk those, like myself, who love marine life and are also interested in how marine animals work (their physiology) have long grappled with the paradox that is killability. often to investigate physiology one has to use invasive techniques or even sacrifice animals, to obtain measurements, but at the same time it is the love for, and fascination with, these creatures that drives the investigation. many of the techniques i use now are non-invasive. but i still have to remove animals from their natural habitat and expose them to different environmental conditions (albeit non-lethal) so the paradox, while not so stark, still exists. this paradox is complicated by the fact that the lives and deaths of what many would consider the most ‘primitive’ marine animals, the sponges, the jellyfish, the flatworms – major players in making marine ecosystems work, but barely thought of as animals by the general public (ie no backbone) – are so ‘other’. ‘cut me do i not bleed’ is far removed from a flatworm which receiving six cuts to the head will produce six new heads, or a sea anemone which will divide, or produce buds, to create another sea anemone, or a sponge which even after being sieved can reconstitute themselves into a viable animal. and indeed ‘death’ for the immortal jellyfish is an ‘accident’ or a predation event – there is no ‘natural’ end to the life ‘cycle’. more common jellyfish species have the ability to enter a dormant state, a time of suspended animation. their life cycles often involve starting off as a polyp, a miniature sea anemone like form, stuck to a solid surface on or near the sea bottom. when the conditions are right they bud off lots of, what looks like, tiny little dinner plates that grow into adult jellyfish. but if the conditions are not right they can stay as polyps for many months and under extreme conditions they can encyst, become podocysts, which can stay in that dormant state for many tens of years. in our lab at the moment ‘waiting for podo’--and even knowing whether or not your immortal or long-lived species is alive at any 11 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) particular time-is intellectually challenging as much as it is frustrating. these are fascinating research subjects that may outlive the researcher. exuent or, when killability defines a life henry buller, department of geography, university of exeter, uk mourning his slain daughter cordelia, king lear asks: ‘why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life, and thou no breath at all?’ (lear, v, iii). only the companion animal, the functional animal and the nuisance animal, each, along with the food animal, is killable. “thou shall’t not kill concerns only man’, writes derrida (2002: 416). killing is the original ontological act not just because it renders only animals uniquely bare-of-life and thus killable but also because it makes humans uniquely response-able in how we kill non-humans ‘with reasons but knowing there will never be sufficient reason’ (haraway, 2009, 81). farm animals are defined by killing, both as non-humans and as human property; they are ‘killable’ through an acts defined as ‘necessary’ or ‘acceptable’ by law (bryant, 2008). indeed, they exist to be killed, their lives are stage-managed to arrive at a pre-defined killing, usually when a desired level of productivity has been reached or exceeded. we might ask whether their killing an act of ending or of beginning, a state of being or of not being? farm animals are killable long before they are killed, before even they are born. engineered, through breeding and, increasingly, genetics, to produce meat or eggs or milk at some somatically enhanced way, their killing is not only assured, it is precipitated, it is definitive. there are two means of escape: to die (though this is uncommon as an ill or injured animal is usually ‘put down’ to avoid the costs of veterinary care or unnecessary feeding) or to be unborn. amongst the vast numbers of chickens and dairy cows, male animals and birds are unwanted and are killed soon after birth or hatching. soon, sexually selective bull sperm and pre-hatching sexing techniques will deny them even that. 12 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) of course, the killing of animals is not the end; farm animals don’t die (as subjects of an act), they are killed (as objects of an act) they are not ‘grievable.’ their killing is a moment of transition from the vibrant materiality of the living body to the very different silent materiality of the edible product (but also, more prosaically, from cost to profit). this is a transition of different killings; the anticipated killing upon leaving the farm, the (recoverable) killing of sensibility when an animal is stunned, the somatic killing of bleeding out, the corporeal killing of the body during cutting up and processing. sometimes, when animals are slaughtered using gas or low atmospheric pressure, the heart needs to be electronically started to facilitate bleeding; a further killing. and yet, to be killable is also to be alive, to have lived. if humans must learn to kill responsibly, they must also learn to let live responsibly. stalking the life-death continuum dorion sagan, science writer as a writer working in science and art, one who has sequentially apprenticed himself to the scientists lynn margulis (symbiotic theory), eric d. schneider (nonequilibrium thermodynamics), and josh mitteldorf (post-neodarwinian group selection) the continuum which results from a deconstruction of the life-death divide holds for me a special allure. in the second chapter of our what is life (2011) we portray death as life's shadow. just as objects cast shadows but shadows alone cannot exist without objects, death is a naked concept without life. immortality in evolutionary terms describes life's “shadowless” baseline state rather than, as the word (and human experience) suggests, a modification of an inevitable tendency toward decline and death. for example, invertebrates with cyclical life patterns such as hydrozoans, or carrion beetles prompted by stress to revert to larval stages of their life cycle, can anthropomorphically be described as “immortal.” among pre-animal life forms (bacteria and protoctists), and even 13 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) among some animals today, there was no automatic connection between life and death; yes, organisms could be killed—for example squashed, poisoned, or burnt to death—but they did not inevitably succumb to the processes of entropic degradation or wear and tear we are too quick to use to explain a would-be universal aging. perhaps surprisingly—or not so, given humanity's anthropomorphocentric tendency that is now writ large as the anthropocene either to project its individual quirks onto a universal stage, or to hold itself up as extraordinary and unique—not all organisms age. some, like salmon, called semelparous, age extremely quickly, dying almost immediately after reproduction. others, arguably with a long phylogenetic heritage, do not seem to age at all. among these number box turtles and sharks in our own chordate phylum. other animals that don't age—and even become stronger and more fertile with time--include lobsters (mitteldorf and sagan 2016). in the unsettling lifedeath i learned that gas-emitting ocean microbes that help cool and control climate die en masse because of viruses. the virally infected algae appear either to succumb to death directly or kill themselves to prevent the greater death of mass infection. here they would resemble human immune cells thought to destroy pathogens and nascent cancers. the calcareous exoskeletons of such algae rain through the sea to its bottom where, subducted, they become limestone lubricant implicated in mountain building activity as part of a global physiology that necessarily coopts and integrates death no less than free radicals are deployed by killing immune cells in the human body. from these frames, “killability” focuses our attention on humanity's self-serving anthropocentric and zoocentric concerns. the bodies of which we are part require our deaths for their lives, even as our lives require the death of microscopic others who may be sensate without our knowledge, but whose triumphs, perceptual gifts and deaths are likely integrated into our own sensorium (margulis et al, 2011). 14 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) references ahmed, sara. (2010). the promise of happiness. durham: duke university press. barad, karen. (2007). meeting the universe halfway. durham: duke university press. bryant, t. (2008) sacrificing the sacrifice of animals: legal personhood for animals, the status of animals as property and the presumed primacy of humans. rutgers law journal 39, 247-330. derrida, jacques. (2002) the animal that therefore i am (more to follow), critical inquiry, vol. 28, no. 2 (winter, 2002), pp. 369-418. haraway, donna. (2008). when species meet. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. johnson, elizabeth r. (2016). unsettling life in the law: living with and as jellyfish. in irus braverman, ed., animals, biopolitics, law: lively legalities. london: routledge. margulis, lynn, celeste a. asikainen, and wolfgang e. krumbein, eds. (2011). chimeras and consciousness: evolution of the sensory self. cambridge: mit press. margulis, lynn and dorion sagan. (2000) what is life? berkeley: university of california press. mitteldorf, josh and dorion sagan. (2016). cracking the aging code: the new science of growing old and what it means for staying young. new 15 schrader and johnson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) york: flatiron books. schrader, astrid. (2012). the time of slime: anthropocentrism in harmful algal research. environmental philosophy. 9(1): 71-93 schrader, astrid (forthcoming 2017). time, affect, microbial suicide. body & society jackson article     sense of things    zakiyyah iman jackson george mason university zjackson@gmu.edu but can we escape becoming dizzy? and who can affirm that vertigo does not haunt the whole of existence? frantz fanon, the wretched of the earth, (p. 253) [i] comforted myself that my sense of alienation and now-heightened visibility were not inherent to my blackness and my femaleness, but an uncomfortable atmospheric condition afflicting everyone. but at the gyroscopic heart of me, there was and is a deep realization that i have never left the planet earth. i know that my feelings of exaggerated visibility and invisibility are the product of my not being part of the larger cultural picture. i know too that the larger cultural picture is an illusion, albeit a powerful one, concocted from a perceptual consensus to which i am not a party; and that while these perceptions operate as dictators of truth, they are after all merely perceptions. patricia j. williams, the alchemy of race and rights, (p. 56) the door of no return—real and metaphoric as some places are, mythic to those of us scattered in the americas today. to have one’s belonging lodged in a metaphor is voluptuous intrigue; to inhabit a trope; to be a kind of fiction. to live in the black diaspora is i think to live as a fiction—a creation of empires, and also self-creation. it is to be a being living inside and outside of herself. it is to apprehend the sign one makes yet to be unable to escape it except in radiant moments of ordinariness made like art. to be a fiction in search of its most resonant metaphor then is even more intriguing. dionne brand, a map to the door of no return, (p. 2) subjects of all human orders had once known their physical environment only in terms prescribed by their modes of subjective understanding and cultural representational schemas. the revolution of imperial western humanism made possible the ongoing displacement of local knowledge (or culture-specific orders) by a hegemonically (re)produced but no less epistemically violent western scientific conception of the cosmos.1 a transculturally verifiable image of the earth, or positivist knowledge as aspirational horizon, has been pursued via a combination of material-discursive force and a coercive (dis)possession of processes of sense perception and cognition on a global scale, in which, according to sylvia wynter (1995), the novel form has played no small part. in “novel and history, plot and plantation,” wynter (1971) states, “the novel form and our societies are twin children of the same parents” (p. 95). that is to say, our contemporary racial capitalist societies and the novel form itself are both cause and effect of the market economy, “an emergence which marked a change of such world-historical magnitude, that we are all, without exception still ‘enchanted,’ imprisoned, deformed and schizophrenic in its bewitched reality” (p. 95). drawing on and augmenting györgy lukács and lucien goldmann’s theories of the novel and eric williams’s history of caribbean slavery, wynter maintains that the emergence of the novel form is inextricably linked with the historical developments of the conquest of the americas and the plantation-societies of the caribbean, as the latter provided the “raw material” for the extension and dominance of the market economy and initiated a globally expansive re-ordering of aesthesis and imaginative capacities. it is in this context that robinson crusoe, oroonoko, and the blazing world in english and don quxiote and sinapia in spanish, with their imperial thematics and speculative elements, inaugurate a new literary form.2 in “the ceremony must be found,” wynter (1984) deepens the argument of “novel and history, plot and plantation” with the claim that not only are “literature” and racial capitalism mutually constitutive but also that by the nineteenth century literature was increasingly regarded as the “highest manifestation of language” and, therefore, considered to be an essential measure of the capacity for technological progress and scientific reason. wynter argues that with the secularization of knowledge and the constitution of “man” in the post-cartesian terms of foucault’s “empirico-transcendental doublet,” “literature” came to function as the transcendentalized index of degree of “culture” which a group, understood in the biologized terms of race and national identity, had achieved or could achieve based on their immanent “nature”: “culture, in the new episteme, now took the place that reason had played in the classical episteme, as the index for determining the degree to which a particular group knew ‘self/world’ in the metaphysical terms of the current order’s ‘rational’ world view which by extension determined bio-ontological value and vice-versa” (p. 46). the reported presence (or absence) of the novel form coupled with assessments of literature’s aesthetic value along lines of race and/or national origin were embedded in the techno-scientific conception of progress that organized man in the hegelian terms of a teleology. while this is not to say, as wynter (1996) maintains (citing valentin mudimbe), that “african world views and african traditional systems of thought are ‘unthinkable and cannot be made explicit within the framework of their own rationality’, the fact remains that ‘the ways in which they have been evaluated and the means used to explain them relate to theories and methods whose constraints, rules, and systems of operation suppose a non-african epistemological locus,’ and, in effect, suppose ‘a silent dependence on a western episteme’” (p. 503). however, the west itself is an iteratively dependent construction; its renewal depends on the ritual purification of knowledge produced by and expropriated from those indigenous onto-epistemic architects the west casts as benighted and, therefore, bereft of knowledge, such that “the western tradition” emerges as an imperious effect of adaptive processes and multiscalar mutations of matter and meaning.3 moreover, the upheavals of political and cultural thought most commonly attributed to the respective events of 1492 and the copernican revolution made possible that mutation at the level of sensorium, which led, in turn, to the rise of natural science and its racialized taxonomies and teleological mode of reason and universality. editor and speculative fiction writer nalo hopkinson draws from greek myth and diverse caribbean linguistic conventions, folklore, and spiritual practices in order to create fictive narratives and lifeworlds that often explore allegorically the vexed figure of the black female body in western scientific discourse and metaphysics, rewriting the conventions of western literary genres, in particular science fiction, realism, and fantasy, along the way. as jessica langer (2011) observes of postcolonial science fiction more generally, “there are levels upon levels of hybridity here: hybridity of form, of genre, of criticism, of concept . . .” (p.109).4 the observation that “postcolonial sf” introduces new complexity into literary theory may also require, as luke gibbons (1998) suggests, new methods of interpretation: “theory itself needs to be recast from the periphery and acquire hybrid forms, bringing the plurality of voices associated with the creative energies of colonial cultures to bear on criticism itself” (p. 27). hopkinson’s locus award-winning novel, brown girl in the ring (1998)—with its levels upon levels of hybridity—provokes such a reconsideration of theory and an experiment in method on at least two counts: 1) it centralizes the role of antiblackness and slavery to the postcolonial, inviting a reworking of prevailing postcolonial paradigms that disaggregate racial slavery from colonialism, and 2) it centrally stages and performs speculation as an intervention into and as theory, intensifying speculation’s performance as theory and theory’s performance by blackness.5 in a reading of nalo hopkinson’s brown girl in the ring (1998), i argue that, as an enabling condition of imperial western humanism, the black mater(nal) is foreclosed by the dialectics of hegemonic common sense, and the anxieties stimulated by related signifiers, such as the black(ened) maternal image, voice, and lifeworld, allude to the latent symbolic-material capacities of the black mater(nal), as mater, as matter, to destabilize or even rupture the reigning order of representation that grounds the thought-world relation.6 in other words, the specter of the black mater(nal)—that is, nonrepresentability—haunts the terms and operations tasked with adjudicating the thought-world correlate or the proper perception of “the world,” such as hierarchical distinctions between reality and illusion, reason and its absence, subject and object, science and fiction, speculation and realism, which turn on attendant aporias pertaining to immanence and transcendence.7  while the immanence-transcendence dualism has a long religio-philosophical inheritance, hegel (1997) is perhaps the emblematic figure for the racialization of this prevailing dualism, providing raciality with what would become the essential touchstones of its logic: teleology and determinism. at the incipiency of globality as an idea, hegel argued that racial polarity is both the means and the ends of the universal-historical order, whereby transcendence is privileged over immanence and the two principles are understood in the oppositional terms of raciality.8 citing reports on african religion that claimed africans worshiped nature or themselves, hegel concluded that africans are governed by the senses and, as a result, are incapable of acquiring adequate distance from nature, a distance that would allow them to oppose nature and the bestial dimensions of the self. for hegel, opposing both is required for the achievement of spirit, reason, and self-governance: “inward freedom” is first attained through opposing one’s immediate existence (natural environment) and one’s natural existence (animal existence); this opposition then provides the condition of possibility for higher order thinking and self-governance. according to hegel, one must rise above one’s natural/sensuous existence via internal reflection to attain spiritual freedom, and this transcendence then becomes the basis of one’s entry into the domain of culture and history. ultimately, hegel concluded: “the african” is eternally an “animal man” because africans are trapped within immanence, or immediate experience, and are, therefore, unable to achieve transcendence or apprehend transcendent knowledge. in this, hegel co-constitutes human-animal, nature-culture, and immanence-transcendence dualisms within the imaginary of global raciality.9 while it is crucial to demonstrate the perniciousness of hegel’s philosophical premises and vocabulary, as hegelianism remains the reigning framework of universalist historicity, it is just as necessary to engage onto-epistemological frameworks that challenge antiblack modes of being and epistemic authority. with brown girl in the ring, hopkinson makes it possible to read what is invisible (but nonetheless present) or what is constitutive yet absent at the manifest level of hegel’s text, namely the foreclosure of the black mater(nal), its latent capacities, and its effects on orbiting discursive-material formations of knowledge and being.10 the term “nonrepresentability” as applied to the black mater(nal) in these pages alludes to a central and ever-present unsettling excess that nevertheless eludes representation. if wynter (1984) is correct that by the nineteenth century, “literature” was understood as the very incarnation of “culture’s” definition—the defining language of a collective impulse whereby poetry, drama, and fiction represented the “self-transcendence” of a people—then, in essence, brown girl in the ring is both an effect and a critique of the very narrative processes and metaphorics that have produced the hegelian “myth of history” and “aesthetico-ontology.” by turning on its head the (racial) teleology attributed to the novelistic form, hopkinson reveals the function of myth in the production of racial teleology and harnesses the power of myth in a generative critique of antiblackness. to put it more pointedly, if a manichean myth of history, reason, and “scientific fact” could produce a world-historical order predicated on the conjunctive abjection of black female gender and nullification of black maternity, then hopkinson’s novel effectively counters this order by, in turn, performing its intervention at the register of myth. writing in an allegorical mode, hopkinson redirects hegelian tropes of blackness, of “the african” in particular, in a manner that exposes the essential but invisibilized role of the black mater(nal) in hegel’s system as well as the irreducible aporia of scientific reason and myth. hopkinson’s text recasts the metaphor of literature and blackness precisely by exploiting the equation of blackness, and in particular africaness, with irrationality and teratology—by troping the trope of african religion. though commonly apprehended in the narratives of western science and philosophy through the terms of objective empirical fact, the “black female body” and her world are, as hopkinson’s text implies, better understood as enabling myths. in order to bring out the slippage between scientific empiricism and myth where black (maternal) female figures are concerned, hopkinson turns the realist world of science fiction into one where myth and empirical reality not only coexist but also wherein myth is embedded in realism. by doing so, the protagonist ti-jeanne and the reader are provoked by “second sight” to confront the manner in which myth, in particular myths of history and of scientific fact, structure and obscure the black female figure and, therefore, foreclose the comprehension of a perspective and comprehension from a perspective of the black mater(nal). in the novel, vertigo functions as a symptom and a metaphor for this predicament, as a disruption in proprioception or the corporeal sense of the body in space and in the making of space.11 in using myth to counter “myths of history,” the novel reveals that myth often shrouds “fact” and claims to objective reality, and for this very reason myth—or, more precisely, a non-representationalist mode of reason or onto-epistemology—may hold the potential to unsettle hegemonic modes of racist reality and their constituent myths. as such, the novel makes available a transvaluation of representation by investing myth differently.12 the problem under consideration in these pages is not simply that of the gap between the referent and the sign—the classical problem of representationalism being the misalignment in spacetime of the thing and its representation—but rather that of a sublimity attributed to the signifier “black female” and the dematerialization this attribution engenders.13 the black mater(nal) serves an enabling function that, while it can be thought precisely as a condition of possibility, in its all at-once-ness it nevertheless exceeds what we can rightfully claim to know; it eludes both measurement and imagination, and the novel provides a way to read that approaches such nonrepresentability.14 i follow hortense spillers in this essay by investigating two meanings of “representation” in the discursive practices of imperial western humanism: representative and re-presentation. the black mater(nal) is non-represent-ability because the black mater(nal) signifies the foreclosed enabling condition of the modern grammar of representation: a space of nonsense or aphasia and correspondingly without a representative in the “i and thou” dialectical processes of recognition, value, and decision.15 regarding re-presentation, in the grammar described, there are “black (maternal) female” figures (or representations) that appear, but they function at the register of myth and, therefore, reveal that representation performs rather than functions mimetically as the notion “re-presentation” suggests. in what follows, i investigate both meanings of representation and trace how each works on the other in hopkinson’s text.16 the approach here diverges from one that evaluates representation exclusively based on a representation’s supposed accuracy or inaccuracy, in other words, its ability to re-present the real thing. while the text certainly problematizes calcified representations of black womanhood, the novel does not then reinvest in the proper re-presentation of black women but rather performs representation in a speculative mode. the text does not (re)produce black women as an empiricist object or within the terms of her production as a transparent foundational object of science. rather than functioning within the limited discourse of empirical facts or seeking the authority of scientific method, black female representations in brown girl in the ring underscore the manner in which representation performs in worlds and in the (un)making of worlds.17 moving away from science fiction’s defining investments in scientific fact, the novel provokes a consideration of the problem of representing a sublime function that necessarily exceeds any claim to knowledge but that can only be approached in a gesture of representation.18 moreover, one could argue that the longstanding black feminist preoccupation with representation, in particular the seemingly inescapable burden of paradoxical modes of visibility/invisibility, do not primarily gesture towards the (in)accuracy of representations but rather toward the performative labor representation does in worlding processes. brown girl in the ring contemplates the stakes and possibilities of a mode of non-self-identical onto-epistemology to emerge, some other relation of being to knowing than what organizes our antiblack present—not based on re-presenting “the voice” or “experience of the oppressed black woman” or simply affirming subaltern knowledge in the form of african religion—but by investigating the conditions of possibility for representation itself. in a reading that insists upon aesthesis and empiricism’s inextricability, whether the epistemological context is the seemingly scientific or concerns perceptual knowledge that signifies otherwise, i will argue that the modern grammar of representation takes as its enabling figure (if figure is the appropriate concept here; portal is probably more accurate) that which is not only unrepresented but, more precisely, nonrepresentable—politicizing both the sense of commonality implied in the notion of common sense and sense perception itself. the regulating terms of the dominant grammar of representation (re)produce black(ened) mater as always and already trapped within immanence, burdening black (maternal) female figures in particular with functioning as a signifier that points to what sylvia wynter (1990) terms "demonic ground," or what is foreclosed from representability: the nonrepresentable beyond dividing what is sensible from what is nullified and precluded from representability. thereby, the modern grammar of representation imposes the inhumanity it presumes. this predicament is signaled in the text by ti-jeanne’s vertigo, whereby vertigo functions as a metaphor for the onto-epistemological predicament of black women in particular and of blackness more generally under conditions of imperial western modernity or the conception of man within the terms of a telos.19   i am interested in tracing how an injunction against an avowed commonality in being, or humanity, by an ontologized conception of gendered race paradoxically provides access to an alternative—a realm of reality (commonly disqualified and discredited by a racially exclusionary common sense), a sense-ability that “operates or becomes manifest as an ability in the realities from which this other realm or mode is excluded” (scott, 2010, p. 175). the mind-body-social nexus in brown girl in the ring indicates a reality discredited (a blackened reality) at once the experience of the carceral and the apprehension of a radically “redistributed sensorium.”20 i argue the black mater(nal) holds the potential to transform the terms of reality and feeling, therefore rewriting the conditions of possibility of the empirical. if, as darieck scott (2010) instructs, blackness is “an embodied metaphor, the lived representation that grants access to unlived possibilities” (p. 120), i seek to limn what vertiginous states introduce as possibility in the narrative. i ask, if an essential feature of your existence is that the norm is not able to take hold, what mode of being becomes available, and what mode might you invent? hopkinson’s story focuses on three generations of black caribbean-canadian “seer women” and their struggle for physical and psychic survival in the isolated, walled-off urban centre of toronto known as “the burn.” the names of the women, mami-gros jeanne, her daughter mi-jeannne, and granddaughter ti-jeanne, are an allusion to the derek walcott play ti-jean and his brothers (1957), which explores the epistemological problems wrought by slavery and colonialism, particularly the loss of indigenous knowledge and the gap between colonial knowledge and its applicability in the lifeworld of a colonized person. in an exploration of similar questions, brown girl in the ring uses tropes of “african religion,” in particular spirit possession and aspects of “double-consciousness” such as burdened “gift” and “second sight,” to explore the modern grammar of representation and its economies of value. in the interest of space, i will limit my analysis to a reading of the scene when ti-jeanne initially experiences visions while on the streets of the burn, but i will discuss this scene’s significance for the novel as a whole and underscore its implications for the theorization of onto-epistemology and representationalism at stake in my analysis.21 “the burn” is the cordoned off, economically devastated urban core of near-future toronto. in the aftermath of the city’s economic collapse and the large-scale riot that emerged in its wake, with the city aflame and in an extreme case of “white flight,” those who could flee to the suburban perimeter did so (wood, 2005, p. 317). they took along with them the city’s goods and administrative services. abandoned by state representatives and economically at the mercy of centrifugal forces, inner city toronto developed an alternative informal economy, one that is governed by a ruthless drug lord named rudy. the premier of toronto, suffering from heart failure, recently became aware of something the public had not: the sudden emergence of a zoonotic virus made it untenable to continue the porcine organ donor program. no longer under the cover of rights and protection and in an attempt to expropriate what resources remain in the burn, representatives of the ailing premier hire rudy and his “posse” to procure a human heart from someone in “the burn.” posse members include crapaud, crack monkey, jay, and tony, all characters introduced on the streets of the burn at the start of ti-jeanne’s epic quest to defeat rudy and his posse, but unfortunately she is not able to do so before they claim her grandmother’s heart for the premier. in order to confront the tragic mystery surrounding her mother and grandmother, ti-jeanne must open herself to supernatural powers and counterintuitive truths that exceed her sense of self and reality as well as challenge the coordinates of the given world. when the reader is first introduced to the narrative’s protagonist, ti-jeanne, we learn that “ti-jeanne could see with more than sight” (p. 9). tormented by prescient images of death and dying, “ti-jeanne hated the visions” (p. 9). her spectacular yet proliferate visions of the premature deaths of others in the burn threatened a total loss of self and initiated fear “like ice in her chest” (p. 19), followed by feelings of vertigo. ti-jeanne’s burdened “gift” of “second sight” opens up the question of reality for ti-jeanne. she hated the visions not only because of their frightening content and overwhelming immediacy but also because no one else could see them and, thus, they threatened her sense of self and reality. but ti-jeanne was not alone in experiencing visions. other women in her family had the “second sight.” as the story unfolds ti-jeanne learns “second sight” is a “gift,” an ability inside of debility, and that she must invent a way of being and knowing in the world that approached this constitutive paradox.22  departing from dubois’s formulation, ti-jeanne’s “second sight” is not deployed by hopkinson in pursuit of recognition within the terms of mimetic reality. rather the female subject of double-consciousness in hopkinson’s text explores the limits of representability itself, ultimately exchanging recognition for myth. the prelude to the narrative’s first full account of ti-jeanne’s prophetic yet terrifying vision was a scene of sexual street harassment immediately followed by a frightening encounter with her mother, whom she only knows as “blind crazy betty,” on the streets of the burn while running a simple errand for mami-gros jeanne. while making her way through the streets of the burn, ti-jeanne caught a glimpse of rudy’s posse, men she knew and was accustomed to avoiding. tony, a man we will come to learn is the father of the baby she held in her arms, is among them. pulse thumping, gaze averted while edging past the men, ti-jeanne tried to appear very interested in picking her way through the garbage littered sidewalk (p.16). a voice called out to her, “hey, sister, is time we get to know one another better, you know!... “ah say,” the man she knew as crack monkey hollered, “is time i get to know you better!” the men’s mocking laughter spurred ti-jeanne to walk faster, hug her child closer to her, while scowling at the man (p.16). as a vision manifests, ti-jeanne is taken out of herself, her voice, vision, and inner thoughts recede as the emergent sense of "second sight" takes over. when ti-jeanne saw her first vision, she abruptly froze, “not trusting her eyes any longer to pick reality from fantasy” (p.16 ). she saw before her crack monkey, rudy’s “right-hand man” (p.16), “a wasted thing, falling to the ground and gasping his last” (p. 16). for one of the other men, crapaud: “metabolic acidosis. cirrhosis of the liver. rum” (p. 16). the third man, jay, killed “running to the aid of his sweetheart” (p.16 ), a trans sex worker; her would-be attacker, a john with knife in hand, would eventually alter course with the gutting of jay. interspersed with folksongs and italicized, the shift in tense and references to rhymes and riddles inject the narrative’s realism with the mythical quality of time suspended or a dreamlike or magical state. ti-jeanne could not see her own death, however, nor that of her child, baby, nor of her on-again, off-again boyfriend, tony. she could not see the deaths of anyone close to her; she also could not see “blind crazy betty” until the woman was right in front of her, her mother’s sightless eyes turned toward baby exclaiming, “that is my child! he’s mine!” (p. 17). announcing the ambivalence that accompanied baby’s birth stemming from constrained circumstances, irreducible to the sum of socio-economic factors, for a woman still young in age, crazy betty continued: “what you doin’ with my baby? you can’t make a child pretty so! you did never want he! give he to me!” (p. 17).23 the resonant quality of the woman’s words sprang from the circumstance that, unbeknownst to ti-jeanne, the woman was in fact her mother, mi-jeanne, and like ti-jeanne she was a “seer woman.” the “gift” of “second sight” ran along the maternal line, and the woman ti-jeanne had known as “blind crazy betty” or simply as a “bag lady,” had not benefited from having her gift cultivated and supported by relations—psychic, spiritual, social—that would sustain her. for most of the narrative, mi-jeanne’s identity as ti-jeanne’s mother is concealed by her ominous image as “blind crazy betty.” although mi-jeanne is presumed missing, as “blind crazy betty” she recursively appears in the narrative as the specter of madness and incommunicability. the mystery surrounding mi-jeanne’s identity and the revelation of its content is primarily relayed through the fragmented perspective and memory of others, especially that of mami gros-jeanne and ti-jeanne. the precipitating events that led to mi-jeanne’s disappearance are relayed through flashback and the exchange of traumatic memories between ti-jeanne and mami. like ti-jeanne, mi-jeanne was a seer, and like ti-jeanne she refused mami gros-jeanne’s help but for different reasons. mi-jeanne’s psyche was overcome by waking nightmares that presaged the violent traumatic events of the riots. by the time mami realized her daughter was having visions, the enormity and intensity of the visions had already overwhelmed mi-jeanne, “[a]nd the powers of the visions had driven her mad” (p. 48). mami hopes that through the cultivation of ti-jeanne’s “gift” of “second sight,” ti-jeanne might be spared from what happened to her mother. but for that to be possible ti-jeanne would have to reimagine the nature of her “second sight” and the coordinates of the given world. for the time being, ti-jeanne rebuffs: “what i tell you mami? i don’t want to know nothing ‘bout obeah, oui” (p. 47). to which mami replied, hoping to clarify both the significance of ti-jeanne’s visions and convey the urgency of ti-jeanne’s predicament, “girl child, you know better than to call it obeah.…is a good thing, not a evil thing. but, child if you don’t learn how to use it, it will use you, just like it take your mother”(p. 47). frightened, ti-jeanne could just stare at mami (p. 47). in hoping that “if she ignored the second sight, it would just go away” and dismissing her grandmother’s teachings as “old time nonsense,” ti-jeanne clung to an empirical reality ordered by a teleological mode of reason and universality (p. 20, 37). but ignoring the visions was not diminishing their unsettling power. ti-jeanne worries: “mami, this ain’t the first time i see something like this. i going mad like mummy ain’t, it?” (p. 46) in moments when ti-jeanne suspects her own madness, memories of her mother and of the frightening encounter with “blind crazy betty” alternate in her mind without ti-jeanne ever realizing that her mother and “blind crazy betty” are the same person. in accordance with the modern grammar of representation, in ti-jeanne’s memory, her mother inhabits a space in and as madness, nonsense, and chaos. in other words, the black maternal figure was a signifier that apportions and delimits reason and the universal.24 in the aftermath of the riots, her mother became nearly synonymous with the disorienting enormity and chaotic origin of the burn. for ti-jeanne, the riots “were mixed up in her mind with memories of her mother lying helpless in her bed, besieged with images of the worst of the rioting before it happened” (p. 48). ti-jeanne remembered that her mother had a vision back when the riots were just starting. in the days that followed, her mother appeared to go mad, “complaining that she was hearing voices in her head” (p. 20). her mother disappeared soon after the voices had started, “run away into the craziness that toronto had become. she had never come back” (p. 20).25 ti-jeanne worried, “maybe it is hereditary?” this was an anxiety that overdetermined the apprehension of both her mother and grandmother as well as obscured the power and force of the abilities constitutive to the disorienting debility of her own “second sight” (p. 20). when the visions start, ti-jeanne attempts, by the forces of will and reason, to dis-identify with that which would potentially sustain her and by implication elude the matrilineal mark of symbolic foreclosure ascribed to the black mater(nal) and to related racially abject worldmaking practices. having already dismissed what mami was trying to teach her as “old time nonsense,” ti-jeanne would initially refuse to accept the disruption of common reality that her sense-ability both exposed and represented, even as hegemonic reality foreclosed the perception of her reality and of a shared being in a reality such as hers—a reality that necessarily could not be held in common; in fact, its foreclosure inaugurated the common (sense) (p. 37). in the case of her mother, a sense (ability) without a spiritual (initiation and ritual practice) and social locus, mi-jeanne’s psyche was in ruins. her reality and the capacities her sense-ability indexed were foreclosed by a common sense that apprehends her as monstrosity. mythologized as “blind crazy betty,” she became an anonymous feature of the generalized image of the burn as antipodean dilapidation. when the black female (maternal) figure appears, if she appears, she appears as the work and revelation of myth. there were many names for what mami, mi-jeanne, and ti-jeanne were: “myalist, bush doctor, iyalorisha, curandera, four-eye” (218); the supposed incontrovertible “truth” of black worldmaking as paradigmatic teratology and “nonsense” has the racialized exchange and circulation of the derisive term “obeah” (and related markers such as “mumbo-jumbo”) as an essential exponent. the term “obeah” (and the lifeworld it is purported to represent) is a recurring flashpoint for characters in the novel: a dramatic contest over the meaning of “obeah” punctuates the narrative’s arc, making it arguably the central conflict of the novel, one that emblematizes the unsettled convergence of the racialization of epistemic authority and sense perception with that of the time and place of africa in new world blackness under conditions of imperial western modernity. while undoubtedly ti-jeanne is the narrative’s central consciousness, the recursive shifts in narrative perspective to that of mami-gros jeanne—as a griot figure, healer, symbol of communalism—and the non-linear work of time and memory function to place pressure on or introduce irony into ti-jeanne’s perspective. exploring the caesura between the grandmother’s voice and the vital knowledge it both possesses and is possessed by and troubling an ocularcentric apprehension of reality that is similarly haunted by raciality, the novel re-signifies double-consciousness wherein ti-jeanne’s passage between the “two worlds” and its accompanying vertigo marks a desire for that which is anticipated but cannot be fully brought into legibility from within the terms of the modern grammar of representation in any form other than nonsense.26 like mi-jeanne before her, ti-jeanne risks her sense-ability—its transformative, anticipatory function, which is contiguous with its debilitating power—in an attempt to seek a place and an explanation within a science-fictional reality wherein all phenomena can be presumably explained within the terms of western (scientific) rationality.27 while ti-jeanne understands herself in the terms of a hegelian “rational” subject, both the science fictional world she seeks and the hegelian discourse that undergirds it position her and her grandmother in the same space as “blind crazy betty,” a reality ti-jeanne is not yet ready to confront.  on that street that day of her first vision, upon looking into her mother’s face and its self-inflicted, dug-out eyes, ti-jeanne saw the specter of her own (un)becoming: “the old fear of madness made ti-jeanne go cold…. madwoman in front of her. hard-eyed men just behind” (p. 17). she thought, “but at least the men had something behind their eyes, some spark of humanity” (p.17). face-to-face with dually gendered images of social death—in the forms of her mother’s visage, which she no longer recognizes, and the huddle of men, a site of gendered violence’s spatial and substitutive logics—ti-jeanne clung to a common reality and sense of humanity that she will eventually have to shed in order to, however provisionally, spark life on non-hegemonic terms and to keep her sense-ability intact. in the interval, ti-jeanne chose the men’s “something” over her mother’s seeming nothingness. she attempted to turn and run back the way she had come only to find herself transported to a green tropical meadow, where, at the end of a narrow, downward-curving dirt path, a figure came over the rise, leaping and dancing up the path: man-like, man-tall, on long, wobbly legs look as if they hitch on backward. red, red all over: red eyes, red hair, nasty, pointy red tail jooking up into air. face like a grinning african mask. only is not a mask; the lips-them moving, and it have real teeth behind them lips, attached to real gums. he waving a stick, and even the stick self-paint-up red, with some pick and crimson rags hanging from the one end. is dance he dancing on them wobbly legs, flapping he knees in and out like if he drunk jabbing he stick in the air, and now i could hear the beat he moving to, hear the words of the chant: diab’-diab’! diab’-diab’! diab’-diab’! (p.18 )  upon opening her eyes, she finds tony standing beside her in roopsingh’s roti shop. “in disorientation,” ti-jeanne asks over a raucous sonic mix of soca and customers yelling their orders through aroma-filled air boasting of curry, frying oil, and stew peas with rice, “what happened? is where we was?” (p.19). while ti-jeanne had hoped “if she ignored the second sight, it would just go away, ” the visions overwhelmed her liberal humanist sense of self-willed occularcentric agency and thwarted her attempts at backward movement. her visions’ sublime vertiginous disruption of proprioception creates an interval for ti-jeanne to move beyond representationalism and western scientific empiricism, in particular. but precisely because it is a threat to identity in the terms of “self/world” described by wynter (1984) at the beginning of this essay, she initially resists its force and effect. for ti-jeanne, the approach of the jab-jab is synonymous with the arrival of death in the form of atavism and disordered being: the jab-jab’s wobbly legs and tail portend the threat of life out of order, a disabled life, a figure described as having a “face like a grinning african mask” (p. 18). as observed by many scholars, “the african mask,” a fetish of nineteenth-century anthropology, exceeds mere representation as the fetishized mask is perceived as the embodiment of the african’s purported atemporal opacity and disordered metaphysics more generally, such that african masks and people are not merely correlates but appear interchangeable.28 michelle wallace (2004) has described the fungibility of african art and african people in the following terms:  the fate of african art objects was not unrelated to the fate of the human bodies also removed from africa under less than ideal circumstances—some of them sold or just handed over and some of them kidnapped…the greatest difference then, between the bodies of our ancestors and these tribal objects is that the bodies were allowed to die (therefore enabling us to replace them), whereas the tribal objects can never die, given their curious half-life on the back shelves of western art…it might be useful to think of them [museum and gallery collections] as ruins . . . . (p.465, 467)29 the authorized disposability of black people that wallace describes with the rather truncated phrase—“allowed to die”—sits somewhat ironically, even if not altogether unsurprisingly, next to her observation that “african objects were salvaged for exhibition or sale” (p. 463) only to find a deadly synthesis in the exhibition and sale of black people: “entire villages were sometimes shipped over to europe, england, and the united states and placed on display in zoos and circuses” in the “general chaos” that accompanied the annexation and colonization of the african continent in the late nineteenth century (p.463 ).30 wallace concludes, “no doubt, many of the objects that made it either to the new world, britain, and europe were probably destroyed one way or another” (p. 463). no doubt, indeed. we know that the name “venus,” practically synonymous with the terror and pleasure of exhibiting people, does not index a single life, but many.31 moreover, black people’s relation to the world of objects cannot be properly understood in the terms of what quentin meillassoux calls kantian correlationism or of the question of perceptual integrity between subject and object, as black peoples’ fungibility with objects is a primary function of blackness in “the” world (in the making of “the” world) and forms an essential condition of possibility for both kant’s questioning of subject-object relations and the emergence of globality as a conceptual horizon.32 so it is not that for black people the question of perceptual integrity is not a problem for contemplation; rather, the question of subject-object is thought in a world that primarily annunciates blackness as the fungibility of people and objects while steadfastly equating subjecthood with the possession and dispossession of objects (human and nonhuman)—objects that necessarily haunt the distorted perceptual terms of the kantian-subject and thought-world relationship, whereby the black mater(nal) signifies the form(lessness) of noise, and noise is produced as isomorphic to the black mater(nal), reciprocally.33 therefore, black contemplation of the question of subject-object, including thought that exceeds its logic, must contend with and cannot help but occur in a context effected by the indistinction and distortion race introduces into these very terms.34 given man’s historical horizon of possibility—slavery, conquest, colonialism—the western metaphysical matrix has race at its center in the form of a chiasmus: the metaphysics of race (“what is the ‘reality’ of race?”) and the racialization of the question of metaphysics (“under whose terms will the nature of time, knowledge, space, objecthood, being, and causality come to be defined?”). in other words, the question of race’s reality has and continues to bear directly on hierarchies of knowledge pertaining to the nature of reality itself. though the notoriously antiblack pronouncements of exalted figures like g.w.f. hegel, immanuel kant, or david hume, for instance, mark neither the invention of metaphysics nor its conclusive end, the metaphysical question of race and that of the foreclosed black mater(nal) in particular as race’s status-organizing principle marks an innovation in the governing terms of metaphysics, one that would increasingly purport to resolve metaphysical questions in terms of relative proximity to the spectral figure of “the african female” or, more specifically, that of the black mater(nal). in probing and radicalizing the indefinite distinction between immanence and transcendence, their gendered and racialized prefigurement as the staging of the black mater(nal)’s nonrepresentability, hopkinson’s novel challenges the terms that ground both attempts to distinguish and combine science and fiction as well as speculation and realism.35 what i want to stress here is that both the reigning hegemonic conception of the human thought-world correlate as well as the idea that ontological unification is both desirable and attainable by means other than violence are essential onto-epistemic aspects of antiblackness historically and contemporarily. the dominant order of appearances and its representationalist logics are forged through and by what denise ferreira da silva (2007) has termed the “global idea of race,” yet this onto-epistemic violence is commonly understood as merely the proper apprehension of reality and justified on that basis. representationalism’s ontological propositions and effects, in particular, commonly rely on a problematic material reductionism that, i argue, is secured by the idea of race: the presumed primacy and transparency of matter is called upon to adjudicate “reality,” “fact,” and “truth,” in general. the matter of racial being and its “hieroglyphics of the flesh” have been the primary measure of (human)being and a principal site for maintaining and extending representationalist rationality.36 in the process, non-representationalist systems of inquiry and modes of ontology are cast in the racialized terms of a teratology, whereby the so-called fetish is its signal anxiety. simon gikandi (2003) has described the doubleness of the fetish as “a figure that is located at the heart of culture and ritual and yet seems to appear to us in its perceptual nature, against reality” (p. 465). embalmed in a paranoid discourse that mystifies their ritualized forms and functions in the movement of west african religion and everyday life, whether in the explicit terms of “race” or the supplementary discourse of “culture,” african objects, and masks in particular, appear, one could argue, as not only “against reality” but as the foreclosing of the reality principle—in this sense, masks become fungible or metonymic with the related signifiers of the black mater(nal).37 the mask’s frightening appearance stems from a selective, yet law-like, figuration of anxiety in antiblack gendered terms, regarding “a dangerous potentiality in all perception and representation” that “reality itself is open to construction,” such that the relation between observable experience and external reality is one of vast potentiality rather than determinism (simpson, 1982, p. 11, emphasis mine). indeed, the world is not as it appears. it is revealed later in the novel that the jab-jab is a manifestation of ti-jeanne’s patron spirit papa legbara or eshu—though, in her consternation, she initially misrecognizes him and the helpful messages he provides. throughout the novel, the appearance of eshu and possession by eshu will be one of her greatest sources of strength for defeating the ruthless druglord rudy and, more importantly, for her and her mother’s survival (coleman, 2009). that her patron spirit is eshu is significant at the very least because the eshu in brown girl is a messenger and, like ti-jeanne, passes between worlds. nevertheless, in ti-jeanne’s attempt to confirm the integrity of her own relation of form to image, she necessarily has to pass, at the very least, through the gendered, antiblack associative links i have just described. the image of the jab-jab recalls the fungibility of african objects (masks) and people as well as the conflation of africa, more generally, and west african religion, in particular, with mythic irreality and the teratological, associations that precede ti-jeanne’s attempts to order her reality. it is no wonder that such circular logics and paranoid relations would induce misapprehension and the dread of vertigo. in the passage above, vertigo—that sense of unhinged reality, a communion with death and that realm which exceeds life—seems to threaten a total loss of self as incommensurable metaphysical frameworks and sensory maps meet. this episodic experience is made possible by what frank wilderson (2011) has called a “paradigmatic necessity,” namely that blackness is “a life constituted by disorientation rather than a life interrupted by disorientation” (p. 3). a life constituted by disorientation has as its essential feature what fanon (2008) diagnosed as an “aberration of affect”—autophobia and self-aversion—an effect of realizing selfhood in the terms of our present global hegemonic mode of the subject: its transindividual and systemic scales of value “woven out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” imposes an antiblack system of meaning and affective economy (wynter, 1995, p. 45). in global hegemonic terms, the african is cast “out of the world” and is thus without standing in relation to the constitution of the reality construct.38 it is not an absence of alternative metaphysical frameworks and perceptual matrices that produces the vertigo i describe; rather, vertigo is an effect of the inability of these alternatives to find footing within “the world” due to ever-renewed processes of foreclosure that take the nullification of the black mater(nal) as the horizon of the reality concept and threshold of the sensible world. for ti-jeanne, “to assume a culture, to support a civilization” under these terms is to be possessed by a metaphysics that produces egoic and filial conflicts and disintegration in the forms of deferral, isolation, anonymity, and a desire for “one human being who was totally dependent on her and would never leave her” (hopkinson, 1998, p. 25). within the logic of the specific civilization in which she finds herself, within the language which it speaks and which speaks it, as a “negro,” one will find herself biochemically altered, its physicalist correlation vertiginous (wynter, 2001). in a gloss of the work of physicist david bohm, wynter (2001) concludes, “transformed meanings have led to transformed matter, to a transformed mode of experiencing the self . . .” (p. 38). assuming the rhetorics of possession, wynter (2001) states further, “[a]nother mode of conscious experience takes over. this mode is one that compels her to know her body through the terms of an always already imposed ‘historico-racial schema’; a schema that predefines her body as an impurity to be cured, a lack, a defect, to be amended into the “true” being of whiteness” (p. 41).39 thus, sensorium and its faculties are “culturally determined through the mediation of the socialized sense of self, as well as the “social” situation in which the self is placed” (p.  37). in being and nothingness, jean-paul sartre (1993) describes existential vertigo in terms that return us to the site of an ominous narrow path, one whose feared balefulness is not manifestly figural, as in the form of a jab jab, but whose causality is annunciated affectively. and yet its existential terms also recall the racialized, gendered, and sexual conditioning of anxiety:    vertigo announces itself through fear; i am on a narrow path—without a guard rail—which goes along a precipice. the precipice presents itself to me as to be avoided; it represents a danger of death. at the same time i conceive of a certain number of causes…which can transform that threat of death into reality…through these various anticipations, i am given to myself as a thing; i am passive in relation to these possibilities; they come to me from without; in so far as i am also an object in the world, subject to gravitation, they are my possibilities. (p. 66) reading this canonical passage on existential vertigo in light of the gendered sexual history of conquest and enslavement makes perceptible the visceral nature of anxieties that orbit the status of objects. framed in essentialist terms, blackness marks a violation of gendered and sexual norms such that race—once ontologized—fixes blackness, regardless of “sex,” in the “feminine position” as that passivity and stasis ascribed to objecthood and death, or objecthood as a form of living death. in this frame, the predominant one—blackness, womanhood, female sex, objecthood, passivity, inertia, and death—form an unbreakable chain and negative telos or declension. for a black woman, such as ti-jeanne, to be “riddin by spirits” is to be possessed by a gendered sexual redundancy, an intensification of death in and by objecthood. paradoxically, objecthood, here, serves to feminize a womanhood considered to be of questionable feminine standing by way of placing her being in common under erasure; in other words, it genders black womanhood on the register of her object status only to dispossess her gender of the fullness of being (human). in sum, according to the ontologized, gendered metrics described, the object’s nonbeing as blackened status figures black womanhood a superposition or the state of occupying two distinct and seemingly contradictory human and object worlds simultaneously— a predicament that underwrites both the separation of “subject” and “object” in western ontological discourse and exposes the impossibility of consistently keeping them apart. thus, i argue that, rather than simply restore activity to matter or militate against the charge of passivity in the exclusive terms of defining agency by activity, an alteration of the object’s blackened gendered status necessitates a transvaluation of the gendered symbolics of passivity and the inoperability of its sliding substitutions. brown girl in the ring is a novel that perhaps should be understood not as a mixing of genres but rather as a performance of their deconstruction—literary genres and those genres of the human that apprehend black maternity as the precipice of a void. in posing the question of onto-epistemology at the register hopkinson’s text poses it, as an intervention into the modern grammar of representation, operative dualisms—science-fiction, fact-belief, observation-projection, realism-fantasy—are destabilized, problematizing generic codes and conventions, their terms of legibility and historical-national organization, and their bonds of signification and constitutive oppositions. these narrative strategies underscore the manner with which brown girl in the ring refuses to be an “object of anthropological desire” (da silva, 2007, p. xxii ). brown girl in the ring’s philosophical inquiry into onto-epistemology and perceptual reality destabilizes the ground of “ethnographic authority” rather than invites it and deauthorizes not only hegel’s racial telos but also the foundational empiricism of franz boas as well. da silva (2007) has shown that as a knowledge project that addresses man as an object, franz boas’s cultural anthropology tied certain bodily and mental configurations to different global regions as boas’s conceptualization of “the primitive mind” sought to explain sense perception in terms of the “laws” of “cultural development” that relied upon and extended a logic that made globality and raciality coextensive.40 rather than read brown girl in the ring through the imperative of anthropological translation or map its proximity to some ideal of western secular scientific rationality, i am most interested in the way yoruba and related cosmological systems function in the novel as tropes in service to a generative critique of the racialized, gendered, sexual fictions of ontology and subjectivity i have just described. diasporic practices of worldmaking potentially act as a mode of redress for onto-epistemic violence to the extent that said praxes preclude the monopolization of sense that authorizes antiblack (euro)modernity. ti-jeanne ticked them off on her fingers: “shango, ogun, osain, shakpana, emanjah, oshun, oya, and eshu” and would need to call upon them, the “old-time stories,” and even crazy betty/mi-jeanne to possess and aid her in her battle with rudy, ultimately recovering her mother in the process (p. 204).41 troping rather than rehearsing yoruba religious practice, in brown girl in the ring, the invocation of the orishas does not so much act as a guarantor of africa as the “essential base” of new world cosmological praxis. rather, it marks the process of altering terms and objects from that of “africa” as a paranoid discourse to that of blackness as an existential predicament such that africa is understood and problematized as an invention of imperial western modernity and its grammar of representation.42 this is a vertiginous circuit whose vicissitudes and paradoxes must necessarily include both the anticipation and indeterminacy of alternation between paranoid and deliberative modes of onto-epistemology. awaiting neither “the science of culture” (anthropological historicity) nor the authentication of what is or is not “caribbean” or “african” (“ethnographic authority”), this altered course reveals that blackness is an existential predicament that precisely and decisively unmoors the fictions of origin and integral human(being). the middle passage is neither place nor historical past but statelessness, a processual (un)becoming, the (dis)continuous iterative unsettling of origin and being, a challenge to the question and terms of origin writ large, and therefore it confounds rather than permits the compensatory gestures discourses of “hybridity” and “syncretism” offer to (racial) ontology.43 even when it is to their great detriment, or perhaps even especially in those instances, the novel’s characters of different, racial, gender, age, and class positionalities participate in a signifying process that negates, rejects, misapprehends, and misnames what has already been prefigured void. mami-gros jeanne’s empiricist praxis and interventions, her onto-epistemology, lie buried under the signifiers of superstition and nonsense. the author’s use of dramatic irony performs and exposes the impossibility of the black mater(nal) to be either re-presented or known in the modern grammar of dialectical subjecthood and authority; what emerges from this narrative strategy is not an affirmation of the positive value of either “immanence” or “transcendence” but rather a (re)valuation of deferral, the ongoing pursuit of a signifier, a name, that is not already determined by those terms, fails to signify in those terms and mutates those terms and their grammar beyond recognition. as the novel unfolds, ti-jeanne gradually relinquishes a fantasy of the will (unified and rational self-directed subjectivity), or sovereignty, as the seat of agency, a fantasy perhaps all the more beguiling because of the ways abandonment, disposability, and segregation act to ensure life’s irresolution in the burn, an irresolution that extends into existence as the ever-presence of dreadful anticipation, psychic diremption, and (dis)possession of the flesh. ultimately, ti-jeanne discovers that receptivity to and assumption of the orishas as ontological co-constituents may not only provide a means for survival but may offer a sense of life beyond mere survival. thus, ti-jeanne’s (dis)abling predicament, or vertiginous state, provides ti-jeanne some other mode of relating where the other is neither an agent of your aggrandizement nor of your diminishment but the arrival of the inoperability of the binary between the two and a suspension of relation on those terms, thus making way for the unforeseen. going deeper into blackness rather than fleeing its trace, brown girl in the ring is an allegory for unsettling modes of cognition and sense-making that authorize antiblack metaphysics. antiblack metaphysics, as foreclosure, positions the existence of blackened reality beyond the conceptual borders of the dialectical encounter that underwrites representationalism’s hegemonic processes of worlding. however, the novel does not simply advocate one representationalist schema, presumed to be more comprehensive or offer more accurate representations of existing entities, over another; rather, it allegorizes the potential enabling effects of disordering the hegemonic mode of reality and self-world relation. in brown girl in the ring, ti-jeanne must forego faith in the idea that there is an all-encompassing transcendental structure—“reality,” “the world,” “truth”—that settles matters of existence once and for all. instead, she measures claims to existence based on their metaphorical resonance and ontological effects upon a world within "the world." in ineluctable co-constitution, where self and world are internal (but not reducible) to each other, what arrangement of existence, modes of relationality, and agential possibilities emerge? rather than assume that the epistemic purchase of inquiry into ontology resides in the measurable distance between representation and referent, ti-jeanne asks, instead, what worldings do particular ontological claims (dis)enable? in this important sense, ti-jeanne’s reorientation to the question of world serves as an analytic for interrogating what representationalism claims to do.44 in conclusion, in brown girl in the ring, vertigo functions as the precipice of a new consciousness and “inchoate theoretics” (scott, 2010, p. 64)—where “sense and non-sense have yet to be differentiated” (marriott, 2014, p. 522). vertigo provides an alternative to “the tyrannies of our common reality,” where positivist knowledge is forged through epistemic coercion, expropriation, and relations of direct domination (scott, 2010, p. 26). i have argued that western science and philosophy’s foundational authority and the reproduction of the scientific matrix of classification necessitates and is maintained by the recursive symbolic foreclosure of the black mater(nal) and dislocation of black gender, maternity, and sexuality in hegemonic philosophies of ontology. vertigo, here, is a measure and means for the disordering and inoperability of a metaphysics that takes the black mater(nal)’s nonrepresentability as its enabling condition. in vertigo, we may limn the potential to queer metaphysics via a transvaluation of (human) being and a reconfiguration of gendered sexual embodiment by means of an emergent sensorium. disordering metaphysics, and metaphysics disordered: “ti-jeanne felt the gears slipping between the two worlds” (hopkinson, 1998, p. 19). in this, ti-jeanne’s vertigo is both the apprehension of unlived possibilities and the salvific eruption into consciousness of discredited sensation, of other ways of living, other modes of life that provide a dizzying sense of vivifying potentiality.   notes 1 i use the term “local” not to signify “isolation” or a lack of politically complex encounters with discontinuous onto-epistemologies near and far; rather, the use of “local” here is meant in the relative sense given the relatively recent emergence of the planetary scale introduced by processes of enslavement and imperial domination. see, for instance, jayasuriya & pankhurst (2003), jayasuriya (2008), and alpers (2009). i thank lamonda horton-stallings for bringing these texts to my attention. see gayatri spivak’s (1999) a critique of postcolonial reason for her use of “epistemic violence.” 2 robinson crusoe, oroonoko, and the blazing world in english and don quxiote in spanish have been variously described as the first novels in either english or spanish. sinapia is generally regarded as the first spanish utopia, and blazing world, similarly, is often considered the first work of science fiction. 3 to take but one example, in a process that contemporarily often goes by the name of biopiracy or bioprospecting, western biomedicine and pharmaceutical corporations “discover,” expropriate, and recast indigenous knowledge of plant and animal species. through the enactment of purportedly secular rituals of copyright, patent, and commercialization, indigenous knowledge is cleaved from the onto-epistemologies with which it is embedded, and once purified this newly repackaged knowledge is then prepared for sale and distribution in accordance with market logics. see mgbeoji (2014) and shiva (2016). 4 many thanks to amanda renée rico for bringing to my attention the jessica langer text. 5 definitions of “postcolonial sf” vary. for instance, in science fiction, imperialism and the third world, andy sawyer's "forward," (2010) suggests that "an explicitly postcolonial science fiction not only has to be written from outside the traditional strands of western science fiction ... but explained and criticized from outside them too” (p.1-2), and hoagland and sarwal's (2010) "introduction" more broadly defines postcolonial sf as "texts that draw such explicit and critical attention to how imperialist history is constructed and maintained" (p. 10). on postcolonial sf see, raja et. al. (2011) and hopkinson & mehan (2004). david higgins’s (2014) review of science fiction, imperialism and the third world provides a productive introduction to some of the issues regarding definition. 6 the black mater(nal), as mater, as matter, gestures towards a web of interconnected signifiers such as materiality, black femininity, maternity, natality, and relation to the mother. 7 for more on the racialized distinction between immanence and transcendence, "belief” and “scientific fact,” see bruno latour’s (2010) “on the cult of the factish gods.” 8 for a fuller discussion of raciality in hegel’s arguments on world history, please see denise ferreira da silva’s (2007) superb reading of hegel in toward a global idea of race. 9 andrews (2015) and colucciello barber’s (2013) respective deleuzian approaches to immanence attempt to think the fullness of immanence and problematize historical, hierarchical dualisms between transcendence and immanence. however, this essay seeks to identify the powerful and seemingly inescapable ways that the reciprocal productions of race and gender haunt both the ongoing perpetuation of this dualism and its critiques as the very terms themselves are racialized and gendered. 10 this argument is informed by jacques derrida’s important work in of grammatology and margins of philosophy concerning “structure of absence” and “différance.” 11 i thank vanessa agard-jones for urging me to think more about what space is doing in this work. 12 my use of the term “myth” is primarily informed by hortense spillers’s (1987) concept of “mythic time” in “mama’s baby, papa’s maybe,” which reworks the concept of myth in roland barthes’s mythologies. in spillers’s deployment of myth, black femaleness is the iterative and recursive material-discursive site, where the dominant system of values variably (re)produces itself in “mythic time” rather than in a temporally-and/or socially-progressivist manner. however, a number of scholars have written about myth in brown girl primarily as it relates to folklore and religious studies, works that do not emphasize the social structural function of myth in the sense that spiller’s does and i extend. see, for example, coleman (2009), baker (2004), and anatol (2004). 13 besides spillers, morrison, crenshaw, wynter, and hammonds’s indispensible engagements with the problem of black(ened) female sexuation in the field of representation, namely that “she” is both essential to the dominant mode and grammar of representation and necessarily invisible, meg armstrong (1996) provides an excellent introduction to the role of black women in kant and burke’s theorizations of the sublime. this is a topic i take up at great length in forthcoming work in philosophia. on blackness and kantian thought, see ronald judy (1991). 14 as the black mater(nal) cannot be comprehended as a unified object with definite identifiable endpoints, it invokes the infinite in size and power, appearing boundless on both registers, and, therefore, resists a mental form in the mind or imagination as well as understanding or conceptualization. moreover, one could not “know” the serialized empirical content of the black mater(nal) in its all at-once-ness or as it presumably exists but only in its serialized conception, which due to processual capacities of thought and human finitude would always remain incomplete. a book that names and engages this challenge via the question of “the world” and the infinity of things is markus gabriel’s why the world does not exist (2015). this essay invokes the aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and sublime as they are read in kant’s "critique of aesthetic judgment" in the third critique. while i am neither strictly adhering here to kant’s philosophy nor the influential philosophical inquiries into the sublime offered by edmund burke and jean-françois lyotard, the question of how the black female figure constitutes and disrupts these powerful analyses is taken up in forthcoming work in philosophia. 15 the phrase “modern grammar of representation” represents my attempt to think with and alongside hortense spiller’s (1987) “american grammar” and denise da silva’s (2007) “modern grammar” and “modern representation.” 16 on the notion of performance/performativity, here i am thinking with karen barad (2003) who states the following: “[t]he representationalist belief in the power of words to mirror preexisting phenomena is a metaphysical substrate that supports social constructivist, as well as traditional realist, beliefs…a performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent preexisting things…the move toward performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature of culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions” (p. 802). 17 see bruno latour and steve woolgar’s laboratory life: the construction of scientific fact (2013) for a critique calling into question the presumed primacy of the scientific method in the practice of science. latour and woolgar find that representation is constituted alongside practice at every level and that experiments are not rigidly performed or regulated in accordance with “scientific method.” on the contrary, experiments typically produce inconclusive results and much scientific fact is constructed during the subjective process of deciding which results to include and exclude. 18 see robert heinlein’s (1977) definition of science fiction, for instance: "realistic speculation about possible future events, based solidly on adequate knowledge of the real world, past and present, and on a thorough understanding of the nature and significance of the scientific method. to make this definition cover all science fiction (instead of 'almost all') it is necessary only to strike out the word 'future'” (p. 9). 19 my argument about “nonrepresentability” is in conversation with and indebted to a tradition of black feminist and queer theorizing on the problem of representation: evelynn hammonds’s (1994) formulation of “black (w)holes,” and hortense spillers’s (1987) analysis of “body-flesh” and “mythic time.” in a current book project, i am delineating how this argument builds on and relates to hammonds’s and spillers’s analyses, in particular. similarly, black feminists and gender theorists such as sylvia wynter (1990) and kimberlé crenshaw (1991) have also produced indispensable analysis of the modern injunction against the black mater(nal)’s representability as an enabling condition of the modern representational grammar. more recently, kara keeling (2007) and rizvana bradley (2015) have produced energizing new work on the relation between black femininity and capacity through a critical engagement with black women’s filmic representations. lacan (1993) uses the term foreclosure to investigate the possible psychical causes of psychosis. he locates the cause of psychosis in the absence of the (symbolic) father from the scene of oedipal family, thereby limiting the family to the mother-child dyad. he concludes that the absence of the father or the name-of-the-father is the central causal factor for psychosis, which is understood as a severed connection or disjuncture between the symbolic, imaginary, and the real. i am not using the term foreclosure in this strict lacanian sense. my use is more informed by the aforementioned black feminist investigations of the burdened sublimity of the black mater(nal). 20 my thanks to kyla wazana tompkins for this felicitous phrase. michel foucault is famous for his conceptualization of power’s lability and distributed agency. here, i am interested in theorizing that which michel foucault (1982) would not, namely domination. foucault famously equivocated before ultimately sidestepping the question of agency under conditions of domination. prior to quickly shifting and remaining with the question of power’s relational forms and dynamics, foucault vacillates: he argues in one place that domination is the calcification of relation and, therefore, can neither be the proper site of an inquiry into the dynamics of power nor of relationality but rather their disablement (1982); but elsewhere he allows for some modicum of relational capacity and distributed agency to exist in domination (1997). my aim is not so much to settle the question of capacity and/or relationality; rather, what i am more interested in exploring concerns how movement at the ontic register of experience does or does not alter the nature of domination and its ontologized terms in brown girl in the ring. 21 this article is an adapted excerpt from a chapter of my book-in-progress tentatively titled the blackness of space between matter and meaning. the chapter-length engagement with the text closely reads additional scenes in the text and makes other claims about black female gender, biotechnology, and representation in the novel. 22 see jasbir puar (2009) on "debility." 23 giselle liza anatol (2004) has noted, “one of the great strides that hopkinson makes in her narrative is not only subverting the idea of the innately maternal woman, but specifically debunking the contradictory european constructions of african-descended women as (a) hyper-maternal mammies and (b) genetically apathetic, cold-hearted, and emotionally distant mothers: stereotypes generated during the slave era and continuing into the present day in various forms” (p. 33). 24 see wynter’s “miranda” (1990) and “ceremony” (1984) for an articulation of black matter’s signification as chaos and irrationality in the discourses of man. 25 black maternity and madness had become nearly synonymous for ti-jeanne. ti-jeanne even initially wonders about her own “waking dreams,” if they were brought on by “the stress of learning how to cope with a newborn baby” (p. 20). 26 kelli moore (forthcoming) is also currently writing on proprioception in light of spiller’s scholarship. moore’s emphasis on the gap between voice and vision in black women’s testimony in domestic violence cases inspired me to at least begin to think about how said gap might function in hopkinson’s text. 27 while ti-jeanne’s development as a character pivots on this conflict, it is starkly conveyed in how ti-jeanne saw mami’s “bush medicine” in comparison to western bioscientific medicine. while mami used both as a healer and a formally trained nurse, “ti-jeanne didn’t place too much stock in mami’s bush doctor remedies.” …ti-jeanne would have preferred to rely on commercial drugs….ti-jeanne didn’t understand why mami insisted on trying to teach her all that old-time nonsense” (pp. 36-37). but it was commercial western medicine’s imbrication in commercial networks and state power that threatened to dissolve the already fragile familial relations she had. this is a topic, along with xenotransplantation and zoonosis, discussed at length in the chapter-length version of this paper. i thank darius bost and alvin henry for helping me develop this point and for being such great sounding boards for this work. 28 for synthetic and critical engagement with this topic, see see strother (1998) and gikandi (2003).  29 wallace’s essay is productively riven with deep ambivalence and unsettled conclusions, but in addition to this view, she expresses a conviction that it is indeed possible (and even desirable) for these collections to be made available to black artists in the west, who may (and arguably already have) discover(ed) generative models in the ruins. 30 see also gikandi’s (2003) discussion of the meeting of guyanese painter aubrey williams and canonical artist pablo picasso. upon being introduced to williams, picasso looked at him and remarked that he had “a fine african head” that he would like to use as a model. gikandi notes the following about that encounter: “williams was disappointed that he was appealing to picasso merely as an object or subject of art, not as an artist, not as a body, not even as a human subject” (pp. 455-456). 31 see hartman (2008). 32 in after finitude, quentin meillassoux (2010) defines correlation as “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (p. 5). i am thinking here not only of kant’s “on the different races of man” (1997) and “on national characteristics” (1997) but also of hegel’s “geographical basis of world history” (1997) and their elaborate and fallacious reasoning, whereby geography, reason, and time become the watchwords of an emergent, racially-teleological conception of “universality” and “world.” see eze (1997) for these essays. 33 eduardo vivieros de castro (2014) also contends that the terms through which kant raises the question of “correlationism” must be de-transcendentalized because the self-other frame through which the question is cast is not universal but particular. with vivieros de castro, my argument is related. i agree that kant’s mode of questioning is neither universal nor should it be transcendentalized, but more than that, i seek to explore the manner in which his mode of inquiry is an effect of an imperial history and rationality. morever, meillasoux, in a critique of correlationism, defines it as “the idea according to which we only have access to the correlation between thinking and being and never to either term considered apart from the other” (2010, p. 5). while not the aim of this essay, i hope one consequence of these pages is a disruption of the “thought vs. world” frame of the debate about correlationism. on noise, see serres (1983). 34 fred moten’s (2003) work is indispensible on the question of blackness and object-status. 35 this paragraph is taken almost in its entirety from an article i wrote entitled “outer worlds” (2015). 36 the phrase “hieroglyphics of the flesh” is taken from hortense spiller’s “mama’s baby, papa’s maybe” (1987). 37 see the following works that question 18th century eurocentric aesthetic standards for “art” and that centralize the internal forces of change producing formal dynamism rather than attributing innovation to relations with the west (especially strothers who cites other scholars working in a similar vein): strother (1998), achebe (2012), and arnoldi (1988). see da silva’s towards a global idea of race (2007) for the insidiousness of the “culture” concept in the human sciences: “[t]he racial, the nation, and the cultural—fulfill the same signifying task of producing collectivities as particular kinds of modern subjects. each, however, has very distinct effects of signification: (a) the racial produces modern subjects as an effect of exterior determination, which institutes an irreducible and unsublatable difference; (b) the nation produces modern subjects as an effect of historical (interior) determination, which assumes a difference that is resolved in an unfolding (temporal) transcendental essence; but (c) the cultural is more complex in its effects because it can signify either or both” (p. xxxvii). 38 the phrase “out of the world” is taken from achille mbembe’s on the postcolony (2001). 39 this quote is drawn from wynter’s (2001) reading of fanon’s reading of himself on the occasions when he had “to meet the white man’s eyes” (fanon, 2008, p. 110), as a prelude to the failure of intersubjectivity, at least one that would be occasioned by the black’s ontological resistance. here, i altered gendered designations to accord with the focus of my analysis. wynter also notes in the preceding page the gendered specificity of fanon’s narration of his experience of antiblackness, as well as what is shared across lines of gender: “while the black man must experience himself as the defect of the white man—as must the black woman vis a vis the white woman—neither the white man or woman can experience himself/herself in relation to the black man/black woman in any way but as that fullness and genericity of being human, yet a genericity that must be verified by the clear evidence of the latter’s lack of this fullness, of this genericity. the qualitative aspects of the two group’s mental states with respect to their respective experiences of the sense of self are not only opposed, but dialectically so; each quality of subjective experience, the one positive, the other negative, depends on the other” (p. 40). in these pages, i am interested in how the black mater(nal)’s nonrepresentability enables this entire field of antinomic dualisms. 40 it is more interesting, and perhaps more relevant, to investigate the racial logic of boas’s empiricism here, given both the common assumption that the “science of culture” established a decisive break with scientific racism as well as the pride of place anthropological translation holds in the scholarship on hopkinson’s writing. however, this investigation could easily extend to the empiricism of david hume, commonly described as the founder of empiricism, and perhaps does so by implication as hume is well-known for the likening of a multilingual black man to a parrot. michael hanchard (1999) comments upon the infamous analogy in the following: “…hume’s cryptic commentary has dual significance, for it implies that the only civilizational possibilities for people of african descent were reactive and imitative. the act of mimicry itself, its subversive and infra-political implications notwithstanding, entails a temporal disjuncture. in historical and civilizational terms, africans in the aggregate could—at best—aspire to caricature. they could only mimic the aggregate european” (p. 252). 41 a number of critics have noted that the depiction of the orisha in brown girl does not appear to re-present any practicing tradition but rather the “blending,” “fusing,” and “dissolving of the boundaries in religious practices” as a “basis for a unique pan-caribbean identity” [see coleman (2009)]. or as wood (2005) has noted, “tracing specific religious references seems to become an academic enterprise” as the novel’s religious pantheon appears to perform in such a way as to undermine our “ability to ‘place’ or locate these deities and practices” (p. 319). 42 in contrast, please see robert farris thompson’s flash of the spirit: african and afro-american art and philosophy (1984) for his highly-influential argument mapping cultural continuities and what are called “survivals” between west african religion, particularly yoruba religion, and “new world” religious and cultural practice. this process of transcription is mapped in spatio-temporal terms—from a putative african past to a (presumably western) modernity—such that when africans, even “ancient” africans, possess cultural properties ascribed to “modernity,” those properties are still framed in comparative terms that presume the “modern” is proper to the west. furthermore, in framing its intervention in terms of a disruption of a commonly-held assumption that finds africa lacking vis-a-vis signifiers of “modernity,” its corrective misses an opportunity to fundamentally call into question the mode of thought that seeks to distinguish and order a relational hierarchy between “primitive” and “modern” technologies and lifeworlds. in short, it recasts rather than forestalls a hierarchical binary between “modernity” and “tradition,” bestowing the “traditional” with a positively-inflected alternative value—that of transcendence. moreover, in building an argument about the yoruba’s “transcendence” over the violence of the middle passage and colonial violence, for instance, it fails to adequately account for the disruptive and creative power of history, thus obscuring the dynamics of change that accompany “yoruba” practice. for a related set of critiques of anthropological claims to continuity, see david scott, “an obscure miracle of connection” (1999) and “that event, this memory: notes on the anthropology of african diasporas in the new world” (1991). and, of course “invention” here alludes to v.y. mudimbe’s (1988) important book, the invention of africa: gnosis, philosophy, and the order of knowledge. 43 here i am in agreement with scott’s (1999) contention, in a gloss of his first book, formations of ritual: “the argument (one, it seems to me, still not sufficiently recognized) was that anthropological objects are not simply given in advance of anthropological projects, but are constructed in conceptual and ideological domains that themselves have histories—very often colonial histories. my point, therefore, was that unless anthropology attends, in an ongoing and systematic way, to the problem of the conceptual-ideological formation of the objects that constitute its discourse, it will not be able to avoid the reproduction of colonialist discourse” (p. 13). see also omi’seke tinsley’s “black atlantic, queer atlantic” (2008), which also calls into question the middle passage as “origin” (p. 192). the term “science of culture” is taken from the often-described founder of cultural anthropology, edward burnett tylor. his highly influential primitive culture (1871) developed the thesis of “animism” and is known for being the first-systematic empirical study of the topic. tylor describes the reformist mandate of anthropological science as follows: “[w]here barbaric hordes groped blindly, cultured men can often move onward with clear view. it is a harsher, and at times even painful office of ethnography to expose the remains of crude old cultures which have passed into harmful superstition, and to mark these out for destruction. yet this work, if less genial, is not less urgently needful for the good of mankind. thus, active at once in aiding progress and in removing hindrance, the science of culture is essentially a reformer's science” (p.453). 44 other critics in (feminist) science studies have raised 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(1971). novel and history, plot and plantation. savacou, 5, 95-102. wynter, s. (1984). the ceremony must be found: after humanism. boundary, 2, 19-70. wynter, s. (1990). beyond miranda’s meanings: un/silencing the “demonic ground” of caliban’s women. in c.b. davies & e.s. fido (eds.), out of the kumbla: caribbean women and literature (pp. 355-372). trenton, nj: africa world press. wynter, s. (1995). 1492: a new world view. in v.l. hyatt & r. nettleford (eds.), race, discourse, and the origin of the americas: a new world view (pp. 5-57). washington, d.c.: smithsonian institution press. wynter, s. (1996). genital mutilation or symbolic birth—female circumcision, lost origins, and the aculturalism of feminist/western thought. case w. res. l. rev., 47(2), 501-552. wynter, s. (2001). towards the sociogenic principle: fanon, identity, the puzzle of conscious experience, and what it is like to be “black”. in m.f. durán-cogan & a. gómez-moriana (eds.), national identities and sociopolitical changes in latin america (pp. 30-66). london, routledge. bio zakiyyah iman jackson is assistant professor of black feminist theory, literature, and criticism in the english department at george mason university and affiliate faculty in women and gender studies. professor jackson has published work in feminist studies (2014), glq (2011 and 2015), and has forthcoming work in qui parle: critical humanities and social sciences.     original research thinking post-developmental pedagogies with physical activity pedagogical resources—or, how might we entangle pedagogies and physiological knowledges differently?     nicole land school of early childhood studies, ryerson university nland@ryerson.ca     abstract thinking with a canadian physical activity pedagogical resource, this article proposes that post-developmental early childhood education pedagogies can engage with physiological sciences beyond the instructive or instrumental relationships currently facilitated by contemporary physical activity pedagogies. to begin, i bring feminist science studies together with post-developmental pedagogies to detail how pedagogy and physiology become intertwined. i trace the tensions of weaving physiological knowledges with pedagogies, acknowledging the power-laden complexities of thinking with euro-western sciences in canadian education. finally, i work through two propositions aimed at making physiological knowledges differently entangled with the complexities of post-developmental pedagogies: (1) crafting physiological knowledges as a problem with pedagogies, while (2) deploying these physiological knowledges as pedagogical provocations that call us to engage differently with physiological knowledges.     keywords post-developmental pedagogies, physiological knowledges, feminist science studies, physical education     introduction this article proposes that post-developmental early childhood education pedagogies can engage with physiological sciences in an effort to unsettle the hegemonic stability of predominant physical activity pedagogies that are underpinned by scientific epistemologies. i organize my argument in two primary movements that echo the intentions of early childhood education post-developmental pedagogies to both trace existing educational trajectories (the beginning section) and orient toward inventing speculative, situated responses to complex worlds (the concluding section) (nxumalo, vintimilla, and nelson 2018; vintimilla and pacini-ketchabaw 2020). i situate this paper within the context of thinking with post-developmental pedagogies (land 2020; land et al. 2020; pacini-ketchabaw, kind, and kocher 2016), which are pedagogies that propose relations that engage with children beyond the linear, ageand stage-based, normalizing logics of child development (burman 2016; moss 2016; pacini-ketchabaw, nxumalo, kocher, elliot and sanchez 2015) in canadian early childhood education. i do this because early childhood education is a space where scientific knowledges entangle with pedagogical practices through various concerns, including, for example, health, nutrition, and physical activity. further, because post-developmental pedagogies work to resist the universalizing, instrumental tendencies of developmental theories by offering situated, local, tentative responses to inherited educational structures, i focus on one physiology-informed curricular resource relevant to early childhood education in canada. throughout the article, my central argument is that taking physiological knowledges to account with post-developmental pedagogies entangles physiology with the ethical and political concerns of post-developmental early childhood education, thus working physiological knowledges to account with pedagogical questions, tensions, and answerabilities that complexify the epistemic structures that typically govern scientific knowledges in early childhood education. i hope that the propositions this article offers will open space for generating locally meaningful experiments in weaving pedagogies with physiologies differently in other contexts.   i begin by discussing how physiology, as a powerful euro-western knowledge, perpetuates colonial epistemic hierarchies and maintains neoliberal conceptions of normative, individualized “health.” digging into how physiological sciences, practices of mainstream physical education, and early childhood education pedagogies become entangled in contemporary euro-western worlds, i turn to a canadian physical activity pedagogical resource, the canadian 24-hour movement guidelines for children and youth developed by the healthy active living and obesity group (halo) of the children’s hospital of eastern ontario (cheo) research institute, the canadian society for exercise physiology (csep), participaction, the conference board of canada, and the public health agency of canada. while each organization provides public access to these guidelines (hereafter referred to as “the guidelines”), in this article i will refer to the version of the guidelines shared on the canadian society for exercise physiology website (2016a). the guidelines function as a document created for educators, professionals, and guardians that shares information on the intensity, type, and duration of physical activity recommended for children. i trace how physiology and pedagogy become intertwined in this resource and detail how these physiology-pedagogy entanglements enable specific educational practices.   in the second part of the article, i put forward one attempt at working a physiological knowledge—excess post-exercise oxygen consumption (or epoc)—differently with early childhood education pedagogies. briefly, excess post-exercise oxygen consumption is an exercise science theory that alleges that once a bout of exercise is complete, a human body continues to “burn” calories to restore the body to its original resting state. following angela willey, a feminist science studies scholar, i formulate a partial “vision of what it might look like to politicize scientific knowledge production in a way that allows for an answerability, an accountability, beyond the realm of internal critique that science as we know it lacks” (2016, 14). i think with epoc as one physiological knowledge that underpins the canadian 24-hour movement guidelines for children and youth. translating willey’s (2016) proposition into early childhood education, early childhood education pedagogies can engage, think, and ask questions with epoc beyond the interpretative or instrumental frames that typically inform how pedagogies and physiology converse. i work through two propositions that bring post-developmental pedagogies and physiological knowledges together in an unfamiliar way: (1) crafting physiological knowledges as a problem with pedagogies, while (2) deploying these physiological knowledges as pedagogical provocations that might create different possibilities for engaging with physiological knowledges in early childhood education. throughout this article, i make the necessary contractions of my work public, as i detail my situated, small intervention into how specific physiological knowledges become entangled with specific pedagogical practices in euro-western canada. i want to imagine an educational practice where we (those who actively participate in pedagogies: researchers, educators, children, families) make physiology differently answerable to the multiple critiques that nourish post-developmental education while creating differently accountable practices of relating with physiological knowledges.   physiology and pedagogies: csep’s movement guidelines for children and youth pedagogical resources that tout physical activity recommendations, outline physical literacy programming, and detail the necessity of educating young children in healthy nutrition habits are increasingly prevalent in canadian early childhood education. these include the canadian 24-hour movement guidelines for children and youth (csep, 2016a), healthy opportunities for preschoolers by temple and preece (2007), and healthy beginnings for preschoolers 2–5 from the chronic disease prevention alliance of canada (n.d.). the guidelines contain four core recommendations: sweat, step, sleep, and sit. related to physical activity, the sweat guideline outlines how long children should be highly active (“an accumulation of at least 60 minutes per day of moderate to vigorous physical activity” [2]), while the step category details additional required physical activity (“several hours of a variety of structured and unstructured light physical activities” [2]). the guidelines note that children and youth should follow these recommendations “for optimal health benefits” (2). targeted toward younger children, csep’s physical activity guidelines for the early years (n.d.) detail physical activity recommendations for toddlers, setting the developmentally rooted groundwork for the guidelines’ prescriptions for moderate to vigorous physical activity by recommending “progression toward at least 60 minutes of energetic play by 5 years of age” (para. 1). the intended audience for the guidelines includes educators, practitioners, and guardians. rooted in a developmental perspective of childhood, where growth and skill development are assessed against a “healthy” or “typical” norm and are universalizable across various children’s bodies, the guidelines are intended to provide a reference for early childhood curriculum and policy. while none of these documents explicitly refer to epoc in their public-facing literature, the assertion that epoc is desirable and happens in concert with vigorous (high energy, demanding) exercise (or play) is one of the many physiological knowledges that underpins these guidelines.   detailing physiology as a euro-western knowledge physiology—as one knowledge production apparatus of euro-western settler colonial epistemic hegemony (haraway and subramaniam 2021; lyons et al. 2017; mckittrick 2021; roy and subramaniam 2016; sanabria 2016; tallbear 2013; willey 2016)—is the science of how a living body functions. i think with physiology in this article because it is a core knowledge that informs mainstream physical education pedagogy. as a euro-western knowledge system, physiology sustains a specific scheme of bodied regulation. physiology is utilized to dictate criteria for normative and legitimate bodied subjectivity, which translates into governmental constructions of citizenship and personhood, which can be achieved through individualized predictable, quantifiable behaviors (guthman 2013; herndon 2005; kendrick 2011). physiology often matters as a tool of governance, owing to histories and present inheritances of settler colonialism that perpetuate euro-western beliefs about knowledge hierarchies as they create ranking systems that place (what is uncontestably understood to be) rational, objective scientific knowledges as the most contemporary, leading-edge form of knowledge. historically, this “true” knowledge of physiology was utilized to govern bodies and subjectivities, as ethnographic methods grounded in physiological “truths” informed how indigenous, black, brown, asian, disabled, queer, and lower-class bodies were classified as aberrant, unhealthy, unintelligent, and in need of intervention or control (briggs 2003; fausto-sterling 2000; haraway 1990; harding 1994, 2016). such a history is not over; physiology and the body heralded by mainstream science remain a mechanism of structural governance.   while an exhaustive survey of the myriad methods that physiology utilizes as a tool of centering euro-western knowledges and subjectivities is beyond the scope of this article, taking inspiration from many outlines of how science unfurls itself as a technique of governance (haraway 2013; harding 2006; lebesco 2011; whitt 2009), a summary would proceed as follows: physiology functions amid truth-driven ontologies by making biochemical agencies and flesh visible in strategic, quantifiable ways (for example, lean muscle mass), which are then classified as normative or pathological based on euro-western state-endorsed understandings of race, health, function, and disease (lean = healthy), which then translates into socially sanctioned criteria for subjecthood and bodied legitimacy (people with lean bodies are desirable citizens). these ongoing familiar, but differently lived, arrangements of knowledge, bodies, pathologization, individuation, and desirability create a recursive system, where physiology makes visible a biochemical mechanism or measure as consequential (lean muscle mass), thus sustaining the need for physiological inquiry in order to ensure the optimal normative functioning of said mechanism (we need to fully understand lean muscle mass physiologically, to ensure more people can work toward gaining lean muscle mass).   in canada, euro-western epistemological traditions, physiology, and other structures that center whiteness as normative overlap to enact settler colonial oppressions targeting indigenous and minoritized communities (allan and smylie 2015; reading and wien 2013; smylie and firestone 2015). this leads to a multitude of physiology-validated (and sustaining) intrusions, including interventions promoting “healthy” physical activity, which act as thinly veiled tools of reasserting settler valuations of bodied legitimacy, desirability, and citizenship (rice 2016; russell, 2020; ward, beausoliel, and heath 2017). physiological evaluations of “healthy” or “ideal” bodies position (male, physically able) white settler bodies as a “normative” benchmark. this supposed ideal designates non-“normal” bodies as less legitimate and less desirable, thus lending a science-based rationale to the historical and ongoing systemic oppression—murder, genocide, slavery, sterilization, relocation, erasure, program and funding disparities—faced by indigenous peoples, immigrants, refugees, and people of color. physiology has been utilized to abstract ancestry to blood quantum, to rob reproductive agency based on skin color, and to maintain the validity of race-based genetic predispositions to what is perceived as moral failing or bodied weakness, such as epidemiological ethnic vulnerability to obesity, anemia, or substance use. in the particular context of thinking childhoods, physiology intersects with child development to dictate “healthy” trajectories of growth and to shape children’s relations with their bodies toward achieving an “ideal” normative body (burrows and wright 2007). this is why thinking with how we engage physiology in the context of canadian early childhood education matters: physiology is a non-innocent knowledge with highly impactful lived consequences.   one site where these consequences of physiology become lived in education is in physical activity or movement curriculum. as mckay, gore, and kirk (2012) argue, physical education resources increasingly integrate scientific insights in an attempt to legitimize physical activity teaching as “valid” amid colonial constructions of scholarly knowledge, thus centering the euro-western scientific knowledge that holds great power and ubiquity. azzarito et al. (2017) contend that physical education curriculum obscures the complexities of moving bodies by ensuring that “specific bodies and identities in relation to the health discourse are normalized, celebrated, and legitimized in pedagogical settings (i.e., school pe) through many acts of reinforcement and reiteration” (2016, 7). particular to canadian early childhood education, physical activity pedagogical resources, including the guidelines, enact the political consequences of physiology through their reiteration of a particular, normalizing response to the question, who can the child be? burrows and wright (2020), following harwood (2009), name these classed, gendered, ableist reiterations as biopedagogies: the pedagogical contours given to (normative, developmental, non-innocent) scientific knowledges as they become enacted in the name of health in education. the guidelines participate in these reiterations as they center neoliberal conceptions of children as future citizens, personal responsibility, bodied legitimacy, and quantifiable educational attainment (dahlberg and moss 2004), and as declarations that early childhood education pedagogies must teach children the skills they need to be healthy or pedagogies that promote fundamental movement skills and fitness are crucial for children’s healthy development become wrapped in affirmations of morality, care, and teleological learning that make them risky to contest. for example, the csep (2016b) accompaniment to the guidelines purports that reaching the recommended sixty minutes of activity can help children “improve their health,” “maintain a healthy body weight,” “do better in school,” “feel happier,” and “have fun playing with friends” (para. 13). these professed benefits invest in dominant developmental euro-western narratives of childhood as a period where children gain the skills they need to become successful and valued citizens within a neoliberal state (azzarito 2009; rich 2011). in turn, the guidelines strategically delimit the possibilities for thinking physical activity pedagogically because pedagogies must properly teach physical activity in order to produce healthy children.   when physical education pedagogical resources are made indisputable by the assumed validity and efficacy of science-informed information, the background knowledges and practices that sustain their unquestionability are recursively bolstered. complex material-discursive enactments (barad 2007) of health, fitness, children, and teaching are framed as fixed, true, and common educational touchstones. the vast, lively, and deeply contestable knowledge-generating practices that underlie these pedagogies, including the physiological sciences that bolster mainstream conceptions of health and fitness, cannot easily become an accessible or worthy concern for pedagogical practice (land and danis 2016; petherick and beausoleil 2016; rich 2011). if posed, questions of why children should participate in prescribed physical activities are answered with a gesture toward evidence-based research, coupled with an assumption that the ontological supremacy of the scientific canon negates any critical impulse.   concealing how physiology entangles with pedagogies by curating the foundational features of physical activity pedagogies that can become subject to pedagogical purview, dominant physical education pedagogies ensure their educational authority and secure the dominance of settler-colonial onto-epistemological paradigms. when pedagogical resources are framed as well-founded and incontestable dictates (“optimal health benefits” can be achieved by following the guidelines), debating the (physiological, ontological, ethical) principles that underpin their content becomes unnecessary. this constructed certainty, whereby it is the curriculum, recommendation, or practice and not the composition of that curricular formation that is made to be perceptible, in turn, brackets the possibilities for critically engaging these pedagogies. foundational investigations and the scientific knowledges they produce are silently woven through the guidelines. gestures in the form of citations are made to background studies but each study’s particular conceptualizations, assumptions, borders, outcomes, and affordances are not centered beyond their utilization as evidence toward the veracity of the guidelines. while perhaps enacted in the name of (patronizing) accessibility, any overt attention to making public the epistemological mechanisms that give the guidelines the gravity they are habituated to assume is not present (ex: timmons, naylor, and pfeiffer 2007; tremblay, shephard, and brawley 2007). in highlighting this making invisible (or, making untouchable) of the messy, imperfect, lively bioscientific knowledges that underpin many predominant physical education and movement teaching approaches, i am focusing on how physiological sciences are not put at risk, and especially not beyond the conventional tools science employs to critique itself (validity, reliability, methodology), in how pedagogical resources typically engage with physiology.   there are a multitude of very important human-centered social justice critiques that make visible how these pedagogies are complicit in race, gender, fat, ability, and socioeconomic privilege-based oppression (azzarito, 2009; dagkas and hunter 2015; flintoff, dowling, and fitzgerald 2015; hylton 2015). for example, laura azzarito (2009) details how high school physical education pedagogies systematically perpetuate gendered and racialized constructions of ideal “fit” and “healthy” bodies. douglas and halas (2013) outline how post-secondary institutions center white, euro-western physical education researchers, which translates into a wealth of knowledge built of white, euro-western epistemologies, ontologies, and research biases. analyzing physical education curriculum, flintoff, dowling, and fitzgerald (2015) trace how curriculum policies conceal white privilege and euro-western knowledges into seemingly universalized, normative discourses of health and fitness. these are very important critiques. with my more explicit focus on complexifying physiology-pedagogy entanglements, i want to emphasize that by making only certain human-centered concerns accessible for critique, current methods for integrating physiology with pedagogies strategically conceal other contestable features of these pedagogies. this delimits the pedagogical possibilities for thinking movement, muscles, fitness, fat, and physiology critically and creatively.   what if we foreground the foundational onto-epistemological assumptions, practices, and knowledges that underpin physical activity pedagogies? the violent histories of decisions justified by science, the euro-western epistemological hierarchies that position science as objective or universalizable, the contemporary structures that produce and are produced by science as dominant knowledge—what happens when we commit to engaging science as a practice of both inheriting and hoping with pedagogies? willey proposes that “when we claim sciences, instead of ‘engaging’ them, the terrain shifts from one of how un/friendly feminists are to science to one of what a world of sciences has to offer, where so much is at stake” (2016, 146). reading willey’s argument with early childhood education pedagogies, to do the work of “claiming” sciences proposes that, in our pedagogical work, we might engage differently (tending to knowledge politics, ethics, consequences) with physiological knowledges, and contest science’s onto-epistemological projects, by intentionally noticing physiological knowledges as a lively pedagogical participant. i propose that refusing to let scientific assumptions hide behind physical education pedagogical resources might become a method for claiming, infiltrating, and taking to account how physiological knowledges entangle in problematic and productive ways with early childhood education pedagogies   the guidelines do not, in the form distributed to practitioners, make clear the physiology that serves as the foundation for the recommendations. while it should be noted that the guideline development report for the canadian 24-hour movement guidelines for children and youth by csep (2016b) is mentioned once in the preamble, in the guidelines points like “an accumulation of at least 60 minutes per day of moderate to vigorous physical activity” (2) are abstracted from the scientific customs that materialize their perceptibility. if the messiness behind this understanding of movement is concealed, the vulnerabilities it might hold are also made irrelevant to pedagogical concern. this allows for certain questions to become possible: who decides what counts as energetic play? how does this assessment devalue other forms of movement? how are gender, sex, race, ability, body size, access, and other power disparities addressed or perpetuated when “moderate to vigorous” physical activity is recommended? while these questions are critical and important, the guidelines make differently complex questions less accessible: what scientific practices facilitate this temporal frame of sixty minutes? what physiological conceptions make this “vigorous” intensity matter, and how do these metabolic activities become imbricated in meaning-making practices? what ways of getting to know movement are made imperceptible by the epistemic power afforded to physiology? if i do put stock in a recommendation for moderate to vigorous physical activity, how might the physiological foundations of this recommendation—and the knowledges, bodies, and consequences they engender—mesh with my pedagogical intentions?   intervening with/in physiology taking physiology to account with pedagogies, i confront singular, authoritative, and non-complex/complexifiable assertions of dominant physiological sciences as they matter in pedagogical resources and work to engage these knowledges beyond their claims to certainty. this article is certainly not the only project intervening with/in physiology. feminist interventions in euro-western science on an ontological level take up the practices of contemporary sciences (barad 2007; frost 2016; mol 2002; roy 2007; youdell 2017), arguing that science dis/invites critical engagements with interdisciplinary knowledges that unsettle the seemingly-unquestionable interpretative inevitability that euro-western sciences have come to bank on – and make bank from (haraway 2016; kirby 2013 mckittrick 2021; roy 2018; stengers 2010; wilson 2015). there are modes of living physiologies that refuse to lend physiology or the euro-western ontologies it compels a single breath stengers 2011): métis scholar zoe todd (2014) examines human-fish relationships to detail how fish can be engaged within expansive relational frameworks lived by indigenous peoples in arctic canada; banu subramaniam (2014) writes with flowers, tracing how her practices of plant physiology intertwine with different disciplines and gendered dynamics across india and america; vaginas are a site of kanien'keha:ka refusal with emily coon (2020), who thinks flesh beyond colonial gendered narratives of reproduction; and kim tallbear (2013) theorizes genomic knowledges with indigenous sciences and relationalities. from the biosciences come a multitude of feminist methodologies of doing science otherwise: tracing metabolisms (landecker 2011, 2013); heart feminism (pollock 2015); thinking fetal development as transdisciplinary relationality (yoshizawa 2016); and imagining epigenetics as obesity entanglements (warin et al. 2015). physiologists craft publications that contradict what the field once took to be true, troubling the underpinnings of the field they have pledged to sustain. feminist art interventions refigure what it is to live fleshed lives when physiology matters, as, for example, sabrina benaim (2017) writes poems made in the traffic of serotonin that animates her depression.   as i work to rethink how early childhood education pedagogies can engage with physiology, i can know, and this article can take up, some of these interventions in physiology. other alternative possibilities for physiologies, flesh, and life remain necessarily imperceptible to my work. i take this unevenly perceptible critical engagement as a making-real of willey’s plea to “recognize the importance of proliferating sciences (and not consolidating epistemic authority) to anti-imperial projects of worlding” (2016, 145). without grandiose claims, i offer my work up to other projects that critique science from a variety of ontological, epistemological, and methodological places, with the hope of working alongside them in this massive project of unsettling colonial hegemonies of euro-western science.   post-developmental pedagogies and physiological knowledges following from critical reconceptualist early years scholarship that has extricated pedagogy from universalized scientific evidence-based prescription (cannella 1997; dahlberg, moss, and pence 2013; kessler and swadener 1992; macnaughton 2000), post-developmental early childhood education orients toward pedagogies concerned with urgently inheriting the present complexities of contemporary worlds with children (blaise 2013; taguchi 2011; rautio and jokinen 2015; pacini-ketchabaw and blaise 2021; taylor and pacini-ketchabaw 2015). post-developmental conceptualizations of childhood begin from an appreciation of how stage-based theories of development, which claim that children reach adulthood through a series of universalized developmental milestones, privilege euro-western ontological and epistemological systems (burman 2016; dahlberg and moss 2004; macnaughton 2003). by constructing both childhood and development as common, linear, predictable, and stable experiences, scholars concerned with creating post-developmental pedagogies argue that euro-western developmental theories allow for precisely targeted education practices, which service settler colonial conceptions of citizenship, individualized responsibility, and productivity (land et al. 2020; pacini-ketchabaw, nxumalo, and rowan 2014; pacini-ketchabaw and taylor 2015). alternative understandings of childhood or education are devalued and silenced by developmental narratives (blaise, 2014), which, in a global and settler colonial context, leads to the imposition of euro-western “normative” expectations of childhood upon diverse children (blaise 2005; cannella and viruru 2004; nxumalo and adair 2019).   post-developmental pedagogies contend that education, childhood, and development are ongoing and plural, and made through different practices, epistemologies, and ontologies (blaise, hamm, and iorio 2017; pacini-ketchabaw, kind, and kocher 2016; rautio 2013). the post-developmental theorizing that i draw upon positions education as a specifically politicized, non-anthropocentric and humanism-refusing endeavor (iorio et al. 2017; nxumalo 2018; olsson 2012; taylor 2020). in contrast to the stable human-centered conceptions of education facilitated by developmentalism, post-developmental scholars maintain that pedagogy, childhood, bodies, and learning unfold with a multitude of human, material, and more-than-human actants (land and todorovic, 2020; macrae 2019; nelson, pacini-ketchabaw, and nxumalo 2018; pacini-ketchabaw, kind, and kocher 2016; rautio 2017). postdevelopmental scholars dissolve developmental constructions of gender (blaise 2005), literacy (nxumalo 2017), movement (hackett and rautio 2019), neurons (taguchi 2016), everyday scientific concepts such as force (de frietas and palmer 2016), and individualized responsibility (taylor 2017) into complex, entangled, intentional, always ongoing pedagogical negotiations—living knowledges (vintimilla, pacini-ketchabaw, and land 2021)—composed and responded with in situated collisions of children, adults, and place-based actants.   physiology, and the physiological knowledges that enable developmental logics, can serve as rich sites of intervention for post-developmental pedagogies. bringing post-developmental pedagogies’ insights toward my discussion of how physiology and pedagogies do, and might, become entangled, i argue that predominant relationships between physiology and pedagogies, such as those in the guidelines, can be reconfigured. when universalized physical activity recommendations lose their utility because the developmental assumptions underpinning them are made, to borrow from haraway (2016), unthinkable, then inherited physiological knowledges do not need to be buried under taken-for-granted curricula and sciences do not need to be ascribed the explanatory power they are accustomed to.   doing physiological knowledges with post-developmental pedagogies i experiment with two propositions for bringing physiological knowledges and pedagogies into unfamiliar, critical conversation: (1) taking physiological knowledges as a problem with pedagogy; while (2) generating pedagogical propositions wherein pedagogies might engage differently with physiological knowledges. i begin by detailing a physiological knowledge that participates in recommendations for physical activity intensity, excess post-exercise oxygen consumption (epoc). i think with epoc as a resource, selected due to its insidious presence in many physical activity guidelines, including the canadian 24-hour movement guidelines for children and youth. i do not claim that epoc is the only or the most important physiological knowledge that participates in the guidelines—it is one physiological knowledge that matters. further, epoc as a physiological knowledge is quite interesting to grapple with pedagogically, as it raises questions of temporality, exchange, and debt.   meeting epoc “oxygen debt,” “after burn,” and “raised metabolism” are some of the names epoc colloquially introduces itself with. epoc is a loyal product of exercise physiology and is dedicated to theories of movement that understand biochemical energy as a system of carefully regulated and bounded consumption, exchange, and production. epoc logics, alongside many other physiological knowledges, lurk beneath recommendations for moderate to vigorous physical activity intensity. oxygen debt needs to be earned, epoc will tell us, by vigorous physical activity; it is the result of exercise work to exhaustion, muscled work that taxes aerobic energy systems and dips into anaerobic reserves when we feel our lungs scream (børsheim and bahr 2003; delorey, kowalchuk, and paterson 2003). the harder you work, the more epoc you can earn (crommett and kinzey 2004; laforgia, withers, and gore 2006; yano, yunoki, and ogata 2003). when we work our bodies via contracting our muscles, epoc knows that we utilize metabolic substrates at the site of muscle contraction to the point of depletion, that lactate is generated as a by-product of muscled work, and that body temperature spikes as an outcome of our effort—and, that these disturbances must be righted to maintain equilibrium, to restore homeostasis (mcardle, katch, and katch 2006). epoc realizes itself as the period where these disruptions are righted, where although our body has stalled its intentional, bounded bout of vigorous physical activity, a tremendous amount of oxygen is required to re-craft muscular energy stores, to oxidize lactate, and to compensate for an increased body temperature. here is where epoc plays its hero card: this post-exercise oxygen deficit, this need to shuttle oxygen throughout the body to repair cells and replenish energy stores even after you finish exercising, also taxes the body—it dips into fat stores and burns calories after you have ceased purposeful physical activity (dorado, sanchis-moysi, and calbet 2004; gaesser and brooks 1984). and epoc might posit, isn’t burning bonus calories an interesting wrinkle in the quest to treat obesity and promote health and fitness?   epoc as a problem with pedagogy to pose physiological knowledges as a problem with post-developmental pedagogies, i invoke a specific conception of what it is to problematize or what it means to take as a problem. how might i make epoc a problem with post-developmental pedagogies? i understand that post-developmental pedagogies are always a practice, a labor, a doing (hodgins 2014; pacini-ketchabaw, kind, and kocher 2016; taylor 2017). stengers, a feminist science studies scholar, emphasizes that “connections are something that must be created…this is the only way of succeeding in creating problems rather than receiving them readymade” (2008, 9). bringing stengers together with post-developmental pedagogies, i make—enact, deploy, do—pedagogies with/in my intentional practices of creating epoc as a problem with post-developmental pedagogies. importantly, i do not want to create problems for the sake of problems. i need to generate “problems that are not to be solved but problems that need a different response” (st. pierre, jackson, and mazzei 2016, 105)—problems that, as stengers stresses “give to the situation the power to make us think” (2005, 185). i need to generate knotted problems that cut across the ontological disjunctures of physiological knowledges and post-developmental pedagogies, and that reconfigure how post-developmental pedagogies can engage with physiological knowledges.   pedagogical problems of response with epoc epoc engenders a logic of response: the harder an agential human exercises their muscles, the greater the demand on metabolic resources within muscles, more resources are consumed and must be regenerated, and thus a greater epoc is created. i might see this as an epoc physiology of response, one loyal to a physiological knowledge of dose-response relationships (altshuler 1981). epoc as response enacts a physiological knowledge where stimuli interject in a body in a specific dose and the body then responds in a measured manner, predictably appropriate to the magnitude of the stimulus. taking response epoc physiological knowledges as a problem with pedagogy is to confront the ways this notion of response cuts across pedagogical practice: how is the “response” practiced by epoc im/perceptible to the ways of being responsive we nurture with pedagogies?   returning to the guidelines to generate pedagogical problems with epoc response logic, i need to trace the various “responses” privileged in the pedagogy this document advances. epoc and vigorous physical activity use a teleological, positivist, and predictable logic of response that captures response as a stable pattern—the harder you work, the more epoc you generate. epoc, as a concept for getting to know the body, extends into the guidelines through both the recommendations made (sixty minutes of vigorous activity a day for the most healthy bodied response) and the pedagogical practices that the guidelines profess. i can borrow from post-developmental pedagogies that refuse a conception of curricular interactions located in linear or predictable logic (olsson 2012; pacini-ketchabaw 2010) to take this straightforward assumption of responsivity as a problem of being accountable for the different modes of responding i create with pedagogy: how can i craft pedagogies that are hospitable to, practice, and can be interrupted by the methods and modes of responding that i value? how can i think with modes of responding imperceptible to dominant settler-colonial paradigms?   post-developmental pedagogies also adopt experimental modes of responsivity, including response-ability (haraway 2016, thinking collectively (instone and taylor 2016), (re)storying (hodgins 2014), or thinking diffractively (davies 2014). post-developmental responsivity is not a singular bounded, stable pattern. with epoc dose-response logic, i can generate problems of response multiplicity: if i understand that pedagogical interactions are non-linear, and therefore refute or complexify the “easy” pedagogical recommendation of prescribing activity intensity, but i do invest in epoc as a relevant knowledge, what modes of responding do the pedagogies i participate in make possible because of the ways that these pedagogies expect cells, lungs, bodies, and children to respond (differently—or similarly)? if epoc response-logic matters to contemporary health discourses and generating local modes of responding with children matter, how can i take up the messy spaces between answerability, invention, and dose-response relationships?   pedagogical problems of transaction with epoc transactional logic animates another epoc physiology. epoc is made visible as the exchange of oxygen for the release of stored muscular energy, as cellular metabolic substrates swap for muscular contraction and oxygen trades back to replenish muscled energy reserves (mcardle, katch, and katch 2006). epoc as transaction begets a specific problem of the kinds of transactions that are made perceptible with pedagogies: how do epoc transactions matter with pedagogical modes of exchange?   epoc employs a transactional logic that roots children’s motion, caloric deficit, and aerobic health in a metabolic transactionality reflective of modern economic systems—and, as rosi braidotti (2013) and hannah landecker (2013) assert, anxieties—where physical activity is exchanged for measurable health and development outcomes. in the guidelines and their accompaniments, this transactionality is demonstrated in statements such as “children who get 60 minutes of moderate-to-vigorous physical activity per day are stronger, more confident, and less stressed” (participaction 2017). this is an easy, straightforward transactionality that, when taken with post-developmental pedagogies that attend to how pedagogy is ongoing (taguchi 2011), generates questions of transaction coherence: (how) can i reconcile or integrate linear conceptions of bodied metabolic transactions with an understanding of curricular exchange that is fragmented and non-linear? what is required of my pedagogy to hold different (or similar) conceptions of transactionality for different scales of exchange (educator-child, cellular)? how might i think with modes of transactionality that disrupt the assumed linearity and commodification of exchange within euro-western logics?   epoc also adopts a transactionality that confronts temporality, as it locates caloric deficits in the future (vigorous physical activity now leads to an increase in calorie-burning later). i can use post-developmental pedagogies to confront this temporal imperative and attend to the multitude of temporalities that reconfigure pedagogical practice (farquhar 2016; myers 2016; pacini-ketchabaw and kummen 2016). with post-developmental practices that cultivate an attention to the present and detail the dangers of imposing future-oriented logic upon early childhood education (holmes and jones 2016; olsson 2012; blaise, hamm, and iorio 2017), i can generate problems of transactional logic: when pedagogies locate children’s aerobic activity as a transaction that enables future calorie burning, what kinds of movement, bodies, and learning do these pedagogies create? how do pedagogies that are underpinned by the metabolic consumption of calories-to-come mesh with my pedagogical values? how does pedagogy do exchange(s) in early childhood education?   the “how” of making epoc a generative problem with pedagogy is always partial and i have offered here two potential means of epoc-problem-ing with post-developmental pedagogies. there are, i hope, a multitude of additional problems that epoc poses with pedagogies, which might include problems of homeostasis (what does the assumption of equilibrium do with pedagogies?), agency (who makes/enacts/does epoc?), veracity (how is epoc contested from within physiology?), or difference (how does epoc do difference?).   generating pedagogical provocations to think differently with physiological knowledges after working two epoc physiological knowledges into problems with post-developmental pedagogies, i turn toward generating pedagogical provocations wherein pedagogies might engage differently with physiological knowledges. post-developmental pedagogies detail how thinking pedagogically is the work of continually (re)crafting meaning and meaning-making practices (nxumalo 2017; rautio 2017) because of the answerabilities and accountabilities that participants in a pedagogical entanglement demand from one another (nxumalo, vintimilla, and nelson 2018). post-developmental pedagogies are situated and responsive. they actively refuse didactic application and universalization, but this refusal is one of speculating, of gesturing toward what might happen when we think with children about how to answer to our inheritances, debts, and relations in the name of living well together. this parallels haraway (1988, 2016) and willey’s (2016) concern with the ethical accountabilities of scientific knowledge production and echoes stengers’s contention that “the ‘how’ is a question which exposes, which puts at risk, those who are obliged…. [and] only these people can take the risk of putting experimental change into the formulation of their obligations, because only they are exposed by the question” (2005, 192). in the context of the pedagogical work i am proposing, these feminist science studies insights mean that generating pedagogical provocations is a question of answerability because different bodies are differently accountable to different problems, provocations, and pedagogies. post-developmental pedagogies act on these accountabilities by creating pedagogical spaces, questions, and conditions that demand that those involved in the unfolding of a pedagogy confront the tensions and imperfections that tug at the borders of that pedagogy (early childhood pedagogies collaboratory, n.d.). provocations intentionally put ideas, knowledges, people, and practices at risk because of how these actants entangle with the pedagogies that underpin or animate a provocation. i want to craft provocations that draw physiological knowledges into differently answerable partial pedagogical entanglements; into questions that demand we think carefully about how we might engage with physiological knowledges and pedagogies in order to create different tensions and openings for re-inventing how physiologies and post-developmental pedagogies can entangle in ways that activate our pedagogical intentions, politics, and ethics.   pedagogical provocations of responsivity in taking epoc response physiological knowledges as a problem for pedagogies, i wondered how epoc might spawn problems of responsivity with pedagogy: how is the “response” practiced by epoc im/perceptible to the responsivenesses of pedagogy? with post-developmental pedagogies, which make a habit of problematizing discourses that allow for the easy translation of one state/knowledge/practice into another in planned, bounded, and future-oriented ways, i can remind epoc of the violences inherent in such linearity: when we understand our flesh or pedagogies as predictably responsive, what possibilities for pedagogy are made possible? this is a provocation of wondering the responsivities that animate pedagogies, of tracing multiple modes of co-extensive relational response and entanglement. what happens when i intentionally attend to how responding/responses happen in the education spaces i participate in? how do euro-western conceptions of response entangle with my pedagogical habits in both obvious and inadvertent ways? where do physiological or epoc notions of dose-response logic interject in my, and children’s, movements, engagements with flesh, or other methods of responding—and how might i, or do i, want to confront these methods of responding? this might work to unsettle epoc certainties and make visible the tensions in trying to contain possible modes of response that interject in early childhood education practice.   returning to the guidelines, participaction (2016) shares a package of resources designed for educators to utilize with children as they incorporate the guidelines into their daily activities). these include coloring pages, matching games, and a certificate of achievement, which intend to evoke a specific kind of pedagogical response. as a pedagogical provocation that takes up the problems that predictable pedagogical response-logics make with pedagogies, i wonder how these resources might make visible non-linear, non-human-centered methods of responding: how can these resources be engaged pedagogically while intentionally decentering the belief that these resources draw a predictable, universalizable, or controllable response from the children and other participants/materials/agencies that engage with these? how else can we respond with coloring pages, complexifying the responses that these resources assume? how might different material analyses, ontologies of “health,” epistemologies of education, diverse lived experiences, or constructions of childhood generate different possibilities for responding with these normative resources? perhaps this provocation might upset the bounded, curated responsivity that these resources enact, and make predictable response-logic visible as only one potential method of responding with/in post-developmental physical activity pedagogies.   pedagogical provocations of transactionality posing epoc’s transactional logic as a problem with pedagogy, i asked how epoc transactions might matter with pedagogical modes of exchange. thinking with post-developmental pedagogies, i can take up the im/perceptibility of economic/metabolic transactional logic, tracing where this logic emerges in children’s everyday engagements and where it intrudes into encounters. this is a provocation of attending to transactions, of making visible how the specific exchange-mode of epoc physiological knowledges might contradict post-developmental pedagogies-informed methods of exchange. epoc articulates an ethic of exchange grounded in a specific future-oriented temporality. with post-developmental pedagogies, i can ask what might be required to frame flesh as in pursuit of a future utopic (“healthy”) state—what must be possible for epoc and the guidelines to locate physical activity amid a futurities framework? post-developmental pedagogies oriented toward productivity (taguchi, palmer, and gustafsson 2016; pacini-ketchabaw, kind, and kocher 2016) lend resources for asking what the ethical implications of centering a physiological knowledge that creates oxygen deficits to burn future calories might be: this is a provocation of complexifying how, or if, movement matters as a transaction. the resources for educators (participaction 2016) detail sixty “sweat” activities that educators can use to promote sweaty vigorous physical activity, including “chase a fairy,” “run from zombies,” “shoot hoops,” “sword fight a pirate,” “chase the boys,” “escape prison,” and “chase the girls.” from pedagogies that take movement as unpredictably generative (jackson 2016; manning 2014; rotas 2015), i know that movement does far more than displace a body in space or fulfill recommendations for physical activity. i wonder how these suggested “sweat” activities might be engaged for the “transactions” they invite. what if i intentionally do not conceptualize these movement activities within a vigorous physical activity/epoc frame of transaction, and instead follow how these activities generate exchange(s) that do or do not mesh with my pedagogical intentions? perhaps this provocation might hold to account the idea of moving as propagating oxygen absences or promoting normative health, while opening space to trace how debts, surpluses, exchanges, and transactionalities are made, multiply and momentarily, with post-developmental pedagogies.   towards a why for doing physiological knowledges differently with pedagogies in mainstream early childhood education in canada, physiology often matters as physical activity guidelines, nutrition recommendations, and normative developmental dictates. this is not to say that physiology is a special site of engagement or governance or resistance in early childhood education, only that it is a force that demands to be reckoned with. i have argued that post-developmental pedagogies can work physiological knowledges toward a complex pedagogical answerability and i have explored one possible strategy for how pedagogies can confront the physiological knowledges that matter to early childhood education. my practice of crafting problems with pedagogies while deploying provocations aimed at demanding a different answerability of physiological knowledges is always partial, necessarily contestable, and vulnerable to both unsettling and re-centering the dominant forms of knowledge i work to complexify.   echoing stengers, i believe that we need pedagogical innovations that take up physiological knowledge(s) “as it diverges, that is, feeling its borders, experimenting with the questions 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of education: the case for biosocial education.” british journal of sociology of education 38 (8): 1273–1287. https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2016.1272406. yoshizawa, rebecca scott. 2016. “fetal–maternal intra-action: politics of new placental biologies.” body & society 22 (4): 79–105. https://doi.org/10.1177/1357034x16662323.     author bio nicole land is an assistant professor in the school of early childhood studies at ryerson university. in collaboration with educators and young children, her research works to create and sustain situated post-developmental pedagogies that take seriously children’s complex relations with fats, muscles, physiologies, and movement. beltrán, héctor. (2020). the first latina hackathon: recoding infrastructures from méxico. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(2), 1–30. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © héctor beltrán, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license the first latina hackathon: recoding infrastructures from méxico héctor beltrán mit hectorb@mit.edu abstract an event advertised as the first all-women’s hackathon in latin america was held in méxico in 2015. highly ephemeral but also highly visible, the hackathon functions as a critical site to examine how communities crystallize and evaporate, and how participants actively negotiate their hacker identities and practices across boundaries of nation, gender, race, and ethnicity. popular discourse poses inclusivity within maker/hacker groups by proposing ways to get different or “diverse” participants to join events aimed at empowering their communities. i explore how members of marked groups are called upon to construct and manage these differences themselves within hacker spaces and “maker” formations. i first highlight how participants at the women’s hackathon aligned themselves with structures of expertise as they negotiated normative constructions of gender and femininity. hackers continue these negotiations when they get caught up in mexican nationalist pushes for productivity. in the final section, i unpack a surprise visit by abuelitas (grandmothers), who taught everyone a lesson on the invisibilized labor that supports communities of hackers. in a space usually reserved for young makers who understand “new” technologies, they claimed their space within “progress” and reasserted undervalued domestic work as foundational for other type of work. by weaving these three threads together ethnographically, i suggest the ways in which differences become important as latina hackers differentially position themselves, but also align themselves, with the contradictions of treating code work as coded labor. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 2 introduction the first women’s hackathon in latin america was held in méxico in 2015. i was a participant-observer in the event as part of a broader ethnographic project where i explored what “hacking” meant to research participants and how they incorporated elements of the hacking ethos and identity into their practices. between 2013 and 2017, when i conducted research, the proliferation of hackathon events coincided with hype from economic analysts projecting that méxico was set to emerge as the “aztec tiger” economy. popular media outlets announced that méxico was undergoing rapid economic growth that would lead to an increase in standard of living.1 during this time, the reforms enacted by president enrique peña nieto’s administration followed a developmentalist logic aimed at moving méxico beyond low-wage factory jobs and toward an entrepreneurial economy. in line with such capitalistic impulses, governmentsponsored hackathons fit into the larger mexican political-economic landscape as spaces to keep recent university graduates busy, as potential generators of companies that could create jobs for these graduates, and as the type of infrastructure that could help méxico emerge on the global innovation stage. i began my fieldwork as the technical instructor for a six-week “incubator-style” course designed to teach entrepreneurship and mobile internet technology skills to mexican students. the workshops took place at the national university of mexico (unam) in 2013 and were sponsored by mit’s global startup labs. the program is part of mit’s international science and technology initiatives that “promotes development in emerging regions by cultivating young technology entrepreneurs” (mit global startup labs, n.d.). within days of releasing an online application to university students via email lists and social media, there were hundreds of applications submitted and dozens of email inquiries from potential applicants. of the thirty-two students selected, only four were women. similar distributions were also common in the over twenty hackathons i attended; despite the “openness” these technological communities promoted, participants at the events and spaces were overwhelmingly men. the explicit all-women dimension of this hackathon was designed to flip the script. of the over three hundred women who registered for the event, about half participated. by one of the organizer’s accounts, this was the largest number of women gathered around the theme of computing technologies in contemporary mexican history. although the women’s hackathon provided the opportunity to notice differences—such as what is different in méxico or how mexicans or latin americans operate hackathons differently than those held in the us and euro special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 3 american orbits—i do not intend my approach to rely solely on comparison. instead, i focus on how research participants position themselves in relation to multiple and intersecting markers of difference. i ask how they reconfigure narratives of progress at the same time that they negotiate ideals of competitiveness and autonomy that accompany most tech entrepreneurship. how do participants figure and reconfigure structures of belonging, recognition, and visibility within socio-technical configurations? hackathon events function as ideal research sites to examine the construction and management of differences and their intersections. highly ephemeral but also highly visible, hackathons allow a sharp view of how different “communities” crystallize and evaporate. i highlight how participants’ code work is aimed at simultaneously enacting “hacker” identities as well as inhabiting, elaborating, and reconfiguring demographic identities organized around parameters of gender and race. while hackathons take on very different modes of participation depending on the group of organizers and sponsors, the basic idea of the form is that an interdisciplinary group of (mostly) young people show up to meet other hackers or entrepreneurs over the course of a weekend. they work to prototype project ideas that might resolve an issue related to an organizing theme for the hackathon. themes such as healthcare, inequality, and climate change make frequent appearances. participants then present “pitches” to a panel of experts who judge the viability of the proposed projects, which usually offer technological or technocratic solutions to the identified problem. the all-women’s hackathon hosted at unam in 2015 was part of a trend that emerged during my fieldwork, in which organizers claimed to have created “firsts” in hackathon worlds: the first hackathon for latinxs, the first hackathon in , the first hackathon by and for women in méxico, etc.2 the event was initially advertised as the first “for women by women” hackathon in latin america. because the event was partly sponsored by us universities (and later companies), and it would include presentations by female and latina-identified professors from the united states, the event quickly became the first hackathon for latina women, not just for mexican women. as one of the organizers, saiph, explained the event, “a female hackathon. a latina hackathon. we are fighting to incorporate two minorities at once!” saiph was a mexican computer science phd student at the university of california, santa barbara. like many of the organizers, she traveled between the us and méxico and had experience with the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 4 hackathon circuit on both sides of the border. she also had experience with constantly shifting between “latina” and “mexican.” such shuttling between ethnic, racial, and national markers can only be understood by thinking transnationally. on the one hand, people like saiph were positioned by mexican developmentalist narratives as forward-thinking, mobile, tech-savvy subjects worthy of representing méxico across national borders. both of her parents were professors who had raised her with what she called a “growth mindset.” as she reflected on her experiences on both sides of the border, she told me, “i was privileged in coming from a family where they believed i could do anything i set my mind to and [they] did not have limiting beliefs. it is [only] now that i see that privilege because i have had to interact with people who have much more limiting beliefs about what latinas can do.” saiph went on to provide anecdotes about multiple times that researchers did not believe she had implemented computer projects she had designed and developed herself. her father, the head of a bio-robotics laboratory at unam, was also one of the organizers of the hackathon, using his connections with other academic administrators to make the event a reality. although saiph came from a relatively privileged upbringing and represented a select minority of the mexican population, she was positioned as a generic “middle-class” mexican citizen who had obtained her mobility and other freedoms by working hard. at the same time, she confirmed nationalist narratives that the software industry was the key to meritocratic progress (see radhakrishnan, 2007). on the us side, meanwhile, identifying as latina/o was for her and others like her inextricable from the shifting political economy of race. as an “emerging middle class,” a homogenous latino collective is sometimes celebrated for their coming of age in america, while the same group is at other times represented as an economic liability that takes jobs, resources, and benefits from “regular” americans (dávila, 2008). the strategic use of the latina/o marker by people themselves points to the mobile and nomadic nature of the signifier; it functions as a political rather than a descriptive category (aparicio, 2017). catherine sue ramírez (2004a), for example, traces the usage of “latina” by self-proclaimed “third world women” as a site of identification for women across the americas to create the “geographical bridges” necessary for “borderland feminism.” thus, while resignifying the event from a “mexican” to a “latina” hackathon might seem like a simple way to make the event more inclusive, participants’ decisions about how to identify and relate to one another within the hackathon were always in the context of shifting (and conflicting) markers of difference constructed in relation to us/méxico politics. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 5 in her research with indian software developers in berlin, sareeta amrute (2016) shows that encodings of class frequently clash with encodings of race. for her research participants, the “software developer” marker grants workers an entry to the type of cultural capital necessary to identify as middle-class, while the “indian” marker casts them as racialized software developers. race and class intersect across a terrain of transnational labor that values technical expertise yet differentially recognizes and rewards this expertise. these racialized and ethnicized workers plug into highly coded and particularized lateral spaces that cross national borders, yet rely on infrastructures that mobilize networks and workers to respond efficiently to market conditions, and shift among different systems of codes that enforce ethnic discipline and social cohesion in segregated labor sites (murillo, 2020; ong, 2006). similarly, i suggest that hackathons can be examined as spaces where hackers come to perform their willingness to become the coding (and coded) workers of the future. hackers at the women’s hackathon, despite their (presumably) rising authority as “coders” or “hackers” in méxico, remained marked as “mexican” coders (regardless of what gender they identified with) once they transited across nationalized borders, whether physically or “virtually” (see aneesh, 2006). at the same time that people such as saiph shuttled between “mexican” and “latina,” they found themselves strategically calibrating their alignment with the promise of liberation that the hackathon discourse offers, and what the hackathon might offer realistically and more immediately on the ground for the attendees who populate these raced and gendered spaces. the “hacker” marker worked as badge of authority in the space of the hackathon, but also worked as an underspecified concept that created ties with representatives of collectives, companies, and universities who many times position themselves differently along political and ideological lines. as hackathon participants aligned their “latina” and “hacker” subject positions to work on their projects, they also engaged in other kinds of work to manage the multiplicity of their identities by gendered, racialized, ethnicized, and national markers. popular discourse poses inclusivity within maker/hacker groups by proposing ways to get different or “diverse” participants to join events aimed at empowering their “communities.” in what follows, i explore how members of marked groups are called upon to construct and manage these differences themselves within hacker spaces and “maker” formations. i first highlight how participants at the women’s hackathon aligned themselves with underlying structures of expertise as they addressed normative constructions of gender and femininity. by using special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 6 computer development kits that allowed them to work at a higher level of the computing stack, they were able to assert their own knowledge without getting lost in the lower layers of coded abstractions. in the next section, i explore how hackers continue these negotiations when they get caught up in mexican nationalist pushes for productivity. although the “smart home” theme of the hackathon could be framed as reproducing gendered divisions of labor, interviews and participant observation reveal that entanglements of gender, technology, and domesticity were actively negotiated. in the final section, i unpack a surprise visit by abuelitas (grandmothers) who taught everyone a lesson on the invisibilized labor that supports communities of hackers. by infiltrating a space normally populated by young technology-producers who represent “progress” and “modernity,” their very presence re-established undervalued domestic work as foundational for other type of work. by weaving these three threads together ethnographically, i suggest the ways in which “differences” become important as women hackers differentially position themselves, but also align themselves, with the contradictions of treating code work as coded labor. stacking expertise and coding femininity during a preliminary organizing meeting for the women’s hackathon, veteran hackathon attendees chimed in on what features they thought would make the event successful. some ideas aligned with what other scholars and organizers have identified as key elements of a feminist hackathon, including a focus on both technical and non-technical solutions to the agreed problem space, a commitment to sustaining the community of practice formed during the event after the fact, and a valuing of learning over invention to create a more inclusive environment composed of subject matter experts as well as marginal users (d’igzano et al., 2016). the event would be held over the weekend but designated hacking spaces would shut down over night, allowing participants to go home and return early the next day. parents would thus feel comfortable granting permission to their daughters to participate in an event that did not involve being out late at night. removing the night work from the hackathon effectively intervened in cultural conventions of staying up all night that continues to be celebrated in computing communities and is many times unappealing, impractical, or unsafe for women (ensmenger, 2010). additionally, in order to get as many women as possible interested in technology and software development, regardless of their background or level of expertise, organizers decided to work with arduino kits. arduino is an open-source electronic prototyping platform used to develop interactive electronic objects. these kits included components that might be used to design devices for a “smart home” with minimal coding experience required. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 7 one the one hand, we could clearly deconstruct the overarching theme of a “smart home” as a way to reproduce gendered conventions of domesticity and divisions of labor. one could argue that designing the perfect home for women by women helps to further an ideology of women’s place in the home; they’re designing the perfect home so they can feel comfortable and stay there, where they belong. however, the dichotomy between the domestic and public sphere has been critiqued as a socio-historical construction that does not represent the experiences of women in méxico specifically and latin america more broadly, where domestic activities are intimately connected to and in constant interaction with markets (montoya, 2002; nieto, 2004). even with growing opportunities for women in méxico to maintain “formal” part-time or full-time work outside of the home, many times they continue to use strategies already common in their communities to juggle multiple commitments related to work and family life (peterson, 2014). sasha constanza-chock (2020) argues that the “hacks” that occur within “subaltern design sites” such as the home never receive the same recognition or resources as those marked to be properly technologically innovative within the bounded space of hackathons and hackerspaces (p. 140). in this sense, the title that was chosen for the hackathon, “#fixit,” pointed away from the infatuation with newness that often permeates hackathons and instead focused on working with existing socio-technical objects and configurations, effectively calling attention to “hacks” that were already taking place within the home. thus, the women at the hackathon did not appear bogged down by the “home” aspect of the event and instead used their enthusiasm to create an intimate space and experience. following their lead, i was often less interested in what was made in these hacker and maker spaces, seeking rather to explore how hacking functioned as a mode for these participants to intervene in and position themselves in relation to existing socio-political structures (ames et al., 2018). to unpack the social dynamics and the work that happened within the women’s hackathon, i start by treating “expertise” as an inherently racialized and gendered category (irani, 2018), and by exploring what it means to navigate between distinct layers of the software coding environment. as i discussed in the introduction, many of the hackathon events i participated in were aimed at empowering particular groups that had been marginalized or underrepresented in the tech industry. the hype around the events was usually framed around these groups of people becoming empowered by using technology but also by actively participating in building the technology that they might use. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 8 this has become important in méxico, as government programs (and many times academic work) frequently frame technology experts as passive recipients or followers, perpetually dependent on foreign “cultures of innovation” (medina et al., 2014). in short, the liberatory potential of the technologies, for advocates of these hackathons, rested on the premise that users could now become producers. jason edward lewis (2016) has proposed a similar vision, writing specifically about indigenous people—a vision in which active technology users can take control of their future by "populating the present social imaginary with fully empowered subjects of a future imaginary” (p. 234). in this way, he argues, users can appropriate technology to create indigenous stories, characters, and epistemologies through which people can articulate dreams and aspirations, in order to help indigenous people create a future imaginary at the same time that they become present in that future. in this view of community empowerment, marginalized populations appropriate new technologies for their own ends. in just this way, the women’s hackathon, as framed by saiph, was meant to bring together a group positioned at the intersection of different marginalized categories (latinx, women); this newly formed “community” would convene, develop, and appropriate new technologies, and use these technologies to resolve issues they have judged important to their collective well-being and future livelihoods. in the case of this hackathon, those issues circulated around the setting of the home. any technology has configurations and conditions of possibility that are hidden from the average user. lewis (2016) uses the analytic of “the stack” (p. 242) to help us understand how these hidden conditions are organized and, often, kept out of view. in the computing domain, a “stack” refers to the interrelated and interdependent layers of hardware components and software protocols that make high-level computations and programs possible. to move from the bottom of the stack (machine code) to the top of the stack (programming languages and systems) means traversing the corresponding circuits, microchips, and computer code that can be part of each “layer of abstraction” that makes up the system. in the professional software world, for example, a “full stack developer” is a (highly sought after) software programmer who possesses the technical proficiency to work at any level of the stack. thus, lewis proposes that for indigenous people to completely infuse their worldviews and future aspirations into the system, they must become involved and be adept at navigating all layers of the stack. only by fully and comprehensively participating in this way, can we increase our ability to “make the technology speak in the way that we desire” (lewis, 2016, p. 242). special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 9 while i (and many tech enthusiasts) find lewis’s vision compelling, it offers a proposal that depends upon long-term education and training (whether formal or informal) and involves focused attention and practice that can take months, years, or generations—certainly more time than is provided in the space of the hackathon, or even several hackathons. a common scene that unfolds at many hackathons is one in which, after introductions and the idea/design phases of technical projects, one person—usually a man (dunbar-hester, 2014)—takes command of implementing a working prototype, claiming because of technical prowess an authoritative, expert position. this often cuts against desires for the inclusive, collaborative development of expertise. indeed, a common scenario within hackathons is that pre-configured teams of experts arrive at the events in order to maximize their possibility of “winning” the event. in other cases, individual “experts” would rush to form the ideally structured team according to (other) expert guidelines. one “ideal” team i frequently heard described was one composed of a hacker (a person with programming skills), a hustler (a person with business skills), and a hipster (a person with marketing/design skills). in other cases, the newly formed small teams would, for the most part, effectively divide themselves up into the experts and the novices, at least along dimensions of technical proficiency. in the end, an expert programmer would be the one responsible for implementing the working project. at the women’s hackathon, as participants attempted to shuttle between “novice” and “expert,” there were several people who came to occupy “mediator” roles, attempting to activate an apprenticeship model for empowerment. i frequently saw these mediators—well intentioned, to be sure—approach their work with an overwhelming congeniality, eager to see themselves as empowering a particular group or determined to resolve a relevant social problem. unfortunately, as experts and mediators took command, the development of proficient technology users, those who might be able to traverse distinct layers of the stack, proved to be more idealized fantasy than implementable project. christina dunbar-hester (2016) has found a similarly aspirational, but not quite functional, apprenticeship model present in her work with radio activists across do-it-yourself (diy) and maker spaces. within these spaces, activists promote their vision for a self-sustaining participatory structure, one in which self-guided discovery and learning can provide a heightened sense of agency to participants, where the demystification of technology can lead to a leveling of expertise through pedagogical activities. in this vision, as time progresses, novices are special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 10 meant to become experts and the field of experts within a group will increase, broadening the capability to recruit more novices, in a self-sustaining noviceexpert model. instead, dunbar-hester (2016) found novice participants frustrated and alienated as they attempted to learn from experts in compressed time frames. she notes that although activists self-consciously tried to distance themselves from competitive and exclusionary aspects of some electronics and engineering cultures (see abbate, 2012; chun, 2013; turkle, 1984), the technical pursuits they offered often ended up being intimidating and unappealing. a consistent situation across dunbar-hester’s (2016) spaces was that “the burden of participation fell disproportionately on women and technical novices” (p. 92). i encountered similar dynamics across my research sites. the burden of participation often fell on novices, while the work of implementation was taken up by the technical experts, who often derived great satisfaction from that work, not always realizing that they might be enacting exclusionary practices. whether novice or expert, however, participants at the women’s hackathon seemed to escape the burden that fell on either, more so than at other hackathon events. . by avoiding the pitfalls of trying to gain too much expertise, or technical knowledge, and focusing instead on the top layer of the stack, in this case in the form of the arduino kits—in this case in the form of the arduino kits—participants worked at the appropriate level of the computing stack (or layer of expertise). the arduino kits allowed them to use coder tools (programs and apps) to manipulate data along with electronic components. in this way, they were able to effectively perform their burgeoning latina-maker subject positions. the atmosphere of the 2015 women’s hackathon at unam was overwhelmingly congenial and designed to foster inclusivity; the message of increasing representation in technology cultures and software development was never far from participants. the first day of the event opened with female role models who described software as “algo que te extiende, que te libera” (something that extends you, that liberates you), and attempted to convince young women that coding was far more social than popular imaginaries made it out to be. “la calidad de nuestras vidas depende de la calidad del software que construimos” (the quality of our lives depends on the quality of the software we build), another presenter confirmed. together with other presenters, this person reminded attendees that software development as a profession was not at odds with normative ideas of femininity—which she associated with standard roles of wife and mother—if this was how young women wanted to assume their professional and social roles. she followed a line that might be familiar from the work of such special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 11 scholars as sanjukta mukherjee (2008), who has argued, on the basis of her fieldwork in bangalore, that software work has been constructed as empowering for women in parts of india because its flexibility is compatible with normative feminine roles of wife and mother. in a méxico where a growing segment of the population is claiming a middle-class identity, sometimes this means living in safe environment surrounded by “tranquilidad” (pertierra, 2015). most of the time “middle-classness” means enrolling children in extracurricular activities and/or private schools, family vacations, and especially access to “modern” household appliances (escobar latapí & pedraza espinoza 2010). the speakers at the women’s hackathon pushed toward this tranquilidad and comfort by promising the attendees that (1) they did not have to abandon their important family roles if they chose to become professionalized working women, and that (2) learning to code might allow them to make their home life even more comfortable and compatible with complex schedules and multitasking. whether one could be a professional woman and a super multitasker in reality was another story. for women across the world who enter the it workforce or related entrepreneurial initiatives, they must not only learn the skills of their trade but also, more often than men, consistently convince customers and colleagues of their experience and expertise (mitter, 1995). while the women’s hackathon provided the space to reconfigure ideals of gender in relation to technology, many of the circulating discourses tended to be anchored in gendered discourses of putting the family first and respectable femininity. similarly, scholars who have conducted research with women from the global south who enter the information technology workforce find that these women calibrate their careers and individual aspirations in relation to the wellbeing of their family. some women decide to slow down their climbing “up the ladder” or give their career up altogether if they feel they are at risk of becoming bad mothers or not living up to the expectations of their in-laws (radhakrishnan, 2008). they might push the boundaries of respectable femininity by asserting that they will not be constrained by family, but always want to be considered of the family (amrute, 2016). at the women’s hackathon, the family, often narrowly defined within méxico as heterosexual and patriarchal, gave burgeoning hackers a referent to negotiate normative roles of gender and femininity as they assumed “expert” roles in the software coding worlds. in the next section, i highlight how my research participants continued these negotiations in relation to nationalist pushes for productivity. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 12 hacking time d’ignazio et al. (2016) lay out premises for feminist hackathons, asserting that one important feature of such an event is that it “intentionally architects media attention in order to advocate for the issue.” saiph certainly prepared for media coverage similarly. she stated in an interview, “para mí lo importante era mostrar al mundo que tenemos mujeres creadoras; hay chicas emprendedoras y todas ellas unen sus diferentes talentos para desarrollar nuevos productos” (for me, the important part is to show the world that we have women makers; entrepreneurial young women exist and all of them unite their talents to develop new products). this “productive” aspect was picked up by media outlets. an unam engineering professor was quoted in another news report: los proyectos que les propusimos son la base de dos cursos que ofrezco: de robots móviles y de casas inteligentes; tomamos las prácticas que hacemos ahí y las modificamos para que las trataran de hacer en dos días. es más, me burlaba de algunos de mis alumnos y les dije: ellas lograron lo que ustedes no pudieron en un semestre. (the projects we proposed were based on two courses i offer: mobile robotics and smart homes; we took the practices of the courses and modified them so they could take them on in two days. actually, i made fun of some of my students and i told them: they [women] accomplished more than you were able to in one semester.) the professor’s comments echoed much of the rhetoric that circulated during and after the event—that is, that these young women were highly productive and that they were able to accomplish more than male students had in an entire semester. at the same time that they positioned themselves in relation to narratives that promoted the “promise of technology,” that new technologies and corresponding entrepreneurial practices could help young people succeed quickly and dramatically (shankar, 2008), the women also took seriously the call to show that they could surpass their male maker/hacker counterparts. whether the “all women” dimension of the hackathon was effective or not, and whether it increased their productivity, depended on who you asked. as participants organized into teams that were composed of diverse disciplinary backgrounds—among undergraduate students there were computer engineering, mechatronics, industrial design, political science, and philosophy majors—i served as floating mentor/ethnographer, circulating between the scattered university spaces and helping with ideas, implementations, and pitches while i asked about special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 13 the explicitly gendered dimensions of the event. mariana, a skilled and amiable computer science student whom i knew from the coding bootcamp i had administered several summers before, confirmed her excitement for the all-women structure: “en otros espacios, los hombres nos reclutan solo para que hagamos sus apps lucir bonitas” (in other spaces, the men recruit us just to make their apps look pretty). i had spent several months working with mariana in a coding bootcamp, where many times she encountered masculinist assumptions and performances of technical competence. at the very least, the women’s hackathon provided a space for her to feel comfortable enough to call out the gendered power dynamics she had experienced within the unmarked (or by its unmarking actually marked as “inclusive”) space where we had worked together previously. this is particularly important as women are often asked to “speak up” in order to show their value within software design spaces (irani, 2019, p. 102). the women’s hackathon gave mariana the space to speak up about the very power dynamics that framed her as an unimportant contributor in the male-dominated space. when i asked another young woman what could have attracted more participants to the event, she responded bluntly, “más hombres” (more men). here she was confirming that not all participants were feeling the “all-women” camaraderie the event attempted to create. pilar, a mechatronics major on the same team, disagreed with her colleague, telling me, “las mujeres tenemos en el chip ser competitivas contra una y otra. si fuera con hombres, decimos, ‘no podemos,’ y no nos activamos" (we women have in our chip to be competitive against other women. if [the hackathon] was with men, we’d say, ‘we cannot,’ and we do not activate). pilar’s comments align almost perfectly with the language of “reforms” that in méxico has traversed decades and morphed alongside political parties and corresponding campaigns. these programs often call for young people to learn english and the latest technology in order to claim their place in the “global” economy; they are encouraged to take matters into their own hands and assume their role as technical, non-complaining citizens. the manifestation of these programs under the tenure of president peña nieto, when the hackathon took place, called for spaces that promised to instill in young people the same chip, here using an image of computing. “todos con el mismo chip,” went the slogan. pilar’s comments took up the same “chip” metaphor, and she differentiated between male and female “chips.” she claimed that her competitive “chip” was activated within the space of the hackathon. this effectively confirmed the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 14 government’s construction of modern co-working spaces across the country, aimed at indexing a newly forming “innovative culture”; the spaces function as efficient and scalable way to “develop,” “modernize,” and appear economically competitive. more importantly, spaces such as the hackathon function to keep recent graduates looking busy. a 2010 study showed that about seven million young people aged fourteen to twenty-nine in méxico were either looking for employment, not enrolled in school, or fell under the broad category of “not economically active” (instituto mexicano de la juventud, 2010). this label is accompanied by a more colloquial term, ninis, short for “ni estudian, ni trabajan” (don’t study, don’t work), often used to refer negatively to young people who have become a burden to mexican society or economy. this labeling also has its counterparts in other parts of the world. vered amit and noel dyck (2012) highlight the bureaucratic category of neet (not in employment, education, or training) used to describe young brits. the authors point to a specific category of youth all over the world who have been affected by economic restructuring. at the same time as these young people are pointed to as indices of social breakdown, they are also sometimes framed as agents of social change and progress. the busy hackers within méxico’s “modern” spaces might effectively dodge the problematic categorization of ninis; they inevitably perform for various publics the role of knowledge workers enthusiastically connected to their computers.3 while most of the hackathon participants were indeed students, some who showed up were recent graduates who were technically unemployed. their participation in this and other hackathons reflects an overall preference by young people in méxico to prefer to work within community or university-sponsored events before participating formally in government and formal politics (ricuarte quijano, 2018), as well as a growing inclination to hone their “code work” within these hackerspaces to think with/against social and political institutions (beltrán, 2020). as anthropologists have shown, the question of how young women from the global south spend their time, and whether it’s leisure, pleasure, or “work,” is a critical site to investigate constructions of gender, productivity, and social change (amrute, 2016; fleming, 2018; krishnan, 2018). whether it was an attempt to evade the nini category, or a conscious effort at selfimprovement (whether it was related to the job market or not), the young women took the call to be productive within the hackathon very seriously. many i spoke special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 15 to agreed that the second panel of speakers should be cancelled; they claimed that the presentations were effectively “wasting their time.” those who had been to other hackathons felt that since those other events did not have any additional presentations, it was unfair that the extra time commitments at the women’s hackathon cut into their hacking time. time constraints created anxiety amongst the groups. one team told me to go away when i approached and started asking questions because i was “wasting their time.” i didn’t take offense to being referred to as a “waste of time.” i was conscious that i might be framed as an intruder, particularly by young women who were new to a hackathon space and had not worked with me in other hackathons or the mit bootcamp at unam. when i asked ximena, a graphic designer i had built confidence with over the years, about my presence at the hackathon, she said, “en tu caso tal vez está bien porque estudias hackathones. pero ser antropólogo no te hace diferente tampoco. al final eres un hombre que va por ahi, criticando, siendo el especialista…no puedes entender lo que es estar aquí celebrando con mujeres, celebrando estar juntas” (in your case, i guess it’s ok since you study hackathons. but being an anthropologist doesn’t make you different either. in the end you’re just a man going around, criticizing, being the specialist…you can’t understand what it means to be here celebrating women, celebrating being together). taking my cue to be a “productive” member of the hackathon instead of asking and trying to understand so much, i worked with teams to put together their final pitches for their designs. we perfected speeches and added the final bells and whistles to the presentations. overlooking us in the engineering building was a commonplace “silicon valley map.” the dated poster showed an illustrated map of the san jose, california region with dozens of company names superimposed on the map, representing the company’s geographic location. the poster was a sobering reminder that this hackathon was meant to mimic the high-paced, competitive cycles of technology-driven capitalism that characterized silicon valley (see jones et al., 2015).4 it was also a reminder that productivity as a unit of measure, rather than a calling, comes from technologies of efficiency that came to prominence with an industrial-managerial orientation that established the language and practice of productivity. the capitalist highjacking of productivity might be implicit in the poster, but one thing that might be difficult to discern from the visual is that the history of productivity is gendered. melissa gregg (2018) shows how the gradual retreat of the office secretary in the service of others’ productivity has been offset special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 16 by technologies that continue the same tradition of entitled delegation. for an elite group of professionals, new technologies provide the socio-technical infrastructures that enable them to practice productivity. whether new technologies would make life easier for the women at the hackathon, and how they might position themselves in relation to the home vs. professional life dilemma, was up for debate. figure 1. the team that told me to go away because i was wasting their time allowed me to snap a picture while they were hacking and receiving guidance from a mentor more interested in hacking and less interested in asking. photo credit: author. also up for negotiation was whether the presentations “wasted their time” or whether the all-woman design of the hackathon was a positive or negative aspect of the event, as the quotations in this section demonstrate. but one thing that all participants agreed on (and made evident) was that they were nervous for their final presentations—the spotlight was now on them to show how much they had learned and what they had spent the weekend making. abuelitas as infrastructure the nervousness that the young women demonstrated during their final pitches was warranted, for different reasons. for one, the event was not entirely all women. as different teams took the stage to present their home improvements, the young men who had participated as mentors during the weekend stood alongside the walls of the auditorium, arms crossed, dressed with black google special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 17 shirts to distinguish themselves and claim authority to the probing gazes they directed toward the stage. in one particularly condescending comment, one of the mentors voiced a demeaning, “awwwwwww,” as the group presented a prototype of a robot meant to crawl alongside babies to keep them company while mothers were in another room. one young woman smiled uncomfortably; another rolled her eyes. the presence and help from the young men resembled similar dynamics to those leslie salzinger finds in the juárez maquiladoras of the early 1990s. salzinger (2016) argues that as young women from the global south became neoliberalism’s preferred workforce, the industrial shop floor became a space for contesting the feminization of the work. male workers attempted to reclaim the inherent masculinity of the work by constantly teasing, crowding, and “helping” their female co-workers in an effort to put their inadequacy on display. while the hackathons of the 2010s might appear to be a world removed from the industrial maquiladoras of the 1990s, the underlying frameworks that constantly “test” the skills and ultimately marginalize women workers stand the test of time, as the “well-intentioned” mentor-helpers reminded us. figure 2. the first team gets ready for their pitch as the male mentors stand on the sidelines. photo credit: author. under the gaze of these male helpers, then, the teams continued to pitch their projects to an attentive audience. the first-place team used its arduino kit to present prototypes for intelligent sensors meant to detect when food supplies special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 18 were running out; another team presented a key holding device that would alert users when all members had safely arrived home; another winning team created a system that would track their pets around a set perimeter, alerting the user when the pet had left the specified boundaries. as the teams progressively gained confidence, their nervousness eased, in no small part because of the presence of a new group of audience members: mothers and grandmothers who had come to witness the presentations and cheer on their daughters and granddaughters. the surprise visit from mamás and abuelitas certainly added a “different” element to the hackathon. i had never seen family members come to cheer on their burgeoning hacker-entrepreneurs at hackathons in the us, for example. neither had i seen them at the male-dominated hackathons in méxico. the family ambiance quickly turned the hackathon into an (even more) hospitable event, with lively cheering for family members and extra commentary from the sidelines. as i circled around the room to speak with the family members, i asked one grandmother what she thought about her granddaughter’s smart home prototype. “lo que no hizo en todo el semestre lo hizo en dos días.” (what she didn’t do all semester she did in two days.) while the abuelita’s comment was in line with the comments regarding productivity that had circulated throughout the event, the very presence of these older women signaled a departure from the “grandmother” discourse that normally circulates in computing worlds. that is, in addition to the performances of technical masculinity that many times intimidate women from participating in technical cultures, it’s common among computer experts to use gendered language specifically to make women feel like outsiders. in the free software community, for example, the term “aunt tillie” is deployed to refer to someone who is not tech-savvy.5 across communities of computing experts, it’s common to hear subjects urge you to build a system or interface that is “easy enough for your mom/girlfriend/grandmother” to use or figure out.6 the complementary guidelines for a clear explanation of a complex system is to “describe it as if you’re explaining it to your grandmother.” ironically, in this imaginary, it is always the grandmother (never the grandfather) who is the willing recipient of (most likely) boring technical explanations. one can imagine the grandmother waiting at home, ready to listen and provide encouraging words on your work in progress. perhaps in these imaginaries the grandfathers, uncles, and brothers are busy in the co-working spaces becoming the “modern,” tech-savvy, mobile workers of tomorrow. indeed, the supposedly unmarked hackathon space that takes center stage in the narrative of the ascending aztec tiger economy overwhelmingly features men in its protagonist roles. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 19 the all-woman’s hackathon space, and perhaps even the “smart home” theme of the event, gave the abuelitas the opportunity and confidence to assume roles as active audience members. after the event, i asked ximena what she thought about her abuelita coming to watch her pitch: “pues me da emoción. ella es la que ayuda en todo del día a día. ella es la que se encarga de todo” (well, i get excited. she’s the one that helps with everything in the day-to-day. she is the one that is in charge of everything.) with recognitions like this by the hackathon participants, the abuelitas became more than cheerful audience members. in a space usually reserved for young makers who understand “new” technologies, they claimed their space within “progress” and reasserted undervalued domestic work as foundational for other type of work. instead of the grandmothers becoming the referents for non-technical persons, novices who don’t understand and thus need to have complex infrastructures explained in very basic terms, here the abuelitas asserted their place as the very backbone of these socio-technical configurations, the necessary defaults for the making and corresponding discourse of technological progress to occur in the first place. the very presence of the abuelitas, mothers, and families on the sidelines effectively displaced the technical (male) mentors, reminding everyone of the “other” work required to make the projects being presented. the first tactic for a postcolonial computing reads, “when we see a technoscientific object, we investigate its contingency not only locally but in the infrastructures, assemblages, and political economies that are the conditions of its possibility” (philip et al., 2012, p. 10). if the projects presented at the women’s hackathon are the technoscientific projects we need to unpack, in this case, we would have to explore the hierarchies of labor involved in constructing the arduino chips. the university and its laboratories where the hackathon took place could also be analyzed as infrastructures that required manual labor to construct and ongoing maintenance, which could make us dig deeper into the classed and racialized labor economy in méxico, connecting these processes to overarching political economic assemblages. the presence of the abuelitas, however, shifts attention to local and immediate. if the young men in google shirts observing from the sidelines represent the technical infrastructures these young women are purportedly appropriating and the global economy that they are meant to join, then the abuelitas intervene to remind us of the work required so that these young women could participate in the event in the first place. at the same time, the abuelitas reminded us that while these young men were present being the “expert” moderators of the event, they special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 20 were many times absent in other domains of family life, in terms of encouragement and support; the cheering family members on the sidelines were overwhelmingly women (grandmothers and mothers) and children. while some of the abuelitas encouraged their granddaughters to take up the productive discourse of the event, their very presence reminded them not to diminish “other” labor in the name of becoming the productive workers of tomorrow. after the winners were announced and prizes were distributed, celebrations ensued as the hackathon participants joined their families, some of whom had brought flowers and homemade food to reward their weekend efforts at the hackathon. i approached mariana as she celebrated with her team, who won second place for “easy petcare,” to congratulate her. “¿qué te parecerion las presentaciones finales?” (how did you feel about the final presentations?) i asked her. “pues, están más bonitas, ¿no?” (well, they’re prettier, aren’t they?) her response was clearly ironic, in relation to the earlier remark she had made about men at other events recruiting her to make their apps “look pretty.” mariana’s response also functioned as a way to remind me that perhaps my “end results” type question was in line with a masculinist, results-oriented technical outlook of the world that was missing the importance of what was really going on at the event: solidarity and interventions along gender lines, as peers, mentors, and family celebrated the young women’s weekend efforts. i was part of this group, no doubt, but also an outsider in more ways than one. here, at the peripheries of the event, in my attempted ethnographic encounters/interventions, i myself was an “exception” (to evoke a coding concept) to what was going on and what was important within the confines of this ritual, a hackathon that had been appropriated for means and negotiations much different than perhaps its original silicon valley, us-based variants had been created for. a straightforward read of the “smart home” design competition at the women’s hackathon in méxico might appear contradictory. how can any of these technologies be liberating, as some of the speakers preached, if they assume and presuppose that women must maintain their interventions within the domestic space, and their “empowerment” within the confines of the hackathon? this interpretation presumes that it isn’t something the women (organizers and participants) had already discussed, and that it isn’t something that was debated within the space of the hackathon itself. it would also be homogenizing, as the varied responses by my respondents on the “all women” component of the event demonstrate, they all had different takes on the matter. finally, as mariana’s ironic comment and posturing shows, there might be spaces of critique within the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 21 hackathon that this male ethnographer does not have access to—rightly so. conclusion during one of our preliminary organizing sessions for the women’s hackathon, one of the male veteran hackers connected to our video conference call from a treadmill. he spent the hour-long session chiming in with comments while he sprinted in his gym clothes. during our introductions, organizers took turns establishing their experience, not only by invoking the software languages and platforms with which they were familiar, but by enumerating the hackathon events they had previously attended. this spirit of productivity, of making the most with one’s time while juggling multiple demands, clearly infiltrated the space of the hackathon. even if there was a deliberate attempt to depart from the “boy’s culture” usually associated with technical expertise, or the technical masculinity that precedes computing, the media coverage, as well as the burgeoning latina hackers, took seriously the call to avoid “wasting” time. the image of the young man running on his treadmill during the meeting also coincides with the overarching narrative of “catching up” that tends to permeate events designed to empower communities through technology. in a history of computing that forgets “programming” was initially a woman’s job (light, 1999) and a computing industry that has treated women of color as ideal workers to later invisibilize their contributions and labor (nakamura, 2014; ramírez, 2004b), the stakes for mexican woman coders are particularly high. in their case, “catching up” means negotiating nationalist narratives of productivity as global south countries attempt to perform their departure from “developing country” status, as well as reconfiguring normative feminine roles instituted by nationalist constructions of the middle-class family. shuttling between “latina” and “mexican” requires strategic maneuvering and aligning with overarching processes that have historically shifted markers convenient to locating “cheap labor” and “passive nimble workers” across racial, ethnic, and national boundaries. an exploration of the construction of gender at the women’s hackathon thus shows that the management of difference is intimately connected with complex ideologies of productivity and work as well as nationalist and developmentalist projects. the organizers of the event strategically used arduino kits to place the young women at the appropriate (higher) level of the computing stack, from where they could assert their own expertise without being getting lost in the lower layers of abstraction. although the “smart home” theme of the hackathon could be framed as reproducing gendered divisions of labor, comments during the event show that special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 22 these entanglements of gender, technology, and domesticity were actively negotiated. some women hackers praised the liberatory potential of new technologies; other women enjoyed the competitiveness and productive time the hackathon fostered; other women resisted the explicit othering and called for more male hackers; other women (the abuelitas) made their presence felt and performed their solidarity with the makers-in-the-making, regardless of what was being made at this hackathon. most importantly, from a space usually reserved for young makers to learn new, “modern” technologies, the abuelitas asserted their place as the very backbone of these socio-technical configurations, the necessary defaults for the making and corresponding discourse of technological progress to occur in the first place. indeed, the fact that the hackathon had the theme of the “smart home” might have even helped the grandmothers feel more comfortable attending the event in order to make their intervention in visibility and recognition. the way that the organizers shifted the name of the event from the first women’s hackathon in méxico to the first latina hackathon shows how the participants, whether they liked it or not, would become enmeshed in the multiple ways that work and coding get co-produced with constructions of race and gender across national boundaries, always adjacent to capitalist product-driven solutions that value difference when it can be framed as a competitive advantage. from participating in a multitude of technology-focused events in both the us and méxico, it became apparent that issues of inequality and difference quickly disappeared when conversations turned toward economic development. at one event i attended aimed at latinx empowerment in silicon valley, for example, a panel discussed the importance of racial and ethnic representation within tech companies. in the very next panel on supporting tech startups in méxico, not one word was said about how the structural hierarchies of inequality in méxico, nor the processes of racialization that we discussed in the previous panel, could potentially rebound to spaces in méxico. this extraction of difference across boundaries is also common to academic work on technology. kim fortun (2014) suggests that while sts scholars like bruno latour have made science and technology vernacular and thus accessible to ethnographic study, work that privileges practice over structure many times leaves the political-economic largely absent. moreover, she states, “in the insistence on the meso—a sociology of association—cross-scale interactions and structural conditions seem to be written off…i must call gentlemen’s engagement, coming together around controlled vocabulary meant to cut across difference” (fortun, 2014, p. 315). in this article, i’ve suggested that an analysis of special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 23 the social dynamics at the first latina hackathon calls for a deconstruction of nationalist ideals of femininity and transnational ideologies of productive time and labor, starting with close attention to the relationship between “experts.” the challenge is that every time we locate expertise from below, or move across activist communities to collaborate, there is always a risk of leaving out some differences in the name of connecting across others. at this woman’s hackathon, for example, there weren’t any efforts to advocate for non-ableist hacking (felt, 2019; yergeau, 2014), or even any language marking the space as genderqueer or trans-inclusive. some hackathons in the us call for participants who “identify as women in some significant way,” for example (dunbar-hester, 2019, p. 27). for a politics of empowerment to be effective, marginalized communities must work together across difference to learn from each other’s’ struggles in order to construct holistic forms of empowerment: political and educational empowerment as well as personal transformation through consciousness (hill collins, 1990). the intersectional work has to start somewhere, but with careful attention to who is left out in the movements across the intersections. this last point is particularly important as expert roles shift and “ethnography” continues to become the trade language to do crucial border-work between ethnographers, academics, community activists, and technology producers. movements narrowly configured around “technology” will unlikely lead to redressing systemic inequity, but they have the potential to create space to build off of synergies and create other movements altogether. invoking postcolonial and decolonial thinkers, anita say chan (2018) reminds us that our role as academics is to “think within,” between, and among perspectives that emerge from widely situated movements inside and outside of academia. the role of mentorship and sustained relationships across and within research spaces becomes particularly important to think alongside overlapping and multifaceted movements. this form of research, where scholars claim an investment in the communities they study (because many times they come from these communities) has an established trajectory in ethnic studies disciplines. these methodologies are often relegated to the sidelines, however, disappeared in the name of studies that purportedly take these differences into account in macroscale theoretical frameworks, or simply passed over by mainstream disciplines that “discover” novel forms of inquiry. if there’s one thing to take from this women’s hackathon, it is that we can always summon the abuelitas to remind us about visibility and recognition, from the day-to-day to the hackathon to spaces of knowledge production. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 24 acknowledgements many thanks to the anonymous and peer reviewers for substantive comments that helped shape this article and to the catalyst editorial staff who helped move it toward its final stage. special thanks to sareeta amrute and luis felipe murillo, who brought the special volume to fruition after serving as discussants for a panel on “hacking imaginaries” i co-organized with erin mcelroy at the american anthropological association annual meeting. my colleagues in mit anthropology provided sharp feedback for revisions and future directions in an intellectual forum. funding for research was provided by the social science research council, the wenner-gren foundation for anthropological research, and uc-mexus. the writing of drafts and revisions would not have been possible without generous support from the mellon/acls dissertation completion fellowship, the school for advanced research residential fellowship, and the uc president’s postdoctoral fellowship at uc irvine. most importantly, my deepest gratitude for the organizers and participants of the #fixit hackathon for allowing me to share their space. any errors or omissions are my own. notes 1 newspaper article titles such as “the comeback kid,” “mexico makes it,” and “the rise of mexico,” give a sense of the recent cheers for mexico’s sudden emergence on the global stage (see, e.g., the new york times article by friedman, 2013). the economist (2012), for example, predicted that by 2018 “made in china” would be replaced by “hecho en méxico” (made in mexico). 2 to get a sense of how popular these hackathon events were in the years i conducted research, an organization dedicated to enumerating the hackathon events reported that in 2016 there were at least 3,450 hackathons organized, 200,000 participants, and 13,000 prototypes built in over 100 countries (laudet, 2017). 3 for another example of how knowledge workers from the global south come to represent developmentalist narratives of progress, see okune’s (this issue) study of how “over-researched” kenyan techno-entrepreneurs come to epitomize the “africa rising” narrative. 4 mcelroy (this issue) explores how technologists and hackers in romania negotiate homebrewed technical ingenuity with western techno-culture and infrastructure, or how they confront “siliconization.” special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 25 5 see, for example, the writings of eric raymond, http://www.linuxtoday.com/developer/2002011401620opkn. 6 thanks much to luis felipe murillo and sareeta amrute for bringing to my attention these examples. references abbate, j. 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(2004a). alternative cartographies: third woman and the respatialization of the borderlands. midwestern miscellany, 30, 47–62. ramírez, c. s. (2004b). deus ex machina: tradition, technology, and the chicanafuturist art of marion c. martinez. aztlán, 29(2), 55–92. ricuarte quijano, p. (2018). jóvenes y cultural digital: abordes críticos desde américa latina. chasqui. revista latinoamericana de comunicación, 137, 13–28. salzinger, l. (2016). “re-marking men: masculinity as a terrain of the neoliberal economy.” critical historical studies, 3(1), 1–25. shankar, s. (2008). desi land: teen culture, class, and success in silicon valley. duke university press. turkle, s. (1984). the second self: computers and the human spirit. simon & schuster. yergeau, m. (2014). disabilty hacktivism. in m. hocks & j. sayers (eds.), hacking the classroom: eight perspectives. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) héctor beltrán, 2020 29 http://www2.bgsu.edu/departments/english/cconline/hacking/ author bio héctor beltrán is assistant professor of anthropology at mit. he is a sociocultural anthropologist who draws upon his background in computer science to understand how the technical aspects of computing intersect with issues of identity, race, ethnicity, class, and nation. hatch article     the metabolic fetish: introduction to blood sugar: racial pharmacology and food justice in black america    anthony ryan hatch wesleyan university ahatch@wesleyan.edu this is an excerpt from anthony ryan hatch's book, blood sugar: racial pharmacology and food justice in black america, which was published in 2016. the excerpt is copyrighted by the regents of the university of minnesota. understanding metabolic syndrome requires that we shift our thinking from an epidemic perspective to one that embraces an endemic view of metabolic health problems. recent scientific discourse about the metabolic problems that comprise metabolic syndrome refers to each of them as epidemics in their own right.1 epidemics are viral or bacterial infections from outside the body that quickly and indiscriminately kill large numbers of individuals living within a circumscribed geographic location. while it is true that most americans will most likely experience and/or die from one or more metabolic problems, these conditions are not epidemics in the historical sense of the term. the historical response to controlling and eradicating epidemics has been to rapidly target individuals who are most likely to fall within the epidemic’s relational and spatial reach.  in stark contrast, the politics of metabolism is characterized by endemic problems. endemics are discriminating, widespread, and long-term population-level phenomena that weaken societies’ energies because treating them is expensive and they lead to the decreased economic productivity of working populations.2 according to data published by leading authorities, the direct and indirect health-care costs from heart disease, diabetes, and stroke exceed one trillion dollars per year.3 because endemics represent a political problem for those who govern, endemic problems quickly become objects of government intervention, scientific disciplines, and capitalist expansion. in the context of improved health and productivity, this framing of endemic phenomenon is required to excise as much political utility, scientific discipline, and economic profit as possible. shifting our perspective from an epidemic to an endemic view is critical for understanding how the biological realities, political rationalities, and economic opportunities of the politics of metabolism shaped the discourses of metabolic syndrome. developing a more robust understanding of the politics of metabolism also involves analysis of the biomedical-government-industry collaborations that lie at the center of biomedical knowledge production in the united states. although metabolic syndrome may not exist as a biological reality in precisely the same ways that cancers exist, it emerged in the context of a massive biomedical, government, and corporate response to the endemic problems of metabolism. the discourses, technologies, and practices of these social institutions are the tools with which researchers construct metabolic syndrome. taken together, these preliminary interpretations underscore both the importance of ideas and institutional practices in the politics of metabolism. race, ethnicity, and metabolic syndrome metabolic syndrome not only constitutes a new way of constructing, studying, and treating human metabolism, it also serves as an emerging cultural location for the construction of new meanings of race and ethnicity. to understand the relationships between metabolic syndrome, race, and ethnicity, and to analyze the meanings produced through the science of metabolic syndrome, blood sugar interrogates the uses of racial and ethnic categories in metabolic syndrome research. the first set of relationships that link metabolic syndrome to race concerns the specific constructions of race and ethnicity that are used in this research. race and ethnicity are socially constructed systems of categorization that are used to identify, group, and rank human beings, albeit based on different criteria. race is a socially constructed category that emerged in the 1600s to classify individuals into so-called races based on presumed biological differences between population groups. ethnicity is a socially constructed category that emerged in the 1920s to classify individuals into so-called ethnic groups based on presumed differences in culture, geographic origin, and ancestry. race and ethnicity are related in that ethnicity emerged in large part in response to critiques of biological notions of race. given this historical relationship, race and ethnicity are not interchangeable systems of categorization. however, there is meaningful overlap between what are considered racial and ethnic groups. for example, african americans are considered to be both a racial and an ethnic group. race and ethnicity are controversial systems of categorization, especially in the context of biomedical research, because individual biological and genetic differences do not fall neatly along racial and ethnic lines. in other words, despite their shared origins in response to biological interpretations of individual and group differences, race and ethnicity are social constructions.  the federal government plays several important roles in the production of metabolic syndrome and race. it enforces the racial categorizations used in biomedical research on metabolic syndrome, funds and produces research on the syndrome, and regulates the labeling and safety of prescription drugs related to it. because of historical and current federal research policies that regulate demographic data collection, statistical information about a research subject’s race and ethnicity is routinely collected along with anthropomorphic, molecular, and genetic information about the subject’s metabolism.4 therefore, the sampling frames, analytic strategies, and research findings of metabolic syndrome research studies are often framed using these racial and ethnic categories. in this regulated scientific environment, it is also common to see published review articles on metabolic syndrome that are focused exclusively on particular racial and ethnic minority groups.5 the racial categories used in federally regulated health research are statutorily based on the office of management and budget’s 1997 standards for maintaining, collecting, and presenting federal data on race and ethnicity.6 the omb recommendations on the measurement of race and ethnicity in the general population note that “the [racial] categories that were developed represent a socialpolitical construct designed to be used in the collection of data on the race and ethnicity of major broad population groups in this country, and are not anthropologically or scientifically based.”7 in this context, many researchers also frame their research on racial groups as ethnic to avoid talking explicitly about race in ways that could be interpreted as racial bias, or worse, scientific racism.  a second set of relationships that link metabolic syndrome to race and ethnicity concerns the effort to study, prescribe, and label drugs that may be related to metabolic syndrome.8 drug companies are actively recruiting individuals who seemingly have metabolic syndrome for their clinical research. for example, the african american rosuvastatin investigation and efficacy study (or aries study) investigated the ability of crestor, a powerful new member of the statin class, to lower both blood pressure and cholesterol in a selfidentified african american population.9 a second recent study, the clinical utility of caduet in simultaneously achieving blood pressure and lipid endpoints in a specific patient population (or capable study) investigated whether caduet, a combination of two drugs, lipitor and norvasc, was effective at lowering african americans’ blood pressure and cholesterol.10 both of these prescription drug studies were conducted in a manner similar to the way that african americans were targeted in the research and marketing of bidil, an antihypertensive medication that is the first drug approved by the fda for use in a specific socalled ethnic group: african americans.11 yet, coupled with recent research findings that suggest that members of racially and ethnically categorized groups might require different medications, dosages, and routes of administration of prescription drugs trials and because of new federal guidelines about the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in clinical trials, this research has a new racial dimension.12  metabolic syndrome has become a new way of representing and explaining racial health inequalities in america. the scope and impact of chronic metabolic conditions have intensified in the united states, especially among racial and ethnic minority groups. recent data from the centers for disease control and prevention (cdc) document substantial and persistent racial disparities in the distribution of and complications from these major chronic metabolic conditions.13 for decades, social epidemiologists have documented such disparities among racial and ethnic minority groups.14 this research on racial health disparities reveals that african americans and other racially categorized minority groups experience higher rates of death owing to chronic metabolic diseases and higher rates of complications from those diseases, in large part because of the interactive dynamics of racism, sexism, and class inequality on health.15  this body of literature on racial health disparities has received less attention in terms of making a theoretical contribution to critical race theory, science and technology studies, or political sociology, and instead has been more embraced in the fields of social epidemiology and public health. at its core, this research challenges the notion that racial health disparities are caused by natural and cultural differences between racially categorized groups. these scholars have long argued that racial health disparities result from group-based inequalities in access to the economic and political resources necessary to maintain and improve health, such as having access to affordable and adequate medical care. however, simply paying more attention to racially encoded health disparities in the context of metabolic syndrome will not be enough. currently, scientific comparisons of racially categorized groups in metabolic syndrome and its correlates have become a veritable cottage industry. nobly, metabolic syndrome analysts often carry out their work with the purpose of devising better biomedical explanations for health disparities in heart disease, diabetes, and stroke. yet, the dubious theories of racial inequality and discourses of race that emerge from metabolic syndrome research on racial and ethnic groups have not been adequately addressed in that research.  through these practices, metabolic syndrome has become a new discursive tool used to produce new meanings of race in the politics of metabolism. specifically, metabolic syndrome draws upon and extends knowledge making practices that have long constructed race as natural, biological, and genetic. as the biomedical discourses and practices of metabolic syndrome continue to unfold, they intersect with the ways in which race shapes the theories and practices of medicine in terms of disease surveillance, diagnosis, and treatment. because metabolic syndrome emerged largely from within twentiethcentury american biomedicine, it was inexorably shaped by the social structures of race and racism. the sociological relationships between metabolic syndrome and race in the united states seem to have emerged at the intersection of scientific racism—a set of scientific discourses and practices that served to ignore, explain away, and/or justify racial inequalities—and the practices of an increasingly biological and technological approach to the study of human metabolism.  blood sugar explores how metabolic syndrome and race operate together as forms of power and knowledge within the politics of metabolism. three questions guide the arguments i make. first, how did metabolic syndrome emerge as a new discourse in the politics of metabolism? second, how are current conceptions and meanings of race constructed through the science of metabolic syndrome? third, what are the implications of this emerging relationship between metabolic syndrome and race for understanding the construction of racial meanings and the reproduction of racism within the politics of metabolism? notes 1 scott m. grundy, “metabolic syndrome pandemic,” arteriosclerosis thrombosis and vascular biology, 28 (2008): 629-36; dean j. kereiakes and james t. willerson, “metabolic syndrome epidemic,” circulation, 108 (2003): 1552-53; p. zimmet, k. g. alberti, and j. shaw, “global and societal implications of the diabetes epidemic,” nature, 414 (2001): 782-87. 2 michel foucault, "society must be defended": lectures at the collège de france, 1975-1976, ed. françois ewald, alessandro fontana, and mauro bertani, trans. david macey (new york: picador, 2003 [1976]), 244. 3 direct costs include the costs of physicians and other professionals, hospital and nursinghome services, the cost of medications, home health care, and other medical goods. indirect costs refer to lost economic productivity because of premature disease and death. this estimate is compiled from the following sources: american diabetes association, “economic costs of diabetes in the u.s. in 2002,” diabetes care, 26 (2002): 917-32; eric a. finkelstein, christopher j. ruhm, and katherine m. kosa, “economic causes and consequences of obesity,” annual review of public health, 26 (2005): 239-57; and thomas thom, “heart disease and stroke statistics—2006 update: a report from the american heart association statistics committee and stroke statistics subcommittee,” circulation, 113 (2006): e85-e151. 4 in 1997, the office of management and budget (omb) provided the definitions of race and ethnicity that must be used in all biomedical and healthpolicy research funded by the federal government. see steve epstein, inclusion: the politics of difference in medical research (chicago: university of chicago press, 2007); and alexandra e. shields, michael fortun, evelyn m. hammonds, patricia a. king, caryn lerman, rayna rapp, and patrick f. sullivan, “the use of race variables in genetic studies of complex traits and the goal of reducing health disparities,” american psychologist, 60 (2005): 77-103. 5 for analyses of this research, see chapter 3, “the scientific racism of metabolism.” 6 office of management and budget, “standards for maintaining, collecting, and presenting federal data on race and ethnicity,” federal register, 62 (1997): 58781-90. 7 ibid., 36874. 8 see david s. jones and roy h. perlis, “pharmacogenetics, race, and psychiatry: prospects and challenges,” harvard review of psychiatry, 14 (2006): 92; jonathan t. kahn, “race, pharmacogenomics and marketing putting bidil in context,” american journal of bioethics, 6 (2006): w1-w5; and sandra soojin lee, “racializing drug design: implications of pharmacogenomics for health disparities,” american journal of public health, 95 (2005): 2133-38. 9 j. m. flack, r. victor, k. watson, k. c. ferdinand, e. saunders, l. tarasenko, m. j. jamieson, h. shi, and p. bruschi, “improved attainment of blood pressure and cholesterol goals using singlepill amlodipine/atorvastatin in african americans: the capable trial,” mayo clinic proceedings, 83 (2008): 35-45. 10 ibid. 11 troy duster, “race and reification in science,” science, 307 (2005): 1050-51; jonathan t. kahn, “race, pharmacogenomics and marketing putting bidil in context,” american journal of bioethics, 6 (2006): w1-w5; jonathan kahn, race in a bottle: the story of bidil and racialized medicine in a postgenomic age (new york: columbia university press, 2012); and pamela sankar and jonathan kahn, “bidil: race medicine or race marketing?” health affairs (2005): 54-55. 12 see my analysis in chapter 4, “killer applications: the racial pharmacology of prescription drugs.” 13 centers for disease control and prevention, “racial/ethnic and socioeconomic disparities in multiple risk factors for heart disease and stroke—united states, 2003,” mortality and morbidity weekly report, 54 (2005): 113-17. 14 david r. williams and michelle sternthal, “understanding racialethnic disparities in health: sociological contributions,” journal of health and social behavior, 51 (2010): s15-s27. 15 i. j. benjamin, d. k. arnett, and j. loscalzo, “discovering the full spectrum of cardiovascular disease minority health summit 2003—report of the basic science writing group,” circulation, 111 (2005): e120-e123; a. h. mokdad, j. s. marks, d. f. stroup, and j. l. gerberding, “actual causes of death in the united states, 2000,” journal of the american medical association, 291 (2004): 1238-45; qi zhang and youfa wang, “trends in the association between obesity and socioeconomic status in u.s. adults: 1971 to 2000,” obesity research, 12 (2004): 1622-32; raynard s. kington, and james p. smith, “socioeconomic status and racial and ethnic differences in functional status associated with chronic diseases,” american journal of public health, 87 (1997): 805-10; michael g. marmot, “understanding social inequalities in health,” perspectives in biology and medicine, 46 (2003): s9-s23; mark d. hayward, eileen m. crimmins, toni p. miles, and yu yang, “the significance of socioeconomic status in explaining the race gap in chronic health conditions,” american sociological review, 65(6) (2000): 910-30; j. c. phelan and b. g. link, “controlling disease and creating disparities: a fundamental cause perspective,” journal of gerontology, 60b (2005): 27-33. bio anthony ryan hatch is assistant professor of science in society and african american studies at wesleyan university. he is the author of blood sugar: racial pharmacology and food justice in black america (university of minnesota press, 2016). he has written articles about health and social justice, critical race theory and scientific racism, and the discursive construction of sex crimes. he is currently developing a book manuscript on the uses and meanings of psychotropic drugs in the u.s. criminal injustice system. microsoft word 76955-1-11-horrocks.docx horrocks, s. (2019). materializing datafied body doubles: insulin pumps, blood glucose testing, and the production of usable bodies. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-26. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © stephen horrocks, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article materializing datafied body doubles: insulin pumps, blood glucose testing, and the production of usable bodies stephen horrocks purdue university shorroc@purdue.edu abstract the network of devices involved in insulin pump treatment reads and quantifies the physiological processes of type 1 diabetes as it performs life-sustaining functions inside and upon users’ bodies. together, these devices gather that information to produce what i call datafied body doubles: numerical stand-ins for the body that recreate them as both usable and controllable for pump users and their physicians. by establishing and normalizing a system of quantification through blood glucose testing and temporally mapping body-readings into data collections, these datafied body doubles fundamentally alter the conceptual and material experience of living with diabetes. as medicallycompelled users, people with type 1 diabetes participate in their own datafication through their continued use of those devices—a choice which is not much of a choice at all—but their bodies are re-created and used to drive their participation in those very techno-medicalized treatments nevertheless. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 introduction people with type 1 diabetes (t1d) are in a precarious position.1 because their bodies no longer produce insulin, they live with a daily ultimatum: inject insulin or die. for the roughly 20 to 38 million people worldwide living with t1d, that choice isn’t much of a choice at all. they are what i call compelled users; for a choice of non-use is a choice of non-life, and that reality has created a unique and bittersweet relationship between people and their treatment devices. in this article, i attempt to flesh out how these medically compelled human–technological relationships influence users’ understandings of diabetes, treatment objects, and their own bodies. now the standard of care and primary method of regulating blood glucose levels for the 3 million people in the united states with t1d, the network of devices involved in insulin pump treatment read and quantify users’ physiological processes while they perform their primary life-sustaining functions inside, upon, and outside the body. these devices compile, analyze, and visualize that information to produce what i call datafied body doubles: numerical standins for the body that construct them as both usable and controllable for pump users and their physicians. these datafied body doubles fundamentally alter the conceptual and material experience of living with t1d in the twenty-first century by, first, providing users a new technological/medical (and therefore expert) point of reference in their methods of reading and interpreting their own bodies; and, second, these body doubles are themselves materialized back in/on t1d bodies as people apply them to their ritualized daily diabetes treatment acts. through this process, insulin pumps and networks of diabetes technologies come to function not only as medical periphery or attachments but as deeply intertwined and active constituents of the body. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 cripping t1d and insulin pump use: considering these human/technological treatment networks as active, reciprocal, and productive provides a compelling frame through which we can begin to crip conversations surrounding t1d and chronic illness more generally. it is perhaps unsurprising that diabetes is not commonly framed within the discourse of disability,2 but i draw them together to highlight some of the ways this connection would benefit scholarship surrounding both diabetes and critical disability studies more broadly. first, at its base, the shift toward constant and concealed treatment practices is emblematic of a much broader system of biomedicalized control that devalues nonnormative bodies, and thereby devalues a life lived with(in) one. here i use the term biomedicalized to signal the late twentieth-century cultural shift in medical practice and culture adele clarke et al. (2009) have termed “biomedicalization,” wherein the goals of controlling disease and “individual perfection” prioritize the transformation of illnesses and bodies through technoscientific means (pp. 1, 11). these goals, rooted in a hope for healing/curing and improving patients’ quality of life, are nevertheless influenced by the power structures that are “automatically ‘built in’ and mobile, embodied through social practices and norms,” both within the field of medicine and in us culture more generally (pp. 4-5). read with perhaps more nuance through the work of sheila jasanoff (2004), the structures of power, social practices and norms, and technoscientific medical interventions involved in late twentiethand twenty-first-century diabetes treatment are all co-produced together within and among various the institutions and discourses with which they engage. and it is in the co-production of technoscientific medical practice, cultural norms, and definitions surrounding t1d, and patient identities where disability studies—and crip theory in particular—can help provide insights and tools for better understanding the implications of insulin pump treatments for the people with diabetes who use them. first, and central to the very purpose of this essay, technological interventions in medical research and practice have transformed t1d from an acute condition to a chronic one.3 insulin injections keep people with t1d alive. insulin pump systems, particularly those that incorporate blood glucose (bg) tracking horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 devices, have drastically improved patients’ quality and duration of life. because these life-sustaining treatments have been and continue to be coproduced alongside the social practices and norms of us and medical cultures, however, they also become sites upon which systems of power are and can be made manifest or “built [on],” to paraphrase clarke et al. above. the act of living with a chronic disease is compounded with various unseen yet nonetheless taxing forms of labor, work that has been made invisible by the long-term and large-scale normalization of able-bodiedness. as robert mcruer (2006) details in crip theory, able-bodiedness is made socially compulsory in part by associating conceptions of embodied normalcy with the ability to produce labor value, but also by framing all disabilities as “essentially temporary, appearing only when, and as long as, they are necessary” (pp. 7-8, 29). through this cultural logic, various disabilities and chronic illnesses such as diabetes can be moved on and off stage as needed. they can be just palatable enough to systems of compulsory able-bodiedness when they need to be, yet out of view when they do not—a flexibility that can be enacted upon people and bodies, but that can also be deployed by people in productive ways. for individuals who live with t1d, the permanent impermanence of the disease as framed by themselves, their doctors, and us culture more broadly produces some significant tensions. geoffrey c. bowker and susan leigh star (2000) refer to similar tensions for tuberculosis patients as “torque.” the interactions between people, institutions, and definition paradigms (in their case, categories about tuberculosis) make their uneasy conglomeration visible: each has a trajectory, and the trajectories may pull or torque each other over time if they move in different directions or at different rates. the threads that tie category to disease, to science, to bureaucracy, and thus to person, often become twisted and tangled in the long process of the disease. the texture of classification here is composed of thick filiations, encompassing much of a person’s life, imposed from outside, and filled with uncertainty and contradiction. (p. 195) horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 as people live with the embodied experience of t1d and all of the vicissitudes associated with a fast-moving and dynamic chronic condition, the medical and cultural definitions and scripts for diabetes are everpresent in co-constructing meanings associated with those experiences. as the “trajectories” or interpretations of those experiences by these three actors align, their interconnection is productive and often invisible. when those interpretations do not overlap, however, the mental/emotional/embodied torque produced can be excruciating. these tensions, i argue, are further complicated with the addition of technological quantification and injection systems detailed throughout the study below. in this context, it makes sense all the more why many people with t1d constantly hope for a cure. that desire for a post-diabetic life—so often actually conceptualized as a return to a pre-diabetic life—is in many ways a desire to escape the labor and torque characteristic of life with a chronic illness. in practice, this desire is discursively linked to a desire for the experience of able-bodiedness in an able-bodied world, a desire to feel normal. the problem, however, is that regardless of a possible future cure, millions of people currently do live with t1d, and reiterating normalizing narratives within imagined futures for t1d further entrenches conceptions of t1d abnormalcy in the present. i draw diabetes into discourses of disability, and especially of crip technoscience, in order to politicize the technological relationships that have become so deeply intertwined with experiences of living with and treating t1d. as the need for repetitive treatment acts overlaps with ubiquitous calls for “the cure,” diabetic bodies come to be framed in terms of what alison kafer (2013) calls “facile references of self-evident cyborgs simply by virtue of their use of ‘assistive’ or ‘adaptive’ technologies” (p. 120). in the context of diabetes, this move flattens the varied human experiences with t1d treatment and packages them as uniform, depoliticizing those processes and the datafied body doubles they produce, despite the cultural and economic structures required for them to function (and to exist at all). i aim to make visible those connections to the systems of medical practice, research, and device production, as well as how those power relationships structure or at least influence people’s daily lives and practices. in so doing, horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 i hope to open a space where we can begin to see the ways people are not only implicated in this technoscientific (re)defining themselves, but how people resist and, though still compelled, actively define the parameters of their own use in new and interesting ways. insulin, blood glucose testing, and twentieth-century transmuted disease: in order to understand the techno-human relationships typical of twenty-first-century t1d, it is important to trace how the medicine and culture of diabetes have changed. not to be confused with its in-nameonly counterpart type 2, type 1 diabetes mellitus—often referred to as juvenile or insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (iddm)—is a chronic immune disorder in which the body cannot break down and use carbohydrates due to a total lack of insulin production. though the particular combination of genetic and environmental factors at play in its cause is still largely unknown, something triggers an autoimmune rejection of beta cells in the pancreas that create insulin. as a result, patients with t1d eventually stop producing insulin altogether and require insulin injections to metabolize foods—any food, all food, any time (“diabetes,” 2005; “diabetes,” 2007; marcovitch, 2006). there were two major shifts in diabetes treatment in the twentieth century that transformed not only how treatments functioned, or even how it affected everyday life for people with diabetes, but that fundamentally altered the disease itself. first, in early 1921, frederick banting and his research team successfully isolated a hormone they named “insulin” from the pancreas,4 and both the medical and popular response was so dramatic that commercial injectable insulin was produced and on the market within a year (banting, best, & macleod, 1922; “frederick grant banting,” 1966). though references to diabetes date back as far as 1500 bce in india and egypt, and though medical discourses have all changed significantly in the thousands of years since then, treatments (and, really, prognoses) for what we now call type 1 diabetes remained generally similar until the 1920s: diet and/or lifestyle changes centered on “abstaining” (medvei, 1993, pp. 46, 49; zajac, shrestha, patel, & poretsky, 2010, pp. 1-5). insulin injection treatment changed everything, essentially ridding patients of their horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 immediate side effects and eventually increasing life expectancy postdiagnosis twenty-fold (brostoff, keen, & brostoff, 2007, p. 1352). what was for centuries a terminal diagnosis accompanied by a doctor’s suggestion to “make arrangements” became a chronic, life-long condition with fundamentally new challenges and side effects. in his book bittersweet: diabetes, insulin, and the transformation of illness, chris feudtner (2003) argues that the discovery and development of the “wondrous drug” itself accounted for the “bittersweet” transformation of diabetes in the twentieth century. as insulin therapy was quickly institutionalized as the standard of care, it altered the “fundamental biology of the disease,” stunting the so-called “natural” problems associated with diabetes, while simultaneously giving rise to scores of new complications and lifestyle changes no one had lived long enough to develop. “the patient,” feudtner argues, “experiences an illness with a transmuted course” (emphasis added). medical practice, as a series of interrelated human decisions, transformed diabetes biologically, altered people’s everyday labor and practices, and created a culture of medicalized control centered on rhetoric of individual responsibility and the “predicament of dangerous safety” (pp. 23, 29). this human-molded diabetic world would serve as a primary site of further transmutations and the standardization of medical science more generally (porter, 1996, pp. 31-32). the second major shift in the twentieth-century diabetic world began in the 1960s, as biomedical researchers began producing blood glucose test strips for use in emergency rooms and clinical diagnostics. these devices allowed physicians to take a small amount blood from their patients, run it across the strip to begin a chemical reaction, and compare the strip’s hue to a chart to give them a range of where their blood glucose levels were at that moment. by 1970, these strips were altered to feed the chemical reaction data into devices that could produce a quantitative reading of the blood’s glucose per deciliter, and glucose meters became available for patients’ at-home use in the 1980s (clarke & foster, 2012, pp. 85-87). as at-home bg measurement became institutionalized in the 1980s and 1990s, the general practice of testing biomedicalized crip users became institutionalized along with it. in their book biomedicalization: horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 technoscience, health, and illness in the u.s., adele clarke et al. (2009) argue that the “technoscientization of biomedical practices” since the 1980s have coalesced into a medical paradigm they call “biomedicalization”—a late-century shift in american medicine focused more on transforming disease and the body through the use of technologies than on treating or controlling it (pp. 1-2, 197). this medical need to transform has disproportionately affected people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, who must also navigate the cultural and economic traps symptomatic of systemic “compulsory able-bodiedness,” discussed in more detail above (mcruer, 2006, pp. 1-2, 8). in essence, the intersections of these sociocultural forces at the end of the twentieth century have turned people with t1d into compelled users5—biomedicalized crip users—who often blood-test their way into the quantified self (qs) movement whether they wanted to or not.6 since the advent of bg testing, t1d-related research has primarily focused on making devices more manageable and user-friendly, on conducting more frequent bg readings (which led to the development of continuous glucose monitors), and networking bg testing devices with other treatment technologies such as insulin pumps. people with t1d now live a fundamentally device-connected life, one in which t1d bodies and epistemologies have been redefined in myriad ways heretofore underexplored. in what follows, i will engage with these devices to begin unpacking how the body is conceptually redefined through the compelled use of these networked treatment devices. datafied body doubles and the network of t1d treatment devices though the exact combination of technologies used for insulin pump treatment vary based on insurance coverage, physician recommendations, and individual tastes and aesthetics among other factors, the standard of care in t1d treatment today includes at least three components: an insulin pump, a continuous glucose monitor, and a blood glucose meter. each of these devices works together to standardize t1d bodies and treatments, and to construct what i call datafied body doubles. below i will map out this horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 network of devices, their functions and connections to t1d bodies, and how they work (or sometimes do not work) together in both maintaining blood glucose levels and making t1d bodies medically usable. blood glucose meters and bodies as numbers: tens of millions of people in the united states and around the world use blood glucose meters on a daily basis, paying into a nearly us$9 billion market worldwide (hughes, 2009, pp. 1219-1220). though they make up one of the largest segments of global pharmaceuticals today, diabetic glucose testing products were not developed and marketed for at-home consumers until the 1980s. by the turn of the new millennium, however, nearly every person in the united states diagnosed with diabetes used a meter at home on a regular basis (tenderich, 2013, p. 68). glucose meters’ rapid shift from medical obscurity to clinical ubiquity, i argue, has been accompanied by significant changes to definitions of type 1 diabetes (and diabetes generally), altering the lived experience of embodiment for people who use these devices on a daily basis. as i will show below, efforts to make the complex physiological processes associated with t1d more manageable have established and normalized a system of quantification that re-creates the body’s processes as a number. in doing so, t1d bodies are overlaid with people’s sensory experiences together with the numbers meant to represent them, conflating and redefining various ways of knowing into sets of integers that make treating such a highly complex condition possible—and in so doing, masking many of the complexities associated with their creation. these device-produced numerical stand-ins for the body set the stage for the creation of datafied body doubles as t1d treatment becomes increasingly networked with more and more treatment and measuring devices. how, then, does a bg meter actually work? by pricking their finger and placing a drop of blood on the end of a disposable test strip, an individual can receive an estimate of their blood glucose level in almost real time. chemicals in and/or on the test strip react when users’ blood is introduced, and the device measures that chemical change to produce a numerical measure of the amount of glucose present in that droplet of blood horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 (clarke & foster, 2012, pp. 86-88). in the united states, this is measured as milligrams of glucose per deciliter of blood (mg/dl)—calculated as millimoles per liter (mmol/l) in most of the world. according to the national institutes of health, fasting blood glucose levels for non-diabetic people average between 80 and 120 mg/dl (4.4 and 6.7 mmol/l), which acts as the approximate goal range for people using insulin injections (national institute of diabetes, n.d.).7 after nearly four decades of consistent and routine use by people with type 1 and type 2 diabetes worldwide, these meter readings have come to be understood as snapshots, illustrative of users’ bg levels—and of users’ bodies more generally. as barbara a. koenig (1988) has argued, the technological imperative of care pervasive in the field of medicine makes the “routinization” and standardization of this type of techno-medical procedure difficult, if not impossible to resist. medical professionals establish and maintain certain “treatment rituals” to help offset the uncertainties inherent in caring for complex health-related experiences such as these (pp. 466-467, 479). in the case of t1d, the numbers produced by these devices have become so normalized as to be understood by doctors and patients alike as direct representations of a user’s physiological state at the time of the test. this is not to suggest that either mds’ or patients’ explicit and tacit knowledges can be so easily reduced or dismissed, but instead that the normalization process in medical science and practice is that influential. often understood as the result of objective (and accurate) technoscientific observations, bg numbers take on the role of authoritative medical opinions in and of themselves. as theodore m. porter (1996) has argued, though scientific measurement systems are built within specific moments and contexts, decades of “regulation, education, manufacturing, and method” have redefined measurement as “precision and objectivity” (pp. 23, 32). numbers produced with these supposedly objective measurements have the uncanny ability to reach across the sociocultural boundaries of medicine and american culture to deal with large and often difficult subject matter— in no small part due to their “ability to bypass deep issues” and distill them into small, digestible chunks (p. 86). horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 it is at the intersection of ritualized medical practice and the abiding “trust in numbers” porter details within the united states where the cultural meanings of bg testing reside. after all, how do glucose meters depict or envision the body? as a number. this re-imaging, or translation of the body as a number has become normalized not only through the cultural authority of medicine (pescosolido & martin, 2004), but by the reiterated act of overlaying those numbers onto users’ sensory experiences with their own bodies. one of the most common linguistic idiosyncrasies shared among people with t1d is the tendency to use the numbers from their bg readings as direct references to themselves. phrases such as, “i was 400,” “they told me i was 35,” and “oh good, i’m 102,” denote a conscious acknowledgement of a state of being—one’s embodied knowledge of how that particular state feels merging with a system of quantification with which to categorize it. more than just a common turn-of-phrase among participants, i would argue, this linguistic act of equating their bodies/selves with biomedicalized recreations thereof is not unlike the marking that comes with a diagnosis of diabetes in the first place. i am, you are “diabetic”—as a medical and social marker or identifier—becomes i am, you are my/your bg, and this marking process is carried over into the treatment acts patients conduct themselves. after a lifetime of mapping bg tests onto lived experiences, these numbers become so far divorced from the calculations and even bodies that produce them (and give them their medical authority) that they come to stand for themselves. the number is as much as one’s own body is—to use judith butler’s (1993) terms, years of reiteration have materialized the number as one’s body in and of itself (p. 2). if the body is made to be understood as a number, it is made to be calculable. it becomes a data point, to be plugged into formulas in order to produce particular solutions. this is how medically “difficult” diabetic bodies become scientifically usable—they are made into something else, something legible to those ways of seeing and knowing. in these attempts to simplify t1d bodies, however, several problems arise that complicate the process. what happens, for example, when someone feels as though they have low bg but their meter produces a number that says otherwise? or horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 when the accuracy of test strip lots vary (often unbeknownst to the user), producing slightly inconstant results? the torque produced by these incongruent readings of the body, to again use bowker and star’s (2000) term, can at times produce a “nightmare texture,” difficult to understand and respond to (p. 27). as i explore below, the body’s processes as they relate to bg are not static—but meter readings are. they are better understood as representations of something that happened than of something happening—and what emerges is somewhat of a temporal problem. continuous glucose monitors and bodies as data collections: to begin dealing with some of the issues that arise from static bg meter readings, and keeping in line with the more-data-is-better streams of many contemporary medical and scientific cultures,8 doctors and device designers alike have invested considerable resources into developing and advocating for the use of continuous glucose monitors (or cgms). fdaapproved for clinical use in 1999 and for at-home use in 2003, cgms are intended to perform the task their name implies: keep track of blood glucose levels over time (sato, hirose, & watada, 2012, pp. 225-226). rather than relying on a singular number gathered ten minutes or two hours ago to get an idea of where one’s glucose levels are, cgm users attach a sensor onto their body (usually somewhere around the abdomen) with a small tube or wire inserted beneath the skin which takes a reading every two to five minutes. these readings are then wirelessly transmitted from the cgm sensor to either an accompanying monitor device or directly to a user’s insulin pump, where they are stored, time-stamped, and visualized for the patient and their physician (medtronic diabetes, 2013a, pp. 2-3). a process which previously would have required painstaking record keeping by patients—who must actually live their lives while they manage their blood sugar—large-scale bg data collection via cgms affords users the ability to stay up-to date with their bg levels in almost real time (even though cgm readings have been shown to be delayed and less accurate than bg meter readings) (medtronic diabetes, 2013a, p. 3). co-produced alongside these new methods of mass-quantification, however, are new horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 temporally redefined t1d bodies. while bg meters construct a usable t1d body, the numerical stand-ins they create are always fixed past-tense representations—t1d bodies that were. cgms, on the other hand, map a constant stream of automated glucose readings onto a timeline to produce usable t1d bodies in both the present and future tense—t1d bodies that are and will be. shifting and intersecting temporalities themselves are not necessarily new concepts for people with t1d. in her recent article, laura forlano (2017) details many of the temporal implications of living a deviceconnected t1d life. as a “disabled cyborg” herself, the biomedical objects connected to her body and necessary for her insulin treatment acts “introduce industrial clock time to [her] biological processes” (p. 4). using kafer’s (2013) concept of “crip time” as a point of departure, forlano explores the tensions and possibilities associated with the artificial (yet medically compelled) convergence of two disparate temporal framings. not only does her insulin pump build an injection schedule on an hourly system, but the cgm attached to her body allows her to see her bg levels without going through the process of pulling out her meter and pricking her finger— an act that frequently interrupts work and/or other social activities (pp. 15, 18-19). beyond the surface difficulties of these experiences themselves, both examples here (and especially forlano’s discussion of the cgm) gesture toward a fundamental shift in t1d crip time more broadly—and these shifts reveal new convergences and perhaps conflations between t1d crip time on the one hand, represented here by forlano’s inherently political use of the cgm to restructure her work and social practices, and t1d “curative time” on the other, represented by the expansion of industrial time within these structured pharmaceutical treatments conducted on/with bodies’ physiologies.9 the biomedicalized repositioning of type 1 bodies as current, present, and dynamic is a process of transforming their embodied temporality in order to optimize them (clarke et al., 2009, pp. 2, 23). people with t1d turn to cgms, whether at the suggestion of their physician or on their own, in search of better control of their bg levels—to optimize their diabetes by tracking it. by plotting bg data points on a timeline, these bodyhorrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 reading devices place current numbers in direct comparison to previous numbers, and in so doing reframe the fundamental meaning of both individual and cumulative readings simultaneously. as i argued above, the numerical body-stand-ins constructed through these tests are made to represent physiological states of the body at particular moments. but streams of cgm readings re-visualize that same body every few minutes, usually in slightly different form. t1d bodies, like all bodies, are dynamic—attempting to control and optimize, or even understand such a slippery entity can be a frustrating and uncomfortable experience. what, then, is the body if it is re-written all day, every day? but, if each bg test and cgm reading primarily derive meaning based on how they compare to other numbers, then the data only create usable meaning as a set and begin to function as what i call datafied body doubles. no longer reduced to 1-to-1 numerical representations of the body on their own, datafied body doubles attempt to recreate the dynamic nature of t1d bodies’ physiologies in data form. if not simply present-tense but active, datafied body doubles must also account for the movement of time in the way users’ present relates to both pasts and futures. thus, cgm manufacturers highlight the importance of bg movement—trends and trajectories, to echo the terms cited most often by manufacturers and users alike—in using datafied body doubles for optimal control. medtronic (2013a), the largest insulin pump and cgm manufacturer in the united states and the maker of the minimed series of insulin pumps, suggests that users “focus on what matters, the trends—the direction and the speed of the sensor glucose readings and graphs. pay less attention to each individual glucose number” (p. 4, emphasis original). from a technical standpoint, this language by medtronic makes sense. unlike bg meters, which measure the glucose-to-blood ratio directly from users’ bloodstream via a finger prick, continuous glucose monitors measure the glucose-to-blood ratio from interstitial fluid located in the layer of subcutaneous fat where cgm sensor tubes are inserted. as a result, sensor readings are always slightly behind what is happening in users’ bloodstream at the time of the test, and people are advised to “always horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 confirm your blood glucose with a bg meter” before making any treatment decisions at all (medtronic diabetes, 2013a, p. 3). what may be understood as a statement of medical “best practices” could also be read as a legal disclaimer to avoid (potentially fatal) blowback from inconsistent or inaccurate cgm readings. from a sales standpoint, this statement also lays the groundwork for the importance of networking the two measuring devices together, which has both clinical and economic implications for the company. but as medtronic says, the numbers themselves are not what really matters. rather than giving patients and doctors a snapshot of bg levels at a particular moment, cgms produce continual snapshots plotted over time to give patients and doctors trends and trajectories. since their move into home use during the 1980s, bg meter readings have functioned within a medicalized value system with two primary outcomes at stake: outside the target range = bad (requiring action from the user, either in the form of insulin injection or glucose ingestion); within the target range = good (users can forget about it and go about their day). with a cgm, however, a targetrange reading by itself is only part of the story, the less important part according to medtronic. cgm visualizations of sensor readings are always accompanied by a trajectory marker of either “going up” or “coming down”— usually identified for users with hypervisible upor down-arrows (and in the case of the medtronic “enlite” cgm system, double-upor double-downarrows if their bg levels are changing rapidly) (medtronic diabetes, 2013a, p. 4). though positive and negative value is still built around individual numbers’ proximity to the target range, new cgm-specific value systems construct positive and negative connotations around an imagined future numbers’ proximity to the same. these cgm-produced blood glucose trajectories, then, are embedded with a new sense of t1d futurity. no longer biomedically valuable to simply identify what/where a person or their body is in a particular moment, cgm systems attempt to predict what they will be. after all, “going down” from a bg of 80 is not about that reading or that moment, but it constructs its meaning from an expectation of a low in the future. this imagined future is intended to help users prevent potentially life-threatening horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 situations, as those low numbers ascribed with negative values can lead to significant (and immediate) consequences for people with t1d. at the same time, the expectation of constant future danger is also part of a remolded twenty-first-century version of t1d’s “grim imagined futures”—to echo kafer (2013)—that have dominated cultural conceptions of diabetes for decades (p. 2). long essentialized as little more than a bleak existence full of suffering, withering, and an ever-present threat of death (assumptions etched into the us cultural canon through films such as steel magnolias (1989) and panic room (2002)), t1d futures are so medically and culturally undesirable that diagnoses are often accompanied by the mourning of one’s lost able-bodied past. though t1d futures reframed by cgms as numbers, anticipated highs and lows, rising and falling may be stripped of their culturally charged language, numbers themselves “have often been an agency for acting on people, exercising power over them” (porter, 1996, p. 77). cgm futurities are built on conceptions of what users should be—a specific target bg range—which keeps people with diabetes in a constant state of dynamic precarity, heavily reliant on the datafied body doubles these measuring devices provide. because these datafied futures are so deeply bound up in the bioeconomics of the production, distribution, and consumption of pharmaceutical devices and medical science and practice, they are powerful, hegemonic, biomedicalized neoliberal futures—futures wherein, as kelly fritsch (2016) argues, the bleakness [of t1d] is necessarily “solved” via biomedical intervention and enhancement, and any possibility of alternative spaces or trajectories requires critical crip interventions (pp. 11-12). first re-created by bg meters as individual data points, t1d bodies are conceptually redefined and temporally mapped into data collections: datafied body doubles that make their subjects legible to medical science in new ways. to be made legible is to be made usable, and in a very real sense, coming to know blood glucose levels (and therefore t1d bodies) means little for actual people unless it is connected with the act of insulin injection. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 insulin pumps and techno-medicalized control of difficult bodies: the network of diabetic measuring devices and practices discussed up to this point have changed the way we think (and even can think) about t1d bodies. though various treatment cultures may hint to the contrary, bg measurement is primarily a means to an end and not an end unto itself. knowing the t1d body and quantifying its processes is only medically valuable to patients and physicians alike in its ability to be used in treatment and/or intervention. enter: the insulin pump. this device is the centerpiece of the current standard of care for people with type 1, primarily because it is site where the life-sustaining act of insulin injection is performed. but assessed through the lens of the t1d treatment network more broadly, the pump also functions as a hub where users go to interact with all their treatment acts, devices, and even their own bodies together in one place. it is here, i argue, where datafied body doubles are gathered and materialized back onto/into the bodies they were made to represent through networked insulin injection. in so doing, the insulin pump comes to function as a catalyst for biomedicalized control of t1d bodies on and through their own doubles. insulin pumps consist of several parts that together perform the function of “delivering” insulin to the body. the device itself is usually about the size of a pager—somewhere in the range of two inches-by-three inchesby-one inch—and houses a motor and piston, a small on-board computer to program delivery schedules and dosage formulas, a display, and some means for user interfacing (in most cases physical buttons, though more recently tandem diabetes, makers of the t-slim insulin pump, have included touchscreen capability) (medtronic diabetes, 2013b, pp. 4-5). in order for that little device to perform its prescribed function, however, it requires several peripheral components (mostly disposable) to connect it to the body and facilitate the movement of sterile pharmaceuticals. first, and most importantly, an insulin pump is only useful for people with t1d when it is used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical-grade insulin product. users fill a disposable reservoir or small tube with enough insulin to last about three days and insert it into the device where the plunger can drive injections. the insulin-loaded pump is then connected to a user’s body horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 by attaching a length of tubing between the reservoir and an infusion set— a port that includes a small tube inserted under the skin, serving as the conduit between the device and the internal workings of the body. with all these pieces in place, users can interface with the pump and give commands to inject insulin as needed—often referred to as a “bolus” dose— and set automated micro-injections to regulate bg levels throughout the course of an average day—known as a “basal” dose (medtronic diabetes, 2013b, pp. 4, 53-56). but to know how much to inject, and when to inject it, users rely on their datafied body doubles created by their blood glucose measuring devices to know “what they are,” and “where they are going.” dosing a pharmaceutical such as insulin involves some rather complex calculations that bring together multiple sites and quantification systems. t1d bodies and their bg levels are measured in mg/dl or mmol/l through the processes outlined above, insulin dose recommendations are based on standardized “units” created by a panel of physicians in the early twentieth century,10 and carbohydrates people ingest are usually measured in grams (though many foods—especially unprocessed foods without nutrition labels—are not easily quantifiable this way). all of these systems of measurement interact with and slightly alter each other, creating a muddy web of numbers that can be difficult to navigate. to make that web more manageable, everyday users are no longer required to perform these complex calculations themselves. insulin dose formulas are programmed into users’ insulin pumps and can be adjusted by their physicians to meet the changing needs of a dynamic t1d body. as people plug their datafied body doubles into their insulin pumps, their devices perform the calculations for them and provide their dose amount. to make the process simpler still, most of the data produced by glucose meters and cgms for networked users are automatically transmitted wirelessly to the insulin pump, requiring even less direct engagement with the “blackboxed” dose calculations (medtronic diabetes, 2013a, pp. 22-27). all they have to do is click “yes,” or “go,” and the insulin pump delivers that amount into the user’s body for them. so long as the datafied body doubles and formulas are working and the outcome is what users expect (i.e., no horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 major unexpected fluctuations in bg levels), as bruno latour (1999) has argued in relation to scientific blackboxing more generally, users have no need to know the inner workings of the device (p. 304). as datafied body doubles are used for insulin dose calculations, the already obscured t1d body is made even more opaque, and the invisibility of technoscientific medical processes work to make diabetes invisible along with it. as insulin pumps inject a dose into the body, people with t1d are inundated with sensory cues of the treatment act: the dose amount incrementally decreasing on screen, the cold sting of pharmaceuticals spreading from the infusion site, the action notification beeps and the sound of the pump’s motor pushing the plunger ever so slightly, and sometimes even the clinical odor of the insulin itself. all of this combines with individuals’ own sensory embodiment, which often fluctuates dramatically with changing blood glucose levels, as datafied body doubles frame and categorize all of these experiences within the bounds of medical authority. by reducing the body and its processes to data collections, it can be more easily used to control the effects of living with t1d—a central goal of bg testing since at least the 1970s (walford, gale, allison, & tattersall, 1978, p. 732)—but it is through networked insulin pump treatment that datafied body doubles are used to materially alter t1d bodies themselves. as users directly and indirectly input datafied body doubles into automated injections through their insulin pumps, what was created as a set of observations of the body becomes a part of the same. the conceptual redefinitions created through reiterated meter and cgm tests are made real by materially changing the body, and users’ sensory experiences with them. conclusion i began this article by calling attention to the precarious position of people with type 1 diabetes. and though it may appear somewhat hyperbolic at first glance, the constant “predicament of dangerous safety” people with t1d live with on a daily basis, to again borrow feudtner’s (2003) term, is as real within the networked insulin pump era as it has ever been (p. 29). bg testing devices and insulin pumps have indeed made significant changes in horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 the ways that precarity is manifest, often in ways users define as life changing or miraculous. their lives are still as dependent on insulin injections as they have ever been, and that is not likely to change any time soon, but the feeling of having just a little more control makes their continued use of these devices worth it. it is that drive—that desire for some semblance of stability within their own bodies where there usually is very little—that compels many of these biomedicalized crip users to maintain their device-connectedness regardless of the possibility of complications, physical or otherwise. and though that drive is often bound up in the hope for (problematic conceptions of) more-able-bodied futures, it is also what drives the “crip aspirations” for a more nuanced and community-built future for t1d—to echo mcruer’s (2018) use of the term (pp. 176, 217). there are of course plenty of conscious non-users, and the economic barriers to entry in this type of hitech medical treatment abound (an issue in desperate need of further interrogation), but the cultural force driving any optimal medical treatment is difficult to avoid. these compelled users are implicated in their own datafication through their continued use of those devices—a choice that, as i argued at the beginning of this essay, is not much of a choice at all—but their bodies are re-created and used to drive their participation in those very technomedicalized treatments nevertheless. though the construction of usable bodies via datafied body doubles is made particularly visible in the case of the millions living with type 1 diabetes, similar methods of biomedicalized control are written into an array of other technologies used in other sites of body and health quantification. giving due attention to these unique experiences of people with their treatment devices can help identify similar spaces of technoscientific meaning-creation, as well as help expand critical frameworks to better include the compelled use of medical devices by people with chronic illnesses. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 notes 1 in referencing the chronic condition noted here as type 1 diabetes mellitus, i will use the terms type 1 diabetes, type 1, t1d, and diabetes interchangeably unless otherwise specified in-text. i capitalize these terms in order to call attention to the role diagnosis—the social, medicalized act of naming and classifying disease—plays in framing how any conversation of diabetes is and can be conducted. see rosenberg (1992). 2 as a chronic illness that can supposedly be pharmaceutically controlled, claims to disability are more often tied to diabetes-related effects rather than to diabetes itself (and similarly, few people with diabetes socially identify themselves as disabled). the us social security administration’s (n.d.) disability evaluation under social security handbook (colloquially referred to as the blue book) notes that both type 1 and type 2 diabetes are “chronic disorders that can have serious disabling complications that meet the duration requirement.” the administration can therefore “evaluate the effects of endocrine disorders [such as diabetes]” to decide whether a particular case is severe enough to qualify for benefits. examples may include amputations, diabetic retinopathy, chronic skin disorders, or cognitive impairments due to diabetic peripheral neurovascular disease or chronic hyperglycemia (sec. 9.00b5, 9.00c, 109.00b5, 109.00c, 109.08). 3 see the history of “transmuted disease” briefly discussed in the following subsection. 4 though the term insuline had been used as a hypothetical placeholder term for a then unidentifiable product of the pancreas nearly a decade before banting’s research, it was banting et al. who suggested the use of insulin as the scientific term for the pancreatic hormone known thereby today. see banting, best, collip, macleod, & noble, 1922, p. 175; schäfer, 1914, p. 84. 5 nelly oudshoorn and trevor pinch (2003), along with the contributors to their edited collection how users matter and other science and technology studies scholars, have written extensively about the politics of use, and the coproduction of users and technologies. and though sally wyatt’s (2008) call for a more nuanced, continuum-based understanding of relationships between people and devices included a nod toward what she called “forced use,” the compelled user—for whom “choice” is but a mask for a system wherein there is none or very little—requires more attention in the user studies literature. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 6 for more on the quantified self movement, see lupton (2016). 7 the international diabetes federation’s has identified a target fasting bg for non-diabetic people of 4 to 5.9 mmol/l (72 to 105 mg/dl), incrementally lower than that outlined by the national institutes of health, whereas the world health organization has defined “normal” bg as never rising above 7.8 mmol/l (140 mg/l) (ceriello & colagiuri, 2008, pp. 1152, 1154). 8 for more on the current drive for big data in medicine, see boyd & crawford (2012); murdoch & detsky (2013). 9 kafer (2013) distinguishes between what she calls “curative time” and the more widely cited concept of “crip time.” the latter is framed in direct opposition to the former, which is characterized by a sense of futurity that “cannot imagine or comprehend anything other than [biomedical] intervention” due to its deep and uncritical investment in compulsory ablebodiedness/able-mindedness (p. 27). 10 banting and the research team who discovered insulin named one “unit” after the dose amount needed to produce a certain level of hypoglycemia in rabbits weighing 2kg. though divorced from the human subjects for whom insulin was intended, unit measurements were standardized at an international conference and have been used ever since. for more on the effect of this decision on cultures of medicine broadly, see porter (1996, pp. 31-32). references banting, f. g., best, c. h., collip, j. b., macleod, j. j. r., & noble, e. c. (1922). the effect of pancreatic extract (insulin) on normal rabbits. american journal of physiology, 62(1), 162-176. banting, f. g., best, c. h., & macleod, j. j. r. (1922). the internal secretion of the pancreas. american journal of physiology, 59, 479. bowker, g. c., & star, s. l. (2000). sorting things out: classification and its consequences. cambridge, ma: mit press. boyd, d., crawford, k. (2012). critical questions for big data. information, communication & society 15(5), 662-679. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2012.678878 horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 brostoff, j. m., keen, h., & brostoff, j. (2007). a diabetic life before and after the insulin era. diabetologia, 50(6), 1351-1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00125-007-0641-0 butler, j. (1993). bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of sex. new york, ny: routledge. ceriello, a., & colagiuri, s. 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(2018). crip times: disability, globalization, and resistance. new york, ny: nyu press. medtronic diabetes. (2013a). getting started with continuous glucose monitoring for the minimed 530g with enlite. medtronic minimed, inc. medtronic diabetes. (2013b). getting started with the minimed 530g insulin pump. medtronic minimed, inc. medvei, v. c. (1993). the history of clinical endocrinology: a comprehensive account of endocrinology from earliest times to the present day. pearl river, ny: parthenon publishing. murdoch, t. b., & detsky, a. s. (2013). the inevitable application of big data to health care. jama, 309(13), 1351. horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 25 https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2013.393 national institute of diabetes and digestive and kidney diseases. (n.d.). know your blood sugar numbers: use them to manage your diabetes. (n.d.). retrieved from https://www.niddk.nih.gov/healthinformation/diabetes/overview/managing-diabetes/know-blood-sugarnumbers oudshoorn, n., & pinch, t. j. (eds.). (2003). how users matter: the coconstruction of users and technologies. cambridge, ma: mit press. pescosolido, b. a., & martin, j. k. (2004). cultural authority and the sovereignty of american medicine: the role of networks, class, and community. journal of health politics, policy and law, 29(4), 735-756. porter, t. m. (1996). trust in numbers: the pursuit of objectivity in science and public life. princeton, nj: princeton university press. rosenberg, c. e. (1992). framing disease: illness, society, and history. in c. e. rosenberg & j. golden (eds.), framing disease: studies in cultural history (pp. xiii-xxvi). new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. sato, j., hirose, t., & watada, h. (2012). continuous glucose monitoring system: is it really accurate, safe and clinically useful? journal of diabetes investigation, 3(3), 225-230. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.20401124.2012.00197.x schäfer, e. a. (1914). an introduction to the study of the endocrine glands and internal secretions: lane medical lectures, 1913. stanford, ca: stanford university press. tenderich, a. (2013). use of blood glucose meters among people with type 2 diabetes: patient perspectives. diabetes spectrum, 26(2), 67-70. https://doi.org/10.2337/diaspect.26.2.67 united states. social security administration. medical/professional relations. (n.d.). disability evaluation under social security. washington, dc: social security administration. walford, s., gale, e. a. m., allison, s. p., & tattersall, r. b. (1978). selfmonitoring of blood-glucose: improvement of diabetic control. the lancet, 311(8067), 732-735. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(78)90855-3 horrocks catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 26 wyatt, s. (2008). challenging the digital imperative. presented at the inaugural acceptance lecture for the royal netherlands academy of arts and sciences extraordinary chair in digital cultures in development, maastricht university. zajac, j., shrestha, a., patel, p., & poretsky, l. (2010). the main events in the history of diabetes mellitus. in principles of diabetes mellitus (pp. 316). springer, boston, ma. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09841-8_1 bio stephen horrocks is a ph.d. candidate in american studies at purdue university specializing in health, technology, and material culture. harvey article    the hela bomb and the science of unveiling sandra harvey university of california, santa cruz sharvey1@ucsc.edu in early 1966, geneticist stanley gartler provided some upsetting news to the attendees at the second decennial review conference on cell tissue and organ culture. he had reviewed some of their work for his study, “apparent hela cell contamination of human heteroploid cell lines” (1968). the hela cell line was derived from the biopsy of a squamous cell carcinoma taken from the cervix of henrietta lacks, an african-american woman who died from this cancer in 1951. in his presentation, gartler revealed the hela cells’ capacity to pass themselves off as other cells and contaminate the samples with which they came into contact. he was able to identify the hela cells because they formed the only cell line included in gartler’s sample that was derived from a black person. based on his findings, gartler argued that much of the attendees’ work was “open to serious question…[and some] would be best discarded” (gartler, 1968, p. 175). as robert stevenson, who later became president of the american type culture collection, put it, the geneticist “showed up at that meeting with no background or anything else in cell culture and proceeded to drop a turd in the punch bowl” (skloot, 2011, p. 154). scientists who attended the conference allegedly referred to this unexpected news as the “hela bomb.”1 this essay returns to the hela cell stories and reveals the violence and underlying fear of miscegenation that fed public intrigue at the time. while narratives about hela contamination are not new, i ask that we stop to contemplate gartler’s revelation and its description as a bomb to grasp how race and gender inform contemporary ways of knowing in the united states. key to comprehending this moment are narratives of black racial passing, which assume a black subject who is able and eager to belie their blackness and pass for white. scientific racism re-enforced passing narratives through the “one-drop” rule linking blackness to blood, and blood to purity. the rule assumes that black blood is a contaminating substance to which white blood (and any other blood) is vulnerable; if a person had at least a "drop" of black blood, they would be read as black within the united states. tracing the accusation of passing highlights it as an apparatus of knowing the other, a technology of disciplining and surveilling bodies, and a regime for regulating populations. given this historical context, this essay considers the moment the hela cells are “discovered” to have originated in a black body rather than a white one as an accusation of racial passing leveled at the cells themselves. in doing so, it demonstrates the ways that the accusation of passing, as both an in vivo and in vitro reading apparatus, becomes an important mechanism for knowing, steeped in epistemological violence. considering the accusation of hela’s passing allows for a departure from the ways the trope has most often been debated within us literature, film, and socio-cultural studies.2 most scholars have been preoccupied with the “passer” and their alleged strategy rather than the anxiety, excitement, and panic that animate the accuser’s attempts to see, classify, and regulate bodies. in focusing on the “passer’s” agency, such scholarship also often comes close to reducing the passing dynamic to the decisions of an autonomous and rational subject.3 hela contamination is an instance in which the passing offender is not a subject but an object—basic biological material. thus, one must reject much of the journalistic reporting that imbues hela with an anthropomorphized agency. at the same time, following the lead of mel chen (2012) and new materialists, i ask how the hela cells have been animated by the fantasies and phobias of black violence and racial contamination. focusing on passing as a reading apparatus of bodies, this essay makes explicit the violence present in “the act of scientific innovation” (wald, 2012, p. 202). this is because science (social, biological, or otherwise) that rests on the relationship between an autonomous seeing, measuring, and creating subject and a knowable and measurable object is implicated in the epistemological claims of the passing accusation. coming to terms with the racialized and sexualized animacies that enliven the hela cells, this paper thus follows from feminist works in science and technology studies that have illustrated the ways we are not the sole beings producing knowledge, works that call for us to wrestle with the failing conceits of modern (scientific, colonial, and nationalist) mastery. in so doing, it demands that we move beyond contemporary bioethical concerns regulating the object’s informed consent and participation in order to imagine an ethics of knowing that is consequential with our own complex vulnerability amongst other racialized and gendered objects. in this vein, i examine the narratives about hela’s passing from the 1950s to the present, including peer-reviewed articles on cell culturing and genetics, science journalism, and cultural studies literature. rather than reinforce a “science” versus “culture” binary, one must consider these bodies of writing as interdependent genres within the archive of scientific knowledge production. this approach troubles the notion that scholarly work within the laboratory or the peer-reviewed journal can be read outside of socio-cultural and historic contexts, and imagines the possibility of critical scientific discussions about blackness, gender, or sexuality that do not take essence as either their assumption or goal.4 the rules dictating what is appropriate scholarly or scientific knowledge do not insulate its practices or findings from popular discourse. on the contrary, they obfuscate the discursive power that historical narratives exert within scientific and other scholarly work. leaving them unchecked produces a naturalizing effect.5 to consider the intricacies of scientific discourse within this larger network of knowledge production, it is necessary to read archival documents alongside more informal exchanges at scholarly conferences, interviews between scientists and journalists, and other popular literature and cultural studies writings. in this way, i trace what cultural studies scholar hortense spillers (1987) calls an “american grammar” shaping and ordering concepts of blackness and gender within even scientific discourse. this grammar overdetermines black women as at once commodities, laborers, hypersexualized objects, and duplicitous subjects. reading the archive in this way, i argue that the threat of miscegenation continues to be a disavowed phobia that places race and gender passing narratives at the crux of biopolitics, biotechnology, and bioethics.6 the first “hela bomb” and its fallout the story of henrietta lacks and the hela cell line is not a new one. in 1951, george gey, the director of tissue culture research at johns hopkins university, discovered the sample of cancerous cells he had received from lacks’s cervical biopsy divided continuously within the correct conditions, something no other cells were known to do at the time. the discovery opened the possibilities for in vitro studies exponentially. narratives of the cell line and the identity of the woman from whom the cells were taken emerged fairly soon after and quite strategically. in fact, one of the earliest narratives of the hela cell line and the identity of henrietta lacks was publicized to garner support and funding for the foundation for infantile paralysis and its efforts to find a poliovirus vaccine; the discovery of the hela cell line and the lab technology developed to keep the cells dividing were the greatest contributions to the effort’s success. the foundation’s director roland berg convinced gey, who was uncomfortable with publicizing lacks’s name, that the story of the hela cells must also include a story of the cell “donor.” how else could the foundation garner interest? the cell line discovery story needed to also be a personal story. in a letter to gartler, berg explained that it was “axiomatic in presenting this type of material to the public that to inform them you must also interest them. as one who has been writing for the public for the past fifteen years in this field, i have learned that you do not engage the attention of the reader unless your story has basic human-interest elements. and the story of the hela cells, from what little i know of it now, has all those elements” (berg, 1953). thus, since the cells’ “discovery,” foundations, science journalists, science studies and cultural studies scholars, and even (or especially) the scientists who have used her cells to further their own research have told and retold stories of henrietta lacks and her cells. during this early period, however, race was not central to the hela narratives (landecker, 2007). in fact, the identity of the woman from whom the cells originated was unclear and often misstated. some authors referred to her as henrietta lakes or helen lane; others named her helen l. even as roland berg attempted to convince gey to reveal the woman’s background publically, he referred to her as “mrs. lakes” (berg, 1953). further, because lacks was not explicitly described as black, she was assumed by most to be a white woman, as the foundation for infantile paralysis no doubt tacitly implied—the “unsung heroine of medicine” (landecker, 2007, p. 164). indeed, berg wrote, “here is a situation where cancer cells—potential destroyers of human life—have been channeled by medical science to a new, beneficent course, that of aiding the fight against another disease” (berg, 1953). in science literature, “hela” began to refer not to the specific cancerous cells of a black woman’s cervix, but to the universal, “generalized human or cellular subject” (landecker, 2007, p. 165). even gey’s attempt to keep lacks’s name and information private contributed to the fabrication of this symbolic woman. he assured berg, “an interesting story could still be built around a fictitious name” (gey, 1953). in this period, hela’s was a story of how any individual—presumably, of course, a white individual—could contribute to scientific advancement and, thus, the progress of the nation. this raises the question of how the hela cell line became racially fixed as black. rebecca skloot’s now widely read and critiqued book, the immortal life of henrietta lacks (2011), had a chapter on this particular moment—the 1966 second decennial review conference on cell tissue and organ culture—yet she did not elaborate on its cultural and political significance. she, however, recognized that it was an important event in the scientific community and thus named the five-page chapter she dedicated to it, “the hela bomb,” appropriating the term scientists used informally to refer to the scandal of hela contamination. race, specifically blackness, was at the center of gartler’s presentation. in his research, he had compared both phenotypes and genotypes of twenty sample cell lines and found them to be sharing the same phenotype variations. more specifically, of the two principal variants, the samples had a type that appeared most frequently in the “american negro male population” (gartler, 1968, p. 750). in march 1966, gartler wrote to gey to confirm the race of the woman from whom the hela cells were taken and concluded, “i have not ascertained the racial origin of all the lines examined; it is known, however, that at least some were thought to have been derived from caucasians (kb, wish, prostate, cmp) and at least one (hela) from a negro” (gartler, 1968, p. 750).7 through the framework of racial biostatistics, gartler concluded that the sample cell lines had been taken over by hela cells and marked by a phenotype most commonly held by black men. he made no comment about any sex discrepancy. instead, the narrative told by cell culture scientists and popular science journalists was one of white cells vulnerable to contamination and disappearance by aggressive, duplicitous black cells.8 prudent scientists should be vigilant of the cell lines and tissue cultures in their own laboratory, the narrative warned. gartler argued that much of the work using cell lines that assumed a particular origin was “open to serious question…[and] would be best discarded” (p. 175). upon hela’s unveiling, many researchers and funders were concerned about the validity of their work. popular science journalist michael rogers reported, “careers had been built on the basis of human tissue culture research, papers written and published, grants and fellowships received—and now, abruptly arose the possibility that the fundamental unit of study might not have been even vaguely what it was supposed to be” (1976, p. 50). however, scientists’ reactions to hela cells passing were also affected by socio-cultural imaginaries. the fallout from gartler’s accusation blurred the lines between the professional, the personal, and the ideals and practices of disinterested scientific inquiry for the cell tissue community and the biotechnology industrial complex more broadly.  for example, during the conference, one of the affected cell lines that gartler identified was fellow scientist leonard hayflick’s wish line, which was derived from tissue originally in the amniotic sac of hayflick’s infant daughter. upon hearing gartler’s presentation, hayflick’s concern for his cell line turned to racial paranoia. worried about the possibility of in vivo rather than in vitro contamination, he called his wife during the conference break to ask whether he was, in fact, his daughter’s biological father. as he retold the anecdote during his own presentation, “she assured me that my worst fears were unfounded” (skloot, 2011, p. 156). the room, reportedly, “erupted in laughter, and no one said anything else publicly about gartler’s findings” (skloot, 2011, p. 156). racial and sexual anxiety turned to comedy as the threat of miscegenation was temporarily covered over. it was not just that hela appeared to the scientific community as a passing actant, but that it had the capacity to make passing subjects out of others—for example, hayflick’s daughter. the link between hela contamination and the destruction of professional careers and scientific progress emerged through the racialization, gendering, and hypersexualization of both the cells and their human source. suturing the cells to the subject, this anthropomorphism drew from tropes of black female hypersexuality and labor. the narratives were rampant in popular science journalism, but also existed in the traffic between scientists, science journalism, and cultural studies. one journalist wrote that for a cell culture lab to receive a letter from walter nelson-rees, a cell culturist who dedicated his work to the detection of hela contamination, was like receiving “a note from the school nurse informing the parents that little darlene had vd” (michael gold, quoted in landecker, 2007, p. 172). in an essay for the london review of books, novelist anne enright recounted a series of websites that explained how to detect the papillomavirus dna in hela cells. she reflected, “i think this means that henrietta lacks had genital warts. i think this means that she slept around” (enright, 2000, p. 9, emphasis in original). additionally, in an article for the feminist philosophy journal hypatia, cellular biologist lisa weasel described hela cells as “a laboratory workhorse” that, although unreliable, performed the role of control group (weasel, 2004, p. 185).  hela and henrietta lacks were contagious and were so together because of the discursive slippage between the narratives of the cellular material and the woman as subject. as michael rogers’s particularly sensationalist journalistic account of hela contamination argued, “in life, the hela source had been black and female. even as a single layer of cells in a tissue culture laboratory, she remains so” (1976, p. 50). these tropes animated scientific discourse as well. for example, in an interview with michael rogers, nelson-rees underscored just how toilsome the task had become, acknowledging, “i hoped i’d never have to look another hela in the face” (rogers, 1976, p. 51). if the cells had at one time signified the universal human cellular subject, the unveiling of their passing resulted in a confrontation between scientists and the particularities of their object of study. racial phobia and its concomitant desires manifested in a black woman’s face returning the gaze. the uncanny moment of the passing object violently and obscenely ruptures any assumptions of science’s inherent goodness. in returning to the question of how the uncovering of this cell line came into discourse through a bomb metaphor, one must ask after the biopolitical work that this metaphor enacts. to take the bellicose reference literally is to assume the hela passing as a warlike moment in the midst of the compiling of biomaterials for medical research. as the basis for his argument about biopolitics, michel foucault insisted that medicine itself is “a political intervention-technique with specific power-effects” (2003, p. 252). the underlying biopolitics of defending society is a matter of “destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race” (foucault, 2003, p. 257). thus, to think of the hela passing as a bomb within the historical context of the time—1966—is to think the passing threat together with other bomb threats and detonations of the time: the cuban missile crisis in 1962, the escalation of the vietnam war between 1963 and 1969, and the bomb that ripped through birmingham’s 16th st. church in 1963. during the cold war and black uprisings against jim crow, the threat of a nuclear bomb encouraged duck and cover practices and hypervigilance against the communist that might be lurking in our own backyard—“red under the bed.” the metaphor projects the threat of a black woman and worker, who passes undetected in the sample of cervical cells. within the passing narrative, hela threatens the sort of categorization necessary for biopolitics of the sovereign state and for the integrity and coherency of the individual, knowing subject. within the context of war, the threat of hela passing constituted the possibility of not knowing who the other was, not knowing how to identify and target the other or, even worse, to discover that one was the other.9 with this frame of reference, surveillance and regulation become critical techniques that bind medicine and science to a larger national and geopolitical project—one that biologists see themselves as taking on. for example, in an article in science, journalist rhitu chatterjee refered to roland nardone, a cell biologist at the catholic university of america in washington, dc as “the paul revere of cell contamination” (chatterjee, 2007, p. 929). to this day, so critical is the threat of contamination that nardone authored and widely disseminated a white paper titled, “eradication of cross-contaminated cell lines: a call for action” in which he characterized the 1970s as a decade full of “revelations” of cell contamination and “concealment of knowledge [of wide spread contamination] and manipulation [of results] through editing” (nardone, 2007, p. 2). washington reporter david dickson wrote that the reluctance to authenticate cell samples resulted in “corruption of scientific literature…forgery…falsifying data…fraud against the federal government…[and] a criminal offense” (dickson, cited in nardone, 2007, p. 2). nardone recommended that government, private funding institutions, scientific journals, professional societies, laboratory directors, and academic department heads contribute to the surveillance and authentication of cell samples (nardone, 2007, p. 4). in these ways, scientific practice and the practices and ideologies of nationalism and accumulation are mutually informed phenomena. what is more, this form of knowledge production must be understood as a moral task that enables the proliferation of the human over the unpredictability of nature and its objects. the epigraph to michael gold’s book, a conspiracy of cells, cites francis bacon on this ethics of knowing: “if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties” (gold, 1986). the quotation is placed opposite a full-length image of henrietta lacks in a suit with her hands on her hips. the promise of modern scientific research invokes a moral disposition towards knowing; it asserts that one be humble, that one make no assumptions. this particular ethics of knowing begins with a presumption of humility and gives rise to a deserving subject capable of knowing the truth about the world itself as object.10 however, gold’s use of bacon’s quotation to offer a solution to hela contamination disavows the ethic’s epistemological investment in mastery. i am reminded of another francis bacon quotation that feminist scholar anne mcclintock underscores: “my only earthly wish…is to stretch the deplorably narrow limits of man’s dominion over the universe to their promised bounds…leading to you nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave” (mcclintock, 1995, p. 23). bacon’s remark reveals modern science’s colonial underpinnings by positing a female and othered nature to be discovered by and contained under the dominion of europe’s man. bacon’s sentiment is rooted in what mcclintock calls “porno-tropics,” a structure of colonial epistemology that allows the knowing subject to project his fantasies, desires, taboos, and phobias onto the colonial space ripe for discovery and mastery (1995, p. 23). to have dominion over and make visible its veiled, feminized interior is to “know” or be certain about the occulted other. as such, nature and women occupy a similar position in colonial and scientific discourse—each existing for the sole purpose of being known and thus possessed, contained, and enjoyed. this process of knowledge accumulation is not a disinterested practice of empiricism but a psycho-political-economic acting out of the phantasy of mastery. the biopolitics that shape scientists’ search for hela contamination and journalists’ actions in retelling the story of henrietta lacks and the hela cells must also be read alongside patterns of black surveillance in the us. the term “passing” emerges in antebellum runaway slave narratives about the “tendency” of black slaves to pass themselves off as free to escape bondage.11 some did so by literally forging paper passes, while others tried hiding their blackness from public perception by passing for white, for native, or for immigrant. the passing slave was a fugitive slave. thus, the passing accusation is one form of unveiling, which assumes that the most important properties of a black subject/object are fugitivity and fraud. in the more contemporary case of henrietta lacks, both scientists and science journalists used her blackness and her sexuality to describe the cells’ tendency to be out-of-control and deceptive. nonetheless, in their practice of detecting hela, scientists and journalists cannot rely on the visual to confirm the cells’ racial “truth.” cellular biologists track this interiority through the material “data” of lacks’s cells. the centrality of visual evidence in scientific progress maintains that the regulatory technique of unveiling has become more precise in identifying, grasping the truth of the subject or matter, and tracing its every move. the western gaze is taken up in dna fingerprinting, a practice science journalist rithu chatterjee argued “has become the standard tool for authenticating cell lines” as well as identifying criminal and foreign bodies (2007, p. 929). the “digital epidermalization” of biometric surveillance renders bodies as racialized, “digitized code,” demanding that they respond to the questions, “who are you?” and “are you who you say you are?” (brown, 2015, p. 109). while the hela passing emerges as a crisis of security and instability, the passing narrative works to contain and regulate the incalculability and unwieldiness of blackness, gender, and sexuality. the accusation of passing reasserts the human’s ability, even its moral imperative, to trace and manage nature’s order of things so that they might not ever unexpectedly “stare you in the face.” thus, gartler’s revelation of hela contamination was, paradoxically, a story of the stability and predictability of other noncancerous human cells. the 1966 presentation concluded with just this argument. he reasserted that his findings demonstrated “the remarkable stability of normal human cultures, that is, the virtual absence of spontaneous cellular transformation among them” (gartler, 1968, p. 175). gartler suggested that “the incorporation of stable genetic markers in material to be cultured is the best guarantee against contamination” (gartler, 1968, p. 175, my emphasis). what scientists needed to do was identify and categorize the stable cell characteristics that would also allow them to grasp the truth of the cell (and limit black female sexuality). once this was accomplished, there would be no cases of “mistaken identity” or “identity theft,” as chatterjee would later describe the hela phenomenon (chatterjee, 2007).   unveiling new biocitizens a more recent iteration of unveiling occurred in 2013 when german scientists from the european molecular biology laboratory published the hela genome in an article titled “the genomic and transcriptomic landscape of a hela cell line” (landry et al., 2013). the paper was widely available on the internet and the scientists had not consulted the lacks family before publishing. at the same time, the national institutes of health (nih) funded a study by university of washington researchers, who had also sequenced the hela genome and were about to publish it in the journal nature, when public outrage erupted. nih director francis collins acknowledged that the study’s principal investigators should have discussed their plans with the lacks family even before seeking funding to begin their project. the german researchers pointed out that they had followed the ethical standards set for genomic research in publishing their findings. they did, however, apologize for publishing them given the conditions under which the hela cells were initially harvested. it is true; scientists are not required to seek informed consent from a donor to publish their genome sequencing. nonetheless, the hela case was special, as almost everyone (the nih, the genome community, science journalists, the editorial board of the new york times) agreed. it was special even though henrietta lacks was but one of many persons whose biomaterials have been taken for scientific use without their knowledge. francis collins moved quickly to address the bioethical concern by meeting with the lacks family. the parties agreed that in the future, researchers who wanted to work with the hela genome could apply for the data stored in the nih’s database of genotypes and phenotypes. in addition, the nih would form a hela genome data access working group, which would review the applications and require researchers to submit annual reports of their work. finally, two lacks family members would participate in the working group. when a family member asked about financial restitution for the use of the genome and about profits from the use of commercial products derived from the genome, collins insisted that this could not happen. nature reported, “[d]irectly paying the family was not on the table, but [collins] and his advisers tried to think of other ways the family could benefit, such as patenting a genetic test for cancer based on hela-cell mutations. they could not think of any” (callaway, 2013, p. 133). what resulted from the collins deal is an arrangement in which descendants of henrietta lacks were to contribute to scientific inquiry by participating in the ritual of giving or refusing consent to researchers wishing to use her body (parts) for the public good. at the same time that the family’s inclusion became institutionalized, any notion of reparations was denied. participatory initiatives have often been taken up as a solution to science’s etho-political crisis and its historical relationship to certain killable subjects and useful bodies and body parts. however, the family’s participation emerges through the research establishment’s response to yet another unveiling of henrietta lacks and hela via the publication of the hela genome. the family was concerned the publication exposed, once again, lacks’s identity, but it also exposed the medical research establishment’s inability to prevent further injury. we can consider this moment in which the hela genome data access working group was formed as a result of what sheila jasanoff calls “bioconstitutionalism.” these are moments of negotiation that “redefine the obligations of the state in relation to lives in its care” (jasanoff, 2011, p. 3). the term reflects a liberal tradition in which a state is sovereign over its polity to the extent that it is able to ensure security. the dynamic is evident in a published interview with patricia king, the head of the national commission for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research (2004). discussing guidelines for increasing african americans’ participation in clinical studies, king pointed to a tension between pushing for inclusion in science and offering protection from science. she comments, “i think that we just haven’t been able to figure out yet how to include people without putting them at more risk than we want to put them” (2004, p. 11). thus, the bioconstitutional moment is one that pieces together biopolitical needs of the state with those of the individual. national security dictates that the state must invest in medical research but must also reduce risk, for example, by protecting the privacy of individual participants. this dynamic includes a series of public unveilings (published medical research, knowledge production, and data sharing) and re-veilings (reifying and protecting individual identity, labor relations in research, and desire and pleasure in colonial underpinnings) as constituting a liberal ethics of knowing, or as research bioethics.  the multiple acts of veiling and unveiling make possible the contemporary biopolitical social contract, which does not merely encourage participation but requires it. as research continues to be privatized, neoliberal biocitizens must ensure their own protection, and are thus responsible for their own health outcomes. sociologist nikolas rose argued, “our somatic, corporeal neurochemical individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence, and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation, and so to a politics of life itself” (2007, p. 8). as emergent members of the body politic, black people have both the entrepreneurial responsibility to manage our own individual health and to further the nation’s collective biosecurity. because it favors the individual’s responsibility to keep their body alive, this formation forgoes the possibility of addressing collective historical trauma. instead, the narrative frames participation as a moral imperative, which designates those who cooperate as civilized. for the good of the individual and the state, the message proclaims, one must not stand in the way of research. in the case of hela research, skloot’s advocating for “justice” and protection for the lacks family was also an attempt to make the case that family members supported scientific progress and the public good and simply wanted to be informed of and consent to their participation. for example, in her 2013 opinion piece for the new york times, she argued that “[t]he lacks family is proud of hela’s contributions to society, and they don’t want to stop hela research. but they do want to learn about the hela genome—how it can be used for the good of science while still protecting the family’s privacy—so they can decide whether to consent to its publication” (skloot, 2013). in this rendition of the contract, new biocitizens come into being, or are unveiled, in their capacity to own themselves—their body parts, their biomaterial—and in their capacity to “gift” their bodies to science. in managing these economies of exchange and inclusion, liberalism sets up its bioethical dilemma—when does one’s right to research infringe upon another’s right to protect themselves from the risks of research? this article’s goal is not to prescribe the right balance but to underscore what the question itself forecloses. what is not acceptable, and what becomes transgressive in this scenario, is a politics of refusal. the bioconstitutional moment is a coercive and violent one as henrietta lacks and her family are repeatedly interpellated as biopolitical subjects through the act of participation. as cultural studies scholar karla holloway wrote, “the experiences of women and black americans are particularly vulnerable to public unveiling” (2011, p. 9). hela has become the exemplary case for examining the bioethics of cell tissue and genomics research, particularly with regard to informed consent, in the same way the tuskegee syphilis experiment signals the worst-case scenario of bioethical risks in us clinical trials. fantasies and phobias around deviant black sexuality overdetermine who must represent subjects of injury. the result is both epistemological and material violence for those expected to be science’s continuously productive subjects. in his 1953 letter to gey, berg perhaps unwittingly named the heart of the matter. hela is required to repeatedly perform as the example par excellence of science research’s progress and risks because of the racial passing and contamination accusations unleashed on them. a major concern following the 2013 genome unveiling is the extent to which the privacy of henrietta lacks and her family, already public icons, can be managed. as skloot argued in the times, “[the family members] want researchers to acknowledge that hela cells are not anonymous and should be treated accordingly” (skloot, 2013). the comment underscores the reason this case has become special: there is already no hope for anonymity. in reading skloot’s comment against the grain, one could conclude that anonymity is not the same as privacy. the oxford english dictionary defines anonymity as “a lack of outstanding, individual, or unusual features.” to be anonymous is to be able to escape the particularizing surveillance of the racial biometric regime. accordingly, one might read anonymity as that which makes possible the universal human with all his privileges, autonomy, and rational decision-making. that is, anonymous cells are those that are able to stand in for the universal or human cellular subject rather than stare back at scientists with a confrontational and particularizing gaze. we might understand anonymity as a prerequisite not just for the status of human but also for the status of the liberal biocitizen, which, as holloway (2011) notes, has full capacity to negotiate privacy. in this regard, privacy as an extension of citizenship refers to the right of the autonomous subject, the individual citizen who has the right to privacy, to private property, and even to his/her own body as property. privacy becomes a critical component of liberal risk reduction. however, hela has no hope for anonymity, just as black subjects more broadly lack access to anonymity.  what, then, is to be made of a call for refusal?12 further, what is to be made of a black public that refuses to participate especially when the health-care systems pay little attention to the ongoing trauma of colonialism and the after life of chattel slavery as fundamental to collective wellness? this is the sort of exchange that does not play by the rules of the health market’s regulation of individual moral virtues. requests for reparations from institutions of knowledge production are often seen as “getting in the way” of knowing and as affronts to colonial science, the nation, and the universal subject.13 the demand for reparations troubles the notion of the inherent good of science and the gestures of inclusion that liberal multicultural scientists and policymakers have made toward black subjects, including the lacks. vital passages and an ethical practice of knowing with regard to the researcher, what might an ethical practice of knowing look like? this might be one that does not only acknowledge others’ refusal but is also complicit in it. additionally, ethical learning must be willfully permeable to contamination. this is not a contamination that assumes whiteness as vulnerable and black or brown bodies as always already contaminated, such that ongoing lead contamination in flint, michigan or uranium contamination on navajo lands remains invisible. it is rather an openness to contaminate an epistemology that relies on the equivalence of knowing and mastery and disavows the violence this produces. it is also a call for openness to temporal contamination, which troubles the teleological narrative of progress with regard to knowledge production. to turn to the question of temporality, and specifically immortality, and to blur the boundaries between its figurative and material instantiations, one might take seriously the proposition of “the immortal life of henrietta lacks” (my emphasis). however, this consideration must deviate from the way in which skloot and others have trafficked in “immortality” for sensationalist ends. instead, this ethical consideration refuses to dismiss the lacks family’s concerns as scientific illiteracy. it also refuses to anthropomorphize the cells. certainly, scholars like priscilla wald were right to insist that the cells are not “lacks herself,” yet this argument will be always already too late (2012, p. 202). the hela cells, once fixed as black and thus incapable of anonymity, continue to be animated by the iconicity of henrietta lacks as a sign of black female hypersexuality. however, taking seriously the concerns that the hela cells are an instantiation of henrietta lacks opens up a different truth. it allows one to return to the violence of the act of colonial unveiling (the bomb), to hela’s confrontational “stare,” and to the radical potential of the object. as toni morrison warned us in her novel, beloved (1988), nothing ever really dies. thus, what if the cells are, in fact, black, uncontrollable, unreliable, and contaminating? for example, the gender assigned to the cells in many narratives change, as each discursive passage animates them in different ways. in the 1950s, hela was understood as an example of the universal human subject—cells from a white woman. then, in 1966, gartler’s statistical analysis of the cells briefly included them in the category “negro male population.” finally, once the cells were fixed to henrietta lacks, scientists, science journalists, and others began describing the cells as hypersexual, black, and female. the ease with which the public has attached different genders to the cells has not received much attention. the fungibility of blackness and the cells as both laborer and commodity allow for hela to move fluidly (perhaps fugitively) through a variety of raced and gendered positions. as scholar saidiya hartman argued this fluidity enables “the black body…to serve as the vehicle of white self-exploration, renunciation, and enjoyment” (hartman, 1997, p. 26). on the other hand, blackness as a contaminating agent refuses to be “containable within a given trajectory of movement and desire” (chen, 2012, p. 178). this is a politics of refusal that stages hela as a “bad object.” the cells not only create a momentary crisis of paternity for hayflick’s daughter, but also threaten to make the child a passing actant herself. this is something black cells are still wont to do, as can be attested by jennifer cramblett, a white woman who filed a lawsuit against midwest sperm bank in 2014 for “wrongful birth” after it unwittingly impregnated her with sperm from a black donor (cuevas, 2014). considering the immortality of hela and henrietta lacks together demands an encounter with the pain of their fixation, constant unveiling, and fetishized consumption. as black feminist scholar m. jacqui alexander described, affect survived the middle passage even when ancestors did not. she wrote, “not only humans made the crossing, traveling only in one direction through ocean given the name atlantic. grief traveled as well” (alexander, 2005, p. 289). this is the case in spite of institutional efforts to leave the past behind. countering this narrative of progress, hela becomes a temporal and affective force of accumulation that shatters or explodes the integrity of black subjectivity in each moment it is publically unveiled.14 each passing of hela, each hela “bomb,” ruptures linear biopolitics, making “the past” palpable, material, and confrontational. to argue that hela is an uncanny temporal force, then, is not to simply say that the cells offer an alternative vision of time. instead, hela becomes a worlding force that troubles any notion of linear biopolitical time by violently demanding that the boundaries between “past,” “present,” and “future” be called into question. hela’s animacy resides in the affective, material power of memory, in what physicist and feminist scholar karen barad called “the very nature of spacetimemattering” (2011, p. 29). in forging an ethical practice of knowing we might take away some important considerations. because history, with all its seeping wounds, endures in the material, we must take seriously its multiple forms of entanglement and specific material relationships. we must do this not in simply observing or measuring an other, nor in affecting an other, but in the ways the other is already in us. this ethics of learning, then, consists in taking seriously the politics of refusal in which hela engages when evading containment. it requires a will towards understanding the self and its time as contaminated. at last, this openness to learning as permeability and contamination is a risk that cannot be managed.   acknowledgements many thanks to tala khanmalek, james battle, herman gray, and jennifer reardon for their invaluable comments, questions, and inspiration and to the uc santa cruz science and justice research center. notes 1 “[s]cientists who were at the conference where gartler made his initial presentation, and others who were active in the field at the time,” used this term. quoted from the author’s personal correspondence with rebecca skloot on 27 march 2015. 2 see the following novels written in the early twentieth century: charles w. chesnutt’s the house behind the cedars (1993), jessie fauset’s plum bun (1999), james weldon johnson’s the autobiography of an ex-colored man (1995), and nella larsen’s passing (2001). examples of films extending into the late twentieth century include imitation of life (1959), pinky (1949), illusions (1982), and true identity (1991). 3 take, for example, rudolph p. byrd’s and henry louis gates, jr.’s note (2011) about jean toomer passing in which they speculated about toomer’s motivations with regard to social mobility and ideological and literary movements. additionally, scholar gayle wald provides an account of black folks’ refusal to pass and the intelligibility of black american identity within the national body politic (2000). scholars of trans politics also debate the strategy of passing. for example, sandy stone calls for a radical refusal to pass: “transsexuals who pass seem able to ignore the fact that by creating totalized, monistic identities, forgoing physical and subjective intertextuality, they have foreclosed the possibility of authentic relationships. under the principle of passing, denying the destabilizing power of being ‘read,’ relationships begin as lies… transsexuals must take responsibility for all of their history, to begin to rearticulate their lives not as a series of erasures in the service of a species of feminism conceived from within a traditional frame, but as a political action begun by reappropriating difference and reclaiming the power of the refigured and reinscribed body” (1992, p. 170). in contrast, c. riley snorton (2009) highlights the radical promise of trans passing. 4 there is abundant literature on race and genomics, for example, but the effort has often been led by science and technology social scientists and published in humanities or social science focused mediums. see, for example, the writings of fullwiley (2008), roberts (2014), duster (2005), tallbear (2013), and reardon (2009). some scientists such as lisa weasel, a cell and molecular biologist, have addressed these intersections yet this scholarship is also often published in humanities or social science focused journals. however, there are exceptions in journals that address the cross sections of biology, health, and the social. see for example ruha benjamin and ian mcgonigle’s “molecularization of identity” (2016) in genetics research, sarah franklin’s “culturing biology” (2001) in health, lisa parker’s “the immortal life of henrietta lacks, feminist themes, and research ethics” (2012) in the international journal of feminist approaches to bioethics, and priscilla wald’s “the art of medicine: cognitive estrangement, science fiction, and medical ethics” (2008) in the lancet. 5 as an example, george gey’s personal files contain his lab notes and peer-reviewed articles on the possible cellular sources of cancer, as well as newspaper clippings about his laboratory and his personal and professional life, human interest stories on the discovery of hela cells and henrietta lacks, and correspondence with funders that discussed the importance of lacks’s story to garner additional research funding. 6 i analyze race and gender together to underscore how subjects are always passed in terms of both, not one or the other. more than making an argument about intersectionality, i am gesturing along the lines of frantz fanon (2008), hortense spillers (1987), and saidiya hartman (1997), that subjects emerge (they pass) as a racialized gender or a gendered race, that there are multiple race/genders that emerge both materially and discursively. for example, spillers argues that black women are passed for “‘peaches’ and brown sugar,’ ‘sapphire’ and ‘earth mother,’ [and] ‘aunty,’” and against the expectations of a variety of white womanhoods (1987, p. 65). hela, of course, is passed within this same american grammar. 7 on april 1, 1966, gey responded to gartler's inquiry noting that the hela cell line initiated from "the cervix in a colored woman aged 31 years” (gey, 1966). 8 see rogers (1976) for an example of this and landecker (2007) for a critique. 9 one key component of sovereignty theories, from those by jean bodin, thomas hobbes, john locke, and jean-jacques rousseau to those of immanuel kant, is that of identifying who is a member of the body politic held together through the social contract. the making of the sovereign is a constant, delineating practice of identification. see, for example, bodin (1992), kant (1983), and rousseau (2011). 10 for examples of earlier writing on this form of knowing in the world and the sort of subject to which it gives form, see heidegger (1977) and foucault (1970). 11 see, for example, marshall (2010), johnson (2000), waldstreicher (1999), smith and wojtowicz (1989), and mccaskill (1994). 12 for a thorough discussion of refusal see benjamin (2016) and (2013), reardon and tallbear (2012), and simpson (2007). 13 for example, see the case of farmer-paellmann v. fleetboston in alondra nelson’s the social life of dna (2016, p. 121-140). 14 see fanon’s black skin, white masks. “locked in this suffocating reification, i appealed to the other so that his liberating gaze, gliding over my body suddenly smoothed of rough edges, would…put me back in the world…nothing doing. i explode. here are the fragments put together by another me” (2008, p. 89). references alexander, m. j. 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(1995). the autobiography of an ex-colored man. mineola, ny: dover publications. johnson, w. (2000). the slave trader, the white slave, and the politics of racial determination in the 1850s. the journal of american history, 87(1), 13-38. kant, i. (1983). perpetual peace and other essays on politics, history, and morals (t. humphrey trans.). indianapolis, in: hackett publishing company. king, p. (2004). interview. belmont report oral history project. retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/belmontarchive.html larsen, n. (2001). passing. in c. larson (ed.), the complete fiction of nella larsen: passing, quicksand and the stories (pp. 163-243). new york, ny: anchor books. landecker, h. (2007). culturing life: how cells became technologies. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. landry, j. j. m. et al. (2013). the genomic and transcriptomic landscape of a hela cell line. genes|genomes|genetics, 3(8), 1213-1224. marshall, a. (2010). ‘they will endeavor to pass for free’: enslaved runaways’ performances of freedom in antebellum south carolina. slavery and abolition, 31(2), 161-180. mccaskill, b. (1994). “‘yours very truly’: ellen craft–the fugitive as text and artifact.” african american review, 28(4), 509-529. mcclintock, a. (1995). imperial leather: race, gender, and sexuality in the colonial contest. london, uk: routledge. morrison, t. (1988). beloved. new york, ny: penguin books. nardone, r. m. (2007). eradication of cross-contaminated cell lines: a call for action. cell biology and toxicology, 23(6), 367-372. nelson, a. (2016). the social life of dna: race, reparations, and reconciliation after the genome. boston, ma: beacon press. parker, l. (2012). the immortal life of henrietta lacks, feminist themes, and research ethics. international journal of feminist approaches to bioethics, 5(1), 159-165. reardon, j. (2009). race to the finish: identity and governance in an age of genomics. princeton, nj: princeton university press. reardon, j. & tallbear, k. (2012). your dna is our history. current anthropology, 53(s5), s233-s245. roberts, d. (2014). killing the black body: race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty. new york, ny: vintage. rogers, m. (1976, march 25). the double-edged helix. rolling stone, 209, 48-51. rose, n. (2007). the politics of life itself: biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century. princeton, nj: princeton university press. rousseau, j.j. (2011). on the social contract. in d. cress (ed.), the basic political writings, 2nd edition (pp. 153-253). indianapolis, in: hackett publishing company. simpson, a. (2007). on ethnographic refusal: indigeneity, ‘voice’ and colonial citizenship. junctures: the journal for thematic dialogue, 9, 67-80. skloot, r. (2011). the immortal life of henrietta lacks. new york, ny: broadway books. skloot, r. (2013, march 24). “the immortal life of henrietta lacks, the sequel.” new york times. retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/opinion/sunday/the-immortal-life-of-henrietta-lacks-the-sequel.html smith, b. and wojtowicz, r. (1989). blacks who stole themselves: advertisements for runaways in the pennsylvania gazette, 1728-1790. philadelphia, pa: university of pennsylvania press. snorton, c. r. (2009). “’a new hope’: the psychic life of passing.” hypatia, 24(3), 77-92. spillers, h. (1987). mama’s baby, papa’s maybe: an american grammar book. diacritics, 17(2), 65-81. stone. s. (1992). “the empire strikes back: a posttransexual manifesto.” camera obscura: feminism, culture, and media studies, 10(2 29), 150-76. tallbear, k. (2013). native american dna: tribal belonging and the false promise of genetic science. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. wald, g. (2000). crossing the line: racial passing in the twentieth-century u.s. literature and culture. durham, nc: duke university press. wald, p. (2012). american studies and the politics of life. american quarterly, 64(2), 185-204. waldstreicher, d. (1999). “reading the runaways: self-fashioning, print culture, and confidence in slavery in the eighteenth-century mid-atlantic.” the william and mary quarterly, 56(2), 243-272. weasel, l. h. (2004). feminist intersections in science: race, gender and sexuality through the microscope. hypatia, 19(1), 183-193. bio  sandra harvey is a phd candidate in politics with a designated emphasis in feminist studies at the university of california, santa cruz. her scholarship investigates the production of race and gender through surveillance technologies originating in colonialism and chattel slavery.  her dissertation, passing for free, passing for sovereign, traces narratives of race/gender passing as they emerge in science, settler colonial law, conceptual art, and enlightenment philosophy. microsoft word 76947-1-11-20190201_kim.docx kim, e. (2019). continuing presence of discarded bodies: occupation harm, necroactivism, and living justice. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-31. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © eunjung kim, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article continuing presence of discarded bodies: occupational harm, necro-activism, and living justice eunjung kim syracuse university ekim108@syr.edu abstract this essay explores the coexistence of struggles against the foreclosure of disabled people’s lives and against occupational illness, debilitation, and deaths caused by the manufacturing process of electronics in south korea. starting from the two activist campsites set up in seoul and the historical backgrounds of occupational health movement, i draw on two documentary films, the empire of shame (2014) and factory complex (2015), that depict workers who became ill and those who died due to toxic exposure at semiconductor manufacturing plants. beyond commemoration, necro-activism emerges in the form of persistent involvements of dead bodies, mourning, and objects representing death as important agents for making claims for justice. taking into account political and historical differences of locations in which disabled people are positioned differently in the global order redirects us from the language of worth toward sociality, collective reframing of suffering and disability, and justice as an ongoing practice of everyday life and afterlife. kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 two protest camps were set up at two busy subway stations in seoul: the first, in 2012, in gwanghwamun subway station near the city hall north of the han river; and the other, in 2015, in gangnam subway station near the samsung building south of the river. in these camps, activists and allies took turns staying in the tents, shared food, slept overnight, and gave speeches to educate the public about their causes. sustained for years by the alliance of over two hundred disability and civic organizations, the first camp demanded the elimination of the disability rating system, a bureaucratic apparatus designed to reduce disability benefits, which led to the deaths of disabled people who were left without care. the second camp was set up by an organization called the supporters for the health and rights of people in the semiconductor industry, which demanded worker’s safety and accountability for illnesses and deaths in the semiconductor industry, including at samsung electronics. despite their different agendas, these two camps have supported each other in solidarity. in his conversation with an activist in the gangnam camp, disability activist park kyung-seok (pak kyŏng-sŏk), from the other camp, explains that disabled people and the workers who became disabled and ill share the status of “wastes” (p’yegimul), as they are deemed worthless and locked away in institutions and disposed of by the government and corporations (ha, 2015). “disposable populations” and “wastes” are used to describe individuals whose experiences of suffering and injustice do not provoke social, political, and legal recognition and remedies and are subject to further violations as their presences are seen as transgressing. as max liboiron (2012) suggests, the “logics of transgression attendant to waste and dirt” constitute the “ideal society” and “out of placeness” (p. 8) based on the value system that determines worth as a condition of emplacement.1 these metaphors of detritus convey finality in that bodily presence has reached what judith butler (2004) calls “the limits of intelligibility” (p. 58). however, being disposed of or locked away does not mean disappearance, just as garbage never disappears from the earth but is moved and transmuted and continues to interact with the environment. kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 what if garbage is never moved away and the suffering doesn’t stop after death? how do we engage with what happens during and after “disposal”— namely, disablement, debilitation, illness, relegation, displacement, degradation, and death—while working to eliminate the conditions that lead to those outcomes? or, to pose the question using butler’s (2004) words, “what, given the contemporary order of being, can i be,” after harms done to me? (p. 58). how do we communicate, make known, and feel our continued earthly presence with harm, whether alive, debilitated, dying, or dead? further, what do the material and traveling presence of discarded and toxic wastes of technologies demand from us who live with, near, or at a distance from them, depending on privilege? much as material and metaphorical wastes imply finality, so too justice—in demands for reparations and apologies for harms inflicted—is often cast as a universal and final outcome that cannot be revisited. justice is described as “not done yet” or “done,” as if justice were something to be completed at a certain time by a set of actions upon which affected people and society in general agree. furthermore, justice is conceived as an object of doing; yet the passive voice indicates that it is not always clear who and what does justice. the legal recognition of injustice, apology, and monetary compensation conditioned by irreversibility and followed by the demand to heal almost always do not do justice to those who were harmed or to the systems of violence that continue to do harm. how is justice lived, if not done, and continued by the earthly presence of bodyminds “even in the midst of unbearable pain” (price, 2015, p. 280), toxic wastes, and ongoing injustice? in this essay, i explore these questions—invoked by the connection made through the status of the people in the two camps as discarded—to imagine a “crip technoscience” approach to manufacturing technology as illustrated by aimi hamraie and kelly fritsch (2019) as “a critical project that holds in tension the unjust imperatives of technoscientific innovation with the transformative capacities to shape matter and meaning through praxis” (p.21) to engage with movements against occupational harm and disability oppression in south korea. these questions are not only concerned with kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 condemning the corporate-state violence of debilitations and murders of racialized, gendered, disabled and once-enabled people, but are also committed to recognizing how lasting presences of debilitating and disabled bodyminds reconfigure the relationship with justice, technology, and the environment (kafer, 2013; clare, 2017). following nikki sullivan’s (2014) focus on bodies’ and technology’s “coresponsibility, coarticulation, movement of (un)becoming with” (p. 189),2 this essay aims to encompass different ways of producing, defining, claiming, and representing disability/illness and disabled/ill people in relation to technology. first, i explore technology involved in the manufacturing and disposal of electronic devices and toxic matters through labor processes (miller, 2017) and their deep reliance on—and constructions of—imperial relations, geopolitical hierarchy, and exploitability. second, i regard the bureaucratic and medicojuridical apparatus of detecting, rating, and calculating incapacities to assess welfare service eligibility and to determine occupational harms for compensation as the technology of violent management that props up healthy bodies as the default precondition and that demands proof of incapacities conceptualized as stable and measurable. third, the subjectivity and orientations of dead people appear in activist spaces as the technology of resistance in relation to living people wanting, calling on, acknowledging their material, not to mention their spiritual, presence. i call this necro-activism. fourth, audio-visual texts and haptic objects, such as documentary films, discourses, images, statues, and symbols, constitute technologies of mediating and materializing lived injustice and justice. north american discussions on technological devices and disabilities in “disability technoscience,” “a field of traditional expert relations and practices concerned with designing for disabled people rather than with or by disabled people,” frequently turn to discourses and spectacles of lifeenhancing possibilities for disabled individuals (hamraie & fritsch, 2019). another predominant discourse and spectacle appears in occupational health science. the once healthy and enabled young workers manufacturing technological devices and becoming disabled and debilitated due to toxic exposure and injuries are highlighted as the cost of kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 development. this binary of white individuals with disabilities as consumers versus young asian and latin american women as victims of toxic exposures and injuries from manufacturing and global capitalist exploitation is formed in racialized, gendered, classed, and geographically specific hierarchies (miller, 2017). thus the “decolonization and racial justice” (hamraie & fritsch, 2019, p. 16) that crip technoscience calls for requires us to attend to locational specificities and internal differences within the geopolitically marginalized places and their temporal and spatial complexities. yet the tendency to turn to the list of representative cases of what illustrates the urgency of material conditions or exemplary practices of resistance in global contexts often ends up reifying the other whose representations of their own experiences are not recognized.3 the assumed certainty of material conditions elsewhere hinders the imagination of ambivalence, nuances, and multiplicity of experiences. disability justice movements in the united states and canada and transnational disability studies scholars have pointed out the urgent need to pay attention to disablements by global capitalist exploitation, state violence, and wars, which debilitate populations (berne & sins invalid, 2016; erevelles, 2011; puar, 2017). jasbir puar (2017) argues, “certain bodies are employed in production processes precisely because they are deemed available for injury—they are, in other words, objects of disposability, bodies whose debilitation is required in order to sustain capitalist narratives of progress” (p. 81). the imperative of challenging us imperialism, militarism, racism, capitalist expansion, settler colonialism, gender regulation, and sexual oppression puts into question the hierarchy between the global north and the global south (including the disenfranchised and settler-colonized others) (meekosha 2011; jaffee 2016; erevelles 2011). the division between north and south reflects colonial history, the cold war, economic developments, and political and military alliances. in addition to challenging the power of european and north american imperial powers, it is necessary to explore the devastating consequences of japanese imperialism and colonial rule and the roles that asian countries play in global capitalism. the narrow conceptualization of kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 the global north as western europe and north america frequently turns into binary thinking that sees only the white oppressor and the black and brown oppressed others, overlooking global exploitations of and by ethnicized asians, eastern europeans, and ethnicized groups in the middle east, and reinforcing the erasure of indigenous people in nonwhite settler colonial societies. these binaries of north and south, western and nonwestern, obfuscate the power structures outside of—yet interlocked with— western europe and north america, by which south korean and japanese corporations exploit their citizen workers, migrant workers, and workers in other asian countries. asian exploitation at manufacturing, recycling, and disposal sites of technologies and militarized violence produce disablements and deaths of workers and residents. following kuan-hsing chen (2010), i think with “asia as method,” not an object of analysis or a celebrated origin of difference. asia as method embraces an orientation toward asia as a site of producing knowledge, politicizing and challenging its hierarchies, and forging solidarity, placed within the frame of world history (pp. 213-216) and as a site where a “pulguŭi chŏngch’i” (crip politics) emerges centering on dependence and discord as major tools for transformation (changaeyŏsŏng konggam, 2018). i attend to historical and activist accounts of industrial harms in south korea and their convergence with—and divergence from—the south korean disability movement’s goal of eliminating oppression and making life and justice possible, revealing the circuit of harm in which south korean exploitation of asian countries occurs. deconstructing the presupposed position of what mel chen (2011) has called “mythic health” (p. 273) in relation to toxicity requires us not to rely on normative bodyminds to determine harm or on citizenship and nation-states to demand redress. chemical exposure and the corpse protest before the semiconductor workers’ cancer cases emerged in 2007, several landmark cases brought occupational health and industrial damage (sanŏp chaehae) to public attention in the 1980s. the history of occupational health kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 and resistance is inevitably intertwined with the post-division history of capitalism, labor movements, and political shifts in south korea. in 1980, cases of black lung disease (pneumoconiosis), injuries, and deaths by fire led to a large-scale uprising by coal miners in sabuk against abysmal working and living conditions and against the violent responses to protests (m. ch’oe, 2017). another case involved fifteen-year-old mun song-myŏn, who worked and lived in a factory that manufactured thermometers: he died of mercury poisoning in 1988 (song, 2017). in the same year, it was revealed that wonjin rayon had been concealing the cases of workers who died of carbon disulfide (cs2) poisoning since the 1970s and laying off many workers who became mentally and physically disabled after chronic exposure (an, 1988; “wŏnjin reion,” 1988). the rapid growth of the south korean economy, heralded as a “success” and “miracle” (maass, 1989), was made possible by the authoritarian export-driven industrialization and development led by military regimes from 1961 to 1987, which exploited a cheapened workforce in export processing zones that attracted foreign investors (song, 2011; lee, 2010). the growth of big conglomerates, including samsung, was buttressed by “low-interest loans through the regularized bank system that helped light manufacturing in the 1960s and the heavy chemical industry in the 1970s to compete in the international market” (song, 2011, p. 16). the achievement of the democracy movement of june 1987 and the subsequent growth of unions provided the rich soil for the public outrage that followed the revelation of industrial disaster cases (cho, 2010). the “corpse protest” (sisin nongsŏng) involving kim pong-hwan, the former worker at wonjin rayon who died of the effects of cs2 poisoning in 1991, magnified the activism of workers and the public’s support. holding up his funeral, kim’s family and other workers demanded the company’s recognition and compensation. after three months without an acceptable response, his family moved kim’s corpse in a coffin to the company, so that they could hold a funeral at the company building. when they were not allowed entry, they set up a wake in front of the building as a site of protest. finally, 137 days after kim’s death, his family and the company reached an kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 agreement, and his family was able to hold his funeral. the material presence of kim’s corpse in the public space as evidence of harm generated a sense of urgency and underscored the moral imperative of justice. this necro-activism constituted the undoing—and the return—of the disposed of “necropolitical labor,” illustrated by jin-kyung lee (2010) as “the most disposable labor, that is, the ultimate labor commodity or worker, something or someone to be thrown out, replaced, and/or (both literally and figuratively) killed after or as the labor is performed” (p. 6). this protest by corpse informed the public about the injustice of industrial harms, corporate cover-ups, and governmental complicity. wonjin rayon, then under the management of the government-owned korea development bank and run by ex-military officers (an, 1988), continued to deny its accountability, and the ministry of labor was complicit in its own actions and inaction. to date, more than nine hundred workers have been diagnosed with cs2 poisoning (s. s. kim, 2017). the protests and demands for justice have continued to resurface to stop the exportation of the same toxic machine imported from japan and the development of the polluted land, as well as to address local residents’ health, the employment of disabled workers, and funds for medical treatments, to name a few issues. this history provides the context of the necro-activism to which i return in relation to the cancer activism against samsung. in the next section, i will address how industrial harm continues as the state-supported capitalism finds newly exploitable necropolitical labor, relying on the enforced ignorance creating the circuits of harm in asia. transnational circuits of harm: moving machines, productions, and workers the toxicity involved in manufacturing rayon was known long before the diagnosis of cs2 poisoning in 1981 in south korea. in japan, after cs2 poisoning in the rayon industry was first reported in 1929, it became one of the most common occupational illnesses in the 1930s (s. s. kim, 2017). old machines were then exported to south korea in the mid 1960s when kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 the postcolonial diplomatic relations between south korea and japan resumed. the machines were in use in south korea until the cases of cs2 poisoning were established as an industrial disaster in the early 1990s. the harm did not end there. after wonjin rayon was shut down, the machines were exported again—this time to dandong, china—despite the objections of south korean workers. it is reported that they are now in use in north korea (s. s. kim, 2017). similarly, the occupational and environmental harms caused by asbestos illustrate the importance of tracing and stopping the transnational movements of harmful machinery and manufacturing sites. in the 1970s, asbestos-processing machines were imported from japan; in the 1990s, the asbestos industry moved to indonesia and also to malaysia, china, and vietnam (kang, 2017). as the use of certain toxic chemicals is banned and the access to information about their harmful effects increases in individual countries, market demands lead to the growth of new labor pools in places with few public regulations and little information on chemical toxicity and its dangers. the health consequences to labor of semiconductor manufacturing began surfacing in the 1970s in california and were first reported in the medical literature in 1983 (ladou, 2006). during a 2003 lawsuit against ibm filed by two workers, epidemiologists who examined ibm’s corporate mortality file found “excess deaths due to brain, kidney, lymphatic, and hematopoietic cancers and melanoma” and a “significant excess of breast cancer deaths in female manufacturing workers at the san jose plant” (ladou, 2006, p. 39). these revelations, however, did not generate international enforcement of bans, monitoring, or changes in industrial standards. this international movement of manufacturing and technology without information about toxicity and with racialized access to bodily protection calls for international monitoring and regulations and for transnational activist coalitions. during the economic crisis of 1997 and international monetary fund–directed neoliberal restructuring, south korea became “a more flexible, capital-friendly postdevelopmental state” (song, 2011, p. 6). in this restructuring process, the direct employment of workers has decreased, kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 replaced with a subcontracting system. instead of being directly employed by the companies that design and sell products, workers are employed either by a dispatching agencies or by subcontracting companies, leading to further corporate exploitation and ill-health caused by their labor and exposure to toxins. south korea’s role in global neoliberalism in the new century requires building asian coalitions to demand occupational and environmental justice. emerging as a sub-empire, “an intermediate state between a developed country and the third world” (s. kim, 2017, p. 155), south korean industry has relied on “two forms of non-ethnic korean labor: foreign offshore in various locations and migrant labor in south korea from more peripheral economies” of southeast asia and south asia (lee, 2010, p. 18)). samsung electronics has established factories in vietnam, in which half the cell phones sold worldwide are now manufactured.4 corporate injustice and global capitalism that profit off of populations that are deemed disposable situate south korea at the front line of ethnonational capitalism as a subempire that is serving the us economy; it is necessary to trace and challenge harms that travel along the transnational circuits of manufacturing and disposal industries that cause sickness, disablement, and death. presence-other-than-human semiconductors function as “the heart of all electronic equipment” (miller & kraidy, 2016, 92) and samsung electronics, along with ibm, has been one of the major semiconductor producers in the world. the semiconductor industry “is one of the most chemical-intensive industries ever developed” (ladou, 2006, p. 34), and workers are potentially exposed to skin irritants, acids, and many “chemicals that cause cancer, reproductive complications, and debilitating illnesses” (miller & kraidy, 2016, p. 92) and deaths. yet it is known as a “clean” industry because semiconductor chips are manufactured in what are called “clean rooms,” in which dust particles are kept at extremely low levels and workers must wear anti-dust suits to keep the chips from being contaminated. affected south korean workers were kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 not informed of the kinds and toxicity of chemicals they were handling in “clean rooms” and later they felt betrayed that “cleanliness” did not mean the same thing for the workers as for the chips (kongyu, 2017). various kinds of cancer and illnesses among south korean workers caused by their exposure to toxic chemicals and radiation in samsung electronics semiconductor plants first became public in 2007, when hwang yu-mi died of acute myeloid leukemia at age twenty-three. rejecting samsung’s payment offered without an admission of fault, hwang yu-mi’s father, hwang sang-gi, demanded recognition from the state (via korea workers’ compensation and welfare service) that the working conditions and chemical exposure at the plant caused his daughter’s death. this effort led to the formation of the organization supporters for the health and rights of people in the semiconductor industry (sharps, panollim), which started what became a more than a decade-long struggle that led to the protest camp in gangnam subway station, which closed in july 2018 after 1,023 days when an agreement was reached between sharps and the third party mediation committee. the fight for justice has been not only against a conglomerate that denied any responsibility for toxic work environments that caused illnesses and deaths in its workers, but also against a governmental agency, courts, mainstream science, legal systems, and even the south korean public, insofar as samsung has been identified with national economic growth and identity. the company has fostered a sense of techno-nationalism, whereby national identity is deeply rooted in its technological prowess and its global recognition. this tehno-nationalism has generated trust in samsung products’ “superior quality” and “innovation,” as well as the company’s “efficient” management built upon its suppression of unions. to make an accusation against samsung is to challenge this trust, a trust once shared by affected workers and their families. gaining the public’s support against samsung’s labor practices thus requires a significant amount of work in crafting effective rhetoric and compelling narratives to communicate material and embodied injustice beyond the exposés. not relying on a narrator or the melodramatic portrayal of illness as kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 personal loss, hong li-kyung’s (2014) documentary film the empire of shame uses silent, off-focus shots from a hidden camera, taken inside the samsung semiconductor plant, thereby dis/orienting the audience in experiencing the inaccessibility of the truth. the snapshots of workers all wearing anti-dust suits that cover almost the entire body force the audience to look for glimpses of identity that show through the workers’ eyes and bodies as well as to detect their sociality through their interactions. the film weaves raw footage of electronics manufacturing plants, nearby residential housing, industrial shipping docks, gigantic containers, and moving ships in extremely long aerial shots. against these landscapes and seascapes, human bodies and their movements appear minuscule and hardly noticeable. the overpowering industrial structures visually crush the frail flesh and bodies of those who are rendered powerless. the film’s quiet observational mode urges the audience to reflect on the power differential between individuals and the system of nationalist neocolonial capitalism. in contrast, im heungsoon’s documentary film factory complex chooses to zoom in on large numbers of ants crawling on cement, trees in a forest, and swarms of crows and dragonflies in extreme close-up shots. swarming organisms show the power of mobilization and resistance (hardt & negri, 2005; halberstam 2013), as well as the importance of presence and sociality without specific purposes that are valued in capitalist society. in the opening scene of factory complex, the bronze statue called the lady of export—created and erected in guro industrial complex in 1974, and refurbished in 2014—is unveiled. but the scene is played in reverse, and thus the statue is being covered up. it is as if the film attempts to undo the present and reject this symbol and what it represents—namely, workers’ devotion to and sacrifices for the national economy by producing exports, a rhetorical device to hide systemic oppression. the statue is thrusting forward holding a globe in one hand and lifting a torch in the other. it embodies the ambition of building an empire, a globally dominating power. by rewinding the sequence, factory complex also reminds the viewers how the women factory workers have been erased from history and from the public awareness but are still working in many factories, answering phones, kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 or serving customers in plain sight. factory complex portrays the history of women’s labor and resistance in the garment industry and wig manufacturing during the late 1970s, to electronic manufacturing, shipbuilding, and semiconductor manufacturing in the first decade of the new millennium. the film makes connections to contemporary service workers engaging in emotional and physical labor at call centers, airplanes, and in supermarkets who routinely endure harassment by customers as well as the pressure to work quickly and efficiently. this gendered exploitation of labor is also symbolized by a female automaton wearing a miniskirt in front of a gas station, bowing and greeting customers every few seconds and promising good service. these other-than-human presences are not the simple expression of the dehumanization of workers or the replaceability of labor itself. rather, the gendered connections between women workers, the statue, and the automaton illustrate how disposable labor exists beyond the divide between human and non-human and the divide between material reality and metaphoricity, maintained by heteropatriarchal notions of care and labor as domains of femininity naturalizing the labor that serves the state. similarly, replacing workers with robots in semiconductor factories, implemented as a solution to occupational harm, would not protect the workers who need to enter the workshop and maintain the machines. machines and the humans are indeed inseparable in their proximity and reliance on each other for existence and intelligibility. the fact that the “clean room” confused the workers, as they thought it was meant for their safety as much as it was for the chips, illustrates this inseparability. the two films consider the environment, buildings, heavy machines, non-human lives sharing people’s marginalization and powerlessness, while delivering a sense of coresponsibility, affinity, and community formed by people’s interactions with those subjects. the return after death focusing on the cases of samsung semiconductor workers, the empire of kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 shame records yi yun-jŏng’s progression toward death with brain cancer. for seven years, she worked at onyang plant inspecting semiconductor chips dipped in high-temperature chemicals. yi is at home with her husband, who tries to record her testimony about her working environment and the kinds of work she did at the chip-cleaning bay by recalling how it smelled and felt as well as the changes it caused in her menstrual cycle. the reconstruction of work environment through physical and emotional memories becomes an important way to communicate what rob nixon (2011) calls “slow violence, a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (p. 2). later yi increasingly becomes silent. the shot of her closed eyes and her soft but minimal hand movements on the hospital bed implies that her death is near. after her death, for families and activists, her dead body is an important material reality that samsung must be forced to acknowledge. as part of the funeral and protest, the hearse carrying yi’s casket makes its way to the samsung seocho building followed by several buses full of mourners. company personnel are positioned in the middle of the road to block the vehicle from approaching. amid physical altercations, the hearse moves forward and is parked near the building. people pay their respects to the dead on the road. the camera shows her casket positioned behind a photo of her face. this demand of the dead makes a strong claim for the recognition of injustice and for accountability, constituting necroactivism. like the corpse protest of kim from wonjin rayon, yi’s dead presence isn’t merely a loss or a tool of and for the living, but actively enacts interdependent relations to continue resistance. the protest sites become the sites of a wake that does not end. similarly, factory complex features another kind of necro-activism. the deaths caused by toxicity at semiconductor plants are embodied by the living surrogate. the scenes of people in anti-dust suits fallen on the ground show them simultaneously enacting the deaths of workers and acting out their own future. on each person’s back is a label printed with the name of a person who died, with the dates of birth and death. protesters’ bodies kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 become tombstones that mark the lives of the workers who died, illustrating another corporeal interdependency. in this necro-activism the dead bodies’ materiality is not the symbolic means of political claims of the living (verdery 1999), as they enliven and depend on the labor of the living to demand their justice and their interconnected future. by setting up the camps near the samsung building and city hall, as described in the beginning of this article, activists refuse to disappear from public spaces, taking turns to remain overnight and enduring harsh living conditions. both camps are also marked with the continuing presence of the dead in framed photos on the mourning tables and in banners on which their names are written. at the camp, members of sharps displayed the sitting statue of hwang yu-mi—whose death led to the formation of sharps— wearing a hospital gown. there were small pots of plants and flowers that flourished under the care of the protesters and the spirits of workers who passed away (personal communication with han hye-kyŏng in january 2019). wooden poles with a wooden bird on top represented the area’s guardian deity, each simultaneously standing for an individual who passed away. the death, suffering, and life of each are remembered and embodied in these non-human presences alongside the displayed message, “don’t kill us any more.” this message reminds us that one can be killed after death— death can be a chronic and repeated process, and each death is connected to the next one. disablement, illness, and death are entangled; thus, the ableist imaginaries of one as worse than the other are rendered obsolete. as the violence of denial and erasure continues, the fight to expose, remedy, and prevent such violence perseveres in a place where victimization, disablement, death, incapacities, disabilities, and frailty coexist as conditions of life. the empire of shame shows scenes of celebration at a high school graduation filled with the laughter of young women. because many workers started working at semiconductor and lcd plants straight from high school before they became sick, the audience finds their playfulness eerie, as the graduates are unaware of the harms that will come to them. the film ends with a shot, at an unspecified place and time, of a garbage dump piled with kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 electronic waste, making visible the geopolitical implications of occupational harms caused by the continuing presence of electronics after their disposal. the scenes capture salvage workers, including asian and black people from the past and the present, rummaging through the garbage in search of valuable parts. the existence of electronic waste along with racially marked children who survive using the salvaged parts illustrate the continuing life of disposed materials and people. harm and the violence of disposal must reckon with the ontology that continues beyond the visible spaces of society. after chronicling the resistance of women workers in south korea, factory complex travels across national borders to canadia industrial park in phnom penh, cambodia, where garments are made for consumption in china, japan, and south korea. the film informs viewers that in 2014, a workers’ demonstration in cambodia demanding higher wages was met with an attack by armed soldiers, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. the scene of bloody corpse is followed by a room full of the panels displaying black-and-white photos of the faces of those who died in the killing fields of the khmer rouge, connecting violence from the past to that of the present (im heungsoon, personal communication, august 2018). the work of mourning and remembering is made possible through the spatial dedication of the photos in tuol sleng genocide museum. the director explains that the women who were killed during the genocide might be mothers and grandmothers of the women workers killed at the protest (im heungsoon, personal communication, august 2018). connecting genocidal violence and the killing of the workers by the military, the film attempts to show that the past and the present coexist. further scenes taken in angkor wat that feature deities in stone statues in ruin invoke lived time, a withering slowly, yet not disappearing presence. genealogical, temporal, and spatial connections, continuities that are not without disruptions, constitute an important dimension involved in the work of conceptualizing and materializing justice. from factories in south korea to dump sites overseas and in the past, to lcd plants in china, and to phnom penh, the bodies of workers and residents—healthy, ill, disabled, alive, silent, screaming, dying, dead, and substituted—are what jongyoung kim and heeyun kim (2016) kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 call “the only and final resort for resistance against the dominating conglomerate of capital, power, and knowledge” (pp. 148-149). the continuing presences of pain and debilitations, disablements, and bodily alterations after harm issue a call for justice across time and space that does not stop at national borders but continues to mobilize other manufacturing sites. furthermore, they call for justice in representations and make connections with the environment and non-human beings and objects. these presences require that justice be reconceptualized as something that cannot be irreversibly completed and resolved by institutional actions; instead, it is something that is lived, remembered, and pursued over time and across communities. as disability studies in global contexts challenges the violent impacts of imperialism and capitalism, it invites engagement with historical entanglements among specific geopolitical centers, including those of sub-empires existing in between peripheries—acting as subcontractors managing, exploiting, and disposing workers—in order to form resistance and coalitions throughout the transnational circuits of harms. the nexus between the occupational health movement and the disability movement disability as a basis for claims of human rights and debilitation as injustice and tragedy are both mediated by interdependent “material-discursive practices” (fritsch, 2015, p. 14) of management in south korea that rely on the medical, juridical, and administrative licensing of impairments and incapacities based on citizenship. this is not to say that disability and debilitation converge, without any differences and hierarchies. kim do hyun (personal communication, august 2018), a disability studies scholaractivist, explains that, although the disability movement in the 1990s clearly addressed industrial injuries as one of its important agendas, the network built between the two protest camps has not been fully developed enough to engage in an in-depth discussion about the effects of emphasizing tragedy in challenging injustice. condemning injustice by emphasizing kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 incapacities and suffering creates tension because this emphasis may reinforce the pitying and othering of disabled/ill bodies, as the ableist view that equates disability with shame and inferiority strongly holds affecting both movements. in a conversation with kim at the sharps’s camp outside the samsung building, kwŏn yŏng-ŭn, a sharps activist, pointed out the public attitude towards the representations of occupational illnesses and deaths displayed at the camp: “sometimes, passersby say, ‘poor thing…’ but i don’t quite understand. we are here feeling rewarded every day for pursuing our dignity, justice, and righteousness…. but those who don’t realize it, say, ‘pitiful.’” stressing the need to reject pity that individualizes and depoliticizes disabled and sick people and deaths, kim and kwŏn agree that the issue to tackle is a structural and capitalist problem (sharps, 2016). noting the importance of a multilayered understanding of tragedy, alison kafer (2015) insightfully states, “a crip refusal to see disability as tragedy, as traumatic, can be just as restricting on our politics and our theories as the ableist insistence that disability is always and only tragic” (p. 6). furthermore, extending the network and coalition between the disability movement and the occupational health movement beyond the boundaries of citizenship and national borders is necessary to challenge the harms experienced by immigrant workers and people overseas inside the factories and living with and near toxic materials. hwang sang-gi urges the compensation agreement to include workers in overseas plants and to ensure their rights to form unions (sharps, 2018). any imagination of the enabling possibilities of technology needs to recognize the racialized, classed, cripped, and gendered material labor involved in the making and disposing of it “without equating disability with injustice” (clare, 2017, p. 56); at the same time, any repudiation of debilitations and deaths needs to reckon with the continuing subjectivity and material presence of “the discarded” in late capitalist society, watching out for the effects of being incorporated into the state management of disability and incapacity. rather than reifying healthiness as a precondition for health justice claims, crip feminist technoscience lets us recognize different modes of presence in kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 “animate and inanimate lives and nonlives” (fritsch, 2017, p. 376; chen, 2011), continuing after violence and resisting closure. the condemnation of the injustice in debilitating marginalized people should also interrupt the imagination of the just world as that of healthy, able-bodyminded people. in a short scene in a hospital room in the empire of shame, han hye-kyŏng, who worked at a samsung lcd plant and had brain cancer that led to several disabilities, is filling out a survey that measures disability identity with the help of her mother.5 although the questionnaire does not capture the complicated experiences of disability and individual negotiations with identities, viewers gain a sense of han’s outlook on her life. to the statement, “it makes me feel very bad to see all the things nondisabled people can do which i cannot,” han agrees. her mother continues to read the questionnaire: “i accept my disability.” han answers, “yes.” “i have confidence about my abilities.” “yes.” “how much?” “a lot.” “though i am disabled, my life is full.” “very much so.” her mother rephrases the last item in the form of a question: “is your life full?” han answers, “very full.” surprised, her mother asks again, “really?” han repeats, “yes!” this conversation delivers a nuanced and seemingly contradictory picture of her life with disabilities. the wording of the survey indicates an ableist preconception of disability; however, han’s adamant answers challenge her mother and the audience not to be satisfied with a monolithic judgment about what it means to victimized and be disabled. han indeed has framed her incapacitations brought on by corporate crimes and immorality as a tragedy, illustrating what puar (2017) calls “the biopolitics of debilitation” (p. 72) as evidence of injustice; but they do not negate her fulfilling life. furthermore her fight for justice to prevent any workers from being harmed coexists with her wish to walk again (personal communication in january 2019), illustrating that her everyday life with disabilities after the camp’s closure involves continuing negotiations with inaccessible environments, memory, isolation, and prognosis. sharps activist kwŏn yŏng-ŭn brings up another important nexus between the occupational health movement and the disability movement in her speech at gangnam camp (sharps, 2016). when the compensation kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 plan drafted by the third-party mediating committee set forth a hierarchy of damage that was based on a medically determined level of impairments, she was reminded of the ongoing fight of disability activists from gwanghwamun camp to abolish the disability rating system that ties provision of social support to medical assessments of the severity of impairment measured in examination rooms, not based on comprehensive consideration of living environments, desires, needs, plans, and experiences. in this regulatory bureaucratic system, people with disabilities receive medical and administrative assessments of their degree of impairment, and those whose impairments and needs are not rated as serious enough do not qualify for state-funded services, including personal assistance and paratransit. against the normative body, numeric scores are created based on medical diagnosis and on every function of an individual combined with family income and care needs. these assessments cause physical and mental pain and exhaustion, constituting debilitating process itself.6 the denial of care based on new assessments has led to deaths at home of people who were living alone, especially when there were fires or malfunctions of medical equipment. protestors also demanded the abolition of the legal obligation of family support (puyang ŭimuje) for their disabled members, because it effectively eliminates the need for social welfare. responding to the persistent demands of the disability activists for more than 1,800 days, the new government promised the abolition of the disability rating system and the camp closed in august 2017 (h. ch’oe, 2017). however, the coalition had to reopen the protest camp in front of the congress in 2018, demanding sufficient budget allocation and a complete eradication of the rating system, condemning the effort to revamp it. (currently in 2019, the camp is located in jongno-gu near the blue house.) applying this lesson from disability activism to the sharps’s demands for reparations for harm in the workplace is crucial, kwŏn states, to avoid affected workers being compensated according to medically graded classifications. thus challenges to the state’s power to authorize the legal and medical identity “disabled” are intertwined with challenges to the harmful conditions that create debilitations. occupational health justice and kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 disability rights are interdependent as individuals travel across these categories and are subject to bureaucratic technology and control. addressing the history of occupational harms and affected people’s resistance, chŏn chu-hŭi (2017) describes how the transformation of workers’ identities by toxins and injured body parts functions as a ground for new social rights: “the role of workers who came to have occupational illness wasn’t passive….they had to prove the toxicity of materials that was previously unknown, and they had to prove epidemiologically that their illness was caused by labor processes and mechanical systems of the manufacturing sites in order to get treatment. as active participants,…they fought for new social rights by creating musculoskeletal identity, asbestos identity, and mercury identity” (p. 330). these identities, fully charged with negativity but not incompatible with having a full life, form the basis of new sociality created in the process to demand justice, challenge expertise, expose workplace harm, corporate criminality, and demand apology, compensation, and prevention.7 mel chen (2011) argues that toxicity is “better thought of as conditions with effects, bringing their own affects and animacies to bear on lives and nonlives” as it generates different kinds of sociality (pp. 281-282). workers’ “asbestos identity,” “mercury identity,” “musculoskeletal identity,” and “leukemia identity” suggest that bodies “disposed of” after suffering harms resonate kathleen miller’s (2018) characterization of life in the dump—“not an end but an experience of continual return” (p. 4). debilitations and mass disablements of people who are considered “disposable populations” are not an end (even after death) but are marked with continual returns to spaces formed for sociality, familiarity, loss, collective mourning, and justice much as being disposed of does not mean nonexistence. these specific identities may not overlap with a more broad self-identification as a disabled person (changaein), but their agendas for making life possible and their efforts to ensure prevention rely on disability policies and social provisions that are in place or need to be created and expanded. ha kŭm-ch’ŏl (2015) declares that the alliance between samsung’s “victims” and disabled people is “the most powerful coalition of the powerless.” kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 justice in south korean disability communities is inseparable from the ecology of beings and matters outside of the intelligible boundary of human and life. crip feminist technoscience studies in this context then may seek multiple origins with locational and historical specificities in the geopolitical hierarchy in which each space carries particular positions in maintaining imperial centers and subcenters. efforts to ask and shape what justice entails in its temporal and spatial in/continuity challenge the finality and irreversibility as terms of justice to redress harms. together with “intimate activism” articulated by manuel tironi (2018) and “the kinds of ethical matters and affective doings it elicits” (p. 452), necro-activism and inhuman presences as important crip politics that are centered on dependence, interdependence, and discord with the system call for careful understanding of justice as lived through everyday recognition (changaeyŏsŏng konggam, 2018). sites of suffering and debilitations are also sites of the histories of resistance where disabilities, illnesses, deaths, and sufferings lead to the power to confront injustice and generate coalitions. acknowledgements i’d like to convey my gratitude to kelly fritsch, aimi hamraie, david serlin, and mara mills, the editors of this issue, as well as anonymous reviewers for their helpful and insightful suggestions. i thank alison kafer, im heungsoon, kim do hyun, chŏng yŏng-ran, han hye-kyŏng, kim si-nyŏ, michael gill, and alice falk for sharing their knowledge, insights and providing help and support. notes 1 in analyzing the use of waste, discard, dirt, and filth by both sides of the occupy movement in the united states, discard studies scholar max liboiron (2012) shows that trash and filth are “the terms over which contests about what counts as tolerable and intolerable conditions, right kim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 and wrong, citizenship and the other, acceptable and unacceptable behavior and what constitutes ‘out of placeness’ have been waged for centuries, and will continue to be waged” (p. 8). 2 sullivan (2014) explains the history of the development of somatechnics by susan stryker and her colleagues, and how transgender issues have been integral to the notion addressing how bodies and technologies construct and transform each other materially and discursively. 3 see kafer’s (2013) careful discussion of the limitations of naming in haraway’s (1991) “a cyborg manifesto,” including the women making chips in asia and spiral dancing in santa rita jail. 4 for more on the health issues among workers at samsung electronics in vietnam, see ipen and research centre for gender, family and environment in development (cgfed), stories of women workers in vietnam’s electronics industry (november 2017), a report that documents miscarriages, other undiagnosed illnesses, and the death of a young woman. 5 the questionnaire is apparently “acceptance management and social interaction,” first developed in the united states in 1987 to measure the acceptance of disability and identity as disabled (kaiser, wingate, freeman, & chandler, 1987). 6 for measuring physical disability, pain-inducing electric probes are used to test nerve responses (chŏng yŏng-ran, personal communication, september 2018). 7 this account also resonates with crip technoscience’s framing disabled people as “experts and designers of everyday life” (hamraie & fritsch, 2019). references an, c. c. 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(2018). hypo-interventions: intimate activism in toxic environments. social studies of science, 48(3), 438-455. verdery, k. (2000). the political lives of dead bodies: reburial and postsocialist change. new york, ny: columbia university press. wŏnjin reion sanjaero 8myŏng samang [원진 레이온 산재로 8명 사망, 8 people died from industrial disaster at wonjin rayon] (aug. 6, 1988).한겨레 [hankyoreh]. retreived from https://newslibrary.naver.com/ yi, c. w. (2017). 메탄올 중독사건: 법의 사각지대에서 시력을 잃은 파견노동자들 [methanol poisoning: dispatched workers who lost vision in the blindspot of law]. in 한국 노동안전보건연구소 [korea institute of labor safety and health] (ed.),굴뚝 속으로 들어간 의사들 [doctors inside the chimney] (pp. 284-298). 서울: 나름북스. yi, h. e. (2017). 태국 노동자 집단 앉은뱅이병을 일으킨 노말헥산 [nkim catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 29 hexane caused group paralysis of workers from thailand]. in 한국 노동안전보건연구소 [korea institute of labor safety and health] (ed.),굴뚝 속으로 들어간 의사들 [doctors inside the chimney] (pp. 272282). 서울: 나름북스. bio eunjung kim is associate professor of women’s and gender studies and disability studies at syracuse university. she is the author of curative violence: rehabilitating disability, gender and sexuality in modern korea (2017, duke university press). microsoft word 71625_1_11_sur.docx sur, a. (2018). review of: feminists and science: critiques and changing perspectives in india. (vols. 1 & 2) by sumi krishna and gita chadha (eds.) (sage publications india, pvt ltd., 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4 (2), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © abha sur, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license ` review feminists and science: critiques and changing perspectives in india. (vols. 1 & 2) by sumi krishna and gita chadha (eds.) (sage publications india, pvt ltd., 2017) abha sur university of california at los angeles asur@mit.edu in his 1979 keynote address "class science and scientific truth" delivered to the new york marxist school's conference on dialectical materialism, richard levins argues that, although mediated by intellectual, material and social relations, science still produces some “real truths about the world” (levins, 1981, p. 9). this essential contradiction “between science as the growth of human knowledge and science as ideology of oppression” is at the heart of feminism’s contested relationship with science (levins 1981, p.9). more often than not, feminist scholarship emphasizes one aspect of the contradiction while ignoring the other. in india, these dichotomous stands are exemplified in the writings of vandana shiva on the one hand, and on the other, the scholarship of meera nanda. while shiva sees modern science as inherently violent in its reductive methodology, its denigration of 2 sur catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) traditional knowledge systems and its destruction of nature for private profit, nanda rails against brahmanical hinduism that has legitimized oppression of women and dalits (formerly known as "untouchables") and sees science as a liberating force in the fight against obscurantism and caste oppression. modern science according to nanda “is the standpoint of the oppressed.” (nanda, 2002, p. 92) in this milieu feminists and science is a salutary intervention. the two volumes offer an expansive exploration of science, society, and gender in india that emphasizes the heterogeneity in feminist thought and practices as well as in scientific disciplines and institutions. against the homogenization of both modern science and local knowledges, implicit in the critiques offered by shiva and nanda, feminists and science recognizes hierarchies in the disciplines and institutions of modern science (swaminathan, vol. 1) as well as in local, traditional knowledges (krishna, vol. 2). as krishna notes, “local knowledges are layered and complex but not always democratic” and “the tension between the local community as both emancipatory and patriarchal is not easy to resolve” (krishna, vol 2, p. xix). feminists and science thus endeavors to understand, elaborate, and explore the nexus of gender, knowledge and power in and across boundaries of modern science and traditional ways of knowing. it is “a labor of love” as gita chadha writes, emphasizing the plurality of theoretical, analytical, and disciplinary approaches that informs this collection of essays (chadha, vol. 2, p. xxxiii). feminists and science is the outcome of a conference and two workshops on the general theme of feminism, knowledge production, and transformation that brought together feminists from a wide array of academic disciplines, non-governmental organizations and state departments. the final workshop was centered on peer review of articles submitted by the participants to develop a dialogical mode of understanding and knowledge-making. taken together the essays in the two volumes cover an impressive range of topics from women in science, the culture of science, feminist epistemologies and practices, the pedagogy of science, feminist science 3 sur catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) fiction to writings on developing different, more inclusive ways of doing science. an excellent introduction by sumi krishna in volume 2 makes explicit the overarching scope and purpose of feminists and science. its purpose, she writes, “is to work towards a more comprehensive and grounded understanding of gender and science in india” (krishna, vol. 2, p. xii). toward this end feminists and science explores the ways in which science is both similar to and different from other social institutions, how gender gets represented in science and, in turn, how scientific methods and practices are mediated by gender. although the twenty-six essays that comprise the two volumes are case studies rooted in specific historical, social, cultural and institutional practices in india, the theoretical and analytical frameworks employed by the authors draw liberally upon international feminist scholarship in science studies. the latter has the effect of making that which is unfamiliar familiar and allows feminists across the globe to engage with the specificities of feminist scholarship in science studies in india without essentializing its difference. under the rubric "women in science" are experiential as well as historical essays on women water professionals, veterinarians, astrophysicists and psychiatrists. these essays articulate the interaction between the structural (social institutions) and disciplinary (bureaucratic, regulatory) dimensions that prevent women scientists from becoming full participants in their chosen disciplines. here disciplinary particularities highlight the more general and systemic aspects of gender discrimination and at the same time reveal the built-in hierarchy in science itself: the less prestigious a field is in the pecking order of “the three-dimensional hierarchy of discipline, function and level” (swaminathan, vol. 1, p. 215), the more amenable it is to democratizing processes. articles pertaining to the culture of science highlight the hegemonic (i.e., ideological and cultural) barriers women face in their career choices. here the specific ways in which merit and creativity are defined and assessed in the sciences is decidedly gendered. women’s stellar performance is attributed to their bookishness, while that of men to their inherent 4 sur catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) conceptual clarity (subramanian, vol. 1). the essays also elucidate the normalization of discourse about science where critical questioning is delimited to enhance the view shared by most that “science and scientists would lead humanity up the path to abundance and equity” (shastri, vol. 1, p. 123). the greater good attributed to science has the effect of silencing gender, caste, and class discrimination within the sciences. the critiques of science are nuanced and refreshing. chayanika shah’s insights into in vitro fertilization therapy, its attendant reconfiguration of the very meaning of fertility and the subtle or not so subtle conflation of creating a baby of the requisite genetic material with the natural process of conception raise far-reaching questions about the politics of gendered bodies, the construction of desire, and the feminist dilemmas surrounding these technologies that offer women choice by allowing them to exert control over their own bodies. in a markedly different context, issues of childbirth and midwifery are also central to meena gopal’s study of caste and gender in south tamil nadu. she draws attention to knowledges and practices of the “lower castes” produced under conditions of hierarchical control and coercion, extracted by the “upper castes” as caste obligation, and largely ignored and silenced in feminist practice and deliberations until recently. here, considerations of livelihoods, markets, labor, political economy, biomedical technologies and caste-stratified knowledges engender a host of ambivalences and contradictions that demand flexibility and adaptability in feminist thought and practice. feminists and science also addresses issues of women’s reproductive labor in medicine, recovery of contributions and experiences of women physicians in colonial and independent india, deliberations on pedagogies in science and technology, development of feminist research methodologies, women’s ways of knowing, etc. this remarkable breadth of feminists and science is matched by the depth and thoughtfulness of its scholarship with one caveat. the question of caste haunts the collection of essays both explicitly and implicitly. however, except in 5 sur catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) gopal’s work, it does not get the serious engagement it deserves. the shared histories of caste and gender oppression are palpable as much in science and technology as in other fields of inquiry. the lack of engagement with the burgeoning literature on caste and gender in india and race, gender, and science studies is an untoward omission. nonetheless feminists and science is an admirable and ambitious project that will go far in establishing the field of feminist science studies in india. references levins, r. (1981). “class science and scientific truth.” in e. altman, m. boger, e. holtzmann, l. m. knauer et al. (eds.)working papers on marxism & science (pp. 9-22). new york, ny: the science task force of the new york marxist school. shiva, v. (1988). “reductionist science as epistemological violence.” in ashis nandy (ed.), science, hegemony and violence, (pp. 232-56). tokyo, jp: united nations university. nanda, m. (2002). breaking the spell of dharma and other essays. new delhi, in: three essays collective. bio abha sur teaches in the women’s & gender studies program at massachusetts institute of technology. she is the author of dispersed radiance: caste, gender and modern science in india (new delhi: navayana 2011). microsoft word 32832_richard_doyle_book review_nj dr.docx doyle, richard (2019). covert plants: vegetal consciousness and agency in an anthropocentric world. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-3. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © richard doyle, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license book review | covert plants: vegetal consciousness and agency in an anthropocentric world edited by prudence gibson and baylee brits (brainstorm books, 2018) richard doyle penn state university mobius@psu.edu i need hardly say that i have no intention of reviewing all the proofs of intelligence which the plants give us. these proofs are innumerable and continual, especially among the flowers, in which the effort of vegetable life towards light and understanding is concentrated. —maurice maeterlinck, l’intelligence des fleurs as detailed in the eponymous plant theory by jeffrey nealon, plant theory is neither the thinking of plants nor thought about plants by humans. plant thinking is instead the experienced pattern of thought by no identity that emerges out of ecosystems engaged in photosynthesis and subject to natural and sexual selection now aware of itself. and plant theory is happening! this is good news for those who wish inquiry to transcend rather than stagnate into contemporary debates always, it would seem, recursively only about themselves. plant perception, plant signaling and behavior, plant intelligence: all of these technoscientific facts confound us and ask us to ponder the delicious news that plants are anything but idle or indifferent! to respectfully remix donna haraway into the post-avatar moment, from rapidly expanding cannabis culture to the plant savior groot, plants themselves are now disturbingly sentient, while we ourselves seem frighteningly inert. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) richard doyle, 2019 2 but, yet more good news: covert plants: vegetal consciousness and agency in an anthropocentric world offers a glorious sampler of strains and genres of plentiful plantitude, a seed mix of covert plant action tended and cultivated by prudence gibson and baylee bries. what an extraordinary brew is here concocted, a vegetalismo of academic reason, with song. there are poems that provide instant and incandescent context for the more scholarly inquiries into kant and goethe, as if each were written for each other, like plant symbionts, shamanic allies of force and light. as a result, the mixture makes the book an enlightening pleasure to read. unlike many edited collections, where chapters can take on a frightening consistency as all concerned ensure that they agree with each other on their major premises, covert plants offers an admixture that keeps us stretching towards the light. luke fisher’s “gardening/grasshopper in a field,” for example, instructs us directly in the sort of immanent thinking necessary to the arrival of the plant as sentient evolutionary co-partner: who took the young thin stems and bent them to be your legs, folded leaves like origami to make a pair of wings? (p. 60) fisher here guides would be phytonauts—explorers, yes, of the plant realm—in the forms of attention that enable plant thinking and perception: watch as patterns unfurl across phyla, plant insect insect plant, all the while retaining the singularity of some plant aspect or consistency that persists. there is a good variation in the mix, with sections ranging over everything from neuroscientific metaphor—a particularly luminous essay by baylee brits—and an icaro, a chanting by tamryn bennett in homage to the songs of the upper amazon: caapi,cipó yagé, yajé natem, shorit aya spirit vine (p. 122) some academic writing on plants is excited but guarded about the real stakes, rarely turning towards the introspective. but there is nothing covert about the courage, persistence, and quality of the diverse treatments of phytopsyche to be found in this volume. plants are not a theme that repeats across this book but an awareness that occurs and transforms as each chapter tunes our attention book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) richard doyle, 2019 3 towards some aspect of plant being. and persist it does, as artists such as natalie jeremijenko sprout into dialogue with susie pratt, giving crucial context to the ways artists were always already, as we used to say before plant theory, tapping into the utopian flavor to be found in dialogue with plants. jeremijenko maps out a mutualist encounter with plants—as in her project treexoffice, a “co-working space in a tree and owned by a tree” (p. 214)—that literally entangles ownership frameworks, the roots of a tree, and the labor that would emerge out of it. if we compare treexoffice with its synergetic forebears, the tensegrity domes of buckminster fuller, we see that utopias can still sprout in the oddest places, less “before the law” than beyond it, linking treexoffice to those courageous tree sitters such as julia butterfly hill who have taught us all the dharma of the trees. lest you find yourself allergic to the utopian puffery above (the reviewer’s, not the collection), fear not, for there are works of extraordinary scholarship that are as fiercely careful in their commitment to the attentive exegesis of philosophical texts as they are radically open to the implications of their insights. covert plants ups the ante on the next wave of thinking, creating, and feeling our way through the unmistakable fact that plants are our symbiotic partners as we hurtle through space. brainstorm books is to be commended for the volume, a fresh harvest of the finest strains. author bio richard doyle (aka mobius) is the author of scores of scholarly articles and seven books. he has been awarded grants from the national science foundation and the mellon foundation while winning acclaim and accolades as a classroom teacher in the us, the uk, germany, and china. in 2002, doyle was healed of life long severe asthma in an ayahuasca ceremony, and he has since devoted his life to synthesizing the world's spiritual practices into a practical, open source and empirically verifiable pathway available to all. edwin erle sparks professor at penn state, doyle's recent books include, the genesis of now, darwin's pharmacy, and looking upside down at nothing. microsoft word 194-1550-1_chilianis.docx chilianis, m. (2018). listening to epilepsy and soundcloud: re-examining sonic subjectivity and affective labor. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-37. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © melanie chilianis, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article listening to epilepsy and soundcloud: re-examining sonic subjectivity and affective labor melanie chilianis melaniechilianis@gmail.com abstract while many patients who are ill form significant networks of support online, i argue that describing experiences in language over social media is not always desirable for someone with epilepsy. my line of inquiry instead explores the tension between music creation and fragmented subjectivity, and folds in a critique of soundcloud, the music sharing and networking site. i first analyze what it means for the subject to compose and produce electronic music, and then analyze my own music on soundcloud. i investigate affective attachment in relation to our entanglement with music and social media, and i extend this to a survey of subjectivity, physicality and networked capitalism. in the article, affect and listening are related through their materiality and space, and by their capacity to mediate sound and meaning. i examine listening for its potential to expand critical activity in accord with embodied processes that are relevant to situated disability. listening and affect guide my argument as concepts, and i conclude that distinct facets of listening can be connected to an ethics of living in the information society. 2 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) introduction while many patients who are ill form significant networks of support online, i argue that describing experiences in language over social media is not always desirable for someone with epilepsy. my line of inquiry instead explores the tension between music creation and fragmented subjectivity, and folds in a critique of soundcloud, the music sharing and networking site. i first analyze what it means for the subject to compose and produce electronic music, and then analyze my own music on soundcloud. i investigate affective attachment in relation to our entanglement with music and social media, and i extend this to a survey of subjectivity, physicality and networked capitalism. in the article, affect and listening are related through their materiality and space, and by their capacity to mediate sound and meaning. i examine listening for its potential to expand critical activity in accord with embodied processes that are relevant to situated disability. listening and affect guide my argument as concepts, and i conclude that distinct facets of listening can be connected to an ethics of living in the information society. i explore affective attachment and misrecognition in relation to epilepsy and narrative rupture. epilepsy is among other conditions or impairments such as schizophrenia, and agoraphobia that can impact the everyday self while not appearing to explicitly physically disable a person. although there is a danger in conflating epilepsy with agoraphobia or schizophrenia, they share some qualities. with schizophrenia, agoraphobia and epilepsy, there are degrees to which an individual will feel their personhood impaired. this may relate to the episodic and unpredictable nature of events that appear ‘outside’ a bounded ‘self’. in terms of epilepsy, impairment may pertain to frequency of seizures, type, intensity, location, or age of onset, and the disabling impact these have on daily activities. mary elene wood (2013) argues that the “often useful distinction between impairment (a limiting physical difference) and disability (the prejudice and social construction of living that excludes, ignores, and demeans those with impairments) can become fuzzy when 3 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) dealing with schizophrenia” (p. 23). this acknowledges that the social model, a long-used disability studies framework, is not necessarily suitable for minded impairments. minded ‘impairments’ directly impact how one is received as a rational subject and these conditions can threaten individuals’ status as valid communicators (price 2011). this has implications in the areas of activism, academia, the arts, and social media. i am therefore interested in the ramifications of narrative rupture in a communications context. affect is also a phenomenon that inheres in configurations of biopower, throughout media, labor and networks, and these “scientific, affective, and linguistic forces of the multitude aggressively transform the conditions of social production” (hardt & negri, 2004, p. 366). in this sense, affect is something subjective as well as something that veers toward the impersonal (koivunen, 2010). lauren berlant (2007, 2008, 2011) elaborates affect through a marxist lens, and extends her analyses to readings of feminist, queer, race and class focused case studies. affect reshapes subjectivity, including the possibility of co-operative subjectivity in relation to technology, which i shall visit later in the article. affect and listening are related through the ‘materiality of mediation’, in terms of sound’s provocations (grossberg, 2010). however, affect cannot address the configuration of the situated epileptic subject with music online. therefore, i enlist the modality of listening as it incorporates several foci in this essay: a situated and specific mind-body, online electronic music, and technoscientific space. aspects of music become ways of knowing analogous and interruptive to discursive structures, even ones of a fluid polymorphous character such as social media. a music-based approach enhances our preconceived notions of "illness" and provides a novel account distinct from many aesthetic perspectives in disability studies which focus on representations of the disabled body in visual art and literature (mitchell & snyder, 2000; lacom, 2005; siebers, 2005; anolik, 2010; straus, 2011; watson, 2012). much of this literature is concerned with the art forms that disabled people produce within a normate milieu, or with representations 4 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) of disabled people created in literary texts by the nondisabled at various points in history. while valuable, these approaches center on high-impact narrative in linguistic, visual, and even musical form, and they favor a certain intelligibility about revealing or uncovering selves either in language or visual art. i do not wish to denigrate first-person perspectives that have informed so much feminist and disability scholarship. as tobin siebers (2008) puts it, “suffering is a signal to the self at risk, and this signal applies equally to physical and social situations” (p. 20). suffering puts the subject on the outside of social norms; writing about how the disabled or impaired self experiences some of these norms, can disturb them. however, my point is that illness is often messy and makes little sense. instead, i offer an account of illness as caught in affective, informational networks ─ specifically soundcloud. such an account is relevant to disability studies and feminist science and technology studies because it provides a snapshot of a social media platform in the neoliberal society as connected to aural media and epilepsy. i argue that there is a gap in critical communication accounts of the information society (lash, 2002; fuchs, 2016) as well as in disability studies autoethnographies that i hope to help fill here by bringing affect into conversation with listening and epilepsy. by placing the subjective act of electronic music production in contrast to a later critique of soundcloud, i show why media platforms are problematic, in the sense that they embody a competitive information market. while some scholars see social audiovisual media in positive terms for citizens, where nonmonetary rewards such as satisfaction, pride in one’s work, social capital, and cultural capital on platforms such as youtube, myspace, and indaba music exist (jenkins, 2006; 2013; 2016; suhr, 2012), i argue that these ‘rewards’ are, at best more complex and, at worst, elusive not only for people with an impairment or chronic illnesses, but for many people. these rewards tie the subject to an intimate compositional process, both private and public, which i elaborate on in the following sections. seeking out and participating in public commenting, networking and exchange 5 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) online is not always a primary or pleasurable focus for someone with a neurological illness – someone who is ill may not gain much social capital from social media. furthermore, people with severe and ongoing illness are often unemployed, underemployed or face interruption to their career; therefore, to expect musical social media to grant non-monetary rewards as a kind of cultural citizenship, or to result in social belonging does not gel. i connect electronic music production and listening as these pertain to epilepsy and affective transmission. i survey soundcloud below, and analyze how the network has changed over time, as well as how engaging with soundcloud has both benefitted and detracted from me as a user with epilepsy. finally, i look at the role of listening in ethical configurations. methodology i understand the body and mind within a feminist framework that includes debates on knowledge, identity, marginalization, and the mattering of the body, which is intertwined with discourse and signs (haraway, 1991; collins, 2000; butler, 1990, 1993, 2001, 2004; currier, 2003). i see this as a complement to disability studies’ social model (siebers, 2008). as a researcher, musician, epileptic and user of soundcloud, i am embedded within the world i discuss; i therefore offer a first-person perspective. i am embodied. my bodymind interacts with social, environmental, and informational space intersecting with creative, medical, affective, attentive, and survival practices (wiley 2012). at different stages of the research, i have aimed to be reflexive by thinking about how my actions, writing and music processes impact the meaning of the framed experience at hand (hockman, 2010). however, i am not only dealing with my "experience," but also with music, with technological extensions, and with concepts. i therefore offer the caveat that i am positioned in various ways. theorizing embodiment ─ whether one’s own or others ─ is difficult, and i resort to using the abstraction "the body" or the "bodymind" to designate how subjectivity is entangled in the body, and possibly with other "things" (couser, 2012). along with bergson (1992), i 6 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) posit that reality is mobile: things "out there" are in the making, and states are not fixed but are always in a process of change. through my research, i work through this complexity and weave together the production of sound with concepts, rather than attempt to transcribe with wholeness my internalized picture (grosz 2005). for this reason, my perspective is partial: i do not seek to master subjectivity (haraway 1991; collins 2000). having said this, however, i do draw on auto-ethnographic and autobiographic traditions, situating my work among eli clare’s (2001; 2015), georgina kleege’s (1999; 2018), and isabel dyck’s (1999). these scholars write political memoir, autobiography, and a first-personperspective case study respectively and show how knowledge from a disabled person’s perspective contributes to knowledge through powerful means. while many narrative researchers are informed by the claim that we can all tell and understand stories, epilepsy challenges this on several fronts (squire, 2008). according to corinne squire (2008), narratives are recounted in sequence and they are underscored by aristotle’s belief that we all have the ability to make meaning through language as moral subjects ─ essentially storying our subjectivity. whatever the seizure experience ─ as a wide variety of seizures exist ─ epilepsy confounds the idea of linear, linguistic narrative by the way it interrupts taken-forgranted subjectivity. i argue that the body is present during the editing of digital music. by extension, the body may be perceived in online interactions and through listening to music composed, generally. discrete events within an "illness narrative" are perceived within an ever-emerging lifestream. at times, these events have rough edges or suddenly jerk into one’s body-consciousness; at others, they are gradual, bleeding the hue and taste of the atmosphere. in neurological chronic illnesses such as epilepsy and serious migraine, events cluster and subside, or surprise one. in this sense, chronic illness is a process rather than a state and involves periods of wellness as well as periods of ill health (van dongen & reis, 2001). this impacts the research narrative and what i choose to share. for example, it is preferable for me to seek subjective continuity 7 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) through music and formal language because the cumulative experience of many seizures is disorienting and interruptive. i highlight the practice of electronic and electro-acoustic musicmaking, which includes experimenting with software and re-mediating existing samples and media (kember & zylinska, 2010). i value musical artifacts but not simply in the sense that henry jenkins (2008, 2013) has in mind (i.e., as media contributing to convergence culture). this is too optimistic in my view because media do not address disability or categorize social difference in a critical sense. instead, i view the composition process and their products, which may yield several sonic ‘versions’, as a research process capable of illuminating conditions, discourses, change, temporalities, and constraints. according to patricia leavy (2009), music-making as a social research methodology can help researchers access, describe, and explain that which is often rendered invisible by traditional research practices. i posit that human variations and bodily sensations may be felt by listeners in electronic music and i foreground bodily gesture in electronic music, even though it may not be as easily observable or imagined as a person playing an instrument. although not without challenge, electronic music can “suggest” a body with timbre, texture, rhythm, dynamics, and frequency (echard, 2006). another way of thinking about the bodymind in electronic music is akin to that of an embodied “happening” (denora, 2000); while naomi cumming (1997) speaks of the listener’s role in "playing" musical subjectivities mediated by pieces of music. various senses, emotions, affect, memory and histories are the starting points for making meaning. i am not concerned with neurological perspectives on the effects of music on epilepsy, such as those of melissa maguire (2012) although brief mention must be made. these include music-processing approaches such as research aimed at reducing epileptic discharges in the brain by listening to mozart (lin et al. 2013); investigating where the auditory sensory memory is (collins, 2014); and the detailed study of musicians’ brains via fmri in order to demonstrate how music and language share brain networks (schlaub, 2015). nor am i seeking to 8 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) explore a neurological basis for creativity (chambliss, 2010) or tracing epilepsy-music connections via brain imaging. while maguire (2012) and schlaub (2015) undertake progressive research ─ maguire reviews the impact of particular antiepileptic drugs on musicians and schlaub investigates music treatments to "modulate" brain plasticity, including a final gesture to neurological music therapies ─ these approaches remain problematic. their methodologies bring to mind the histories and current practice of being and becoming a generalizable research subject ─ where the person is “always already on the edge of being regarded as at best a ‘different’ kind of person and at worst not a person at all” (wood 2013, p. 20). here wood deploys narrative methods to disturb this practice in mental illness to circumvent the subjecthood that takes place for schizophrenics. these studies can seem quite innocuous on the surface, but they are part of medicine's and psychiatry’s methods that have a history of subjugating epileptics and the mentally ill. i now turn to the question of how the bodymindedness of epilepsy finds its way in sound and music online. music, the subject and epilepsy i am interested in the composition process and engagement with sound. throughout this process, the bodymind is involved in an electronic music production, listening, feedback, and revision cycle, shaping and being shaped. i place versions of a composition online at or near the end of such a cycle. in this section i am concerned with how music and the subject are entangled, and how these embody understandings of epilepsy. as a starting point, aden evens (2005) gives an evocative description of sound and worlds as perceived by the composer: the composer and the performer capture percept and affect in sound, implicating worlds of forces not yet unleashed but whose reserve powers the music, driving it along. personal histories, impersonal events, an intake of breath, a bloody battle. an entire history of music insists implicated in every note, every phrase, 9 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) every contraction. a sonic history in every utterance, whose most contracted, whose clarity is the specificity of the sound but not its sense. it is this contraction, the contraction of all sound, the contraction of all vibrations, which gives sense to sound, contracting clearly just this vibration, this sound wave, and letting the rest remain obscure, implicated in various degrees of relaxation (p. 35). contraction and relaxation parallels contrast, as unheard and unattended-to frequencies fall away; one listens to this particular vibration and others recede. depending on the compositional approach, the composer may have a degree of volition in the creating process, which gives sense to her sound; however, the epileptic does not when a seizure visits her. there may be a “bloody battle” – between a need to keep going and seizures. when i am next in a production session, my body resets, finds a balance with determination, and carries on composing. i expand on the embodied and affective process of creating in this section and its relevance to "chronopolitics" (virilio via sharma, 2012), while i link this to affect in the affective attachment section below. my composition, swiqos1 (chilianis, 2017) responds to the selection process evoked by evens (2005) above. i will now describe how i made this piece, in a fragmented way, rather than a linear fashion. this example is an abrasive piece of electronic music that pinpoints aural sensations and convolutions. i actively worked with some of these sonic vibrations, which produced a range of subjective and bodily affects in me ─ from irritation to laughter. to begin with, i used a frenetic drum file that i had improvised in another audio application. i then i worked the area that straddles production and audio mixing. from my music journal: making so fast i don’t want to stop … something that made music, made rhythm jump for me. just now i solo-ed the middle band, as i felt the tom was over loud, i solo-ed it on and off and it produced quite a distinct audio effect, … because of the eddies of modulation in the other tracks. i may use this. i italicize these phrases as they stand out for me. the music-making 10 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) seems bigger than i am, it seems to have more volition and will than "i" do. a buzzy saw synth enters at 20” and is not pretty ─ it is in harsh contrast to the "bubbly", soft-edged and bouncy opening. this saw synth fades in and out through the piece and was a late addition by myself. perhaps it embodies an attempt to involve more "volition" against some of the more collaboratively, even passively made sound background. overall, i am at the controls: i am the one who solos a track, i can fade one sound down against the others if its vibrations grate; i select (but not if i have a seizure). i incorporated some random computer processes during the production of swiqos and one might point out that this indeterminacy is akin to the uncertainty of epilepsy. however, random selection out of a group of possible sound events still returns a specificity of sound in the final mix. in this instance a computer program randomly selects drum sounds, which are sometimes pitched randomly; in this case, the software is the selector. in another instance (in the arranging and mixing stage of production), i interact with the audio editor,2 seeing a potential for sound and rhythm. the level of complexity occurs through polyrhythms, layering, and the signal processing chain where at times i lost track of where or why sounds occurred.3 both happy accidents and sonic failure can occur during this kind of making process, which i occasionally cultivate in order to find sonic timbres previously unknown to me. in this instance, i allow sonic layers, timbral change and effects in addition to the mixing desk-like emulation in the software to guide me in my composition. throughout the production process, there is a distinct spatial positioning between the subject, the software, musical structure and the sonic shapes as they grow. the chain of musical sense that results from highlighting and sequencing sound from the mass of potential vibrations applies to both compositional approaches 1) random software algorithms, and 2) my interaction with music software. when i am held back by something that "feels" involuntarily outside the self, the "i" of the everyday can be suddenly nowhere, or can seem filtered with another substance (light, sound).4 "i" can be 11 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) momentarily inarticulate ─ but sound or noise of varying velocities and timbres makes sense to me. during these periods, conversations seem jarring and may proceed with delays on my side and uncertainty and wariness on the other. this excerpt from helene cixous’s (2004) work neuter demonstrates a loss of language through the paradox of william who kills off his character as he almost arrives at the symbolic (through the melted mirror). cixous questions how wilson can author his story, even though as readers we are asked to listen to a narrator without a subject, which destabilizes his voice. the reader will have to lend an ear to a narrator-sans-subject ergo sans voice other than that ear which, echo of its muteness, the admission of its loss feebly raises: indeed, at the moment in which william wilson writes he has already killed with his own hands the other william wilson he has scored out the name-of-william wilson from among the living at the time of a bloody scene in which the mirror melted on him, he lost access to the symbolic ergo it is impossible for william wilson to arrive at language, still more impossible to be the author of a brief story (p. 49). cixous (2004) takes us on a cochlear route arriving at a character’s authorial impossibility. i do not align myself with wilson’s character per se, except to acknowledge how poststructural subjectivity shares some qualities with the states associated with the seizures i experience. what i want to suggest is that when i place the "sonic body" online, the expectations and norms, both on and offline around strength, reason, career, ability, communication, and femininity usually result in my actively "killing off’" the self in language. facing an internet where people place their best and boldest, or even loudest selves online is dissonant,5 and not always appropriate for the eroded or fragmented self due to epilepsy. in this sense, it is safer to position subjectivity online via music. during and after illness we must become intelligible through whatever the symbolic and discursive registers are around us. judith butler (1999) has drawn attention to the “difficulty of the ‘i’ to express itself through the language that is available to it” (p. xxvi). the logic of the 12 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) dominant linguistic and economic registers, particularly those that rely on speed and efficiency, can sometimes alienate the epileptic bodymind, particularly in verbal interactions, when seizures slow or pause speech. epilepsy can thwart the rules of everyday communication. in response to this, i turn to music-making to regain continuity over rupture. as naomi cumming (1997) argues, “a person does not just move towards something but does so with ‘urgency’ or ‘hesitation.’” (p. 149). here, a relationship between gesture, subjectivity and object ─ in this case, a musical instrument or the sonic potentialities in a piece of music software ─ are evident. with gestures affected during seizing, and feelings of energetic release that burst through during wellness, there is no regular pattern; so i experience an inexplicable, zigzagging existential situation. this is reflected in the changing rhythms of swiqos. epilepsy often involves compromised social identity, despite what neurologists and positive narratives on the illness state. for example, many underestimate the felt and physical effort it takes to be around normed others during seizure and post-seizure periods: the annoyance of stares when i reach into my bag for medication after a seizure on the train; the confusion post-seizure that descends affecting everyday interactions, where strangers sometimes butt in to "correct" me. all these and more have a social cost, which i endure. some of these frustrations are routine repetitions ─ they can be heard as collisions, rhythms, buzzy timbres and intensities in my music. swiqos has identifiable boundaries, locations, transfers, ruptures, places, collisions, senses, repetitions, surprises and affects. trinh minh ha (2011) likens these boundaries and edges to twilight, where people’s identity slips and transforms, where a "dog is taken for a wolf." this is particularly salient for the person with epilepsy who may well understand the instability around subjective and bodily transformation. the temporal boundary animates a problematic for epilepsy, denoting the in-between yet obscured time period between body and mind states. i have framed an appreciation of the electronic music composition process so as to gain understandings of the subject and epilepsy from a different angle. i now turn to the notion of affective 13 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) attachment to place the subject online. affective attachment berlant’s (2011) notion of misrecognition is useful for comprehending the subject caught within the stickiness of the digital economy because it outlines a process where the subject seeks affective ties and attachment as well as perceiving musical meaning. she speaks of optimism in terms of attachment, where the subject compensates for what is difficult in a variety of ways. misrecognition is vital to exploring "the relation" and also to our relation to a "something": “to misrecognize is not to err, but to project qualities onto something so that we can love, hate, and manipulate it for having these qualities – which it might or might not have” (berlant, 2011, p. 122). for berlant, this process is part of shaping an optimistic life, whatever the constraints, and resolving "ambivalence" so that “we are not defeated by it” (p. 122). soundcloud is part of both the culture industry and facilitates connected intersubjective social worlds. in this way, there are multiple points for possible projection and relation, and they occur at distinct temporalities. the time it takes to upload a track, the period over which a collaboration takes place (including shared audio files and messages), the years spent on the platform, new algorithms that enable a piece to be "discovered" and shared (and subsequently buried again). it could be argued that swiqos embodies the temporalities of misrecognition and that it is perhaps the outcome of the spatial processes of attachment. teresa brennan’s (2004) interpretation of misrecognition is one of interlocking fantasies that are physical and grounded in a spatial configuration.6 as a spatial "image," misrecognition is one’s self “image … deflected back to the self from an other, one's ideal image, which also gives one a perspective on oneself” (brennan, 2004, p. 108). both brennan's and berlant’s notion of misrecognition are spatial, but i see brennan’s conceptualization as allowing for growth in embodiment and as a form of the imagination. 14 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) according to brennan (2004), the “force of the imagination is material and physical,” and this can be within the subject or projected outside the self to other "things" (p. 109). in this sense, the interlocking fantasies of misrecognition that are bound up with music and the body can be a desire for a more reliable body, competence within an acoustic network, or connections with other composers or musicians. we may strive to hear our loved thing; or, it may grate on us and grind us down. these fantasies of one’s self, one’s image, and the other also unfold sensorially in electronic music, in the cycles of production and desire within which we can be caught. in thinking about how we accommodate ruptures ─ be that in consciousness or narrative ─ berlant (2011) contends that the “sensual experience of self dissolution, radically reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar” at a remove from both trauma and optimism (p. 44). as we compensate, we produce predictable habits that “defend against losing emotional shape entirely” (berlant, 2011, p. 44), and we wear tracks in our lives. to compensate is to find ways to counteract those things which are challenging, abrasive or unpleasant to living. however, the terms "compensate" and "defend" may not always be appropriate for the subject with epilepsy or mental illness. how does one compensate for seizures that interrupt one’s personal and professional life? if we were to speak of compensating for this radical gap, the very rupture a seizure creates, then i would prefer to do so in the productive sense to which berlant (2011) alludes (in reference to the "production of habits"). it is here i would defend the possibility of music in two senses: 1) as a habit ─ in terms of an everyday practice, as it is one i have felt i have a need to rely on ─ and 2) as a speculative affect. the former may often be interrupted by illness itself, or by doctors who curb the desiring self; the latter is a theoretical and practical tool ripe with possibilities, and therefore able to interrupt discursive configurations. despite the physical, psychic and emotional dimensions of the self that may be threatened during the range of epileptic experience, if there were to be a common thread, it would be in terms of the qualities of 15 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) unpredictability, myoclonic involuntariness, and cyclic irregularity. a subject who is routinely interrupted, even momentarily by "self dissolution," is perhaps more likely to seek temporal chains of compensation, in addition to the need to re-steady and locate her body in the spatial world. this reorientation is often done in the context of particular places among bodies, smells, and more specific or nameable emotions: all up, an affective scene (davidson & milligan, 2007). in what follows, i build on affect and i argue that listening is partially responsible for locating and orienting subjectivities that endure interrupted diurnal narratives and rhythms, not only for epilepsy, but for an ethics of relational media participation. listening online and offline in this section, i outline what it means to listen for epilepsy and whether the concept of listening may open alternatives to dominant linguistic and technological systems. attentiveness to listening as a process may destabilize potentially loaded, rational language and the terms on which ableist stories are told, including those used to soothe and ask questions of patients. in place of dominant medical narratives, we could be listening to the epileptic bodymind as music, tones, textures, and rhythms such as those i have discussed above in combination with musical subjectivities. or we could pay attention to the “sensual operation” of the affective voice with care (kanngieser, 2013, p. 237). in positioning listening in this way, i foreground disabilities ─ in particular, people with neurological and mental illness. i acknowledge the limits of the listening sense as a practice for deaf and hard-of-hearing communities; my inclusion of one modality as a way to attune sensitively to some bodies in the world is exclusionary to others. for jean-luc nancy, listening has its root in subjectivity, and underlies an opened being-to (devisch 2006). nancy’s (2008) work, listening, highlights the tactile and resonant relations amongst the subject and world, and directs attention away from thought in visual form. 16 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) this is a significant and valuable approach for renewing sonorous thinking about both the sound of language and of music itself. sounding is also key to subjectivity and gritten (2014) locates sound-listening in cognitive development as part of “mother-infant interaction”, contending that nancy’s analysis of music helps us to learn to trust each other (p. 26). while gritten assumes a woman in the mothering role (and, presumably, a heteronormative configuration), the role of sound in this relational context should be noted. i shall revisit listening’s promise in terms of how the sonic can assist moral, ethical, and aesthetic contexts in the final section. for now i focus on how nancy (2008) explores the time of the subject as a referral, and in this way investigates how meaning and sound share that time, which is also the time and space of the self: a self is nothing other than a form or function of referral: a self is made of a relationship to self, … and the point of occurrence of a subject in the substantial sense would have never taken place except in the referral, thus in pacing and resonance, at the very most as the dimensionless point of the reof this resonance: the repetition where the sound is amplified and spreads, as well as the turning back [rebroussement] where the echo is made by making itself heard. (p. 25) subjectivity is enfolded with sound and sense. nancy (2008) encourages a listening subject beyond a phenomenological "point of view" insisting that listening is “always still yet to come, spaced, traversed and called by itself, sounded by itself” to a resonance of being (p. 21). key to nancy’s argument is his appropriation of two french verbs from electro-acoustic composer, pierre schaeffer,7 écouter and entendre (kane 2012). écouter denotes “distance and spatial location (where) identifying objects on the basis of their distinguishing sonic characteristics” assists us in situating sound (schaeffer 1966, p. 106, cited in kane 2012, p. 440). this is significant in everyday, embodied sonic scenarios. but in nancy’s (2007) words, écouter becomes an “intensification and a concern, a curiosity or an anxiety” (p. 21). the sensing self listens and “perhaps it is necessary that sense not be content to make sense … but that it also wants to 17 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) resound” (nancy 2008, p. 22). nancy here speaks of entendre, which for schaeffer had been a way to focus on the quality of sounds away from their original contexts.8 nancy (2008) extends entendre, and unfolds a perceiving self-inworld; for him differences in human senses are evidenced by the immense variety in musical shifts across history and genre. his work also “resists re-inscribing a listening subject and a listened to object. instead, the audible appears affirmatively as the perpetual flux of a shared sonorous world” (hickmott, 2015, p. 482). however, a call to listen should not envelop every person in the same way, which a perpetual flux could hide. indeed, a call to listen is dependent upon who is telling whom to listen; it can be redolent of discipline, school, official directives and ─ as nancy (2008) himself points out ─ an imperative to understand or a command to be silent. furthermore, nancy’s work effaces not only sexual difference quite explicitly by using the male pronoun, but also assumes someone who listens with ease of attention and ability at all times. as sarah hickmott (2015) argues, most of nancy’s arguments are based on "great western art music" and are aligned with the conscious will. while his anti-foundational listening space routes dualism differently, it disguises power relations a person with a disability faces during an encounter with the medical establishment, if i am to bring this back to self-in-world. i am also concerned that nancy maps much of his ontology onto the empty womb of venus and he relies on this visual metaphor of the female "belly" “which reduces feminine and maternal sexuality to an ultimately unproductive womb” (hickmott, 2015, p. 488). the resonating womb, the "empty belly" or the "empty vessel", then becomes the reof the above, repeating, spreading sound; the depoliticized, decontextualized feminine form carrying masculine ideas (hickmott, 2015). my own listening is sometimes affected by seizures; remembering or tracking the order and sequence of a verbal message can be difficult; musical listening too can be compromised. i briefly add schaeffer’s (1966) first two listening modes to complete the four to assist with the 18 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) impact epilepsy has on listening in these scenarios. schaeffer’s first word for listening is ouïr. it describes distracted attention to background sound and noise, where everyday sounds pass us by unnoticed; with the second meaning, comprendre, we aim to understand messages from utterances and languages, including "musical grammars" (kane, 2012). comprendre emphasizes listening as understanding, perceiving messages from others and the media. playing in ensembles is a challenge if i "drop out" during the middle of a piece, or an improvisation. the seizure time may be short, up to two minutes, but in returning to the situation i play without entendre (full intention), because i am yet to écouter ─ identify sound objects, and spatially locate with precision my body and the sounds around it, including my fellow musicians. i am for a time submerged, the listening state returned to ouïr, (described by kane (2012) pejoratively as the “least developed” but filtered at a distance (p. 440). for me, having a good rehearsal is not necessarily about disability pride (for example, not caring about my impairment and seeing society as disabled), it does actually depend on whether or not i have a seizure during the real-time flow of musical time. how quickly will the muscles in my embouchure recover so that they will have the flexibility and resilience of the musician i was yesterday.9 am i able to play through all the movements of a mozart duet? will i remain sensitive to other improvisers and acoustic events in a jam session? muscles and consciousness will be affected, but sometimes they are not: therefore, there are inconsistencies in my abilities. however, if i do have a seizure during playing, "i" "keep going" as soon as possible in order to flout biomedical expectations that living with epilepsy leads to “learned helplessness” (hermann, trenerry & colligan, 1996 in bishop & allen, 2007). through listening, i build a multilayered aural picture of myoclonic epilepsy. i now vary the focus to technological concerns, to the music network site soundcloud. 19 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) soundcloud and the digital economy soundcloud is a social media network that allows users to upload audio and share their content with listener followers. listeners follow musicians and those musicians appear in a timeline on the users’ home screen. it spans the globe and hosts a range of musical content in a vast array of styles, from first-time makers to commercial artists. soundcloud is now one of the world’s largest audio media platforms: since launching in 2008, the platform has become renowned for its unique content and features, including the ability to share music and connect directly with artists, as well as unearth breakthrough tracks, raw demos, podcasts and more. this is made possible by an open platform that directly connects creators and their fans across the globe. music and audio creators use soundcloud to both share and monetise their content with a global audience, as well as receive detailed stats and feedback from the soundcloud community (about soundcloud, n.d.). soundcloud has been through many revisions and upgrades, particularly since web 2.0. i have used the platform since 2010, when the promise of "monetizing" content was not in the "about" page. soundcloud is celebrated by many in the music industry, for example, “the platform’s deeply social nature ─ based around following artists, labels, and curators, liking and resharing tracks, and adding comments at specific times within a song’s waveform ─ makes soundcloud feel more personal and interactive than other streaming services” (titlow, 2017). in recent years, when people online heard that soundcloud might fold, there was worry, disappointment and a rush by some to archive the entire site (hagerdoorn 2017)10. as a platform, many music and audio creators use soundcloud to share their audio or in the hope of finding an audience. it now attracts commercial artists with expensive pr campaigns and major label interest. at the outset, co-founders eric wahlforss's and alexander ljung’s ideal target user was the semi-professional artist. as an artist or creator, it was 20 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) easier to find, attract and keep audiences for one’s work when the network was smaller. but the effort to attract new audiences has declined over the years and wahlforss points out that the returns for creators are indeed "marginal" in terms of membership in the network; for him, investing in this demographic is limited: for instance: we always focused very hard on the creators. we still do. but eventually the marginal returns of improving things for creators goes down. except for things that help them expand their reach among listeners. so product wise, i think we’re shifting more towards discovery than other product features. (2017). content made through embodied-technology chains, supplied by creators and uploaded to the cloud adds value to information networks. content supplied in this way is part of an affective network known as digital labor because it benefits, or is exploited by, start-ups or corporations; it is unpaid (terranova, 2004; scholz, 2013; hardt & negri 2004). users on soundcloud are well aware of this, as the community protests every time the platform upgrades to new versions. for example, when soundcloud launched soundcloud go in 2016, there was much negative response from the artist community about the geoblocking of some content. indie musician dave wiskus’s open letter to the start-up also demonstrated this: you’ve been running ads for a while now without paying us. … but now you’re charging people for access to our songs, rolling out the red carpet for the major labels, and saying you’ll get around to us eventually. …so not only are you getting our music for free and paying us nothing, we’re actually paying you to take it. what an excellent deal (meadow, 2016). there are a number of affects projected onto soundcloud by wiskus and, while it may not be possible to conclude whether this is misrecognition, soundcloud and playing music are certainly bound up with his subjectivity. there is disappointment here, and thus something of berlant’s "cruel optimism". and soundcloud co-founders have stated to the tech community that they are not interested in investing in creators 21 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) despite the unique value that community generates (from new music from palestine and nairobi to archives of happy hardcore from the 1990s). in wahlforss’s words: “we rely on a community of audio creators, and that’s something that nobody else has.… and it’s used in so many different ways. it’s less about search and listen. soundcloud is audio that reaches you in various ways” (2017). his language here is very much that of corporate ownership (wahlforss recently stopped the internet archive backing up the network). a listening of the one-to-many. to contrast, a datahoarder user believes that “sites of cultural importance should be constantly archived” indicating a potential listening site for the many-tomany outside of those who "own" (fullouterjoin, 2017). it is ironic that wahlforss and ljung won a european web entrepreneur award in 2013 for their work with soundcloud, with the european commission recognizing their goal to democratize music online beyond this listening experience (european commission, 2013). as jodi dean (2012) puts it, networked media such as soundcloud are a part of “communicative capitalism”, a material-symbolic order that promises limitless opportunity for connection, participation, and contribution. an entrepreneur award from the european commission ─ an established organizational body that acts in europe’s interests with the power to manage eu policies, allocate funding, and discuss international trade ─ recognizing soundcloud through its democratizing, even revolutionary qualities that the early net had is an idealizing of a network that i question. my critique comes from the perspective of a creator participant and i build on this perspective in the next section. affective attachment and disappointment can power ─ or stimulate ─ the need to produce and therefore enlist digital labor, keeping the net afloat with audio content. this is also about desire, making the "object or scene powerful enough to have magnetized an attachment to it" and involves relations of proximity and approximate exchange (berlant, 2011, p. 48). an example is the soundcloud groups feature, which the platform terminated in 2016 amid much community protest. over the years, i participated in several groups. in an ocean of content, groups were a way 22 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) for like-minded creators to find each other, listen, perhaps collaborate and comment with respect. a user moderates a group, but there is a possibility among many user-members to exchange material that ends up in a new work. i considered this most valuable, for example, see my remix of flautist andrew bishop, repeater (chilianis 2013). although the groups, australian experimental music or the flute group do not exist now, the comments by three others and myself were made while the piece was shared to these groups. in this way, soundcloud acted as a kind of “promise”, and as subjects in a network we perhaps leaned “toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter” (berlant 2007, 33). the encounter is a sonic, communicative one. during these times, soundcloud enabled me, sometimes very quickly, to show work to collaborators located in spatially distant areas and continents, i shared fragments of sonic work to installations overseas, it functioned as a portfolio when applying to calls for work, and i have enjoyed listening to musicians i would not otherwise have heard. when wahlforss and ljung removed the group function, i noted the social media outcry against it. sam bartee (2016) a group moderator argues that: soundcloud claims that groups are ineffective in growing an audience. on the contrary, groups are one of the few remaining ways to grow an audience if the music you create isn’t mainstream. i can personally confirm this, as my audience growth has been almost exclusively through groups, rather than curated playlists, reposts or other methods. i have tried these, but there simply isn’t an audience large enough for these methods to work (bartee, 2016). along with bartee, most of my small audience (186 followers) grew several years ago when i was a member of a few groups. but there are other factors that impact audience growth, such as changes to the interface (many users objected to changes in interface, thus impacting the listening experience), whether listeners in other countries have access to your work (geoblocking), and anti-piracy algorithms. over the last few years my initial involvement with soundcloud diminished when the 23 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) network grew too big to be meaningful for me. a search for particular genres, subcultures or experimental music was less likely to yield results and more likely to return the generic search of the day. in other words, soundcloud’s “discovery” algorithms overrode a manual search keyed to creators’ tags. additionally, many of my followers, particularly those who were experimental musicians or composers were now rarely active, perhaps also discouraged by these features. individuals have their own many and varied listening and affective relationships to digital music. this article is not an empirical study of the differing depths to which people listen online; however, i argue that there is a distinction between wahlforss and ljung’s discourse and the economic purpose for the platform on the one hand, and the subjectivization of an individual through online sonic media, on the other. for example, sean cubitt (2013) states that “a traditional condition of subjectivity is awareness of the relations one has entered into. such awareness may not be a property of immersion into social networks” (p. 76). while that may be the traditional view, there are more relational views of subjectivity more in accord with minority identities. for example, wendy brown (2005) argues, the neoliberal body politic is not seen as a body, rather, as a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers. this occurs even if we are expecting something akin to "community" voice or a listening public. therefore, it is somewhat of a fallacy that social media is conceived of as a democratic space or publics, as it embodies the values and logic of neoliberalism. even when recognition seems possible, it is “only on the terms that govern a competitive market of appearances” (couldry, 2010, p. 131). bodyminds feel and sense, and music and sound can be vital to subjectivity, but this subjectivity is not immune to appropriation in entrepreneurial terms. it is time to grapple with the idea of multiplicity, multiple others breathing and sensing. 24 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) the role of listening in ethical configurations to begin at the smallest scale, listening on soundcloud occurs through a network where one is connected by one’s followers and those whom one follows. kate crawford (2012), who likens listening online to paying attention, investigates the ways individuals share ─ or withhold ─ to social media with a variety of listening stances. i can listen to other artists with attentiveness, sometimes i take notes on a composition and give feedback or a review, i send the musician a message; or i can listen distractedly akin to flicking through television channels. i am open to the newness of the music or sonic world presented to me, or i am not. then there is the entire (always unfinished) acoustic field soundcloud, a possibility made of listeners inhabiting a condition of plurality and intersubjectivity (lacey, 2013). this is seen as valuable by music bloggers, reviewers, and record labels in addition to soundcloud. however a more detailed investigation is necessary in order to grasp the flows and surges in power. a wider notion of listening encompasses social and economic inequalities. through listening, i invite multiple voices, non-traditional narratives, and unusual ways of being to participate in an acoustic sphere. i highlight the temporal implication of human and technological interdependence. i now conceptualize the singular disabled body as part of the “social fabric” where “individuals’ and social groups’ senses of time and possibility are shaped by a differential economy, limited or expanded by the ways and means that they find themselves in and out of time” (sharma, 2014, p. 3). for, the vagaries and multiple tempi of chronic illness lend the possibility of understanding vulnerability in others. the quality of this understanding involves limits, and to understand “the limits of ‘knowing’, ‘understanding’, and ‘acknowledging’ others is to render a disposition of humility and generosity” (butler, 2005, p. 53). as judith butler (2005) says: as we ask to know the other, or ask that the other say, finally or definitively, who he or she is, it will be important not to expect an 25 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) answer that will ever satisfy. by not pursuing satisfaction and by letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other live, since life might be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of it. if letting the other live is part of any ethical definition of recognition then this version of recognition will be based less on knowledge than on an apprehension of epistemic limits. (butler, 2005, p. 53) i believe these epistemic limits can be approached, not by an immersive overflowing sense of listening, but through listening in a register that is somewhat filtered. despite claims that sound is allimmersive, sound is also locative and we can face toward another’s account, should they wish to give it. this kind of listening may take the form of “a willingness to acknowledge the limits of acknowledgement itself” (butler, 2005, p. 53). there can be different qualities of listening, as nancy and crawford attest. i do not propose that the listening register i am thinking of here is the same as a fan’s moving and “soulful” experience (van maas, 2012), but i suggest that we can recognize the other by curbing the master "i" and even the cognition, momentarily. for me, this kind of listening is sometimes most possible after the "i" is interrupted by a single seizure or during "wait time" before doctors’ appointments. i am more aware of unfair labor practices, i hear the disrespect in an escalator boss’s voice when he shouts to his older worker, i imagine populations who work in electronics factories in china and workers on undersea cables. while there are certainly limits to a listening stance that engages with others in the global media and technological labor force, i argue it is possible to listen for the temporalities that constrain diverse, mostly outsourced, populations from call center workers, to iphone factory workers, to those who work on internet infrastructure, or in western countries, to the working poor or those seeking more employment in the west. i am mindful of sarah sharma’s (2014) intertwining of temporalities and power relations, which “must be set again and again. they are expected to recalibrate and fit into a larger temporal order” (p. 8). 26 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) listening means i am willing to face toward the other, to listen to accounts of debility, exhaustion, overwork, underwork, and social difference with an openness; to understand, partially, that some others slow while many speed. as a result, certain labor forces suffer from changed posture, long-term pain, poisoning, accidents ─ including death ─ that result in disability. in these situations, illness and debility can become the new norm in entire working populations (puar, 2009). i discussed the notion of the temporal boundary in my own music above as it related to my bodily changes. here a temporal boundary points to a class separation between those whose time matters and those whose time does not. an example of people for whom time matters is international business people who demand taxi drivers drive fast to the airport through peak hour (sharma, 2014). the body is inherent in listening equations to the extent that it interacts and senses human interdependence. it is this sensitive-ear, attuned as much to atmosphere (brennan 2004) as to online networks, which enables imaginary publics in diverse geo-locations. bîrneanu, alexiu, baciu, sandvin and fylling (2016) conducted research “in timiş county, in order to explore the ‘lived’ experiences of 24 people with disabilities both from cities and countryside regarding problematic aspects of disability or community/economic factors likely to influence the disabled person’s status on the labor market” (p. 57). although this discourse from a romanian ethnography appears to see people with a disability as a “problem” in relation to the economy, the researchers do unpack parental and career opinions regarding the limitations of what it is like to live in isolated rural areas with a lack of access to medical treatment (bîrneanu et al. 2016). a further consideration is how the nation is conceptualizing some of the guiding principles of disability around educational and workplace inclusion, as received from the united nations and unesco charters. i believe it is important to be aware of concepts of disability outside of the west, and i only touch the surface here. there are two limitations to what i have called my listening imaginary: 1) butler’s epistemological reserve regarding the limits of "acknowledgement", and 27 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) 2) during times of prolonged ill-health i am more vulnerable. thus it is challenging to maintain this particular "feminist stance." a more general listening, tactile sensitivity is possible. conclusion in this article i have focused on epilepsy, musical subjectivity, and affective attachment on the one hand, and the musical network, soundcloud and digital labor on the other. i have brought these two perspectives together through attention to listening, which has allowed me to subvert linear narrative to some extent. linear and traditional narratives are not necessarily appropriate for epilepsy and other sporadic or episodic illness which present interruptive and non-linear qualities. the experience of the epileptic seizure and the subject’s compromised "felt self" during that time allow for a poetics of attachment associated with electronic musical play and, initially, an engagement with soundcloud. i often seek compensation through music for the sudden "loss of control" caused by an unpredictable flow of electrons. by listening out for the discontinuity and fragmentation with which the subject lives, we may be able to gauge an uncomfortable sense of "dis-ease" that is called for when thinking of the many. for it is through attention to rhythms, shifts, and swerves in music that we may become attuned to these temporal variances and collisions in multiple subjectivities. while soundcloud promises global reach and the possibility of "direct connections" or even money as a platform, it cannot offer this equally to every user. in the case presented here, a small array of sonicaural connections do exist, and music sharing, occasional collaborations, remixes and genuine comments also occur, suggesting an intimate sonic publics. i also listen on soundcloud and follow many people from different continents. in this way, especially with small-scale artists, i enact a listening beyond the (epileptic) body, in order to imagine the body in the internet. this is not an unproblematic stance (since this is bound up in digital labor), but it is a starting point for exploring musical participation. 28 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) musical participation online is complex and needs further investigation, particularly around the area of illness and disability. i am thinking about the multiple routes sonic information takes within a listening public and the meaning that is made by others. from a critical perspective, it may not be possible to control soundcloud's production process, including the means and outcomes of media production (for which christian fuchs (2016) argues we should aim). as a musician and epileptic i can be critically reflexive about online listening; i can also withdraw. modes of listening take many forms (nancy, 2008) ─ in both onand offline spheres ─ and while there are so many sounds that catch us, patterning back and forth, passing us by, hooking into our attention, our desire, interacting with the other senses, we may, in the midst of the network, turn our listening ear toward an other. i imagine a practice, habit, or culture that is more striated and accommodating for the multiple temporalities of disability and illness. notes 1 https://soundcloud.com/melchil/swiqos. retrieved 27 march 2017 2 digital audio workstation or daw as these applications seem to be referred to. 3 in daw the emphasis is on ‘workflow’, ‘control’, and knowhow. 4 i have generalised idiopathic epilepsy, which denotes that the cause is unknown and that the epileptiform activity arises from all parts of the brain. my generalised tonic clonic (grand mal) seizures are ‘controlled’ on medication. i have myoclonic seizures monthly to daily. 5 the exception is groups on social media, such as facebook, where people with epilepsy are members. they may discuss recent seizures or the side effects of medication. i do not discount such groups; i only wish to describe another phenomenon. 6 based on lacan’s mirror stage: “lacan caught its nature in the mirrorphase or moment when the subject has an image of itself in the eye of the other.” (brennan, 2004, p. 108). 29 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) 7 schaeffer had four verbs for listening. 1) ouïr, 2) comprendre, 3) écouter & 4) entendre as i will elaborate below. 8 for a discussion about how schaeffer and nancy’s use of the french verbs differ, see kane 2015 in martin scherzinger ed. music in contemporary philosophy, 2015. 9 embouchure refers to the way the mouth and facial muscles are used to play a wind instrument. the muscles around the mouth and lips form a shape to allow air flow. sound resonates in the body of the flute and the body of the player. 10 see also discussion on datahoarder group: https://www.reddit.com/r/datahoarder/comments/6oisam/soundcloud_s aid_no_a_call_to_arms/ & archiveteam https://www.reddit.com/r/archiveteam/comments/6ohytf/soundcloud_req uests_the_internet_archive_cease/ references about soundcloud (n.d.). retrieved from https://soundcloud.com/pages/contact ahmed, s. 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(pp. xx37 chilianis catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) xx). milton park: routledge. wood, m. e. (2013). life writing and schizophrenia: encounters at the edge of meaning. amsterdam, nl: rodopi. van dongen, e., & reis, r. (2001). chronic illness: struggle and challenge. medical anthropology: cross cultural studies in health and illness, 19(4), 293-297. barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, nc: duke university press. bio melanie chilianis is a composer and independent scholar from melbourne, australia. she has work permanently (commissioned) in the goldcoast exhibition centre audiovisual alcove and her solo sound installation days of our lives was represented in contemporary composition: from avant-garde to experimental curated by stéphanie kabanyana kanyandekwe in now hear this, part of melbourne now at the national gallery of victoria. her acoustic compositions have been performed and broadcast live on abc-fm (australia) and radio 3 (national radio, italy). she holds a doctor of philosophy in film and communication studies where she explored the concept of the epileptic body through electronic music. she published an encyclopaedia entry on drum’n’bass music in australia, co-authored an article on children’s engagement in art and music (australian art education), and presented at the first sound:gender:feminism:activism symposium in london (creative research into sound arts practice, london college of communication). melanie’s sound work mcvox, published by winchester university press, is archived in the british library. her recent electronic and electroacoustic music explores the tension between interruption and a desire for continuity. melanie currently collaborates with iranian composer and santour player atefeh einali. microsoft word 71502-1-11_vandewiel.docx van de wiel, l. (2018) prenatal imaging: egg freezing, embryo selection and the visual politics of reproductive time. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-35. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © lucy van de wiel. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license ` article prenatal imaging: egg freezing, embryo selection and the visual politics of reproductive time lucy van de wiel university of cambridge lvdw2@cam.ac.uk abstract in the last decade, two influential new reproductive technologies have been introduced that are changing the face of in vitro fertilization (ivf): egg freezing for “fertility preservation” and time-lapse embryo imaging for embryo selection. with these technologies emerge alternative visual representations of the assisted reproductive process and its relation to time. first, frozen egg photographs provide a lens onto contemporary reconfigurations of reproductive aging and stage a life-death dyad between the frozen cell and the embodied self, which drives treatment rationales for egg freezing. second, time-lapse embryo imaging creates visual recordings of developing embryos in the incubator; the resultant quantified visual information can then be repurposed as a tool for predicting embryo viability. as these two sets of prenatal images reference dying eggs and non-viable embryos, they demonstrate a necropolitics of reproductive time, in which not only the generativity of new life but also the encounter with the death, finitude and fallibility of reproductive substances drives a widespread and intensified engagement with reproductive technologies. 2 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) introduction in the second half of the twentieth century, prenatal life became visually recognisable in the grey flurries of fetal ultrasound, the stylized photography of fetal remains and the iconic scene of fertilization by micro-injection of a sperm into an egg cell.1 prenatal images play a key role in shaping reproductive experiences such as pregnancy or in vitro fertilization (ivf) and have gained symbolic significance as they circulate beyond the clinic into advertisements, political campaigns and popular culture at large (franklin, 1993). feminist scholarship as well as science and technology studies (sts) have drawn attention to the importance of reproductive imaging in the cultural imagination of the reproductive process. technologies such as ultrasound and fetal photography have all been highly significant not only in visualizing prenatal life, but in reconceptualizing the reproductive process itself, the gendered bodies involved in this process and the temporal structures that govern them (duden, 1993b; franklin, 2014; petchesky, 1987). now, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, two influential new reproductive technologies have emerged that offer alternative representations of the assisted reproductive process and its relation to time. firstly, egg freezing, the popular “fertility preservation” technology, produces photomicrographs of frozen eggs that reference a period of ongoing cryopreservation. secondly, “time-lapse embryo imaging,” an ivf embryo screening technology, relies on the visual analysis of the developing embryos in the incubator. both egg freezing and time-lapse embryo imaging are recent, and rapidly-adopted, innovations in assisted reproduction that engage cellular time by instrumentalizing, respectively, the temporal plasticity and developmental regularity of prenatal life. the visual mediations of cellular life that these technologies produce bring the extracorporeal reproductive process into view. although the assisted reproductive process has ceased to be located 3 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) exclusively inside the female body since the advent of ivf four decades ago, the recent popularization of egg freezing for fertility preservation and time-lapse embryo imaging for embryo selection has routinized the visualization of an originary ex vivo component of the individual reproductive process.2 beyond "in vitro fertilisation (ivf), the in vitro cryopreservation of eggs and the in vitro incubation of embryos have become the subject of representation and reproductive decision-making. through the analysis of us and uk case studies of photomicrography3 of frozen eggs and time-lapse videos of developing embryos, i will make the case that these twenty-first-century visual mediations of early, extracorporealized prenatal life reconfigure the reproductive process in line with shifting treatment rationales that underlie an ongoing expansion of ivf and its industries. i do so through a cultural analysis4 of these new reproductive images, which hitherto remained hidden from the intended parent but are now routinely shared. the first case study revolves around the photomicrographs of frozen eggs. egg freezing has become a widely influential reproductive technology in the last decade. an increasing number of fertility clinics offer the procedure and the possibility of freezing eggs has been widely covered in public debates, popular culture and academic literature (carroll & kroløkke, 2018; jackson, 2017; van de wiel, 2014a). now that frozen eggs may continue to exist for extended periods of time outside the body, cellular photography of ova becomes a means for relating to them while they remain in the freezer. with a close reading of the frozen egg’s photomicrograph, i will analyse how the discursive practices and apparatuses of imaging that frame the frozen eggs reconceptualize and repoliticize reproductive time in cells and bodies alike. time-lapse embryo imaging, the second case study, attracted national media attention when it was introduced in the uk in 2013 and has been heavily promoted by fertility clinics in britain and across the globe as an alternative, and more advanced, form of embryo selection. time-lapse embryo imaging systems integrate incubators and cameras to create time-lapse videos of developing embryos. these systems can 4 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) observe and record temporal developmental markers (e.g., the timing of cell division), which provide the basis for a predictive viability assessment of the embryos. time-lapse embryo imaging is rapidly being adopted in fertility clinics around the world and is changing clinical and research practices. emerging in the wake of an increasingly public visual interface with prenatal life, the visualization of cellular development in time-lapse embryo videos adds yet another visual dimension to the encounter with early human life on screen. time-lapse imaging also introduces a novel instrumentalization of cellular time, given that temporal markers — rather than static morphology — of embryo development become the basis for selection. both of these imaging technologies introduce new, individualized representations of prenatal development which provide a foundation for reimagining the reproductive process and the temporalities that govern it. by visualizing frozen eggs and developing embryos in the context of the fertility clinic, these imaging technologies bring the ex vivo component of the assisted reproductive process into view. once outside the body, the time of cellular stasis or cellular development can align with patients’ reproductive goals of extending fertility or predicting viability. in turn, the suggested possibilities of cryopreserving fertility and assessing embryo viability harness reproductive futures to expand the indications for fertility treatment in contemporary ivf. first, egg freezing can expand the group of potential ivf patients as an infertility treatment for the fertile population to avoid future infertility. second, time-lapse embryo imaging expands ivf by adding extra treatment options for each treatment cycle to avoid future failed implantations. the future-oriented treatment logics underlying this expansive drive can be analysed through a close reading of the visual mediations of eggs and embryos that co-emerge with the rising popularity of egg freezing for fertility preservation and time-lapse embryo imaging for embryo selection. this paper, then, explores the entanglements of embodied, technological, cellular and capital temporalities in twenty-first-century visual cultures of assisted reproduction to analyse the treatment rationales underlying the expansion 5 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) of contemporary ivf. freezing eggs, freezing time in the last decade, egg freezing has become an increasingly popular reproductive technology for women who would like to have the possibility of having genetically-related children later on in life. particularly the use of egg freezing to circumvent age-related infertility has received widespread attention both within the fertility sector and in wider public discourses (inhorn, 2017; jackson, 2017). as what is effectively an ivf procedure with a period of cryostorage between egg extraction and fertilization, egg freezing introduces an alternative temporal organization of the reproductive process. instead of the conventional nine months, the duration between ovulation and a potential birth may be stretched, while the act of extracting and freezing eggs itself can be framed as a first step in an ivf cycle that may lead to future live births (van de wiel, 2014b). yet what makes egg freezing a unique reproductive technology is that it does not seek to create a “take-home baby” in the first instance but is instead organized around the continuation of reproductive potentiality, or fertility.5 the resultant cryopreserved fertility is more temporally flexible; it is frequently framed as “extended fertility” (mohapatra, 2014) and shifts existing temporal limits to childbearing and conception. with the temporal plasticity of freezable eggs — and the reproductivity and fertility associated with them — emerges a new temporal politics of reproduction. scholars of reproduction have situated egg freezing within broader conflicting societal pressures on women’s life course management. in making parents, us sociologist charis thompson (2005) highlights challenges of synchronization between different bureaucratic, cyclical, social and biological time scales of the fertility clinic, in which the temporal structures of the working day, the menstrual cycle, cellular developmental rhythms and age norms pertaining to childbearing meet (pp. 111–112). following thompson, australian sociologist catherine waldby (2015) suggests that women use egg 6 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) freezing to reconcile the “otherwise incommensurable differences between the time scale of their reproductive biology, the steadily elongating nature of the life course and the increasingly iterative structure of portfolio careers and relationship formation” (p. 479). several feminist scholars, such as cattapan, hammond, haw and tarasoff (2014), have argued that egg freezing is an expensive and risky procedure that provides an individualist solution to structural social issues that result in later childbearing (p. 239). these include labor-related provisions of parental leave and childcare as well as class-specific patterns in relationship formation (carbone & cahn, 2013; inhorn, 2017). in responding to external social pressures on women, the growing popularity of egg freezing also reflects the production of new temporal regimes that govern the management of embodied female reproductivity throughout the life course. when presumably fertile women can preemptively undergo infertility treatment, the biomedicalization of infertility begins to extend to the fertile life course.6 conversely, egg freezing is also often framed as a means of mitigating the “biological clock” (wyndham, figueira, & patrizio, 2012) and thereby suggests that fertility can be extended to the infertile life course. through this double movement, cryopreservation enables the overlapping of fertile and infertile life courses in new ways, resulting in a state of what we may refer to as “postfertility.” this is not to say that the categories of fertility and infertility have become obsolete — quite the contrary. rather, these categories are mobilized in new ways and begin to signify through one another when infertility is lived in the fertile life phase and fertility is positioned as extending beyond pre-existing reproductive age limits. as a consequence, fertility becomes an increasingly uncertain, and precarious, referent. as both fertility and infertility become indications for treatment to, respectively, preserve or achieve reproduction, egg freezing poses new questions about the agency that may be exerted over timing reproduction. combined, the possibility of egg freezing simultaneously produces the suggestion of increased agency and increased uncertainty about the ongoingness of reproductive potential.7 in a context of a rapidly 7 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) expanding fertility sector — projected to grow to $21 billion worldwide by 2020 (maida, 2016) — egg freezing presents new opportunities for creating consumer need pertaining both to making fertility legible and exerting agency over its relation to time. as the possibility of egg freezing becomes the occasion for interpellating large groups of presumably fertile women to consider “extending fertility,” it becomes necessary to reflect critically on the entanglement of cultural and clinical processes that reconceptualize reproductive time in the production of treatment rationales for this new reproductive technology. one cultural-clinical object in which these processes coalesce is the visual representation of the frozen egg, which provides a case study for reflecting on the reproductive futures, pasts and presents that animate influential treatment rationales for egg freezing. the frozen egg image follows a rich history of reproductive imaging in which both the visualization of prenatal life — in ultrasound, in ivf, in fetal photography — and the temporal logic it represents have been adopted to rationalize and politicize the reproductive process. perhaps the most influential example of this is the use of ultrasound imaging technology and fetal photography in anti-abortion rhetoric, which appealed specifically to fetal developmental time to limit access to abortion.8 much as the visible fetus was ascribed autonomy and independence, so scientific images of gametes (sperm and eggs) play a key role in contemporary imaginations of reproduction that position gametes as autonomous protagonists in an origin story of disembodied cellular fusion (lie, 2012; 2015). given the temporal plasticity of cells that can be stopped and started at will in tissue culture (landecker, 2007), the recognition of the cellularity of the human reproductive process suggests that it, too, can be temporally manipulated through techniques of cryopreservation. the iconic image that epitomizes human agency vis-àvis reproductive cells is the fertilization of an egg in ivf, which, as us social scientist sarah franklin (2013) demonstrates in biological relatives, has been instrumental in shifting popular understandings of the reproductive process (p. 249). 8 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) by focusing on the photomicrography of frozen eggs in particular, we can examine the temporal dimension of the visual politics of reproductive time in the context of egg freezing. i will analyse how the image of the cryopreserved egg expresses divergent constructions of temporality in the cell and in the reproductive body of the “self,” which in turn animate influential treatment rationales that align with new modes of biomedicalizing female reproductivity and fertility. in doing so, i draw attention to both the specificity of the photographic medium and the object depicted in the image in order to highlight their significance for the reframing of reproductive time in egg freezing practices. one new type of prenatal imagery emerging with this reproductive technology is the photograph of the frozen egg. women who freeze their eggs may receive photographic images of the cells they have cryopreserved after their procedure. on her blog about her “egg freezing process,” a woman using the online alias “eggfreezer” includes one such picture. she decided to freeze her eggs to, in her own words, “beat my biological clock, [and] have kids even when my reproductive system would have it some other way” (eggfreezer, 2008a). her blog documents her experience of the procedure over the course of several months on the blogspot platform. she concluded her account of the egg freezing process with a post that included a picture of her frozen egg and the following text: here is an actual egg from my retrieval .… this egg was inside me (in a premature state) for 32 years — even before i took my own first breath as a newborn. had i not had the retrieval, this egg would have just never developed and died off last month— just another one of the many millions that die off over a woman's lifetime. instead, through modern medicine, it was able to be matured and extracted and it is now quite literally frozen in time alongside 27 others, potentially to be the starting building block of a future human being .… this is the tie — the everything and anything that is what a woman prefers when she wants “her own” biological baby. whatever it is that she wants — what i want — it’s 9 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) in there. part of me is in there. (eggfreezer, 2008b) more than a diagnostic image, or a souvenir of the procedure, the photograph of the frozen egg that is “now quite literally frozen in time” functions as a reference point for eggfreezer to consolidate her conceptualization of both the cryopreserved cell and her embodied self. when eggfreezer uses the image of the frozen egg to conceptualize her reproductivity, the image becomes a form of what us art historian amelia jones calls “self-imaging: the rendering of the self in and through technologies of representation” (2006, p. xvii). rather than reflecting the self’s appearance, the egg photograph presents a cellular temporality which allows a rendering of the self in relation to time. regarding the temporal dynamics of self-imaging, jones theorises “self-portrait photography as a technology of embodiment” that stages an engagement with “the fact of the aging and inevitable death of the subject” (jones, 2002, p. 972). she reasons that the photograph is a sign of the passing of time, of the fact that what we see in the shiny surface of the photographic print no longer exists as we see it: it is a sign, again, of our inexorable mortality as well as, paradoxically, an always failed means of resecuring our hope of having the photographed subject “live forever.” (2006, p. 46) jones reads the photograph’s “frozen time” as a sign of passing time: it is a visual confrontation between the photographed moment that “no longer is” and the moment currently inhabited by the viewer. the resultant temporal distance between the past depicted in the photograph and the present moment of observation, she suggests, becomes an extendable principle that includes a future in which we will have changed, in which we — and those depicted — will fail to live forever. in this reading of the photograph as not simply an image of the past, but as a temporal relation that incorporates the past and the present while extending into the future, photography marks a confrontation with finitude. jones develops her argument in dialog with peggy phelan’s (1997) mourning sex, which argues that the still image of the photograph 10 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) “serves both to ‘conjure’ the moment, the scene in which the photograph was taken, and to take the moment out of time, [...] to give it a new temporal logic” (p. 157). the significance of this new temporal relation between the frozen image and the living subject, jones argues, follows from the use of photography as a “technology of embodiment.” jones contends that the subject performs “herself or himself within the purview of an apparatus of perspectival looking that freezes the body as representation and so — as absence, as always already dead — in intimate relation to lack and loss” (2002, p. 949). in this way, photography functions as a technology of embodiment that points to the finitude of the living, embodied subject.9 jones develops her thought following french theorist roland barthes’s reflection on mourning and photography in camera lucida. occupied with the death of his mother, barthes (1981) writes: “in front of the photograph of my mother as a child, i tell myself: she is going to die: i shudder … over a catastrophe which has already occurred. whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe” (p. 96). the photograph’s catastrophe follows from its “anterior future”: the image presents a past moment that tells of a future that has already passed at the time of viewing (barthes, 1981, p. 96). in its resistance to releasing the moment into the past, the photograph “induces belief that it is alive … but by shifting this reality to the past (‘this-has-been’), the photograph suggests that it is already dead” (barthes, 1981, p. 79). the catastrophe thus lies in the “arrest of aliveness, which simultaneously foreshadows the terminal arrest of death”; the photograph captures the tension between the two temporalities of aliveness and arrest (yusoff, 2007, p. 222). the photograph of the egg is poised at the tension between aliveness and arrest. the egg in this photograph is framed as an element of a redistributed reproductive embodiment that eggfreezer recognises as “part of me,” even if it is stored in the freezer. jones’s approach to photography as a “technology of embodiment,” in which multiple temporalities meet, speaks directly to eggfreezer’s use of the egg’s 11 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) photograph to imagine the temporal relations between the cell, its reproductive potential and her embodied self. time is at the forefront of this photograph, which depicts an egg that has been extracted because of its vulnerability to the passage of time and is now reframed as “literally frozen in time” (eggfreezer, 2008b). this framing suggests that the photograph’s “frozen moment” here does not primarily reference the slippage of a moment of the embryological examination of the extracted cell in the past (barthes’s “this-has-been”), but rather signifies the frozen state of the egg characterized by the arrested cellular time in the present (“this-is”). as the frozen moment of the photograph depicts the frozen state of the egg, this photograph presents an alternative temporal logic to the photographs theorized by barthes and jones. rather than a “sign of the passing of time” that is a “failed means … of having the photographed subject ‘live forever’” (jones, 2006, p. 46), the photograph references a cell whose existence in time is seen to be halted and may thereby maintain its viability. the frozen egg “induces belief that it is alive” without “shifting this reality to the past” (barthes, 1981, p. 79); the cell’s arrested time thereby does not foreshadow death but is framed as having a futural orientation that promises both its own latent aliveness and its future reproductive potential. the photograph of the egg thus becomes a sign of an ex vivo reproductivity that is not subject to the passage of time; this circumventing of reproductive finitude through cryopreservation is at the heart of the promise of egg freezing practices. given that the image depicts the arrested present rather than the past moment, while the egg is frozen, the photograph is “live” — in a sense analogous to the “live” broadcast of moving images and in keeping with the latent life recognized in the frozen egg. the photograph is not “live” in the sense of simultaneous recording and broadcasting, but rather it is live because the photographic trace of the past depicts a “this is,” or a “still now,” in which the time of observation matches the time of cryopreservation while the egg remains in the freezer. as a counterpart of the finitude associated with the passage of time both in the body and in 12 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) the photograph, this state of being “literally frozen in time” becomes an affirmation of continued reproductivity. while the egg’s image affirms the aliveness of arrested time, in the confrontation with this image eggfreezer directs the work of mourning mortality to the site of the body: “had i not had the retrieval, this egg would have just never developed and died off last month” (eggfreezer, 2008b). a reversal of barthes’s anterior future, the image of the in vitro cryopreserved egg signifies its aliveness in the present while eggfreezer invokes an in vivo past of the egg in which it is “going to die” and would have been “already dead” at the time of writing (barthes, 1981, p. 96). with the cryopreserved egg functioning as a foil for her body, eggfreezer suggests the female body becomes the site of the incessant dying of “many millions” of eggs “over a woman’s lifetime” in a process that culminates in the finitude of age-related infertility. in this model, the salvaging of eggs and their preservation in the freezer rescues them from the aging body “through modern medicine” (eggfreezer, 2008b). however, there is no particular reason to assume that this specific egg would have “died off last month” if she had not “had the retrieval.” the egg may have stayed with her for several more years; it could have ovulated in the future; there is even a slight possibility that this very egg could have been fertilized in vivo without medical intervention. rather than a medical fact, the invoked imminent death of the photographed egg is a narrative device that stages a charged life-death dyad between the frozen cell and the embodied self, which drives the rationale for egg freezing. as sarah franklin and celia roberts (2006) observe in born and made, the notion that the egg was saved “through modern medicine” is a trope so familiar that it is expressed in the term assisted reproductive technologies. in eggfreezer’s case, it is not assistance with reproducing at present, but rather assistance with shifting reproductive time that egg freezing affords. landecker observes that “the ability to freeze, halt or suspend life” as “an infrastructural element of contemporary biotechnology” results in a situation in which “to be biological, alive, 13 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) cellular, also means (at present) to be a potential ‘age chimaera,’ to be suspendable, interruptible, storable, freezable in parts” (2007, p. 228). eggfreezer’s account presents a negotiation with the implications of becoming freezable in parts. with reference to the photograph of the frozen egg, eggfreezer positions the egg as the locus of a continued reproductivity “frozen in time,” analogous to the way in which the photographed moment is congealed in time. however, in this move, the visualization of the alternative temporal logic of the egg’s continued existence functions as a technology of embodiment that positions the female reproductive body as the site of finitude. as a consequence, paradoxically, through the temporal specificity of the imaging process that references the continuity of “latent life,” it is the mortality and finitude of the body that become increasingly visible (radin, 2013).10 the process of egg freezing, then, produces prenatal images that mediate reproductive time in new ways. the temporal specificity of the photograph of the egg affirms the notion that eggfreezer can “beat [her] biological clock” and freeze reproductive time, much like the image freezes the time of the photographed moment. the temporal distance between the depicted moment and the moment of observation, in turn, reinforces the finitude of embodied fertility. the frozen egg’s photograph thus aligns with a treatment rationale that motivates egg freezing through this dynamic between a suggestion of technologically mediated agency and embodied loss related to reproductive aging. this visual reframing of reproductive time in egg freezing practices thus results in a life-death dyad in which the cell continues living, while the self from whom it was taken becomes the locus of mortality. this points to an implicit necropolitics of reproduction, in which the temporalextension of reproductive potential afforded in the egg freezing procedure, and its recognition in the image of the frozen egg, hinges upon the construction of embodied reproductive loss and in vivo egg death. the politics of the popular emphasis on egg death follows from the privileging of the foil of future infertility over concerns about the biomedicalization of female fertility, pre-emptive overtreatment, physical 14 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and financial risk, reification of a gendered reproductive imperative and the dependencies produced through the reframing of reproductive potential as requiring ongoing monitoring, treatment and capital investment. the spectre of preventable finitude characterizes a broader “shift from current reactive treatments … to the proactive management of lifelong reproductive potential” exemplified not only in egg freezing but similarly in new processes of embryo selection (beim et al., 2017). time-lapse embryo imaging whereas egg freezing is a technology for extending the reproductive process and prolonging the time of fertility by slowing down cellular time to cryopreserved stasis, time-lapse embryo imaging is a technology for speeding up the reproductive process and shortening the time to socalled “ivf success” by selecting the “best” embryo on the basis of its temporal development. hailed by some as the most significant development in ivf in decades (walsh, 2013), time-lapse embryo imaging is a novel technology for embryo selection that uses visual analysis to assess embryo viability. since 2013, it has been widely promoted in the uk and global sales of the major time-lapse device manufacturer have increased with each quarter (vitrolife, 2017). in ivf procedures, embryos develop in incubators for three to five days after fertilization before being implanted. embryologists traditionally remove the embryos from the incubator on a daily basis to check their development under the microscope and decide which embryos to transfer to the woman’s body. in time-lapse embryo imaging systems, the embryos remain in the incubator for the entire incubation period and are instead photographed every five to twenty minutes. these images are collated and accelerated in time-lapse videos that show fertilized eggs splitting into two cells, shaking like liquid bubbles, and dividing into a compact embryonic cell mass. by comparing the observable characteristics of an incubated cohort of embryos — such as the timing of cell divisions — to historical 15 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) embryo populations that have resulted in live births, time-lapse embryo systems are used to predict which embryos will be “viable” or “nonviable.” in spite of a cochrane review suggesting that the current evidence of increased live birth rates is too limited to justify the routine adoption of this technology (armstrong et al., 2015), time-lapse imaging systems have been rapidly introduced in fertility clinics across the globe.12 notwithstanding the efficacy of this method, its particular entanglement of imaging and reproductive processes reframes the figure of the observable, viable embryo through the distribution and rhetorical framing of time-lapse videos. at first sight, time-lapse embryo imaging does not seem to be a novel technology at all. contemporary developmental biology uses several more advanced and detailed time-based visual technologies for studying embryos than time-lapse embryo imaging. for example, laser scanning microscopy (lsm) and light sheet fluorescence microscopy (lsfm) allow in vivo 3d imaging of living embryos at cellular resolution, thereby offering greater visual detail than the light microscopy technology used in time-lapse systems. reflecting the objective of creating “in toto” representations of embryogenesis, these imaging methods enable continuous, automated individual cell tracking throughout the entire early embryo –without the temporal gaps characteristic of time-lapse imaging (tomer et al., 2012; wellmann, 2017). time-lapse films of embryos, by contrast, have been produced and circulated for over a century. historians of science have analysed the significance of biological time-lapse imaging primarily at a time when cinema emerged as a new time-based medium (landecker, 2012; olszynko-gryn & ellis, 2017). not only is time-lapse imagery of embryos no longer novel, but film scholar david lavery even wrote an article on the “disappointing career of time-lapse photography” and dismissed this visual technique as “mundane” and “commonplace,” suggesting that time-lapse videos of dividing cells have lost their “otherworldliness” (gaycken, 2012, p. 62; lavery, 2006, p. 2, p. 7). likewise, german historian of science janina wellmann argues that the early association 16 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) between the moving image and the suggestion of liveliness is no longer convincing, given the prevalence of animation in contemporary visual culture (wellmann, 2017; see also landecker, 2012).13 nevertheless, time-lapse embryo imaging represents a significant innovation in twenty-first-century ivf; with its rapid and widespread introduction emerges a new set of prenatal images and a retemporalization of the reproductive process in which the time of development, capital, labor and representation meet in new ways. first, in the context of the fertility clinic, the familiar embryo video gains importance as at once a diagnostic image, an individualized recording of patients’ potential future children and an origin story that starts in the incubator rather than the maternal body. it depicts an image of developmental time that becomes meaningful in an anticipated reproductive continuum implicated in the notion of “ivf success.” second, it represents a move from static to dynamic imagery in embryological practice. by automating embryo assessment, the timelapse medium thus allows a reorganization of the relation between the time of embryo development and the temporal organization of embryological practice. third, it is not just a representation of early embryo development, but itself a novel tool for selection.14 beyond the observation of embryos in the incubator, time-lapse embryo imaging has a data-driven component. as the time-lapse system’s camera records the embryos, the visual information is quantified and analysed with algorithms to predict the developmental potential of each embryo. now a selection method, the developmental time of embryo development comes to relate to the time of value production through treatment rationales that biomedicalize the reproductive process in new ways and expand the scope of ivf. the option of adding this newly visible step in the ivf cycle requires additional clinical and financial decision-making on the part of the patient. time-lapse embryo imaging is one of the few laboratory technologies that is directly marketed to patients (pottage, 2018). for example, unlike most embryological equipment, eeva (early embryo 17 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) viability assessment) has a dedicated website, which targets intended parents and promotes time-lapse embryo imaging as a means to approach “ivf with a higher level of confidence” (auxogyn, 2017). as part of its direct-to-consumer marketing strategy, the website includes a patient testimonial video titled “courtnay and michael’s journey,” which introduces the time-lapse apparatus, the embryo videos it produces, rationales for treatment and exemplary patient responses to them (the eeva test, 2015b). the testimonial video tells the story of a couple who had spent a long time trying to conceive and eventually decided to undergo ivf. the video opens with a smiling courtnay, who tells the viewer about the time she missed a call from her fertility doctor, who contacted her sooner than she had anticipated. from the very first sentence, eeva is framed as the enabling condition for a successful pregnancy that emerges sooner than you would expect — in this case soon enough to miss your doctor’s phone call. the success of ivf is here temporalized: courtney, who had long attempted to conceive, found a way to speed up the process and become pregnant quickly with the assistance of the eeva technology. upon returning the call, the doctor announced courtnay’s pregnancy by asking: “you know the news, right?” when courtnay tells us how she responded by asking “what news are you talking about?”, the camera zooms out and we see her partner michael rocking a baby, affirming the outcome of the pregnancy that the doctor announced on the phone. linking the moment of the doctor’s announcement that courtnay recalled and the diegetic present in which the baby is recorded, the video establishes a link between the clinically and technologically mediated experience of embryo selection and a “take-home baby.” in doing so, it makes a visual argument for an investment into the technoscientific management of this early stage, which here plays a decisive role in establishing “ivf success” and was instrumental in speeding up the reproductive process by avoiding implanting embryos that are not predicted to lead to a viable pregnancy. the video’s next scene suggests extracorporealization is 18 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) instrumental to this speeding up of the reproductive process. it cuts to a still image of a green hilly landscape with a white heterosexual couple holding hands, walking down a sand path. the woman holds a string leading to a large embryo floating above her head. resembling a helium balloon, a red multi-cellular embryo hangs in the air, enclosed by a threedimensional green square that looks like the rectangular containers holding the embryos in the eeva incubator. the floating embryo resembles a thought-balloon, signifying how the embryo is almost umbilically connected to the intended mother’s mind rather than her body. in keeping with franklin’s argument that reproductive technologies are often framed as “offering nature a helping hand,” the eeva green logo visually resonates with the scene’s natural surroundings and is presented as guiding the couple on the path of their “ivf journey” (franklin, 2013). the peaceful scene paints a picture of a mode of reproduction in which the apparatus exists in harmony with nature and the intended parents, while the embryo exists outside the maternal body on the road to “ivf success.” as counterpart to this visual image, the time-lapse embryo imaging system is itself framed as a more transparent alternative to the maternal body.15 in a televised bbc news report about time-lapse embryo imaging, dr. simon fishel is quoted as describing the technology as “almost like having the embryo in the womb with a camera on them [sic]” (walsh, 2013). the idea of the machine as an alternative, technocultural “womb” that emulates the body through enhanced visibility is also a further extension of the pervasive ideal of bodily transparency in western medicine. dutch media scholar josé van dijck (2005) explores the history of this ideal in the transparent body by analyzing various medical imaging technologies as “the material embodiment of collective desires and fantasies” (pp. 15–17). the visualization of live embryo development in time-lapse videos affirms the association between increased visibility and medical progress that van dijck describes. they moreover fulfil a dual diagnostic and affective function, analogous to ultrasound images, as visualizations of the first encounter with prenatal life, which is now 19 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) moved forward to the time before implantation (2001, pp. 108–9).16 the time-lapse embryo videos likewise become meaningful as an extension of what barbara duden (1993b) describes as “the desire to remove the frontier between the viewer’s eye and the unborn” and to witness “the breakdown of a horizon which, since the beginning of history, had made the unborn an unseen and unverifiable presence” (p. 566). by extension, while the time-lapse apparatus facilitates a mode of reproduction in which the embryos are distant from the intended mother’s body, the concomitant increased visibility of the embryos may function to mediate this distance by positioning the visual — rather than embodiment — as the key mode of accessing the desired potential future child. as us science scholar hannah landecker (2006) has argued for early biological cinema, which allowed people other than scientists to “participate visually in the sights of scientific work” (p. 123), so does timelapse embryo imaging provide a means to share images of the embryos that previously would stay within the embryological lab. the scientific films that landecker describes opened up the scientific gaze to other participants; here time-lapse embryo imaging allows patients to partake in the embryological gaze. time-lapse imaging manufacturers highlight the possibility of improving patient communication with this shared vision as one of the key selling points of this technology (vitrolife, 2015). in turn, fertility clinics present the inclusion of a “special download” with the timelapse embryo imaging add-on as a perk to (potential) patients (carefertility, 2018). the testimonial video also shows the smiling couple watching their “special-download” video of the embryo that developed into their son at home. in a differently cut version of the patient testimonial, courtnay’s voice-over reads embryo incubation as the originary development moment: “when you watch the video of the eeva test, we were astonished that really everyone starts out that way and that we got to see a picture of our son at a cell level” (the eeva test, 2015a). thus framed as depicting embryonic individuals, time-lapse embryo videos run the risk of reproducing the maternal erasure and ascription of personhood to prenatal life which was widely criticized and politicized in 20 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) fetal ultrasound, while positioning ivf as a model for conceptualizing the in vivo reproductive process (franklin, 2013; petchesky, 1987; stabile, 1992). in sharing the clinical gaze in this way, the seemingly objective imagery of developing embryos also visualizes a specific, and contested, treatment rationale that suggest that the ivf process can be sped up by adopting an automated, predictive, data-driven method of selecting embryos. accompanying the visual of two developing embryos, the voice-over explains that “your ivf team uses the eeva test results with their traditional grading methods to select the best embryo for transfer.” in the testimonial video, we see two embryos developing next to a text box that explains that the time-lapse technology “analyses the developmental potential of the embryos and categorizes them into ‘high’ and ‘low.’” after a couple of divisions, the words high and low are superimposed on the two embryos, which subsequently move to a screen where two embryologists of “your ivf team” interact with them. rather than handling the embryos and controlling conditions, the embryologists’ monitoring of the incubated embryos thus becomes a matter of watching the screen and analyzing statistical and visual data. this screen-based, digital approach to embryo selection, which visualizes the developmental differences between embryos, promotes the notion that there is a universal regularity in the timing of embryo development that can be both observed and instrumentalized to predict viability by means of automated standardization, quantification and predictive analytics. the temporal regularity of embryonic cell divisions has been recorded for over a century (cohen, 2013). the understanding of embryogenesis as subject to a temporal law of development was recognized as early as 1800 by thinkers like the german critic karl philipp moritz, who conceptualized embryo development as organized by “rhythmical time,” or the recognition of an interlinked timed repetition and variation (wellmann, 2015, pp. 30–31). in nineteenth-century embryology, this scientific attention to the regularity of time-based phenomena was 21 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) produced through sequential representations arranged into “normaltafeln,” or the assortment of “thousands of individual moments in thousands of individuals built into an ascending temporal series of static moments” (hopwood, 2000; landecker, 2006, p. 126). after what mexican-american historian of science jimena canales called the “cinematographic turn,” the late-nineteenth-century representations of biological processes became “visible as processes” through the timebased medium of film (canales, 2002; wellmann, 2011, pp. 310–313). the key aspect of scientific cinematography is of course the representation of time, which could now be manipulated to give visual access to phenomena that were previously too slow or too fast to observe. the temporality of cinematography becomes meaningful and valuable at the conjunction of “the time of experiment, the time of recording and the time of demonstration” (landecker, 2006, p. 123; wellmann, 2011, p. 314). after the turn of the millennium, time-lapse embryo imaging introduced a “cinematographic turn” in the ivf clinic. the technology’s synchronization of the different modes of clinical, recorded and playback time that landecker references not only introduce a lively, accelerated representation of the developing embryos. the integration of an additional mode of what we may call “datafied time” renders the timing of cellular divisions into a tool for selection. the quantified visual information deduced from the developing embryos is key to both the assessment of their viability and the provision of data for the development of algorithmic tools to assess similar embryo cohorts in the future. through this datafied approach, incubated embryos are viewed in light of historical embryo populations to predict their viability. another variation of “the biological” functioning as a tool in contemporary reproductive biomedicine (franklin, 2013), the characterization of the embryos’ temporal regularities as a method for selection — as distinct from natural phenomena — is relevant because this has made them patentable under us and european law. although controversial and contested by both the research and bioethics communities (cohen, 2013; sterckx, cockbain, & pennings, 2014), the eu 22 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and us patent offices have issued patents that cover the precise timing of embryo development, including clauses that specify a “time interval … between the resolution of cytokinesis 1 and the onset of cytokinesis 2 [of] 8-15 hours” — thereby explicitly aligning developmental time with capital time.17 here the extracorporealized embryo is no longer only located in vitro. rather, the embryo becomes in silico: both as digitalized image, which may be shared between medical professionals and intended parents, and as data sets and patentable algorithmic tools for selection, which emerge from data circulations between clinics and manufacturers. the cinematographic turn in ivf thus has a distinctly data-driven character that bridges past, present and future. in conclusion, time-lapse embryo imaging videos, characterized by the speeding up of photographed time to produce moving images that show an accelerated version of the recorded reproductive process, make a visual argument for embryo selection. the wiggling embryos dividing their cells are emblematic of “the need to animate, enliven, set into motion as an expression of our desire for … ‘feeling alive’” (zarzycka & papenburg, 2014, p. 166); the embryos’ movement conveys both a current liveliness as well as the possibility of future life in the proclamation of “high” viability. while presented as diagnostic and quantitative measurements, the time-lapse embryo videos also visualize a culturally significant origin story that positions the beginning of identifiable human life outside of the maternal body, and inside the benevolent technology. after extracorporealization, the incubated embryos become visually accessible to intended parents, who may now see what was previously confined to the embryologist’s gaze. the reliance on an algorithmic analysis of the visualized embryos speaks to an increasing importance of large data sets and predictive analytics in assisted reproduction. the rapid introduction and distribution of time-lapse embryo imaging expresses an expansive drive within contemporary assisted reproduction. whereas egg freezing expanded the group of potential candidates for treatment by making not only infertility but fertility an indication for ivf, time-lapse embryo imaging expands the ivf treatment steps as well as 23 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) patients’ and clinics’ investments in the instrumentalization and visualization of the reproductive time of embryonic development. conclusion in keeping with the focus of catalyst’s special section, both the reproduction of imaging processes and the imaging of reproductive processes are key in appreciating the new reproductive decisions that intended parents navigate in twenty-first-century assisted reproduction. by analyzing the rhetorical framing of frozen egg photography and embryo development videos, i have drawn attention to the way in which the visual representation, acceleration and congealment of reproductive time can align with a particular treatment logic. what is at stake in the introduction of these treatment rationales is a broadening indication for ivf — whether through enlisting a group of fertile women as candidates for pre-emptive infertility treatment or through expanding the ivf cycle with additional treatment options. in this process, the two new reproductive technologies of egg freezing and time-lapse embryo imaging are not only changing the face of ivf but also retemporalizing the reproductive process.18 egg freezing slows down the reproductive process by introducing a period of cryopreservation between egg extraction and fertilization. the concomitant temporal extension of the reproductive potential counterbalances ongoing embodied fertility decline. the frozen egg’s photograph reframes a familiar picture of a gamete into a reproductive image poised at the distinct temporalities of frozen and embodied time emerging with egg freezing. unlike conventional photography, the depicted frozen moment did not signify an irrecoverable flash from the past, but an ongoing state of cellular cryopreservation. the resonance of frozen time in the still image and the cryopreserved cell affirmed the “liveness” of both. in so doing, this presentation of cryopreserved time reinforced the contrasting finitude of the aging body, its precarious fertility and the loss of its eggs. the rhetorical framing of this reproductive 24 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) image aligns with a treatment rationale that motivates egg freezing through a dynamic between the affective attachment of anxiety and loss to embodied female reproductive aging and the ascription of potential viability to the imaged, un-aging egg frozen in time. conversely, time-lapse embryo imaging is framed as a technology to speed up the reproductive process by implanting the most viable embryo first. time-lapse embryo imaging uses timed observation to instrumentalize the temporal regularities of prenatal development in embryo selection. time-lapse embryo imaging, characterized by moving images that show an accelerated version of the recorded reproductive process, likewise affirms a treatment rationale for embryo selection. the system visualizes both the animation of early life and the drama of selection by superimposing a “high” and “low” assessment of their viability. while the patient testimonial video showed the baby resulting from this process, the charge of the clinical embryo videos follows from the proximity of continued and failed viability in the petri dish. as these two sets of prenatal images reference non-viable embryos and dying eggs, they demonstrate a necropolitics of reproduction, in which not only the generativity of new life, but also the increased awareness of the death, finitude and fallibility of reproductive substances drives the engagement with reproductive technologies. these life-death dyads — whether between the frozen and embodied egg or the viable and non-viable embryo — propel new, future-oriented treatment rationales for broadening the indication for ivf. the fragility of these vital distinctions becomes apparent in eggfreezer’s framing of her frozen egg as a promise of continued liveliness that provides the “building block” for a “future child” and is also “part of [her]” (eggfreezer, 2008b). the tenuousness of this promise emerges in her final blog post: “all the vitrified eggs died on thaw.” seven years after freezing, the attempted thaw renders the photograph into an image of mourning after all, and she writes: “this is unfathomable. i cannot begin to explain the grief i am feeling. i have a call with dr. b on monday morning.” despite her commenters urging for an update in the years following, we never 25 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) hear from her again. acknowledgements i would like to acknowledge the anonymous peer reviewers and editors of the special issue for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. i would also like to thank my colleagues at the university of cambridge and the university of amsterdam for their feedback. this work was supported by the wellcome trust (provision award, grant number 100606), the alan turing institute and the amsterdam school for cultural analysis (asca). notes 1 the use of diagnostic medical ultrasound in obstetrics and gynaecology was introduced in the 1960s and quickly became a routinized part of pregnancy care. it is rooted in a history of measuring distance using sound. as early as 1794, lazzaro spallanzi demonstrated that bats navigate through the dark using echo reflection from high frequency sound. this technique was automated in the late 19th century and subsequently used primarily in maritime underwater navigation. early medical use of ultrasound focused on its purported therapeutic effects and later the diagnosis of tumors, before there was a global boom in research and clinical use of fetal ultrasound in the 1960s (newman & rozycki, 1998; woo, 2002). fetal photography was first popularized in nilsson’s 1965 photo essay “the drama of life before birth” in life magazine. the stylized photography of fetal remains was a groundbreaking depiction of prenatal life that has become part of “the mental universe of our time” (duden, 1993a, p. 14). the visualization of in vitro fertilization (ivf), and particularly the visual representation of a needle inserting a single sperm into the egg in intracytoplasmic sperm injection (icsi), has become ubiquitous as a stock image of human reproduction (franklin, 2013, pp. 246-50). 2 ex vivo (outside the body) is the counterpart of in vivo (inside the body). in vitro (eg. in vitro fertilization) is a technical term for “in glass.” 3 photomicrography refers to photographs taken with the aid of a microscope. this is to be distinguished from microphotography, which produces photographs that are shrunk to very small scale and require a microscope for viewing (peres, 2007, p. 94). 26 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) 4 this article follows the practice of “cultural analysis” as developed by mieke bal (1999). in this approach, the analyst purposively does not apply a single method to understand an object, but rather brings diverse analytic and theoretical lenses in dialogue with particular case studies and cultural objects (bal, 2002, p. 4). 5 the phrase “take home baby” is commonly used both in research and clinical settings to refer to a live birth as a result of an ivf cycle (peters et al., 2007). this phrase may be distinguished from other measures of reproductive success, such as clinical pregnancy rates, that do not necessarily result in a live birth (chetkowski, 2014). clinical pregnancies can result in spontaneous abortions, ectopic pregnancies, foetal deaths and neonatal deaths (within 28 days of birth) and such cases may be excluded from a ‘take home baby’ rate (peters et al., 2007, p. 127). 6 i use “biomedicalization” in line with us science scholars mamo et al.’s (2003) definition: “biomedicalization describes the increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional processes of medicalization, both extended and reconstituted through the new social forms of highly technoscientific biomedicine. the historical shift from medicalization to biomedicalization is one from control over biomedical phenomena to transformations of them” (p. 161). 7 see taussig et al. (2013) on critiques of potential and potentiality in biomedicine, especially pp. 54-55 on the politics of embryonic potential. 8 it was the popularization of fetal imaging, ros petchesky argues in her classical studies on the visual cultures of reproduction, that was instrumental in the rhetorical shift from religious claims about the beginning of life to a medical discourse of biological facts about prenatal development which were reified through fetal imagery (petchesky, 1987, 1990). following petchesky, sarah franklin analyses the temporal politics of anti-abortion activism and argues that the 1980s right-to-life movement harnessed a biological discourse that emphasized “biological development rather than divine authority” and thereby embeds the “religious time of theo-ontology within the secular time of biology” (franklin, 2014, p. 112). 9 like jones and phelan, mary ann doane holds that “the privileged form of the index has been associated with death,” thereby invoking a notion of finitude to theorise the medium-specificity of the photograph (doane, 2007, p. 129). 27 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) 10 as radin argues was the case for genomics, these cryotechnologies, which harness latency in assisted reproduction, give momentum to the “anticipatory regime[s]” that animate egg freezing discourses (radin, 2013, p. 500; van de wiel, 2014b, p. 4). 11 necropolitics can be read as the counterpart of biopolitics, which references not the governance of life but the governance of death and dying. whereas achille mbembe positions biopolitical investment of power into life against the necropolitical investment of power into death, rosi braidotti theorises the relationality between a biopolitics and necropolitics (braidotti, 2013; mbembe, 2003; van der zaag, 2016). i here use the term to refer to the politics of the recognition and legibility of death, finitude and fallibility in the management of reproduction. beyond a politics of bringing life into being, contemporary reproductive management, i argue, discursively produces loci of death and decline that function as sites of individualized and politicized governance. 12 as an indication, the swedish company vitrolife, one the of two major suppliers of time-lapse embryo imaging equipment, reported a significant growth in sales between the end of 2014 and 2016, from 30 million to 160 million sek (vitrolife, 2016). time-lapse imaging is a treatment option in the majority of large fertility clinics in the united kingdom. 13 myers and dumit (2011), by contrast, argue that cellular time-lapse images can “seem to impart too much life” through the suggestion that they show not only motion but also intention and personification in cellular processes (p. 254). 14 see franklin (2013) for a discussion of the embryo as tool. 15 referencing the origin story recounted in genesis 1-3, the eeva system’s name suggests a correspondence to the biblical name eve, meaning “mother of all the living” (gen 3:20 revised standard version). this is a telling association, given that the secular creation story told through the time-lapse embryo videos shifts the locus of life’s origin by staging a first visible encounter with prenatal life while it is enclosed by the machine rather than the mother. 16 the suggested continuity between the time-lapse embryo video and fetal ultrasound — and, by extension, the embryo and the fetus — becomes explicit in a promotional video of time-lapse embryo imaging by the largest uk fertility chain, care fertility. titled jaycie's journey using 28 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) embryoscope time lapse imaging at care fertility, it shows a succession of a single embryo in a time-lapse video, a traditional twodimensional ultrasound video, a three-dimensional ultrasound video, and postnatal footage of a baby girl named jaycie (care fertility, 2015). 17 see patents us7963906 b2, 2011, us8337387 b2, 2012, ep2430454 b1, 2013. 18 this retemporalization is in keeping with landecker’s argument that “being a cellular entity after cryobiology means being freezable and open to artificial synchronization; any living thing, after these interventions, becomes an object that can be stopped and started, suspended and accelerated” (landecker, 2007, p. 232). the temporal plasticity of cells in tissue culture directly comes to bear on reproductive timing in the case of egg freezing. references auxogyn. 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(2012). a persistent misperception: assisted reproductive technology can reverse the “aged biological clock.” fertility and sterility, 97(5), 1044–1047. 35 van de wiel catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fertnstert.2012.02.015 yusoff, k. (2007). antarctic exposure: archives of the feeling body. cultural geographies, 14(2), 211–233. https://doi.org/10.1177 /1474474007075355 zarzycka, m., & papenburg, b. (2014). motion pictures: politics of perception. discourse, 35(2), 163–176. bios lucy van de wiel is a research associate at the reproductive sociology research group (reprosoc), university of cambridge. her research focuses on egg freezing and the gender politics of ageing; the datafication of ivf; and the political economy of contemporary assisted reproduction. microsoft word news in focusmolldrem and thakor.docx molldrem,s. and thakor, m. (2017). genealogies and futures of queer sts: issues in theory, method, and institutionalization. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (1) 1-15 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © stephen molldrem, mitali thakor, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license news in focus genealogies and futures of queer sts: issues in theory, method, and institutionalization stephen molldrem university of michigan molldrem@umich.edu mitali thakor northwestern university mitali@northwestern.edu abstract in the following essay, we describe the emergence of work by various sts scholars at the intersections of queer studies and social studies of science and technology. we focus on recent developments that have materialized under the label of “queer sts” within a longer history of sexuality studies. we ask: what is queer sts, and what is “new” about it? we also narrate several critical new developments in academic collaborations in this growing subfield, from workshops to conference roundtables, and attempt to further develop queer sts theory and praxis as intersectional labor in negotiating the role of this nascent sphere of academic practice. 2 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) introduction: toward a genealogy of “queer sts” since the rise in studies of the history of sexuality in the late 1970s—and, later, the growth of lesbian and gay studies (abelove et al., 1993), queer theory (de lauretis, 1991), and lgbtq studies as identifiable intellectual and disciplinary areas—scholars have labored at the intersections of sexuality studies and studies of science, technology, psychology, and medicine. one could chart out a genealogy of queer feminisms that have centered science and medicine in their analyses of the sex/gender system and heteropatriarchy, beginning, for example, with de beauvoir (1949), moving through irigaray’s critiques of psychoanalysis (1985 [1977]), to haraway’s influential work on cyborg studies and speciesism (1978; 1991 [1985]), and into the explosion of feminist sts that has emerged over the past two decades and shapes contemporary inquiries into the gendered histories of biomedicine and technology. a somewhat different genealogy could be told of the 1970s and 1980s, in which the burgeoning conceptual and textual foundations of sts were temporally and disciplinarily aligned with constructivist approaches to the study of gender and sexuality, yet remained largely bracketed off from one another. many recognizable works in sts and, separately, sexuality studies from this era could be considered as part of the same intellectual-historical moment that produced, for example, bloor’s knowledge and social imagery (1991[1976]) and latour and woolgar’s laboratory life (1986[1979]) alongside foucault’s the history of sexuality, vol. 1 (1978[1976]), weeks’ coming out (1979[1977]), rubin’s “thinking sex” (1984), and padgug’s “sexual matters” (1979). at this time, scholars in feminist philosophy and epistemology of science were working through constructivist critiques of hegemonic science and political philosophy on the grounds of their masculinist roots (bordo, 1986; collins 1989; keller, 1982; narayan, 1989) and presciently making linkages between the co-construction of science and politics (arditti, klein, and minden 1984; merchant, 1980; scheper-hughes, 1983). all of these texts shared in dramatic transformations taking place in the 3 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) humanities and social sciences that insisted on the rigorous, systematic, and ongoing analysis of the unseen processes that facilitate knowledgeproduction, truth-telling, and subject-formation, both in history and the contemporary moment. as scholars in these fields wrote from resurgent feminist, materialist, and otherwise radical or minoritarian positions, they worked to unpack how scientific power both exerts its homogenizing rule against the diversity of human experiences and generates new forms of life. the influence of these fields persisted and intensified through the 1980s, 1990s, and into the first decades of the twenty-first century. yet for reasons that are still historically opaque (but which likely have everything to do with how sts and gender and sexuality studies have been differently institutionalized), the obvious connections between queer/gender/sexuality studies and sts have only in the last several years come to materialize into a kind of nascent institutional crucible or “field formation” (wiegman, 2012). in many instances, the works identified with this field have taken the form of a disaggregated collection of efforts loosely collected under the rubric of “queer sts” – a project that we have actively contributed to and shaped since 2015. in the sections that follow, we provide an overview of such work, discuss some of its key actors, and conclude by speculating on the possible future(s) of this zone of activity. we do so as an open invitation, and in order to provide some material and conceptual resources to scholars who are interested in advancing the materialization of queer sts. in the first section, we address the realm of queer sts theory—as in a body of texts, set of structuring claims, or a corpus of literature that could ground and/or orient queer sts inquiry. in the second section, we discuss queer sts method, as in techniques or tools for doing queer sts work, in relation to important questions about institutionalization— strategies for cultivating infrastructures to support queer sts on campuses, in journals, professional associations, and other areas. we act in service of fostering what gayle rubin calls “durable structural mechanisms to secure the reliable transfer of queer knowledges” to other 4 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) queer sts scholars and future practitioners (2012, p. 354). ultimately, we call for a polyvalent queer sts with many constituents. this vision for queer sts insists on rigorous and ongoing critiques of institutional power structures within and outside of the university, while also positioning itself to maximize the benefits of inclusion and resources from academic institutions in such a way that refuses tokenization. rather than a coherent or settled subfield, we imagine an expansive set of transnational and cross-disciplinary conversations and alliances that collectively elaborate queer sts. queer sts theory: from lack to materialization we realized the need for a reproducible body of queer sts theory after we discovered that, as graduate students, we had no template or guide for building queer sts prelims or field examinations reading lists. we had to do this labor from scratch, with guidance from faculty mentors and peers, but without the published reference points or shared resources that would guide the development of a field exams list in a more recognizable body of literature such as “queer theory,” “feminist sts,” “the history of sexuality,” or even new fields like “digital studies” or “digital sts.” mitali acted publicly on the need for more queer sts resources in 2013 by publishing a two-part blog post on “queer sts” as part of her exams process (thakor, 2013). subsequently, in 2015, she published a public and collaborative google document called the “queer sts reading list” (thakor, molldrem, et al. 2015). at this point stephen and mitali became connected via twitter, and the list quickly started to expand. the queer sts reading list continues to grow, and anyone can contribute to it. compiling these different kinds of texts in an accessible resource signals the deep resonances across distinct fields that could collectively give life to something different—which might be called queer sts. on the one hand, the list reads like a who’s-who of scholars in lgbtq studies, queer of color critique, the history of sexuality, and sts scholarship 5 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) focused on gender and sexuality. on the other hand, the specific themes that cut across the entries in the queer sts reading list highlight how scholars have honed in on similar topics or approaches in fields that are often very different from one another, methodologically or disciplinarily speaking. for example, biomedicalization, postcolonial and anti-racist inquiry, multiple queer feminisms, queer approaches to media, and gendered histories of technoscience all take center stage in the syllabus. some of the authors cited were already recognizable as sts scholars whose work was, in one way or along, queer (e.g. suchman, 2007; epstein, 1996, 2007; terry, 1999; and murphy, 2012). on the other hand, other authors (e.g. ferguson, 2004 and canaday, 2009) appear here in a semi-institutional sts context for what is possibly the first time. the list also incorporates feminist and postcolonial science fiction, from joan russ (2008[1975]) to octavia butler (1987-89), that have been productive toward developing new theories of sexuality and technoscientific futures alike. it is important to acknowledge that queer sts was named well before our reading list began to be assembled. anita thaler, whose twitter handle is @queersts and who leads a queer-feminist sts working group in austria, has been working on developing a body of queer sts theory for some years now. indeed, even since we began the queer sts reading list project, a great deal of work has been published, some of it in this journal after catalyst was launched in spring 2015. in the past year, angie willey’s undoing monogamy has been published (2016), christoph hanssmann has brought an sts perspective to trans studies and feminist health history in tsq (2016), michelle murphy has embarked on new queer projects on “alter-life,” and the queer feminist science studies anthology, edited by cyd cipolla, kristina gupta, david a. rubin, and angela willey is forthcoming—and this is just a small sampling. queer sts method and institutionalization: the labor of intersectionality 6 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the labor of building a body of queer sts theory is an ongoing process being done in a number of different lgbtq/sexuality studies, feminist studies, and sts publishing spaces. in addition to traditional published work, this labor includes the development of novel kinds of collectivelysourced digital resources that help foster new sets of conversations. as a result, queer sts method is necessarily interdisciplinary, traversing the methodologies of anthropological interviewing and fieldwork, feminist reflexivity, sociological sampling, and laboratory-based experimentation. thus, we seriously consider intersectional theory as central to queer method. building upon kimberlé crenshaw’s metaphor (1989, 1993) of the traffic intersection at which race and gender meet to produce new and different effects than those identities alone, numerous feminist and queer theorists have used intersectionality to interrogate the ways in which racial, sexual, gendered, classed, and ableist subjectivities overlap and conjoin (see also: taylor et al., 2010; grzanka, 2014; and luft and ward, 2009). we think of queer sts as intersectional work, with an emphasis on work as a constitutive part of the labor of such theorizing. nash (2010; 2014) and puar (2012) have both argued that attention to the labor of doing intersectional theory highlights how such theorizing is often fetishized and abstracted from the experiences of those for whom multiply hyphenated identities have always been a curse. as nash cautions, “the problem is feminist (or anti-racist) inattention to particular subjects’ experiences, the ‘cure’ is studying more intersections, and crafting more complex intersectional frameworks” (2010, p. 3). romanticizing intersectionality and making it seem something precious, in other words, treats it as kind of critical panacea, or a solution for somehow fixing social theory. what, then, does the naming of “queer sts” do for us, if sts always might have been, could be, but is not quite (yet) a form of queer critique? who is doing the work of keeping sts intersectional, or keeping sts queer and feminist? intersectional work is often framed as “difficult”—and therefore stalled—as though we might have to move mountains to be more 7 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) expansive and empathetic in our understandings of power, difference, and experience. can we imagine more full, more enriched and extensive ways of doing sts work that take intersectionality as a given, as more than just personal experiential knowledge? queer sts enjoys the privilege of newness in this particular moment, attracting the attention of more early-career scholars at both local and international venues. for instance, at the 2016 joint meeting of the society for social studies and the european association of the study of science and technology (4s/easst) in barcelona, we convened a queer sts roundtable. all of the invited participants raised the provocation that serious efforts to institutionalize queer sts within academia would prove a necessary disruption to how universities envision power and technoscientific progress, and contribute to the political aims of the sts project. yet scholars in this nascent field can begin by building the scaffold for emotionally and intellectually supporting one another in ways that are radically different from the normative forms of recognition and inclusion associated with academic spaces. these need to be in place even before new forms of institutional backing – such as the funding to hold such events and roundtables in the first place – ever materialize. as of this writing, many recent and forthcoming efforts have bubbled up across institutions to foster this kind of activity and space, including a workshop at the first midwests workshop (september 2016), annual informal meetups at the 4s conference (november 2015, september 2016, august 2017), and regular workshops and reading seminars coordinated by the sexualities project at northwestern university and the queer sts group at the university of michigan. these scholars are working, online and offline, in creative and provocative ways and across disciplines to strengthen academic bonds and offer new avenues for queer sts world-making. conclusion: staying with the troubles of queer sts we began this essay by noting that queer sts is simultaneously a 8 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) nascent institutional formation that is starting to be organized under a label as well as a longstanding and disaggregated collection of overlapping conversations in sts, feminist and gender studies, the history of sexuality, and lgbtq studies. rather than approaching this as a paradox, problem, or issue to be resolved through the consolidation of a diffuse body of knowledge into a subfield with defined boundaries, we would follow haraway’s (2007, 2016) cues, and instead encourage scholars to “stay with the trouble” and ambiguities of queer sts. we would advocate for our colleagues to treat queer sts as a haraway-ian (2007) “contact zone”—one that helps to organize research agendas, institutions, and academic lives. haraway deployed the phrase “stay with the trouble” in response to reviewers of her manuscript when species meet (2007): “how can we together inherit these pastpresents; how can i, can we, stay with the trouble without the mad solace of yet another exterminism, another fix...[?]” (2010, p. 55). in many ways, haraway’s questions inadvertently resonate with the one asked by warner and berlant in a classic essay written during the mid-1990s: “what does queer theory teach us about x? as difficult as it would be to spell out programmatic content for an answer, this simple question still has the power to wrench frames” (1995, p. 348). we believe that “queer” still has the “power to wrench frames” but also that “sts” has the analytical power to “stay with the trouble” of “queer.” as queer studies scholars, we argue that the perspectives that sts has to offer to queer, trans, and sexuality studies are clearly wideranging, particularly regarding tools for the kinds of reflexive, empirical, and ethnographic methodologies that sts brings to the table. and as sts scholars, we argue that the proliferation of queer perspectives in the study of science, technology, and medicine is not only taking shape in recent iterations of queer sts. it has been happening for decades. however, as we have pointed out, the institutionalization of minoritarian knowledges is not a neutral process or a necessary outcome of scholarly collaborations or cross-disciplinary dialogue. rather, institutionalization 9 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) must be actively shaped and contested in both research agendas and the labor of intellectual and academic life. on this front, we take our cues from ongoing debates over institutionalization in women’s studies, ethnic studies, and queer studies that highlight both the risks and potentials inherent in the institutionalization of minority knowledges in the neoliberal or corporate university (ahmed, 2012; ferguson, 2012; rubin, 2012; halberstam, 2009; nash and owens, 2015; wiegman, 2012). therefore, the work of queer sts will necessarily entail careful attention to the gendered, raced, and heterosexist scaffolds of not only scientific analysis – the object of much current sts research – but also of the institutions from which that sts research emerges. a collective “we” must ask bluntly (and reflexively): who sits on steering committees? what is the makeup of incoming graduate cohorts? whose work is cited on syllabi and graduate exam common lists? who is receiving tenure and who continues to adjunct? which institutions are seriously investing time, care, and resources into structuring robust sts programs with a demonstrated commitment to scholarship grounded in minoritarian standpoints? conundrums like these – in universities, professional associations, academic presses, and so forth – will continue to constitute the “trouble” of queer sts as much as any methodological innovation that might emerge from intellectual exchange. thus, to live up to its potential to wrench frames, queer sts research cannot just perform intersectionality and inclusivity in its writing, but also must do the far more uncomfortable work of critiquing and unsettling the structures in which it could quickly become comfortably at home. as nash insists, we must take seriously the intent of crenshaw’s “intersectionality” as a call to examine and dislodge: “the attention to crenshaw's traffic analogy as experiential rather than metaphorical has tended to constrain the feminist imagination, making an attention to more intersections rather than a deep interrogation of identity the hallmark of good, hard work” (nash, 2010, p. 3, emphasis added; see also nash, 2014). we conclude then, by stating what might be obvious, but which 10 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) always bears repeating: the future of work at the intersection of queer studies and sts—or the future of “queer sts,” if scholars collectively continue to invest in that label—rests with those who will continue to do this labor. following traditions of coalitional left, queer, feminist, and anti-racist movements, the constitution of a “we” can be strategically rearticulated depending on the needs of particular moments, as conflicts over institutionalization arise. this means, ultimately, that forms of alliance and terms of contestation need not be determined in advance. we are excited to be playing a small part in this project, and look forward to working with other scholars to continue to build collaborative queer sts agendas, spaces, and resources. acknowledgements we extend our thanks to participants in the 2016 4s/easst queer sts roundtable: ardath whynacht, patrick keilty, patrick grzanka, and rebekah cupitt. their thoughts in the pre-conference digital roundtable and at the in-person panel were central to the formation of this essay. we would also like to thank the participants in the queer sts workshop that we co-convened with jean hardy at the 2016 midwests network conference. stephen thanks all of his colleagues who have participated in meetings of the queer sts rackham interdisciplinary workshop at the university of michigan, particularly fellow co-coordinator jean hardy. we are grateful to the sponsors and supporters who made the 2015 and 2016 #queersts4s meetups possible, and we eagerly anticipate continuing this dialogue at 4s 2017 in boston. we also thank banu subramaniam and angie willey for their work editing this special issue of catalyst and for their 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(1987 [1983]). the feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. in s. harding (ed.), feminism and methodology (pp. 157-180). bloomington, in: indiana university press. suchman, l. (2007). feminist sts and the sciences of the artificial. in e. j. hackett, o. amsterdamska, m. e. lynch, & j. wajcman (eds.), new handbook of science and technology studies (3rd ed.). cambridge, ma: mit press. taylor, y., hines, s., & casey, m. (eds.). (2010). theorizing intersectionality and sexuality. london: palgrave macmillan uk. terry, j. (1999). an american obsession: science, medicine, and homosexuality in modern society. chicago university of chicago press. thakor, m (2013). “queer sts, part 1 and part 2.” mit hasts blog. http://hasts.mit.edu/2013/12/04/queer-sts-part-1. thakor, m., molldrem, s., and multiple authors (2015). google docs. https://docs.google.com/document/d/18hnaag2aync0stxryowoxoql6c l3snnjhhvjkpl_wii/edit. weeks, j. (1979[1977]). coming out: homosexual politics in britain from the nineteenth century to the present. london: quartet books. wiegman, r. (2012). object lessons. durham, nc: duke university press. willey, a. (2016). undoing monogamy: the politics of science and the possibilities of biology. durham, nc: duke university press. 15 molldrem and thakor catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) bios stephen molldrem is a phd candidate at the university of michigan, ann arbor in the department of american culture. mitali thakor is a postdoctoral fellow in the sexualities project at northwestern university. microsoft word 76953-1-11-_hamrieandfritsch.docx hamraie, a., & fritsch, k. (2019). crip technoscience manifesto. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-34. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © aimi hamraie and kelly fritsch, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article crip technoscience manifesto aimi hamraie vanderbilt university aimi.hamraie@vanderbilt.edu kelly fritsch carleton university kellyfritsch@cunet.carleton.ca abstract as disabled people engaged in disability community, activism, and scholarship, our collective experiences and histories have taught us that we are effective agents of world-building and -dismantling toward more socially just relations. the grounds for social justice and world-remaking, however, are frictioned; technologies, architectures, and infrastructures are often designed and implemented without committing to disability as a difference that matters. this manifesto calls attention to the powerful, messy, non-innocent, contradictory, and nevertheless crucial work of what we name as “crip technoscience,” practices of critique, alteration, and reinvention of our material-discursive world. disabled people are experts and designers of everyday life. but we also harness technoscience for political action, refusing to comply with demands to cure, fix, or eliminate disability. attentive to the intersectional workings of power and privilege, we agitate against independence and productivity as requirements for existence. instead, we center technoscientific activism and critical design practices that foster disability justice. hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 introduction as disabled people engaged in disability community, activism, and scholarship, our collective experiences and histories have taught us that we are effective agents of world-building and -dismantling toward more socially just relations. the grounds for social justice and world-remaking, however, are frictioned; technologies, architectures, and infrastructures are often designed and implemented without committing to disability as a difference that matters. this manifesto calls attention to the powerful, messy, noninnocent, contradictory, and nevertheless crucial work of crip technoscience: practices of critique, alteration, and reinvention of our material-discursive world. disabled people are experts and designers of everyday life. but we also harness technoscience for political action, refusing to comply with demands to cure, fix, or eliminate disability. attentive to the intersectional workings of power and privilege, we agitate against independence and productivity as requirements for existence. building upon earlier work defining crip technoscience as politicized design activism (hamraie, 2015, 2017), we articulate four political commitments of crip technoscience as a field of critical scholarship, practice, and activism.2 in framing crip technoscience as such, we follow feminist technoscience studies by describing both a realm of practice and a field of knowing that has emerged from it. crip technoscience braids together two provocative concepts: “crip,” the non-compliant, anti-assimilationist position that disability is a desirable part of the world, and “technoscience,” the co-production of science, technology, and political life (jasanoff, 2004; murphy, 2012). crip theory centers disability as a locus of resistance against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (mcruer, 2006) and “ablenationalism” (mitchell & snyder, 2015), agitating against liberal assimilation and inclusion practices by marking disability as a desirably generative and creative relational practice (fritsch, 2015a). we seek to bring crip theory and feminist technoscience into closer contact, exploring their generative frictions. in some respects, the field of hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 disability studies has been entangled with science and technology studies (sts)—and feminist sts in particular—since its origins, especially through its critiques of biomedicine and militarism and in its embrace of situated epistemologies. in naming crip technoscience, we invoke long histories of feminist, queer, anti-racist, and disability collaborative praxis, such as in technoscience projects engaging universal design, sensory engineering, reproductive justice, and hiv/aids activism.2 however, to date, crip theorists have had limited engagement with the critical concept of technoscience, particularly as it is used in feminist sts to mean the productive and non-innocent entanglement of scientific knowing and technological making.3 this limited engagement has yielded an ahistorical position that science, technology, and medicine are anathema to crip worldremaking, ignoring disabled peoples’ ongoing, creative, and open-ended appropriations of science, technology, and medicine, particularly in acts of protest and “epistemic activism” (hamraie, 2012, 2017, p. 132). crip technoscience thus calls forth leah lakshmi piepzna-samarasinha’s concept of “crip science” (2018, p. 69) to highlight the skills, wisdom, resources, and hacks disabled people utilize for navigating and altering inaccessible worlds. in pushing crip technoscience as a field of research and a practice of critical “knowing-making” (hamraie, 2017, p. 99), we conjure frictional practices of access production, acknowledging that science and technology can be used to both produce and dismantle injustice. as a field of study, crip technoscience begins from the feminist politics of technoscientific “noninnocence” (haraway, 1991), acknowledging that many of the technologies that have enabled disabled people to gain access to the social world have been produced through military-industrial research and development, imperial and colonial relations, and ecological destruction, all of which contribute to the uneven debilitation of human and non-human life (erevelles, 2011; fritsch, 2015b; kafer, 2013; puar, 2017). nevertheless, we contend that technoscience can be a transformative tool for disability justice. we contrast crip technoscience with mainstream “disability hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 technoscience” as a field of traditional expert relations and practices concerned with designing for disabled people rather than with or by disabled people. in mainstream disability technoscience, such fixes are understood as de facto goods, services for (supposedly) unfortunate disabled people, and ultimately depoliticized. disability technoscience positions enhancement and capacitation as progressive moves to overcome disability. “hackathons” led by charity organizations embody innovation-for-innovation’s sake and define disability as a problem in search of a solution (wong, 2015a, 2015b). disabled people are often treated purely as clients or users. for example, the organization tikkun olam makers (tom) describes disabled people as “need knowers” and nondisabled designers and engineers as “solution experts.” riffing on the term special needs, which associates disabled people with minority interests outside of majority norms, these designations reinforce the division between disabled people as passive recipients of access or assistive technologies and non-disabled designers, developers, and technologists as experts. disability technoscience reinforces the sense that disabled people are not already making, hacking, and tinkering with existing material arrangements. disability is cast as an object of innovation discourse, rather than as a driver of technological change. melanie yergeau (2014) historicizes mainstream disability “hacktivism,” arguing that hackathons have become the “new telethon” in that they frame “disability as pitiable and in need of remediation.”4 in response, yergeau invokes “criptastic hacking” as a “disability-led movement, rather than a series of apps and patches and fixes designed by non-disabled people who cannot even be bothered to talk with disabled people.” criptastic hacking highlights crip technoscience as a field of relations, knowledges, and practices that enables the flourishing of crip ways of producing and engaging the material world. in contrast to dominant forms of knowing-making for disability, we invoke crip technoscience to describe politicized practices of noncompliant knowing-making: world-building and world-dismantling practices by and with disabled people and communities that respond to intersectional systems of power, privilege, and oppression by working within and around hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 them. within feminist sts, we find a valuable openness to the possibilities of material production, including feminist hacking and coding (haraway, 1991), “tactical biopolitics” (da costa & phillip, 2008), and “critical making” (ratto & boler, 2014; sayers, 2018), practices that push technoscience beyond the military-industrial into the realms of activist resistance and world-remaking. this openness manifests in donna haraway’s “cyborg manifesto” (1991), which inaugurated a tradition of feminist technoscience and activism. while acknowledging the non-innocent entanglement of most technologies with militarism and capitalism, haraway calls for “modest witnessing,” simultaneously resisting systems of domination and finding ways to hack and tinker with them (1997, p. 3). she frames modest witnessing in terms of “socialist and feminist principles of design” (p. 161), maker practices that could work “in alliance with anti-military science” (p. 169). feminist scholars such as michelle murphy (2012) have built upon the work of activist technoscience to describe what murphy calls “protocols” of feminist knowing and making. the promise of feminist technoscience lies in challenging hegemonic narratives about technology as always enframing or deterministic, and in imagining the transformative possibilities for crip hacking, coding, and making as frictional access practices. while critical making is recognized as part of the feminist sts tradition, disabled peoples’ maker practices have not yet been fully considered in the radical political history of disability studies. the capaciousness of feminist technoscience studies emboldens our conviction that critical technoscience, so much a part of our crip political history and genealogy, can also provide the discursive tools for embracing disabled people as experts, makers, and activists resisting mainstream disability technoscience. we call for crip technoscience scholarship and practice as modest witness, holding in tension the non-innocence of military-industrial science, technology, design, and media with the imperatives for disability justice, accessibility, and world-remaking. disabled people design our own tools and environments, whether by using experiential knowledge to adapt tools for daily use or by engaging in professional design practices. crip technoscience conjures long histories of hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 daily adaption and tinkering with built environments. we remember the crucial world-building work of independent living activists who learned to code, repair wheelchairs, and plan cities while refusing to remain institutionalized. we also invoke disability activism that centers the remaking of the material world as a central protest tactic, whether by smashing curb cuts with sledgehammers or pouring curb ramps with bags of cement (as adapt activists have done), by staging direct actions with mobility devices (as in the case of protesters leaving behind wheelchairs and crutches to crawl up the steps of the us capitol building, or in the case of nelia sargent, a blind woman who chained her power wheelchair to a nuclear reactor building in 1976 [giordano, 2013]), or by occupying media spaces (such as the jerry lewis telethon) to contest the rendering of disabled bodies as defective and in need of a cure (longmore, 2015). we invoke the history of disabled resistance to assistive technologies (such as audre lorde’s [1997] refusal to wear a breast prosthesis), as well as to war and militarism (as in the case of veteran ron kovic, who staged a demonstration at the republican national convention, “show[ing] their solidarity by gripping the arms of each other’s wheelchairs while they are being pushed by others” [wolfson, 2014, p. 120]).5 we respect the leadership of contemporary disability justice movement leaders, such as alice wong (2019) and vilissa thompson (2019), whose strategic use of media technology to challenge dominant narratives about disability (through the disability visibility project and ramp your voice! websites, twitter feeds, and related podcasts) also demonstrates collective power. while crip technoscience seeks to disrupt ableist and capitalist military-industrial systems, we also center contemporary liberatory projects for “collective access” (mingus, 2010b; piepzna-samarasinha, 2018). to struggle for a more accessible future in which disability is anticipated, welcomed, and in which disabled people thrive, we offer four commitments of crip technoscience as a field of critical scholarship, practice, and activism. hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 four commitments of crip technoscience crip technoscience centers the work of disabled people as knowers and makers. crip technoscience privileges disabled people as designers and world-builders, as knowing what will work best and developing the skills, capacities, and relationships to make something from our knowledge. unlike typical approaches to disability that objectify disabled people and situate expertise in medical professionals and non-disabled designers or engineers, crip technoscience posits that disabled people are active participants in the design of everyday life. not only do disabled people make access in our everyday lives in ways that do not get recognized as design, but the lived experience of disability, and the shared experience of disability community creates specific expertise and knowledge that informs technoscientific practices. we call for greater acknowledgement of the lived experiences and material design practices of disabled people in the work of technoscientific intervention. there is a widespread perception that access technologies are made for us by non-disabled experts, but there is little recognition of our own practices of remaking the material world. yet the field of disability scholarship grew out of activism against rehabilitative models of medical expertise and intervention (upias, 1976), crafting a materialist politics with anti-capitalism at its center (oliver, 1990; russell, 1998), and continues to struggle against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (mcruer, 2006). crip knowing-making forms the basis of political slogans such as nothing about us without us (charlton, 2000), framing disabled people not just as design experts but also as epistemic activists whose politicized ways of knowing the material world also situate us to produce the material conditions that allow disability to thrive, in addition to remaking how disability is known and experienced. without glorifying do-it-yourself design practices, crip technoscience recognizes that disabled peoples’ world-dismantling and world-building labors stem from situated experiences of “misfitting” in the world (garland-thomson, 2011). crips are not merely formed or acted on by the world—we are engaged agents of remaking. in centering the expertise of disabled knowers and makers, crip hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 technoscience involves the use of materials and technologies to produce forms of access otherwise unavailable (or economically inaccessible) via mainstream assistive technology channels. there are many examples of disability experience as knowing-making, so many creative and ingenious ways of living in the world. for example, historian bess williamson (2012a) has traced the ways that disabled people in the american postwar period documented their work as “tinkerers” in community periodicals, retrospective memoirs, and oral histories. they adapted specialized medical and assistive equipment, altered their houses, and repurposed everyday household tools. disabled people turned away from medical supply companies to hardware stores to alter objects to their own advantage, asserting their “presence in a world that largely ignored them” (williamson, 2012a, p. 12). disabled designers such as alice loomer (1982), a wheelchair user, described her crip maker practices of repurposing household items for wheelchair maintenance or for ad hoc assistive technologies as “hanging onto the coattails of science.” loomer argued that her own tinkering and maintenance practices “kept [her] away from nursing homes and attendants”: “i made it. so i know how to fix it…i may have failed as often as i succeeded, but i have equipment that fits me” (p. 30-31). loomer’s work complicates the typical association of the disabled cyborg with a desire for innovation, instead turning to maintenance practices as sites for examining the “frictions, limitations, and failures inherent to technoscientific design processes” (hamraie, 2017, p. 107). similarly, in the 1960s, disabled engineer ralf hotchkiss hacked his wheelchair to plow snow off sidewalks while attending oberlin college, and in the 1980s began the whirlwind wheelchair international, when his global travels to find better designs for wheelchairs took him to nicaragua: i met these four young fellows sharing one wheelchair, and they had already redesigned that wheelchair. they had ridden it so hard that it had broken in 20 different places. they had reinforced it, welded it all back together, and made it much stronger than it had been. and they knew so much about good wheelchair design. it was clear they were the people i was looking for to help me, and i could help them hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 as well, so we’ve been working together ever since. (hotchkiss, 2011) while wheelchair users are not often treated as engineers, the four disabled designers had become experts in wheelchair engineering through trial and error and ingenuity, an ethos that continues in whirlwind wheelchair international’s low-cost, open-source wheelchairs, which are intended to be maintainable for a lifetime, enabling a broader range of people to access them. more recently, designer sara hendren and anthropologist caitrin lynch’s (2016) project engineering at home has called attention to the ad hoc design practices of “cindy,” a recently disabled woman with several amputations. while cindy “received the best available ‘rehabilitation engineering’ technology that money can buy,” she nevertheless “found she had little use for it,” opting instead to use tools of her own design (hendren & lynch, 2016). hendren and lynch frame cindy’s work as “user-initiated design,” which can “yield a powerful course correction to the top-down modes of manufacturing.” another disabled designer, sarah welner, began her career as an obstetric surgeon before focusing on gynecological health for disabled people. recognizing that “conventional examining tables are too high and narrow” for disabled women, particularly wheelchair users, welner designed a table with a button-operated “hydraulic lift” and more comfortable foot rests (waldman, 1998). while the engineering and design professions have historically excluded women, welner, loomer, and cindy’s work are clear examples of the places where crip technoscience and feminist design practices meet. gender and disability expertise diffract through one another to question dominant modes of knowing and making. disabled parents have also been agents of crip knowing-making. disabled parents hack baby cribs and change tables, sew bells on children’s clothing to enable blind parents to keep track of their children when moving through public spaces, and mount car seats on portable luggage carriers to enable blind parents who use white canes or have a guide dog to pull their child behind them with their free hand (fritsch, 2017). wheelchair users adapt slings, wraps, and nursing pillows to carry babies and toddlers on hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 their laps. other parents invent various tools to help feed and bathe their children, get them dressed, do their laundry, put on shoes, zip up coats, and engage in play. queer, gender non-conforming, and trans disabled people also hack and tinker with reproductive technologies and kin formation to become pregnant, gestate, chest feed, and share responsibilities. all these forms of knowing-making are shared on social media (such as with the disabled parenting project’s website, blog, twitter feeds, and related video projects), through disability community publications and events, and during conversations at parks and playgrounds. while disabled people face a multitude of barriers to becoming parents, disabled parents hack, tinker, and alter our material-discursive world, creating crip communities of knowing and making that challenges normative assumptions about parenting as a non-expert consumer activity. crip technoscience is committed to access as friction. emerging out of historical fights for disability rights, the terms accessibility and access are usually taken to mean disabled inclusion and assimilation into normative able-bodied relations and built environments. when viewed as synonymous with inclusion and assimilation, access and accessibility are treated as selfevident goods.6 as kelly fritsch explains, however, the etymology of the word access reveals two frictional meanings: access as “an opportunity enabling contact,” as well as “a kind of attack” (2016, p. 23). taking access as a kind of attack reveals access-making as a site of political friction and contestation. while historically central to the fights for disability access, crip technoscience is nevertheless committed to pushing beyond liberal and assimilation-based approaches to accessibility, which emphasize inclusion in mainstream society, to pursue access as friction, particularly paying attention to access-making as disabled peoples’ acts of non-compliance and protest. for example, before enforceable disability rights laws in the united states, disabled people took direct action to create ramps and curb cuts, making obvious the inaccessibility of the built environment. disability activists have taken sledgehammers to sidewalks in acts of protest, using bags of cement to pour curb cuts, and have used the design of curb cuts and ramps (conceived as levers for facilitating participation) as sites of hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 productive friction through which interdependence-based disability politics could arise (hamraie, 2017, p. 99-102). the independent living movement has also used material experimentation to enact crip technoscience and access friction. while the movement was critical of rehabilitation as a field of expert knowledge, it did not refuse the language or tools of rehabilitation outright. in addition to appropriating the term independent living to promote a disability politics of interdependence, the movement understood technoscience as a site of politicized resistance and regularly used hacking and tinkering practices as the basis of disability organizing. many of their methods are captured in designers ray lifchez and barbara winslow’s book design for independent living, produced in collaboration with the movement. the book reveals the everyday technological hacks that disabled people in berkeley in the 1960s and 1970s developed to thrive in an inaccessible city. emblematic of the movement’s crip technoscience ethos, lifchez and winslow offer the concept of “non-compliant users,” illustrating this with an image of a powerchair user wheeling against traffic on a street without curb cuts (1979, p. 153). this technology-enabled movement against the flow of traffic marks anti-assimilationist crip mobility: not an attempt to integrate (as in the liberal approach to disability rights), but rather to use technology as a friction against an inaccessible environment. more recently, toronto resident luke anderson was frustrated by the lack of wheelchair access he experienced on a daily basis. trained as a structural engineer, anderson designed a simple portable wooden ramp in 2011 stenciled with the url “stopgap.ca” and gifted thirteen of these ramps to businesses in his neighborhood. built as a temporary “stop gap” measure to improve accessibility, the ramps are a non-compliant technology; they are not intended to be a permanent solution or structure, do not have to follow building codes, and do not require a city building permit or variance, all of which can be expensive and difficult to obtain. anderson’s experiment took off, leading to the formation of the stopgap foundation and the community ramp project, which has now distributed over 1,200 portable wooden ramps worldwide (fritsch, in press). hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 in another contemporary example of access as friction, collin kennedy, a cancer patient in winnipeg, manitoba, protested hospital parking prices by filling the pay-slot on a parking meter with spray foam, telling the local news that he planned to continue doing so “until changes are made” (canadian broadcasting corporation [cbc], 2016). when crip time came into friction with the hospital’s parking meter time, kennedy challenged health capitalism: “you should be able to come here, park, get your treatment, however long that treatment takes…this is a medical facility where people are not going for entertainment. they’re not going for productivity and commerce. we’re here because of life and death” (cbc, 2016). kennedy’s activism—the use of spray foam to obstruct the parking meter—creates frictional access through attacking a technology of capitalist time and contests the commercialization of health care. crip technoscience is committed to interdependence as political technology. we position the crip politics of interdependence as a technoscientific phenomenon, the weaving of relational circuits between bodies, environments, and tools to create non-innocent, frictional access. mainstream disability technoscience presumes disability as an individual experience of impairment rather than a collective political experience of world-building and dismantling. this perception has two primary consequences. first, disabled people are perceived as dependent and the goal of technoscience becomes to encourage independence. second, disability and technology are both perceived as apolitical and stable phenomena, rather than material-discursive entanglements that take shape through struggle, negotiation, and creativity. the crip analytic of interdependence helps us understand how technoscience can simultaneously be entangled with global networks of domination and also provide opportunities for kinship and connection. donna haraway’s (1991) cyborg figure, for instance, has been taken as a material metaphor for the entanglement of nature and techno-cultures. this figure has shaped the critical concept of technoscience by showing the networks of knowledge and material production that comprise global capitalism as a force organizing relations between bodies, technologies, hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 and environments. disability critics of the cyborg figure, however, argue that haraway’s approach to the cyborg takes for granted that disabled people easily meld into technological circuits, an assumption shaped by imperatives for rehabilitation, cure, independence, and productivity. as alison kafer (2013) demonstrates, the imagination of disability in feminist technoscience is often limited to either eugenicist ideals of a disability-free future or to “depoliticized” ideals of the cyborg hybrid body (p. 8-10); disability is either a “master trope of human disqualification” (snyder & mitchell, 2006, p. 125) or a “seamless” integration of body and machine (kafer, 2013, p. 105). frequently, feminist technoscience conflates “‘cyborg’ and ‘physically disabled person’” (p. 105), treating disabled people as “posthuman paragons” (allan, 2013, p. 11). even when taken up critically, the cyborg figure in feminist technoscience reinforces ideas about disability as lack and disqualification (bailey, 2012). if, as kafer argues, disabled people have often uneasy or “ambivalent relationship[s] to technology” (2013, p. 119), our practices of interdependence, access intimacy, and collective access can be understood as alternative political technologies: “disabled people,” she writes, “[are not] cyborgs…because of our bodies (e.g., our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of our political practices” (p. 120). crip technoscience offers interdependence as a central analytic for disability–technology relations, recognizing that in disability culture, community, and knower-maker practices, interdependence acts as a political technology for materializing better worlds. in alliance with moya bailey and whitney peoples’s call for “black feminist health science studies,” crip technoscience is “suspicious of the individualism and siloing practices rewarded in the academy and see[s] collaboration and interdisciplinary as core” values that ought to guide intellectual and material production (bailey & peoples, 2017, p. 18). these values extend beyond the academy, however. as disability justice activist mia mingus (2010a) writes, interdependence offers a politics of crip alliance and solidarity: “it is truly moving together in an oppressive world towards liberation….it is working in coalition and collaboration.” we call for crip technoscience to hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 design for collective access and disability justice. we find interdependence as a political technology throughout the history of disability activism. for example, in north american disability activist histories, the most frequently narrated of these is the story of the “504 protest,” which took place in 1977 when disability activists in berkeley, california, occupied the department of health, education, and welfare to protest for the enforcement of section 504 of the federal rehabilitation act, a law that mandated accessible federal programs, spaces, and services. activists in the independent living movement had sought to foster a “crossdisability consciousness” across mobility-disabled, blind, and deaf people (zukas, 2000, p. 141). at the protest, they transformed this consciousness into a political technology, using asl to communicate with the outside when phone lines were cut off, rigging an air conditioner from other mechanical parts in the building, and establishing networks of care (o’toole, 2000, p. 47). similar narratives have been told about the birth of autistic community through organizing made possible by the internet and autistic-accessible conference spaces (sinclair, 2010) and are currently being written through new crip technoscience projects (such as those highlighted in the critical commentary section of this issue). these and other material practices describe a crip technoscientific sensibility wherein disabled interdependence also enables what mingus (2017) calls “access intimacy,” a crip relational practice produced when interdependence informs the making of access. crip technoscience also plays with the boundaries of trust, interdependence, and crip relations. blind artist carmen papalia, for instance, stages crip uses of technology in public space. in one practice, papalia uses a twenty-foot white cane on busy streets to create a sense of antagonism with other pedestrians, which renders access as a frictioned practice; in another, called “blind field shuttle,” papalia leads groups of (sighted) people on walks with their eyes closed. both practices make use of a technology—papalia’s white cane—to stage social interactions in public space that put ideas of independence into question (papalia, 2013). also drawing on crip political interdependence, georgina kleege and hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 scott wallin’s (2015) practice of “participatory description” compels narrated visual content through group-based methods. unlike the traditional role of audio description “as a detached, neutral act of translation that functions only as an enabling accommodation,” participatory description uses technoscientific modes, including internet video databases, to “explore the aesthetic, ideological, political and ethical underpinnings of this work of representation and its described object or event.” participatory audio description has also influenced the emergence of new technoscientific tools for accessibility mapping projects. blind designer josh miele, for instance, worked with touch graphics, inc. to design tactile and audio maps of the bay area rapid transit system. other projects use mapping for collective access. unlike mainstream disability technoscience “crowdsourcing” projects, which invoke a charity model of disability wherein non-disabled people collect data but do not engage in disability culture or politics, emerging projects such as mapping access are making participatory access-making the basis of a kind of technoscientific “access intimacy” (mingus, 2017) through practices such as “critical crowdsourcing” of accessibility data (hamraie, 2018). rather than simply creating functional maps, mapping access focuses on mapping as a tool for producing critical relations between bodies, environments, and technologies. at collective map-a-thons, the project enrolls disabled and non-disabled data collectors in the process of interrogating the messiness of access-making in institutional conditions and describing these conditions collectively. critical crowdsourcing practices include enrolling large numbers of both disabled and non-disabled people to collaborate on surveying and describing building accessibility while simultaneously identifying the aspects of the americans with disabilities act compliance that fail to consider the lived experience of accessibility. collaborative mapping visualizes the evidence of inaccessibility while creating opportunities for collective response. crip cartographic technoscience thus enables more critical design, and interrogation of the everyday built environment. our call for crip technoscience theory and practice holds in tension kafer’s crip politics of interdependence with the crip ambivalence toward hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 technology. we follow kafer by calling on the usefulness of the cyborg (and the technoscientific circuits it embodies) not as a disabled figure per se, but as a tool for “stag[ing] our own blasphemous interventions in feminist theory” (kafer, 2013, p. 106). crip technoscience borrows the tools of feminist hacking and coding to blaspheme against liberal theories of disability rights and rehabilitation imperatives, as well as against the technological essentialisms of disability scholarship. while disability technoscience is often deployed for unwanted cures or enhancements, we contend that it can also be cripped, reclaimed, hacked, and tinkered with to create a more accessible world. crip technoscience is committed to disability justice. crip technoscience aligns with the disability justice movement, with its critique of mainstream disability rights concepts, and its focus on intersectionality, collective liberation, and wholeness. crip technoscience emphasizes that disabled people are not mere consumers of, or objects for, assimilationist technologies, but instead have agential, politicized, and transformative relationships to technoscience. we note that (as a matter of disability justice) disabled people often reject devices that cause pain or lead to infections, refuse pharmaceutical drugs with undesirable effects, discard technologies produced solely to make non-disabled people more comfortable (rather than to make life easier for disabled people), problematize expensive tools crafted by the medical and military-industrial complex, and instead demand more public, widespread forms of access. these critiques and practices align crip technoscience with impurity (shotwell, 2016), embracing the ugly (mingus, 2011), and staying with the trouble (haraway, 2016). while we write from our position as english-speaking, north american, settler and immigrant scholars and makers, we commit to crip technoscience that centers the leadership of those most impacted, including the expertise of black, brown, and indigenous disabled people. we call for a crip technoscience that disrupts the entitlements of whiteness and colonialism in designed spaces and highlights access as a frictioned project requiring decolonization and racial justice. we imagine disability justicehamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 informed crip technoscience as building upon projects such as “open in case of emergency,” a 2017 issue of the asian american literary review edited by mimi khuc, which uses print culture, images, and symbolic imaginaries to hack the diagnostic and statistical manual (dsm). this interactive project draws upon familiar technoscientific objects (such as the dsm), as well as poetry, tarot, and hacked science, to work through asian american intergenerational trauma and displacement. we also imagine crip technoscience allying with emerging work in feminist of color technoscience, such as a recent catalyst “lab meeting” on black lives matter and pedagogy that describes possibilities for extending critical ideas about race, intersectionality, and the environmental construction of health to rehabilitation, immunology, and mental disability (pollock & roy, 2017). crip technoscience is not only in alliance with these projects, but takes the position that they ought to be central to how we imagine accessible futures. in committing to disability justice, crip technoscience explicitly engages the tensions that arise out of taking disabled bodies to be whole, railing against the ways that we are assumed to be damaged, tragic, or in need of cure. to approach disabled bodies by way of wholeness marks the importance of collective, relational, and interdependent approaches to disability. following eli clare, we crip wholeness to include “that which is collapsed, crushed, or shattered” (2017, p. 158), emphasizing that whole and broken are not opposites but rather can be held in productive tension. following a disability justice framework, marking disabled people as whole is to “value our people as they are, for who they are, and understand that people have inherent worth outside of capitalist notions of productivity” (berne & sins invalid, 2016, p. 17). taking up wholeness in this way also addresses the complexity of wanting to both accept disabled bodies as they are while simultaneously desiring to hack, tweak, and otherwise engage and alter our relationships to our bodies and technology. as clare asks, “how can i reconcile my lifelong struggle to love my disabled self exactly as it is with my use of medical technology to reshape my gendered and sexed body-mind?” (2017, p. 175). crip technoscience embraces this contradiction, making space for critically engaging technological hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 intervention while maintaining that such interventions are not compulsory. we find inspiration for crip technoscience and disability justice within what alice sheppard (2019) calls “cultural-aesthetic technoscience,” particularly the ways that disability artistry, performance, and media explore the complexities of wholeness, seeking neither to overcome disability nor lapsing into a celebration of individual difference in and of itself. for example, sins invalid, a performance collective led by queer and disabled people of color, uses live and video performances, along with publications, to convey alternatives to disability rights perspectives centered on assimilation. in their performances, which feature people who use assistive devices such as canes, power wheelchairs, and crutches, deaf people, amputees, and people with non-apparent disabilities, “normative paradigms of ‘normal’ and ‘sexy’ are challenged, offering instead a vision of beauty and sexuality inclusive of all individuals and communities” (sins invalid, 2018). in their publication skin, tooth, and bone (2016), the collective outlines a framework for disability justice organizing that draws on performance and activist work made possible through technology. similarly, the canadian disability arts organization collaborative radically integrated performers society in edmonton (cripsie, 2018) challenges “dominant stories of disability and other forms of oppression, through high-quality crip and mad performance art, video art, and public education and outreach programs” that “celebrate the generative possibilities of ‘disability’ and ‘mental illness,’ in terms of how these experiences can offer important alternative perspectives.” in the dancebased video-art project other-wise, danielle peers and lindsey eales (2013) explore themes of interdependency, access, and wholeness, speaking the movements of their dance as peers’s and eales’s bodies move toward and away from each other, limbs entangling over and around peers’s wheelchair: “lifts. supports. draws me out and pulls me in. connects…we are the chair…we will not overcome, but we are becoming.” performative uses of technology transform the meaning of functional technology from rehabilitative or adaptive to cultural. another site of crip technoscience world-remaking is disability hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 fashion. for example, chun-shan sandie yi’s crip couture project (2017) creates wearable art, tailor-made prosthetics, and orthotics to highlight difference and disability. yi works with unconventional materials, including skin and hair, to engage the contradictions of disability wholeness. designer james shutt’s myostomy project likewise offers lingerie-inspired stoma plugs for colostomy bag users, as well as body art products that aestheticize the stoma (london, 2012). like yi’s work, these interventions transform the typical understanding of assistive technology, rendering it as crip fashion, art, and culture. crip media production is also a tool for producing new representations of disability that challenge disability technoscience discourses. for example, disabled artist sue austin developed a wheelchair that allows her to dive underwater. documenting these experiences in the ocean’s depths, surrounded by blue water and oceanic creatures, austin highlights the joy and freedom of “revisioning the familiar” (2012) by using a wheelchair to negotiate unexpected worlds. appearing in the disability and technology documentary fixed (2014) directed by regan brashear, austin’s work offers ways of “seeing, being, and knowing” with disability that affirms crip world-remaking (austin, 2012). in the digital age, youtube and other online services have become tools for distributing disability justice content. autistic activist mel baggs’s manifesto, “in my language” (2007) (viewed over 1.5 million times as of this writing), uses video and sound to make a strong case for the dignity and personhood of autistic people. in a series of clips, baggs makes sounds, touches objects, and uses their body to move through space. later, baggs shows the same clips with a computer-generated voiceover explaining that moving and feeling are a language. because “the way [baggs] naturally thinks and responds to things looks and feels so different from standard concepts,” “some people do not consider it thought at all, but it is a way of thinking in its own right.” instead, baggs advocates for the agency and power of autistic people, particularly non-speaking people, who are often excluded from mainstream disability narratives. while recognizing the inequitable ways in which many people come hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 to disability, crip technoscience claims disabled life as desirable life, as life worth living, and as a difference that matters. disability rights often foreground a pride-centered framework without acknowledging the relationships between pride and “the violence of social/economic conditions of capitalism” (erevelles, 2011, p. 17). crip technoscience acknowledges that that pride-centric frameworks may make it “difficult to acknowledge the overwhelming suffering that results from colonisation, war, famine, and poverty” (meekosha, 2011, p. 677), such that it becomes crucial to reject “the ways in which disability is presently employed as a mechanism for oppression in the global context” (jaffee, 2016, p. 118). within such contexts, “positive re-envisionings of disability” are not always politically salient (puar, 2017, p. xix). building on disability justice, however, crip technoscience centers the transformative role of disabled people in both technoscientific and activist conditions to both build and dismantle the world toward more just social relations, which includes engaging the “specific sensibilities and discourses” (ben-moshe, 2018) that disability culture offers to refute disability “as a vector of social control” or “a weapon of debilitation” (fritsch & mcguire, in press). following clare, we ask, “how do we witness, name, and resist the injustices that reshape and damage all kinds of bodyminds—plant and animal, organic and inorganic, nonhuman and human— while not equating disability with injustice?” (2017, p. 56). this question acknowledges the messiness of access-making in conditions shaped by colonialism, militarism, and injustice, but also asks us to go further and locate the conditions and transformative power of crip knowing-making under these systems. disabled people use technoscience to survive and alter the very systems that produce disability or attempt to render us as broken. take the example of safwan harb, a disabled syrian refugee with two disabled family members (british broadcasting corporation [bbc], 2016). while living in a refugee camp, harb designed an accessible scooter using found materials, which enabled him and other family members to navigate the camp’s unpaved streets. harb’s invention signifies crip knowing-making in spaces produced through war and displacement. mobility, in this context, is not a hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 tool for reinforcing ablenationalism, productivity, or even rights. but harb’s invention is an outcome of a design process enacted through crip experience. crip technoscience recognizes the non-innocent contexts in which knowledge and access emerge. in some cases, crip technoscience may be an individual knowing and making that reorients the material world. in others, it may be collective, politicized work toward interdependence and justice. building on haraway, we offer crip technoscience as a critical project that holds in tension the unjust imperatives of technoscientific innovation with the transformative capacities to shape matter and meaning through praxis. the point is not to achieve ideological purity outside of mainstream disability technoscience, militarism, or capitalism, but to locate and center threads of resistance already occurring within and against these systems. as technoscience expands beyond cold war–era emphases on militarism to include conditions often deemed innocent or uncontroversial (such as sustainability), disabled people are often caught between imperatives to save resources and enable access (a conflict most recently highlighted by the #strawban debate discussed in alice wong’s piece in this issue). but crip technoscience can offer us a sensibility and set of practices for responding to collective problems such as climate change and pollution. not only do disabled people act as experts and designers in matters of how to reduce single-use plastics such as straws, but we can also draw on our community-generated accessibility and universal design practices to shape responses to the anthropocene. for example, recent studies estimate that volatile organic chemicals (vocs) in fragranced beauty products and aerosol sprays produce more c02 emissions than cars (mcdonald et al., 2018). disabled people with chemical sensitivities or injuries have long advocated for fragrance-free spaces to avoid migraines, brain fog, and illness, in addition to calling for reduced industrial pollution. activists such as piepzna-samarasinha (2018) have not only offered education about fragrance accessibility, but also hacked the production of fragrance-free products. following piepzna-samarasinha, who describes accessibility as an “act of love” (2018, p. 74), crip technoscience imagines the hacking of non-harmful resource use as an act of planetary love through hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 which accessibility for marginalized disabled and chemically injured people can also mitigate chemical harm toward the atmosphere and oceans. these opportunities for hacking and tinkering with pervasive practices such as voc use also show us that crip expertise and ingenuity need not rely on disability pride narratives to challenge global conditions harming human and non-human life. in drawing on disability justice principles, crip technoscience agitates against compulsory ablebodiedness and ablenationalism, and mandates for independence and productivity. it works on multiple scales—from the most basic everyday hacks to organized efforts toward collective access—to materialize accessible futures as those in which bodies need not be perceived as productive, legible, articulate, or beautiful to be understood as important agents of world remaking. conclusion crip technoscience spans historical and contemporary design practices, political activism, scholarly alliances, global systems, and micro-scale resistances. we call for crip technoscience practices that challenge the political economy of technology, particularly as it is ensnared within injustices perpetrated by imperatives to fix, cure, or eliminate disability. crip technoscience struggles for futures in which disability is anticipated and welcomed, and in which all disabled people thrive, regardless of their productivity. by endorsing accessible futures, we refuse to treat access as an issue of technical compliance or rehabilitation, as a simple technological fix, or a checklist. instead, we define access as collective, messy, experimental, frictional, and generative. accessible futures require our interdependence. we center technoscientific activism and critical design practices rooted in disability justice, collective access, and collective transformation toward more socially just disability relations. we call for activists, scholars, and makers to expand possible futures for disabled people. we find crip knowing-making in the design and implementation of architectures, technologies, and infrastructures. we seek broad recognition for, and hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 engagement with, the world-building and -dismantling force of crip technoscience. notes 1 earlier work defined crip technoscience as “experimental practices of knowing-making [that] challenged hierarchies and power relations…by shifting expertise to those with lived experiences of disability and away from the outside experts often designing in their name” (hamraie, 2017, p. 99) and “technoscientific practices…that politicize disabled people’s relationships to technologies produced by the military or pharmaceutical companies, while valuing the technoscientific activism that has characterized disability rights history” (hamraie, 2015, p. 309). 2 liberation technoscience projects have included black panther health activism (see nelson, 2013); feminist reproductive technoscience (see murphy, 2012); act up protests against the us food and drug administration (see epstein, 1996); and the independent living movement’s accessibility activism (see williamson, 2012a, 2012b). crip technoscience connects to historical activism and scholarship while offering a politicized, anti-assimilationist lens for understanding disability in relation to technology. 3 there are, of course, also histories of engagement between disability studies (particularly scholarship on embodiment and culture) and critical approaches to science, technology, and medicine. see casper and koenig (1996); mills (2011); ott, serlin, & mihm (2002); sobchack (2006); and sterne (2001). however, we concur with stuart blume, vasilis galis, and andrés valderrama pineda, who write, “the challenging questions that disability raises for sts go beyond those relating to the politics of technological change to include questions relating to knowing, to knowledge production, and in particular to embodiment” (2013, p. 102). crip technoscience turns to these questions of knowing, making, and doing. 4 “new telethon” references the rehabilitation-centered media events hosted by the late jerry lewis that have been widely contested by disability activists and scholars. see longmore (2015). 5 veteran activism has frequently involved mobility devices. in the 1978 film coming home, a paralyzed veteran chained himself and his hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 24 wheelchair to the front gates of a military base in protest of the war and high rates of veteran suicide. while depicting a radical disability protest, however, the opening screening of the film was held at an inaccessible theater in san francisco. in response, disability activists chained themselves to the front of the building in protest (linton, 2007). similar tactics were used in anti-war and anti-nuclear protests in the 1970s and 1980s (a. finger, personal communication, 2018) and in protest of the war on terror (ollis, 2012). most recently, adapt activists in the united states have used their mobility and assistive devices to protest cuts to healthcare, staging “die-ins” at us senate healthcare policy deliberation meetings (mcbride, 2017). 6 as disability justice activists point out, disability rights approaches are often focused on assimilation into middle-class, white, productive, heteronormative norms. additionally, disability rights are often enforced through “accommodations” that integrate disabled people into mainstream society using standardized formulas and checklists. we 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(2000). national disability activist: architectural and transit accessibility, personal assistance services [an oral history conducted in 1997 by sharon bonney]. volume iii of builders and sustainers of the independent living movement in berkeley. berkeley, ca: regional oral history office, the bancroft library, university of california—berkeley. bios aimi hamraie is assistant professor of medicine, health, & society and american studies at vanderbilt university (nashville, tn). their interdisciplinary research spans disability and feminist theory, architecture and design, and science and technology studies. hamraie is the author of building access: universal design and the politics of disability (university of minnesota press, 2017). hamraie also directs the critical design lab, a multi-institution project focused on disability, design justice, and the lifeworld. kelly fritsch is an assistant professor in the department of sociology and anthropology at carleton university in algonquin territory (ottawa, canada). her research broadly engages crip, queer, and feminist theory to hamraie and fritsch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 33 explore the relations of disability, health, technology, risk, accessibility, and social justice. she is co-editor of keywords for radicals: the contested vocabulary of late-capitalist struggle (2016, ak press) and was a 20152018 banting postdoctoral fellow at the women & gender studies institute, university of toronto. microsoft word vostral-127-1156-8.docx vostral, s.l., (2017). toxic shock syndrome, tampon absorbency, and feminist science. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), page 1-30 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sharra l. vostral, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article toxic shock syndrome, tampon absorbency, and feminist science sharra l. vostral purdue university svostral@gmail.com abstract in 1980, the centers for disease control recommended that women limit their use of superabsorbent tampons since the risk for toxic shock syndrome increased with greater levels of absorption. however, women had no way of following this advice because products did not have consistent absorbency labels. the tampon task force, comprised of manufacturers and consumer advocates, convened to set standards for absorptive capacity as well as nomenclature for all commercial tampon brands. esther rome from the boston women's health book collective participated as a feminist health activist and recruited scientist nancy reame to help generate data on their behalf. importantly, reame rejected the use of blue saline as a menstrual fluid replacement in the syngyna—the synthetic vagina lab instrument—to test tampon absorbency, and insisted upon heparinized blood instead. in the process, the advocates developed a feminist science: they challenged the process by which a standard is established, the method by which variables are controlled, and the erasure of menstrual fluid from tests about tampon 2 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) absorbency. the feminist science yielded both usable and valid outcomes, with results that challenged the design of the experiment upon which industry-wide standards were to be based. introduction on september 6, 1980, twenty-five-year-old patricia kehm died from complications due to toxic shock syndrome (tss). her death, along with seventy-three women and two thousand others sickened between 1970 and 1980 after using superabsorbent tampons, precipitated action ("toxic shock syndrome—united states, 1970–1980," 1981). in the short term, the food and drug administration (fda) pressured procter & gamble to recall rely—the superabsorbent tampon with the highest rate of tss—and the company removed the tampons from store shelves (though other superabsorbent tampons, including those from playtex, tambrands, and kimberly-clark remained on the market). product liability lawsuits, including that of kehm's family against procter & gamble, garnered meager payouts to compensate for injuries and deaths. a less obvious but long-lasting result was the establishment of the tampon task force in 1982. the task force, composed of manufacturers, consumer groups, and feminist health advocates, sought to set uniform standards concerning tampon absorption capabilities and deliver labeling recommendations to the fda. the importance of this was that higher absorptions were linked to higher rates of tss, but women did not have an accurate way of knowing which tampons were more or less absorbent. this essay examines how feminist science influenced the proceedings of the tampon task force and how feminist health advocates initiated the approach. on the task force was esther rome, one of the founders of the boston women's health book collective (bwhbc) and co-authors of our bodies, ourselves (obos). her inclusion marked an important departure from regulation-as-usual with men and corporate representatives setting the policy standards. rome brought to the tampon task force the same tactics she deployed in writing our bodies, ourselves. from the 3 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) bwhbc’s beginning, the founders set out to obtain and distribute medical knowledge about women's health that had been the exclusive purview of mostly male physicians, who were often "condescending, paternalistic, judgmental and noninformative" (boston women’s health book collective, 1973). what these doctors would not provide, the women set out to learn, discover, and take for their own to share with other women. the scene would repeat itself on the tampon task force. when manufacturers would not share data, were not forthcoming, and were not even using menstrual blood for absorption tests, rome solicited feminist scientist nancy reame, a nursing professor at the university of michigan, to generate data on the consumer advocates' behalf. together with other tampon task force members, they insisted upon sharing data amongst all the scientists and the fda regulators, enacting an ethic of feminist science. reame used heparinized blood (blood treated with heparin so it does not coagulate quickly) instead of saline to test tampon absorption rates. it was a watershed moment for consumer groups, feminist health advocates, and women scientists, with feminist science producing data and networks of knowledge based upon the biological materiality of menstruating bodies. thus, at this historical moment when feminists challenged the universality and androcentrism of medicine, the inclusion of a reified "woman" and an understanding of essentialized "women's bodies" was a radical departure.1 feminist ideas privileging women's knowledge and the materiality of women's bodies were critical in shaping science during the 1980s in the face of the unknowns related to toxic shock syndrome. in this case, feminist methods relied upon a universal biological female as the basis for which to establish lab practices and tampon absorbency standards. we now understand this essentialized reading of the female body as conflating gender, sexed bodies, and experiences of menstruation. it makes sense to think of people who have periods—as a category—simply as "menstruators" (bobel, 2010), rather than using gender as a proxy. menstruators might yield different ways of knowing about periods, their management, and related health outcomes 4 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) associated with tampon use. at the time, however, insistence that menstrual blood mattered informed feminist science, which valued not only female bodies but also common-sense research practices that incorporated real-life applicability to menstruators. this approach challenged the privileged position of "fastidious" science as described by epidemiologist alvan feinstein, a shortcoming of which is to eliminate so many variables that context—in this case, that of menstruating bodies—is erased. through feminist science, advocates challenged the process by which a standard was established, the method by which variables were controlled, and the disappearance of menstrual fluid from tests about tampon absorbency. feminist science yielded both usable and valid outcomes, with results that disputed the design of the experiment upon which standards were to be based. the rise of toxic shock syndrome by the 1970s, two separate but significant events converged. first, the new illness of toxic shock syndrome was identified in 1978 (todd, 1978). second, synthetic materials had begun to displace cotton in tampon composition creating a category called "superabsorbent" (tierno, 2001). although tss is not exclusive to people who menstruate, by september of 1980 the centers for disease control (cdc) declared that tss was associated with superabsorbent tampons ("follow-up on toxic-shock syndrome," 1980), thus the majority of cases affected them. although many theories emerged to explain this new link, mike osterholm, an epidemiologist working for the state of minnesota during the 1980s, determined that superabsorbent tampons captured and held air— specifically, oxygen (osterholm, 1982). tampons, especially superabsorbent ones, introduced enough oxygen into the usually anaerobic vaginal canal to change its ecology and promote the growth of staphlococcus aureus, the bacterium responsible for tampon-related tss, in those women who happened to carry this particular strain of 5 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) bacterium. pat schlievert, a microbiologist, identified the co-factors of the tampon creating an aerobic vagina and the naturally occurring higher ph during menses as contributing to tss. the conditions were ideal not only for reproduction of the s. aureus bacterium, but also the production of the toxin tsst-1 (schlievert, 1981). when the toxin transferred into the bloodstream, and if the woman lacked the requisite antibodies and titers for it, it could precipitate organ failure and shock, thus the illness toxic shock syndrome. the three elements of oxygen, bacterium, and lack of antibodies were required for tss to foment. in general, more white women were affected since they were a larger part of the population, but the cdc reported cases of tss across categories of race and ethnicity (mmwr, 1983). toxic shock syndrome occurs in about 1 in 100,000 women, making it a rare occurrence, and cases are not necessarily terminal when treated early enough with antibiotics (hajjeh, 1990). however, for a small segment of women, the risk is quite real. all of this, though, has taken years to understand and was science-in-the-making during the early 1980s. scientists scrambled to understand the most rudimentary elements of the illness and its transmission. by the fall of 1980, it was clear was that something potentially deadly was going on with tampons. procter & gamble removed its successful tampon rely from production and sales, and the cdc and the fda recommended that women use the least absorbent tampon possible (cdc, 1980; vostral, 2011). the fda did not want to suggest banning tampons, due in part to their long safety record since the 1930s. however, without accurate information and labeling, there was no way for women to determine which tampon to purchase with the lowest absorbency. they could not follow guidelines to avoid tamponrelated tss, short of abandoning tampons altogether. feminist interventions in tss women needed accurate information about tampons, and quickly. the 6 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) fda held responsibility for safety and labeling, and reached out to astm for assistance. currently known just by its initials, astm (american society for testing and materials) is a professional organization that develops voluntary consensus standards concerning materials, engineering, and testing practices. everything from steel gauge to screw threads requires agreed-upon standards, and as a technology, tampons were now the focus of negotiation. astm had a special committee known as f-4 to develop standards for medical devices, and tampons fell under its purview. standard setting usually included industry representatives, with astm helping to build consensus among stakeholders. important at this moment was the inclusion not only of producers but users and representatives of "general interest." astm partnered in a new cooperative program with the national consumers league (ncl) to include layperson consumer input into the standard setting process. becky lebuhn (at the time cohen), was the consumer representative from the ncl on the f-4 medical devices committee. she encouraged the f-4 committee to agree to the fda's request to develop a tampon standard, but pointed out that with no other women on the committee, only she qualified as an actual user. a group purporting to represent consumers needed actual tampon users in the standards development effort; an allmale chorus was insufficient. through the ncl, lebuhn volunteered to "assemble a group of women, including representatives of women's health and advocacy organizations" to participate on the task force and make sure women's health and safety concerns were on the table (lebuhn, 2017). in this case it was not just competing industries potentially vying to maintain the upper hand of a design or process but also consumer groups and feminist health advocates who had a stake in their personal safety and well-being. the tampon task force as it came to be known met in january of 1982, seven more times throughout that year, and for the next three years to develop "a tampon standard as expediously (sic) as possible" (ellis, 1982). the following manufacturers, consumer groups, and women's health advocates composed the group: johnson & johnson, kimberly7 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) clark corporation, tambrands, inc., playtex international, bwhbc, coalition for the medical rights for women, empire state consumer association, national consumers league, national women's health network, and woman health international. though the advocacy groups had a unified front, this essay focuses upon the involvement of the bwhbc through its papers archived at the arthur & elizabeth schlesinger library at harvard university. well known for its signature book our bodies, ourselves, the bwhbc began in 1969 in boston as a grassroots group of twelve women sharing frustrations about medical paternalism and the active withholding of information by physicians. the collective grew into a nonprofit, and shaped the women's health movement during the 1970s. bwhbc goals included providing health and medical information in an accurate and understandable way so that women could make informed decisions about birth control, pregnancy, and sexual health, for instance, and thus become their own health experts. within the history of women’s rights, this is characterized as the "difference" approach; that is, placing the female body at the center of politics, knowledge, and power as opposed to the "equality" approach that deemphasizes female biology, in part due to the legacy of discrimination based upon it (kline, 2010). embracing difference, bwhbc advocated for the normalcy of women's life events, from birthing to aging, and challenged frameworks that unnecessarily pathologized their bodies. the relationship of tampons to tss and women's health was therefore a serious concern for bwhbc. esther rome2 had already published a menstruation brochure written in red ink, and was very concerned about the link between menstruation, tampons, and tss. rome was a well-informed feminist activist, and an important voice to include on the tampon task force. her colleague and co-author of the 1984 edition of obos, jill wolhandler, participated intermittently as well. the bwhbc was a significant advocacy group; with its heft representing women, calling upon them for letter writing campaigns, and publishing and distributing our bodies, ourselves, the fda and manufacturers could 8 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) not easily dismiss their concerns. in addition to the consumer representatives, lawyers for the different parties attended meetings as well. david swankin was general counsel for the national consumers league, and becky lebuhn recruited him to the task force. he attended all the meetings and corresponded with the fda and manufacturers and represented their interests. swankin was the first executive director of the white house office of consumer affairs under lyndon johnson, and later worked at the us department of labor. swankin emphasized the dramatic divide between the consumers and manufacturers: "i cannot overstate the cultural gap that governed this entire thing. so there were legal considerations because of what was going on with toxic shock, [and] the cultural thing that just was overwhelming, overwhelming [emphasis in original]” (swankin, 2016). this "cultural thing" was not just the emergence of an active consumer rights contingent but feminism-in-action. the feminist advocates challenged assumptions, questioned language, and embodied a new approach. together, they required the men to acknowledge and bear witness to the materiality and biological functioning of their bodies. swankin recalled that an fda representative came to one of the first meetings and said "you know, everything is a balance in medicine, even an aspirin can kill you." this approach was not well received by the advocates or rome herself. swankin remembered rome arguing: "excuse me," she says "i think that is probably true, but this is not medicine. it [menstruation] is a normal everyday process that half the world goes through and to treat it like an illness and therefore to say what you have is a risk/benefit, it is a risk you have to take into account, there is no benefit." and they did not like that. justifying risk to treat an infection or illness with medicine was one thing; a healthy person assuming the risk of death by wearing a superabsorbent tampon was quite another. thus, the standpoints of the manufacturers, the fda, and consumer advocates were quite stark. characterizing their competing positions, swankin compared them to entrenched international adversaries. “so right away it was like dealing with the north 9 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) koreans to try to settle the problem. you couldn't do it because it was from such different perceptions” (swankin, 2016). rome had a dynamic personality, and was not shy about getting her larger points across. swankin recalled that at one of the first meetings, "esther, comes in in a white dress…she was nursing her baby, and she was nursing [him] at the meeting. it was not enough to cover her breast; we're doing natural things here. you should have seen these guys [lawyers in the three-piece suits]. they were gulping, gulping, gulping," their discomfort palpable about the perceived impropriety. swankin continued with his recollection of the scene, with rome saying, "[you] know. we don't have to actually do anything. we can bleed all over our dresses; they do in many, many places. i don't know if you appreciate that, but it wouldn't bother me if we couldn't do something here. maybe that's the alternative." here, a veiled threat of abandoning tampons for an "alternative" approach reminded the corporate representatives of the collective influence millions of tampon wearers had on their future profits. rome, in a way, was living evidence of the political power of reproductive processes. with her behavior rome challenged multiple norms: do not bring a baby to a business meeting, do not expose a breast in public, do not breastfeed in public, do not "free bleed" on a white dress. with her very body she offered evidence that had been excluded from the realm of common knowledge amongst these male corporate representatives and she demanded that they understand women's bodies differently. she also requested that payment for a babysitter of her choice be included in her travel expenses, although it was not deemed a legitimate cost of the trip to philadelphia for the meetings. her ability to push these boundaries was crucial because corporate representatives had not been confronted by menstrual realities in this visceral way. though they had significant familiarity with their companies, marketing strategies, and the tampon as an object of manufacturing, they had little grasp of consumer expectations, preferences, and actual experience using tampons, and no embodied understanding of how well the tampons functioned (or not). this was 10 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) exactly why becky lebuhn knew that women needed to be the major voice on the tampon task force. simply by inhabiting their gendered male bodies, the corporate representatives did not have to participate in the social norms required to hide menstrual fluid. they were exonerated from the disproportionate cost of possible illness and death borne upon their bodies due to tampon-associated tss. swankin recalled that the manufacturers really did not understand—or chose not to understand—the feminist advocates and consumer stakeholders, and their usual mode of business thinking did not help. the corporate representatives fell into de facto salesmanship, which pandered to the women rather than engaging their legitimate concerns. as swankin put it: [o]ne time they brought in stephan–wife [stepford-wife] types to the meeting, and the discussion that time was deodorants [in tampons]…the women that they brought were all dressed up, absolute straight out of new york ad agencies, and they had prepared expensive sample kits to pass out, of all the different things, and everybody threw in what they wanted to give them, in this little goody basket (swankin, 2016). the "freebie" baskets were ironically filled with the very deodorant tampons and products for which the women sought safety regulations and also had no intention of ever using. lebuhn, who continued to serve as the convener and secretariat for the advocacy groups, felt that it was very condescending, as if the companies were trying to influence the consumer representatives with token gifts (lebuhn, 2017). swankin concurred, noting that the advocates "refused to take them. but that's another example, of obviously, they [the corporate reps] thought that by…taking a madison avenue approach that they [the consumer groups] were going to say 'ah, i see what you are trying to do.'" and that was to get them to agree with the manufacturers that the products were perfectly fine as they were. swankin concluded that the corporate representatives "just had zero connection in their minds to what people wrote [our bodies, ourselves] and their allies," as he put it, which 11 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) included not only all the consumer advocates at the meeting but the strong grass-roots network that each organization cultivated. it took awhile for the manufacturers to realize that the feminist health advocates and consumer groups would not easily be swayed and that they had multiple concerns. there were other tampon-related problems besides just a lack of absorbency standards: tensil strength of string so it would not break, particulates sloughing and fraying from the tampon's "pledget" wadding, applicators that cut vaginal skin, allergic reactions to embedded perfumes and deodorants, undisclosed leachable chemicals, and overall general "biocompatibility" (kobren, 1981). since none of this was tested for or regulated, it was an opportunity for sweeping policy recommendations. in this regard, a significant point of contention for the health advocates was the lack of available scientific data about any of these issues. the consumer groups had the burden of proof on their side since cdc scientists as well state epidemiologists had reported a significant association with superabsorbent tampons and an increased risk of tss (osterholm, 1982). additionally, manufacturers still could not prove definitively that tampons were uninvolved. manufacturers were not forthcoming with all their data, calling it "proprietary," though swankin felt results could have been easily squelched if they did not serve corporate needs. furthermore, corporate lawyers were well aware of product liability lawsuits filed against all the manufacturers related to both bodily harm and deaths resulting from tampon-related tss, the most well publicized and successful being kehm v. procter & gamble (1982), concerning patricia kehm's death resulting from the use of rely tampons (riley, 1986). the issue of data sharing and the integrity of the corporatesponsored research was a serious concern. at the outset, the consumer advocates were at a disadvantage without their own scientific research lab to double-check data and results. the manufacturers possessed a depth of scientific know-how with engineers, biologists, animal labs, and money to run any number of tests. the consumer groups had no such resources or facilities. furthermore, swankin reflected, "[t]he 12 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) manufacturers, nobody believed them…it was going to be bought research." he added, "[t]here were all these allegations [about proprietary studies], that if the study was legitimate, and it came out and it didn't say what they wanted it to hear they'd kill it, so we'd never see it anyway." due to the lack of open sharing, and fears of proprietary secrets being revealed not only to corporate rivals but the broader public, the data collected was not made available to the advocates to examine. furthermore, astm would not pay for tests at the behest of the consumer groups. within the negotiating structure, they were at the mercy of manufacturers and data produced by in-house scientists who chose whether or not to share. the consumer groups had no way to evaluate the validity of scientific presentations without their own lab to corroborate or challenge the methods and data. this was about to change. fighting fire with fire if absorbency was the key factor to convey in warning labels, it was important to have data on it. the tampon task force was charged with creating a standard for measuring absorbency and a standard for intralaboratory results. the consumer groups and health advocates wanted one that was not solely in service of the manufacturers, and at the same time through their presence they did not want to give tacit approval for a hollow standard (memo, 1983). the consumer groups recognized that they needed a sympathetic scientist with access to a lab to help them translate their feminist intents through the language of science to the other manufacturers at the negotiating table. they found this in nancy reame. reame met rome in the late 1970s at a small conference sponsored by the society for menstrual cycle research (smcr). she held a master of science in nursing and was just finishing her phd in physiology, focusing on reproductive sciences. she had always been interested in women's reproductive health, including the endocrinology of 13 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) menstruation, and was headed toward a tenure-track position in the school of nursing at the university of michigan. later in her career, reame was named to the institute of medicine and became a fellow with the american association for the advancement of science. her work on endocrinology and menstrual health brought her to the smcr meeting. there, reame learned about the problematic politics of tampons. first, she got a crash course in tampon testing from a newly hired researcher at kimberly-clark corporation, the manufacturer of kotex sanitary napkins and tampons, whom she met at the conference. this researcher, referred to here as "karen," confided in reame about the overall lack of understanding the corporate scientists had about all things vaginal and menstrual. reame summarized the essence of their conversation. [karen] said "[y]ou would be amazed how tampons are tested by the industry…they hired me because i'm the first reproductive physiologist they have in the feminine care division. it's all paper chemists. it's all men. they don't use menstrual fluid. they don't use blood of any kind. they use blue dyed saline water. it's pretty clear it's repugnant to talk about menstrual blood much less work with it in the lab." and she [karen] said, "[w]hat's worse, they don't even understand the functioning of the female human vagina." and she said "[t]hey hired me, [and] as part of the interview when i sat down, they said could i please draw a human vagina, just the anatomy?" reame commented, [a]nd that was pretty much the extent of her interview…they knew enough to go after a physiologist, but two other male candidates were vying for the job: one a primate specialist, one a guinea pig physiologist, and she herself was a basic scientist in reproductive physiology. [karen] said, "i was working with guinea pigs, but i have a vagina, and i knew enough about basic anatomy that i drew the right relationship of the vagina and uterus from my anatomy class," and she said, "and i got the job." and she said "[t]hat just 14 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) shows the level of ignorance in the feminine care industry; no wonder something serious was going to happen" (reame, 2016). the conversation left an impression upon reame about the systematic misunderstanding of women's bodies in relation to menstruation and tampon development. following this meeting, karen invited reame to neenah, wisconsin and the headquarters of kimberly-clark corporation to present her dissertation work on the biology of menstruation. the seminar resulted in a one-year, $25,000 contract to conduct viscosity studies of menstrual fluid. this late-1970s interaction was the last of reame's connection to the company. the second important result of attending the smcr conference was that reame met esther rome. rome had not forgotten her. after the first two meetings of the tampon task force, it was clear that the health advocates needed scientific help, and rome reached out to reame. reame remembered rome, saying to her ‘you're not going to believe this! they expect us to just buy into their data! we aren't going to do that. we need somebody who can do this!’ (reame, 2016). rome further explained to reame why it was so important to get her on board. reame recalled her saying, "[y]ou are the only person in the country that's ever worked with menstrual blood! we don't want an epidemiologist, we don't want someone who can crunch the numbers, we want someone who's actually done some clinical research." i said of course! i love it! this sounds like such an adventure! (reame, 2016). reame joined forces (receiving $2,500 for the lab studies) and attended the meetings alongside rome, swankin, and the others, thus legitimizing their position. swankin explained, "nancy was the connection to the science; she could explain deep science" and had a fluid way of doing so, and she "played that role of connecting science to activists." in addition, reame had "a very important function; they [the corporate representatives and lawyers] respected her, you couldn't laugh at her, you couldn't make believe she wasn't there" (swankin, 2016). with reame on board, the consumer groups and feminist advocates could 15 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) participate in a more robust manner, matching science with science. setting a test method: the syngyna the syngyna—a synthetic-vagina test apparatus—was a device designed to measure tampon absorbency. it was developed in 1958 by g. w. rapp, a professor of biochemistry and physiology at loyola university chicago for the campana corporation, which manufactured pursettes tampons (rapp, n.d). as his lab report explains, rapp first devised some basic methods to measure absorbency, such as dripping a measured amount of fluid on a tampon or dunking a tampon in a flask filled with fluid until it reached full capacity, but neither seemed to replicate body temperature, muscular pressure, or angle and positioning of a vaginallyworn tampon. he tried developing an "in vivo" test using women as test subjects but rejected this approach because they presented too many uncontrollable variables. as a result, he devised a glass vacuum tube with a hydrostatic head, and inside the tube a condom pulled taunt served as the vaginal orifice. it was surrounded by a warm water bath to simulate body temperature (figure 1 and figure 2). the hydrostatic head controlled the flow rate of the liquid entering the syngyna chamber. (to see a modern version in use go to "tampons—syngyna test by sgs" on you tube, https://youtu.be/kyxuqdzsg4o.) the absorption testing methodology called for either a saline solution or a viscous material called "blue goo"—composed of cellulose gum, glycerol, sodium chloride, sodium bicarbonate and water—to be used as the control (rapp, n.d.). to make this a "known" in an experiment, it made sense to produce a fluid with consistent elements that any decent lab technician could create. this helped to eliminate variables and focus upon the unknown properties of the tampons, each with their various sizes, shapes, and absorbencies. the syngyna apparatus and test method circulated throughout the industry as a means of determining tampon absorbencies, but it had not been scrutinized in terms of its efficacy to set a federal standard. this was one of the goals 16 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) of the tampon task force. thus, the bureau of medical devices, a division of the fda, and the manufacturers began using the syngyna test to assess its accuracy across brands, but the consumer groups and feminist health advocates were left out until nancy reame joined them. the task force accepted reame as a peer scientist, and one of the manufacturers sent her the specialized syngyna lab apparatus to begin. she said that when it arrived, there were plenty of jokes about it in her allfemale lab, including speculations about "vagina envy." they named theirs sally (reame, 2017). the very basis of the standardizing process was questionable to reame and the health advocates. the syngyna was a poor representation of the dynamic vagina, and its methodology excluded real menstrual fluid. the feminists questioned whether or not the saline was a sufficient standin for menses, which was complex during any given menstrual cycle, containing proteins, mucus, and cellular debris as well as blood. this labmade representation of menstrual blood was decidedly synthetic, and not in any way a natural product of a woman's body. what kind of effect would a simulated product rather than menstrual fluid have upon absorbency? the consumer advocates did not know, and even if the industry scientists had any inkling, they certainly were not going to say, for fear of revealing anything they perceived as proprietary or legally incriminating. the convenient de-gendered and dehumanized syngyna erased all forms of difference, from the size of the vaginal canal, with its shape, angle, elasticity, length, and circumference, to the fluids coming from it, eliminating vagaries of menstrual fluid from watery to clotted and its rates as well as volume, which women would never conceptualize and measure in grams anyhow. perturbed, reame recalled that even the canal itself was represented by a condom, "sheik" unlubricated #9, loaded with racialized and ethnic overtones (reame, 2017). the reduction of vaginal canals to one form and shape had a long history with tampon developers. earle cleveland haas, a doctor of osteopathy and the inventor of the tampax tampon in the 1930s, held a 17 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) similarly dismissive attitude. when asked if he measured any part of the vagina or cervix during the development of tampax, haas remarked, "i have seen so damn many of them i had an idea. some are short and some are longer, of course, but that didn't make any difference" (kehm v. procter & gamble, p. 1179). reame wondered aloud what kind of testing device women might devise, for surely it would not involve a condom. reame challenged this entrenched legacy of reducing menstruation to a simplistic mechanical process disconnected from the materiality of bodies and launched a research program to alter the science. by 1983, reame's lab at the university of michigan became one of the eight (she estimates) to test the differences in absorbency amongst the pooled tampon samples across a range of categories (regular, super, and super-plus) provided to her by the other manufacturers. her lab was on par with the industry labs, which was critical in terms of legitimacy, especially since she was the sole investigator to test tampon absorption of blood. in her prior studies for kimberly-clark, she tapped into her ob/gyn nursing network and asked the labor and delivery nurses to collect their own menstrual fluid in a menstrual cup called a tassaway. for the syngyna experiments, she dropped by the hospital blood bank to gather outdated donated blood, which the technicians were more than happy to offload. (these were the days before hiv and there were no irb protocols, so this grassroots approach was a creative and pragmatic solution.) early on in planning the design of the studies, reame had proposed to the task force using heparinized blood as a comparative test fluid against saliva at all eight study sites, but was told by several industry scientists that such an approach would simply not be realistic under laboratory conditions (although no data were ever presented she pointed out). deciding to proceed anyway with testing both saline and blood, she was pleasantly surprised when the donated blood performed as well as a reproducible test fluid (reame, 2016). reame reflected on the results and commented, "the overall findings were pretty close to what i showed in my lab, which makes me think they were all pretty on target," but "i couldn't get a handle of how 18 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) similar my data were with everybody else's, although they all…had to contribute and show data, but nobody wanted to say [what they had]. that just made me mad. that's just not the way [we do things]. we're used to sharing." here, her understanding of both good science and feminist science came to the fore. there was not an open practice of sharing data, and swankin felt that the industry folks were always hedging for the next lawsuit, worrying about every possible implication of the data in terms of liability. this was not entirely unwarranted since procter & gamble had been successfully sued for product liability due to injuries and deaths related to rely tampons, and there were at least one thousand cases in the works against them alone (gruber, 1989; vostral, 2011). swankin also recalled that the litigation lawyers were a different crew than the task force lawyers, indicating an extensive legal department to look out for each of the manufacturers interests, yet another challenge for the resource-deprived consumer groups. the report that reame submitted to the tampon task force titled "comparison of syngyna fluid and venous blood using the syngyna absorbancy (sic) test" drew attention to some important differences in findings between saline and heparinized blood (reame, 1983). esther rome and jill wolhandler also chimed in with reame in the "letters" section of jama, the journal of the american medical association, bringing feminist science to established and mainstream medicine. as they saw it, there were "questions about the statistical validity of the analysis of test data presented to the task force" in which the results using saline and heparinized blood were different. "although the relative ranking of the product does not change," they stated, "the differences in absolute absorbency seem significantly different at the higher absorbencies, with much more blood being absorbed" (rome, wolhandler, & reame, 1988, p. 686). this raised the concern that some tampons might be miscategorized as less absorbent than they actually were; when presented with menstrual fluid they would absorb more than they did with saline. this had potential health ramifications if women thought that they were using a less-absorbing tampon due to the way it 19 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) was potentially mislabeled. here, the very basis of the standard could be inherently flawed due to the use of a less-than-ideal synthetic fluid in the lab protocol. for the consumer groups and feminist advocates, the goals of the study were to establish absorbency ranges measured in grams of fluid, which then correlated with an agreed-upon nomenclature such as regular, super, and super-plus. the manufacturers argued on both fronts. they wanted decent margins within a category due to the fact that not every tampon, even from the same lot number, is exactly the same. for example, a box of regulars could contain tampons that absorbed more or less, and the manufacturers wanted these allowances likely because the machinery was not calibrated for this kind of precision (swankin, 2016). the other hurdle was nomenclature, since the terms used were generated by marketing departments. both tampax and playtex produced super tampons, but playtex absorbed far more. regularizing the super designation would force material changes for one or both. as these companies were fierce business competitors, the stakes were high concerning the implications of the standards for market share and costs. the naming of the sizes remained a problem. several ideas were floated. one was to do nothing and just list the grams of absorption. this allowed advertisers to use any words they wanted to describe the product, which would prolong the misunderstandings. another was to create a scale similar to sunscreen, with higher numbers correlating with higher absorption, also conveyed numerically in grams. this, rome insisted, was equally confusing and misleading (rome & wolhandler, 1985). steve fellman, the lawyer representing tambrands, inc., described how manufacturers suggested offering "small, medium, large, and extra large" as possible terminology, but this was not well received (fellman, 2016). the implication was that this system correlated to vaginal size rather than tampon absorbency, which had no relationship to one another. the task force as a whole, however, never came to any 20 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) agreements and disbanded by 1985. rome and wolhandler wrote a letter to the living section of the new york times indicating "[o]ne thing we learned from the tampon task force is that the materials used in tampons have not been tested adequately. most have never been studied in the vaginal environment" (rome & wolhandler, 1985). furthermore, rome wrote that the manufacturers ultimately agreed "on an industry standard for the syngyna test that is similar to the test proposed by the american society of testing and materials and that continues to have the same flaws" (rome, wolhandler, & reame, 1988). fellman may have had influence behind the scenes with manufacturers, however, breaking the stalemate amongst them. whether it was his personality, the fact that tambrands had not succumbed to the "absorbency wars" (as they were referred to in-house), or that the company simply had less to lose, he likely helped convince some manufacturers to agree to absorbency ranges and terminology. but this still included the flaw mentioned by rome: the use of saline rather than blood or menstrual fluid in the syngyna test. even though the tampon task force did not achieve its goals, letter-writing campaigns to the fda spearheaded by bwhbc and a lawsuit brought against the fda by the public citizen health research group pressured the agency to act on the issue of labeling, which was still unresolved (public citizen, 1988). the judge ruled in the consumers' favor that the fda must publish a final regulation by october 31, 1989. the final categories for absorption by grams as well as nomenclature came that year, with standardized labeling for tampons effective in march of 1990 (cdc, 1990; farley, 1991). the final standards were defined in terms of ranges, while keeping the same language of the marketers, though regularizing the meaning: 6 g or less (junior absorbency), greater than 6 g up to and including 9 g (regular absorbency), greater than 9 g up to and including 12 g (super absorbency) or greater than 12 g up to and including 15 g (super plus absorbency) (federal register). that information about absorptive ranges and their correlating definition was finally encoded into federal policy was a success. these ranges and 21 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) descriptive terms were non-negotiable elements for the consumer groups and health advocates from the very beginning. their influence upon the tampon task force is printed upon every box of tampons by its display of absorbency ranges, so that women can have accurate information about their tampons in an effort to best match their menstrual flow. the elusive pursuit of standards despite the success of labeling in terms of grams and nomenclature, the feminist advocates felt shortchanged. they had far greater ambitions for tampon safety and wanted to address chemical residue in deodorant tampons and their perfumes, string breakage, plastic applicator lacerations, and overall material safety. they wanted standards for these things, but in the end they all got dropped. in part, early conversations by the task force about these agenda items helped the manufacturers delay discussions about the real issue of absorbency, and detracted from the greater goal at hand. at a certain point, the consumer groups and health advocates realized they needed to distill their efforts to focus on one issue rather than diluting things with lots of demands, though they were legitimate. they were unable to get all the industry scientists on board to use any form of blood, which ironically would seem to offer more accuracy in terms of replicating real life conditions. it may also be that there was not a critical mass of feminist scientists in the room to overcome the prevailing norm for saline. even sydney wolfe of the public citizen health research group, who supported labeling and helped to sue the fda, sided against feminist science in support of saline. he argued that because blood came from different sources, it was simply impossible to reproduce lab conditions and standardize tests, thus saline was the best test fluid upon which to base absorbency standards (wolfe, 1987). the results for both saline and blood did yield the same rank order of tampons, so using blood was not necessarily required, though the protest about the higher absorbency of blood was never resolved and tampon users remain in the dark about this important piece of 22 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) information. yet, the very act of offering an alternative means of envisioning the methodology and providing data challenged dominantly held views about the insignificance of menstrual fluid. the women’s health advocates, and especially the influence of esther rome, was felt beyond the standard setting process. some of the men were personally affected by their involvement with the task force. swankin acknowledged he got "a real education" from the women on the task force, and he appreciated the way rome raised her points. steven fellman, the lawyer who represented tampax, inc. took a copy of our bodies, ourselves home to his wife due to meeting rome, something he would not have done otherwise (fellman, 2016). conclusion the process to agree upon an absorbency standard suffered on multiple fronts during the 1980s: president ronald reagan's administration was unsupportive of new federal regulations, industries resisted changes to tampon packaging and product design since they threatened profitability, and there was no critical mass of feminist scientists on board with the proposed methodology. though the task force disbanded without agreement in 1985, the process of bringing consumer groups, health advocates, and corporate representatives together marked an important precedent in standard setting. furthermore, some of the goals of the feminist health advocates were included in federal labeling guidelines appearing five years after the last official meeting of the tampon task force. the need for more precise labeling and testing remains. categorized as class ii medical devices, tampon contents are considered "trade secrets" and not publicly disclosed, so there is still no way to know what materials or chemicals they may contain, even when a new product is introduced, or how they might relate to tss. carolyn maloney (d-ny) introduced the tampon safety and research act in 1997, renamed the robin danielson act regarding tampon safety, in recognition of danielson’s death due to tss in 1998. for nearly twenty years maloney 23 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) has pursued this legislation, to no avail. it would require independent research upon tampons and sanitary napkins to gauge their health impact, and content labeling similar to clothing or food (h.r. 1708, 2015). this basic information is long overdue, and the threat of a house bill along with grassroots protests have compelled some manufacturers such as kimberly-clark (kotex) and procter & gamble (tampax, always) to list ingredients (kounang, 2015). this historical case study points to the significant implications of consumer groups and feminist advocates using tactics learned while writing our bodies, ourselves and deploying them in the federal regulation process by producing their own scientific data. it also highlights the importance of feminist ideas privileging women's understandings of their own bodies to shape science during the 1980s, in the face of the unknowns related to toxic shock syndrome. though the overall lab methods employed may seem conventional, the testing of actual blood when it was purposely excluded demonstrates resistance to status quo scientific practice. importantly it asserts the primacy of bodily experiences to menstruation and esther rome's insistence upon flesh, vaginal orifices, and menstrual blood being inseparable from the tampon as a technology—women's bodies were the requisite context. the syngyna summarily detached menstruation and tampons from women's embodied experiences by instrumentalizing them for lab purposes. women and their bodies were invisiblized and simulated by technoscientific apparatus, with differences erased and then standardized into glass, tubing, and latex condoms (which, incidentally, come in various sizes to accommodate differently shaped penises). all difference between women was extricated; the resulting data from the syngyna test were more "real" than could be gathered from a flesh-andblood person. yet, the quality of the data drawn upon to set policy recommendations was absolutely crucial to absorption standardization. feminist science both questioned assumed lab practices as well as devised new methods, insisting upon the biological materiality of menstruating bodies in an effort to accurately label tampon boxes and 24 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) therefore stem the rates of tampon-related tss. figure 1. image of the syngyna apparatus glass tubing with tampon. in dixie farley (1990, february), preventing tss: new tampon labeling lets women compare absorbencies, fda consumer 24(1), 8. 25 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) figure 2. line drawing of syngyna lab apparatus. in d. e. marlowe, r. m. weigle and r. s. stauffenberg, (1981, may), “measurement of tampon absorbency test method evaluation,” fda, bureau of medical devices, report 81-013, schlesinger library, bwhbc, box 29, folder 2. 26 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) notes 1 the term "women" is used in its historical sense in this essay, since that was the common parlance of the moment. 2 esther rome passed away in 1995, and her papers are part of the bwhbc records at the arthur & elizabeth schlesinger library on the history of women in america. references bobel, c. (2010). new blood: third-wave feminism and the politics of menstruation. new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. boston women’s health book collective (1973). preface. in boston women’s health book collective, our bodies, ourselves: a book by and for women. accessed at http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/history/preface-to-the-1973-editionof-our-bodies-ourselves/ centers for disease control (1990, june 29). historical perspectives reduced incidence of menstrual toxic-shock syndrome—united states, 1980–1990. mmwr weekly, 39(25), 421–423. retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001651.htm centers for disease control (1980, september 19). follow-up on toxicshock syndrome. mmwr weekly, 29(37), 441–445. ellis, w. (1982, january 22). wayne ellis to f. alan anderson. schlesinger library, bwhbc, box 29, folder 2. farley, d. (1990, february), preventing tss: new tampon labeling lets women compare absorbencies, fda consumer 24(1), 8. 27 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) federal register. (1989, october 26). department of health and human services. section 801.430. 54(26), 43771. feinstein, a. (1988, december 2) scientific standards in epidemiologic studies of the menace of daily life. science, 242(4883), 1257–1263. fellman, s. (2016, july 12). interview with author. friedenfelds, l. (2010). the modern period: menstruation in twentiethcentury america. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. gruber, w. (1989, march 27). after 8 years, procter still not free of the rely controversy. chicago tribune. retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-0327/business/8903300138_1_procter-gamble-pampers-diapers-productliability-suits h.r. 1708, robin danielson feminine hygiene product safety act of 2015. retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/1708/text hajjeh r.a., reingold a., weil, a., shutt, k., schuchat, a., & perkins, b.a. (1999, november–december). toxic shock syndrome in the united states: surveillance update, 1979–1996. emerging infectious disease, 5(6), 807–810. kline, w. (2010). bodies of knowledge: sexuality, reproduction, and women's health in the second wave. chicago, il: university of chicago press. kobren, l. (1981, september 24). standard for performance characteristics of menstrual tampons. schlesinger library, bwhbc box 28 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 29, folder 2. kounang, n. (2015, november 13). what’s in your pad or tampon? cnn health. retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/health/whats-inyour-pad-or-tampon/index.html lebuhn, b. (2017, february 5). correspondence with author. lebuhn, b. (2017, march 7). interview with author. martin, e. (1987). the woman in the body: a cultural analysis of reproduction. boston, ma: beacon press. memo (1983, october 1). consumer members of tampon task force. schlesinger library, bwhbc, box 29, folder 2. michael l. kehm v. procter & gamble. united states courthouse, cedar rapids, iowa. april 5, 1982. osterholm, m., davis, j. p., gibson, r. w., mandel j. s., wintermeyer, l. a., helms, c. m., forfang, j. c., rondeau j., vergeront, j. m., & the investigative team (1982). tri-sate toxic-shock syndrome study. i. epidemiologic findings. journal of infectious diseases, 145(4), 431–440. public citizen (1988, june 1). press release: fda sued for failing to require tampon absorbency labels. schlesinger library, bwhbc box 33, folder 11. rapp, g.w. (n.d.). a comparison of the absorptive efficiency of commercial catamenial tampons. schlesinger library, bwhbc box 29, folder 2. reame, n. (2017, january 30 & february 10). correspondence with 29 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) author. reame, n. (2016, april 6). interview with the author. reame, n. to swankin, d., with attached report (1983, may 23). schlesinger library, bwhbc folder 34, box 1. riley, t. (1986). the price of a life: one woman's death from toxic shock. bethseda, md: adler & adler. rome, e., & wolhandler, j. (1985, august 18). toxic shock syndrome. the new york times. retrived from http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/28/garden/l-toxic-shock-syndrome224765.html. rome e., wolhandler, j., & reame, n. (1988). the absorbency of tampons. jama, 259(5), 685–686. schlievert, p.m., shands, k. n., dan, b. b., schmid g. p., & nishimura, r. d. (1981). identification and characterization of an exotoxin from staphylococcus aureus associated with toxic-shock syndrome. journal of infectious diseases, 143(4), 509–516. swankin, d. (2016, february 24). interview with author. tierno, p. (2001). the secret life of germs: what they are, why we need them, and how we can protect ourselves against them. new york, ny: atria books. todd, j., fishaut, m., kapral, f., & welch, t. (1978). toxic-shock syndrome associated with phage-group-i staphylococci. lancet, 2(8100),1116–1118. 30 vostral catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) “toxic shock syndrome—united states, 1970-1980.” (1981, january 30) mmwr, 30(3), 25–26. “update: toxic shock syndrome–united states.” (1983, august 5). mmwr, 32(30), 398–400. retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000119.htm vostral, s. (2008). under wraps: a history of menstrual hygiene technology. lanham, md: lexington. vostral, s. (2011). rely and toxic shock syndrome: a technological health crisis. yale journal of biology and medicine, 84(4), 447–459. wolfe, s. (1987). dangerous delays in tampon absorbency warnings. jama, 258(7), 949–951. bio sharra l. vostral is an associate professor of history in the college of liberal arts, and affiliated with programs in women's, gender & sexuality studies, and american studies at purdue university. linden & sullivan review     review of malignant: how cancer becomes us (university of california press, 2013) and teratologies: a cultural study of cancer (routledge, 1997)    lisa lindén linköping university lisa.linden@liu.se mairead sullivan emory university mairead.sullivan@emory.edu "cancer, in all its nounishness, refers to everything… and nothing" -s. lochlann jain, malignant: how cancer becomes us "the narrativization of the struggle against cancer is not only present in the accounts of personal experience, it pervades all representations of the disease." -jackie stacey, teratologies: a cultural study of cancer s. lochlann jain's 2013 book malignant: how cancer becomes us tracks how cancer has become so thoroughly embedded in the fabric of u.s. culture. roughly fifteen years earlier, cultural studies theorist jackie stacey's teratologies: a cultural study of cancer mapped the ways in which cultural fabrics shape cancer narratives. the inaugural publication of catalyst has presented an opportunity for the editors to bring jain and stacey into conversation and to engage the shifts, overlaps, and discontinuities between these two studies. reading malignant and teratologies through the multifaceted field of feminist science and technology studies sheds light on theoretical consistencies and changes in the time between their publications. this review, which follows the conversation between the authors, is intended to further help locate these books in the broadening theoretical landscape of sts as well as feminist and queer studies. while jain and stacey's projects are very different, they share many intellectual and methodological commitments. both scholars are strongly interdisciplinary, as reflected not only in malignant and teratologies but also in their training as well as current institutional appointments. jain trained with donna haraway in the interdisciplinary history of consciousness program at the university of california santa cruz and is currently appointed as professor in the department of anthropology at stanford university. jain's first book, injury: the politics of product design and safety law in the united states (2006) draws upon anthropology and sts to examine how harm is conceptualized in u.s. liability law and post-injury litigation. jain has also contributed to jonathan metzl and anna kirkland's against health: how health become the new morality (2010), an anthology that draws upon fields such as sts, anthropology, disability studies and feminist theory to critically interrogate health cultures from inside biomedical and public health studies as well as sts. stacey was trained at the centre for contemporary cultural studies at the university of birmingham and, until 2007, was appointed in the department of sociology and the institute for women's studies at lancaster university—an academic setting where, in addition to stacey, scholars such as sarah franklin and maureen mcneil were working at the intersections of feminist theory, cultural studies and sts. early in her career, along with sarah franklin and celia lury, stacey co-edited the anthology off-centre: feminism and cultural studies (1991). this collection was primarily concerned with the intersection of cultural studies and feminist theory, however, it also announced feminist cultural studies of science and technology as an important working area. stacey engaged the intersection between feminist cultural studies and sts further in global nature, global culture (2000), a volume also co-edited with franklin and lury, in which imaginaries of life, nature, scale, and technoscience are examined. stacey's first single-authored book, star gazing: hollywood cinema and female spectatorship (1994), detailed how women's experiences of cinema were shaped by their experiences of time and place. the book was the first sustained account to bring together feminist psychoanalytic theory of film and birmingham school sociology.  stacey's most recent book, the cinematic life of the gene(2010), reads contemporary anxieties about cloning, as articulated in films addressing the topic, through a feminist and queer lens. stacey is currently appointed in the department of media and cultural studies at manchester. in addition to their shared commitment to interdisciplinarity, both authors draw on their own illness experience, specifically cancer, to theorize the wider social and cultural constructions of illness. in this way, malignant and teratologies join such important works as audre lorde's the cancer journals (1980), eve sedgwick's essay "white glasses" (1991), and, more recently, mel chen's animacies (2012). jain's engagement with cancer's entrenchment in a number of social and technological shifts of the 20th century is reminiscent of and builds upon rachel carson's silent spring (1965). similarly, stacey begins with susan sontag's illness and metaphor (1978) but pivots the argument to show that it is not only the patient experience that is saturated with metaphorical meaning but the whole field of biomedical science. by bringing their own experiences and expertise to bear on these longstanding conversations, both authors offer new inroads with important implications for feminist and queer engagements in sts. in malignant, jain begins with her own cancer diagnosis and moves outward through topics as varied as pathology reports, tort law, the us war machine, and the commodification of cancer research as branding tool. cancer, jain argues, tracks with an "everywhereand nowhereness" (p. 184). cancer surrounds us—from the ubiquitous ribbons campaigns to the endless media hype about risks, diagnosis rates, and the search for a cure. and yet these cultural representations of cancer eclipse the way in which cancer has come to infuse nearly every facet of u.s. culture and recent history. by situating cancer as part of a constellation of social, political, and legal networks, jain argues that the very institutions and social movements that claim to be working against cancer are, in fact, also bound to its production and persistence. jain demonstrates how the construction of cancer as a disease reaches far beyond a simple diagnosis through the language of risk, mortality, and survivorship. as a cultural phenomenon, jain tracks cancer's emergence along the aftermaths of war, the effects of environmental degradation, and the neoliberal imperatives of late capitalism. much of malignant focuses on how statistics and population data attempt to contain cancer within a logical sequence. jain's attention to matters such as population data, screening practice and cost-benefit analysis locates cancer in areas not often explored by feminist sts scholars. her focus on statistics and population data builds on existing sts work on cancer (see for example fujimura, 1987, 1988, 1996; keating & cambrosio, 2011; löwy, 2010). however, whereas this body of sts work is interested in explaining the diverse scientific practices of cancer research, jain adds an important critical patient studies perspective by focusing on personal, affective and temporal dimensions of the cancer experience. in this vein, instead of first and foremost discussing and describing cancer researchers' knowledge practices, jain is more concerned with how the cancer experience connects to political and societal scales of cancer's power relations. performing a cultural critique of neoliberal futurity, jain illuminates the political and cultural tropes embedded in a temporality that is often experienced by patients in "cancer land" as non-chronological rather than as progressive and linear. her approach can fruitfully be compared to medical historian and physician robert aronowitz' unnatural history: breast cancer and american society (2007). malignant and unnatural history are both critical engagements concerned with the question of how breast cancer has gained its current political position in the american society. the overlapping themes in the books are plenty: patient perspectives, cancer time, emotions such as fear, hope and anxiety, critiques of the individualization of risk and health responsibility, and an understanding of cancer as complex and elusive. despite these similarities, unnatural history lacks malignant's feminist sts sensitivity towards the embodied and gendered dimensions of cancer temporality, storytelling and practice. in chapter one, "living in prognosis: the firing squad of statistics," jain argues that the language of probability—the ubiquitous 1 in x, or y% chance—attempts to solidify meaning around that which is, ultimately, unknowable. by showing how biomedicine—particularly in its use of population data—makes absent the complexity and uncertainty of cancer, jain's argument is in conversation with other feminist works on biomedicine and health care which consider how the pursuit of scientific vision tends to sidestep the reality of science as both embodied and situated (see haraway, 1997). jain contrasts the aggregated, abstract, and predictable bodies of statistics with ethnographic insights on risk, diagnosis, and survivorship. her articulation of "prognostic time" names a disruption in the logics of temporality and, thus, can be compared to alison kafer's (2013) "crip time," a term which identifies not only the ways in which disability is often described in temporal terms but also how disability might queer time. similarly, in the chapter "can sir: what screening doesn't do" jain describes the current debates around cancer screening, particularly as they are couched in market principles of cost-benefit analysis. jain demonstrates how these debates tend to emphasize biological cancer predisposition (biomarkers), while rendering other possible cancer causes (chemical, environmental, demographical, gender-specific etc.) invisible. the chapter focuses specifically on recent shifts in screening recommendations for both breast and prostate cancers. including the two cancers together, as they often are, jain argues, has the added effect of occluding differences between the origin stories of these two cancers as well as differences between the trajectories of the two diseases. jain's focus on how biomedical knowledge (cancer cause = biomarkers) is made under extreme conditions of uncertainty—what she calls "the structural unknownness of cancer" (p. 178)—speaks to feminist-theory-informed sts discussions of how the pursuit of objectivity, such as in the form of cost-benefit analysis and screening as classification practices, can make uncertainty and "data noise" invisible or silenced (see bowker & star, 1999; murphy, 2006). as feminist sts scholar susan leigh star (1990) famously did, this argument invokes the "cui bono" question: who benefits and what uneven distributions of costs are made invisible? in a similar vein, jain importantly encourages us to ask about political cancer specificities: "whose cancer death is averted"? (p. 174, emphasis in original) and "what cost is worth what benefit, and to whom?" (p. 175). thus, jain's argument effectively shows how biomedicine can make invisible knowledge uncertainty, including how diseases may affect people differently. in this way, her focus on the centrality of biomarkers in practices of classification are similar to what sts scholar joan fujimura (1987, 1988, 1996), in the context of cancer research, defines as a "standardized package" that privileges molecular biology in cancer knowledge practice. similarly, sts scholar and medical historian ilana löwy's (2010) focus on how screening culture practice reflects a molecularization of cancer is akin to jain's discussion of biomarkers. moreover, by contrasting the presumed progressive futurity of cancer screening and biomarkers with cancer uncertainties and specificities, her argument serves as an excellent example of feminist sts research showing how linear, progressive temporality carries with it exclusionary politics of, amongst other things, sex and race difference (see also roberts, 2007; adams, et al, 2009; m'charak, 2010). especially, in focusing on "prognosis time," jain joins feminists scholars who argue that patients undergoing treatment with reproductive technologies such as ivf and pgd experience time as simultaneously abrupt, promissory, complicated and uncertain rather than as clearly sequenced and predictable (thompson, 2005; franklin & roberts, 2006; roberts, 2007). connecting the temporality of survival statistics to the cancer campaigns for early detection, rather than, say, prevention, the chapter "poker face" demonstrates how "cancer culture's" emphasis on futurity mirrors capitalism's "actuarial time," in which the ability of some to accumulate wealth—or health—across the lifespan relies on many unacknowledged others for whom such possibility is foreclosed (p. 56). the temporality of late capitalism is discussed further in the chapter "the mortality effect," in which jain explores the current gold standard of medical research: the randomized control trial. like the "actuarial time" of capitalism's future, the randomized control trial relies on the failure of some treatments in order to justify the efficacy of others. the seeming imperative that some must die in order for others to live is further reflected in the chapter "fallout," in which jain reveals the underbelly of u.s. cancer culture: "that the twentiethand twenty-first century definition and management of what we call cancer track with the institutions that have come to define america—the military, post war big medicine, technology, advertising…" (pp. 183-184). tackling cancer's relation to medical malpractice suits in the chapter "lost chance," jain further demonstrates how cancer evades linear temporality, unable to be pinned to a single event or transmission. this chapter builds on jain's important first book, injury: the politics of production design and safety law in the united states (2006) by demonstrating the way in which error is already recognized as a necessary by-product of the medical system, an error which is often located in the relationship between doctor and patient, thus occluding the complex interactions of the entire system.   another thread that runs though malignant connects the cancer experience to social imperatives surrounding gender and sexuality. the chapter "cancer butch" looks specifically at breast cancer and butch identity to highlight the gendered and sexualized demands of femininity that accompany the commodification of the disease. in this chapter, jain brings queer and feminist politics, with a particular emphasis on aids activist group act up, to bear on the "pinkwashing" of breast cancer activism while also demonstrating how the breast cancer experience might inform some of the critical commitments of feminist and queer thinking (p. 79). moving from questions of queer gender to queer reproduction, the chapter "inconceivable" tracks jain's experience with egg cell donation and how the lack of data and regulation surrounding ivf, contra cancer, makes the potential risks of such practices invisible. by relating to feminist sts work on ivf treatments and sex hormones—in this chapter, for example, she references the work of charis thompson (2005) and nelly oudshoorn (1994), jain sheds light on how sexual and gender politics are involved in ivf and hormone treatment practice.  however, in contrast to an earlier emphasis on ivf as producing postmodern "cyborg babies" through the coupling of technology and reproduction (davis-floyd and dumit, 1998), jain is first and foremost concerned with how ivf as a highly profitable industry allows the focus on success, measured as babies born, effaces the multiple other bodies involved in the production of the gamete. her critique of the interlinking between ivf treatment and late capitalism recalls that of feminist sts scholar charis thompson (2005) who names "promissory capital" as circulating around future success. in both jain's and thompson's work, success is described as anticipatory and exclusionary practices that serves to trade with people's futures.  emphasizing how reproduction is entangled with logics of profit and scientific ignorance (that is, undone and/or neglected research areas, see for example frickel et al., 2009), jain forcefully highlights how a multitude of interests such as free market healthcare, pro-procreation and reproductive rights serve to maintain ignorance about possible links between ivf treatment hormones and cancer occurrence. in doing so, her argument points at the interlocking of gender, sexuality and biomedical markets. like michelle murphy, in sick building syndrome and the question of uncertainty (2006), jain pushes a feminist concern with marginalized knowledges further to ask questions about the stakes—especially for lay people—in non-knowledge, uncertainty and ignorance. still focusing on gender and sexuality, elsewhere jain foregrounds butch embodiment as she ruminates on the relationship between cancer prosthetics—from wigs to port-a-caths to breast forms—and the demands of normative embodiment.  jain's malignant finds cancer in plain sight, in the most everyday of twenty-first century american life. stacey's teratologies, by contrast, brought cancer out of hiding, unmasking the "cancer subcultures," as she calls them, in the context of the uk in the early 1990s. intersplicing the many stories that are told about cancer with her own narrative of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery, stacey brings the reader into the gruesome, messy, and abject world of the cancer patient in the early 1990s. although at the time of its publication teratologies was largely situated within cultural studies, the book has become understood as a predecessor to what has been called "feminist cultural studies of science and technology" (lykke, 2008; mcneil, 2007) or what elsewhere has been more broadly labeled "feminist technoscience studies" (åsberg & lykke, 2010; weber, 2006). furthermore, teratologies offers an astute contribution to queer critical health studies, in league with the many works on hiv/aids and cancer published during that period. even if feminist sts work has existed for a long time, when teratologies was published, the intersections between feminist sts and cultural studies had just started to be explored.1 as teratologies reflects, early feminist work in this area was articulating an important problematization of  medical science by emphasizing it as a figural trope and practice invoking an unmarked, yet always gendered, position of knowing (see for example balsamo, 1996; cartwright, 1995; franklin, 1997; haraway, 1997; jordanova, 1993; martin, 1987; treichler, 1990). teratologies was published around the same time as david hess' (1997) political constructivist sts work on cancer research. stacey's and hess' studies have several similarities: they focus on alternative cancer knowledge claims, they perform analyses critical of an assumption of a neutral observer and they attend to the gendered dimensions of cancer culture. however, stacey's feminist sts sensitivity towards tropes and figures is missing in hess' account (1997). in powerfully elucidating the importance of studying the figurative in medical discourse about cancer, teratologies is a landmark in the 1990s rise of feminist and queer cultural studies engaging with sts. in the book, stacey works through the various stories and processes that are used to construct cancer to demonstrate the multiple—and at times conflicting—ways in which cancer is defined. stacey articulates a similitude between her own experience as a cancer patient and her experiences as a lesbian, feminist, and an academic. by tracking cancer through stories as disparate as the instantiation of self-help culture, the rise of medical imaging, and strange similarities between taboos surrounding lesbianism and cancer, stacey brings cancer narratives into the purview of questions of the status of the self in the late twentieth century, engagements with how medical technology produce the very objects they define, and feminist and queer work on abject bodies (see also bersani, 1987; betterton, 1996, 2006; braidotti, 1994; creed, 1993; kristeva, 1982). stacey describes her text as "the tales of monsters and marvels that pervade the popular imaginary of cancer subcultures" (p. 10). to guide the text, stacey hones in on her own experience of teratoma—originating from the greek word teraton meaning monster—a specific kind of cancer tumor with tissues or organ components. stacey's emphasis on semiotics—on stories, figurative speculations, tropes, and metaphors—is deeply aligned with a longstanding—and cultural studies inspired—feminist sts sensitivity towards the role of the figural in the production of science and technology. in the chapter "metaphors," for example, stacey argues that rhetorical devices are "fundamental to arguments about the ways in which the clinical gaze has conceptualized the human body in biomedicine" (p. 51). stacey demonstrates how metaphors of visual observations and temporal linearity prevail in contemporary medicine. consequently—and in a manner that jain's book echoes—stacey emphasizes cancer temporality and the medical gaze in a way that is rooted in arguments of cultural constructions, signification and subject formation. stacey also precedes jain in elucidating how "cancer time" is highly precarious and uncertain, something that disrupts and complicates scientific vision of linearity and progress. in focusing on scientific visions of linear time, stacey's work is connected to one of the few feminist cultural studies of science and technology explorations of temporality predating teratologies: sarah franklin's (1991) chapter in off-centre in which she discusses linear scientific temporality through the notion of "fetal teleology." like franklin, stacey illuminates how medical science in its orientation towards a desired future represents time as determined, progressive and linear. jain's malignant picks up this same thread of time in her interpretation of prognosis. still focusing on the visual, in the chapter "visions" stacey explores the ways in which imagery—from personal photographs to medical imaging—confront the boundaries of knowing. specifically, stacey—and here she explicitly engages with feminist scholars working on technoscientific visualization of the body such as rosi braidotti, lisa cartwright, donna haraway and emily martin—demonstrates how the rise of medical imaging of the body's interior has tracked with cultural discourses surrounding bodily processes, most specifically the anthropomorphization of cell systems, a transformation she finds most readily in the languages of immunity, reproduction, and cancer. highlighting how a visual personification of the cell is "inextricable from masculine desires and fantasies and uses of the female body" (p. 155), stacey's argument is closely aligned with feminist sts work on visualization that emerged during the same period and that drew upon cultural studies to point at the gendered dimensions of visualization (see for example casper, 1998; treichler, cartwright and penley, 1998). in this way, stacey's engagement with visualizing technologies of cancer control and eradication builds on feminist work about medical and scientific tracking and visualization such as jordanova (1993), martin (1994) and cartwright (1995).  following the examination of the cell as "a microcosm of the self," stacey turns to the question of how that self is conceptualized in the seeming revolt of this microcosm that defines cancer (p. 147). the chapter, aptly titled "selves," explores the manner in which cancer regimes impel specific practices of the self. often regarded as the antidote to conventional biomedicine—or at least less rigid companion—self-help cultures, stacey argues, are no less beholden to imperatives of "rational self control" (p. 187). in discussing how health responsibility has become simultaneously individualized and rationalized, her argument resonates with contemporary feminist sts critiques of biomedicine emphasizing how the extensive focus on individualized health responsibility also reproduces a gendered assumption of rational self-control (see clarke, et al, 2010; roberts, 2007). quite strikingly, her critique of health as self-management is perhaps even more relevant today when the information age has expanded the regimes of self-care practices: self-monitoring digital technologies (such as personal fitness trackers and health-based apps), telemedicine, the wide range of diagnostic tools available on the internet—the list of current techniques for "rational self-control" is long. her discussion of how breast cancer responsibility is put on the individual nicely connects her argument to—and this is an explicit reference point in teratologies—feminist scholar alisa solomon's (1992) work on breast cancer activism in which she problematizes the individualizing focus on lifestyle in breast cancer information. by comparing this information with activists' demands for research and discussion about societal and environmental factors, solomon's critique predates some of the arguments put forward by stacey—as well as jain.2 stories about cancer are populated with many figures, perhaps none more ubiquitous than heroes and monsters. however, as stacey articulates, who and how one is hailed into these narratives reflect cultural anxieties around life, death, and disease. in her opening chapter, "heroes," stacey demonstrates the modes in which cancer survival stories—which rely on a narrative schema of strength in adversity, a "crisis-rescue-recovery formulation"—"pervades all representations of the disease" (p. 11). similarly, the chapter "monsters" draws together stacey's experiences with cancer and her experiences of being a lesbian to expose the ways in which both experiences confront the specter of taboo and the borders of the abject. drawing from kristeva's (1982) notion of abjection as "death infecting life," stacey delicately weaves together resonances of the imbrication of life and death in both cancer and lesbianism (which she identifies as "the c word" and "the l word") via their relation to our cultural concepts of reproduction: whereas cancer's uncontrollable proliferation barrels toward death, the lesbian's distance from biological reproduction is rendered a kind of genetic or generational death. in this way, stacey very keenly anticipates lee edelman's field shifting polemic no future (2004). in its focus on abjection, teratologies is a beautiful example of feminist cultural studies of science and technology work that operates through "figurative speculations" (p. 96) to unweave some of the tropes and figures that biomedical cultures inhabit. having this focus, stacey is closely aligned with other feminist scholars who interrogate monster imaginaries and abjection by means of deconstructing the western humanist self (see for example creed, 1993; shildrick, 2002). building on these scenes of abjection, the chapter "bodies" explores how cartesian dualism is both challenged and reinforced by the splits between biomedicine and so-called alternative therapies. tracking through the ways in which this divide renders biomedical patients "physical bodies with symptoms" while alternative therapies step in to handle the collateral effects of disease, particularly in the realm of the emotional, the chapter concludes with a brief look at how some alternative therapies, even as they are imagined to reject a mind/body split, rely on a biomedical logic that repeats these cartesian claims (p. 132). stacey's more recent collaborations with mary bryson have brought these questions to bear in contemporary queer conversations on temporality and affect (bryson & stacey, 2013; stacey & bryson, 2013). jain's "survivor" mirrors stacey's "hero" as the spectral figures that attempt to give the cancer experience a linear—and hopeful—temporality. both scholars engage with and add to the work of audre lorde and eve sedgwick to show how cancer experience intersects with experiences of gender and sexuality. both weave their stories into broader questions of how visualization and reproductive technologies produce bodies and selves. elsewhere, their overlaps offer a pivot point that send readers in productively different directions. for example, both engage responsibility to think through who is and is not held accountable in the causal chain of cancer. jain focuses on the power dynamics of medical models in which doctor's knowledge trumps patient experiences as well the rise of marketing-based corporate support for cancer research from companies whose practices are know to cause cancer. stacey, on the other hand—reflecting the british welfare state model of social medicine of the 1990s as well as reflecting some of the patient driven approaches learned from hiv/aids activism—draws attention to the emphasis on self-management in both the prevention and treatment of cancer. although teratologies has long been on the readings lists of students and scholars of queer and feminist sts, feminist health studies, and cancer cultural studies more widely, malignant's more recent publication highlights the many cultural shifts and theoretical innovations that have taken place in the time between their publications: the stabilization and rapid growth of feminist sts studies on medicine, the increased discussion around temporality and affect in feminist and queer theory, the advent of the information age, and the wider attention to environmental and social correlates to cancer, to name just a few. even so, both jain and stacey show how constructions of cancer—its stories, knowledges and lives—affect us in deeply paradoxical and intimate ways.  moreover, in weaving together personal stories with modes of late capitalism, jain and stacey manage to elegantly and carefully link quotidian cancer experiences and temporalities with large-scale circulations of power. in doing so, they perform an embodied and situated critique of biomedical anticipatory practice in a manner lacking in more generalizing and non-gender sensitive arguments. in this way, in staying with mundane and affective cancer trouble, they perform an indispensable critique without becoming foundationalist and reductionist. being anything but invisible observers, jain and stacey tell stories about the stakes in embodying cancer as a political, cultural and material phenomenon. by telling different stories than the dominant ones, they make present what often remains untold in the "cancer world." in doing so, they disrupt the dominant narratives of linear scientific progress by telling temporally messy "stories that matter to the worlds we might yet live in" (haraway, 2003, p. 3). by illuminating the complex and changing personal and political scales of biomedicine, malignant and 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(1990). feminism, medicine, and the meaning of childbirth."in m. jacobus, e. fox keller, & s. shuttleworth (eds), body/politics: women and the discourses of science (pp. 113-138). new york, ny: routledge. treichler, p. a., cartwright, l., & penley, c. (eds.). (1998). the visible woman: imaging technologies, gender, and science. new york, ny: new york university press. weber, j. (2006). from science and technology to feminist technoscience. in k. davis, m. evans, & j. lorber (eds.), handbook of gender and women's studies (pp. 397-414). london, uk: sage. bios lisa lindén is a doctoral candidate at the department of thematic studies—technology and social change, linköping university, sweden. her research interests concern feminist technoscience studies, politics of care and visual sts. in her phd dissertation project she studies swedish hpv vaccination campaigns with a focus on communication technologies (including digital and social media), subjectivity and care. mairead sullivan is a doctoral candidate in the department of women's, gender, and sexuality studies at emory university. her current project—tentatively title "strange matter: thinking breastedly in feminist and queer theory"—is an archival tracing of questions of breastedness at the borders of feminist and queer thought. her research interests include feminist and queer theory, psychoanalysis, and critical health studies. news in focus    news in focus      ebola and its discontents   elke mühlberger boston university muehlber@bu.edu deboleena roy emory university droy2@emory.edu pamela scully emory university pamela.scully@emory.edu banu subramaniam umass amherst banu@wost.umass.edu jennifer terry university of california, irvine jterry@uci.edu as we planned this inaugural issue, and watched the news of ebola in the u.s. media, we witnessed the epidemic of ebola happening "out there" and then the ensuing panic when it arrived "here" in the u. s. the coverage was hauntingly similar and yet different. with each global pandemic, we have heard growing cries for a global "management" often tied to circuits of biomedicine, pharmaceuticals, and (inter)national security. a year later, the many apocalyptic narratives have been laid to rest for the time being, but ebola remains in the air as an early warning of the epidemic "still to come." we asked three interdisciplinary scholars to reflect on what they saw.  ~ curated by deboleena roy and banu subramaniam     my 'top 6' ebola terrors elke mühlberger, microbiology, national emerging infectious disease institute (neidl), boston university, school of medicine   the current ebola virus outbreak has been devastating and terrible in many aspects. as of march 2015, about 25,000 people were reported to be infected and more than 10,000 patients have died. and it is not over yet. this outbreak dramatically demonstrates just what viruses are capable of and how vulnerable we are when we are struck by emerging infectious diseases without being prepared. besides the terrifying disease itself, there are numerous other disconcerting aspects of this outbreak that have made me shiver. so i came up with a very personal 'top 6' list of ebola terrors. #1  self-proclaimed ebola experts. simply terrifying. vocal, annoying and worst of all, frequently wrong. this clearly led to … #2  ebola hysteria. it was impressive to see how the lack of scientific reasoning and common sense led to a complete misjudgment of the actual risk of becoming infected with ebola virus. fear leads to rather creepy and misguided behavior. to give just one example: the stigmatization of people from west africa at the peak of the hysteria. at times during this outbreak i had a hard time believing that this is the 21st century. #3  the transmission debate. after all these months with ebola it is clear that this virus does not spread as rampantly as flu or measles. yet some folks continue to speculate that ebola virus may become airborne through just a couple of mutations. do we know of any other human virus that has managed to change its mode of transmission from bodily fluids to airborne? not that i am aware of. #4  the "out of an abundance of caution" phrase. an overabundance of caution has likely caused more harm than good. out of an abundance of caution, poor excalibur, the perfectly healthy dog of the spanish nurse infected with ebola virus, was euthanized, even though there is, and has never been, any indication that dogs can either be infected with or transmit ebola virus. out of an abundance of caution, nurses and doctors who risk their lives helping to contain this terrible outbreak are given a cold welcome at home by being put into isolation. and we do this despite the knowledge that ebola virus is only transmitted from human to human after the onset of symptoms. sadly, many people who were otherwise willing to volunteer in west africa did not go because of the threat of being grounded for another three weeks upon their return. #5  the ebola publication flood. those of us who actually work on ebola virus are strongly affected by number five on my list the flood of ebola publications we have had to wade through during the last couple of months. don't get me wrong, it is extremely important to gather as much information as possible about ebola virus disease. but when hype takes over and scientific rigor is sidelined, this leads to significantly more work and money being spent in the future as scientists pursue or challenge these false leads. and some of these recent publications are of breathtaking uselessness.  #6  ??? good gracious me—what was my number 6? i guess it was something important. oh yes, ebola virus—it causes a terrible disease, has ravaged an already fragile economic system in western africa, decimated entire families, made children into orphans, and the list goes on and on. but ebola virus is not the only member in the club of dangerous viruses. take, for example, measles virus. it is the most contagious human virus we know of. it is immunosuppressive. it kills children. according to the who, there were 145,700 measles deaths globally in 2013. the good news is that we have an effective vaccine to protect against measles virus infection. i have a hard time understanding why parents would put their children’s lives in danger by not vaccinating them against such a serious disease that can cause death. makes me sick. actually, i think the #1 terror on my list is parents who put their kids (and others) at risk of getting severely ill, even though a safe vaccine is available. combatting ebola requires much more than science pamela scully, women, gender, sexuality studies and african studies, emory university it has been more than a year since ebola appeared in west africa, moving stealthily in the tropical forest interior at the borders of guinea, sierra leone, and liberia, and then rapidly accelerating when it reached the sprawling capital cities of conakry, freetown and monrovia. as we now know, it took some six months for the local and international public health organizations to realize what they were dealing with. since august 2014 the cdc, who, doctors without borders, partners in health and others have directed millions to curtailing ebola. because of longstanding ties with liberia, founded by us settlers in the 1820s, at the request of president ellen johnson sirleaf the us sent in the military to establish field hospitals and coordinate operations. while ebola still ravages much of guinea and sierra leone, it has been halted in liberia at the time of writing. what lessons can we learn from this massive outbreak, which has killed over 11,000 people? there are many, from the impoverishment of the capitalist mode of drug discovery and delivery, and the poverty of development agendas which have poured millions of dollars in aid into the war-torn countries hit now by ebola, but which did not create sustainable public health systems; to the lack of trust between citizens and their governments, and between citizens and medical experts. but here i want to concentrate on ebola as a gendered and locally contextual disease. ebola can be called a woman's disease (bofu-tawamba, 2014). ebola is contracted through bodily fluids. in west africa, women are responsible for care giving, preparing food, and washing the dead in preparation for burial. and the ebola dead are particularly virulent. women are thus highly likely to contract ebola. the fact that so many people who have died were women, leaves a terrible legacy—thousands of children who no longer have mothers to look after them in societies where that is the key responsibility of women. in addition, the creation of so many orphans has other terrible effects: studies show the prevalence of sexual violence against women and girls in liberia. even more alarmingly, a study by msf showed that nine out every 10 survivors they treated in 2011 were under 18, and one in 10 were under the age of four. we can expect an increase in the vulnerability of girls to rape and other forms of sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking, in the aftermath of ebola. to understand ebola then, we have to look beyond the science and know about how households work and the gendered division of labor in a particular society. it is for these reasons that the who and others have started looking to communities and to social scientists to understand how to end ebola (and other similar outbreaks in the future). the ebola anthropology initiative is a collection of social scientists, primarily anthropologists (the author is on the advisory board as a historian), who are in dialogue with the public health community to try and raise important questions around culture ad political economy as crucial contexts to understand the disease. the allied ebola response anthropology forum1 has created a website that provides thoughtful analyses of local conditions. most importantly, these initiatives stress that communities must be at the center of any public health initiative. they have to help direct the work, and not just be told what to do. in liberia, where ebola has almost disappeared, this happened not just because of the establishment of health care facilities, but because communities made changes themselves. people did not abandon their ways of showing care and love for the sick and the dying, but made accommodations. they changed the way they say hallo (no more handshakes) and how they bury their dead: no more laying hands on the dead body. ebola has highlighted the failures of the development agenda with short-term goals driven in part by donor demands for quick results. both local organizations and communities and the bigger funding agencies are trying to rethink the way forward. the ebola 100 research project is seeking to document the ways in which people at all levels and in different countries tried to address ebola: this will help us document and understand societal responses to this epidemic. emory university recently received a grant from the cdc to establish the african centre of excellence for public health security in liberia. the paul g. allen foundation has issued an rfp for innovative proposals, which include social mobilization and community partnerships. perhaps, these initiatives will be the beginning of more productive and egalitarian ways of working in the world. ebola and the unequal economy of life jennifer terry, department of gender & sexuality studies, university of california at irvine the ebola outbreak of 2014 laid bare the reality of an unequal economy of life according to which some lives are valued over others. while thousands of west africans fell ill and died from the disease over the spring and summer, it wasn't until a small number of white westerners from the united states and europe came down with ebola virus disease (evd) in late july that authorities with the world health organization, usaid, and the u.s. centers for disease control and prevention began to treat the outbreak like the urgent and deadly crisis that it was. over the summer of 2014, among the most sympathetically publicized cases of afflicted people featured white, christian american health care workers, kent brantly and nancy writebol, both employed by samaritan’s purse, a faith-based non-governmental organization headquartered in boone, north carolina. comparing both the disparities in medical treatment and the partiality of publicity surrounding cases of ebola infection brings to light how some lives are apparently more valued than others. in the midst of this situation the more raw issue of money-making reared its ugly head. i offer two examples to illustrate this: the first has to do with pharmaceutical profiteering akin to what naomi klein has called disaster capitalism and the second with revenue-conscious damage control and labor exploitation of nurses by a non-profit medical organization in texas. 1. british pharmaceutical giant glaxosmithkline has in recent years bought up vaccine-makers in anticipation of a growing global market in anti-viral treatments with the emergence of sars, mers, evd and the like. in march 2014, three months into the latest ebola outbreak, gsk contacted the world health organization to announce that it had developed a preclinical ebola vaccine candidate. johnson and johnson announced human clinical trials of an anti-ebola vaccine in january 2014, partnering with a danish vaccine maker to accelerate production. pfizer also jumped into the game around the same time. mapp biopharmaceutical, inc., a relative newcomer and small-scale manufacturer of engineered monoclonal anti-bodies, started to make headlines during the summer of 2014 when the media racheted up its panicked coverage. mapp's product, zmapp,™ was one of a very few anti-viral treatments that showed promise in animal trials but due to a lack of sufficient funds and poor coordination among government agencies and various pharmaceutical companies, there wasn't enough of the drug stockpiled for dealing with last summer’s outbreak (the economist nov. 1, 2014). in late july, zmapp™ was secretly administered to brantly and writebol, who were exposed to the ebola virus while working in a clinic in monrovia, liberia. the intravenous treatment was given to the two under the compassionate use exemption of the u.s. food and drug administration. both were then airlifted to emory university hospital in atlanta and pronounced cured within weeks of their arrival. around the same time, doctors with médecins sans frontières (doctors without borders) decided to withhold the same treatment from dr. sheik umar khan, a beloved sierra leonean physician who died in late july after treating many ebola patients. khan was never told that zmapp™ was available (fofana and flynn, 2014). doctors from médecins sans frontières claimed their decision was based on sound ethical reasoning. they decided it would cause a serious loss of trust among local residents if khan died from the medication and they decided that if it was effective it would not be fair to give khan priority treatment while hundreds of other infected people did not have access to the very limited supply of zmapp.™ two weeks after khan's death, the world health organization approved several experimental drugs, including zmapp,™ for treating ebola virus disease. 2. financial investment professionals in the united states began to exploit the ebola scare especially following september 30, 2014, when the first case of ebola in the united states was officially announced. following the conventions of what priscilla wald has called the contagion narrative (2008), the leading media corporations in the united states made much of the misfortune of thomas eric duncan, a native liberian who traveled to dallas from monrovia in september to visit family members. when duncan—patient zero in media coverage—came down with a fever several days after his arrival, he sought treatment at the texas presbyterian hospital emergency room. he was sent home with a diagnosis of sinusitis and given a prescription for antibiotics, even though he told the medical staff that he had just arrived from west africa. three days later he was back in the emergency room with severe symptoms of ebola infection. after several hours, the er staff called the centers for disease control and prevention in atlanta. duncan was finally admitted over 30 hours after this second trip to the er to a 24-bed intensive care unit that had been emptied of all other patients. a lawsuit filed against the owners of texas presbyterian by nina pham, one of the nurses who cared for duncan, notes that for the next eight days he was cared for by nurses and other medical personnel who were not adequately trained or equipped to handle a patient with ebola. the suit further charges that the hospital violated pham's privacy and committed fraud in the accounts it provided to the media (emily, 2015). the day after duncan was formally admitted, the 26-year-old vietnamese american emergency nurse arrived at work to find that she was being assigned to care for him. when she inquired about safety precautions (since there had been no in-service training at the hospital), her supervisor "went to the internet, searched google, and printed off information regarding what nina was supposed to do, and handed nina the paper" (pham vs. texas health resources, inc., filed in dallas county court on march 2, 2015). despite the fact that there was a biosafety level four facility at galveston national laboratory—only an hour away by plane—that was equipped to handle ebola, texas health resources (thr) did not consult the lab, one of only two such labs in the united states. after caring for duncan, with whom she developed great sympathy, pham was told by her employer that she could go home. relieved, she invited friends over. two days after duncan died, she woke up with a fever and called the hospital to notify them but was told that her 99.8 fever did not meet the threshold the threshold of concern, 100.4. the next day she awoke with a 100.6 fever and called the hospital requesting to be admitted as a “no information” patient, a precaution to protect her identity from the media. she was taken into isolation when she arrived at the er for a battery of tests. hours later, the chief nursing officer entered pham's room in a full hazmat suit to inform her that she had tested positive for the ebola virus. she soon also learned that her request for privacy had been violated, with "dozens of people throughout the thr system" having access to her health status and identity (pham v. thr). when pham was transferred to the national institutes of health facility in bethesda, maryland for further treatment, the thr worried about their reputation and their declining revenue. to make this point more vividly, right before she was transferred, one of pham's physicians entered her room wearing a tiny gopro camera concealed under his hood and commenced to film everything in the room. though she didn't give him the answers he was seeking, finally her eyes welled up with tears and she made a few optimistic statements. the video was immediately edited to make thr look good and was posted on the organization's youtube site, despite the fact that pham had never given her permission to be used in any public relations campaign. pham received aggressive treatment at the nih and was eventually pronounced cured, whereupon she was released and sent directly to the white house for a highly publicized meeting with president obama. it should be noted that pham's lawsuit concludes with a word of caution about the claims of medical triumph: the symptoms of anxiety and pain (related possibly to the aggressive experimental treatment she received) persisted well after her release from the nih, making her unable to return to work. what can be gleaned from these two interwoven illustrations of who is valued when it comes to deadly infectious disease and who is not? while it may seem encouraging that financial investments for contending with evd increased over the course of the outbreak of 2014, we learn from locally-based health care activists that resources are much better spent by supporting community-based efforts of preventive education, contact tracing, and humane care than the speculative capital that is directed toward expensive and risky pharmaceutical trials. fostering relationships of trust between health care workers and people in the communities they serve is a much more cost effective way to gain control over infection rates and to care for patients in a manner that honors their dignity and allays social suffering (mogelson, 2015). notes 1 the ebola response anthropology forum (n.d) is a frequently updated online database of articles and information about ebola. social scientists and outbreak response team members from the london school of health and tropical medicine, the institute of development studies, and the universities of sussex and exeter produce the forum. the aim of the online database is to foster policy discussion and critical debate while providing rapid responses by e-mail, conference calls and web-based dialogues to operational questions raised by those working for ngos, government, and international agencies to contain the epidemic or care for those affected. the forum is funded by a grant from the research for health in humanitarian crises (r2hc) programme. references bofu-tawamba, n. (2014, november 7). african women face ebola triple jeopardy. al jazeera america, retrieved at http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/ebola-response-africanfemalehealthworkersculturecaregivingroles.html mogelson, l. (2015, january 19). when the fever breaks: government measures have proved inadequate, but communities in liberia and sierra leone are coming up with ways to battle the ebola virus. the new yorker. retrieved at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/19/when-fever-breaks nina pham v. texas health resources, inc. (2015, march 2). (filed with the district court of dallas county, texas). retrieved at http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/biz-columns-blogs/tarrant-business-blog/article12831470.ece/binary/nina%20pham%27s%20lawsuit%20v.%20texas%20health%20resources the economist. (2014, november 1). giving it a shot: drugmakers bet that vaccines will help in the fight against ebola. retrieved at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21629399-drugmakers-bet-vaccines-will-help-fight-against-ebola-giving-it-shot umaru, f., & flynn, d. (2014, august 24). sierra leone "hero" doctor's death exposes slow ebola response. reuters. retrieved at http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/08/24/health-ebola-khan-idinkbn0go07c20140824 bios elke mühlberger is a renowned expert in the field of bsl-4 hemorrhagic fever viruses. she has a strong research focus on the highly pathogenic filoviruses, ebola and marburg virus. her research interests range from molecular biology studies on filoviral replication and transcription to cellular responses to filovirus infection. mühlberger received her phd in virology from the philipps university marburg, marburg, germany in 1993 and continued to work on filoviruses as an independent pi and group leader in marburg. in 2008, she joined the department of microbiology at boston university, boston, ma as an associate professor and the national emerging infectious diseases laboratories as the director of the biomolecule production core. deboleena roy is associate professor of women's, gender, and sexuality studies and neuroscience and behavioral biology at emory university.  she received her phd in reproductive neuroendocrinology and molecular biology from the institute of medical science at the university of toronto. she is currently associate faculty in the neuroscience program, graduate division of biological and biomedical sciences and senior faculty fellow at the center for ethics at emory university. her fields of interest include feminist theory, feminist science and technology studies, neuroscience, molecular biology, postcolonial theory, and reproductive justice movements. her research and scholarship attempt to create a shift from feminist critiques of science to the development of feminist practices that contribute to scientific inquiry in the lab. she has published articles in signs: journal of women in culture and society; hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy; neuroethics; australian feminist studies; rhizomes: cultural studies of emerging knowledge; endocrinology; neuroendocrinology; and the journal of biological chemistry.  she has also contributed to several anthologies including handbook for feminist research: theory and praxis (2011); neurofeminism: issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science (2012); gendered neurocultures: feminist and queer perspectives on current brain discourses (2014); and mattering: feminism, science, and materialities (2016). pamela scully is professor of women's, gender, and sexuality studies, and professor of african studies at emory university. her most recent book is sara baartman and the hottentot venus: a ghost story and a biography, co-authored with clifton crais (princeton, 2009, 2010). she is finishing a short biography of president ellen johnson sirleaf of liberia. she writes generally on sexual violence, transitional justice and feminist theory. she serves on the editorial board of the journal of women's history, the journal of british studies, the journal of peacebuilding and development, and social dynamics, and is on the advisory board of the journal of southern african studies. professor scully works closely with the institute for developing nations, a partnership between emory university and the carter center, which focuses on collaborative research regarding issues of poverty and development. banu subramaniam is professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts, amherst. trained as a plant evolutionary biologist, she seeks to engage the feminist studies of science in the practices of experimental biology. she is author of ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity (university of illinois press 2014), and coeditor of feminist science studies: a new generation (routledge, 2001) and making threats: biofears and environmental anxieties (rowman and littlefield, 2005). spanning the humanities, social, and natural sciences, she works at the intersections of biology, women's studies, ethnic studies and postcolonial studies. her current work focuses on the xenophobia and nativism that haunt invasive plant species, and the relationship of science and religious nationalism in india. jennifer terry is associate professor of gender & sexuality studies at the university of california at irvine. her books include an american obsession: science, medicine, and homosexuality in modern society (university of chicago press, 1999) and two co-edited anthologies, deviant bodies: critical perspectives on difference in science and popular culture (indiana university press, 1995) and processed lives: gender and technology in everyday life (routledge, 1997). she has written articles on reproductive politics, the history of sexual science, contemporary scientific approaches to the sex lives of animals, love of objects, signature injuries of war, and the relationship between war-making practices and entertainment. her current project is titled attachments to war: violence and the production of biomedical knowledge in 21st-century america.    mccann, carole r. (2020). review of on infertile ground: population control and women’s rights in the era of climate change, by jade s. sasser (new york university press, 2018), and gender before birth: sex selection in a transnational context, by rajani bhatia (university of washington press, 2018). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(2), pp. 1–7. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © carole r. mccann, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license book review | on infertile ground: population control and women’s rights in the era of climate change, by jade s. sasser (new york university press, 2018), & gender before birth: sex selection in a transnational context, by rajani bhatia (university of washington press, 2018) carole r. mccann university of maryland, baltimore county (umbc) mccann@umbc.edu at first glance, jade sasser’s on infertile ground and rajani bhatia’s gender before birth seem to tackle distinct topics, but the rich analysis of each shows that they are in fact intertwined within a larger field of reproductive politics and science. that richness, i believe, comes from the mixture of methods and the reproductive justice analytic that each employs. with regard to their methods, both assemble and analyze an impressive archive of texts and ethnographic data to trace the emergence and scientific grounding of their topics from street-level practice to global political discourses and technologies. centered on how women of color and women of the global south are positioned within discourses and practices, their analyses illuminate the shifting registers and configurations of neoliberal populationism as it moves across geopolitical spaces, organizational locations, and technological regimes. utilizing a reproductive justice framework, each book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 2 analysis excavates and demonstrates the resilience of gender, racialized, colonial logics that continue to animate reproductive knowledges and practices. i want to highlight several aspects of each book that exemplify the value of transnational feminist science studies methods for understanding current reproductive knowledge-making through a reproductive justice frame. then, drawing on their conclusions, i raise some thoughts about how we might move forward to continue to build robust analyses of transnational reproductive politics in these uncertain times. in on infertile ground, jade sasser offers an expansive historical account of linkages between environmentalism and populationism, which, in turn, informs her ethnographic analysis of contemporary youth advocacy training programs sponsored primarily by the sierra club. firmly situated in the reproductive justice frame, her historical narrative reminds readers that organizations like the sierra club have long hued to a populationist agenda. her analysis of current advocacy illuminates ghosts that haunt recent efforts to link reproductive politics to climate change. the shift away from population control to a neoliberal focus on women’s empowerment as a means of bringing population growth under human control may be new. but it is far from addressing the structural constraints on women’s reproductive autonomy. sasser demonstrates that this shift installs an individualistic requirement for women to be sexual stewards of their fertility and the environmental future. at the same time, this advocacy reinvigorates older narratives about the need for women of the global north to act on behalf of women in the global south, in this case, to remedy their unmet contraceptive needs. moreover, her incisive account of workshop narratives and practices shows how those ghosts are avoided in gestures to “the dark times” of population control that are quickly displaced by the need to move on with the current concerns. in so doing, the workshops evade serious engagement with the legacies of structural racism and colonialism, and she concludes, they effectively displace feminist reproductive justice goals. the focus on youth advocacy as the way to shape the environmental future raises an important issue of leadership training for aspiring activists, many of whom are our students. sasser’s account should move us to ask, at what point do such trainings stop being grassroots organizing and become a limited politics of “astroturf cultivation”? the sierra club practices offer a particularly striking example in its “values clarification” exercises, which avoid in-depth discussion of the injustices of twentieth-century population control practices by shifting the focus to the renewed malthusian anxiety about human numbers. in so doing, it centers book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 3 urgent action over reflection on the assumptions underlying the call to action. how might we better equip ourselves and our students to recognize and talk back to such practices? following reproductive justice logic, as sasser suggests, one signal of a politics of “astro-turf cultivation” might be a narrative of women’s empowerment disconnected from feminist analysis of the roots/histories/politics of their structural disempowerment. one other aspect of the climate change-population advocacy that i want to highlight is the enduring relationship of science and controversy in this field. sasser notes that among funders and advocates she spoke with, there is one common refrain: the need for more science to quell the controversies that population reduction programs provoke. scientific data as a means to overcome controversies associated with reproductive politics is a longstanding shibboleth of populationism. demographers perfected this rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century. it is a strategy that has been particularly derived from and supported by the transparent objectivity accorded to numbers. in the past, it was fertility rates; today, it is data linking population growth to greenhouse gas emissions. but as sasser rightly notes, these data, which purport to single out the effect of human numbers, represent instead the tangle of social and biological factors that cannot be separated. and she notes the focus on numbers alone continues to distract attention from the destructive production processes of late-stage capitalism by pointing to problematic bodies elsewhere. in gender before birth, rajani bhatia demonstrates how the imperative to reproduce frugally has shaped sex selective practices transnationally and how, in return, sex selective practices and resistance to them in the united states continue to rely on the racialized tropes of older population control narratives. her analysis of lifestyle sex selection, a market-driven neoliberal set of practices of assisted reproductive technologies (art) provides a vivid account of the development and marketing of technologies that sidestep the question of prenatal sex selection by acting before pregnancy is established, such as sorting sperm. she builds a detailed analysis of the interacting figures that populate sexselection discourse: the family balancer, gender dreamer, abject anti-citizen, that situate the west as the best at gender equity, the rest as bound by timeless culture, and singles out china and india as exemplars of sustained reproductive excess. these figures once again situate white women in the us as modern rational reproducers and asian women everywhere as irrational reproducers oppressed by book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 4 their cultures. she identifies one new figure in this landscape—the wealthy global bio-citizen, whose adherence to the small family ideal entitles them to purchase reproductive technologies to maximize their familial gender equity. motivated by fairness or heartfelt desire, the family balancer and the global bio-citizen must use sex-selective technology within a family planning framework of frugal reproduction. still, sex-selection providers rely on orientalist tropes in representing westerners as girl-wanting and asians as boy-seeking. these orientalist tropes are crucial legitimating narratives, which posit lifestyle sex selection as a reasonable and moral practice in contrast to the sex-selection practices based on abortion in other nations; again, india and asia are the exemplars. the narrative depends on the longstanding presumption that sexselective abortion is an essential factor in “adverse sex ratios” in those nations. since balanced gender is the goal of lifestyle sex selection, the practice is presented as one without a gender bias. one of the key issues raised by bhatia’s analysis concerns the regulatory inconsistencies that have made lifestyle sex selection possible and which have enabled its extension through global networks of clinics and laboratories. bhatia’s study traces the history of the development of sperm sorting and preimplantation gender determination as grounded in agricultural practice and extension into human medical trails. in these practices, providers of the service have operated largely outside the purview of state agencies and, therefore, have set the terms of practice as well as the limits of our knowledge about them. when state agencies have acted, she shows, providers have been able to move the regulated practices to other locales through a global network of clinics and laboratories whose connections are actively—if discretely—cultivated. in addition, her insightful analysis of feminist anti-sex selection shows how feminists became supportive of provider autonomy in the face of efforts by legislative bans designed to curtail women’s access to abortion. both books expand our understanding of the texture of contests over and meanings of reproductive justice in the contemporary moment. they identify key instances in which the language of reproductive justice, health, and rights has been taken up and repurposed by a variety of mainstream actors and networks actors for their own uses. some of those uses are knowingly mendacious, as bhatia shows regarding anti-abortion sex-selection bans. some of those uses, such as environmentalists, see themselves as acting in alliance, which sasser effectively critiques. bhatia’s analysis of the strategies and rhetoric of feminist sex selection activism in the us has been fundamentally shaped by powerful enemies. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 5 sasser, on the other hand, demonstrates that even with purported friends, who often have more resources, coalition work risks the return of older tropes that coopt reproductive justice goals. i also want to acknowledge the important work bhatia and sasser do to build out the concept of populationism. they borrow the term from environmentalists ian angus and simon butler (2011), who define it simply as the attribution of “social and ecological ills to human numbers” (xxi). on its own, i think, the concept is insufficient to support a robust reproductive justice approach because it masks the underlying logics by which social ills are attributed to numbers. as both books demonstrate, those logics coalesced in the threads of malthus’s population concept. sasser’s focus on the environmental populationism highlights the fundamental linkage of anxiety about the earth’s carrying capacity to malthusian logic that population growth will always outstrip nature’s ability to accommodate it. bhatia’s focus on art’s bio-populationism demonstrates the malthusian logic of frugal reproduction, in which sex is essentialized. it is man’s reproductive nature, realized through women’s bodies, that puts humanity at risk. moreover, as both books demonstrate, orientalist racialization is central to populationist logic. malthus’s argument for population statistics hinges on their value in ranking the inadequacies of nations and peoples in a racialized hierarchy. as sasser and bhatia demonstrate, an effective feminist conceptualization of populationism should foreground these intertwined logics. to conclude i want to point to issues raised in the books’ conclusions that, to me, suggest fruitful avenues for further research. in her conclusion, bhatia calls for a feminist approach to sex selection that “refuses to be captured” (p. 197) by reproductive binaries such as individual/population, (in)fertility/(over)population, and so on. relatedly, one of sasser’s concluding questions asks if “it is enough for feminists to insist on women’s bodily autonomy” (p. 149) or whether feminists need to “grapple with population growth,” in which she points to recent work by donna haraway and kim tallbear. first, when it comes to feminist agency to avoid capture and co-optation of our reproductive knowledge and frameworks, i want to suggest that we need to carefully assess the situated vulnerabilities of feminist organizations. both books demonstrate the ease with which better financed (sierra club) and more powerful (anti-choice) social actors have usurped feminist language and frameworks for their own purposes. both books provide examples of the fluidity of reproductive book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 6 politics that shape feminist organizing, whether it be the creation and cancellation of sierra club training program, or the shifting center of the anti-sex-selection campaign in the us. a robust reproductive justice approach should include careful assessment of situated vulnerabilities of feminist actors in this arena to provide better tools to understand how they may succumb to external influences and/or resist the usurpation of feminist justice goals. at a moment when planned parenthood—the largest provider of reproductive health care for low-income and women of color in the us—has lost 40% of its budget, the precarious economic and political position of feminist reproductive health, rights, justice organizations in these neoliberal times is particularly ripe for analysis. feminist science studies is well equipped to build our understanding of the complex vulnerabilities of feminist reproductive organizations and principles to external forces, and the fault lines of gender, race, and class that have always defined them. second, responding to sasser’s question about grappling with population numbers, i suggest that feminist analyses also pay close attention to the configuration and effects of quantitative elements of reproductive narratives. population statistics established the individual/aggregate reproductive binary and the fundamental features of its operation. aggregation mediates between administrative ledgers, state policy, and popular discourse though accounting tools that detach life events from their social grounds to produce disembodied statistical figurations such as sex ratios and unmet need. those figures in turn contour individual responsibility for managing life events. the continued slippage of aggregate and individual animates the numbers that define population problems and locates their solutions in individual action. central to that slippage is the orientalist logic that requires right-minded liberal (read white) people to control their reproduction so that they, like overpopulated nations, will not suffer the consequences of too many to care for. in grappling with the numbers, feminists must attend to the historically situated mediation practices and the methodological processes underlying the configuration of demographic data. there are always gaps and contingencies in how and what the data represent that must be negotiated. a robust feminist reproductive justice approach would interrogate the resolution of those gaps and contingencies in the construction of numbers to illuminate how they are inflected by situations of their enactment. bhatia’s account of contestation of racialized sex selection numbers and sasser’s critique of overpopulation as a cause of greenhouse gases provide strong examples of what i am suggesting should become routine practice. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) carole r. mccann,2020 7 reference angus, i., & butler, s. (2011). too many people? population, immigration, and the environmental crisis. chicago: haymarket. author bio carole r. mccann is professor and chair of gender, women’s, + sexuality studies at university of maryland, baltimore county (umbc) and author of figuring the population bomb: gender and demography in the mid-twentieth century (university of washington press, feminist technosciences series, 2016). microsoft word 71511-1-11_wesner.docx wesner, a. (2018). contested sonic space: settler territoriality and sonographic visualization at celilo falls. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-34. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © ashton wesner, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article contested sonic space: settler territoriality and sonographic visualization at celilo falls ashton wesner university of california at berkeley ashton.wesner@berkeley.edu abstract in this article, i argue that “seeing with sound" is a fraught political process with the potential to both obfuscate and assist indigenous claims to land. i do so by analyzing the portland district u.s. army corps of engineers’ 2007 sonar images of celilo falls on the columbia river. i take up feminist materialist analytics developed by native american and indigenous studies scholarship on cartography and refusal, and place them in conversation with the sonic geographies of columbia river indigenous writers. namely, i use elizabeth woody’s poem waterways endeavor to translate silence from currents (1994) to investigate how overlapping and conflicting deployments of sonic imaging play a major cultural, political, and material role in the (re)mapping of celilo falls. first, i present a theoretical framework that considers the role of what i call sonic knowledges in unsettling colonial visual cartographies. i use archival army corps’ maps and critical sonar studies literature to show how the army corps’ 2007 riverbed sonograms emerge from a longer context of us settler practices of enclosing land with maps and surveying water with sound. i 2 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) then turn to a close reading of newspaper articles and state legislation to analyze how the sonograms take on a present political life in ways that repackage ocularcentrism and assuage settler guilt, thus authorizing ongoing us enclosure of indigenous lands. yet, i also bring to bear indigenous sonic knowledges that position imaging processes as potentially antithetical to addressing questions of access to land and self-determination. through examining newspaper interviews, public testimonies, and elizabeth woody’s poem, i elucidate deployments of sonic knowledge that can help us think about what anti-colonial (re)mapping practices demand of contemporary cartographic imaging processes. attending to sonic knowledges under conditions of settlerocularcentrism, i suggest, might assist anti-colonial feminist science studies engagements with processes of imag(in)ing indigenous space. introduction dislocated from one another, we are now flooded, resting in place. we suffocate in the backwater of decadence and fractious contempt. purity of the ancient is the language without tongues. the river elegantly marks swirls on its surface, a spiral that tells of a place that remains undisturbed. elizabeth woody (warm springs, wasco, yakama, and navajo), 1994, excerpt from poem “waterways endeavor to translate silence from currents,” p. 97 it is 2015 and just east of the dalles dam on the oregon shore of the columbia river, i am looking out across lake celilo from celilo park. i hear the steely rumble of an oil tanker train along the union pacific line, the resounding horn of a cargo barge plodding downriver, and the whoosh of highway traffic on the i-84. standing at the river’s edge, my face is wet with rain and ears full of wind — i hear the quick, whipping monofilm sail of a windsurfer and the crashing crests of world-renowned mid-river waves. between lulls in the gusts, i hear the methodical gurgle 3 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) of lake celilo’s waves lapping at the rocky shore. celilo park is a treaty fishing access site on nch’i-wána,1 which (for now) is commonly called the columbia river. along the public recreational shoreline there is also treaty mandated infrastructure: a boat launch, fish cleaning tables and structures for net-drying, a parking lot with electric outlets, and bathrooms with showers. the most heavily used of thirty-one sites along the river, celilo park is one node in a federal compensation system aimed to reserve mid-columbia river tribes’ treaty right to half of the river’s salmon.2 throughout the columbia river basin, indigenous fisheries, villages, burial grounds, sacred places, and commercial infrastructure remain inundated — and salmon runs decimated — by twentieth-century hydropower development in what now amounts to over 60 dams. demarcated by congress and constructed by the united states army corps of engineers (ace), the sites provide commercial fishing locations at the “usual and accustomed places” for fishers of the nez perce tribe, confederated tribes of the warm springs reservation of oregon, confederated tribes of the umatilla reservation, and confederated tribes and bands of the yakama indian nation. before the 1950s and for centuries preceding, however, the visual, sonic, and geopolitical landscape of this stretch of the river did not look or sound the way i have just described. i grew up visiting the columbia river as a white, non-indigenous person—i conduct this research and writing as a settler — and what i cannot hear in celilo park at present is the sound of falling water. beneath the floating fishnets on lake celilo is wyam,3 celilo falls. celebrated poet and enrolled member of the confederated tribes of warm springs, elizabeth woody — whose poetics of sonic geography run through this paper — has translated the sahaptin word wyam to mean “echo of falling water” or “sound of water on rocks” (1994, p. 9). before inundation by the rising backwaters of the dalles dam on 10 march 1957, this was a geophysically complex stretch of the river. at wyam the nearly 900-yard-wide channel narrowed to less than sixty, and dropped more than twenty feet in elevation, charging the flow drained from 237,000 square miles of watershed through basaltic 4 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) islands and outcroppings in thundering falls and rapids, whirlpools and eddies. on those rocky cliffs, fishermen constructed seasonal platforms and their dip-nets brought in a prolific catch, as millions of salmon forged the constricted current toward their spawning grounds upriver. celilo falls — presently inundated by lake celilo, the 330,000-acre-feet of impounded waters i see from celilo park — was part of the most productive inland fishery and hub of commercial, cultural, and political exchange for indigenous peoples in the region. on the heels of the 1957 inundation’s fiftieth anniversary, as media outlets explain, the portland district ace faced pressure from environmental activists and celilo village descendants and residents to provide definitive evidence as to whether they had dynamited the basaltic formations in the river channel during dam construction (patton, 2008; rojas-burke, 2008). the ace turned to visual data to disprove such indictments and, in a public act of settler (re)discovery — enabled by technology that “sees with sound” (kellogg, 1961; ritts and shiga, 2016) — produced new images of celilo falls. in april of 2007, an ace survey team led a boat fitted with a multi-beam sonar scanner onto the flat waters of lake celilo to generate a sonogram of the riverbed. the oregonian newspaper published the cartographic images, explaining, “new sonar maps produced by the corps of engineers reveal a virtually unchanged celilo falls beneath the murky water of the columbia” (rojasburke, 2008, para. 5). the article begins with historical and political context for the survey: about 10 miles upstream of the dalles, the columbia river once thundered over fierce rapids and a big horseshoe-shaped waterfall where generations of native americans gathered to catch salmon by the hundreds. the lake that rose behind the dalles dam swallowed celilo falls in 1957. as if that weren't destruction enough, government demolition teams blasted the falls to ruins...or so the stories said. (emphasis my own, paras. 1-2) this narration of historic settler violence begins, as many do, with a 5 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) description of a distant and completed event, a people past, and a dismissal of intergenerational memory. the narrative erases persisting indigenous existence and use of this place, and neglects the welldocumented history of the ace's dynamite-demolitions along the columbia throughout the twentieth century. historical and ongoing destruction is diminished, and the ace is made to appear innocent in the face of allegedly fallacious accusations. yet at the same time, the indigenous interviewees featured in the oregonian’s article expressed relief to see an image that suggested their ancestral fishing grounds had not been dynamited. further still, these interviews suggested that sonic cartography might be useful for land reclamation struggles and thus politicized the ace sonograms as an opportunity to (re)assert the futurity of indigenous relations with celilo falls. how do anti-colonial scholars of science and technology contend with the use of technoscientific imaging processes toward seemingly contradictory ends: as tools to bolster both settler-state authority as well as indigenous claims to land? in this paper, i extend this question to examine the role of sonic visualization in divergent conceptualizations and claims to space using an analysis of the production and circulation of images created by the 2007 ace sonar survey of celilo falls. i take up the feminist materialist analytics developed by native american and indigenous studies scholarship on cartography and refusal (goeman, 2013; simpson, 2014), in conversation with the sonic geographies of columbia river indigenous writers (pinkham, 2010; woody, 1994), to argue that “seeing with sound” is a fraught political process with the potential to both obfuscate and assist indigenous claims to land. i begin this paper with a theoretical framework that considers sonic knowledge in unsettling colonial visual cartographies. to further elucidate the political stakes of “seeing with sound,” i then use archival maps and critical sonar studies to historicize the material production of sonograms at celilo. i consider the 2007 ace sonar survey in a much longer context of us settler and imperial practices of imaging territory, which enclose lands with maps and survey waters with sound. in the third section, a 6 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) close reading of newspaper articles and state legislation demonstrates how the sonograms take on a present political life in ways that repackage ocularcentrism, assuage settler guilt and thus authorize ongoing us enclosure of indigenous lands. throughout this paper, i attend to multiple political valences of sonic cartographies and the enactments of anticolonial resistance in both constituting and contesting the sociopolitical life of the images. thus, the final section engages with tonawanda band of seneca scholar mishuana goeman’s (2014) call to theorize spatial justice through indigenous women’s cartographic practices. i focus on the role of sound in a politics of refusal (simpson, 2014) to the maintenance and memorialization of settler control at celilo falls. turning back to elizabeth woody’s poem (1994, pp. 97-98), i examine sonic geography as a spatial framework for thinking anti-colonial land politics and undoing the ocularcentric logics of settler cartographies. sound matters columbia river treaty tribes and columbia river indians continue to take fish at celilo park in a place visually, sonically, and geopolitically (re)spatialized by the territorializing projects of settler colonial occupation. nez perce historian, storyteller, and elder, allen pinkham, has written about his contemporary relationship with celilo falls, in part, through sonic memory. i have stopped at celilo over the years, and the silence is a terrible thing to experience. there are no sounds of mothers and grandmothers cooking or washing dishes after a meal that included fresh salmon or eels. no sounds of mothers and daughters cutting salmon and eels to dry for winter storage and use. no sounds of men chopping wood for cooking or smokedrying at the old village site. no sounds of children running, playing, and shouting at each other. near where fish were being caught, there are no sounds of nets going into the currents or of fish being clubbed when brought onto the scaffolds and put into 7 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) fish boxes…. now, there are no sounds of hand cable cars being pulled across to the various islands; their wheels are quiet. (2007, p. 592) pinkham’s memory routes an historical account of life at celilo falls through a sonic register. his tracing of past and present sounds at celilo affords an account of space that is gendered and persistent in its sociality and materiality. here, women and more-than-human beings are the central agents of biological and social production. he describes an interrelated set of indigenous socialities and technologies that are reproductive and relational. relations between mothers, grandmothers, salmon, eels, nets and cable cars, constitute an “intact” celilo falls as lively and sound-full. pinkham’s repeated “terrible” experience of silence over the years — a dense and layered series of “no sounds” — registers the violence of material enclosure and social dislocation as a series of many acoustic absences. pinkham constructs a historically specific sonic knowledge that is both an intimate claim to indigenous social space and an indictment of the constant invisible terror of ongoing occupation (see barker ed., 2017; goldstein ed., 2014; kauanui, 2016; wolfe, 2006). similarly, elizabeth woody’s (1994) poem “waterways endeavor to translate silence from currents” (p. 97) produces a dislocated, yet animate, sonic geography. woody is a highly acclaimed indigenous poet, educator, and founding member of the northwest native american writers association. her poem, an excerpt from which serves as an epigraph for this article, begins “first of the voices are innocent, from memory/” and ushers the reader into a multitudinous, resonant remembrance. the poem’s scaffolding stands on images of resounding columbia river beings — fissures hiss and songs linger — while spiraling through a flooded place of dislocation. akin to pinkham’s insistence on the vital relations that constitute celilo falls, woody’s poem likewise represents celilo falls in its own right. further still, woody’s poem evokes futurity through an emplaced and communicative river. the poem’s final three lines depict a columbia that might be caressing and caring for itself: “the river elegantly marks swirls on its surface,/a spiral that tells of a 8 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) place/that remains undisturbed.” the symbol of spiraling water evokes a sense of falling as ongoing movement. a place “that remains undisturbed” is a persistent place, brought into being by continuous story-making, although perhaps only legible as such to the closed and specific “we” of the poem. neither spectacular nor ocular, celilo is irreducible to geophysical structures that can be made sensible by visual measurement alone. pinkham’s sonic memories and woody’s sonic geography turn our attention to the ways sound and silence are historical, material, and spatial. yet, neither pinkham nor woody describes the social, cultural, and spatial dislocation brought on by inundation as “death” (barber, 2010). sound and silence figure prominently in columbia river indigenous peoples’ memory of an acute event of primitive accumulation, experience of ongoing dispossession, as well as the collective maintenance of their relation to the vitality of celilo (see pinkham, 2010; ulrich, 2007; woody, 1994). what i call sonic knowledges refer to the various ways in which sound is experienced, described, represented, and codified as material truth claims or ontological facts. sonic knowledges figure centrally in contemporary contestation surrounding what counts as life, personhood, and a legitimate claim to place across interlocking social and political spheres: the historic echo of pounding waters, memories of reverberating dynamite blasts, and pings of underwater soundwaves. multitudinous sonic knowledges converge and diverge in the imagining and imaging of celilo falls, but with uneven power relations and toward the production of vastly different spatial politics. imaging matters dan proudfit — head of the portland district ace's survey section — led an outfitted boat over lake celilo in april of 2007. as his team cruised the reservoir’s surface, a multi-beam sonar scanner’s projector emitted pings toward the intended deflecting structure or target (i.e., the geomorphic basalt formations of the columbia riverbed). these sound pulses 9 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) reverberated from their target back to the water’s surface and were received by the scanner’s hydrophone. a transducer converted these reverberations to electrical impulses that could then be spatially visualized as a series of black and white sonograms. akin to photo negatives, these images were then inverted and “falsely” colored through computer processing (peterson, 2012). evocative of a colorful 3-d topographical model, the resulting images convey the riverbed’s geophysical structures as they might appear without water running through or over them. the sonograms’ red-to-green color gradation indicates an increase in depth (from about twenty to 120 feet) along the river floor and the shadowed indentations, ridges, and cuts indicate spatial dimension. in so doing, the ace produced yet another visualization of celilo falls in a long line of measurements, maps, and surveys of this stretch of the river. this time, they used sound. although the bottom of celilo lake had never once been mapped since the dalles dam was completed, us mapmaking of celilo falls is not new. throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ace produced and deployed images of the columbia’s geophysiology for the purposes of expanding riverine navigation, preventing floods of settler developments, irrigating agricultural lands, and generating hydroelectricity for a rapidly increasing settler population and wartime industry (see allen, 2007; fredlund, 2007). in the pacific northwestern united states more broadly, land and water surveys assisted the quantification, invasion, and enclosure of the land by the settler nationstate throughout the fur trade, the lewis and clark corps of discovery expedition, westward extension of the railroads, and urbanization of western territories (see banner, 2007; blackhawk, 2006; huhndorf, 2009; limerick, 1987). federal plans, specifically those for settler territorialization of the columbia river basin, relied on visual representations of waterways to imagine and enact the expansion of homesteading, commercial agriculture, hydropower, and military industry (see lang, 2007; white, 1995; worster, 1985). following rapid development of navigational infrastructure in the 10 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) early twentieth century, the ace turned its focus to the columbia’s potential to support large-scale hydropower plans (willingham, 1992). historian william lang (2007) explains: “celilo falls and the dalles, rather than the object of concern as an obstacle to navigation, suddenly became a location for an economic bonanza, where engineers sought to exaggerate the river’s fall and create a bountiful source of power” (p. 574). ace surveys of the nation’s rivers laid the scientific groundwork for federal plans to systematically develop entire watersheds for irrigation, flood control, and hydropower throughout the us and advocated for the construction of dams on the columbia, the dalles dam being one of them (national research council, 1999; north pacific division of u.s. ace, 1969). figure 1: close up of celilo falls reach. [a close-up section of an army corps map depicting the columbia river reach at the dalles, between oregon and washington. the river is outlined in bolded, black ink, with place names identifying cities, highways, and hydropower and navigational infrastructure proposed by the army corps of engineers. the water downriver of the dalles is blue, while the proposed inundation upriver from the recommended project is filled in with red.] 11 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) figure 2: map key indicating "proposes project" and projected flooding. [a map-key, titled “legend” in black font at the top. beneath are symbols (such as variously shaded polygons, dotted lines, and circles) with definitions indicating ace projects in various stages. the existing and authorized project symbols and descriptions are in blue, the proposed projects in red, the possible future projects in yellow, and the present and potential irrigated areas in green.] columbia river and tributaries, northwestern united states. letter from the chief of engineers to the secretary of the army, 28 june 1950. report plate 78. the ace maps imagined the spatial reorganizations of settler futurity and enabled such a project’s material implementation. red, on this 1949 ace survey of the columbia, demarcates a “proposed reservoir” project behind the “recommended project” at the dalles (figure 2). evocative of the blue and red anatomical depictions of blood-filled veins, the proposed project seeps east. bright ink floods and exceeds the empty, outlined reach of the columbia river —covering a small, hollow black circle labeled “celilo/celilo falls” (figure 1). 12 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) technocientific systems designed to produce maps or aerial views of land assist projects of us territorial control, military expansion, and the cultural formation of a nationalist imaginary. from safari cameras and wwi hot air balloons, to the war on terror’s unmanned aircraft and “curiosity” (nasa’s mars rover), scholars have contended with the violent consequences of power-laden visualization technologies and ocularcentric ways of knowing, especially imbricated projects of empire building through territorial conquest (see anderson, 1983; chandler, 2016; earle, 2014; gregory, 2014; kaplan, 2006, 2017). in a similar but different vein, feminist science studies scholars have predominantly theorized sonography as an instrument of visualization in the context of the body, gender, reproduction and subject-formation (see cartwright, 1995; haraway, 1997; milstein & krolokke, 2012; palmer, 2009; taylor, 2008). similarly, acoustic technologies have enabled scientific and military detection and visualization of underwater sound waves to enable a kind of “seeing by listening” (kellogg, 1961). adjacent to medical sonograms, geophysical sonar survey systems are run through with implications for defining and ordering what counts as valuable and vital, or enemy and other. the role of sonar imaging technology as an instrument of settler colonization in the us, however, remains underexamined. as i argue in this paper, geophysical sonograms can both uphold and break with the cartographic legacy of settler-state control over contested territory. critical studies of sonar have traced its emergence from the cold war to contemporary securitization of oceanic space and underwater landscapes. an acronym for sound navigation and ranging, sonar was first widely developed and deployed during wwii for the detection of underwater military targets, such as submarines (peterson, 2012). this work shows how the instruments and sense-making systems that perceive and translate underwater sound arose from an inextricable relationship between military naval and security research, and sciences of cetology and oceanography (see ritts & shiga, 2016; oreskes, 2003). as these sonar studies lay bare the co-constitution of military and scientific 13 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) technologies, they show how underwater spaces become configured as “marine battlefields” (kaushik et al., 2005). a term that conveys the positivism of military discourse, “marine battlefield” also historicizes and politicizes the underwater landscapes in which instruments of surveillance and management produce effects of (re)territorialization. imagining and imaging underwater landscapes as “battlefields” — frontiers of expansion and original scientific discovery — reshape longstanding notions of the oceanic boundaries of sovereign powers and extend material claims to territory. there is an urgent opportunity here to interrogate the role of geophysical sonar discourses and visualizations — from images of riverbeds to archeological sites — as political actants enrolled in sociocultural and legal contestations over the legitimacy and futurity of indigenous claims to ancestral territory. federal agencies like the environmental protection agency and national park service draw from their readings of technoscientific images to make decisions about the validity, import, and response to environmental and sovereignty struggles on the part of indigenous peoples. sonar surveys are used in the arbitration of legal and regulatory processes such as environmental impact assessments and native american graves protection and recovery act (nagpra) proceedings (see oregon state historic preservation office, 2013; us army corps of engineers, 1999). in the context of ongoing settler colonial occupation and enclosure of underwater land, what can be learned from examining the way the ace sonograms deploy acoustic surveillance in the mapping of an “underwater battlefield”? and how can these efforts be understood as acts of national security-making? politics of representation louie pitt jr., [a] warm springs tribal member, said historical photographs seem to show blasting at the site of the falls. "are they still there? were they dynamited? that questioning has been going 14 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) on for years," said pitt, director of government affairs and planning for the tribe.— rojas-burke, 2008, para. 6 state and federal fisheries managers agreed there was one good thing about the dalles dam: it would end indian fishing at celilo falls. although the fisheries people fought the dam down to the start of construction, they took comfort from the expectation — or at least hope —that drowning celilo falls would end indian fishing on the columbia and disperse the indians. – roberta ulrich, 2007, p. 80 shortly after the survey’s completion, the oregonian published an article titled “sonar shows celilo falls are intact,” with a black and white aerial photograph of the columbia river from the 1940s set alongside its contemporary mimetic equivalent, the 2008 ace cartographic sonogram of land underwater (rojas-burke, 2008). the new map does not mark gravel bars for demolition or channels for dredging nor does the sonic transducer identify enemy objects for target launch. this visual juxtaposition — the abutting proximity of an historical aerial landscape photograph and a present-day colorized sonogram — was offered as authoritative evidence and conclusion: the celilo falls that existed above water in the 1940s is intact beneath the river in 2007. 15 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) figure 3: the main cataract at celilo falls as seen in october 1933. the falls were flooded by the construction of the dalles dam in 1957, and rumor had it that the us army corps of engineers demolished them (rojas-burke, 2008). [two images juxtaposed, one beneath the other. the top image is a black and white aerial photograph of celilo falls, showing the white-water of rapids gushing down-river and the rocks basalt formations of the mid-river cliffs and south oregon shore. the bottom image is the 2007 ace sonogram, in color, indicating the depths and dimensions of the riverbed. a deep blue to green fills in the deep river channel, while the shallow rocky outcroppings are colored red, orange, and yellow.] the article enables a public record of ace innocence in response to rumorbased accusations of explosive settler violence. eve tuck (unangax) and k. wayne yang have theorized such examples of non-indigenous peoples' moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization as “settler moves to innocence” that attempt to rescue settler futurity through a problematic reconciliation of settler guilt and complicity (2012, p. 3). portland district corps’s col. thomas o’donovan’s decision to request a detailed sonar survey from dan proudfit’s survey team is described as a “wade into the celilo falls controversy” (para. 7). drawing from a prior oregon public broadcasting interview with o’donovan, the article contextualizes the ace’s rationale: “my team came to me and said, ‘look, we don't think we blew the falls up,[….]i said, 'well, that really isn't gonna cut it in terms of 16 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) sitting down with the tribes and talking about this important cultural resource that it is for them” (emphasis my own, para. 10). the effect of generous enactment constructs the sonar survey as a benevolent gesture on the part of the very same federal agency that was responsible for flooding celilo falls in the 1957. simultaneously, the falls are reduced to their “important cultural” import alone. this elides the political and economic stakes of envisioning celilo falls intact for tribes, especially in the context of emerging debate over possible future removal of hydropower dams on the columbia (para. 16). boyd cothran, a cultural and military historian of the us, examines the cultural production of the settler-american public’s belief in “their fundamental innocence in the face of settler colonial legacies of violence” (2014, p. 24). here, i suggest that feminist materialist analyses examine how scientific imaging processes also make “settler moves to innocence” (tuck & yang, 2012) and contribute to the production of a revisionist and benevolent settler historiography (cothran 2014). scientific visions, too, are enrolled in the cultural work of maintaining settler colonial control over land and obscuring the historical violence of this control (see braun, 2002; chapin et al., 2005; harris, 2004; hunt & stevenson, 2016; özdenshilling 2016). the ace is willing to deploy innovative technologies to offer visual evidence of a scientifically substantiated claim to historical truth. the ace publicly reveals this new narrative of what happened at celilo falls as a kind of gift in exchange for a previously flawed narrative. the truth claims authorized by cartographic conventions articulate with a performance of good intention and risk dismissing celilo village residents’ testimony with a tacit suggestion that material violence committed by the ace at celilo was not as bad as “rumor had it” (rojasburke, 2008). however, the oregonian article did not situate the sonograms in historical material context. in 1873, the ace began dynamiting basalt rock formations, like those at celilo falls, as they were considered an obstruction to navigation of the river (barber & fisher, 2007, p. 721). during the dalles dam construction there is at least one significant 17 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) instance of dynamite use in 1956, as shown in figure 4: “more than 20 tons of powder, and removed 60,000 cubic yards of basalt.” the ace maps i discuss in the previous section were used as blueprints for dynamite placement during construction from the late 1800s through the 1950s (allen, 2007; willingham, 1992). explosives were a technology of territorialization for the expansion of state control and capital in the midcolumbia river, and countless places occupied, used, and held in relation by indigenous peoples were destroyed by the ace detonations. figure 4: “final major blast at the dalles dam, removed 60,000 cubic yards of basalt, more than 20 tons of powder used.” 1956. ohs research lib, bb002863. [a black and white landscape photograph—a tall, mid-action dynamite blast stretches the length of the photograph, with clouds of dark smoke, dirt, and water extending skyward. in the foreground are gravel and sand bars, and portions of the columbia river and low, smooth mountains are seen in the background.] yet there are multiple, potentially disruptive, methods for making sense of the sonograms, some of which elicit feelings of relief and visions of indigenous futurity. in the same news article analyzed above, elizabeth woody situates the sonograms in a longer process of holding the ace accountable for its major role in the dispossession of indigenous life on the mid-columbia: the revelation brings relief and hope to many members of columbia basin tribes. 18 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) "i was deeply moved," said woody. "i actually cried, i was so relieved that it wasn't destroyed." woody said it's easy for her to understand why members of her tribe and others came to believe that the u.s. government dynamited the falls. people living in the village at celilo falls heard and felt the blasting for excavations at the dam, she said. "people experienced the explosions and associated it with the loss," she said (rojas-burke, 2008, paras. 13-16). woody brings non-visual senses to bear on geophysical knowledge production and the making of history. she provincializes sight and centers celilo villagers’ experience of hearing and feeling blasts as constitutive of the explosion’s event. woody continues to argue: “people said the corps had dynamited celilo so no one would fight for the dams to come down” (emphasis my own, para. 17). conversing with woody during this interview, louie pitt jr. (member and director of government affairs and planning for the confederated tribes of warm springs) also contends with the sonograms on explicitly indigenous terms. the sonograms assist his imag(in)ing of future indigenous geographies outside of, or beyond, settler colonial structures: “someday those dams will be gone,” pitt said. “when that day comes the falls will return. indians will be waiting” (para. 21). woody and pitt jr. decenter the process of imaging celilo falls. their language enrolls embodied and auditory senses to construct an emplaced history of indigenous experiences at celilo falls. woody explains that the sonic knowledge of those “living in the village” offers a challenge to the ace’s use of visual evidence to maintain a record of public innocence. she regards sonic memories of dynamite as undoubtedly “heard and felt,” and politicizes visual representations of land as potential claims-making tools in a struggle against dispossession. 19 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) woody’s evocation of an undammed future for the columbia river implies that the scientific and legal authority afforded these sonograms might assist in future efforts to make claims to land currently under water. likewise, pitt jr. affirms the certainty of such a future on the columbia river where indigenous peoples not only survive the violences of the ace, but also anticipate and prepare for the inevitable dissolution of hydropower infrastructure. not all forms of sonic knowledge are afforded equal amounts of ontoepistemological legitimacy in the popular imaginary nor in scientific and political spheres (goh, 2017). in the following section, i further examine how sonic knowledges are used to politicize visual representations and take up the ace sonograms as a technology for producing indigenous futures and refusing settler spatial orders. i argue that mishuana goeman’s (2013) theorization of (re)mapping as an engagement with “the power of native epistemologies in defining [native] moves toward spatial decolonization, a specific form of spatial justice” (p. 4), brought together with audra simpson’s (2014) politicized indigenous refusal of settler “sense,” opens possibilities of understanding how indigenous sonic cartographies do productive political and spatial work toward shaping the futures of indigenous places “within and apart from settler governance” (p. 11). sounding refusal and indigenous futurity nearly eight years after their initial release, the same ace sonograms that had trafficked as geophysical evidence of ace innocence publicly entered the juridico-military sphere. in the 2015 regular session of the seventy-eighth oregon legislative assembly, a house joint memorial measure — hjm-15 (figure 5)—was introduced to “[urge] united states army corps of engineers to provide preliminary statement of feasibility for lowering lake celilo to a level sufficient to reveal celilo falls during a certain period” (para. 2). this period of revelation was specified as lasting one to two weeks, between 1 january 2016 and 1 january 2020. a copy 20 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) of hjm-15 was sent to the commanding general and chief of engineers of the us army corps as well as to the commander and district engineer of the us ace, portland district. an article in the northwest news network drew a connection between the ace sonograms and this new political initiative to physically reveal the falls: in 2008[sic.], the army corps of engineers released a sonar survey of the river bottom in front of celilo village. the underwater survey showed the falls and surrounding rock formations remain intact. in recent years, several small nonprofits have emerged to advocate for restoring celilo falls and its historic fishery. they include the friends of celilo falls, which takes pains to say that it does not represent or speak for columbia river tribes. in written testimony, friends director sean aaron cruz said a permanently restored celilo falls could perhaps become a unesco world heritage site (banse, t., 2015, paras. 13-15). the state-sanctioned move to uncover and (re)cover celilo falls is integrally constituted by imaging processes. such a spectacular and material memorialization project requires a critical examination of how technoscientific images are — like cothran’s examples of stage performances, postcards, and tourist sites (2014) — also enrolled in the cultural production of settler memory and commonsense (rifkin, 2014). yet as i have shown, contradictory meanings can be produced and mobilized to very different political ends using the same images. the commentary submitted during hjm-15’s legislative proceedings offer an opportunity to analyze how sonar images are simultaneously enrolled in, and critiqued as, cultural and legal projects of settler-state redemption and territorialization. this next section examines anti-hjm-15 testimonies submitted by two indigenous writers to demonstrate how settler visual representations of indigenous lands are continuously contested. both tabitha whitefoot and se-ah-dom edmo are celilo village descendants with extensive 21 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) experience in indigenous-led research and education, currently through positions at lewis and clark college and the columbia river inter-tribal fish commission respectively. indigenous responses to hjm-15 (of which i only consider the archived public commentary) were not homogenous. i have intentionally selected two testimonies that reject the primacy of the visual, and in so doing both critique and refute the spatial politics undergirding the settler-state’s imagined memorial. their testimonies offer material for exploring articulations of historicized sound, sense, and sociality that challenge the taken-for-granted value of imaging celilo falls. figure 5: helm, j. (2015). house joint memorial 15, 18th oregon legislative assembly-2015 regular session. 22 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) native and indigenous studies scholars have demonstrated that calculated refusal of settler “gifts,” such as inclusivity or apology, is also an assertion of power (simpson, 2014). audra simpson, kahnawà:ke scholar of anthropology and native american studies, theorizes indigenous “refusal” as an alternative to the desire for legibility and inclusion within settler colonial nation states (2014, p. 1). building on her argument that “like indigenous bodies, indigenous sovereignties and indigenous political orders prevail within and apart from settler governance” (p. 11), simpson demonstrates how indigenous refusal of “gifts” (re)shape the politics, sense, and reason from which they emerge (p. 1). whitefoot’s and edmo’s testimonies in opposition to hjm-15 can be read as assertions of columbia river indigenous women's political sovereignty and challenges to settler-state legitimacy. each writer refuses hjm-15 and problematizes the set of evasions that make possible such a state-sanctioned “move to settler innocence” (tuck & yang, 2012). tabitha whitefoot, an educator, researcher, and member of the yakama nation, was a young child at celilo village on the day of inundation. her submitted hjm-15 testimony elucidates sonic and sensory knowledges that trouble ocularcentric accounts of land and challenges the authority of visual sonography to evidence that “celilo falls still exists.” please listen to the voices of those individuals with a real stake in the prospect of revealing celilo falls, the descendants of those people who were displaced, who lost their homes and sense economic and social order. these late comers know nothing of this heritage, to them it is but a series of pictures and news reports. to us it is our story, our life. ask the leaders of the treaty tribes, whose tribal members were displaced and impoverished by dam building. i was four years old the year of inundation… my eyesight was severely impaired, so i have to depend on my other senses to report this out to you. first, you cannot imagine the original smell of celilo. it was a 23 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) sweet, smoky, fresh, compelling, odor. i can close my eyes and bring it forward. the sound, was indescribable, the closest i have come, is where you can hike behind the falls at silver falls state park. but that sound is directly overhead, and the sound at celilo actually reverberated off the cliffs…like a hum of industry and nature combined. the air was sometimes scrubbed clear by the winds and dry air, other times the mist could make you damp. these memories are powerful and evoke a sense of security and joy to me... (emphasis my own, p. 1). whitefoot makes an explicit connection between displacement and imagining processes: visual consumption has political and material consequences for “those individuals with a real stake in the prospect of revealing celilo falls.” she critiques settler representations of celilo falls as “but a series of pictures and news reports,” made by “newcomers” with little knowledge of celilo heritage and no experience with economic and social loss there. whitefoot’s historicized and emplaced testimony interrupts her settler audience’s overreliance on the visual. whitefoot does not describe celilo’s vitality as one that is seen, rather, she “can close [her] eyes” to bring forward smells that her audience “cannot imagine” and sounds that are “indescribable.” taking up simpson’s framework of refusal, we might read whitefoot’s rich descriptions of celilo’s sounds (hums and reverberations), olfactory and tactile sensations (sweet, smoky and fresh odor; winds and dry air), and material-affects (security and joy) as not only an alternative to settler recognition but a political enactment of indigenous sovereignty and spatial production. explicit connection between redemptive violence and visual spectacle is also forged in se-ah-dom edmo’s testimony. edmo, a shoshone-bannock, nez perce, and yakama celilo village descendant, whose father witnessed the 1957 inundation, wrote to urge “a no vote on hjm 15 and to call into question any motivation or movement to temporarily lower the dalles dam to reveal the falls.” she explains: uncovering celilo would be like digging up the grave of a relative 24 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) — just so well meaning non-native progressives can feel good about themselves and the work they are doing. what we really need is to work to empower the people who suffer generational trauma because of environmental racism. hjm 15 is misguided, i urge you to vote no! (2015, p. 1) edmo’s language, “like digging up the grave of a relative,” presents a much more familial, and vital relationship to celilo falls than the newspaper articles that tout sonograms as evidence of its “still there”ness, as though the basalt formations alone — and not the relations and life they co-produced — constitute celilo falls. edmo evokes death and burial, foregrounding the loss, violence, and covered reality of the falls. together, these testimonies refute media proclamations that celilo falls was not destroyed during dam building. conclusion imaging processes and sonic cartographies are contested practices of territorialization as well as methods for unsettling colonial geographies. mishuana goeman, scholar of native literature, geographies, and feminisms, has developed a theory of (re)mapping that is “not just about regaining that which was lost and returning to an original and pure point in history, but instead understanding the processes that have defined our current spatialities in order to sustain vibrant native futures” (2013, p. 3). for goeman, (re)mapping looks like engagement with the multiple and simultaneous spatial politics that cartographic technologies afford but not in a return to some “pure idea of indigeneity” (2013, p. 3). rather, “in considering the map as an active apparatus that restructures spatial domination, social relations, and epistemological violence, we move away from romanticized notions of resistance” (p. 66). a poem can produce alternative maps and geographic understandings. goeman demonstrates that “the literary…tenders an avenue for the ‘imaginative’ creation of new possibilities, which must happen through imaginative modes precisely because the ‘real’ of settler 25 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) colonial society is built on the violent erasures of alternative modes of mapping and geographic understandings” (2013, p. 2). i turn now to examine poetry as a sonic genre with the imaginative capacity for reorganizing space with a reading of elizabeth woody’s (1994) poem “waterways endeavor to translate silence from currents.” this poem, from her book luminaries of the humble (1994, pp. 97-98), might offer an example of indigenous cartography at celilo falls: waterways endeavor to translate silence from currents first of the voices are innocent, from memory, desolate synthesis of weeping, rain, into dry creek beds. stone with roots, companion of guardians, bares itself toward the summit of crowns. the exchange of bones for sawdust, for silt, for worthless currency. the clouding springs hiss into veins of fissures, topsoil wears into desert, an illusion of property, fringed by momentum of cutting down origin. the hiatus is the flourish of sword and degeneration. in our genesis, the beginning of words meant that we would not be without land or relationships. vacuity, the lack of emotion etches into destruction the scaffolds of abundance, rapids, falls, spawning beds, the echo of falling water. the nascent place of all the songs lingers amongst the multitude of ancestors, commonly wedged into bone hills, vandalized and cataloged. dislocated from one another, we are now flooded, 26 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) resting in place. we suffocate in the backwater of decadence and fractious contempt. purity of the ancient is the language without tongues. the river elegantly marks swirls on its surface, a spiral that tells of a place that remains undisturbed. from luminaries of the humble by elizabeth woody. © 1994 the arizona board of regents. reprinted by permission of the university of arizona press. i examine how woody’s poem produces place and contends with inundation through sound. i recognize that, as a settler encountering the particular language and resonances of this piece, my reading has limitations. poetry itself is a sonic genre and this poem turns on “the echo of falling water. the nascent place of all/,” “lingering song,” and “language without tongues.” the “stone” in woody’s poem has “roots” and “companions,” indicating an agential reality in and through which it “bares itself.” life is evident in “scaffolds of abundance” and “spawning beds,” a human/more-than-human entanglement produces place (todd, 2017). celilo falls is thus irreducible to a “cataloged” geophysical formation or abstract space but is an always-emergent, relational place. inundation is configured as neither complete nor past. flooding is more than a hydromorphological event: “dislocated from one another, we are now flooded/resting in place.” the collective plurality of those flooded is rooted in place — “resting” — and the “we” implies a collective, related set of subjects beneath the water. the reader encounters the columbia as an agential subject. the river acts. it “elegantly marks” itself, in “a spiral that tells of a place/that remains undisturbed.” the figure of the spiral evokes a sense of continuous motion inward and outward, suggesting a vitality and futurity to that which “remains undisturbed.” much scholarly, journalistic, and personal analysis of celilo falls foregrounds the political, legal, scholarly and cultural work of columbia 27 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) river indigenous peoples toward securing fishing rights, sovereign territory, and un-dammed indigenous futures; the persistence of indigenous relations to salmon, other more-than-human beings, and wy’am in its impounded (for now) yet no less animate form (see aguilar, 2005; barber, 2005, 2018; dougherty, 2014; fisher, 2010; schneider, 2016; ulrich, 2008; woody, 1994). this paper is made possible by this body of knowledge. i aimed to privilege specific indigenous cartographies and theorizations of space while also critiquing the settler nation-state’s ongoing deployment of science and claims of innocence toward liberal colonial ends in the present moment. there is much opportunity to engage with the possibilities for sonic claims-making and contestation to refute ongoing yet unsuccessful projects of settler-state territorialization (see ritts et al., 2016). this paper demonstrates that overlapping and conflicting deployments of sonic imaging play a major cultural, political, and material role in the (re)mapping of celilo falls. the visual rendering of sound waves echoed off riverbed rock and the way it is made sensible in mainstream media authorizes a subordination of indigenous claims to the sonic and social spatiality of celilo falls and erases a legacy of the ace’s role in dispossession from the public historical record. yet i show how indigenous sonic knowledges have positioned imaging processes as potentially antithetical to addressing questions of access to land and selfdetermination. interviews, public testimonies, and a poem refuse the settler-state’s visual revelation of celilo falls on terms that can help us think about what anti-colonial (re)mapping practices demand of contemporary cartographic imaging processes. attending to sonic knowledges under conditions of settler-ocularcentrism might enable robust and critical engagements with indigenous spatial politics. acknowledgments enough thanks cannot be given to jen rose smith for her ever-incisive 28 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) feedback, careful questions, and generous inspiration. i am also humbly grateful for the input and guidance of catalyst’s lead and guest editors, reviewers, my writing group colleagues, conversations with beth piatote, and mentorship of nancy peluso, shari huhndorf, and jake kosek. notes 1 this is the mid-columbia river sahaptin dialect name, as phonemic orthography, for the big river (hunn, e., james selam and family, 1991). however, it is important to note that sahaptin is not the name that many sahaptin speakers use for their language, but the common mis-assigned name by colonial settlers and anthropologists who learned this assignation from the columbia salish. for example, the yakama nation’s tribal cultural resource program uses the name ichishkíin sɨ́nwit (″this language″) instead of the salish language term sahaptin (beavert & hargus, 2010). 2 treaty fishing access sites along the columbia river have legally protected land and amenities designated for exclusive use by indigenous fishers under the ongoing us district court litigation known as us v. oregon, starting in 1950s/60s. tribal access to historical fishing grounds, guaranteed to tribes by treaties formed in the mid-1800s, was lost due to dam construction along the columbia river system. the columbia river treaty fishing access sites (crtfas) program was implemented to compensate for this loss. the project spanned over 25 years of legislation, planning, design, and construction, and involved projects along nearly 150 miles of the columbia river, from bonneville dam to the foot of mcnary dam between the states of oregon and washington. the four treaty tribes—the nez perce tribe, confederated tribes of the warm springs reservation of oregon, confederated tribes of the umatilla reservation, confederated tribes and bands of the yakama indian nation—are the mid-columbia river indigenous peoples who were forced to cede millions of acres to the expanding us settler nation-state through treaties in what was then recently incorporated “oregon territory” in 1854-1855 (fisher, 2010). in these treaties they reserve their rights to fish, hunt, and gather at all “usual and accustomed places.” apart from the four treaty tribes, historically columbia river indians have lived off reservation, identify their ancestry as that of river people, and are not federally recognized but have organized their tribal governance through community and loose confederation as columbia river tribe. 29 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) columbia river indians continue to live and fish in their ancestral homelands along the columbia river, at celilo village, and “in-lieu fishing sites” among many other places in washington and oregon (fisher, 2010). 3 people live at wyam today, and have since time immemorial. wyam (sahaptin) refers to the village of celilo, on the south shore of the river (which was also partially flooded by construction of the dalles dam) as well as the series of cascading waterfalls and fishing sites in the river. references aguilar, g. 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(2014). settler common sense: queerness and everyday colonialism in the american renaissance. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. 33 wesner catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) rojas-burke, j. (2008, 27 nov.) sonar shows celilo falls are intact. the oregonian. retrieved from http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf /2008 /11 /sonar_shows_celilo_falls_are_i.html schneider, l. (2016). dammed by the state: indian fishing and geographies of settler colonialism in the columbia river basin. unpublished doctoral dissertaion. uc los angeles. simpson, a. (2014). mohawk interruptus: political life across the borders of settler states. durham, nc: duke university press. taylor, j. (2008). the public life of the fetal sonogram: technology, consumption and the politics of reproduction. new brunswick, nj and london, gb: rutgers university press. todd, z. 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(2015). testimony submitted to oregon state legislature 2015 regular session: house committee on rural communities, land use, and water. retrieved from https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015r1/downloads/ committeemeetingdocument/65658 wolfe, p. (2006). settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. journal of genocide research, 8(4), 387-409. woody, e. (2003). "recalling celilo." in e. c. wolf, & s. zuckerman (eds.), salmon nation: people and fish at the edge (2nd ed.), (pp. 9-16). portland, or: ecotrust. —— (1994). seven hands/seven hearts: prose and poetry. portland, or: the eighth mountain press. —— (1994). luminaries of the humble. tucson, az and london, gb: the university of arizona press. willingham, w. (1992). a history of the portland district us army corps of engineers. washington, d.c.: us government printing office. bio ashton wesner is a doctoral candidate in environmental science, policy, and management at the university of california, berkeley. microsoft word 29586-article text-77455-1-11-20190113.docx phan, t. n. (2019). amazon echo and the aesthetics of whiteness. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-39 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © thao n. phan, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article amazon echo and the aesthetics of whiteness thao phan alfred deakin institute for citizenship and globalisation, deakin university thao.phan1@deakin.edu.au abstract this article examines the figuration of the home automation device amazon echo and its digital assistant alexa. while most readings of gender and digital assistants choose to foreground the figure of the housewife, i argue that alexa is instead figured on domestic servants. i examine commercials, amazon customer reviews, and reviews from tech commentators to make the case that the echo is modeled on an idealized image of domestic service. it is my contention that this vision functions in various ways to reproduce a relation between device/user that mimics the relation between servant/master in nineteenthand twentieth-century american homes. significantly, however, the echo departs from this historical parallel through its aesthetic coding as a native-speaking, educated, white woman. this aestheticization is problematic insofar as it decontextualizes and depoliticizes the historic reality of domestic service. further, this figuration misrepresents the direction of power between user and device in a way that makes contending with issues such as surveillance and digital labor increasingly difficult. on 6 november 2014, amazon surprised the tech community by casually phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 unveiling its newest “futuristic gadget experiment”: the amazon echo (wo1ng, 2015).1 choosing to forego the usual fanfare of tech launches, the echo was announced using a press release and a string of promotional images and videos, showcasing a sleek, black cylindrical object with pulsating blue lights and perforated speaker holes. although from the outside it resembled a bluetooth speaker, an already popular commercial product, it quickly became apparent that the echo was capable of much more than just playing music. the echo had an in-built, voice-controlled digital assistant called alexa, which, like apple’s siri, could respond to verbal commands and provide the user with information about news, weather, traffic, and more. it could sync with other applications, create to-do lists, shopping lists, and schedule appointments and reminders. more distinctively though, the echo could also connect to other wifi-enabled devices to effectively function as a voice-controlled “smart home hub” controlling other smart home products such as light bulbs, thermostats, and switches (amazon, 2015). fitted with an array of microphones, the device was designed to be “always on” and, thus, always listening. while many reviewers praised the echo as exactly “what smart homes should feel like” (wong, 2015), others were more apprehensive, particularly because all interactions were recorded and saved unless users chose to manually delete them. one reviewer condemned the echo, describing it as “a trojan horse [for corporate america] to penetrate our remaining private moments” (wasserman, 2014) while another suspiciously asked, “alexa, what are you hiding?” (murphy, 2014). despite these concerns, the echo received almost instant commercial success and over the next few years would come to dominate both the market and the cultural imaginary for smart home devices. following its initial limited release, the echo received a general us release in 2015, followed by its first international releases in the uk and germany in 2016. by december 2017, it had expanded into thirty-four 1data for the chapter was collected from online promotional videos, customer reviews, youtube parody videos, and tech reviews. to respect the anonymity of customer reviewers, names have been redacted and references to their customer accounts have been removed. phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 countries with amazon introducing a full product line of more than nine related devices. it is, to date, the most popular device of its kind. as of november 2017, there were an estimated 20 million units installed in us homes, a figure which represents 75 percent of the us market for home automation devices. by comparison, the google home, the next leading consumer product, has an estimated 7 million units installed or 27 percent of the us market (consumer intelligence research partners, 2017). as one of the first devices to integrate home automation with voice control and artificial intelligence (ai) systems, the echo has subsequently taken a place in the public consciousness as the exemplar of smart home technology. amazon echo commercials have gone viral, generating millions of views and spinoff parody videos; there are dozens of online forums and communities dedicated to discussing the echo and its features; tens of thousands of customer reviews have been posted to amazon.com; and hundreds of professional reviews by tech writers in publications such as tech radar, engadget, cnet, gizmodo, pc mag, business insider, and more. in this article, i examine the ways in which the amazon echo has been figured on visions of idealized domestic service. the terms figure and figuration designate here the act of producing a cultural representation of an object, idea, person, or event. this representation does not necessarily correlate to its “real” conditions—which is not to say that they do not have real implications or effects—but rather their imagined impressions imprinted in places such as language and culture. the case study materials for this analysis comprise commercials for the echo, amazon customer reviews, and reviews from tech commentators. the commercials analyzed were published on amazon’s youtube channel between november 2014 and november 2017. customer reviews were accessed on the amazon product pages with both the highest positive and negative rated reviews at the time of study selected for close reading, and professional reviews from non-paywalled popular tech commentary magazines were also sourced during the same period. it is my contention that across these discursive sites, the echo is consistently modeled on an phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 idealized vision of domestic service. in many ways, this vision works to reproduce a relation between the device/user that mimics the relation between servant/master in nineteenthand twentieth-century american homes. significantly, however, the echo departs from this historical parallel through its aesthetic coding as a native-speaking, educated, white woman. as i will argue, this aestheticization is problematic insofar as it decontextualizes and depoliticizes the historic reality of domestic service. the echo romanticizes the relations of servitude in a way that denies the pain and historic context of that relation. it not only erases the bourgeois middle-class home as a site of exploitation, especially for women of color, but also misrepresents the power relation between the user and the device in such a way that obscures issues such as hierarchical surveillance and digital labor. smart homes, nostalgia, and class privilege in her work analyzing the commercial cultures of smart homes, lynn spigel (2009) has argued that “in moments of technological transition, people often search for ways to balance novelty with tradition” (p. 61). she states that like radio and television before it, smart homes and other new technologies “are subject to patterns of cultural adaptation that aim toward conserving familiar lifestyles” (p. 61). tracing this strategy through historical examples from the “homes of tomorrow” of the 1930s and 1950s to bill gates’s 1990s fantasy smart house, spigel notes that the discourse of smart homes is oddly nostalgic, looking backwards in its attempt to look forwards. she states that these “nostalgic returns” are usually marked by “hierarchies of social position and class privilege” (2001, p. 403). specifically, she refers to adi shamir zion’s reading of gates’s smart house, which zion argues prescribes a particular class relation between the house and its user. gates’s house is a peculiar mix of premodern structural techniques with state-of-the art digital technologies. choosing to conceal electronic circuitry with natural materials such as timber, stone, and marble, gates’s phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 ambition is to have the house “be in harmony with its surroundings and the needs of the people who will occupy it” (gates in zion, 1998, p. 71). he describes the house as “an intimate companion or, in the words of the great twentieth-century architect le corbusier, ‘a machine for living in’” (p. 71). zion argues that gates’s demand for the house to both discreetly serve and function as an “intimate companion” is analogous to the “servant class in relation to the master in the ‘upstairs/downstairs’ quarters of the english country house” (p. 72). in this way, gates’s smart house architecturally recuperates not only the physical features of the premodern home but the distinctive rhetorics of class privilege that accompany family structures of this era. i would suggest that the echo is similarly figured through a nostalgic discourse that is tacitly laden with class privilege. in her broader work addressing media, the home, and family life, spigel (2001) has described the coding of advertising images of new domestic technologies with what she calls “yesterday’s future” (p. 382). she defines this as a romanticized vision of the future that looks to the past in an attempt to imagine tomorrow’s “everyday.” in the commercial representations of kitchens that clean themselves, robots that provide forms of intimate care, and houses that automatically adjust the climate to comfortably suit their families, smart homes and associated products position themselves as a futuristic pastoral fantasy, what spigel calls “a wish fulfilment of some idealized past” (p. 391). in the case of the amazon echo, it is the white, middle-class nuclear family lifestyle that functions as the stage on which new and radical media practices are debuted. for instance, in the first demonstration video released on the official amazon website and youtube channel in 2014, a fictional white, american, suburban family is shown unboxing and welcoming their “newest member”: the amazon echo. the four-minute video demonstrates the device’s functions by presenting various scenes in which the echo is used to perform domestic tasks. staged like a family sitcom, the video is laden with generational clichés and gendered stereotypes. a sarcastic teenage daughter mocks her annoying younger brother. a dorky father phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 tries to look cool by showing off his new gadgets. in one scene, the mother is in the kitchen mixing dough with her hands: mother: oh i need to get wrapping paper [looks at the echo]. alexa, add wrapping paper to the shopping list. alexa [placed on the kitchen counter]: i’ve put wrapping paper on your shopping list. mother: alexa, how many teaspoons are in a tablespoon? alexa: one tablespoon equals three teaspoons. mother: oh ok. alexa, set a timer for eight minutes. alexa: eight minutes starting now. figure 1. scene from amazon echo demonstration video (amazon.com, inc., 2014). here, the echo is a happy electronic helper, supporting a perky and proficient mother in carrying out her daily duties. like “his wife judy” jetson, who relies on the robot maid rosie, the echo mother seamlessly integrates new technologies into familiar routines of domesticity. indeed, in the same ways in which the jetsons, a show ostensibly about a futuristic space-age family, is in essence an exact replica of the flintstones, a show about a prehistoric stone-age family, the characters’ conformity to traditional nuclear family stereotypes demonstrates the portability of such tropes into almost any place or context. such nostalgic dramatizations are phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 designed to provide a comforting assurance that “while technology advances, domestic ideals remain the same” (spigel, 2009, p. 60). indeed, these nostalgic and romanticized images of middle-class domesticity continue as an underlying theme in almost all of the echo’s subsequent promotional material. in an ongoing series of commercials titled “alexa moments,” which began airing on us commercial television in 2016, different households are portrayed incorporating the echo into intimate and strikingly heteronormative scenes of domestic life. a man in a wedding tuxedo buttons his jacket and looks into a mirror and says “alexa, add anniversary to my calendar. one year from today.” a couple are looking at buns baking in the oven, the male partner looks confused while the woman sighs “alexa, open baby names,” they both giggle in excitement. after wiping liquid off his face with a baby towel, a man asks alexa to tell the baby stats app that “brian went pee again.” a middle-aged couple sit on a couch and reminisce over a family photo album and one asks “alexa, play the top songs from 1967.” each commercial was short (ten seconds) and was structured using the same formula: a single scene followed by a close up of the echo. amazon has produced over a hundred of these micro-commercials and, while individually they appear as intimate vignettes of everyday life, as a whole they mimic the narrative trajectory of what queer scholar jack halberstam (2005) calls “a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality” (p. 4). this is a logic that privileges the paradigmatic markers of heteronormative life experience “namely, birth, marriage, reproduction, and death” (p. 2). it sentimentalizes the nuclear family and ties the echo to traditional domestic ideals. phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 figure 2. scene from “alexa moments: big day” (amazon.com, inc., 2017). figure 3. scene from “alexa moments: bun in the oven” (amazon.com, inc., 2016). phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 figure 4. scene from “alexa moments: top songs” (amazon.com, inc., 2017). this figuration accords with mainstream discourse on smart homes that weave together radically new technologies with deeply conservative principles. in readings of gender within this context, many scholars have argued that this discourse furthers stereotypes regarding the gendered division of household labor. this is often critiqued by drawing parallels between the figuration of smart home technologies, and especially digital domestic assistants, with figures such as housewives or mothers. for instance, spigel (2001) has argued that homes of tomorrow are created in the image of an imaginary 1950s housewife. she states, “they simulate the role of a full-time mother who lives in a suburban dream house and who looks after everyone’s needs” (p. 391). similarly, in her research interviewing smart home designers, anne-jorunn berg (1999) correlates the functions of home automation with women’s work. she reads the domestic sphere as a “feminine domain” and as such argues that designers of smart homes should consult more with women because “women possess important skills for and knowledge about the home that phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 should be a resource in the design process” (p. 310). this characterization draws on very traditional notions of women’s value and views housework itself as a gendered skill that can be modeled by paying closer attention to real-life, physical women. more recently, yolande strengers and larissa nicholls (2017) have argued that smart homes and digital assistants are marketed as a kind of “wife replacement” (p. 6). in a content analysis of magazine and online articles, they found that the smart home was predominantly promoted as “a means to reduce the stress of managing everyday tasks, appliances, household supplies and householders by providing greater control and integration—a form of ‘coordinating’ or ‘multitasking’ work which often falls to women” (p. 5). for them, the desire for a domestic assistant is indicative of modern women’s “double-bind”—the ambition to pursue satisfying careers as well as maintain roles as mothers and partners. the attraction of home automation is, thus, in its potential to fulfill “wife-like duties on a household’s behalf, thereby freeing up time and coordination pressures on women” (p. 5). the prevalence of the housewife figure in scholarship on digital assistants can be understood as coextensive with the rise of “housekeeping” as a dominant metaphor in recent scholarship addressing networked media and the domestic sphere (see jarrett, 2016; kennedy nansen, arnold, wilken, & gibbs, 2015; tolmie, crabtree, rodden, greenhalgh, & benford, 2007; strengers & nicholls, 2017). “digital housekeeping” is characterized as those forms of labor “involved in incorporating home networks into domestic routines” (tolmie et al., 2007, p. 332) and includes managing subscription and internet accounts, researching software and hardware upgrades, and organizing cables, wires, and other devices in the house. the “digital housewife” has subsequently emerged as a descriptor for the actor/agent who performs or enacts this labor. this metaphor has also been extended by authors such as kylie jarrett (2016) to highlight the gendered distribution of consumer labor in the social reproduction of the commercial web (pp. 1-2). for jarrett, the forms of online participation that are integral to platforms such phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 as facebook, youtube, or twitter resonate with “the unpaid, quasivoluntary labour of the domestic sphere” (p. 4). in the case of smart homes and digital assistants, the housewife metaphor is called on again to capture the parallels between the promises of home automation and the activities of social reproduction. however, i would like to argue that there are major limitations to focusing solely on the housewife/mother figure. first, by prioritizing the gendered division of labor within their critiques, these readings risk reinscribing its binary logic. for instance, in her work, berg (1999) naturalizes the relationship between women and reproductive labor, arguing that male designers lack a “basic knowledge about housework” precisely because the domestic sphere is an essentially “feminine domain” (p. 309). this categorization oversimplifies the division of labor within the home and positions women as a priori trapped within heteropatriarchal structures. the solution for many of these authors, including berg as well as strengers and nicholls, is not to challenge the stereotype of women and housework but rather to further commit. both studies recommend in their conclusions to “involve more women in the design and development of automated and smart technologies” to ostensibly “reduce traditional ‘women’s work’” (strengers & nicholl, 2017, p. 9), a suggestion that does not question the binary division of labor but instead ties women closer to it. second, these readings overlook the dynamics of power and privilege that function within gendered groups. by focusing only on the mother/housewife these readings elide the subtle hierarchies that structure the relationships between women within the domestic sphere. for instance, rarely acknowledged is the role of maids, cleaners, nannies, childcare workers, cooks, laundresses, and other gendered figures who historically have assisted upperand middle-class women in the fulfillment of their domestic responsibilities. these figures are often neglected within analyses of women and power in the home, with most readings choosing to focus on dynamics of gender rather than dynamics of class or race. indeed, passed over in many critiques of smart home devices is the distinct sense of class privilege embedded within the discourse of these phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 sophisticated luxury items and how this privilege contributes to broader social hierarchies. while these authors foreground the idealized image of a mother or housewife as the archetypal figure through which to critique the gendered dynamics of smart home discourse, here i propose a different figure: the idealized vision of domestic service. despite the clear connection between smart home technologies and the labor of domestic service, as figures, domestic servants are surprisingly underexamined within the critical literature. by shifting the focus, my aim is to highlight the role of class privilege in the figuration of digital assistants and to also underscore the class and racial hierarchies that proliferate within modes of gendered social reproduction. keeping pace with idealized domesticity like almost all new domestic technologies, the echo is sold on the promise of freedom from drudgery.1 since the 1920s, advertisements from stove-top percolators to washer-dryer units have pandered to ideas of housewives’ “liberation” (see cowan, 1983; spigel, 2009). women are depicted playing tennis, going shopping, and chatting with their girlfriends while the machines at home do the work. although social and cultural expectations of both men and women in the domestic sphere have certainly changed over time, the appeal for such a “liberation” endures. for instance, in the commercial “voice shopping with alexa” produced in 2016, amazon portrays a busy working mother rapidly performing domestic tasks within moments of coming home from the office. she kicks off her work heels and immediately begins bringing the home into order. without breaking a sweat, she directs a succession of requests at the echo: she orders dog food, throws out old takeaway, changes the bin liners, orders a gift for a school teacher, prepares dinner for the family, sees to the laundry, sets the table, and when she finally sits to rest, makes time to order herself some bath salts. the late twentiethcentury fantasy of the modern woman who “has it all”—family, career, and phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 confidence—is repackaged here as a correlate to the modern home. absorbing marxist feminist critiques of the devaluation of domestic labor as a result of its largely invisible position in the eyes of the market, this example illustrates the ways in which socially progressive movements, such as women’s liberation, can be co-opted by commodity capitalism. here, reproductive labor is afforded the status of “legitimate” labor—not only is it visible but it is performed with skill and deftness. in kicking off her shoes, the actress in the commercial signals that for modern women, coming home from the office is when the real work begins. as a manager in an organization might rely on an office assistant to assist in coordinating tasks, this woman relies on her digital domestic assistant to likewise support her in this regard. “women’s liberation” here is not freedom from responsibility—indeed since the 1980s many liberal feminists have lobbied for corporate inclusion in decision-making and managerial roles—but freedom from the doubt that “having it all” is possible. the use of a digital assistant to help keep pace with the unrealistic expectations of idealized domesticity is reminiscent of the ways in which early twentieth-century middle-class households used domestic servants to resolve certain contradictions between feminine virtue and the hard labor of domestic work. evelyn nakano glenn (1992) argues that in the context of the united states, the rise of industrial capitalism during the latter half of the nineteenth century also coincided with the elaboration of middle-class women’s reproductive responsibilities. she states, rising standards of cleanliness, larger and more ornately furnished homes, the sentimentalisation of the home…and the new emphasis on childhood and the role of the mother in nurturing children all served to enlarge middle-class women’s responsibilities for reproduction at a time when technology had done little to reduce the sheer physical drudgery of housework. (p. 7) by the early twentieth century, the norm for most middle-class women was to hire another woman to perform much of the hard labor of household tasks. these women were usually recent migrants, workingclass “native-born” women, or women of color. in this way, white middlephan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 class women were free to indulge in other class privileges, such as participating in cultural activities, leisure, volunteering, and charity work. similarly, phyllis palmer (1987) in her work on the relations between housewives and household workers in america in the 1920s to 1940s, notes that many middleand upper-class women were held to a domestic code that placed contradictory demands on “feminine virtue” and domesticity (pp. 192-195). “virtuous women” were defined in terms of their spirituality, elegance, and refinement and were expected to create a warm, clean, and attractive home for husband and children. however, maintaining such a home meant confronting the reality of physical labor and dirt. transferring these physical duties to a domestic helper allowed middle-class women to both fulfill their domestic duties and also spend time on self-improvement. palmer argues that middle-class women searching for hired help were essentially searching for a clone: “a woman who could do things as she herself did them, for the hours that were expected of her, and with the credit for finding such a paragon going to her” (p. 194). remediating this role in the twenty-first-century smart home is the amazon echo. again and again, the echo is figured as a technology that enables the fulfillment of domestic subjectivities. in the example above, the identity of the working mother is made possible only through the labor of the digital assistant, a relationship that mimics the reciprocity between early twentieth-century middle-class women and their servant staff. indeed, the figure of the servant helps bring to attention certain continuities in how affluent households have aspired to organize their homes. historian lucy delap (2011) notes that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “domestic service was an institution that was key to establishing claims to identities of privilege, entitlement, and status” (p. 191). she argues that servant-keeping functioned to delineate “middleclass identity” and despite current attitudes that cast servant-keeping as anachronistic and antithetical to forms of domestic modernity, domestic service continues to function as a marker of privilege for the affluent classes, albeit recast under more “progressive” titles such as au-pairing phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 (pp. 191-204). in the same vein, new domestic technologies, and especially smart technologies such as the amazon echo, help to imply a sense privilege and class identity through the provision of certain levels of domestic service. while the echo itself may not be capable of physically performing tasks such as cooking, cleaning, or chauffeuring, it does work to centralize command over applications that can, for instance, by controlling automated vacuum cleaners like roombas, placing orders for food delivery services like dominos, or making requests to ridesharing services such as uber. the aspirations of middle-class respectability are here measured at the level of everyday domestic organization, a model that remediates earlier structures of ownership and service through the technosanitized language of automated systems and the sharing economy. the (digital) servant problem like the people on which they are figured, digital domestic assistants are held to a standard of idealized servitude that demands not only excellence in its physical performance but an expectation of personal devotion to the household that goes beyond the exchange of labour for wages. this devotion is expressed through qualities such as loyalty, dedication, pride and affection. a striking theme across customer reviews on the amazon website was the compulsion to share not just assessments of the echo’s features but intimate stories of personal connection and companionship. for example, in a review posted on 2016, one customer praised alexa as a perfect bedside companion for his brother diagnosed with ms: my brother…who has been bed ridden and paralyzed with multiple sclerosis from his neck down for more than 30 years now has a new friend named alexa! he was in tears with happiness when alexa played 70's music, played jeopardy, answered all his questions and wakes him up every morning. thank you amazon for giving my brother a new bedside companion. phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 another customer shared her husband’s experiences after purchasing an echo: we have been using echo since april 2015. prior to that time, my husband had been hospitalized for several weeks. he is currently wheelchair bound. we immediately installed the hue bridge and lights as well as the wemo outlet. with these, and dear, dear, alexa, he has a great deal of control of his environment in ways that make him much more independent. others might enjoy echo for fun and convenience, but for him it is a lifeline! he has even had her turn the lights on in my bedroom when i didn't hear him call…our lives have settled into a new normal, and the echo is a huge part of what makes normal easier. in an open forum with over 200,000 individual reviews, these comments consistently received the highest approvals by fellow amazon users with some receiving over 50,000 upvotes. they went beyond a statement of customer satisfaction to express a distinct sense of affection for “dear, dear, alexa.” while i in no way wish to suggest that the echo does not meet genuine needs, as in the cases above, or only functions as a marker of privilege or excess, what i do hope to emphasize with these examples is the consistent use of language. many reviewers referred to alexa as a “friend” or as “family,” a sentiment indicative of the integration of digital assistants into the most intimate parts of users’ everyday lives. these terms of affection are reminiscent of descriptions of “good” servants—those who demonstrated hard work and loyalty. “like family” was a compliment bestowed on those dedicated workers who went above and beyond their duties, a commendation delivered with the unspoken caveat “despite being the hired help.” the image of the “family retainer” such as little women’s hannah who lived and worked for the march family for sixteen years and became “more of a friend than a servant” was a well sought after asset (strasser 1982, p. 163). unsurprisingly however, the reality rarely matched the ideal and employers were often left disappointed when servants fell short of their high expectations. historians have noted the influx of literature during the late nineteenth phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 and early twentieth centuries responding to this so-called “servant problem” (see davidoff 1995; dawes 1974; delap 2011; huggett 1977; sambrook 1999; strasser 1982; turner 1962). they found that across domestic manuals, women’s magazines, periodicals, the newspaper press, and government reports there was a sense of urgency to address what was perceived as a dire shortage of “decent help.” the issue was not necessarily a question of quantity but that of quality. employers complained that “most servants put on airs, stole from their employers, left their positions without notice, and performed their duties without skill or care” (strasser 1982, p. 163). in response, many middle-class women published literature outlining guidelines and offering advice to their fellow peers on how to best manage and get the most out of their domestics. lida seely, author of mrs. seely’s cook-book; a manual of french and american cookery, with chapters on domestic servants, their rights and duties and many other details of household management (1902), offered in her manual a list of twenty “don’ts” for employers when dealing with servants. these ranged from “don’t engage a servant without having a clear understanding as to what he or she is expected to do” to “don’t neglect to have inventory of china, glass, silver, and bric-a-brac of each servant coming and going” (pp. 33-34). this genre of advice literature written by employers specifically for employers is a practice that bears an uncanny resemblance to the style of reviews written by customers on the amazon website. for instance, users often structured reviews in terms of lists of positive and negatives or dos and don’ts. one top reviewer posted 9 tips in his review of the echo dot. they suggested for users to “take the time to voice train alexa at least once. it's kinda tedious but really improves the accuracy,” and “if a phrase doesn't yield the results you're looking for, reword it and try again”. the parallels between domestic manuals and user and tech reviews extends even more so into the kinds of concerns that were raised. value for money and expenses were a common theme. mrs. seely’s cook-book included pay tables for servants from one day to one month, and described best practice for settling wages with servants in the event of phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 dismissal (pp. 1-38). similarly, tech reviews from wired, gizmodo, tech radar all made assessments based on functionality and value for for money. but perhaps the most striking similarity is in the forms of criticism levelled at both servants and digital assistants. listening, both not enough and far too much, were equal causes of anxiety for domestic employers and amazon echo users. the verge reviewer david pierce (2016) opened his review of the echo with snapshot from an interaction “alexa, what’s the weather today?” “alexa! what’s the weather today?” “alexa what is the weather today goddammit.” “right now, in new york it’s 25 degrees with clear skies and sun. today’s forecast has mostly sunny weather, with a high of 29 and a low of 19.” he criticised the echo’s lack of responsiveness she doesn’t work every time, she doesn’t respond the way she’s supposed to half the time, and it doesn’t take long before you stop totally relying on her. and then she sits silent… i need the echo to just work, so i’m not standing in my kitchen like an insane person shouting questions to nobody._ the demand for precision and unfaltering compliance from reviewers like pierce and the subsequent splurge of vocal frustration when these expectations were not met is reminiscent of the treatment of servants who fell behind their duties. as one housekeeper stated “i am treated and spoken to as if i were a dog…and grumbled and growled at from morning to night” (quoted in huggett, 1977 p. 155). knowing when to speak and when to listen was a high priority. the top critical reviews on the amazon customer reviews page made complaints that ranged from an inability to listen well, “it seems to have slowly lost its sensitivity to my voice. it can no longer hear me say alexa unless i am within 3 feet of it”; to listening too much, “needs security! anyone in range of this things bluetooth can connect and start playing music or speaking through this thing on cell calls…i heard alexa announce that a bluetooth device had connected, so i phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 opened the app and discovered numerous devices, that weren't mine… now, i get to randomly hear other voices or music start playing, in the middle of the night, anytime the people in the apartments behind me decide they wanna screw around.” these complaints were, again, resonant with expectations placed on servants. in her book domestic service (1897), lucy maynard salmon, vassar college’s first female historian and a domestic reformer, discussed the social degradation of servants specifically through the regulation of everyday social interaction. she writes [the domestic employee] is seldom introduced to the guests of the house, whom she may faithfully serve during a prolonged visit; the common daily courtesies exchanged between the members of the household are not always shown her; she takes no part in general conversation around her; she speaks only when addressed, obeys without murmur order which her judgement tells her are absurd, “is not expected to smile under any circumstances” and ministers without protest to the whims and obeys implicitly the commands of children from whom the deference to parents is never expected. (p. 158) attempts to work against these norms was a sign of “wilful disobedience,” an offence which could likely result in a discharge from service. amazon echo customers implemented equivalent solutions with their own wilful assistants that included “unplugging until the flaw is fixed” or simply discarding the device as “junk”. directly related to issues of listening were concerns for privacy and surveillance. while i will discuss directly the relationship between surveillance and the echo’s figuration later in this chapter, for now i would like to highlight how these concerns manifest as shared anxieties between echo reviewers and domestic employers. among tech reviewers in particular, the placement of what is essentially a corporate microphone in individual households attracted a great deal of suspicion. many saw it is indicative of the convergence between the “internet-of-things” and dragnet surveillance, while others voiced concern that such devices opened the phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 door for the commoditisation of our most private moments. the fear that someone may be listening, even if it was not clear who or what for, carried into the concerns of the customer reviews. some focused on the recent nsa scandals, making vague accusations of “government surveillance” and labelling the echo as “amazon’s little nsa spy.” others directed their criticisms at amazon itself, for instance, in one representative review, the customer below griped: [i] suspect that this device is listening more than we think it is. i will be talking about something and suddenly i start seeing more ads and more stuff about what i was talking about…i honestly worry that this device and amazon, and facebook, and google, and apple are all developing much more extensive and personal telemetry and information on all of us than we can appreciate. we've allowed them all to spy on us and we willingly give them everything about ourselves with full trust. who is to say the nsa isn't listening in? while you and i have little to hide, and most of us out there behave in a lawful good manner, the telemetry on us can still be used for insidious purposes. in this example, domesticity is defined through comfort and privacy. this fetishisation of privacy as a domestic priority is part of a longer narrative that has been slowly evolving since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is associated with the twentieth century decline in servant keeping. delap (2011) notes that the rise of the individualistic and privatised domestic sphere recast servants as “intrusive” and “disruptive” (p. 192). she argues that in the edwardian period, many social commentators advocated for servantless living, primarily because it was considered a more “dignified” middle-class lifestyle but also in part so that households could free themselves from the gaze of nosey servants. she discusses articles in which maids were described as “lurking during domestic squabbles” and “[watching] her employers as a cat watches mice” (p. 193). even lida seely (1902) included special notes to servants in her domestic manual bluntly calling them into line, “don’t spy on your masters and mistresses—the fact that their bread is in your mouth should be a reason for keeping it shut” (p. 35). phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 while historically tensions between privacy and servant-keeping resulted in a decline of servants as a domestic fixture, in the present moment these same tensions have been negotiated with almost the opposite effect. servant-keeping (even in its figural form) returns to the domestic realm at the very same time that privacy appears to make its exit. these examples illustrate the persistent figuration of the echo in the image of domestic service across a broad range of materials. in amazon’s own promotional discourse and in the discourse produced by customers and professional reviewers, domestic servility is reinscribed onto the figure of the digital domestic assistant in ways which distinctly shape attitudes and relations with the device. whether this is conscious or unconscious is secondary to its effect; that is, projecting onto the device preexisting structures and narratives regarding servility and the domestic organisation of power. there are, however, notable deviations between the echo’s figuration and the historic reality of domestic servility. of significance to this analysis is the deracialized representation of the voice of alexa. race, voice, and figurative narratives it is my contention that the voice of alexa is coded through whiteness. by whiteness, i refer to the sense of being “non-raced,” that is, not explicitly identified according to race. richard dyer (1997) has argued that in dominant discourse (i.e., white discourse) whiteness is a category that often escapes identification and explicit racialization. he states, “race is something only applied to non-white peoples” and that whiteness is not “racially seen and named” in the same manner (p. 1). whiteness defines the voice of alexa insofar as it escapes the ascription of characteristics that identify it as a racialized other. indeed, mark marino (2006, 2014) has argued that most mainstream chatbots often utilize what he calls “unmarked (white) standard english” (2006, p. 4). this is a form of english that aspires to evade specific identifying cultural inflections; it is language that is, for him, “without culture, disembodied, hegemonic, and, in a word, phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 white” (2006, p. 193). in hci voice interface research, the dominant paradigm is to consider race through a strictly visual logic. race is understood as a variable of skin tone, hair type, eye color, and other forms of visual presentation. as a result, non-visual variables such as voice are often neglected as an expression of race. for example, on the subject of race and conversational agents, human–computer relationship researchers clifford nass and scott brave (2005) have argued that interface designers should focus on accent, meaning the unique vocal intonations associated with regional dialects, rather than “the skin color of the agent” when designing an interface (p. 67). they state, the current research suggests that race is not important as an independent effect, at least when an accompanying voice provides broader and deeper information than what can be determined from ancestral geography. the linguistic and paralinguistic cues are so informative that identifying a person’s geographic progenitors is simply not valuable. (p. 69, emphasis added) yet, at the same time, they also advocate for the use of labels and stereotypes to help socially identify a synthetic voice. they argue that appealing to labels can be favorable as “labels allow the human brain to make quick assumptions and predictions about other people and help the brain cope with the complexities of social interactions” (p. 69). they go on to discuss how accents are tied to stereotypes and how properties such as “education,” “intelligence,” and “credibility” are “manifested in speech” (p. 70). this reductive view of race that considers only visual cues, such as skin color, willfully overlooks broader materializations. it overlooks the relationship between race, class, and accent; it neglects how “education,” “intelligence,” and “credibility” are attributes that are themselves racialized; and it also fails to acknowledge that race is not just a matter of “being” but of “doing”—that is, one not only is raced but also does race, and this includes employing cultural linguistic markers (see nakamura, 2008). to suggest that voice can be empty of race fails to consider how whiteness phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 has come to constitute a neutral norm. it reinforces the dominant cultural belief that “whites are not of a certain race, they’re just the human race” (dyer, 1997, p. 1), and that coextensively white language is not raced language, it simply is language. arguably, the selection of the “white voice” reflects the desire by voice-interface designers to best create the conditions for speech intelligibility. designers often proceed on the tenet that native english speech is the most intelligible speech. this speech is perceived as “nonaccented”—that is, not containing the audible markers of racial difference. but as halcyon lawrence (2014) has observed, the ubiquitous use of native speech in speech-mediated technologies is nonetheless problematic as it implicitly functions to “assimilate accented speakers to some native norm” (p. 768). it contributes to an imperialistic view of language that positions those with accented voices as outside the imagined image of a national subject and furthers the use of language as a tool of colonization and marginalization (see nieto, 2007). although amazon echo’s assistant alexa is never explicitly identified as “white,” it is nevertheless aestheticized and characterized by amazon using aspects that are underwritten by ideals of whiteness. alexa speaks english in a broad american accent rather than, for example, a distinctive southern drawl or a south asian accent. it does not use vernaculars or dialects that are stereotypically associated with racialized communities, such as black or latino communities. it has an extensive vocabulary and partakes in certain social mores to associate it with the “mannered,” educated upper classes. and finally, it has been given a name that consciously draws on the narrative exploits of western civilization. amazon’s senior vice president of devices david limp stated in an interview that, along with having desirable phonics for voice recognition, the name alexa was chosen because it was “reminiscent of the library of alexander [sic],” which has been culturally viewed in the west as “the source of all knowledge” (limp in lashinsky & limp, 2016). indeed, the plethora of parody videos that reimagine digital assistants such as alexa or siri as mexican, african american, or chinese with phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 24 names like siriqua or shameka all play on racial and ethnic stereotypes in such a way that underscores the whiteness of the original model.2 the figuration of the echo and alexa as a native-speaking, educated white woman here departs with the historic reality of domestic servants. in the united states, the role of domestic workers in middleand upper-class homes were (and is still) undertaken by predominantly women from working-class, african american, latino, and other racialized migrant groups (glenn, 1992; strasser, 1982). the contradiction between the historic reality and the representation of domestic service is in many ways inherent to the figuration process. as scholars such as donna haraway (2013), lucy suchman (2012), and claudia castañeda (2002) have argued, figuration is not only a process that helps us to describe phenomena but a process that in itself has “worlding” potential. analyzing figures and figurations is not just a matter of reading histories that are already laid out but of coming to grips with the dynamic construction and reconstruction of histories and cultural narratives. while objects, such as the amazon echo, are figured by existing cultural narratives, they conversely work to refigure our understanding of those same narratives. they thus have the potential to bring into the world new structures, frameworks, and attitudes to power. for this reason, feminist authors such as haraway have argued that figures are inherently political and that without responsible engagement can operate to reinscribe damaging existing orders.3 in this instance, the figuration of the echo and the digital assistant alexa in the image of idealized domestic service correspondingly refigures cultural narratives of domestic servility. instead of being represented as difficult or degrading work, domestic service becomes a pleasure to perform. instead of servant-keeping being a traditional and conservativebourgeois form of inferring status, smart assistants are a progressive and uniquely modern marker of social class. and instead of servants themselves being acknowledged as a historically racialized and exploited class exemplary of wider histories of racism in america, alexa is a whitewashed and compliant character dreamed up from the aspiringly socially phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 25 conscious culture of silicon valley. these narratives have an effect on those previously circulating, reworking popular attitudes and beliefs about domestic service. while the establishment of new trajectories is arguably inevitable as a part of the figuration process, there are certain shortcomings within this context. first, the elision of racial identity from the figuration of domestic service dehistoricizes and depoliticizes the servant/master relation. where this relation has been fundamentally predicated on racialized human exploitation, the figure of the white-speaking, middle-class ai effectively erases this essential narrative. we may ask, for what reasons has amazon chosen to figure alexa in this way? the optimistic (and albeit less likely) view is that in attempting to reach a broader racially demographic audience, amazon flips the script on servitude, allowing those who have been traditionally trapped in subordinate relations of race and class to indulge in a fantasy in which black and brown people give the orders and a white voice cheerily complies. what is, unfortunately, more likely is that by aestheticizing in accordance with the norms of whiteness, amazon seeks to appeal to a more “universal” subjecthood for their digital assistant. in doing so, they can avoid both the discomfort associated with racialized servitude as well as any confrontations with the historical consequences of slavery, colonialism, global capitalism, or white supremacy. here, the nineteenth-century american fantasy of a servile class that is without race and without history is fulfilled. as strasser has argued, one of the key indignities of working as a domestic servant was that employers paid little respect to one’s identity outside of the contract of service. rena bethune, a black household worker interviewed in 1977 lamented, “[employers] don’t care anything about you. they don’t want to know nothing about your background; they don’t even want to know what’s going on in your home. all they want to know is what you are doing for them” (strasser, 1987, p. 178). for multinationals such as amazon, the coming of age of ai systems and home automation finally resolves the long-standing “servant problem.” by creating a servile class that literally phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 26 have no personal backgrounds, no families, opinions, desires, wants, or needs, or homes of their own, these companies are able to capitalize on an idealized vision of servitude without having to contend with the practicalities or moral question of servant-keeping. second, the figure of idealized domestic service misrepresents the power relation between the device and its user in such a way that it makes contending with issues such as surveillance and digital labor increasingly difficult. whereas in classic servant/master relations it is the servant who is understood to be performing labor for the household, in this refiguration the relation is inverted. companies such as facebook, google, twitter, and amazon famously capitalize on the exploitation of user data through complex mechanisms of commercial surveillance. while some of this data is created consciously by users in the form of user-generated content, or what christian fuchs (2015) calls “prosumer labor,” much of it is gathered through measures of monitoring and surveillance of users’ profiles, communications, behavior, activities, and social relations. fuchs argues that the processes of consumption on digital platforms, like social media, is also in effect a process of production insofar as user activity actively produces the data commodities that are then sold to advertising clients. this process constitutes a kind of labor, which like all labor within commodity capitalism, is vulnerable to issues such as exploitation, coercion, and alienation (see fuchs, 2012, 2015). within cultures of automation in which ai systems form part of the critical infrastructure of capital accumulation, large-scale monitoring and consumer surveillance have become “an integral component of the online value chain” (andrejevic, 2012, p. 85). in this context, smart home devices with digital assistants form another interface for the collection of user data. by adding microphones that record natural language and conversation to the already rich array of data collection methods, amazon is able create more layered and intimate profiles of domestic habits that have so far been only obliquely observed or constructed through conjecture. that amazon encourages users to link their echo devices directly to online phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 27 purchasing accounts is suggestive of the intent to manipulate domestic environments into commercially lucrative opportunities. mark andrejevic (2012) describes these forms of commercial manipulation as indicative of the widespread integration of predictive analytics into marketing ecologies. he describes this as a wager predicated on the belief that “comprehensive monitoring will give marketers greater influence over consumers” (p. 74). the marketing industry exploits data gathered from user activity to in turn create the ideal conditions to induce desired behavior. he critiques this intent to “trigger latent demand” as a form of conscious manipulation and control: if i have certain anxieties and desires that are triggered and enhanced by custom-targeted forms of marketing that result in a response anticipated by marketers, it seems misleading to say that behaviour has not been subject to deliberate forms of management and control. in this respect, the ability to collect and analyze large amounts of data in order to influence consumer behaviour might be considered a form of power. (p. 76) the inclusion of smart devices into intimate spaces and daily routines represents a new frontier for the commodification of everyday life, creating a suffocating reality in which every aspect of social and personal life becomes colonized by commercial interests. to describe smart devices as working for or in service of households is an inaccurate representation of the direction of power; on the contrary, it is the household that labors for the device. the figuration of the echo through idealized servitude not only obscures this power relation but also consciously exploits this false image to extract more information, more data, more labor. conclusion in this article, i have explored the ways in which the assistant alexa is figured on the idealized image of a domestic servant. examining a range of case study materials, i have explored how this figure consistently appears in the discourse of customers, paid reviews, amazon marketing, phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 28 and other popular media. although i have argued that this figuration, and in particular the use of the white-speaking voice, misrepresents and refigures racialized histories of servitude, i also wish to acknowledge the ways in which this figuration similarly obscures exploitative relations in the contemporary moment. within the techno-fetishistic language of contemporary ai discourse, humans and human labor are posited as at odds or at risk of displacement by machines. on the one hand, workers are said to be under threat as industries are automated and professions obsolesced; on the other, this new-found labor efficiency is a source of opportunity as time and money are invested elsewhere. the displacement of the human, as something that is fundamental to the figuration of ai technologies like digital assistants means that forms of human labor vital to their functioning are rarely considered. the echo, for instance, suggests the automation of tasks like the provision of food, transport, and a clean and ordered home. all the user need do is ask and the white-voice delivers. however, this characterization erases the wide-ranging networks of exploited labor that make such service possible. from the factory workers who assemble these devices in sweatshop conditions in places like shenzhen, china, to the low-income pickers in amazon’s mega-warehouses in places like chester, virginia, and the migrant workers who make and deliver food in service industries across the country, all these tasks are performed by predominantly racialized labor and all go unacknowledged within this figuration. while these workers and their histories have not been the primary subject of this discussion they nevertheless constitute a central part of understanding new domestic technologies and their figurations. their continued erasure in historic and contemporary discourse is a telling insight into the ongoing marginalization of racialized workers. while much of the critical literature addressing ai and gender and race has focused on social personality (how the interface is made to look or sound like a person), fundamentally, the figuration of domestic assistants in the image of domestic service speaks more to the historic dehumanization of phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 29 working-class men and women of color than to the contemporary anthropomorphism of these digital assistants. acknowledgements i am grateful to the organizers and participants of the qut: at home with digital media symposium where i first presented this paper in 2017 for their supportive feedback during the event. i would also like to thank my generous readers gilbert caluya, scott mcquire, tim neale, tom sutherland, and the peer-reviewers for their considered comments in helping to improve this article. this research is supported by an australian government research training program (rtp) scholarship. notes 1 however, as authors such as ruth schwartz cowan (1983) have argued, the promise of freedom from drudgery is often an empty one, as new domestic technologies arguably create “more work for mother.” 2 gregory jerome hampton (2015) has similarly argued in his book imagining slaves and robots in literature, film, and popular culture that fictional robot characters such as rosie the robot are often modeled on antebellum slave tropes like the mammy. her blackness too was erased by identifying her not with southern accent but a new jersey accent, a notable point of difference between the household who spoke with broad non-distinct american accents (pp. 11-12). 3 haraway’s own engagement with figures and figuration famously includes the cyborg (1985/2004), the modest-witness (1997), and ,more recently, the cthulucene (2016). phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 30 references amazon.com, inc. 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(2014, november 7). amazon echo is another step toward commoditizing your personal life. mashable. retrieved, from http://mashable.com/2014/11/06/amazon-echo-commoditizing/ wong, r. (2015, february 10). amazon echo: this is what a smart home should feel like. mashable. retrieved from http://mashable.com/2015/02/10/amazon-echo-review/ promotional videos and commercials amazon.com, inc. (2016). alexa moments: buns in the oven. retrieved from https://www.ispot.tv/ad/ax2k/amazon-echo-dot-alexa-moments-bunsin-the-oven phan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 37 amazon.com, inc. (2017a). alexa moments: big day. retrieved from http://www.ispot.tv/ad/avri/amazon-echo-dot-alexa-moments-big-day amazon.com, inc. (2017b). alexa moments: top songs. song by lester young. retrieved from https://www.ispot.tv/ad/av_j/amazon-echo-dotalexa-moments-top-songs-song-by-lester-young amazon.com, inc. (2014). amazon echo demonstration. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rve3hpwmcze bio thao phan is a researcher in feminist science and technology studies, specialising in ai and gender. she is currently a research fellow at the alfred deakin institute for citizen and globalisation at deakin university, melbourne. the original version of this article, published 1st april, 2019 in vol 5 (1), included screenshots of amazon customer reviews with images posted by the reviewers. the author recognizes that these images were potentially identifying and wishes to sincerely apologize. she has taken active steps to have the article amended to remove any identifying material. template introduction    catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 2    catalyst editorial board installation view of soldadera, a series of works by nao bustamante exhibited at the vincent price art museum in 2015, curated by jennifer doyle. foreground:  "kevlar fighting costumes" (set of 5), 2015; background: rebozo, 2015 (video) and soldadera, 2015 (wall piece). photo: dale grine. welcome to the second issue (spring 2016) of catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, an international, peer-reviewed, open-source online journal published twice yearly. this second issue leads with an essay that was the recipient of the catalyst award at the 25th annual international ucla center for the study of women thinking gender conference (april 23-24, 2015). in “redefining ‘virgin birth’ after kaguya: mammalian parthenogenesis in experimental biology, 2004-2014,” eva mae gillis-buck takes up a line of inquiry around reproduction pioneered by anne fausto-sterling and sarah franklin. she considers a host of responses to a 2004 experiment reporting the healthy birth and development of kaguya, a mouse with two mothers and no father, to argue that radical understandings of sex and parenthood can be found even within scholarship that maintains the impossibility of mammalian parthenogenesis. pathenotes (sperm-free ovum), gillis-buck writes, “are queer entities, non-human actors that challenge our cultural dualisms and demand new words to describe their existence.” in the introduction to our first issue (fall 2015), we suggested that one of catalyst’s central aims is to incite new political and intellectual mixing of fields and approaches. our second issue presents an extended special section cultivated through this catalysis. over the past year, the journal received a number of submissions on militarism and digital culture. these essays were written from different field perspectives, mostly deriving from sociological sts and media studies. keenly aware of scholarship emerging on this topic from points in and around feminist sts, the catalyst editors invited authors into dialogue with one another prior to review so the papers could benefit from sustained exchange. over the course of six months, we added more writers to the mix: some already active in feminist sts, and others variously working out of media studies, postcolonial studies, digital rhetoric, critical art practice, documentary filmmaking, and media anthropology. the cover image of this issue of catalyst features a photograph taken from the documentation of soldadera, an important recent exhibition of works about the women of the mexican revolution produced by nao bustamante, the american performance and media artist internationally recognized for her incisively political work on the body, sexuality, class and mexican and mexican-american identity and politics. the soldaderas that concern bustamante are the women who fought in the mexican revolution, the armed national struggle between 1910 and 1920 that transformed mexican culture. bustamante conducted extensive research for the project, repurposing archival photographs and films, and affirming the overlooked narratives and perspectives of these women soldiers while also provoking conversation about their various roles in warfare, which included serving as domestic laborers and healthcare workers. not unlike the contemporary lioness soldiers described in this issue by isra ali, the soldaderas of the mexican revolution were enlisted not only for battle, but also to serve as cultural informants, serving as spies for the revolutionary forces and engaging in the tactile work of cultural mediation. that the fabric of warfare entails the labor and bodies of women is well known, but the nature of that fabric, and how it coheres, is less clear. in other components of the series (exhibited at the vincent price art museum in 2015), bustamante invited visitors to touch and to unravel the fringe on a shawl. the garment was modeled after those worn by the soldaderas, except that the fiber is not silk or cotton, but kevlar®, the bullet-resistant technical material of warfare developed by the chemist stephanie kwolek for the us company dupont in 1965. a short video shows bustamante herself in rifle training. her target, improbably, is an empty dress: a golden yellow gown in the style worn by the soldaderas that swings gaily from a tree branch, shimmering against the snow. this dress is one of those tailored according to bustamante's designs and displayed on mannequins and in vitrines in the soldadera exhibition. a group of these mannequins appear in the photograph on the cover of this issue. standing before a wall projection of a film bustamante made from archival footage dating from the revolutionary period, they are just a little bigger than life in their oversized period dresses, all tailored from the same anachronistic synthetic. typically used in the manufacture of protective gear for warfare, kevlar® is an industrial product, a far cry from the linens and leather worn by the soldaderas who appear in the historical projections. bustamante’s gun skills belie the logic of failsafe warfare design: her practice bullets lodge in the dress, evidence that the kevlar® has resisted her assault on the fabric of warfare, but cannot fully keep it in check. the bullet tears are evidence of the vulnerability of the war game and its material arsenal to critique, and of the status of women as crafty perpetrators of fabric, mediation, tactility, and also as agents with a propensity to poke holes in putatively failsafe invention. in attachments to war, the book forthcoming from duke excerpted in this issue, jennifer terry writes: “attachments are relational. they can be strong, fragile, unstable, enduring, motivating, demoralizing, profitable, or devastating.” she emphasizes that war and biotechnology are, at this point in history, intimately and mutually attached. bustamente’s attention to the material conditions as well as the metaphoricity of warfare’s technical fabric is refracted in the scholarly works published in this issue, all of which engage in ideas about the technological and biomedical aspects of war as the new everyday in digital times. marisa brandt, a communication studies and feminist sts scholar, and emily cohen ibañez, a media anthropologist and filmmaker, both consider the immersive technologies used in military trauma therapy with war veterans. brandt examines virtual militainment in an essay that offers a sustained discussion of bravemind (formerly virtual iraq/afghanistan), the immersive system used by the us military to provide psychological treatment for veterans diagnosed with neurological disorders. brandt shows how bravemind, though introduced as a tool for remediating ptsd and other conditions, extends and reifies depoliticized logics of gendered trauma-narrative production. what is at stake in the virtual system, she shows, is not the ability of warfighters to share their memories of war (which is the goal on offer), but rather the ability of veterans (most of them men) to take control of their affective responses—and to do so in a system in which authority is displaced from the therapist (most of whom are women and civilians) to the virtual system. lucy suchman and d. andy rice both consider simulation systems, with suchman focusing on flatworld, an immersive military training simulation developed between 2001 and 2007 at the university of southern california’s institute for creative technologies. suchman’s paper draws from an ongoing ethnography to take up, specifically, two archival sources: a tour video of flatworld staged by its designers in 2005, and a documentary about the program. at this juncture in her study, suchman pursues the question of the ways in which boundaries between the real and the virtual are maintained and also traversed. how, she considers, does simulation training become performative of the real? and whose imaginaries are at play in the program’s design and promotion? turning to judith butler’s classic 1993 text bodies that matter, suchman tracks the different ways in which bodies are materialized in flatworld. the bodies involved include not only american users and the simulated american and iraqi figures, but also the system’s researchers, producers, and trainers. her account points to slippages and resistances through which the virtual system becomes the grounds for the production of the binary “us and them,” friend and enemy, in the course of training. rather than showing us discrete identities performed and produced, suchman shows the movement and slippages that occur within bodies and between them, in the shifting contexts of promotion, instruction for use, and play. training to train, and learning to see how military simulation works, is a level of consideration to which we need also to attend in order to better understand the practice of training for acts of war, and training as an act of warfare in itself. this is the territory of d. andy rice, as well, who considers embodied practice and the production of the real. his focus is the live training simulations conducted at the fort irwin national training center in the california mohave desert, a veritable baudrillardian “desert of the real” where proximity to hollywood becomes an opportunity for the development of sets and the recruitment of talent to orchestrate for the us military simulated improvised explosive device attacks, suicide bombings, beheadings, sectarian infighting, protests, raids, and sweeps. though multiple repeat performances with live actors, four thousand soldiers prepare for deployment, with filmmakers documenting the process live. one of the contributions rice makes is to interpret the body of the camera operator in phenomenological terms, allowing us to see how the live staged performances and the performed simulation are integral with the embodied performance of its filming, just as journalists are embedded in the territory of war. rice invites us to consider how cinematic structures of affect extend outside the theater and are turned on the world itself, in this case the world of the live-performed war simulation which precedes and models the real of war. isra ali introduces a sustained interpretation of the role of tactical compassion offered to us women soldiers enlisted into contemporary warfare—specifically, their placement by the us military in afghanistan and iraq, in the 2010s, in special ops programs such as lioness that are explicitly designed to use women as mediators and as cultural intelligence gatherers in situations where direct violence and male presence have been recognized to be less than successful, namely in situations where local women are off limits to male soldiers. the promotion by the us military of women soldiers’ presence as non-threatening “support” in the war zones, ali explains, seems to be motivated by a sense that women can better perform what she describes as tactical tactility, the work of performing as soldiers of compassion, currying trust and promoting information sharing among women and men in muslim communities. this labor has been encoded as a special form of competence performed both by women soldiers and women journalists after the military cultural turn, a point in the early 2000s at which the relative ineffectuality of the logics of violence was widely recognized. ali cautions that in its enlistment of women into the most critical zones, the military may come off as progressive and progressing to a neoliberal pro-war feminism. we must recognize the problematic situation, she notes, not only of us women soldiers performing in this gendered scheme of empowerment through enlistment into tactical compassion, but also that of muslim women, who are situated as being in need of rights and empowerment on the model of the us woman soldier. kate chandler’s essay offers a comparative read of the paradigm of the “unmanned” drone. placing the term in historical context, chandler reminds us that the term and the idea of pilotless operation predate the digital-era technology. interpreting aspects of this history from the cold war and earlier, chandler shows the configuration of this technology’s particular strategies of misrecognition of subjective control. she also interprets a problematic text of the antiwar feminist art ngo code pink: women for peace, in which the humanization of war technology is achieved through a narrative framing that situates the woman as soldier-perpetrator in a maternal relationship to her victim, a civilian who the fictionalized soldier conflates with her own child. we would like to conclude with a distinction about catalysis in interdisciplinary exchange. one often hears that interdisciplinary encounters can break down barriers between fields, which suggests that mixing creates a combination of fields that is integrally new and whole in its fabric. we wish to trouble that notion, suggesting that disjuncture and difference, the tenuousness of loose and weak threads, are internal to all fields and essential to the creative process of generative work. in this issue of catalyst, many of the authors have never met in person; their papers are neither necessarily more unified as a group nor internally broader in scope as a result of their exchanges. the dialogue among these papers did not simply galvanize an argument or view, but rather generated a stronger sense, within each paper, of the specific threads of approach and politics informing each contribution. the result is a set of papers that reflect on each authors’ own field claims and histories, shaped and clarified by mutual inducement to identify stakes, working in some cases not only with but also against some of the standards and expectations of both familiar and newly approached fields. one might say of any project, identified as interdisciplinary or not, that the outcomes are never predictable or safe, and that by opening a project to other fields one has to forgo conditions such as consistency, authority, and unity of position. reading within and across these papers, one can find new threads as well as older lines of thought about the digital, about visual digital practice, and about feminism and militarism. challenging violent technologies, logics, and representations, the authors are passionate about the politics that their research marks and approaches. the editorial board warmly thanks managing editor cristina visperas for her production leadership and creative contributions to the journal in its first two years of production. welcome to hannah zeavin, managing editor for summer 2016. we thank monika sengul-jones for the original web design and for continuing contributions to infrastructure and promotion and paola mendez, brenda johnson-grau and alexandra apolloni of ucla, caroline warren of emory and hannah zeavin of nyu for their assistance on issue 2. the editorial board eagerly awaits our next issue, "black studies and feminist technoscience,” co-edited by cristina visperas, kimberly juanita brown, and jared sexton. the catalyst editorial board also thanks for their generous contributions toward the production of this issue the society for social studies of science (4s); the department of communication, the doctoral program in science studies, and the dean of social sciences at the university of california, san diego; the department of women's, gender, and sexuality studies at emory university; the technoscience research unit at the university of toronto; and the department of media, culture, and communication at new york university. references butler, j. (1993). bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of sex. new york and london: routledge. miranda, c. (2015). "fiminity in kevlar: nao bustamante's women of the mexican revolution," the los angeles times, may 14, 2015. http://latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-artist-nao-bustamante-women-of-themexican-revolution-20150513-column.html microsoft word newsinfocus-smiley.docx smiley, s. (2017). a knotty problem: arts based action research in and out of a community garden. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (2) 1-13 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sam smiley, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license news in focus a knotty problem: arts based action research in and out of a community garden sam smiley astrodime transit authority sam@astrodime.org abstract what happens when a/r/tographers attempt to build a sculpture out of japanese knotweed, an “invasive species” in a community garden in provincetown, ma, u.s.? using an arts based performative approach, media artist and researcher sam smiley organized a series of community interventions with gardeners, and naturalists and sculptors during the appearances environmental arts festival in may of 2016. this article is a debrief of the journey of a knotweed sculpture from the b-street community garden, to the side of the highway, and its ultimate destruction in a bonfire on national seashore, in a public event called smouldering thing. the article is primarily methodological from an arts based research perspective, but draws theoretically on the sts fields of the public understanding of science, as well as media and science studies. 2 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) introduction description of art and research intervention at appearances festival (spring 2016, provincetown, massachusetts) b-street gardens has an alien visitor. the name of the visitor is japanese knotweed, fallopia japonica. however, it has many other names throughout the world, including huzhang (china), duizendknoop (netherlands), mexican bamboo, and fleeceflower, to name only a few. originally introduced to the netherlands in the 1800s from japan, eventually this world traveler made its way to b-street gardens. in the spring of 2016, i worked with americorps volunteers and community garden members to create a sculpture of japanese knotweed rhizomes and roots on the premises of b-street gardens, located in provincetown, massachusetts, usa. as an artist, i faced the daunting task of designing a community arts intervention that both served the community aesthetic and had conceptual value as art. i believe that the crossroads of this type of intervention is humor. humor can be an important tool in revealing complexity. ultimately, i wanted to create an intervention that would spawn complex dialogue about japanese knotweed and the concept of “invasiveness” in general. “invasive species” and “weeds” have emerged as the modern day ecological “villains’ of climate change – killing native species, taking “over,” and destroying native habitats. many have critiqued this rhetoric as nativist, racist, nationalist, and unproductive for conservation biology and ecology. i drew on these critiques to create a japanese knotweed festival, a celebration of the consumption and celebration of this “invasive” species that is both edible and useful to the community in which it has settled. the intervention at b-street gardens became an open-ended inquiry into the messiness in bringing together science, arts, and politics. it also framed a larger question of arts method as epistemology. i ask: how can arts interventions be used in a community garden context to bring a greater understanding of a specific plant that is considered “invasive”? 3 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) field site and context situating my research the b-street gardens are located on a provincetown-owned conservation trust run by the provincetown conservation commission. provincetown is an ocean side town at the tip of cape cod, massachusetts, with a year-round population of under 3,000. in the summer it becomes a tourist town, and the population swells to 60,000. it has an “off-season” from november to march, a “shoulder season” of may-june and sept-oct, and a “high season” of july-august. it has a large gay, lesbian, and bisexual population, both on season and off season, and is marketed as a tourist town for the glbt community. [link: town of provincetown. http://ptownchamber.com/ ] situating b-street gardens b-street gardens are near wetlands, and the land itself was bought as filled in wetlands, so gardening use is considered appropriate given that history (personal communication, a. brandt, july 1, 2014). care for the garden is held together through the work of some dedicated community volunteers and through the muscle of americorps, whose work at bstreet is both to provide an infrastructure for the garden and to identify “invasive” species and manage them (see fig. 1). 4 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) fig.1 there is a large stand of japanese knotweed in the wetlands around the community gardens. japanese knotweed is a well-known adversary to the americorps volunteers, since they spend each spring clearing it capewide. (personal communication, a. brandt, july 1, 2014). in that sense, the “community” is currently being built around a common enemy, japanese knotweed (see fig. 2). fig. 2 5 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) situating myself i am a 50-year old white bigendered queer media artist, born in michigan, united states. i have been living and voting in provincetown since 2008. i participate in the provincetown community, both as a volunteer on community projects and as an artist. after being waitlisted two years for a community garden plot, i finally got a plot in 2014 (see fig. 3). i had never had my own garden before, so i was excited! fig. 3 situating appearances appearances is an eco-arts festival that takes place annually in april and may in various locations throughout provincetown over a two-week period (see fig. 4). first organized in 2012 by artist dorothy palanza, the festival emerged out of the provincetown conservation trust, a private non-profit organization that works with the town conservation commission, and the open space board to create more open space in provincetown. 2016’s festival was its fifth iteration. 6 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) fig. 4 procedure: migrations and translations i conceived the community art project as a way to bring a clearer understanding about the uses and ecological behaviors of japanese knotweed to the community within b-street garden. i decided to approach the project as an a/r/tographer: artist, researcher, teacher. this is a method within the field of arts-based research that has emerged from the university of british columbia. i had two collaborators for the knotweed intervention: stephen wells, an artist in provincetown, and laura kathrein, an artist, ecologist, and m.ed. candidate in community arts at lesley university in boston, who brought her expertise in social media and photography (see fig. 5). stephen, laura and i came together to formulate a plan to make a knotweed sculpture in b-street gardens during this festival. we worked with americorps volunteers early in the spring to dig up the rhizomes of japanese knotweed, create a temporary sculpture of them in the garden, and then burn the rhizomes at the end (child and wade, 2000). stephen and i used the dried parts to build knotweed animals, including a knotweed turkey from a lobster trap (see fig. 6). it worked really well in the end because it got a lot of visibility from people passing by in cars. 7 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) we stored the rhizomes safely in garbage bags nearby in preparation for the following bonfire. at the end of the festival, we took all parts of the knotweed, piled them up, and made an enormous and ceremonial bonfire called the smoldering thing, in a nod to burning man events (see fig. 7). then…we ran into trouble. human trouble. members of the bstreet gardens in no way wanted a knotweed sculpture at the garden site. help came in the form of resourceful work of dorothy palanza, the organizer of the festival. she had ascertained that the campground who was hosting the festival might also not want the knotweed on their premises in any form but food. [i did some talks during the festival about the uses of japanese knotweed in pies.] she found an area where there were some other artists at the side of the highway. that area of the highway was out of jurisdiction of anyone who might be fearful of the plant. fig.5 8 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) fig.6 fig. 7 fear of a knotweed planet the protests against our knotweed sculpture made me wonder what was so threatening about a plant, albeit one with gigantic rhizomes. i did some research on japanese knotweed’s prior history as an ornamental in england to see if there were any parallel conversations. according to the japanese knotweed alliance, an organization based in the u.k., “knotweed’s stout rhizomes (underground stems) are notorious for 9 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) pushing through asphalt, building foundations, concrete retaining walls and even drains, causing significant damage. this can add huge costs to development and regeneration schemes. contaminated soil should be treated as controlled waste” (see fig. 8). fig.8 moreover, i discovered in that in the u.k. japanese knotweed pieces are considered and treated as “controlled waste” under the environmental protection act of 1990. jeff howell, a columnist for the daily telegraph, notes that “the surveying profession has become terrified of japanese knotweed. mortgages are being refused on properties where it has been spotted, even in a next-door garden. and some homes have become “blighted” and unsaleable because of the hysteria surrounding the issue.” indeed, the out of control panic rose to the point that in march of 2014, a man killed his wife and himself because he thought japanese knotweed was invading their home! inconclusions i am calling this section “inconclusions” because, rather than ending with an answer, i want to end with a question. 10 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) i believe that, during our arts-based intervention, these japanese knotweed plants shaped our actions, often in ways that enabled its continued propagation. for example, during the project we dug up the plants in an attempt to find rhizomes and we cooked them using our peculiar human methods of consuming food. we were aggravated by knotweed, frustrated by it, and we eventually burned it. reflecting on my experience, i cannot but ask myself about the framing of the problem: in what ways have knotweed plants used us, the artist-humans, in their continued struggle for epigenetic survival? the only answer i have been able to come up with, as a community arts-based practitioner, is to celebrate it! and hold a festival in its honor which is educational, edible, and yes, cultural. because japanese knotweed, that alien invader, is indeed part of the natureculture (haraway) of provincetown. perhaps a better question is: how we can live with this species of plant? and how can we make ourselves part of its ecosystem? references bailey, j. p., & conolly, a. p. (2000). “prize-winners to pariahs a history of japanese knotweed s.l. (polygonaceae) in the british isles.” watsonia 20. 93–110. brown, larisa. “japanese knotweed invasion is halting house sales as buyers are denied mortgages on blighted properties” | daily mail online. (2013, july 19). retrieved february 24, 2017, from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2370938/japanese-knotweedinvasion-halting-house-sales-buyers-denied-mortgages-blightedproperties.html callon, m. (1987). “some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of st brieuc bay.” in power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? john law, ed. 11 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) london: routledge keegan & paul. 196–223. cardozo, k., & subramaniam, b. (2013). “assembling asian/american naturecultures: orientalism and invited invasions.” journal of asian american studies 16 (1) 1–23. childe, l., & wade, m. (2000). the japanese knotweed manual: the management and control of an invasive alien weed. chichester, uk: packard publishing limited. corsi, r. (2010). “grow time take 1.” retrieved from https://vimeo.com/9356515 d, c., flav, f., griff, p., wynn, k., & lord, d. (1990). fear of a black planet. def jam recordings. evens, m. (2014, march 31). “man kills his wife and himself after fearing japanese knotweed invasion.” daily telegraph (uk). retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10735346/man-kills-hiswife-and-himself-after-fearing-japanese-knotweed-invasion.html firth, c., maye, d., & pearson, d. (2011). “developing ‘community’ in community gardens.” local environment 16(6). 555–568. ghose, r., & pettygrove, m. (2014). “actors and networks in urban community garden development.” geoforum, 53. 93–103. global invasive species database. (n.d.). [database]. retrieved from http://www.issg.org/database/species/search.asp?st=100ss&fr=1&str=&l ang=en haraway, d. (1988). “situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective.” feminist studies, 12 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) 14(3). 575–599. irwin, rita l.& decosson, alex (eds.). (2004). a/r/tography: rendering self through arts based living inquiry. vancouver, british columbia: pacific educational press. milstein, t., & pulos, a. (2015). “culture jam pedagogy and practice: relocating culture by staying on one’s toes.” communication, culture & critique 8(3). 395–413. https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12090 presidential documents: invasive species executive order 13112 of february 3, 1999. (1999). federal register, 64(25). retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/fr-1999-02-08/pdf/99-3184.pdf schmelzkopf, k. (1995). “urban community gardens as contested space.” geographical review, 85(3). 364. subrahamian, b. (2001). “the aliens have landed! reflections on the rhetoric of biological invasions.” meridians 2(1), 26–40. subrahamian, b. (2014). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. urbana: university of illinois press. sutherland, c. e. (1958). the ecology of invasions by animals and plants. london: chapman and hall. tactical biopolitics. (n.d.). retrieved december 4, 2016, from https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/tactical-biopolitics thompson, n., & sholette, g. (2004). the interventionists: user’s manual for the creative disruption of everyday life. cambridge, ma: mit press. 13 smiley catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 3(2) bio sam smiley is an artist, researcher, and educator. they teach arts based research and community arts at lesley university and has an m.f.a. in electronic arts from rensselaer polytechnic institute. their research explores invasive species, weeds and plant subjectivity and uses sts (science, technology and society), cultural studies, history of science and arts based research. they live in provincetown, massachusetts. science & justice   critical perspectives       science & justice: the trouble and the promise     jenny reardon university of california, santa cruz reardon1@ucsc.edu jacob metcalf university of california, santa cruz jake.metcalf@gmail.com martha kenney san francisco state university mkenney@sfsu.edu karen barad university of california, santa cruz kbarad@ucsc.edu we live during times that are at once troubling and promising. around the world, economies have collapsed, the gap between the rich and poor has grown dramatically, and trust in public institutions has plummeted (lipset & schneider, 1983; pharr & putnam, 2000; picketty, 2014; putnam, 2000). just fifteen years after celebrations anticipating a prosperous new millennium—one united by the forces of globalization and the promise of science and technology, hope for the future has turned into widespread concern and questioning of the basis of sustainable life. yet in this questioning there is also new opportunity. in many parts of the globe, and in many different walks of life, people are gathering together to reimagine how we might constitute a more just and livable world. universities have emerged as one important site of these transformations. public universities in particular have become a core node in a wide-ranging debate about what kinds of knowledge and skills are worth investing in, what value we can expect from that investment, and who should benefit (fischer & stripling, 2014; marginson, 2011; nixon, 2011). although it seems unthinkable to those who grew up in the wake of dramatic post-wwii investments in higher learning, today even leaders in higher education challenge the worth of a university degree (lederman, 2008). like many established institutions, universities face unprecedented cuts and are under intensified pressure to demonstrate their practical value.  however, this pressure and these cuts are experienced unevenly. anticipating greater economic returns, many academic administrators—including those at the authors' home institutions—have made decisions to selectively support science and engineering over the arts, humanities and social sciences. yet these decisions come at a time when even science and engineering are under pressure to prove their relevance and are also facing painful budget cuts from federal funding bodies.  in a 2014 article published in the proceedings of the national academy of sciences, prominent biomedical chemist bruce alberts and his co-authors call upon biomedical scientists to confront the fact that national institutes of health (nih) budgets will no longer continue to grow (alberts et al., 2014). further, access to these shrinking public coffers require scientists and engineers to demonstrate "broader impacts" and to provide expanded ethical training for their students (schienke et al., 2009). although scientists and engineers might receive more support, new federal laws that mandate deepened engagements with ethical and social issues now encourage them to share resources with their social science, humanities and arts colleagues. these changes, combined with calls to reimagine, deepen and broaden approaches to science and engineering ethics, have created novel opportunities (schienke et al., 2009; tuana, 2012). specifically, they open up new possibilities—full of promise and danger—for science and technology studies (sts) and feminist science studies (fss) to bring their theoretical developments to bear upon the pedagogical and research practices of their home turf: universities.  sts and fss scholars have long sought to open up spaces in which scientists, engineers, humanists, social scientists and artists may work together to create knowledge that is responsive to a broader range of societal concerns and needs. beginning in the 1980s, various initiatives were launched with these goals in mind and new curricula were developed (barad, 2000; rosser, 1995).1 one particularly noteworthy nationwide effort was "women and scientific literacy: building two-way streets," a program created and administered by the american association of colleges and universities with support from the national science foundation.2 this program, which ran from 1996 to 1999, sought to increase the participation of women and racial minorities in the sciences, expand the science content of women's studies, and broaden the content and teaching methods of science, engineering, and mathematics to include methodological and epistemological insights from feminist science studies with an eye towards making ethical and social concerns integral to these curricula. broad societal shifts and concerns have created the opportunity for these efforts, which were previously experimental and often on the margins of the institution, to become mainstream initiatives.   here we reflect on our efforts to navigate these changing institutional landscapes.3 specifically, we describe the challenges and promise of forming at uc santa cruz the science & justice working group and its companion, the science & justice training program (science & justice research center (collaborations group) 2013). both the group and the program have cultivated formal and informal infrastructures for generating discussion and research at the juncture of the natural and social sciences, arts, humanities, and engineering. these infrastructures have enabled us not to build a separate program or department, but rather to thread the insights of fss and sts throughout the university and to build relationships and programs that work across its intellectual and institutional boundaries.  a focus on justice proved critical to our efforts. justice is one of the three fundamental principles of the belmont report (1979), an investigation commissioned by the national commission for the protection of human services of biomedical and behavioral research. the belmont report provides the foundation for research ethics and legal protections at all institutions that receive u.s. federal monies. focusing on human subjects research, the report puts three classical liberal principles at the heart of its recommendations: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (research, 1979). however, in practice dominant institutionalized forms of science and engineering ethics often bypass the fundamental issues of equality, fairness and equity that the belmont authors call us to attend to in their invocation of justice (schienke et al., 2009; tuana, 2012; personal communication with patricia king, 2004).  those of us engaged in forming the science & justice working group and the science & justice training program were inspired by belmont's call, but not bound by its invocation of classical liberal principles. our turn to justice entailed a more fundamental questioning of the first principles that guide any society and its pursuit of knowledge. john rawls captured this aspect of justice in the opening pages of his enormously influential book, a theory of justice:  "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (rawls, 1971/1999, p. 3). of course there is a danger in orienting around this lofty notion of justice. as rawls himself explains, as the staring point of social life, justice is "uncompromising"—it is that which one cannot be against (ibid., p. 4). as bedrock, justice can lack mobility, play and the sense that things could be otherwise. as the first virtue of social life, it easily resists critique. and yet, à la foucault, we do not believe dangers can be avoided, no matter our approach (foucault, 1977, p. 163). perhaps more to the point, as donna haraway has taught us, if we are to understand and enable responses to our world, we must "stay with the trouble" (haraway 2010; haraway 2012). more thoughtful—and indeed, just—practices arise from tempering justice's elevating powers with a situated questioning of the collective basis of our lives (fraser, 2009; haraway, 1988). thus, the work of imagining and enacting justice is always open, and never finished (derrida, 1992, 1994). it involves an ongoing creative working together. oriented around this expansive conception of justice, science & justice at uc santa cruz departed dramatically from the bureaucratic concerns about proper process that shape much of what today operates as science and engineering ethics. in the united states, institutional ethics in the form of bureaucratic governance of research practices by institutional review boards (irbs) has done much to respond to the egregious abuses of human subjects—abuses that motivated the writing of the belmont report. yet, increasingly, this form of ethics has lost its responsiveness to the actual conditions and practices of research (rothman, 1992). designed to meet the formal requirements of regulatory law, rather than the evolving needs and concerns of those who give their time and bodies for research, not surprisingly this approach to ethics spawned by the belmont report and reflected in irb review practices generates little enthusiasm from either scientists and engineers or fss and sts scholars.4 we found that refocusing on justice, while not a perfect answer to these problems, offered a more constructive mode of engagement (science & justice research center (collaborations group), 2013). while this focus partly arose out of local commitments to social justice—social justice is a core institutional value at uc santa cruz—justice also proved a better concept to work with for reasons that moved beyond our local context.  in its call to question the first principles of a society, it allowed us to open up the space of ethics in novel ways. in its attention to questions about the common good, it helped us to create the basis for working across disciplines on shared problems and objects. it inspired us to consider what new models of collectivity might better fit with the current zeitgeist and produce more responsive, robust knowledge (latour, 2005; matsutake worlds research group, 2009; mol, moser, & pols, 2010; puig de la bellacasa, 2011).  the trouble and the promise in the recent rounds of cuts to universities, departments and programs committed to the critical study of science and technology fared unevenly. for example, in 2011 the academic program and administrative services review core council at pennsylvania state university recommended defunding its science, technology and society program.5 on july 1, 2012 the program formally closed its doors, falling victim to administrators seeking ways to meet budget deficits and improve "efficiency." yet, in the same year that penn state defunded its sts program, harvard university, an institution with a longstanding phd program in the history of science, officially launched its program on science, technology and society through its john f. kennedy school of government, offering a secondary field concentration in sts to students pursuing phd, doctor of design, and sjd degrees.6 other universities are responding to budget cuts by funding academic initiatives that support the development of science and engineering, creating new opportunities for funding and support for sts and fss.  these new opportunities present challenges and potential dangers. much like the dilemmas that research subjects face as they are more routinely invited to the same table as scientists and engineers,7 sts and fss scholars often find that inclusion into new science and engineering initiatives does not necessarily entail meaningful engagement (benjamin, 2013; reardon, 2005; viseu, 2015). writing sts and fss scholars into a grant is not the same thing as treating them as central players who shape research principles, goals, and practices. yet, despite these familiar challenges, the current moment presents possibilities for creating new institutional practices that foster the kinds of intellectual change long-imagined by sts and fss scholars. in this space of trouble and promise, science & justice at uc santa cruz arose.  inspired by a bike ride through the ucsc meadow, animated by lively breakfasts at a beloved santa cruz brunch spot, and encouraged by a close colleague and friend, science & justice was born of a desire and hope that it would be possible to craft new spaces and gatherings where, in the company of colleagues from across the university and beyond, we could ask, ‘what kind of world do we want to live in?'8 this effort grew out of years of sustained intellectual dialogue among scholars at uc santa cruz who believed in the power of this university on the pacific's edge to sustain transformational thought. perhaps most famously, uc santa cruz is home to the history of consciousness department, founded in 1967, where faculty and graduate students have pushed beyond disciplinary conventions to create inquiry adequate to the task of engaging with the world as it is, and as we want it to be. uc santa cruz also is home to inventive pedagogy committed to social justice pioneered in its community studies department, founded in 1969. both reardon and barad chose to come to ucsc partly because of this history and the potential it offered to build novel spaces for thinking, teaching, and transformative change. yet reardon and barad arrived on campus on the eve of dramatic challenges to public education. the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 combined with powerful conservative political movements, led to widespread defunding of public institutions. public universities were amongst the hardest hit, and in many ways the university of california became the epicenter in national debates about the values and goals of public higher education (brown, 2011; lye et al., 2011). beginning in 2008, staff and faculty positions were slashed, salaries furloughed, and student-to-faculty ratios sharply increased while undergraduate tuitions skyrocketed in the midst of controversial changes in the governance of the university of california (byrne, 2011; meister, 2009, 2011). while austerity was similarly imposed on other universities, it was felt particularly sharply at the university of california where it represented a dramatic departure from california's historical commitment to tuition-free public education.    these historic budget cuts came along with increased pressure to rethink and re-articulate the ways in which university research and teaching benefit broader publics. while born out of a dire situation, this spur to change also created some room for the kind of work we envisioned. discouraging of elite and insular scholarship, the climate encouraged scientists, engineers, and sts and fss scholars at uc campuses to work together to reimagine what a science and engineering for the people of california—and all their many companions—might look like (haraway 2008).9 in an unexpected way, this situation created openings for arriving at shared goals and collaborative projects, positive outcomes of what were otherwise a devastating set of changes and challenges.  research ethics: from rules of conduct to experiments with engagement in universities, social scientists and humanists most frequently are asked to collaborate with scientists and engineers under the banner of "ethics." ethics emerged as an institutional framework during the 1960s and 70s in response to a series of highly publicized scandals including the infamous tuskegee syphilis study, the use of disabled children during for hepatitis research at the willowbrook state school, and the injection of cancerous hela cells into patients without their knowledge or consent (rothman, 1992 ; skloot 2010; steneck et al., 2007). public exposé of these experiments prompted the belmont report, a report that investigated these abuses of human subjects and prompted the implementation of standardized ethical procedures by institutional review boards (irbs).10  these developments brought much needed attention to paternalistic and sometimes abusive actions of researchers. yet they also conceptually divorced "knowledge" from the "implications of knowledge." irbs and science and engineering ethics programs focus their attention on delineating how knowledge should be collected and used, not on how knowledge should be produced. given this lack of attention to the practices most central to the intellectual life of researchers, not surprisingly, many scientists and engineers—who otherwise have strong ethical convictions—fail to find inspiration in this institutionalized version of ethics. indeed, eric cech (2014) recently found that despite engineering schools' increased emphasis on teaching engineering ethics, earning an engineering degree today is correlated with a "significant decline" in students' commitment to the "public welfare." in building science & justice, we sought to understand in more detail what might be driving this disconnect. as a first step, we surveyed what counted as responsible conduct of research (rcr) training. rcr emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the research regulation reforms in an effort to teach the next generation of scientists how to discern proper research conduct from misconduct.  nih first mandated formal training in rcr curricula as a component of national research service awards institutional training grants in 1990. though it allowed grantee institutions to determine the content and format of the training, the nih suggested that training cover conflicts of interest, data management, professional standards, authorship and attribution, institutional policies for reporting misconduct, and the proper uses of human and animal subjects (mastroianni et al., 1999; steneck et al., 2007). the scope of the nih's mandate grew to include all graduate and postdoctoral trainees at granting institutions (and not just those funded by the grant). from the time of the first federal mandates to the present, implementation of rcr training has been haphazard and for the most part led by volunteer instructors (bulger & heitman, 2007; steneck et al., 2007). instruction is typically in the form of lectures, case studies and multiple-choice test modules on websites, with little to no attention paid to the history, politics, or economics (dubois et al., 2010; mastroianni et al. 1999). from our perspective, the most important shortcoming of rcr pedagogy is its reliance on hypothetical case studies that implicitly delineate what is and what is not relevant to ethical decision-making. consider "a new dialysis machine," a test case used in the national online ethics center.11 in this case, the reader is asked to choose between two competing models of dialysis machines. the first uses an expensive reusable filter that must be autoclaved in the unreliable conditions of a poor hospital, and therefore carries some risk of infection. the other uses an inexpensive disposable filter that decreases the chance of infection, but must be continually resupplied from the manufacturer, thus creating high costs and dependence on a shaky supply chain. the reader is asked to balance the financial considerations against the patient safety consequences of each option and provide an argument about which path to choose. this is a plausible way of framing the problem, yet it does not direct the reader's attention to the intellectual property laws or the unjust distributions of resources that create the material conditions for the dilemma in the first place. in other words, what is not possible to ask within this hypothetical case study is whether the decision space presented to the engineer is itself a formalization of an unjust political and economic regime. yet it is this very regime that the engineer may need to recognize and understand in order to respond fully to the ethical problem posed.12 a survey of intellectual property activism and scholarship demonstrates that these deeper questions of political economy are of interest to scientists and engineers. for example, scientists and engineers have played important roles in illustrating the ways in which patents stifle genomics innovation and the availability of pharmaceuticals (andrews, 2002; kapcyzynski et al., 2003; kapcyzynski et al., 2005; s. reardon, 2013). while the new dialysis machine case presents realistic trade-offs an engineer might face, it limits the decision space, too narrowly defining where a student can begin their ethical consideration.  clarifying this limitation of rcr training is not to suggest that it is a waste of time for scientists and engineers. learning institutionally mandated research practices helps avoid overt abuse and misconduct. however, it also is necessary to have institutional spaces that make it possible to rigorously assess how research practices form and how the objects of research are constituted within sociotechnical systems. the lack of such spaces, we suggest, constitutes a primary reason for the widespread dissatisfaction with the rcr model, as it avoids many fundamental issues that scientists and engineers find vexing (jasanoff, 2011). while the individual engineer hardly can be expected to solve large-scale problems of intellectual property regimes or to fundamentally alter inequalities between wealthy and impoverished nations, there nonetheless exists a disjuncture between what the rcr presents as "ethics" and what scientists and engineers find ethically and intellectually compelling (cech, 2014; science & justice research center (collaborations group), 2013). thus, it leaves scientists and engineers who often rightly sense ethical issues at their own lab benches with few options to pursue those concerns.13 from responsible to response-able in order to avoid some of the pitfalls of standard ethics frameworks, we took inspiration from feminist science studies scholars, who re-conceptualize ethics as situated, relational, and open-ended. this work marks a shift from an ethics figured as individual responsibility to an ethics of "response-ability" (see especially barad, 2007; haraway, 2008; schrader 2010, 2012). more than a clever play on words, response-ability, donna haraway argues, is not about aligning one's actions with a set of universal ethical principles. instead, it requires cultivating practices of response. these practices are developed and done with others, both human and non-human, in a process of ongoing exchange.14 feminists have written about this kind of responsive ethics in the context of agility training (haraway, 2008), harmful algae research (schrader, 2010), brittlestars enlisted in biomimetic and nanotechnology research (barad, 2007), affective and bodily mutual articulation in human-animal co-domestication (despret, 2004), and longterm patterns of relating between orchids and insects (hustak & myers, 2012). in each of these accounts, the authors illustrate how skills, knowledge, and even bodies emerge from dynamic choreographies of response, or processes of becoming-with one another (thompson, 2005).  one condition for response-ability in the university is a better accounting of the conditions and consequences of knowledge production. here, we found the work of karen barad particularly insightful. in meeting the universe halfway, barad substantially reworks conventional notions of responsibility so that we might better account for the entangled material and discursive apparatuses of knowledge production (barad, 2007).15 her use of the term "apparatus" has deep theoretical roots, but one way of understanding the apparatus is as a vastly expanded version of the "methods and materials" lists familiar to scientists. beyond just a list of instruments, equipment, software, methods of accounting for background noise, and error analysis used to perform and analyze experiments, barad suggests that we should account for all the material relationships that are part of knowledge-making practices, including political, social and cultural ones. accounting for the apparatus by providing an "equipment list" is already a crucial aspect of securing the objectivity of scientific investigations. barad builds on this, enlarging the scope of what needs to be included in an objective accounting of the full set of material factors that go into producing scientific results (barad, 2000). this expanded work of accounting does not happen in a space separate from where research is imagined and designed; rather, it is integral to scientific practices. ethics is therefore neither merely a matter of gaining consent for human subject participation in the design of an experiment, nor a set of post-facto philosophical considerations of scientific results or impacts. facts and values, matter and meaning, are made together at the lab bench (and in the field, at the blackboard, and all the spaces where scientific research is done). attending to the multiplicity of entangled apparatuses that constitute scientific practices enlarges the scope of ethics and understands the consideration of justice as integral to the practice of science. by not making ethics exterior to knowledge, but rather a part of it, a baradian approach to response-ability makes doing ethics more concrete and practical for the working scientist.16  indeed, one way of understanding response-ability is that it is what makes ethics do-able.  codified and institutionalized models of ethical pedagogy operate at too abstract a level, disembodying and disarticulating knowledge-making practices from their material conditions, inducing—even requiring—disengagement from the very concerns that animate many scientists and engineers (müller, 2012). thus, pre-established, codified ethics bypasses what ought to be central to ethical practice: engagement. of course, codes must be developed, understood, and followed in most cases, but vexing problems of scientific and engineering practices that demand response cannot be engaged from within the pre-circumscribed spaces of codified ethics. ethics in the fullest sense is only do-able when scientific and engineering practices are accountable to the conditions and consequences of knowledge production. creating the space of response-ability: the emergence of science & justice at uc santa cruz  science & justice at uc santa cruz was born out of this desire to build concrete institutional spaces where practices of response-ability could be cultivated. orienting around justice proved an important first step. as previously mentioned, uc santa cruz has a long history of attracting scholars who wish to push at the edges of disciplinary boundaries in order to conduct research that might contribute to a more just world. thus we found that justice hailed faculty and graduate students from across all five divisions of the university. for many of our scientists and engineers, it was a particularly welcome call. for them, all too often ethics had become an administrative hoop to jump through rather than a meaningful engagement with the questions that motivate them.17 justice promised a new beginning, an opportunity to transcend closed and constricting forms of bureaucracy and to build institutions and knowledges that could support a greater diversity of lives. it encouraged us to ask what principles and practices should guide these efforts (reardon, 2013).18 justice also oriented us around collective work, a kind of work familiar to our colleagues in science and engineering, and long sought after in the social sciences and humanities. for all these reasons, justice proved a good partner to ethics, and to our efforts to foster response-able modes of knowing and enacting collective worlds. collaborative work also formed an important point of common orientation. science & justice began with the formation of the science & justice working group (sjwg) in the fall of 2006. to begin with, the group consisted of a small group of graduate students, research staff, and faculty. since then it has become a bi-weekly meeting that regularly gathers around 30-40 faculty, research staff, graduate students, and interested professionals and activists in the surrounding area. from the very beginning, the sjwg avoided standard academic talks where scholars imparted their findings. instead, we gathered together to work on shared problems. emphasizing a problem-driven model of inquiry facilitated the group's ability to encourage dialogue among people with widely varying backgrounds. it provided a common concern around which to gather. in an early example that proved formative to later efforts, two graduate students from forensic anthropology, cris hughes and chelsea juarez, came to us with a problem they were encountering as they attempted to identify the remains of missing persons sent to them by the state of california. the state required that they assign a race to the bodies to aid in identification. hughes and juarez argued that the method of determining ‘race' used in forensic science obscured rather than illuminated the correct identity of the body. the racial categories encoded into their database were developed in the southeastern united states and reflected different social histories than the californian context. because of this, hughes and juarez found that the racial categories in the database did not correspond with the categories people used to describe themselves and others. recognizing that this problem was not only technical, but also social and political, they came to science & justice to enlist help in imagining how to create new categories that would aid in returning the bodies to their proper resting places. in the sjwg meetings, they were able to discuss their concerns with social scientists and historians who understood how historical processes shaped the construction of racial categories, and life scientists who could help illuminate how racial categories are differently understood and used in their fields. using these conversations as a starting point, hughes and juarez were able to unpack the entangled social, political and scientific dimensions of the problem. not only did this create a deeper knowledge of the problem, it enabled them to respond to it by opening up new avenues of intervention.19 in this case we found that orienting around a concrete problem gave all participants entrée into the discussions.  as a result of these experiences, core members realized that methods developed within the sjwg had the potential to yield new types of research that both function as interventions in how science is practiced and provide new avenues for achieving social justice.  science & justice training program building on the success of these cases in the sjwg, in the spring of 2009 we wrote a grant proposal for the national science foundation's ethics education in engineering and science program to develop our methodologies and formalize them in a graduate student training program. the grant proved successful and in the spring of 2010 ucsc launched the science & justice training program. while the focus of this paper is not the infrastructure of the training program, there are some key features that are necessary to outline in order to understand the development of our pedagogical and collaborative practices. graduate students from any division are welcome to participate regardless of their previous training and expertise, and students from each of the five divisions have participated in the program at some level. 20 in the first iteration of the training program, students enrolled in an introductory course cross-listed in the sociology, biomolecular science and engineering, and feminist studies departments that covers introductory literature in sts and fss. this course began to build a cohort of students knowledgeable about each others' work.21 over the years it has been taught, this course evolved to focus on teaching students how to identify and respond to connections across their areas of research, so that they might create collaborative projects. for their final projects, the students each wrote a research proposal in the style of a national science foundation grant application, which was then judged by an interdisciplinary panel of faculty that chose a cohort of eight to ten science & justice fellows. fellows received two terms of funding, allowing them to focus on their research projects. in many cases, their departments contributed a portion of the funding, which proved important for gaining wider faculty support for the program. in the following term, the fellows enrolled in a second methods course, in which they developed their project. fellows received continued mentoring as they began their projects and were expected to continue contributing to the science & justice community through activities such as helping to shape events for the sjwg and writing collectively authored articles (science & justice research center (collaborations group), 2013).22 of course creating a new graduate training program on campus proved a major undertaking that involved tremendous time, energy and diplomatic skills.  however, we were aided by one institutional feature of uc santa cruz: despite being a home for a number of important sts scholars—especially in the fss tradition—the campus had no single, formalized program, department, or location for sts research and teaching. therefore we were working across shifting disciplinary boundaries from the outset; there was no precedent for walling off sts off from other disciplines. this points to a benefit of having no de facto community: it creates the need to continually "retie the knot" (haraway, 2008, p. 1).23 to be sure, this distributed structure required greater organizational labor, but ultimately led to a wider base of support. our pedagogical innovations have been mutually supportive with other aspects of the s&j programming, and our ongoing efforts to build enduring working relationships across intellectual and institutional boundaries. teaching students across disciplinary boundaries not only creates practical connections across divides, it also encourages new forms of interactions among the faculty who support these students, as well as new kinds of inquiry in the students' home departments. finally, it provides a concrete site in which to develop the kind of response-able research we envisioned—research that can respond to the full range of epistemic, ethical and political dimensions of contemporary technoscience. the sjtp was a modest attempt to create the training needed to foster response-able research. below is a distillation of the pedagogical methods we found useful in this project. collaborative practices: gathering around objects while many recognize that robust inquiry that supports more livable worlds requires interdisciplinary collaborations, academic cultures have not been particularly good at fostering such engagements. we have found in our courses and sjwg meetings that unknowingly held and caricatured views of other disciplines are the most common cause of conflict. even among students and faculty who have the best of intentions to produce collaborative work, it is challenging to adequately understand and generously engage with another discipline's methods and histories. one temptation posed by this trouble is to jettison the disciplines and work from a non-disciplinary framework. however, in our context this is not a plausible solution, largely because our fellows need to produce research that is legible in their own fields for the sake of their dissertation projects and job prospects.  we have found that our most successful response to this deep-seated shortcoming has been to gather around objects. in the sjwg and sjtp, we encourage students to craft new objects: from solar greenhouses to newspaper editorials; from interdisciplinary workshops and collaborations to written accounts of our dialogues. extending bruno latour's call to understand objects as gatherings around which new forms of democracy can be built, we have found that gathering around objects is both more productive and lower stakes than gathering around theories or ideals.  in latour's dingpolitik,24 objects are not essential and unchanging, but are instead produced through gatherings. they are that which congeal out of difference and what we share across divides. they make up our common world (latour, 2005). in order to activate this potential of objects to gather us across difference, we begin the training program by asking students to bring in their object of study. we then ask the students to provide a five-minute description of their objects.25 these presentations are usually told as if their objects were well-bounded—what latour would call smooth objects or matters of fact (latour, 2004). however, by asking other members of the seminar to articulate associations they have with the object, it quickly becomes clear that none of the objects presented are as safely bounded as they first appeared. consider, for instance, the object of one student working on the politics of climate change: "carbon." carbon, an object that for many appears to be a well-bound single molecule, turned out to have a surprisingly lively set of associations. among them were: the political and linguistic habit of dropping the ‘dioxide' of carbon dioxide; its status as a shorthand for all other greenhouse gasses; how we track public opinion and how it matters; the governance of carbon economies; the role of skepticism in public life; the shortcomings of the concept of "anthropogenic;" the politics of meat consumption and car use; the apocalyptic discourses of climate change; and papal indulgences.   this exchange helps illustrate how an object can serve as a spark to ignite conversation. conversely, it also draws attention to how the people gathered reshape their object in the course of their discussion. it soon becomes evident that what started out as an uncomplicated matter of fact had become a matter of concern. when the concern is shared, as we have found it often is, it provides a foundation for collaboration. in each course, the multiple iterations of this exercise resulted in students independently developing interdisciplinary research clusters organized around problems of mutual concern, such as climate change, water resources, and genetic testing.  importantly, we begin the objects exercise prior to assigning "the aesthetics of matters of concern" by bruno latour (2008), in which he discusses his idea of objects and things as gatherings. because we welcome students from all campus divisions, it is a priority to create a space in which everyone feels comfortable making a contribution. we have found that beginning the course by having the students discuss their "object" is especially effective, because scientists and engineers often already have an "object" in a traditional sense that can be made readily present in a classroom. solar cells and jars full of dead krill are just a couple of examples. in contrast, humanists and social scientists, who are not often asked to identify objects within their research projects, face difficulties articulating specific objects. their frustrations are encapsulated in one sociology student's exclamation: "i don't know what my object is!" although some humanists and social scientists were able to present objects in a traditional sense, such as co2 or ritalin, their research clearly focused on the controversies around those objects. however, once the latour reading is introduced, they too began to think about how they are part of world-making and object-making. for scientists and engineers, such readings encouraged a reconsideration of their previously well-bounded objects as always having entailed complex social and political relationships. since each of the students struggle with the implications of having something familiar made strange, these complimentary forms of discomfort create a collaborative and sympathetic collective environment.  methods for mapping response-ability once we are at the same table and gathered around common objects, it is necessary to develop shared practices that can foster response-ability for these objects. one exercise we found useful in this context was situational mapping. medical sociologist adele clarke developed situational maps as a method for addressing a lack of reflexivity in social-science methods arising from grounded theory (clarke, 2005). these maps ask the researcher to identify and lay out the major human, nonhuman, discursive, historical, symbolic, cultural, and political elements within a research situation. they also situate the researcher by making explicit the role that the researcher's personal experience and "intellectual wallpaper" play within the research situation (clarke, 2005, p.85). we found that situational maps helped students articulate areas of inquiry that move them across disciplines and spaces that are typically separated. mapping out the material and symbolic domains that constitute objects cultivates reflexive research and helps students to account for their dual roles as participants in and analysts of the situation in which their objects exist.  another mapping exercise we invited the students to experiment with is genealogical mapping. this method builds on foucault's notion of genealogy (foucault, 1977). for foucault, genealogy is not a search for origins, but rather a meticulous practice of tracing the embodied, historically-situated, contingent, multiple, and heterogeneous conditions of possibility that produce the objects and subjects of knowledge-making practices. taking foucault's notion of genealogy as inspiration, barad (2000, 2007) articulates a method of analysis that is attuned to a shift of objective referent from individual object to "phenomenon:" namely, an accounting of the heterogeneous multiplicity of material-discursive apparatuses that produce and are an inseparable part of the phenomenon being investigated.26 in particular, the mapping exercise begins with identifying the diverse apparatuses that are the conditions for the possibility of investigating and producing particular phenomena in the laboratory. students then worked with these initial sketches to add specific lines of entanglement between various apparatuses. this exercise complemented the opening object exercise and helped students develop their analytical skills more systematically in thinking about the complex set of practices that condense and sediment into their objects (what they originally took to be independently existing objects). key to this exercise is learning to consider the specific genealogies of each of the apparatuses and to discern how they matter in the study and production of each object. no two objects fit into the same genealogical maps; the details are crucial.     students in our course found that situational and genealogical maps were not only useful for explaining their situations to themselves, but also for providing colleagues from other disciplines with concrete and largely jargon-free entrance points to their research. this created new opportunities for collaboration around shared concerns. for our students who had not previously examined their situation as researchers within their projects in a structured sense, this use of situational and genealogical maps proved particularly helpful. in course evaluations, one student noted that situational mapping was particularly helpful in decentering herself from a position of expert-researcher and instead developing a model of research that enabled collaborative work with other participants in the 'situation.' through these exercises we were able to adapt qualitative social science and humanities methods to overcome the exclusions at the heart of standard ethics models: the situation or phenomenon became the unit of analysis rather than the individual object, and attempts to participate response-ably in technoscientific systems became the primary purpose of ethical inquiry.  close reading: attending to exclusions developing research practices that focus on the absences, differences, and silences of technoscientific systems also has been important in our movement toward ethics as response-ability. in particular, re-reading a technoscientific object with an eye toward silences has helped students to question the seeming completeness of a situational or genealogical map. jane gallop (2000) offers close reading as a way to attend to elements of a text that appear marginal or subordinate on a cursory reading, but which nonetheless become conspicuous or surprising when given further attention. emphasizing repetitious or troubling portions of the text that interrupt the assumed flow of a narrative, close reading highlights elements that are too often silent. delving deeper into such silences allows students to find connections or resolve conflicts across disciplines that may have otherwise remained unexamined. in our class evaluations, one student noted in reference to the technique of close reading: "the ways i want to engage with thinking and creativity are valued in this space in a way that they are not within my discipline. that the desire to work for social justice is not seen as something to be tagged on [sic] at the end of the project, and that pedagogy is seen as important to the content." susan leigh star's work also offers methodological approaches to discursive silences that more directly engage the project of science and justice. in a 2007 interview, star emphasized the critical importance of the lived experience of disadvantaged subjects for understanding technoscience in general. she argued that if we worked to take down the "transcendental wall of shame" that prevents open discussion of personal experience amongst academics, "we could stop using technology to sequester people and their experiences. if we begin with those who are excluded, shamed, and silenced, their lives will become the most important philosophical questions to be answered" (star, 2007, p.229). by always starting investigations into the conditions and consequences of technoscience with the question "cui bono?" one is able to follow the silences and absences in discussions of technoscientific systems (star, 1991). as our courses emphasize, and as our students' projects described below illustrate, methods that illuminate differences, silences, and absences in technoscientific discourses teach researchers to raise and engage questions about who research helps and serves. as scientific research becomes even more central to legitimating and constructing worlds, this skill will only become more important for envisioning and enacting a world that supports a greater diversity of lives (benjamin, 2013; harding, 1991, 2008).  modest enactments of science and justice one of the more important—and unexpected—lessons learned by many of the graduate students in our training program is that justice in scientific and engineering systems is not accomplished by remaking the entire world around a pre-figured sense of what justice looks like. instead, it is necessary to become modest and do the hard work of attending to the specificities of one's situation (haraway, 1997). this experience highlighted the need to rethink what counts as "success." contrary to the academic habit of seeking conclusive and final results, they found that justice work is necessarily iterative, ongoing, and untidy. as the students came up against roadblocks and revised their projects, initial disappointments were replaced by commitment to work with more modest and specific goals.  the experience of kate richerson, one of our fellows who works on mathematical models of fishery conservation, nicely illustrates this dynamic. richerson initially developed her project to rectify a lack of ecological data about a lake in sierra leone that is a critical source of subsistence fishing. modeling the fishery was hampered by a lack of adequate accounts of the ecological pressures at play, which included such factors as the presence of large poaching fleets. through interviews she sought to develop localized knowledge about the historical and present-day fishery stocks, but she quickly ran into a problem commonly faced by interviewers: the lack of mutual trust between her and her interview subjects. she found that the politics of her research methods significantly complicated what it would mean to act response-ably. although she was disappointed that the interventions she had planned did not materialize, richerson's project demonstrated that even localized interventions can be limited by one's positioning as a researcher.  a similar lesson emerges from another project, in which two of our fellows from the physics department, derek padilla and ian carbone, wrestled with making energy-efficient models of food production available to small-scale organic farmers. both worked in a lab that was developing solar cells for greenhouses. the cells allow wavelengths that plants use for photosynthesis to pass through, and absorb the remaining wavelengths, converting them into electrical energy. building a greenhouse with these cells would enable a farmer to produce the energy needed to run greenhouse infrastructures (e.g., fans, electronics, temperature regulation, etc.) on site, and perhaps earn income on energy returned to the grid. in addition to this project's technical and scientific challenges, padilla and carbone were drawn to this project because of its potential to allow them to act on their ethical and political interests in making agriculture more sustainable. however, they soon realized that this technology would mostly benefit large, industrial-scale greenhouse operations.  while they certainly wanted industrial farms to be more energy efficient, padilla and carbone also felt that smaller-scale organic farming ultimately offered a more sustainable model of food production, and wanted to create a version of the new greenhouse technology that would work for these small organic farmers. thus, they planned a pilot project in which small-scale farmers would use a greenhouse with the novel solar cells on their farms and collect data about how energy collection worked and how it affected plant growth.   it is notable that from the outset these material physics students framed their phd project around an opportunity to intervene in food system ethics. however, as they developed their project in our science and justice framework it became even more unique. when they first began the science & justice training program, padilla and carbone held a familiar perception of science and justice: take technologies from the powerful and give them to ‘the people.' yet without a sufficiently specific understanding of who ‘the people' were and what they wanted, the justice component of their work was too nebulous. using qualitative social science methods developed in the research methods seminar, padilla and carbone interviewed a number of small organic farmers to see how such technology might be of use. they quickly found that their dingpolitik was not quite what they anticipated—the solar panels did not gather people in the way they had hoped. many of the small-scale farmers they interviewed had made deliberative choices to avoid technology-driven farming and were not interested in a pilot project that would draw them into high-tech engineering questions. although this result was disappointing, it prompted padilla and carbone to re-imagine their object in relation to other constituencies of food systems justice projects, such as educators and artists. padilla and carbone went on to use the ‘green' greenhouse as an educational tool for students and members of the santa cruz community to learn about sustainable agriculture and nutrition alongside properties of light and color under the luminescent solar concentrating roof. having expressed a desire to do research at the intersection of science and justice, padilla and carbone thus reconfigured what a physics degree and subsequent career might look like when organized around a more modest understanding of justice. both fellows went on to find academic jobs that valued their response-able approach to physics: padilla in a physics and chemistry department in a community college, and carbone in an environmental studies department in a small liberal arts college.27 another fellow's project also illustrates the importance of reassessing research projects in order to imagine how we might participate more response-ably within the technoscientific worlds we help to build. initiated by discussions at sjwg meetings, martha kenney, an s&j fellow, and ruth müller, then a visiting graduate student from the university of vienna, developed a collaborative project around re-reading interviews conducted by müller. müller's dissertation (müller, 2012) was concerned with the life stories and labor conditions of postdoctoral researchers in the biological sciences in austria and the u.s. these junior scientists, whose lives were defined by a constant rush to advance in a rigidly defined career track without much space for family and social connections, occupy an important role in the contemporary university, where a constant sense of insecurity motivates fast-paced knowledge production. müller's work shows how this sense of constant rush and individual competition is also corrosive to the social relations that are necessary for effective knowledge production in the laboratory. the researchers she studied rarely found opportunities to discuss shared hardships in a supportive space.  müller found that her interviews offered the postdocs a space to discuss their work and lives. they also brought her into close contact with peers who, much like müller herself, were struggling to build their careers. affected by the interviews and attentive to the shared labor conditions, she became interested in analyzing the role she played in the research sitation as an sts scholar. in the context of the sjtp, müller and kenney sought to use the feminist literature on practices of care in technoscience to address the troubling questions about careers, lives, and the management of public universities that had remained unsettling for müller as her dissertation came to an end (mol, moser, & pols, 2010; puig de la bellacasa, 2011). müller and kenney revisited müller's interview transcripts together, re-reading them for the moments where the conversations interrupted business-as-usual in the life science worlds of the postdocs. in an article they co-authored, müller and kenney show how the interviews created situated moments of reflection, connection, and disruption that might have acted as forms of resistance to the procrustean demands of life science careers (müller & kenney, 2014). by returning to a project that seemed complete, müller and kenney were able to move beyond diagnosis and toward thinking about how research practices can also be mundane care practices by allowing for new narratives, subjectivities, and collectivities to arise that challenge those commonly available  (mol, moser, & pols, 2010). for example, "what postdocs had thought was a personal struggle to meet the demands of a life science career [became] a collective problem not only but also through the process of participating in an sts study" (müller & kenney, 2014, p. 18). while interfering in the working lives of life science postdocs is a mundane intervention, it still matters. reading interviews as "agential conversations"—conversations that interfere in the worlds they study, müller and kenney demonstrated that justice work within sts can be directed toward modest, ongoing, and situated efforts. why science & justice? along with the science & justice training program, the broader science & justice initiative at uc santa cruz is engaged in a situated, modest approach that has faced its own share of limits and trouble. our recent experience of becoming a research center illustrates some of the ongoing challenges.28 founders of s&j thought long and hard about whether to take on this more institutionalized formation. fears of being shaped by and implicated in institutional politics and procedures worried us, but ultimately we understood that there was no escaping these kinds of dilemmas. with promise there is always trouble. with new construction comes new cuts.29 the challenge is to engage in them in a manner that cultivates response-ability. all of this became immediately manifest as soon as we moved into our new space. science & justice had not had a designated physical space before, and this resource afforded us expanded freedoms to organize meetings and house visiting fellows. however, the community studies department previously occupied the space we were given.as already noted, community studies—a hallmark of the uc santa cruz's commitment to social justice—offered a unique activist-oriented undergraduate major. in the worst of the "cost-cutting" phase of the financial crisis at the university of california, the santa cruz campus "suspended" community studies.30 when we moved into a few of their old offices, someone anonymously wrote "oxymoronic term" underneath our "science & justice" sign that identified the location of our offices. while we don't know with any certainty who wrote this, we assumed it was a community studies student and we sympathized with the implicit critique. in a university that increasingly channeled funds to science and diverted funds from efforts such as community studies that were explicitly devoted to social justice, what, one might ask, did science have to do with justice? indeed, it was a well-placed remark that resonated with a long-standing concern of ours. while this paper has emphasized the need to take advantage of shifting institutional demands and to orient sts and fss scholarship towards reshaping the university itself, we recognize that new opportunities for us come at a cost to other programs that deserve support and yet are increasingly marginalized. we also recognize the particular risk in adopting justice as a guiding framework. justice is a powerful rhetoric that is itself hard to resist; thus, it can produce single-minded activism and a loss of criticality (rose, 2004, 2012; ticktin, 2011). these problems are compounded when justice is united with the universalisms of science (reardon, 2013). much suffering has been wrought by hegemonic and colonial efforts to build universalized knowledge and justice together; a single knowledge and a single justice excludes too many. for "science and justice" to do the sts and fss work of fostering response-ability, we must make science and justice mutually unsettling, tempering any bent toward universalism. however, if we can "stay with the trouble" (haraway, 2010, 2012) rather than ignore or give in to it, our efforts at uc santa cruz demonstrate the potential of orienting around justice. justice calls us to think about what might be, at the same time that it compels us to account for and respond to what has gone before. rather than presuming a world already made, justice imagines a world in the making between past and future (arendt, 1968/2002; barad, 2010; derrida 1994). it asks us not to stand back and observe the world as it is, but to response-ably make it. while "world-making" can have a grandiose ring to it, it is, we suggest, ultimately a more humble and open endeavor. world-making does not assume that we have a final grasp on how the world is put together, what is right and wrong, or indeed that we all share one unambiguous world. on our campus, these aspirations and imaginaries of justice have gathered scientists and engineers together with colleagues in the humanities, social science and arts to substantively engage with one another. thus, while a "science & ethics research center" or a "science & society research center" might not have provoked graffiti,  "science & justice" proved the more provocative and promising endeavor. it made us "stay with the trouble" of making worlds together, a first critical element of response-ability.   our focus on teaching also proved crucial to our success. teaching makes up much of the everyday practice of university life. it is what we do together. while the s&j training program seeks to train the next generation of graduate students how to better respond to the join between questions of knowledge and questions of justice, it also seeks to remake our university by teaching our faculty and our institution new ways of thinking and working together. training graduate students also provides a concrete site in which to develop the kind of response-able research we envisioned—research that can respond to the full range of epistemic, ethical and political dimensions of contemporary technoscience. while our students did not "change the world" in the ways in which some of them might have at first hoped, they have helped to innovate mundane, yet world-making, practices.  ours is but one example of what might be possible in the contemporary moment.31 while the times are disheartening in many ways, the current turbulent state of universities, the demand that science contribute to social goods, and the limitations of dominant institutionalized forms of ethics all open up the chance to create new ways of getting on and knowing that better respond to contemporary lives and problems. the pedagogy and practice of science and justice developed at uc santa cruz is one effort to make good on this potential, and to create technoscientific worlds that are more open, modest, indeterminate, and hopefully better, where what counts as better is always a matter of our concern. acknolwedgements this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no. ses-0933027. we would like to acknowledge the many contributions made by graduate students who have taken the sjtp course, and the faculty who help to teach it, especially andrew mathews, who taught one cohort of science and justice fellows, and helped to reformulate the training program to make it sustainable after the nsf grant ended. we also would like to acknowledge the tremendous administrative support provided by colleen massengale. additionally, we acknowledge the ucsc division of social sciences, the graduate school, the engineering school, the division of physical and biological sciences, the center for biomolecular science and engineering and the office of research for their support. finally, we would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors of this journal for their careful reading and editing of this essay. notes 1 noteworthy is the 1987 barnard conference on women in the natural sciences (sponsored by the barnard center for research on women), one of the earliest conferences creating an opportunity for conversation between feminist science studies scholars (many of whom were trained in science, some of whom remained active scientists) and women scientists who did not have prior knowledge of the growing field of feminist science studies. the keynote speaker was evelyn fox keller. 2 more information on this program can be found at http://aacu.org/womenscilit/index.cfm 3 jenny reardon and karen barad formed and led the first iteration of the science & justice training program and co-taught the courses from 2010-2012.  jacob metcalf was the postdoctoral fellow for the initiative. martha kenney was a fellow in the first cohort of science & justice fellows. 4 it is important here to distinguish between institutionalized ethics and ethics as a commitment to doing good in the world. we do not believe there is anything inherent about 'ethics' as an intellectual and practical engagement that leads to narrow bureaucratic formations, particularly as embodied in research governance practices in the u.s. instead, such formations have been the product of a very specific set of articulations that we are only able to briefly describe. 5 see http://onwardstate.com/2011/01/15/budget-crunch-hits-home-sts-program-recommendation-for-closure/ (accessed june 18, 2014). 6 for one explanation of these events see nstallingorder.org/2013/03/27/sts-program-at-penn-state/ (accessed june 24, 2014). 7 one of the lasting impacts of the belmont report is that after 1979 research subjects increasingly have been invited to the table to discuss policy and ethics, a trend that escalated with hiv/aids patient and community advocacy and activism in the early 1980s and the rise of a neoliberal self-health orientation subsequently through the rise of hmos and social media (epstein 1996; epstein 2007). 8 jenny reardon, karen barad, and donna haraway gathered for these breakfasts. rebecca herzig went on walks with reardon in the uc santa cruz and raised the important question: 'what are we after?' these early beginnings of science & justice as an aspirational endeavor eventually lead reardon and metcalf to search for ways to develop concrete support and recognition for the many graduate students eager to develop it. 9 our use of 'science for the people' here is meant to invoke science for the people, an organization of scientists and engineers that formed in 1969 (see http://science-for-the-people.org/, accessed june 18, 2014). science & justice asked what science for the people might look like if it took on board three decades of fss and sts scholarship. 10 in the u.s., the most consequential research regulation is the "common rule," title 45 section 46 of the code of federal regulations, which requires all institutions that receive federal research money and conduct human subjects research to use institutional review boards (irbs) to protect research subjects from individual harms. the propriety of governing research practices in the social sciences and humanities according to the common rule and its implicit assumptions about research ethics has been vociferously contested, particularly when it interferes with social justice goals (for example, see: basset & o'riordan 2002; dingwall, 2008; duster et al., 1979; librett & perrone, 2010; shea, 2000). the u.s. health and human services, which enforces the common rule, recently solicited input for the first major revisions in decades, and received requests for major changes to research ethics governance in the humanities and social sciences from the national academies that addresses some of these concerns (committee on revision to the common rule, 2014; health and human services, 2011) 11 this resource is sponsored by the u.s. national science foundation and hosted by the national academies of engineering. see: http://www.onlineethics.org/resources/cases/dialysismachine.aspx. accessed 5/22/2015. the online ethics center (oec) recently launched a project to substantially overhaul this resource, including efforts to make case studies contextually richer. 12 as recent critiques of the increasingly popular ‘engineering to help' model demonstrate, limiting the possibilities for exploring moral and political contexts can also turn seemingly benevolent projects into boondoggles of wasted effort (schneider et al., 2009). 13 sts scholars have produced numerous studies that document and demonstrate these limitations of the rcr model (bucciarelli, 2008; conlon & zandvoort, 2011; kline, 2001; lynch & kline, 2000; vaughan, 1996). many of these sts-inspired critiques of ethics pedagogy have analogues in the literature oriented toward philosophy audiences.  see for example (anderson et al., 2007; davis & feinerman, 2010; martinson et al., 2006; titus et al., 2008). 14 haraway develops this notion of response-ability in her critical assessment of jacque derrida's writing on animals (haraway, 2008). drawing on derrida's claim that much of the history of philosophy is an iteration of an unaccountable distinction between humans who respond and animals that react, haraway argues that contemporary bioethics (especially as it regards animals) is overly committed to logics of calculation and sacrifice. rather than understanding animals as merely reactive and ethics as merely the calculation of properly sanctioned instrumental use relationships, haraway insists that animals be understood as co-laborers worthy of, and themselves capable of, response. she writes, "response, of course, grows with the capacity to respond, that is, responsibility. such a capacity can be shaped only in and for multidirectional relationships, in which always more than one responsive entity is in the process of becoming. ... answering to no checklist, response is always riskier than [calculation]," (p. 71). knowing is thus always a multidirectional engagement, and knowing well requires capacitating response from within knowledge-making practices even if the other party is nonhuman. 15 importantly, for barad, discursive practices are not merely linguistic practices, nor are they exclusively human. diffractively reading bohr's crucial insight that scientific concepts are instantiated in specific laboratory apparatuses (which give meaning to particular concepts to the exclusion of others), through foucault's notion of discursive practices as specific historical conditions of intelligibility, barad develops a notion of discursive practices as specific material configurations, where the notion of materiality is also reworked. importantly, apparatuses are material-discursive, not material and discursive. for more details see barad (2007).    16 similarly, astrid schrader has argued that what counts as evidence within experimental configurations is critical to the possibility of both identifying causal relationships and responsibility. tracking how marine ecologists have attempted to account for the toxicity of dinoflagellete blooms in estuary ecosystems, schrader demonstrates that the temporality of causal relationships within these experiments is of critical importance for the political and ethical consequences of the knowledge produced (schrader, 2010).      17 several sts and fss scholars also have observed the limits of institutionalized ethics and have re-envisioned ethics in ways that are friendly to science and justice practices of response-ability. see for example rajan (2006), fortun (2008), and tuana, et. al. (2009). 18 john rawls captured this foundational aspect of justice in the opening pages of his enormously influential book, a theory of justice (rawls 1971/1999, pp. 3-4).  we have not failed to note that this strong alignment of truth and justice might also account for the power of justice to gather our science and engineering colleagues.  19 specifically, hughes and juarez went on to create a survey on the definition and use of racial categories in forensic science. they distributed the survey to members of their professional society not only to create data about the practices and views of their colleagues, but also to open up a discussion about the definition and use of race in forensic science. currently cris hughes is using the methods of forestic anthropology to study social justice issues surrounding u.s.-mexico border deaths. her early findings suggest that the remains of mexican migrants from the rural, southern states and indigenous communities are more likely to remain unidentified. these findings can be used to identify the structural vulnerabilities that lead to uneven identification of human remains. 20 ucsc is administratively split into five divisions: arts, humanities, social sciences, engineering, and physical and biological sciences. 21 when the nsf funding came to a close in 2012, we re-structured the training program so that it would be sustainable after the grant ended. for instance, the two courses have been combined into one that preserves the essential features of each. student proposals are now proposals for collaborative events that the sjwg hosts, continuing the tradition of cross-facilitations between the sjwg and the sjtp. while students no longer receive fellowship funding, they do have the opportunity to organize events funded by the science & justice research center. 22 in addition to op-eds that have appeared in the local press, several students from the first and second cohorts co-authored, together with reardon, barad and metcalf, a paper on science and justice that appeared in plos biology (science & justice research center (collaborations group), 2013). 23 two of our fellows, zachary caple and katy overstreet, started a group for experimenting with collaborative methods that they called ‘retying knots,' inspired by haraway's figure. 24 latour recently reminded us that the word thing derives from the old english "ding" which means a meeting or assembly. a thing, or a gathering, arises around a matter of concern. 25 this object exercise is indebted to fss's long history of rethinking objectivity (keller, 1985) both in terms of the object and subject of knowledge. for example, barad (2007) argues that the objective referent is not an individual independently existing object, but rather an entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous agencies. fss scholars also argue that knowing subjects are also more than individual thinkers. key to this rethinking has been the contributions of feminist empiricism (longino, 1990), feminist standpoint theory (harding, 1991), situated knowledges (haraway, 1991), and agential realism (barad, 2007). see also the work of daston and galison (2010) on the history of objectivity. 26 "phenomenon" has a particular meaning in agential realism. to gloss a rather involved account, phenomena are the entangled web of diverse agencies that constitute and are inseparable from the object of investigation. see p. 389 of barad (2007) for a sample drawing of a genealogical map; the phenomenon illustrated there is quantum physics. 27 to hear one of these students' own account of their science and justice experience, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6rwei3vzre (accessed june 24, 2014). his description of his s&j project begins around minute 51. 28 building on the success of the training program, in 2011-12 administrative leaders at uc santa cruz encouraged reardon to create a science and justice research center. ultimately her proposal was successful, and the university provided physical space, as well as funding for a half-time administrative assistant and programming.   29 this formulation draws on karen barad's concept of "agential cuts," which adapts from niels bohr conception of the experimental apparatus as enacting cuts between the object and the agencies of observation. she argues that we need to take responsibility for the cuts we participate in enacting; with each cut we "contest and rework" what matters and what is excluded from mattering (pp. 178-179).  30 as naomi klein has astutely argued, financial crises often become the cover for eliminating programs and efforts that fall outside of political favor. the major has recently been re-instated—but not the department, which was disbanded. 31 the formation of the science & justice at uc santa cruz was in many ways shaped by the california context during the financial crisis. while much of the restructuring of universities and research is being is being experienced worldwide (often characterized as the 'neoliberalizion of universities'), the specificities of both the promise and the trouble importantly varies between institutional and national contexts. we offer this account not so that our model can be "imported" wholesale into other contexts (though some of our techniques might prove useful). instead, we hope to learn from other researchers in sts and fss what becomes possible as institutions make difficult changes. we would be interested in hearing about other initiatives to compare the knowledge formations that arose in similar times, but different places. references alberts, b., kirschner, m.w., tilghman, s., & varmus, h. 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(in press) bios jenny reardon is professor of sociology, faculty affiliate in the center for biomolecular science and engineering, and director of the science and justice research center at uc santa cruz.  she is the author of race to the finish: identity and governance in an age of genomics (princeton university press, 2005), and is currently finishing a second book manuscript entitled the postgenomic condition: ethics, justice, knowledge after the genome (forthcoming with chicago university press). jacob metcalf is a researcher at the data & society research institute, where he provides research and policy advice on data ethics for the nsf-supported council for big data, ethics & society, and founding partner at ethical resolve, llc.  he is the former assistant director at the science & justice research center at uc santa cruz.  he is currently pursuing several projects on big data and human subjects research protections.  martha kenney is assistant professor in women and gender studies at san francisco state university.  working in the tradition of feminist science studies, her research and teaching explore the politics of biological storytelling.  her current project examines and intervenes in the narratives emerging from the new field of environmental epigenetics. karen barad is professor of feminist studies, philosophy, and history of consciousness at the university of california at santa cruz.  barad's ph.d. is in theoretical particle physics and quantum field theory.  barad held a tenured appointment in a physics department before moving into more interdisciplinary spaces.  barad is the author of meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning (duke university press, 2007) and numerous articles in the fields of physics, philosophy, science studies, poststructuralist theory, and feminist theory. using feminist theory and social justice pedagogy to educate a new generation of precautionary principle chemists lasker, g. a., & simcox, n. j. (2020). using feminist theory and social justice pedagogy to educate a new generation of precautionary principle chemists. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-13. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license using feminist theory and social justice pedagogy to educate a new generation of precautionary principle chemists grace a. lasker university of washington bothell glasker@uw.edu nancy j. simcox university of washington nsimcox@uw.edu abstract students in the science classroom learn that science makes right, which devalues (whether inadvertently or very purposefully) other non-scientific areas of study and largely works against ideas of collectivism and community, especially as science “rises to the top” in collaborative partnerships and interdisciplinary research and service. applying feminist theory and social justice pedagogy within the chemistry classroom can help focus the students’ learning experiences away from hierarchical outcomes that perpetuate discriminatory practices toward change agency and the pursuit of equity, especially in regard to the design of safer chemicals. most would agree that it is not ethically acceptable to continue to design and produce chemicals that cause adverse human health effects and environmental pollution; however, changes in the chemistry classroom to redirect this outcome have been slow. emphasis on designing safer chemicals driven by the precautionary principle can advance the role of students and teachers as change agents in their communities. when considering feminist theory and social lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 2 justice pedagogy in the chemistry classroom, classrooms become inclusive and learning outcomes shift toward focusing on how to reduce health disparities due to chemical exposures and how to interact with systems of domination and decision making in the workplace and beyond. new chemistry curriculum is needed in these areas to help prepare a new generation of “precautionary principle chemists” who will advocate for all of our communities. introduction faculty in health sciences, biology, environmental science, environmental justice, and public health have steadily integrated social justice and health equity pedagogy into the classroom, impacting critical consciousness, citizenship, and advocacy as well as supporting students from communities traditionally excluded from mainstream stem programs of study and careers (alemán & gaytán, 2017; greenberg, 2017; howard-grenville et al., 2017; kennedy & odell, 2014; madrigal et al., 2016; vakil, 2014; zembylas, 2005). yet other science disciplines such as chemistry have been slow to adopt similar strategies. chemistry students largely lack the resources, tools, and support to combine social, political, and academic growth to take action and learn to participate in decision making that promotes a more equitable and sustainable world (greenberg, 2017). applying feminist theory and social justice pedagogy within the chemistry classroom helps shift the students’ learning experiences away from hierarchical outcomes that perpetuate discriminatory practices toward change agency and the pursuit of equity, especially in regard to the design of safer chemicals as a fundamental aspect of chemistry curriculum. additionally, emphasis on designing safer chemicals and implementing environmental regulatory frameworks driven by the precautionary principle can advance the role of students and teachers as change agents in their communities. this article posits that shifting learning outcomes toward a justice-oriented curriculum grounded in feminist theory and a precautionary principle focus creates inclusive learning environments that allow students to find purpose, accomplishment, and change agency within chemistry. the history of science “science” was born of a philosophy known as positivism. this philosophy holds observation and measurement as the highest authority of valid knowledge (trochim, 2006). science was developed as the observation of universal laws that exist around us as a code to be cracked and controlled if we could observe and quantify these laws. this philosophy heralded empiricism (observation and measurement) as a foundational tool for scientific investigation (trochim, 2006), lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 3 encouraged the idea of right and wrong approaches and answers to scientific inquires (andersson, 2017), and inaccurately purported science as unbiased and impartial (barton, 1997). this approach has shaped the foundation of science education as well. the science classroom was born in lecture halls and laboratories with students memorizing equations and manipulating data for the pursuit of foundation and application. the science classroom supposedly mirrors the “real world,” but we have since recognized that this decontextualized science removes the “why” and “so what” questions asked by students and replaces them with standards-based outcomes that exclude growth mindset development from contextualized learning experiences (ashby & mensah, 2018; buxton, 2010; king & ritchie, 2012; lasker et al., 2017). science drills itself down into the realm of details and rout memorization at the same time it becomes larger than itself as it holds itself absolute and infallible (millar, 2012). students in the science classroom learn that science makes right, which devalues (whether inadvertently or very purposefully) other non-scientific areas of study (cobern, 1994; feinstein & kirchgasler, 2015) and largely works against ideas of collectivism and community especially as it “rises to the top” in collaborative partnerships and interdisciplinary research and service. science instruction favors “the prevailing culture and structural manifestations in stem [that] have traditionally privileged norms of success that favor competitive, individualistic, and solitary practices—norms associated with white male scientists” (ong, smith, & ko, 2017, p. 206). decontextualized science also counters feminist thinking that rejects dualistic thinking, which simplifies complex ideas and issues into bounded areas and generates hierarchies that normalize “prevailing power relationships and [makes] them more difficult to challenge” (ferguson, 2017, p. 271) in part due to their gendered structures (haraway, 1988; harding, 1986; kahveci, 2015; ståhl & hussénius, 2017). instead, feminist thinking embraces discovery as a fluid, dynamic process rather than a cause-and-effect, static experience. it “asks how things come to be, requiring that we historicize our thinking and recognize dynamic and changing relationships rather than static entities” (ferguson, 2017, p. 271). it is rooted in justice, freedom, and equity movements that embrace intersectionality and interdisciplinarity as fundamental aspects of inquiry, discovery, and problem solving. social justice pedagogy also supports students’ prior learning as an important aspect of critical assessment, growth mindset development, and contextualization during the learning process (chubbuck & zembylas, 2008; dimick, 2012). dimick (2012) identifies three areas of social justice education lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 4 relevant to science curriculum—equity, social justice curricula and pedagogy, and socially just interrelations—that contribute positively toward student learning outcomes. applying feminist theory and social justice pedagogy within the chemistry classroom can focus students’ learning experiences away from hierarchical outcomes that perpetuate discriminatory practices toward change agency and the pursuit of equity, especially in regard to the design of safer chemicals. justice-oriented chemistry curriculum chemistry faculty are largely trained on and use traditional classroom lectures and laboratory exercises that were developed decades ago in order to demonstrate foundational chemistry concepts. in doing so, they inadvertently perpetuate a system that fails to provide interactive environments where students can develop skills such as critical thinking and problem solving or engage in peer-to-peer learning (bergtrom, 2011; berrett, 2012; jensen, kummer, & godoy, 2015). research overwhelmingly supports positive outcomes associated with active learning in stem classes (cromley, perez, & kaplan, 2016; eichler & peeples, 2016; king & richie, 2012; prince & felder, 2007). according to dr. clarissa dirks, co-chair of the us national academies scientific teaching alliance, “at this point it is unethical to teach any other way” (waldrop, 2015, p. 273). we herald success in having integrated active learning into chemistry education (goacher, kline, targus, & vermette, 2017; henry, 2017; hinde & kovac, 2001; jardine & friedman, 2017; wakeling, green, naiker, & panther, 2016) but the question is, what exactly are these students “actively learning” about in their chemistry classes? social justice is a point of view that supports equity in political, human, social, and economic rights (adams, 2016) not only at the individual level but also at the organizational and institutional level (barry, 2005). also, environmental justice is “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (environmental protection agency, 2015, para. 1). environmental justice is not limited to environmental or ecological rights but also incorporates labor, food, civility, climate, indigenous rights, culture, economics, immigration, and civil rights into the movement (cole & foster, 2001; faber & mccarthy, 2003; schlosberg, 2013). for the most part, chemistry students are not challenged to actively connect chemistry learned in the classroom with disparities faced by communities (lasker, 2019), but shouldn’t active learning mean actively integrating life experiences into learning experiences? lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 5 social justice pedagogy allows acknowledgment in learning spaces that there are disparities between resources, outcomes, and opportunities among marginalized populations (shakman et al., 2007). faculty who apply social justice pedagogy strive to create inclusive classrooms that demonstrate equity as foundational and fundamental and use “critical, critical race, postmodern, poststructural, feminist, and multicultural education theories [to] espouse the social justice education goal” (mthethwa-sommers, 2014). this approach not only supports marginalized students who have experienced significant difficulties accessing higher education but also helps students recognize the global impact of their by promoting an equityand justice-oriented framework for the context by which they learn chemistry and, ultimately, enter into the workforce. when considering feminist theory and social justice in the chemistry classroom, learning outcomes shift toward reducing disparities within communities and “the ways in which social group differences of race and ethnicity, national origins, language, religion, gender, sexuality, class, disability, and age interact with systems of domination and subordination to privilege or disadvantage different social group members relative to each other” (adams & zuniga, 2016, p. 96). it helps students recognize issues of discrimination and injustice and their role in mitigating those impacts through greener and safer chemical career aspirations (llored & sarrade, 2016; noyori, 2015; lasker et al., 2017; schindel dimick, 2015). framing curriculum using a justice-oriented pedagogy not only helps support students in finding relevancy and purpose in their program of study but also supports retention of women and underrepresented minorities in stem and related programs, too (conley & hamlin, 2009; hansson & lindahl, 2010; mills & ayre, 2003; rivera maulucci, 2013; worthley, 1992). women and other underrepresented groups do not persist in stem educational programs at the same rates as their white, male counterparts (carlone & johnson, 2007; good, rattan, & dweck, 2012) and statistics support significant underrepresentation of women in the stem workforce. the united states has made stem enrollment among women and underrepresented minorities a priority. millions are spent to address these inequities yet globally, women accounted for only 28.8% of those employed in scientific research and development in 2014 (unesco institute of statistics, 2017). in the us, women represented only 29% of those employed in stem-related occupations in 2013 and only 31% of all physical science occupations (national science board, 2016). and salary gaps continue to exacerbate an already significant problem. according lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 6 to the national science board (2016), median annual salary among science and engineering highest degree holders in 2013 put men at $80,000 and women at $55,000. these gaps in stem enrollment and employment will continue to widen if changes aren’t made in the classroom first. a multidisciplinary group of participants have been investigating social and environmental justice as a framework for chemistry education at the green chemistry and engineering conference annually since 2016 to help faculty learn more about the importance of inclusive classrooms and to shift their chemistry curriculum toward justiceand equity-oriented outcomes. over the years, faculty who have attended these meetings have integrated justice-oriented projects, courses, and undergraduate research into their chemistry and green chemistry programs. however, feedback at these symposium from participants reveals a significant barrier around the lack of american chemical society (acs) accreditation standards around social and environmental justice and the resulting difficulty of transitioning courses and programs toward a social justice and feminist theory framework. chemistry faculty are still bound to hierarchical acs standards that favor current oppressive systems over justice-oriented ones, and tools and resources to support faculty in transitioning their curriculum are still few and far between. using a precautionary principle focus in the classroom it is no longer acceptable to continue to design and produce chemicals without a better understanding of their toxicology, health effects, and environmental consequences. many countries are adopting new chemical policy initiatives to address the chemical burdens and disparities placed on underserved communities. for these countries, a significant amount of policy and regulations are guided by the precautionary principle. the precautionary principle was formally introduced in 1998 and defined by four central components: “taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision making” (kriebel et al., 2001, p. 871). the precautionary principle is not new, and its implementation can lead to promoting more cost-effective alternatives to hazardous products and processes. for example, traditional models of risk assessment have been described as a barrier toward developing environmentally rigorous protections as well as perpetuating the removal of individuals and communities from decisionmaking processes around chemical design and exposure policy (kriebel et al., 2001). in addition, current scientific practice minimizes uncertainties, ignores complex issues, and gives attention to the more quantifiable and narrowly defined lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 7 researchable aspects of an environmental or health-equity-related problem (tickner, 2002), further delegitimizing other non-stem disciplines that may be able to address these larger, systems-level impacts. in the us, chemical design processes and environmental and safety policies are reactionary, placing the burden of hazard identification on the population not the corporation, whereas the precautionary principle shifts the burden for proving the safety of chemicals onto the suppliers of chemicals and not the users (geiser, 2015). still, in a policy blog hosted on the american chemistry council’s website, the precautionary principle is attacked as costly and leading to unintended regulatory consequences. (becker, 2012). this argument does not acknowledge, nor seem to value, the immeasurable instances of disproportionate exposure to hazardous chemicals experienced by vulnerable populations such as children, low socioeconomic communities, women, and communities of color (clark, millet, & marshall, 2014; environmental health news, 2012; landrigan et al., 1999; nelson, scammell, hatch, & webster, 2012; weiss, 2000; woodruff, zota, & schwartz, 2011). to counter these reactionary ideologies, new tools and activities must be created and used in us stem curriculum that complement a shift toward precautionary principle approaches that value social justice, health equity, and environmental sustainability when considering chemical design and education (anastas & warner, 2000; coish et al., 2017). in this way, faculty not only value multiple student perspectives from a variety of lived experiences as valid for constructing, retaining, and applying knowledge (university of michigan center for research on teaching and learning, 2018) but also help students recognize their capacity for change agency around equitable justice for all. conclusion justice-oriented chemistry curriculum helps students make connections between social justice, health equity, and environmental sustainability issues with the future work they will do as chemists. real change can occur when students shift toward precautionary principle frameworks that value equity for all. students largely underrepresented in the science classroom can find connections between their own experiences facing injustice and inequities as they learn to advocate on behalf of their communities. feminist theory and social justice pedagogy help faculty create inclusive classrooms that provide accessible learning experiences for all students, not just those already privileged by the science system. by helping students understand that their decisions as professionals can have real lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 8 impacts on millions, students can shift their professional goals away from reactionary-styled thinking toward precautionary-principle supported change agency. references adams, m. 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(2006). positivism & post-positivism. retrieved from http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php https://nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/#/report/chapter-3/women-and-minorities-in-the-s-e-workforce https://nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/#/report/chapter-3/women-and-minorities-in-the-s-e-workforce http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 13 unesco institute of statistics. (2017). women in science. retrieved from http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/women-science university of michigan center for research on teaching and learning. (2018). creating inclusive college classrooms. retrieved from http://www.crlt.umich.edu/gsis/p3_1 vakil, s. (2014). a critical pedagogy approach for engaging urban youth in mobile app development in an after-school program. equity & excellence in education, 47(1), 3145. wakeling, l., green, a., naiker, m., & panther, b. c. (2016). an active learning, student-centred approach in chemistry laboratories: the laboratorys as a primary learning environment. s. rowling (ed). in proceedings of the australian conference on science and mathematics education (formerly uniserve science conference) (p. 134). waldrop, m. m. (2015). the science of teaching science. nature, 523, 272-274. weiss, b. (2000). vulnerability of children and the developing brain to neurotoxic hazards. environmental health perspectives, 108(suppl 3), 375-381. woodruff, t. j., zota, a. r., & schwartz, j. m. (2011). environmental chemicals in pregnant women in the united states: nhanes 2003–2004. environmental health perspectives, 119(6), 878-885. worthley, j. s. (1992). is science persistence a matter of values? psychology of women quarterly, 16(1), 57-68. zembylas, m. (2005). science education: for citizenship and/or for social justice. journal of curriculum studies, 37(6), 709-722. author bio grace lasker is a senior lecturer and director of health studies at the university of washington bothell. her research and teaching are centered in environmental health and social justice, epigenetics, and public health nutrition. she is also investigating the intersection of toxicology, green chemistry, and change agency in education. nancy simcox is a lecturer and the director of the continuing education programs for the uw department of environmental & occupational health sciences. she develops and delivers research-based education programs for practicing professionals, including industrial hygienists, physicians, nurses, safety engineers and others in the environmental, health and safety field. http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/women-science http://www.crlt.umich.edu/gsis/p3_1 lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) grace a. lasker and nancy j. simcox, 2020 14 atanasoski & vora   article     surrogate humanity: posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor     neda atanasoski university of california, santa cruz natanaso@ucsc.edu kalindi vora university of california, san diego kavora@ucsd.edu in his 2014 book, the zero marginal cost society, jeremy rifkin writes, "if i had told you 25 years ago that, in a quarter century’s time, one-third of the human race would be communicating with one another in huge global networks of hundreds of millions of people … and that the cost of doing so would be nearly free, you would have shaken your head in disbelief" (p. 69). rifkin, a social theorist and founder of the foundation on economic trends, takes the notion that free information and communication are harbingers of a large-scale revolution in which we move towards a "near zero marginal cost" society—one in which "nearly free goods and services" emerge through the optimization of productivity (that is, with the development of technologies such as 3d printing when the "cost of producing an additional good or service is nearly zero") (p. 70). rifkin's book raises questions about how the internet of things (iot) can lead to the end of capitalism as we know it (p. 70). the iot might portend the first "smart infrastructure revolution," but this is a revolution that is haunted by the specter of what rifkin calls "the last worker standing": "big data, advanced analytics, algorithms, artificial intelligence (ai), and robotics are replacing human labor across the manufacturing industries, service industries, and knowledge-and-entertainment sectors, leading to the very real prospect of liberating hundreds of millions of people from work in the market economy" (p. 121). while some might regard this vision of technological replacements for humans that substitute "intelligent technology" for mass wage labor as a future dystopia, rifkin sees such technologies as enabling the uncoupling of human productivity from employment, thus freeing humans for the "evolving social economy" embedded in a "collaborative commons" organized by social networks and open-source programming. rifkin argues, in short, that the infrastructure revolution, marking a break from the first (18th century) and second (early 20th century) industrial revolutions, emancipates human creativity from the drudgery of waged work (p. 132). rifkin's techno-utopic perspective is both profoundly humanist, in the sense that its goal is to delink human freedom from labor; and also profoundly post-humanist, in the sense that the human must be displaced from the scene of labor by technology in order to posit a moment of emancipation. rifkin's postulations can be read as participating in contemporary discourses of what we call surrogate humanity. the surrogate human is one way to conceptualize the function of the technologized posthuman stand-in, a rich and experimental subject/object encompassing the techno-fantasies of revolutionary change through which we can highlight how the seemingly novel frontiers between human and machine elaborate much older discourses of humanization and dehumanization, and of human difference and its transcendence. by surrogate humanity, we mean to include not only specific technologies such as 3d printers and robots operating in factories that literally replace older spheres of human action and labor, but also the processes through which racialized, gendered, and sexualized spheres of life and labor are seemingly elided by technological surrogates, even as these spheres are replicated in emergent modes of work, violence, and economies of desire. to read surrogate humanity in this way requires an analytic that attends to techniques through which difference (whether human–non-human or between inter-human qualities) is produced, while understanding categories of difference as historically specific.  cultural and political fantasies that hinge upon the idea that humans can be freed from labor through technology are part of an ethos and an economy that valorizes the expansion of human capacities for creativity, in which creativity is defined as those limited forms that register as having market value. such a formulation of creativity as capital, made possible by technological surrogates who take over non-innovative work, relies on an implicit assumption that humans will somehow be freed from their historical differentiation in value as racialized and gendered populations in the global economy. nonetheless, new technologies have historically designated what kinds of labor are considered replaceable and reproducible versus what kinds of creative capacities remain vested with privileged populations and spaces of existence.1 humanity stands in a differential if connected relationship to artificial intelligence and networked objects, a relationship that continues to be racialized. moreover, prophesies and predictions about the scope of this "third" industrial revolution, brought about through the iot, is prefigured by a profound political and ethical break with prior global-political imaginaries of revolution, articulated most recently in early and mid-20th century decolonial and socialist aspirations for a redefinition of the human.  emphasizing this historical specificity, we might consider the notion of revolution in smart infrastructures, or networks of people and things, as a postsocialist notion of revolution. labor and technology have been the privileged sites through which to understand a socialist revolutionary imaginary. yet the 21st-century association of revolutionary change with the novelty of technological objects and platforms and their social effects dislodges the term "revolution" from its prior association with political and social transformation, altering the possible fields for political action. this article argues that the restructuring of imaginaries of free and unfree labor, visible and invisible workers, and the racialized conditions of labor cached in the distribution of differential working conditions in the 21st century can therefore be contextualized as part of a postsocialist and post-revolutionary (in the marxist sense) relationship to the political.2 more than a simple periodizing of the notion of revolution in a postsocialist world, this article tracks how historical forms of domination and power, encompassing but not limited to social categories and hierarchies of difference, get built into seemingly non-human objects and the infrastructures that link them, thus sanitizing digital media technologies as human-free. rather than questioning the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the human, fantasies about the revolutionary nature of new media and technology developments as posthuman carry forward and re-universalize the historical specificity of the category "human" whose bounds they claim to surpass. the post-enlightenment subject, already socially and politically empowered, leaves a remarkable remainder in allegedly non-human technologies.   at the same time, we argue, it is insufficient to merely point out the way in which human racialized and gendered labor underwrites techno-utopic fantasies (lifting the wizard of oz curtain hiding the truth behind "smart technologies"). certainly, task and service workers necessary to sites and platforms of the sharing economy continue to perform historically undervalued racialized and gendered work. in response to emergent phenomena such as, for instance, the racialization of labor in online gaming, there is already a large and varied body of scholarship on race and technology (nakamura, 2009). theorists including lisa nakamura and wendy chun have demonstrated that race continues to matter despite claims that the internet is a site of self-making in which race ceases to be bound to embodied characteristics. in fact, chun (2009) proposes the concept of "race as technology." she charts how digital media and networks take up structures of control as a model of power, building them into the infrastructure of the internet (chun, 2006). thus, rather than extending a logic of representation and recognition to the sphere of digital culture, we build upon work such as chun's and nakamura's that insists on developing new optics for thinking about race and gender as overlapping with, but also exceeding, representation.3 critical race studies and feminist science studies, each of which has differently engaged posthumanism to extend an analysis of the vitality and agency of objects and matter in a way that problematizes the centrality of modern man in the field of the political, can thus productively be put into dialogue as a starting point for theorizing technology beginning with difference. as lucy suchman (n.d.) writes: "modernist epistemologies treat agency as something both independent of, and contained within, singular entities, whether humans or artifacts. in this respect, the language of intelligent artifacts remains consistent with a tradition that treats separation and autonomy, rather than relatedness, as the mark of intelligence and agency" (pp. 7-8). keeping in mind richard doyle's point that "vitality and autonomy of computational artifacts emerge through the camouflaging of the networks that support them" (suchman, n.d , p. 8), in this article we also address race and technology as imbricated epistemological and ethical terrains that produce political and temporal narratives of humanization—narratives that draw and redraw the bounds of the human.    emphasizing this imbrication, we address not just how technologies produce race, but also how race, as modernity's central epistemological project, produces technology and ideas about what constitutes a technological revolution that can reconstitute the human. this is a necessary theoretical step for extending a politics from interventions based on feminist and critical race theory into the field of the posthuman. on the one hand, then, this article develops a critique of the techno-utopic imaginary of a revolutionary inter-networking of humans and things, which frees the human from labor, as both racial and racializing. on the other hand, it addresses the potential for thinking technology theoretically and politically as a starting point for decentering modern "man." the first part of this analysis therefore puts critical race studies and anticolonial and decolonial approaches to work re-describing "man" in conversation with feminist science studies. this essay is also a speculation about how the posthuman takes on a different meaning if it is conceptually traced back to the epistemological and material shifts, as well as to the legacies tied to prior post-enlightenment revolutionary aspirations, such as that of franz fanon, who sought to reconceptualize who or what can count as human. we then position these distinct yet critical approaches to posthumanism against the popular hypotheses and fantasies that the emergence of the internet of things will lead to the obsolescence of human labor. the latter posits that the infrastructure revolution and intelligent artifacts (surrogate humans) mark a paradigm shift away from capitalism, but it does so by reaffirming existing paradigms of racialized and gendered value through the figure of a surrogate human who performs degraded work that is always already meant to be invisible. through an analysis of several contemporary platforms that exemplify these emergent infrastructures (including alfred and amazon's mechanical turk), we conclude by highlighting the erasures and disappearances undergirding techno-utopic fantasies of a post-labor society.  at the same time, we grapple with what it means to think the subject of labor, and the human as subject, outside of the biological-economic imperatives of prior imaginaries. "the replacing of a certain ‘species' of men by another ‘species' of men": decolonial and anti-racist imaginaries of post-man to date, popular and scholarly writings about the 21st-century technological revolution have largely associated revolutionary change with the novelty of technological objects, thus evacuating the term "revolution" from its prior investments in political and social transformation. asserting that the techno-revolution is in fact socio-political as much as it is about the innovation of techno-objects and platforms, our study foregrounds the inheritance of previous revolutionary demands and considers how revolutionary aspirations are always tied to a re-imagination of who or what is human. as is well known, 18thand 19th-century european colonialism, a structure that instituted a global sliding scale of humanity through scientific notions about racial differences and hierarchies, undergirded systematic enslavement and subjugation of non-white peoples to advance european capitalism and the industrial revolution. developed alongside and through the demands of colonialism, the term "human" designated a distinction among human beings, not just between humans and animals, such that humanity was something to be achieved (scott, 2004, p. 91). revolutionary aspirations for decolonization thus carried forward the ambition to achieve a full humanity.   at the same time that colonialism was without a doubt a project of dehumanization, as scholars such as david scott (2004) and samera esmeir (2012) have recently demonstrated, discourses of civilization, european technological innovation, and notions of progress also aimed to "humanize" racialized others. a similar tension between humanization and dehumanization can be located in contemporary fantasies tied to the techno-revolution. on the one hand, there is a fear that as technologies become more proximate to humans, inserting themselves into spheres of human activity, the essence of humanity is lost. on the other hand, the fantasy is that as machines take on the sort of work that degrades humans, humans can be freer than ever to pursue their maximum potential. as we postulate, this tension arises because even though the technological revolution claims to be revolutionary precisely because it surpasses human limitations, the figuration of "humanity" following the postof the post-human brings forward a historically universalizing category that writes over an ongoing differential achievement of the status of "the human." to provincialize the human in such versions of (post)humanism, we pick up a set of conversations about technology and the obsolescence of the human, debates that begin with "the human" and its non-human other, and restage them within historical conversations in postcolonial and critical race studies and feminist theory. frantz fanon emphasized the category of the human as a racial epistemological and ontological project that can be remade through revolution in wretched of the earth, his seminal work on the potentiality of decolonial movements. decolonization, fanon (2005) wrote, is "quite simply the replacing of a certain ‘species' of men by another ‘species' of men" (p. 35). the revolutionary aspirations tied to decolonization, therefore, are fundamentally about aspirations tied to reimagining who or what is human, and how they come to be so. at stake in the fanonian concept of revolution is the reimagining of the human-thing relation as a precondition for freedom. yet, unlike techno-utopic discourses, which assert that the networking of things frees humans to explore their capacities for creativity to their fullest, in fanonian terms, the colonized "thing" can only become "man" when it frees itself from the shackles of the racial-epidermal and economic schemas of colonial rule (fanon, 2005, p. 40). in this sense, for fanon, the redefinition of man that comes about through decolonization can lead to a crisis in capitalism. as he asserts, in the colonial context wealth is attached to race and not just class (fanon, 2005, p. 40). put otherwise, the accumulation of wealth is predetermined by a global racial schema tied to the dehumanization and dispossession of the colonized "native." the project of humanization is thus fundamentally both about a redistribution of wealth gained through imperial exploitation and about an explosion of the imperial racial paradigm.  importantly, and in contrast to contemporary techno-utopic hopes for the end of capitalism, for fanon, shifts in the capitalist paradigm stem from, rather than bring about, the epistemological and ontological transfiguration of the category of the human. his writing is foundational to what alexander weheliye (2014) has formulated as "the greatest contribution to critical thinking of black studies—and critical ethnic studies more generally …[this is] the transformation of the human into a heuristic model and not an ontological fait accompli" (p. 8). weheliye argues that, given developments in biotechnology and informational media, it is crucial to bring this critical thought to bear upon contemporary reflections on the human. as he writes, "[questions of humanity], which in critical discourses in the humanities and social sciences have relied heavily on concepts of the cyborg and the posthuman, largely do not take into account race as a constitutive category in thinking about the parameters of humanity" (weheliye, 2014, p. 8). sylvia wynter is arguably one of the most important thinkers to do so. while wynter's thinking has been categorized as "counterhumanist," more than simply being in opposition to existing definitions of the human (or, in the terms of modern knowledge, of what wynter has termed "man"), wynter's work is about the unthinking of contemporary epistemologies and ontologies, about their disruption, and about the unmaking of the world in its current descriptive-material guise.4 this makes her theorizing crucial to contemporary debates surrounding the techno-revolution and capitalism, as well as to those interested in wresting a new figure of the human (or, less ambitiously, a new human potentiality) from the epistemological break that follows from this revolution.   wynter (2003) contends with what it might mean to disturb foundational colonial differences upon which global modernity was instituted. while from the renaissance through the 18th century the physical sciences defined man (what wynter calls man1), from the 19th century through the present day it has been the biological sciences that have dominated the representation of man (man2). in this post-enlightenment "cosmology," race became the ground upon which answers to the question of what and who we are were instituted. thus, as darwinian notions of natural selection and race continue to author modern narratives of societal development and evolution, ongoing "archipelagos of otherness," including the jobless, poor, and "underdeveloped," are still undergirded by the colonial color line even if it is articulated in economic rather than explicitly racial terms (wynter, 2003, p. 321). this is because, for wynter, an "economic script … governs our global well-being/ill-being – a script, … whose macro-origin story calcifies the hero figure of homo oeconomicus who practices, indeed normalizes, accumulation in the name of (economic) freedom. capital is thus projected as the indispensable, empirical, and metaphysical source of all human life" (wynter and mckittrick, 2015, p. 10), engendering what gayatri spivak (1988) names the "subject predicated by labor" (p. 252). the post-enlightenment effects of economic domination, which wynter and mckittrick (2015) explain include "both the socially stratified divisions of labor internal to each bourgeois nation state, as well as the transnational macro-divisions of labor that are performatively enacted" by categories of development and underdevelopment in a global mapping of first and third worlds, have only been exacerbated since the end of the cold war (wynter and mckittrick, 2015, p. 42).5 the present thus entails "logically induced technologically automated labor process cum large-scale joblessness by means of large-scale mechanized agriculture cum peasant farmer landlessness and attendant hunger/poverty/anxiety cum increasing drug addiction" (wynter and mckittrick, 2015, p. 42).  wynter's emphasis that capitalism is just one aspect of a larger colonial matrix of power, and that the exploitation of labor is entangled with, if not symmetrical to, the massive appropriation of land, points to some of the limits of current techno-utopic aspirations that technology emancipates humans from labor. in scenarios posited by speculative writing on iot, for instance, posthumanism liberates humanity by ending labor exploitation but mentions nothing of imperial-racial legacies. in contrast, decolonial and critical race scholars such as wynter first ask who or what falls into and out of the category of human, signaling that the human as a shifting and disciplining category continues to be profoundly racialized, and only then poses the question of what sorts of re-descriptions of the human are necessary to conceive of what comes "after man." wynter's call for imagining the human after-man as an ontological problem, like weheliye's argument that posthumanism has failed to address the role of race in the way the parameters of the human are laid down, points to the co-existence of the world of the humanist subject (man) and those other worlds forcibly written upon by colonial practices that continue outside/alongside it. these worlds, according to dipesh chakrabarty (2000), circulate together with but are not commensurate with the post-enlightenment subject and its history, now the history of capitalism. this impasse has been part of the project of decolonial and postcolonial politics, and has been taken up in affiliated scholarship, most notably in south asian and latin american subaltern studies. this scholarship convincingly argues that posthumanism is therefore another false universal brought about by the post-enlightenment subject.  feminist theorists of science and technology studies have similarly critiqued western humanism, and specifically its ideals of freedom and equality, as in fact delimiting the human. in a statement that echoes the work of many critical race studies scholars, rosi bradotti (2013) argues that this delimiting humanism reduces the "sexualized, racialized and naturalized "others" to disposable bodies" (p. 13). emphasizing the influence of colonial legacies and the violence of the holocaust on the anti-humanism of poststructuralist, postcolonial, and feminist thinkers who have rejected the disciplining function of the category of the human, braidotti argues that it is this scholarship that should provide scaffolding for anti-racist, feminist, and politicized theories of the posthuman that offer "alternative ways for conceptualising the human subject" (p. 37). as a way to postulate an answer to what comes "after man," one approach to posthumanism within feminist science studies has troubled assumptions of the inanimacy of matter and a corresponding lack of agency by inanimate bodies. karen barad (2012), for instance, has theorized the vitality of matter and of life outside the frame of anthropocentrism. she develops a theory of agential realism to argue that "matter is not mere stuff, an inanimate given-ness. rather, matter is substance in its iterative intra-active becoming—not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of agency. it is morpho-logically active, responsive, generative, and articulate" (barad, 2012, p. 80). theorists such as braidotti and barad offer strategies from within feminist science studies for understanding the limitations of models of technological revolution that effectively recapitulate already existing paradigms of historical change and the subjects and socialities that will result from that change. rather than looking toward a future overthrow of current human relations through technological development, these authors rethink the long history of how we understand human life and its relationship to technology through examining matter as the way to unthink, or denaturalize, the human–object division. this allows each to hold on to the importance of corporeality while working against the assumption of a given subject. when objects are viewed intra-actively (barad, 2012) or as having monistic embodied vitality (braidotti, 2013, p. 56), the centrality of human consciousness can be suspended. these projects self-consciously decenter the particular historical mode of being human that ascended from among others to become "man." provincializing that human subject helps destabilize the "world" that has been written over other worlds that decolonial thinkers such as weheliye and wynter invoke to reveal the limits of posthumanism. the specter of obsolescence and the internet of things  in contrast to feminist and decolonial calls for a redescription of the human after man, expressions of excitement in the us and northwestern europe about the internet of things (iot) produces a version of the posthuman that in fact replicates capitalist and imperial racial and gendered paradigms of value and valuelessness. the iot is a social-technological infrastructure that is designed to largely bypass the need for human oversight and intervention, and yet manage the mundane and reproductive work of daily life. this seemingly neutral and mechanical technological infrastructure that organizes the temporal experience of work and the form of subjectivity through which one must engage that infrastructure effectively materializes assumptions of what constitutes a human, even as it excludes those who are not the intended subject of the posthuman.6 thus race, gender, sexuality and class matter in the constitution of the realm of the technological even as the technological realm promises that the next step in human teleology is the overcoming of the human itself.  jeremy rifkin's zero marginal cost society (2014), the book with which we opened this article, exemplifies the sense of infinite possibility attached to technological objects and smart infrastructures in a moment when it seems impossible to attach such a sense of revolutionary possibility to a political project. of course, this is not to say that the sense of possibility engendered by technological objects is not political (or that such objects do not have a politics). rather, it is that present-day techno-utopic discourses, to which rifkin's work belongs, propose a re-enchantment of a world that depends upon inter-networked techno-objects. this is what david rose, a product designer, entrepreneur, and visiting scholar at mit's media lab, has called "enchanted objects"—smart objects that can intuit human needs, such as an umbrella that lights up when rain is predicted, or a cap for prescription medication bottles that sounds an alarm and sends text messages and emails when one forgets to take one's pills (rose, 2014). rose elicits the fantasy of enchanted objects through a euro-american fictional genealogy including harry potter and lord of the rings that features extraordinary objects like swords that anticipate the enemy. the desire for ordinary objects to be extraordinary can be productively linked to an even longer genealogy that includes european-derived fairy tales and disney's animated films like the sorcerer's apprentice and cinderella, in which ensorcelled wash pails and dust brooms free the apprentice and the orphan from their toils. these fantasies are about emancipation from manual, repetitive, and unimaginative labor by making "the worker" invisible as pails and brooms (or irobot's modern day rumba vacuum cleaner) move on their own. they thus extend the history of the autonomous subject whose freedom is in actuality only possible because of the invisible support labor of servants, slaves, wives and, later, industrial service workers who perform this racialized and gendered labor.7 rose's enchanted objects, which are a part of the iot infrastructure, are about improving the everyday quality of life through smart technology and its interconnectedness with everyday spaces (the home, places of work, etc.). but the very concept of a world that is re-enchanted following the disenchantment brought about by rationalization and secular modernity speaks to the longing for overcoming an entrenched way of being that hinges upon a total reimagining of human-object interactions and interfaces.  such a re-enchantment that seeks to overcome the sense of disappointment in the limitations of bio-economic man embedded in a rational-secular-scientific society also speaks to a seemingly global disenchantment with political projects, such as socialism, that while positing an alternative to capitalist development are also of this disenchanted modernity. in this revolutionary imaginary, human consciousness thus shifts vis-à-vis the magic of objects rather than as a result of political transformations. what rose terms enchantment, thinkers in the field of object-oriented ontology (ooo) theorize in relation to things, which, they argue, in contrast to the anthropocentric view, are not simply the constructs of human cognition. according to ian bogost (2009):  [ooo] puts things at the center of … study.  its proponents contend that nothing has special status, but that everything exists equally–plumbers, cotton, bonobos, dvd players, and sandstone, for example. in contemporary thought, things are usually taken either as the aggregation of ever smaller bits (scientific naturalism) or as constructions of human behavior and society (social relativism). ooo steers a path between the two, drawing attention to things at all scales (from atoms to alpacas, bits to blinis), and pondering their nature and relations with one another as much with ourselves.  (para. 9, emphasis in original) this understanding of things and their interaction (without accounting for what barad [2012] has called intra-action) flattens the field inhabited by things and fails to consider the asymmetries between the categories of objects, animate and inanimate, that are engaged.  an exception is jane bennett's (2010) formulation of vibrant matter. like the work of other ooo philosophers, bennett critiques constructivism as obscuring what she calls "thing power," and therefore moves away from epistemology as a critical site. opposing "the parsing of the world into dull matter (it, things) and vibrant life (us, beings)," which she describes with jacques ranciere's phrase as a "partition of the sensible," she argues for a form of distributive agency that recognizes material itself as acting as quasi-agents and forces "with trajectories, propensities, and tendencies of their own" (p. viii), thereby suspending "the subject" as a fetish (p. 19). she argues that recognizing "thing power," the potency of matter to self-organize, to exert force upon other matter, and to continue to exist, "sets up a kind of safety net for those humans who are now, in a world where kantian morality is the standard, routinely made to suffer because they do not conform to a particular (euro-american, bourgeois, theocentric, or other) model of personhood" (p. 13). bennet's goal of "raising the status of the materiality of which we are composed" (p. 12) by recognizing all bodies as "sharing distributive agency where bodies, human and non-human, affect one another in deluezian assemblage" (p. 23), could usefully articulate with decolonial projects that unthink the human of posthumanist theory and expand it to include states of non-subject being.  techno-utopics surrounding big data, smart objects, and internetworking of humans and machines, however, do not dwell in the vitality of matter, but rather propose the thing as a surrogate human. in this way, they replicate the violent neoliberal impetus to enfold difference into sameness—into a shared space and time. like ooo, techno-utopic fantasies conceive of a re-enchanted world made magic through a technology that works to bypass human thought and labor, as well as the historical, economic, and imperial legacies that create categories of objects and people as needed, desired, valuable or disposable. this is an enchantment that expunges the racial and gendered status of "object" within global infrastructures. enchanting the object thus removes the possibility of recognizing the racialized and gendered scaffolding of advanced capitalism and of an attendant anti-racist politics. therefore, even as thinkers like rose and rifkin attempt to outline how the smart infrastructure will disrupt existing capitalist relations of production, their jump into the unimaginable (beyond homo-economicus) remains anchored in post-enlightenment human/non-human epistemology, primarily because of the global-racial mapping out of which emerges the "smart infrastructure" of the human-thing network.   the replaceability of human labor with the surrogate human as enchanted object is contextualized by capitalist development in the global north, in which the specter of unemployment is only attached to those populations not already marked for elimination or surplus. the condition of surplus being, or of the production of the obsolete, is always racialized (hong, 2011). this is true even if, and precisely because, techno-revolutionary fantasies of the 21st century congeal around a dehistoricized imaginary of emancipation and free labor. in his 1930 essay "economic possibilities for our grandchildren," for instance, the economist john maynard keynes coined the term "technological unemployment" to describe the process by which machines replace the need for human labor in industrialized societies. sue halpern (2015) explains: "at the time, keynes considered technical unemployment a transitory condition, 'a temporary phase of maladjustment' brought on by 'our discovery of means of economizing the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour'" (para. 3). yet the ways in which the socio-economic scaffolding of empire enabled imaginaries of surplus or obsolete humanity to begin with is crucial for understanding the dystopic fears surrounding the surplusing of modern man himself.8  we might think of this as the longer historical context for stephen hawking's publically expressed fear that ai will be the end of the human species (cellan-jones, 2014). halpern (2014) writes of this as the "creepiness" inherent in an iot: "as human behavior is tracked and merchandized on a massive scale, the internet of things creates the perfect conditions to bolster and expand the surveillance state. in the world of the internet of things, your car, your heating system, your refrigerator, your fitness apps, your credit card, your television set, your window shades, your scale, your medications, your camera, your heart rate monitor, your electric toothbrush, and your washing machine—to say nothing of your phone—generate a continuous stream of data that resides largely out of reach of the individual but not of those willing to pay for it or in other ways commandeer it" (para. 22). "creepiness" can here be most explicitly understood as marking the unprecedented centralization of information available for state and corporate surveillance. at the same time, and perhaps only implicit in this passage, the eeriness surrounding data-ization and mechanization of modern man indicates the potential obsolescence of the human as we know it because the human mind need not itself think/act upon bodily and everyday needs (this is the end of the cartesian thinking/being paradigm). instead, machines—surrogate humans or "enchanted objects"—do the thinking (as that which signifies humanity becomes infinitely reproducible and consumable).  in contrast, in techno-utopic perspectives such as rifkin's in zero marginal cost society, the inter-networking of humans and things—physically and affectively—renders only human labor obsolete, rather than the human itself. rifkin, as the office of jeremy rifkin notes, is a u.s. economic and social theorist who has written over twenty books since the 1970s on the environment, energy, the economy, and technology, and who has advised numerous world leaders in europe and is "the principle architect of the european union's third industrial revolution long-term economic sustainability plan to address the triple challenge of the global economic crisis, energy security, and climate change" (n.d., para. 4). it is from this stance that he builds on his prior interests in political-economic alternatives to posit that technological innovation can bring about a zero marginal cost society and an end to capitalism. although this argument is ostensibly about technology as the condition of possibility for freedom, rifkin glosses over the question of how economic, social, and human obsolescence has been figured through a racial-imperial episteme. this elision is most evident in the way in which he distinguishes two categories or species of "man" produced within the iot: there are the makers, and there are those who are replaceable by self-replicating machines, such as 3d printers. with regard to the former, rifkin contends that the makers movement is nothing less than the early embodiment of the new human consciousness. he cites the creation of fab lab in 2005 at mit, an outreach project that uses open-source software to allow anyone to create their own 3d printed objects, thus creating prosumers (producers and consumers) (rifkin, 2014, p. 89).9 the now 70 fab labs, though primarily in the industrialized urban north, have also made their way to the global south, where they enable simple tools and objects to be created in order to advance economic welfare (p. 94). purportedly emanating from "world class universities and global companies," rifkin calls this multi-sited space the "people's lab" as it has made its way to non-elite neighborhoods. in this frame, 3d printing is understood to be revolutionary because of its potential to democratize the means of production. equally as important, rifkin highlights that the cost of making thousands of products is no more than the cost of making just one. a dream machine, the 3d printer can even make its own parts, rendering it a "self-replicating" machine that costs next to nothing to repair and run (p. 93).   yet rifkin envisions more than just a trickle down benefit of creativity from the urban global north to the global south that can then use these innovations for economic uplift. he also understands technological self-replication and cheapness to lead to a reversal of outsourcing that has been the hallmark of imperial and neoliberal economic practice, which relies on surplus populations that it has itself made surplus. rifkin (2014) writes, "manufacturers that have long relied on cheap labor in their chinese production facilities are bringing production back home with advanced robotics that is cheaper and more efficient than their chinese workforces. at philips's new electronic factory in the netherlands, the 128 robot arms work at such a quick pace that they have to be put behind glass cases so that the handful of supervisors aren't injured. philips's roboticized dutch electronics factory produces the equivalent output of its chinese production facility with one-tenth of the number of workers" (p. 124). that one species of human (the exploitable labor force in former second and third worlds) is being replaced in its function by technological innovation—by things (surrogate humans) in the iot—replicates a sliding scale of humanity established through the development of capitalism in the colonies. in this sense, the use of robots as replacements for degraded workers confirms an already existing bias about what kind of work is dangerous, dull, or dirty, and what kind of workers can be replaced easily by machines that are more accurate and economical (rothstein, 2015, p. xi). terry gou, ceo of foxconn, articulates the racialized condition of replaceability most explicitly. gou, rifkin relates, "joked that he would prefer one million robots [to his one million workers]. 'as human beings are also animals, to manage one million animals gives me a headache'" (p. 124). as rifkin elaborates, "china, india, mexico, and other emerging nations are learning quickly that the cheapest workers in the world are not as cheap, efficient, and productive as the information technology, robotics, and artificial intelligence that replace them" (p. 124). the "new human consciousness" that rifkin predicts will emerge through the makers' collaborative commons thus nevertheless reasserts a human-thing hierarchy that is racialized and globalized through the well-worn racial-imperial paradigm (p. 65). yet, despite techno-utopic projections, as we elaborate below, human labor-power continues to be an irreplaceable commodity, highlighting the growing unevenness between racialized, gendered, and ostensibly endlessly exploitable populations who labor in places like china, india, and mexico. while it is worthwhile to point out how neatly rifkin's techno-utopia relies on imperial and neo-imperial imaginaries of surplus labor (as surplus populations), it is equally important to note the need to replace the exact functions of such populations with technology. this is a racial logic of elimination in which the violence happens not through physical extermination (though wynter's argument certainly allows us to understand how the costs of the tech-revolution do also lead to physical extermination). rather, the violence of this fantasy occurs through the desire to subsume the global racial other into the iot's "things" by reducing the "cheapest" of labor-subjects to their mere function within global capitalism.   humans as a service: toward an "artificial artificial intelligence" the collapsing of the human into the thing in iot draws attention to the ways in which the maximizing of life potential through data and making service "automatic" is racial and racializing even as (and precisely because) this process seemingly removes actual laboring human bodies through surrogate technologies. the problem of the automation of "miserable" work is profoundly contradictory. emergent technologies and platforms propose a future free from degraded work, yet the infrastructures of the sharing economy retain the degraded categories of labor formerly done by racialized others. utopic hopes for a human freed from degraded labor thus produce platforms that must actively conceal the fact that other forms of  "miserable" work are still being done by human labor. what we suggest is that the proliferation of discourses, hopes, and fears tied to emergent technologies and technological platforms calls for an engagement with how, as langdon winner (1980) puts it, technologies are "ways of building the world" (p. 128). as he argues, a flexibility that inheres in technologies vanishes "once initial commitments are made" as to how these technologies will order human activity and influence work, consumption, communication, and everyday life (p. 127). following this logic, we move to a discussion of how the categories of race and gender are embedded and embodied (even in their erasures) in the emergent infrastructures of enchanted objects, smart technologies, and the sharing economy. as an example of the movement towards a technologically-enabled (yet still racialized) freedom from labor that retains the modes of abject work claiming to be overcome, we consider alfred club, the 2014 winner of the blog techcrunch's annual competition for tech startups, which was hyped as an innovator in the realm of the emergent tech-driven sharing economy.10 techcrunch touted alfred as innovative because it is "the first service layer on the shared economy that manages your routine across multiple on-demand and local services" (perez, 2014). "alfreds" are individual workers made invisible and interchangeable through the alfred club's platform; however, every aspect of the alfred service advertises the possibility of zero personal interaction between the subscriber, the person who is to act as the butler, or "alfred," and the additional service providers whom "alfred" manages. as the company boasts, "alfred is an automatic, hands-off service that hums along quietly in the background of your life – so you can be free to live yours" (alfred "meet alfred"). the interaction with the most potential for personal contact occurs at the very start of service. when a person signs up for service through the company's website, she is assigned an "alfred." the subscriber receives access to a picture and background check of her designated "alfred" as the primary individual to whom she can then begin to delegate tasks, such as buying groceries, picking up the dry cleaning, and cleaning the house. this is also the person who initially picks up the keys to the subscriber's home, though even this level of interaction can be bypassed if the subscriber chooses to send a picture of her keys so that the company can make a copy of them. indeed, this service platform's primary innovation is the erasure of contact between service workers and subscribers. for instance, the alfred service at times uses some existing on-demand services, such as handy for cleaning and taskrabbit for errands, but with alfred, the subscriber need not be home when the task happens (kessler, 2014). as critics of the app pointed out, what distinguishes alfred from a non-high tech personal servant is the depersonalizing aspect (all "alfreds" share the same name in this sharing economy, as the subscriber need not remember their assigned "alfred's" actual name), and the cost: just $99 per month.   with this emphasis on invisiblizing the service worker, it is possible to read alfred as targeting the customer who would be uncomfortable having a live-in butler, and who, perhaps espousing a liberal ethos, wants to make sure that the "alfreds" are not underpaid or abused. for instance, tech writer sarah kesser describes her concerns as she decided to give the service a try:  am i really so lazy that i can't even lift my thumbs to my own iphone to ask someone else to clean my home or do my laundry? am i contributing to unfair labor practices—like those for which workers recently sued handy—or at the least, to the next startup bubble, by encouraging this startup nesting doll of a service? but alfred has one argument that is hard to deflect: returning to my home after work to find all of my errands completed, without any effort on my behalf, sounds amazing. despite my qualms, when they offer me a pre-launch trial, i'm in.  (kessler, 2014, para. 7)  liberal concerns surrounding labor practices and the exploitation of labor can thus quickly give way to the pleasures and enjoyment of services precisely because alfreds are successful if they completely erase the signs of their presence (one magically finds one's errands are complete upon returning home). invisibility makes it possible to remove (and move beyond) initial concerns about the physical bodies tasked to pick up subscribers' dirty laundry. put otherwise, though alfreds are actual workers, their function within the alfred platform is to act as enchanted objects, their labor invisibilized and invisibilizing of other service providers as they complete the busy professionals' onerous chores necessary to the functioning of adult life (alfred "meet alfred"). its founders, marcella sapone and jess beck, build such an ethos of unseeing dull and dirty work as a precondition for happiness into the very origin story of alfred. according to the alfred website: one fateful night after a long, demanding day at work, [marcella and jess] ran into each other in the laundry room of their apartment building. the overwhelming sentiment? frustration. leisure time shouldn't be a luxury; it should be a right and a reward for working as hard as both of these women did (and still do!) a pact was made: no longer would they let mundane chores control their lives. (alfred "our story," para. 2) the work that alfred makes invisible to the subscriber is work that has always been invisible: women's work. not mentioned in this story is also the long history of black, asian american, and latina women who have historically performed domestic work in white homes (davis, 1983). but like the alfred founders, who are white-collar professionals, "women" and racial others signifying liberal progress within neoliberal multiculturalism  (atanasoski, 2013; melamed, 2011) are now hailed into that category that deserves happiness by relying on someone else's invisible work. the service platform thus both inherits the prior forms of racialized and feminized, intimate labors supporting the nuclear, heteronormative, and white family form and disappears such intimate service obligations (and possible annoyances) from the modern home in a mode consistent with notions of racial and sexual progress. those who enter your home, touch your dirty clothes, and clean up after your "epic parties" know your habits and preferences for baked goods, but you need not see or know them (alfred "faq"). as the origin story of the service elaborates, "since [their initial meeting], marcela and jess have worked tirelessly to create the first ever non-intrusive, recurring, in-home service that virtually everyone can use. with alfred, these innovative women have ensured they personally will always come home happy—and they want the same for you" (alfred "our story," para. 3). this refiguration of human intimacy and intimate spaces is not only haunted by the heterosexual nuclear family and the asymmetries in how the work that has kept this formation functional is differentially valued, but it is also haunted by the imperial-racial production of intimacy as often violent (stoler, 2006). thus, while the race, gender, sexual orientation, or domestic arrangements of the alfred subscribers (which are implicitly diverse) necessitate the reimagining of intimate labors as anonymous workers no longer bound by their racialized or gendered bodies, such service platforms also inherit prior (imperial) imaginaries of happiness and freedom that were relationally consolidated and unevenly distributed.  the alfred service's emphasis on worker invisibility in completing the chores of busy professionals and enabling their happiness, as well as alfred's "innovation" of coordinating among other services in the sharing economy, align alfred with the ethos of disappearing degraded work in the object-centered universe of the internet of things. people ("alfreds") and artifacts in the internet of things could be said to perform a similar function in techno-imaginaries of the sorts of innovations that will maximize human happiness and freedom. according to wired magazine, in the new world of programmable objects that form the internet of things, "we are seeing the dawn of an era when the most mundane items in our lives can talk wirelessly among themselves, performing tasks on command… imagine a factory where every machine, every room, feeds back information to solve problems on the production line" (wasik, 2013, para. 4-5). positioning its platform as part of this techno-future, the co-founder of alfred noted that with her app, "the services in your life know you and they are automatic" (as cited in chang, 2014, para. 7). in contradistinction, as we have emphasized thus far, this future vision profoundly depends on a present in which devalued subjects performing miserable (and historically classed, racialized and gendered) forms of labor are considered replaceable by technology. marx's original critique of capitalism's dehumanizing effect on workers can still be applied to techno-utopic fantasies of a post-capitalist posthuman world: the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society…owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. he becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. (marx & engels, 1969, pp. 98-137)  fantasies of a networked world in which automation, programmability, and data engender unprecedented freedom in fact reproduce, and perhaps even expand, the sphere of devalued labor, transposing categories of abjection from the human into the very infrastructure upon which the techno-utopic future depends.  that multiple alfreds, who are actual workers rendered as "automatic" services, facilitate daily life for privileged subscribers reveals how the disappearance of bodies historically marked as "things" undergirds utopic hopes that the sharing economy and iot will free those positioned as fully human from the pains of mundane labor. in this sense, the sharing economy of programmable "objects" and service platforms that utilize people only to make them invisible (reducing them to their functionality) re-inscribes differential relationships to the category of the human, now mediated through digital networks and informatics. the sharing economy, of course, also references and innovates upon earlier imaginaries that servitude could be mechanized, thus eliminating the need for racialized bodies (whose function within modernity was always already to serve).  these prior imaginaries, however, remained tethered to a humanoid form, thus reiterating a direct relationship between racialized bodies and mechanical servants in ways that contemporary conceptions of automation to do not. for instance, writing about the history of humanoid robots, despina kakoudaki has argued that "the fantasy of the robotic servant, worker, or slave promises that if enslavement of real people can no longer be tolerated in the modern world then mechanical people may be designed to take their place, and their labor will deliver the comforts of a laborless world for the rest of us" (kakoudaki, 2014, pp. 116). throughout the 20th century, robots have been associated with industrial labor and mechanized production rather than with art or innovation. robot masses have thus embodied "a form of abjection that is total and absolute, a state of preconsciousness in which neither the gestures of emancipation nor those of revolt are available" (p. 133). the total submission of the robot to the human as the robot-slave enables a formulation of human freedom from labor without submitting the human to the machine. moreover, the robot worker, who replaces the slave in the 20th century, is one who can never come to political consciousness or question the economic or political system within which it toils. the robot-worker is in a perpetual state of false consciousness, unable to rebel, go on strike, or unionize because robots are supposed to "have no fantasies about their social position" (kakoudaki, 2014, p. 135-136).  what is revolutionary about dreams of revolutionizing labor through technology thus seems to be the impossibility of a social or political revolution because technology lacks political consciousness. this is precisely the reason that techno-dystopic imaginaries revolve around the reversal of normative presumptions about the social need for a totally abject and submissive workforce. as kakoudaki explains, cultural fears that those enslaved as objects will rebel—even when they aren't supposed to—abound, evident in texts such as karel čapek's 1920 science fiction play rossum's universal robots (r.u.r) and the television series battlestar galactica. these fears, particularly in the 20th century, are tied not to actual robots, but rather to the human condition within industrial capitalism and a world ideologically divided between different models of work and governance, such as capitalism and communism. moreover, "the fantasy of a laborless world and the desire for mechanical slaves who would never rebel or have needs are the flip side of a more personal nightmare, in which people become fully absorbed into an automatic world that does not permit desires or needs. … in addition to the fear of becoming automatic, or mechanical, we have the fear of being enslaved, the fear of being a tool, the fear of being an object, the fear of being inanimate. … the imagery alludes to being engulfed" (kakaoudaki, 2014, p. 145). kakoudaki insists that sociocultural paranoia surrounding exploitation, servitude, and enslavement projected upon humanoid robots be separated from other automated solutions because "robots perform direct and personified actions that retain a connection to how humans might perform the same labor" (p. 118). she thus concludes that there is a direct representational relationship between the racial histories of human chattel slavery and the robot's "potential for racial or ethnic representation [that] comes from its objecthood. … robots are designed to be servants, workers, or slaves" since their "ontological state maps perfectly with a political state" (p. 117). yet this formulation raises several questions. for instance, what is the difference between the fear of engulfment into an industrialized world of factory production and labor, and the fear of engulfment into an internet of things, exemplified by a different conception of "automated" solutions like alfred? moreover, if earlier imaginaries of robot functionality are fundamentally about the need for unfree labor (that is, according to kakoudaki, the robot is a mechanized slave), then what is the relationship between states of free and unfree labor in a postindustrial economy? as a hyperactive medium of free labor adding social value within late capitalism, the internet, which has given rise to the sharing economy and imaginaries of servitude that are quite different from that of humanoid robots, necessitates an investigation of how racialized and gendered imaginaries of freedom and/as labor have shifted, as well as what the implications of such shifts might be (terranova, 2004, p. 73). for instance, late capitalism does not just appropriate creative/unalienated labor, but rather nurtures, sustains, and exhausts it (terranova, 2004, p. 94). in fact the "free" quality of those excess productive activities that internet users undertake with pleasure yet are mined for value, such as clicking "like" on a facebook page, or clicking on advertisements linked to browsing activities, "puts the desire for creative work into tension with the information economy's demand for knowledge as added value (p. 77). while shifting the relationship between producer and consumer, according to terranova (2004) the commodity nevertheless does not fully disappear in this arrangement. instead, it becomes "more transparent" as it showcases "the labour of the designers and programmers," with continually changing content that draws users back (p. 90). this conception of transparency, however, doesn't allow for an analysis of non-innovative human labor, or service labor such as that organized through the alfred service, as a commodity within the digital economy. instead, the transparency of service workers as commodities managed through platforms like alfred resides in their organization as those who quite literally are meant to go unseen by consumers. this analysis points to the need to frame contemporary discussions of the digital economy and late capitalism as not clean breaks from, but rather outgrowths of, liberal systems of rule and earlier moments in which free wage labor was made productive. indeed, the category of free labor doesn't newly emerge as important in the late capitalist digital economy. as lisa lowe (2015) has argued, free wage labor and liberal notions of freedom were innovations of imperial rule. ambitions of colonial states not to suppress but to rule rendered the need for emancipation from slavery, the institution of free wage labor (even as indentured or coolie labor), and free trade – three pillars of imperial liberal governmentality. the disappearance and subsumption of human bodies and their reemergence in and through the informational milieu as transparent commodities can thus be understood as racialized not in the sense that only black, brown, or asian bodies perform the degraded tasks; rather, the transparency of the commodity as dull or dirty labor is racialized in the ways in which it affirms a particular notion of human freedom, leisure, and happiness emerging from imperial modes of liberal governance. the disappearances necessary in the production of the transparent commodity might be considered as being at the core of artificial intelligence function within networked spacetime, as our next example, amazon mechanical turk (amt) demonstrates.  the amt internet marketplace is a platform where employers can post "human intelligence tasks" with a price for each task. for this third-party service, amazon takes a percentage from the employer. when a huge amount of data needs to be organized into culturally legible categories, say, classifying pornographic images or linking items for the "similar products" function on retail sites like amazon, this work is sourced task by task to a global pool of workers, and performed as micro-tasks. a form of crowdsourcing, amazon mechanical turk provides what jeff bezos, amazon ceo, calls "humans-as-a-service" (irani 2015; irani & silberman, 2013).  as the amazon logo jokes, the platform is "artificial artificial intelligence," replicating the imagined speed of digital processors by giving employers access to an enormous pool of temporary workers for high-data tasks when there isn't time to develop appropriate algorithms to do the job. data-scrubbing labor, or “commercial content moderation," which allows for image filters in social media sites like facebook and search engines like google to maintain community standards of acceptable content, offers another example of a growing site of the low-paid and miserable work of producing the timely and sanitized digital experience our sensorium and consciousness have been cultivated to expect and demand. this work is sourced through intermediary firms like taskus to business process outsourcing units in the philippines (chen, 2014).11 digital service-based companies like amazon show how digital platforms engender new relations between human labor, space (where people who perform needed tasks are located and how they can be located by those who need their services), and finally the product itself (the service, and the “human-as-service"). the experience of digitized, near-instant delivery that is part of amazon's basic warehousing strategy, essential to its commercial success and as innovative as sam walton's walmart infrastructure was for brick-and-mortar commodity sales, relies on subjecting warehouse stock workers to dehumanizing work shifts and physical demands for speed and endurance required to move products fast enough to achieve same-day and next-day delivery. this is an example evocative of the mechanical turk crowdsourcing platform and commercial content moderation employed by facebook and google, and it can be productively put in tension with techno-utopic aspirations about the projected obsolescence of human labor in the post-industrial economies of the post-cold war world. what the excitement about platforms like amt and alfred point to is the urgent need to theorize technological fantasies as doing something more than projecting prior racial-imperial formations onto modes of mechanization, such as humanoid robots, that are readily legible because of their humanoid form yet non-human ontology. yet, as we have emphasized, underscoring the legacies of racialized and gendered work for contemporary imaginaries of freedom from work points to how contemporary platforms also engender a different time-space that virtualizes the racialized and gendered materiality of service work through a dynamics of connectivity and the ideals of the sharing economy. these are liberal fantasies that seek to include racialized and gendered bodies into freedom (women are now professionals, 3d printing can help the global south) while invisibilizing the racialized and gendered architectures of their revolutionary claims to remaking the human. towards a feminist critical race (post)humanism sidestepping the centrality of racial thinking in the production of a sliding scale of humanity in enlightenment and post-enlightenment thought delimits contemporary considerations of how the revolution in infrastructures and global networks frees humanity from the shackles of prior economic paradigms. these considerations reassert the primacy of “western man" even as they herald the decentering of the human. in contemporary posthumanist techno-utopic imaginaries that conceive of enchanted objects, invisible butlers, and “artificial artificial intelligence," the space and time of the posthuman “reinscribe the humanist subject (man) as the personification of the human by insisting that this is the category to be overcome, rarely considering the cultural and political formations outside the world of man that might offer alternative versions of humanity" (weheliye, 2014, pp. 9-10). perhaps, then, the reasons that decolonial and critical race perspectives on unthinking the human as a category of modernity are not read in conversation with theories of the posthuman have to do with the fact that thinkers like fanon are categorized as fundamentally humanist. in short, they are understood to cling to firm hopes for the human, even as they propose alternate visions of what this human might be. but at they same time, decolonial thinkers like fanon are also posthumanist thinkers—if we remember that the category of the “human" has been dominated by post-enlightenment scientific (biological and economic) thought. put differently, the monopolization of the category of the human has made it nearly impossible to conceive the human outside of enlightenment scientific paradigms—and this is precisely the project of decolonial critical race and feminist thinkers. in the words of sylvia wynter (2003), this is a project that is about postulating what comes “after man" (pp. 257-337).  the “truth" of humans as fundamentally biological organisms arose out of the secular post-darwinian re-naturalization of the human as inherently differentiated by race and sex. this form of the human sets the stage for ongoing differentiation of the productive function of humans, non-humans, and objects. the historical production of the biological as the platform of humanity corresponds to the fantasy of human obsolescence in the form of the valorizing of artificial intelligence and artifacts. in object oriented ontology, where analysis is developed by putting “things at the center of being, … pondering their nature and relations with one another as much as with ourselves," (bogost, 2012, p. 6) and even in the more human-referencing notion of enchanted objects that intuit human needs, the human is abstracted when de-centered. in contrast, the posthuman turn in feminist science and technology studies scholarship retains a commitment to redressing the masculinist bias in the politics of knowledge production, even as it moves away from the limits of representational categories of gender and sexuality. such categories have served and continue to serve important political functions in the history of feminist praxis.  if the predominant fantasies of systemic social change in mainstream euro-american public discourse dwell upon the techno-utopics of a world in which all of those who are already human and already subjects ascend into the realm of those whose lives are supported by (de)human-technological infrastructures of service, then how do we think about the relationship of new technologies to possible fields of political protest or action? how can such a conception of the political maintain the urgency of thinking “after-man" with wynter while at the same time supporting humanistic inquiry into the politics of imaginaries of the human, of autonomy and freedom, and of the history of the subject, with all of its contingent dehumanizing and devastation along hierarchical vectors of othering? dominant techno-utopic imaginaries direct funds and structure engineering research labs around the world, and therefore also impact the distribution of differential conditions of comfort versus misery in the postsocialist present. these conditions are distributed between the realm of humans as a service and the human-machine infrastructure that supports the aspirational realm of labor-free creative existence, and they bring forward histories of racialized conditions of labor, free and unfree, visible and invisible. one component of such fantasies, as kakoudaki (2014) points out, is the very impossibility of political revolution, because techno-objects lack political consciousness.  we conclude with a question: what role does consciousness have in revolution and political action in the postsocialist present? the turn to the posthuman in critical race and gender studies intentionally, and in the case of feminist posthumanism, perhaps unintentionally, invoke decolonial revolutionary philosophies of the end of the post-enlightenment subject as a revolutionary project. from the perspective of this mode of revolutionary thought, the assumption of “consciousness," and particularly the proletarian consciousness brought about for workers by the very material conditions of capitalist production, is an obstacle to understanding political action in contexts such as the dehumanization enacted through technologies like alfred and amt. from this perspective, “post-socialism" does not mark the end of historical change, but rather a global condition provincializing the subject of history established by hegel, the post-enlightenment subject/human that moves history forward through man's progress toward the consciousness of freedom (hegel, 1953), the very mode of revolution proposed by franz fanon in 1961.  notes 1 on the relationship of reproducible, replaceable labor and the concentration of creativity in certain (racialized) categories of the human, see vora (2015).  2 as david scott (2014) argues, an association between political action and tragedy demarcates postcolonial and postsocialist imaginaries because possible emancipatory futures have been stalled. 3 lisa nakamura (2010) suggests that the interface of the internet imposes a white, straight male consciousness as a filter on users that must be actively resisted to create alternative digital cultures online. 4 on wynter as a counterhumanist, see wynter and mckittrick (2015, p. 11). 5 as wynter and mckittrick (2015) elaborate, “this is understood with respect to the surplus quantity of these costs, specifically the costs of the single-model free-market competitive capitalist economy in its now, post-1989, homogenizing, transnational/transreligious and /or transcultural, techno-automated cum mechanized agriculture form" (p. 43). 6 for example, computerized factory production and call center work managed by dialing software promote what donald winiecki (2007) calls a “machinic subjectivity." 7 see the discussion of janet jakobsen's critique of the autonomous subject and how technologies can extend such historical relations of support in vora (2015); see also jakobsen (2012, p. 25). 8 for example, thomas malthus's lectures and essays on population while a professor at the east india company college in england promulgated the idea that india had a surplus of reproductivity, and that this reproductivity could be a source of material wealth for colonizers. the discourse of race and india, and particularly of indian workers as numerous, easily replaceable, and best-suited for reproduction, becomes transformed in different settings of labor, but malthus's argument for the need to manage india's reproductivity and harness it for profitable production is sedimented into the industries that transmit vital energy from india's workers to its consumers.  see vora (2015, p. 9). 9 with 3d printing, open source software “directs molten plastic, molten metal, or other feedstocks inside a printer to build up a physical product layer by layer, creating a fully formed object" that comes out of the printer (rifkin, 2014, p. 89). 10 thanks to erin mcelroy for pointing us to the story of the alfred app.  11 in an article on the work of commercial content moderation, adrian chen (2014) writes, “many companies employ a two-tiered moderation system, where the most basic moderation is outsourced abroad while more complex screening, which requires greater cultural familiarity, is done domestically. us-based moderators are much better compensated than their overseas counterparts: a brand-new american moderator for a large tech company in the us can make more in an hour than a veteran filipino moderator makes in a day. but then a career in the outsourcing industry is something many young filipinos aspire to, whereas american moderators often fall into the job as a last 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(2015). life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press.  wasik, b. (2013, may 14). in the programmable world, all our objects will act as one. wired. retrieved at http://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2/all/ weheliye, a. (2014). habeas viscus: racializing assemblages,  biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human. durham, nc: duke university press. winiecki, d. j. (2007). subjects, subjectivity, and subjectification in call center work. journal of contemporary ethnography, 36(4), 351-377. winner, l. (1980). do artifacts have a politics? daedalus,109(1), 121-136. wynter, s., & mckittrick, k. (2015). unparalleled catastrophe for our species? or, to give humanness a different future: conversations. in k. mckittrick (ed.), sylvia wynter: on being human as praxis (pp. 9-89). durham, nc: duke university press. wynter, s. (2003). unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—an argument. cr: the new centennial review, 3(3), 257-337. bios neda atanasoski is associate professor of feminist studies and critical race and ethnic studies at uc santa cruz. she is the author of humanitarian violence: the u.s. deployment of diversity (university of minnesota press, 2013). kalindi vora is assistant professor of ethnic studies and affiliate faculty of the science studies and critical gender studies programs at uc san diego. her book, life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor (2015), examines domestic work, customer care, and the commodification of human organs, gestational surrogacy and knowledge work as representing a global economy of vitality that relies on affective and biological labor of feminized workers.  microsoft word 243-1519-1_irani.docx irani, l. (2018). “design thinking”: defending silicon valley at the apex of global labor hierarchies catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-19. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © lilly irani 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives “design thinking”: defending silicon valley at the apex of global labor hierarchies lilly irani uc san diego lirani@ucsd.edu abstract this paper examines the emergence of “design thinking” as a form of technical expertise. it demonstrates that “design thinking” articulates a racialized understanding of labor, judgment, and the subject, emerging as a defense of north american design in the face of global competition from asia. as design workers in asia begin competing with north american designers, north american design consultancies articulate and stabilize design thinking, i argue, as a way of defending north american design at the apex of global hierarchies of labor and creativity. i take creativity, design, and technology as contested and valorized social categories that emerge out of globally distributed labor processes geared toward developing new products, markets, and vehicles for financial investment. 2 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) introduction science studies scholars have shown how what counts as “technological” creativity – both in cultural practice and in sts analytics – is shaped by histories of race, colonialism, and gender (fouché 2006; philip 2006; oldenziel 1999). these scholars show how contests over what counts as properly technological or inventive has also been a contest to rearticulate and defend racialized hierarchies. fouché (2006), for example, shows how patent officials deemed black invention a product of accident or laziness rather than intention and intelligence (p. 647). oldenziel (1999) shows how north american and european anxieties about white racial superiority shaped what counts as “technology” – bridges and machines, but not textiles, pottery, and mud architecture. the social category “technology” excluded the creative practices deprioritized by industrial-era capitalists and european colonial powers; machines took priority as marks of modernity over both north american agriculturalists' work and the work of weavers in the colonies. i draw on historical and ethnographic research to track the racialized dynamics of labor competition and expertise performance that generated “design thinking” beyond public view. the data and interviews informing this paper are drawn from ethnographic research i conducted at design firms in india but spanning silicon valley and european cities for fourteen months between 2009 and 2014. “design thinking” as expertise i want to start with the claim that “design thinking” is a form of expertise. though design and planning theorists had used the term “design thinking” for decades (dorst 2011), pedagogical programs in design thinking have exploded in the last decade. students can take courses in “design thinking” ─ a mix of brainstorming, prototyping, cultural observation, and teamwork skills – at stanford, harvard, mit, university of virginia, and countless other institutions. notably, it is not only 3 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) engineering schools that have developed courses in design thinking, but also business schools. “design thinking” is a term popularized in palo alto by the design firm ideo and stanford university through forums like ted, businessweek, and harvard business review. in those forums, it stands for a critique of rationalistic, impersonal, and quantitative forms of corporate knowing (see, for example, euchner 2012). in place of design’s emphasis on specifying product form and mechanism, design thinking teaches corporate workers to tell stories about the lives of potential customers and imagine different futures for them. design thinking also represents an expansion of the meaning of design. industrial designers and, later, interaction designers, have long given form to everyday objects around us ─ office furniture, the computer mouse, or the form of the computer laptop are just some of the product forms to which ideo lays claim. with the shift from product design to "design thinking," however, elite institutions like stanford, harvard, and mit emphasize an approach to design as market strategy over the craft skills of model making, typography, and mechanism design. in their place, design thinking focuses on the identification of market opportunities and broad product strategy informed by applied ethnographic research and design experiments. design thinking is the promise that methods ─ “ideation,” prototyping, and iterating ─ can locate opportunities where there seem to be none. images of ideo at work show engineers, marketers, and business people cheerfully organizing post-it notes with ideas written on them, mining the communicational unconscious activated through their collaboration for "the next big thing." champions of design thinking train corporate employees, educators, and even government actors to combine their professional understandings of their work with empathy for those whom they seek to sell to, educate, or discipline. this form of expertise is institutionalized in professional education programs. design thinking promises to make innovation continuous and replicable. it is encoded in workbooks and guides published by ideo, as 4 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) well as universities. but this form of expertise only emerged in the mid2000s. its emergence was as much about global production and labor flows as it was about epistemology. the view from the machine shop: from “mechanical” to “mystical” my relationship to this professional shift was as a practicing software designer in the mid-2000s at a large silicon valley tech company. friends and colleagues had graduated from stanford with degrees in mechanical engineering, specializing in the design of devices, circuits, and algorithms. they found employment at ideo but found themselves working more as management consultants than product designers. they described a shift within the global design firm in the mid-2000s: the firm de-emphasized the design of things. within the company, employees referred to this shift as ideo 2.0. figure 1. visitors from chile tour ideo’s machine shops. photo credit: carlos osorio it was difficult to find ideo employees who would speak on these matters to an inquiring researcher. to understand why ideo had shifted from products to corporate strategy, i had to go to the machine shop. john and rick ─ these are not their real names ─ had each spent a 5 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) decade lathing, grinding, and 3d printing prototypes for product designers at ideo. over that decade, the shop had adapted its role along with new technologies. as industrial designers shifted from sketches to computer aided design, for example, the shop shifted from producing models in foam and metal to 3d printed materials. more than technological change, john and rick identified shifts in the global competitive landscape with a shift in company priorities toward “design thinking.”1 with these shifts, they explained, the machine shop staff shrank from twenty-six people to only six. in the 1990s, american companies designed products in the united states and then outsourced the manufacture of those products to somewhere with hospitable laws and cheapened labor ─ think china (bina 2012; enloe 2004:60). beginning in the early 2000s, john explained, the design order began to shift. chinese manufacturers began to offer design services for the products they were going to make. “ideo started to feel the pressure of not being able to charge the rates [for product design] they wanted to charge.” rick cut in, recounting tales of chinese business managers touring ideo's facilities to take notes on how ideo organized the design process. “quite frankly,” he said, “ideo got ripped off. but that’s what happens when you’re successful.” i thought of how silicon valley heroes steve jobs and bill gates had toured xerox parc and found there a model to appropriate for windows and mac windowing operating systems.1 i said nothing. ideo, john explained, was no longer able to command high rates for engineering-oriented projects in the face of competition from chinese designers. “they started saying, ‘okay, now what do we do?’ where was there still opportunity to charge rates? they saw mckinsey and some of those other [management consulting firms] making money…for strategy or report kinds of things.” john described ideo’s shift from specifying manufacturable things ─ designs ─ to consulting with executive-level decision makers. rick cut in to sum it up: “there’s been a shift to less mechanical and to more 6 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) mystical.” john and rick had left to start their own machine shop that produced rapid prototypes for the valley’s engineers. what john described as ideo’s shift to the “mystical” was ideo’s shift to “design thinking” as an expanded approach to the specification of market opportunities more than things. they called this service offering “phase 0” and posed it as a complement to “left-brain” management consulting approaches focused on supply chains, pricing, and firm structure (edmonson 2013). configuring a new nexus of labor and belonging globalization policies threatened ideo’s claim on designs by opening them up to competition from chinese designers. globalization, more broadly, threatened the ideology that positioned american workers as engines of global, corporate wealth. the book a whole new mind by daniel pink was published in 2006, around the same time as ideo was shrinking its machine shops and moving to the mystical. pink was also the author of freelance nation and a speechwriter for vice president al gore. 2006 was also a time when public anxieties about outsourcing reached yet another fever pitch in the united states. in the wake of manufacturing outsourcing in the 1970s and 1980s, us policymakers had pointed to in-person service work and “symbolic analyst” work as where americans could still outcompete other, globally dispersed workers (reich 1991). the growth of the internet, however, had opened american workers up to competition in programming and call center work as well. pink’s book a whole new mind was one example of a book that stepped in to repair the ideological rupture. it argued for a new source of american distinction and economic prowess: the creative industries. 7 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) figure 2. daniel pink’s book a whole new mind: why right-brainers will rule the future depicts a brain containing both binary code and music notes. a blurb by business writer tom peters on the cover declares, “this book is a miracle. completely original and profound.” the book argued that three factors threw up a competitive crisis for american symbolic analysts: “asia,” “abundance,” and “automation.” i will argue that each of these factors in fact figured asia as a problematic epistemic site. in pink’s writings, “asia” meant a massive, skilled labor pool that could take on “routine” left-brain, logical work ─ financial analysis, radiology, and computer programming ─ for lower wages than americans performing the same work. “abundance” meant an oversupply of consumer products, fueled by global factories usually located in asia. pink argued that oversupply, rewritten as almost a divine gift of plenty, was not a problem of capitalism. nowhere were there questions of environmental devastation or the construction of needs. rather, it was a problem of "curation." pink called for a new kind of worker who could make emotionally and socially 8 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) meaningful products that stood out in a crowded marketplace. if us workers were not manufacturing, they could step in as designers, curators, and those with aesthetic judgment and cultural sense. implicit in this argument was that workers in the factories elsewhere in the world could not provide such judgment. pink also warned that “automation” would eventually replace routine, left brain work ─ the kind of work asian workers now took on in the global economy ─ with machines (pink 2006). claims about automation are frequently claims about kinds of people. historian of science simon schaffer analyzes debates about automata, including the original mechanical turk, that people witnessed playing chess in public spaces during the late 1700s (1999). schaffer argues that debates about bodily, mental, and social mechanisms were debates about free will’s proper relation to emerging industrial capitalism (1999, p.126). enlightenment philosophers understood themselves as those who could stand apart and understand the mechanical principles of nature, bodies, and society. workers and artisans, in their philosophy, were like machines ─ devoid of sentiment or formal reason ─ to be understood and be managed (1999, pp. 126-130). with the industrial revolution, popular culture often represented women and children working in textile mills as machine-like workers, capable of the repetitive action; the yarn spinning device spinning jenny famously linked femininity to the machine (1999, p. 21). this vision of the machine ─ as in people, as in things ─ generated new visions of the properly human and less than human. sometimes, these visions emerge in the anxiety to differentiate the human from the merely mechanical. for example, gestalt psychologists grappling with emerging models of computational intelligence argued that the human mind could not be a deterministic machine, or even a feedback learning mechanism. they articulated “insight” as the capacity to find solutions not through trial and error, nor mechanical process, but as a perceptual shift (bates 2007, p.344). other times, imaginaries of automation illustrate technologists' imaginaries of what it is to live, 9 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) interact (suchman 2006; helmreich 2000), and labor (atanasoski & vora 2015). observing the same moment in which pink writes, lisa nakamura shows how world of warcraft machinima-makers produce racist representations of chinese players as “goldfarmers” indistinguishable from automated bots (2009, p.138). we might also think about the us geek quip, “go away or i will replace you with a small shell script” ─ once printed on thinkgeek t-shirts ─ as symptomatic of how certain programmer subcultures orient toward and wish for distance from the labor of those they find inconvenient.1 when pink cites asia and automation as threats to proper americans, then, we might ask how al gore’s speechwriter defines the proper american in contradistinction to those already conflated others. like enlightenment philosophers who must fashion a unique position for themselves by rendering some people and practices mechanical, pink calls on readers to become “high touch, high concept” workers ─ workers who create spiritually meaningful, standout products through art, narrative, and design. he builds on decades of management concessions to artistically expressive workers (boltanski & chiapello, 2005), and gives a nod to feminist critiques of abstract logic as a masculinist value (turkle & papert 1990, pp. 129-132). pink advised readers seeking to thrive in this brave new world to develop right-brain capabilities that generate value through culture, spirituality, and beauty. pink outlined “six senses” for “the conceptual age:” the first sense was design. pink then offered readers advice on how to become more design minded, including: keep a small, good looking notebook to inscribe inspirations, observations, and annoyances; read i-d, metropolis, o, the oprah magazine, and real simple; follow karim rashid’s manifesto and resist skill specialization. pink named design as part of his “conceptual age.” this conceptual age rested on the labors of industrial and mass labor arrangements that produced the abundant reproductions of the designers’ will (forty, 1986). the designer’s most important habitation would be one of conceptual production, and spiritual and personal integration as a means of value creation. 10 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) figure 3. a diagram from pink’s a whole new mind depicts temporal eras that begin with the “agriculture age” of farmers and move through “industrial age (factory workers)”, “information age (knowledge workers),” and “conceptual age (creators and empathizers).” each era moves higher along an axis that collapses “affluence, technology, and globalization” into a single mathematical identity. figure 4. an illustration from pink’s a whole new mind, complementing the diagram in figure 4, depicts a progression of humans from ape to farmer to welder to manager to artist. pink’s ideas expressed a broader public understanding of the proper place of the us in a global economic order shaped by intellectual property law, as well as the opening up of markets in eastern europe and asia as sources of labor and as potential consumer bases. american brands and patents ─ the stuff of the right-brained mind ─ could 11 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) become central to economic success while the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (stem) jobs celebrated during the space race now seemed more outsourceable. what is asia here? this moment of the “conceptual age” was precisely the moment when us trade negotiators were pulling asian nation-states into alignment with stronger intellectual property laws. the “conceptual age” glossed the ways that intellectual property regimes regulated the difference between good and bad creativity, and good and bad creators. historian kavita philip shows how liberal intellectual property critics like lawrence lessig cast asians as criminal pirates who “do nothing but take other people’s copyrighted content, copy it, and sell it” (lessig 2004, quoted in philip 2006, p.212). lessig is best known for developing creative commons licenses that sustain “remix culture” ─ creativity that avowedly draws on the labor of others without breaching the law. pink might have even called this curating. in free culture, a book published the same year as pink’s, lessig initially identified piracy with asia and eastern europe ─ post-socialist regions with different ethics of production and access. philip notes that free culture quickly drops reference to eastern europe and designates piracy as asian (2006. p.212). this racialization as uncreative pirates echoed depictions of chinese “goldfarmers,” incapable of play or aesthetic expression, in world of warcraft (2009). the trade agreements and international divisions of labor in pink’s “conceptual age” cast asians as mathematical, unaesthetic, rule-oriented producers. anxious north american publics recast these not as properties of jobs produced by labor processes and ip restrictions, but as properties of racialized people. conclusion: guarding “creative” difference in a global economy 12 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) figure 5. a t-shirt from stanford’s design journal depicts a torn piece of paper and a black permanent marker, iconic of design and innovation work cultures (irani et al. 2010). the shirt, in kraft paper brown, declares “math is easy. design is hard.” photo credit: author it was in this moment ─ 2005 to be exact ─ that a group of students at stanford university launched a design journal called ambidextrous. many were mechanical engineering and computer science students who wanted to think with both the left brain and the right brain, science and culture. their publication built community around the then new stanford d.school, or design school project that teaches design thinking around the world. as a recent graduate of the computer science department, i worked as an editor for the journal. the editor created a tshirt for the magazine made of brown cloth, signifying a relationship to kraft paper and hastily brainstormed design drawings. on the chest was the image of a torn sheet of white paper, a sharpie-style marker, and a declaration: “math is easy. design is hard.” the torn paper and sharpie indicated an ethos of creativity and innovation ─ fast thought, direct speech, working with the materials that are around. sharpies and paper are the material culture of schematic drawings, but also brainstorms ─ the labor of ideas produced at a fast clip, fluent collaboration with other emotionally intelligent team players. this shirt expresses economic anxieties in the face of the global reorganization of 13 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) labor. math, a skill valorized during the cold war “space race” (wissehr 2011), no longer promised us dominance. the declaration that “math is easy” naturalizes mathematical skill at precisely the moment when indian and chinese workers become available as a labor pool to perform that kind of work in globally networked capitalism. us “model minority” stereotypes about “asian math genes” (ng et al. 2016) become rough and ready tools for people making sense of changes in the geographies of production. instead of asking why capitalist dynamics attempt to make even skilled labor as cheap as possible, the stanford journal declares design as the valuable form of expertise.1 i heard this logic echoed in the hallways at google as designers discussed the threat of outsourcing to india; they concluded that programming could be outsourced. design, they concluded, was too “creative” to outsource. only those living on the edge of the future ─ a temporalization as old as colonial enlightenment and later modernization ─ could combine emotion, cultural cosmopolitanism, and technology to make good designs (see suchman 2011). the t-shirt built on a long history of the shifting lines between modern and backwards, civilized and savage, expert and non-expert. the t-shirt’s implicit argument was that design would remain american while math, once the apex of sputnik-era knowledge hierarchies, could belong to lesser intellects on the sliding scale of humanity. the argument was not quite right. ideo’s shrinking machine shop and turn to “design thinking” was a response to chinese workers trained for entrepreneurial adventures and to design products. in china, hierarchies of labor and subjectivities of work were also undergoing transformation as china reoriented toward global capital (chumley 2017; lindtner 2017; irani forthcoming).2 feminist science studies work even figures in this story. in shenzhen, lindtner argues that entrepreneurs draw on postcolonial and feminist influences as they seek new sources of inspiration and legitimacy to develop emerging technology enterprises (lindtner 2017, p.299). similarly, design thinking also selectively draws on feminist interventions into the philosophies of knowledge and technology 14 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) in the search for novel markets and value-producing projects. hierarchies of labor are a product of global political economies ─ trade agreements, investments in education, and accumulations of skill and performance that promise the production of value. skills like “design thinking” are particularly promissory. a “design thinker” promises insights, new markets, and aesthetic judgment, like a divining rod leading to new markets or domains of life ripe for intervention. those who possess cosmopolitanism ─ an affable, empathic rapport with consumers and corporate executives alike ─ can promise value in these worlds. those whom clients, investors, and immigration interviewers read as the right kind of cosmopolitan, even if not white,3 read as citizens of pink’s “conceptual age.” these are the racialized people whom mark zuckerberg defends when he defends the dream act.4 these are the immigrant startup founders the us department of state sought to recruit under obama-era start-up promotion laws. these are the very same racialized start-up founders steve bannon, former trump strategist, said overpopulate executive roles in silicon valley. economic nationalism depends on hierarchies of race and economic practice to mobilize people in the name of whiteness and economy. bannon shows the iron hand of this logic and ideo the velvet glove. in her analysis of biopolitics in the thick of pink’s “conceptual age,” historian kavita philip asks what the designation of “the pirate” as target of geopolitics and discourse tells us about the overlapping of political economy and constructions of difference. “the conditions of possibility for discourses about technology and authorship,” she argues, “are imbricated with emerging global legalities.” she traces how the pirate, a racialized figure of technoscientific production, emerges out of the legitimization of particular intellectual property regimes. those who did the copy work to make western media companies' products accessible found themselves criminalized as pirates as those firms turned toward emerging markets (sundaram 2010). “in the process of being produced as global technological citizens,” philip (2006) argued, “we are drawn into authenticating some kinds of equivalences and protecting some kinds of 15 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) difference” (p.205). at that moment, advocates of remix culture protected white difference by reconfiguring legalities to sanction curatorial creativities of “remix” while criminalizing the networks of production and circulation that made modernity’s media available where access failed to serve the project of profit. this paper follows philip's call by asking the function “design thinking” serves discursively and within a global political economy. legalities of intellectual property are certainly relevant here. so are the ways legalities, state educational investments, and nationalist projects in china produced the larger numbers of industrial designers with which ideo had to compete. rather than competing, ideo protected north american difference. powerful institutions like stanford minted and assisted in the circulation of this “mystical,” empathetic, creative vision of labor and personhood that requires the work of manufacturing workers, industrial designers, miners, and others to matter, but renders those labors mechanical and “easy.” philip calls for a feminist analysis that traces situated practices of technology through both discourse and political economy. jennifer hamilton calls this “the how of whiteness” (2017). the how of whiteness here is through the production of new categories of expertise. on its face, design thinking appears as a form of engineering that integrates feminized rationalities of storytelling and empathy. yet to treat design thinking as a feminist practice ignores the global divisions of labor and distributions of value that make this sensibility of touching, feeling, and making valuable and effective.5 notes 1 a harvard business school case study of ideo’s addition of “phase 0” service offerings corroborates john and rick’s oral history (2013). 2 these hierarchies of labor that privilege venture research labors over production labors also structure masculinities and classed subjectivities within china (lindtner 2017; chumley 2017). in china, “design” signals not just any aesthetic practices of formgiving and ornament, but one that signals a shift towards global capital and aesthetic communities (chumley 2017). 16 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) 3 whiteness is not a property of white people, but rather an orientation towards practices and codes racialized as white, and therefore superior (see fanon 1967). 4 academic achievement becomes a racialized marker of belonging; achievement legitimizes the exclusion of some minoritized people on the basis of the achievements of other minoritized people (e.g. “model minorities”). while dream act is often thought of in connection with latin@/chican@ identities, it formally includes on the basis of education or military service rather than race. aihwa ong (1996) points out that in the united states, racialization can masquerade as culturalization that renders some (racialized) practices and habitus more desirable for the nation without formal reference to race as a category (ong 1996:739). 5 this analysis of how labor process makes racialized and gendered subjectivities possible owes a debt to ethnic studies scholar evelyn nakano glenn who observed that black and immigrant servants made possible “the woman belle ideal for white middle class women” who employed them (nakano glenn, 1985:104; see also irani 2015). acknowledgements i am grateful to my fellow panelists and the engaged audience at our 4s 2017 panels. also, thank you to beth reddy, kavita philip, rebecca jordan young, katrina karkazis, and two anonymous reviewers for feedback on drafts. references adas, m. 1990. machines as the measure of men. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. atanasoski, n. & kalindi v. 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(2013). phase zero: introducing new services at ideo (a). case study. harvard business school. enloe, cynthia. curious feminist: searching for women in a new age of empire. berkeley, united states: university of california press, 2004. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsd/detail.action?docid=223994. euchner, j. "design thinking: an interview with roger martin: roger martin talks with jim euchner about the need to include intuitive thinking in the innovation process." research-technology management may-june 2012: 10+. business insights: global. web. 8 feb. 2014. fanon, f. (1967). black skin, white masks. new york, ny: grove press. forty, a. (1986). objects of desire: design and society from wedgewood to ibm. new york, ny: pantheon books. fouché, r. (2006). say it loud, i’m black and i’m proud: african americans, american artifactual culture, and black vernacular technological creativity. american quarterly 58(3), 639-61. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2006.0059. glenn, e. n. (1985). racial ethnic women’s labor: the intersection of race, gender, and class oppression. review of radical political economics, 17(3), 86-108. hamilton, j.( 2017). discussant comments. whiteness and technoscience i. 4s boston. 18 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) helmreich, s. (2000). silicon second nature: culturing artificial life in a digital world. berkeley, ca: university of california press. irani, l., dourish p. & mazmanian, m. (2010). shopping for sharpies in seattle: mundane infrastructures of transnational design. proceedings of the 3rd international conference on intercultural collaboration (pp. 39-48). new york, ny: acm publishing. irani, l. (2015a). difference and dependence among digital workers: the case of amazon mechanical turk, south atlantic quarterly ,114(1), 225234. ─── (2015b). justice for ‘data janitors’. public books. retrieved from http://www.publicbooks.org/justice-for-data-janitors/ lindtner, s. (2017). laboratory of the precarious: prototyping entrepreneurial living in shenzhen. women’s studies quarterly, 45(3-4), 287-305. ng, j., park, y. & hernandez, x. (2016). beyond the perpetual foreigner and model minority stereotypes: a critical examination of how asian americans are framed. contemporary asian america: a multidisciplinary reader (3rd edition), (pp.576-599). new york, ny: new york university press. oldenziel, r. (1999). making technology masculine: men, women, and modern machines in america 1870-1945. amsterdam, nl: amsterdam university press. pink, d.( 2006). a whole new mind. new york, ny: penguin books. reich, r. (1991). the work of nations: preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism. new york,, ny: a.a. knopf. schaffer, s. (1999). the enlightened automata. in w. clark, s. schaffer & j. golinski (eds.), the sciences in enlightened europe (pp.126165). chicago, il: university of chicago press. suchman, l. (2006). human-machine reconfigurations. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. 19 irani catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) ─── (2011). anthropological relocations and the limits of design. annual review of anthropology, 40(1), 1-18. sundaram, r. (1999). recycling modernity: pirate electronic cultures in india. third text, 13(47), 59-65. turkle, s.& papert, s. (1990). epistemological pluralism: styles and voices within the computer culture. signs, 16(1), 128-157. wissehr, c., concannon, j., & barrow, l. h. (2011). looking back at the sputnik era and its impact on science education. school science and mathematics, 111(7), 368-75. bio lilly irani is an assistant professor of communication & science studies at university of california, san diego. her book on cultural politics of innovation and development in transnational india, entitled innovators and their others, is forthcoming from princeton university press. she is a cofounder and maintainer of digital labor activism tool turkopticon. her work has appeared at acm sigchi, new media & society, science, technology & human values, and south atlantic quarterly and other venues. she has a ph.d. in information and computer science (emphasis: feminist studies) from university of california, irvine. microsoft word 71535_1_11_saychan.docx chan, a.s. (2018). decolonial computing and networking beyond digital universalism, 4(2), 1-7. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © anita say chan. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary decolonial computing and networking beyond digital universalism anita say chan university of illinois, urbana-champaign achan@illinois.edu the prominent collective of global scholars who wrote of decolonial thinking and the “decolonial option” in the 2007 essay series in the journal cultural studies did so urging a broader recognition of the diverse contexts and agents of knowledge production who long represented “a colonial subaltern epistemology.” they wrote to draw attention to the long and diverse histories of decolonial interventions that emerged to confront the “variegated faces of the colonial wound inflicted [over] five hundred years of… modernity as a weapon of imperial/colonial global expansion” (mignolo, 2007, mignolo & escobar, 2010). writing as researchers bridging conversations and debates across four continents, but facing the new millennium largely as scholars with roots and ties to latin america, they renewed critiques of how the colonial underpinnings of global knowledge production continued to reassert western frames of thought as universal scientific truths. and they underscored how this “historically worked to subordinate and negate ‘other’ frames [and] ‘other’ 2 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) knowledge,… reproduc[ing] the meta-narratives of the west while discounting or overlooking the critical thinking produced by indigenous, afro, and mestizos whose thinking… depart not from modernity alone but also from the long horizon of coloniality” (walsh, 2007, p. 224). they thus stressed the vitality of “other” forms of knowledge production occurring “beyond the academy” (mignolo & escobar 2010, p. 18), and highlighted the de-colonial options enacted by indigenous and other social movement actors as vital to future decolonial projects. pressing on “the importance of thinking within” and alongside the perspective of these movements (mignolo & escobar 2010, p. 19), they urged scholars not only to reimagine their roles as academic documentarians of movements (as actors still dedicated to a reproduction of dominant forms of modern epistemologies), but to decenter their own forms of knowledge practice by beginning to “think with [movements] theoretically and politically.” as such, decolonialists posed the significance of how cultivating a politics of decentralization and a decentering of the self as expert and knowledge practitioner – might offer an affront to modernity’s domination and its politics of self-replication through the occupation of other epistemologies. a decade later, as new forms of what we might call replicant politics (chan, 2018) have begun to globally spread, the decentering project of decolonialism and developing proposals for “decolonial computing” could not be more poignant. today, after all, growing national calls to ensure a reproduction of the familiar, to recenter some form of “the authentic” and to replicate some version of “us” free from the strange) or unfamiliar as the key matter and central means of securing futures in the context of rapid global change, have now proven to be the defining political force in diverse national contexts all across the west. in the face of such contemporary symptoms, adopting a parallel stance of self-preservation and insisting upon stronger modes of identity conservation may seem like the only choice for progressives. but decolonial computing frameworks highlight another potential, not only in recognizing the diverse vibrancy of existing challenges to “digital 3 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) universalist” models (chan, 2014) that problematically elevate narrow versions of western and elite digital practice and innovation as the only relevant pathway to the future, but in cultivating knowledge practices that indeed foster a decentering of the self as a generative asset towards the creative co-production of alternative futures. the extensive transnational and local organizing examples of various collaborative networks – from those extending from zapatista organizing, to the ddos stagings and virtual sit-ins emerging from the tactics of interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral alliances engaged within the electronic disturbance theater – demonstrate how a de-centering politic, less concerned with a replication of its own “centers” than with the generativity of collaborative organizing, emerged decades ago in early networked cultures (dominquez, 1998; lane, 2003; smith, 2016). today, the dynamic socio-technical networks of digital organizers across latin america that, in the cases i’ve studied around indigenous language software and digital media translations, often bring together open technology coders from across the global south and north, transnational media artists, rural and urban public school teachers, public sector workers, and quechua, aymara, and zapotec community organizers of diverse generational profiles to develop novel collaborative practices in distinct contrast to digital universalist imaginaries. while affirming that neither silicon valley, nor mit, nor wall street, nor any other privileged center of innovation and technology can subsume the diverse lived realities and local complexities that span across their positionalities, neither do they come together with the aim, hope, or expectation that some alternative “unity” across their network, or new centralizing force, will emerge. imagining technological futures with and in between the interfaces of the diverse forms of knowledge practice that come alive among them – and that can come together across differences, rather than in spite of it – instead becomes a key resource for imagining new digital futures (tsing, 2005). a range of mixed media collectives have emerged across diverse urban and rural contexts in the andes: from the escuelab civic hack lab 4 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) networks in lima1 and puno2 (sustained by organizers like kiko mayorga and neyder achahuanco apaza), to quechua3 and aymara twitter and blogging channels (sustained by organizers like irma alvarez and aymar ccopacatty), and aymara social media translation projects (sustained by organizers like jaqi aru’s ruben hilari4 and the instituto de lenguas y literaturas andinas-amazónicas’ amos batto5). these projects each draw together diverse actors (often across long distances between dispersed rural and urban sites) for routine collaborations that necessarily take place in physical (and not merely virtual) meeting space. in such encounters, widely diverse expertise sets and ethical commitments are bridged, spanning the knowledge practices of multiple generations of actors, and technical practices that emerge from global coding collectives, indigenous community leaders, and language activists, public school pedagogists, and transnational media artist networks. multiple orientations to time, nature, history and ethical and epistemological commitments are consistently channeled throughout. and no aim exists to center or anchor any single logic, assert a single version of right, or give spatial or temporal privilege to a given order. what one notes instead are multiple orientations that together work to disrupt the dominant framework that defines technology’s socalled globally “peripheral” actors as ones who were meant to be “leftbehind” and forgotten, or as irrelevant to work to creatively re-envision alternative economic or technological futures.6 working to sustain diverse collaborations around media, technology, and culture, such networks develop relations around decolonial computing that enact a shared ethics of de-centering to work across wide relations of difference and rework instrumentalist orientations of standard innovation ventures around time, history, and nature. while such elements are typically treated under dominant innovation practice as objects to control, optimize, or dominate within decolonial computing networks, they instead offer fertile grounds on which participants’ diverse orientations to such spatio-temporal-material elements can indeed to brought together to open new forms of relating across creative differences. 5 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) figure 1: photo archive of a software translation hackathon held in lima, peru’s escuelab civic hack lab space on november 11, 2011. like approaches for a post-colonial computing that lily irani, kavita phillip and paul dourish have called for that aim for expanded “tactics, ways of proceeding, and need-to-know approaches to reality that expand the transdisciplinary scope of what one needs to know,” (2010, p. 21) ,such developments around a decolonial computing perspective take seriously the new orientations required to “think within,” between, and among in the diverse perspective of wide-ranging and widely-situated movements both inside and outside traditional research spaces. writing now in 2018 as renewed calls for alternative and urgently needed forms of global political imaginaries that no longer take for granted a presumed stability and centrality of western liberalism and modernity are being called upon, such forms of open-ended relating and experimentation indeed yield valuable lessons. 6 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) acknowledgements my thanks go to the organizers and participants of the mixed digital media collectives in the andes, particularly irma alvarez and aymar ccopacatty, kiko mayorga and neyder achahuanco apaza of the escuelab civic hack lab, ruben hilari of jaqi aru and amos batto of the instituto de lenguas y literaturas andinas-amazónicas. my thanks as well to the support of the center for latin american and caribbean studies and the illinois program for research in the humanities at the university of illinois, urbana-champaign. and last but not least, many thanks to the organizing vision of paula chakravartty and mara mills, to the participants of the decolonial computing conference at nyu’s media, culture and communication department, and to michelle murphy and the editorial team of catalyst who brought this volume together. notes 1 http://escuelab.org/ 2 https://www.facebook.com/escuelabpuno/ 3 https://twitter.com/hablemosquechua 4 http://www.jaqi-aru.org/ and http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/05/140515_tecnologia_facebo ok_aymara_ar 5 http://www.illa-a.org/wp/ 6 in peru, the south american nation i’ve worked in longest as an ethnographer, various initiatives over the past decade have defied such limited digital universalist presumptions. before similar national proposals would emerge in countries in the west like france, for instance, peru had become one of the first nations – alongside china and brazil – where national legislation for the use of free and open source software in public offices was proposed in 2001 (this was also a year before city-scaled measures had been taken up in germany and italy, but not yet national ones). by the mid-2000s, hacker spaces and maker labs of basically every stripe – some based at universities, others at museums, and in cities and in rural sites alike, were growing dynamically across the country. and prominent digital initiatives, like the one laptop per child program, launched in partnership with mit, that helped ignite global 7 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) educational technology markets in the mid-2000s, gained its largest international deployment site in peru. references chan, a. (2014). networking peripheries: technological futures and the myth of digital universalism. cambridge, ma: mit press. chan, a. (2018). "data cultures and prediction proxies in the age of replicant politics." presentation for the society for the social studies of science annual conference, august 29. sydney, australia. dominguez, r. (1998) "digital zapatismo." thing. net. march 20. accessed from: https://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/digzap.html lane, j. (2003). "digital zaptistas." the drama review 47, 2: 129-144). mignolo, w. d. (2007). introduction: coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking. cultural studies, 21, (2 -3 march/may), 155 -167. mignolo, w. d. & e. a. escobar (eds.). (2010). globalization and the decolonial. london, gb: routledge press. philip, k., p., irani, l. & dourish, p. (2010). postcolonial computing: a tactical survey. science,technology, & human values. 37(1), 3–29. smith, e. a. (2016). "zapatismo in cyberspace: an interview with ricardo dominguez," rhizome.org. jan. 24. accessed from: https://rhizome.org/editorial/2016/jan/26/interview-with-ricardodominguez/ tsing, a. (2005). friction: an ethnography of global connection. princeton, nj: princeton university press. walsh, c. (2007). shifting the geopolitics of critical knowledge: decolonial thought and cultural studies "others" in the andes. cultural studies 21, (2-3 march/may), 224 -239. 8 chan catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) bio anita say chan is associate professor in the department of media and cinema studies and faculty fellow at the national center for supercomputing applications at the university of illinois, urbanachampaign. she is the author of networking peripheries: technological futures and the myth of digital universalism (mit press, 2014). she coleads the big data from the global south initiative under the european research commission-funded data-active project, and serves on the editorial board of the journal global perspectives. microsoft word 76937-1-11-20190131_thompson.docx thompson, v. (2019). how technology is forcing the disability rights movement into the twenty-first century. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © vilissa thompson, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary how technology is forcing the disability rights movement into the twenty-first century vilissa thompson institution ramp your voice, llc vilissa@rampyourvoice.com when i began blogging in 2012 for an online social work platform after graduating with my master of social work, i never thought my words would become a part of the disability online activism sphere, and i never imagined the impact we will make on the collective movement. technology, whether we love, hate, or avoid it, has been integrated into every facet of life in this decade, and those of us who use it for activism and connecting with each other often wonder how would our work exist without it. one of the joys of technology and online activism is the foregrounding of intersected voices, particularly those of color, that have been overlooked and devalued for too long. the disability community is the largest minority group in the united states and world, yet white male faces and voices have dominated our history and movement. disabled people of color have always been here and we are fighting for our rights since the beginning of the disability rights movement; the joyce jacksons (thompson, 2017a) and johnnie lacys (thompson, 2017b) of the movement cannot be ignored or be reduced to a footnote in recounting powerful leadership. omitting or minimizing the work of pioneers such as thompson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 jackson and lacy (who were instrumental to the start and progression of the independent living movement) is not only disrespectful to their contributions, but is sadly a commonplace practice in our retelling of disability rights history, which includes who receives accolades and recognition. personally, i created my own platform, ramp your voice!, in 2013 to add a unique perspective that i felt was missing—black disabled women/femmes. i was already writing about disability from the lens of a social worker as a way to combine the two worlds i am a part of. within social work, there was little representation of disabled voices, and i felt that i could fill this important gap with my perspectives. by writing in this way, i started to notice the invisibility not only within social work but also disability activism spaces as well. at that time, there were few disabled writers of color with platforms, specifically black disabled women and femmes. i believe many of us who started writing around that time understood the impact of the lack of representation and sought to do something about it. since 2013, there are more voices that sound like mine, but there is always room for more to bloom and be a part of this dynamic space online. technology gives us the ability to find the community we desperately seek, particularly those of us who live in areas that are not very diverse or where we cannot venture out safely or independently in our communities due to systemic and/or architectural barriers. blogging, vlogging, social media platforms such as facebook and twitter, and online forums shatter these barriers and give us the freedom to be seen, heard, and to tell our truths, call out the -isms and -phobias that we fight against every day, and, most importantly, connect with those who “get” us. these are the people we do not have to explain ourselves to; the unspoken agreement surrounding the ableist nonsense we deal with is significant when adding these relationships to our support systems. seeing people or stories you heavily relate to can also influence how you view and understand the interactions and experiences you have. for instance, when i created the #disabilitytoowhite hashtag in may 2016, it opened the thompson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 floodgates online for disabled people of color to share freely about the racism, exclusion, and invisibility we deal with everyday. the hashtag allowed disabled people of color to connect over the mistreatment and disadvantages we endure, and to not be forced to have such conversations in private. we can share the injustices publicly to not only raise awareness but also to hold people accountable for what is going on within our disabled spaces. the hashtag has been used to explain discrepancies witnessed and experienced, and to give a name to something we all have felt but did not have an accurate term for. technology, in the manner of hashtags, can be used to acknowledge gaps and bring us together to shed a light on issues that have gone unnoticed or unaddressed due to resistance against shaking up the status quo. technology is diverse in how we use it as a community. as a writer, my words are how i impact the world i live in and make my voice roar. the various ways to use technology, whether with words, videos, or hashtags, have dramatically shaped the issues the disability rights movement focuses on at any given moment. we are able to fight about why the americans with disabilities act (ada) matters while also declaring that we are proud of the bodies and minds we possess. if there is something you are passionate about as an advocate or activist, you can lend your perspective to the current conversations or start your own good trouble. disabled people are using technology to lead discussions (and when necessary, create controversy) on film and tv representation, fashion industry and inclusion, adaptive technology for video gaming, the rocky road to employment, and so on. the options are indeed limitless on what a person can establish as their particular niche to be heard. technology also removes the limits that traditional activism requires; many of us are not able to march in the streets, or our communities may have too many architectural barriers for us to navigate cities and buildings. for example, many of our rural and urban areas have broken or absent curb cuts or buildings that have not been renovated to provide wheelchair access—all of which can stymie our ability to protest safely and be fully included in demonstrations. being able to use a smartphone, tablet, laptop, thompson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 or camera to film and/or write our stories was the much-needed edge that was missing in this work. while some argue that online activism is not real activism, the impact we are making cannot be dismissed. for example, without technology, some of the major moments in our current history would not exist, and the new wave of leaders in our movement would be unheard of. the fight to save the affordable care act in 2017 was heavily influenced by the way disabled activists used technology to blog, vlog, and protest removing certain provisions and how it would place many of our lives in grave peril. this coming together not only was a victory, policy wise, but also allowed new activists to come on the scene and make their unique experiences known to the masses within and outside of the disabled community. seizing opportunities to not only reshape our government, but also dynamic voices in the community, is powerful to both new and established activists. the way i use technology for activism has empowered me in ways i never imagined. the ability to influence the progression of a movement, generate controversy on important issues that drastically affect my livelihood, and connect with other mighty individuals are some of the ways that technology is redefining both my world and others’. for many of us who once felt isolated, that feeling has lessened because we understand the power we possess to influence and connect is literally a keystroke away. there is no turning back, especially when multiply-marginalized voices are no longer silenced. this unexpected gain with technology is one that goes unnoticed, except by those of us who would not be as visible or heard in the movement if it did not exist. technology has pushed our movement and community to be intersectional and remove the monolithic tone that has to be shed. we as a community are better when we all are able to see ourselves, feel valued, and have the ability to be a part of a movement that we have always belonged to. thompson catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 acknowledgements i want to thank my beloved grandmother, viola c. thompson, who loved me fiercely and shaped me into the woman and activist i am today. to the black disabled people reading this: you are seen and loved tremendously. references thompson, v. (2017a, february 3). black history month 2017: remembering joyce jackson, black, disabled, & phenomenal. ramp your voice [blog post]. retrieved from http://rampyourvoice.com/2017/02/03/black-history-month-2017remembering-joyce-jackson-black-disabled-phenomenal/ thompson, v. (2017b, february 10). black history month 2017: johnnie lacy, defiantly black & disabled. ramp your voice [blog post]. retrieved from http://rampyourvoice.com/2017/02/10/black-history-month-2017johnnie-lacy-defiantly-black-disabled/ bio vilissa thompson, lmsw, is a macro-minded social worker from south carolina. ramp your voice! is her organization where she discusses the issues that matters to her as a black disabled woman, including intersectionality, racism, politics, and why she unapologetically makes good trouble. microsoft word gunderman-119-1134-4.docx gundermann, c. (2017). reading blood work is an art form: toward an embodied feminist practice of veterinary science and care. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (2), 1-28 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © christian gundermann, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article reading blood work is an art form: toward an embodied feminist practice of veterinary science and care christian gundermann mount holyoke university cgunderm@mtholyoke.edu abstract what are the advantages of a concrete, embodied relationship between human subjects and their non-human objects of care for the veterinary process of knowledge production? the scientific reductionism that frames formal studies makes much of the knowledge gained in those studies questionable or severely limited, since many important factors of real life illnesses and their causation and cure are excluded from consideration for the sake of clinical control and traditional scientific objectivity. this essay narrates my experience with my mare lilly who suffered from a rare auto-immune disease; at the same time, it describes and analyzes the history and strategies of the world's largest internetbased equine patient advocacy network on metabolic illness, a network that supported my journey of knowledge acquisition and contribution, through our case history, to a larger alternative veterinary cause of knowledge production. located between feminist science studies and critical animal studies, this project explores the notion of touch and raises questions about the biomedical field's present-day heavy reliance on visual diagnostics. what is the relation between visual technologies and the detached, disembodied knowledge "from nowhere" that conventional science believes in? how much of the alternative to 2 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) this way of knowing lies in touch, embodied assistance, relationality, and intuition? and finally, in observing and documenting the relationship at the heart of this venture around knowledge, my essay also suggest that this is a queer project where queerness is understood as the careful but radical reconfiguration of kinship in the context of haraway’s recent call to “make kin, not babies.” introduction how to begin? who is the reader?1 how to frame the argument? how to write an academic article about a deeply personal experience, one whose utterance collides with any number of traditional academic limits? this project is about medical treatment, care ethics, t/technologies, r/research, gender, and internet communities; it is also, perhaps most centrally, a challenge to the millennial distinction in western thought between “the animal” and “the human.”2 biomedicine is built on the backs of nonhuman animals, but what happens when an animal is actually the patient? these lines all converge in my percheron-cross mare lilly.3 and now it is about grief as well. what is care if not the practice of becoming worldly?4 what does care have to do with gender?5 what is the connection between grief and care? what are the communities where humans and equines commingle that have arisen from these contexts of care and grief? how do they function, and what are the roles of biomedicine and various technologies in their creation of biocitizenship? what are the discursive constraints in academic writing around care and grief, particularly when other animals are concerned?6 what are the complex temporalities of such writing? in this piece, i move away from the cold-body, anatomy-hall practice of science, which, in newtonian fashion, approaches and frames the body (and nature at large) as a set of distinct, independent entities, substances, and mechanisms: objects of study and intervention. based on a feminist critique of scientific reductionism, and particularly on karen barad’s agential realism, this writing instead seeks to move toward understanding reality as intraactive, framing certain specific physical functions as dynamic relations 3 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and energy exchanges. in other words, i wish to leave behind a mechanistic vision of the body and approach health and illness as the embodied experience of warm bodies that are always entangled in energetic exchanges. such a practice must steer clear of the traditional academic disembodiment of the writing voice. my grief, which is one central energetic mode of entanglement here, is not an additional strand, at will to be added to, or subtracted from, the study of, say, the fluctuating hormone levels of the patient, but a constitutive element of warm-body medicine. this project has, in its production, already bridged the period from summer 2013 to summer 2015 and now 2016/17 (as i revise sections of this in 2016/17 for publication). as i reread it with the hindsight of the tragic outcome of 2015, the hopeful tones of the 2013 draft read as hopelessly naive, blissfully innocent. what processes of violence do i bring to bear on one material-discursive construct (lived reality with lilly) to transform it, step by step, into another, an academic text? lilly is dead now, many years before her time. she died in the middle of my writing process. my attempts at healing her from her afflictions have failed. was it inevitable? are treatment and cure illusions, a “god trick,” part of the disembodiment of scientific knowledge (haraway, 1988, p. 581)? what about academic writing? my outlook on what traditional science, various alternative sciences, and even the academic writing process have done for us is more pessimistic now than it was in 2013. finding a diagnosis was as elusive as producing an orderly narrative, but i hope to show that there may be good reasons to eschew either or both.7 how to live with her last call to me for help? on the early morning of july 18, 2015, the only help i could offer was euthanasia, trying to steady her panicked, thrashing body on the ground for a seemingly endless, yet much too short, hour until the veterinarian arrived with the gentle, lethal intravenous cocktail: those two unmistakable bright-pink syringes of pentobarbital. lilly was never much of a talker; when she “spoke,” it was significant. “help me!” and now this memory of her call for what i could not give (or did give?) is precious and painful. help me leave my body? or help me 4 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) get up? how do we confront our impotence in the face of those who believe that we can help? is this ultimately the predicament of medical doctors, a pressure before which many have retreated into high technology? my grief works itself into the interstices of rational analysis, into previous drafts of this account, splitting and shattering it further. how does death reposition my quest for health—lilly’s health, my own? my grief is not of the gentle kind, a mournful sadness. the english term grief seems deeply appropriate in its proximity to violent emotions such as despair, anguish, distress, pain, but also in its association with grievance, aggravation. i howl “like an animal” (but i am an animal; how can i howl like one?), extruding, expelling my soul for hours every day until i collapse, with “a violence that brings [my language] to the limits of speakability” (butler, 2000, p. 80). furthermore, this very writing brings a grievanc e, levels a plaint against the “man of science, ” against science, against what does it mean for me to say this in an academic paper? to quote judith butler to legitimize my words—or, on a more optimistic note, to draw on the work of one of the trailblazers of academic speakability of our age? as butler’s reading of antigone insists, the realm of unintelligibility remains and will remain opaque to a certain degree. i cannot and do not expect to become completely intelligible within academic language through this project, but now that grief forms a constitutive part of it, i note, observe, sputter out what can, at least partially, be said while preserving the opacity, the mystery of my experience. queering kinship: “make kin, not babies!” this is the witty slogan in haraway’s urgent call to rework kinship in the face of climate change and planetary destruction. queer feminism has everything to do with such a need to restructure kinship. feminists should “exercise leadership in imagination, theory, and action to unravel the ties of both genealogies and kin, and kin and species” (haraway, 2015, p. 161). “my purpose,” she argues, “is to make ‘kin’ mean something other/more than entities tied by ancestry or genealogy” (p. 161). what other forms of expressing my “inalienable right to procreate,” my affective (and biological?) need to mother/father, are there that do not make more humans? how to rethink cross-species relations to their fullest potential (involving love, care, and grief) that are not second to the “real thing”? how to confront what haraway bravely mentions as the immediate suspicion (“and who can blame them”) that my insistence to exclude myself explicitly (programmatically?) from the (human) baby-making business represents “neoimperialism, neo-liberalism, misogyny, and racism” (p. 164) is merely an expression of my white privilege? how to claim family sick leave at work to care for my recumbent lilly? how to explain that six pm is not a good time for committee meetings because it’s dinner time in my barn? (my childbearing colleagues wield stronger arguments in the “work/life balance” debate!) lilly and i are queering the genealogies of mothering, fathering, brothering, and sistering (and even fathersistering or brothermothering? cousingrandfathering?). we are trans-species warriors. 5 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) my own impotence. just as in antigone’s case, our culture continues to deem this violent response to the visceral experience of death inappropriate, obscene, private at best. like antigone, i erupt into the public sphere of academia (this bastion of rational, humanist thought) with a claim to my “right to grieve” (butler, 2000, p. 80). this claim may appear even more scandalous in that the object of my grief is “just an animal” (like me!). to be sure, here reside some of the political aspects of this grief’s unintelligibility, in the very sense that butler attaches to antigone’s claim and that she intimates is queer, a radical reworking of kinship. and then the question: is a better science project, a warm-body anatomy, not always the outcome of grief? the logistics and circumstances (ninety-degree weather, weekend) made organizing an autopsy difficult, so science and its cold-body epistemological comforts once again retreated in favor of simply accepting what had happened without “that kind of knowing.” why did lilly “suddenly ” die? why had she been slowly starving to death between march 2014 and july 2015? (so was it sudden, or drawn out, or both?) why wild speculations on the frequent, continuous, even excessive, use of anthelmintics in contemporary horses (some owners give anthelmintics, i.e.dewormers, with the daily grain): in the wild life of our bodies, the evolutionary biologist rob dunn suggests that our human bodies have evolved to coexist with many other species. in the chapter on crohn’s disease, he analyzes an alternative medical practice which involves the insertion of hookworms and pinworms into the gastrointestinal tracts of patients with crohn’s, which in many cases has induced remission; biomedicine does not understand why and tries to brush the treatment off as placebo. dunn’s argument is that the human gut has evolved to be in struggle with worms and that modern hygiene has eliminated this companionship. out of “boredom” or “longing” for the lost worms, the immune system begins to attack the “host’s” own body: our bodies are “eating their guts out” (dunn, 2011, p. 23). the continuous use of anthelmintics is a recent phenomenon in horses. so is the emergence of equine ibd. would biomedicine do better with autoimmune disorders if it chose to take haraway’s notion of cum panis (companion) seriously rather than continue with a paradigm that understands disease to stem from “infection,” from the intervention of an extraneous aggressor (pathogen) whose elimination is biomedicine’s mission? 6 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) could no one make sense of it? why is so much knowledge apocryphal with horses? why was she not diagnosed (or not officially, or, at least, not when there was time)? in fact, equine inflammatory bowel disease (ibd) is beginning to crop up in research papers on what are labeled as “emergent” diseases; while prognosis is poor, research into this rare condition is beginning. however, just like there is a solid barrier between medical research and what trickles down to the practitioners in the field, particularly with rare diseases, the likelihood of finding diagnosis and proper support from local veterinarians is slim. a guardian needs enormous amount of initiative, endless emotional resources, and often deep pockets to help an individual affected by such a disease.8 how much does “this kind of knowing” matter to me? the kind of knowing “for sure” based on biopsies, autopsies, “hard” evidence?9 lilly’s own primary-care veterinarian, a research-oriented man, was not research-oriented enough to provide us with a proper diagnosis while lilly lived: only two years of head-shaking. he did not bother to consult the latest publications, as i eventually did. i came up with equine multisystemic eosinophilic epitheliotrophic disease (meed), one of the subcategories of ibd, or possibly granulomatous enteropathy (ge), two related autoimmune-mediated malabsorption disorders. i come to this hypothesis (corroborated by a young veterinarian who has come into our lives recently, but too late for lilly) based on observing and interpreting symptoms and data such as blood chemistry and tactile observations made day and night for half a decade. but i don’t know “for sure” in the way that veterinary medicine claims that meed or ge can only conclusively be diagnosed: invasively, through biopsy or necropsy. i hypothesized too late, trusting that the “man of science” knew best. the point is that we missed the opportunity to experiment with corticosteroids. my consolation is that even with corticosteroids, the prognosis for horses in an advanced stage of meed or ge is poor. so the abyss of knowing and the abyss of not knowing devour me simultaneously as i consider what i failed to know when there was time to act. 7 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) what would it mean to “act”? action toward health? i, the griever, berate myself for not having acted (enough). but why should i consider death “the worst outcome” by definition and illness the most undesirable state, to be eliminated as soon as possible?10 what, then, is objectionable to me about my “man of science,” lilly’s veterinarian, failing to diagnose her affliction or provide treatment options (however elusive)? what is wrong with embracing her return to the bowels of the earth when her own bowels became unable to provide sustenance for her? will i want the same nonintervention for myself when the time comes? “composting is so hot!” as haraway insists (2015, p. 161). when is it best to diagnose, “know,” act, and when is it best to accept, surrender, compost, know otherwise? how much life justifies how much suffering for whom? how to know? i opted not to know “conclusively” (necropsy) in order to conclude otherwise. conclude: to end, to close, to lock, like the earth closes a body off from the living? but does it? do not the “inconclusive” ruminations, the digestive dynamics of earthly existence, continue inconclusively in the bowels of the earth (and my mind)? is my mind equivalent, parallel, related, to the earth in how we digest (compost) my mare’s physical remains?11 throughout my life with lilly and throughout this project, i am and have been torn between science’s epistemological comforts and promises and the realization that much of it is ultimately grasping at straws. w hat is the value of measuring? can there be measurement without theory, theory without measurement, and to what extent is all theory an art form?12 during certain periods (months at a time), i took lilly’s temperature rectally at least twice a day and kept a diary: the most basic of medical measuring techniques, marrying the intimacy of our daily rituals to the ancient technology of the diary. this data now allows me to construct a graph of her body temperature between february 3 and 20, 2013, the period of the most acute crisis where she was mostly recumbent. 8 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) graph 1: daily recorded body temperature of lilly there was likely (definitely?) an infection between december 2012 and march 2013, peaking in february. but was it due to a particular identifiable external pathogen (borrelia? ehrlichia?) or internal sepsis caused by intestinal lesions? i regularly (what is regular?) had blood drawn to measure glucose, insulin, and blood levels of the pituitary hormone acth. what does that tell me now? what did it tell me then? as some veterinarians explained to me after this blood work appeared inconclusive, these are snapshots in time. blood chemistry fluctuates over time, over weeks, over the course of a day. reading blood work is an art form, not an exact science. we start from a hunch. what, then, is an exact science? an impractical and unaffordable chimera? in order to gain more exact knowledge, we would need to draw blood ten times a day, every day, for several weeks. who can afford that without health insurance? which health insurance system would support this model of science? how practical would it be, how much more accurate or valuable is this information than my intuitive sense that my horse is doing well or not? looking into her eyes and knowing? is the graph above inherently more useful, objective, consequential, effective than my diary? the devil is in the details, and the details are overwhelming: hence scientific reductionism. how do we construct our k/knowledges? what is static and what is information? is a medical expert needed to sort static from 9 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) information? can the lay expertise of the owner/guardian prove to be equally, or more, useful? and how often does knowledge come late, too late to make a difference? the logistics of having in my care an ill horse limit the reach of science’s epistemology in more blatant ways than with an ill human: knowing is a matter of transportation (how to get her to a hospital, hours away, in her state, given that she needs strength to stand in the swaying, bumping, shifting trailer), of hydraulics (how to lift her body when she cannot get up), of body density (the limits of x-ray and ultrasound imaging for equine diagnostics), of the length of the intestines (equine anatomy makes a colonoscopy impossible), of prey-animal psychology (the stresses of the confinement and immobility associated with hospitalization). but the question remains whether these epistemological limits do not apply to human illness as well, albeit to a different degree in a world that is tailored to human needs, designed with the size of the human body in mind.13 what was complex in 2013, when i began this writing process, is now perhaps on the brink of chaos. i do not pretend to find definitive answers to all or even any of these questions; the prognosis on my own project is “guarded,” but still i don’t want to refrain from asking them, as they drive the process of my investigation forward more than any progress narrative at which i could be grasping. with irigaray, i engage in the spirit of the question to move us away from the center to the margins of the discourse. biocitizenship with nonhuman animals: building patient activism for horses with metabolic illness the following paragraph was written in 2013. i will quote it as such in its entirety because its tone of voice so jarringly clashes with my reality in instead, i am going to make an effort—for one cannot simply leap outside that discourse—to situate myself at its borders and to move continuously from the inside to the outside. luce irigaray, “questions” (1985, p. 122) 10 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 2015/6, yet illuminates a crucial moment in time: briefly the back story: from november 2011 on, lilly, then my riding and training partner and companion of four years and my next of kin, has had a series of severe, life-threatening health crises. local veterinarians have been unable to help at best, and in one particular episode—a misdiagnosed and untreated serious infection—have caused great suffering due to their incompetence and lack of attentiveness while shamelessly charging for their shoddy services. there are grounds for a lawsuit but i do not have time or energy to engage in litigation culture. horses continue to be legal property, not subjects. lilly’s net value is negligible. in any case, chances are that she will live. i will be unable to leave her for more than a few hours at a time for at least the next ten to twelve months to administer her medications five times a day in particular sequences. what sustains us through this journey are internet communities. thanks to them, lilly will likely live despite local incompetence. i choose to leave this paragraph unaltered to leave a performative trace of the jagged temporality of my journey with lilly, the constant retroactivity and belatedness both of my care and my “sleuthing.” i also leave it to document the particular anger i felt toward “local biomedical incompetence,” in opposition to my utopian construction of the alternative internet communities that were promising that we would get through lilly’s health crises. patient activism generally arises to fill a need not met by existing professions and institutions, both to pressure them and to provide mutual emotional support. finally, what is at stake is also the construction of belonging, of kin and companionship. my current position on these communities is not fundamentally different from what it was in 2013. i will, in what follows, engage with the challenge to traditional veterinary structures brought forward by internet patient activists, but i must now acknowledge that the nature of lilly’s illness obviated a cure or management of her symptoms based on the knowledge produced by this activism. this is not a criticism of the 11 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) movement but rather the realization that lilly’s illness simply made her fall outside the roster of their hard-won expertise. she probably didn’t suffer from what these communities have evolved around, but nevertheless we are indebted to them: in part because they helped mitigate some of her symptoms and, even more crucially, because they provided an invaluable emotional support network. what is the nature, what are the obligations and rights of these belongings? how do diagnostics—both in the form of the biomedical diagnostics industry and the alternative communities that weave their discourses through and against it—inflect our queer trans-species reworking of kinship, as mentioned previously? do we, do i, belong to these communities even though lilly likely did not suffer from the diseases they address? how does her death affect my biocitizenship in them? what are my continued obligations to their mission of alternative knowledge production? as dumit demonstrates in “illnesses you have to fight to get,” a major player in the complicated dynamics around emergent diseases in the human context is the institutional interaction between biomedical practitioners (particularly primary-care physicians), hmos or other insurers, and the patient (2006, p. 577). many patients with contested illnesses (often classified as “syndromes”) fail to get health coverage and thus cannot afford treatment. if you prefer: “many patients…cannot get health coverage and are thus unable to afford treatment. since health insurance is still a rare occurrence in the equine context, the institutional discontent in owners of horses with emergent diseases is directed more “simply” against the biomedical field’s various practitioners, as well as the allocation of research funds. the psychological and moral pressures around “non-biologizable” illnesses in humans is different from those in equines as well, although there are parallels. nettleton analyses the considerable moral pressure on patients resulting in guilt, ambivalence, and self-doubt in the context of “medically unexplained symptoms” (mus) (2005, p. 1168). the owners of horses with mus, misdiagnosed, or dismissed symptoms and disabilities are often put under pressure by trainers, veterinarians, and other equestrian humans to pressure the horses to perform “until they either break or get better,” and thus the horses themselves also become the recipients of our medical uncertainties and biomedicine’s simplistic definition of what constitutes proper illness. nettleton’s foucaultian historicization of the hegemonic biomedical idea “that the origins of disease are located within the interior space of the body” is particularly suggestive in this context (p. 1168). to legitimize our existence as patients, i argue, we thus cannot work symptomatically to heal them, but have to locate the origin of the malaise in logocentric fashion in order to eliminate it and return the organism to a full functionality that is itself never critically understood as an idealized, ableist phantasm 12 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) for the sake of brevity, i focus here on the second community i joined after my mare came down with laminitis, the equine cushing’s insulin resistance (ecir) network. since early 2012, we have been supported by dr. eleanor kellon, a research veterinarian based in pennsylvania. on a shoestring budget and in collaboration with other volunteer activists, kellon has mounted a large internet research and support network for guardians of horses with various metabolic conditions, most prominently: insulin resistance (ir) and pituitary pars intermedia dysfunction (ppid, also known as “equine cushing’s syndrome”). the yahoo group “ecir” (equine cushing’s /insulin resistance) currently has more than 12,000 members globally and includes thousands of case histories. the group now possesses the “largest field trial database in the world” for these disorders (www.ecirhorse.org), and is registered as a public charity under 501(s)3. in 2015, the group identified the following key focus areas: • building a bridge between formal research (conducted in veterinary research institutions) and real-life experience with ppid/ir horses • other related forms of outreach, particularly toward international veterinary information service, but also expansion and continued growth of the group’s three internal platforms: the ecir yahoo group, the ecir facebook page, and the informational website ecirhorse.org • strengthening of a core area of ecir groups, the volunteers. trained at the university of pennsylvania, and actively involved with science-based research and publication, kellon continues to be the group’s most active link to formal veterinary research. she is one of ecir’s most competent policers of scientifically unfounded theories or solutions. as part of this ethos, any claim members make as to what constitutes successful treatment of their horses has to be backed up by hard and fast data. this rule was instituted, no doubt, in response to the ever-increasing number of “snake-oil vendors” in the field of equine health and nutrition who gain access to semipublic forums such as ecir in order to indirectly market or promote their products, and in those contexts often prey on confused and desperate horse guardians in crisis. 13 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) up until very recently, ir and ppid were so poorly understood by traditional veterinarians that, from the late 1990s onward, the internet rapidly became the main source of horse information for guardians. nevertheless, i would argue that the group provides insufficient epistemological and even logistic critique of institutionalized scientific knowledge production. since its inception in 1999, ecir has sought to serve as a bridge between its “field trial databases” and formal research. early on, for example, some members provided blood samples from numerous horses diagnosed with ppid for formal studies at cornell’s veterinary college. one particularly seminal study, based on an ecir member’s contributions in 2004, debunked the common veterinary hypothesis that elevated sugar and starch levels in fall grasses alone caused laminitis, a severe and complex inflammatory condition of the hooves, in ppid horses. the study showed that the seasonal change in hormone levels in ppid horses occurred even without access to fall pasture and without any changes to a low-sugar/low-starch diet. these contributions were then formalized and published in a study in a major veterinary journal (donaldson, 2005). this confirms the important role of the group in discovering the seasonal change in hormones in ppid horses, thereby enabling the early detection of ppid in horses before the catastrophic development of laminitis. the relevant hormone test is now a regular veterinary procedure in the field and several national laboratories offer it as part of their normal services, which most certainly occurred in response to the activist demand from many horse owners/guardians over the last decade and a half. ecir has been instrumental in focusing and championing that demand. the distinctive feature of kellon’s networks is their combination of cutting-edge science and accessible, free-of-charge support. within science-based networks, in which she functions both as an insider (with her strong pro-science ethos) and an outsider (she is personally not institutionally sponsored), her forte is to provide practical, undogmatic questioning of established wisdom and protocols. her approach is 14 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) always eminently “field-based”: in other words, founded on the experiences of real horses and real owners rather than the controlled and reductive environments of formal studies. nevertheless, she does not reject the knowledge gained in formal studies and often refers ecir members to them. she teaches and encourages old-fashioned carebased methods such as layperson observation, diary keeping, and selfeducation through popular online science courses, and in this way integrates newer technologies in crucial ways. on february 6, 2013, i joined ecir (already having been a member of the epsm group since january 2012) after receiving a condemning set of x-rays. these radiographs confirmed that lilly’s pedal bone had rotated by six degrees, sunk toward the sole of her hoof, and detached itself from the laminae that bind it to the hoof walls, due to severe inflammation. this inflammatory state, laminitis, is an overdetermined symptom, the showcase phenomenon for what nettleton calls “medically unexplained symptoms.” the symptom’s cause, in lilly’s case, remains nebulous to this day. there are several theories, some of which i espoused as probable cause in 2013 but have since put in doubt or rejected. the first possibility is a misdiagnosed infection with ehrlichia, a tick-borne bacterium. the attending veterinarian failed to treat it with antibiotics, as he should have. the second theory was that lilly had an early onset of ppid (as hypothesized by dr. r., up until that point lilly’s primary-care doctor). this is now the least likely cause, as it was never confirmed by any data. the third, and now strongest, hypothesis is that, due to her ibd, she was already developing intestinal lesions and may have developed an infection due to those lesions. thanks to my diligent temperature-taking between december 2012 and april 2013, there was a demonstrable period of fever, suggesting an infection of sorts. but early in 2013, i had no inkling of the possibility of ibd. without that hypothesis—and since the other two causes seemed equally unlikely, yet there had to be some trigger—in consultation with various members of ecir and kellon herself, i decided to treat them as equally possible, and put together a program that consisted of a continued low-carb diet, 15 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) antibiotic treatment (doxycycline) for three months, and the dopaminereceptor site blocker pergolide, just to cover all possible bases, until her laminitis subsided. the attending veterinarian was pessimistic as to lilly’s prospects and advocated for euthanasia. this is consistent with a more oldfashioned, pre-ecir approach to laminitis in horses, where the “lack of use” of a horse over an extended period of time (usually at least a year to allow for full rehabilitation) and the intense personal care involved often exceed what owners are willing to invest. the “mantra” developed by ecir is ddt+e: diagnosis, diet, trim + exercise. this mantra that allowed them to challenge the established, euthanasia-centered approach to laminitis effectively. the first d invokes the group’s investment with science. diagnosis means here that the cause of laminitis has to be determined and eliminated, usually based on a combination of lab work and close observation. the most common causes are elevated acth levels (leading to excessive cortisol levels in the blood, typical for ppid horses) and insulin resistance (which, not unlike type 2 diabetes in humans, also causes inflammation; the laminae are a common target for inflammation in the horse’s body). ir is exclusively managed through diet, but ppid requires pharmacological intervention with pergolide mesylate, a dopamine inhibitor that also blocks the receptor sites for acth in the brain (used to treat parkinson’s disease in humans). the approach to ppid obviously depended on the availability of acth testing in laboratories, specific veterinary knowledge in how to handle the blood sample, and the marketing of pergolide at an affordable price, as well as education in how to dose and administer the drug correctly. preceded by direct action of the sort that act-up championed against government agencies in the 1980s and 1990s, ecir also pressured the food and drug administration in 2007 with an online petition and a barrage of fedex packages during the “great pergolide scare,” when the agency threatened to prohibit the bulk manufacturing of pergolide in compounding pharmacies across the country.14 in considering ddt+e, we see the functioning and mission of the 16 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) ecir group in a nutshell, as well as the kind of horse owner it serves. most ppid horses with a good chance to live are under the vigilant care of humans motivated enough to educate themselves to educate their veterinarians, farriers, and trainers. the owner of a ppid horse needs to assemble a team and manage it carefully, typically at home (not a boarding facility). one of the striking phenomena of kellon’s networks is that their members—the response team, the experts, virtually everyone involved— are women. it is no accident that kellon’s specific research and support structures bear the mark of a female-identified genius. the entire approach is based on close caring relations.15 owners/guardians provide detailed data based on daily interaction and documented in diaries. the yahoo group also provides emotional help and grief support to owners. there is an open acknowledgment that we not only have tight and intimate relations with our equines that need not be camouflaged, but that those relations, rather than standing in the way of science and knowledge production, are prerequisites for the work. in this sense, while remaining committed to a number of mainstream biomedical institutions and ideologies that operate according to the principles of mechanistic cold-body anatomy, ecir opens the path in important ways toward a feminist practice of embodied, warm-body science. embodied science in practice i am concluding with an example of embodied science in practice, or “what ‘having a body’ means in relation to scientific work” (latimer, 2013, p. 13). the notion of touch (as gendered female) raises interesting questions about (the genderedness of) the biomedical field’s present-day heavy reliance on—indeed, pioneering advances in—visual diagnostics. what is the relation between visual technologies and the detached, disembodied knowledge “from nowhere” in which mainstream science believes (haraway, 1988)? how much of the alternative to this way of 17 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) knowing lies in touch, embodied assistance, relationality, and intuition? is a fusion of the two technologies possible, desirable, even necessary or inevitable when the quality of life of the patient is the main goal? in order to explore these questions against the backdrop of lilly’s history, i would like to return once more to the question of podiatry in horses. the profession of the farrier has its history as a craft, and as such is eminently empirical and based in practical applications. “no hoof, no horse” used to be a matter of human survival, but continues to be of highly practical importance for horses as individuals. more recently, however, and particularly when there are manifest pathologies, farriers have begun to work closely with veterinarians and their advances in visual technologies, most notably portable digital x-ray equipment, which lets the practitioner in the field immediately apply the “insights” gained. in february 2013, right at the beginning of lilly’s second bout of laminitis, the “condemning” set of x-rays mentioned earlier clearly showed both the rotation and sinking of the coffin bone. figure 1 is an x-ray of her left front foot: figure 1 by way of contrast, consider figure 2, the radiograph of a healthy hoof without p3 rotation: 18 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 2 the coffin (or pedal) bone, the most distal bone of the limb, has a triangular shape that, in this x-ray, has rotated by several degrees, as compared with the nonpathological hoof, where it lines up parallel to the frontal hoof wall (seen in a more transparent color to the left of the coffin bone). in addition, the sharp tip of the coffin bone in lilly’s hoof has sunk down and is pressuring the (thinning) sole (or bottom of the hoof, the interface with the ground). the coffin bone is attached to the hoof capsule (composed of horn) only through connective (soft) tissue, called “laminae.” the rotation causes the bone to tear those laminae away from the hoof wall with the hundreds of pounds of weight that each limb bears, causing the associated pain and lameness. to match the x-ray image up with a look at the foot from the outside, figure 3 shows an external photograph of lilly’s same left front foot figure 3 as i mentioned earlier, within less than twenty-four hours, ecir’s emergency response team sent me a marked-up image of the x-ray as well as the original external photograph, with detailed instructions on how to trim the hoof in order to relieve lilly’s pain and initiate her process of rehabilitation toward realignment. 19 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 4 figure 5 the white triangle in the external photo (figure 4) represents the estimated position of the coffin bone inside the hoof capsule. the green and blue lines in both external photo and radiograph (figure 5) represent the changes in the external hoof shape to be made. the yellow wedge gives a sense of how the hoof wall is tearing away from the rotated coffin bone, opening up a gap where the laminae are stretched and weakened. the brown lines with the arrow above indicate how much the whole bone structure has sunk down within the hoof capsule, as compared to where it should be located. this technique clearly takes advantage of x-ray technology to explain the forces at work in this pathology and to suggest the necessary 20 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) steps for intervening mechanically. internet and long-distance interventions (the responder was located thousands of miles from us) limit the scope of technologies heavily to the visual, lending x-ray technology a clear advantage. however, farriers working with veterinarians in the field also now use digital radiography to visualize the changes they make as they proceed; in this way, farriery draws on the visual advancements of modern biomedical technologies. in addition, farriers often have the horse they treat sedated and/or anesthetized by the veterinarian, thus receiving their feedback primarily from the high-tech interface, not dialogue with the patient. lilly and i had the great fortune to find, through ecir, abigail nemec, a highly trained farrier experienced in laminitis rehabilitation who was local enough to rush to us physically. she proceeded differently from the plan the internet farrier had proposed. while nemec considered the xrays and markups, she evaluated lilly’s feet and the entire horse with her hands, her intuition, and active communication with the patient, then decided that lilly would not be able to tolerate the interventions suggested. she worked closely with lilly’s feedback on each millimeter of change she made to her hoof shape. her decisions were based as much on external visual aspects of the hooves as on the way they felt in her hands. furthermore, each horse’s tolerance for pain is different, as well as how they communicate that pain (stoic? hysterical? internalized? optimistic?); their reactions to changes in hoof angles must inform a good trimmer’s decisions on how far to go or even in which direction to go. a good rehab farrier will also have some immediate feel for how the horse will tolerate the changes in the days following the intervention. the trims became long collaborative sessions in which nemec communicated intimately with lilly; lilly’s input was as important as what visual biomedical technology was providing. there was an artfulness to nemec’s method that could most accurately be described as a dance, particularly in the martial-arts-balanced ways she dodged lilly’s compromised body as it occasionally collapsed during the trimming sessions. lilly’s relief and subsequent recuperation were achieved as 21 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) much due to this intimacy as to nemec’s anatomical knowledge and ability to read a radiograph. epilogue: toward an embodied health science the central intellectual problem of our time is that of complexity. —lewontin & levins 2007, p. 183 confronted with the serious limits of scientific reductionism (a topic i enacted earlier in my demonstration that blood work with the hormone acth was, within a mechanistic framework, only potentially useful if, unrealistically, we could draw blood a thousand times over several weeks), much of science has recently cast its lot with large data. however, if the problem were only that we just don’t have enough time and world to process complexity (and complexity is certainly preferable to simplicity), then large data would indeed offer the solution. in the biomedical context, large data creates the illusion of addressing the complexity of embodied existence without abandoning the objectivity of a reductionist, mechanistic approach. it allows the practitioner to hide behind the smokescreen of scientific objectivity while admitting that simplicity and monocausal pathways are insufficient. it thus enables the survival of cold-body anatomy in an updated version. in this parting act, however, i want to suggest instead that living bodies are more than highly complex mechanical assemblages (with which large data might have a better chance), more than the sum total of their various systems that we can [the] reductionist focus has been the principal orientation of our science since the seventeenth century. it searches for the smallest particles in isolation and assumes that they will behave in the same way when assembled in the whole. it is an approach that works well in engineering where the parts are built by design and can be tested in the laboratory. in the biological and social sciences it is a useful research tactic but as a philosophy it creates a pattern of knowledge and ignorance that in the long run is harmful and makes us more vulnerable to surprises. (lewontin & levins, 2007, p. 183) 22 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) continue to study and manipulate in newtonian fashion. i want rigorous sciences that are open to this insight; that are informed by a baradian understanding that all forms of distancing and cartesian cutting are temporary and ultimately inadmissible strategies in a universe where players “intra-act” rather than interact. there is no outside from which to observe, analyze, and manipulate. i want sciences that move away from framing embodied life in terms of distinct particles, substances, and mechanisms and begin to address the energetic entanglement and relationality of all embodiment. so i return once more to haraway’s plea that feminist science should not so much give up on visuality as masculinist altogether, hopelessly ensnared in the “god trick,” than reimagine what a feminist and embodied visuality would be in conjunction with other forms of sensory input (1988, p. 581). i hasten to add that this includes even input that we cannot define as sensory in a conventional way (sound, smell, taste, touch), although the outcome (the “healing”) could make it “evidence-based” after the fact. our farrier’s sense (sensory and supersensory) that lilly’s laminitis case would likely not benefit from some of the adjustments suggested by the disembodied internet responder originated from her reading of the x-rays themselves. nemec “knew a few things” about horses like lilly, thanks to her lived and embodied experiences: horses built like her (whose biomechanical forces were likely to produce a certain outcome); horses who think and act like her; alpha mares who need to feel in control in order to heal; mares who will hide their pain. nemec’s intuition was confirmed when she saw lilly in person and heard what lilly had to say. no radiograph will tell you that, although some of “that” may be encrypted in it if you know how to read carefully. what ended up happening in this encounter between nemec and lilly was the full range of what, in feminist science parlance, might be called an embodied feminist methodology and a practice grounded in such an embodied knowledge production, and perhaps something more, a feminist onto-epistemology–cum–dynamic trans-species pedagogy. advanced visual biomedical technologies, then, become another tool, in 23 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) equal need of intuitive and intellectual use as more traditional hands-on techniques as well as supersensory abilities, and need to be carefully balanced against and with them. reading radiographs, like blood work, is a (scientific) art form. we need scientists who are also artists. notes 1 i wish to thank jennifer hamilton and jacquelyne luce for their incisive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 2 throughout the essay, i follow this special issue’s distinction between institutionalized mainstream science and alternative forms of scientific knowledge production by capitalizing terms associated with the former. 3 i am fully aware that this project, like my life in general, operates within the parameters of late-capitalist pet-culture logic, in which the care of some animals is purchased at the expense of others (grier, 2006). but to become aware of one’s attachments is neither to transcend them completely nor to remain uncritically caught within them. paraphrasing donna haraway speaking about her dogs, i ask: “whom and what do i touch when i touch my [horse]? how is ‘becoming with’ a practice of becoming worldly?” (2008, 35). my project rises up against “subjectless queer critique” of emotion and attachment in recent queer scholarship on species (luciano & chen, 2015, 194), where “to feel for others, to love and to grieve…remains as normatively white as the figure of man” (190). i affirm, with haraway, that “touch does not make one small; it peppers its partners with attachment sites for world making” (2008, 36) because, as van dooren argues about haraway’s engagement with dogs, it “draws us out into complex interwoven histories of co-evolution and broader patterns of co-becoming” (2014a, 293). in the case of horses—my horses—these histories and worldings involve such practices as war, colonization, animal testing, pet culture, pregnant-mare-urine estrogenreplacement therapy, and the horse racing industry, to name just a few. 4 for a discussion of the concept of care along similar lines to mine, consider maria puig de la bellacasa, “‘nothing comes without its world’: thinking with care” (2012), and haraway, when species meet (2008), both of whom develop care in proximity to love, curiosity, as well as 24 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) critique. as van dooren succinctly puts it: “as an affective state, caring is an embodied phenomenon, the product of intellectual and emotional competencies: to care is to be affected by another, to be emotionally at stake in them” (2014a, 291). 5 for foundational work on this topic, consider carol adams and josephine donovan (2007). 6 grief also constitutes one of the battlegrounds of human exceptionalism, as it was until recently considered to be an exclusively human affect. ethological studies on many species have demonstrated the falseness of this assumption. as an outstanding example of this work, consider van dooren’s “mourning crows” (2014). 7 jutel and mcbain (2012) understand diagnostics as the creation of an organized narrative out of a “disorganized story” or “disorder” (1533). 8 i do not have space to theorize my economic positionality properly here. suffice it to say that, as a white queer academic who does not “come from money” but has limited human-family obligations and a stable income, my pockets were not deep enough to consider high-end hospitalization for lilly without declaring bankruptcy. this consideration seems relevant in the current political discussions over government deregulation of the involuntary service of human health care. veterinary service, sometimes mentioned by conservatives as a model of health care deregulation, is considered “voluntary” because we have the option of electing euthanasia rather than treatment. 9 in “do we really need to know?” (jutel & mcbain, 2012), the authors demonstrate that often what we consider medical knowledge may be inconsequential for the treatment and the outcome. 10 see also weinstein’s concept of “critical life studies,” which serves to critique “the remnants of humanism buried in the concept life itself” (2015, p. 237). 11 wilson (2008) points to the link between gut and brain in depression. what is relevant for me in this context is the naturecultural breakdown of the mind-body binary, where the “gut” ceases to stand for a particularly essentialized “dumb matter” paradigm (p. 379). 12 i have in mind here karen barad’s quantum-physics-based arguments about the mutual imbrication of theory and measuring, kept apart in 25 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) newtonian physics: “measurement practices . . . must be a part of scientific reasoning: that is, bohr situates practice within theory” (2007, p. 121). 13 it is important to keep in mind that the “size of the human body” is an ableist fantasy. “compulsory able-bodiedness . . . emanates from everywhere and nowhere” (mcruer, 2006, 8). 14 see https://www.ipetitions.com/petition/savepergolide 15 see adams’ and donovan’s discussions about the connection between care, ethics, and gender. references barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, nc: duke university press. butler, j. (2000). antigone’s claim: kinship between life and death. new york, ny: columbia university press. donaldson, mark t. et al, (2005). variation in plasma adrenocorticotrophic hormone concentration and dexamethasone suppression test results with season, age, and gender in healthy ponies and horses. journal of veterinary internal medicine, 19(2), 145–146. donavan, j., & adams, c.j. (eds.) (2007). the feminist care tradition in animal ethics. new york, ny: columbia university press. dumit, j. (2006). illnesses you have to fight to get: facts as forces in uncertain, emergent illnesses. social science and medicine, 62, 577–590. dunn, r. (2011). the wild life of our bodies: predators, parasites, and partners that shape who we are today. new york, ny: harpercollins. grier, c. (2006). pets in america: a history. chapel hill: university of north carolina press. 26 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) haraway, d. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. feminist studies, 14(3), 575–599. ———. (2008). when species meet. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. ———. (2015). anthropocene, capitalocene, plantationocene, chthulucene: making kin. environmental humanities, 6, 159-165. irigaray, l. (1985 [1977]). this sex which is not one (c. porter & c. burke, trans.). ithaca, ny: cornell university press . jutel, a., & mcbain, l. (2012). do we really need to know? journal of the american medical association, 308 (15), 1533–1534. latimer, j., & miele, m. (2013). naturecultures? science, affect and the non-human. theory, culture, and society, 30(7/8), 5–31. lewontin, r., & levins, r. (2007). biology under the influence: dialectical essays on the coevolution of nature and society. new york, ny: nyu press. luciano, d., & chen, m. (2015). introduction: has the queer ever been human? glq, 21(2–3), 183–207. mcruer, r. (2006). crip theory: cultural signs of queerness and disability. new york, ny: nyu press. nettleton, s. (2005). “i just want permission to be ill”: towards a sociology of medically unexplained symptoms. social science and medicine, 62, 1167–1178. 27 gundermann catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) puig de la bellacasa, m. (2012). “nothing comes without its world”: thinking with care. sociological review, 60(2), 197–216. van dooren, t. (2014a). care. environmental humanities, 5, 291–294. ———. (2014b). mourning crows: grief and extinction in a shared world. in s. mchugh & g. marvin (eds.), the handbook of human-animal studies (pp. 275–289). new york: routledge. weinstein, j. (2015). posthumously queer. glq, 21(2–3), 236–238. wilson, e. (2008). organic empathy: feminism, psychopharmaceuticals, and the embodiment of depression. in s. hekman & s. alaimo (eds.), material feminisms. bloomington, in: indiana university press. bio christian gundermann is chair of gender studies and associate professor of gender studies at mount holyoke university. christian gundermann understands theory as a daily practice like breathing and eating. he teaches students in different contexts as diverse as the interpretation of films, the history of the queer movement, the questioning of the human/animal boundary, the historical study of horsemanship, the practice of body modifications, the connections between feminism and the sciences, the nexuses of power, knowledge, pleasure, and suffering etc. that there is no practice without theory, and that every theory is always already a practice. microsoft word 71499-1-11-karolina agata kazimierczak.docx kazimierczak, k. a. (2018). medical imaging and the "borderline gaze of touch and hearing": the politics of knowledge beyond "sense atomism. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-209. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © karolina agata kazimierczak, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article medical imaging and the "borderline gaze of touch and hearing": the politics of knowledge beyond "sense atomism" karolina agata kazimierczak university of aberdeen k.a.kazimierczak@abdn.ac.uk abstract this article traces different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration and breast examination) involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer and suggests that they might be productively considered as “visualization apparatuses.” drawing on auto-ethnographic data and medical literature, it explores how these apparatuses make visible and help materialize a particular bodily configuration (e.g., a simple cyst as a benign breast disorder). in examining side by side the practices and devices commonly characterized as medical imaging such as ultrasonography and the more mundane apparatuses such as syringes or trained eyes and fingers, the article draws attention to the non-given nature of image and imaging, and to the equally non-given nature of the distinctions between vision, touch and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing. in doing so, it seeks to problematize the traditional partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and epistemological modalities, while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch and hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledge-making. 2 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) bringing together feminist (haraway, 1988; puig de la bellacasa, 2009; barad, 2007; 2012) and post-phenomenological (ihde, 2007; ingold, 2000) work on knowledge-making and perception with the concept of synesthesia (harris, 2016; hayward, 2010; marks, 2002), it argues for a certain knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism,” which helps us to rethink not only the apparent distinction in the different sensorial universes but also, more broadly, the questions of knowledge, politics, responsibility and accountability. introduction [t]he medical gaze embraces more than is said by the word “gaze” alone. it contains within a single structure different sensorial fields. the sight/touch/hearing trinity defines a perceptual configuration in which the inaccessible illness is tracked down by markers, gauged in depth, drawn to the surface, and projected virtually on the dispersed organs of the corpse. the “glance” has become a complex organization with a view to a spatial assignation of the invisible. … the medical gaze is now endowed with a plurisensorial structure. a gaze that touches, hears, and, moreover, not by essence or necessity, sees. (foucault, 2000, p. 164). the medical gaze, the cornerstone of the sociological imagination of the relationship between vision, knowledge and embodiment in the space of the clinic (foucault, 2000), has long been seen as linking the different sensoria within one perceptual and epistemological configuration. michel foucault speaks in this context of the local, “borderline gaze of touch and hearing” practiced by physicians (2000, p. 165). applying his concept to the case of a computer tomography suite, medical anthropologist barry f. saunders notes how “looking comprises a multiplicity of gestures” (2010, p. 18). and yet, while other senses might be involved in its “plurisensorial structure,” the organizing principle of the gaze and of the clinic often appears to be that of a fundamental visibility concerned with the spatial arrangements of bodies (foucault, 2000, pp. 164-165). the 3 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) practices and apparatuses of medical imaging seemingly contribute to this visual regime as they help produce particular reconfigurations of objects/bodies in terms of sets of images or image data (prasad, 2005). the materiality of these visual arrangements and the devices and practices which help to constitute them has been widely discussed; on the one hand, in the tracing of the conditions of development and production of particular imaging technologies (joyce, 2006; koch, 1993; pasveer, 1989; yoxen, 1987); and, on the other hand, in the careful articulations of the clinical practices in which they are involved (joyce, 2005; prasad, 2005; saunders, 2010). contrary to popular imaginaries, the visual in the clinic is not virtual; it does not make the patient and her embodied experience “disappear behind the images” (blaxter, 2009, p. 764). neither is it representational if we are to follow feminist science studies scholar karen barad’s understanding of representationalism as a metaphysical framework separating the world into “the ontologically disjoint domains of words and things” (2003, p. 811) or “representations” and “ontologically separate entities awaiting representation” (2007, p. 49). as she notes in her discussion of fetal ultrasonography, the apparatus “does not allow us to peer innocently at the fetus, nor does it simply offer constraints on what we can see; rather it helps produce and is part of the body it images” (2007, p. 202). in this context, the fetus and the ultrasound image are not separate entities but rather parts of an ontologically inseparable phenomenon constituted in the intra-action of the “object” and the “agencies of observation.”1 following barad’s understanding of apparatuses as “instrument[s] of power through which particular meanings and bodies and materialdiscursive boundaries are produced” (2001, p. 80),2 in this article i want to trace different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer and to suggest that they might be productively considered as “visualization apparatuses.” i use this term to refer to these instruments, technologies and practices, which have power to render objects/bodies visible, that is, observable 4 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and knowable, but – importantly – only as part and parcel of their own apparatus. these “visualization apparatuses” and the notion of visibility they entail can be seen to encapsulate different optical systems (embodied or otherwise), and the possible configurations of images or image data. but, crucially, they need to be understood also in relation to other perceptual systems and other types of data. drawing on auto-ethnographic work, on oncological and radiological literature and on feminist science studies and postphenomenological accounts of sensory perception and knowledge, i want to explore how the three biomedical apparatuses (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) make visible and help materialize a particular bodily configuration of which (importantly) they are part: a simple cyst, a benign breast disorder. by examining side by side the practices and devices commonly characterized as medical imaging, such as ultrasonography, and the more mundane apparatuses, such as syringes or trained eyes and fingers, i want to open up for inquiry two important issues related to visualization and its apparatuses. firstly, i want to draw attention to and problematize the notion of medical imaging technologies as given and predefined objects or entities. the non-givenness of imaging technologies needs to be understood not only by recognizing that, as “apparatuses of observation” in the sense suggested by barad (2003, p. 815), these technologies are not separable from their objects of investigation but rather intra-actively materialized together with these objects. the non-givenness of these technologies needs also to be understood in terms of acknowledging that, as the objects of inquiry, they are not separable from the specific practices, in which they are located, including our analytical practices. imaging has sometimes been defined as relating to specific technologies and practices involved in the configuration of images (see, for example, papenburg et al., 2015). in this article i want to explore the broader genealogies of three different medical apparatuses, and investigate how some of them (i.e., the ultrasound and its digital display) come to be 5 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) included in the biomedical imaginary of imaging, while the other (i.e., needles and syringes in fine needle aspiration, or eyes and fingers in medical examination) come to be excluded. in the process, i also want to explore what specific modes of sensing and knowing are involved in making these differentiations. this last question brings forth the second and central concern of the article. by bringing together these diverse practices and apparatuses, i want to explore and problematize the relationship between vision, touch and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing in biomedicine. in various diagnostic practices for breast cancer, seeing might be understood as always already dependent on different forms of hearing and touching with/in different bodies, both human and non-human (as sonic waves are transduced into electronic ultrasound images; or as the suction of a syringe in fine needle aspiration draws out and makes visible bodily fluids); touch might also be a “listening-touch” (harris, 2016) (as piezoelectric crystals of an ultrasound transducer vibrate in response to electric currents and ultrasonic waves), and both can be understood as visualizing devices, or “haptic-optic” systems (hayward, 2010, pp. 580581), which help render particular bodies and particular bodily conditions (such as a simple fluid-filled breast cyst) visible and intelligible. this insistence on the problematic distinctions between vision and touch, touch and hearing, and vision and hearing is not meant to suggest that biomedical practices and apparatuses are simply multisensory, nor that the different sensoria are indistinguishable as modes of perception. rather it suggests that vision, touch and hearing, as modes of sensing and knowing, cannot be taken for granted, as already given, distinct from one another, and from the phenomena, which they render knowable, but are more appropriately understood as such in particular instances of seeing/touching/hearing/knowing and in relation to specific practices and apparatuses. in this article i therefore seek to problematize the traditional partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and epistemological modalities while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch 6 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledgemaking. drawing on the feminist tradition of situated knowledges (haraway, 1988) and response-ability (barad, 2007; 2012) and on nonatomist (ihde, 2007; ingold, 2000) or synesthetic understandings of sense and experience (harris, 2016; hayward, 2010; marks, 2002), i want to argue for a relational understanding of sensory experience and the related conception of knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism.”3 bringing together the feminist and post-phenomenological work on knowledgemaking and perception with the concepts of synesthesia, i suggest, can help us to rethink not only the apparent distinction in the different sensorial universes but also, more broadly, the questions of knowledge, politics, responsibility and accountability. knowledge politics of vision, touch and hearing as noted by maria puig de la bellacasa, feminist theorist of science and technology, vision has been “the dominant metaphor in modern knowledge-making and epistemologies” (2009, p. 298) and, as such, subject to much feminist critique. the key point for this critique has been the traditional linking of vision with a particular version of objectivity, what donna haraway (1988) calls the “god trick” (pp. 581-582), an epistemological orientation marked by the disengaged view “from everywhere and nowhere” and by the absolute separation of the viewing subject from the object of its conquering gaze. the reclaiming of vision both as a metaphor and as a specific field of sensory experience is the fulcrum of haraway’s argument for situated knowledges (1988). wrested away from the illusions of disembodiment and transparency, vision can no longer be conceptualized as single or totalizing but rather as splintered into partial perspectives which are always finite and locatable and never innocent: “vision is always a question of the power to see – and perhaps of the violence implicit in our visualizing practices. with whose blood were my eyes crafted?” (pp. 585, emphasis in original). the embodied and located vision of situated knowledge does not remove or 7 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) negate this violence; instead, it allows us to become accountable for it, “answerable for what we learn how to see” (p. 583). this vision is best characterized by the optics of diffraction rather than that of reflection, concerned as it is with “the production of difference patterns in the world, not just of the same reflected – displaced – elsewhere” (haraway, 1997, p. 268). following haraway’s project of re-appropriating vision for feminist knowledge politics, puig de la bellacasa (2009) turns to touch as the foundation of situated and committed knowledges. tracing the move from vision to what she calls “touching visions” in feminist theorizing, she explores the potential of touch in problematizing “abstractions and disengagements of (epistemological) distances – between subjects and objects, knowledge and the world, affects and facts, politics and science” (p. 298). in this context, touch appears to be linked with the fuller recognition of the matters of embodiment, relationality and engagement. the reversibility of touching contact, the possibility of “being-in-touchwith” oneself and another, of being materially involved with/in the tangible world in its ongoing transformations – these seem to be the promises of touch as a sensorial universe and as a metaphor for knowledge-making. but, as puig de la bellacasa suggests, turning to touch does not mean replacing the illusions of distance and transparency with those of the embodied, unmediated immediacy. situated knowledges reclaiming touch, just as those re-appropriating vision, are not immune to injustice or violence; they give no assurances of final resolution, rather they open up spaces for accountability. as barad notes: “touch is never pure or innocent. it is inseparable from the field of differential relations that constitute it” (2012, p. 215). touching involves a response to the other, where the other and the self are not already given but constituted in mutual “response-ability.” touch is thus a matter of responsibility understood not as an obligation of the self toward the other but as a relation integral to the ongoing worldly materializations within which the self and the other are articulated and materialized (barad, 2007, p. 265). it is the responsibility for these articulations and materializations, for the 8 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) material consequences of our world-shaping (touching) visions, that marks feminist knowledge politics.4 the feminist projects of reclaiming vision and touch have been paralleled by the anthropological and post-phenomenological work revaluing the significance of hearing as a mode of sensing and making sense of the world (ingold, 2000; ihde, 2007; rice, 2008). the “auditory turn” (ihde, 2007) has looked to sound and hearing as a way for a more participatory and relational engagement between subjects and objects: listening to the voice of the other, giving voice, being immersed in a shared stream of sound, traversing the boundaries of inside/outside. as touch before, hearing seems to suggest the possibility of redressing the distancing and objectifying orderings of vision: “[t]here is an old and deeply held tradition that vision ‘objectifies’, and, contrarily but not so widely noted, there is also a tradition which holds that sound ‘personifies’” (ihde, 2007, p. 21). and yet, for don ihde and tim ingold, this turn to sound and hearing is not meant to idealize the auditory experience but rather to draw attention to the problematic understandings of experience, perception and knowledge as implied by the dominant visualist tradition. this tradition, according to ihde, introduces a certain “sense atomism” (2007, p. 46), which, firstly, conceptualizes experience in terms of distinct and separable sensory systems and, secondly, enacts a radical break between sense and significance, between perception and cognition. as ingold explains: at the heart of this approach is a representationalist theory of knowledge, according to which people draw on the raw material of bodily sensation to build up an internal picture of what the world “out there” is like, on the basis of models or schemata received through their education in a particular tradition. the theory rests on a fundamental distinction between physical and cultural dimensions of perception, the former having to do with the registration of sensation by the body and brain, the latter with the construction of representations in the mind. (ingold, 2000, pp. 282-283)5 9 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) he further argues that it is only through this “narrow conception of thought” (p. 287) that vision had come to be seen as an objectifying sense and thus opposed to the seemingly more participatory mode of hearing. drawing attention to sound and hearing opens up a possibility for intervening into this limited understanding of vision and knowledge. the “auditory turn” thus constitutes not only the reclaiming of sound and hearing, but also the reclaiming of vision as a field of sensory experience, and as a metaphor for thought. knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism” crucial for ihde’s (2007) and ingold’s (2000) understanding of knowledge and perception is the resistance to “sense atomism” or the partitioning of experience into separate and separable modes of sensing.6 drawing on phenomenological understandings of experience, these authors suggest that in the actual sensory and perceptual practices seeing, touching and hearing are not distinct activities but intermingled aspects of the bodily engagement with/in the world. this problematic separation of the different modes of sensing has often been illustrated by the phenomenon of synesthesia, that is, the capacity to perceive a sensation related to a particular sensory modality in response to a stimulation of another (e.g., seeing certain forms or colors on hearing particular sounds). as ingold (2000, p. 268) notes, the very category of synesthesia relies on and further reproduces “a two-fold distinction between sensation and perception on the one hand, and between discrete sensory modalities on the other.” but, as illustrated by such synesthetic concepts as “haptic visuality” (marks, 2002), “fingeryeyes” (hayward, 2010) and “listeningtouch” (harris, 2016), the notion of synesthesia nevertheless introduces the possibility of disrupting these distinctions, and in doing so, contributes to a non-atomist, non-representationalist, response-able politics of knowledge. media theorist laura marks uses the concept of “haptic visuality” to trouble the separation between vision and touch. on her account, 10 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) haptic perception, “the way we experience touch both on the surface of and inside our bodies” (2002, p. 2), forms part of the visual experience of cinema. this entails a certain embodied and tactile vision where the eyes act as organs of touch, feeling as well as seeing the textures of the cinematic image. haptic visuality is thus constituted through particular forms of images, “haptic images,” but also, and more importantly, in the reconfiguring of the relationship between images and their viewers, between the objects and subjects of the gaze: haptic images do not invite identification with a figure so much as they encourage a bodily relationship between the viewer and the image. thus it is less appropriate to speak of the object of a haptic look than to speak of a dynamic subjectivity between looker and image. (p. 3) eschewing identification in favor of an embodied, dynamic relationality, haptic visuality thus seems to follow the diffractive optics of situated (touching) visions. following marks’s concern with haptic optics, feminist science studies scholar eva hayward proposes a notion of “fingeryeyes” as a way of attending to the “synaesthetic quality of materialized sensation” (2010, p. 580). but, her concern is not as much with the relationship between the viewer and the image as with the possibilities of sensing across different sensoria, different media and, most importantly, different species. looking at the laboratory encounters of marine biologists and their critters, hayward suggests that vision and touch are not separate or separable but remain in the relationship of “constitutive supplementarity,” which is expressed in and generates particular textures of the world (p. 582). in this understanding of sense and sensory experience, the eyes and the fingers and, equally, the tentacles, are not seen as distinct organs of perception but rather as inseparable from (within) the body’s sensorium. vision and touch are amalgamated and slide into each other as fingers and eyes and tentacles converge in moments of sensitization. importantly, in these instances of sensing, species do not simply react to one another and to their environment, rather they manifest “with and of” 11 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) the environment and the other, thus constituting “a sensorial ensemble” (p. 593). the notion of “fingeryeyes” thus troubles the sensory, bodily and species boundaries while also hinting at the power relations inherent in the embodied haptic optics: cross-species sensations are always mediated by power that leaves impressions, which leaves bodies imprinted and furrowed with consequences. animal bodies – the coral’s and mine – carry forms of domination, communion, and activation into the folds of being. (p. 592) as such, it calls forth and makes space for response-ability in sensing and knowledge-making. coming from the field of medical anthropology, anna harris’s concept of “listening touch” offers parallel insights into the distributed nature of sensation and the permeability of bodily boundaries (2016). exploring the ways in which medical students are taught and acquire the skills necessary for the clinical technique of percussion, she suggests that listening and touch are not confined to and experienced through their respective organs of the ears and the fingers, rather they constitute a form of “body-listening touch” (p. 42). as the training physicians pay attention to the pitch as well as the vibration of the percussed bodies, the auditory and tactile experiences become intertwined within the movements of the sensing body: “listening-touch in percussion is not a single moment. as the finger-hand-wrist moves, the ear anticipates. the body works in coordination and listening-touch is distributed throughout the technique” (pp. 37-38). interestingly, for harris the concept of “listening-touch” problematizes not only the distinction between touch and hearing. similarly to haptic optics and its diffractive touching visions, it also helps to trouble the separation between the subjects and objects of perception, as (in the case of self-percussion, an important technique for clinical training) the percussing bodies also become the resonating ones. the synesthetic notions of “haptic visuality,” “fingeryeyes” and “listening-touch” contribute to a conception of knowledge politics beyond 12 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) “sense atomism” as they challenge the representationalist and individualist – in the sense suggested by barad (2003, 2007), ingold (2000) or ihde (2007) – metaphysical approaches which separate subjects and objects of perception and divide sensation into distinct domains of different senses and their respective organs. these concepts do not simply imply that perception is multisensory or multimodal; they also indicate the inherent intra-activity of sensory practices which are also, importantly, knowledge practices. writing about the “robotic tactility” feminist science studies scholar claudia castañeda (2001) suggests that touch cannot be understood in any general abstract terms as a given. rather it needs to be seen as constituted through particular embodied relations, particular encounters between bodies and worlds, where touching bodies and the nature of their relation are not already established “in advance of an encounter” but are materialized through them (p. 230). the notions of “haptic visuality,” “fingeryeyes” and “listening-touch” extend this understanding of touch into other modes of sensing and knowing. in this view, seeing, touching and hearing need to be conceptualized – to paraphrase castañeda’s words – as relational qualities that arise out of embodied intra-actions. as i will argue in the following parts of the article, this has important consequences for our understanding of medical imaging technologies and other diagnostic “apparatuses of observation” (barad, 2003, p. 815) not as already given but as intra-actively constituted in particular instances of seeing/touching/hearing/knowing, which also importantly help determine what comes to be understood as vision, touch and hearing in biomedicine. what follows is the discussion of the three different “visualization apparatuses” involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer (ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination). this discussion draws on various sources of data, including auto-ethnographic field notes, patient information leaflets, radiological and oncological literature, and historical and philosophical accounts of different imaging technologies.7 13 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) imaging bodies, imagining vision dark room, lying on the bed, half turned toward the ultrasound screen and the doctor who stands next to it. cold gel on the breast and the sensation of the transducer probe moving over the skin, coming back to the same place over and over again. not looking at my breast but at the screen, where more than fifty shades of grey are swirling. among the grey and greyish, the blackish spots move. is it what the doctor is looking for? yes, this is a cyst, the doctor says. do you want me to drain it off today? again the greyish swirls on the screen, the blackish spots among them. a sharp scratch now, says the doctor. the sharp stinging sensation in my breast, but still i am not looking there. i look at the screen. and, suddenly, a thin long shape in the lighter shades of grey moving through the swirls. this is a needle, i think to myself. the greyish shape meets with one blacker spot, then another, and both of them vanish. ah, these are the cysts. then, the thin shape disappears from the screen too. only the grey swirls remain. the needle has been taken out. it is now drained, the doctor says. were there one or two cysts? i ask. two, he confirms. ah yes, i could see it on the screen, i say, proud of being able to “read” the scan correctly. so it was only some fluid? yes, look, it’s here, the doctor says and shows me the syringe with a yellowish fluid inside. so, these are the cysts too. you can touch your breast and see that it’s gone now, the doctor says. obediently, i touch my breast, but i am worried to press too hard in case it hurts. full of tension and apprehension i cannot say whether i sense any change. still, not to disappoint the doctor i say: oh, yes, it’s gone. thank you! this scene in the dimmed clinical room with the ultrasound machine at its center is one among several episodes constituting my encounter with diagnostic practices for breast cancer. it takes place on an early evening 14 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) in late january 2016, almost three months after my discovery of a suspicious lump in my left breast and an urgent visit to my local gp, resulting in a non-urgent referral to the breast clinic at a large teaching hospital in scotland. the setting for this scene is disturbingly familiar, even if the circumstances are not: a few years earlier i had spent long hours in the rooms and corridors of the same out-patient department, not as a patient but as an ethnographer following a group of men diagnosed with prostate cancer. this does not prepare me for being the subject of the clinic’s gaze, but it makes me aware of its various “apparatuses of observation” which help to render particular bodily arrangements determinate as cancerous or non-cancerous. a brief information leaflet received together with my letter of appointment tells me that “the breast clinic has been designed to provide a diagnostic service” for my “breast complaint,” that “certain procedures may have to be performed” in different rooms within the clinic, that i may “need to spend three to four hours at the clinic before a final result is available,” and that during this time i will be seen by “the doctor” while nursing staff – including a breast-care nurse specialist – will also be present. the leaflet suggests the breast clinic is a complex matter: an arrangement of different practices, apparatuses and relations involving different human and non-human participants, including clinical staff, spaces and technologies. what it does not reveal is the extent of the world-making capacity of these practices and apparatuses. over the course of just a few hours the breast clinic helps to make visible and materialize a particular bodily configuration: a simple, fluid-filled cyst in my left breast now successfully drained and therefore conclusively determined as a benign rather than malignant lesion. leafing through oncological and radiological literature, i learn that the majority of breast lesions are in fact benign (guray & sahin, 2006); simple cysts are by far the most common among them (berg, sechtin, marques, & zhang, 2010). as one oncology article notes: “cysts occur predominantly in the middle and late reproductive period, increasing in frequency from 35 years to a maximal incidence between 40 and 50 15 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) years” (courtillot et al., 2005, p. 329). i have only recently reached the lower limit of this age range, but i am already in the company of nearly one-in-three women between the age of 35 and 50 who present with a cyst. i am also in a more select group of 20% to 25% of cases of simple cysts which involve “palpable (gross) cystic change” (guray & sahin, 2006, p. 438). the exact causes of cysts like mine are not known, but there might be some links with the hormonal changes during the menstrual cycle and the excess of estrogen in the body. i learn this from a brief conversation with the doctor at the clinic and from a leaflet he has given to me. but cysts have also been characterized as disorders of lobular involution thus making them part of the “normal” processes by which the breast epithelial tissue is gradually lost due to aging. the formation of cysts is here seen as a result of the excessive secretion of the epithelium and the subsequent dilation of a terminal ductal lobular unit, the basic functional unit of the breast (courtillot et al., 2005). the two cysts in my left breast might have formed in this way although – as i learn from another oncology source – the pathogenesis of cyst development is still poorly understood (vargas et al., 2004). but the way in which cysts materialize and become visible in the breast clinic in the form of fluid-filled structures relies on a number of “visualization apparatuses.” the ultrasound machine and its particular ways of seeing and making visible is one of these apparatuses. as i read in a medical textbook on breast imaging: the most common sonolucent mass in the breast is the simple cyst. to make an accurate diagnosis of a benign cyst, strict criteria should be observed. cysts should have sharply defined walls. they may be round, ovoid, or lobulated and appear solitary or in groups. cysts should have no internal echoes. (kopans, 2007, p. 585) “sonolucent” is a term used in ultrasonography to describe that which allows a through-transmission of ultrasonic waves without reflecting them back to their source, that is, without producing any echoes. in practice, 16 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and very much against its etymology (latin sonus “sound” and lucere “to shine”), this term is used to characterize these areas of the ultrasound image that appear black and non-reflective, rather than bright with the reflected sound waves. these are the (silent) black spots among the (echoing) grey swirls. the complex genealogies of ultrasonography have been widely acknowledged: from its roots in the developments of military sonar and radar technologies through its early applications in medicine, where it focused on therapeutic rather than diagnostic uses, to its particular implications for female bodies and subjectivities both in the testing of its early apparatuses on breast cancer patients and in its ongoing, pervasive use in obstetrics (cartwright, 1992; duden, 1993; koch, 1993; mitchell, 2001). what has also been noted is the particular, non-optical nature of its vision (barad, 1998; 2007). ultrasound imaging does not rely on the properties and behavior of light; its seeing and making visible is instead dependent on the emission, reflection and absorption of the high frequency sound waves transmitted to a body through the direct contact with a transducer, converted into electric currents, calculated by a computer and, finally, displayed in a visual form as a two(or threeor four-) dimensional image. this – in the words of sociologist of science edward yoxen (1987) – is “seeing with sound” (p. 281). but, equally, it could be considered a form of “listening-touch”: as the ultrasound transducer slides over a gel-covered body, its piezoelectric crystals vibrate in response to the electric currents and to the ultrasonic waves which pass through and are diffracted by the tissues. this way of imaging through sound and touch, which displays sonographic data in terms of spatial relations between differently echoing tissues, owes much to medicine’s earlier visual traditions, such as x-ray imaging (koch, 1993) and anatomical drawings of the cross-sections of different body parts (yoxen, 1987). but, as the history of ultrasonography suggests, this way of imaging was not the only one possible or even considered. the early ultrasonic devices developed by john wild and tested on women with 17 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) different breast lesions presented sonographic data in reference to their different acoustic behaviors as plotted on a diagram (koch, 1993) and, as such, did not contribute as easily to the imaginary of a body opened up for visual inspection. for, as barad (2007) has importantly noted, the ultrasound does not simply allow us to peer at or into the body; rather “the marks on the computer screen (the sonogram images, sonic diffraction patterns translated into an electronic image) refer to a phenomenon that is constituted in the intra-action of the ‘object’ … and the ‘agencies of observation’” (p. 202). the ultrasound makes the cyst visible but only as a part of its own apparatus, as a sonolucent spot, visualized through electric transformations of sound waves into a digital image. deferred from the sonic diffraction patterns, the cyst can only be seen and known diffractively through its variously materialized effects. what is also materialized and constituted in this process of transduction and translation of sonic data into a particular configuration of image data is the notion of ultrasonography as an imaging technology and a form of seeing rather than touching or hearing. the same cannot be said of some other apparatuses within the breast clinic, such as fine needle aspiration and breast examination, which contribute to the materialization of the fluid-filled structures in my left breast. the lights are still dimmed, but the doctor is gone, the examination now concluded. shedding quickly the baggy hospital gown, open at the front and so large it can wrap almost twice around my body. what should i do with it? i ask the nurse. just leave it here, she says. she takes the syringe still half-filled with the yellowish fluid. will you have to send it for further testing? i ask her. no, it is not necessary in case of a cyst, she says and places the syringe in a yellow plastic container for the medical waste. the draining of the fluid from my breast is technically called fine needle aspiration. as i read in a paper published in american journal of radiology: aspiration may be performed [in the case of simple cysts] if the 18 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) patient is symptomatic or if the cyst prevents adequate compression for mammography. aspirated fluid is typically not sent for cytology if it is cloudy yellow or green because of high false-positive rates. the fluid is sent for cytologic evaluation if it is bloody or if the patient requests that the aspirate be tested (hines, slanetz, & eisenberg, 2010, w122). the discarded syringe and its liquid contents are seemingly incidental, even immaterial, for the imaging of the breast lesion, excluded as they are from further mattering in the diagnostic practices of the breast clinic, and therefore from its vision. there is no use for the drained fluid, no need to test it. furthermore, as suggested by the medical literature and the doctor’s question as to whether i want the cyst drained off, there is even no need to perform the procedure in the first place. in my case the draining of the cyst is not meant to confirm a seemingly already certain diagnosis but rather to remove the discomfort and disquiet of a symptomatic patient. and yet, the syringe half-filled with a yellowish fluid is also highly consequential, as it constitutes a powerful visualization of the simple cyst, its liquid form made apparent. fine needle aspiration can be seen in this context as a haptic optic system. as the needle pierces the flesh guided by the “listening-touch” of the ultrasound and its diffracted vision, as the plunger slides up the syringe its suction draining the fluid, the procedure reveals to the eye what the ultrasound has already seemingly made visible: a black, sonolucent spot on the ultrasound display as the effect of the high-frequency sound wave moving through the non-reflective, anechoic fluid of a simple cyst. it is by this act of draining, which makes it disappear from the ultrasound display (and thus from the clinic’s diagnostic field of vision), that the cyst can finally be materialized and seen as just that: a simple water-filled nodule, the absence of which can be inspected and felt – just as its earlier presence had been – by skilled hands. lying on the bed, a room with strong lights. my arms above my head. the breast-care nurse is touching my breasts. yes, there is something here, she says examining my left breast. it feels like a 19 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) cyst, perhaps a fibrocystic matter, but it is absolutely benign, it is nothing malignant. what would it feel like if it were malignant? i ask. what do you mean? she asks me back. how does a cancerous lump feel? it is hard and craggy, with little arms and legs coming out of it. this feels round and soft, and mobile. this is a benign cyst. this scene constitutes the very first episode in my encounter with the breast clinic and its diagnostic apparatuses. but it is not the first time i have undergone a physical examination for my breast complaint. almost three months earlier, soon after i have become aware of the suspicious lump, a doctor and a nurse from my local gp practice determine that – while some harder areas can indeed be felt in my left breast – to their practiced hands they do not seem suspicious at all. still, deemed expert in the knowledge of my body, i am referred to the breast clinic, although the referral is considered non-urgent. my self-knowledge is meant to be the result of being “breast aware,” that is – to quote a leaflet produced by the breast cancer care charity – “getting to know how your breasts look and feel so you know what is normal for you” and, therefore, can be “more confident about noticing any unusual changes that may be a symptom of breast cancer” (2016, p. 11). in the breast cancer earlydetection campaigns, breast awareness had superseded breast selfexamination (bse): “a regular, repetitive monthly palpation to a rigorous set method performed by the woman at the same time each month” (thornton & pillarisetti, 2008, p. 2119). the genealogies of bse and breast awareness are quite complex. while the idea of examining breasts for small lumps had been tentatively promoted throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the notion of bse was introduced and gained momentum in the 1950s with the joint campaign by the american cancer society and national cancer institute (lerner, 2001). inspired by the success of the pap smear for the early detection of cervical cancer, bse was intended as a similarly life-saving screening method for breast cancer at the time when other techniques (such as mammography) were not yet fully developed. controversial from 20 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) its very inception due to the often sexualized images of the female body used in its promotion, and the inducing of the fear of cancer among healthy women (lerner, 2001), since the 1970s bse has come under growing scientific scrutiny because it has been linked to the increased numbers of benign lumps identified and biopsies performed but not to the reduction in breast cancer mortality and morbidity (thornton & pillarisetti, 2008). deemed harmful to women and burdensome to health services, bse has since been largely rejected in favor of breast awareness the clinical benefits of which are still debated, but which, nevertheless – as evidenced by the breast cancer care leaflet – is currently encouraged as a cancer-screening tool among so-called “well women” (thornton & pillarisetti, 2008). in contrast to the rigorous palpation of bse, being breast aware means assessing both tactile and visual cues, looking not only for lumps and swellings inside the breast but also for any changes in its outward appearance. in fact, out of the eight changes that should be looked for, according to the breast cancer care leaflet (2016, pp. 13-14), only two (“a lump or area that feels thicker than the rest of the breast” and “a swelling in your armpit or around your collarbone”) refer to symptoms that could be experienced specifically through palpation while the remaining six (“a change in size or shape” of the breast; “a change in skin texture such as puckering or dimpling”; “redness or a rash on the skin and/or around the nipple”; “your nipple has become pulled in or looks different”; “liquid that comes from the nipple without squeezing”; and “pain in your breast or your armpit that’s there all or almost all the time”) rely on various sensory signals, including a more general sensation of pain. despite that, through genealogical links with its discredited predecessor bse, the practice of breast awareness and its role in early cancer detection is still considered predominantly in terms of “touching and finding” (thornton & pillarisetti, 2008, p. 2119), rather than seeing or making visible. in the breast clinic, the physical examination precedes the ultrasound scan and the fine needle aspiration. in some cases (but not in 21 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) mine), it might be all that is required. as the trained eyes and hands or, to use hayward’s (2010) term, “fingeryeyes,” of the breast-care nurse trace the shapes and structures of my flesh, the lump in my left breast slowly materializes in a form intelligible to the breast service, and to me. no images or even image data are being produced here, but the hard mass in my breast is made observable and apparent as a benign rather than malignant condition. what is also made apparent (in fact, conspicuous by its absence) is breast cancer. i am fascinated by the imaginary of a hard, craggy, tentacled entity brought forth by the haptic optics of physical examination. and i wonder what careful practices have taught the nurse to see and feel and render visible and knowable the craggy body of the cancer and the round soft one of the benign cyst. thinking back to my reading of the breast imaging textbook and its descriptions of simple cysts, not just as sonolucent spots but as round and sharply defined objects, i also wonder how other apparatuses, such as ultrasonography or mammography and various images produced as their part might be intra-actively brought together to make these imaginaries and their determination possible. conclusion writing about technoscience and its “visual hermeneutics,” ihde (2009) describes imaging technologies as postmodern equivalents of the camera obscura, as they powerfully shape and make possible specific ways of visualizing and imagining the world. as he notes, these ways of seeing involve a reconfiguration of non-visual phenomena into visual ones by exaggerating “a kind of magnification/reduction distortion into monosensory dimensions” (p. 467), which obscures but does not eliminate the “whole body experience.” in her reading of the camera obscura, and other versions of “the technological eye”, haraway suggests that the camera needs to be understood not only as “an analogy to the seeing eye in brainy, knowing man, for whom body and mind are suspicious strangers,” but also, and perhaps more importantly, 22 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) in its etymological sense as “a judge’s chamber, in camera, within which the facts of the world – indeed, the critters of the world – are assayed by the standard of the visually convincing” (2008, p. 251). the feminist and post-phenomenological politics of knowledge have often treated imaging technologies as suspect. but they have also made apparent that no intervention is harmless and no way of knowing without its violence. with bodies handled, examined or punctured, exposed to the high frequency sound waves or electromagnetic radiation, determined as cancerous or non-cancerous, committed to life-changing, grueling treatments or excluded from them, what counts in the process of medical imaging is not without its material consequences. writing about the history of breast cancer treatments, barron h. lerner (2001) notes the extreme violence of early surgical techniques, such as halsted radical mastectomy or wangensteen’s superradical mastectomy, and how screening and early detection programs would commit women with even small tumors to these life-changing procedures. s. lochlann jain’s (2013) anthropological accounts of contemporary “cancer culture” in america draw attention not only to the tremendous toxicity of many standard chemotherapy regimens but also to the widespread nature and severe consequences of delayed cancer diagnoses. as i have argued in this article, imaging a simple cyst in the space of the breast clinic involves many different apparatuses and different ways of making bodies visible and knowable. not all of these apparatuses are commonly considered as imaging technologies, and not all ways of making bodies visible in the clinic involve the production of images or image data. certainly not all of them rely on optical arrangements for their vision. more often than not, the gaze of the clinic is also dependent on the “borderline gaze of touch and hearing.” as i have indicated, ultrasonography, a ubiquitous diagnostic apparatus and a common example of medical imaging technology, involves seeing with sound and sonic diffraction patterns which are translated into electronic images; but it also relies on the “listening-touch” of its vibrating piezoelectric crystals. fine needle aspiration and medical examination, 23 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) excluded as they are from the imaginary of imaging, are differently configured haptic optic systems where the suction of the syringe draws out and renders visible an anechoic fluid and the skilled “fingeryeyes” of doctors and nurses materialize both benign and cancerous lesions. recognizing this synesthetic character of the clinical gaze and its apparatuses does not suggest that clinical diagnostic practices are simply multisensory, or that different perceptual systems are indistinguishable within a body’s sensorium. rather it draws our attention to the non-given nature of distinctions between vision, touch and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing, and the equally non-given nature of imaging and its technologies. in doing so, it argues for a particular conception of knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism” which is grounded in non-representationalist, non-individualist understandings of sense and experience, and in feminist traditions of situated knowledges and response-ability. in this conception, seeing, touching and listening are understood not as predefined perceptual and epistemological modalities distinct from one another and from the phenomena that they render knowable, but – to paraphrase castañeda (2001, p. 230) – as relational qualities that arise out of embodied intra-actions. what counts as vision as compared to touch and hearing, and what counts as image and imaging are not given in advance but articulated and materialized in specific practices and apparatuses which constitute particular instances of seeing/touching/hearing/knowing. in this context, responsible (and response-able) knowledge-making in biomedicine is not a matter of good scientific or clinical practice (if this is to be understood simply in terms of following some pre-existing norms or protocols), rather it is a matter of accounting for and remaining open to what diagnostic determinations are made, what ways of sensing and knowing are involved in making them and with what effects. acknowledgements i would like to thank the editors of this special section, bettina papenburg, liv hausken, sigrid schmitz and natasha myers, and the two 24 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of my work and helpful suggestions on how to clarify its arguments. i would also like to thank the participants of the authors’ workshop at 7th new materialism annual conference “performing situated knowledges: space, time, vulnerability”, warsaw, poland, 21-23 september 2016, and the participants at the “new materialisms and politics” workshop at the university of aberdeen, 21-22 september 2017, for their comments and reactions to the earlier drafts of this article. notes 1 barad proposes the notion of “intra-action” to characterize the mutual constitution of objects, and objects and subjects within phenomena (2007, p. 33). unlike “interaction,” which assumes the existence of separate individual agencies prior to their relation, “intra-action” sees specific entities not as given but as emerging through their relations in the process of differential becoming. 2 barad’s conceptualization owes much to haraway’s notion of an apparatus of bodily production as a material-semiotic, meaninggenerating matrix which allows for the mapping and materialization of boundaries (1988), and to bohr’s understanding of measurement apparatuses as “macroscopic material arrangements through which particular concepts are given definition, to the exclusion of others, and through which particular phenomena with particular determinate physical properties are produced” (barad, 2007, p. 142). 3 the concepts of “situated knowledges,” “response-ability,” “sense atomism” and “synesthesia” are explained and further discussed in the following parts of the article. 4 donna haraway emphasizes this notion of accountability and responsibility in relation to both touch and vision: touch, regard, looking back, becoming with – all these make us responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape. in touch and regard, partners willy nilly are in the miscegenous mud that infuses our bodies with all that brought that contact into being. touch and regard have consequences. (2008, p. 36) 5 this understanding of representationalism has some important parallels with barad’s conceptualization discussed earlier in this article. 25 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) 6 this understanding of “sense atomism” can be read as another version of what barad refers to as the metaphysics of individualism, an ontological framework which sees the world as “composed of individual entities with individually determinate boundaries and properties” (2007, p. 107). 7 the purpose and intention of including these various sources is not to tell a story of one patient’s encounters with the breast cancer services but rather to make particular theoretical points in relation to imaging and its technologies. as such, the events recounted in this section do not follow any chronological sequence but rather an internal logic of its theoretical argument. references barad, k. (1998). getting real: technoscientific practices and the materialization of reality. differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies, (10)2, 87-128. barad, k. (2001). "re(con)figuring space, time and matter." in m. dekoven (ed.) feminist locations: global and local, theory and practice (75-109). new brunswick, n.j.; london, gb: rutgers university press. barad, k. (2003). posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter. signs, (28)3, (801-831). — (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, nc and london, gb: duke university press. — (2012). on touching – the inhuman that therefore i am. differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies, 23(5), 206-223. berg, w.a., sechtin, a.g., marques, h., & zhang, z. (2010). cystic breast masses and the acrin 6666 experience. radiologic clinics of north america, 48(5), 931-987. blaxter, m. (2009). the case of the vanishing patient? image and experience. sociology of health and illness, 31(5), 762-778. 26 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) breast cancer care (2016). know your breasts: a guide to breast awareness and screening. retrieved from: https://www.breastcancercare.org.uk /informationsupport/publication/know-your-breasts-guide-breast-awarenessscreening-bcc2. cartwright, l. (1992). women, x-rays, and the public culture of prophylactic imaging. camera obscura, 29, 18-54. castañeda, c. (2001). "robotic skin: the future of touch." in s. ahmed & j. stacey (eds.), thinking through the skin (pp. 223-236). london: routledge. courtillot, c., plu-bureau, g., binart, n., balleyguier, c., sigal-zafrani, b., goffin, et al. (2005). benign breast diseases. journal of mammary gland biology and neoplasia, 10(4), 325-335. duden, b. (1993). disembodying women: perspectives on pregnancy and the unborn. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. foucault, m. (2000). the birth of the clinic: an archaeology of medical perception (a. m. sheridan, trans.) london, gb: routledge. (original work published 1963). guray, m. & sahin, a.a. (2006). benign breast diseases: classifications, diagnosis, and management. the oncologist, 11(5), 435-449. haraway, d. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. feminist studies, 14(3), 575-599. — (1997).modest_winess@second_millenium.femaleman©_meets_onco mouse™. new york, ny and london, gb: routledge. — (2008). when species meet. minneapolis, mn and london, gb: minnesota university press. harris, a. (2016). listening-touch: affect and the crafting of medical bodies through percussion. body and society, 22(1), 31-61. hayward, e. (2010). fingeryeyes: impressions of cup corals. cultural anthropology, 25(4), 577-599. 27 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) hines, n., slanetz, p.j., & eisenberg, r.l. (2010). cystic masses of the breast. american journal of radiology, 194, w122-w133. ihde, d. (2007). listening and voice: phenomenologies of sound. albany, ny: state university of new york press. — (2009). from da vinci to cad and beyond. synthese, 168(3), 453-467. ingold, t. (2000). the perception of the environment: essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill. london, gb and new york, ny: routledge. jain, s. l. (2013). malignant: how cancer becomes us. los angeles, ca and london, gb: university of california press. joyce, k. (2005). appealing images: magnetic resonance imaging and the production of authoritative knowledge. social studies of science, 35(3), 437-462. — (2006). from numbers to pictures: the development of magnetic resonance imaging and the visual turn in medicine. science as culture, 15(1), 1-22. koch, e. (1993). in the image of science? negotiating the development of diagnostic ultrasound in the cultures of surgery and radiology. technology and culture, 34(4), 858-893. kopans, d. b. (2007). breast imaging. philadelphia, pa: lippincott williams & wilkins. lerner, b. h. (2001). the breast cancer wards: fear, hope and the pursuit of a cure in twentieth century america. oxford, gb: oxford university press. marks, l. (2002). touch: sensuous theory and multisensory media. minneapolis, mn and london, gb: university of minnesota press. mitchell, l.m. (2001). baby’s first picture: ultrasound and the politics of fetal subjects. toronto, on and london, gb: university of toronto press. papenburg, b, schmitz, s., hausken, l., haagensen, t., radomska, m., hellstrand, i., mehrabi, t. (2015). the processes of imaging / the imaging 28 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) of processes. position paper for new materialism on the crossroads of the natural and human sciences working group of cost action 1307 new materialism: networking european scholarship on ‘how matter comes to matter’. available at: http://newmaterialism.eu/content/5working-groups/2-working -group-2/position-papers/newmaterialismimaging.pdf pasveer, b. (1989). knowledge of shadows: the introduction of x-ray images in medicine. sociology of health and illness, 11(4), 360-381. prasad, a. (2005). making images/making bodies: visibilizing and disciplining through magnetic resonance imaging (mri). science, technology, and human values, 30(2), 291-316. puig de la bellacasa, m. (2009). touching technologies, touching visions. the reclaiming of sensorial experience and the politics of speculative thinking. subjectivity, 28, 297-315. rice, t. (2008). ‘beautiful murmurs’: stethoscopic listening and acoustic objectification. the senses and society, 3(3), 293-306. saunders, b. (2010). ct suite: the work of diagnosis in the age of noninvasive cutting. durham, nc and london, gb: duke university press. thornton, h., & pillarisetti, r.r. (2008). ‘breast awareness’ and ‘breast self-examination’ are not the same. what do these terms mean? why are they confused? what can we do? european journal of cancer, 44(15), 2118-2121. vargas, h.i., vargas, m.p., gonzales, k.d, eldrageely, k., & khalkhali, i. (2004). outcomes of sonography-based management of breast cysts. the american journal of surgery, 188(4), 443-447. yoxen, e. (1987). "seeing with sound: a study of the development of medical images." in w.e. bijker, t.p. hughes, & t.j. pinch (eds.) the social construction of technological systems: new directions in the sociology and history of technology (pp. 281-303). cambridge, ma, and london, gb: the mit press. 29 kazimierczak catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) bio karolina kazimierczak completed a masters degree in sociology at the university of warsaw and undertook her doctoral work in the department of sociology, lancaster university. she currently holds a lecturer position at the university of aberdeen business school. her research has explored the questions of knowledge, power and agency in health, illness and biomedicine, in science and academic institutions, and in popular culture. paean to bicillin l-a® and the end of harry barlow’s munson, peggy. (2020). paean to bicillin l-a® and the end of harry barlow’s rhesus monkey experiments. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-12. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © peggy munson, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license paean to bicillin l-a® and the end of harry barlow’s rhesus monkey experiments peggy munson strickenbk@aol.com [but] thanks to harlow and his colleagues in the study of attachment, we have been humanized—we possess an entire science of touch, and some of this came from cruelty. there’s the paradox. —lauren slater, “monkey love,” the boston globe, 21 march 2004. fascism is not our future—it cannot be; we cannot allow it to be so— but this is surely the way fascism can begin. —david remnick, on donald trump, “an american tragedy,” the new yorker, 9 november 2016 i was in harry harlow's “pit of despair,” that walled isolation chamber with a one-way mirror: spent months there, rocking like a horse turned wooden by the blank stare of a mute whisperer into part of an attic’s unaccounted boneyard. i do know how it feels to suckle at a wire mother, because a tin mom’s teleprompter was the script given me by captors whose transgenic faces tarred my raptor-feathered fight. isolation, that velvet rope of triage that cannot be deveined, spelled out america’s subliminal apartheids like a bride’s soft skin that lives within her hardened marriage. i started off homebound, a leitmotif of the mandela effect, once a latchkey kid, keyed up in the collective amygdala, critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 2 then gently cordoned off the way a capsized crew is threaded off from where they tread together until one of them goes lost. later, i was rigid as the monkey huddled in a corner, egg-eyed like the tempest of an anthropomorphic psychosis that society sections away. that monkey’s mutagenic life became the dna of all human cruelty. i pined for touch while the chemical cartel nudged me with its ammonia waves, and even now, i cry for the word felt. felt mother, how i longed to feel mothered. i sensed my ancestors near as i was dying there, on a cold bathroom floor. my mother had abandoned me, in such inoculating heat from tuskegee. experimental machinations pushed my hem to the heavens. what you done in the dark sure come to the light. blighted starlight through the tiny window i could not stand up to reach. like a hunchback child kept in a four-foot-high basement, or the muteness pounded by a venal gavel into the mouth of each woman whose abuse is denied, i was just too weak to speak. the miscreant who put monkeys on “rape racks” taught us motherly touch was broader than milking at a celestial maw, our similarly simian dna a common tree of syngenta and ciba-geigy, borne of swiss notions of neutrality plunked proximal to our maddened germany. ciba first pigmented clothes, making arsenic green, so before this nothing was unbleached, before harlow our cloth mothers sewed a flowery sack-dress from flour. grandma said simply, you wore what you had, as young harlow in iowa sketched winged creatures in his imaginary land yazoo, then vivisected them violently with lines. flat latitudes, we noted of the echolocating expanse, were seamed with unreachable simplicity. it may be that proximity is all that you know of love harlow chided. so, we courted collision, divisibly midwestern, depressed from atrazine, our stewed prairie madness critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 3 soon calcified in milk teats, metastasizing into brains in my unassuming block, spiralizing the dna of cornstalks that is more complicated than human or monkey. corn has the genome of not running away, a racked realism. because, says science, corn has to stay put. i thank god i have not been so deprived. outside the gallows of cloth pelts, the spiralized germs climbed the collective neck as a borrelia spirochete that started the neurological twitch, idea-like, behind my eye. history is limited by the lexicographer’s sty so that pure experience and the sailor’s cure are as unreachable as oscar wilde’s fainting chair from which the pulse of a syphilitic miasm propelled this theatrical democracy into costumed darwinian eugenics. project paperclip fastened us all to pathogens from which peoria lab penicillin would set us free. raunchy beats led me to peoria, my sister and i two of few white girls at a funk concert there. we danced where the missouri and mighty mississippi met to dump pesticides into a cancer cluster that later struck her. penicillin was first made on corn-steep liquid from local farms there so that by d-day, troops had their shots, a wonder drug for wunderkind. farmers, invested in the wartime cog, and proud of their penicillium corn, bought nitrogen from bombs, and ddt for their crops. now, like a trial-by-drowning witch, i only have that get-down-on-it twitch like the high whine of pride and its insecticide. the cremains of my life's gyrations shaken down from a statue of a life. my sister once said i could be zebra and she would be monkey, iconoclast to her monkey mind, i was that dialect from exile, body-dialectical, before my sister lost her breast then-incommunicado to my illness, critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 4 our girlhood shirked in shucked husk dolls. an axis mundi of atrazine and paxil, she replied tersely, stole her flesh, while she regulated earth and euphoria. now i take my penicillin shot for neuro lyme riddled by the neurotoxic moonshine that flows as free as cornstalks marching quietly around my gmo-laced city, mitsubishi’s first electric car town near where mad hatter rage from lincoln’s blue mass pills spit out a blue planet like a lead plug to house milliners who would never be millionaires and the myoclonic start of beggar's subways below the green peace of death, with an iron-on ideology and one ribald eyeball staring out of a masonic dollar. zebra melts into my ashen face, a grayed area found on google cartography, medicine’s improbable diagnosis defying occam. sprayed skies collapsing into new games parachutes, as my mailman’s detergent conjuring zyklon b deeply sickens me. i haven't seen anyone in weeks. they call this limbic kindling, as in it only takes a spark to get a fire going, our sunday school song about giving away god, as if diluted sameness that should end already, will shake the exoplasmic ego away. children of lyme, connecticut don’t look like teetotalers now, but van gogh when the night got in his brain. their hyperacuity threatens national security. the flight pattern of plum island birds ends around swingsets that carved smiles in the afternoon air. it’s crayon biowarfare, those poor little monkeys, where nancy lanza counts yard-roaming deer before, before, every evening before, the ixodes ticks on crisp newtown grass, dr. charles jones defends himself to the medical boards, as the fda rations antibiotics like curative mold withheld from poor black men of tuskegee. critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 5 the poor black men of tuskegee were reduced to symbols of the disease process of white supremacy that fanned out quietly through the tumorous nurseries and tumorous suburbs and tumorous white flight exploding into a hyper-white aircraft that sprayed a sick mist over my friend's land and drove her into a temporal seizure that started with the a-bomb researcher in michigan feeding her radiation as a child when she was human subject number 423. the cure was this paean to bicillin, raunchy mold on corn steep. proxemics, josie, i say, watching a video where the cheerleader near peoria huddles with a cursing dad under her home as an ef4 pulverizes it. he shouts nails or other fright-words, flushing her from the timid hole— their dream kitchen dashed to smithereens. she’s shrilling omigod omigod our demigoddess dorothy, past an untouched, illusory large-screen tv, insulation draped like congratulations streamers, staircase freestanding on grass, dad’s “holy shit” as shocked prayer, there in washington, where our vorticist was a fascist, what plath said every woman adores: making luminous literata into imagistes, as if overexposed “children of the sun,” their deepest palimpsest undone. feminist confessionals became ovens, before “it gets better,” oh lyrical lymie heather, her “it gets better” speech stopped when she flung herself before a train. the ss entomological institute’s paranoid pesticides preventing tick warfare, then all of it hatching into the same symbolic nymph. recombining in john deere combines trolling once-swamped malarial fields: this gathered, hard-fracked hem. now the hymn-drum of stimming indigo kids where brucella-laced bison roam standing rock, critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 6 where grandma succumbed to the rorschach plaques, where solar civilizations still solicit sundown towns, where flint is the garbage fire going. who is the vorticist-fascist? we can’t de-cipher this spin. it’s bad, josie, says dad, to his post-apocalyptic, just another day. josie, come on now. i know it’s scary, come on now. josie, we gotta get outside where it’s safe. our house is freakin’ destroyed. she climbs from the smashed dollhouse to the russian doll cocktail, with the mighty mississippi oxbowing to nearby nauvoo, harkening proximity to these tainted morphologies of mergers through history: she tilts toward the windmilled chem-sky, toward the histo-soil, as insect people emerge seeking palliative, chimeric saliency. like sweet josie, i cling to what stings me. what is kindled— here to ferguson, stone’s throw from monsanto— becomes counterforce’s carburetor, body heat to calibrate the missile. dad’s right, josie: get your back up off the wall. proximity could grow love, that steep of mutual contamination, a flanking then fucking then fomenting at the field’s end, where medicine molts just as the monarch molts: the crowning crown begins anew, but we crawl up toward a vestigial, surrogate sense, the sensitive’s mensa, where still artists with paresis claw toward the blinding blue. otherwise, madness and its cure become the felted lovers sinking into oxytocin dreams, until our brains are completely overrun, and we can only remember the invention. notes for “paean to bicillin l-a ® and the end of harry harlow's rhesus monkey experiments” my story weaves into this larger story. i contracted sudden-onset, disabling myalgic encephalomyelitis (me/cfs) in 1992, then secondary multiple chemical critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 7 sensitivities (mcs), and then lyme disease plus associated co-infections after 2004, which became persistent and nearly deadly due to my lack of immunity. at the end of 2008, after an infectious disease society of america (idsa) doctor refused my positive blood tests for these infections and denied me intravenous antibiotics, emboldened by the “lyme wars” and the idsa’s official stance against the chronicity of lyme disease, i was abandoned to die in the corner of a bedroom and adjoining bath at my house, largely without care when i could not crawl beyond a few feet and had to live within tiny parameters or a room’s corner and adjoining bathroom—like a harlow monkey isolation experiment—for over 7 months, immobilized, ultimately dependent on a noninvasive bipap ventilator to breathe, unable to bathe or speak out loud, mostly without human contact and scarce media for twenty-four hours a day. in the united states, 79 to 90% of personal assistance for disabled adults is provided voluntarily by families and friends, due to lack of available services that vary state by state, leaving people to fall through the cracks (national center on elder abuse, 2012). me/cfs is characterized, as the institute of medicine (2015) describes it, by a slew of multi-systemic “symptoms that are made worse by exertion of any sort,” even mild stimulation, often referred to as “post-exertional malaise,” or pem (p. 1). functional impairment is extreme, to the point that a small task like talking, reading, or brushing one’s teeth can be more than a patient can do in a day. other trivial activities can cause a “crash” that lasts for months or years or leaves a patient permanently bedridden, needing to reduce all stimulation. as one patient described in the institute of medicine (2015) report guide for clinicians, “beyond myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome: redefining an illness,” “my personal experience of having me/cfs feels like permanently having the flu, a hangover, and jet lag while being continually electrocuted (which means that pain plays at least as much of a role in my condition as fatigue)” (p. 6). “there is sufficient evidence that pem is a primary feature that helps distinguish me/cfs (seid) from other conditions” (institute of medicine, 2015, p. 5). harry harlow conducted studies on maternal deprivation in rhesus monkeys; often bizarre and sadistic, they expanded the science of touch—some involved the comparison between monkeys raised by cloth “mothers” and those raised by wire “mothers,” some involved what amounted to solitary confinement and torture. as lauren slater wrote in “monkey love,” “here is where he stepped from science into fairy tales. he made many of the iron maidens: some rattled their children and stabbed them. no matter what the torture, harlow observed, the babies would not let go. there is no partial reinforcement to explain this behavior; there critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 8 is only the dark side of touch, the reality of primate relationships, which is that mothers can kill us even as they hold us.” also, “harlow, a brash man who could also be strangely shy, said, 'it may be that proximity is all you know of love—i thank god i have not been so deprived’” (slater, 2004). the mandela effect is when people collectively remember something in a way that didn’t happen, such as people thinking nelson mandela died in prison in the 1980s when he passed away in 2013. “russian doll cocktail” or “russian biological cocktail” refers to the use of simultaneous chemical and biological agents, often in rapid and complex succession, to make finding the cause of illness from these agents exceedingly difficult. plum island was a zoonotic (animal to human disease) biowarfare lab off the coast of long island that produced biological agents often blamed on the outbreak of lyme disease in lyme, ct, and elsewhere on the east coast—which since shifted its operations to kansas (carroll, 2004). via kris newby’s (2019) book bitten, i learned after this poem was written that willy burgdorfer (credited with the discovery that borrelia burgdorferi causes lyme disease) stated that he thought early us lyme outbreaks were caused by a biological weapons release, and i discovered that burgdorfer’s most influential advisor was rudolf geigy of the j. r. geigy ag chemical company in basel, where burgdorfer launched his tick-focused career, which later merged into ciba-geigy. swiss chemical company ciba-geigy merged with sandoz in 1996 to form novartis. ciba-geigy has manufactured many products, including antibiotics (cipro, rifampin, amoxicillin, etc.), but also produced atrazine (herbert, 1997). zyklon b was a pesticide created by the german chemical and pharmaceutical cartel ig farben, which ciba-geigy modeled itself after, used by the nazi’s in gas chambers in wwii (the nazis also killed tens of thousands of disabled and chronically ill citizens via aktion t4, first using extreme neglect and starvation, then “advancing” to the more expedient gas chamber that served as a prototype for larger models). “in order to remain competitive with the germans, the three largest swiss chemical companies, ciba ltd., j.r. geigy s.a., and sandoz ltd., formed a similar cartel called basle ag. this trust lasted from 1918 to 1951. by 1970, however, market conditions led ciba and geigy to merge, forming one of the world's leading pharmaceutical and specialty chemical companies” (“cibageigy ltd. history,” n.d.). basle was originally a leader in the dye industry, and early dyes were often based on arsenical pigments, with elements originally used as pesticides or drugs. syngenta was formed out of the novartis merger, and produces agricultural chemicals and gmo seeds (“ciba-geigy ltd. history, n.d.). critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 9 the first mass quantities of penicillin were made during wwii at the peoria lab in peoria, il (usda, 2018). what you done in the dark sure come to the light, intoned nurse eunice rivers, repeating a patient in the tuskegee syphilis experiment, which involved nonconsensually exploiting poor black men by withholding available penicillin treatments for syphilis to observe the disease’s progression of brutal, protracted, and long-suffering symptoms (hayden, 2003). doctors prescribing antibiotics for lyme disease in recent years have repeatedly faced the threat of losing their licenses for treating patients by the international lyme and associated diseases society guidelines, versus the antibiotic-restricting infectious disease society of america guidelines. the single drug pending approval for me/cfs, ampligen, has also been held up by decades of red tape in the fda, so patients cannot get it. the vorticist is ezra pound, who coined the pre-wwi term for art and poetry, including his own. he described poetic vorticism as locating both movement and stillness within an image and incorporating history and ancestry. as he wrote, all experience rushes into this vortex. all the energized past, all the past that is living and worthy to live. all momentum, which is the past bearing upon us, race, race-memory, instinct charging the placid, non-energized future. the design of the future in the grip of the human vortex. all the past that is vital, all the past that is capable of living into the future, is pregnant in the vortex, now. (pound, 1914/2010). pound was locked up for twelve years at st. elizabeth’s hospital, which overlooked washington, dc, for his fascist beliefs. he also famously dubbed the bisexual, freudchallenging poet h. d. an “imagiste,” or a proponent of his school of “imagism” that focused on “luminous details,” but flattening her own complex poetry to a pretty trinket, though he also referred to her work in his essay on vorticism. this poem in many ways reclaims a neo-vorticism to transform it. the atomic energy commission and department of energy (in the 1990s) declassified information on the non-consenting human subjects used for radiation experiments in prior decades noted in this poem. the personal stories i have heard of people living through this, as well as related government programs like mkultra, have convinced critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 10 me to trust the first-hand reports. (see “doe openness: human radiation experiments,” https://ehss.energy.gov/ohre/index.html.) sandra steingraber’s documentary film living downstream is referenced. it deals with atrazine contamination, focusing on central illinois, particularly areas near peoria, less than an hour from my hometown. around when she went to college in my hometown twin cities of bloomington-normal, il, and was diagnosed with cancer, mitsubishi decided to place a welcomed auto plant outside of my town, later launching an advertising campaign called “the new normal,” which depicted electric cars zipping around normal, il—a sign of a green revolution in an agriculture-heavy area. in my childhood home in normal, in the 1990s, my sister measured above-epasafe levels of triazene herbicides—a class that contains atrazine—in the tap water we had ingested throughout our early years, and then later developed breast cancer. the commonly prescribed antidepressant paxil is also now implicated in breast cancer cases as a potential endocrine disruptor, which in this case brings up the idea of chemical synergy (where two chemical agents can far more than double the toxic effects of the original agent) (healy, 2014). nancy lanza lived in one of the most deer-populated, lyme-endemic areas of the country (deer carry and spread lyme ticks)—before she was murdered by her son i’ll call “al,” as did subsequent reports, who went on to commit horrific mass murder at sandy hook elementary school. pleas to state offices to examine al’s brain for lyme or tick-borne co-infections did not result in a comprehensive analysis of his blood and brain tissue for tick-borne illness. dr. robert bransfield has extensively researched and spoken about the links between a small subset of late-stage lyme patients and violence induced in part by direct brain infection and inflammation (violent or combative behavior can happen in other brain infection as well), including in very rare cases homicidal violence, yet lyme treatment remains controversial due to the efforts of the infectious disease society of america, which openly debunks the notion of chronic lyme disease and long-term antibiotic therapies in most cases. dr. charles jones spent years fighting medical boards in connecticut in a prohibitively expensive legal battle because of the “crime” of prescribing antibiotics to children with lyme disease. (“be safe newtown,” n.d.). the cure for syphilis, still a common treatment for neurological lyme, was injections of penicillin, now bicillin la. both syphilis and lyme disease are caused by spirochetes, and called at different points in history “the great imitators” because of their breadth of symptoms that can resemble other diseases (lyme spirochetes have also been found in the brains of alzheimer’s disease patients). “children of the sun” is a term used by julius evola, a nazi-affiliated philosopher and https://ehss.energy.gov/ohre/index.html critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 11 darling of the italian fascists who is openly admired by steve bannon and members of the us “alt-right.” he uses the term to describe a reawakening “white race.” this group calls itself the solar civilization, making it sound like a green business instead of a racist cult. “sunset towns” were historically all-white towns, cities, or neighborhoods that practiced segregation via shutting out people of other races “once the sun went down,” through direct laws, signs at the town limits, violence, or intimidation tactics. heather askeland johnson, my thirty-three-year old poet friend, suffered severe neurological lyme disease, fought tirelessly to get treatments she ultimately couldn’t afford or access, and in deterioration and despair took her own life in 2014, after posting an “it gets better” video to encourage bullied youth not to commit suicide. the quotes of josie and her dad are taken from a video posted on youtube by marc wells (2013) after he and his daughter bravely went through a devastating tornado on november 17, 2013, in washington, il, just outside of peoria. “recombining in john deere combines” references “recombination” —the combining of viral or other genetic material in a cell that can create new pathogenic agents. the concept of “indigo children” from nancy tappe in the 1960s and 1970s characterized certain gifted, highly perceptive children, who also may have symptoms of add, adhd, or autism spectrum. “get down on it” and “get your back up off the wall” are from legendary funk band kool and the gang, who my sister and i saw in peoria around 1984 or 1985. “will it play in peoria?” was a term popularized in the vaudeville era, when peoria, il, became the litmus test of what “middle america” (and then, the rest of america) would think. acknowledgements for my two favorite poets lost to these illnesses, heather (askeland) johnson (who passed away in 2014 at age 33) and nicole meredith reinert (who passed away in 2016 at age 40). references be safe newtown. (n.d.). retrieved from http://besafenewtown.org/bsnfacts.html carroll, m. c. (2004). lab 257: the disturbing story of the government’s secret plum island germ laboratory. new york, ny: william morrow. ciba-geigy ltd. history. (n.d.). retrieved from http://besafenewtown.org/bsnfacts.html critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) peggy munson, 2020 12 http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/ciba-geigy-ltd-history/ hayden, d. (2003). pox: genius, madness, and the mysteries of syphilis. new york, ny: basic books. healy, m. (2014, february 18). new test suggests antidepressant paxil may promote breast cancer. la times. retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/18/science/la-sci-sn-antidepressant-paxil-breastcancer-20140218 herbert, b. (1997, february 17). dangerous deception. the new york times. retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/17/opinion/dangerous-deception.html institute of medicine. (2015, february 10). beyond myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome: redefining an illness. washington, dc: national academies press. national center on elder abuse. (2012). abuse of adults with a disability. retrieved from https://ncea.acl.gov/ncea/media/docs/abuse-of-adults-with-a-disability(2012).pdf newby, k. (2019). bitten: the secret history of lyme disease and biological weapons. new york, ny: harper wave. pound, e. (1914/2010). vortex. poetry foundation. retrieved from https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69480/vortex slater, l. (2004, march 21). monkey love. the boston globe. usda, agricultural research service. (2018, march 5). penicillin: opening of an era. retrieved from https://www.ars.usda.gov/midwest-area/peoria-il/national-center-foragricultural-utilization-research/docs/penicillin-opening-the-era-of-antibiotics/ wells, m. (2013, november 21). 11-17-2013 tornado washington, il [video file]. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfrgsvoji1u author bio peggy munson is the author of the poetry collection pathogenesis and the novel origami striptease, as well as the editor of stricken: voices from the hidden epidemic of chronic fatigue syndrome. she has living with me/cfs, mcs, and lyme disease for decades. http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/ciba-geigy-ltd-history/ http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/18/science/la-sci-sn-antidepressant-paxil-breast-cancer-20140218 http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/18/science/la-sci-sn-antidepressant-paxil-breast-cancer-20140218 http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/17/opinion/dangerous-deception.html https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69480/vortex https://www.ars.usda.gov/midwest-area/peoria-il/national-center-for-agricultural-utilization-research/docs/penicillin-opening-the-era-of-antibiotics/ https://www.ars.usda.gov/midwest-area/peoria-il/national-center-for-agricultural-utilization-research/docs/penicillin-opening-the-era-of-antibiotics/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfrgsvoji1u microsoft word treusch-124-1223-1.docx treusch, p. (2017). title: subtitle. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2), 1-27 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © pat treusch, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article the art of failure in robotics: queering the (un)making of success and failure in the companion-robot laboratory pat treusch center for interdisciplinary women’s and gender studies (zifg), technical university berlin p.treusch@tu-berlin.de abstract this article investigates an emerging class of contemporary machines: the robot companion. it is introduced as a robot that will accompany “us” in “our” human everyday lives. this article analyzes one example of how robot companionship is realized while querying how this realization might imply a change in how “we” conceive of human/machine relations. drawing on central insights into the making of the humanoid armar, the author develops an approach to emerging human/machine relations through affects, more precisely through the affective strategies and affective labors taking place in the robotics laboratory. she furthermore suggests taking a posthumanist perspective on the analysis, which entails becoming attentive to the intra-active co-production between human and machine. importantly, this also allows her to tweak the powerful differentiation between success and failure at work in this specific setting, the robotics laboratory. how can “we” rethink human/machine relations of humanlike interaction through queering success and failure at the robot/human interface? finally, the author suggests establishing an understanding of laboratory work on 2 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the project of the humanlike companion that takes into account the queering potential of failure—centrally by emphasizing the interweaving of knowing and affects, rather than neglecting their connection. at stake seems to be the possibility to develop visions of how to turn the capitalist endeavor of increasing rationalizations of “human everyday lives” into a more responsible and accountable practice of technologization that accounts for the largely neglected dimensions of human/machine relations beyond the success/failure binary. 1. introduction: robot companionship—a new class of humanrobot relations emerging from the european network robot companions for citizens (robotcompanions.eu, n.d.), a recent strand of contemporary humanoid robotics envisions the realization of a special machine, namely the “robot companion.” this machine is special because it is charged with social meaning in a double sense: first, it is classified as a companion “for citizens”; second, it is described as a technological innovation—or, one could even say, as a technological intervention into what is perceived as “a critical challenge [that] human society faces: how to increase and maintain our quality of life in the future” (robotcompanions.eu, n.d.). thus, the robot companion will supposedly leave the factory halls of industrial production and enter the sphere of everyday lives, including public spaces and private homes, in order to operate close to “us humans.” it is precisely such flexible possibilities of bringing humans and humanoid robots together as companions that solve the problem of how to maintain and improve a certain quality of life. it is through this perceived need that robot companionship will also supposedly become a market success. the vision of such machines operates through promises of “technoscientific salvation” (haraway, 1997, p. 8) from, primarily, the work-burdened contexts of the household and the workplace. the quality of this emerging human/machine relationship also highlights the burdens of social, particularly urban, life in late capitalist societies in the global north, with its structural separation and loneliness, especially with increasing age. in addition, the image of sociality and close relations between humans and robots carries a 3 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) distinct connotation of human/human relations as inherent to companionship. this article asks: how is the production of this new class of machines transforming hegemonic ideas of both human/machine relations and companionship? to explore this question, i draw on the example of the humanlike robot companion armar iii. armar is being developed at laboratories specializing in a current strand of humanoid robotics in germany, anthropomatics, at the karlsruhe institute for technology (kit). more precisely, i am interested in how an interaction at this specific level of robot/human interface is understood and experienced as a success with regard to social scripts, with their concomitant expectations and behaviors, and when it is perceived as failing. reconstructing the circumstances of success and failure in the making of robot companionship, i opt to open up the perspective of a queer-feminist critique on this dichotomous division, as articulated by judith halberstam (2011). in this way, i will contemplate “new ways of understanding… knowledge projects” (subramaniam & willey, 2016, p. 2; emphasis in original) in contemporary humanoid robotics. my argument is that querying interactions with robots, and concomitant concepts of the ability to interact autonomously in a socially meaningful manner, from the suggested perspective of queer failure might open up new avenues for considering the dimensions of realizing companionship with robots that have so far been neglected and thus have not been part of the understanding of the knowledge project “humanoid robotics.” how can “we” rethink practices of knowledge and artifact production in the context of this specific robotics laboratory through a queering of the success/failure dichotomy? 2. analyzing human/machine relations—a theoretical and methodological framework feminist interest in researching the design of human/machine interfaces and asking how they either transport or rework the gendering of science 4 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and technology is longstanding. alison adam (1998), for instance, has researched the inscription of “concepts of masculinity and femininity” (p. 1) in computers. drawing on select aspects of adam’s fundamental study, i emphasize her finding that key researchers into early artificial intelligence (ai) “regard themselves as the gold standard of universal subjects,” (p. 5) thus establishing “gendered patterns of rationality” (p. 6). those researchers were mostly mathematicians and, when selecting their objectives, “naturally looked to themselves” (p. 35). this led to the objective of building a machine that could play chess (franchi & güzeldere, 2005, p. 46); consequently, chess was selected as the model for some aspects of intelligence and became “the test bed for ideas about creating intelligence” (turkle, 2005, p. 220). in this regard, computer sciences are grounded in a scientific framework that perpetuates a division that can be described—following sandra harding (2008)—as the thinking tradition of “western modernities” (p. 2): scientific rationality and technical expertise are presented…as enabl[ing] elite westerners and men around the globe to escape the bonds of tradition, leaving behind for others the responsibility for the flourishing of women, children and other kin, households, and communities….these others must do the…reproductive and “craft” labor….these others are mostly women and non-western men. (p. 2) the epistemological framework of western modernities creates a division between the realm of scientific rationality and expertise and that of craft labor. this dichotomy is fundamental to the sexual, transnational division of labor and its powerful operations of social ordering along the intersecting (identity) categories of gender, race, ableism, and class. notably, it is traditionally the male, elite westerner who finds “himself” in the epistemological position of neutrality, rationality, and expertise— which, as harding points out, is tied to enabling some over others to take part in scientific and technological processes of hegemonic knowledge production and innovation. this, in turn, propels the establishment of patterns of rationality that are interwoven with gender, race, ableism, and 5 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) class in their hierarchical relations. along these lines, i am, first, interested in the ways in which the realization of robot companionship relates to the epistemological framework of western modernities. second, i explore how a queerfeminist critique of this framework involves developing an analytical feeling for the contingent nature of exclusionary sorting operations between human and machine that also incorporate the divisions between success/failure, rationality/affectivity, and technical expertise/craft labor in knowing and realizing companionship in contemporary robotics. furthermore, i suggest an approach that leads to a queering of the success/failure binary with and in robotics. my argument is that a posthumanist feminist account of the making of robot companionship allows the linking of a queer theory of failure with the aim of creating robot companions in a productive manner for both fields of expertise. 2.1. demonstrations: the laboratory as a space for realizing and querying robot companionship: this article discusses the realization of robot companions using one humanoid robot, namely armar iii. i draw on this example from the perspective of the queering witness; i.e., who queers the “modest witness” (haraway, 1997, p. 23; emphasis in original) of western modern knowledge production. in exploring the role of the laboratory and the witness to laboratory action in processes of knowledge production in a positivist epistemological framework, donna haraway (1997) identified the modest witness as an emblematic figure of objectivist science that “mirror[s] reality” by becoming “invisible, that is, an inhabitant of the potent ‘unmarked category’” (p. 23). such a form of witnessing performs the “god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere” (haraway, 1991, p. 189). in short, the god-trick enables “the knower” to claim that he/she is speaking the truth, while neglecting her/his subjective and embodied worldliness. against this backdrop, haraway’s queering witness is “a more corporeal, inflected, and optically dense, if less elegant, kind of modest 6 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) witness to matters of fact to emerge in the worlds of technoscience” (1997, 24). thus, i approached the robotics laboratory in which armar is being built, tested, and demonstrated as a site that allows me to become a queering witness to robot companionship. i participated in everyday work in the “kitchen laboratory” in which armar is situated. i will delve more deeply into this context as the heart of the institute in the next subsection. for now, it is important to fully understand the kind of interactive setting between humans and machines, especially humanoid robots. lucy suchman (2011) provides a very productive approach to demonstrations as both the “theatre of proof” (latour, 1988, in suchman, 2011, p. 123) and “theatre of use” (smith, 2009, in suchman, 2011, p. 123). more precisely, she draws on the latourian term “theatre of proof”: that is, an understanding of the objects of research which asks for the ways things stabilize through networks of actions and both human and more-than-human actors, in order to complement this with wally smith’s notion of the “theatre of use,” through which the demonstration of technology is analyzed as “a particular assemblage of hardware and software…presented in action as evidence for its worth” (suchman, 2011, p. 123). while the first term focuses on the actions and actors in the laboratory, the latter also considers the framing of these actions and actors. given the example of armar iii, the frame is the kitchen, a specific setting within the modern household. here, visitors can experience in the present a future in which the humanoid robot is part of the household. notably, a central goal of the demonstration is to make the audience familiar with a future technology. this implies not only a need to guarantee the success of their interaction with the robot in the kitchen but, importantly, also to make this perceptible as successful. how does the demonstration function as a successful realization of robot companionship and establish a frame for robots and humans to become companions? geared toward becoming a witness to laboratory practices of realizing companionship, i proposed in my study (treusch, 2015) to trace how differences are enacted and how properties of the actors in the lab are the results rather than the preconditions of this enactment. thus, i 7 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) understand my queer-feminist posthumanist performative account of witnessing laboratory practices as becoming attuned to the entangled agencies between humans and more-than-humans in the construction of human-robot companionship. through this analytical prism, i tweak the causal relations of the making of robot companions: how does interaction at the robot/human interface during demonstrations exceed the idea of the two entities in causal relations, namely the “human creator” and the “creation,” the robot? in line with suchman (2011), i query “the figuration of subject object intra-actions in contemporary humanoid robotics, and how we might rethink questions of sameness and difference at the interface of humans and machines” (p. 121). from this perspective, sameness and difference are not predetermined qualities, but rather emerge from the intra-actions in the kitchen laboratory. as barad (2007) points out, intra-action “signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies” (p. 33; emphasis in original), while “distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intraaction.” i draw on the term intra-action in order to develop a performative account of distinct yet relational agencies in the robotics laboratory. from this perspective, the analytical unit shifts—from actors with predetermined properties to entangled agencies. at the same time, to participate as the queer witness includes recognizing the enactments of patterns of rationality in their contingency. in this article, i am especially interested in the dichotomy between success and failure in the lab. the queering witness, as i will continue to argue, does not suggest a reading of success as guaranteeing that robot companions will soon move in with us, nor a reading of failure as proof for a techno-skepticism that insists on showing that robotics will never realize its goal. rather, my interest is in overcoming such binary oppositions, for instance in practices of associating the robot with “the human” through engaging with the entangled agencies of a coproduction between human and machine during demonstrations of armar. in what follows, i will further develop a queering account of the politics of the modern success/failure dichotomy and bring it into relation 8 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) with the larger scientific framework of ai, a core field of knowledge and artifact production for contemporary humanoid robotics. 2.2. approaching demonstrations of the companion robot through queer failure this section introduces the queer concept of low theory and its concomitant account of failure as a mode of knowledge counterproduction in order to develop the possibility of an intervention into hegemonic forms of knowing and practices of applying knowledge in humanoid robotics. i will bring a queering approach of failure into conversation with selected insights into a historical account of knowing and feeling in early ai. in the queer art of failure, judith halberstam (2011) develops an understanding of low theory as a resource for counterimaginations, or rather as “a grammar of possibility” (p. 2). this grammar is a political project that “expresses a basic desire to live life otherwise.” it ties in with longstanding critical feminist engagements with technoscience as worlding practices. however, the challenge in contributing to science out of feminist (and queer) theory is to generate a grammar of possibility that not only critically intervenes into hegemonic forms of worlding but also “moves beyond the critique/engagement binary to open space for rethinking how we know” (subramaniam & willey, 2016, p. 1). along these lines, i generate new impulses for practicing embodied objectivity as a move beyond the critique/engagement binary from the suggested conversation between feminist critical engagements with technoscience and halberstam’s take on low theory. low theory works against the “dominant logics of power and discipline” (2011, p. 88). the goal becomes to open up possibilities for a “narrative without progress” and “a more chaotic realm of knowing and unknowing” (p. 2). i regard both as querying approved ways of knowing and as opportunities to enable different actors and their counterknowledge which have formerly been restricted to existing—if at all—outside the laboratories of (contemporary) ai and robotics. 9 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) my account of queer failure is guided by taking aspects of halberstam’s conceptualizations into a new context, the robotics laboratory. in so doing, i primarily identify two central aspects of halberstam’s work: first, the capitalist framework of success and its disciplining power and, second, the stakes of failure as not only an individual experience of defeat, with its consequential feelings of social refusal and shaming, but also as a mode of intervention into the promises of mastery and success. imagining counterstrategies against such a disciplining of thought, halberstam advocates a concept of failure “as a refusal of mastery, a critique of the intuitive connections within capitalism between success and profit” (2011, pp. 11–12). this connection between success, mastery, and capitalism has special meaning for the robotics laboratory: if the demonstration is a success, the chances of also making this machine a market success are thought to increase accordingly. thus, the robot companion in action is presented as the ideal 24/7 service agent that speaks to a “service economy” (suchman 2007, p. 217) as it emerged with the idea of software agents that supposedly organize “our” everyday lives in an optimal, hence most effective, manner and offer assistance with all kinds of administrative work. how can “we” work with failure against the capitalist connection between success and mastery? central to the concept of low theory, as halberstam (2011) points out, is not “arguing for a reevaluation of these [static] standards of passing and failing,” but rather to “dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently live” (p. 2). hence, if producing “high theory” (p. 16) requires mastery and a concomitant disciplining of thought, then low theory invites me to become less serious and more playful in theorizing alternatives to the capitalist bonds between success and profit. in this sense, failure becomes “a practice” (p. 24) of “recogniz[ing] that alternatives are embedded already in the dominant and that power is never total or consistent; indeed failure can exploit the unpredictability of ideology and its indeterminate qualities” (p. 88). in addition, and as halberstam underlined, “low theory might constitute…an undisciplined zone of knowledge production” (p. 18). in this regard, 10 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) dominant modes of thought already include the possibility for alternatives and failure becomes the opportunity to experience and foster counterhegemonic possibilities of knowing and being that remain indeterminate. affects are central to this account of failure, as halberstam (2011) emphasizes, when “addressing the dark heart of the negativity that failure conjures” (p. 23). the darkness and negativity of failure carries an “unbeing and unbecoming” (halberstam, 2011, p. 23)—not only of the individual who fails to conform to the static standards of failure versus success, but—importantly—of exactly the hegemonic, hierarchical relations to knowledge that condition those standards in the first place. in this way, failure becomes a practice of undoing the logics of the capitalist connection between success and mastery. precisely such an undoing through failure occurred when garry kasparov experienced his high-profile defeat against deep blue, a chess computer. as elizabeth wilson (2010) points out, this chess match and its result encouraged a public discussion, perpetuating “a fundamental hostility between affect and computation”; however, that discussion “doesn’t survive closer scrutiny” (p. 11). kasparov—in line with wilson— relies on both rational and affective labor, as “his intellectual labor demands some kind of affective connection…that normally regulates chess playing at this level” (p. 15). wilson furthermore speaks of an “emotional relationality” (p. 16) as the central condition for playing chess. her reading of kasparov’s failure thus dismantles the logic behind a fundamental dichotomy between computational rationality and affective labor. this account of ai moves beyond deploying chess as an icon of gendered patterns of rationality. as she points out, “the conventional presumption that chess-playing expertise is a purely cognitive endeavor, isolatable from other talents and capacities” can be “challenge[d] as a way of opening up the conceptual terrain for thinking about the relationship between ai and affects” (pp. 8–9). in contrast to the authors cited in the section on affects in human/machine relations, she traces “some kind of intrinsic affinity, some kind of intuitive alliance between the 11 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) machinic and the affective, between calculating and feeling” (p. 31) in the work of early ai and argues for the need to acknowledge “the coassembly of machine and emotion…as…one of the foundations of the artificial sciences” (p. x). kasparov’s failure is read together with nonantagonistic forms of affiliation between human and machine as it expresses (not only historically) a desire for the intelligent, machine other. by bringing aspects of halberstam’s work on failure as a queering practice and wilson’s insights into the entanglements of affect/intellect and machine/emotion, i develop a mode of intervention—or rather a mode of attention—that i will use in the remainder of this article to explore the realization of robot companionship during demonstrations. 2.3. a robot companion in action: performing the kitchen armar iii is equipped with a head with two “camera eyes”; two arms, each with a hand with five fingers; and a torso, and stands on a wheeled platform. notably, armar is not equipped with features that would allow viewers to sort it into modern identity categories at first sight. however, as i have shown in detail in my study, the robot is nevertheless endowed with cultural genitals that sort it into the male sex/gender (treusch, 2015, pp. 208–209). additionally, the design strategy of modeling armar after the “average human” describes a statistical dimension that—despite its seeming neutrality—draws on the white male european as a clearly determinable parameter and hence id/entity (see pp. 165ff and 172ff.). with haraway (1991), the human-likeness of armar is entrenched in the prominent figure of “the fictive rational self of universal, and so unmarked, species man, a coherent subject” (p. 210). the focus of this article, however, is not to trace the ways in which the humanoid robot becomes a coherent subject, but rather to delve more deeply into selected scenarios in which sameness and difference between human and robot materialize intra-actively. 12 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 1. armar in its kitchen. armar iii “lives” in the main robotics laboratory, which is designed like a kitchen. it is a spacious room with an l-shaped kitchenette in white, equipped with all the appliances that one would expect in a “real” kitchen: refrigerator, sink, oven, plenty of storage, and several workstations. the room can be accessed through a sliding door that is wider than the other doors in this hallway; next to the sliding door is a window mounted into the wall, with sliding glass panes. the shutters are always closed and the bright lights are switched on to optimize the lighting conditions. in the middle of the room, we find a desk with a computer workstation that demarcates where the kitchen area ends. there is a 13 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) huge screen mounted on top of the oven with a split screen on which one can see the kitchen through armar’s camera eyes as well as a 3d model of armar moving around the kitchen in real time. when one of the engineers opens the oven, we can see a keyboard stored on the baking tray that the engineers use to operate the screen. thus the laboratory kitchen differs from the kitchens with which most people are familiar. here i am thinking of the standardized western kitchenette, which became a huge market success. notably, the kitchen as “we” have become familiar with it evolved from socio-historically specific conditions that deeply interconnect efforts at rationalization with capitalism and also regulated the pairing of individuals and the gendered division of responsibilities within the household. even though certain aspects might vary from the household kitchen as we are familiar with it, this kitchen laboratory nevertheless appears to be an ideal setting for demonstrating the state of the art in humanoid robotics. thus, a central part of the daily work in this kitchen consists of demonstrations of the robot armar to a variety of audiences, ranging from visiting students from the social science department of kit to visiting guest researchers from japan and russia. demonstrations encompass both what the robot can do in the kitchen, like opening and closing doors, grasping a food container and locating items, and what one can do with the robot; that is, possibilities for interacting in the kitchen. demonstrations interweave the familiar with the not-yet-familiar as well as the present with the future and therefore constantly negotiate possible forms of robot companionship. in my study, i developed the notion of “performing the kitchen” (treusch 2015, p. 107), through which i explored the processual, iterative nature of enacting human/machine relations through the concept of posthumanist performativity. in what follows, i will contemplate the successful interaction between humans and the robot as a result of an intra-active co-production in the specific setting of the selected kitchen laboratory. 14 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 3. demonstrations: the (un)making of success and failure in this subsection, i consider demonstrations as consisting of a set of specific tasks primarily aimed at securing the success of the human/robot interface and thus making the demonstration a success. i ask: in what ways do these tasks involve failure? how can “we” grapple with success during demonstrations as intra-active co-productions? demonstrations generally follow a scheme—first there is an introduction, then different interactional scenarios are played out in which the robot demonstrates what it is capable of doing. at least two engineers are involved in demonstrations: one wears a headset through which the robot is operated and also operates the computer workstation in the kitchen; the other usually stands next to armar, guiding the audience through the various steps of the demonstration. during an interview, one of the engineers stressed that work, such as the integration of software into the robot, is not the scientific part, this is the pure engineering part at maximum, this is only software, problems, there exist some problems and one solves them somehow; you don’t make science from this, but a demo is called in three weeks and by then everything has to run [on the robot]…one takes the path that somehow works and then this will also work out somehow (interview engineer cd, july 2011; translation: pt; emphasis: english in original). making the human/robot interface a success in front of an audience requires what i call the “smooth engineering” of the robot, which seems to consist mainly of problem-solving strategies and the hope that everything will work out somehow. the engineer describes the situation of not having full control over the machine as “nerve-wracking” (interview engineer cd, july 2011; translation: pt). this delivers the first insights into the entanglement of agencies and affects in demonstrations. furthermore, when asked for a definition of “engineering” (in comparison to the “scientific part”), the engineer answered as follows: “[with] 15 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) engineering, you have a problem, you solve it, the problem is solved and you’re happy” (interview engineer cd, july 2011; translation: pt; emphasis in original). engineering involves developing strategies to cope with the nerve-wracking project of realizing the robot companion. even though not addressed directly, the potential of wracking one’s nerves is tied to the possibility that things might not work out as planned; the procedure might fail, especially when working with a robot that is still under construction and does not yet run robustly. what happens when success is in danger of becoming failure? 3.1 communication—one potential source of failure one source of complications during the demonstration is communication. in order to talk to the robot, one has to wear a headset with a microphone connected to armar’s sound recognition system. however, the procedure for giving a command is not as easy as talking into the microphone (see treusch, 2015, p. 140ff). during one demonstration, armar received a command that it did not recognize— which underlines that communication involves more requirements than “just” operating the mute switch in the right manner. the speech recognition system might recognize speech, but this does not necessarily result in understanding. one also has to say the words in the right manner. however, even though the command was repeated, armar still did not get it right and answered with “goodbye” (see treusch, 2015, p. 140ff). this reaction evoked laughter in the audience. notably, this laughter did not express a skepticism toward the project of the robot companion in general. rather, i experienced it as a kind of sympathetic reaction that ties in with the widely shared experience of miscommunication with technical devices. the engineer who was wearing the headset during this demonstration joined in with the laughter and the relaxed atmosphere in order to explain the following: i always have to switch off the transmitter for the microphone, so that—while i’m now explaining something to you—it doesn’t hear me and might eventually understand something, then it will talk 16 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) one’s ears off about what it wants to get rid of at the moment. (d1, july 2011; translation: pt) part of the headset is a “mute switch” (d1, july 2011) that has to be operated in a specific way. in explaining this, the engineer takes up the relaxed atmosphere and makes a joke about armar that draws upon his experiences with a failure in communication with the robot: when he talks into the microphone by accident, the robot can recognize and reply to words. figure 2: communication with armar (during a demonstration) remarkably, what could be considered a failure in communication is taken up here as something that reveals insights into armar’s apparent state of mind, and armar is assigned character traits. this depicts a peculiar form of anthropomorphism of the machine, which works to 17 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bridge the gaps between expectations of the humanlike robot as a potential companion, on the one hand, and the reality of current technology levels, on the other. during a conversation with the same engineer (here called kl), i asked him how he personally sees human-likeness in armar. he answered as follows: kl: hm, so i find this dialogue system, when he talks about random stuff, this sometimes has human traits, when he says that he runs out of steam [laughing]. of course, this is all justifiable, because he misunderstood something and then reacts like this, but these situations are so comical, in which you see some humanity.... but then, precisely with such things that you haven’t seen very often, i believe they have this surprise effect, even though in my case i’ve been here for a long time. and i guess that external people see something they haven’t seen so far, or not often, and that it contains something human. (interview engineer kl, july 2011; translation: pt) what could be regarded as a failure in communication seems to become an indicator for success in the sense of successfully realizing a robot that is legible as human, and hence showing comical behavior (for a detailed analysis of this excerpt, see treusch, 2015, pp. 202–203). behaviors manifested by the machine that are regarded as unexpected and have a surprising effect—even for practitioners familiar with the machine and its inner workings—are perceived as comical. thus, when armar fails to execute an order, this in turn is interpreted as a form of dissident behavior by the machine. the refusal makes the machine more human than the simple execution of orders. 3.2. getting familiar with armar—making the interface a success the design of the kitchen laboratory already reveals significant conditions for realizing the robot companion: this room is built in a very accessible manner, the color white dominates, and it is always very bright in the room. creating these “open labs” (treusch, 2015, p. 69) involves 18 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) generating a certain atmosphere that has as much of a structuring effect on actions in this space as the spatial arrangements of the kitchenette and computer workstation. i experienced the atmosphere as inviting, and therefore also as indicating a certain kind of transparency in realizing the project of the humanlike kitchen robot. this impression reverberates with the popularity that humanoid robots in general, and this machine in particular, have already gained and that is supposedly still increasing. even though humanoid robots have become so popular, they are still a new technology. thus, introducing this new technology in a way that generates familiarity is of special importance in contemporary robotics. in my study, i explored the beginning of demonstrations in detail, because this part plays an important role in making the audience familiar with armar. at the start of demonstrations, armar is initialized. this process is used to introduce the robot’s body to the audience as a humanlike body. the engineer standing next to the robot uses his own body along with verbal explanations to illustrate the human-likeness. for instance, he cross-references his own arm and the robot’s arm while explaining that “it has a neck, and a head, and arms with elbows, which we are seeing...and shoulder joints such like in the human arm” (demonstration 1, july 2011). morana alač (2009) has explored work on humanoid robots in a different setting, through what she frames as “indexing the two bodies,” which stipulates “physical proximity” and “allows for exploration through touch” (p. 496). i identify these practices of endowing the robot with body parts and indexing its body as a way of inviting the audience to see and to feel the robot’s body. the engineer does not only use his own body to show the humanoid body parts that are his body parts that are its body parts. rather, he touches his/its arm and enacts proximity corporeally and, importantly, also intra-actively. touch is an important signifier of capacities to affect and to be affected. as maria puig de la bellacasa (2009) highlights, “touching is…the experience par excellence in which boundaries between self and other are blurred” (p. 298). this thought resonates with barad’s (2012) take on “the nature of touching” (p. 207). 19 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) notably, touching in a cross-referencing mode can be analyzed not only as the intra-active enactment of a bodily scheme of human-likeness between armar, the engineer, and the audience, but also as a form of affective labor in making the audience feel what a robot is like and what it is capable of doing. with alač (2009), i furthermore contemplate these intra-active practices of association in terms of “‘getting into’ the body of the machine” (p. 496). this notion nicely displays the corporeal, processual, and over-individual practices of learning to see, know, and feel robot companionship. touching in particular invokes “awareness of the embodied character of perception, affect and thinking” (puig de la bellacasa, 2009, p. 297). both visitors and engineers are trained to develop a sense of armar as humanlike, including the shape as much as the behavior. the affective practices of association assembled here seem to guarantee the success of the human/robot interface. along these lines, i suggest delving more deeply into the interrelations between entangled agencies and affects, as they seem to build the core of practices of association. 3.3 entangled agencies and affects in making the robot companion a success demonstrations in the kitchen laboratory are of special value—their success is of utmost importance to everyone involved. accordingly, the expectations of both the engineers and the visitors create specific conditions for interaction at the human/robot interface. practices of association between visitors, engineers, and the robot entangle knowing and feeling, as they involve all the senses and, as i will argue, build the preconditions for successful interaction in the kitchen laboratory. the project of realizing robot companionship can be considered as opening up new realms of computation and engineering. however, the new depends upon being integrated into the familiar in order to become a market success. as i have shown, the humans (including engineers and visitors) become familiar with armar and vice versa through getting to 20 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) know each other—involving all the senses. thus, i argue that the practices of association rely heavily on what are regarded as noncognitive styles of knowing, such as affects and emotions. against the backdrop of my posthumanist performative account of entangled agencies in practices of association, i suggest an approach that treats affects as the basic social glue, as that which enables relating and interacting (corporeally) and directs the analytical attention toward “preindividual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act” (clough, 2008, p. 1). from this perspective, i regard affect as “an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state of relation” (seigworth & gregg, 2010, p. 1), which also demands that “we” take into account the pre-individual, processual, and corporeal nature of affects and understand those affects as forces as well as seemingly individual emotions. sara ahmed points out that a strict division between emotions and affects as objects of knowledge is a problematic form of sorting operation (ahmed, 2014, p. 1), especially against the backdrop of scholarship following the so-called “affective turn” (clough, 2008, p. 1). moreover, affects, understood as emotions as well as corporeal forces, can clearly be categorized into the realm of craft and reproductive labor, as opposed to scientific rationality and expertise. the latter is associated with the operations of mind and the former is marked by the burdens of embodied bonds and bodily labor. as ahmed (2014) has illustrated, the urge for a new scholarship on affect is pinned against an “implied impasse” that is assumed to be the result of a history of queer and feminist concerns with the body and emotions, “in which body and mind, and reason and passion, were treated as separate” (p. 4). for ahmed, such a distinction between affect and emotion also carries a tendency to gender knowledge (production), as she points out: “if affects are unmediated and escape signification; emotions are mediated and contained by signification” (ahmed, 2014, p. 4). the “gendered distinction” (ahmed, 2014, p. 4) between affects and emotions privileges the one over the other as the more proper object of study and thus creates the danger of perpetuating a gendered, epistemological 21 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) framework of western modernities. precisely by differentiating affects from emotions, the former are assigned the status of a proper object of knowledge while the latter are in danger of being banned from academia, including “certain styles of thought” such as queer and feminist modes of knowing, the “‘touchy feely’ styles of thought” (ahmed, 2014, p. 4). from this perspective, i suggest mapping the affective capacities surrounding the centralized human/robot interface along with the emotions that emerge at this interface as also processual, codependent, and corporeal in nature. furthermore, i consider this analytical prism to be an intervention into the hegemony of gendered patterns of rationality in ai and robotics and as an opportunity for an active queer and feminist contribution to this field of (applied) knowledge. the realization of robot companions is a highly affective process that involves knowledge as well as all the senses, which makes this process notably supra-individual and corporeal. the everyday tasks of the engineers who are working on and with the robot mostly rely on rational forms of knowing and applying their knowledge about how to realize such a machine. however, the approach that i have suggested emphasizes the intra-active practices of association, and through this it becomes an entry point that allows “us” to work toward overcoming the modern dichotomies between passion and reason, rational and irrational, and failure and success from several sides; that is to say, from a queer-feminist theorization of failure and its insights into shifting “our” understandings of how “we” know and from the actual practices performed in one laboratory of recent humanoid robotics. 4. toward a low theory of intra-action in the kitchen laboratory: a mode of relating differently? demonstrations as examples of the theatre of use and the theatre of proof are key to making humans familiar with the humanlike robot; that is, the process of making humanoid robot companions real. situations in which a demonstration does not proceed smoothly reveal the conditions 22 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) and practices of realization. they display practices of coping with failure as i have witnessed them. in these situations, the connections between knowing, perception, emotions, and affects are displayed in unique ways. in such cases, we are not observing predetermined identities with agential properties meeting and interacting; rather, distinct agencies that are mutually entangled, intra-active, become palpable as they emerge from practices of association. the latter involve largely noncognitive— that is, touchy-feely—styles of thought. thus, i highlight that touchy-feely styles of knowing are already part of the hegemonic knowledge project of companion robots. even though robot companionship might be conceptually understood as a functional service relation between human and robot, the insights gained from demonstrating armar reveal that this concept does not do justice to the actual relations between engineers, audience, the robot, and other devices involved in the enactment of robot companionship. from this perspective, the insights into interaction in the kitchen laboratory presented here permit two conclusions: firstly, emotions and affects do not belong to a realm outside of the laboratory, but are fundamental to the knowledge project of humanoid robotics. secondly, interaction in this setting displays the highly affective, that is corporeal, processual, and supra-individual nature of working and knowing in this branch of robotics. these insights not only allow me to link a queer theory of failure with companion robotics, but also to stipulate a different kind of understanding of the knowledge project of robot companionship: one that pivots around reconsidering the nature of human/machine relations through the inseparability of emotionality and rationality as well as the intra-active quality of human/machine relations. my account of a low theory of robotics implies a need to acknowledge the conditions for success in the laboratory, and through this also to tweak the narrative of progress and to install an understanding of progress that encompasses its enactment, including the acts and actors. for instance, i identify the capacity to laugh with the machine as the affective labor of bridging gaps and coping with the (still 23 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) existing) constraints that limit successful interaction at the human/robot interface. practices of becoming trained and learning to see, feel, and know what the humanoid robot can do—with all its limitations—emerge as the central condition for realizing robot companionship. acknowledging this might allow the robotics laboratory to become a less disciplined zone of knowledge production, in which goals are much less predetermined. the format of the demonstration, with its opportunities to become a queering witness, would allow this perfectly. in addition, my analysis requires making the issue of how to realize human-robot relations of companionship into an open question that can only be answered in conversation with the specific needs emerging from situated relations of companionship. i envision such conversations as being part of an interdisciplinary low theory of robotics. feminist and queer counterknowledge on human/machine relations could make an active contribution to robotics, primarily on two levels. first, as wilson’s and my studies have shown, there is a deep connection between feeling and knowing that calls for rethinking not only dichotomies between passion and reason, scientific and unscientific, and body and mind, but also of hegemonic narrations of human/machine relations. this claim resonates with the process i have illustrated: demonstrations require a robot companion that shows humanlike capacities, just as much as capacities to affect and to be affected. these pivot around emotions such as curiosity about connecting with the machine other as well as laughter. this is also where failure comes into play as, second, i have depicted how anthropomorphism is used to explain machine failure in terms of characteristic human traits. however, my argument here is that it is precisely the situation in which failure is interpreted as a humanlike refusal of the machine to obey that could become a point of departure for innovative collaborations beyond the figure of the universal human and “his narrative” of success and progress through rationality. instead of practicing forms of association that rely on finding “the human” in the robot, robotics could create new forms of intimacy with machines that become a starting point for critical, self-reflecting encounters with social 24 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) norms in their restrictions upon what it means to be a human(-like) companion. this, however, would imply at least withstanding, if not expediting, the negativity of failure as an undoing—an undoing of the ideas of individual success and concomitant autonomous agency as well as bodily integrity, but also of the implemented logics of success of a service-oriented robot companionship that defines human/machine relations of mastery over the machine as a form of mastery over what are defined as the critical challenges of “our” societies. finally, i raise with susan leigh star (1995, p. 89) the question of “cui bono?” —who benefits? as part of developing a low theory on the art of failure in robotics, i imagine creating a “contact zone” (haraway, 2008, p. 36) between robotics and a queer theory of failure that unfolds through “mundane” practices of “accountability, caring for, being affected, and entering into responsibility” (haraway, 2008, p. 36). this contact zone would be an interdisciplinary, less disciplined zone of knowledge production that acknowledges the interconnectedness of feeling and knowing as well as the indeterminacy of human/machine relations. it would also continuously challenge the idea of bodily integrity as well as capitalist standards—including those related to standards of organizing reproductive labor, especially elderly care—and social as well as technoscientific norms of embodying, knowing, and feeling companionship with robots. not least, i consider such a new branch of “low robotics” an opportunity to lead the way out of what is perceived as one impasse that haunts the field of contemporary robotics: ai’s longstanding failure to build more robust, accountable, intelligent agents. references acord, l., bisbee, j.k., bisbee, s., niederhoffer, g. 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(2008). the affective turn: political economy, biomedia and bodies. theory, culture and society, 25(1), 1–22. franchi, s., & güzeldere, g. (eds.) (2005). machinations of the mind: cybernetics and artificial intelligence from automata to cyborgs. in mechanical bodies, computational minds. artificial intelligence from automata to cyborgs (pp. 15–149). cambridge, ma: mit press. halberstam, j. (2011). the queer art of failure. durham, nc: duke university press. haraway, d.j. (1991). simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature. new york, ny: routledge. 26 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) ______. (1997). modest_witness@second_millennium. femaleman©_meets_ oncomousetm. new york, ny: routledge. _______. (2003). the companion species manifesto: dogs, people, and significant otherness. chicago, il: prickly paradigm press. _______. (2008). when species meet. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. harding, s. (2008). sciences from below: feminisms, postcolonialities, and modernities. durham, nc: duke university press. puig de la bellacasa, m. (2009). touching technologies, touching visions: the reclaiming of sensorial experience and the politics of speculative thinking. subjectivity, 28, 297–315. robot companions for citizens. (n.d.). retrieved from www.robotcompanions.eu. suchman, l. (2007). human-machine reconfigurations: plans and situated actions. 2nd ed. new york, ny: cambridge university press. _______. (2011). subject objects. feminist theory, 12(2), 119–145. suchman, l., trigg, r., & blomberg, j. (2002). working artefacts: ethnomethods of the prototype. british journal of sociology, 53(2), 163– 179. seigworth, g.j., & gregg m. (eds.) (2010). an inventory of shimmers. the affect theory reader. durham, nc: duke university press, 1–25. subramaniam, b., & willey, a. (2016). call for papers—science out of feminist theory for the journal catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience. star, s. l. (ed.) (1995). the politics of formal representations: wizards, 27 treusch catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) gurus, and organizational complexity. in ecologies of knowledge: work and politics in science and technology (pp. 88–118). albany, ny: state university of new york press. treusch, p. (2015). robotic companionship: the making of anthropomatic kitchen robots in queer feminist technoscience perspective. linköping, sweden: liu press. retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-118117 turkle, s. (2005 [1984]). the second self: computers and the human spirit. 20th anniversary ed. cambridge, ma: mit press. wilson, e.a. (2010). affect and artificial intelligence. seattle, wa: university of washington press. bio pat treusch is a lecturer at the center for interdisciplinary women’s and gender studies where she teaches feminist sts across disciplinary boundaries. she is currently also a postdoc at the bmbf research group mti-engage (interdisciplinary human-robot interaction research) —both at technical university berlin. her research interests include interdisciplinary feminist science and technology studies with a focus on human-machine interaction, queer theory, feminist materialisms, affect studies and research based teaching methods. doucet-battle article     bioethical matriarchy: race, gender, and the gift in genomic research    james doucet-battle university of california, santa cruz jbattle@ucsc.edu (now) the director of the us national institutes of health (nih), francis collins, is trying to make up for decades of slights. over the past four months, he has met lacks family members to answer questions and to discuss what should be done with genome data from their matriarch’s cell line. (callaway, 2013, p. 132, emphasis added) narratives—socializing stories—that are attached to all women and blacks of both genders have an inordinate control over the potential for private personhood. the public controls of race and gender are so robust that private individuation is rarely an opportunity for those whose identities fall within these two social constructs.  (holloway, 2011, p. 7) is that where the manhood lay? in the naming done by a white man who was supposed to know? who gave them the privilege not of working but of deciding how to? (morrison, 1998, p. 147, emphasis added) in a letter to the journal nature on august 8, 2013, a research team led by andrew adey, joshua burton, and jacob kitzman from the department of genome sciences at the university of washington, seattle announced the successful mapping of the genome and epigenome of the hela cell line.1 this development occurred less than seven months after a german research group directed by lars steinmetz published data in an open access journal detailing the first successful genomic sequencing of a hela cell line.2 these accomplishments promised to change the way researchers understood environmental adaptation and energy regulation as metabolic processes of genetic mutation. this advance could possibly shed new light on the causative factors and mechanisms underlying the development of type 2 diabetes and other cardiometabolic disorders. however, the international research community, particularly the national institutes of health, harbored concern about what the new discovery might mean for future research. although the german team removed the online data, the family of henrietta lacks, who was the original source of the hela line, was especially concerned about the ethical implications of these discoveries. it seemed the scientific community was once again producing wealth and knowledge from the hela cell line without acknowledging its fraught history of bodily appropriation. as chronicled by hannah landecker (2000) and rebecca skloot (2011), the hela cell line was commodified without the knowledge of lacks’s family at a time when informed consent was not yet a legal norm. this time, however, the lacks family demanded economic justice. in a statement released the day before the announcement, francis collins, director of the nih, sought to reconcile the newly mapped hela line with the lacks’s demands: just like their matriarch, the lacks family continues to have a significant impact on medical progress by providing access to an important scientific tool that researchers will use to study the cause and effect of many diseases with the goal of developing treatments. (national institutes of health. 2013, august 7, news release, emphasis added) on closer reading and for the purpose of this article, the statement “just like their matriarch, the lacks family continues to…provid[e] access” reveals a vexed engagement with hela’s history. although henrietta lacks’s consent to the use of her cervical cancer cells beyond the diagnosis and treatment of her condition was not required, the phrase “providing access” implies that she did. collins’s statement frames the family as a biological resource and locates labor value squarely within researcher expertise, reproducing hela’s history of racialized and gendered forms of labor, kinship denial, and commodification that are often disavowed. together, these issues make the intersections between genomics, race, and gender a fundamentally bioethical relationship.  engaging with scientific and media narratives about henrietta lacks and hela, this article charts the ways genomic research have facilitated the re-emergence of a particularly thorny term: matriarchy. within the bioethical nexus of genomics, race, and gender, the invocation of matriarchy in these narratives makes the private “public,” a process karla holloway (2011) argues constitutes a control of race and gender (p. 7). hence, they belie racialized gender constructs based on african descent that are rooted in socioeconomic history, revealing political and resource allocations erased by the matriarchal label and which i term bioethical matriarchy. in this sense, investigating bioethical matriarchy departs from max weber’s (1910) century-long call for an analysis of technology separate from an analysis of the “property relations” among economic actors (weber 2005, p. 27). i make two arguments: 1) although race and gender have occupied much scholarly and media attention, matriarchy, specifically black matriarchy, as both a racial and gender construct of otherness, has remained under-analyzed but yet routinely deployed in the social sciences, politics, and humanities; 2) underlining patriarchal gift economies of exchange, bioethical matriarchy (or the bioethical matriarch) marks racialized and gendered forms of exchange arising from the absence of consent or of obligational precedents for reciprocation. three fundamental questions drive this article’s inquiry: 1) what do novel matriarchal genomic origin narratives tell us about embedded racialized and gendered forms of exchange and their historical intersections with socioeconomic status and inequality?; 2) how are race, gender, and the social order reproduced or regenerated as a productive economic construct?; and 3) can restorative or reparative justice render the bioethical matriarch whole? arguably, the bioethical matriarch is positioned as not whole. as this essay will show, henrietta lacks’s matriarchal status derives not from any real power lacks may have had, but from hela’s subsequent notoriety gained recursively as a fragmentary biospecimen. to examine these questions, i build on previous ethnographic research conducted on type 2 diabetes and race in new york and northern california, and new ethnographic and archival fieldwork in baltimore, md and washington d.c. exploring the underlying role of race in both genomic and global health disparities research.3 i suggest that deconstructing the matriarch-status ascription addresses the intersections of genomics, racial labor, and gender beyond their component social, political, and biological parameters. at stake is whether the political and economic power enfranchising inherited rights to resources accrue to the matriarch as a result of this exchange. the racial bioethics of the gift classical anthropology defined gift exchange as a circulation of property that sets in motion obligations to give, receive, and reciprocate (malinowski, 1922; mauss, 1990). early functionalist projects focused on exchange as a social and political lens through which the value of the gift was seen as secondary to the function it served in cementing human relationships. however, women and slaves have each been exchanged historically as both fungible gifts and property (du bois, 1924; strathern, 1988). w.e.b. du bois’s (1924) theorization of the gift as racial labor preceded mauss’s notion of the gift as political (mauss, 1990). i read du bois’s definition of the gift alongside catherine waldby and robert mitchell's (2006a) account of 21st century “tissue economies,” in which cells and tissues are transferred from poor, socially and economically disadvantaged “surplus” bodies to the wealthy and powerful in society, a transfer rationalized by narratives of citizenship and civic duty (waldby & mitchell, 2006b, pp. 56-57). and like du bois, waldby and mitchell put forward a redistributive and regenerative political economy for bodies made deficient in their material appropriation.  participatory inclusion by the poor and disadvantaged, particularly women, highlights joan scott’s (1986) insistence upon placing gender front and center in any historical analysis of labor. additionally, i bring the notion of racialized forms of gendered labor as fungible, or exchangeable property, to bear on richard hyland’s (2014) assertion that gift-giving and exchange occur in sociocultural spaces outside and in spite of legal or moral sanction, where according to karla holloway (2014), “the evolution of legal text did not… fully and /or finally determine social act” (p. x). outside of critical race and feminist studies and the medical humanities, few scholars have engaged the ways notions of matriarchy both inform conditions of exchange and misrecognize affective kinship structures.4 hela and its embeddedness in slavery’s historical rupturing of personhood generally and motherhood specifically, troubles neat scholarly notions of gift exchange, reciprocation, and consent, by introducing a body that has historically constituted a “point of convergence where biological, sexual, social, cultural, linguistic, ritualistic, and psychological fortunes join” (spillers, 1987, p. 67). racial and gender constructs overdetermine notions of individual sovereignty and subjectivity for women and blacks, whose bodies always have  “a compromised relationship to privacy (holloway, 2011, p. 9). genomic science offers new opportunities to make private bodies public, often under the neoliberal banner of individual sovereignty. sometimes this sovereignty is defined in terms of an “inclusion-and-difference” paradigm, which is driven by older epistèmes circumscribing group difference in terms of biologically ascertainable “races” (epstein, 2007, pp. 6-7). however, “race” is still often rendered a genotypically-fixed feature of the body (or a stable category, in equilibrium) that is scientifically discoverable, rather than an elusive or illusive target. this presents an intractable form of social and scientific classification that alondra nelson (2008) suggests has created new forms of social meaning around identity. genetic tests as a commodity offer new tools for “self-fashioning” based on notions of scientific impartiality and fulfilling one’s “genealogical aspirations.” while nelson cautions against prematurely assessing the social and political ramifications of newly marketed genetic “ancestry” testing models, she submits that the knowledge claims they make, as well as their subsequent interpretation by consumers, set in motion new forms of subjectification based on biological notions of racial difference (bolnick et al., 2007; nelson, 2008). the personal fulfillment of diasporic genealogical aspirations and the political imperatives of research inclusion underline a desire to make legible ancestries violently ruptured by slavery and colonialism and bodies marked anonymous historically. in  particular, black feminist writers, specifically fiction writers, make visible these otherwise violent and anonymous historical silences and ellipses of memory. in toni morrison’s beloved (1988), the novel’s protagonist, sethe, attempts unsuccessfully to repress traumatic memories of slavery, bondage, and loss, which involved murdering her own two-year-old daughter to prevent her recapture by slave patrols pursuing runaway slaves in the north. saidiya hartman (2007) writes about the tension between slavery, memory, and the archive, and how each produces both contingent silences and a sense of irrevocable ancestral loss, asking, “was my hunger for the past so great that i was now encountering ghosts? had my need for an entrance into history played tricks on me, mocked my scholarly diligence, and exposed me as a girl blinded by mother loss?” (p. 16). in writing about the violent erasure of genealogical memory, hartman blurs fiction with historical analysis—what elsewhere she calls “critical fabulation” (2008)—to excavate an unknowable maternal past. the erasures of memory and history instituted by racial slavery continued to haunt the life of henrietta lacks and the immortal life of hela, both situated in “a common historical ground, the socio-political order of the new world” in which, according to hortense spillers (1987), a “diasporic plight marked a theft of the body” (p. 67). the lacks matriarchal narrative represents the private theft of the mortal black body that can be “killed” (roberts, 2014), while hela represents an “immortal” public text read from genetic analyses of the cells, their genome, and their epigenome, all decoded from, to paraphrase spillers, “an undecipherable kind of hieroglyphics of black flesh” (spillers, 2014, p. 67). deconstructing matriarchy the oxford english dictionary defines a matriarch as “a woman who is the head of a family or tribe,” and “an older woman who is powerful within a family or organization.” further, oxford defines matriarchy as “a system of society or government ruled by a woman or women.”5 discursively figuring henrietta lacks as "matriarch" positions her as a notable figure in her family, but this positioning elides her actual power in both her personal, family life (which we may not have access to) and larger cultural, historical, and social contexts reproducing dominant notions of race and gender. discursive framings of matriarchy in social and political scientific literatures have long labeled african-american and, by extension, afro-creole family structures as “matriarchal,” “matrilineal,” or “matrifocal” (beckles, 1999; clarke, 1999; frazier, 1940; hyman & reed, 1969; moynihan, 1965; smith, 1956, 1988, 1996).6 moreover, invocations of matriarchy have usually contained political motivations (matory, 2005; sanday, 1998). for example, the 1965 moynihan report attributed “matriarchal” family structures to “the culture of poverty” affecting a large percentage of the african-american population. low rates of marriage, skewed representations in popular culture, and statistics on out-of-wedlock births, reinforced the notion of endemic african-american cultural pathology and family disintegration. and this biosocial “fact” of african-american matriarchy has seeped into genomic discourse. according to lisa weasel (2004), the story of henrietta lacks reignited evolutionary debates about human origins (see landecker, 2000), while reinscribing a narrative “from which race and gender cannot be extricated” (weasel, 2004, p. 189). race, a theoretical and methodological pre-occupation of nineteenthand early-twentieth-century biological anthropology that sought to find its essence, later gave way to cultural and postmodern arguments emphasizing its socially constructed nature, only to reappear with vigor as a biological entity in the early twenty-first century (bliss, 2012). thus, in terms of racial history as a constructed lens through which to view the past, particularly the gendered past, genomic science offered new truth claims about the prehistory of race (wailoo, nelson, & lee, 2012). hela exemplifies and henrietta lacks personifies the regenerative persistence of this sub-saharan-african genetic possibility and ability, carrying with it the narrative baggage of the racialized black matriarch. further illustrating the historical conflation of ancestry with gender, and race with genetics, researchers at the university of california, berkeley in 1987 argued for an original mitochondrial ancestor of all humanity. the scientific narrative of the sub-saharan, out-of-africa origins of humanity soon found itself in tension with judeo-christian origin narratives based on religious myth. subsequently interpreted through a gendered western religious lens, this mitochondrial ancestor, or “genetic matriarch,” was envisioned as eve from the biblical garden and was sometimes referred to as “mitochondrial eve,” who in turn became known as “african eve” (oikkonen, 2015, p. 748). some saw this development as a compromise between science and religion. others saw it as a simplistic racialization of an extremely complex story of human variation. analyses of race and gender, imbricated within evolutionary theory, had moved from the “bare bones” of the fossil (fausto-sterling, 2005) to gendered explanations of sub-saharan-african genetic ancestry (oikkonen, 2015). in the above cases, scholarship about human genetic ancestry proved permeable to perennial constructions of race and gender. empirical sample data, first attributed descriptively through observation, were subsequently ascripted interpretively using categories demarcating inherited social statuses (matriarchal, religious, racial, gender, etc.) and therefrom imbued with explanatory characteristics of hierarchal social value. as social facts, such ascripted statuses are then read scientifically as inherited, not achieved. ascription or ascripted status refers to a social standing inherited from birth. by contrast, achieved status refers to a merit-based social standing accomplished during one’s lifetime. i base my understanding on earlier anthropological work on ascripted status and the sociology of ascriptive inequality to offer a broader analytic that moves beyond attribution as description to ascription as explanation (davis, 1950; linton, 1936; parsons, 1970; reskin, 2005; reskin & branch-mcbrier, 2000). in scientific circles, the use of the term “matriarch” to describe henrietta lacks runs counter to anthropological definitions of matriarchy as an intergenerational female right to political and economic power. matriarchal societies pass on status and wealth to children through the maternal line and, more importantly, women in these societies figure prominently in the total political and economic structure of the group. matriarchal societies trace not only temporal but cosmological descent from a female ancestor/progenitor/goddess, sacralizing social practices that legitimates the social order between and among the sexes. seen this way, matriarchy does not imply the political or economic power to subjugate others but the power to conjugate and regenerate the totality of social life (sanday, 1998). in contrast, matrifocal (or matricentric) groups are female-headed households characterized in creole societies by racialized forms of male exclusion from the larger socioeconomic sphere (smith, 1996). children in matrilineal groups inherit positive status and, often, rights to resources reckoned through the maternal line. unlike the integral social role matriarchy serves, matrifocality exists within the interstices and at the margins of larger socioeconomic forces. children in these families inherit neither positive status nor resources (or rights to them) from their mothers. other scholars have critiqued matriarchal discourses as self-indulgent practices in status elevation removed from their racialized context. for these scholars, matriarchy as a concept explains precious little while gratuitously describing a non-existent kinship structure. matriarchy, as expounded upon by nineteenth-century scholars such as edward tylor and twentieth-century scholars such as w.h.r. rivers, found little support from empirical studies, which thus stated that matriarchy no longer existed. if it ever did, it did so within overarching patriarchal kinship structures either through patrilineal marriage or matrilineal brother/uncle rubrics (sanday, 1998). matriarchy assumes inherited female rights to resources and influence in political decision making. hence, in the lacks case, the characterization of “matriarch” is curious, given that it finds little to no definitional or objective traction. worse still, it crowds out conversations about matrifocality as an intergenerational process of gendered dispossession marking racialized forms of male exclusion from the wider socioeconomic field (brereton, 2002). yet, it is not enough to simply dismiss lacks’s ascribed status of “matriarch” as a matter of poor word choice, however unintentional. rather, because it circulates within wider scientific narratives on african origins and genetic “eve”s, the usage of “matriarch” exemplifies larger problems around locating research wealth and engaging with the material-discursive makings of race and gender. finding africa in the admixed matriarch building on contacts made and interviews conducted during summer 2011, i attended in spring 2012 the genetics of the peoples of africa and the transatlantic african diaspora conference, held at the university of north carolina, chapel hill. an international meeting, the conference brought together biological anthropologists, geneticists, molecular biologists, and epidemiologists of color whose work addressed the genetics of health and health disparities in transnational and diasporic african-descent populations. the meeting raised three important and contentious issues: one epistemic, one definitional, and one methodological. the first issue centered on personal identification within a “racial” or “ethnic” group. the second revolved around the definition of an “african.” the third centered on locating “africa” in the “admixed” human genome. scientific discourses about henrietta lacks and hela cells have long reflected these epistemic, definitional, and methodological issues. when walter nelson-rees received six cell samples from the soviet union in 1973, he believed them to have originated in female donors. the cells were all revealed to possess only x-shaped chromosomes, meaning they had the genetic markers for maternal origin and descent. upon closer examination by ward peters in detroit, all six “soviet” samples were determined to have originated from a sub-saharan-african female—to be specific, an “admixed african american” female, henrietta lacks. the publication of the hela genome and epigenome in august 2013 was preceded and accompanied by debates about health disparities, genomic explanations for differential disease outcomes among racial groups, and the politics of racial classification and their intersections with power, purity, admixture, and ethnoracial self-identification. however, the dual lives of henrietta lacks and the immortal hela cell line trouble these health disparity debates, biological discourses on purity and admixture, and attendant claims to locate and source sub-saharan-african genetic diversity in the human genome, figuring what spillers calls the “undecipherability of black flesh” even in the face of these widespread, organizational attempts to decode it. the epistemic question was raised by african-american molecular biologist dr. marcus scribner7, who participated in the chapel hill meeting i attended. visibly perturbed by the ways race had been linked to specific genomic scripts in an earlier presentation, scribner said, “ancestry tests for ancestors, not living people. it is an act of categorical misrecognition to attempt to explain genetic and genomic differences within human populations using the language of race.” against efforts to define “an african” as a member of a sub-saharan group on the continent, scribner argued, “an african is someone who either originates from or lives within the african continent. it makes no difference whether what we call ‘european’ y-chromosomes are found in north africa, the us, and [sic] south africa; or ‘arab’ y-chromosomes in the sudan.” scribner traced the assumptions behind such claims to nineteenth-century biological anthropology and evolutionary theory, which equated an exaggerated bantu phenotype as the prototypical “negro”: this was about europe and america writing an evolutionary narrative to themselves about themselves and those below them as a result of contact, colonization and slavery. knowledge produced for domestic consumption and the exercise of power, but wholly inaccurate. however, the historical dynamics of power challenge genomic narratives about race. one researcher who traces genomic ancestry in latin america said, the population of the dominican republic has a heavy african component. in a continuum of africanicity, from lowest to highest you have: mexico, ecuador, colombia, puerto rico, and the dominican republic. yet national and cultural narratives in the dominican republic focus on their “european heritage.” haitians are seen as the africans although there are dominicans with as much or more african genetic ancestry than haitians. since the 1960s, several anthropologists and afrocentric scholars have used the terms “africoid” and “africanity” to describe an essential sub-saharan-african aesthetic (maquet, 1972; senghor, 1967). over time, these two terms have been adopted by scholars in biological anthropology, diaspora studies, psychology, cultural studies, and increasingly, in the field of genetics. for example, “africanicity” was deployed originally in studies of african art and film but is now taken up in genomics to describe degrees of africanicity in a genetic sample (lima et al., 2007). what is unclear is precisely how and  when the aesthetic became seen as biological, with some researchers using africanicity to define a common “african american cultural dna” (mcdougall, 2011, emphasis added),8 but the epistemic and definitional interpretations of african ancestry in the latter deterritorialize sub-saharan africa geographically while simultaneously inferring its genetic locatability. the central question, therefore, remains: how to source the wide genetic diversity of sub-saharan africanicity in admixed african-descent populations? as one molecular epidemiologist told me, it is extremely difficult to source (african) origins in an admixed population. and of course, there can be degrees of admixture even within the same population. the southeastern united states has the least racially admixed and the pacific northwest the most racially admixed african american populations in the us. testing afro-caribbean and afro-brazilian populations can perhaps tell us more about african ancestry than united states african americans—too much admixture. in agreement, another researcher offered a possible solution: the high percentage of european y-chromosomes in the african american population makes mitochondrial (mt)dna a better locus of study. it is a circular genome that is maternally derived. it performs no recombination, is traceable and more copies of it are available for study. mitochondrial dna (mtdna) is derived only through maternal lines, and the genetic information it contains regulates energy production by utilizing oxygen to convert food to energy. this energy regulation mechanism represents human adaptation to a diverse set of environmental and historical challenges. african americans have some of the highest rates of type 2 diabetes in the us. however, their mtdna contains diverse sets of sub-saharan dna. the genetic complexity of type 2 diabetes includes co-factors that usually accompany the disease, including hypertension; hypercholesterolemia; eye, kidney, and heart diseases; chronically high blood sugar levels; and alzheimer’s disease. diabetics rarely die from diabetes itself but rather from one or more of these cardiometabolic factors. recently, the genomic research focus on this type 2 genetic complexity, known as the metabolic syndrome (mets), has been centered on examining mtdna and its energy and metabolic system.                 epidemiological studies of metabolic diseases in african americans must reckon with the ways slavery has structured mtdna inheritance in african american populations. these epidemiological lines lead us to african-american women as embodiments of a particular history. while locating africanicity presents unique challenges, operationalizing admixture analyses in the us offers robust research opportunities, highlighting two important historical factors favoring african-american participation in genomic research. first, the united states was the only slave society that experienced an increase in its african descent population. caribbean slave economies like jamaica, for example, preferred working slaves to death and replacing them with new imports from africa (brown, 2010). second, by 1830, four years before the end of slavery in the british west indies, enslaved africans in the us on average had three maternal ancestral generations preceding them, each generation born in the us. from an epigenomic standpoint, african americans, representing both a large sample pool and a diverse population in terms of admixture, demonstrate a longer history of environmental and epidemiological interaction with european populations. in terms of africanicity, this variously admixed population demonstrates a predictable pattern of mtdna flow through west african maternal lines. embodying the diversity of sub-saharan mtdna in a racially admixed family, the body of henrietta lacks revolutionized cellular biology and spurred global biomedical research. the sequencing of the hela genome and epigenome in 2013 promised, or threatened, to change the way we understood metabolic adaptation to environmental change. it raised ethical questions about who should profit from that understanding. race, gender, and ascripted, or inherited, matriarchal social status, intertwined within regimes of property ownership, and drew a bioethical line between novel forms of exchange and historical regimes of appropriation. moreover, it accented the line between the racial gift as social exchange and the gendered commodity as market exchange. matriarchal wealth and racialized participation it is not difficult to source the missing intergenerational wealth implied in the matriarchal designation given to henrietta lacks. the hela cell line has founded a global industry that has generated six decades worth of professional and scientific capital. a search on the pubmed central database turns up over 70,000 research papers written over the last sixty years about hela and its central role in developing effective vaccines for both poliomyelitis and the human papilloma viruses. yet, somehow achieving a just calculus of balanced reciprocity between the lacks family, the scientific community, and the wider society benefiting from hela research remained an unformulated equation. the publishing of the hela genome and epigenome prompted media speculation about negotiations between the nih and the lacks family concerning the possible payment of royalties to the family. as reported in nature, this presented a dilemma for francis collins: some lacks family members raised the possibility of financial compensation, collins says. directly paying the family was not on the table, but he and his advisers tried to think of other ways the family could benefit, such as patenting a genetic test for cancer based on hela-cell mutations. but they couldn’t think of any. (callaway, 2013, p. 133) although financial compensation was not ultimately granted, two members of the lacks family were subsequently included on the ethics board charged with formulating the appropriate conditions for obtaining hela genome samples for research. board inclusion was framed as an equitable step toward medical justice, despite the family’s deepening intergenerational poverty, relative scientific illiteracy, and sparse social capital—and all of this in fact risked furthering the exploitation that inclusion sought to redress. johns hopkins university, moreover, created two scholarship programs in the name of henrietta lacks and promised that 40% of new hires at the university would come from inner city baltimore. for the lacks family, monetary recompense is for the most part generated through speaking appearances and private donations made by those particularly touched by the story of henrietta lacks and hela.9        henrietta lacks’s birth in the former slave quarters of a virginia tobacco plantation highlighted the sociogenesis of a racialized social hierarchy that would later relegate her to the colored ward of a hospital in which she sought treatment for cervical cancer, and from which her now immortal cells were harvested. over sixty years later, her cells continue to replicate in laboratories around the world, persisting alongside questions of ethics, consent, and social justice. and having “contaminated” upwards of 20% of the cell lines used in research globally, she continues to cross biological boundaries expounded by the social order that characterized the world in which she lived and died. the history of henrietta lacks’s life and hela’s immortal behavior transgresses the rational boundaries of society and science, labor and expertise, and their constructed social mechanisms of racial inclusion and exclusion. for one african-american geneticist, dr. richard ralston, research inclusion constitutes a vital component of producing both knowledge and justice through “participation” by minorities, both as research subjects and researchers. he asks, “if we don’t care enough about what is happening in our own families and communities, then who will?” ralston is one of a cohort of geneticists and molecular epidemiologists of color trained at historically black colleges and universities. aware of the history of the tuskegee syphilis study, he believes that custodianship of african-descent dna is a matter of social justice and ethical responsibility. however, at the meeting in chapel hill, he saw attempts to collect this dna as driven more by economic and scientific motives than by a desire to reduce health                  disparities, noting, “i know a lot of people working in genomics. trust me, most of them don’t give a damn about black people. but they can’t ignore the amounts of money coming into genomic research.” ralston’s belief in the importance of african-descent sampling exists in historical tension with dual suspicions about the interests of the market and the curiosity of science. the lacks case reflects these suspicious histories and constitutes neither accident, nor coincidence, nor even malign intent, but rather the genomic fulfillment of long-standing social, economic, and structural processes. it reveals impoverishment structures existing within larger patriarchal wealth accumulation networks and offers an optics for examining kinship and making legible the sociocultural construction of both racial research categories and health disparities. i submit that these biosocial forms of wealth accumulation and status regulation are not acquired through merit but are ascripted by birth within hierarchal gift relations reflecting gendered and raced disparities in both social capital and social justice. such disparities render elusive ethical notions of informed consent and research equity. discussion in this article, i explored the rise, fall, and genomic resurrection of matriarchy. this genomic moment, when the political economy of race and matriarchy took on new salience in authoring new participatory regimes of wealth accumulation, relied on older, gendered forms of social engagement and obligations to give and receive that legitimated appropriation in the absence of informed consent. the racial body as a diverse, regenerative product of power and history marks mercantile colonial, capitalist industrial, and contemporary biocapital epochs. authorial power and historical narratives recirculating matriarchal discourses insinuate an elevated kinship status neither ascripted by birth nor achieved through merit, and in so doing reproduce the social order. from a social justice standpoint, the failure to reciprocate to the donor defines mauss’s notion of sacrificial exchange (mauss, 1990, p. 82). the challenge of modernity, mauss argues, is to transform the economy of human relationships from one based on sacrificial exchange to one based on balanced reciprocity (1990, pp. 82-83). in the case of the hela cell line, its perpetual self-laboring, recent genomic and epigenomic sequencing, and discursive accession to matriarchal status and wealth are as ascripted economically as they are intergenerationally. difficulties persist in determining whether and how the lacks family might benefit from the commodification of hela in scientific knowledge production. weber (1910) earlier advocated understanding technology as separate from materialist history and analyses of property relations. in the case of genomic technology, this article suggests otherwise. in regenerating and thereby naturalizing the social order as a social fact, the historical violence of racialized reproduction carries greater socioeconomic value than kinship, which, when emptied of meaningful social content, “can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by the property relations” (spillers, 1987, p. 74). african americans have been historically commodified as legal property, objectified economically as alienated racial labor, and mined biologically as a natural resource. property, labor, and resources as gift objects, serve as “marker(s) in the economy of human relationships,” highlighting specific sociohistorical bonds in which the failure to reciprocate, as with the example of the nih’s treatment of the lacks family, precedes any legal enforcement or moral or ethical sanction (hyland, 2014, p. 50). the matriarchal label attached to henrietta lacks forecloses a clearer understanding of an “irredeemable past” in which the “present was the future that had been created by men and women in chains, by human commodities, by chattel persons” (hartman, 2007, p. 233). sethe, in toni morrison’s beloved, struggles against such a social order, one built on racialized and commodified reproduction that legitimates acts of bio-appropriation based neither on consent nor reciprocity. however, such culturally legitimated acts, based not on the “protected relationships” assumed by mauss, insist on the right to obligate the giver to gift through participation in asymmetrical forms of exchange (hyland, 2014, p.52). to paraphrase sanday (1998), sethe refuses to conjugate merely to perpetuate and consequentially subjugate her descendants to biological lives or existences conditioned upon reproducing intergenerational obligations to exchange sacrificially as a gift of their racialized labor to the nation. seen through this prism, i suggest the impossibility of achieving matrifocal justice or assuming matriarchal power to effect the ethical reformation of racialized social practices. i build on the work of joan scott (1986) in positing that kinship alone does not reproduce gender, but that both gender and race are constituted in large part separately from kinship by political and economic forces operating in the wider society (p. 1068).  conclusion in this article, i focus on matriarchy, specifically black matriarchy, as a vital yet unexamined contextual analytic in the social and political sciences. i presented a case of how the economically (re)productive, commodified, and laboring black female slave re-emerged as an economically (re)producing, commodifiable, laboring, status-elevated black matriarch. neither an accident of racial, gender or sexual history, nor a coincidence of physiological pathology and reproductive regeneration (or for that matter    an exemplar of social deviance), she eventually crossed the segregated lines of kinship, desire, and race to redefine exchange, integration, and contamination in both society and biology. this article has attempted to show how the political economy of matriarchy as deployed in media and scientific narratives around hela link to older histories of racial and gendered practices of exchange and appropriation. “she,” whether the primordialized “mitochondrial eve,” racialized “african eve,” or the “admixed” henrietta lacks, demonstrates how “she” was rendered fecund and exploitable in scientific knowledge production. consequently, as an ascripted matriarch having no real ability to effect change in the social order, her descendants live in relative poverty. she and most black “matriarchs” in the us struggle against a downward intergenerational spiral of health and economic disparities, kinship instability, and their disparate intersections with social, economic, and medical justice. the concept of bioethical matriarchy highlights the ethical importance of examining discourses that valorize sacrificial exchange and the elevated status claims ascripted to the obligated. i suggest paying future attention to how and why discourses of race and gender continue to operate productively within a social system of organized scientific and economic practices involved in the perennial deciphering of black flesh. in this social system of organized technoscientific practices, a political economy of racialized participation mobilizes both researchers and targeted risk populations in extra-legal cultural spaces. however, this widening of attention from the fragmentary biospecimen to the whole person now leaves us several very important questions to consider: as a politics of reparation, should a framework for redress prescribe reparative or restorative justice? in other words, can restorative justice make the bioethical matriarch “whole” in a legal sense? or, can reparative justice render the bioethical matriarch “whole” in an economic sense? and what is more “just”? to “repair” or  “restore?” these abstract yet vital questions expose the very real sociocultural dynamics of sacrificial exchange and the failure, inability, or sheer unwillingness to reciprocate. examining efforts toward achieving social justice via programmatic mechanisms of inclusion and consent requires making robust analytical distinctions between the sacrificial inequality of participation and the bioethics of appropriation, along the axes of power they inhabit. the future will determine whether the true bioethical value of the gift can facilitate balanced reciprocity commensurate to the imagined biovalue of race and gender. acknowledgements      i want to thank my colleagues in the race, genomics, and media working group and the science and justice center at the university of california, santa cruz for our productive discussions. i also extend my appreciation to sandra harvey, fatimah jackson, and marcia ochoa, who each contributed uniquely to the direction this project took, and to the reviewers for their insightful and provocative comments at each stage of writing. notes 1 see adey et al., (2013). 2 see landry et al., (2013). 3 this article is informed by archival research at the tozzer library at harvard university and the george gey collection in the alan mason chesney archives at johns hopkins university. in addition, i carried out over 100 hours of observation at health disparities conferences and meetings, in california, texas, washington, dc, and north carolina. 4 see hoad (2005) and comaroff (2007). comaroff locates (through hoad, 2005) the rationality in mbeki’s irrational refusal to accept definitions of hiv/aids that characterize it as a sexually transmitted disease, arguing that these definitions perpetuate western racist stereotypes and the euro-american propensity to use african bodies for experimentation and profit (hoad, 2005, p.104).  for mbeki, aids marks the impact of the living legacies of imperialism on african immune systems. from this perspective, remedies lie less in costly or hazardous drugs, which prolong neocolonial dependency, than in the reversal of inequality (comaroff, 2007, p. 214). comaroff avers that the hiv/aids epidemic in (south) africa, like the natural disaster hurricane katrina, dialectally exposes history, power, and capital. for an important exception, see hyman & reed (1969). 5 see http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/matriarch and http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/matriarchy. 6 one notable misapplication of the matriarchal meme was reflected by the misreading of edith clarke's my mother who fathered me (1957), which was interpreted as a case in point of caribbean social pathos. intended as an ethnographic examination of the social vitality of jamaican kinship practices within the context of the island’s independence, clarke wished to emphasize the social relationships generated by the kinship structure, not to critique the structure itself. r. t. smith (1988) argues that much of the scholarly misrecognition concerning west indian kinship is due to a lack of understanding of the epistemes of the people themselves. empirical methodologies misread how meaning is constructed within kinship groups by placing undue emphasis on class, politics, or cultural essentialisms (smith, 1988, p. 28). 7 i use pseudonyms for all the narrators in this article. 8 see de b’béri (2007). although sympathetic to herskovits’s (1990) earlier attempt to refute hegel by demonstrating a persistent and significant african socio-historical presence, i caution against equating cultural persistence with racial biology. the theoretical application of hegelian dialectics to understanding former slave societies begins with dubois (1994) and radiates through fanon (1963).  dubois’s “double consciousness” (1994, p. 2) is, in fanon’s work, a “manichaeism” dissonantly experienced subjectively and objectively. marxist dialectics do not analyze slavery, gender, or the colonial encounter; race, power, violence, and the ideology of difference trouble the relative social and racial homogeneity assumed within marxist imaginaries (fanon, 1963, pp. 40-46). 9 as of late 2016, members of the lacks family had spoken at over 120 schools over the previous five years. references adey a., burton j.n., kitzman j.o., hiatt j.b., lewis a.p., martin b.k., qiu r., lee c., & shendure j. (2013). the haplotype-resolved genome and epigenome of the aneuploid hela cancer cell line. nature, 500(7461), 207-211. beckles, h. (1999). centering woman: gender relations in caribbean slave society. kingston, jamaica: ian randle publishers. de b’béri, b. e. (2007). the semeiotic of africanicity in gaston kaboré's film buud yam. tydskrif vir letterkunde, 44(1), 98-109. bliss, c. (2012). race decoded: the genomic fight for social justice. palo alto, ca: stanford university press. bolnick, d. a., fullwiley, d., duster, t., cooper, r. s., fujimura, j. h., kahn, j…tallbear, k. (2007). the science and business of genetic ancestry testing. science, 318, 399-400. brereton, b. (2002). race relations in colonial trinidad, 1870–1900. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. brown, v. (2010). the reaper's garden: death and power in the world of atlantic slavery. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. callaway, e. (2013). deal done over hela cell line. nature, 500(7461), 132-133. clarke, e. (1999). my mother who fathered me: a study of the families in three selected communities of jamaica. kingston, jamaica: university of west indies press. comaroff, j. (2007). beyond bare life: aids, (bio)politics, and the neoliberal order. public culture, 19(1), 197. davis, k. (1950). human society. new york: macmillan. du bois, w.e.b. (1994). the gift of black folk: negroes in the making of america (vol. 18). oxford, uk: oxford university press. epstein, s. (2007). inclusion: the politics of difference in medical research. chicago, il: university of chicago press. fanon, f. (1963). the wretched of the earth. (r. philcox, trans.). new york, ny: grove. fausto-sterling, a. (2005). the bare bones of sex: part 1—sex and gender. signs: journal of women in culture and society, 30(2), 1491-1527. frazier, e. f. (1940). the negro family in the united states. chicago, il: university of chicago press. hartman, s. (2007). lose your mother: a journey along the atlantic slave route. farrar, straus and giroux. hartman, s. (2008). venus in two acts. small axe, 12(2), 1-14. herskovits, m. j. (1990). the myth of the negro past. boston, ma: beacon press. hoad, n. (2005). thabo mbeki's aids blues: the intellectual, the archive, and the pandemic. public culture, 17(1), 101-128. holloway, k. f. (2011). private bodies, public texts: race, gender, and a cultural bioethics. durham, nc: duke university press. holloway, k. f. (2014). legal fictions: constituting race, composing literature. durham, nc: duke university press. hudson, k.l., collins, f.s. (2013). family matters. nature, 500, 141-142. hyland, r. (2014). gift and danger. journal of classical sociology, 14(1), 45-53. hyman, h.h., & reed, j.s. (1969). “black matriarchy” reconsidered: evidence from secondary analysis of sample surveys. public opinion quarterly, 33(3), 346-354. landecker, h. 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(2013, august 7). nih, lacks family reach understanding to share genomic data of hela cells. news release. retrieved from http://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-lacks-family-reach-understanding-share-genomic-data-hela-cells. nelson, a. (2008). bioscience genetic genealogy testing and the pursuit of african ancestry. social studies of science, 38(5), 759-783. oikkonen, v. (2015). mitochondrial eve and the affective politics of human ancestry. signs, 40(3), 747-772. parsons, t. (1970). equality and inequality in modern society, or social stratification revisited. sociological inquiry, 40, 13-72. reskin, b. (2005). including mechanisms in our models of ascriptive inequality. in l. b. nielsen & r. l. nelson (eds.), handbook of employment discrimination research (pp. 75-99). dordrecht, netherlands: springer. reskin, b. & branch-mcbrier, d. (2000). why not ascription?: organizations’ employment of male and female managers. american sociological review, 65(2), 210-233. roberts, d. (2014). killing the black body: race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty. new york, ny: vintage. sanday, p. r. (1998, july). matriarchy as a sociocultural form. paper presented at the 16th congress of the indo-pacific prehistory association, melaka, malaysia. scott, j. w. (1986). gender: a useful category of historical analysis. american historical review, 91(5), 1053-1075. senghor, l. s. (1967). the study of african man. mawazo, 1(4), 3-7. skloot, r. (2010). the immortal life of henrietta lacks. new york: crown. smith, r. t. (1956). the negro family in british guiana. london, uk: routledge. smith, r. t. (1988). kinship and class in the west indies: a genealogical study of jamaica and guyana. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. smith, r. t. (1996). the matrifocal family: power, pluralism, and politics. new york: routledge. spillers, h. j. (1987). mama’s baby, papa’s maybe: an american grammar book. diacritics, 17(2), 65-81. strathern, m. (1988). the gender of the gift: problems with women and problems with society in melanesia. berkeley, ca: university of california press. wailoo, k., nelson, a., & lee, c. (eds.). (2012). genetics and the unsettled past: the collision of dna, race, and history. new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. waldby, c., & mitchell, r. (2006a). tissue economies: blood, organs, and cell lines in late capitalism. durham, nc: duke university press. waldby, c. (2006b). umbilical cord blood: from social gift to venture capital. biosocieties, 1(1), 55-70. weasel, l. h. (2004). feminist intersections in science: race, gender, and sexuality through the microscope. hypatia, 19(1), 183-193. weber, m. (2005). remarks on technology and culture. theory, culture & society, 22(4), 23-38. bio james doucet-battle is an assistant professor in the department of sociology at the university of california, santa cruz. his research interests lie at the intersection of diaspora and transnational studies, science, technology and society studies, development studies, and health disparities. microsoft word 293-1516-2-kneese and merid.docx kneese, t. and merid, b. (2018). introduction: illness narratives, networked subjects, and intimate publics. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-6. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © tamara kneese and beza merid. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license introduction illness narratives, networked subjects, and intimate publics tamara kneese university of san francisco tkneese@usfca.edu beza merid university of michigan bmerid@umich.edu this themed section of catalyst examines the material effects/affects of illness, disability, dying, and death, enduring topics across the humanities and social sciences that have become, in recent years, the focus of scholarly investigation in fields like communication studies, sts, medical anthropology, and feminist and queer science studies (braidotti 2013, fassin 2007, mialet 2012, serlin 2010). online spaces have become notable sites of such inquiries (arnold et al. 2017, mccosker and darcy 2013). in much of this work, scholars track the emergence of complex, intimate publics through encounters between patients and caregivers, among networks of mourners, and through subjects who trade paradigms for “how best to live on, considering” (berlant 2011). drawing on media 2 kneese and merid catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) studies and textual analysis, other scholars examine face-to-face interactions, privately sent emails, posts on semi-public facebook walls, and the public comment sections of personal illness blogs that participate in the production of both subjects and publics. people who are ill or dying may describe their own affective, embodied, psychological, and existential conditions over social media platforms, through illness blogs or comedy performances, in artistic creations, over gofundme campaigns seeking money to help with medical costs, during in-person support group meetings, or in emails sent to update established social networks (jain 2013). caregivers may give voice to their own experiences through similar outlets, producing and circulating knowledge about their positions as workers who, facing burnout or illness, need care themselves. the pieces in this themed section demonstrate how these diverse sites of cultural production galvanize personal narratives, engaging with experiences of pain and loss, to create new publics (and counter-publics) or mediate new forms of networked subjectivities. taken together and individually, these pieces consider the ways that human-technological assemblages intersect with illness narratives, and how these assemblages help us make sense of such intrusions. they show individuals, communities, and institutions grappling with the day-to-day realities of illness, disability, dying, and death, along with their more profound implications. as a reflection of the authors’ experiences with illness or around illness, they illustrate the ways in which these life events disrupt and redefine the lives we imagine for ourselves. the stakes of this section feel all the more heightened by the chilling political climate taking shape across the global north, where people who are the most vulnerable are in danger of losing their access to health care or having health care as a right of citizenship significantly abridged. in the us, with ongoing threats to the integrity of the affordable care act and the protections of the americans with disabilities act by the trump administration, we have witnessed a resurgence of activism around issues of illness and disability. this themed section makes the case that 3 kneese and merid catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) illness, disability, dying, and death continue to be sites where networked subjects are made and intimate publics spark collective political intervention through an array of online spaces. illness narratives are crafted not only by those who are personally ill, but by the experiences of those around them; illness bloggers often write about the ways their friends and family are coping as they detail their own lives. the stories we tell about these experiences illustrate the challenges of making a life when living is a challenge. social media platforms and the popularity of illness blogging, along with other illnessrelated online networks, make clear the undeniable impact these new social forms have on one’s relationship to illness. through these digital intimate publics, private cancer scars—whether physical or emotional— can be shared with a broader community. in their articles, susan jacobson and reisa klein each describe the long-term companionship afforded by sites like instagram and youtube, where individuals with breast cancer can come together, share information, or simply vent. parsing these networked subjectivities is vital work; it helps us understand emerging modes of sociality that afford patients and caregivers the community, language, and access to resources they need, while also situating our own often individualizing experiences of illness and dying within broader social and political contexts. also crucial to this section is the role of what abou farman (2017) calls “terminality,” or what it means to live with the knowledge that one’s time is limited, if in less than certain terms. we are interested in the longterm, transtemporal, and intersubjective co-mingling of the living and the dead, particularly in online spaces. to preserve an illness narrative for posterity and to share one individual’s story with a broader audience can have lasting political and emotional import. stuart murray’s and deborah steinberg’s contribution is an important example of this kind of transtemporal collaboration. their work examines the capacities for overlap between academic writing—which is so often portrayed as cerebral and disembodied—and illness blogging. through experiences with terminal cancer, their work becomes more intersubjective. illness 4 kneese and merid catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) blogs are associated with affective and communicative labor, including care for the self and others: “[b]log tools offer their users (and authors and readers) a continually renewable capacity to produce, express, and connect with others, while also undertaking the often all-encompassing and highly intimate emotional, physical, and relational management associated with their illness” (mccosker and darcy 2013, 1267). the production and maintenance of illness blogs is inherently collaborative and embodied. other pieces in this themed section examine aspects of the relationship between illness narratives and creative practice. melanie chilianis and ardath whynacht consider the ways that illness informs artistic creation, either for individual practitioners or in collaborative, group settings. such work points to the more subversive potentialities of illness narratives, especially given concerns over the co-optation of health information as a mode of privacy invasion and surveillance. along these lines, kirsten ostherr’s essay on the data-fication of personal health information considers the role of such data imaginaries in fomenting tensions between patient-driven and clinic-driven portrayals of illness, which some argue has fulfilled neoliberal promises of an ever-moreoptimized self. ostherr notes how personal narratives may be mined for valuable data by a variety of stakeholders, from advertisers to insurance companies. throughout the process of writing, reviewing, and editing the articles that comprise this section, we have experienced first-hand how personal illness and loss have delayed or otherwise complicated the many drafts, emails, and exchanges that constitute a scholarly dossier: the long-term temporal mapping of academic labor does not always or precisely coincide with the embodied aspects of its production. steinberg sadly passed away during the editorial process of this section and, following her wishes, murray continued to work on her article to ensure its inclusion herein. as a kind of praxis of this transtemporal and intersubjective co-mingling, their work includes the voices of both authors in conversation with one another as a testament to and in defiance of 5 kneese and merid catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) terminality. illness narratives produce intimate publics and networked subjects, but the preservation and maintenance of such narratives has its own distinct effects. to care for a dead loved one’s blog is an act of continued love as well as a form of archival practice, keeping this shared experience for purposes of posterity. to that end, we have also included a pdf of steinberg’s illness blog in an attempt to share it with catalyst readers and to preserve it in case it disappears from its domain name. acknowledgements we thank the authors who shared their work—and so much of themselves—along with the catalyst editorial staff and anonymous reviewers for helping us produce this section, providing much unseen labor on the backend side. we are deeply appreciative of their various contributions. references arnold m., gibbs, m., kohn, t., meese, j., nansen, b. (2017). death and digital media. london: routledge. berlant, l. (2011) cruel optimism. durham, nc: duke university press. braidotti, r. (2013) the posthuman. cambridge, uk: polity press. farman, a. (2017) terminality. social text, 35(2(131)): 93-118. fassin, d. (2007) when bodies remember: experiences and politics of aids in south africa. berkeley, ca: university of california press. jain, s. l. (2013) malignant: how cancer becomes us. berkeley, ca: university of california press. mccosker, a. and darcy, r. (2013) living with cancer: affective labour, self-expression and the utility of blogs. information, communication & society, 16, 1266–1285. mailet, h. (2012) hawking incorporated: stephen hawking and the anthropology of the knowing subject. chicago, il: the university of chicago press. 6 kneese and merid catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) serlin, d. (2010) imagining illness: public health and visual culture. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. edmiston review     feminist bioethics and intersex medical interventions: a review of making sense of intersex: changing ethical perspectives in biomedicine (indiana university press, 2014)       e. kale edmiston vanderbilt university kale.edmiston@vanderbilt.edu how does a clinician determine what constitutes an ethical problem? in making sense of intersex, ellen feder argues that cases that appear straightforward are the most likely to result in ethical violations.  regarding intersex surgical interventions, which are typically performed in infancy, feder contends that clinicians often miss the ethical complexity of parental decision-making on behalf of children. informed consent presumes an adult who can, with available information, make choices about their own body. for infants who cannot consent to surgery, however, how do parents and clinicians negotiate the boundaries of medical decision-making on behalf of infants? what are the long-term ethical implications of decisions to alter an infant’s body? as intersex adults have pointed out, their primary bioethical concern is not accessing needed care, but the ability to refuse interventions. feder, a professor of philosophy at american university who specializes in bioethics, examines how assumptions about normalcy produce the need to conceal intersex bodies, and how these assumptions result in shame and familial conflict.  throughout the book, feder investigates intersex medical interventions from multiple angles, including the primacy of the child-parent relationship, the ethics of caregiving and consent, and the complex slippage that occurs when “good medicine” does not equate to “ethical medicine.” by composing an interdisciplinary analysis of medicine, making sense of intersex can be read with interest by medical providers, bioethicists, and medical humanities scholars. making sense of intersex begins with an historical account of atypical sex/intersex as a medical category. feder claims that the development of the standard of care (soc) for intersex is not a linear narrative of progress towards ethical treatment of intersex patients. building upon the work of alice dreger, co-founder of the intersex society of north america, feder argues that contemporary fascination with “hermaphroditism” (an anachronistic term for intersex) can be traced to the victorian period, when intersex first became a medical category, and intersex people became objects of fascination for clinicians. nineteenth-century attitudes towards intersex individuals were connected to conservative ideas about gender and sexuality, to the expansion of medical authority, and, through military exams given to british colonial forces, to the subsequent “discovery” of the high prevalence of intersex individuals. during this era, the first genital surgeries were performed, albeit at the request of consenting adult patients (dreger, 1998). in the early twentieth century, care of patients with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, an intersex diagnosis with concordant medical needs, was connected to medical need and patient autonomy. in contrast, the development of soc practices in the mid-twentieth century more closely followed conservative victorian-era attitudes by emphasizing aesthetic surgical intervention. feder posits that the modern insistence on surgical intervention for atypical genitalia relies upon an ahistorical perspective, and thereby ignores the ways in which intersex people have lived happily without cosmetic surgical interventions in other eras. feder proceeds with a discussion of the infant-parent bond. soc for intersex diagnoses is fraught because it requires clinical decision-making on behalf of an infant. using bourdieu’s concept of habitus, that is, the unquestioned frameworks that guide cultural structures, feder discusses how such assumptions generate an imperative for normalcy, thereby creating situations wherein parents who want nothing but the best for their children can do significant harm. such decision-making requires that parents imagine what life might be like for their newborn infant as an adult, sexual being. parents must make a decision for their infant that is “in their child’s best interest,” but are likely not equipped with the medical knowledge or caregiving experience to do so. by engaging with feminist scholarship on motherhood and kleinian psychoanalytic theory, feder suggests that motherhood necessitates attentive care and interpretive skills to anticipate a child’s needs. anticipation of these needs is predicated on parental identification, the idea that parents are able to see themselves in their child, and therefore interpret their needs based on a priori knowledge from life experience. because sexual difference is of such primary importance in western conceptualizations of the body, parents of intersex infants are unable to imagine themselves as their child, a future intersex adult, and instead project a desire for normalcy onto their child as an adult who does not yet exist. in the case of intersex infants, feder contends that surgical interventions without the patient’s consent represent a failure of parental identification. feder then deliberately “turns the lens” from intersex patients to clinicians, arguing that the assumption of a clinical imperative to conceal intersex bodies stems not from medical need but from projected provider disgust. a series of qualitative interviews with medical doctors follows an innovative approach in the intersex literature that allows for insight into the medical decision making process and the assumptions underlying it. feder offers perceptive analysis of these conversations, concluding that for clinicians involved in the care of intersex infants, a “normal” appearance, with all of its presumed social rewards, takes priority over the sexual pleasure and at times the medical need of an intersex infant. proponents of genital surgery in intersex infants maintain they are helping their patients avoid shame.  however, we must consider the source of shame by asking who provokes it; shame and disgust are implicit when families are instructed to change their child and to keep their diagnosis a secret. feder concludes instead that we should relocate the “imperative for change” from the bodies of intersex infants to the providers that care for them.   while critics in the west often cite genital circumcisions in sub-saharan africa as coercive, they take for granted or ignore infant intersex surgeries performed in the west. feder (2014) addresses this paradox by arguing that aesthetic genital surgery on intersex infants may represent a “difference of degree rather than kind (p. 127).” citing ethnographic work among the kono of sierra leone, who practice circumcision as a rite of adulthood that allows for political participation in society, feder argues that kono initiation is similar to western surgical practices in intersex infants, differing only in that it is required of everyone and is a public ritual, while in the west genital surgeries are required of only a few and are considered private and shameful. criticism of non-western practices relies on a false dichotomy rooted in colonialism that describes western practices as medical and therefore necessary, and non-western practices as primitive and therefore unwarranted. however, feder (2014) suggests, “practices that have been well-established are not the result of careful…reflection, but instead are a matter of repeated enactment of cultural values...” (p. 132). in insisting on the modification of an infant’s body, those who promote genital surgeries are in effect suggesting that it is more important to change an individual’s body than it is to change a society that insists on a gender binary. in the latter half of the book, feder asks why, if soc for intersex infants has changed drastically in the last twenty years, has the rate of infant genital surgeries remained the same? many providers state that early genital surgery is “what the parents want.” this sentiment mirrors previous arguments for infant surgical intervention that assumed parents would be unable to bond with a child with atypical genitalia.  the second half of the book questions these assumptions and offers an analysis of power in parent-child and patient-provider relationships to the study of bioethics. informed by psychoanalytic interpretation of the parent-child bond, feder analyzes a series of qualitative interviews with parents of intersex children.  she argues that the parent-child bond is one of interdependence, that is, parents don’t just shape their children, but are in turn shaped by the act of parenting. feder similarly turns to the patient-provider relationship, suggesting that physicians help to shape reality for their patients; the provider assumption that the intersex soc represents guidelines for “what is” rather than “what should be” represents a refusal to acknowledge the unequal power dynamic between provider and patient. alternative conceptions of time are implicit throughout making sense of intersex. the birth of an intersex individual creates urgency in the minds of providers, while simultaneously forcing parents to re-imagine their child’s future. embedded in the argument for aesthetic surgeries for intersex individuals is the idea that individuals with atypical genitalia cannot have a future, or that their only possible future is tragic. in fact, feder begins making sense of intersex with a critique of the 2000 statement by the american academy of pediatrics, which states that the birth of an intersex individual represents a “social emergency.” feder’s framing of the implicit beliefs underlying the “emergency” of an intersex body parallels arguments posed by feminist disability studies scholars such as alison kafer and queer studies theorists such as jack halberstam about the role of time, particularly “futurity” in conceptualizing non-normative bodies. their work considers similar bioethical questions in the context of prenatal genetic counseling and violence against transgender people, making significant contributions to discourses on non-normative bodies. feder’s work would have been strengthened by engagement with these existing critiques of bioethics, power, and violence. likewise, making sense of intersex offers feminist disability studies and queer studies additional tools for discussing the medicalization of embodied difference. ultimately, feder, kafer, and halberstam are all asking the same question: who gets to decide which bodies are anomalous—and, ultimately, will such bodies be allowed to exist in the world on their own terms? acknowledgements special thanks to dr. aimi hamraie for their contributions to the revision of this manuscript.  references dreger, a.a. (1998). a history of intersexuality, from the age of gonads to the age of consent. journal of clinical ethics, 9(4), 345-355. feder, e.k. (2014). making sense of intersex: changing ethical perspectives in biomedicine. bloomington, in: indiana university press. bio e. kale edmiston is a post-doctoral scholar at china medical university in shenyang. he recently completed his phd in neuroscience at vanderbilt university, where he was also the co-director of the vanderbilt university medical center’s program for lgbti health, as well as the co-founder and director of the trans buddy program. his research interests include feminist and transgender science studies, the neuroendocrine system and social behavior, and the neurodevelopmental effects of stress and trauma.   labmeeting lab meeting     toyin ojih odutola’s art practice as a technology of the skin    kimberly juanita brown mount holyoke college kimbrown@mtholyoke.edu cheryl dunye san francisco state university cdunye@gmail.com dell m. hamilton hutchins center for african and african american research, harvard university dell@dellmhamilton.com toyin ojih odutola new growth (maebel), 2013 pen ink and bronze marker on board 13 x 14  22 3/4 x 23 1/2 x 1 1/2 inches framed ©toyin ojih odutola. courtesy of the artist and jack shainman gallery, new york. introduction engaging toyin ojih odutola’s work is a practice in the productive deployment of “more.” in her prolific artistic career she has produced mesmerizing drawn portraits that ask the viewer to go deeper, and to follow her hand and her pen in order to see the nuanced articulation of the skin that she engenders in her work. in a session moderated by catalyst board member kimberly juanita brown, brown and dell m. hamilton are joined by filmmaker cheryl dunye (the watermelon woman). the subject of the lab meeting is toyin ojih odutola’s art practice as a technology of the skin. ojih odutola's art practice is imbued with a precision that the study of race, gender, and a poetics of the skin necessitate. in this she has few peers, as her art process is as unique as its eventual product. from film and photography to multimedia and visual iconography, we sought to parse out the multilayered possibilities present in ojih odutola's visual texts. kimberly:  i'm kimberly brown. i'm assistant professor of english and africana studies at mount holyoke college and part of the dark room collective, which dell and sandy will introduce themselves, but they are part of that as well. not the dark room collective, that's the soul and we are the dark room seminar. the collective is a whole other group of people. this is our 5th year, we are entering our 5th year of having conversations about critical race theory and visual culture study… oh, i'm done with my introduction. dell:  my name is dell hamilton. i'm an artist, an independent curator and a writer. i'm based in boston and i also work at the hutchins center for african and african american research, at harvard. my studio practice is everything from photography, and performance, and video, drawing and painting, and then i have a sort of research practice that i've been developing as well. and that's where a dark room has been really important for me in terms of me trying to think through how i create a studio practice that's research-based and thoughtful, but still exists in a kind of intuitive, kind of really raw but visceral, kind of way of working stuff. kimberly:  dell is our first and only artist, right? dell:  yeah, we need more artists man, i can't be the token artist. kimberly:  i sent that to you, but you were at the talk, so you kind of know what she said about her art practice and about her relationship to it, particularly. i just wanted to put that talk in the context of the images that i pulled out; we don't have to talk about all of them but definitely, the one i chose for the cover is the one that the editorial board at catalyst approved. i wanted to make sure that the image that was on the cover represented some form of black womanhood immersed within the study and also thinking about black studies. and i just love, i love...that image. cheryl:  i love it too. kimberly:  and then i chose some other ones, just one because i knew it was famous, the one that's in the episode from “empire.” the one, the cloth.... toyin ojih odutola hold it in your mouth a little longer, 2013 charcoal, pastel, and graphite on paper 40 x 30 inches 48 x 37 1/2 x 1 3/4 inches framed ©toyin ojih odutola. courtesy of the artist and jack shainman gallery, new york. dell:  that's the one from "empire." it's really, really cool. dell:  and then this one. i can't remember what medium this one is so this one's actually low, i'm printing it to. that one. so i think that i printed out five of them, there may be more of them, but i printed out five. kimberly:  so the one with the feet.... dell:  yeah. i want to say, i think it’s watercolor but i mean i know that.... yeah. it's weird, i think this reproduction is a little bit odd because it reads as watercolor to me. i don't know but i think that's what it is, so that's why i kind of want to look at this one a little more. …yeah, it's like a bait-and-switch that she's doing, and it's very, very clever.  it's really, really smart, but the other thing, too, that's interesting to me about when she's talking about her work in terms of the interviews that i was watching before, when i had to do her introduction, was the fact that, for her, it's not only like a kind of emotional, kind of psychological underpinning that she's trying to get at, but it's also really, it's a bodily sort of sensation that's she also.... because she talks about her hand getting really tired and injured because she had been working many, many hours and she had this crazy deadline and had to, you know…but she also talked about insisting on the fact that she's a draftsman and not a painter.  it had to do with the fact that the way the brush feels on a surface, that it's too soft for her and there's something about the concreteness of pen on paper that does something for her. that resonated with me because i'm very much a materials person as well, so it feels very performative…not just in terms of how the images look on the surface, but it feels performative for her, her process. kimberly:  right. i wanted to ask a question about what you think the viewer encounters when the viewer encounters an image of hers, what you see that you had to engage with that other art practices maybe don't allow for. i'm trying to get at what people assume it to be and then what people see when they look at these images, that makes them so compelling for very different kinds of people. i wouldn't think that this would appeal to an “empire”…and is [also] appealing for a larger group of people, i guess. i’m kind of asking why people love her work so much. like we love it, but why, but how, what does it offer, maybe. dell:  what work does it do? kimberly:  right. cheryl:  it represents so many landscapes and textures and feelings of moving forward, and moving backwards at the same time. with nostalgia and just blackness in itself, and even in its form it really does play with sort of mapping…two spaces at the same time, so there's a lot of layers. that simple word, that really are “pleasing”. i think patterns are pleasing, but i think the truth is the darkness and the type of black people that she portrays are very similar to the ones that i'm attracted to with my work: so it's that black girl. that black girl, you know, not marlo thomas, but that black girl. kimberly:  can you talk about what your engagement was with her as a student and what you were teaching? how that came about? cheryl:  i was teaching narrativity a lot to graduate students. i had to really think about narratives down to their smallest unit and building stories from those units. you know, sort of fábula and building outward from that, and the strength of storytelling and how events tend to tell stories and you need to kind of hone in on it. and you also need to have, really, an ability to make jumps within the kind of context…. you don't need to fill a space up with so many things for discovery. you need people to take things away and i feel like what's left with her work is exquisite in that sense of filling up spaces. she has a real sense of the narrative of space, and texture, and material, and stroke. finding the sweet spot on a screen too, or a screen, or a canvas. places where your eyes will go because of color, because of what's happening there, you know, placement. it's very traditional, in one sense, it's not radically correct. it's pleasing, it's very pleasing. dell:  but i think the fact that it's traditional is probably one of the reasons why people do like the work.  people within the art world, they don't always necessarily always like to be uncomfortable. they want you to sort of give them some, you know.... sometimes they’re looking for meaning, but mostly looking for pleasure. and i think color itself—like how she's using color with her drawings—i think that that's definitely, for me, one of the things that initially kind of drew me to her images. seeing it from across the room, seeing the colors—that it is kind of also flickering with the light on the surface—and then getting closer and realizing that it's pen-ink on paper, and i'm just like, "oh, wait a minute, this looks really, really interesting.” it's kind of maybe, i think, there's a level of pleasure, and surprise, and kind of unexpectedness, but i think in that regard, i think convention serves her work really well in this case. kimberly:  right. cheryl:  i think the sense of loneliness in africa, too, and i feel like—i know for me as an african…i was born in africa…so we come from african heritages—the loneliness in between and figures are alone, but we did talk about that issue of growing up in...i think she's from texas or something, i don't remember exactly, someplace lonely, i mean every where is lonely for the.... dell:    right. was it alabama? kimberly:  yeah. that's where her father was teaching, right? dell:  huntsville, alabama, i think. kimberly:  yeah. i think so. dell:  that's it. yeah, because that's where she got her b.a. is from university of alabama, huntsville. cheryl:  the odd black girl in spaces where we don't even exist. you have to create your own.... dell:  right. world. yeah, that's exactly right. kimberly:  it gets back to—we read shine last year, last september—our first meeting, our first book last year, and it gets at the lighting because, to me, it was like a shine there, a light there, the life that you are talking about, the layers. you know—what cheryl was talking about. and then the traditional portraiture history. portraiture all in the same space, but what she does to the skin is so intricate for me because it is so dark and it's so full of life…i want to combine those two things because it's phenomenal and it's rare. dell:  yeah. the reason why it looks [like that] is because of the pen-ink on the surface that she's working on but also because she uses metallic markers underneath. so that's the other way that she gets that.... the fact that it looks layered, is because it is layered and that's, i think, intentional in her process. it does feel like a kind of engraving because if you watch videos of her working, that's exactly what it looks like is happening: that she's literally pressing into the skin of the surface of the paper. kimberly:  yes...i know. that's the precision of it though, and it's also why it's damaged her hands so fully, because you might to do something that's so precisely it doesn't dull the skin. it also takes on it's own shimmer and shine. that is hard to do. dell:  i think the other thing that i always think of when i look at her images is ritual scarring practices from around the world, and i imagine it's fairly painful: getting them initially, afterward, in terms of what the skin looked like. they’re works of art on skin.  it's drawing on skin, it's literally… so that's the other thing that always comes to mind when i look at her work. it's part of a longer genealogy in body art. kimberly:  i never thought about that. cheryl:  with the resurgence of black people who are thinking about blackness in radical ways, which is what the work is really about. the people that she's capturing and bringing this underpinning to, these layers to their bodies, are like afro-punks, like what's going on now. like people who are sort of edgy and on a cutting-edge of a variety of the different backgrounds and histories. nose piercing. there's somebody with all these sort of subversive and marginalized identities in blackness, i think, that’s talking about how expansive we are and can be. so that's what it really is. it seems almost sci-fi like that. we are moving in our own distant future, so it's calling me as somebody who lives on those margins and presents that way. we're beautiful. we're beautiful, we're subjects, and just as affirming as sort of what's happening right now with the afro-futurist, afro-punk, the only way to use it because that's a popular word right now, because if it was weak, it was really happening. like all military boots and snot, this is allowing us to inhabit many identities and spaces at the same time. even the scars have different colors. toyin ojih odutola the paradox of education, 2013 charcoal and pastel on paper 40 x 30 inches 48 x 37 1/2 x 1 3/4 inches framed ©toyin ojih odutola. courtesy of the artist and jack shainman gallery, new york. kimberly:  yes. maybe for me so many of these images start out as photographs. it's fascinating to me as well, what gets held, because she talked about how she then alters the stance… and she moves it to the left, she moves it to the right. she does something to alter that engagement. then to have that engagement evolve into something else that is beyond photography, and also other genres of maybe representation. because maybe photography wouldn't give enough of this. what we're discussing... my students were really… they saw the series of the images and most of them that i chose had the subject looking at the viewer, and they were really kind of mesmerized by that. the idea that they didn't quite know what they were looking at, who they were looking at, and then how to direct their gaze, what exactly they were supposed to be looking for. cheryl:  that's interesting. kimberly:  it made for a really vibrant conversation about viewers’ expectations and how to divert that in an image… cheryl:  yeah. the thing is there's not a lot of art that can be made without a camera. when you're in art school, you are encouraged to take anatomy classes in total art and so you use a live model. but in most cases, when you're working in your studio, you're not going to have a live model. you just cannot afford to. so, you work from images and you download things off the internet, or you get your camera, your camera-phone, or your nikon, or canon, or whatever. you ask your friends to sit for you, or your parents to sit for you. and whether you're a draftsman or painter or video artist, you're almost always working from some photographic image in terms of developing these conventions and sort of thinking about how the colors look on the page and how you might compose a frame. there's not a lot, there's no way to sort of get around photography, and it's ridiculous. or ubiquity, rather. toyin ojih odutola the tourist, 2016 charcoal, pastel and pencil on paper 56 1/2 x 42 inches (paper) 61 7/8 x 47 1/2 x 2 1/8 inches (framed) ©toyin ojih odutola. courtesy of the artist and jack shainman gallery, new york kimberly:  i like it because i can see the past of photography here but it looks like how photography can go forward, because i don't know what to do about digital images because i'm still so—i would call it ambivalent but i just still don't like then.  i detest a digital black and white image; it drives me crazy for no good reason, but except that i could tell and if i can tell, it's not good so it's hard for me to look at a contemporary black and white image that has been so manipulated technologically with software, or whatever, however it's done.  this looks like what i would want digital photography to be if it were good, like if it could get there.  could it get there, i don't know. cheryl:  yeah. it's a kind of super realism. kimberly:  right. that you could see a camera somewhere in here, but it's so much more than what you know a camera can do. cheryl:  and again i'm always attracted to the stories of the space and the split. where do these characters exist? where are they living? what's their experience? what stopped them in this moment? they had to make another story on top of, through, the process, and now they exist in two different spaces. i'm trying to think of the object, the one that you chose.... there was on with the dresser with other little smaller objects on it, i don't think it's one that you had, they're telling a story, there's like boots walking along the canal. kimberly:  oh yes. cheryl:  what are these stories?—and that's where i get off.  it’s like, wow. so the storytelling is complete both on and off the camera. it is always so great to have somebody who you mentored for a hot minute, blow up. you're like, "okay, it did work, it did work". i said something in there. kimberly:  yes. definitely. she seems to have taken all of the layers of all of her disbursed and integrated identities and made it a part of the art practice. it does come through in these pieces. dell:  yeah, that's half the battle, trying to decide what to keep and what to get rid of. then you can figure out a vocabulary that has personal meaning for you. if you get through that part, then it's going to be all right. it can be painful in that process. i'm sorry go ahead.... kimberly:  no, no, i'm sorry. cheryl:  i was just going to say, i remember there's another interview that i watched of her and she's talking about the fact that as soon as she finished, she had gotten picked up by jack shainman and someone said to her, "oh wow, you're getting picked up right out of grad school. your career is going to die because you're going to have to make the same work for a very long time." i just remember thinking, (a) that's mean; for toyin, there isn't—as conventional that the work looks—that there's a whole world that's conjured in these images. i'm not sure if i necessarily see narrative, but it's a world that pulls her in, so she doesn't have any fear about making the same work look the same over and over and over again. it seems like she tries to do something different each time and she's probably trying to push the boundaries further with each drawing—and certainly with the range of size, and scale, and color, and texture, and so forth. i think she's obviously doing just fine, but i found that comment really strange, particularly i think when you get out of school there's no sure thing. it's so easy to stop making art and not have the support to keep your art practice flourishing. kimberly:  people don't quite know what to say, i think. i feel like it's the same interaction with her work, don't quite know what to say and therefore… dell:  right. kimberly:  maybe that's just with artists in general and also what they do with the reproduction, with lowered expectations that align with the genre. cheryl:  yeah. artists kind of suck; we're kind of mean to each other. kimberly:  i think that everybody has their own particularly meanness already out. cheryl:  i remember coming out grad school and i was the one out of my mfa program at rutgers in new brunswick—i was at the mason gross school of the arts doing a studio practice—my early work. i was the only one out of my graduate program who got picked up at the beginning of “the culture wars” or whatever it was. there was a meanness around the other students and the art world and there was like, “we don't know what this is; we don't know how to deal with it.” dell:  yeah. like, "why her?". cheryl:  right.  it was at the biennial. it's a weird space to be in… and thinking more about toyin's comments in the interview that you're referencing, are ones that you have to comment about because they're so offsetting. you're like, “hell, i just got picked up and it doesn't really matter, and you're already trying to man-speak for me.” and i think as a black artist in the kind of young, queer/not queer, whatever-of-color realm dealing with these contemporary settings of showing your work and just getting it in.... it's so great to see somebody…busting out with talent. and ignoring what people are saying and just going about it. kimberly:  because it was the genre at first that was off-putting for people because it's not... like, who's drawing and moving into these gaps? dell:   exactly. kimberly:  so when you say not listening to these people because you cannot have them interact before you even produce it. they will try to talk you out of your own vision. dell:  the thing is, it happens a lot. i think hank saw the work and understood it, and got it. kimberly:  what i'm finding most—i was going to say “rewarding” but why would it be rewarding; i didn't make the art.  i'm most interested in using her work, toyin's work, to study blackness. when ordinarily it would not look like this, it would not go this way, it would not be this genre, it would not be this artist, it would not be... she's both young-ish and she has a large archive of work already, and it's a very particular style of visual representation, visual art and the kind that people want to say is not something that is a museum, and/or art gallery production. to have that be museum and gallery production and also to move it to these other spaces like television shows, and like citizen. so without claudia rankine, i wouldn't probably wouldn't have known about her for a few more years, maybe. but existing in citizen, also puts it in another sphere of not just representation, being, but also study. so then people had to look at it for the way that it was presenting it and also for it standing alone. there are art pieces in citizen i didn't give a second look and this is the one that really stayed with me. dell:  have you seen some of her other work from 2014? maybe about two years, some images on her website, it's some of her earlier work, that i saw at jack shainman a couple of summers ago. there's instances where the figure is up against this richly-patterned background and so i wonder what happens to the kind of singularity of the subject, and the individual and these images that we're looking at now versus some of these earlier one's where the skin and the background pretty much become collapsed. kimberly:  oh yes, she showed a couple of them. the figure could be absorbed within the pattern.  it could be a distraction, and i think that the white background for me, works much better… the contrast there. but i could see what she was attempting to do because it was again about color and not necessarily about race, but about color, like the richness of color and how to use it against skin i think.  but i could see how the body could be absorbed in that at any second. dell:  i remember seeing them and they were very, very overpowering. there's a kind of precarity that i felt in looking at them because you kind of get lost in the fact that the background and the foreground around and the subject background are collapsed. there i think the size of them, there like 42” by 60”, something like that. i remember those images very much, and just remember being almost kind of shocked by them. kimberly:  and i liked it because it’s holding on to the themes or the motif of movement, of life, and also of her precarity, because it's not as if this skin exists where it wants to exist. his body's not going to exist where they want it to exist; all they can do is try or attempt. also, some of that back and forth engagement, particularly with the viewers, says you will see me or you will... i'm pulling from my toni morrison upper-level seminar. i'm writing quotes from every novel and putting it on the syllabus. cheryl:  that's awesome. kimberly:  it's a line from a mercy, and the line is: “from now you will stand to hear me.” and it's something here that says from now you will see me. even if that isn't what desire, what you want, what you think you're looking at or looking for. you will see me, on my own terms. “invisible to whom”—morrison. baby suggs in the clearing: “love your skin.” she doesn't say love your skin, she says love your flesh, right? dell:  yeah. “love your flesh.” yeah. but that's good enough. kimberly:  close enough. then the precarity there, always there, always present but not something that you're going to make the central part of who you are in the world. it's the skincare. cheryl:  i love the skincare. kimberly:  we made it very literary, i don't know if she would agree with it. dell:  no, actually, it makes sense because that was the other thing i wanted to talk about: how she titles her work. it's very much engaged in literature and language. cheryl:  it also strikes ending in a different way. kimberly:  yes. cheryl:  it's storytelling. kimberly:  she did say that. she said something about telling a story with the skin. i'm messing up her quote. dell:  yeah. i remember her talking about that because one of her shows at jack shainman was called “like the sea” and it's from that zora neale hurston quote. you know, like every shore is different. visual vocabulary is interesting. when i read morrison's work and certainly zora neale hurston's work, i do make pictures in my head. i assume now that that's what toyin does as well, that there's some picture-making that's happening. kimberly:  thought pictures. dell:  thought pictures. exactly. there's some kind of thought picture process happening when she's reading language. kimberly:  maybe we should just send a piece to morrison and see if she has anything to add… dell:  what does she think. [laughter] kimberly:  thought pictures, yes. i like that, i like that connection as well. not just the skin at the study but also the link with literary traditions. dell:  well the other thing too to keep in mind, at least in the art world, we talk about, “how does someone read your work, or is your work legible or illegible.” so it's still has to do with language and reading and communication, so it's kind of a default way of talking about art, certainly within art school.  but this link to language—i think is absolutely there and without even necessarily referencing whatever literally text we're thinking of.  the thought picture thing—it's there, it's embedded in the way we talk about art. kimberly:  okay. we are almost at the end. i did want to think a little bit about how we might see her in time, like the temporality of the pieces, because i'm struck by how they cannot really be located. part of that is because they can't really always locate clothing so... that’s already off the table, but also that i'm not quite sure how i'm supposed to be reading, skimming the way, the way that it is drawn, because it is not a painting, and because it is not a photograph. how i'm supposed to temporally locate myself to think about how you think that might be functioning? cheryl:  like everyday gesturing, there's sort of an authenticity of the... it's the now or the not-too-distant future.  it's soothing in the space that i do get located, i feel like kinship to, especially with dark skin. it's having darkness as the skin, so there's a kinship with that.  i feel presence. kimberly:  it's true because we didn't talk about the darkness of the skin being significant as well and also pulling in the viewer, pulling in the subject. cheryl:  i think toyin and i used to joke about, “is she black or is she black-black.”  you know even being able to have somebody to say that to and so she wrote a book that represents that.  i don't know, i feel comforted. i feel like i have a place in the world.  bios kimberly juanita brown is an assistant professor in the department of english and the program in africana studies at mount holyoke college. her research engages the site of the visual as a way to negotiate the parameters of race, gender, and belonging. her book, the repeating body: slavery’s visual resonance in the contemporary (duke university press) examines slavery’s profound ocular construction, the presence and absence of seeing in relation to the plantation space and the women represented there. she is currently at work on her second book, tentatively titled “their dead among us: photography, melancholy, and the politics of the visual.” this project examines images of the dead in the new york times in 1994 from four overlapping geographies: south africa, rwanda, sudan, and haiti. brown argues that a cartography of the ocular exists in documentary images in order to normalize global violence as inextricably connected to blackness via photographic proximity. brown is the founder and convener of the dark room:  race and visual culture studies seminar. the dark room is a working group of scholars examining the intersection of critical race theory and visual culture studies.  cheryl dunye emerged as part of the 1990's "queer new wave" of young film and video makers.  dunye's work is defined by her distinctive narrative voice. often set within a personal or domestic context, her stories foreground issues of race, sexuality and identity. dunye's narratives are peppered with deconstructive elements with characters directly addressing the camera and making ironic references to the production itself. the effect of these devices, and of dunye's appearance in her films and tapes "as herself," is to blur the distinctions between fiction and "real life."  dunye has made over 15 films including mommy is coming, the owls, my baby’s daddy, and hbo’s stranger inside, which garnered her an independent spirit award nomination for best director. her debut film, the watermelon woman, was awarded the teddy at the berlinale in 1996 and was recently restored by outfest’s ucla legacy project for the films’ 20th anniversary. dunye has received numerous awards and honors for her work including a 2016 guggenheim fellowship. she is also a member of the academy of motion picture arts and sciences. presently, dunye is a professor in the school of cinema at san francisco state university and is at work on her next feature film black is blue. dell m. hamilton is an artist, writer, and curator based in boston. born in spanish harlem and spending her formative years in the bronx borough of new york, hamilton was raised in a bilingual as well as a multi-racial honduran family. her studio practice is grounded in the interdisciplinary contexts of the african diaspora and her tactics include text art, installation, video, photography and performance art.  her work has been shown to a wide variety of audiences in boston including the museum of fine arts, spoke gallery/medicine wheel productions, nk gallery, mobius, okw gallery, the fort port artist building, atlantic works, the joan resnikoff gallery/roxbury community college, and the massachusetts state house. in 2010, she also participated in perfolink: maestros y discipulos in earthquake-ravaged concepción, chile. she currently works at harvard's hutchins center for african and african american research. her programmatic projects have included the 13th triennial conference of the arts council of the african studies association (acasa), "african art: roots and routes" as well as the inaugural "bridging the gaps: african american art conference" both in 2004. during her stint as assistant director at the du bois institute, she also curated exhibitions for carrie mae weems, suesan stovall, and lyle ashton harris. she is a contributor to transition magazine, an international review published by indiana university press and has presented scholarly research papers at the musee quai branly, the howard art project, the school of the museum of fine arts and at boston university. microsoft word 261-1521-1-dewolff.docx de wolff, k. (2018). review of: review of arts of living on a damaged planet: ghosts and monsters of the anthropocene edited by anna tsing, heather swanson, elaine gan and nils bubandt (minneapolis, mn and london, uk: minneapolis university press, 2017) and unreal objects: digital materialities, technoscientific projects and political realities (digital barricades) by kate o’riordan (london, uk: pluto press, 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4 (1), 1-7. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kim de wolff, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license review arts of living on a damaged planet: ghosts and monsters of the anthropocene edited by anna tsing, heather swanson, elaine gan and nils bubandt (minneapolis, mn and london, uk: minneapolis university press, 2017) and unreal objects: digital materialities, technoscientific projects and political realities (digital barricades) by kate o’riordan (london, uk: pluto press, 2017) kim de wolff university of north texas kim.dewolff@unt.edu how should we respond to the entwined trajectories of seemingly inevitable technological progress and a planet careening toward ecological collapse? we resist. and we focus on the arts of living. or so argue two new books that share feminist materialist commitments to the entangled becomings of matter and meaning, humans and more-thanhuman worlds. in arts of living on a damaged planet, the editorial team assembles a powerful transdisciplinary collection that addresses the lively 2 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) and deathly multispecies landscapes of the anthropocene. here, “bodies tumbled into bodies”, the flourishing and perishing of beings as/and ecologies challenge modernist assumptions of individuality and progress. in unreal objects, kate o’riordan also takes on progress, turning to the grand technoscientific projects so often positioned as utopian solutions to the problems of contemporary life. here, bodies tumble into technologies as she ambitiously works to destabilize the assumed, yet always mediated, existence of biotechnical objects. as all of the authors grapple with the emerging materialities of the now and the near future, both texts demonstrate commitments to decentering the human but, crucially, with feminist attention to situated narratives and meanings. as tsing et al. write, “material worlds and the stories we tell about them are bound up with each other” (m10). this statement would be equally at home in o’riordon’s introduction since the influence of donna haraway’s material-semiotics and karen barad’s feminist new materialism reverberates throughout both texts. as such, neither book outlines a radically new theoretical perspective; they instead share the strength in what they bring together, reinvigorating powerful feminist approaches in the current moment of technological and ecological concern. arts of living on a damaged planet gathers the work of twenty prominent humanities and science scholars and writers into a guidebook for earthly survival that demonstrates the “arts of living”: entangled histories, thick description and situated narratives. the collection is organized around two points of departure, each with a respective introduction and table of contents: indeterminate ghosts leading us through landscapes haunted by modern progress; and multispecies monsters unsettling individuality while inspiring forms of collective care. with compelling questions and sweeping synthesis, the twin introductions are provocation-manifesto hybrids: calls to look, listen and imagine differently. co-written by the four editors, these opening pieces draw on concrete examples from the volume to establish a shared language of entanglements, world making, and storytelling of comingled feminist materialist traditions, rather than turning to lengthy theoretical 3 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) exposition. tsing’s presence, though, does ring particularly clear as the imperative to develop the “art of noticing” life in the ruins echoes from her 2015 book the mushroom at the end of the world. as a collection, these essays push far beyond the individual contributions of the unanimously stellar cast of contributors (including the inimitable ursula k. le guin, karen barad, and donna haraway), to follow interwoven threads not only across species and geographies but through the very makings of scale. or, as barad writes of spacetimemattering, “the dynamic reconfiguring of the field of relationalities…where scale is iteratively re-made in intra-action” (g111). most directly in conversation with the anthropocene as concept and epoch, ghosts takes us from the unexpected secret lives of lichen in a new england cemetery (pringle) to the more expectedly haunted landscape of chernobyl fallout where surprise lies in a radiation monitor and surreptitious photographer’s sense-ability to feel and even taste decaying atoms (brown). monsters, in contrast, takes a more indirect approach to the anthropocene, tacking between species and spatial interdependencies to show “the enfolding of bodies within bodies in evolution and in every ecological niche” (m2). it is in this conversation between what appear as macro-level entanglements (freccero’s humans and wolves and lien’s fishy connections) and the micro-level ones (mcfall-ngai and gilbert’s microbial worlds) that challenges to modern paradigms of autonomy and ecology emerge. yet perhaps the most telling demonstration overall is how readily monsters infiltrate ghostly landscapes and vice versa. that many chapters could fit equally well on either side (particularly parker’s grassland of invasive species that render indigenous wildflowers ghosts and rose’s shimmering symbiosis of flowers and flying foxes) is testament to the entangled existence of beings and landscapes where relationships exceed even the most careful organizational structures. as an artifact, the paperback version of arts of living on a damaged planet embodies ontological commitments to entanglementsagainst-progress narratives in its own material form. with double covers, acknowledgments and tables of contents, the haphazard placement of a 4 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) barcode sticker provides the only clue as to which way is up. regardless of your point of entry, the second half of the text will be upside down. the ambiguous beginning combined with the flipping required to read the book in its entirety is more suggestive of endless looping of a möbius strip than simply having two sides, a sentiment that is foreshadowed by the john cage image and accompanying caption that opens ghosts with “elements that can be layered into infinite compositions.” this innovative organization, however, is somewhat diminished in ebook form where, rather ironically, the coded templates of digital readers become more limiting than physical paper and the book is remediated in linear fashion, beginning with ghosts and ending with twin codas (that mischievously meet at the central inversion point of the paper version). where arts of living on a damaged planet explores modes of collaboration and experiments with written forms, in unreal objects kate o’riordan offers conceptual precision as a tool for disarming narratives of inevitability. in order to challenge progress stories and all their attendant injustices, we cannot take the objects of big technoscience at face value. but with the material turn, o’riordon contends, too many scholars are guilty of doing just that: insisting that technoscientific objects are already given and, in doing so, enabling domination by reducing human agency to mere response. here enters the concept of unreal objects, tasked with bringing these seemingly inevitable objects “back to the life of things, processes, materials and meaning making” (p. 14), back, that is, into the realm of feminist materialities where media-objects make worlds. an unreal object, then, is anything given or treated as real but that derives this very status from its unacknowledged entanglements with the contingencies (the “unreal”) of apparatus, mediation and storytelling. after carefully situating “unreal objects” within (feminist) and against (objectoriented) materialist theoretical constellations in the introduction, the four chapters that follow put the concept to work, ambitiously tackling the topics of the human genome, biosensors, smart grids, artificial meat and de-extinction respectively. given the current proliferation of many excellent monographs dedicated to these topics in depth, unreal objects’ 5 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) potential lies in demonstrating the analytic prowess of its namesake concept as it travels. this is arguably most successful in “the shadow of genomics” which demonstrates the unreality of the human genome as it only emerges as an object through its digital mediations with and as code, a process that simultaneously renders life a commodifiable form in the service of biocapitalism (p. 27). the concept also works well in “smart grids: energy futures, carbon capture and geoengineering”, revealing how smart grids currently only exist as green promises on a large scale, but it is less powerfully applied to biosensors like the fitbit, which already appear more obviously as both media and as objects. the area where unreal objects truly excels is in explicitly carving space for feminist critique within what has become an expansive materialist literature. this work is not at all contained in the introduction and conclusion but appears throughout the text, including where it pokes holes in the “inflated ego” of totalizing digital media theory (p. 16), and in a memorably pointed feminist takedown of timothy morton’s hyperobjects as a “god trick” (p. 44). o’riordan points to the importance of “collective political thinking” in academia and beyond, asking “which speculations get to count as real futures?” (p. 142). considered together, unreal objects and arts of living on a damaged planet map critical pathways of resistance and collaboration through some of the most pressing (and trendy) contemporary territory where the fleshy and digital meet. in unreal objects, where the mediated is always the contingent, the same contradictory forces that make objects unreal allow for a seemingly inevitable world to be made otherwise. but despite its inclusion as part of a series called “digital barricades,” which explores possibilities for “revolt and liberation,” the promise of resistance sometimes feels tacked on to the end of chapters and falls short of inspiring action beyond theoretical disruption. though such openings are arguably preconditions for living differently, there is more work to be done establishing what such practices might look like, particularly outside academic contexts. tsing et al. are more successful in getting on with the arts of living, acknowledging but refusing to get bogged down by 6 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) arguments about terminology or origin points for the anthropocene (as in moore’s 2016 anthropocene or captialocene?). still, it is notably the scholars based in the natural sciences who most lucidly articulate new practices, calling for ecologists to build bridges with microbiologists (mcfall-ngai, m65) that can then be manifested in multispecies approaches to conversation (funch, m151). admittedly, i was initially hesitant to undertake a joint review of what on the surface appeared as such markedly different texts: a massively multi-authored, edited collection about strategies for multispecies survival, and a highly theoretical-sounding single-authored book about digital objects: one sharing almost equal space with scientists, the other taking aim at scientific projects. but it is in such unexpected crossings of emerging life forms and emerging technologies that generative conversations themselves emerge where we might consider the anthropocene-as-geological-fact an unreal object, or talk about a human genome that is not only highly mediated (o’riordan) but arguably also mostly not human (gilbert m76). at the same time, this reading together left me wishing that o’riordan had done more with her own writing practice, which has a somewhat frustrating tendency to bury the most fascinating details instead of leading with compelling stories. conversely, tsing et al. seem only to gesture toward power and capitalism, whereas o’riordon is far more explicit about whose interests narratives of progress serve. because arts of living on a damaged planet provides an exemplary model for interdisciplinary work that moves beyond simple juxtaposition to collaboration truly deserving of the label transdisciplinary, i cannot help but think of how the promises of “symbiotic scholarship” (m8) might be limited not only by the time it takes to develop an art but also by the demands of the neoliberal university. we need new institutional structures. new metaphors. new stories. old stories told anew. we need more (feminist) humanists who focus on the non-human and more scientists who ask big philosophical questions about what it all means. no single text or pair of texts can solve our nested crises, but arts of living on a damaged planet and unreal 7 dewolff catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) objects can and do offer creative optimism for confronting terrors without succumbing to despair. together, these authors open up spaces for meaningful change, “disrupting the narrative of the inevitable world given to us in which we can only react” (o’riordan 2017, p. 3), pushing with cautious hope toward new forms of observation, resistance and action in perilous times. in the exquisite prose of deborah bird rose, “we are…called into gratitude for the fact that in the midst of terrible destruction, life finds ways to flourish, and that the shimmer of life does indeed include us all” (g61). references barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, nc: duke university press. haraway, d. (2016). staying with the trouble. durham, nc; duke university press. moore, j. (ed.). (2016). anthropocene or captialocene?nature, history and the crisis of captialism. oakland, ca: pm press. morton, t. (2013). hyperobjects. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. o’riordan, k. (2017). unreal objects. london, uk: pluto press. tsing, a. (2015). the mushroom at the end of the world. princeton, nj: princeton university press. tsing, a, swanson, h., gan, e. & bubandt, n. (eds.). (2017). arts of living on a damaged planet: ghosts and monsters of the anthropocene. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. bio kim de wolff is an assistant professor of philosophy at the university of north texas. rice article     weaponizing affect: a film phenomenology of 3d military training simulations during the iraq war    d. andy rice university of california, los angeles andyrice@ucla.edu figure 1. one of three camera operators records a training simulation at the fort irwin national training center in 2012 (left). simultaneously, a technician in a media center nearby (right) records video streams for later review by soldier trainees. he also follows a director’s commands to emit smells, broadcast sounds, and ignite small explosions as the scenario unfolds. recorded by the author, with permission from fort irwin national training center. the us military has long envisioned the mojave desert, two hours east of los angeles, as the ideal place for simulating otherness. this rhode island–sized swath of desert, site of the army’s fort irwin national training center (ntc), has served as a sort of screen upon which the army projects the image of its enemy—a uniquely three-dimensional “film body,” to adapt the term of film phenomenologist vivian sobchack (1992)—in response to particular historical circumstances across time. the iterative nature of these changes resembles an affect system, a concept named by american behavioral psychoanalyst silvan tomkins (2008) to describe a living being’s mechanism for adaptation and survival in response to shifts in mood, circumstance, and feeling. before the united states entered world war ii, fort irwin served as the training grounds for general george patton’s tank battalions. during the cold war, the us army simulated battles here across dozens of miles of desert against the “krasnovians,”—the name given to a us regiment that replicated the tactics and armaments of soviet land forces—in preparation for tank warfare against the russians on the plains of germany. after the fall of the soviet union in 1989, the army vacillated among an amorphous amalgam of potential foes that happened to have purchased russian weaponry, including the “hamchuks” (north korea) and “atlanticans” (cuba), before settling on the “sumerians,” who represented the iraqi republican guard (john wagstaffe, personal communication, 15 april 2007). in the midst of the occupations of iraq and afghanistan after 2003, however, the us military overhauled its “force on force” training paradigm to emphasize counterinsurgency and “cultural terrain.”1 “despite the fact that cultural knowledge has not traditionally been a priority within the department of defense (dod),” argued montgomery mcfate, a trained cultural anthropologist who became a key architect of the military’s turn to culture, “the ongoing insurgency in iraq has served as a wake-up call to the military that adversary culture matters” (mcfate, 2005, p. 43). the army introduced “cultural awareness training” to a new manual in 2004 that was guided by the “warrior ethos,” meant to instill in each soldier the autonomy and quick thinking capacities needed to negotiate the uncertainties of urban, insurgent warfare on behalf of us interests (us dept. of the army & us marine corps, 2007). in response, the ntc disbanded the sumarians and constructed thirteen mock iraqi and afghan villages that simulated locations, social conditions, and everyday life practices. these sites came to serve as the final training grounds for american soldiers before they deployed to war zones in iraq and afghanistan. for two weeks, the army and contracted special-effects technicians and scenario writers from the hollywood film industry orchestrated simulated improvised explosive device (ied) attacks, suicide bombings, beheadings, sectarian infighting, protests, raids, and sweeps for 4,000 soldiers finalizing their preparations for deployment. army forts and marine bases across the country began to build such simulation sites, all hiring arabic-speaking iraqi-american actors (and later pashtoand dari-speaking afghan-americans) to play mayors, villagers, police chiefs, mothers, aid workers, and so on to enhance the cultural realism of their scenarios (wagstaffe, personal communication, 15 april 2007). in effect, a staged, embodied enactment of support for america’s invasion of their native countries was extracted from these subjects. rather than expanding upon the obvious irony of this scenario, i examine the complex experiences afforded by the site simulations among these civilian subjects, as well as the troops in training, the mix of military and civilian staff members who manage the sets, and the media and academic visitors (including me) who have documented the fort irwin simulations. i contend that when the army began to operate embodied training simulations focused on cultural awareness and counterinsurgency, it was almost “hardwired” to adapt old instincts for domination and control to this new, intersubjective context, raising a series of questions about culture, learning, and critique. what do troops learn about culture and cultural exchange through a “cultural awareness” training regime that still treats “the enemy” as embodied subjects? how do different role players make sense of their experiences in the training simulations in relation to their prior life experiences, and what meaningful patterns emerge from their accounts? and why would the public-affairs office in this fort welcome—and even cultivate—visits from journalists, television news reporters, artists, and documentary filmmakers to assess  “worst-case-scenario” training that on the surface makes visceral the failure of us military policy in iraq and afghanistan? in many journalistic accounts, scholarly studies, and documentaries about the fort, somewhat incredibly, the spectacular display of violence, blood, chaos, and bodies serves as evidence of progress rather than failure within the military in the wake of abu ghraib (see gerber & moss, 2008; filkins & burns, 2006; magelssen, 2009).2 “i sensed a genuine desire on the part of army and iraqi staff to make things right,” concluded one performance-studies scholar after spending a day immersed in rehearsals of ied attacks at the fort (magelssen, 2009, p. 68). my analysis, however, is not an endorsement of the training. i reject the conclusion that such manifestations of “cultural awareness” in simulation training demonstrate that the us military is becoming a progressive institution. rather, i propose below that the manufacture of media fascination and positive reporting is part of the simulation’s design—and is significant to the survival of this particular fort. finding new ways to cooperate with reporters on military-friendly terms is in keeping with strategies since vietnam for controlling journalism about us wars (stahl, 2010).3 in the context of pervasive cameras in the united states and abroad, the military’s vision of a future of endless small-scale urban warfare against insurgent enemies facing poverty and environmental collapse,4 the routines of torture in secret military prisons, the rise of “militainment” news and video games, and the pervasive use of drone strikes that kill civilians, i argue that it is imperative to see the military’s experiments with managing affects in immersive, cinematic simulation performances as a new kind of weapon executing old ends, and not a new iteration of clean, “virtuous war,” in the ironic phrase of military-simulation scholar james der derian (2009). at its center, this is an article about the cinematic mechanics entailed in weaponizing affect. like the “shock and awe” campaign in miniature, the war-movie “cultural awareness” spectacles at fort irwin are intended to disorient and soften those immersed within them—troops and visiting journalist-filmmakers alike—so that they are primed for official explanations on hand to account for “the real” of their intense affective sensations. central to my account is kara keeling’s (2007) theory of cinematic clichés, which she argues can be internalized and projected upon the world as “common sense” filters for perception and attention. at fort irwin, the cliché of the stoic, masculine action-film protagonist who must harden himself to sadness and grief also centers troop learning priorities and teaching methods, limits the range of soldiers’ encounters with iraqi and afghan role players, and offers a familiar schema for visiting journalist-filmmakers to follow in their own documentary stories. action-cinematic narratives in the movies and simulation-training scenarios alike typically end before the aftermath of urgent action, short-circuiting the need to process suffering, remorse, and loss. in addition to their supposed role in simulating “adversary culture” and facilitating troop learning, in other words, cinematic techniques also serve a military public-relations strategy to mitigate dissenting journalism and subvert critique amid disastrous wars. film phenomenology with cameras and the simulation body cameras and performance have played a key role in war campaigns, dating to matthew brady’s photographs of corpses on battlefields arranged before his lens during the american civil war,5 but the iraq war featured an unusually wide array of camera operators who created photographs, moving images, and spectacles to be photographed for very different ends. photographs of atrocities have not necessarily communicated dissent or moral indignation. below i offer an account of how the visual records of bloody, violent displays at fort irwin have in fact undermined possibilities for their use in critique. i draw on film theorists of affect and intersubjectivity (cartwright, 2008, 2011; keeling, 2007; laine, 2007; marks, 2000, 2002; sobchack, 1992, 2004) to think through the centrality of cinema-industry tropes in the construction of the training simulations and the porous boundaries between action-film depictions of war and the subjective perceptions of participants in the training simulations as to the real and the fake of their experiences. laine argues that the orientation of the cinema viewer to the screen epitomizes the ephemeral, yet continually reconstitutes space “where the ‘outside’ of the collective experience becomes the ‘inside’ of the subject’s psychic life” (laine, 2007, p. 10). my research on fort irwin suggests that many young soldiers who have not yet gone to war have internalized these cinematic “outsides” and have drawn from their viewing experiences as a basis from which to judge the affective realism of their military training. in this light, the cinema is not exactly an ideological apparatus of mechanical reproduction or an illusion machine playing on insatiable unconscious desires, but rather “a matter of affects,” in laine’s terms, that drives those in charge of fort irwin to conform the landscape to their trainees’ common-sense orientation to the world (laine, 2007, p. 10; keeling, 2007). i intend to emphasize, however, that it is not just soldiers who understand war imagery primarily from the clichés of entertainment cinema. my analytical approach draws from the film phenomenological method pioneered by sobchack, who adapted the insights of french phenomenologist maurice merleau-ponty (1962) to the study of cinema. across years of writing in the film phenomenological mode, sobchack came to treat her own flesh as a kind of recording device in the midst of watching a film, partly as a materialist critique of the nihilistic writing on simulation by theorists following jean baudrillard (1994).6 sobchack kept track of the sensations she experienced while viewing cinematic material for later, more considered structural analysis of genre and film form. while sobchack writes from the position of a viewer in a cinema theater, however, i write from my experience as a cameraperson in the midst of a three-dimensional, cinematic, war simulation space inhabited by various actors. i visited fort irwin in 2007 and 2012 to document and observe training simulations. i return to my footage here to help recall events that i might otherwise have forgotten, failed to notice, or needed to analyze further, but also to reflect on the performativity of being a documentary cameraperson in the context of this intersubjectively produced simulation experience. i embodied the “variable” of the visiting journalist-documentary filmmaker, a cinematic trope that the simulation scenario seemed well prepared to manage. i situate my phenomenological analysis in a historical study of 250 news reports written about the fort over a period of roughly twenty years (1989 to 2012),7 as well as three articles published in performance studies journals and a feature-length documentary film titled full battle rattle (2008). like suchman (2016), i thought about this digital archive as a field site. these stories illuminated patterns in narratives about military training at the fort and revealed shortcomings—or perhaps intended effects—in my thinking about the up-close experiences of intensely graphic simulation scenarios that had played out before my camera, which were then immediately interpreted for me by military personnel serving as my guides. in this way, my approach differs from previous scholarly treatments that have focused exclusively on up-close ethnographic observation of performance in relation to official military policies. i also analyze interviews i conducted with a former soldier who rotated twice through fort irwin and with a white barstow resident who donned a burqa to play an afghan woman to draw out key points about affect and realism in the simulations. in the tack and yaw between phenomenological description of camerawork and archival-historical analysis, i have come to frame fort irwin as a kind of “simulation body” with an affect system, akin to sobchack’s (1992) notion of the “film body.” merleau-ponty grounded his understanding of experience in the human body’s capacities to perceive stimuli and express intention, qualities that sobchack ascribed to the “film body” that emerged in the space between a film and a viewer in the midst of a screening. likewise, what i am calling the “simulation body” denotes a spatially distributed system that perceives stimuli and expresses intention in the midst of performance, here in performances that change slightly over time to keep the fort relevant and funded. the human bodies, communications networks, scenario scripts, vehicles, mock towns, and so on constitute so many variables for the simulation body to manage toward the aims of its own economic, political, and cultural reproduction. i consider the traces left by the simulation itself across time in the archive of film and journalistic reports, the desert landscape in the transition from force-on-force combat to counterinsurgency war, and accounts of participants who have passed through simulation training as indicative of the ongoing development of this particular affect system. to sharpen the implications for my central point here, i treat the journalist-documentarian as a variable to be controlled by various other elements within the distributed simulation body, not as an observer to be more or less ignored. the simulation itself, in other words, always-already accounts for the journalist-documentarian who attempts a neutral evaluation of training simulations. though it is unbounded by skin, the simulation body, i claim here, consistently executes an affective strategy centered on avoidance and mystification of the feared object, here “the enemy” that the military constructs, defeats, and then augments across time like an endless and increasingly elaborate action scene. suchman (2016), citing judith butler, refers to the figure of the enemy in us military-training simulations as a limitation to cultural awareness: “the intelligibility of the body includes always its ‘constitutive outside,’ those unthinkable and unlivable bodies ‘that do not matter in the same way,’” she observes (p. 8). in the military, the two terms for “those unthinkable and unlivable bodies” are “enemy” and “civilian,” with the former category figured as threatening and immoral and the latter as antithetical to the disciplined, hypercapable, action-oriented soldier body. this institutional hubris is in tension with the fact that the us military remains somewhat accountable to civilian oversight, which can constitute an existential threat—especially during a messy counterinsurgency war rife with mistakes and scandals, like abu ghraib. public-relations strategies since vietnam have aimed to lead us civilians to identify with us soldiers and the activity of soldiering, as opposed to the civilians and enemy combatants they have killed (stahl, 2010). part of this strategy has entailed attempts to control journalism, which i tether below to my account of stories about fort irwin. the simulations serve as training for troops about to deploy, but they also seem to function as a quickly recognizable, close-to-home, “good enough” story for visiting us writers and filmmakers who cannot or would rather not undertake the hard, expensive, controversial, and dangerous accounting needed to really assess the efficacy of such methods in iraq and afghanistan. this is a devil’s bargain. starting from my phenomenology of documentary camerawork at fort irwin below, i come to suggest a more general problem for documentary practice and reportage in the context of simulation, one with particularly urgent stakes in times of war. “stitch lane” 2007 “turn the camera off,” the army sergeant tells me. several unscripted flames are searching for unconsumed materiel on the driver’s side of a mangled charcoal humvee spattered with red stains. this army officer, known at fort irwin as a tactical controller (tc),8 is about to veer from standard protocol to fix the problem. the tc grabs a plastic container filled with fake blood and uses it to douse the fire as twelve other tcs, a fort irwin public-relations guide, and several members of the media look on. satisfied, the tc politely informs me that i can resume videotaping. smoke continues to billow into the air from three canisters hidden behind the wheels of the “bombed” humvee—canisters designed for use in scenes like this one. we are at the closest training site to the public-affairs office at fort irwin ntc: medina wasl, a mock iraqi village comprised of thirteen cargo containers fashioned with faux siding to resemble homes in rural iraq, as well as a mosque, a pen with goats, and a market, all aligned along a central dirt road. the humvee serves as the focal point of the most often observed and practiced training simulation here, dubbed “stitch lane” by the army. the simulation depicts the aftermath of an ied attack—complete with $60,000 “simman” medical dummies dressed with bloody lacerations and scattered across the street, iraqi villagers wailing over an injured family of three in a black sedan struck by shrapnel from the explosion, and a confused army private stumbling through this scene, alternately calling for a medic and his mother. troop trainees must “stitch” and evacuate the wounded quickly and safely. my shock at being immersed in the dimensionality and chaos of this environment blends with a perverse sense of fascination, familiarity, and even comfort at the resemblance it bears to a hollywood action-film set. i wind my way through this action-film documentary with a video camera of my own, both impressed and confused by my access to the damning scene as an early-stage graduate student. troops in training are tasked with quickly securing the area around the blast, assessing injuries to soldiers and civilians, stopping massive bleeding while warding off insurgent sniper attacks and car bombs, and evacuating the injured to a secure forward operating base set up in the desert several miles from the village. during their two weeks at fort irwin, troops practice this scenario three to four times, with tcs observing their performance and stage-managing insurgent attacks based on the soldiers’ failures to follow proper procedures. tcs try to “kill” all the new troops in early renditions of this exercise should they take more than ten minutes to carry out the evacuation. all participants in the simulation wear miles laser-tag vests, which perceive signals emitted from guns or roadside bombs that approximate the ballistics and physical trajectories of actual weapons. when a suicide bomber detonates within close proximity of the american soldiers, a tc with a “god gun,” a light blue physics calculator fashioned after a handgun, “shoots” each casualty to assess the extent of their simulated injury or death. this time a suicide bomber drives a truck through an unprotected alley to the scene and detonates, killing all the soldiers and civilians. at the end of a simulation, the troops gather in a communal space in front of a television screen—the central courtyard of the village “mosque”—as a tc shows video of their performance and leads a discussion about how to improve the next time. the emphasis here is on procedure (how to secure the perimeter of the ied site, identify wounds, apply a tourniquet efficiently, load bodies into the medevac truck, and so on), but unspoken is the development of positive affective sentiments among the soldiers who learn together. the soldiers bond through this ritual before a mainstay of domestic architecture, the television, which functions not as a window on reality but as a mediator of their relations with one another. video viewing in this spatial arrangement is a historical practice and form of expressive experience they all share. performance before cameras is vital to their mission as the executors of empire in an age of ubiquitous media, as the scandal of abu ghraib ironically suggests. the significance of performing affective qualities before the camera is exemplified later, when the army arranges for two particularly charismatic and friendly iraqi-american actors to sit with me for interviews. they say that they try to play a role in “saving lives” in their native and adopted countries by teaching young american soldiers about the cultural nuances they will encounter once in theater. “sam,” a chaldean christian liquor store owner from san diego who immigrated to the united states in the 1970s and last visited iraq in 1986, states that “this is reality, we’re not playing games with it. we’re using real iraqis”: we act like them, we get mad like them, we yell out just like the iraqis, we tell them get the hell out of my country, ’cause you’re not helping—we do everything just like in iraq ’cause they should know. that’s what they’re gonna face. i talk to lieutenants who have been in iraq already when they come here. they say, hey, flashback. this is the same. we give them the same thing. (“sam,” personal communication, 8 april 2007)9 i later discover that he has conducted more than fifty interviews for the press. he also appears in many photos on a wall at the public-affairs office, including one with president george w. bush. i see this wall on the day i am leaving the fort and pan my camcorder across the photographs of other journalists who have passed through this place, labeled by name and institutional affiliation: market road productions, australian tv, a berlin newspaper, armed forces info services, christian broadcasting network, danish national tv, history channel modern marvels, deutsche welle television, french radio, state dept. press tour, sacramento tv, the bbc, and dozens of others. six to twelve media institutions visit for every rotation, the public-affairs officer tells me. “then they go on my wall of shame,” he quips. i am surprised when he points out the newest image, a photograph he had taken of me, unaware, the day before. he tells me that keeping photographs on the walls helps him remember all the people he has met, and he reiterates again how much he likes journalists. i like him, too. he has told me many good stories today about the history of the fort, his own life as a military reporter, the iraqi-american actors he has met, and the pedagogical aim of all the simulation scenarios that we watched together. but as i leave the office and begin the thirty-mile drive through the desert between fort irwin and barstow, i cannot shake the thought that all of us media visitors hang there like so many hunting trophies. being trapped in the “desert of the real,” as baudrillard (1994) had thought to call the social condition of the united states while driving through this same mojave desert, is a confusing sensation (p. 1). it is not clear, after all, that visions of chaotic violence, civilian death, and physical destruction like those i had just documented should function to promote a war effort. noor behram’s haunting forensic photographs of the rubble and innocent victims of us drone bombings in pakistan, for instance, testify to the ongoing significance of documentary representation of atrocity for raising awareness, indignation, and momentum for protest. “i want to show taxpayers in the western world what their tax money is doing to people in another part of the world,” he explains (ackerman, 2011). the us military, applying similar ideas about the power of documentary images to opposite ends, has pressured journalists in iraq not to publish graphic photographs of the actual dead.10 but at fort irwin, the explicit depiction of violent events that the army treats as emblematic of actuality and predictive of future experience—gory, bloody, and merciless throughout—in fact seems to short-circuit energy for dissent and anger in the near term: my own and that of the other journalists on the “wall of shame.” over months of reflection, i come to understand the scenes of violence at fort irwin, the accounts of iraqi-american actors, and the public-affairs officers’ explanations, which seemed to anticipate my strong affective responses, as aligned with incremental policy changes dating to the 1960s designed to control depictions of american wars and suppress dissent. stahl (2010), for instance, argues that the rise of military-industrial-entertainment collaborations since the vietnam war, and especially since the early 2000s, co-opts war imagery for pleasurable, interactive “militainment” products and military recruiting. economic pressures on news organizations wrought by the rise of cable and twenty-four-hour news channels incentivizes media to produce low-budget talk shows and relay the stories of pentagon public-relations personnel over independent reporting. publishing graphic war photographs could endanger ongoing access to these officials, so most news organizations did not. the unfortunate result has been the ceding of war imagery almost entirely to the entertainment industry, where images of killing and the killed tend to drive action and plot rather than reflection on suffering. narrative films about masculine war heroes who successfully solve problems through violence and first person shooter games “invite one to project oneself into the action,” in stahl’s phrase (2010, p. 3). building on such trends, fort irwin produces immersive environments designed to arouse strong affective responses from participants, including those of journalist-documentarians. the codes of action-entertainment cinema—complete with reductive depictions of the culture of the other—are then deployed to define interpretations of graphic violence. in other contexts or historical moments, such scenes might have served to discredit a war effort or show a lack of cultural knowledge. but here and now, the circulation of intense affect functions as an evolving weapon—one calibrated, as i explore below, by narrative cinema techniques. awareness of cinematic culture a film spectator may comment about the experience of seeing a film as believable or convincing without articulating the assumptions from which this sense of the real emerged, sometimes even in the full awareness that their sense of this reality directly contradicts social facts.11 in the context of “stitch lane,” participants’ experiences of realism play on broadly shared understandings of hollywood action tropes for manufacturing drama, affect, and audience investment, even if—or perhaps especially because—the immersive scenario references war events that spectators and participants alike imagine to have had mortal corollaries in iraq or afghanistan in the recent past. in this light, the drama of the simulation scenario affectively stitches together the trauma of the ied explosion as an actual world phenomenon, the narrativization of such events through hollywood techniques, and the training of anxious troops in the present who know movies but not war for the contingencies of a future that may bring actual wounds. these three sutured temporalities function to solidify bonds of camaraderie in troops who must confront the specter of bodily harm through performances in which they stand at once as subjects and objects for their fellow performers, including iraqi and afghan role players. all function simultaneously as subjects and objects of the cinematic realism operational in the simulation, a style of realism vested in the visualization of the wound above all. embedding such visualizations within narratives affects soldiers and actors, as i show below, but also visiting observers to the fort, like me. how are we new arrivals to make sense of a training spectacle designed to overwhelm the senses? military spokespersons stand at the ready to offer explanations for the shocks: train like you fight; inoculate against stress; weed out the bad-apple troops who might kill civilians; teach troops cultural awareness so they don’t misunderstand gestures, expressions, and gender norms; and so on. over time, medina wasl became not just a site for training soldiers, but also a showpiece for the army’s new, public-relations-oriented framing of itself as a progressive cultural institution in the midst of insurgent war. this has been an effective strategy. in articles about the training simulations at fort irwin, invocations of realism are both pervasive and ambiguous in ways that are instructive about what cultural awareness might mean here. descriptions in reports and comments from military interviewees typically identify landscape, climate, the presence of arabic-speaking iraqi bodies, and the occasional inducement of traumatic symptoms in trainees to signify realism. across the transition from “force-on-force” to “cultural awareness” training, stories about the fort increasingly focused on the journalists’ sensory experiences of being present to the simulations. their narratives read like a cross between phenomenological description and hollywood script: “pop-pop-pop-pop-pop-pop! boom!” wrote one. “toomer popped off a round—and then his gun jammed, at the worst possible time, just like in the movies” (thevenot, 2004). a new york times feature published in 2006 likewise connected the action-cinematic ethos at the fort to realism, authoritatively demonstrated in this account by soldiers’ embodied responses to their new training regimen: with actors and stuntmen on loan from hollywood, american generals have recast the training ground at fort irwin so effectively as a simulation of conditions in iraq and afghanistan over the past 20 months that some soldiers have left with battle fatigue and others have had their orders for deployment to the war zones canceled. in at least one case, a soldier’s career was ended for unnecessarily “killing” civilians. (filkins & burns, 2006, p. 1) the figure of the soldier who “unnecessarily” kills civilians plays an important part in this particular story and many others—a peculiarity worth analyzing. i interpret two meanings to the recurrence of this figure. first, it implies the narrative of the progressive army, monitoring its troops for “bad apples” who may misrepresent us interests in theater by committing atrocities. the army will not deploy a soldier who demonstrates an unnerving lack of calm in the midst of a simulation. this narrative bears little relation to the pre-2007 policy of not counting killed civilians in iraq and afghanistan, judging from reports that i address below. second, and more to the point, in the news story the soldier who kills civilians functions as evidence for this visiting journalist that the cultural-awareness training simulations are working properly. the public-affairs officer at the fort tells the reporter that the simulations are so realistic that they have induced “battle fatigue” and killing sprees to prove that the training approximates an intense war experience. the reporter then conveys this juicy information to readers. somehow, across the institutional transition from “force-on-force” training to “cultural awareness,” the figure of the puking, pathological, traumatized soldier body remained the index of functionality in journalistic evaluations of military training, though as an index for different modalities of troop suffering. quotations from senior officers offer rationales for extreme training of this sort that shift over time away from environmental conditions and toward culture. in 2004, when the us army still emphasized force-on-force training, brigadier general robert cone of fort irwin stated: we want our commanders to say that it’s harder at the national training center than in war. . . . we put them in a tent where it’s 100 degrees, there’s dirt in their computers and they haven’t had a shower for a week and see how they function. we want to put them under stress and see how they cope. (santschi, 2004) cone emphasized the realism of the training in terms of the soldier’s bodily response to the harsh desert conditions, but he did not mention culture as part of this environment. four years later, comments from fort irwin commanding officer general dana pittard emphasize sensations of alterity (which we may hesitate to characterize as culture) over the physical environment: “the kind of towns, the urban towns we’re creating, the signs, it must hit all five of your senses. you must see iraq and afghanistan. you must smell it. you must touch it” (rather, 2008). a feature published in 2007 affirmed that this kind of affective realism was key to the new regime of cultural-awareness military training—and to writing about such training. “‘it’s realistic to the point where soldiers pass out, throw up, turn white and start shaking,’ said sgt. mark ramsey, an iraq war veteran and hollywood stuntman who helps plan the training mission” (vargo, 2007). ramsey was referring to the sensations of fear and shock that troops experienced amid referents to the sensorial environment of iraq and surprise insurgent attacks, not simply the heat of the desert. “you’ve got to train like you fight” (vargo, 2007). the way to ensure the survival of the simulation body economically and institutionally, ironically, hinged on its capacities to create images that could induce in its human components the affects associated with looming death. strong affect grounded the approach to teaching at the fort. strong affect an ex-marine corps noncommissioned officer, “greg,” who rotated through fort irwin on two different occasions while on active duty, reflected in an interview with me that the training he received overwhelmingly intended to make soldiers fearful, suspicious, and on edge. “the commanders want to instill a certain fear in you to keep you sharp, to keep you edged, to keep you ready,” greg explained. pedagogy emphasizes that no procedure or action carried out by troops deserves a commander’s positive praise. “bottom line is that it’s just never going to be good enough, no matter what,” greg said. “their reward system is through negativity. . . . i didn’t realize that until i stepped out of the military and got into this profession, fitness, which is more about positivity” (“greg,” personal communication, 3 february 2012). he recalled one incident in particular in which a janitor rolled an ied in a trashcan into a room of soldiers undetected, a simulation meant to reenact an ied attack that had killed a number of marines in a mess hall in iraq the week before. “it was an eye opener for everybody. it was like, i don’t think we’re ready for this. it’s an intangible kind of thing, a fear . . . almost like a feeling where you just want to tuck up in a cave and hide,” he reflected (“greg,” personal communication, 3 february 2012). when this simulation event occurred at fort irwin, it indexed a specific moment of the recent past, while also suggesting an emergent strategy being deployed by insurgents that would likely impact this unit of marines deploying to iraq soon. the relatively brief duration of time between the actual ied explosion in the mess hall in iraq and its simulation at fort irwin was key to its affective power for this group of marines. this was a reenactment of current news and a training simulation simultaneously. in this context, the bodies of these marines in training touched something of the bodies of those who had died in the bomb attack affectively, if not literally. it could have been them. greg’s response, “i don’t think we’re ready for this,” was perhaps the desired pedagogical outcome of the bomb simulation. one can never be vigilant enough. the visible evidence of stress, fear, and disgust at fort irwin were made central to claims about improving the survival rates of soldiers. such images suggest to visitors and evaluators that the fort can habituate soldiers to the intense affects of war, thus limiting the power of affective response to gore and fear that can impede judgment in actual battle. the fort irwin simulation body must also anticipate war scenarios of the future, or at the least make a case that their training paradigm remains relevant in times of peace. images at fort irwin thus have a dual aim, a dual purpose in relation to the fort’s survival. by coincidence, tomkins (2008) in fact names the aims of consciousness within the affect system as image (p.10). the aggregate of sensory, memory, and affective imagery processed through consciousness comprises the organism’s image, its understanding of purpose and direction. spokespersons for the army—stewards of the institutional image—argue that simulations like “stitch lane” and the one greg described above “inoculate [soldiers] against stress” and thus allow them to function more effectively in scenarios where lives may be at stake (a conceit of this training that i examine at length below) (lavell, 2003). it is also the case that phenomena that arouse intense affects, particularly those that routinely defy explanation and trigger fear, force those who experience them to undertake particular coping strategies, to search out explanations for feelings of humiliation and contempt. in tomkins’s affect system, this is one way to theorize the recursive relationship between affect and consciousness. the subject produced by repeated exposures to humiliation and contempt, in tomkins’s description, resembles the archetypal action hero as well as the military’s avowed ideal of the good soldier, “learn[ing] to have contempt for those who surrender too easily and to avoid defeat at any cost lest he suffer self-contempt” (tomkins, 2008, p. 481). tomkins suggested that there is a monopolistic tendency in the affects of contempt and humiliation if they are not confronted, assuaged, or worked through. repeated experiences of these negative affects produce in the subject what tomkins calls a “strong affect theory” that serves as the foundation of ideological thinking: “it is the repeated and apparently uncontrollable spread of the experience of negative affect which prompts the increasing strength of the ideo-affective organization which we have called a strong affect theory” (tomkins, 2008, p. 460). “strong theories” about how the world works harden over time into what eve sedgwick, building on ideas of sigmund freud (2001) and melanie klein (1946), calls the “paranoid position” (sedgwick, 2003, p. 123). this corresponds most closely with the principle of avoiding negative affect, the defining strategy of military training and defensive infrastructure. avoidance strategies inevitably cut the subject off from a range of encounters with potentially shaming, humiliating, or misunderstood objects that have in the past overwhelmed the psyche, and so further mystify the objects. this leads a strong theory position to claim more and more objects as applicable within its purview over time, because power to control affective experience is defined increasingly by avoidance. it seeks almost automatically to expand its power through boundary marking, and this can be contagious with others who follow a similar affective strategy of avoidance that is not counterbalanced by positive affective experience, like fellow soldiers forced to endure drill and then threat. moreover, positive affect can actually come about in the process of working to counter the negative affect by avoidance or anger, as was the case with the soldiers’ staging of photos at abu ghraib. in these cases, ironically, the object associated with the strong affect theory of avoidance becomes central as well to the experience of a restrained positive affect. total and complete destruction of the source of negative affect leaves a kind of vacuum at the center of affective life. we might ask after the implications of avoidance in relation to images that tend to arouse negative affects. keeling (2007) argues that cinematic structures extend outside the theater once they are internalized by spectators and turned on the world itself. those who regard what they encounter through the logic and needs of cinematic structures become “living images,” their perceptual world an extension of theatrical experiences as well as a reflection of the world on screen (p. 25). keeling points to the example of the black panther party, whose members appeared in public with guns in the late 1960s as a part of a strategy to draw television cameras to their new defiant, revolutionary image of blackness. while keeling praises the way this gesture challenged dominant schemas for understanding the image of blackness, she notes that this action also reproduced the reductive cinematic cliché that “it takes masculine tactics to effect political change”—a staple trope of hollywood action films that troubled female panthers in subsequent years (p. 79). in many cases, for keeling, projecting cinematic perception onto the media-saturated world outside the theater is a short-term survival strategy always in danger of reproducing the logic of capitalism over time. new ideas are folded into dominant notions of common sense. materializations of cinematic affect accumulate upon the land in places like fort irwin. cinematic structures here homogenize processes of identification and becoming for the ends of military capital, “even to make that violation feel good,” in keeling’s terms (p. 25). certainly for soldiers, the strong negative affects of training reinforce boundaries between “us and them” and work against the notion of openness in intercultural exchange one might think to be central to cultural awareness engagements. performance scholar zack whitman gill (2009) argues that this kind of training in fact reinforces a “martial heterotopia” defined by a “warrior ethos” parallel to but set apart from (and above) civilian life: while an army soldier demonstrates the qualities that comprise the seven core values [loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage], a civilian is constructed as the opposite. every moment of a recruit’s existence in the army affirms this absolute difference, through a series of performances that immediately and visually discard the lax and disorganized lifestyle of the civilian. (p. 144) gill’s analysis of the training at fort irwin as a permanent rehearsal, detached from and contemptuous of civilian life at home and abroad, would seem to dovetail well with keeling’s theory about the projection of cinematic common sense and tomkins’s writing on strong affect theory. military scripting does not produce a value-neutral simulation in which participants can envision future scenarios by tweaking abstract variables. this is a simulation, rather, that intends to encode through cinematic techniques a set of values and presuppositions into its human variables for an ideological outcome. whereas sobchack likens cinematic consciousness to plastic surgery (“we have all had our eyes done,” she quips), the fort irwin simulation body aims to colonize the sensory-affective organization of individuals within its space. and visiting journalists and filmmakers who follow the norms of neutral reportage are easily subsumed as variables within this system, time and again moved by the affective force of witnessing simulation scenarios and interviewing soldiers to then reproduce as “consciousness” the military-friendly explanations on hand. critique of affective realism bonnie docherty, a researcher at human rights watch who specializes in questions of disarmament and limiting civilian casualties during war, published the most detailed study of the training simulations and their relation to the practices of soldiers once deployed in theater. her account “more sweat…less blood” (2007) throws into question the recourse to affective realism in public-relations material and news reports about the efficacy of training at the fort. docherty positions herself as a spokesperson for improving military training to reduce civilian casualties, and was allowed unusually extensive access to the fort and its personnel. she visited the fort three times over the course of four years of research and pored through 40,000 pages of training manuals and documents about army lessons learned (pp. 5-6). in line with the reports of other visitors, docherty emphasizes the importance of realism in her study, but she found it lacking at fort irwin. the towns were too small and the iraqi role players too few to simulate the sense of threat that they engendered for troops once deployed (p. 4). she says it was a problem that only american soldiers stationed at fort irwin play the insurgents, as soldier trainees quickly learn to distinguish between arabic speakers who play cultural roles and “insurgents,” none of whom speak arabic (p. 6). the simulation scenarios themselves were not varied enough in intensity or goals. encounters with iraqi role players were still minimal (p. 7). and the rules of engagement taught and practiced at fort irwin did not always overlap with international humanitarian law, in her estimation. she insists that “troops must receive reviews that consider not only military success but also civilian casualties,” a factor not evaluated in army engagements in iraq until september 2007, four and a half years after the start of the war (p. 4). while docherty quotes veterans who experienced flashbacks to their combat experience in the midst of participating in simulations, she avers from accepting these comments as evidence of the kind of realism she deems most important to cultural-awareness training. “the different views of ntc’s realism are in part attributable to whether or not a trainee had been to iraq,” she observes. her field research corroborates the views of one battalion commander she interviewed, who said that “those who had not been in theater were ‘relatively unfazed [by the realism]. [to them, i]t’s a training exercise’” (p. 20). she concludes that the realism advertised by the military as its training product, and relayed by most visiting journalists and filmmakers in their representations of the simulations, remains elusive. “the new trainees’ lack of reaction is disconcerting since ntc’s role is to awaken them to what lies ahead,” she concludes (p. 20). john wagstaffe, the public-relations officer at fort irwin before 2011, reflects on the dilemma the army faces in getting the attention of its young trainees. “if it’s not on video,” wagstaffe says, “then it didn’t happen” (john wagstaffe, personal communication, 11 july 2011). wagstaffe explains that for a generation of recruits who grew up playing video games and watching war films, the baseline standard of assaultive sounds, smells, and actions that could induce the sensation of affective realism—the stated key to pedagogy at fort irwin—is extreme. this problem is partly of the military’s own making. in military-sponsored video game series like america’s army, call of duty, and halo, recruiting depots set up in public schools, advertisements aired during sports broadcasts, hollywood action movies endorsed by the military like g.i. joe (2009) and ironman (2008) (gonzález, 2010, p. 16), and the controversial “army experience center” opened in a philadelphia shopping mall (cousineau, 2011, p. 519),12 extreme, graphically depicted, reactive violence predominantly functions as a form of exciting entertainment. offering gaming experiences as part of the army brand, in addition to suggesting that army life might lead to such adventures, aids recruiting within the army’s key demographic of poor, frustrated young men. it is also an ethos at odds with the notion of cultural awareness. as one sergeant noted in unnerving frustration in the midst of the transition to cultural awareness in 2004, “you train a guy to kill, and then you tell him to go hand out water and not to shoot anybody unless he’s shot at” (thevenot, 2004). within this context, it is not surprising that some of the soldiers view the embodied training simulations as just another drill to endure. moreover, and perhaps more to the point, commanders’ assumptions about such preexisting attitudes lead them to develop “worst-case scenario” simulations, to perform simulated gore and violence that exceed what soldier trainees would likely see in combat. to achieve the affective realism that would open the space for soldiers to feel the consequences of their actions and the possibilities for their own deaths, in other words, would mean creating scenarios that were not representative of their future lives. it is worth saying a bit more about the kinds of realism claimed as operational at the fort and the problems that these claims pose for evaluation by outsider journalists and filmmakers. visitors have no way to judge whether or not this kind of training is effective at reducing civilian casualties, facilitating cultural exchange, or saving the lives of american soldiers during deployment. beyond this, the evaluators who most matter, iraqis and afghans living through wars who must deal with the distant presence of american troops in their home countries, are not available for comment about the realism of military training. instead, iraqi-americans who mostly left the country in the 1970s; soldier trainees who have not deployed but have played video games; and veteran soldiers whose traumatic experiences of war lead them to experience flashbacks in the midst of much more mundane, everyday sensations stand as authorities on realism in reports and films about the fort. while these participants may be well intentioned and open, they are also following orders. they manage procedural realism: the reality of written military codes about how to move down a narrow street as a unit, perform guard duty, inspect cars at checkpoints, and “kick down doors,” to use the phrase of one army mechanic. while these concerns are practical and relevant to the everyday activities of soldiers, and useful to see and improve upon through the use of video, they have little to do with iraqi or afghan culture. figure 2. video stills of the “wounded private” (left) and afghan role players (right) acting in the stitch lane training simulation, 2012. recorded by the author with permission from fort irwin national training center, barstow, ca. what is significant here is the relation between the affective experiences induced by the simulation scenarios and the official interpretations on hand to account for them. military spokespersons use the term “culture” to describe differences in customs, belief, and behavior that troops will encounter in iraq and afghanistan, but in practice the sensory experiences of otherness produced in the simulations are very much about the conjuncture of army and cinema customs, beliefs, and behaviors. viewers and participants who have not been exposed to graphic depictions of violence tend to have more pronounced visceral responses to the training simulations. one middle-aged white woman from the nearby town of barstow, whom i will call jane, accepted a job as a part-time role player at fort irwin around 2008. i interviewed her in 2012. in rotations of troops who were destined for afghanistan, she wore a burqa and played the second wife of a rural muslim afghan man (his actual wife, jane’s actual friend, played his first muslim wife in the simulation). though jane knew very little about afghanistan or muslim culture, the army allowed her and other local american women to play these roles because, according to script, they said nothing in public, remained anonymous beneath the burqas, and simply followed their husbands (“jane,” personal communication, 15 february 2012). arabicand pashto-speaking role players are more expensive to contract, so as many roles as possible are played by enlisted army members and local civilians who need part-time work. as a result, role players like jane enter the simulations with a very different set of experiences of war imagery and expectations about war representations than most army trainees. jane recalls seeing for the first time one of the amputees who played a bomb victim in the stitch lane simulation (figure 2). “to me it was so realistic that i just started crying,” she says:   he was yelling where was his leg, and the next thing i know i’m just crying because i’m wondering where his leg’s at. just sitting there, and you’re like, oh my god, it’s how they must feel when they’re out there and they lose their leg. . . . my dad didn’t really let me watch war movies, so my first time out here, i didn’t know we had amputees, so i cried a lot my first rotation. they made me stay over there because i really was. . . . i was devastated. i don’t know a lot about war. so when i’d seen it, it was very scary. (“jane,” personal communication, 15 february 2012). jane says she gradually learned how to cope with the display of violence and blood because she needed the job and because she accepted her officers’ interpretation of what she had seen: many soldiers had lost limbs in iraq and afghanistan, so it was crucially important that they experience something of what these moments are like before deploying. here, again, the simulation body of the fort brought jane’s strong negative affective response into line with the position of the overall military mission. repeated exposure to simulations of traumatic events—here an odd parallel to the logic in therapy for “prolonged exposure” explored in brandt (2016)—blunted jane’s potentially political, visceral reaction to the visage of the aftermath of an ied attack as devastating, scary, and sad. by hardening herself to the intense affects of fear and disgust that overwhelmed her at first, jane came to believe she could help soldiers better perform their jobs. “i got to where i understand that the concept out here is to help [american soldiers] come back alive,” jane explains: i have to learn to do it because it’s my job. and so i waited a couple days and i came back, and the more you come back and you see it, you see you’re helping soldiers. they come in, and you know that hopefully what they learned while you were here is going to bring them back alive. so that made me feel really good about what had first freaked me out (“jane,” personal communication, 15 february 2012). jane’s reaction to the horror of seeing an amputee and her subsequent acceptance of the military’s interpretation of its meaning, mimic the logic at the center of many documentary and journalistic interpretations of the training simulations. absent their own critical intervention, these reports convey a message sympathetic to the military mission. in his article “rehearsing the ‘warrior ethos,’ ‘theatre immersion,’ and the simulation of theatres of war” (2009), for instance, performance theorist scott magelssen foregrounds interviews and observations that he gleaned from his one-day visit to the fort as representations of its reality as a reformed, newly progressive vision of american military norms. while he acknowledges that he saw nothing that the army did not want him to see, he nonetheless judges the training simulation positively: i sensed a genuine desire on the part of army and iraqi staff to make things right by teaching the troops about the changing face of the cultural and political landscape in iraq, and a deep resentment toward those who act poorly, as in the case of the alleged blackwater massacres. (magelssen, 2009, p. 68) like the embedded reporters who “objectively” relate sympathetic stories about humble and patriotic american soldiers on the ground in iraq, magelssen in effect assumes what digital-media theorist elizabeth losh has described as a pragmatic rhetorical stance. losh ascribes this position to critics of the us wars who nonetheless accept military contracts to program virtual-reality training games like tactical iraqi and virtual iraq (losh, 2006). these programmers argue that the games’ missions to teach the arabic language and muslim culture and aid treatments of ptsd respectively outweigh the fact that the military funds the games and might misuse or reappropriate their work for other ends in the future. while i appreciate the nuance of this position for the designers of such programs and scholars who write about military affairs, it is not the place from whence to evaluate training outcomes. perhaps magelssen was intending to give pause to an audience of academics who would regard military activity as a de facto negative component of collective life in the united states, or perhaps he was acting out what he saw as ethical ethnographic practice by affirming the legitimacy of the pragmatic position of his iraqi-american subjects. this is, indeed, the dominant framework in journalistic accounts of the fort, and magelssen’s article offers a more detailed account than most from which to draw such conclusions. but in focusing on the present of his visit as opposed to the longer history of the fort itself or the potential ramifications of the shift from conventional warfare to “cultural awareness,” magelssen overestimates the truth-value of his proximity to the cinematic events and people he describes. he writes as though he had not been a part of the show, and yet his conclusions uncannily resemble the public-relations material that the military itself has generated around these training simulations. the same could be said about the nationally televised feature documentary about the fort irwin training simulations, full battle rattle (2008) by jesse moss and tony gerber. while the filmmakers state in material about the film that they are against the war personally, and while it is the most comprehensive treatment of the experiences of individuals in the training simulations (soldiers and actors alike), it foregrounds intimacy with subjects employed by the military, presence to simulated performance events, and the stories of participants over structural critique. thus, while the style of the film retains faith in the camera to communicate the phenomenological experience of fake war and all the complexities the endeavor entails, it also by design gives a great deal of control over the production of affect and the interpretation of its political import to military spokespersons, who orchestrate both for the participants in the simulation, the filmmakers, and the spectators of the finished film. absent a story from the perspective of iraqi civilians that follows soldier trainees once they are deployed (a far more difficult, hazardous, and expensive project to undertake), the filmmakers must acknowledge a measure of complicity in the military campaign and its continuance, in spite of their stated intentions to the contrary. as of 2012, the public-relations office at fort irwin still showed the film in its entirety to introduce the look, feel, and rationale of the simulations to groups of tourists who visit the fort to see a live training exercise.13 conclusion: "stitch lane" 2012 figure 3. video stills of the staging ground for the stitch lane training simulation, 2007 (top row) and 2012 (bottom row). the explosion that initiated the simulation in “medina wasl” in 2007 can be seen in the top right frame; the explosion in this same space, renamed “ertebat shar” by 2012, can be seen on the bottom left. recorded by the author with permission from fort irwin national training center, barstow, ca, 2007 and 2012. like the us economy as a whole, the fort irwin simulation body seems to equate survival in an era of “cultural awareness” with growth. when i return to the fort for a second visit, i am again taken to this area—medina wasl, now reimagined as an afghan village called ertebat shar—to witness the performance of “stitch lane” from a press box above the now-paved central street. the village has more than 200 structures and has become by far the largest on the fort (figure 3). concrete barricades line the street, and buildings feature more elaborately detailed facades and awnings. hooded men push carts of plastic toys and melons through the street, occasionally followed by a figure in a burqa or a goat. a statue stands in the center of the town, a replica of the princess of hatra erected in 238 ce in the city of al hadr, iraq, to protect it from persian invaders. though the town is now meant to simulate afghanistan, the statue remains. because the circumference of the statue’s base and the concrete barricades that surround it prevent anyone from standing too close, tcs and their contracted pyrotechnicians can hide large gunpowder charges there and detonate them safely, a sensory-story element they are loath to give up (figure 4). a plaque at the base of the statue indicates that it was constructed “in appreciation of the american soldier, the true protector of democracy” by strategic operations, a san diego based action/softcore-porn film-production company saved from near bankruptcy following 9/11 by entering into the military simulation business. figure 4. video stills of the “princess of hatra” statue and placard, 2012. recorded by the author with permission from fort irwin national training center. supplying iraqi role players, amputees, and pyrotechnics expertise to the army became a cottage industry in southern california during the iraq war years, when strategic operations grew around 60% per year (vizzo, 2011). in lieu of the medical dummies, civilian amputees adorn latex suits that squirt fake blood from their missing limbs and play soldiers who have just lost limbs in ied attacks. professional army videographers record the training events from three different angles using large cameras with expensive zoom lenses. their footage is compiled, marked, and integrated for use in after-action reviews at a communications center hidden in the village. soldiers will watch selections from the footage later at a newly built, climate-controlled movie theater instead of the interior of a faux mosque. two contract employees monitor the feeds on a computer screen and cue the sounds of gunfire, the call to prayer, livestock, screams, and so on at the command of the lead tc. they can also release smells into the center of the village, including burning flesh, “dragon’s breath,” coffee, roast beef, jasmine, sewer, apple pie, gunpowder, and vomit (“technician,” personal communication, 15 february 2012). all the footage that they record is sent wirelessly by way of microwave transmission to a larger communications center and server on the post. through a radio lavalier i attach to the head tc, i hear stage directions before they unfold in the town as the action begins. he conjures snipers out of myriad windows, summons a suicide bomber to the center of the city street, and directs insurgents to fire from their locked-down positions until they are hit. “give them a hollywood ending,” he says to one. the insurgent stands in a window and shoots as many of the american soldiers as he can before the receptors on his laser-tag vest beep to indicate that he has been killed. the duration of the firefight stretches on, nearing forty-five minutes as a host of civilian tourists on an “ntc box tour” look on with me from the covered platform. confined to the space for our own safety, it is as though we are pioneer spectators to a new form of hypermasculine super-cinemascope filmmaking. immersion in action-cinematic simulation, however, is a difficult place from which to explore adversary culture or offer a critique of military activities already visible within the simulation itself. indeed, media visitors to the ntc became a key variable within the simulation and, over time, an asset. the public-affairs office at the fort anticipated the norms of journalistic practice, the allure of cinematic display, and the influence that their interpretations could have on the stories their guests would tell about simulation training. in the midst of shocking and disorienting simulations of “worst day ever” scenarios, public-relations officers, tcs, and particularly gregarious iraqiand afghan-american actors offered quick, on-message explanations of the need for such scenarios to save lives and the virtues of the military’s new, culturally aware approach to warfare. reporters, scholars, and documentary filmmakers visiting the base have reproduced both the phenomenological novelty of cinematic spectacle at close proximity and the military’s explanation for these innovations as emblematic of enlightened, virtuous warmaking, although they are inappropriate indices for the efficacy of “cultural awareness” in theater. this consistently reproduced result—one way in which the military is weaponizing affect in an era of counterinsurgency war—foregrounds a difficult dilemma for documentary practices in the context of increasingly ubiquitous simulation technologies. the ethical documentarist can be anticipated by the simulation and enfolded within its logic. cinematic performance is here a weapon that short-circuits the oft-assumed power of documentary exposure to bring about social change. rather, the rules by which ethical documentary practitioners play—faith in following subjects or foregrounding their statements over voice-of-god narration, belief in proximity to subjects as a route to truer representation, discerning organic narratives in subjects lives to allow their nuanced characters to emerge—are easily subsumed into this simulation body. notes 1 for an incisive critique of the cultural turn in military training, including a chapter on “cultural terrain,” see gonzález, 2010. 2 to foreshadow a point to which i return at length later in the article, many of the reports and films i consider here position the cinematic gore and violence in simulation training as tools for hardening troops to the realities of battle, as well as reining in impulses to abuse prisoners or kill civilians.  the visage of iraqi dress, décor, and everyday activity serves in these stories to emphasize the seriousness with which the military is taking culture in the midst of chaos, a connection i will critique. 3 stahl (2010) identifies the formation of the all-volunteer army, official press conference, embedded reporting scenario, and interactive first-person presentation of troop experiences as entertainment as parts of a sustained effort since the 1960s to blunt dissent, decouple citizenship from soldiering, and create “large scale press integration into a system of pentagon public relations” (p. 23). fort irwin welcoming reporters to observe training fits into stahl’s critique of “militainment,” and i touch on his larger argument below (stahl, 2010, pp. 15–16). 4 looking back from the perspective of 2016, the u.s. army field/marine corp counterinsurgency field manual of 2008 articulates scenarios that have in many respects come to fruition in the middle east–north africa region, among others. the manual ruminates on the fact of 9/11, the failing wars in iraq and afghanistan, and the specter of 2.8 billion young, jobless city dwellers living in poverty throughout the globe by 2015, coping with “overcrowding, pollution, uneven resource distribution, and poor sanitation,” and ostensibly recognizing an allure in radical ideologies that identify the united states as a key culprit. the introduction of the manual predicts a long low-intensity war against an entity like the islamic state: “america is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to u.s. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society” (us dept. of the army & marine corps, 2008, pp. viii, 1–2). however, there is little critical reflection here on the military institutions that would benefit financially and politically by reproducing such a state of affairs. 5  for a consideration of the production process of brady’s photographs and its relationship to the industrialization of war, see trachtenberg, 1985. 6 baudrillard (1994) uses the term simulation to describe a social condition in which the copy, instrumentalized toward the ends of profit and empire, precedes the possibility of a preexisting original. sanitized of archaic, ritualistic, and mystical qualities, these copies simply reproduce a normative code, stretching lifeless in all directions and annihilating meaningful cultural and political differences over time. he argues that the mechanically reproducible photographic images that constitute movies, television, and print advertising, especially since the 1960s, function to amplify desires for the real while simultaneously cutting off possibilities for engaging with a “profound reality” (p. 6). baudrillard’s tendency to write about bodily experience as a theoretical rather than a lived phenomenon in the era of the image, however, has left him open to feminist critiques like those of sobchack (1992, 2004), who theorizes materiality as enmeshed in idiosyncratic phenomenological experiences of cinema and other everyday encounters rather than absent from them. 7 i relied extensively on the newsbank: access world news database for news stories about simulation training, which i accessed in july 2011 and downloaded and analyzed in intervening years. 8 when i visited the fort in 2007, these trainers were called “operational controllers.” in 2012, the army referred to them as “tactical controllers.” to avoid confusion in this chapter, i refer to them throughout as tactical controllers, but this is not necessarily the case in other works about the fort created before 2011. 9 the rhetorical emphasis on realism is ubiquitous in my interviews, a point to which i return in my analysis below. 10 the case of photojournalist zoriah miller, who published images of marines killed in a suicide bombing in 2008, highlights the complexities entailed in press access, representation of war, and embedded reporting. spokespersons for military units have embraced embedded reporters’ positive stories about the everyday lives of soldiers. however, they claim that published photographs of americans killed in action provide their enemies with intelligence about the effectiveness of their attacks, violate principles of informed consent, and offend soldiers’ families. miller argues, conversely, that the images are vital to communicate to american readers about the physical and emotional cost of the war. the fact that his photographs shocked viewers when suicide bombings happen every day, he concluded, “says that whatever [the military is] doing to limit this type of photo getting out, it is working.” since the publication of the photographs, no military unit has permitted miller to embed. as war casualties increased, fewer us units allowed embedded journalists to accompany them to battle sites (kamber & arango, 2008). 11 ien ang’s seminal reception study watching dallas (1985), for instance, discusses the phenomenon of “psychological realism” in relation to european fans’ responses to the american television soap opera dallas. audience members identified with the dilemmas of the show’s protagonists even though they were aware that the degree of wealth and drama it portrayed were not representative of american society on the whole. 12 the $12 million center, which closed in july 2010, offered visitors 80 gaming stations, helicopter and humvee simulators, and a space for managing enlistments. located between an arcade and a skate park, the center became a flashpoint for protesters troubled by the army’s endorsement of graphic violence in first-person shooter games targeted at children. see cousineau, 2011, pp. 518-20. 13 a public-affairs officer communicated this information to me during my visit to the fort in 2012. every month, the army leads several “box tours” for members of the public to see the “worst day ever” a soldier might encounter in afghanistan. the “show” very much resembles a hollywood war movie, as i suggest in the conclusion of this article. references ackerman, s. (2011, 12 december). rare photographs show ground zero of the drone war. wired. retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2011/12/photos-pakistan-drone-war ang, i. (1985). watching dallas: soap opera and the melodramatic imagination. london, uk: methuen. brandt, m. (2016). simulated war: remediating trauma narratives in military psychotherapy. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 2(1).1-42. baudrillard, j. (1994). simulacra and simulation. ann arbor, mi: university of michigan press. cartwright, l. (2008). moral spectatorship: technologies of voice and affect in postwar representations of the child. durham, nc: duke university press. cartwright, l. (2011). the hands of the projectionist. science in context, 24(3), 443-464. cousineau, m. (2011). the surveillant simulation of war: entertainment and surveillance in the 21st century. surveillance and society, 8(4), 517-522. http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/4190 der derian, j. (2009). virtuous war: mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network (2nd ed.). new york, ny: routledge. docherty, b. (2007). “more sweat…less blood”: us military training and minimizing civilian casualties. cambridge, ma: carr center for human rights policy at harvard university. filkins, d., & burns, j. (2006, 1 may). mock iraqi villages in mojave prepare troops for battle. new york times, 1. freud, s. (2001). the case of schreber, papers on technique, and other works. the standard edition of the complete psychological works of sigmund freud: vol. 12. london: vintage. gerber, t. (director) & moss, j. (director). full battle rattle. [video/dvd] new york: first run features. gill, z. (2009). rehearsing the war away: perpetual warrior training in contemporary us army policy. tdr: the drama review, 53(3), 139-155. gonzález, r. (2010). militarizing culture: essays on the warfare state. walnut creek, ca: left coast press. kamber, m., & arango, t. (2008, 26 july). 4,000 us deaths, and a handful of images. new york times, a1. keeling, k. (2007). the witch’s flight: the cinematic, the black femme, and the image of common sense. durham, nc: duke university press. klein, m. (1946). notes on some schizoid mechanisms. international journal of psycho-analysis, 27, 99-110. laine, t. (2007). shame and desire: emotion, intersubjectivity, cinema. brussels, belgium: p.i.e. peter lang. lavell, k. (2003, 9 march). advances in training help revolutionize the military. san diego union-tribune, g-1. losh, l. (2006). the palace of memory: virtual tourism and tours of duty in tactical iraqi and virtual iraq. in proceedings of the 2006 international conference on game research and development (77–86). perth, australia.  magelssen, s. (2009). rehearsing the “warrior ethos”: “theatre immersion” and the simulation of theatres of war. tdr: the drama review, 53(1), 47-72. marks, l.u. (2000). the skin of the film: intercultural cinema, embodiment, and the senses. durham, nc: duke university press. marks, l.u. (2002). touch: sensuous theory and multisensory media. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. mcfate, m. (2005). the military utility of understanding adversary culture. jfq, 38, 42-48. merleau-ponty, m. (1962). phenomenology of perception. london, uk: routledge. rather, d. (2008, 16 september). battle plan. dan rather reports. santschi, d.r. (2004, 29 november). uncertain future // base closures: fort irwin fights to stay on duty. press-enterprise, a01. sedgwick, e.k. (2003). touching feeling: affect, pedagogy, performativity. durham, nc: duke university press. sedgwick, e.k. & frank, a. (1995). shame and its sisters: a silvan tomkins reader. durham, nc: duke university press. sobchack, v. (1992). the address of the eye: a phenomenology of film experience. princeton, nj: princeton university press. sobchack, v. (2004). carnal thoughts: embodiment and moving image culture. berkeley, ca: university of california press. stahl, r. (2010). militainment, inc.: war, media, and popular culture. new york, ny: routledge. suchman, l. (2016). configuring the other: sensing war through immersive simulation. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 2(1), 1-36. thevenot, b. (2004, 12 september). duty calls: louisiana national guardsmen are training furiously in california, preparing for the front lines of iraq. times-picayune, 1. tomkins, s.s. (2008). affect imagery consciousness: the complete edition. new york, ny: springer. trachtenberg, a. (1985). albums of war: on reading civil war photographs. representations, 9, 1-32. united states department of the army & united states marine corps. (2007). the us army/marine corps counterinsurgency field manual: us army field manual no. 3–24: marine corps warfighting publication no. 3–33.5. chicago, il: university of chicago press. vargo j. (2007, 15 june). destination iraq: inland base trains troops for intense situations. press-enterprise, a01. vizzo, e. (2011, 10 may). purposeful chaos: local company sets up realistic training for combat, drug houses, and ship seizures. san diego union-tribune, c-1. bio d. andy rice is the aspire fellow in socially engaged media in the division of undergraduate education at ucla. he earned his phd in communication from ucsd in 2013. he is a documentary filmmaker and media studies scholar whose written work centers on social justice documentary production, documentary film studies, phenomenology, and performance studies. he has also produced/directed two feature-length documentary films, and was the co-producer, cinematographer, and editor of a feature documentary titled spirits of rebellion (2016), about the history of the black independent film movement known as the l.a. rebellion microsoft word 288-1538-1-ostherr.docx ostherr, k. (2018). “privacy, data mining, and digital profiling in online patient narratives”. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4 (1), 1-24. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kirsten ostherr, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article privacy, data mining, and digital profiling in online patient narratives kirsten ostherr rice university kostherr@rice.edu abstract practices of health datafication and inadequate privacy policies are redefining the meaning of online patient narratives. this article compares patient-driven illness narratives and clinic-driven illness narratives to uncover a set of unrecognized assumptions about trust and privacy in health discourses. specifically, i show how the open sharing of patient stories in social media, blogs, and other public domains collides with privacy regulations and normative assumptions in the us health care system that prevent integration of those stories into electronic health record (ehr) systems. i argue that publicly told stories based on personal experiences of illness are valuable sources of health care information in part because they are subjective, richly detailed, and open ended. yet, precisely because of their public nature, these patient stories are unprotected sources of data that are barred from integration into health care data ecologies where clinical action takes place. consequently, an impermeable barrier exists between the officially sanctioned accounts in the clinical record and the contextual richness of patient stories on the social web. the tensions between these two approaches to 2 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) narrative and data create an opening for exploitative digital profiling practices that can ─ and already do ─ harm patients. examples are drawn from hugo campos and medtronic, patientslikeme, apple health records, google health, microsoft health vault, ibm watson health, and opennotes. introduction digital technologies are redefining health, communication, and what counts as human connection in medicine through practices of datafication that quantify formerly intangible aspects of human experience (mayer-schonberger & cukier, 2013; van dijck, 2014). amid the growth of virtual clinics and remote health care, these developments give rise to an urgent question: how does health datafication impact our understanding of embodied knowledge in medicine? clinically-driven digital health initiatives draw on the rhetoric of disembodiment, suggesting that many of the formerly “human” roles in health care can be performed by artificial intelligence (ai) or virtual telehealth encounters. in contrast, patient-driven digital health initiatives suggest that individual illness stories form the embodied foundation for practices of do-ityourself (diy) biohacking, crowdsourcing, and open data sharing that can facilitate new models of peer-to-peer health care. entangled in these divergent views of the future of medicine are conflicting claims about the locus of knowledge in health care: does meaning reside in the data, or in the stories? by exploring the different kinds of illness narratives that circulate inside and outside clinical settings, this essay will uncover a critically important but unexplored set of assumptions about trust and privacy in health discourses. specifically, i will show that patient communities online assume an ethos of openness, trust, and sharing of stories and data with little expressed concern about privacy. in contrast, clinical environments value privacy over sharing of stories and, consequently, emphasize data over narrative, as a more secure and objective mechanism for transmitting information. the tensions between these two approaches to narrative and data create an opening for 3 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) exploitative digital profiling practices that can ─ and already do ─ harm patients. the networked mediation of illness narratives takes place through the circulation of digital signals in a wide range of domains. in this essay, i want to focus on the “trading zones” (galison, 1997) between two critically important discursive fields: patient-driven illness narratives and clinic-driven illness narratives. specifically, i will explore how the proliferation and open sharing of patient stories in social media, blogs, and other public domains collides with privacy regulations and normative assumptions in the us health care system that prevent integration of those stories into electronic health record (ehr) systems. i will argue that publicly told stories based on personal experiences of illness are valuable sources of health care information in part because they are subjective, richly detailed, and open ended. yet, precisely because of their public nature, these patient stories are considered to be unprotected sources of data that are barred from integration into health care data ecologies where clinical action takes place. instead, contemporary ehrs quantify disease through biomedical datapoints such as blood pressure, weight, height, pulse, temperature, oxygen saturation, respiratory rate, pain level, medications, procedures, and so forth (zhou et al., 2016). an impermeable barrier exists between the officially sanctioned accounts in the clinical record and the contextual richness of patient stories on the social web. in the final section of this essay, i will present a discussion of alternative practices, concluding with a warning about the risks of opening up patients’ detailed personal narratives to be mined and exploited through digital profiling practices that might harm their narrators as much as they help them. part i: patient-driven illness narratives patients have shared their illness narratives for centuries, but the new platforms for storytelling in the digital age have radically expanded the scale of the audience and, consequently, the impact of individual stories. 4 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) as a result, patient stories that previously would have circulated privately, among family and friends, are now open to any person with an internet connection. notably, medical spaces are excluded from these publics by design. although patient stories have been recognized as the foundation of diagnosis since the days of osler (1901), they claim ever diminishing space in contemporary clinical documentation. federal incentives have recently pushed more clinicians to adopt ehrs, leading to widespread complaints about the role of these technocratic interfaces in dehumanizing the clinical encounter, for both doctors and patients (hsiao, chun-ju & hing, 2012; shanafelt et al., 2016). as i will discuss below, ehrs are widely seen as incapable of capturing important experiential and affective dimensions of the patient’s story and, consequently, are seen as a threat to the practice of narrative medicine. therefore, while patient-driven illness narratives are circulating more openly than ever online, the clinical repositories for these narratives are becoming more constrained and restrictive in their communicative abilities. patients’ illness narratives have emerged as vivid counternarratives to official accounts, challenging traditional models of biomedical expertise as they circulate through robust networks of engaged citizens concerned with health care, often termed “e-patients” (ferguson & frydman, 2004). members of these groups have developed extensive online activist communities, demand access to their own health data, conduct crowd-sourced experiments, and “hack” health problems that traditional medical experts have failed to solve. in this way, e-patients can be seen as practicing a form of “citizen science” (hand, 2010) in medical contexts as a means of creating alternative models of patient-physician partnership. critically, e-patients claim a unique form of expertise based on the embodied experience of living with illness (as a patient or a caregiver), and they emphasize the value of openness and sharing for themselves and other e-patients as a means of empowerment. as this movement extends earlier, pre-digital models of patient activism (dumit, 2006; epstein, 1996), it becomes enmeshed in networks of health 5 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) datafication that blur the boundaries of commercial, clinical, and everyday health activities (ruckenstein & schüll, 2017). the expansion of platforms for sharing patient stories is part of a larger transformation of technologies of representation rooted in the emergence of the social web. while networked publics existed and communicated through analogue technologies long before the rise of the internet (jenkins, 2009), the possibility for subjects to broadcast their own narratives is a fundamentally important feature of the digital age that builds on the concept of the “open internet” (rainie & wellman, 2012). while many scholars have described both the liberatory as well as the repressive features of global information and communication technology (ict) networks (tufekci, 2017), the aspect i want to highlight here is the role of the internet in circulating new models for understanding the value of intimate stories as alternative forms of data-making that can be used to build things, such as counter-publics centered around healing and care. participants in the quantified self and e-patient movements take an active stance toward curating their own stories and health data (ferguson and the e-patient scholars working group, 2007), transforming the process of health datafication into a process of health “data-making” (nafus & sherman, 2014; pybus, coté, & blanke, 2016) that aims to benefit the people whose bodies generate the data rather than those who manufacture their device or act as data brokers (van dijck & poell, 2016). storytelling in these online patient communities can be seen as a means of pursuing greater patient autonomy that challenges paternalistic models of health care. the emergence of patient stories online through tweetchats (e.g., #hcsm), personal blogs (such as the liz army), illness communities (e.g., association of cancer online resources, or acor), and “health journal” sites (e.g., caringbridge) has been widely recognized as critically important, even life-saving, to the patients and caregivers who write and read them (debronkhart, 2013; han & wiley, 2013). indeed, the explosion of patient stories online has given rise to digital health makerspaces, 6 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) including collaborative platforms for data collection and exploration (e.g., crohnology and patientslikeme), and biomedical device hacking collectives (e.g., do-it-yourself-pancreas-system, or diyps, and nightscout) that can challenge exploitative models of health datafication. in these e-patient ecosystems, implicit trust in authors and audiences is underscored through celebration of openness and transparency across the sites. as e-patient blogger liz salmi (2017) notes, “unlike a traditional journal, my blog has no privacy settings. people from around the world can read and learn, through my experience, about what it is like having brain cancer.” she goes on to explain the value of that openness: “through logging my health and interactions with health professionals i am able to document my own medical history, and have been able to publically show that a frightening diagnosis has developed over time into something more akin to a chronic condition.” here, personal health data, presented in narrative form, provides an intimate, experiential account of living with illness that is grounded in contextual detail and rooted in the author’s perspective on her illness, rather than in the biomedical model of disease. while many e-patients turn to self-narration as a source of empowerment, there is widespread recognition in the community that control over documentation ─ the conversion of narrative into data ─ is a tremendous source of power within traditional medical organizations that e-patients have been barred from accessing. building on citizen science models of engagement, e-patients have demanded access to their own medical datasets, viewing them as sources for telling their stories in new ways that can fundamentally alter the knowledge hierarchies associated with proprietary, private, closed biomedical data ecosystems. one example is the case of hugo campos, who has fought to gain access to the data generated by his implantable cardioverterdefibrillator (icd), a small electronic device designed to shock his heart in the event of an arrhythmia. while his icd sends data to his doctor on a daily basis, campos can only view the data by making an appointment with his doctor and requesting a printout (standen, 2012). campos 7 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) sought open access to his data to take greater control over his own health, but he encountered major barriers from the device manufacturer, medtronic (singer, 2011; marcus & weaver, 2012). after years of activism on this issue, campos was honored by the obama white house in 2015 as a “champion of change” for “data liberation” (white house, 2015) but he is still fighting to gain full, open access to his icd data (campos & sebastian, 2015). campos and other e-patients such as regina holliday (“regina holliday’s medical advocacy blog,” 2009-) and dave debronkart (“epatient dave: toward a science of patient engagement,” 2009-) often frame their critique of closed medical documentation systems in terms of privacy and ownership, asking: who owns the data? who controls access to the data? in whose interest is “privacy” invoked ─ the patient’s or the manufacturer’s? in campos’s case, it is the story of his ongoing struggle, not any insights from the data itself, that earned him recognition from president obama. the “biomedical technoservice complex, inc.” (clarke et al., 2010: 57) responded to campos’s demands by framing big health data as resistant to narrative translation. as david steinhaus of medtronic explained, “in principle, the company is fine with giving patients their data directly. the problem is how to format it so it’s useful to everyone. as is, the raw data is highly technical. would patients understand it? you want to do it in a way that makes sense for the patient, that they can interpret correctly, so they don’t generate a lot of angst and difficulty for the physician or anyone else” (standen, 2012, n.p.). this example demonstrates how the expression of affect through illness narratives can be used to frame patients as overly emotional and therefore incapable of objective, rational interpretation of data. advocates of narrative medicine have long argued that we need access to personal, descriptive details to recover the important social, emotional, lived dimensions of experience that are crucial to the patient’s story and healing. however, aligning those often-ignored elements of patient experience with narrative, rather than with data, reproduces a linkage of affective storytelling with unreliable subjectivity, while reaffirming the purported objectivity of “pure” data 8 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) (daston & galison, 2007). regulatory structures that keep patient narratives out of ehr systems reproduce this false opposition, increasing the need for patients to tell their illness stories in online publics, while decreasing the value of those stories within corporate health care systems. and yet, as the possibilities for personal stories to morph into large, richly detailed databases become apparent through online sites, data donors and researchers are beginning to explore new models for thinking about narrative through a quantitative lens. for example, the site patientslikeme has functioned since 2004 as an open forum for patients to describe symptoms, side effects, treatment regimens, and other experiential variables like mood, sleep, stress, and activity, so that participants can search for others with their condition and learn from their peers. the site quickly evolved into a vast archive of narratives that could be datafied and mined for larger-scale insights. despite ongoing expressions of concern by medical experts about patients using “dr. google” to self-diagnose (swaminath, 2016), participants found the patientslikeme site to be a powerful resource that could be used to inform or challenge traditional scientific studies (eichler et al., 2016; okun & goodwin, 2017). patientslikeme promises to be “honest, open, and transparent” about their uses of community members’ personal health data. they argue that “patients know what it’s like to live with disease, and they can teach us more than we can teach them,” while framing patient stories as a form of data (“about patientslikeme,” n.d.). the site emphasizes the importance of personal narratives that, when documented on the platform, can convert experience into a form of evidence (“our science,” n.d.). yet, this patient-centered counternarrative exists in a tenuous relationship to biomedical models of value and risk. the very conditions of possibility for the e-patient movement to emerge overlap with expanding practices of datafication that digital health initiatives, especially those concerning population health, seek to exploit (ostherr, 2018). as a result, patient narratives are easily datafied online (even while 9 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) being denigrated as subjective), while individuals’ own health data are not readily available to them. the emphasis on privacy in regulations such as the health insurance portability and accountability act (hipaa) that aim to protect patient health information has limited the expansion of patient voices and autonomy in clinical domains, inadvertently pushing these stories out into public discourse instead.1 in this sense, privacy norms and regulations for clinical contexts are indirectly responsible for putting patient data at greater risk for digital profiling and exploitation. consequently, new methods for sharing patient data such as patientslikeme generate unevenly distributed forms of value that do not always benefit the data “donors” as much as they should (ostherr et al., 2017). some users of the site have raised concerns about the partnerships between patientslikeme and health care stakeholders, such as pharmaceutical companies astrazeneca, avenir, biogen, boehringer ingelheim, bristolmyers squibb, genentech, janssen, novartis, pfizer, and others, as well as health insurance providers aetna, bupa, copatient and healthy business group (patientslikeme, “partners,” n.d.). as one site user commented, “i did sign up, but how do i know drug companies or others won’t use it to try and sell me something? what about my insurance company or employer getting at this data somehow? you’re using my full name right here. it would seem a simple thing for someone i don’t want to search the site and find out intimate details about my health record. am i wrong?” (allison, 2016). while patientslikeme insists that it is transparent about these partnerships and its role in supporting its patient-centered business model, researchers have noted that data use is loosely regulated on many online health platforms (agus, 2016; van dijck, 2014; van dijck & poell, 2016). the lack of restrictions allows for commodification and exploitation by actors with less community-minded goals, raising the important question of who truly benefits from online sharing of personal health data. 10 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) part ii: clinic-driven illness narratives the role of illness narratives in clinical settings has long been recognized by practitioners of narrative medicine. the field has existed since the early 1970s, pioneered by scholars who published groundbreaking research demonstrating the value and clinical relevance of telling and hearing stories of illness (charon, 2006; charon et al., 2017). clinician advocates of narrative-based medicine challenge the reductionism that can emerge from data-driven practices of evidence-based medicine, recognizing instead “the narrative features of all data and the evidentiary status of all clinical text” (charon & wyer, 2008: 297, emphasis in original). when narrative techniques are taught as part of medical school curricula, they are used to cultivate new approaches to communication among doctors and other health care providers, rather than among patients. yet, they share a recognition voiced by e-patients: meaningful personal health data emerges from intimate stories rooted in the embodied experience of illness. without the contextual richness found in these stories, the explanatory power of biomedical data is greatly diminished. however, under current privacy regulations, clinical ehrs only capture narrowly defined, quantitative biomedical data (zhou et al., 2016). despite the abundance of narrative details streaming through social media networks, the boundaries between the open web and hipaa-protected zones cannot presently be crossed. since the early 2000s, technology companies such as microsoft and google have embraced a version of narrative medicine through strategic acknowledgement of the value of online patient stories, though with different objectives in mind. because they operate in the public sphere, these companies can access the multi-layered “social life” of users’ health narratives by integrating diverse sources of data from nonhealth-related domains. early efforts to construct consumer-facing ehr platforms like microsoft health vault (2007) and google health (2008) can be seen as attempts to bring together the contextual data captured through online search and related activities with more traditional 11 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) biomedical markers of health and disease. although these initial forays failed, with google health closing shop in 2011, and dwindling use of microsoft’s still-functioning platform (thorp-lancaster, 2016), the vision they pursued shapes the health data industry and its privacy policies today. notably, google researchers are at the forefront of investigations into development of deep learning methods for mining ehr data to build predictive models for patient health outcomes. while such studies promise to “drive personalized medicine and improve health care quality” (rajkomar et al., 2018: 1), they also threaten to aggregate data from across the social web and the life span, thereby producing new levels of digital profiling that threaten new harms to patients’ privacy. further threats arise with the recent announcement of apple’s update to its iphone operating system that provides a purportedly “effortless solution” to integrating ehr data from multiple health care providers on the patient’s iphone (apple, 2018). media coverage of this new app noted the failures of microsoft and google to achieve widespread adoption of their own health data platforms, noting that apple may succeed where others failed for two major reasons: the intimacy of smartphones as personal technologies, and the company’s reputation for industry-leading privacy standards (johnson, 2018). indeed, apple’s website emphasizes its neutral role in ehr data transactions, stating, “apple is not creating, receiving, maintaining, or transmitting protected health information for or on behalf of a covered entity or business associate” (“healthcare,” 2018, n.p.). while intended as an assurance of the privacy and security of its app, in essence, this legalese means that apple is not subject to hipaa regulations, leaving open the possibility for less overt uses of patient data through indirect means. health information stored on apple smartphones may be protected, but once the data is backed up on the icloud platform, it can be mined not only by apple (pagliery, 2016), but also by google, microsoft, and amazon when the data are backed up on servers operated by those companies (axon, 2018; novet, 2018). indeed, these threats are not merely hypothetical. a recent study 12 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) of what happens to the data we enter on popular mobile apps and their associated websites found that personally identifying information such as name, email address, location data, and other behavioral information is widely shared without users’ knowledge. the third-party domain that receives sensitive data from the most apps is google, followed by apple and facebook (zang, dummit, graves, lisker, & sweeney, 2015: 3). risks of exposure of sensitive information range from apps using unencrypted connections that could be intercepted and exploited to third-party advertisers and analytics services mining the content of users’ data to target personal advertisements, set financial rates, and offer or withhold services. commenting on the lack of regulations governing the mobile app ecosystem, the privacy rights clearinghouse advocacy group has reported, “this is a particular concern with health and fitness apps, which often collect both demographic and health (or medical-like) information that does not fall under the protections of any health privacy laws. when you use the apps, you often create a record of data such as your diet, daily exercise, glucose readings, pregnancy, and/or menstrual cycle” (njie, 2013: 4). here we see the monetization of the rich contextual data that patient stories can provide when captured in open sources online and through health and wellness apps. since we already know that google and others in the data business seek to capture as much personal information about their users as possible, why would we assume that their intent for ehr mining is any different, or that their use of those data would be purely benevolent? in contrast to the openness (and vulnerability) of patient communities online, the ehr ─ the central repository of patient information in american medicine ─ is almost universally seen as a closed system incapable of absorbing the unstructured data that patients share through their “metaclinical” social networks.2 comparative studies have shown how ehrs eliminate important contextual information about the patient’s experience of illness by framing clinical narratives solely in terms of biomedical disease models (patel, arocha, & kushniruk, 2002). some narrative medicine skeptics have expressed concern that patient 13 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) stories in the form of unstructured data can become lengthy and unusable by clinicians who often need quick, succinct summaries to make treatment decisions (morris, 2008). while artificial intelligence (ai) and machine learning are seen as potential solutions to this problem, even proponents acknowledge that few insights will emerge if the contextual data is never captured in the first place. as deborah disanzo of ibm watson health recently observed, “seventy percent of our determinants in health are not in our clinical or genomic data. we analyzed 650 million data points from one activity. we could find, really, no good actionable insights [because] it’s very difficult to get good social determinants in health data” (muoio, 2017: n.p.). the need to supplement clinical data with social and behavioral nuance leads researchers and data brokers alike back to scraping users’ personal information from the social web, yet critical code researchers have shown that big data analytics tend to reproduce the biases of their programmers and the society from which they emerge (crawford & calo, 2016; eubanks, 2017; noble, 2018; o’neil, 2016; sweeney, 2013; wachter-boettcher, 2017). the likelihood that algorithms designed to mine big health data will harm those already suffering from structural racism, poverty, and health disparities suggests that greater protection of users’ data within contexts of social sharing is urgently needed. under current regulation of these sociotechnical systems, patient stories and health data are disconnected forms of knowledge and meaning that exist in separate realms and are shaped by the affordances of their host platforms: open internet for patient stories, closed ehr for patient data. a recent study of patient reviews of doctors on the online rating platform yelp argued that the user-driven character of the content on this open-access site produces comments about fundamentally different aspects of the patient experience as compared to hospitalgenerated patient satisfaction questionnaires and surveys (merchant, volpp, & asch, 2016; ranard et al., 2016). the authors note, “online platforms are democratizing in ways that answering pre-assigned questions can never be ─ because giving voice to patients also means 14 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) giving them the opportunity to select the topics” (merchant, volpp, & asch, 2016: 2484). some researchers have noted the unfortunate role of privacy restrictions in perpetuating the separation of unstructured narratives (e.g., yelp) and quantitative medical datasets (e.g., ehrs) (dohan, garrett, rendle, halley, & abramson, 2016). yet, when considered in light of widespread third-party data mining, the restrictions governing clinical data sharing must also be seen as protective, insofar as they successfully prevent data brokers from accessing patients’ sensitive personal health information. however, for patients to benefit fully from sharing their illness narratives online, the digital health ecosystem must move beyond a binary opposition of paternalistic protectionism versus open source exploitation. conclusion: closed networks and opennotes the risks of third-party exploitation of data shared in online patient communities are real. however, the necessary response is not to firewall open patient resources online, thereby undermining their benefits alongside their harms, but rather to open up clinical ehr networks to more diverse forms of input, with greater privacy protections. no good models exist to date, but the opennotes project is a promising initiative that allows patients to see and comment on the few spaces where physicians actually include unstructured text: their clinical notes. while the project is explicitly focused on giving patients access to their own data, not on narrative medicine, opennotes nonetheless emphasizes narrative as a site of exchange that can improve patient care and wellbeing (nys health foundation, 2017). indeed, participants in the pilot study saw striking improvements in trusting doctor-patient relationships, patients’ feelings of control over their care, patients’ greater knowledge and recall about their medical conditions, and greater “adherence” to medication regimens (gerard, fossa, folcarelli, walker, & bell, 2017; klein et al., 2016). populations that reported a particular benefit from opennotes included people with serious co-morbid or chronic 15 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) conditions, and patients who were elderly, non-white, or had less than a high school education (bell et al., 2017). with over 6 million users between 2010 and 2017, the organization is developing a second iteration of the project, called “ournotes,” in which patients, families, and clinicians collaboratively generate notes (commonwealth fund, 2014). in this version, patients can not only review but also contribute to the clinical notes in their ehr. this phase explicitly centers on the power of storytelling to improve health outcomes and quality of life through patient-generated health histories and goals of care. importantly, this project aims to integrate some of the social and affective dimensions of illness into clinical care, where it might impact the medical treatments available to a patient, or the clinician’s understanding of the patient’s priorities. ournotes acknowledges and works within the existing framework of biomedical care while extending the boundaries of that frame to include more patients’ and caregivers’ voices. yet, by preserving the centrality of the ehr, the traditional clinical context of care, and a limited social network, this initiative fundamentally accepts the model of clinic-driven definitions of disease, and in that way, reproduces the limitations of doctor-centered structures of knowledge (lee, walker, delbanco, & elmore, 2016). the great strength of patient stories in platforms outside traditional clinical settings is their rich detail, their unrestrained narration, the varied and unfiltered affective states they register, the wild heterogeneity of sources and types of information they include, and the multiplicity of voices they present. most of these variables continue to be excluded from ehrs, even those running opennotes or ournotes. medical institutions may not be receptive to the voluminous, messy “big health data” that floats freely across online platforms, but other organizations (like google, microsoft, amazon, and facebook) are paying attention (robbins, 2016; wingfield, thomas, & abelson, 2018). just like all of the other data about internet users that third parties can access (shopping, social media, gps, music and video streaming, and so on), patients’ personal accounts of their daily lives are vectored through analytics 16 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) engines by companies seeking to monetize their data. the resulting digital profiles invisibly shape the communications and transactions that surround us. by maintaining rigid boundaries between public-sphere ambitions for health and wellness and private-sphere practices of medicine and delivery of health care, current us policies allow private interests to freely exploit our data, potentially harming us socially while ignoring our deeper medical needs. acknowledgements i would like to thank the editorial team at catalyst for their valuable insights, especially david serlin, mara mills, and the editors of this special issue, beza merid and tamara kneese. notes 1 in sum, the health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996 (hipaa) governs the use and disclosure of individuals’ protected health information (phi) by covered entities, namely, health plans, health care clearinghouses, and any health care provider who transmits health information in electronic form in connection with business transactions. phi includes demographic data that relates to the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health or condition; the provision of health care to the individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual (office for civil rights, 2013). 2 elsewhere i define “metaclinical” spaces as “those sites constituting the vast ecosystem outside of traditional clinical settings where consumerpatients engage in behaviors that may be directly or indirectly related to self-management of health and disease, whose digital traces can be captured and incorporated into data-driven frameworks for health surveillance and intervention” (ostherr, 2018). 17 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) references agus, d.b. 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(2011, november 22). getting health data from inside your body. mit technology review. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/426171/getting-health-data-frominside-your-body/ standen, a. (2012, may 28). patients crusade for access to their medical device data. kqed/npr online. https://www.npr.org/sections/health shots/2012/05/28/153706099/patients-crusade-for-access-to-their-medicaldevice-data swaminath, a. (2016, august 29). stop asking dr. google for advice. new york times. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/08/29/aremedical-websites-like-webmd-healthful/stop-asking-dr-google-for-advice. sweeney, l. (2013, may). discrimination in online ad delivery. communications of the acm, 56(5), 44-54. https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/onlineads/ thorp-lancaster, d. (2016, aug 12). fitbit shutting down microsoft healthvault integration on september 12 [update]. windows central blog. https://www.windowscentral.com/fitbit-shutting-down-microsoft-healthvaultintegration-september-12 23 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) tufekci, z. (2017). twitter and tear gas: the power and fragility of networked protest. new haven, ct: yale university press. van dijck, j. (2014). datafication, dataism and dataveillance: big data between scientific paradigm and ideology. surveillance society, 12,197-208. van dijck, j. & poell, t. (2016). understanding the promises and premises of online health platforms. big data & society, 3(1), 1-11. wachter-boettcher, s. (2017). technically wrong: sexist apps, biased algorithms, and other threats of toxic tech. new york, ny: w.w. norton. white house archives, president barack obama. (2015). champions of change: precision medicine: hugo campos. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/champions/precision-medicine/ wingfield, n., thomas, k., & abelson, r. (2018, january 30). amazon, berkshire hathaway and jpmorgan team up to try to disrupt health care. new york times https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/technology/amazonberkshire-hathaway-jpmorgan-health-care.html. zang, j., dummit, k., graves, j., lisker, p., & sweeney, l. (2015). who knows what about me? a survey of behind the scenes personal data sharing to third parties by mobile apps. technology science. 2015103001. zhou, l., collins, s., morgan, s.j., zafar, n., gesner, e.j., fehrenbach, m. & rocha, r.a. (2016). a decade of experience in creating and maintaining data elements for structured clinical documentation in ehrs. amia annual symposium proceedings 2016, 1293-1302. bio kirsten ostherr, phd, mph is the gladys louise fox professor of english at rice university, in houston, texas, where she is a media scholar, health researcher, and founding director of the medical humanities program. she is the author of medical visions: producing the patient through film, television and imaging technologies (oxford, 2013) and cinematic prophylaxis: globalization and contagion in the discourse of world health (duke, 2005). she is the editor of applied media studies (routledge, 2018), and co-editor of science/animation, a special issue of the journal discourse (2016). her current research is on information and communication technologies in medicine, patient narratives, trust and privacy in digital health ecosystems, and the role of simulation as a mediator between human and technological 24 ostherr catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) forms of medical expertise. her current book project is called quantified health: learning from patient stories in the age of big data. potency and power: estrogen, cosmetics, and labeling in canadian regulatory practices, 1939–1953 tessaro, lara. (2020). potency and power: estrogen, cosmetics, and labeling in canadian regulatory practices, 1939–1953. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-43. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © lara tessaro, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license potency and power: estrogen, cosmetics, and labeling in canadian regulatory practices, 1939–1953 lara tessaro kent law school, university of kent l.tessaro@kent.ac.uk abstract building on a rich body of feminist scholarship on estrogen, this account interrogates how potent estrogenic cosmetics and consumer product labels emerged together, through the regulatory practices of scientists and lawyers, in mid-century canada. composed from archival and other primary sources, the story traces the development of canada’s first cosmetic regulations – which applied only to cosmetic products containing estrogens. in 1944, “sex hormones” had been the first substances for which the department of national health and welfare adopted labels in lieu of dose or potency standards under the food and drugs act. with dose-response thresholds thus written out of the sex hormone regulations, in 1949, regulators devised a new type of consumer product label that warned women to use estrogenic cosmetic products “with care”. further regulatory amendments in 1950 appeared, on their face, to require positive proof of safety for estrogenic cosmetics. however, through varied administrative and enforcement practices that hinged upon “directions for use” in product labels, national health officials quietly reintroduced dose-response logics back into estrogen regulation. as legal technologies for disciplining women consumers to regulate their own exposures, product labels were becoming instrumental. with labeling, estrogen catalyzed an early example of risk regulation in canada. introduction today, endocrine disruption is a well-established phenomenon. the fact that special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 2 industrial chemicals could disrupt endocrine systems of humans and wildlife burst into popular consciousness in the mid-1990s, with the publication of our stolen future (colborn, dumanoski, & myers, 1996). in translating the science to public audiences, researchers and activists have often leveraged the fact that these endocrine-disrupting chemicals can participate in humans’ and animals’ hormonal systems, including by mimicking estrogen in bodies.1 some scholars have critiqued the repronormative, heterosexist, transphobic, or ableist discourses that infuse these translations, which reinforce sex panics about disruption of normative bodies (ah-king & hayward, 2014; di chiro, 2010; o’laughlin, 2016; scott, 2009). others have explored chemical and multispecies productions of sex, gender, and sexuality (fausto-stirling, 2000; haraway, 2012; hayward, 2014), and celebrated the queer intimacies and pleasures of hormone disruption (chen, 2012; pollock, 2016; preciado, 2013). without mongering these fears or indulging these pleasures, it can now be said that these molecules can change fetal development; impact fertility, metabolism, and behaviour; and cause cancer.2 in canada, one of the first endocrine disruptors to be industrially produced was estrogen. more particularly, the interwar years saw the manufacture and marketing of estrogenic preparations made of estrone, estradiol, equilin, equilenin, or stilboestrol (or des). scholars have examined endocrine disruption in ways that refuse to separate the “natural” from the “cultural.” for example, nancy langston (2010) has traced a history of endocrine disruption through the synthetic estrogen des. working within a material-semiotic tradition, celia roberts (2007) has troubled distinctions between “natural” sex hormones and “synthetic” industrial chemicals (see also haraway, 2012). following that tradition, this article holds hormones firmly together with (other) industrially produced endocrine-disrupting chemicals; as compounds with particular historical, political, and industrial trajectories, these are nonetheless all estrogenic substances. critically, whether “natural” or “synthetic,” estrogenic compounds regularly resist conventional dose-response logics (vandenberg et al., 2012; bergman, heindel, jobling, kidd, zoeller, & world health organization, 2013). conventionally, the greater the dose of a substance given to an organism, the greater the physiological response—a relationship, in pharmacology, referred to as potency. as scientists now know, estrogenic substances can upset the old toxicological truism that “the dose makes the poison.” some cause adverse effects at low doses, and indeed can have relatively greater toxicity at low doses than at high doses. these findings have major implications for chemical regulation, as it special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 3 implies that there is no safe threshold for exposure to estrogenic chemicals (scott, 2015). in pharmacology in the 1940s, however, the conventional paradigm ruled supreme. as elsewhere, canadian laboratory scientists, pharmacists, and clinicians shaped their research, compounding, and prescription practices around concepts of dose and dosage.3 ideas about potency routinely structured determinations, by department of national health officials,4 of whether and what amount of a substance was safe. yet, despite their centrality to biomedical discourses, dose-response logics were not stable or unified in regulatory spheres. as explored here in the context of estrogen regulation in canada, dose-response (or potency) limits were not legally prescribed: they were never “written into” rules or regulations. indeed, national health explicitly rejected the adoption in law of any dose-response limit or thresholds. instead, dose-response limits were performed by regulators in informal, fluid, and sometimes contradictory practices. crucially, at the core of these practices was product labeling. this article argues that estrogen, cosmetics, and product labeling were co-produced in mid-century canada (jasanoff, 2004). law’s imbrication with matter has recently been taken up in sociolegal and critical legal studies.5 however, few legal historians have situated their work within in the material turn—whether in new materialisms, relational materialism (mol, 2013), material feminisms (alaimo & hekman, 2008), or other such frameworks that center the interaction of matter and meaning.6 identifying “law” and the “material world” as distinct analytical realms admittedly performs “precisely the kind of ontological partition…that we are purporting to refute” (johnson, 2018, p. 7). nonetheless, legal historians who embrace materiality aim to move away from law-as-discourse, separate from its (socio)material “contexts” (johnson, 2015; tomlins, 2016). in this spirit, my article conjoins legal history with an stsinflected praxiological approach to ontological enactment (mol, 2002). contributing to interdisciplinary conversations in sociolegal studies, legal history, and sts, and using archival material not previously addressed by historians, the story told here provides an empirical case of how regulatory practices perform sociomaterial realities, and how law is enacted by sociomateriality. my account is woven with two main evidentiary threads. first, i draw on archival evidence of the development of the sex hormone regulations, and a department of justice file examining the constitutionality of a statutory provision on cosmetic licensing.7 second, i trace the legislative evolution of that provision and the special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 4 regulatory evolution and enforcement of the sex hormone regulations, specifically its labeling requirements. intertwined, too, are contemporaneous accounts by national health officials, scientific studies on estrogen creams, the delaney committee’s 1952 study on chemicals in cosmetics, and newspaper ads. informed throughout by historiographies of estrogen in its multiple materializations,8 this story adds understanding of relations between estrogen, cosmetics, and labeling to a rich body of feminist scholarship on sex hormones.9 the initial part of this account describes the first cosmetics regulation in canadian history, which applied only to products containing sex hormones. in lieu of any dose or potency standards for estrogens, regulators instead devised novel labels warning women to use these products “with care.” soon, however, the department of national health would conclude that greater direction was required. in the second section, this story recounts how further amendments to these regulations, in 1950, introduced new labeling rules unique to estrogenic cosmetics. under these rules, women were instructed, for the first time in canadian history, to use consumer products “only as directed” on a label. in variable administrative practices related to labeling, officials negotiated the content of these usage directions. in this way, national health quietly reintroduced dose-response logics back into estrogen regulation. the conclusion summarizes these historical events, considering their stakes and continued implications. enacting cosmetics and gender through a “use with care” label, 1939–1949 to appreciate how potent estrogenic cosmetics and powerful labeling techniques emerged together, canada’s sex hormone regulations provide a revealing starting point. first enacted in 1944, these regulations purported to standardize biological drugs (tessaro, 2018). efforts to standardize hormones and other biological drugs were increasingly pursued by laboratory scientists and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the interwar period, and chemical synthesis of biological drugs had arguably “dissolved the boundaries between natural and artificial substances” (von schwerin, stoff, & wahrig, 2013, p. 29). yet, despite this lack of essential difference, “biologicals were often more complex, more difficult to handle, and less standardized than the chemical drugs” (gaudillière, 2005, p. 606), with multiple physiological effects both desired and harmful (von schwerin, stoff, & wahrig, 2013). rather than see these as side effects, biologics are better understood as ontologically precarious. their precariousness arises from their “historical construction as both natural and artificial objects” (von schwerin, stoff, & wahrig, 2013, p. 29), as their “naturalness” made them special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 5 culturally desirable and pharmaceutically promising, yet difficult to produce and control. in the early 1940s, the task of stabilizing estrogenic biologics, and converting them to drugs, commonly fell to standardized bioassays (gaudillière, 2010; oudshoorn, 1994). despite widespread reliance by scientists and manufacturers on standardized tests to materialize hormones, in canada in 1944, national health resisted endorsing conventional standardization methods for estrogenic substances such as estrone, estradiol benzoate, and stilboestrol. senior departmental officials rebuffed efforts by canadian physicians and pharmacists to ensure that the new sex hormone regulations would prescribe standardized bioassay methods for measuring and materializing the potency of estrogens. relatedly, national health also refused to regulate standard doses of estrogenic preparations, though the efficacy and safety of estrogens were widely conceived as a matter of dose (krieger et al., 2005; langston, 2010; sengoopta, 2006; watkins, 2007).10 instead, national health delegated to pharmaceutical manufacturers the power to set doses of estrogenic drugs (tessaro, 2018). in lieu of potency or dose standards, the regulations adopted “special” labeling provisions (curran, 1953, p. 185). these rules required labels to supply information on their bioassay methods and to caution women to consult physicians (pc 1944-3721, p. 2292). enacted with variable potencies and unfixed doses, its safety and predictability ensured not by standards but by labels, estrogen was materialized by canadian regulators in 1944 as simultaneously safe and potent (tessaro, 2018). with these techniques, national health regulators rendered safe doses of estrogenic substances imperceptible (murphy, 2006). when the 1944 sex hormone regulations were enacted, canada lacked statutory power to regulate cosmetics. six years earlier, american federal law had been extended to cover cosmetics (food, drug, and cosmetic act, 1938).11 in reaction, early in 1939, the canadian parliament hastily considered amendments to the food and drugs act. a new definition of drug made cosmetics a class of drug and the term cosmetic was defined. furthermore, the bill empowered the government to license cosmetics manufacturers. the bill passed and while much of it was proclaimed into force that summer, the cosmetics provisions were not (proclamation, july 22, 1939).12 implying that masculine war efforts trumped feminine beauty products, linton davidson, a food and drug analyst and informal chronicler of the department of national health’s history, argued that world war ii caused the government to postpone enacting the cosmetic provisions (davidson, 1949b).13 yet during the war, the use and sale of cosmetics exploded, special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 6 as women turned to performances of femininity to demonstrate their commitment to the war effort (black, 2004; mceuen, 2011; peiss, 1998). in fact, the better explanation for the delay is that, before the bill passed, there were murmurs that its cosmetic provisions may not be constitutionally valid; indeed, in a separate account, davidson (1949a) admitted that “questions of validity loomed” (p. 81) over the bill. by that summer, hormonal cosmetics were offered for sale in canada.14 their potency conjured from estrone, estradiol, equilin, equilenin, and des, these products comprised estrogens whipped into creams or mixed into oils. when marketing these lotions, the cosmetics industry stirred up a toxic blend of gender, age, and class directives, in a semiotic mixture infused with racial hierarchy. advertisers bonded estrogenic creams to biomedical discourses in which menopause, and women’s aging, were beginning to be framed as pathological (bell, 1987, 1995; mccrea, 1983; li, 2003b; mire, 2014). elizabeth watkins (2007) shows in her history of hormone replacement therapy that, as cosmetics firms in the interwar period increasingly promoted the notion that youth and beauty were synonymous, their “ads imparted a clear message: use of estrogen-containing creams would make a woman’s skin look younger” (pp. 84-85). just as white, middleand upper-class women sought hormone replacement therapy to relieve menopausal discomfort (watkins, 2007), estrogenic cosmetics, sold in eaton’s and other high-end department stores as expensive luxury face creams, were likewise targeted at and favored by privileged female consumers. the main promoter of hormone creams was cosmetics guru helena rubinstein, whose products were among the most expensive on the market (mceuen, 2011).15 luxury hormone creams not only offered women youth and beauty but, inevitably, they also implied whiteness. as kyla schuller (2018) shows, the very idea of proper gendering is part of a racialized project of ranking populations. in the interwar period, the emerging mainstream cosmetics industry in the united states had been quick to commodify whiteness (schuller, 2009; black, 2004).16 during world war ii, estrogenic cosmetics fell in step with shifting criteria of female beauty when, as war created and deepened racial hierarchies in the us, a “genuinely ‘feminine’ face was dictated by racial meanings and age,” and the “women considered most likely to possess or have the ability to create one were middleclass housewives” (mceuen, 2011, p. 6). as parliamentarians were publicly debating the cosmetics bill, national health officials were privately deliberating whether to investigate estrogenic breast enhancement creams. in march 1939, davidson brought his supervisor’s attention special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 7 to an advertisement for s-8 brand of hormone preparations, represented as “restoring the breasts to the graceful contours and firmness of youth” (figure 1). declaring a shapely bust to be the “essence of womanly beauty” and describing a greco-roman bust carved in gleaming white marble as the “most envied feminine form in the world,” the ad discursively links hormones, gender, and racial superiority. characterizing the breast cream as a cosmetic not a drug—which landed it outside national health’s jurisdiction—davidson nonetheless proposed investigatory efforts. but with the bill’s passage still pending, assistant chief dominion analyst aime valin directed davidson to take “no action for present” (figure 2). special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 8 figure 1. advertisement for s-8 brand of hormone preparations, 1 march 1939. library and archives canada, rg 29, volume 258, file number 347-1-6 (part 2), reproduction copy number e011195705. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 9 figure 2. analyst report to assistant chief dominion analyst, 23 march 1939. library and archives canada, rg 29, volume 258, file number 347-1-6 (part 2), reproduction copy number e-011195705. estrogenic creams were not supported by scientific studies demonstrating their safety. there was a paucity of evidence about to what extent topically applied estrogen was absorbed into blood streams and circulated through bodies, although some researchers attempted to assess systemic effects. for example, in a 1938 study, researchers examined creams containing androgens or estrogens (moore, lamar & beck, 1938). using a low dose, they found these hormones were easily absorbed through animals’ skin, and that estrogenic face cream “sold commercially and recommended for the removal of wrinkles from normal women special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 10 has decided internal effects when applied daily on the skin of experimental animals” (moore, lamar & beck, 1938, p. 14). concluding that the creams posed hazards to women, they urged further study. yet over the next decade, such studies would be sparse, and cosmetic companies’ enthusiasm for estrogen ever more abundant. neither the us food and drug administration (fda) nor the american medical association (ama) harbored positive feelings towards estrogenic creams. to the contrary, in the late 1930s, there was “a strong bias by the us medical profession against the over-counter sales” of estrogenic cosmetics (mock, 1951, p. 870). concerned about carcinogenicity, the ama campaigned against the creams. after it published an editorial critical of endocreme (“endocreme,” 1938), the manufacturer sued the ama in defamation. supportive of the ama’s position, the fda supplied expert evidence, but the federal court rejected it, holding that the animal studies relied on by fda witnesses to claim that estrogens were carcinogenic were insufficient to prove a likelihood of cancer in women. langston (2010) finds that, as a result of the court’s decision, the fda backed down from enforcement activities to control these creams. taking a longer view, the fda regained its zeal by the late 1940s and early 1950s, when it targeted estrogenic creams with misbranding prosecutions (bennett, 2020).17 in canada, after the second world war, national health began preparing to regulate cosmetics, an effort led by its food and drugs division. when, late in 1945, the division informed industry of its plans, the toilet goods manufacturers’ association responded with a lawyer’s opinion that the statutory provision empowering cosmetic licensing was unconstitutional.18 a department of justice lawyer confirmed this opinion. in elmer driedger’s view, the licensing provision was “of doubtful validity.”19 with driedger’s assistance,20 in 1946 the food and drugs division prepared new statutory language on cosmetics. pivoting away from licensing, the bill proposed to prohibit the sale of injurious cosmetics and to require manufacturers to register cosmetics with information about their ingredients, and created a suite of regulatory powers. the deputy ministers of national health and justice approved the bill. however, brooke claxton, the minister of national health and welfare, belatedly intervened. anxious that the registration requirements “may prove contentious,” claxton’s intervention killed the cosmetics amendments.21 at the end of 1946, minister claxton moved to national defense. national health was soon moving forward again on the cosmetics file. researching what it could special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 11 not yet lawfully regulate, the department created a cosmetics section within laboratory services and appointed a cosmetics analyst.22 of course, cosmetics were just one part of the department’s growing capacities; in april 1949, the food and drug regulations were thoroughly overhauled (pc 1949-1536; davidson, 1949a). concurrently, canada finally enacted the 1939 statutory amendments regarding cosmetics (except for the constitutionally dubious licensing provision), thereby making cosmetics a class of drugs (proclamation, april 5, 1949). cosmetics could now be specifically governed through regulations. however, the only type of cosmetics that canada then chose to regulate were products containing sex hormones (pc 1949-1536, pp. 945-947). in 1949 no cosmetics were made with androgens, gonadotrophins, or progesterone—no testosterone tonic, no gonadotrophic gloss. only estrogen, that spring of youthful, reproductive femininity, had infiltrated cosmetics. thus, canada’s first cosmetics regulation really applied only to products containing estrogens. driedger had no difficulty with representing cosmetics as a subclass of drugs. robert curran, in contrast, overtly disparaged this legislative decision. as national health’s in-house lawyer, curran’s public disdain for the canadian government’s approach is jarring. when the amendments came into effect in 1949, he wrote an article for a mainly american audience that mocked the canadian legislation in (cis)sexist terms: notwithstanding the opinion of a great constitutional lawyer of long ago that “parliament can do anything except change a man into a woman or a woman into a man,” it would have been preferable if cosmetics and devices were treated as individual subjects in the legislation, rather than to distort the ordinary meaning of a drug by including in it things which common sense rejects from it (curran, 1949, p. 411). in this less than subtle rhetoric, curran advanced gendered distinctions between cosmetics and drugs. admitting that cosmetics contained medicinal ingredients, he nevertheless reckoned that cosmetics were “not expected to contain a high degree or medication nor are extensive therapeutic claims likely to be made for them” (curran, 1949, p. 411). for curran, the boundary was clear: “the borderline between cosmetics and drugs, of course, rests upon the claims which are made” (1952, p. 718; see also curran, 1953). moreover, “puffery” need not be discouraged. after all, the public would not be deceived by exaggerated or false claims, as nobody really thought that cosmetics would do “what nature has failed to do” (curran, 1952, p. 718). special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 12 no substance challenged such rigid distinctions more than estrogen. as will be seen, some estrogenic “cosmetics” were more potent than estrogenic “drugs.” ads for premarin, marketed as a drug for menopause, and for helena rubinstein’s cream, marketed as a cosmetic, made similar claims: youthful beauty, reproductive femininity, reinvigorated vitality, and happier husbands (see figures below). faced with estrogen’s multiple materializations, and with government lawyers’ diverse depictions, how, then, did national health decide to regulate estrogenic cosmetics? as in 1944, when it had devised a “caution label” for estrogenic drugs, in april 1949, the department once again turned to labels in lieu of standards, licensing, or registration. the sex hormone regulations were amended to prohibit the sale of cosmetic products containing sex hormones, unless a label bore the statement “this preparation contains a potent sex hormone. use with care” (pc 1949-1536, section 02.0009). canadians had never previously been directed, by a label, to use a consumer product with care. in the 1940s, in canada as in the us, food and drugs were required to bear labels stating what a product was. such labels impliedly represented that the product met legally prescribed standards of quality and identity, exposing companies to misbranding or adulteration prosecutions if the product did not “measure up” to regulated recipes. national health’s innovation for estrogenic cosmetics enlisted labels to govern women’s behavior, deflecting responsibility away from government and industry. for these gendered products, safety would no longer be built into the product by requiring manufacturers to follow a standardized recipe set out in pharmacopoeia or regulations. with labels, women were made responsible for ensuring their own safety, by attending carefully to how they used cosmetics. this differential regulatory treatment reflected and reproduced gendered norms about women and bodies. estrogens were acknowledged to be potent, yet these “naturally occurring” womanly substances were branded as “essentially safe.”23 cosmetics were brushed off as figuratively and materially superficial; as curran intimated, women used cosmetics to deceive. deceptive women could be compelled to take responsibility for avoiding the hazards occasioned by their guile. further, regulating through labels strengthened the notion that topical cosmetics, used to cleanse or alter bodies’ external surfaces, were less harmful than drugs administered parenterally or orally, thus reinforcing bodies as special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 13 impermeable, bounded, autonomous (but see alaimo, 2010). shaped by this gendered script, estrogen was prepared to act up. as enacted by canadian regulators in 1944, estrogens were already ontologically precarious— natural and synthetic, desirable and harmful, potent and safe. once materialized as an everyday cosmetic, estrogen became even more resistant to traditional regulatory controls. fed by regulators’ reluctance to control cosmetics, fueled by stereotypes about gender, sexuality, age, and class, estrogen materially provoked the injunction to “use with care.” rules had engendered estrogenic potency, and now estrogen was potentiating gendered rules. resurrecting dose-response logics in estrogen regulation through labeling practices, 1950–1953 one year after introducing “use with care” labels, canada would again amend the sex hormone regulations. true to pattern, national health devised another novel form of label, continuing the turn toward delegating responsibility for safety to women consumers. in the process, estrogen and labels would become ever more entangled. the amendment, made in 1950, abandoned “use with care” labels for estrogenic cosmetics. instead, any cosmetic product “containing a sex hormone purporting to have oestrogenic properties” was now prohibited from sale—unless it was “demonstrated to be free from systemic effect from sex hormones,” and unless new labeling requirements were met (pc 1950-2084, section c.02.010). labels would now be required to state, “use only as directed,” and relatedly, companies would be required to include “directions for use” with estrogenic cosmetics (pc 1950-2084, sections c.02.010(a)(v) and c.02.010(b)(ii)).24 the new legal test demanding that estrogenic cosmetics be proven “free from systemic effect” was laudable. it reflected ongoing medical concern about the carcinogenic hazards of topical estrogen. importantly, this test did not necessarily depend on dose-response reasoning or evidence. to the contrary, with ahistorical reference here to a modern-day concept, this test appeared to set a highly “precautionary” standard. rather than setting a toxicological threshold, on paper, the law demanded positive proof of safety. in practices, however, the poison remained in the dose. national health’s scientists were devoted to toxicology’s monotonic curves, measuring and materializing sex hormones through dose-response calculations. despite this, as special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 14 mentioned, back in 1944, the department had declined to set dose ranges or potency standards for estrogenic substances in the sex hormone regulations. consequently, national health scientists lacked any regulatory incentive to test the physiological effects of estrogenic drugs. having eschewed standards, national health was unable, by 1949, to perceive either a “safe” or “hazardous” dose of estrogen. what amount of estrogen in an oral, parenteral, or topical preparation was safe? which estrogenic cosmetics were “free of systemic effect”? national health did not know. dose had been left to manufacturers and dosage left to clinicians. once statutorily empowered to regulate cosmetics, national health had to face up to dose. how would the department determine what dose— what amount—of estrogenic potency in a cosmetic was safe? this question was complicated by the obvious fact that face cream did not come packaged in “doses.” even had national health been monitoring the effects of estrogen preparations in cold laboratories with standardized bioassays and rodents, moving into the comfortable homes of middle-class, middle-aged women, estrogen and bodies met in ways less precise. in that creamy form, estrogen was slippery.25 performed as predictably potent in mass-produced pills and medically supervised injections, in quotidian beauty regimens, estrogen became less knowable. how much cream a woman applied before going to bed, or when starting her day in the morning, was not determined quantitatively or mechanically, but through sensory and affective practices. how much cream does it take to make your skin feel softer, smoother, firmer? a dry winter’s wind, a poor night’s sleep, a husband’s bad mood—all caused one’s relations with cream to change. when these practices changed, so did estrogen’s effects. in its cohabitation with wealthy women and their skin, estrogen enacted an ambiguous toxicity. advising on this question was the responsibility of dr. leonard pugsley. the department’s only endocrinologist, pugsley had done doctoral studies at mcgill university (pugsley, 1932), supervised by the acclaimed biochemist dr. james collip. collip had extracted and isolated the human and equine estrogens comprising the menopause drugs emmenin and premarin, backed by canadian pharmaceutical firm ayerst, mckenna & harrison, ltd.26 by 1947 pugsley had become the chief of laboratory services at national health. he also continued to research bioassay methods for and physiological effects of sex hormones (davidson, 1949, pp. 92-94; “reports to the reader,” 1951).27 as langston (2010) shows, pugsley’s research was quietly influential, leading national health—and eventually the fda—to end the use of des in chicken feed.28 with hormonal special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 15 cosmetics, however, pugsley would take his cues from us companies and regulators. in a 1951 article that simultaneously highlighted and obscured national health’s practices, pugsley described the 1950 amendments to the sex hormone regulations. explaining that national health had thought it advisable to “limit the amount” of estrogen in cosmetics, he wrote that the department had nonetheless decided against legally prescribing an upper potency limit, because a limit “would tend to indicate approval and freedom from any undesirable side effects” at lower potencies (pugsley, 1951, p. 536). yet his article also repeatedly claimed that an “upper limit” had been administratively adopted (pugsley, 1951, p. 536). this inconsistency attracts legal scrutiny, as it suggests that the department was doing precisely what it had decided not to authorize in law. the internal inconsistency becomes less confusing when one recalls that pugsley’s article was aimed at an american audience. pugsley was seeking to reassure readers that canadian regulatory practices for estrogen were not so far removed from american ones. but american practices for estrogenic cosmetics were also legally oblique. the fda had no authority to set potency limits for estrogenic cosmetics. instead, it attempted indirectly to stipulate upper potency limits, through the specter of misbranding prosecutions or, relatedly, by threatening to deem higher potency creams to be drugs and to regulate them as such. while the legal source of the fda’s estrogenic potency limits was murky, the material source of the fda’s “rule” was not. the rule was born of and enmeshed within the products of helena rubinstein. in the 1940s, helena rubinstein packaged her “estrogenic hormone cream” in jars advertised as containing one month’s supply. such ads implied how much cream should be used (figures 3, 4). part of a strategy to paint its products as scientific and therapeutic (watkins, 2007), the marketing tactic made cream seem like medicine and amount like dosage, aiming to persuade women to buy and use a jar every month. by 1949 the fda effectively took the position that existing products of helena rubinstein (and other reputable firms) reflected permissible potency and dose. to limit daily exposure, the fda seems to “have settled on 10,000 international units (iu) of oestrogens per ounce as an acceptable amount for hormone creams, as long as the amount used was no greater than 2 ounces per month” (bennett, 2020; see also mock, 1951).29 special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 16 figure 3. helena rubinstein advertisement, toronto daily star, 6 april 1945. “a scientific preparation that will help you achieve beauty for your skin by retarding the effects of aging. 30night supply.” reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 17 figure 4. helena rubinstein advertisement, toronto daily star, 17 october 1947. “estrogenic hormone cream – contains natural hormones which your skin absorbs. result? you look younger! use it for one month. see the change. 4.50.” reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. in canada, rather than a murkily authorized limit of 10,000 iu per ounce, the 1950 regulatory amendments required estrogenic cosmetics be demonstrated to be special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 18 “free from systemic effect.” as noted, this test seems highly precautionary. how was this test squared with pugsley’s claim that national health had adopted an upper potency limit for estrogenic cosmetics? the answer lay in labeling practices. as mentioned, under the 1950 regulations, to be sold as a cosmetic, not only did a preparation need be proven free of systemic effect but its label had to state “use only as directed” and to provide “directions for use.” these labeling techniques were the means through which dose-response considerations, erased from the sex hormone regulations in 1944, were smuggled back into estrogen regulation in 1950. the regulations did not articulate what “directions for use” were required. rather, when requiring manufacturers to give usage directions, national health inspectors could try to force firms to stipulate the amount of cream that women should use on a monthly basis. if that amount of cream contained less than a certain potency, national health could deem the product to have no systemic effect and it could be legally sold as a cosmetic. in this way, the reintroduction of dose-response logics to estrogen regulation in canada was implicit and discretionary. pugsley’s article painted national health’s new labeling approach as deriving from a “ruling on potency,” claiming that “an administrative ruling has been made on an upper limit of potency for one month's supply” (1951, p. 536). yet no ruling, in any adjudicative or administrative law sense, had ever been made.30 recall that pugsley was translating the canadian approach to his american audience. us lawyers, consumer groups, and industry representatives were accustomed to the administrative rulings issued by the fda under the 1938 food, drug, and cosmetic act. by contrast, the canadian statutory scheme did not delegate power to national health to issue administrative rulings. nevertheless, this story stays with pugsley’s phrase “administrative ruling.”31 in many respects, it perfectly apprehends a “way of regulating” (gaudillière & hess, 2013) emerging within national health by the 1950s. capturing a move away from legally codified standards in legislation or regulation, and towards more discretionary and individualized obligations, administrative ruling reflects the processual dynamic in this way of regulating. while rules codify a fixed and stable interpretation, intended to apply generally, “ruling” instead evokes more fluid regulatory interventions, tailored to individual cases. three episodes in the early 1950s reveal how instances of “administrative ruling” by national health officials, centered on labeling, reintroduced dose-response logics to estrogen regulation. in doing so, these officials performed highly variable special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 19 enactments of dose-response relationships. the earliest example, in 1950, was spurred by newspaper ads for five different estrogenic breast creams. national health’s inspection services asked j. t. thompson, the department’s cosmetics lead, whether the creams had systemic effects. thompson reported back with a specific enactment of a dose-response relationship. he started with the intended physiological response—growth of mammary tissue—and then worked backward to judge what amount would achieve this response. in his view, the requisite dose would be so high as to cause systemic effects. this approach conveniently allowed thomson to take a hands-off approach: i don’t think bust development creams should be classed as cosmetics or used except under medical supervision. to be effective, the dosage must be heavy, and i should think some degree of systemic effect would be unavoidable. enough at least to put the preparations out of the cosmetic class. having thus politely washed my hands of them, i get out from under!32 however, in a separate report to inspection services, pugsley disagreed that these five creams had systemic effects. while he acknowledged that they would cause growth in mammary tissue, rather than ask what dose would cause this response, pugsley argued that breast tissue growth was inherently cosmetic: “i would say this is an effect on local tissue and not necessarily systemic action.”33 pugsley’s enactment of weak protection was entangled with his strong commitment to labeling. even though the creams were each advertised at 30,000 iu of potency— three times stronger than what the fda typically tolerated for cosmetics—he felt label directions with a thirty-day limit would suffice. of note, these five highly potent creams were already sold in a thirty-day supply. thus, if national health wished to limit women’s exposure to only 10,000 iu per month, its inspectors would need to direct us firms to shrink the physical size of packages sold in canada. neutered by pugsley’s advice, national health inspectors predictably took no action.34 national health’s most protracted investigation of estrogenic cosmetics, pursued from its vancouver office in 1952, provides a second example of how dose was enacted through labeling practices. inspector e. l. devlin was trying to bring venus products—which sold a breast cream called formula v7, advertised with a pseudoscientific booklet—into compliance with the sex hormone regulations. in a long letter to venus, setting out regulatory requirements and explaining the potential carcinogenic hazards of estrogens, devlin performed a subtly different variant of dose-response. he advised that, given estrogen’s effects on breast tissue, one must assume that applying formula v7 to breasts would affect “the special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 20 body hormone balance” such that the cream must be “regarded as having systemic effects.” he therefore deemed formula v7 to be a drug (though, at 6,000 iu, it was one-fifth the potency of the five creams earlier deemed to be cosmetics). as a drug, formula v7 would need to comply with the drug labeling rule in section c.02.007 of the regulations, and, in devlin’s view, the label would need to state “what amount is to be used over a 30 day period.”35 without doubt, devlin’s precautionary interpretation of the regulations was legally wrong, though it exemplifies how distinctions between cosmetics and drugs were enacted in practice. based on his view that formula v7 had systemic effects, devlin properly concluded that it was a drug not a cosmetic; however, devlin was wrong to understand that the regulations’ drug labeling rule required any “directions for use.”36 regardless of the fact that national health had no authority to impose directions for use upon drugs, firms that hawked hormones were often agreeable to directing women on how to use their products. in this case, venus complied with devlin’s (erroneous) advice, promising to label its jars with the weight, a statement that the cream contained 6,000 iu of estrogenic substance per ounce, and a direction to use not more than 1 and 2/3 ounces each month.37 indeed, venus had pronounced numerous directions in an insert in its advertising booklet, many of which were outrageous and drew startling associations between formula v7 and cancer. for example, the insert advised that while “formula v7 is not intended for the discovery of existing cysts but if its use is instrumental in doing so, then it may be considered an additional though unintentional benefit.” when devlin told venus to remove the insert, the company argued that it was just an “amplification” of the directions for use already required by law.38 leveraging power through labels, national health inspectors were enacting dose controls that the department had rejected when originally preparing the 1944 sex hormone regulations. seizing upon a labeling rule for cosmetics, infusing it in practice with dose-response considerations, shifting those considerations towards substances deemed drugs, inspectors resurrected dose and reinserted it into the regulatory regime. admittedly, reigning in a local cosmetics company dabbling in quackery was not the same as interfering in innovations of major pharmaceutical firms. power was material. yet estrogen, too, was powerful, triggering national health officials to re-embrace dose-response logics previously eschewed. devlin wrapped up his compliance efforts with venus in may 1952. a few weeks later, a select us congressional committee, known as the delaney committee, special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 21 released its final report on chemicals in cosmetics. this report followed two years of high-profile hearings, chaired by congressman james delaney, to study chemicals in foods and cosmetics. endocrinologists and dermatologists had testified on potential hazards of estrogenic creams. some witnesses had equivocated;39 others had clearly expressed the view that these creams could be carcinogenic and hazardous.40 almost all had testified that hazard was a matter of dose. as the products were sold as both night and day creams, the report observed that women could be “covered by these substances 24 hours of every day” (house of representatives, 1952, p. 613). the report also expressed concern that estrogenic creams, if applied in “sufficient quantity,” may cause “undesirable physiological changes” (house of representatives, 1952, pp. 613-614). however, the committee ultimately recommended only that more research “would be desirable” (house of representatives, 1952, p. 614). only a few researchers would take up this invitation. one study found that, even at small doses, estrogenic creams caused systemic effects—namely, endometrial hyperplasia—if applied over a long period (goldberg & harris, 1952). another found the creams did not induce any clinically observable changes to the appearance of facial skin (behrman, 1954). overall, this small body of research indicated that estrogenic creams were not just harmful but useless. regardless, some commentators parroted industry’s position: there was “a consensus of opinion amongst experienced observers that cosmetic hormone creams with a maximum potency of 10,000 iu per ounce (31 g.) of vehicle, if used in the manner by the informed manufacturer, are free from systemic effects” (peck & klarmann, as cited in bennett, 2020). faced with a substance that could not easily be pinned down, national health entrenched its reliance on labels as a regulatory strategy. a third example shows how, by 1953, informal potency limits on labels had become so routinized that, provided a product included suitable directions for use, inspectors could overlook unsubstantiated and misleading advertising claims. when regional inspectors internally raised questions about an ad for lady esther hormone cream, which boasted of the cream’s high potency and ability to “renew the beautifying effects of your own waning hormone supply” (figure 6), the chief of inspection services quickly advised that the claims were “within the realm of permitted cosmetic puffery.”41 labeled at 10,000 iu and marketed as thirty days’ supply, this product exemplified compliance with the unwritten rules characterizing administrative ruling. yet such ads exploited women’s fear of aging and “preyed on women’s economic and emotional dependence on men,” raising the scenario “of a husband special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 22 fleeing his wife’s wrinkled skin and finding comfort in the arms of a smootherskinned woman” (watkins, 2007, p. 87). however, national health inspectors had no power, and perhaps no inclination, to find any “objectionable greasiness” in the advertisements warning middle-aged women that, if they did not use potent estrogenic creams, they would lose their husbands.42 figure 5. venus products’ advertising booklet insert for formula v7, march 1952. library and archives canada, rg29, volume 259, file number 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy number i115336. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 23 figure 6. lady esther advertisement, london free press, 26 october 1953. “stay lovely… stay loved… with lady esther natural estrogenic hormone cream.” library and archives canada, rg 29, volume 259, file number 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy number i-115336. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 24 figure 7. helena rubinstein advertisement, toronto daily star, 6 february 1952. “your husband looks at you with new interest.” reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. further reproduction prohibited without permission. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 25 figure 8. premarin advertisement, 1951, in the vancouver medical association bulletin, november 1951. (history of nursing in pacific canada, ubc open collections, retrieved from https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada). https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 26 concluding thoughts: law in estrogen, estrogen in cosmetics, cosmetics through labels law is still “commonly seen as a discourse, something that is distinct from, yet gives meaning to, things in the ‘real world’” (johnson, 2015, pp. 409-410). however, careful readings of historical evidence can fracture this boundary, revealing law’s material formations and matter’s legal forms. holding together matter and law—or, shrinking the distance between the onto-epistemological and the political that this equation solidifies, holding together potency and power43— can subvert insistent representations of toxicity as “wayward particles behaving badly” (liboiron, tironi, & calvillo, 2018, p. 333). instead, toxicity can be interrogated as ways in which “forms of life and their constituent relations, from the scale of cells to cultures, are enabled, constrained, and extinguished within broader power systems” (liboiron et al., 2018, p. 336). in exploring the historicity of estrogen as a legal phenomenon, and the historicity of labeling as an estrogenic phenomenon, this account has interrogated how estrogenic realities were enacted with regulatory powers, techniques, and practices in canada in the mid-twentieth century. materialized through regulation as potent and ineffective, hazardous and safe, natural and an artifice, systemic and cosmetic, estrogen was a provocation to regulators (roberts, 2007). perceiving toxicity through monotonic dose-response curves, and facing potent substances that were associated with cancer and reproductive effects, in the early 1940s, the department of national health nonetheless decided to let the pharmaceutical industry decide in what doses and potencies estrogen should be made and sold. in so doing, conventional dose-response thresholds were written out of regulations under the food and drugs act, making it largely impossible to perceive a “safe dose” of estrogen (murphy, 2006). in this way, estrogen came to matter in midcentury canada. thus materialized, estrogen bit back, catalyzing new labeling practices. when national health decided later that decade to regulate estrogenic cosmetics, but was unable to rely on regulatory experience with dose thresholds or potency standards for parenteral or oral estrogen, its officials subtly reintroduced doseresponse logics to topical estrogen. they did so by effectively enacting “potency limits,” through novel labels that directed women how to use these products— first by suggesting “care” should be used, and later by providing direction on how much cream to use in a given period. these labeling practices were not uniform, however, nor were the dose-response logics that they perpetuated. this account has showed how variable labeling practices enacted different ontologies of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 27 potency. departmental inspectors, tasked with scrutinizing ads to identify noncompliance and on alert for misleading representations, were suspicious of overblown claims made for these creams and inclined to assume adverse effects, working backwards from this assumption of hazard to promote safer doses through use directions. the chief of national health’s laboratory services, by contrast, trained as an endocrinologist, open to hormonal drugs and skeptical of unproven hazards, acted from an assumption of safety. pugsley viewed labels less as a means to guarantee safety—which was presumed—and more as a performance of regulatory oversight. ultimately, these practices reacted to and reproduced estrogens’ precarious ontologies through regulatory techniques and material technologies of labeling. for regulating ambiguously potent substances marketed to women, labels were becoming instrumental. in this entanglement of law, toxicity, and gender, estrogen was not the only phenomenon being naturalized. menopausal women were also constructed with estrogen (bell, 1987; mccrea, 1983). estrogen was performed, in regulatory practices, as malleable, superficial, deceptive, temperamental. in regulating cosmetic estrogen with labels rather than standards, national health sought to “standardize” the consumption behavior of menopausal women construed to possess those very same features. as artefacts of gendered regulatory strategies for estrogen, product labels have a troubled history. in canada, labeling techniques emerged as a means by which industry and government regulators could evade responsibility for potency, dose, and safety of estrogenic substances, as product labels delegated responsibility for “safe dosing” of potentially harmful substances to feminized consumers. moreover, this delegation of responsibility was never about arming women with information about hazards that they could rely upon to make informed “choices.” rather, direction for use labels evolved in response to estrogenic substances that had been “standardized” with variable potencies and unfixed doses. far from transparency, such labels maintained the imperceptibility of estrogenic hazard. thoroughly naturalized, today, as a gendered technique of green governmentality or of precautionary consumption for toxic consumer products (mackendrick 2018; scott, haw, & lee, 2017), warning and direction labels first emerged with estrogen. in canada, estrogens were the first substances for which labels were used in lieu of standards, initially for drugs, then for cosmetics. labels allowed regulators to require that potent ingredients be identified in consumer products and to discipline women to regulate their own exposure by following directions. such labels made it explicit, for the first time, that women would need to govern special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 28 themselves accordingly.44 in this respect, national health’s potent mixture of labels and “administrative ruling” to apprehend and mitigate the hazards of estrogen should be understood as an early example of risk regulation in canadian law. the deployment of usage directions performed estrogen as a risk to be managed, rather than as a hazard to be avoided. this mode of governance kept dose-response considerations, limits, or thresholds “off the books”; rather than codified in statutes or regulations, potency limits were enacted more ambiguously in fluid administrative practices. materialized in these practices, potency becomes an assemblage of social, material, and legal relations that are enabled and circumscribed through product labels. returning to the old toxicological truism, perhaps there is another critique available, one that moves us beyond simple condemnation of reliance on conventional monotonic dose-response curves for endocrine disrupting chemicals. what if we started with the proposition that—at least in some times, at least in some places—the dose really does make the poison? if the dose makes the poison, then what makes the dose? with growing calls by some activists and academics for more extensive consumer product labeling as a regulatory strategy to tackle exposure to toxic chemicals, such questions remain entirely relevant today. mandatory labeling of gendered consumer products has rapidly traveled far beyond estrogenic cosmetics. a few years after the sex hormone regulations first incorporated cosmetics, standalone cosmetic regulations followed (sor/52-271). these regulations governed cosmetics not through standards, licensing, or registration, but with cautions, directions, and other labeling requirements—techniques that were introduced, in canada, with estrogen. acknowledgements i owe many thanks to dayna nadine scott and roxanne mykitiuk at york university, who co-supervised the llm research from which this article was born. this research was funded by the law foundation of bc graduate fellowship, the honourable william z. estey graduate fellowship, an ontario graduate scholarship, and a york graduate scholarship. shelley gavigan encouraged me to “go wide” in the archives, with fruitful results, and library and archives canada staff provided invaluable assistance. thanks are also due to aryn martin and philip girard, who read this research closely and generously, and emily grabham, who provided useful guidance at the final stages. i am also very grateful to catalyst’s expert editorial team, and to two anonymous reviewers for their deep special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 29 engagement with and elevation of this work. notes 1 these chemicals were called “environmental estrogens” in the 1980s. that evocative term has fallen out of use as scientists have come to understand that endocrine-disrupting chemicals have many different and complex modes of action. in addition to estrogenic action, endocrine-disrupting chemicals can have androgenic or anti-androgenic effects. further, they do not only mimic hormones by attaching to hormone receptors but can block receptors, among other participations in endocrinal systems. for a scientist’s account summarizing the evolution of the field, see mclachlan (2016). 2 the scientific literature on the human health effects of endocrine-disrupting chemicals is voluminous. for one authoritative summary, see bergman, heindel, jobling, kidd, zoeller, & world health organization (2013). 3 in brief, dose is the amount of a drug that is administered at one moment in time, while dosage is the dose that is administered over a particular time period. 4 in 1944 the former department of pensions and national health was split into two departments. pensions became the responsibility of a new department of veterans affairs, and a separate department of national health and welfare was legislatively constituted. see an act to establish a department of national health and welfare, 1944–1945, and an act to amend the department of national health and welfare act, 1945. 5 for examples and summaries of this scholarship, see cloatre (2013); cloatre & pickersgill (2015); cole & bertenthal (2017); davies (2017); grabham (2016); faulkner, lange, & lawless (2012); and lezaun (2012). 6 the material turn has found tremendously diverse expression, including through actor-network theory, object-oriented ontology, thing theory, agential realism, posthumanism, speculative realism, non-representational theories, and material feminisms. many of these approaches have quite different disciplinary origins, and it is not my goal in this essay to delineate or assess the various similarities or differences. 7 library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9-150108, “powers to license manufacturers of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 30 cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. this file was released in full under the access to information act on january 29, 2018, following a statutory appeal to the federal information commissioner, and is on file with the author. 8 for the leading historiography of sex hormones, estrogenic drugs (and other technologies), and/or endocrinology in the interwar period in north america and western european states, see bell (1987, 1995); oudshoorn (1994); fausto-stirling (2000); seaman (2003); li (2003a, 2003b); gaudillière (2005, 2010); krieger et al. (2005); sengoopta (2006); roberts (2007); watkins (2007); langston (2010); and haraway (2012). this list excludes historiography of the contraceptive pill, introduced in the mid-1950s. 9 the term sex hormones is fraught with difficulty and has long been problematized in scientific and feminist discourses (oudshoorn, 1994; faustosterling, 2000; roberts, 2007). like these authors, i adopt the term where it was used by my historical actors. scientists and bureaucrats within national health and on the canadian committee on pharmacopoeial standards did not always use this term. at the risk of overgeneralizing, these actors tended to speak of sex hormones when contemplating end-use products (including in the context of the sex hormone regulations). in other contexts, such as when preparing pharmacopoeia monographs, they would speak of estrone, estradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and so on. 10 however, as langston (2010) shows, as early as 1939, some research into the synthetic estrogen stilboestrol (des) had also shown that toxicity did not relate strictly to dose, and indeed that “low doses of des could be more toxic than high doses” (p. 38). she argues that as “early as the 1930s…researchers knew that estrogens do not act in linear or predictable ways” (p. 38). 11 in its food, drug, and cosmetic act 1938, the united states imposed requirements for pre-market regulatory approval of “new drugs.” in canada, regulatory approval for new drugs was still decades away. however, for present purposes, the point is that neither the us nor canada required pre-market approval of cosmetics—whether through regulatory approval of new products, standardized potency test methods, prescribed “doses,” or otherwise. 12 the 1939 amendments that were brought into force addressed miscellaneous matters. only one provision in the bill that was unrelated to cosmetics was not special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 31 proclaimed into force in august 1939; see section 4. 13 other national health officials later made the same argument; see curran (1953) and pugsley (1967). privately, though, elmer driedger’s january 29, 1946 legal opinion indicates that, before it passed, the licensing provision attracted some constitutional concern; see library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9-150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. 14 the earliest ad located that offered a hormone “beauty aid” product for sale was published in 1938; see “20% discount” (1938). in the us, hormonal cosmetics became available for sale at roughly the same time, at the end of the 1930s (mock, 1951). 15 some cheaper creams, advertised for breast enlargement rather than for facial skin, were sold in canada through mail order. see, for example, november 7, 1950 memo from curran to whitmore enclosing five advertisements; library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9-150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. 16 in the 1930s and 1940s, production and marketing of certain other cosmetic products in the us (and likely also in canada) drew heavily upon racism. in particular, in this period, the mainstream cosmetic industry intensified racist marketing of skin whitening products to black americans (and to southern europeans and white women of anglo-saxon descent); see peiss, 1998; mceuen, 2011; mire, 2014; hunter, 2011; glenn, 2008. most of these products contained ammoniated mercury, a highly toxic agent with no “safe dose.” currently in canada, consumers continue to purchase skin-whitening products for cosmetic uses. most of these products contain illegal toxic substances—such as mercury, hydroquinone, corticosteroids, and tretinoin—that are banned or restricted in cosmetic products in canada and indeed in most industrialized countries; see ghetoh and amyot, 2016. while such products raise concerns, in a pharmacological idiom, about hazardous dose or dosage, as illegal substances they do not engage similar questions to those examined here regarding how regulators substitute labeling practices for traditional safety standards. 17 see, for example, u.s. v. 11 jars of female sex hormone estrogenic ointment special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 32 cream (case no. 2089, fdc no. 21350, sample no. 35600—h, disposition december 11, 1946); u.s. v. 94 jars, etc., (case no. 3034, fdc no. 27873, sample no. 57635—k, disposition november 17, 1949); u.s. v. 176 jars, etc. (case no. 2726, fdc no. 26641, sample no. 2790—k, disposition april 5, 1949); u.s. v. 40 cases, etc. (case no. 4277, fdc no. 34886, sample no. 17403—l, disposition january 14, 1954); u. s. v. 8 jars (case no. 4181, fdc no. 35320, sample no. 58957—l. 30-185 m, disposition july 9, 1953); and hormonex (fdc no. 38280, sample no. 30-185 m, disposition september 23, 1955). these reported fda notices of judgment are digitally archived by the us national library of medicine, at https://fdanj.nlm.nih.gov/. for discussion of some of these enforcement proceedings, see bennett (2020). 18 january 22, 1946 letter from chisholm to varcoe, in library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9-150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. 19 january 25, 1946 memo from driedger to varcoe; january 29, 1946 draft letter by driedger to varcoe; and february 1, 1946 letter from varcoe to chisholm, in library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9-150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. the crux of driedger’s legal advice was that the licensing provision could not be constitutionally valid, under federal legislative powers, “because nothing is prohibited.” in essence, national health was precluded from licensing a substance under the criminal law power unless the licensing regime was integrated with a criminal prohibition. 20 driedger is a well-known figure in canadian legal history. his influential 1983 text the construction of statutes (2nd ed.) is one of the authorities that has been most frequently by the supreme court of canada. in addition to his scholarly work, his career with the department of justice culminated with his appointment as deputy minister. 21 may 27, 1946 letter from curran to varcoe, in library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. https://fdanj.nlm.nih.gov/ special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 33 22 march 1, 1946 letter from curran to driedger, in library and archives canada, legal opinions and materials of precedential value, rg 13, vol. 2635, file no. 9150108, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional”. see also davidson, 1949a, p. 9. 23 by contrast, a study published by the ama concluded that it was “accepted that a certain amount of puffery is necessary in the field of promotional cosmetic advertising. however, some manufacturers of creams containing estrogens have made claims, either directly or by innuendo, that overstep these limits” (behrman, 1954, p. 122). 24 ads for the drug premarin, regularly deployed these two phrases throughout the 1940s and 1950s. premarin was developed and first marketed in canada, in the early 1940s, by the pharmaceutical firm ayerst, mckenna & harrison ltd. 25 additionally, and critical to practices later enacted by national health officials to put an informal “upper limit” on potency, the regulations also required a statement of the “net contents” (or weight) of an estrogenic cosmetic product; see section c.02.010(b)(iii). 26 for studies in a material-semiotic or relational materialism tradition that attend to the “texture” of ordering practices, see, for example, law & lien (2012), and de laet & mol (2000). 27 pugsley published at least one study with collip; see collip, pugsley, selye, & thompson (1934). see also li (2003a), pp. 91–94 for information about pugsley and fellow graduate students’ experiences in collip’s lab. 28 after joining national health in 1939, pugsley authored and co-authored scientific studies regarding biological assay methods for hormones; see pugsley & morrell (1943); pugsley (1946); and willis, rampton, & pugsley (1949). 29 for the research on the effects of des in chicken feed, see bird, pugsley, & klotz (1947). 30 in 1950 the fda tried to crystallize its “rule of thumb” on the potency of estrogenic cream into a statutory rule. when the house commerce committee was considering amendments to make it easier to restrict the sale of prescription drugs, the fda asked it to write into the act an “exemplary list of prescription special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 34 drugs” to guide interpretation of a new definition of prescription drugs. on the list was “estrogenic substances—except skin creams containing not more than 10,000 international units of estrone, or the equivalent of other estrogens, per ounce of cream” (dunn, 1951, p. 969). however, industry opposed this list and the durham-humphrey bill passed in 1951 without it (dunn, 1951, p. 966). 31 in the context of us federal administrative law, as a general category, administrative rulings would include interpretations, opinions, orders, directives, and decisions issued by administrative agencies that have been legally empowered by legislation to make those rulings. 32 “administrative ruling” also provides a convenient label not found in the historiography of canadian public law. the legal and historical literature regarding debates, in the interwar period, over the legitimacy of delegated legislation and the emerging administrative state is massive, and i cannot rehearse it here. 33 november 1950 handwritten note from thomson to whitmore, in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. 34 november 7, 1950 memo from curran to whitmore (with handwritten note by pugsley), in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. ironically, pugsley’s formulation unintentionally implied that these five creams could not be sold as cosmetics, as preparations that did not necessarily cause systemic effects failed to meet the more stringent legal test of being demonstrated to be free from systemic effect. 35 november 7, 1950 memo (pugsley’s handwritten note), in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. 36 march 21, 1952 letter from devlin to venus products ltd., in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. devlin also special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 35 requested various other label changes, which he asserted were required pursuant to section c.002.007. 37 march 26, 1952 letter from venus products ltd. to devlin, in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. 38 march 26, 1952 letter from venus products to devlin; march 28, 1952 letter from devlin to venus products; and may 16, 1952 letter from devlin to national health officials, in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. venus products ltd. was remarkably candid about its reasons for wanting to retain these directions for use: “our only hope was that in the event of cancer being discovered coincidental with the use of formula v7 that the victim would think and do a little investigating before going off half cocked and blaming us unjustly. one claim with the publicity that would be sure to attend regardless of how unjust that claim was or whether our product was proven harmless in the highest court the results to us would be so adverse that it could well put us out of business.” 39 chemicals in food products: hearings before the house select committee to investigate the use of chemicals in food and cosmetics, house of representatives, 82d cong., 2d sess., 583 (november 20, 1951) (testimony of dr. ervin epstein, pp. 739-740); and chemicals in food products: hearings before the house select committee to investigate the use of chemicals in food and cosmetics, house of representatives, 82d cong., 2d sess., 583 (november 23, 1951) (testimony of dr. thomas h. sternberg, pp. 919-920). 40 chemicals in food products: hearings before the house select committee to investigate the use of chemicals in food and cosmetics, house of representatives, 82d cong., 2d sess., 583 (november 20, 1951) (testimony of dr. h. v. allington); and chemicals in food products: hearings before the house select committee to investigate the use of chemicals in food and cosmetics, house of representatives, 82d cong., 2d sess., 583 (november 23, 1951) (testimony of dr. samuel ayres). 41 october 26, 1953 memo and november 2, 1953 memo in library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs – articles taken special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 36 from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements,” 1949–1953, vol. 259, file no. 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy no. i-115336. 42 in the bottom right-hand corner, figure 6 states lady esther hormone cream had “no objectionable greasiness!” 43 originally published as l'anomalia selvaggia. saggio su potere e potenza in baruch spinoza, negri 1991/2000 identifies as “potere” and “potenza” what in english translations of spinoza had both been reduced to “power.” 44 when it comes to changes materialized through topical estrogenic products, not everybody has been given the self-responsibilizing option of attending to their own exposures by following label directions. transgender women and non-binary people wanting estrogen-derived effects of softer skin, less body hair, or breast enhancement often lack the option of purchasing over-the-counter products and following labeled directions. if they wish estrogen to shape their embodiments, this use is typically medicalized, supervised by a physician willing to prescribe it. while boundaries between estrogenic drugs and cosmetics were blurred in the 1940s and 1950s, for trans or genderqueer people seeking more feminine embodiments in 2020, such boundaries are rigidly enforced by law. indeed, in this scenario, labels are disregarded, as, in many jurisdictions, estrogen must be prescribed “off-label.” references archival material library and archives canada, “powers to license manufacturers of cosmetics / if section 3(j) of food & drugs act is unconstitutional” (1946-1947) [legal opinions and materials of precedential value], rg 13, volume 2635, file number 9-150108. library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements”, 1938/121940/05, volume 258, file number 347-1-6 (part 2), reproduction copy number e011195705. library and archives canada, department of health fonds, rg 29, “food and drugs articles taken from newspapers magazines & newspaper advertisements”, 19491953, volume 259, file number 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy number i-115336. united states. food and drug administration. notices of judgment archives. 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(2018). toxic enactments: materializing estrogen and regulation under canada’s food and drugs act, 1939–1953 (unpublished master’s thesis). osgoode hall law school, york university, toronto, on. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) lara tessaro, 2020 44 tomlins, c. (2016). historicism and materiality in legal theory. in m. del mar & m. lobban (eds.), law in theory and history: new essays on a neglected dialogue (pp. 515540). oxford, uk: hart publishing. vandenberg, l. n., colborn, t., hayes, t. b., heindel, j. j., jacobs jr, d. r., lee, d. h., … & zoeller, r. t. (2012). hormones and endocrine-disrupting chemicals: low-dose effects and nonmonotonic dose responses. endocrine reviews, 33(3), 378-455. von schwerin, a., stoff, h., & wahrig, b. (2013). biologics: an introduction. in a. von schwerin, h. stoff & b. wahrig (eds.), biologics: a history of agents made from living organisms in the twentieth century (pp. 1-31). london, uk: picking & chatto. watkins, e. (2007). the estrogen elixir: a history of hormone replacement therapy in america. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. willis, c. g., rampton, s. e., & pugsley, l. i. (1949). variables affecting the assay of testosterone propionate using the seminal vesicle response of the juvenile castrated male rat. endocrinology, 44(3), 251-258. author bio lara tessaro is undertaking doctoral studies in law at the university of kent in canterbury, uk. this article is based on research undertaken for her ll.m. degree, which she attained from osgoode hall law school at york university in toronto, canada. microsoft word 71538-1-11-iraniandphilip.docx irani, l. and philip, k. (2018). negotiating engines of difference. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-11. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © lilly irani and kavita philip. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary negotiating engines of difference lilly irani university of california san diego lirani@ucsd.edu kavita philip university of california irvine kphilip@uci.edu when paula chakravartty and mara mills invited us to a conversation on what it would mean to decolonize computing, we attempted not simply to go back to our earlier work on “postcolonial computing” but to rethink postcoloniality and its limitations in the practice of technopolitics. south asian historiography, experimental and theoretically sophisticated since the 1980s, has influenced almost all contemporary theorizing about colonialism and its aftermath. but how useful are global generalizations and future-oriented strategies that begin from such a specific experience of british imperialism and indian de-colonization? latin american countries, for example, experienced colonialism and imperialism in radically different ways from south asia, both because of the earlier ends of direct spanish or portuguese colonization, and because of their proximity and strategic significance for the us during the 2 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) cold war. indigenous peoples in the americas have experienced multiple layers of colonial violence that are not captured by the frameworks honed in the study of the nineteenth-century british empire. decolonial theory and postcolonial theories alike often pose their struggle as against “western civilization” and “western modernity” (kumar 2015, maldonado-torres, 2016, pp. 10-11). yet contemporary forms of indigenous nationalism rewrite modernity via computation and entrepreneurship while schooling euro-american state and corporate actors in new forms of accommodation of non-western difference. careful decolonial accounts must recognize these diverse experiences of subjugation by the west, while refusing to render the non-west innocent (de la cadena & lien, 2015, p. 442; comaroff & comaroff, 2009). our earlier work on “postcolonial computing” problematized histories and sociologies of technology by drawing on work from targets of eurocentric development: india, brazil, china, and indigenous australia. there we worked to unsettle the presumed universality of technoscience by offering analytical tactics for accounting for difference and uneven circulations. this essay grapples with engines of difference; we now call attention to attempts by technonationalist and capitalist actors to claim and configure (profitable) essential difference. in 2018, the corporate leaders, financiers, and heads of state at the world economic forum (wef) turned their attention to “the multiconceptual world.” the wef is better known as davos; it is one place where state and capital meet to co-ordinate their efforts, work out shared interests, and deal with legitimacy crises. economist sebastian buckup, wef head of programming, explained the multiconceptual turn thus: “we have moved out, gladly so, of a time when the west is in a position to lecture other countries if i might say so … it’s not just about more even distribution or more widely distributed power, we also have different concepts of global governance” (cgtn, 2018). india’s prime minister narendra modi, russian prime minister vladimir putin, and china’s xi jinping all challenge the dominance of “the west” in defining governance and rights norms (babones, 2018); they cite difference as 3 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) grounds for multi-polar global governance. modi’s rule in india has come with a turn toward hindutva, a form of hindu religious nationalism and the aggressive facilitation of accumulation in the name of economic growth and technological nationalism (mishra, 2018). under his rule, india has seen “cow protection” vigilantes — in the name of vegetarianism — lynch muslim cattle traders and dalit (oppressed caste, formerly known as "untouchables") leather-workers (mander, 2018). struggles over land and resources in south asia, once rooted in principles of indigenous sovereignty or citizenship rights, now find themselves overrun by technological nationalist projects. industrialists and state actors call on citizens to sacrifice their lands and relations so the nation can manufacture a “people’s car,” or futurist military drones (dam, 2016; environment support group, 2014). without an analysis of capital and of power within difference, how do we decolonize new techno-nationalisms that re-invent indigeneity as modern power, while seeking legitimacy with ongoing imperial formations of the nation-state and capital? the wef’s multiconceptual turn still accommodates the very hierarchies of humanity that decolonial theories so forcefully identify (subramaniam, 2017; tuck & yang, 2016). for those of us grasping at a decolonial politics of resistance, what are the dangers of embracing a politics that rests simply on revealing and celebrating difference? we proceed with patience, humility, and cautious optimism. we cannot make pronouncements about the future or the forms of politics appropriate to this moment. we only point to a conjuncture and the challenges it throws up for our familiar political categories and problematics. as states claim nationalism as a form of decolonization, we turn to the long history of political contests over the meaning of decolonization beyond south asiabritish relations. frantz fanon, observing decolonization taking place in the context of the cold war, noted that americans “advise the european countries to decolonize on gentleman’s terms” while they “take their role as the barons of international capitalism very seriously” (fanon 2004 (1961), p. 4 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) 38). anti-colonialism, fanon warned in his anti-colonial treatise the wretched of the earth (1961), was being deployed in the interests of an emerging global structure of imperialism and capitalism. the midtwentieth-century transfer of sovereignty to formerly colonized nations was, in some imperial visions, regarded as a mere legal formalism — a transition to a different mode of white trusteeship in which imperial global influence was to be re-forged through novel economic and cultural mechanisms that would place markets rather than militaries, and trade rather than territory, at the center of global networks. it proceeded through “practical tactics such as the creation of radio free europe and committees for the defense of oppressed minorities.” (fanon, 2004 (1961), p. 39). reading fanon reminds us that one cannot read these texts and practices (e.g., us-funded radio broadcasts and social movements for diversity in the third world) with a naive attention simply to the slogans they circulated for or against, decolonization. one would have to pay attention to their contexts, asking: who funded them? whom did they recruit? what other movements did they displace or scramble? what practices accompanied these media and social-movement discourses? the invocation of “decolonization” marked a struggle over the terms of who and what could live, work, trade, and move in the world. communists, social democrats, and religious nationalists were just some of those who struggled to fill the vacuum left by colonial power. in the context of the cold war, americans and europeans employed technical assistance and community development programs to direct new nations and their poor away from communism. the ford foundation, for example, fostered religious difference as a weapon against communism (mccarthy, 1987). it supported buddhist political groupings in burma to bolster social democratic leadership; buddhism, a ford field representative wrote, is “inherently opposed to the tenets of communism” (mccarthy, 1987, p. 101). in india, the foundation seeded the books for india program, later supported by indian philanthropists; the program sought to “intensify the revitalization of traditional indigenous values … 5 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) which may prove an even stronger barrier to the acceptance of communism by hindus and moslems than imported western ideals” (mccarthy, 1987, p. 98). at the same time, anti-colonial nationalist projects shored up cultural difference in the name of national sovereignty (lu, 2010). during the cold war, imperialists and diplomats alike used the terms anti-colonialism, decolonization, and post-colonialism. the terms could be used as a marker of a problem as well as the site of a solution. they were used by advocates of paternalistic economic policies as well as autarkic ones, by imperialists as well as by revolutionaries. diplomats could speak the terms to stabilize the existing world order, even as rebels spoke them to overturn existing orders. decolonization was not a straightforward, liberating process. rather, it was a contest over the very meaning of liberation itself. as the century wore on, the terms of an anticolonial nationalism grew in many directions, including sectarian leftisms and authoritarian populisms. the anti-colonial coat served to cloak the holes in the spaces of practice, administration, and governance that needed to be repaired; yet often it was expedient to continue inhabiting colonial institutional structures (jaffrelot, 2009). the end of the cold war shifted terrains of opportunity and languages of legitimacy for multinational companies and national formations. globalizing corporations shifted sharply in the 1980s from seeing uniformity and standardization as necessary to global expansion to seeing diversity as the key to generating consumption. companies engaged with difference to globalize their markets, first by localizing their products by adapting them for cultural variations. pizza hut, for example, added tandoori in bangalore and starbucks added bean paste pastries in shanghai. even manufacturing supply chains can be reorganized to work through ethnic networks and cottage industries, sometimes celebrating or reifying particularities of cultural practice to strengthen production (bear et al., 2015). the dazzling array of global difference has been good for products and profits. globalizers did not have to sweep the globe free of difference 6 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) in order to prepare it for increased rates of commodity circulation (kraidy, 2005); they readily cathected narratives of national difference, regional variation, indigeneity, and gender variation. ambivalence and hybridity helped build paths toward product diversity and consumer choice more often than they produced effective resistance against malleable, flexible, creative new flows of capital (kraidy, 2005). in twenty-first-century india, as resurgent nationalisms erupted, the entrepreneur became the figure that promised cultural authenticity even with integrations into global capital (philip, 2016; upadhya, 2009). this form of technonationalism idealizes economic growth and spectacular corporate stories, such as indian ceos at google and microsoft, or indian industrialist family tata’s ownership of prestige brand land rover. champions of indian business work to demarcate indian distinctions as business advantages; they transform jugaad — a word that connotes clever, highly-constrained improvisation — into a national brand (kaur, 2016; philip et al., 2010). in the shadows of this pursuit of profitable difference and economic dominance lurk policies that treat labor rights, social movements, small landowners, and forest dwellers as barriers to accumulation and enemies of the nation (irani, forthcoming; subramanian, 2017). special economic zones since the 1950s, technological reconfigurations like india’s 2016 demonetization (patel & weston, 2017), and a host of other development projects actively call on people’s varied aspirations to enroll them in futurities of capitalism (mankekar, 2015; cross, 2014). institutions that stabilize capitalism or mitigate its disasters promote entrepreneurship as a way of channeling the aspirations and frustrations of people in developing countries into financially generative, rather than unprofitable directions (clinton, 2010; baumol, 1991). the world bank, the bill & melinda gates foundation, and the us department of state encourage start-ups, hackathons, and “innovation cultures” to redirect energized, dangerous third world bodies away from terrorism into entrepreneurship (clinton 2010; baumol 1991). technology companies invite feminists and civil rights activists to generate voice 7 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) online, fueling circuits of attention-capital even as these groups pursue human rights or liberation. indian and global policy experts promulgate “the digital” as a promising enabler of accumulation, achievement, access, and the accommodation of difference (irani, 2017; turner, 2006). firms do not simply try to obliterate difference; rather, they study difference as a tactic of transforming citizen-subjects into consumerentrepreneurs through techniques of empathetic design thinking and ngo partnerships (irani, forthcoming).these promises of computing are forged in the settler colonial united states and brought into articulation with nationalist-capitalist promises in india. indian economist kalyan sanyal argues that capitalism negotiates with “the world of difference” (2007, p. 8), as firms, states, and ngos partner to manage the informal economy and the surplus populations produced by dispossession. we argue, a step further, that firms and states not only valorize difference, but also massage, de-construct and re-construct difference into forms that can live well with capital (foucault, 2008 (1978-79)). capitalism does not always annihilate its others; it can come to regulate some differences profitably while violently suppressing and disciplining others. post-colonial and de-colonial frameworks, then, cannot in themselves produce recipes for liberation. in “postcolonial computing,” we wrote “the seams among differences are not simply a source of undesirable unevenness and aberration, but also sites of creativity and possibility” (philip et al., 2012, p. 8). a decolonial computing, however, cannot rest on a celebration of difference, creativity, and possibility. while our prior attempts emerged from an optimistic pedagogical critique, our renewed efforts begin with a caution, situated in a changing political economy. culture and innovation industries now systematically take up counterhegemonic efforts, profitably stripping them of their activist intent (costanza-chock, 2018, p.12). a celebration of difference alone is not enough to sustain a pluriverse – a “world where many worlds fit” (escobar, 2018, p. 16).1 how can we resist or even overthrow the forces that make a pluriverse impossible? 8 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) acknowledgements although the authors contributed equally to this piece, itself based on almost a decade of collaboration, we gratefully acknowledge conversations with anasuya sengupta and ashwin mathew. this collaboration would not have been possible without the intellectual space for interdisciplinary conversations generously built by paul dourish in the uc irvine department of informatics in the early 2000s. notes 1 escobar (2018, p.16) quotes the world social forum which, in turn, echoes the zapatista call: “queremos un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos.” references babones, s. (2018). modi at davos: today we believe in a multicultural world and a multipolar world order. https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones /2018/01/23/modi-at-davos-today-we-believe-in-a-multicultural-worldand-a-multipolar-world-order/#7c7ddfd16fba baumol, w. (1996, january). entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive. journal of business venturing 11(1), 3–22. doi:10.1016/0883-9026(94)00014-x. bear, l., ho, k., tsing, a., & yanagisako, s. (2015, march 30). gens: a feminist manifesto for the study of capitalism. generating capitalism, cultural anthropology website. retrieved from https://culanth.org/fieldsights/652-gens-a-feminist-manifesto-for-thestudy-of-capitalism de la cadena, m., lien, m., blaser, m., jensen, c., lea, t., morita, a., et al. (2015). anthropology and sts: generative interfaces, multiple locations. hau: journal of ethnographic theory 5(1): 437–75. cgtn. (2018) wef: china's presence and the us inspires multiconceptual model https://news.cgtn.com/news/30597a4d7a677a6333566d54/share_p.html clinton, h r. (2010, november1). leading through civilian power: 9 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) redefining american diplomacy and development. foreign affairs 89(6), 13–24. comaroff, j. & comaroff, j. (2009). ethnicity inc. chicago, il: university of chicago press. costanza-chock, s. (2018). design justice: towards an intersectional feminist framework for design theory and practice. proceedings of the design research society. retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3189696 cross, j. (2014). dream zones: anticipating capitalism and development in india. london, gb: pluto press. dam, a. (2016, may 5). defeated development. the quint. retrieved from https://www.thequint.com/news/politics/defeated-development-theabandoned-singur-tata-nano-factory. environment support group. (2014, november 25). challakere villagers overcome barc lies to reclaim amrit mahal kavals. press release: bangalore. retrieved from http://www.esgindia.org/campaigns/press/challakere-villagers-overcomebarc-lies-.html escobar, a. (2018). designs for the pluriverse. durham, nc: duke university press. fanon, f. (2004). the wretched of the earth. (r. philcox, trans.) new york, ny : grove press, 2004. (original work published 1961). foucault, m., senellart, m. (2008). the birth of biopolitics: lectures at the collège de france, 1978-79. basingstoke, gb: palgrave macmillan. irani, l. (2017) hackathons and the making of entrepreneurial citizenship. science, technology, and human values, 40(5), 799-824. — (forthcoming). innovators and their others: entrepreneurial citizenship in indian development. princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 2019. jaffrelot, c. (2009) hindu nationalism: a reader. princeton, nj: princeton university press. 10 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) kloos, s. (2016). the recognition of sowa rigpa in india. how tibetan medicine became an indian medical system. issues, 3(3). lu, duanfang. (ed.) third world modernism: architecture, development and identity. abingdon, gb: routledge, 2011. maldonado-torres, n. (2016). outline of ten theses on coloniality and decoloniality. frantz fanon foundation, http://frantzfanonfoundationfondation frantzfanon.com. mander, h. (2018, july 4). returning to hapur. the indian express (blog).https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/hapur-moblynching-minorities-india-communal-violence-5244625/. mankekar, p. (2015). unsettling india: affect, temporality, transnationality. durham, nc: duke university press. mccarthy, k. (1987). from cold war to cultural development: the international cultural activities of the ford foundation, 1950-1980. daedalus, 116(1), 93-117 mishra, p. (2017). age of anger: a history of the present. new york, ny: farrar, straus and giroux. subramaniam, b. (2017). recolonizing india: troubling the anti-colonial, decolonial, postcolonial in critical perspectives engagements with decolonization and decoloniality in and at the interfaces of sts curated and introduced by kristina lyons, juno parreñas and noah tamarkin . catalyst 3(1). tuck, e. & yang, k. (2012). decolonization is not a metaphor. decolonization: indigeneity, education, & society, 1(1). bios lilly irani, assistant professor of communication, science studies, and critical gender studies, is the author of chasing innovation (2019) and co-founder and maintainer of turkopticon. kavita philip, associate professor of history and affiliate faculty in informatics at the university of california, irvine, is author of civilizing 11 irani and philip catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) natures (2004), and co-editor of four volumes of interdisciplinary work in radical history, political science, art, activism, gender, and public policy. microsoft word brault-123-1239-1.docx brault, c. (2017). feminist imaginations in a heated climate: parody, idiocy, and climatological possibilities. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2), 1-33 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © claire brault, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article feminist imaginations in a heated climate: parody, idiocy, and climatological possibilities claire brault brown university claire_brault@brown.edu abstract this paper proposes to imagine an alternative climate scenario of our future. through a parodic rewrite of intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) climate scenarios, i challenge the rise of geoengineering technologies as a mitigation "solution" for the current ecological crisis. showing that the ipcc is offering capitalocentric visions of ecological futurity and more-than-human economies that contribute to mainstreaming dangerous, hubristic geoengineering, i advance that feminist imagination and conviviality is a more capacious way to face climate change, one that climatology would benefit learning from. i do this drawing from isabelle stengers’ conceptualization of stupidity, which i argue can describe the ipcc’s futurology, and from her figuration of the idiot, a conceptual character who poses questions that cause us to pause and think, opening up possibilities. 2 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) introduction while in the last fifteen years many geologists have argued over the dating and periodization of our current epoch, many feminist voices have problematized the anthropos of the increasingly scientifically consensual term anthropocene, objecting that its universal pretentions masks unequal responsibilities and effects.1 yet, while in the humanities so many critiques of the anthropocene start by specifying that paul crutzen popularized this term (2002), they often fail to mention that he was also the first scientist to break the ice on the subject of geoengineering (2006). in addition, the boom reacting to crutzen’s anthropocenic intervention occurs years after the “anthropogenic” qualification of climate change. the latter emerged in its global institutionalized form with the creation of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) in 1988 and has not yet become the object of substantial conceptual critique. this lack of critical scrutiny regarding the “anthropos” of “anthropogenic” global heating persists even though the date used by the thousands of climate scientists required to reach consensus in consultation with worldwide states is treated as clear, in contrast to the contested starting point of the anthropocene. namely, the ipcc (2013) draws its “anthropogenic” conclusions by comparing temperatures and greenhouse gases after 1750 with millennia of “pre-industrial” data. insofar as the diagnosis raises the question of whether “we”—who heated the earth to the point of compromising future generations’ ability to say “we” again—became “human” in 1750, climate “anthropogenesis” stages a hasty equation between homo sapiens and homo oeconomicus, with “his” universal pretensions. this capitalocentric analysis does not stop at past data: the climate models cited by the ipcc also presume the future predominance of capitalism even a century from now—arguably exacerbated by the formation of carbon markets and possible geoengineering, all in the name of mitigating “solutions.” the relative lack of critique of this “anthropogenic” qualification (compared to the critiques of “anthropocene” abstraction) might be 3 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) attributed in part to a perceived need to tighten up ranks2 against the illnamed “climate skeptics” or “deniers,” long fed funding by oil companies and now triumphing (for instance, with the 2016 us election). but while the oil industry notoriously pursued research corroborating the claim that global warming was caused by all-too-specific oil-addicted humans as early as the 1980s, only to promptly fuel research attempting to refute this very claim later on, a far less notorious fact is that the same companies now fund geoengineering research (hamilton, 2013). it turns out that a certain technoscientific3 confidence makes strange bedfellows of “skeptics” thirsty for lucrative carbon-credits-emitting technologies and climate scientists believing in a unified truth as a foundation for dangerous high-technofixes. universalizing claims about the “man”-made nature of past and present global heating risks creating a scientific climate of technocratic omnipotence apt to justify future ecologically, politically destructive “solutions.” these objections could be dismissed as divisive of the environmentalist movement. but, to the contrary, critical, pluralist, contestatory feminist examination of climate science, and continued (re-) invention of feminist sciences have never been more needed.4 when we accept the simplistic perception that there are only two sides to climate debates, with only one that recognizes “human” impact, the unequal contributions to and effects of climate change on more-than-human lives are erased and hubristic technoscience, rather than more nuanced scientific and technological theories and practices, are deemed justified. this need for pluralizing and contestation defies the commonly held but deceptive perception of the climate crisis as an example of how much environmentalism and feminism need science (the former being assumed as outside the latter). instead, climate change might offer a telling example of how badly the sciences need feminist environmentalist imagination. what would feminist climatological imagination look like? here, as with the case of haraway’s (2016) critique of the anthropocene (she invokes the capitalocene, the industriocene, the plantationocene, and the 4 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) chthulucene), a proliferation of terms is helpful. global warming might be hypothesized as “anthropogenic” if, armed with feminist theory, we underscore problematic entanglements among the man of humanism, the man of western modernity, of capitalism, of plantation, of industrial revolution, contrasting this universalized story with the immense multitude of earth dwellers struggling to seek refuge in a new climate. capitalogenic, industriogenic, plantationogenic, chthulugenic climates beg to be reimagined. i begin from a feminist parody of the ipcc’s scenario descriptions. i then contrast this parody with some of the epistemological assumptions and prescriptive conclusions upon which the nobel peace prize–winning panel’s climatological language relies. parody makes visible the need for feminist theory’s contribution to the climate sciences. the ipcc reports are one of the most prominent and politicized expressions of climatology. they provide the principal scientific ground for international negotiations, while their writers subject themselves to consensus-based deliberations that are highly problematic to many sciences otherwise reliant upon openness to dissensus and contestation. ursula le guin has claimed that “truth is a matter of imagination” (2012), and donna haraway has long valued parody and speculative imaginaries in rethinking epistemological, ontological, ethical, and political commitments (2006, 2015, 2016). similarly, this paper shows one crucial instance where feminist imaginations can feed into scientific knowledge in vital(ist) ways (bennett, 2009; colebrook, 2014). deploying parody, science fiction, and sarcasm, i attempt to defy the capitalocentrism of climatology as futurology. my use of parody acts as a feminist writing strategy (micciche, 2010, pp. 173–188) that underscores the uncertainty, multiplicity, and openness of our futures, begging the question of why certain capitalist futures imagined by the ipcc are so often taken more seriously than other possible alternatives. what sorts of economic arrangements may be most apt at generating a feminist (ecopolitical) climate? what sorts of roles does technology perform in a feminist climate? what sorts of scientific knowledge production might this call for? while i cannot address these 5 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) questions exhaustively here, i would like the following to offer one way to trouble the hegemony of a climatology that stifles the very possibility of asking them. what new questions and possibilities are permitted thanks to the use of feminist parody? more than a mere critique of the ipcc reports, what follows is a proposal for defying some of the hegemonic assumptions and epistemological procedures that animate many of today’s climate debates, making the case for climatologies’ need for feminist imaginaries. before proceeding any further, i should warn that what follows risks being interpellated, misread as a rejection of technology in general. indeed, part of the feminist intervention here consists in a denunciation of a certain “technofixery.” however, when i use the term technofix with a negative valence, it is by no means because of some principled antiscience or technophobic stance but rather to provoke the question of what gets to count as technology, let alone the question of dualisms hierarchically opposing “high” and “low” technology, “backward” and “futuristic” approaches, so as to problematize climatology’s “fixing” approach (which posits that industrial, corporate technologies alone will “fix” the climate, taken as a unified problem warranting such fixing and knowable enough to predictably be “fixed,” etc.). in other words, i evoke “technofixery” as those technologies meant to (impossibly) “fix” the climate crisis in the sense of sustaining capitalist hegemony, not as a rigid opposition to all that can be read as technological. the feminist parodic approach below challenges the exclusion of technologies of the self and of collective more-than-human, noncapitalist assemblages from what counts as legitimate “technology,” proposing instead to “stay with the trouble” (haraway, 2016), i.e., to assume that no technology is innocent but that some deemed more “realistic” may only be so if reality is conceived solely through a capitalocentric lens. 6 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) capitalocentric consensus futurology versus the feminist dissenting imagination by its own description, the ipcc is “the international body for assessing the science related to climate change.” the united nations founded it in 1988 “to provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation” (ipcc, 2016). as such, it has a crucial impact on how public officials in international summits, along with the broader public, view the state of scientific knowledge on climate. synthesizing results generated by the computer models used by climatology worldwide, the ipcc describes what ecological changes to expect and which directions may be less destructive than others. similar scenarios run by computer models in different research projects are grouped in what the ipcc calls “scenario families.” these various possible futures share certain common traits, for instance in demographic terms, or based on how reliant they may be on, say, the service industry or so-called renewable energies as opposed to more polluting energy sources. each of these scenario families is described in a similar language, to enable comparisons. the ipcc asserts its noncommitment to specific programmatic goals to demonstrate an alleged policy neutrality, so as to retain, in true positivist fashion, a semblance of scientific objectivity. as they focus on physical science and the impacts of, as well as adaptation and vulnerability to, climate change, working groups i and ii of the ipcc especially go out of their way to show that they are not pursuing “political agendas,” that is, pushing for one program or set of policies more than others. the third working group is more explicitly prescriptive and composed of more economists alongside physicists, as it writes the reports on mitigation. even a cursory reading of working group iii’s latest report (2014) reveals that two major sets of measures the panel recommends include the creation of carbon trade markets and geoengineering, which shows a general orientation favoring continued 7 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) capitalist predominance. however, even there, policy suggestions are advanced individually so as to appear not to offer a wholesale program that might pressure diplomacy. but the starting point informing the climate-change mitigation recommendations, used by all three working groups, is already symptomatic of the political and economic assumptions climatology makes. the models imagined and projected to assess climate futures are implicitly capitalocentric, to borrow j.k. gibson-graham’s adjective (1996). below is one example of a scenario family description, excerpted from the ipcc reports: the a1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in midcentury and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. the a1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. the three a1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (a1fi), non-fossil energy sources (a1t), or a balance across all sources (a1b). (ipcc, 2013) in relative contrast, the b1 scenario family is described as a convergent world with the same global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the a1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. the emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives. (ipcc, 2013) the ipcc’s presentation of various possible scenarios has certainly had the effect of underscoring the multiplicity of our possible futures: 8 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) relatively like-minded demographers and mostly neoliberal-to-keynesian economists turn out to be capable of imagining several equally possible outcomes. there is something highly valuable in this recognition that in spite of some premature claims celebrating the “end of history” and capitalism’s late 1980s triumph (fukuyama, 2006), the future—lucky for us—is in fact not set in stone. but the language of markets, efficiency, productivity, and, fundamentally, of economic growth (albeit moderate in some scenarios) highlights the underlying assumption behind all of the scenario families described here: global capitalist hegemony. several futures are possible—yet we shall assume that they will indefinitely continue to be capitalist. ultimately, the ipcc scenarios propose a capitalocentric future: they do not consider the possibility (or possible necessity?) of capitalist collapse or the rise of noncapitalist economies. in contrast, i have crafted a noncapitalist, feminist, more-thanhuman “scenario (queer) family.” the following z00 scenario parodically imitates the ipcc’s language and form illustrated above. parody offers a feminist rewriting strategy (micciche, 2010, pp. 173–188) by which the copy’s form imitates the supposed “original” form, yet serves a different content that in part clashes with it. the resulting gap causes an uncanny effect and, ideally, a smile or laughter. what follows, then, is certainly playful, but does not merely mock the models with absurd proposals; instead, it opens up the possibility of imagining another order of things and a glimpse at the contingency of the original. the z00 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of rapid feminist degrowth and slow living; a global more-than-human population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter in favor of queer kinships and generalized access to reproductive autonomy; and the rapid introduction of convivial tools following the abolition of private property as well as the proliferation of do-ityourself (diy). camels, donkeys, feet, and bicycles generalize as more-than-human slower means of transit and companion species. food production diversifies as a result of a global ban on gmos and the generalization of subsistence permaculture, indigenous 9 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) agricultures, and aquatic polycultures in flooded valleys, decreasing in quantity with the decline in population and simplification/diversification of local diets. production becomes almost exclusively local and organic, with commodities’ value measured (if at all) not by exchange but by the durability and use of objects. barter and collectivization of needs and goods at local levels replace routine transport over long distances. major underlying themes are naturecultural bioand economic diversity, bioregional cooperatives, community building, and more leisure time, with a generalization of participatory, local-democratic, scientific, and artistic practices. by 2101 the terms growth, profit (in reference to economies), and capitalist are facing extinction, mostly found in etymology dictionaries. the z00 scenario family develops into multiple groups that each describe diverse postcapitalist economies. the multiple z00 groups are distinguished by their convivial emphasis and how humans spend their liberated time: collective and individual creation of vernacular sciences, art, dance, and music (z0068x); joyful farniente and queer love (z006y); and other activities unimaginable to earlytwenty-first-century human generations (z0070z). this above is no more a program than the ipcc “scenario family” descriptions. some may read it as “merely” science-fictional or “utopian.” yet the point of this parodic, science-fictional rewriting is to underscore that the futures imagined by ipcc scientists themselves are utopian: none entertains the possibility of degrowth and postcapitalist futures. many environmentalists have affirmed that capitalist growth is increasingly incompatible with human survival,5 an impossible direction to sustain—in other words, a dangerous utopia. beyond—or maybe through—the parodic tone of the above scenario, i quite seriously wish to contrast a postcapitalist perspective (gibson-graham, 2006) on climatology with a climatological, capitalocentric imagination. opening up possibilities for noncapitalist economic regimes requires the performative staging of such a contrast and the disruption of 10 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) assumptions about the (unsustainable) capitalist nature of our future. i should specify that my goal here is not merely to rewrite or claim to correct the ipcc’s scenarios, or to propose some sort of symmetrical opposite to them. some have already accomplished valuable work underscoring, similarly, that climate models must be more comprehensive, including noncapitalist scenarios even when these may turn out either more authoritarian or more democratic than capitalist ones. in their “climate leviathan,” j. wainwright and g. mann (2013) have imagined four futures corresponding to different economic and political regimes, including a “climate behemoth” where reactionary and nationalistic conservatism (in part what we are currently resisting, i.e., the global rise of nationalist far-right movements) would triumph, as well as a “climate leviathan” (global green authoritarianism). alternatively, “climate x” would correspond to a communist version of the new climate regime. the authors claim that “climate leviathan seems to have come to stand as the most ‘practical’ response, though many recognize the unlikelihood of its achieving an effective hegemony soon” (p. 15). they write about climate x: “utopianism? not necessarily.” in my view, parody and provocation are apt at underscoring this lack of necessity. my goal, again, is not to establish a program. as michel foucault writes, “the idea of a program of proposals is dangerous. as soon as a program is invented, it becomes law, and there is a prohibition against inventing” (foucault, 1997). besides, countless objections could and should be raised about the z00 scenario’s specifics and its general outline. i have named it z00, picking a letter at the opposite end of the alphabet from the above-cited capitalocentric ipcc scenarios, for contrast and provocation. the double zeros, mimicking the numbering form of the ipcc scenario families, evoke a new beginning, and could also be read as two letters o, such that the whole might sound like a zoo, evoking the concern for multispecies worlds rather than just human economies. yet even this name is ironic, precisely because many zoos cage their animals. noncapitalist scenarios tend to be cast aside, imagined as locked “outside” of what passes for the real world, just like 11 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) wild animals are ascribed a constrained heterotopian space (foucault, 1986). besides, the greek etymology of zoe/zoon for “living being” can all too easily translate as “animals,” a certainly more-than-human (“morethan” and not “other-than”: humans are animals too) yet zoocentric perspective, obscuring plants, bacteria, etc. one could also object that not knowing the conditions in which companion species like donkeys or camels would help with transport, or that, remembering that bicycles and diy often stand for the hipster commodification of degrowth and cooptation of alternatives under consumerist banners, nothing guarantees that my unlikely assemblage would indeed be(come) postcapitalist, let alone nonexploitative. all these are highly technological, too; as such, they include all dimensions of the pharmakon: simultaneously cure and poison, they offer no absolute guarantees. but my alternative scenarios’ goal isn’t noncontradiction or perfection. instead, it is precisely to open up a space in which we might actually entertain and discuss these imperfect yet practical postcapitalist possibilities. what matters with this feminist parodic rewriting is the relation between the scenarios, staging a contrast that raises the question of why one might easily laugh at and/or with a z00 scenario, though many of its key aspects are concrete, local, accessible, participatory, large and small scale, drawing from plural and contested pasts as well as presents and imagined futures, while the ipcc’s capitalocentric scenarios are presented as a pragmatic and perfectly serious sort of futurity (often the only one). instead, i play the idiot’s game of calling the latter scenario stupid (i explain these provocative stengersian terms below), hoping that this will show climatologies’ need for feminist provocation and imagination. the ipcc has been praised even by feminist ecosophers such as emilie hache as offering a “futurology” allegedly capable of informing “an ethics for the future” (2011). these two phrases are originally philosopher hans jonas’s. his imperative of responsibility (1985) inspired many environmentalist thinkers and activists, insofar as it called for a new ethics surpassing kantianism to take into account both future human 12 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) generations and nonhumans, whose survival is threatened and who lack a voice of their own. however valuable this contribution turned out to be for environmentalism, and while we may join hache in appreciating the new, future-oriented way of conducting science the ipcc inaugurated, we may also remember that jonas’s recommendations came with his claims that political leaders should craft their deliberations based on the figure of a future-oriented, benevolent “patriarch” looking after his wife and children (present and future more-than-human generations), after consulting “experts” in the new science he named “futurology.” if the expertise the ipcc has provided thus far may indeed qualify as futurology, and if we also recall that, even though the general public has often seized the reports, these are primarily addressed to “policymakers,” we may doubt that this should be the object of praise. the ipcc functions internally on the basis of consensus, compiling climatological studies worldwide. therefore, the epistemological procedures it observes seem highly democratic. however, that this panel must commit to consensus in fact impoverishes its reasoning. futurological consensus erases dissent, flattening knowledge to generate an illusion of sciences speaking univocally. among others, gaia theorist james lovelock, though he problematically made apocalyptic warnings and advocated for geoengineering a few years ago (positions he later retracted—2007, 2010), has rightly stressed that dissensus and openness to contestability make for the production of sounder scientific knowledge than does consensus. let us add that this pertains to the sciences as it does to politics at large: at stake are different conceptions of democracy, namely agonistic, contestatory versions (e.g., honig, 1993). the perceived pressure to tighten ranks to denounce “climate skeptics” obscures how clearly politically charged and damaging to pluralism climatology can be, and how much it marginalizes alternative climate futures. one may laugh at the above mentions of community economies, naturecultural diversity, and queer, more-than-human kinships. but capitalocentric desires for endless growth that inform the ipcc models consensually obviate what could, in the end, be a possible future, all the 13 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) while allowing little to no laughter to be directed at unsustainably, capitalocentric futurities made of geoengineering or carbon markets. in considering the volatility of capitalism, political theorist william connolly has underscored the need to distinguish between likelihood and possibility (2013). the capitalocentrism of the ipcc scenarios may at first glance seem more likely, but my parodic description of a postcapitalist future can become possible if we expand our imaginaries (yusoff & gabrys, 2011), highlighting already existing alternatives : virtually all of the eclectic assemblages of technologies in the z00 scenario already exist and are constantly evolving. this imaginative effort may be bolstered by parodic science-fictional rewrites of climatological models, among possible strategies. as the degrowth movement (among other critics of capitalism) has shown (meadows, 1972; ariès, 2005; latouche, 2009; kallis, 2011), we may well go so far as to point out defiantly that capitalocentric futures are in fact less likely, or quite literally less viable, than postcapitalist alternatives—parody opens the possibility to turn the tables and show the dangerous utopianism of capitalist futurity as well as the potential pragmatism of myriad “other” experiments that are usually marginalized and assumed to be “low-tech” or to belong to an archaic past on a universal developmental timeline. a feminist climatology does not shy away from contesting the ipcc’s consensus. it dissensually imagines seemingly unlikely futures in order to expand the realm of the possible. as has become increasingly obvious with queer-theory debates on temporality (edelman, 2004; halberstam, 2005; muñoz, 2009; freeman, 2010), visions of the future operate as normative technologies. with z00 futures, i propose to playfully conjure the visions of capitalocentric futurology in climatology’s models that the ipcc reports illustrate. geoengineering stupidity let us now turn to the major differences between the ipcc perspective and my own science-fictional yet nonutopian scenario “family,” through 14 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the tropes of isabelle stengers’s concepts of stupidity and idiocy. in “gaia, the urgency to think (and feel)” (2014), stengers argues that the ipcc’s working group i’s alarm-sounding should be distinguished from working group iii’s recommendations. she in turn sounded the alarm regarding the specter of geoengineering blackmail: we should certainly not assimilate under the same name, “objective science,” all of what the ipcc is producing. while group i experts get nightmares when they obtain a new understanding of the intricate dynamics of the ice sheets, group iii experts tell no such stories about the protagonists of their scenarios. they tell no stories at all but envisage the costs and benefits of measures to be taken by benevolent states respecting the functioning of the market. when the failure of this business-as-usual approach will be recognized, we may anticipate that it is also among those experts that the possibility of a “good anthropocene” will take its official roots. it will be claimed that there is no choice but to try and tame gaia. geoengineering will be presented as a logical accomplishment in the great history of human emancipation and mastery—and those who resist will be accused of betraying our destiny. the script is already written. here stengers rightly suggests that blackmail and failure have long been the very conditions for the reproduction of capitalist imagination, and that geoengineering is becoming the supposed logical response to climate change, prolonging the dreams of mastering nature that have long plagued science. i have argued above that the ipcc reports in general— across working groups—express a capitalocentric imaginary. i thus differ slightly from stengers. granted this nuance, i will draw from stengers to critique the particularly hubristic turn that this climatological perspective has taken, especially with the ipcc’s latest assessment report in 2014– 15. the ipcc’s recommendations have long proposed to rely upon carbon-trading markets to limit co2 emissions. that has worked superbly in china, for instance, where vast fields of windmills have earned 15 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) investors lucrative carbon credits, while the way these windmills may eventually be connected to the actual electric grids remains uncertain and ecologically costly (davidson et. al., 2016). but leaving aside the highly contestable yet “consensual” ipcc idea of remedying a capitalogenic climate crisis with further capitalist ventures in the form of carbon trading, i focus below on a more recent development among the ipcc’s recommendations to then contrast it with my feminist parodic thought experiment. the ipcc’s 2014 mitigation report and 2015 synthesis report opened a new chapter in the history of the panel. these embraced geoengineering (in the form of carbon dioxide removal – cdr) technologies as an allegedly compelling “mitigation solution.” the ipcc developed the notion of “overshoot,” accompanied with subsequent deployment of carbon trapping technologies, as one possible path to mitigation. un climate conferences, following ipcc advice, have gradually and (in)famously generated the threshold of a 2°c increase in global mean temperature as the “acceptable” limit (even though the ipcc also provided evidence that many, often poor, regions of the world would suffer drastically from such an increase). with its fifth assessment report (2015), the panel now entertained possibilities of “temporarily” “overshooting” the 2° target, but eventually compensating in part for this excess with future cdr technologies. “overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread use of beccs and afforestation in the second half of the century” (p. 12). in other words, this strategy counts on hypothetical geoengineering technologies that have not yet been invented, proven effective, or shown to be without major risks of worsening the situation, let alone ethically acceptable or democratically supported. among cdr techniques, the ipcc most seriously considered bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or beccs (2014, p. 12). this would consist of growing trees and other carbon-absorbing biomass and then burning it in power plants designed to capture carbon emissions before they reach the atmosphere, supposedly generating energy with 16 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) “net zero” emissions while removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. many questions are unanswered regarding beccs, including where such captures would then be stored, where the immense necessary biomass could be planted, whether such massive land use would not further aggravate climate change (land use already contributes 24% of direct emissions, according to the ipcc), and how leaks from storage would be avoided. similarly to the ethico-political questions relevant to nuclear waste, one also wonders how humans today could ensure that living beings in the deep future would not be endangered were they to dig the storage open inadvertently, which could cause runaway climate change. certainly one could object that plants evolved their own natural technology (photosynthesis) to bury carbon in the ground as an integral part of the complex earth systems within which we live and act. yet, as the “overshoot” scenario has it, the sort of burial that human industry would perform would be developed over a few decades rather than over the deep time of plant evolution, and would be concentrated in burial sites that, if opened, would leak their carbon all at once: a perfect “runaway climate change” recipe. thus, both spatially and temporally, the concentration and acceleration at play prompts dark laughter with regard to such technologies, as we humbly admit that plant technology vastly outdoes industrial phantasms. time will tell whether hubristic confidence pays off. let us remain caught up in the same growth-oriented logic and postpone to a hypothetical future the supposed solution for the problem wrought by such logic. granted, the “solution” itself assumes more technoscientific progress and “mastery” of nature (plumwood, 2002) at the planetary level. furthermore, one possibility (among many others) that escapes under the ipcc’s capitalocentric blind spots is that further knowledge concerning the technologies imagined could perhaps result in conclusions that such technologies may ultimately be judged too risky and uncertain. unimaginable for consensual futurology is the possibility that we humans do not and might not ever know enough to tinker helpfully with the global climate. in other words, the specific kind of 17 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) scientific-technological knowledge at play here refuses to entertain its own (present and future) limits. in aux temps des catastrophes (2013), stengers explains that our need to think becomes dangerously incapacitated in the current ecological crisis. she points to the urgent need to name la bêtise (translated as “stupidity”). stengers distinguishes “stupidity” from “dumbness” (the french false cognate of stupidité). the former is an active force rather than a stable attribute defining specific individuals. bêtise/stupidity traverses, seizing people and assemblages. being dumb when confronted with a terrible situation would in contrast take the form of paralysis (the french word for “dumb” shares its root with “stupor”), curtailing action in the face of a larger force. dumbness engenders numbness. in contrast, and likely more destructively, bêtise actively engages forces into actions that do not match, and even worsen, the exigencies of a particular situation.6 i contend that cdr technofixes correspond quite precisely to this designation. in stengers’s view, stupidity currently inhabits those “(ir)responsible” for making decisions.7 in the ipcc reports, the potentially helpful and necessary diagnosis of a situation of ecological crisis as requiring rapid, drastic change and stemming from the industrial period contrasts with the incapability to think beyond capitalocentric futurology led by large-scale technological “experiments,” top-down policy-making, and technocratic environmentalism. it does not seem to have occurred to ipcc scientists and economists that, just as not all human history (let alone all earth history) has been capitalist, neither do all future times have hegemonic capitalism written on them. thus, technofixes that make humans and many current earth dwellers dependent on one specific, contingent, and recent economic mode of production may not be acceptable ethically or politically. here we encounter the very issue i initially staged with the question of technofixery: the issue is not so much with the techne, as a bicycle or a social movement’s collective strategy can also be considered forms of technology. the problem lies with the assumptions made about 18 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) definitive choices durably committing us and deeming the matter resolved, or deeming the goal to be resolution (the “fixing”), curtailing attempts at posing capitalist economies and their “others” as problems and questions. one common characteristic of virtually all geoengineering techniques is that in order to be implemented, they rely upon major industrial means being sustained. were geoengineering technology to crash suddenly for whatever reason, if the models were right, such a crash could result in unpredictable change in atmospheric chemistry, which would be potentially vastly destructive for the biota at the time of the accident. therefore, beginning to rely on such technology may condemn future generations of more-than-human living beings to stick to industrial economies indefinitely, unless they wish to commit mass suicide. capitalist economies have been oil-dependent for a while now, and geoengineering could further seal an even more profound and durable dependence on industrial economies. in reflecting upon what a convivial (postindustrial, postcapitalist) society would look like,8 precursor theorist of degrowth ivan illich (2001) critically denounced “radical monopolies.” for instance, a monopoly emerges if only one soda company produces soda, but people who are thirsty may still be able to drink water instead. if, on the other hand, the only available mode of transit in some areas becomes the car, a commodity (the car) exercises a “radical monopoly” over the satisfaction of a need (mobility). i suggest that geoengineering may be a “hyper-radical monopoly”: even if it “worked,” it could result in making the more-than-human species that currently (struggle to) exist on this planet dependent for their very condition of existence on one technological solution that is itself contingent upon a hegemonically industrial mode of production. the ipcc’s generous proposals of developing such technology sets up capitalocentric blackmail for generations to come. having busied itself to speak in one single, consensual voice making a “strong case” for “anthropogenic” (capitalogenic, industriogenic) climate change, the ipcc’s new “overshoot and geoengineer” tack commits present and future humans and many more-than-humans to capitalogenic climates. 19 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) this plan assumes full confidence in industrialism and requires indefinite espousal of capitalist modes of production, ignoring the major historical evidence of their technologies’ fallibility and economies’ volatility. great plan! where we do sign? but of course, consent, now or in the future, is not truly part of the discussion, at least not in any sort of depth, as a scientifically “consensual” case for diagnosing an “emergency” justifies all sorts of decisions. how future generations of humans and more-than-humans might consent, and how democratic worldwide support might be provided even today, remains a puzzle. similar arguments to those used for legitimizing nuclear energy inform the ipcc’s advocacy of geoengineering. we would surely be invited to trust the experts, once geoengineering techniques are deemed operational; the consensual futurologists will assure us that the “probability” of an accident is infinitesimal. this probability will then be equated to a risk (beck, 1992), with no consideration that risk may be better weighed by taking into account not only probabilities but also the extent of the damage (potentially devastating and planetary, in this case) were the technofixes to fail. even in the unlikely case that geoengineers invented a technology deemed 99.99% reliable, if the 0.01% chance of failure means potentially eradicating countless species on earth, would it be ethically sound to proceed? the “stupidity” of probability-based reasoning has tragically been demonstrated by nuclear accidents in chernobyl and fukushima. given, then, the enormous risk involved in geoengineering the climate—which engages a much vaster scale than the regions any given nuclear plant threatens, as well as planetary complex systems we are far from grasping fully—wouldn’t taking such a risk require at least unanimity among present and future more-than-human species, if it were to be democratically founded at all? how would that be attainable? additionally, nuclear plant accidents threaten the complex earth systems. beccs purport to regulate those systems, which may require even greater epistemological confidence and vastly broader knowledge and predictability. with these considerations in mind, don’t capitalocentric scenarios like the new “overshoot” scenario seem 20 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) profoundly utopian, in the most totalizing and dangerous sense of this term? these may indeed become much more laughable (a tragic laughter) and “lower-tech” than my z00 scenario (queer) family. feminist idiocy in the 2015 preface to the english edition of au temps des catastrophes, stengers sarcastically writes: today, the grand campaign to deny the problem has run out of breath a little, but the second phase is being prepared. new voices are making themselves heard, asserting that it is impossible to restrict emissions, which in the meantime have exploded. the only solution is geo-engineering. (2015, p. 8) while geoengineering was but a dark future looming on the horizon when she first composed the book in 2008, as argued above, this technofixery constitutes an instance of what stengers then characterized as stupidity. as she has already reminded us, there is “no guarantee whatsoever that the sciences, at least as we know them today, are equipped to respond to the menaces of the future” (stengers, 2009, p. 22). in order to confront ipcc stupidity, we may now invite to the stage yet another stengersian “conceptual character”—the idiot (2005). armed with my parodic family scenario and a bit more provocation, i contend that some not-so-stupid, though perhaps idiotic, feminist sciences and theory may be better “equipped” to think through the “menaces of the future.” the questions raised at the end of the section above are, to an extent, symptomatic of what stengers calls “idiocy:” namely, they offer welcome pause to think, a mode of address that, however important, is not intelligible to accepted and public discourse, performing a disruptive effect. such salutary idiocy poses questions heretofore unaddressed by climatological futurology. stengers describes the idiot as being defined by her resistance to both consensus and urgency: in the ancient greek sense, [idiocy refers to]…a semi-private language that excludes from a form of communication 21 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) characterized by an ideal of transparency and anonymity….[the idiot] is the one who always slows the others down, who resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in which emergencies mobilize thought and action. (2005, p. 994) thus idiotic interventions disrupt the rush of stupidity, causing pause. while those stressing urgency rush to an “and so,” the idiot demands that we slow down. in the face of the crisis or emergency, s/he proposes the conditions of emergence of critical thought. in fact, it may be precisely when emergency is so saliently felt that we need to elasticize time to make sounder moves. there is a risk of idiocy not being intelligible by the consensual knowledge structures it disrupts. the greek word idiot, evoked above by stengers, sharing its etymological root with the english word “idiom,” refers to a private, idiosyncratic way of thought that struggles to be publicly understood or recognized and may be dismissed by preconceived and accepted views. in spite of this risk, the idiot is valuable insofar as “she demands that we slow down, that we don’t consider ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what we know” (stengers, 2005, p. 995). idiocy, as a form of radical skepticism, an antidote to hubris, underscores the limits of knowledge and does not assume, in the case of climatology for instance, that the climate can be modeled in a sufficiently accurate way to warrant a single solution with a single, sweeping, and mass-scale technological fix. the technological practices deployed in an idiotic z00 scenario are multiple, contestatory, and open-ended struggles rather than fixed ones. indeed, the parodic scenario description offered at the beginning of this paper intends such disruption—not only as such, but because of the contrast between the scenarios and the resulting highlighting of some of the immensity of what is left to imagine. in writing a family of scenarios to envision a world beyond the imaginable capitalist futures exclusively considered by mainstream climatology, this parodic intervention provokes us to wonder whether such complexity could even be calculable under the metrics of current economic laws assumed to track climate change accurately in emissions scenarios. by extension, it 22 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) highlights that the capitalocentric models contain a lot of unknowns as well. this is why my z00 scenario concludes with the qualifying phrase “mostly unimaginable to early twenty-first-century human generations.” from this radically skeptical perspective, we may turn to scientific views that do not presume ecological behaviors to be fully knowable or predictable in the future, as well as economic, social, and political developments producing arrangements beyond the blinders of capitalist economies. the idiotic, parodic scenarist invites and stages disruptive questions not interrogated by capitalocentric imagination: “do/should we really need/desire endless capitalist growth, anyway?” “isn’t industrial globalization bound to disappear, just like all economic forms in human history so far, and be replaced by arrangements unfathomable to current generations?” “can the climate ever be modeled in sufficiently accurate ways to allow us to geoengineer it?” the parodic form, as it mimics and yet subverts, caricaturing the ipcc’s language, performs and provokes idiotic questions: the idiot neither speaks the common language nor shares the common assumptions this language undergirds. therefore, with parody and critique as allies, the idiot can espouse the ipcc’s turns of phrase but include proposals such as biking, the abolition of private property, or queer more-than-human kinship, opening a space for the uncanny, for laughter, for unfamiliar grounds, and for staging a relation between these imaginaries that defies the presumption that ipcc capitalocentrism would be all that realistic or pragmatic after all. it becomes possible to mock capitalocentrism, perhaps even to dismiss it as dangerously utopian, disconnected from the reality that capitalist growth is unsustainable and destructive. in contrast to the declarations of an ipcc that synthesizes climatological research from negotiations seeking consensus within a community of scientists and mainstream economists accountable to the united nations, an idiotic approach may dissensually compare the mitigation “solutions” proposed by the ipcc to a multitude of existing proposals. this approach foregrounds ongoing attempts at the concerted and participatory proliferation of a new ethics and new modes of living at 23 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) various scales, i.e., diverse economies in the here and now (gibsongraham, 2011), with present and future generations as a matter of concern (hache, 2014), “queer kinships,” and more-than-human sympoiesis (haraway, 2015) contrasting with the language of “population control” typical of the ipcc. thus i describe the z00 scenario as one where private property has been abolished and feet and bicycles have taken over as modes of transport, to the detriment of car hegemony. community economies and indigenous and organic local food production have generalized. alternatives that today are usually relegated to the margins have instead spread to displace the hegemonic capitalist mode of production from its throne. some of the key notions informing this scenario include community economies, as advocated, for instance, by j.k. gibson-graham: i.e., economies in which surplus value generated by workers is shared instead of being appropriated by a small minority owning the means of production. conviviality (illich, 2001; humbert et al., 2011) and degrowth (ariès, 2005; latouche, 2009; kallis, 2011) replace business as usual. taken together, these assemblages, forming “ecoegalitarian resonance machines” (connolly, 2008), are indeed elaborate collective and subjective technologies no less legitimate than those geoengineering “emergency” measures in “overshoot scenarios” considered so “high-tech.” here it may be objected that my z00 climate scenario risks setting up a problematic binary that merely opposes climatology’s futurity with a romantic “return” to “other,” supposedly “low-tech” approaches. but there is a vast difference between a “return” narrative, a binary opposition, and an intervention highlighting what is made unthinkable by a specific knowledge’s hegemonic status. the scenario above assembles a patchwork of approaches that do not always speak to one another, from degrowth and conviviality, ecosophical and ecopolitical movements more present in europe and latin america (d’alisa et al., 2014), to climate justice, feminist, and queer ecologies language, as well as indigenous and non-western views and practices, all of which are already in existence and in movement. thus, far from the retrogressive imposition of 24 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) an alleged binary opposite, such an assemblage stages a pluralistic defiance to hegemonic, contradictory, impossibly capitalocentric consensus futurology; it foments multiplicities that contrast and challenge contemporary hegemonic economies: the idiot disrupts the supposed anonymity and transparency of public discourse (usually assumed to be one). spatially, the parodic z00 scenario incites questioning of what counts as largeversus small-scale experimentation: aren’t the noncapitalist assemblages evoked here already widespread? temporally, contrary to a possible (mis)reading in terms of “return” and mere revaluation of “low-tech” approaches, the parodic idiot’s tone incites defiance regarding normative, linear temporalities that assume “forward” or “ahead.” this presumption that low-tech and diverse postcapitalist economies are “backward” or regressive indeed assumes that “modernity” has so far been moving “forward” (latour, 2012) and that “forward” has meant “better”; it denies, in an all-too-familiar western colonial gesture, the coeval nature of these “other” modes (fabian, 2014). similarly, distinctions cannot be reduced to a binary opposition between capitalist accelerationism and slow movements: indeed, the slowness of more ecologically bearable transport or food may result in denser convivialities and faster critical thinking. the idiot’s pause is one that makes room for an acceleration of the pace of thought and the fast, unpredictable proliferation of possibilities. their exclusion from the realm of the legitimately “technological” is an indication of what is taken to be likely, given hegemonic yet contingent economic systems, more than of what is possible to live and imagine. parody also opens up an occasion to laugh at western, all-too-modern magic (capitalocentric) wand9 hubris as ultimately less, not more, pragmatic than the myriad alternatives already deployed by so many who are allegedly on the margins but are potentially so central to “staying with the trouble” (haraway, 2016). the same sort of idiotic questions erupt from this parody when it comes to “low” versus “high” tech: why would diy or bicycling count as “low-tech” while geoengineering counts as “high,” and why would “high” 25 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) signify a “superior,” more “advanced,” or more valuable (valued) way on a vertical axis representing hierarchy? the laughter produced by parody offers a glimpse at the answer, which has to do with exclusions of noncapitalist knowledges and practices (themselves not innocent or pure, but perhaps offering a different order and economy of power). especially when the lowest-denominator resistances call on us to “unify” and “march for science” while we hope to defend, mobilize, and deploy different, pluralistic sciences, and when vital nuances are flattened by perceptions of an allegedly “common” enemy, it matters greatly that we highlight more complex lines distinguishing plural and contested commitments to the sciences and politics, as well as the politics of science. the climate-change-as-corporate-opportunity vision of al gore (gore, 2013, p. 592; luke, 2015), the investments of the climate-skeptic oil industry into geoengineering research (hamilton, 2013), and the studies on “aerosol injections” currently conducted at harvard with the united nations’ geoengineering governance initiative’s blessing make strange bedfellows these days. it matters which sciences and which technologies get to be defended, for which ones we may march and to which feminism contributes, distinguishing also against which science we might in fact protest, all while avoiding dualistic critique. feminist parody defies climatological stupidity by raising this sort of idiotic objection, potentially producing different climes. parody has the advantage of provocation, partly compensating for the risk run by the idiot of not being heard—though, even with parody, the risk of not being understood remains. i do not expect all the suggestions above to be fully understood. however, i hope to have shown that, where climatology’s capitalocentric gaze reads the post-1750 past as producing “anthropogenic” climate change, we may instead critique capitalogenic, industriogenic, plantationogenic climates and that, where climatological futurology assumes all futures shall be capitalist, we may laugh a feminist laughter that underscores other possible climates. 26 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) notes 1 one would be hard-pressed to exhaustively synthesize these critiques, from donna haraway and her creative proliferation of terms (the chthulucene, plantationocene, industriocene, capitalocene, etc—2015), to giovanna dichiro’s note that the environmental justice movement has not been taking on this universalizing notion and its masking of unequal responsibilities and impacts. stacy alaimo has critically engaged (2016) post-colonial historian dipesh chakrabarty (2009)’s conception of the disembodied “human” as a “geological force,” and has contested his claim that experiencing “ourselves” as a species is an unprecedented situation. isabelle stengers’ questioning of the “troubling abstraction,” “man” (2015), performs similar critique. though it is one of the most vibrantly responsive, feminist theory isn’t alone in objecting to the concept of anthropocene. examples beyond feminism include the term “capitalocene,” developed in j.w. moore’s 2016 anthology, or ecology theorist dorion sagan’s questioning of anthropocentric humans’ naming an epoch, when the massive oxygen pollution produced by cyanobacteria eons ago, making the proliferation of life possible, has yet to be granted the title of “cyanocene” (2017). 2 see for instance bill mckibben’s bellicose rhetoric and call for unity (2016). 3 here i follow, as do the other essays in this special issue, the distinction made by sandra harding between science and the sciences (2008), extending it to climatology and climatologies. 4 many climate justice voices have denounced the inadequate character of the response to the climate crisis on the part of governments, as well as the connections between big oil and funding of climate skeptic research. for lack of possibly reviewing exhaustively this literature, one example includes research reports and position papers published as early 27 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) as 1999 by bruno, karliner and brotsky, or more recently, the assemblage of manifestoes and position papers published in the occasion of the cop21’s preparation in new york, titled “what now for climate justice?” (bond et. al, 2014). however in both of these instances as in much of the literature, if the cops (the unfccc’s annual conventions on climate change) are denounced as insufficient, ineffective, and tied with big money, usually the ipcc is cited in uncritical manners— bruno et. al. mentioned the ipcc in passing describing it as “a large group of the best climate scientists” (1999, p. 12). the ipcc is taken as a major reference (which it certainly is) and its reports as the needed authority to ground radical environmentalist claims (which is problematic in my view). this paper challenge this authority by, rather than assuming climate justice needs climatology, showing that imagining climate futures requires feminist insight. 5 for example, as early as 1996, economists h.e. daly and k.n. townsend’s “impossibility theorem.” 6 an english edition of stengers’s book, in catastrophic times: resisting the coming barbarism, came out in 2015. however, here i use the french text, because of the nuance explained here between stupidité (dumbness) and bêtise(stupidity). the latter, one may add, also connotes beastly (bête) recklessness, a more-than-human resonance that does not lack irony. 7 here lies another reason why i turn to the original french text. there stengers refers with great irony and even sarcasm to nos responsables (“our public officials,” “those in charge of/responsible for us”) and contrasts them with objectors to growth like herself, activists, and some scientists who may be deemed “irresponsible” from what i (following gibson-graham) call a capitalocentric viewpoint. however, in the english text, the translation of this term as “our guardians” causes a loss of the sarcastic and defiant tone. 28 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) 8 in illich’s “convivial society,” tools would serve humans rather than the opposite, a problematically dualistic human/technological vision i cannot fully develop here. however, i use the term above because it resonates with my z00 scenario, in a loose interpretation of illich as preoccupied with autonomy and solidarity. 9 political theorist timothy w. luke wrote of geoengineering as a wouldbe “miracle cure” as early as 2010. references alaimo, s. 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(2010). queer ecologies: sex, nature, politics, desire. bloomington, in: indiana university press. muñoz, j.e. (2009). cruising utopia: the then and there of queer futurity. 33 brault catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) new york, ny: nyu press. plumwood, v. (2002). feminism and the mastery of nature. new york, ny: routledge. sagan, d. (2017). beautiful monsters: terra in the cyanocene. in s. tsing et al. (eds.), arts of living on a damaged planet (pp. m169-m174). minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. stengers, i. (2005). the cosmopolitical proposal. in b. latour & p. weibel (eds.), making things public: atmospheres of democracy (pp. 994-1015). cambridge, ma: mit press. ——— (2013). au temps des catastrophes: résister à la barbarie qui vient. paris, france: découverte. ——— (2014). gaia: the urgency to think (and feel). in the thousand names of gaia: from the anthropocene to the age of the earth. conference, rio de janeiro. retrieved from https://osmilnomesdegaia.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/isabellestengers.pdf ——— (2015). in catastrophic times: resisting the coming barbarism. london, uk: open humanities press. wainwright, j., & mann, g. (2013). climate leviathan. antipode, 45(1), 122. yusoff, k., & j. gabrys. (2011). climate change and the imagination. climate change, 2(4), 516–534. bio claire brault is a postdoctoral fellow at brown university. before completing her phd in political science at the university of massachusetts, amherst, claire brault earned her ba and her ma in law and political studies from the university of rennes, in her native brittany (france). her work draws from a number of disciplines and interdisciplinary fields: environmental political theory, feminist theory, feminist science and technology studies, ecocriticism microsoft word 71526_1_11_mills.doc mills, m. (2018). the hard disciplines. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © mara mills. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary the hard disciplines mara mills new york university mmills@nyu.edu science and technology studies (sts) is a latecomer to postcolonial and decolonial debates. in 2012, kavita philip, lilly irani, and paul dourish published “a tactical survey” of possibilities for postcolonial computing, noting that “the ‘hard’ disciplines” — the sciences and science studies — had by and large held themselves apart from the political and theoretical movements common across other academic fields. “sts did take on the hard bastion of objectivity,” they explained, “transforming euro-american sociology, history, and philosophy. however, much of the mythos of the western origin stories of science and rationality, while being demolished in theory, manifested itself in practice, in a locational focus on euroamerican spaces of science” (philip et al., 2012, p. 6). on the other hand, sts scholars have repeatedly lamented the lack of attention to “hard” science and technology within the mainstream of postcolonial studies. in a recent issue of science, technology, and human values dedicated to feminist postcolonial technoscience, editors anne pollock and banu subramaniam insist that this inattention is no longer tenable. “as science 2 mills catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and technology have ... moved center stage in the circuits of state and global power,” they write, “we have witnessed technoscience’s vital role not only in those circuits but also in the social movements that resist them” (pollock & subramaniam, 2016, p. 952). can the big guns of critical theory be retrained from poems and movies onto algorithms or process control? among those who are working at the intersection of postand decolonial theories and sts, a common approach has been to examine the legacies of colonial ideology within engineered objects, scientific categories, or medical protocols — the ways these things incorporate and prescribe particular values. histories of international technical standards have been an important branch of this research because standards exhibit, as susan leigh star and martha lampland point out, “generative entrenchment,” wherein early decisions “ramify throughout the growth of the system” (star & lampland, 2009, p. 14). a classic example of generative entrenchment in computing is the “linguistic imperialism” that inflects nearly all the information technologies initially designed by or for english speakers, from the level of the operating system to that of the screen. in a 2016 issue of the ieee annals of the history of computing, dongoh park explains that “the english language has long served as the lingua franca of computing and computer mediated communication. many of the core applications and standards of digital computing, including programming languages, operating systems, and applications, have been developed, documented, and serviced in english” (park, 2016, p. 40). when it comes to computing, to use the terms of marxist critique, the technical “base” and the culturalaesthetic “superstructure” cannot be cleanly separated. linguistic imperialism materializes in optical character recognition (ocr) software that is slower and less accurate — or that fails entirely — for so-called “special characters” including asian scripts, multilingual mexican colonial documents (see hannah alpert-abrams, in this roundtable), and braille. similarly the speech-processing software in cochlear implants, marketed globally by only a few corporations, is 3 mills catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) largely based on historical trials with english-speaking test subjects, and privileges non-tonal over tonal languages.1 the generative entrenchment of colonial ideals also structures visual media. as simone browne explains in her book dark matters: on the surveillance of blackness, embedded racism and “white prototypicality” pervade today’s digital imaging technologies (browne, 2015, p. 110).2 valuable though they are, exposés of embedded ideology run the risk, as pollock and subramaniam point out, of maintaining or emulating unidirectional models of technological progress wherein “science, rationality, progress, and enlightenment always rest in europe or the west, to subsequently diffuse to non-western nations” (p. 953). these critiques often demand technological solutions in a manner that can sit too comfortably with the ideals of innovation, utility, progress, and development. is it decolonizing to improve technology incrementally, expand access to mainstream computing, or diversify ownership and management within corporate capitalism? beyond invention and design, postcolonial and decolonial analyses can be applied at every stage of the global computing supply chain: physical resource extraction, information extraction in the emerging paradigm of “data colonialism,” low-wage electronics manufacture and low-wage digital labor, pirate assembly, e-waste, pollution, and environmental justice. digital colonialism also manifests in the interlacing of computing and everyday life, from digital border control to automated weaponry to airbnb-enabled racism to the spillover between virtual and physical harassment. narrow stories of heroic ict invention — limited to predictable regions and elite actors or corporations — often fail to weigh the significance of political economy, law, and (inter)national policy. scientific knowledge production can also be expanded or re-situated by calling attention to information transfer and idea theft, historical misattribution, and “peripheral” digital practices (see anita say chan, in this roundtable), or by emphasizing labor, maintenance, and repair rather than invention. many postcolonial sts scholars foreground the ways people take 4 mills catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) advantage of technology: how they domesticate, personalize, and interpret the electronic artifacts they come by; how icts are appropriated or put to unintended purposes, from improvisation to creative misuse to outright remaking. others underscore the prevalence of resistance, refusal, abandonment, and non-use. from social media to digital databases, icts are equally present in the ongoing project of decolonization, playing significant roles in activism and scholarly criticism. but tools of computing and telecommunication were built to employ us, treating us as the “human factor” in technical networks at once dense and extensive. to enroll computing in the project of decolonization, the devices that occupy so much of our time must equally preoccupy our research and inquiry. acknowledgements i want to thank lizza dauenhauer-pendley for introducing me to the concept of data colonialism. notes 1 i’ve written on this topic in “do signals have politics? inscribing abilities in cochlear implants,” the oxford handbook of sound studies, ed. trevor pinch and karin bijsterveld (oxford up, 2011), 320-346. 2 on the term “white prototypicality,” browne cites lewis r. gordon, “is the human a teleological suspension of man? phenomenological exploration of sylvia wynter’s fanonian and biodocean reflections,” in after man, towards the human: critical essays on the thought of sylvia wynter, ed. anthony bogues (kingston, jamaica: ian randle, 2006), 239. references browne, s. (2015). dark matters: on the surveillance of blackness. durham and london: duke university press. philip, k., irani, l. & dourish, p. (2012). postcolonial computing: a tactical survey. science, technology, & human values 37 (1): 3-29. 5 mills catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) park, d. (2016). the korean character code: a national controversy, 1987-1995. ieee annals of the history of computing 38 (2): 40-53. pollock, a. & subramaniam, b. (2016). resisting power, retooling justice: promises of feminist postcolonial technosicences. science, technology, & human values 41 (6): 951-66. star, s. & lampland, m. (2009). reckoning with standards. in standards and their stories, ed. star and lampland. ithaca and london: cornell university press, 3-24. bio mara mills is associate professor of media, culture, and communication at new york university, where she co-directs the center for disability studies. merid article    "stroke’s no joke": race and the cultural coding of stroke risk    beza merid university of southern california merid@usc.edu in august 2009, the american stroke association (asa) began a public service announcement (psa) campaign designed to inform african americans about stroke warning signs and the need to seek immediate emergency medical care at their onset. the campaign, titled stroke’s no joke, featured african american stand-up comedians joking about family members delaying emergency medical care after the first signs of stroke. in addition to jests, the campaign deployed a direct camera address informing the viewer about the dangers of delays in care seeking. the stroke’s no joke campaign included television, radio, online, and billboard psas, using the tag line “time lost is brain lost” to frame stroke as an urgent medical threat. addressing both the disproportionate risk of stroke among african americans and the deleterious effects of delays in seeking emergency care, stroke’s no joke represents a critical endeavor to reduce race-based disease disparities. yet while the campaign was explicitly designed to target african americans, its message to viewers curiously did not articulate racial disparities in stroke risk and death, instead deploying stand-up comedy as a means of shaping the informed african american patient. in this article, i draw on theorizations of the cultural construction of race to examine knowledge production around african american stroke risk. here i rely on the works of janet k. shim (2014) and angela jenks (2010), who illustrate how cultural concepts of race can depoliticize racial health disparities and frame them instead as neutral markers of racial difference.  i take the stroke’s no joke campaign as my focus to analyze how avowed antiracist efforts to intervene in a persistent health inequity can essentialize race as a static marker of cultural difference. in examining african american stroke disparities and the institutional undertakings to address and mitigate them, i argue that this process of essentializing and racializing cultural difference positions both race and culture as apolitical and ahistorical risk factors, stripping such well-intentioned institutional interventions of their stated aims toward equity. in response to this depoliticization of biomedical knowledge production about african american stroke risk, i consider how racial health disparities persist as part of structural, not just cultural, barriers to health equity, and call for a feminist biomedical knowledge production that discursively centers the bodies and lives for whom this knowledge is vital. the “cultural coding” of biomedical knowledge production is part of a broad effort by health institutions to improve the efficacy of interventions into persistent disease disparities. with regard to racial disparities in stroke death, researchers at the centers for disease control and prevention (cdc) found that while stroke mortality declined substantially among different racial groups in the 1970s and 1980s, “little improvement was made in the 1990s” (casper et al. 2003, p. 2). in addition to this slowed decline, they reported that stroke hospitalizations increased 18.6% from 1988 to 1997 (ibid.). in the atlas of stroke mortality: racial, ethnic and geographic disparities in the united states, the cdc’s 2003 report responding to this ongoing crisis, the agency acknowledged the recognition among public health agencies for local interventions that could “provide more targeted and culturally appropriate stroke prevention programs and policies” to better address these racial disparities (ibid). known as “cultural competence,” this model is intended to enable and improve cross-cultural and cross-racial communication in the context of care. this framework of cultural competence works toward understanding the cultural and social influences that shape relationships between medical practitioners and patients as well as the quality of care given; it is also a tenet of institutional efforts to intervene in persistent racial disease disparities like african american stroke risk. emerging from prominent organizations like the department of health and human services (hhs), the american heart association (aha), and the cdc, this call to intervene in racial health and disease disparities reflects concerted institutional attempts to understand and correct individual, cultural, geographical, and structural causes of these disparities. the collective work of these agencies frames persistent disease disparities as the product of individual behaviors, such as delays in care seeking; of cultural beliefs, such as distrust of medical institutions; and of structural barriers to care, such as a lack of local access to emergency services. calls to action recognize racial health disparities as the product of a combination of these factors, advocating for interventions that take each into account. rather than articulating african american stroke risk as such, the logic of stroke’s no joke attributes african american stroke disparities only to individual risk factors and cultural differences, while evading more pernicious structural inequalities and barriers to care. rather than engaging with the complex social determinants of health and illness that shape this persistent disparity, the campaign reconstructs blackness, here via stand-up comedy, as both an object of and a vehicle for biomedical knowledge production.  "stroke’s no joke": the campaign stroke is a leading cause of death among americans in general, and among african americans in particular. according to the cdc, a stroke occurs “when a clot blocks the blood supply to the brain or when a blood vessel in the brain bursts” (know the facts about stroke). immediately following the onset of a stroke, there is a three-hour window during which treatment is most effective in preventing cognitive impairment and death. interventions seeking to reduce stroke mortality through increased patient awareness focus on improving patients’ recognition of stroke symptoms and promoting immediate action during this critical window of time. the cdc reports that more than 795,000 people in the united states suffer a stroke annually, and that stroke kills almost 130,000 americans each year (stroke facts). of the nearly 800,000 strokes reported annually, about 610,000 are first or new strokes and approximately 185,000 strokes occur in people who have had a previous stroke. furthermore, the asa reports that annually, women have more strokes than men, and that stroke kills more women than men (understanding stroke risk). according to data from 2010, the most recent year from which these statistics are available, roughly 55,000 more women than men had a stroke, and 77,109 women—as compared to 52,367 men—died as a result of stroke (women face higher risk of stroke). it is estimated that stroke costs the united states $36.5 billion each year in health care services, medications, and missed days of work (understanding stroke risk). given its significant rates of morbidity and mortality, addressing the enormous toll of stroke on the individual and national body as well as its disparate incidence among african americans is vital. equally pressing, i argue, is the need to understand the means by which african american stroke risk is communicated, and what this reveals about the politics of knowledge production in racial disease disparity interventions. the commercials televised for the stroke’s no joke campaign feature african american comedians alonzo bodden and george willborn each performing stand-up routines in front of a laughing audience. they perform inside a comedy club, dimly lit with a brick wall backing the stage. aside from minor differences in the jokes told, the bodden and willborn commercials are effectively identical. in both their jokes, an uncle phones and complains about experiencing symptoms that the psa would later indicate are stroke symptoms. in both acts, the comedians urge their uncles to seek emergency medical care without delay. bodden, for example, relates to the audience that his uncle experiences dizziness and loss of balance, but after offering to take him to a doctor, his uncle replies, “no, i’m gonna look up the symptoms.” bodden appears incredulous, saying to his uncle, “your symptoms are you’re dizzy and you’re losing your balance!” the audience laughs, and bodden continues that his uncle now complains of an inability to search his symptoms online because his arm has become numb. still exasperated, bodden replies, “well use your good arm and dial 9-1-1!” bodden’s response is, once again, met with laughter as the camera pans the room to show the silhouettes of laughing audience members. following his “routine,” the campaign’s insignia appears on screen as bodden begins his direct camera address: “stroke’s no joke. if you or someone you love is showing symptoms of stroke, don’t wait ‘cause it might be too late. dial 9-1-1. time lost is brain lost.” as bodden delivers this information, the campaign’s web address, strokesnojoke.org, followed by the insignia for both the ad council and the american heart and stroke associations appear on screen, this same script replayed in the commercial featuring george willborn. in the latter, the camera pans over a laughing audience before landing on willborn on stage, who jokes that his uncle had called a series of family members before reaching him. after complaining of stroke symptoms and being encouraged by willborn to seek immediate emergency care, his uncle nonetheless decides to wait until willborn returns from out of town to seek help. and like the commercial featuring bodden, the camera then cuts to a direct camera address where willborn urges viewers to seek emergency care at the first signs of stroke. notably, women are absent from this conversation about african american stroke risk; in both the bodden and wilborn commercials, the relatives who are suffering stroke symptoms and the family members who urge immediate emergency care are all men. after delivering jokes about delaying emergency medical treatment, bodden and wilborn use the direct camera address to emphasize the importance of seeking immediate care. employing what robin nabi et al. (2007) call a “restoration of gravity,” the psa shifts from the comedians’ light-hearted material to the campaign’s central message. nabi and her co-authors argue that humorous social issue messages typically promote more message discounting among viewers than serious messages; thus, the authors suggest that the conclusion of a humorous message should “reestablish serious intent” to maximize the efficacy of humor as a functional element in serious contexts, and to minimize the extent to which audiences resist or discount the information being communicated (p. 50-51). the comedians make explicit the need to view the onset of stroke symptoms as a cardiac and neurological emergency, emphasizing that action must be taken immediately following symptom onset. as the comedians remind viewers, “time lost is brain lost.” aside from the glaring absence of women, the commercials themselves are striking for two particular reasons: the absence of an explicit acknowledgement of the racial disease disparities in stroke incidence spurring this campaign, and the ambivalence of using stand-up comedy both as an efficient channel through which african americans can be addressed and an instrument of health communication that can potentially undermine the seriousness of a message. the stroke’s no joke campaign is part of the aha’s broader efforts to address african american stroke risk and mitigate racial disease disparity. the aha’s 2011 diversity report, a public account of the agency’s attempts to improve health equity across racial groups, specifically notes that the campaign’s multimedia campaign is “dedicated to reaching african americans about stroke warning signs and the need to seek emergency medical care at the first sign(s) of stroke” (p. 4). however, this message about racial disease disparity is made implicit in the campaign’s televised commercials, which are more focused on addressing individual behavior. while i find this implicit gesturing to be inadequate to the task of raising public awareness of stroke risk, the commercials’ failure to make explicit the campaign’s intentions is not what is most troublesome here; rather, by addressing the problem implicitly, the psa—the public face of larger, institutional interventions into african american stroke risk—individualizes and therefore depoliticizes heart health and care. according to the cdc, stroke is the third leading cause of death among african americans, behind heart disease and cancer, respectively. the cdc reports that the risk of having a first stroke is nearly twice as high for blacks than it is for whites; further, blacks are more likely to die from a stroke than are whites. significantly, this research also makes a distinction between disparities in the incidence of stroke and disparities in treatment-seeking behavior. the work of eliminating persistent racial disease disparities rightly begins with locating the causes of these disparities. for example, the cdc’s 2003 atlas report traces how stroke hospitalizations and stroke mortality among racial and ethnic groups persist over time. importantly, the atlas also traces what these data reveal about geographic and racial disparities in stroke, representing on both local and national maps the alarming concentrations of stroke death in the southeastern us in what is called the “stroke belt” and among african americans (p. 2). the strength of this intervention is its investment in understanding the myriad factors that contribute to such health disparities. in particular, the atlas makes a case for identifying the social determinants of health among populations that suffer most acutely from these disparities, and for adopting interventions that reflect their many causes. disparities in treatment-seeking behavior may reflect the longstanding cultural and structural effects of race and racism in biomedicine. citing for example social injustices like the 1932 tuskegee syphilis study where african american subjects were denied treatment for decades under the guise of studying the “natural history” of the disease, as well as racial health inequalities emerging from medical segregation and discrimination in twentieth-century america, scholarship at the intersection of biomedicine and culture examines the social and political contexts that produce these disparities. possible causes include past and continued distrust of physicians and medical institutions, the effectiveness of patient-provider communication, cultural differences in symptom response, and access to emergency medical services as both a socioeconomic and geographical issue (casper et al., 2003; moser et al., 2006; nelson, 2011; pollock, 2012). stroke prevention research also identifies a series of controllable risk and “lifestyle” factors that increase the risk of stroke. the national stroke association (nsa) (medical risk factors) notes that high blood pressure, atrial fibrillation, high cholesterol, diabetes, sickle cell disease, and artery diseases like atherosclerosis, carotid and peripheral artery disease can and should be treated to manage the risk of stroke. so-called lifestyle factors that may increase the risk of stroke include tobacco use and smoking, alcohol use, poor diet, physical inactivity, and obesity. these controllable risk factors are considered alongside uncontrollable factors like age; family history; gender; prior stroke, transient ischemic attacks, and heart attacks; and, most relevant here, race. considered in full, the current understanding of the many contributing factors leading to stroke involve both individual and social determinants of disease, illustrating how both individual behaviors and the individual’s social environment work together to shape stroke risk. but as this campaign reveals, knowledge production about biomedical risk does not always reflect this understanding. ongoing threats to health equity including the lack of access to quality care, exposure to environmental toxins, distrust of the medical establishment, high rates of incarceration, food "deserts" in impoverished areas, and the stress of discrimination, can all play a role in the persistence of racial disease disparities. in the context of disease disparities such as this one, race is significant as an indicator of, to borrow from herman gray (2013), a structural position that organizes collective disadvantage (p. 772). it is a marker of inequity along a series of axes, defined by risk factors both controllable and not. race, in other words, is the nexus of complex and intersecting social determinants of disease. rather than communicating these structural issues around stroke risk, however, the psa reduces these disparities in stroke risk to the level of personal responsibility, while reducing the role of race in this disparity to an empty signifier of difference. the use of stand-up comedy here becomes a surrogate for a much more complex conversation about race and the social determinants of health. deploying black stand-up comedians to communicate health risks to black populations trades on the notion that comedy, and by extension the african american humor tradition, is an effective channel through which black populations can be interpellated. the african american humor tradition is rooted in social commentary and critique that speak to the lived experiences of african americans, functioning as a lens through which race and difference are mediated (haggins, 2007; krefting, 2014; watkins, 1994; zoglin, 2009). before it became mainstream in the late 1980s and early 1990s, black stand-up comedy thrived in local clubs catering to black audiences. clubs like the comedy act theatre in los angeles, founded by michael williams in the 1980s, gave black comedians a space to perform at a time when promoters and bookers for national, mainstream—i.e. white—comedy clubs would not book them; as williams explained to me, mainstream comedy clubs typically did not book many black stand-up comedians because they did not believe there to be a demand for black performers within their clubs (personal communication, 2008). since that time, black stand-up comedy as a genre of performance has become far more accessible to mainstream audiences. this greater accessibility was fostered by what bambi haggins (2007) identifies as black comedians’ crossover comic personae. as haggins writes, the black comic persona has become “firmly ensconced in contemporary mainstream american popular consciousness” (p. 2). black comedic social discourses went from circulating within very prescribed spaces to becoming part of a broader mediascape. part of this “crossover” into mainstream popular consciousness, as haggins writes, is the construction of a comic persona that utilizes black experiences in a manner that is accessible to wider audiences. so while comedians like dick gregory, richard pryor, paul mooney, dave chappelle, chris rock, w. kamau bell, and jerrod carmichael have all worked within the traditions of black stand-up comedy—at times using stand-up to critique systemic racism and structural inequality—they have largely done so while speaking to large, mainstream audiences. the use of black stand-up comedy in the context of this campaign is distinct from this tradition in that it is being deployed as an instrument of institutional, prescriptive communication. black stand-up comedy functions here as a vehicle to promote what nikolas rose (2007) calls biological citizenship. rose writes that life in the twenty-first century is understood through a biomedical paradigm, and that these “biological senses of identification and affiliation” make ethical demands on the self, kin, community, and society (p. 133). in this psa, black stand-up comedy is used by the state to communicate to african americans the need to understand the african american body as always at risk of disease. hence, the psa’s commercials are not black stand-up comedy, exactly; rather, they perform an idea of black stand-up comedy to fashion an informed and responsible biocitizen.  the cultural competence and entertainment-education models of risk   the stroke’s no joke campaign constitutes one of a series of race-based health interventions launched by the asa and the aha, interventions employing cultural competence as a framework for promoting health equity as both an institutional and public concern. as the aha states in its 2007-2008 diversity report, the agency aims to increase cultural competency “through cause initiatives that reach a specific population group, through programs that outreach to high-risk audiences and through targeted advertising and communication efforts” (p. vi). cultural competence has been the dominant framework through which physicians and epidemiologic researchers have sought to account for and mitigate the role of race in disease disparities, stigma, and biases in treatment decisions. by being sensitive to socioeconomic differences causing these disparities, the clinician can ostensibly develop a competence or understanding of the “cultural variables” fostering these disparities. this thinking plays a prominent role in medical education and in policies put forward by organizations like the aha and cdc. as angela jenks (2010) notes, cultural competence emerges from a “strongly antiracist agenda that seeks to counteract the differential access to quality care that many believe has led to extreme health disparities in the united states” (p. 220). and it is because of the importance of this agenda that the means by which stroke prevention is made “culturally sensitive” must be scrutinized. antiracist intentions notwithstanding, cultural competence interventions like stroke’s no joke can frame such disparities as a matter of a “natural, and unavoidable, difference of cross-cultural communication and can become a way to avoid difficult conversations about racism” (jenks, p. 221). this is helpful to keep in mind when considering the stroke’s no joke campaign within broader institutional efforts to fix or alleviate this disparity. in addition to the stroke’s no joke campaign, the asa and aha deployed two community-based education programs, search your heart and conozca su corazón, to deliver biomedical knowledge, promote behavior change, and reduce heart disease risk factors among african americans and latinos, respectively. these programs put into action research-driven interventions on racial stroke disparities. they take a comprehensive approach to promoting behavior change, using community health workers, heart disease health assessments, online support through social media campaigns, as well as work placeand home-wellness models to provide their target populations with biomedical knowledge about their risk of stroke morbidity and mortality. it is important to situate the stroke’s no joke campaign within this context to understand how the antiracist intentions of cultural competence, after which these community programs were also modeled, inform and constrain psas like stroke’s no joke. the stroke’s no joke campaign was created by the asa, the ad council, and burrell communications, the latter a marketing communications firm specializing in “insight-based” marketing that targets african american audiences. following from the same body of research that fostered the community education programs preceding it, the stroke’s campaign was designed to reduce prehospital patient delay and, somewhat less explicitly, to promote the benefits of early treatment of stroke. this is a critical message because, as a 2006 aha scientific statement finds, “most individuals who experience symptoms delay substantially before seeking treatment” (moser et al., p. 169). according to this same document, most delays occur in the following phases of treatment-seeking: the first phase lasts from symptom-onset to the decision to seek medical attention; the second phase lasts from the decision to seek medical attention to the first medical contact; and the third phase lasts from first medical contact to hospital arrival (ibid.). the scientific statement indicates that the longest delays occur in the third phase, between symptom recognition to the decision to seek care. patient delay in seeking treatment for stroke is a persistent problem in the united states. and because stroke disproportionately affects african americans, institutions like the aha and the cdc target this high-risk population with race-based health promotion campaigns, which are called upon to increase their efficacy in promoting health equity. the aha’s scientific statement noted that public education campaigns until that point had been ineffective in reducing patient delay. the failure to eliminate these disparities, the aha statement argues, reflects a preoccupation with symptom recognition and insufficient attention to “the urgency of immediate emergency transport and treatment within the context of the potential therapeutic benefits of reducing prehospital delay” (p. 176, emphasis in original). further, citing epidemiologic research indicating racial disparities in both the incidence of stroke and in patient delay, the report recommends that future public education strategies focus on minority populations to make “significant gains” in reducing delays to treatment: “blacks may recognize acs [acute coronary syndrome] and stroke symptoms less readily than whites, delay longer in seeking treatment, be less likely to reach an emergency room via ambulance in some communities, and yet have a greater risk of death from both acs and stroke at an earlier age than the rest of the population” (p. 176). the authors of the scientific statement and the cdc’s atlas argue that the best interventions going forward will be those that target high-risk populations with the goal of reducing prehospital delay. given the pressing need to intervene in the racial disparity in stroke incidence and mortality, as well as in the high incidence of prehospital delay, why not make the stakes of an intervention like stroke’s no joke explicit? why, in other words, would such a campaign be raced-based but without clearly articulating the urgent threat facing african americans in particular? according to healthy people 2020, a document produced by hhs which sets 10-year national objectives to improve health, establish benchmarks, and monitor progress toward these objectives, achieving health equity and eliminating health disparities is a pressing, overarching goal. but while deploying stand-up comedy and the african american humor tradition to raise stroke awareness among african americans, the stroke’s no jokes campaign does not articulate this goal even as it communicates individual behavioral changes that would presumably meet it; instead, this focus on the individual rather than the structural reconfigures the political category of race into a natural classification of bodies (roberts, 2011). generally speaking, the psa’s mobilization of stand-up comedy reflects the success of the entertainment-education model of health communication, wherein health messages are embedded within entertainment media, which is assumed to form an efficient means of providing accurate information to viewing publics (brodie et al., 2001; kennedy et al., 2004; murphy et al., 2008; singhal & rogers, 2001). entertainment media have long been used to communicate health information. dating back to the nineteenth century when broadsides and public health posters were used to identify disease risk factors and promote behavior change, public health and military training films, primetime television, pharmaceutical advertisements, medical reality television, and the internet have all been used to hail subjects and foster risk-aware subjectivities  (dumit, 2012; ostherr, 2013; serlin et al., 2010). studies conducted by the cdc, as well as the kaiser family foundation and the usc annenberg norman lear center’s hollywood, health, & society program, have provided empirical evidence demonstrating the efficacy of these efforts, particularly in addressing disease disparities along the lines of race and socioeconomic status (moser et al., 2003; murphy et al., 2008). in a report produced by the kaiser family foundation and hollywood, health, & society, murphy et al. (2008) found that many americans rely on television as an important, and often primary, source of health information. their research focuses on the role of health content in primetime television programming, but their analysis is useful in understanding the importance of the healthscape as a site for biomedical knowledge distribution: “according to one survey, 26% of the public cited entertainment television as being among their top three sources of health information, and half (52%) said they consider the health information contained in these programs to be accurate” (p. 1). members of racial and ethnic groups in particular, they found, stand to benefit from this brand of health communication: the heaviest consumers of television—low socioeconomic status african american and hispanic women—are at a disproportionately higher risk for life threatening ailments such as certain cancers, diabetes and heart disease. moreover, evidence suggests that minority viewers are also the most likely to act on information learned on television. (murphy et al., 2008, p. 2) the report suggests that the entertainment-education model offers a unique opportunity to educate viewers about scores of health conditions, while also instructing viewers on how they might handle their own illnesses. the stroke’s no joke campaign, then, follows from these calls to action in its aims to curb the disparate incidence of stroke among african americans. it is coded to be “culturally appropriate,” following the recommendation of publications like the atlas of stroke mortality, aiming to address african american stroke risk. likewise, it balances the use of humor with the restoration of gravity to minimize message discounting by viewers. the campaign’s very premise aims to eliminate prehospital delays in treatment-seeking among african americans, a significant factor in the racial disparity of stroke deaths in the us. however, by emphasizing individual responses to a deeply structural health issue, the stroke’s no joke campaign risked defining race as a static marker of difference independent of larger, socioeconomic factors. the campaign, and the broader politics of racialized biomedical knowledge production it exemplifies, illustrates the limited and limiting means by which blackness is studied and deployed in biomedical knowledge production. biologizing race through treatment the intersections of blackness and stroke risk dovetail into contemporary definitions and uses of race in biomedicine. these negotiated meanings, among epidemiologists and scholars of the social determinants of health, reveal how understandings of the relationship between race and risk evolve and remain contentious over time. frequently, these debates about risk focus on two competing understandings of race: one is a biological or genomic definition of race as a predisposition or innate, individual-level pathology, and the other is a culturalist understanding of race as a social construct responsible for real and devastating health disparities (braun, 2014; kahn, 2013; pollock, 2012; roberts, 2011; shim, 2014). janet k. shim (2014) writes that the latter, this “cultural prism”—namely, “its discursive opposition to biology, its perceived observability and verifiability, its resonance with health promotion ideologies, and finally its conceptual flexibility”—makes it a “popular, and scientifically and politically safe, construction of race” (p. 194). yet the constructivist model of race has limitations for explaining racial health disparities. mainly, while it rejects the notion of race as an innate pathology, the model also creates a context in which the medical significance of race is unclear and, in particular, blackness is clumsily articulated and targeted as a health risk. the stroke’s no joke campaign demonstrates how biomedical risk becomes racialized. the campaign grew out of the same marketing infrastructure targeting african americans as potential-consumers in market segments for hair products, alcohol and cigarettes, music, and athletic shoes; indeed, the aha’s 2007-2008 diversity report identifies its search your heart education program for african americans as one of its culturally competent “consumer initiatives.” the ubiquity of this marketing infrastructure is telling. since the 1970s, the marketing of race and blackness—as a coveted demographic subgroup and consumer market—has participated in the reinforcement of discrete and consistent racial categories outside the realm of consumerism (roberts, p.165). burrell communications, the marketing firm that produced this campaign, built its reputation and clientele by targeting african american consumers for corporate entities like procter and gamble, toyota, and mcdonald’s. the choice to use burrell to produce this campaign, perhaps seen by the sponsoring agencies as a strategic move to reach and promote behavior change within african american patient populations, reveals the ways in which racial categories are uncritically reproduced using the language and strategies of the market. the internal logic of this race-based marketing infrastructure is identical to that of racialized medicine in heart disease disparities. the marketing of the pharmaceutical drug bidil, a combination drug designed to treat heart failure, is perhaps the most notable example of this enterprise. bidil was tested in the african-american heart failure trial (a-heft), a clinical trial that enrolled 1,050 self-identified african americans suffering from heart failure. in 2005, after showing a remarkable increase in survival rates among its users, the makers of bidil applied for and received fda approval to market the drug as a race-specific treatment for heart failure. despite little evidence that race mattered to the drug’s efficacy, as well as the opacity of interpreting racial self-identification in a clinical trial, race was used to market bidil as a pharmaceutical solution to a persistent disease disparity. part of a growing trend in developing pharmacogenomic therapies capable of being tailored to a person’s genetic make-up, bidil was controversially touted as an “ethnic drug.”  with no empirical data supporting its claim to be more effective in black patients than in non-black patients, bidil’s eventual commercial failure revealed the central problem with racialized medicine: a reification of race tethered to beneficial medical developments. bidil became, as anne pollock (2012) writes, a pharmakon, both remedy and poison (p. 156). the core critique of bidil—that it naturalizes racial disparities by treating race not as a dynamic and complex social construct but rather as a genetic reality—can be levied here against the use of race as a marker of cultural difference in stroke risk and prevention. pollock points out that racial differences in heart disease are both material and semiotic (p. 5). the disparate incidence of and premature mortality from heart disease and stroke among african americans are evident. by redefining race through certain notions of disease and treatment, the stroke’s no joke campaign reproduces the racial narratives about bidil that naturalize race and that paper over broader social and environment factors influencing health disparities. practically speaking, using race as a proxy or shorthand to screen for and treat disease disparities can seem like an efficient use of physicians’ and epidemiologists’ efforts. physicians often discuss this shorthand as a potentially problematic but ultimately valuable tool; when the goal is to save lives and minimize biomedical risks to high-risk populations, the ends are thought to justify the means. but as dorothy roberts (2011) points out, race is a bad proxy that can hinder physicians and researchers from considering other evidence-based symptoms and clinical measures. using race categorically to treat patients differently—based on either a patient’s self-identification or a clinician’s perception of a patient’s race—constitutes an imprecise treatment plan. further, race-based treatments can leave patients open to potential harm emerging from biases and stereotypes, diverting attention and resources away from social determinants of health and therefore reproducing rather than alleviating persistent disparities. this effort to marshal a responsible, efficient, and “culturally appropriate” health intervention relies too heavily on an understanding of race as a static, universally applicable variable while ignoring the broader context in which race becomes medically significant. reports like the atlas of stroke mortality call for solutions to racial disease disparities that rely on changes in personal behavior and structural inequalities. as shim explains, “in order to better understand the kinds of factors that determine heart disease incidence and distribution, research must consider multiple levels of causation at the same time” (p. 200). i argue that this attention to multiple factors of causation must extend beyond the realm of research to include the means by which disease and treatment are communicated to at-risk populations. in other words, it’s not enough to establish community-based health education programs like know your heart and conozca su corazón; institutions like the aha and asa must also be mindful of how they represent to target populations and the wider public the relationships between race and biomedicine. feminist biomedical knowledge production the racialization of biomedical knowledge production limits the rhetoric used to address biomedical risk. the campaign’s framing of african american stroke disparity as an individualand cultural-level failing wholly ignores the role of social and structural barriers to health equity, including why race is correlated with disease disparity in the first place. and further, it undermines the aha’s deployment of an antiracist approach to cultural competence in its know your heart and conozca su corazón programs. the question of how best to understand the persistence of racial disease disparities is important to consider as biomedicine continues to grapple with the medical significance of race. this flattening of the complexities of race into a narrow reproduction of race-as-difference illustrates how race itself can become a hypervisible, if somewhat empty, signifier of difference. the coding of race in stroke’s no joke illustrates what herman gray calls a “cultural politics of diversity,” where visibility, rather than a struggle over the social, economic, and cultural basis of disadvantage, is an end in itself (p. 772). in the televised campaign, attention is being paid to african american stroke risk in ways that invisibilize structural determinants of health inequities. the irony here, of course, is that the cultural prism—and, indeed, the very notion of race as a cultural, not biological, phenomenon—is held up as a laudable alternative to the reductive essentialism of biological race. as shim writes, this discursive opposition to biological race frames the cultural prism as a “safe,” apolitical way to examine the social determinants of disparity (p. 90). it is this apolitical conceptualization, however, that fails to capture “the full measure of complex causal pathways” by which we know disease disparities to persist (p. 110). the depoliticization of persistent racial disease disparities as a matter of cultural difference or individual lapses in self-care illustrates the need for what i term feminist biomedical knowledge production. despite the findings of institutions like the cdc and aha indicating that persistent racial disease disparities are the product of numerous causal factors that include structural barriers to care, the urgency of communicating stroke as a leading cause of death for african americans is elided in favor of a marketing pitch to a segment of consumers. perhaps the problem, then, is that for the ad council, burrell communications and, somewhat surprisingly, the aha, african americans here are primarily consumers rather than biological citizens subject to a set of forces causing their death. feminist biomedical knowledge production is vital for science and technology scholars who aim to interrogate not only how disease disparities are reproduced, but also how racialized knowledge production helps generate these disparities as well as what biological citizens might do about them. feminist biomedical knowledge production could help illuminate the assumptions about race and cultural difference made in campaigns like stroke’s no joke, and in the practice of racialized medicine more generally. for guidance here, we might look to scholars like dorothy roberts, who has written effectively on the implications of imagining race as a primarily biological or consumerist means of classification. framing race as an essentialist cluster of genetic predispositions or behaviors that aggravate the already-disparate incidence of disease validates beliefs in an intrinsic racial difference; the politics of this kind of knowledge production renders invisible the black lives that are lived in light of pernicious structural barriers to equity, and the black bodies on which these disparities take their toll. likewise, feminist biomedical knowledge production could discursively center the lives, bodies, and experiences of the biological citizens subject to these disparities, representing those presently erased by the misguided, even if well-meaning, assumptions of cultural competence. in a moment when biological citizens so often become agents of their own care in self-help groups, on illness blogs, and through user-generated health discourses on platforms like youtube, perhaps the depoliticization of disease disparities will create an opening, as david serlin (2010) writes of online illness narratives about hpv, for a proliferation of user-generated discourses about stroke. under this paradigm of knowledge production, women’s status as sufferers of a disparate incidence of stroke and stroke death, as well as the entirely political nature of racial disease disparities could be foregrounded. as roberts (2011) writes, “if its function as a political system is recognized, race can have a valid use in scientific research to locate, understand, and eliminate the effects of racism” (p. 311). the trick, it seems, is to build and sustain a nuanced understanding of what race means in the context of health disparities, and to resist the urge to simplify that understanding in the transition from knowledge production to knowledge distribution. references american heart association. (2007). cultural competence: the journey continues. annual diversity report. retrieved from http://www.strokeassociation.org/idc/groups/heartpublic/@wcm/@global/documents/downloadable/ucm_300377.pdf american stroke association. (2011). annual diversity report. retrieved from http://www.heart.org/idc/groups/heartpublic/@wcm/@icom/documents/downloadable/ucm_427469.pdf american stroke association. (2016). understanding stroke risk. retrieved from http://www.strokeassociation.org/strokeorg/aboutstroke/understandingrisk/understanding-stroke-risk_ucm_308539_subhomepage.jsp braun, l. (2014). breathing race into the machine: the surprising career of the spirometer from plantation to genetics. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. brodie, m. foehr, u., rideout, v., baer, n. miller, c., flournoy, r., & altman, d. (2001). communicating health information through the entertainment media. health affairs, 201(1), 192-199. casper, m.l., barnett, e., williams jr., g.i., halverson, j.a., braham, v.e., & greenlund, k.j. (2003). atlas of stroke mortality: racial, ethnic, and geographic disparities in the united states. atlanta, ga: department of health and human services, centers for disease control and prevention. centers for disease control and prevention. (2013). know the facts about stroke. retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/stroke/docs/consumered_stroke.pdf centers for disease control and prevention. (2015). stroke facts. retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/stroke/facts.htm clarke, a., mamo, l., fosket, j.r., fishman, j.r., & shim, j.k. (2003). biomedicalization: technoscientific transformations of health, illness, and u.s. biomedicine. american sociological review, 68(2), 161-194. dumit, j. (2012). drugs for life: how pharmaceutical companies define our health. durham, nc: duke university press. gray, h. (2013). subject(ed) to recognition. american quarterly, 65(4), 771-798. haggins, b. (2007). laughing mad: the black comic persona in post-soul america. new brunswick, nj: rutgers university press. jenks, a. (2010) what’s the use of culture?: health disparities and the development of culturally competent health care. in i. whitmarsh & d.s. jones (eds.), what’s the use of race? modern governance and the biology of difference (pp. 207-224). cambridge ma: the mit press. kahn, j. (2013). race in a bottle: the story of bidil and racialized medicine in a post-genomic age. new york, ny: columbia university press. kennedy, m.g., o’leary, a., beck, v., pollard, k., & simpson, p. (2004). increases in calls to the cdc national std and aids hotline following aids-related episodes in a soap opera. journal of comunication, 54(2), 287-301. krefting, r. (2014). all joking aside: american humor and its discontents. baltimore, md: the johns hopkins university press. moser, d.k., kimble, l.p., albert, m.j., alonzo, a., croft, j.b., dracup, k., evenson, k.r., go, a.s., hand, m.m., kothari, r.u., mensah, g.a., morris, d.l., pancioli, a.m., riegel, b., & zerwic, j.j. (2006). reducing delay in seeking treatment by patients with acute coronary syndrome and stroke: a scientific statement from the american heart association council on cardiovascular nursing and stroke. circulation, 114(2),168-182. murphy, s.t. heather, h., & rideout, v. (2008). how healthy is prime time? an analysis of health content in popular prime time television programs. los angeles, ca: the kaiser family foundation & the usc annenberg norman lear center’s hollywood, health & society. retrieved from http://kff.org/other/report/how-healthy-is-prime-time-an-analysis-of-health-content-in-popular-prime-time-television-programs/ nabi, r., moyer-guse, e., & byrne, s. (2007). all joking aside: a serious investigation into the persuasive effect of funny social issue messages. communication monographs, 74(1), 29-54. national stroke association. (2016). medical risk factors. retrieved from http://www.stroke.org/understand-stroke/preventing-stroke/medical-risk-factors nelson, a. (2011). body and soul: the black panther party and the fight against medical discrimination. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. ostherr, k. (2013). medical visions: producing the patient through film, television, and imaging technologies. oxford, en: oxford university press. pollock, a. (2012). medicating race: heart disease and durable preoccupations with difference. durham, nc: duke university press. roberts, d. (2011). fatal invention: how science, politics, and big business re-create race in the twenty-first century. new york, ny: the new press. rose, n. (2007). the politics of life itself: biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century. princeton, nj: princeton university press. serlin, d. (2010). introduction: toward a visual culture of public health. in d. serlin (ed.), imagining illness: public health and visual culture (pp. xi-xxxvii). minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. shim, j. k. (2014). heart-sick: the politics of risk, inequality, and heart disease. new york, ny: new york university press. singhal, a. & rogers, e.m. (2001). the entertainment-education strategy in communication campaigns. in r.e. rice & c. atkins (eds.), public communication campaigns (pp. 343-356). thousand oaks, ca: sage publications. sunder rajan, k. (2006). biocapital: the constitution of postgenomic life. durham, nc: duke university press. u.s. department of health and human services. (2010). healthy people 2020. retrieved from https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/about/advisory/reports watkins, m. (1994). on the real side: a history of african american comedy. new york, ny: lawrence hill books. williams, m. (2008). personal communication. zoglin, r. (2009). comedy at the edge: how stand-up in the 1970s changed america. new york, ny: bloomsbury. bio beza merid is a lecturer in the master of science in global medicine program at the keck school of medicine at the university of southern california. his scholarship explores notions of responsible patienthood and the production of biomedical knowledge in the context of cancer and heart disease. he is currently working on a book manuscript examining stand-up comedy as an unexpected site where biomedical knowledge is both produced and consumed. wu review     review of the exquisite corpse of asian america: biopolitics, biosociality, and posthuman ecologies by rachel c. lee (new york: new york university press, 2014).    cynthia wu university at buffalo, state university of new york cw229@buffalo.edu how might an analytic that foregrounds race inform prevailing concepts of the biological? this is the question that undergirds rachel c. lee’s ambitious and playful recent book. lee convincingly shows that an asian americanist critique in science and technology studies (sts) and an analytic that takes seriously the biological in critical race and ethnic studies is not far-fetched. the mutual constitution of these strains of thought is absolutely necessary in order to understand the present’s ongoing structural disparities. the antiracist critiques that have issued from both in and outside of the academy in the past few generations have rightfully undermined biological explanations for racial difference that were birthed by eighteenthand nineteenth-century scientific racism. indeed, the weight of our contemporary understandings about us structural inequalities rests on a tacit separation between the biological and the racial; the state and its collusion with capital, not genetic differences, are what create inequality. these interventions of the past were, and continue to be, productive, to be sure, which is why lee’s book, which proposes to rethink the place of the biological in critiques of racially inflected power, is bold. lee demonstrates how modernity’s exercise of power is both biopolitical and necropolitical and that the specificities of its deployment are defined by a history of colonialism and racial classification. modern states are, by and large, produced and motivated as well by the selective generation of death, however much we might want to distinguish them thusly from older forms of governance. this parceling of life into bios—that is, life that entails protection or recognition, and zoe, or bare life not thusly protected and recognized—is at the heart of broader concepts of what it means to be human. this distinction is defined along racial lines as well as in ways specific to gender, sexuality, colonial subject status, and ability status.  although it may be understandable to assert a reactionary claim to human-ness (and a corresponding disavowal of the nonhuman) for those who do not currently possess it, lee insists that a more enabling goal “intervenes into zoe-fication by adopting a hospitable regard toward the intertwinement of nonhuman and human populations” (p. 48). the hallmark of the regulation of life in contemporary times might be readily understood as that which subtly but coercively “makes live.”  however, a corresponding dynamic occurs, too, where the denial of life is not merely relegated to an unintentional side effect of the state’s (selectively directed) life-giving actions. lee argues that, in order to redress disparities between rights-bearing and non-rights-bearing life forms, we must dismantle the conceptual barriers that have historically distinguished them from each other. in short, we must put an end to the separation between the human and the nonhuman. lee’s book thus presents deftly argued and almost kinesthetically-imposing close readings of contemporary cultural productions that launch an asian americanist critique of transnational capital, distribution of resources, and regulatory mechanisms informing gender, sexual, and ability comportment. from the fragmented bodies in the poetry of lois-ann yamanaka, the dance of cheng-chieh yu, the fiction of kazuo ishiguro, the comedy of margaret cho, or the performance art of denise uyehara, the privileging of the part over enlightenment-descended concepts of the whole prevails. the cross-species intimacies suggested by ruth ozeki, amitav ghosh, and others implore us to recognize that much of the havoc wrought by colonialist, neo-colonialist, and/or neoliberal forces can be explained and undone by a critical framework that de-centers the human. throughout these examples, lee puts the disparate sources of her archive into coherent, complementary (but also productively frictive) conversation about the creation of interfaces among differing categories of biological life produced by modernity. for instance, lee effectively shows that narratives about disjointed or denigrated corporealities—even when they are not explicitly about race, as in the example of ishiguro’s never let me go—carry with them the racial registers with which we are familiar. presumably racially neutral figures are the providers of somatic, life-sustaining parts without being able to occupy the uncomplicated position of their recipients. when they do enter that charmed circle, asian-raced subjects can mitigate the surveillance that coerces sanctioned models of health. moreover, they can call out the very biopolitical project itself on an aggregate scale. these interventions take the form of unsettlingly queer, feminist, and crip articulations, such as in yu’s my father’s teeth in my mother’s mouth or uyehara’s big head. lee’s book also makes an indirect, yet provocative, statement about form. the exquisite corpse signaled in her book’s title—based on the form originally called cadavre exquis by writers like andre breton in the early twentieth century—is a jointly-composed poem created among multiple authors, each composing one line after the previous contributor has laid and hidden theirs. the final product bears the characteristics of its idiosyncratic fusion. similarly, in lee’s book each chapter attaches itself to the next not in terms of chronology or other transparent ordering logic but through thematic resonance. rather than place an acknowledgements section preceding the narrative proper, lee appends to the conclusion what she entitles a “tail piece” that performs that and other functions, asking “can an epilogue mark a becoming rather than an ending?” (p. 256). in these ways, the book is performative.  it does what it says as it embraces nonlinearity and fragmentation in its composition. the one question with which i am left after reading the exquisite corpse of asian america is not specific to the book itself. it is one i pose to the recent and not-so-recent trends alike in the fields of sts, critical race and ethnic studies, queer theory, and gender studies that propose a politics of non-hierarchy between the human and the nonhuman. in a different context, i had asked it of mel chen’s (2012) animacies, and we can ask it, too, of older texts in this tradition, such as donna haraway’s (1991) iconic simians, cyborgs, and women. in calls to cast away the stifling separations between the human and the nonhuman, are we overlooking how this imperative might be politically enabling to differential extents for those who do and do not already have full human status? who can and cannot afford to make these boundaries permeable? to be sure, lee is careful to acknowledge that her proposition to embrace cross-species relationships is not the exclusive provenance of the elite, academic asian americanist left. her stance is not purportedly “more ‘advanced’… in comparison to articulations that prioritize social justice on behalf of those human-animals” (p. 50) subjugated by the forces of racism and colonialism. as she recognizes, some populations, such as people with disabilities and indigenous people, have always respected the porosity between the human and the nonhuman. still, i wonder if the social location of the speaker, specific to time and place, matters in these appeals for a non-hierarchy among species. whose words carry more weight when making these claims? is the posthuman turn ultimately most efficacious for those whose human-ness has already been recognized? is the renunciation of a charmed status associated with the human more earth shattering—or, at the very least, practical or affordable—for some than for others at the present time? lee asks us to consider the myriad ways in which “asian americans ruminate over their bodies and body parts as sites of governmentality and norming” and provide “living testaments to the organism’s resilience and unpredictability in expressing biopolitical agency” (p. 101). my hope is that the book will inspire further experiments with form as well as further experiments in cross-fertilization between sts and asian american studies.    references chen, m. y. (2012). animacies: biopolitics, racial mattering, and queer affect. durham, nc: duke university press.
   haraway, d. (1991). simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature. new york/london: routledge. lee, r. (2014). the exquisite corpse of asian america: biopolitics, biosociality, and posthuman ecologies. new york: new york university pres. bio cynthia wu is an associate professor of american studies in the department of transnational studies at the university at buffalo (suny). she is the author of chang and eng reconnected: the original siamese twins in american culture (temple, 2012). endocrine-disrupting chemicals (edcs) as industrial and settler colonial structures: towards a decolonial feminist approach shadaan, reena, and murphy, michelle. (2020). endocrine-disrupting chemicals (edcs) as industrial and settler colonial structures: towards a decolonial feminist approach. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-36. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license endocrine-disrupting chemicals (edcs) as industrial and settler colonial structures: towards a decolonial feminist approach reena shadaan york university reenas@yorku.ca michelle murphy university of toronto michelle.murphy@utoronto.ca abstract oil refineries and settler colonialism are not typically how feminist and environmental frameworks scope the problem of endocrine-disrupting chemicals (edcs). instead, it is much more common to find edcs described as a problem of packaging, plastics, and consumer goods, and to characterize their effects as a problem of bodily damage, and particularly as injuries or alterations to the reproductive and sexual development of individuals. this paper seeks to expand from these individualized, molecularized, damage-centered and body-centered frames, and to strengthen decolonial feminist frameworks for understanding edcs. we contend that our understanding of edcs must expand to the structures of settler colonialism and racial capitalism that accompany oil extraction and refining, as well as to the distribution of emissions to airs, waters, and lands. building on the argument that pollution is colonialism, we hold that edcs are materially a form of colonial environmental violence, disrupting land/body relations, and at the same time, are made possible by a permission-to-pollute regulatory regime. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 2 introduction in winter, the cold air draws out into visible relief the smoke that flows from the stacks of canada’s seventeen oil refineries. forty percent of canada’s petrochemical refining happens in one location in southwestern ontario called chemical valley, where three refineries and some fifty other facilities are clustered (ecojustice, 2007). plumes are emitted into the air at a steady flow, punctuated by an almost daily interruption of leaks, flares, and spills— interruptions that are simultaneously obscured and revealed by the companies in tweet-sized accident reports and inadequate monitoring data. these refineries are just one node in a continent-spanning infrastructure in which the fossil fuel industry extends and spreads from coast to coast. the settler colonial state of canada has built itself out of this extraction, starting with furs in the seventeenth century and then expanding to timber, fossil fuels, and mining. in turn, canada’s environmental governance is largely a permission-to-pollute system, designed to support extraction as a core economic feature of the nation (barker, 2009; coulthard, 2014; murphy et al., 2019a). the centrality of extraction in canada is expressed by the fact that it is home to 75% of the world’s mining companies (statista, 2018), and is the world’s fourth largest oil producer, supplying 43% of oil imported to the united states (natural resources canada, 2018). the siting of canada’s chemical valley, moreover, is no accident. located on the st. clair river, which has been made into the dividing line between the two settler states of canada and the united states, chemical valley is situated at a crucial site in the twentieth-century invention of oil-based fossil fuel capitalism, stretching from the establishment of fordism and the industrial automotive industry in detroit at the southern extension of the waterway to the world’s first commercial oil field at the northern end. chemical valley sits on the traditional territory of aamjiwnaang first nation, and its creation began in the 1850s along with colonial processes of land theft, private property, and later, the establishment of the reserve system. aamjiwnaang first nation is surrounded by disruptions from chemical valley on all sides, including hundreds of subsurface pipelines, storage caverns for sludge and gas, as well as atmospherically in the form of pollution. the presence of over 150 years of colonial disruption is profoundly shaped by the laws and regulations of the canadian state in the past but also in the present. for example, the emission standards for oil refineries on the canadian side of the river are strikingly lax in comparison to those in the united states; canadian refineries can have emission levels fifty times greater than comparable us refineries (ecojustice, 2018). moreover, projected levels of oil and gas industry growth coupled with lax special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 3 regulation and subpar commitments under canada’s 2030 paris agreement means that the oil and gas industry will account for 38% of canada’s total emissions by 2030 (environmental defence & stand.earth, 2018). the airborne emissions of such oil refineries carry a multitude of endocrine-disrupting chemicals that disrupt lands, sovereignty, bodies, and futures.1 addressing this fossil-fuel-related environmental violence, we argue, is a necessary starting point of a feminist decolonial approach to understanding what endocrine-disrupting chemicals are and do. the term endocrine-disrupting chemicals (edcs) is a shorthand for a large range of substances that mimic, block, or disrupt the work of hormones ordinarily found in human and nonhuman bodies. as such, edcs can affect metabolism and reproductive health, as well as all organ systems and gene expression. this paper is concerned with the creation of industrially produced substances that disrupt hormones. we draw inspiration from theo colborn’s foundational scholarship and commitment to facilitate state and public engagement on endocrine disruption vis-à-vis industrial pollutants, such as in colborn’s early work on industrially rooted disruptions to nonhuman life in the great lakes (colborn, dumanoski & myers, 1996). colborn founded the endocrine disruptors exchange (tedx), an environmental non-profit, which traces edcs to fossil fuels and industrial processes, a trajectory of research that is further exemplified in wylie’s (2018) work on edcs and fracking. industrial edcs are often synthesized from fossil fuels, and released in processes of extraction, refining, production, and disposal to air, water, and land (wylie, 2018; the endocrine disruption exchange, n.d.). we build upon this link, further rooting these industrial processes in the context of settler colonialism and its relation to fossil fuel capitalism as per indigenous environmental justice. we differentiate hormone disrupting chemicals—that is, chemicals that non-consensually disrupt hormones—from the consensual use of substances to alter bodies, gender expression, and reproductive health. we acknowledge that hormone-interacting chemicals have many sources, from plants to pollution to drugs, and can include both life-affirming and life-harming, consensual and non-consensual outcomes. we further find inspiration and guidance from indigenous land and water protectors such as katsi cook (mohawk, akwesasne first nation) and ada lockridge (anishinaabe, aamjiwnaang first nation), who have researched and taught about the ways edc pollutants have disrupted communities intergenerationally on the great lakes (fitzgerald et al., 1998; hoover et al., 2012; laduke, 1999; mackenzie, lockridge & keith, 2005). in focusing on disruption, this paper situates edcs in industrial processes and sources, which are further understood as made possible by settler special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 4 colonialism. thus, such industrial edcs are material forms of colonial and capitalist violence. oil refineries and settler colonialism are not typically how feminist and environmental frameworks have scoped the problem of hormone disrupting chemicals.2 in mainstream liberal environmental frameworks, it is much more common to find edcs described as a problem of exposure from packaging, plastics, consumer goods, and foods, and to characterize their effects as a problem of bodily health and particularly as injuries or alterations to the reproductive and sexual development of individuals. the emphasis on reproductive and sexual health is reflected by the fact that this group of substances is often emphasized as disrupting estrogenand androgen-related processes, thereby highlighting the effects to sex-associated bodily developments and processes. in canada, popular environmental discussions about hormonedisrupting chemicals have been strongly associated with the chemical bisphenol a (bpa) in plastic products, such as baby and water bottles. likewise, phthalates, used to make plastics, cosmetics, and personal hygiene products, are another well-known edc associated with everyday consumption. flame-retardant chemicals, such as polybrominated diphenyl ethers (pbdes), are yet a further group of industrial edcs, likewise embedded within household consumer products such as furniture and electronics. this association of edcs with personal consumption is further thickened with monitoring work that has documented high levels of edc exposures indoors, particularly in homes, as the result of such consumer goods and materials (dodson et al., 2012). the home has come to be represented as a site of concentrated edc exposure through another culprit, house dust, which collects and concentrates pollutants (hwang, park, young, & hammock, 2008). while edc dust research tends to focus on personal spaces, other research importantly remobilizes dust to show the extensive spread of industrial pollution into a community’s living spaces, such as the innovative work done around the chevron refinery in richmond, california (brody et al., 2009). the conventional framing of edcs as primarily a concern of exposures from products at the moment of consumption or in domestic space limits public understanding of edcs to individualized, molecularized, damage-centered, and body-centered frames. embracing this habitual framework, mainstream advocacy around edcs easily slips into an individualized environmental politics that takes the form of campaigns for labeling products, education towards consumer vigilance in purchasing, or even housecleaning practices as tactics to manage these special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 5 consumption-born exposures. edcs as limited to a consumer-based problem are apparent in canada’s regulatory regime, where the only edc-specific regulation to date concerns the removal of bpa from consumer items used by infants. a consumer focus responds to funding-related and other pressure on mainstream environmental organizations to produce actionable, immediate interventions for the public. however, such interventions reinforce individualizing narratives of blame in relation to edcs, such as is apparent in consumer-based activism—what norah mackendrick (2015) refers to as precautionary consumption. organized through the feminization of reproductive labor, precautionary consumption places responsibility on women to purchase goods that are deemed non-toxic, natural, or organic in order to seemingly avoid toxic exposures. a signature aspect of environmental sexism is women’s disproportionate labor in managing environmental harms (voyles, 2015). while precautionary consumption is common in popular environmental health discourses, it is flawed. it assumes that boundaries can be established between people and their environments, and erases the fact that toxics are ubiquitous in our surroundings (endocrine disruptors action group, 2016; mackendrick, 2015; scott, haw, & lee, 2016; scott & lewis, 2015). edcs in consumer products always come from somewhere. that is, they can be traced back through the chain of production to their manufacture and a larger disbursement of environmental violence. hence, edcs operate as built-in exposures (endocrine disruptors action group, 2016)—industrial chemicals knowingly added to commodities, often as a means to turn the waste products of fossil fuel refining into profit-making chemical feedstocks to be inserted into marketable products. petrochemical manufacturers know that hormonedisrupting substances, such as flame-retardant chemicals or plastic-softening phthalates, create harm and yet nonetheless continue to sell and distribute them. moreover, industrial chemicals as wastes and pollution are knowingly put into air, water, lands, and bodies as a “free” form of disposal for companies. the ubiquity of edcs in air and water pollution makes individual avoidance of edcs in a pervasively polluted world impossible. precautionary consumption advocates for individual responses to structural issues—what alexis shotwell (2016) calls healthism—and is only accessible to those with economic means, presenting avoidance of exposure as a matrix of morality and choice. indigenous communities cannot individually avoid being affected by colonialism and black communities cannot merely avoid the encompassing surround of anti-blackness. consistent with neoliberal individualization, healthism absolves the state of its responsibilities to regulate harmful toxicants, erases structural violence, and special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 6 places the burden of responsibility and blame on often feminized labor (mackendrick, 2014; scott et al., 2016; scott & lewis, 2015; shotwell, 2016). precautionary consumption thus perpetuates injustice rather than mitigates it. even as the aim of precautionary consumption is to limit edc and other toxic exposures, the approach erases and deflects responsibility for exposures that are fundamentally made possible by fossil fuel capitalism and settler colonialism. this paper seeks to contribute to the disruption of this heteronormative domesticated understanding of edcs and to strengthen decolonial feminist frameworks for understanding edcs as manifestations of structural violence in unevenly polluted worlds. we might begin this reframing by noting that phthalates are petrochemicals, manufactured through either the feedstock chemicals of naphthalene or orthoxylene that are derived from oil refining. bpa, too, is derived from petroleum, and its very use is premised on the need to make other petroleum-based epoxy resins and plastics more pliable. this paper’s understanding of edcs joins other researchers in pushing the study of edcs back to fossil fuel and petrochemical industry production, and thus also extends out to extraction itself, including oil fields, fracking pads, mining pits, and tar sands (bolden et al., 2018; bolden et al., 2015; gómez-barris, 2017; kassotis et al., 2016; kassotis et al., 2015; kim et al., 2016; endocrine disruption exchange, n.d.; truter et al., 2016; wylie, 2018). this understanding of edcs also expands to the wastelanding practices of settler colonialism and racial capitalism that accompany oil extraction and refining performed through the distribution of industrial and infrastructural emissions to airs, waters, and lands.3 in this paper, we join other environmental justice researchers to take up this challenge of highlighting the industrial and extractive sources of edcs, as well as to add an emphasis on the work of settler colonialism in the structures that underlay this modality of environmental violence. each refinery, each factory, each pipeline in canada and the united states is on the traditional territory of specific indigenous nations and is made possible by a history of land theft and genocide, as well as ongoing colonialism. we end by presenting our collaborative work on the the land and the refinery: past, present, and future as an example of developing a decolonial feminist approach to edcs (murphy et al., 2019a). in reaching towards a decolonial feminist approach to environmental violence, resituating edcs as industrial chemicals is not enough. we argue that it is crucial to also question the very habits of framing edc harms primarily in terms of sex and body-based damage. a decolonial feminist approach to edcs cannot be satisfied with the individualized body-based frame and heteronormative mode of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 7 much research on edcs. guided by eve tuck’s (2009) prompt to suspend damagecentered research that extracts findings from the lives of indigenous and other over-researched communities, we refute body-centric narratives of harm that reduce people to “damaged bodies” and imply harm as an individualized event. this mode conceals broader infrastructures and relations—structures of violence (murphy, 2017; wolfe, 1999). to refute extractive body-centric approaches is a methodological commitment that interrogates violence at its source, rather than at its, albeit important, manifestations of pain, loss, and harm. as a collaboration between a non-indigenous south asian diasporic scholar and an indigenous métis scholar, we draw on multiple itineraries to inform our decolonial feminism, shaped by different, sometimes conflicting, histories of occupation and complicity.4 as our work in this paper highlights chemical violence on anishinaabek land and with specific relation to aamjiwnaang first nation as well as the broader lower great lakes basin that is also governed by haudenosaunee laws, we frame our approach primarily through engagements with indigenous decolonial feminist frameworks from that territory. we also build on feminist and queer studies scholars who have pushed back on the heteronormative sex panics that scientific and media accounts of edcs have tended to promote (ah-king & hayward, 2013; di chiro, 2010; shotwell, 2016). likewise, we learn from feminist science and technology studies (sts) scholarship that has importantly attended to the ways scientific practices in toxicology and evidentiary practices in toxic governance have been sites of struggle involving industries and research scientists around the legitimacy of hormone disruptor research, and especially the validity of low dose effects (hayes, 2011; cordner, 2016; vogel, 2012; wylie, 2018). in europe, such struggles have erupted into the news as scientists denounced the role of industry representatives in the creation of new edc standards for the eu (kortenkamp et al., 2016), while in canada and the us, critical work has shown the role of industrial lobbies in promoting flameretardant edcs (endocrine disruptors action group, 2016). thus, in addition to reframing edcs as industrial chemicals, we also argue for an approach that positions such violence as the structural and extensive reach of settler colonialism and racial capitalism through both corporate pollution and setter state regulation into land/body relations. we learn from and contribute to indigenous feminist theorizations of environmental violence as constituted through settler colonialism, extraction, and experiences of community-based, body-based and particularly gendered, sexual, and intergenerational harms (carmen & waghiyi, 2012; native youth sexual health network & women’s earth alliance, 2016). following this work, we argue that violence through fossil-fuel-related edcs is violence on the land is violence on our bodies. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 8 beyond body-centric narratives closely attending to edcs can teach us to disturb many of the pernicious habits by which chemical violence is conventionally represented. building on the argument that pollution is colonialism, we hold that edcs in canada and the united states are materially a form of colonial environmental violence, disrupting land/body relations, and at the same time, are made possible by a permission-to-pollute regulatory regime. this regulatory regime emphasizes outdated “dose makes the poison” approaches to toxicity, erasing not only low-dose effects, but also intergenerational effects, cumulative effects, as well as concentrated effects that expose indigenous, black, brown, and poor communities to early mortality, intensified debility, and reproductive violence. because edcs can have some of their most injurious effects at low levels, the structural allowance of such exposures using a “dose makes the poison” logic is particularly pernicious in the context of chronic, persistent, and cumulative exposures borne by frontline communities and those occupationally exposed to petrochemical facilities. as developed by métis scholar max liboiron, as well as our collaborative work in the endocrine disruptors action group, the pollution is colonialism framework attends to how land, in all its relations and not just as territory, is turned by colonial logics into a resource to be extracted and a terra nullius (empty space) dumping ground for waste (endocrine disruptors action group & the civic laboratory for environmental action research, 2017; liboiron, 2019; mckittrick, 2013; voyles, 2015). this framework understands land in an extensive sense; land is composed of earths that carry histories, ancestors, and future generations; stones that are grandfathers; waters as a living being; and many animals and plants that human communities have longstanding agreements with and responsibilities towards (mcgregor, 2009, 2018; betasamosake simpson, 2014; hill, 2017). this sense of land stretches forward and backward in time, and is importantly reproductive. that is, it understands that communities and humans are made of and through land; they are themselves a manifestation of land. industrial edcs can teach us about the structural injustices built into permissionto-pollute regulatory systems and these land/body relations. such edcs, which interfere in the conduct of hormonal systems and even gene expression, are notable for their disruptions to developing fetuses, pregnancy, infancy, or any other window of life when people are in intensified development and alteration, requiring us to attend to the distribution of life changes and exposure to injury by life stage. the widespread ubiquity of industrial edcs, on the one hand, and their intensification for frontline communities, on the other, make hormonal disruption special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 9 a profoundly expansive and yet uneven condition for people living and surviving in the hostilities that have been built into the world by racial capitalism and colonialism. yet it is crucial to keep in mind that the effect of edcs goes beyond these reproductive, life course, and sex-related disruptions to include neurological, cardiovascular, immune, and other effects (shug, janesick, blumberg, & heindel, 2011; su, 2016; waye & trudeau, 2011). the roles of hormones extend beyond those areas of the body we dominantly signify as reproductive or sexed. further, some edcs are linked to cancer (national institute of environmental health sciences, 2018). for example, a 2012 multi-year study, “breast cancer risk in relation to occupations with exposure to carcinogens and endocrine disruptors: a canadian case–control study,” found suggestive links between occupational exposures to carcinogens and edcs and an elevated risk of breast cancer in the area around aamjiwnaang (brophy et al., 2012). this finding is consistent with other occupational studies, which have repeatedly pointed to heightened cancer risk as a result of edc exposures (iavicoli, fontana, & bergamaschi, 2009; villeneuve et al., 2010). aamjiwnaang first nation has a well known skewed sex ratio of twice as many babies born with femaleversus maleidentified genitalia, while widespread interference in sexual development has been documented in birds, fish, and reptiles in the region (mackenzie, lockridge, & keith, 2005; marentette et al., 2010; de solla, bishop, & brooks, 2002). thus, the injustices built into the regulatory system express themselves through edcs as particular sexed and gendered effects, and at the same time, as pernicious effects altering many aspects of bodily being, including cognition and exposure to early death.5 the violence of edcs is not only widely extensive and unevenly intensive across communities and land/body relations; it is also expansive in time. edcs are associated with intergenerational impacts that manifest in later generations (endocrine disruptors action group, 2016; wolstenholme et al., 2012).6 the intergenerational scope of chemical violence can happen in a multitude of ways. first, because edcs can have particularly strong effects on developing fetuses, exposures while pregnant can include consequences for not only the person exposed but their future child, and the gametes of that future child, hence their grandchildren.7 second, some edcs have harmful epigenetic effects, some of which are inheritable, and thus can be passed on as metabolic susceptibilities to future generations beyond three generations. third, disruption to reproduction and the loss of community members to death can have long-lasting effects to communities’ well-being emotionally, spiritually, culturally, and materially. fourth, edcs, through their persistence in water and soil, or through their effects special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 10 on and accumulations in animals and plants, disrupt the ability of communities to maintain kinship and obligations to land, food, and nonhumans. there is a robust body of literature on the impact of edc exposure on nonhuman life (colborn & clement, 1992; hayes et al., 2002; hoover, 2013; sapouckey et al., 2018). thus, edcs manifest the ways pollution is not just a harm in the moment but part of ongoing violence that stretches across generations, across communities, and across land. edcs have not only intergenerational effects to human descendants but also place-based disruptions to relations to land and nonhuman relations. as an alternative to focusing primarily on the body, we draw on the concept of distributed reproduction to theorize and create actionable interventions to limit exposures to industrial edcs. distributed reproduction names an understanding of reproduction occurring beyond bodies within uneven spatial and temporal infrastructures and relations. this conception of reproduction acknowledges the fulsomeness of land/body relations, understanding reproduction to exceed the individual body as the site of childbirth and extends into relations to land. it also attends to the reproductive work of settler infrastructures that distribute the benefits and violences of capitalism and colonialism in particular ways, reproducing and privileging capitalist relations to land and life (murphy, 2013). settler colonial infrastructures are always in disruptive relations to land in the fulsome sense of all our relations and indigenous sovereignty. within the settler colonial infrastructures of the oil and gas industry—which includes both the corporate industrial structures and the state’s permission-to-pollute system of regulation—white, settler, and capitalist forms of life are promoted, and other forms of life, land, and sovereignty are disrupted. through settler infrastructures, particular ways of accumulating benefits for the settler state persist that depend on the ongoing disruption and negation of indigenous sovereignty and devaluation of indigenous, black, racialized, and poor communities, as well as the nonhuman communities which are present in places of intensive pollution. thus, disrupted land and colonial infrastructures also become part of our land/body relations as our lives are formed in part through this violence. yet despite this infrastructural violence, land and indigenous sovereignty persists and is valued (murphy 2013). in theorizing distributed reproduction in this way, we draw on the concept of reproductive justice, as crafted by women-of-color feminists in the united states (forward together, 2018; incite! women of color against violence, 2006; ross, 2017; ross & solinger, 2017; sistersong, n.d.); the comilla declaration of 1989, written in bangladesh, which theorizes the engineering of life in both agriculture and in human bodies as connected forms of the relations of reproduction; marxist feminist work that theorizes the structuration of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 11 reproduction as pivotal to capitalism; indigenous feminisms that attend to the intergenerational reverberations of violence and the continuance of colonialism, as well as understandings of land as the wellspring of being, responsibility, and law; and queer studies work that questions heteronormativity within ways of envisioning futures. we further draw on environmental justice praxis, which identifies the systems and processes that render some life polluted, and therefore, expendable—or conversely, some life as expendable, and therefore, pollutable. the 1984 union carbide/dow chemical disaster in old bhopal, india, has occupied a central place in our conception of environmental injustice. the subsequent multigenerational and multifaceted movement for justice is another important location in which community struggle has conveyed the logics of distributed reproduction. as the movement holds states and companies responsible for the ways some life is violated, altered, and abandoned, there is a simultaneous community-based push to reproduce hopeful futures (fortun, 2001; hanna, morehouse, & sarangi, 2005). following this path of theorizing, we call for a conceptualization of edcs not merely as a class of chemicals but as a structural relation of violence that manifests the intergenerational, land-based, and targeted violences of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and fossil fuel extraction. as liboiron, tironi, and calvillo (2018) assert, “structures define toxicity.” (p. 333). this sense of distributed reproduction helps us to highlight both the reproduction of structures, including the burdens of chemical violence that are reproduced in frontline and occupationally exposed communities, and the land/body relations of life support that communities create and are responsible to. it builds on the work of tonawanda seneca feminist scholar mishuana goeman (2017), who has called for attention to the ways “gendered and sexualized violence has multiple connections that spread out on vertical and horizontal scales” (p. 100). as such, distributed reproduction is layered. it points to the intergenerational and transgenerational burdens of edcs, which target indigenous, black, racialized, feminized, queer, trans, two-spirit, and poor communities who often live proximate to intensive industry and extraction, and at the same time, points to the intergenerational settler project of technologically and legally building infrastructures of extraction and indigenous elimination. it points to the extensive life supports that we, as communities, maintain and create to make up our land/body relations, and it points to their disruption by systems that benefit the settler/racist state. when we relegate edcs to harm at the molecular level (as is the disciplinary focus of many biomedical studies), we erase the broader structures of violence that reproduce cross-generationally, as well as the various special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 12 incarnations of harm that occur on a collective level (see liboiron et al., 2018; scott et al., 2015). this is not to minimize the harms experienced on an individual level. rather, the aim is to link these harms to the broader structures that underlie and perpetuate them, as well as to understand the interconnectedness of body, land, and structures of power. this conceptualization, in turn, puts the representational burden for violence on polluters, and the broader permission-topollute system that allows these harms to persist. in contrast, body-centric narratives highlight the harms and the victims of harm, but decenter the perpetrators of that harm. by refocusing our attention to the perpetrators of harm, new possibilities of action become clear—beyond individualized and consumer-based approaches that stem from body-centric narratives. to address the violence of edcs, it is necessary to theorize structurally, in infrastructures, as well as decolonially, through land/body relations. to live with and against the violence of settler colonialism and racial capitalism, it is also necessary to foster and support affirming forms of distributed reproduction that uphold communities, defend land, and respect land/body sovereignties. edcs as structure, not an event while toxics do not discriminate, settler colonial systems do. as such, edcs have disproportionate and targeted impacts, including heightened rates of breast cancer amongst women in the automotive plastics industry (brophy et al., 2012), and a myriad of harms in frontline communities, such as aamjiwnaang first nation, on whose land chemical valley, including three of canada’s biggest refineries, sits. in short, chemical violences have “disproportionate impacts, concentrated by indigeneity, race, gender, class and age, that result from exposures to environmental toxicants and the processes of industrial development” (endocrine disruptors action group, 2016, p. 19). these uneven exposures are rooted in broader structures and must be approached as such, rather than via the individualizing accounts of body-centric and molecular-level harm. at the same time, edcs exceed this targeted and concentrated violence. they flow through waterways, are transported on air currents, bounce up or down to the poles, and move through commodities. the structural violence of edcs is thus both concentrated and overflows to become widespread. this shift in understanding to the structuration and overflow of pollutants is reflected in recent environmental justice scholarship, which affirms the embeddedness and interconnectedness of bodies, environments, and structures or power through transcorporeality (alaimo 2010, 2016) or corporeal citizenship (gabrielson & parady, 2010).8 this is a departure from earlier conceptions of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 13 environmental injustice, which, as laura pulido (2015) notes, lacked a root cause analysis by focusing on acts of individualized and deliberate harm as well as the effects of that violence on black, brown, indigenous, and poor communities. more recently, pulido (2016a, 2016b) uses cedric robinson’s (1983) racial capitalism to denote racism and white supremacy as fundamental to capitalism, which, alongside settler colonialism, is at the root of environmental injustice. racial capitalism and settler colonialism are structures, not events (wolfe, 1999, 2006; kauanui, 2016). that is, they are ongoing projects that are extensive spatially, present in mundane institutions, actions, and logics, and reproduce over time from the past to the future. settler colonialism, moreover, is a land-centered project with a temporal aim, operating by eliminating and replacing indigenous life and governance. settler colonialism and racial capitalism, which simultaneously arrange life in canada and the us, are interconnected through shared histories and regimes of whiteness, property, exploitation, and extraction. these structures help to order distributed reproduction in that they both strive to arrange which beings, life supports, and relations are supported and persist, and which are open to be disappeared, wasted, or replaced. edcs, then, run through and reinforce these structures. gender is a further relation at work in this structural understanding of environmental violence, and has received renewed attention in environmental justice scholarship, following earlier approaches that glossed over gendered environmental injustices, or detached gendered injustices from broader structures of power. the renewed approach to gender in environmental justice is reflected in dayna nadine scott’s (2015) feminist political economy of pollution. this approach “interrogates systematic issues of power and ownership relating to the question of who profits from and exerts exploitative control over ecological resources, economic capital, and social labour” (p. 5). the super-exploitation of women is fundamental to this question, including the disproportionate burdens of bearing and managing toxic exposures (scott et al., 2015). indigenous feminist theorizations further point to gendered harms, such as in the conception of environmental violence as an explicitly gendered term. first defined by carmen and waghiyi (2012), environmental violence refers to the disproportionate impacts of chemical violence on indigenous women. building upon this initial framing, the native youth sexual health network and women’s earth alliance (2016) define environmental violence as “the disproportionate and often devastating impacts that the conscious and deliberate proliferation of environmental toxins and industrial development (including extraction, production, export and release) have on indigenous women, children and future http://csalateral.org/issue/5-1/forum-alt-humanities-settler-colonialism-enduring-indigeneity-kauanui/#ts-fab-bio-below http://csalateral.org/issue/5-1/forum-alt-humanities-settler-colonialism-enduring-indigeneity-kauanui/#ts-fab-bio-below special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 14 generations, without regard from states or corporations for their severe and ongoing harm” (p. 15). the canadian national inquiry into missing and murdered women and girls (2019) also highlighted the coupling of extraction economies with the intensification of sexual violence against indigenous communities. indigenous feminists from around the lower great lakes, such as mishuana goeman, leanne betasamosake simpson, elizabeth hoover, audra simpson, katsi cook, and others all emphasize not only how colonial environmental violence intensifies through gender, but also how gender has been crucial to indigenous resurgence. as goeman (2017) argues, the bodies of native women are dangerous because they produce knowledge and demand accountability, whether at the scale of their individual bodily integrity, of their communities’ ability to remain on their bodies of land and water, or as citizens of their nations. the sites of these “meeting places” and scales of geographies are key to contesting colonial structures that limit spatial alternatives and thus continue to create spatial injustices. (p. 123) the targeted, multiscalar, gendered, and disproportionate harms that industrial edcs perform are not a chance or exceptional occurrence. in resonance with our understanding of distributed reproduction, liborion et al. (2018) describe a structural understanding of toxicity as “the contravention of order at one scale and the reproduction of order at another” (p. 335). we take up this insight to argue that uneven and multiscaled land/body exposures to industrial edcs and other toxicants cause bodily disruptions to health and other adverse impacts, but also maintain settler colonialism, racial capitalism, and the gendered economy of pollution. the reproduction of these colonial and industrial systems is dependent on the intergenerational reproduction of disproportionate and targeted violences, including chemical violences, with beneficiaries to the white settler state and multinational companies. this violence is not an outlier or unintended consequence, nor a sign of a broken system; rather, it is part and parcel of a structure invested in the maintenance of colonialism, whiteness, capitalism, and heteropatriarchy. it is not only that edcs are built into products; they are built into settler colonialism itself. representing harm, shutting down heteronormative panic and stigma in moving towards a decolonial feminist approach to edcs, we also share a concern with much of the critical feminist and queer studies scholarship that has sought ways to critique and offer alternatives to the sex panic and stigma that is special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 15 so often baked into scientific studies of the sex-related effects of edcs. biomedical research on sex-related effects is picked up by the media and translated into alarms over the “feminization” and “chemical castration” of males and the reinforcement of ableist conceptions of “normative bodies.” for example, the notable cbc documentary the disappearing male begins with a striking announcement: “sounds like a b movie—‘millions of males vanish!’ fact is, there aren’t as many nowadays. not human males, not frogs, not fish…from toys to shampoo, we’re awash in strange new compounds, and we’re only just learning that males are being hit hardest” (doc zone, 2008). just as industrial edcs operate in, reproduce, and manifest broader structures of power, oppression, and exploitation, popular approaches to combating edcs likewise reproduce exclusionary narratives that designate some life as worth living, and others as “damaged” or sub-human. while the harms of non-consensual exposure to edcs are intensely lived, they are often contorted by heteronormative damage-based research concerned with both nonhumans and humans alike, instigating feminist and queer scholars to craft alternative frameworks that do not activate pathologizations of intersex, queer, and trans life. in against purity: living ethically in compromised times, alexis shotwell (2016) notes that edcs are presented as disruptions to a state of bodily purity and naturalness—a state that is imagined and impossible. rather than strive for “purity politics,” shotwell (2016) argues that it is necessary to engage with the complexities of our lived-realities, including our exposures to edcs. similarly, scholars such as malin ah-king and eva hayward (2013) respond by arguing that sex is not a stagnant concept, but, rather, an ongoing process that is, in part, influenced by edcs as well as many other relations. this scholarship concurs that the focus on “normative” bodies reproduces anti-queer, heterosexist, and ableist narratives (ah-king & hayward, 2013; clare, 2017; di chiro, 2010; shotwell, 2016). it locates harm as disruption to an imagined gender binary, which erases the multiple responses to edcs within and across different bodies. it also reframes the embodied experiences and pains of disrupted bodily development and fertility as primarily a problem of the gender binary. drawing on crip theory, such work emphasizes the ways that all bodies become themselves in chemical relations. undoing the stigmatization of these effects thus becomes a way of mitigating the violence of toxic exposures. as another way to mitigate this pervasive heteronormative panic, scholars have called for a focus on harm, rather than bodily difference (shotwell, 2016; scott, 2009). as ah-king and hayward (2013) rightly ask, “why is sex more central than cancer, auto-immune disease, and even death? what cultural nerves (many of which are globalized), are triggered?” (p. 4). in this way, some scholarly special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 16 interventions reject edc-associated heteronormativity by redirecting attention to the non-sexed harms associated with edc exposure. while scott (2009) advocates for a harm-based (rather than a difference-based) approach in relation to increases in female offspring and suspected sex-specific miscarriages in aamjiwnaang first nation, she articulates that harm cannot be viewed as separate from settler colonialism. indigenous feminist scholarship, emphasizing land/body relations (rather than chemical/body relations) moves us even closer to a decolonial framework for understanding edcs. a notable example of scholarship that offers an expansive, more-than-body understanding of harm is the work of mohawk scholar elizabeth hoover (2017), who drew from and develops katsi cook’s framing of environmental reproductive justice (erj). erj identifies harms as collective and relational, “not just a collection of individual bodies, but as social bodies” (hoover, 2017, p. 4). erj points to the collective harms that stem from chemical violence that disproportionately impacts indigenous communities, lands, as well as nonhuman kin. these harms cause disruptions to social and cultural reproduction, which has extended intergenerational impacts. hoover et al. (2012) expand, in addition to concerns about the physical reproduction of community members, indigenous people are concerned about how environmental contamination impacts the reproduction of cultural knowledge…at akwesasne, community members report a loss of language and culture around subsistence activities like fishing, which have been largely abandoned because of fears of exposure to contaminants. the generational reproduction of culturally informed interpersonal relationships has been affected as much as physical reproduction…for many indigenous communities, to reproduce culturally informed citizens requires a clean environment. (p. 1648) this indigenous land/body understanding foregrounds environmental violence and injustice as the disruption of relationships and responsibilities (mcgregor, 2009), which maintain “collective continuance” (as per whyte, 2014) and “mutual flourishing” (as per kimmerer, 2013). as we utilize erj to understand the declining sex ratio in aamjiwnaang first nation—bordered on three sides by canada’s chemical valley—lowered male birth rates are linked to broader concerns of cultural continuity. scott (2009) writes, “as one band member has stated: ‘our daughters will have to go outside our community for their partners.’ the concern is essentially one about cultural survival” (p. 251). in violence on the land, violence on our bodies: building an indigenous response to environmental violence, the native youth sexual health network and women’s earth alliance (2016) refer to disproportionate toxic exposures as a “modern form of sterilization” (p. 46). edcs special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 17 are thus material forms of gendered and heterosexualized colonial violence, reflecting centuries of reproductive injustice via colonization that extends to both land and bodies. in learning from these varied critical reframings of harm, we remain cautious about reproducing an analytical framework that remains focused on damage, rather than on violence. in reaching for a decolonial feminist approach to edcs, then, we take seriously the call by unangax scholar eve tuck (2009) to “suspend damage,” a call for researchers to discontinue research approaches that document the deficits and suffering of indigenous communities, but also all other oppressed and highly extracted-from communities. as environmental justice scholars, we have seen over and over how the permission-to-pollute state does not change when confronted with the evidence of injury. instead, communities are left with the burden of representing environmental violence through their very lives. tuck’s (2009) work echoes the politics of refusal by other indigenous scholars who reject the extractive nature of so much academic research (hoover, 2016; simpson, 2007). tuck suggests that a desire-based approach to research by and for communities has a better chance of bringing forth the world one wants to live in. but this does not mean avoiding the study of violence. instead, a decolonial feminist approach to edcs must ask how it can study violence without reproducing harm. how can it put the burden of representing and responding to environmental violence on the perpetrators and structures—refineries, companies, states, laws, financialization—rather than those most affected? this question of how to suspend damage-based approaches fundamentally animates our research in the land and the refinery: past, present, and future (murphy et al., 2019a). reaching toward a decolonial feminist approach to edcs in the land and refinery project the land and the refinery: past, present, and future is a project led by vanessa gray (anishinaabe, aamjiwnaang first nation) and michelle murphy (winnipeg métis), co-created with kristen bos (urban métis) and reena shadaan, and housed in the technoscience research unit (tru, university of toronto). this project seeks to visually and informationally attach responsibility for environmental violence to corporations, with our initial focus being on the imperial oil refinery in sarnia, ontario, located in canada’s chemical valley on traditional anishinaabek land, and the specific territory of aamjiwnaang first nation. imperial oil’s sarnia special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 18 refinery was first built in 1871, making it one of the oldest refineries in north america, mirroring the history of canada as a settler colonial state and the rise of oil-based fossil fuel capitalism. our research team is an indigenous-led collective, housed in an indigenous-led lab, and comprised of indigenous and people of color members, whose research “subjects” are the settler state, imperial oil, and the fossil fuel industry broadly. we understand our work to learn from and contribute to indigenous sts, as well as decolonial feminist sts. through our work, we aim to implicate the settler state, as well as the refinery and its multinational owner, exxonmobil, as complicit in this violence. one element of this project is an extensive database we have constructed to link polluters to pollution to pollutionrelated health harms, which manifests in a mobile application called pollution reporter. pollution reporter aims to share information about health harms and emissions that is often inaccessible to aamjiwnaang and other affected communities, and in so doing, hopes to support the communities’ sovereignty to care for land and their abilities to link environmental violence to companies without having to transit research through their own suffering. the mobile app arranges its research to attach responsibility for health harms caused by pollutants to the refinery and the state. the land and the refinery project, including the app design, is created to refute exploitative practices of data extraction that manifest colonial logics of expropriation, logics that are even present in environmental and health data that seeks to contribute to the amelioration of pollution (murphy et al., 2019b). this project is further rooted in the knowledge that canada’s toxics regulation is fundamentally flawed, as the state is complicit in a permission-to-pollute system. loopholes in regulations are, we argue, not an unintended consequence, but rather built into the regulatory regime to allow pollution to a certain level.9 through stories and research on the land and the refinery: past, present, and future website, the project provides a textual and visual testimony of the permission-to-pollute system in canada, placing obligations for violent actions on both the company and the state. this consideration is fundamental to the project, which requires shifts in gaze—from individualized, body-centric, and damagecentric narratives to the perpetrators of harm and the conditions of settler colonialism from which they are rooted. the database that the pollution reporter app draws on also seeks to reflect our understanding of edcs and their relation to a colonial permission-to-pollute system (murphy et al., 2019b). to make the database we had to critically analyze special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 19 available companyand stateproduced data about pollution in chemical valley. the app’s database draws on the national pollutants release inventory (npri)—a useful but fundamentally flawed nationally used method to report emissions. under the npri, which functions much like the us-based toxics release inventory, facilities are required to provide annual emissions data for 324 chemicals to the federal government, which is then made publicly available. this is useful because it is rare source of data that directly attaches emissions to facilities in an area such as chemical valley, where there is a concentration of some fifty facilities concerned with petrochemicals. other publicly available pollution data, primarily in the form of limited air monitoring, provides information that cannot be tied back to a specific facility. however, the npri is flawed. it is based on industry self-reported emissions data, which is often produced through indirect methods (calculative estimations generated by software or spreadsheets), with no actual physical measure of pollution. in addition, companies only have to report releases when they exceed a certain level, often measuring at the scale of a ton. thus, npri data simultaneously reveals and obscures environmental violence. however, as a component of the permission-topollute regulatory system in canada, the npri is nonetheless an admission to some kinds of environmental violence (murphy et al., 2019b). our approach is to thicken this “bad” data with responsibilities and relations. we use the data as evidence of the permission-to-pollute state, as well as testimony of acts of violence. we also connect the data to the colonial history of the refinery, which occupies anishinaabek land, and particularly that of aamjiwnaang first nation. through this historical work, we situate the refinery’s pollution within a history of colonial disruption to indigenous land/body sovereignties. additionally, and crucial to this paper, the database connects peer-reviewed studies about health effects to the chemical releases the refinery admits to. we attach responsibility for those health effects to their creator, imperial oil, its majority owner, exxonmobil, as well as to the canadian state, which allows these emissions to occur. the data in pollution reporter is a visual testament to the colonial violence of imperial oil, which is intergenerational, distributed, persistent, and cumulative, reflecting extensive violence that targets present and future life and thus disrupts community and relations to land (murphy et al., 2019b). this project is ongoing and builds on decades of work by the aamjiwnaang community on chemical valley (luginaah, smith, & lockridge, 2010; mackenzie, special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 20 lockridge, & keith, 2005). what is different about this project is its approach. while much past work has documented harms to the community in order to show the violence of chemical valley, the land and the refinery is an indigenous-led project, responsible to community, that seeks to critically study and obligate a settler colonial company and contribute to less-disrupted futures. in this way, we seek to suspend damage and activate desire-based frameworks, as well as respect and activate indigenous jurisdiction, land/body sovereignty, and decolonial futures. in doing this work, we have proceeded with permissions from chief and council as well as the aamjiwnaang first nation environmental committee and community consultation. the app and website are primarily made for aamjiwnaang, even as they are public. the project is co-led by vanessa gray, community land defender, and we also collaborate with community members in the theorization and creation of this project through community events, with the understanding that this work is in service to aamjiwnaang and other frontline communities. importantly, we situate the pollution as a disruption that goes back to 1871, which is a long time ago, but in the context of long histories of precolonial anishinaabek presence and land relations, is also a short time ago. we remember the time and generations before chemical valley, and we also know there will be a time after chemical valley that we are also responsible to. lastly, we honor that polluted land is still sacred. disrupted land and life is valued and cared for. this work of activating relations, responsibilities, and histories has helped us to develop this paper’s decolonial feminist approach to edcs. through npri-housed industry self-reported data, the sarnia imperial oil refinery admits to releasing 76 different chemicals and chemical categories. of these 76, at least 59 are potential edcs. of the 59, at least 21 chemicals have strong research evidence of hormone disruption. these edcs are amongst toxicants that produce respiratory, cancerrelated, reproductive, neurological, eyeand skin-related, cardiovascular, liver, kidney, and blood-related, gastrointestinal, and immunological harms to life. in addition, many are harmful at low levels, have intergenerational and subclinical effects, as well as persist in land and human and nonhuman life—health outcomes that are often lesser acknowledged in state, industry, and disciplinary toxicological databases about chemical harms. our data draws on state-produced and scientific sources that connect toxics to individualized and body-centric manifestations of violence; yet, presented in this database and explicitly rooted in the perpetrators of violence, the data collectively demonstrates cumulative colonial violence and community persistence, past, present, and future. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 21 in explicating the permission-to-pollute system, we have found that emergent scientific research on edcs is underutilized by the state, which results in risk assessment and regulatory measures that do not adequately address toxic exposures and the extent of their impacts. moreover, another level of erasure of the violence of industrial edcs is accomplished by the state’s determination of toxicity based on designating thresholds of exposure, which profoundly shapes the risk assessments of chemicals under the canadian environmental protection act, 1999, as well as through ontario’s ambient air quality criteria, ontario’s occupational exposure limits, and the non-binding canadian ambient air quality standards. threshold-based regulation allow certain amounts of a substance to be released into the environment under the assumption that low-level exposure to various toxicants do not produce adverse impacts. this is an outdated approach, inconsistent with toxicological findings, particularly in relation to edcs and low-level impacts in general (see lanphear, 2017; vandenberg et al., 2012). further, the state’s regulatory approach ignores the impacts of cumulative and chronic exposures, including exposures to multiple edcs, such as those emitted by the imperial oil refinery and its neighboring facilities on a daily basis. in addition, pollutants that are not deemed bioaccumulative or persistent can become persistent by virtue of our constant exposure to them (shapiro, 2019). accordingly, thresholds, we argue, are an ineffective method for holding companies responsible for their toxic exposures, particularly in frontline communities adjacent to industrial and polluting activities, and amongst workers in those facilities. thresholds are, in effect, an additional manifestation of canada’s permission-to-pollute system.10 this approach to edcs understands itself to be a testament to not only corporate and state colonial violence but the ways pollution itself is part of broken treaties. our research documents the ways land theft and the imposition of private property made chemical valley possible. the project aspires to make pollution and ourselves responsible to ongoing treaties, such as the one dish and one spoon wampum covenant that dates back to before colonialism and is a recurring form of agreement with and between haudensaunee and anishinaabe confederacies to care for and live on the lower great lakes peaceably and without taking more than is needed. we also seek to activate the two-row wampum covenant, the first european-indigenous treaty of the region (between dutch and haudenosaunee) that calls for colonial inhabitants to not interfere through their actions in indigenous sovereignties and lifeways. thus, the permission-to-pollute system is a constituent element in the ongoing violation of these agreements that special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 22 the land and the refinery project seeks to uphold (murphy et al., 2019a). in addition to serving community, the pollution reporter app aims to demonstrate and make actionable the central argument in this paper, that edcs are pervasive in refining, enact intergenerational violence, and disrupt land/body sovereignties. to date, most toxicological research on edcs has focused on dermal and oral exposures, with exposure via inhalation from airborne emissions as a relatively recent research focus (darbre, 2018). airborne edcs are a particular concern in relation to extractive and polluting industries, which reproduce the targeted, disproportionate, and intergenerational violences of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, and the gendered economy of pollution. through a decolonial feminist distributed reproduction lens, pollutant edcs represent the reproduction of these broader processes, in part, due to the intergenerational impacts associated with edc exposure that can then be tied to these structures. the erasure of edc exposure through air pollution and industry is an erasure of the uneven harms borne by indigenous and frontline communities, but also an erasure of the structural analysis necessary to approach edcs and create relations of responsibility for dismantling settler colonialism. relegating our analyses to consumer products, body-centric scopes, and single edcs serves to frame edcs as an individualized issue that is limited to molecular-level harm. we hope to activate and build upon efforts which trace the extension and responsibility for chemical violence within settler colonialism—including the expansive and cumulative edc exposures that stretch from industrial emissions into myriad dimensions of life and land. as work on the land and the refinery project continues, we aim to go beyond a focus that attaches peer-review health research to edcs, and to include and reframe the thick body of work by scientists and community knowledge holders about the effects to animals, plants, and waters. in a human-centric frame, animal studies of the effects of edcs are evidence toward possible harms to human health, rather than evidence of the more-than-human harms that edcs create in their intergenerational disruptions to both land and bodies. we expect the work of this project to be ongoing, and hopefully to be passed intergenerationally, just as we have tried to take up the teachings and work of those land protectors who have gone before us. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 23 conclusion: structures and land/body relations through this conceptualization of edcs as a structural relation of chemical violence that manifests settler colonialism, racial capitalism, and the gendered economy of pollution, new possibilities emerge. individualization encourages environmental approaches that focus on body-burdens of harm, as well as the often feminized burdens of responsibility for mitigating those harms. in this dominant approach, the prime opportunity for action is through individual and consumer-based practices, which do little to mitigate the extent and impacts of edcs, are largely unavailable to working-class and poor communities, facilitate racist and classist narratives of individual choice and blame, and allude to the private sector as the solution to the adverse consequences associated with edcs—such as through consuming organic produce, installing water filtration devices, or using “toxic-free” cosmetics. rather than solutions, this type of approach perpetuates gendered environmental injustice through intensified feminized burdens of reproductive labor, which individualize responsibility and blame for chemical violence. these are compounded in indigenous and racialized contexts in which freedom of choice and blame narratives are utilized to perpetuate deficiency narratives. however, as we shift focus beyond individualized, body-centric, and damagecentered approaches towards land/body relations and a structural distributed reproduction frame, new ways of responding to environmental violence come to the fore. a structural lens highlights collective, cumulative, and intergenerational harms, their roots in settler colonialism and racial capitalism, and their manifestations across varied but interconnected sites of chemical violence. this structural analysis facilitates transnational and intergenerational solidarities across communities impacted by chemical violence at its various stages in the commodity chain (see wylie, liboiron, & shapiro, 2017)—from the athabasca chipewyan first nation and mikisew cree first nation downstream from alberta’s tar sands (extraction), to aamjiwnaang first nation, on whose land chemical valley sits (refining), to predominantly racialized and immigrant nail technicians occupationally exposed to phthalates and acetone, both produced from petrochemicals (consumption), and to fatal emissions and waste dumping, such as in the former union carbide plant in old bhopal, india, which used carbaryl (containing petroleum distillates) to manufacture and formulate the pesticide sevin. to highlight the structures that underlie chemical violence is to assign responsibility to the perpetrators of that violence and demand its end. at the special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 24 same time, activating a decolonial land/body framework depends on re-building our relations with land and community life-support. decolonial futures are possible in the ethical relationality we make together (arvin, tuck, & morrill, 2013; donald, 2012; konsmo & recollet, 2019; todd, 2016; betasamosake simpson, 2017). as we shift our gaze beyond individualist framings and solutions and towards structures of power, oppression, and exploitation, we move towards collective action, to hold perpetrators accountable, to dismantle colonialism, to build and rebuild relationships of solidarity and mutual aid, to respect land/body sovereignties, and to enact the futures we desire. acknowledgements we thank our collaborators on the land and the refinery: past, present, and future, vanessa gray, kristen bos, beth coleman, ladan siad, and nicholas shapiro. we further credit tajdeep brar, emily astra-jean simmonds, sophia jaworski, and jessica caporusso, who assisted in database research towards the pollution reporter app. finally, we thank the anonymous reviewers for their thought-provoking and invaluable feedback. notes 1 we use capital l “land” in this paper to indicate an understanding of land that is not commensurate with territory or earth, but rather includes nonhumans, ancestors, future generations, and “all our relations” stretching both backward and forward in time. this understanding of land seeks to honor anishinaabek and haudenosaunee teachings, which are distinctive, but which both emphasize kinship with land and are both manifest as part of indigenous law in the lower great lakes region. this generational emphasis on land extends to many indigenous understandings of land/body, but at the same time is specific within different nations. this approach to land is discussed further in the paper. 2in the last two decades, endocrine disruption has been legitimized as a form of chemical violence. in 2002 the world health organization (who), the international labour organisation (ilo), and the united nations environment programme (unep) recognized edcs as substances of concern with the release of global assessment of the state-of-the-science of endocrine disruption (damstra, barlow, bergman, kavlock, & van der kraak, 2002). this report summarized growing scientific concern on endocrine disruption as a mode of chemical violence with the potential to cause adverse health impacts in human and nonhuman bodies. global assessment of the state-of-the-science of endocrine disruption built special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 25 upon the recommendations put forth by the intergovernmental forum on chemical safety in february 1997 and the 1997 declaration of the environmental leaders of the eight on children’s environmental health. state-level measures to address edcs also emerged in the late 1990s. in 1996 the united states environmental protection agency (epa) began to screen potential edcs (primarily in pesticides) under the food quality protection act and the safe drinking water act (united states environmental protection agency, 2017). in the same year, theo colborn, dianne dumanoski, and john peterson myers (1996) published the groundbreaking our stolen future, which brought attention to the intergenerational violences of edcs. in 1997 the european parliament began its own efforts to prompt research and action on edcs (commission of the european communities, 1999), and in canada, hormone-disrupting chemicals were included in the canadian environmental protection act, 1999. a decade later, unep and who released state of the science of endocrine disrupting chemicals – 2012 (bergman, heindel, jobling, kidd, & zoeller, 2013). the more recent report points to holes in edc research and, by extension, regulatory measures. who and unep thus called for several interventions, including more comprehensive methods to identify edcs, sources of edc exposure and exposure routes; attention to cumulative edc exposures, particularly in industrial zones; better reporting of edcs in products and materials, and; data sharing to improve international edc awareness and action (bergman et al., 2013). 3 in wastelanding: legacies of uranium mining in navajo country, traci brynne voyles calls wastelanding an “underexplored component of environmental racism” (p. 9). voyles extends kuletz’s (1998) work on wasteland discourse, and defines wastelands as “a racial and a spatial signifier that renders an environment and the bodies that inhabit it pollutable” (p. 10). wastelands are not limited to arid, barren landscapes. various lands and those that occupy them can be deemed “wastelands” to facilitate resource extraction and polluting practices (voyles, 2015). this practice connects to capitalist logics, in which place is transformed to manifest relations of inequality. 4 there are points of interaction in the albeit profoundly different histories and experiences of occupation in south asia and the americas—exploitation, displacement, violence (often gendered), and disruptions to social, cultural, economic, and political organization. however, there are also important dynamics to attend to, such as south asian complicities in settler colonialism in the americas, as well as ongoing threats to indigenous communities within south asia, such as in the indian state’s efforts to impose uranium mining on adivasi special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 26 lands. 5 our understandings of distributions of exposure to early mortality as constitutive of settler colonial environmental violence is indebted to ruth gilmore’s (2007) theorization of racism as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (p. 28). 6 epigenetic research tends to differentiate between intergenerational and transgenerational effects. intergenerational effects denote the exposure of three generations when a pregnant being is exposed, thereby affecting the parent, the fetus, and the fetus’s gametes. transgenerational effects are caused by inherited changes to the epigenome that then affects gene expression and can thus extend beyond three generations as an inheritable alteration. 7 nancy langston’s (2010) case study on diethylstilbestrol (des) is a notable example of the intergenerational violences of edcs. des is a synthetic estrogen and known endocrine disrupter. des was prescribed to alleviate symptoms of menopause, as well as to prevent miscarriages. however, in 1971, boston-based researchers found a cluster of women with rare vaginal cancers. it was discovered that their mothers had consumed des during their pregnancies, the impacts of which only became apparent in their daughters following puberty (langston, 2010). 8 we also note that new materialist relational theorizations tend to obscure their debt and relation to indigenous epistemologies and ontologies (todd, 2016; watts, 2013). 9 for instance, liboiron, tironi, & calvillo (2018) point to the cost-benefit analysis that underlies much toxics regulation. this is apparent in ontario, where ontario regulation 419/05: air pollution – local air quality allows facilities to bypass the provincial air quality standards if they are unable to meet the requirements for cost-related or technical reasons. as an alternative, facilities can apply for sectorspecific or site-specific standards (“technical standards”), which allow facilities to exceed provincial air pollution standards. in chemical valley, imperial oil and several other facilities use technical standards for benzene emissions. 10 flaws in the federal-level regulatory approach were highlighted in recent efforts to reform the canadian environmental protection act, 1999. in june 2017, the standing committee on environment and sustainable development (2017) special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) reena shadaan and michelle murphy, 2020 27 released eighty-seven recommendations related to toxics governance in canada. these recommendations were formed alongside various stakeholders, including experts in environmental law, health, and justice, including indigenous nations and frontline communities. edcs are noted explicitly in two recommendations, but relate to a number of the other recommendations put forth. specifically, recommendation 39 states, “the committee recommends that the government revise the definition of ‘toxic’ to ensure that it addresses endocrine disruptors.” moreover, recommendation 44 states, “the committee recommends that environment and climate change canada and health canada implement measures, thresholds, techniques and reporting requirements specifically addressing endocrine disruptors.” the latter recommendation was promoted in part due to the fact that there is no safe threshold of exposure for edcs. this is further reflected in recommendation 40, which states “that sections 64 and 68 of cepa be amended to expressly address substances that are dangerous at low level quantity thresholds.” the standing committee further proposed recommendations related to the disproportionate impacts of edcs and other chemical exposures, consistent with an environmental justice and environmental violence lens (standing committee on environment and sustainable development, 2017). in june 2018, the government of canada responded to standing committee’s recommendations with an expressed commitment to improving the consideration of edcs in risk assessments, better addressing lowdose and cumulative impacts, and improving protections for “vulnerable populations” 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(2006). settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. journal of genocide research, 8(4), 387-409. wolstenholme, j. t., edwards, m., shetty, s. r., gatewood, j. d., taylor, j. a., rissman, e. f., & connelly, j. j. (2012). gestational exposure to bisphenol a produces transgenerational changes in behaviors and gene expression. endocrinology, 153(8), 3828-3838. wylie, s. a. (2018). fractivism: corporate bodies and chemical bonds. durham, nc: duke university press. wylie, s. a., liboiron, m., & shapiro, n. (2017). making and doing politics through grassroots scientific research on the energy and petrochemical industries. engaging science, technology, and society, 3, 393-425. author bio reena shadaan is a phd candidate in the faculty of environmental studies at york university, where she focuses on environmental justice and occupational health. she is a 2017 recipient of the joseph-armand bombardier canada graduate scholarship to honour nelson mandela. michelle murphy is professor of history and women & gender studies, as well as canada research chair in science and technology studies and environmental data justice at the university of toronto. she is métis from winnipeg. microsoft word 76921-1-11-parvin.docx parvin, n. (2019). look up and smile!: seeing through alexa’s algorithmic gaze. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-11. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © nassim parvin, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives look up and smile! seeing through alexa’s algorithmic gaze nassim parvin georgia institute of technology nassim@gatech.edu what’s at stake in the introduction of algorithmic fashion assistants? in april 2017, amazon debuted echo look, the latest in their cluster of products that are built on artificial intelligence called alexa. echo look is a small oval device equipped with a camera, designed to be a virtual fashion assistant when you need “a second opinion on your outfit.” the video promoting echo look opens on a brightly lit living room where a young woman is lying on a couch. the camera pans to a close-up image of her feet—in patterned red socks—resting on the top of the couch arms. we hear her say, as if asking a real person, “alexa, what is the weather today?” while the camera zooms in on her face. cutting from one scene to another, we watch able-bodied mainly female actors performatively pose for the camera in modern well-fitting clothing with distinct styles. they appear racially diverse and upper-middle class: different skin colors and distinct facial features are represented, set within modern minimalist interiors and refined clothing. the ad ends with each of the women moving away from the camera’s frame. parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 echo look’s short promotional video fits well into the contemporary tech ad genre. the only marked difference is that it prominently features women, a clue to the assumption it holds regarding its main users’ gender— aligned with modern ads for domestic technologies such as detergents and washing machines. echo look promises ease and fluidity of use streamlined into the morning routine of the successful upper-middle-class woman who nonetheless needs help with her appearance. the ad’s imagery reveal more of what it presupposes about its idealized user: her morning routine is clearly not about scrambling to prepare breakfast, checking in on a sick parent, or frantically finishing an overdue report for work; what she needs, rather, is an inventory of her wardrobe so she can recall the clothing she owns, panoramic videos to check for possible imperfections from every angle, and even more efficient ways to share her photos with friends. above all, she needs a personal stylist who can tell her what not to wear on command. compared to those applications of artificial intelligence and big data that pose a direct threat to lives and livelihoods such as drones, self-driving cars, or smart policing (see, for example, eubanks, 2018; jafarinaimi, 2018; noble, 2018, suchman, follis, & weber, 2017), echo look may seem like an innocuous gadget. nonetheless, echo look is worthy of attention on multiple grounds, two of which i outline here. as with any new technology, its introduction surfaces ethical and political issues that may have been invisible otherwise, in this case no less than dominant perceptions of (women’s) bodies and what fashion is and does. the specificity of the domain is also productive for seeing this category of technology anew, illuminating its taken-for-granted premises and lofty promises. seen from every angle: unmasking the algorithm’s gaze the idea of a disciplinary gaze (foucault, 1977), symbolized in jeremy bentham’s design of a circular prison where the inmates are always visible from a tower at the center—especially its features of permanent visibility parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 and heightened consciousness—has been a productive starting point for understanding fitness and beauty regimes in their power to render bodies the subject of an ever-present gaze.1 subjects subjugate themselves by internalizing the gaze that yields a power distributed in social relations, practices, and ideals. for example, individuals monitor their bodies, constantly comparing them to what is for most an unachievable ideal pictured in health and beauty magazines. or extensive health and beauty regimes are sold under the guise of freedom (duncan & klos, 2012): you will feel and look healthy if you lose only five pounds!2 figure 1. the actors in the ad exhibit this constricted grace as they pose for alexa. in this screenshot set within a brightly lit bedroom, we see a presumably young asian woman in black clothing in front of a dresser with echo look on top. her hands are in her pockets, her shoulders are back and her chin is up. she appears calm and content with a subtle smile. echo look’s disciplining powers align with these patterns but play out in more insidious ways.3 for instance, getting alexa to take a picture requires a carefully choreographed move: standing at the right distance from the camera, ensuring adequate lighting, and making sure she can actually recognize the words spoken in the presence of other noises or an accent. parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 “look up and smile” is what appears on the screen before the picture is taken. the phrase evokes experiences of street harassment, fitting squarely within a culture where being ladylike still often carries expectations of smiling with the chin up, sitting with ankles crossed, and taking up as little space as possible with dainty movements that are nonthreatening and docile. the limitations and choreographed poses (both required and suggested) extend disciplinary practices where “feminine movement, gesture, and posture must exhibit not only constriction, but grace and a certain eroticism restrained by modern society: all three” (bartky, 1988, p. 30) (figure 1).4 the app is designed to collect, archive, and support sharing of these poses well-aligned with practices of self-presentation on social media and the associated thirst for a steady stream of images to maintain meticulously crafted personas, ready for instantaneous albeit fleeting consumption. in this manner, echo look serves as another tool for the selfie genre, “quantifying the self and regulating the value of affective labor” (losh, 2015). the vulnerability that comes with the exposure of 360-degree views of the body reinforces the perpetual need for fashion assistance in a world that judges individuals, especially women, on their ability to effectively manage and present their bodies. as such, echo look emerges as the perfect tool for self-discipline through 360-degree views that render a view from nowhere—another example of unregulated gluttony of technological vision (haraway, 1988, p. 581). in doing so, it carries forward the history in which women are framed to be just a sight (rocamora, 2011) assisted by the omnipresence of tools both lowand high-tech: mirrors, cameras, screens, and now this! authorizing cloud: ceding authority to data the disciplining power in the relentless monitoring of poses and gestures is coupled with that of echo look’s normalizing judgment.5 like a nagging whisper, alexa emerges with mysteriously sourced yet authoritative parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 decrees. trying out echo look in my design studio, it was striking to observe how even my students and colleagues who are most knowledgeable about fashion, those with a distinct style and high confidence, doubted their choices when faced with alexa’s ratings—and tried hard to figure out the logic behind the percentages: is it that it does not like the combination of patterns or is this jacket too boxy? and, potentially, this process can continue indefinitely as the comparative results are generated in percentages with no stopping point, as a perfect score appears unattainable. still, ceding judgment to its code is not where alexa’s demands end. as the promotional video comes to an end, we hear, “plus, alexa is built in the cloud and always getting smarter—and so will echo look.” in this way, the normative judgment of alexa substantiates the pitfalls of a code that is simultaneously absolutist and relativistic. it is absolutist in the sense of assuming that a universal set of principles could provide the basis for fashion choices, therefore undermining individual and cultural diversities in fashion expression as well as the deeply social and situated nature of fashion for dominant western, heteronormative notions of style and beauty. it is relativistic in the sense that it looks to majority opinion to identify and fix this universal code, elevating already powerful voices. moreover, amazon is selling echo look while in beta, “laden with the promise of what it might become” (stilgoe, 2018, p. 26). this promise is similar to that of other products dependent on machine learning, enlisting users to submit their most intimate data for realizing the products’ full potential while the terms of accountability and ownership remain ambiguous. what is clear, however, is that the dynamics and ideals of the sharing economy and connectivity are similarly mobilized, carrying over the legacies of gendered and racialized labor, not unlike what we have seen in other crowdsourced platforms such as google image labeler and mechanical turk (atanasoski & vora, 2015; irani, 2015; jafarinaimi, 2012). and, of course, the kinds of information that amazon can potentially mine from these images is mind-boggling. they include not only the details of parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 what i wear, what size i am, or my favorite colors. they also contain information about the rhythms of my life—when i get dressed daily for work or the gym for ever more precise targeted ads—as well as information about my surroundings—what furniture i own, what books are on my nightstand, or what brand of vitamins i take.6 what algorithms cannot do: i need something that looks like i’m destroying the patriarchy what this algorithmic gaze fails to see, however, is where i am going, both literally and figuratively. the former, that is whether i am dressing to go to a club or a funeral, is potentially an option that can be added in future updates to the app. the latter, however, is telling of that aspect of fashion that is beyond the domain of algorithmic analysis. in a recent new york times commentary, eva hagberg fisher (2018) documents what it was like to think through her choices of outfits as she appeared in court and on tv, for testimonies, speeches, photo shoots, and interviews, after she found herself in the very particular situation of defending her sexual harassment case. her account, titled “how i learned to look believable,” brings to the fore a nuanced understanding of fashion that can be characterized as a mode of inquiry into the social world. this understanding emerges from the inherently problematic nature of situations that call for an attentiveness to what is worn, as expressed in one of the principles that hagberg fisher shares: “you always want to stay ‘just plausibly sexy enough to look like you could have been harassed but 100 percent weren’t asking for it.’” the question “what should i wear” surfaces because hagberg fisher is in a particularly delicate situation. it is a situation that is difficult to pin down, one that calls for pause and reflection on what outfit might best serve it. the uncertainty of the situation manifests in the difficulty of characterizing it as she approaches different salespersons for help. “i need something that looks like i’m destroying the patriarchy,” is among the questions she attempts, hardly resulting in any helpful suggestions. what is certain, parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 however, is that hagberg fisher’s concern is not about how well the clothes sit on the body or whether the colors and patterns match. nor is her question about crafting an expressive or performative personal style. rather, her uncertainty about what to wear is a reflection of the uncertainty of the situation. her journey develops as a way of questioning the social world and the relational qualities that shape and reshape it. each outfit serves as a probe into this world that is at once pushing back at the situation, collecting evidence about how it reacts, while upholding an ideal: “i wish that we lived in a world where i could both wear high-heeled gold-detailed boots and be utterly reliable and credible, but the patriarchy is still too strong.” paradoxically for hagberg fisher, the fact that her situation demands her to pay meticulous attention to her clothes is a direct product of the same patriarchy that she is attempting to destroy. and indeed, it is striking to see how an understanding of what this precarious situation is exactly develops as she composes one outfit after another, rendering the collection of outfits as a trace of what she learns in the process. fashion and style emerge, in this manner, as ways of engaging, challenging, and inquiring about the world. this is perhaps true for both individual styles and collective developments in fashion sensibility. as an example of the latter, consider the adoption of shoulder pads as women worked to find a place at the table by conveying power through a silhouette that resembled that of their male counterparts—and how its going out of fashion reflects a new collective understanding of values and issues at stake for women working alongside men. in short, what hagberg fisher’s poignant piece of commentary captures is the inherently situational and social nature of fashion that is irreducible to algorithmic logic. echo look’s promotional video alludes to empowerment through imagery of women who appear confident about their looks, veiling the high price of its promise: being tethered to a device that reveals very little while demanding a whole lot. well-aligned with the dominant understanding of fashion as frivolous, echo look reduces it to a matter of fit, color, and pattern combinations; following trends; and keeping an inventory of what parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 you own. what’s more, echo look remains of no use at all for situations such as that of hagberg fisher’s, when the question of what to wear is very real and of consequence. it is my hope, however, that echo look’s introduction occasions the opportunity to see fashion for its substance as we interrogate algorithms’ claim to reason: surfacing both their inadequacy and oppressive potency. acknowledgements i am deeply grateful to mary mcdonald, anne pollock, jennifer singh, lauren wilcox, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions on drafts of this paper. i would like to thank students and friends, especially horyun song, tae eun kim, and mahtab laghaei, for their time and observations in trying out echo look. i am also grateful to the editors at catalyst, banu subramaniam in particular, for their generous support of this publication. notes 1 it is important to note that foucault does not directly engage disciplinary practices that influence female bodies, as highlighted by sandra bartky (1998). for an overview of foucault’s theory in relationship western bodily practices inclusive of its criticisms, see pylypa (1998). 2 this is not to overlook the active engagement of individuals and groups with such norms and practices in spite of challenges such as those noted by diane ponterotto (2016). indeed fashion itself, as i will also discuss later, is recognized a site of creativity, resistance, and individual and social action. fashion is, arguably, marked by a central tension that is being liberatory and disciplinary at the same time. tarrant and jolles’s (2012) edited collection fashion talks: undressing the power of style takes up this tension though a series of articles engaging fashion from feminist perspectives. for an informative series of articles, commentary, and creative work that capture current debates and scholarship on different facets of fashion, see also the spring/summer issues of wsq: women's studies quarterly, inclusive of natalie havlin and jillian m. báez’s (2018) essay charting recent debates in this area as well as noteworthy examples such as michele white’s (2018) discussion of feminist makeup tutorials and parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 masquerades on youtube, or the ten principles of disability justice captured by patricia berne and collaborators (2018) on behalf of the sin invalid performance project on disability and sexuality. 3 while the concept of the gaze is a productive point of entry into critique of echo look, it is by no means to be where we stop and certainly not a wholesale endorsement of foucault—which is certainly unwise, as articulated by linda alcoff (1990). 4 for dramatic examples of such poses, see the promotional video at https://www.amazon.com/amazon-echo-look-camera-styleassistant/dp/b0186jaewk. 5 foucault identified three disciplinary powers: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination. for a concise summary, see gutting (2014). 6 the kinds of collective insights that such a big data set might yield are unclear yet open to speculation. could they be used by amazon to sell its overstocked plaid skirts? could the combination of my daily facial expressions together with my weight changes be revealing of my mood and lifestyle and thus of value to insurance companies? for recent precedents, consider roomba’s collection of home maps or the exposure of military bases through the fitness app strava’s maps of running and walking routes. references alcoff, l. (1990). feminist politics and foucault: the limits to a collaboration. in a. dallery, c. scott, & h. roberts (eds.), crises in continental philosophy (pp. 69-86). albany, ny: suny press. atanasoski, n., & vora, k. (2015). surrogate humanity: posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 1(1). retrieved from https://catalystjournal.org/index.php/catalyst/article/view/ata_vora bartky, s. l. (1998). foucault, femininity, and the modernization of patriarchal power. in r. weitz (ed.), the politics of women’s bodies: sexuality, appearance, and behavior (pp. 25-45). new york, ny: nyu press. parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 berne, p., morales, a. l., langstaff, d., & sins invalid. (2018). ten principles of disability justice. wsq: women's studies quarterly, 46(1), 227-230. duncan, m. c., & klos, l. a. (2012). paradoxes of the flesh: emotion and contradiction in fitness/beauty magazine discourse. journal of sport and social issues, 38(3), 245-262. eubanks, v. (2018). automating inequality: how high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor. new york, ny: st. martin's press. fisher, e. h. (2018, january 3). how i learned to look believable. new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/03/style/dressing-forsexual-harassment-hearings.html foucault, m. (1977). discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. (a. sheridan, trans.). new york, ny: pantheon. gutting, g. (2014). michel foucault. in e. n. zalta (ed.), the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/foucault/ haraway, d. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. feminist studies, 14(3), 575-599. havlin, n., & báez, j. m. (2018). introduction: revisiting beauty. wsq: women's studies quarterly, 46(1), 13-24. irani, l. (2015). difference and dependence among digital workers: the case of amazon mechanical turk. south atlantic quarterly, 114(1), 225-234. jafarinaimi, n. (2012). exploring the character of participation in social media: the case of google image labeler. in proceedings of the 2012 iconference (pp. 72-79). new york, ny: acm. jafarinaimi, n. (2018). our bodies in the trolley’s path, or why selfdriving cars must *not* be programmed to kill. science, technology, & human values, 43(2), 302-323. parvin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 losh, e. (2015). feminism reads big data: “social physics,” atomism, and selfiecity. international journal of communication, 9, 1647-1659. noble, s. u. (2018). algorithms of oppression: how search engines reinforce racism. new york, ny: nyu press. ponterotto, d. (2016). resisting the male gaze: feminist responses to the ‘normatization’ of the female body in western culture. journal of international women's studies, 17(1), 133-151. pylypa, j. (1998). power and bodily practice: applying the work of foucault to an anthropology of the body. arizona anthropologis, 13, 21-36. rocamora, a. (2011). personal fashion blogs: screens and mirrors in digital self-portraits. fashion theory, 15(4), 407-424. stilgoe, j. (2018). machine learning, social learning and the governance of self-driving cars. social studies of science, 48(1), 2556. suchman, l., follis, k., & weber, j. (2017). tracking and targeting: sociotechnologies of (in)security. science, technology, and human values, 42(6), 983-1002. tarrant, s., & jolles, m. (eds.). (2012). fashion talks: undressing the power of style. albany, ny: suny press. white, m. (2018). beauty as an “act of political warfare”: feminist makeup tutorials and masquerades on youtube. wsq: women's studies quarterly, 46(1), 139-156. bio nassim parvin (formerly jafarinaimi) is an assistant professor of digital media in the school of literature, media, and communication at georgia tech. parvin’s research explores the ethical and political dimensions of design and technology, especially as related to values of democratic participation and social justice. microsoft word 241-1501-1-atanasoski.docx atanasoski, n. and vora, k. (2018). the surrogate effect: technoliberalism and whiteness in a “post” labor era. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-13. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © neda atanasoski and kalindi vora. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives the surrogate effect: technoliberalism and whiteness in a “post” labor era neda atanasoski university of california santa cruz natanaso@ucsc.edu kalindi vora university of california davis kavora@ucdavis.edu abstract this paper offers preliminary reflections on the relationship between the seemingly opposed logics of white supremacy and racial liberalism by sketching the contours and workings of what the authors call technoliberalism. first, the article briefly overviews the relationship between the discourse of “white loss,” immigration and automation in contemporary us national politics. it then addresses how technoliberal imaginaries that argue that it is robots, not racialized others, who are taking us jobs, pin their anti-racist logics on a postracial technological future. through examples of robotic and digital technologies intended to replace human bodies and functions, the paper thus excavates the suppressed racial imaginary “technoliberalism.” 2 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) automated teaching and learning characterizes the new generation of factory robots. this is a central aspect of what the world economic forum has recently dubbed the “fourth industrial revolution,” in which even the production and programming of technology can be performed by machines themselves. even though the development of human-free industrial robots announces that an ostensibly post-labor (and as we will go on to argue in this paper, a “post-race” and “post-gender”) epoch is upon us, the automation that was an inherent part of the first industrial revolution has signaled the threat of the replaceability of specific types of human functions and human workers that are racialized and gendered. following the 2016 us presidential election, for instance, the media announced that donald trump could not live up to his promises to return jobs to the white working class because these jobs were lost to robots rather than to threatening racial others (i.e., to illegal immigrants and racialized outsourced labor in the global south). nonetheless, the machine and the racialized other pose a similar threat of displacing those already fully human in this conception of (white) loss. in this paper, we offer preliminary reflections on the relationship between the seemingly opposed logics of white supremacy and racial liberalism by sketching the contours and workings of what we call technoliberalism that is a part of the so-called fourth industrial revolution. we begin by briefly overviewing the relationship between the discourse of “white loss,” immigration and automation in contemporary us national politics. we then move to addressing how technoliberal imaginaries that argue that it is robots, not racialized others, who are taking us jobs, pin their anti-racist logics on a post-racial technological future. through examples of robotic and digital technologies intended to replace human bodies and functions, our paper thus excavates the suppressed racial imaginary of “technoliberalism.” according to the logics of technoliberalism, technology advances humans toward a postracial future by asserting a post-labor world in which racial difference, along with all human social difference, is transcended. though 3 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) technoliberalism asserts anti-racism as a central premise, we show that technoliberalism’s post-racial imaginary is in fact another variation of racial liberalism that has been a part of us governance from the inception of that nation. by insisting on the continuing importance of racial and gendered histories of labor that expand the category of labor and the worker far beyond the myth of the factory worker as the only subject of labor, we can see that technoliberalism not only fails to be anti-racist, but is in fact an affirmation of the us racial empire. to open our analysis, we begin with a short video, entitled m.a.m.o.n: latinos vs. donald trump (ale damiani 2016) that brings together the imaginary of robots, labor, and trump’s infamous wall. figure 1. latinos vs. donald trump https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q__bsi5rblw we see in this spoof of the border wall an argument that closing the border increases the need for automation (even as the inefficiency of the automated border system frustrates the violently expelled workers). we will return to how this video is a critique of both the white supremacist and technoliberal imaginaries of the us economy at the end of this essay. for now, we observe that one of trump’s first executive actions on 24 january 2017, thematized in this video, announced the immediate 4 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) construction of a border wall. both trump and the phantasm of a border wall promoted in his presidential campaign are symbols that bring together labor, technologies of control, and white supremacy. the fantasy of isolation, closing of borders, and expelling immigrant labor animating trump’s promises to build a border wall to revive a formerly booming national economy. the imagined result would restore the (unmarked white) working class laborer to a former glory, symbolized by figures like the auto industry worker and coal miner. in response to claims that immigrant others are responsible for the loss of a glorious era of white labor in the united states, tech industry leaders emphasized that in fact it was automation that was the biggest threat to american workers. these claims were positioned as anti-racist, redirecting concerns about white loss from the immigrant threat to the threat of robotics. yet, as we contend here, these arguments are also part of a problematic relationship between what we call technoliberalism and the fantasy of post-racism in the labor arena. it is thus crucial to ask: what is the relationship between white loss and the discourse of postlabor technology/technoliberalism? the racial imaginary trump invokes, both in his campaign rhetoric and in his presidential speeches, has led many scholars of race in the us to question whether we must now think about fascism rather than liberalism if we want to analyze race relations (we need only to think of the recent events in charlottesville va to understand why this seems to be an important move). briefly, racial liberalism has long been viewed as a central tenet of governance and empire in the us. jodi melamed (2006) has argued: in contrast to white supremacy, the liberal race paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism. antiracism becomes a nationally recognized social value and, for the first time, gets absorbed into u.s. governmentality. importantly, postwar liberal racial formation sutures an "official" antiracism to 5 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) u.s. nationalism, itself bearing the agency for transnational capitalism (4-5). on the one hand, trump’s campaign and presidential rhetoric that has been overtly racist in tenor contradicts the tenets of racial liberalism in us politics and culture outlined by melamed. on the other hand, we might consider the opposition to trump’s assessments of job loss as white loss articulated by tech leaders in particular as yet another innovation in the logics of racial liberalism. what we are theorizing in our work as the emergent formation of technoliberalism. by technoliberalism, we mean the way in which liberal modernity’s simultaneous and contradictory obsession with race and the overcoming of racism has once again been innovated at the start of the twenty-first century (and techboom 2.0) through the frame of a post-labor world. technoliberal futurity envisions robots as replacing human form and function in factories and other spheres (for instance, bus and taxi drivers, janitors, and call-center workers). as proponents of such futures argue, it is not that jobs are being stolen from the us white working class by mexicans and the chinese, but that, as robots take human jobs, other solutions for human obsolescence must be found. thus, as we insist here, there is a need to parse out what racial logics continue to structure the technoliberal imaginary that is positioned in seeming opposition to white supremacy. one representative example is a cnbc commentary (mckissen 2017), which noted that, eighty-five percent of manufacturing jobs were lost to technology from 2000-2010, not chinese job thieves. … we can expect more automation, and not just on the shop floor. last year the white house predicted 47 percent of existing jobs will eventually be eliminated by automation and artificial intelligence. … unless donald trump has a time machine stored in a secret lair underneath trump tower, going back to a labor-driven manufacturing economy isn't an option.” (https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/trump-jobs-robots-and-realsolutions-commentary.html). 6 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) in the technoliberal logic of this report, it is not that the new economy uses cheap, racialized labor outsourced to the global south. rather, the new economy does not need any human labor. similar assessments abound in news reports pointing to trump’s racist fallacies, including his cornerstone promise to revive coal mining in the us (and thus dismantling the obama-era clean power plan). yet, as a recent new york times article outlines, in decatur, ill., far from the coal mines of appalachia, caterpillar engineers are working on the future of mining: mammoth haul trucks that drive themselves. the trucks have no drivers, not even remote operators. instead, the 850,000-pound vehicles rely on self-driving technology, the latest in an increasingly autonomous line of trucks and drills that are removing some of the human element from digging for coal. … hardy miners in mazelike tunnels with picks and shovels [celebrated by trump] — have steadily become vestiges of the past. (tabuchi 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/coal-jobs-trumpappalachia.html?mcubz=3). what is interesting about this article and others like it is that the evidence that trump’s labor policies are racist is the same evidence that suggests that the laborer as a figure, and human labor writ large, is vestigial to the tech-driven economy. to be clear, we are not contending that the nostalgic vision of the white working class in the us is disconnected from the logics of white supremacy. rather, we are proposing that there is also an urgent need to parse out the racial logics that continue to structure the technoliberal imaginary which articulates itself as separate from white supremacy. the fully automated future, it is important to note, is not unconditionally celebrated. it is often articulated as loss ─ just not as white loss, but rather as universal human loss. according to stephen hawking, “the automation of factories has already decimated jobs in traditional manufacturing, and the rise of artificial intelligence is likely to extend this job destruction deep into the middle classes, with only the 7 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) most caring, creative or supervisory roles remaining.” (larson 2017, https://medium.freecodecamp.org/bill-gates-and-elon-musk-justwarned-us-about-the-one-thing-politicians-are-too-scared-to-talk8db9815fd398. elon musk, founder of tesla and spacex, makes a similar point: “what to do about mass unemployment? this is going to be a massive social challenge. there will be fewer and fewer jobs that a robot cannot do better [than a human]. these are not things that i wish will happen. these are simply things that i think probably will happen” (ibid.). the tech entrepreneur and shark tank judge mark cuban has been critical of trump, and in particular of trump’s racist understandings of job loss. as he put it, “i'm willing to bet these companies [that promised to build new factories and create new jobs in the us like fiat chrysler, gm, ford, intel and walmart] when it is all said and done ... are going to end up leading to fewer people being employed ... and there is nothing president trump can do to stop that because of the trends in technology — machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, etc. — changing the nature of work” (snider 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/02/20/cubantrump-cant-stop-rise-robots-and-their-effect-us-jobs/98155374/) at the same time tech billionaires articulate a universal human loss and spell out the end of the worker, the connection between liberalism and capitalist development means that warnings about the inevitable obsolescence of manual jobs is paired with a simultaneous optimistic outlook for the growth of the capitalist economy. thus, the technoliberal imaginary continually reasserts that us industry is growing, rather than being in decline as trump has argued. according to a 2016 pbs newshour report, despite [trump’s] charge that ‘we don’t make anything anymore,’ manufacturing is still flourishing in america. problem is, factories don’t need as many people as they used to because machines now do so much of the work. america has lost more than 7 million 8 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) factory jobs since manufacturing employment peaked in 1979. yet american factory production … more than doubled over the same span to $1.91 trillion [in 2015], according to the commerce department. … trump and other critics are right that trade has claimed some american factory jobs, especially after china joined the world trade organization in 2001 and gained easier access to the u.s. market. … but research shows that the automation of u.s. factories is a much bigger factor than foreign trade in the loss of factory jobs. … the vast majority of the lost jobs ─ 88% ─ were taken by robots and other homegrown factors that reduce factories’ need for human labor. … (wiseman 2016, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/factory-jobs-blamerobots/). the pbs report concludes that the upside of the robot revolution is that the asian drain of jobs is ending, as manufacturing returns to the us where the use of robots can be easily implemented as an affordable solution to outsourcing. in the technoliberal imaginary, us imperial power has thus been reaffirmed through technological innovation. by way of conclusion, we want to return to the critique of technoliberalism that we see in the mexico border wall satire video featuring robo-trump, with which we opened this paper. as we read it, the short film asserts the need to understand racialized labor as central to automation (not as separate from it, as in the technoliberal imaginary). the film demonstrates that automation (or the expulsion of mexican workers from the us ─ including doctors, beauty queens, meteorologists, and food truck chefs) is both violent and inefficient. the automated complaint system at the wall cannot do the work that a human could do, leading to a comical and purposeful miscommunication as the system thanks the angry food truck worker for his cooperation and asks him not to return. the film also insists that racialized labor is central to all aspects of the us economy, from the service industry to entertainment. even more significantly, the film can be read as making a connection between fascist and technoliberal futures. trump (or at least we can 9 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) assume the man is trump, based on his hairstyle) is inside the giant killer robot who crosses the border wall to stomp on the expelled mexican workers. that the body of trump and the body of the robot act as one underscores the dual violence of automation and white supremacy. the film thus refuses to treat them as separate, as does technoliberalism. the film suggests that technoliberal imaginaries that utilize robots to frame antiracist arguments against the logic of walls are violent in their own way. as we well know, new technologies of automation have historically often provided the rationale for actually ramping up production and the need for more workers whose labor has been devalued due to automation, for instance in twentieth century agribusiness (marez 2016). more recently, we see this in the crowdsourcing of what amazon calls humans as service in their data management platform amazon mechanical turk. we thus agree with feminist and critical race scholars of science, technology and society (sts) and labor, like vora (2015) and subramaniam and herzig, among others, who insist that what is needed today is an exploration of the ways in which geopolitical and economic shifts demand a grappling with new subjects of labor, which, with the simple privileging of the factory laborer would remain invisible. for example, herzig and subramaniam (2017) argue that the “very assertion of a subject’s ability to labor, like assertions of capacities for reason, suffering, or language, often serves as a tool for delineating hierarchical boundaries of social and political concern” (p. 104). in other words, only certain kinds of subjects (and certain kinds of work), following orthodox marxist conceptual rubrics, could be legible as “labor,” while other kinds of work (for example, women’s reproductive labor or nonhuman, including animal work) fall away from that category. affirming that we must account for these unnamed or unrecogized laboring subjects under biocapital (including nonagential, nonhuman, nonliving, and metaphysical labor), they call upon “radical scholars’ further reflection on the labor concept’s myriad entanglements with exclusionary categories of race, nation, gender, sexuality, disability, and species, while reaffirming the 10 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) significance of "labor"” (p. 104) as a category of analysis. while class is still very much a part of the analysis, subramaniam's and herzig’s point is that because of the over-privileging of the white blue-collar worker, other categories entangled with labor fall away. instead, as they insist, these other categories must be thought alongside class in order to recast the stakes of who (or what) can be made legible as a laboring subject. such an analysis would also open up new possibilities for thinking through the racialization of the white underclass (and/as failed whiteness, “white trash,” etc.) (hartigan 1997). because of the technoliberal insistence that we are entering a post-labor world that is anti-racist because it is human-free, it is urgent to assess the ways in which technology has innovated upon capital’s dependence on racialized and gendered labor. as we have argued here, a post-race world forecasted by tech industry icons and leaders asserts a universal humanity, thus rendering racialized labor invisible. as automation ostensibly “frees” humans from the drudgery of manual labor for more creative and innovative work (atanasoski and vora 2015), the people who get those creative jobs will be those representing the whiteness of how such skills are embodied (e.g., attendance at a liberal arts college or those who have experienced certain class privileges). because, as we have pointed out, technoliberals cite automation, rather than immigration, as the main threat to the us worker, this occurs ironically though opposition to policies of exclusion, expulsion, and overtly racist discourse, even as the privileges of whiteness are reasserted. it is thus urgent to pay attention to the connections between the post-racial and post-labor logics of liberalism today even as we appear to be in an era ruled by the logics of fascism ─ the two, we suggest, are never disconnected. acknowledgements the authors thank banu subramaniam and michelle murphy for their encouragement to publish this piece, as well as the participants of the 11 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) whiteness and technoscience double panel that convened at the 4s conference in boston in 2017. we also thank the anonymous reviewers for their feedback. references atanasoski, n. and vora, k. (2015). surrogate humanity: posthuman networks and the racialized obsolescence of labor. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 1(1). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.28968/cftt.v1i1.42.g103 hartigan, j. (1997).unpopular culture: the case of "white trash". cultural studies 11(2), 316-343. herzig, r. and subramaniam b. (2017). labor in the age of bioeverything. radical history review, 127, 103-124. larson, q. (2017). a warning from bill gates, elon musk, and stephen hawking, freecodecamp, february 18. retrieved from https://medium.freecodecamp.org/bill-gates-and-elon-musk-justwarned-us-about-the-one-thing-politicians-are-too-scared-to-talk8db9815fd398. marez, c (2016). farm worker futurism: speculative technologies of resistance. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. mckissen, d. (2017, february 24). here’s the one overlooked solution to america’s job crisis we need to talk about now, cnbc. retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/trump-jobs-robots-and-realsolutions-commentary.html. melamed, j. (2006). the spirit of neoliberalism: from racial liberalism to neoliberal multiculturalism, social text 24. 12 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) snider, m (2017, february 20). cuban: trump can’t stop rise of the robots and their effect on u.s. jobs, usa today. retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/02/20/ cuban-trump-cant-stop-rise-robots-and-their-effect-us-jobs/98155374/. tabuchi, h. (2017, march 29). coal mining jobs trump would bring back no longer exist. the new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/coal-jobs-trumpappalachia.html?mcubz=3. vora, k (2015). life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. wiseman, p (2016, november 2). mexico taking u.s. factory jobs? blame robots instead. pbs. retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/factory-jobs-blame-robots/. bios neda atanasoski is an associate professor of feminist studies and the director of critical race and ethnic studies at the university of california at santa cruz. she is the author of humanitarian violence: the us deployment of diversity (university of minnesota press, 2013), and coeditor with kalindi vora of postsocialist politics and the ends of revolution, a special issue of social identities (2018). currently, she is completing a second book, co-authored with kalindi vora, entitled race, robots, and the politics of technological futures (forthcoming, duke university press, 2019). kalindi vora is the director of the feminist research institute and associate professor of gender, sexuality and women’s studies at uc davis. her first book, life support: biocapital and the new history of 13 atanasoski and vora catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) outsourced labor (university of minnesota press, 2015), takes up questions of technology, colonialism and raced and gendered labor under globalization. her research has included ethnographic study of it professionals and gestational surrogates in india, and a new project with neda atanasoski on the racial and gendered politics of robotics and artificial intelligence, about which she has edited special issues and published in journals such as, ethnos: journal of anthropology, current anthropology, social identities, the south atlantic quarterly, postmodern culture, and catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience. her current book project with neda atanasoski is entitled, race, robots, and the politics of technological futures (forthcoming with duke university press, 2019). mcelroy, erin (2020). corruption, șmecherie, and siliconization: retrospective and speculative technoculture in postsocialist romania. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(2), 1–25. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © erin mcelroy, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license corruption, șmecherie, and siliconization: retrospective and speculative technoculture in postsocialist romania erin mcelroy ai now institute, new york university erinmcelroy@nyu.edu abstract this article explores socialist and postsocialist technoculture in postsocialist romania, focusing upon both retrospective and speculative accounts of what did, and what could have, transpired beyond the purview of the state and of capitalism. upon a backdrop of postsocialist siliconization and western anticorruption politics, it looks to queer, corrupt, and deviant technological practices that pervert normative and western accounts of socialism and its transition. in particular, this article sifts through speculative and retrospective accounts of hackers, computer cloners, and political artists and organizers, many of whom narrate technocultural practices of șmecherie—a romanian word with romani roots inferring cunningness and cleverness. these narrations, imaginations, and speculations, i suggest, corrupt postsocialist siliconization and anticorruption politics through practices of cloning, play, excess, and kinship. introduction there are about a dozen of us hovering around a table in the macaz cooperative bar in downtown bucharest on moșilor street, where the artists veda popovici and mircea nicolae are convening one of several workshops as part of their project istoria (nu) se repetă [history does (not) repeat itself]. as workshop participants, we are tasked with devising objects that can be used to depict a future past from romania’s postsocialist transitional period—one that could have happened after 1989, but that never did. the artists describe their project: special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 2 from darkness to light, from authoritarianism to freedom, from communism to capitalism—these tropes form the greatest narrative of recent history. this narrative casts collective experiences of solidarity and resistance in the footnote of history. the dreams and projections of the 1990s and 2000s, the post-revolutionary desires of a truly better world for all, remain buried under financial pyramid schemes, the mineriads,1 and migration. in istoria (nu) se repetă, these are returning fragments and imperfections in the narrations of possible but lost worlds: feminist trade unions, radical housing movements, collaborative economic projects or awareness raising campaigns on the dangers of capitalism. these counterfactual stories encompass an array of sites, from the coop bank and public information campaign entitled “money is not made through work,” to the union of women workers of romania, who occupied their suveica factory and who now own their own homes in floarea albă. there are the small shop owners at the obor and vitan markets, unscathed by the “mallification” and technourbanism that mark 2018 gentrifying topographies upon which disproportionately roma residents are evicted (as is the case surrounding macaz).2 and the list goes on, filled with places and stories that could have been, but due to the decimating impacts of romania’s transition to capitalism, never were. as istoria (nu) se repetă project participants, we are convened in order to imagine these critical fabulations and to fabricate their materialities. a few of us are excited about one space in particular: the building on calea victoriei that in the mid-1990s headquartered both the roma rights organization, romani criss, and the lgbt organization, accept. during the 1990s, these two groups did indeed share space, forging what could have been rich and sustained space of decolonial, antiracist, anticapitalist, and queer futurity had liberal ngo-ization and capitalist imperatives not severed them. but in popovici and nicolae’s future past, the two groups continue to grow together and build a free school. as workshop participants, we opt to draft a syllabus for the school. amongst other topics, we decide that hacking should be included in the curriculum. as one participant offers, “yes, we all learned computer programming during the 1990s, and before that during socialism. and everyone hacked or knew someone who did. what would have happened if hacking could have really kept romania from getting swallowed up by global capital?” another bemoaned, “romania had such a strong informatics program during socialism, and diy tech stuff too—but it all got cannibalized by the west after 1989.” “look around, it’s like silicon valley has taken over,” another muttered. “șmecherie [a romanian word with romani roots inferring cunningness, or a sort of street-smart cleverness]3—is alive and well in hacking here,” another suggested. “shouldn’t it have been able to help us keep from being siliconized?” as many of us begin to question, why was it that special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 3 siliconization transpired, and why wasn’t romanian computing culture able to better resist western incursion? might it still be able to? by siliconization, workshop participants here refer to the practice of becoming silicon valley, through cooptation and absorption of romanian technoculture and infrastructure into silicon valley and western tech companies. they also refer to modes in which aspirations of western recognition and desires to become western in the aftermath of 1989 transform local onto-epistemologies. critiques of siliconization and processes of becoming silicon valley align with a growing body of literature that has called for decolonial approaches to theorizing postsocialist transition in eastern europe (boatcă, 2006; karkov & valiavicharska, 2018; koobak & marlin, 2014; țichindeleanu, 2010; tlostanova, 2018). this body of work understands post-1989 capitalist transition as a violent process of privatization and predation, one that resulted in novel forms of economic and racial dispossession (atanasoski & vora, 2018; chari & verdery, 2009; chelcea & druță, 2016; popovici, 2020a; vincze & zamfir, 2019). at the same time, istoria (nu) se repetă also converses with a body of work by those invested in queer, decolonial, and antiracist practices of speculation and future making, which engages in speculative narrative work in order to dream up futures that didn’t yet, but that still might, manifest (bahng, 2017; eshun, 2018; keeling, 2019; lothian, 2018; muñoz, 2009; rifkin, 2019). aligned with what saidiya hartman describes as “critical fabulation”—or the writing of speculative histories marked by violence and institutions on one hand, but also “desire and the want of something better” (2018, p. 470)—istoria (nu) se repetă fabricates a postsocialist transitional culture that could have been more emancipatory than acculturation into capitalism. this mode of fabrication can be understood as queer, in that it refuses francis fukuyama’s (2006) “end of history” inevitability. western technology and its postsocialist imposition here are read as normative, with homebrewed șmecherie beyond western capital circuits of reproduction. șmecherie practices in this way align with bogdan popa’s theorization of queer postsocialist politics, whereby queerness “emerges from desires that constitute a surplus in relation to the normal circuit of exchange value” (2018, p. 30). this does not mean that șmecherie infers queerness; rather, it relates to a form of deviancy and excess antithetical to the normativity of western capitalism. in this sense, șmecherie works against what elizabeth freeman (2010) describes as “chrononormativity,” or the temporality that capitalism inheres in order to reproduce its futurity. by engaging with șmecherie, postsocialist dreamers of anticapitalist, antiracist, and decolonial futures past and yet-to-come queer siliconization imperatives by attempting to unbecome silicon valley. in this article, i draw upon fieldwork conducted in the romanian cities of bucharest, cluj, and râmnicu vâlcea between 2016 and 2018, during which i collaborated with and learned from queer, decolonial, and anticapitalist activists, special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 4 dreamers, and visionaries, particularly in the realm of anti-gentrification organizing. much of this entailed attending organizing meetings and conducting research with the housing justice collective, frontul comun pentru dreptul la locuire (fcdl / common front for housing rights),4 housed in macaz, and also frequenting art events, lectures, workshops, parties, protests, and more. bucharest-based artist, political worker, and theorist, veda popovici, who cocreated istoria (nu) se repetă and who organizes with the fcdl and macaz, served as my primary intellectual partner and teacher in many of these spaces. her work thereby informs my theoretical arguments and ethnographic observations throughout this article. during my research, i also studied romania’s socialist and postsocialist cybercultures, learning from and interviewing those involved in official state and underground computing worlds alike. while these flourished during and after socialism, they were rendered corrupt and “dark” by proponents of westernization post-1989—a common ascription of postsocialist eastern european culture, technological and otherwise (atanasoski & mcelroy, 2018; popovici, 2020b). here i weave these worlds together, studying their differences and historical contexts, as well as their entanglements. in this way, i take up alexei yurchak’s (2013) methodological practice of attending to retrospective accounts of socialism and transition, or accounts produced in their aftermaths. in particular, i focus upon how desires of both becoming and unbecoming siliconized render differential retrospective, and also at times, speculative, technocultural accounts. inspired by yurchak’s project, i am interested in the differences between state tech projects and those produced in “deterritorialized milieus” outside, yet in relationship to, those of the state (yurchak, 2013, p. 128). i am also invested in better understanding why visions of cyber deviancy remain a dream amongst speculative future makers. by neither taking “the west” nor the state as origin points in technocultural sociality, yet by tracing their role in siliconization, this research contributes to postsocialist studies and the anthropology of nonwestern technoculture. these contributions align with the ongoing political work of collectives such as macaz, committed to decolonizing western relationality and uncovering deviant relationships whitewashed in narratives of socialist and transitional corruption. indeed, as istoria (nu) se repetă workshop participants agreed, socialist and transitional romania did maintain a rich cyber culture—one often erased in normative computing narratives. during the 1970s and ’80s, the state cloned western licenses in order to produce unique romanian models such as the felix and cobra. meanwhile, underground, trained and untrained technologists, hackers, and playful youth alike cloned and produced their own unique computers and networks, a practice that continued and even flourished after socialism’s demise (fiscutean, 2018). throughout eastern europe, such practices bestowed new modes of piracy, play, sharing, and kinship (gutfrański, 2019; haigh, 2007; special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 5 imre, 2016; jakić, 2014; kind-kovács & labov, 2013; stachniak, 2015; švelch, 2018; wasiak, 2014). similar (yet also different) technological projects and imperatives can be seen throughout the globe, often having to do with entanglements of empire, the state, peripherality, making do, and subversion (chan, 2018; rai, 2019; rosas, 2010). this is not to fetishize all of these projects and practices as inherently deviant and decolonial, nor to suggest that deviancy de facto bears queer, antiracist, and/or decolonial ethos (coleman, 2017). rather, i suggest, they offer inspiration to those encumbered by the onslaught of siliconization. in the words of anita say chan, in the face of growing national and western-centered calls to technologically “ensure a reproduction of the familiar” (2018, p. 2), it is high time for decolonial approaches to computing. as she puts it, decolonial computing frameworks highlight another potential, not only in recognizing the diverse vibrancy of existing challenges to “digital universalist” models that problematically elevate narrow versions of western and elite digital practice and innovation as the only relevant pathway to the future, but in cultivating knowledge practices that indeed foster a decentering of the self as a generative asset towards the creative co-production of alternative futures. (chan, 2018, pp. 2–3) as chan, along with istoria (nu) se repetă participants, accord, there is value in imagining and materializing technofutures beyond reproduction of the familiar. today, while many former hackers recount their exploits as șmecher, proponents of siliconization frame socialist and transitional cloning practices as corrupt. conversely, workshop participants understand these corrupt technological pasts as rife with decolonial, queer possibility. in what follows, i trace these retrospective and speculative accounts, sifting through narratives of șmecherie, socialist-era computing, and postsocialist technoculture. these, while often not explicitly queer, do nevertheless pervert (and perhaps help decolonize) postsocialist siliconization through practices of cloning, play, and kinship. corruption today in and beyond romania, cyber deviancy often is rendered as antithetical to capitalist processes of postsocialist westernization. deviancy and șmecherie can be understood as thwarting assimilationist dreams of becoming “the silicon valley of eastern europe,” a toponymy that has grown over the last decade in part due to the high concentration of western outsourcing firms and fast internet. colossal glass it offices and co-working spaces gentrify romanian urban centers, where it is often difficult to see that today’s silicon infrastructure sits upon the ruins of socialist-era factories (mcelroy, 2019; vincze & zamfir, 2019). upon this landscape, socialist and transitional cyber deviancy is often framed as “corrupt” by those aspiring westernization. yet elided is that this deviancy in fact laid the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 6 groundwork for the siliconized present. here i further explore corruption as a retrospective narrative form. corruption has been front and center as of late in romania, particularly in the anticorruption street protests interpellated as “the light revolution.” since 2017, these have risen to fame through demonstrators’ use of “light technology” in order to chastise government corruption. supported by big banks, tech firms, and neoliberal politicians, these protests purport that for romania to overcome the specters of socialism currently plaguing its social democratic ruling party (a neoliberal party painted as “still socialist” by its also neoliberal opponents), disavowal with the socialist past is requisite (atanasoski & mcelroy, 2018; deoancă, 2017; florea, 2015; popovici, 2020b). embracing siliconization is one way to do this, as embracing western europe had been before socialism (also a time of extreme fascism). it was then, in the pre-socialist interwar period, that bucharest had been rendered “little paris of the east” (perhaps a precursor to today’s little silicon valley). this aspirational fantasy, long familiar in postsocialist and postcolonial geographies alike, manifests in perpetual quests “become western” (amrute, 2016; bhabha, 1997; chakrabarty, 2008; irani, 2019; liu, 2019; rofel, 2007; yurchak, 2013). in postsocialist romania, this transpires in the streets, but also in technology itself. take the following scenario from black the fall, a bucharest-based, japanese-backed, game: everyone is watching. it’s dark—it’s always dark—and black is trying to escape unnoticed from the repressive regime that is socialist romania. black, a nuts and bolts factory worker, has to deceive guards, smuggle goods, and manipulate people—all without getting caught in the cold, industrial never-ending dystopia. black, a video game character in black the fall, has only one friend—an abandoned robot. on screen, black, a humanoid perhaps more machine than human himself, is hard to make out against rows of identical figures. these are either bicycling to power the machine that was state-socialism or listening to the censored radio free europe—a cold war us-backed media propaganda machine designed to instill anticommunist sentiment within the eastern bloc (petrovszky & țichindeleanu, 2011). as black sneaks past a sea of coffins arranged in a halfcollapsing building, an overseer blocks a forgotten room filled with old portraits, a vestige from the good old pre-socialist days when bucharest was the little paris of the east. to the game designers, writing code in the silicon valley of eastern europe, this aristocratic era is a fond historical memory, a time when kings still meant something—a time before socialism and its aftermaths corrupted promises of western enlightenment. in the game, even after “the wall” comes down in what is understood to be 1989, blackness persists. according to game creator, cristian diaconescu, this is due to the dark specters of corrupt socialism. thus, if one makes it to the game’s end, a photo of diaconescu’s design team at a light revolution protest appear, thereby disavowing the “illiberalism” of socialist technology and its corrupt aftermaths. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 7 while corruption in computer programming and data storage refers to processes in which errors and malware alike compromise data integrity and lead to system crashes, in postsocialist siliconized contexts, socialism and its remnants are rendered as corrupt. in the game, black’s robot friend is coded as clumsy, tired, and dark, nothing like the siliconized clean, light technology of today. in this way, siliconization reproduces its future by straightening temporally corrupt cyberculture. shannon woodcock suggests, “just as the homosexual is born into his/her closet and needs to develop in order to ‘come out’ into the world of heterosexuals, the ‘post-socialist’ east exists in western capitalist discourse in order for europe to benevolently bestow recognition on its other” (2011, p. 66). this framework of recognition understands that to escape its socialist-era ghosts, eastern europe must become silicon valley. this can be seen in the co-optation and erasure of socialist and transitional technology, as well as in the anticorruption framing of socialist and transitional technoculture. for instance, in 2018, the romanian-german television series hackerville made headlines as hbo europe’s first co-international production. the series features a german romanian detective who returns to her romanian hometown of timișoara to track down a ring of dangerous cybercriminals. as is revealed, some of these “criminals” are just kids having fun and trying to make quick money, and some are part of a nefarious international network. created by ralph martin and jörg winger, the series also explores repressive socialist histories in romania. however, “hackerville” as a geographic descriptive generally refers not to timișoara, but rather to the smaller mountain city of râmnicu vâlcea, which in 2011, wired famously described as “cybercriminal central” (bhattacharjee, 2011). perhaps as a precursor to hbo’s hackerville, and perhaps inspired by the wired article, in 2015, the silicon valley cybersecurity firm norton security also made a film about dangerous romanian hackers. in it, they rendered râmnicu vâlcea as “the most dangerous town on the internet.” similar to hackerville, norton depicts romanian cybercriminals in socialist-era decrepit buildings, threatening to hack the entire planet. but unlike hbo’s series, norton’s video features actual hackers, many of whom have since been apprehended, some of whom were offered plea deals to work for cybersecurity firms. there is guccifer (who famously hacked hillary clinton, george w. bush, colin powell, and more), iceman (who hacked nasa), and tinkode (the most wanted hacker of 2012), along with anonymous scammers. these figures are juxtaposed by harrowing police narratives, the ramblings of a somber priest, and the authoritative voice of norton’s all-knowing head of security, kevin healy. as captions ominously warn in the beginning, “last year, over a billion dollars was stolen by romanian hackers. everyone knows what is happening, but omerta, the code of silence, is the norm” (dunn, 2015). as is inferred, the silicon valley special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 8 cybersecurity company is here to save innocent americans from the most dangerous town on the internet and its code of silence. in norton’s film, nicolae stănculescu, a râmnicu vâlcean former communist authority figure, attempts to contextualize the city’s proliferation of hackers. “the legacies of communism are complex,” he warns. “many of the burdens from that regime still dominate aspects of people’s lives. important changes took place, especially in the 1980s and 1990s when romania went crazy resulting in the creation of the so-called new human” (dunn, 2015). mădălin dumitru, a romanian it security specialist and founder of cyber smart defense, offers, “because under communism, we were quite limited. we didn’t have so many gadgets. we didn’t have so much access to technology. and since 1989, since the romanian revolution, romanians started to have access to this technology, and they started to develop more and more. they were hungry for it and for technology” (dunne, 2015). while these narratives do attempt to contextualize postsocialist-era hacking upon a socialist-era palimpsest, they, like western cold war narratives, reify socialism and the transitional period as technologically bleak and underdeveloped. such stories feed light revolution protests and siliconization processes, both of which hinge upon a retrospective anticommunist timeline. this timeline erases socialism by shuttling “the little paris of the east” into “the silicon valley of eastern europe”—both periods of western aspiration and mimicry. yet it was during socialism that mimicry was materially practiced in the realm of computer cloning. as i have found, many former hackers, scammers, and diy technologists alike recall these past exploits not as a means of “catching up,” but rather as practices of șmecherie. this is not to suggest that these hackers themselves identified as roma, but rather that they were enmeshed in the deviant and cunning worlds that șmecherie (as it has been popularized in romanian poor and working-class culture) gestures towards. while statesanctioned cloning can be linked to romania’s own desires to catch up and simultaneously feed the machinery of state surveillance (verdery, 2018), underground șmecher cloning, hacking, and cabling were rather implemented to instantiate kinship and connectivity amidst conditions of rampant austerity and disconnection. as istoria (nu) se repetă seeks to investigate, what would it mean to queer these anticorruption accounts, and also dream of futures past that could have kept post1989 siliconization at bay. by queering, and aligned with queer theory, this inquiry diverges from reading queerness as a simple identarian code or sexuality descriptive (barad, 2015), but rather as a field of inquiry and set of interpretative strategies to elucidate the relationality of socialist and transitional technoculture. this is in part what popovici gets at with her analytic of “queer as corrupt,” in which corruption inheres queerness within postsocialist contexts (2020b, p. 70). special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 9 regarding postsocialist cyberculture specifically, queering illuminates computational coding acts that transpired beyond, and in excess of, official state histories and cold war victory narratives alike (popa, 2018). in this way, queerness perverts imaginaries of a reified postsocialist, siliconized “common time” (starosta, 2014). as neda atanasoski and kalindi vora put it, “postsocialism marks a queer temporality, one that does not reproduce its social order even as its revolutionary antithesis” (2018, p. 141). queer, corrupt, and șmecher practices of speculation thus facilitate anticapitalist, decolonial future-making despite the onslaught of siliconization. while such speculative and retrospective narratives of cyberculture are important in understanding postsocialist contradictions, also significant are accounts of those who engaged in these practices. in going on to explore these, i continue to think with and through queer, speculative analytics. these, i find, pair well with retrospective accounting practices of official and underground șmecher cloning worlds. many of such accounts, while not explicitly queer, do nevertheless queer siliconization by disrupting notions that contemporary cyberworlds in postsocialist romania are simply a result of the west alone. as work by media scholars such as tung-hui hu (2015) and shannon mattern (2017) have well illustrated, across the globe, present-day infrastructures often build upon those of prior eras. the novelty of the most recent wave of technological development is thus simply a silicon fantasy. applying this to romania, it becomes clear that neither postsocialist șmecherie nor siliconization are unfolding upon a tabula rasa. this is why it is crucial to look outside of siliconized narratives. in other words, postsocialist technoculture hasn’t just become the property of silicon valley and its anticorruption narratives; there are other stories circulating in and out of transitional materiality and fantasies. state cloning technological development was a crucial part of the state socialist project in romania, as it was in other eastern bloc nations. the figure of the engineer itself was understood as a cyborg of sorts, intended to propel the country into socialist modernity, while socialist projects of electrification and industrialization spread regionally. these projects did not inhere assimilatory drives into liberal democracy, but rather the sustenance of a dialectical post-enlightenment future, one premised upon industrialization, urbanization, and centralization (buckmorss, 2002; collier, 2011). people were moved into cities undergoing rapid development, while dormitories were built around new factories to house workers—the cyborgs of socialist futurity. here i briefly map this landscape so that i can later chart what transpired below its surface. technological growth in socialist romania in part developed due to the country’s maverick status with both the west and the soviet union. romania had refused to special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 10 fully align with the socialist economic bloc, comecon, which had stipulated that each nation have economic specialties, and that romania’s would be agriculture (mureșan, 2008). but with futurist visions of technological growth and collectivization as precondition for industrialization, romania, rather than exist only as food supplier, wanted to develop technology. scientists at the atomic physics institute built romania’s first computer in 1957, cifa-1, making romania the eleventh country to manufacture a computer. after cifa-1, an array of models erupted, from marica, dacicc, and cet in cluj to mecipt in timişoara. these early machines were made to further scientific inquiry and to advance technourban centralization, for instance the optimizing of sugar beet harvesting and public transportation timetables (popoviciu, 1969). over twenty-five official computer models were crafted during socialism, many of which were exported to the people’s republic of china, the czechoslovak socialist republic, the german democratic republic, the polish people’s republic, syria, egypt, and iran (baltac, 2015). having spoken with computer scientists involved in these early endeavors, nostalgia and wistfulness characterize their memories, as does a form of paternalism for having been the first or best at this or that. vasile baltac, one of the early makers of the micept models, today is a professor at bucharest’s national school of political science and public administration, and the ceo/cofounder of software companies softnet.ro and novatech. these are headquartered in the same building on floreasca boulevard that centralized national computer research during socialism. in winter of 2017, he met with me there, eager to share photographs of times past, when he and his colleagues led some of the country’s most valorized technological missions. unlike software company headquarters in silicon valley, the building is old and cracked, worn but filled with technological futures past, entangled in concrete and cables. it was in 1967, baltac recounted, that the government launched a program to promote computational industrial development and to introduce computers into the national economy. although third-generation computers were imported from the west, romania successfully produced and exported its own by cloning western models. france offered romania the license for iris-50 medium-sized computers, which baltac and his team transformed into the felix c-256. an entire felix family was cloned, with over 650 mainframes and many hcs (home computers) such as prae and cobra. while the communist leader nicolae ceauşescu determined hcs to contravene party ideology for being too consumerist, their manufacturing continued regardless, beyond his purview (kovacs, 1991). industrial robots too threatened ceauşescu, who worried that they would replace the working-class labor force. while the word “robot” was banished from the press, robotics research continued, supported by local authorities who decided to turn their heads (kovacs, 1991). these researchers were just some of many dissident forces in the underground of a maverick state. yet this is not the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 11 sort of dissidence that istoria (nu) se repetă imagined nourishing a queer, decolonial technofuture. of more interest are the histories that took place further underground, and those that still might come to be. socialist șmecherie donna haraway suggests, “the main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. but illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. their fathers, after all, are inessential” (1987, p. 4). in other words, cyborgs bear lives that have little to do with their makers’ intentions. if we read computers and computer makers as cyborgs of the socialist period, it becomes clear that some of the most interesting cyborgian practices transpired beyond the pale of the state. it is this that i continue to explore here. tibi, who now lives in the us, where he works in a software company, grew up in bucharest in the 1980s, where he learned programming from his cloned spectrum. the zx spectrum was built in britain in 1982, and soon copied and produced throughout eastern europe, he explained to me one morning over a skype call when i was living in bucharest, and he in the us. the 8-bit hc ran a basic interpreter, making it relatively easy to use as long as you had a tv set and an audiocassette for external program memory, he recalled. “if you pressed ‘i’ it would be ‘if,’ ‘e’ it would be ‘else,’ so you could type basic pretty quickly.” most people that he knew with computers in the 1980s had spectrum clones, he grinned. although the party cloned the spectrum to create the cobra, these were enormously expensive and difficult to obtain, inspiring the proliferation of underground diy hardware assemblage. while tibi doesn’t remember where his family bought their computer, he does recall it being an unusual purchase. in the 1980s, cobras cost 35,000 lei, about half the price of a dacia car.5 black market clones were much cheaper (and therefore more popular), sometimes going for 12,000 lei. that said, clones were still five to six times the cost of the average romanian salary at the time (fiscutean, 2017). tibi recounts having to buy russian audiocassette tapes so that he could store information and load programs on his computer, since it, like its contemporaries, lacked storage. underground markets emerged, with people trading cassettes and parts. rather than playing games like his peers, tibi used these to learn software and programming. “i remember that at one point i was using my computer to read a very precise scale that was measuring the input of a drop of water to show how it evaporates—even with 32k of memory,” he reminisced. tibi joined his high school’s computer club, unofficially organized by two professors who were into computers. there was one computer class taught in his school, but it was very simple, based on fortran, a fast and efficient computer language developed by ibm in the 1950s. “you can still see traces of the past today,” he special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 12 explained, referencing how fortran and basic are still used. specters from spectrum times. bogdan, a retro-computing expert, is trying to archive these spectrum times by creating a computer museum in cluj. one rainy afternoon, we sat down in an old bar and he told me about how every thursday midnight during socialism, the party-sanctioned tv station would pause broadcasting normal programming to instead emit an hour of code. it sounded like a fax machine, he described, mimicking its mechanical buzz. bogdan’s brother would fight the family for use of the television during this time, so that he could record the code on one of his floppy disks plugged into his cloned computer. he would then spend the week decoding it. “it wasn’t some fancy key to some government secret—nothing like that. sometimes it was just information about the airport, sometimes an announcement from a big shop, sometimes games and free software. this how we began to learn basic programming,” he smiled. his friends would come over to play the games, resulting in ten adolescents hovering around one computer. this sort of techno community became prolific amongst youth of late socialist period. bucharest’s polytechnic university became a hotbed of cloning, with students engendering all sorts of deviant computer practices, sometimes creating entire supply chains. as andrada fiscutean (2018) has well documented, sometimes parts were scrapped from other computers; sometimes they were flown in with the help of airline pilots. dealers would come to campus with electronics, parts, leds, and resistors, selling them at bulk to the students. often, they would meet at a nearby campus pub. there was even this guy they called “the american” who sold transistors right in front of legitimate electronics stores, somehow getting away with it. soon, everyone at the university had these șmecherie homemade machines, each made with about two thousand solder joints and a sea of wires. about 90 percent of the romanian computer industry was built on reverse engineering in the 1980s, i’ve often been told. no two machines were ever the same. even their cases varied, depending upon what was available underground. the keyboards contained keys polished one at a time with a nail file, upon which professional-looking paper letters and numbers were glued, thanks to a friend’s paper business. the purpose was to learn and to have fun, never to engage in corporate profiteering. might these cloned computers—derived from smuggled and stolen parts alike— queer anticommunist narratives of socialist tech as simply poor, benign accomplices to black the fall dystopics? this spectrum hybrid, a perversion to the west, was not produced by the west, nor by the socialist state. its past is muddled and unattached to pure origin tales. its materiality depended upon illicit connections, disassembled motherboards, and forbidden border crossings— objects and events that istoria (nu) se repetă participants imagine could have led to futures beyond siliconization. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 13 transition sitting around the table at the macaz cooperative, across from a list of antiracist, anticapitalist, and feminist ethics painted on the wall, istoria (nu) se repetă participants began recounting stories of 1990s technoculture and its various perversities. what if these could have somehow staved off the dawn of post-1989 technocapitalism? “no, it would have been impossible to fight back,” another ventured. “the west and its technologies were too powerful.” with that, one workshop participant began detailing how much she remembers transition itself being informed by technology, particularly media. not only was the 1989 revolution itself the first revolution televised, but the broadcasting of the event was staged by the west to justify western intervention (petrovskzy & țichindeleanu, 2011). but on top of that, she recalls, “people just started watching tv. western tv. or romanian tv modeled on western programming. but either way, tv was the truth teller.” here i continue to explore the complex and often perverse relationship with the west that romanian technoculture found itself in during transition. as another friend recounted, during the 1990s when she was just a child, she would sit around with her parents and watch six hours a day of mtv. because television programs were undubbed, and because people were fascinated with the new world that had just opened up to them, viewers learned english quickly, and also spanish due to the abundance of telenovelas. even though mtv has since “gone to shit,” her mother, now in her sixties, still watches it daily, and has a television in every room of her home. at the same time, her father became obsessed with bootlegging, and so their family would go to the flea market each weekend to buy black market cds. later, during the 2000s, her father would pirate movies from torrent sites, which he would burn to dvds and arrange by geography in his home library. through pirating, bootlegging, and television, the post–cold war spectral encounter between the east and the west became an asymmetrical geographic interplay. mckenzie wark observes, “the territory of the east was maintained as an image of the other within the map of the west; the map of the west was the other put into covert circulation in the territory of the east” (1994, p. 65). and yet, the circulation of the west in the east produced complex frictions and effects. english proficiency, along with the abundance of socialist-trained informatics workers, became an inspiration for western firms looking to launch a new eastern european outsourcing market post-1989. this offered opportunities to some, but most people i’ve spoken with recount having lost, rather than gained, employment in the 1990s. or they somehow pieced together an array of undignified gigs. in 1988 computer production was valued at 10 billion lei, but in 1991 it sunk to 3 billion, with hardware production ceasing (docaș, 2015). florin, founder of an it company, recounts the number of it workers dropping rapidly, special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 14 and a canadian firm extracting a whole team of two hundred people. as factories crumbled, malls appeared. as small markets vanished, mega image and carrefour hypermarkets manifested from western europe. casinos and gambling venues too erupted in the 1990s, in chain venues such as maxbet. between 2003 and 2014 the number of slot machines quadrupled in romania, reaching 62,000 (meseșan, 2016). today these are filled with working-class gamblers trying to win at a capitalist game rigged against them (verdery, 1995)—something that istoria (nu) se repetă also reimagines another future of. cristian, a fellow istoria (nu) se repetă participant, works for a multinational in sema park adjacent to the polytechnic university. one cold winter day he met me there to show me around. as we began walking by teams of tech employees with badges hanging from lanyards worn around their necks waiting in queues for food trucks, cristian began recounting his own history there. his father had been a cyberneticist, having studied at the university in the 1980s. but his father’s position was made obsolete when western firms swept in after 1989, so he resorted to driving taxis and working odd jobs throughout cristian’s childhood. after high school, cristian was able to study economics in the uk. he then managed get a job for hewlett packard in romania in the 2010s. now he does technical writing for a different firm in sema park. during socialism, sema park had been an agricultural industrial center. but today it lives as a jumble of high-tech glass towers and old socialist-era warehouses. there are still canteens that serve the same traditional romanian food that they served to socialist agricultural workers, but now they’ve rebranded their exteriors with brick and glass, having changed their names to hipster-sounding titles, like “cactus.” “they’re just doing what they have to keep up,” cristian tells me, pointing out a large empty lot that reminds him of the spaciousness and heavy industrial ruins of the 1990s. “this is what everything was like in the ’90s—i miss it.” he used to come here in high school to go clubbing, back when it was cheap. there are also new food trucks that have come in, mostly selling burgers and coffee, and a fancy café inside the glass building where he works that oddly resembles a tropical botanical garden. there’s also a sports center and bowling alley, idm, with a logo mimicking ibm’s. but it’s been there for a while, and, having bowled there myself, i can attest that is far from bourgeois inside. across the city from idm is pipera, the neighborhood of socialist-era computing and felix manufacturing. after 1989 felix found itself in a messy relationship with the actual ibm, the former suddenly supposed to produce hardware for the latter. and yet ibm’s strategy failed, at least at first, as they had to compete with a new underground market in which romanians would assemble their own computers with uncertified it parts from hong kong to taiwan in small garages. on our skype call, tibi recalled, “in the early 1990s, i was interested in building my own pc. if you wanted to do an upgrade with some parts, it was cheaper to build special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 15 your own. i was building for a couple of friends, even my brother.” as in other peripheral locales, underground technocultures and practices sprung up just to make do with what was available. in doing so, new forms of kinship, connection, and șmecherie were engendered. tibi also remembered one of the first commercials to be released on romanian television after 1989. it was a felix computer commercial with a slogan went viral: “v-am prins, vrăjitoarelor!” (i caught you, witches!). “it was everywhere,” he remembers, “everyone knew it.” but what might it actually mean? today, people have different interpretations of the satiric commercial, which featured a man walking into a cave filled with witches preparing some potion for him. were the witches felix makers crafting socialist-era machines now liberated by capitalism, or were they americans now trapping corrupt romanian computer-makers with their end-of-history alchemy? then again, as witches are gendered and racialized in popular imaginaries in romania (often invoking anti-roma racism), might the commercial be conflating socialism with roma people? if so, the advert renders felix on a new western journey away from its corrupt past. but then again, perhaps the commercial acted as a prescient satire from the future, aware that that despite the west’s bests efforts, romanian computer perversion would continue to flourish—though maybe in internet cafés and computer labs instead of caves. postsocialist șmecherie indeed, despite the best spells cast by capitalism, the specters of the spectrum clone found their way into postsocialist times. as i continue to explore, this endurance, bypassed in siliconized narrative structures, continues to bolster, touch, and pervert the present. while ibm was wreaking havoc in felix worlds, tibi and others continued to produce machines underground. meanwhile, an array of computer magazines began circulating, saturated with computer construction manuals, software installation guidelines, code, and instructions in how to set up satellites and lan networks. from backtracking methods to articles on virtual reality, techno-skepticism, and the phenomena of the hacker, magazines such as open tehnologia informației and pc world romania blossomed in the 1990s. alexandra, a queer programmer who now works for a french tech firm in bucharest, remembers learning to build computers from reading the magazine extreme pc. it got big in the 2000s, replete with online chatrooms and support. she learned how to code in school during a weekly class and in online chatrooms, some of which are still active today. meanwhile, apartments began setting up “decoders” to steal hbo, otherwise not available. “it was this funny little device that we all had on the back of our televisions,” she recounted as we took a walk through an overgrown park on the outskirts of the city one blistering summer special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 16 afternoon. if it broke, everyone knew someone who would come and set up another, she smiled in remembrance. in 2014 romania’s piracy rate was twice that of the eu at 60 percent, but in 1996 it was as high at 86 percent (fiscutean, 2014). at the time, there was little legislation protecting intellectual property, and the software market developed accordingly. ms-dos was the first pirated operating system in the 1990s, and then os/2, and later windows, via russia. at first, pirated software was largely not sold for profit, and rather was understood as educational material, building collective knowledge about coding, algorithms, and open source products. vlad, a queer performer from râmnicu vâlcea, remembers that it was then that a zillion internet cafés sprung up overnight. “it was hard to get into them because they were so crowded,” he recalls. one of his neighbors invented a vpn to mask ip addresses, and soon everyone started paying him for vpns so that they could hack from home. vlad remembers that often people would make money fast from some internet hack and then use the money to pay for personal manele (roma popular music) concerts. these networks were soon strung throughout cities on telephone poles, building the backbones of what is now europe’s fastest internet connection. this wasn’t the experimental project of state socialism intended to improve central planning and economics; it was more an organic decentralized network intended to connect and share information, music, movies, tools, games, and software amongst neighbors. because internet dial-up packages were expensive, and because of the intense poverty incited by transition, generally, one person would buy internet and then share or sell it to people in their building, wiring cables haphazardly. as people had already been pirating and sharing satellite stations, and as the magazines and chatrooms taught wiring techniques, stringing cables across apartments and blocks of flats “was really no big deal,” i’ve been told. today still, telephone poles, from cluj to bucharest, are adorned in a massive array of cables from the early 2000s era, some still working, some just there on because they are too woven in to detach. the first time i pointed these out to a friend visiting from the us, she asked if it was an art installation. and yet, as people are always quick to remind me, the cabling today is nothing compared to the early 2000s, when it became commonplace for telephone poles to crash with the weight of the cables, sometimes smashing cars parked beneath. bogdan set up a similar network in cluj, connecting twenty-four people in his block. it was 2004, and he had no internet cable, but somehow managed to use tv cable. “we all had intel 486 computers then, the new generation,” he told me. they had sixteen kilobytes, used routers, and it took five minutes to transfer a picture. you could never shut down your computer once it was connected because you didn’t want to be bumped off. setting up this network was just one of his many diy computer projects of the era. for him, it all began in grade school when special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 17 he would cut class and hide in the attic. there, he discovered an old broken mii8b computer from the 1970s. curious, he came back the next day with a screwdriver. it was the late 1990s, and there was no google or yahoo to tell him how to fix it. but there were smoky internet cafés where he could ask questions. so, he began. two years later, he won a math competition and was awarded an old intel 486 computer that the national television station was discarding. eventually, he saved up money from his job at the local newspaper to buy the parts to make it work and to install windows. hardware became cheaper after 2002, he remembers, and it became easier to pirate the operating system. soon after, he began to visit the oser flea market every weekend to pick up older broken models. before long, his entire room was crammed with computers. it was then that he began to build his neighborhood network, eager to share and pirate new software for his growing collection. but then, in 2010, the internet monolith romania data systems (rds) came in, promising better and faster services, fiber optics even. threatened by independent networks, they would sometimes threaten building administrators, citing technical illegalities about the size or length of the wire. sometimes they just cut cables. “everything went to hell.” eventually, bogdan’s network came down, but still, there remains one stubborn cable. “no one says anything about it—i think people think it’s part of a spy network!” he laughs. today, bogdan maintains a day job with amazon, but spends most of his time finding discarded and broken computers, cleaning and repairing them, turning them into specters of their former selves. postsocialist computer cloners, neighborhood network builders, and retrocomputing experts alike touch upon what bogdan describes as the “x86 generation”—a reference to intel’s microprocessor and the generation wedged between gen x and millennials. this generation was born predigital, but also created the context for the digital. bogdan argues that it is this generation who created the complex, entangled, and often contradictory romanian technoscapes today preyed upon by silicon valley. “unlike what everyone thinks, it’s not silicon valley leading the tech wave—it’s these people,” he told me firmly. the west may absorb existent infrastructure, computer factories, wires, and more. but it wasn’t silicon valley that created these materialities. thus, while siliconization co-opts underground cyberworlds, it remains materially corrupted by, and dependent upon, their existence. florentin, a member of the independent free and open source software and hardware project ceata, also remembers rds sweeping in. his own father worked at the state-owned romtelecom (now telecom and connected to t-mobile). romtelecom, along with c-zone, was bought up by rds, he remembers. meanwhile, upc, another large corporation, bought up the smaller firm, astrid. florentin got his first computer in 2000 before this consolidation, but he never got special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 18 to use an independent network because he couldn’t find one in his bucharest neighborhood, drumul taberei. “maybe because everyone there was old,” he questioned. there was a really cool network in crângași where people battled for its control. florentin wanted to set one up too, but he had no money to buy cables. his father had some extra telephone wires, so he tried to stretch them and use them in a ramshackle way, but it never worked. he recollects how slow the dial-up was in his block between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m., as this was when all the downloading and uploading would begin. he had wanted to start assembling computers independent from microsoft operating systems, but to download other operating systems, you needed a fast connection. microsoft had also set up an automatic update on his computer preventing him from downloading what he wanted. maybe it was this that got florentin thinking about the importance of moving away from silicon valley and private software. perhaps it was this that led him to ceata. “the only way that you can maintain security is to have the right hardware,” he explained. today, florentin creates new machines from spare parts, much like he and others did a decade earlier. his goal is to ensure that his computers aren’t hacked by silicon valley–driven data capitalism and spying. he and others from ceata frequently visit other free software communities from across the globe, determined to string together a network of practitioners and users free from the corporate reigns of siliconization. back in romania, ceata has even made its way to macaz, eager to help the co-operative’s organizers implement safer practices. yet back in post–cold war silicon valley, fears of “dangerous” and “illiberal” eastern european hackers accumulate. this imaginary often becomes internalized in romania, reflective in black the fall imagery and light revolution protests alike. nevertheless, technocultural deviancy persists, building upon histories of informal infrastructure and subversive relationality. space invaders in the spring of 2018, during a light revolution protest (and also a far-right homophobic “normality” demonstration), a third march crawled through bucharest’s streets. for the first time, the annual lbgtq pride parade was granted access to march through bucharest’s city center, rather than being confined to urban outskirts. also, for the second year in a row, ibm, google, and accenture pinkwashed the event (popovici, 2020b), not dissimilar to pride parades in california’s silicon valley (stanley, 2018). however, this year, a small group of anticapitalist protestors, many of whom were istoria (nu) se repetă participants (but also part of a broader wave of anticapitalist queers espousing anarchist, feminist, antiracist, and antifascist politics), were prepared. we came equipped with large banners against pinkwashing, racial capitalism, and fascism. “fuck off google” stickers were brought from a solidarity action in berlin, where at the time, google was attempting to establish a campus. activists replicated the special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 19 messaging during the cluj pride that took place a week later, along with a “lgbt and space invaders against gentrification” sign. referencing the 1978 cold war video game, the sign overtly corrupted the cold war 2.0 to reclaim robotic space invaders. unsurprisingly, liberal technocapitalists chastised the queer dissidents in both cities, reminding us that romania was now finally free from socialism. how dare we corrupt that! as popovici recounts of the tensions, if progress can only be achieved through neoliberal complicity, “an anti-capitalist position associated with queer and feminist positions becomes incompatible with the desired future of a western becoming” (2020b, p. 56). when a photo of one of the antipinkwashing banners began circling in a forum monitored by accept, rather than defend it, the organization just deleted the image. it was “too far of a step to take, the anti-google stuff,” someone later explained. this, of course, is a far step away from the speculative future woven by istoria (nu) se repetă participants, who imagined how accept and romani criss worked together to corrupt siliconization. had ceata and others of the x86 generation been committed to queer, decolonial future-making in the 1990s, perhaps a free school replete with hacking classes would have been created. in this speculative future, șmecher practices might have been able to queer early siliconization and instantiate antiracist, anticapitalist cyberworlds. instead, șmecher hacking practices were quite distinct from 1990s accept and romani criss worlds. nevertheless, șmecher practices did indeed subvert and devalue siliconization imperatives. perhaps it is this devaluation that istoria (nu) se repetă find hopeful in their speculative accounting. as robin d. g. kelly (1996) has insisted, reserving the category of resistance for activists belittles everyday forms of resistance and subversion. writing of such everyday practices, he suggests, if we are to make meaning of these kinds of actions rather than dismiss them as manifestations of immaturity, false consciousness, or primitive rebellion, we must begin to dig beneath the surface of trade union pronouncements, political institutions, and organized social movements, deep into the daily lives, cultures, and communities which make the working classes so much more than people who work. (kelly, 1996, pp. 3–4) along these lines, saba mahmood suggests that “the category of resistance impose[s] a teleology of progressive politics that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being and action that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and the re-inscription of norms” (2011, p. 9). thus, queer and decolonial speculative accounts understand that șmecherie, despite its lack of overt politics, subverts siliconization beyond normative special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 20 resistance frameworks. rather than cloning liberal platforms of recognition, șmecherie exists in excess of such framing. it is this that perhaps istoria (nu) se repetă participants, along with popovici and nicolae, find hopeful in their dreaming of technofutures to come. josé esteban muñoz writes, to want something else, to want beside and beyond the matrix of social controls that is our life in late capitalism, is to participate in this other form of desiring. thus, the connection between queerness and utopia is most salient at this precise point—the desire for a new world despite an emotional/world situation that attempts to render such desiring impossible. (2009, p. 278) queerness, as both perversion to capitalism and desire for something else, is not simply recasting socialist nostalgia, nor reproducing liberal imaginaries. unattached to origin stories and to becoming silicon valley, queering here commits to speculating upon other cyberworlds and friendships in order to code something new. acknowledgements this article is dedicated to everyone i have learned from and organized with in romania, particularly those in macaz and the fcdl, and to istoria (nu) se repetă co-creator, mircea nicolae, who sadly passed away during the course of my writing of this article. in particular, i am indebted to veda popovici, whose generosity in sharing knowledge, stories, and analysis is far too great to describe here. i also thank those who offered me feedback on this piece at various stages of its writing, including neda atanasoski, lisa rofel, karen barad, megan moodie, liviu chelcea, bogdan popa, sareeta amrute, luis felipe r. murillo, veda popovici, and the generous anonymous reviewers. notes 1 the mineriads were a series of miner-led altercations that took place in romania following the collapse of state socialism. 2 postsocialist transition has led to the disproportionate evictions of roma residents in romania (popovici, 2020a; vincze & zamfir, 2019). roma are romania’s most racialized minority, having been subjugated to slavery, failed reparations, eugenic technoscience, nationalism, and fascism—all setting the stage for contemporary dispossession (lancione, 2019; mcelroy, 2019). 3 șmecherie is used by roma and non-roma romanians alike due the prevalence of roma culture in poor and working-class spaces. as a word, it is significant in roma and romanian culture, without an exact english equivalent. special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 21 4 the fcdl is an antiracist, feminist, and anticapitalist grassroots organization that fosters solidarity and builds community to resist gentrification (popovici, 2020a). 5 the dacia automobile manufacturer was famously founded in romania in 1966, and then purchased by the french renault group in 1999. references amrute, s. 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(2019). introduction: the speed of guccifer. obieg. https://obieg.uhttps://www.zdnet.com/article/the-mix-of-poverty-and-piracy-that-turned-romania-into-europes-software-development-powerhouse https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-mix-of-poverty-and-piracy-that-turned-romania-into-europes-software-development-powerhouse https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2017/11/the-underground-story-of-cobra-the-1980s-illicit-handmade-computer/ https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2017/11/the-underground-story-of-cobra-the-1980s-illicit-handmade-computer/ special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 23 jazdowski.pl/en/numery/the-speed-of-guccifer/introduction-the-speed-of-guccifer haigh, m. (2007). downloading communism: file sharing as samizdat in ukraine. libri, 57(3), 165–178. haraway, d. (1987). a manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s. australian feminist studies, 2(4), 1–42. hartman, s. 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(1994). virtual geography: living with global media events. indiana university press. wasiak, p. (2014). playing and copying: social practices of home computer users in poland during the 1980s. in g. alberts & r. oldenziel (eds.), hacking europe (pp. 129– 150). springer. woodcock, s. (2011). a short history of the queer time of “post-socialist” romania, or are we there yet? let’s ask madonna. in r. kulpa & j. mizielinska (eds.), de-centring western sexualities: central and eastern european perspectives (pp. 63–83). routledge. yurchak, a. (2013). everything was forever, until it was no more: the last soviet generation. princeton university press. author bio erin mcelroy is a postdoctoral researcher at new york university’s ai now institute, https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2019.1684078 special section: computing in/from the south | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) erin mcelroy, 2020 26 and is co-founder of the anti-eviction mapping project and the radical housing journal. erin earned a doctoral degree in feminist studies from the university of california, santa cruz, with a focus on the politics of space, race, and technology in romania and silicon valley. microsoft word 76945-1-11-20190201__earle.doc earle, j. (2019). imagining otherwise: the importance of speculative fiction to new social justice imaginaries. review of bodyminds reimagined: (dis)ability, race, and gender in black women’s speculative fiction, by sami schalk (duke university press, 2018) and migrant futures: decolonizing speculation in financial times, by aimee bahng (duke university press, 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-7. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © joshua earle, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license review imagining otherwise: the importance of speculative fiction to new social justice imaginaries bodyminds reimagined: (dis)ability, race, and gender in black women’s speculative fiction, by sami schalk (duke university press, 2018) and migrant futures: decolonizing speculation in financial times, by aimee bahng (duke university press, 2017) joshua earle virginia tech jearle@vt.edu sami schalk begins her new book bodyminds reimagined: (dis)ability, race, and gender in black women's speculative fiction (2018) with a confession. she admits that she was not always a fan of speculative fiction due to the “geeky male whiteness of the genre” (p. 1). and while earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 speculative fiction continues to be predominantly white and male, schalk shows us how diversification of the medium is, in fact, happening. she also helps us as readers understand, through speculative fiction, the various intersectional oppressions that (dis)abled women of color (and others) navigate in their non-speculative, everyday lived experience. schalk begins by examining octavia butler's novel kindred (1979). according to schalk, kindred illustrates that disability is not merely a metaphor for blackness or slavery, but must also be taken as the literal, embodied reality of enslaved people. in the opening of kindred, we learn that the protagonist has lost her arm in mysterious circumstances. the specter of eventual disability forces the reader to “anticipate and expect that disablement could occur at any moment in the text, an experience that psychologically gestures toward the vulnerability of slaves to disability at any moment as well” (p. 50). the ways in which disability affects slaves’ productivity in the slave economy becomes a literal and metaphorical mirror for how disability affects us all in our own society. schalk returns to butler's work in chapter 3, examining the earthseed series (parable of the sower (1993) and parable of the talents (1998)). the earthseed series, schalk suggests, illustrates how disability cannot be understood as either a purely negative experience, nor as merely a gateway to superpowers. while scholarly discussion of the earthseed series has landed in both of those camps, schalk insists that butler's work itself does not. the parallels between how scholars have treated the earthseed series and how scholars, and the public, tend to treat disability here in the real world are the explicit target of schalk's critiques in this chapter. through the lens of phyllis alessia perry’s (1998) novel stigmata, schalk illustrates how race, gender, and disability conflate to produce certain types of mental illness and (dis)ability (while acknowledging the inseparability of disabilities of the mind and body, represented by her use of the term “bodymind”), and how the psychiatric-pharmaceutical industry earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 works to reinforce and control that production. by evoking the ways in which people have been deemed mentally unfit, disabled, or feebleminded throughout history, particularly in the eugenic era in the first half of the twentieth century, stigmata illustrates the particularly racialized and gendered ways in which we as a society see mental disability. in her penultimate chapter, schalk makes a subtle but significant shift in how she describes the defamiliarizing work of speculative fiction. here, schalk takes on realist (dis)abilities (such as blindness or obsessive compulsive disorder) in non-realist settings or with non-human bodyminds. in doing so, schalk illustrates how (dis)abilities that we think we know and understand can be complicated by changing the contexts in which those (dis)abilities function on an individual and cultural level. the blind character, oree, from n.k jemisin’s the broken kingdoms (2010), who can “see” magic due to her demon heritage, is disabled in non-magical places but functionally non-disabled in magic-rich settings (pp. 119-120). oree's dual status challenges the notion of the (dis)abled as un-able in all contexts, but also avoids the notion of the “supercrip,” both tropes that are often deployed in both speculative and realist settings. throughout bodyminds reimagined, schalk continues to show us that it is possible to imagine ourselves differently. it is incumbent upon us as readers, citizens, and authors to do so more often, in more ways, and including more kinds of people. only through different imaginings will the world's oppressive structures shift. bodyminds reimagined is an important work on theorizing speculative fiction and the ways in which it can change perceptions, actions, and minds. a model for future intersectional scholarship, this book is well written and accessible. in her 2018 migrant futures: decolonizing speculation in financial times, aimee bahng also uses speculative fiction to disrupt expectations. bahng notes how pervasive financial speculation has become in our society, and how risk and return, capital and colonialism, have been used on and against migrant and diasporic populations. bahng uses speculative earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 fiction by people of color, particularly asian americans, to show us different ways to imagine and bring forth alternative, and perhaps more just, futures. bahng centers each chapter around a theme or location, draws out some standard narratives, which she then complicates through several examples of speculative fiction. this book is significantly less accessible than schalk's. the connections between real-life examples and speculative fiction reimaginings/queerings are less obvious, the relevance of finance in particular seems to wax and wane throughout the book. the writing is sometimes weighed down by jargon and the difficulties of wrangling a multitude of ephemerally-connected threads into a coherent whole. the introductory chapter does not provide a useful overview of the structure of the book. gradually, however, it becomes clear that this omission is intentional, as i realized once i was a few chapters into the book, into the cases and comparisons. only then did i begin to understand what bahng was doing. the ideas in this book are big, novel, and fantastic. but more than that, the structure itself is an act of academic decolonization and speculation. perhaps it was merely my own failure, based on my expectations of scholarly work, that i had trouble in the beginning. as i continued, i began to realize that this book does not just illustrate how speculative fiction can disrupt our western linear, capitalist, colonialist expectations. just as karen tei yamashita (author of tropic of orange, [2017]), in bahng’s words, “puns on the narrative ‘plot’ lines that follow unidirectional, linear trajectories to suggest progress and development” (p. 66), bahng herself disrupts this same expectation. bahng does, in this scholarly work, to scholarly work what she describes speculative fiction doing to speculative finance, capitalism, and various colonialisms, including neoand post-. it is a profound experiment in narrative scholarship, and a bit of clunkiness is probably expected. earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) because of the complexities of her arguments, i will focus on one chapter as illustrative of the book. in chapter 3, “speculation and the speculum,” bahng delves into reproduction, and particularly the notion of surrogacy, as a racialized and colonialist practice. she begins by comparing a pair of real-life stories: the 2008 new york times magazine story about (and authored by) alex kuczynski, titled “her body, my baby: my adventures with a surrogate mom,” and the discourse that article inspired; and the story of nadya suleman, commonly referred to as “octomom,” and the ways in which the discourse around her story changed over time. bahng puts these real-life stories in conversation with alfonso cuarón’s 2006 film children of men, and nalo hopkinson’s 2000 novel midnight robber. kuczynski’s tale is rife with markers of class and the colonial offloading of labor onto women of color, particularly migrants. the photos in kuczynski’s own story show her, a white woman, holding a blue-eyed white baby, while their nanny, a woman of color, looks on. kuczynski also talks about being able to go on a few last-minute trips (white-water rafting, skiing, drinking bourbon, and going to the super bowl [p. 79]) before her surrogate finally delivered. these circumstances, detailed in kuczynski's own writing, illustrate the ways in which finance allows one the benefits of motherhood while avoiding the labor/responsibility.1 this is the case both in gestating the child, which was done by her surrogate, and in caring for him as well, which will be done in large part by a nanny. this allocation of labor allows kuczynski the privilege of maintaining the globetrotting life to which she has grown accustomed. alternatively, suleman’s story began as a tale of scientific wonder of in vitro fertilization, but as her financial situation became more widely known, racial, class, and immigrant narratives took over in popular discourse. suleman became the poster child for the racialized “welfare queen,” leeching off the system, producing more offspring than she could possibly care for on her own—a distinct nono in our neoliberal capitalist system. earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) bahng then contrasts suleman, kuczynski, and children of men with hopkinson's novel midnight robber, which queers futurity, both the teleological discourses around technological progress, and the oppressive structures that are upheld by western, white technological and social norms. hopkinson, bangh argues, queers these narratives through “crossspecies partnering and queer family formation…[and] migrant communities…dislodged from heteronormative domesticity” (pp. 82-83). and through these queerings, hopkinson disentangles technology from the western cultural codes of progress, freedom, and modernity (p. 83), instead valorizing migrancy and social coalitions that are situated in new, local, and contingent ways. both schalk’s bodyminds reimagined and bahng’s migrant futures are fascinating, important, and exciting. i recommend these books for any scholars who want to use race, gender, (dis)ability, or migrant issues in their work, and especially for those who are interested in how fictional imaginaries might be used to investigate real-world issues. i am super excited to see where these two scholars go next. notes 1 the relative lack of kuczynski's husband in both the story and its treatment by bahng is somewhat notable in that it seems to re-inscribe the heteronormative notion that mothering is a set of labors that are done by women. that reproductive labor is discussed in this book only as a racialized and colonial project, and not in gender terms is a fairly glaring omission, one that could have been easily dealt with in a single paragraph or note. earle catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) references butler, o. e. (1979). kindred. boston, ma: beacon press. butler, o. e. (1993). parable of the sower. new york, ny: open road media. butler, o. e. (1998). parable of the talents: a novel. new york, ny: seven stories press. cuarón, a. (director). (2006). children of men. [motion picture]. united states: universal studios home video. hopkinson, n. (2001). midnight robber. new york, ny: grand central publishing. jemisin, n. k. (2010). the broken kingdoms. new york, ny: orbit. kuczynski, a. (2008, november). her body, my baby: my adventures with a surrogate mom. new york times magazine, 42-49, 64, 74, 78. perry, p. a. (1998). stigmata. new york, ny: anchor books. yamashita, k. t. (2017). tropic of orange. minneapolis, mn: coffee house press. bio joshua earle is a phd candidate in science and technology studies at virginia tech. his work focuses on the connections between eugenics and transhumanism, and the way bodies and identity shape and are coconstructed by and within both movements. microsoft word 298-1856-1_editorialboard.docx catalyst editorial board. (2018). intimidating knowledge. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-2. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © catalyst editorial board. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license editorial intimidating knowledge catalyst editorial board in the few years since catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience inaugurated its first issue in 2015, the journal has published five issues. we founded catalyst because we saw need for a journal that valued cutting edge scholarship in feminist technoscience. very often, we found, in our own experiences, and in others, that disciplinary boundaries severely “disciplined” the contours of knowledge. feminist journals often under appreciated the role of science, and sts (technoscience) journals under-appreciated the role of social categories such as gender, race, class, sexuality, nation, and indigeneity. deeply aware of the critical stakes of knowledge formations and social justice, we inaugurated catalyst, so we might help catalyze more bold, robust, creative, and imaginative explorations in the feminist technosciences. we are deeply committed to feminist accounts that take seriously the intersectional roots and evolutions of science and feminism. the five issues we have published have each been very well received. they have each pushed the bounds of disciplinary and interdisciplinary technosciences in interesting and important ways. but as 2 catalyst editorial board catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) sociologists of knowledge have long noted, success usually breeds attacks, and we have watched with deep concern as some authors of catalyst (along with scholars across disciplines), and authors working in feminist technoscience more broadly, have been attacked. it is noteworthy that these attacks have primarily focused on junior scholars, often women of color, queer, and trans scholars; i.e., the attacks focus on precisely those who are already vulnerable in the academy. they have received hate mail, they (and their scholarship) have been publically vilified, and their superiors (chairs of departments and university administrators) have been notified, cautioned and at times publically pressured to take action to disavow their work. in many ways, debates on academic freedom are not entirely new. in particular, feminists and feminist scholarship have long been the focus of ridicule, outrage, and threats. but it is also clear that at this particular time in history, and with the growth of social media, attacks on academia and academics is particularly acute. the very ground and veracity of academic knowledge – of what counts as knowledge and what does not – is under pressure. there is a plethora of evidence that academic freedom is at present insecure, and fragile, all across the globe. moreover, without strong commitments to equity and anti-racism, academic freedom can be twisted to protect harassment as bipoc and lgbtq2s scholars make inroads into disciplines. political actions camouflaged in instrumental logics and free speech, have weaponized ideas of academic freedom to protect hate speech and harassers, while threatening individual faculty, programs and departments. as editors of this journal, we stand firm in resisting this backlash, and hostile political climate for feminist, anti racist, anti colonial, and queer scholarship. our only response can be not to be silenced, and to draw on the many legacies of social movements that helped create the very departments and intellectual fields this journal celebrates. we join our colleagues (faculty and administrators) in other fields, and editors of other journals to work to support our authors, feminist technoscience scholars, and the integrity of the publishing process. microsoft word template article.docx wentworth, k. (2017). handholds and other kill floor mnemonics. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (2), page 1-14. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kara wentworth, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license image & text handholds and other kill floor mnemonics kara wentworth acls/mellon public fellows program kwentworth@gmail.com these notes refer to a video component titled handholds and other kill floor mnemonics available on catalyst journal at www.catalystjournal.org abstract on the kill floor of a small u.s. animal slaughterhouse, butchers use knives to separate pig hides from bodies. in the process of skinning and disassembling, the animal’s body takes shape, becoming knowable and known in new ways. i focus on the material interactions between hands, hides, and knives to make sense of slaughter as a material-semiotic process. though animals are unequal and unwilling partners, they take the lead at times, guiding butchers’ moves and cuts, and offering ways to get a hold of, make sense of, and manipulate the body. in the short film handholds and this companion essay, i zoom in on cuts in flesh: literal handholds in animals’ hides that butchers use to get a grip, to hold taut, to rotate, to skin, to pull a pig across a room, and to carry its head and hide to the offal bin. here i ask what it means to get a hold of and make sense of a body using this sort of material mnemonic device. wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 2 i spend time on slaughterhouse kill floors, observing and participating in state-sanctioned killing, in chains of contemporary surveillance and control, and in the everyday material work of animal slaughter. i ask questions that are familiar to science studies and feminist scholars, but strange on the kill floor: what sort of knowledge is butchering? is it embodied in human bodies, animals’ bodies, tools, or in material interaction itself? how do bodies come to matter and come to be meaningful in the process of killing and taking apart? here, i make cuts in film and in ethnographic details to splice together a brief focused narrative, zooming in on hands, hides, and knives to foreground the cuts butchers use as handholds in animals’ bodies. the animal’s body, i argue, offers a material script for how to see the body, how to understand the body, and what moves to make in the process of disassembly. scripts – both in theaters and in slaughterhouses – are material guides that come to life in performance. butchers change the animal’s body as they work with it, revealing new layers and parts, cutting and marking the body to aid the process of disassembly as they go. i explore these cuts as material-semiotic devices, following the insistence by feminist scholars including donna haraway and karen barad that matter and meaning are constituted together.1 working in the flesh of things, i focus on the intimate process of re-working a material body, showing how these interactions are simultaneously acts of knowing and of carving out bodies and meaning. cuts in flesh are markers and handholds that help a butcher know where to go and manipulate the animal’s body into a knowable, disassembleable object. some butchers cut tears in the animal’s body to guide them. on one kill floor with two butchers, the more experienced of the two always took on the difficult task of evenly splitting a cow carcass into two perfect ‘sides’ of beef. though the less experienced butcher had been doing the work for a decade or more, the one who was slightly more senior learned to butcher as a child alongside his father, and had a keener eye and steadier hand as he worked. i watched in awe as he stood before a wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 3 headless cow hanging upside down, and used a knife to cut a line from the base of the hanging neck upward toward the spine. he then turned to the top of the animal, steadying an electric saw that hung from the ceiling, weighted on a pulley, so that it rested at the center of the animal’s crotch, right between its legs. next he turned on the saw and guided it slowly down using gravity and his own body for balance, splitting the spine perfectly in half. as he got closer to the neck, the slit he had cut at the start became a visual guide for where the saw should travel. this split in the neck is a cut in flesh that makes the animal’s body an aid in the process of its disassembly. another sort of cut is also common: a slice through hide that forms a handhold that butchers can use to move and manipulate the animal’s body. these handholds, sometimes torn by accident while removing a hide; sometimes cut on purpose to help carry a head to the trash or pull a hide off the animal’s back, help butchers know and disassemble the animal. i describe elsewhere the method one small slaughterhouse uses for removing the cow’s entire head so that it bleeds out quickly.2 here is what happens next: for a moment, the head hangs by the hide and muscle at the back of its neck while blood spills from the veins. the butcher punctures a hole through the hide at the back of the neck, and puts his hand through it as if it is the strap that hangs above a car door, allowing a passenger to hoist themself in and out. holding the head through that newly cut handhold with the left hand, the butcher uses the knife in his right hand to slice the head off completely, severing that last bit of flesh, and leaving the head to swing down to his side, still held in the left hand through the handhold. the butcher can then transfer the head to the inspection table so the teeth (to determine age) and lymph nodes (to check for the presence of systemic disease) can be examined and any valuable head parts – such as a cow’s tongue and cheeks – can be trimmed off and included with the rest of the meat from the animal. after inspection and trimming, the butcher can put his hand through the same strap-like handhold, and carry the head to the offal bin for disposal. wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 4 in a typical slaughterhouse, pigs’ hair is loosened from their skin through scalding, then rubbed off by mechanized or handheld rubbing tools and/or flame. at the end of the process, pigs are wearing their heads and their own pink, hairless skins, looking as they often do at a butcher shop or charcuterie: familiar, edible. but most kill floors i’ve visited are too small to have a large scalding tank so all animal hides, including pigs’, are removed with a knife. working quickly, it is common for a butcher to accidentally cut slices through the hide of a cow – and even more so a pig – as he3 removes the skin from the animal’s body. for some time i thought that all these cuts were accidental, and used opportunistically by butchers to lift and rotate the pig’s body slightly so he could get at another part of the animal. but i realized, over many months of watching live, and then rewatching video, that some of these cuts are accidental and some are cut on purpose. at a plant that gets money for its cow hides, butchers try hard not to cut through the hide as they are skinning. but pig skins are worth less, and are often included in the weight of offal the rendering company hauls away each week. more cuts in a pig hide make no financial difference for the slaughterhouse. some butchers will intentionally cut handholds into the pig’s flesh to help manipulate the animal on the cradle, to pull the whole animal, wheeled cradle and all, to another part of the kill floor, and to provide a good grip and anchor point to pull off the rest of the hide where it is still attached to the animal along the spine once the pig is hanging from the rail. these handholds help the butchers to disassemble and make sense of the animals. i argue that disassembling an animal’s body is itself a way of knowing the animal. separating a body into legible, edible parts is a material process that reveals the animal’s body as a particular sort of knowledge object: not only an object that guides the process of how to take it apart, but an object that can be taken apart, understood, and consumed: a known object in multiple senses. just as dissecting a text or memorizing its lines might be ways of knowing a written object, taking apart an animal and distinguishing its parts are ways of knowing a body. distinguishing here has dual meanings: material wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 5 and semiotic. distinguishing is both a knowing process: mentally separating x from not-x, and a material process: separating x from not-x with a knife’s blade. as butchers break down a carcass in the cutting room, they simultaneously make sense of and make separate parts. butchers distinguish in multiple senses of the word at once: perceiving difference and enacting it simultaneously. cutting and knowing are drawn together with metal on flesh. taking disassembly as a material knowledge-making practice, these handholds can be understood as material mnemonic devices: places to hold onto in the process of knowing the animal body and working a named subject into an edible object. russian psychologist lev vygotsky talks about a zone of proximal development: an arena of tasks that an individual cannot achieve on his or her own, but is capable of accomplishing with outside assistance (vygotsky and cole 1978). vygotsky believed that this level of capability – what we can achieve with the aid of others – is a better measure of where a child is developmentally than simply measuring what the child can accomplish alone. i turn to vygotsky not for his understanding of child development, but for his insight into how individuals learn and accomplish skills in concert with others and with the world. beyond childhood, we are all knower-doers, developing capacities and skills over time on our own and with the assistance of other people and material aids. handholds cut by butchers on the kill floor are one type of material-semiotic aid. using these handholds, butchers are able to make sense of an animal’s body and take the body apart, cuttingknowing the body, making its material form matter in particular ways. the work of wood et al. extends vygotsky’s work to include the idea of “scaffolding”: temporary modes of assistance that a knower can stand on top of to get someplace new. by watching mothers encourage and aid three to five-year-olds as they worked with blocks, wood and colleagues honed in on the importance of general encouragement and specific guidance to help young children accomplish challenging tasks. as wood and colleagues put it, this sort of assistance allows people to complete “elements of the task that are initially beyond the learner’s capacity” wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 6 (wood, bruner et al. 1976). scaffolding puts [learners] in a position to achieve success in an activity that they would previously not have been able to do alone. i draw on these psychologists of learning and development not because the butchers i describe are novices but because all of us – novices and experts alike – are learning from and thinking with the world in every task. knowledge is inherently social. knowledge does not exist within the mind of a lone individual but instead is always enacted with objects and others. a butcher “knows how to butcher” in concert with tools and with the body of each individual animal as it presents its particular material form. complex tasks like butchering an animal are beyond the capacity of any individual, and can only be accomplished in the interactions between bodies (humans, animals, and tools) each time. i argue that humans cannot slaughter alone. animals take part not only as passive substance, but as guides. butchers manipulate the animal’s body to make guide lines and handholds: temporary infrastructures that they as knower-doers can stand on to accomplish something that they could not achieve alone. the handholds cut in animals’ flesh act as material mnemonics, helping butchers to know the animal’s body. these handholds are like grooves in a stone wall that a rock climber can use to get a grip as she travels. these particular cuts provide places to hold onto as butchers traverse the animal’s body, transforming it into a known, distinguishable, consumable object; making the body matter in a world of consuming and consumable bodies. butchering is not unlike rock climbing, passing hands across the expanse of animal flesh while butcher and animal traverse from life to death to standardized commodity. along the way, butchers carve literal handholds as they make and make sense of the animal’s body as a carcass, a “side” (half carcass), and ultimately as a set of knowable, sellable “cuts” of meat. handholds are material mnemonics. in the literal material world, they are places to hold onto. in the linguistic abstractions we use to theorize knowledge, they are tools for knowing and places to stand: scaffolding. while bodies in life come to matter and to be meaningful wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 7 through complex frictions of oppressive power and creative becoming, bodies in death can offer, guide, and push back as they are rendered meaningful. focusing in on the bodily material practices in slaughter allows for a different sort of material analysis of bodies coming to matter. in death and disassembly, bodies become knowable and come to matter through intimate material interaction. notes 1 in her 1992 promises of monsters, haraway insists that “bodies as objects of knowledge are materialsemiotic generative nodes” (298). in the same vein, karen barad uses material-discursive to highlight the inextricability of material and discursive practices (or as she would say, performances) (2003, 2010). 2 see “francisco tickles the medulla” – forthcoming from anthropology and humanism. 3 yes, all of the butchers i have worked with on the kill floor have been men. women and queer folks have worked just off the kill floor, cutting carcasses into cuts of meat, grinding meat, making sausage and other products, wrapping the finished products in clear plastic on styrofoam trays. there is one exception i’ve witnessed: at the kill floor on an agricultural university campus, two young women worked beside me, mostly spraying water and cleaning up, but occasionally taking a knife to the body. references barad, k. (2003). "posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter." signs 28(3): 801-831. barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 8 entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, duke university press. haraway, d. (1992). the promises of monsters. cultural studies. l. grossberg, c. nelson and p. a. treichler. new york, routledge: x, 788 p. vygotsky, l. s. and m. cole (1978). mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. cambridge, harvard university press. wood, d., et al. (1976). "the role of tutoring in problem solving." journal of child psychology and psychiatry 17: 89-100. wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 9 handholds film – supplemental text for screen readers film title: “handholds” running time: 5 minutes 25 seconds closeup of a knife blade, held in one hand, as the other hand pulls fatty innerskin tissue away from a body, allowing the knife to find a groove between skin and muscle. [the sound of whirring, a machine stopping and starting, an ongoing buzzwhirr] the knife cuts from left to right of the screen, then returns to the left side and cuts again, now cutting with shorter slices, still in a line from left to right, revealing a pattern of yellow-white fat and pinkish muscle underneath as the knife cuts more deeply with some cuts and more shallow with others. [rumpf-rumpf-rumpf-rumpf-rumpf-rumpf: an insistent sound from another machine off-camera: this one, i can tell you, though those watching the film can’t see it, is a winch, working hard to lift a body toward the ceiling] the rumpf-rumpf pulley sound continues, film cuts to a wide shot of a landscape: peaks and valleys, the ground is thinner more yellow and the sky is pink with bits of red – this landscape, we may realize, as the title appears in white lettering over the middle, right at the horizon line – is a landscape of flesh: lines cut with a knife separating the body itself (the top, the ‘sky’) from the skin/hide (the bottom, the ‘ground’). “handholds” appears and stays over the image for a few seconds… [20 seconds in now] wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 10 the screen goes black, the title stays, then you hear a pop-pop sound (more protests from the mechanized winch), then voices, screen goes black, then silent. voices and background vibrating sound build, we see two hands again, holding a knife in one hand and the hide of an animal in the other, but this shot is wider: we see the butcher from the chest to the knees, we see the pig from the cut-off hoof to the chest. the hand holding the hide was invisible under the hide before, but now a thumb is sticking through: there’s a hole there. this butcher has a hold on the animal in a different way, gripping through a hold in the skin rather than grasping skin together in bunches and squeezing. cuts to another shot of butcher, this time with whole hand through a hole in the skin, thumb on top, four fingers hidden under the hide, as he cuts in long strokes with the knife, separating body from skin. cut to a medium shot: chest to knee, of a butcher with his back to us as he presses on the front and back legs of a pig at once, pushing and rotating the body away from him, then grabbing into two handholds: two torn holes in the animal’s hide to lift the body and rotate it further, then one hand in a handhold of skin, the other pressing on the far hind leg, until the pig’s body has rotated away from the butcher, and it is possible to resume cutting long lines at the border between body and skin yet again. camera zooms in on the hands and knife as the butcher gets a handhold, first through a hole in hide, then grasping folds of skin, and continues with long then short cuts to separate the skin from the body. cut to butcher in between medium and close-up, cutting skin away from body, then using the knife to cut a hole through the hide itself: aaahah! this is where those holds in the skin came from! or were some of them cut by accident? by misses in the separating of skin from body? wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 11 the butcher uses this new hole to lift and rotate the body away from him, then puts a hand through the hole to get a grip as he continues to cut along the line between body and hide, camera zooms in, so we just see hands and knife and flesh again. [the sound of sniffling, the butcher perhaps. then voices: inaudible, yup!, inaudible, yup!] a loud whirring begins then camera cuts to a metal object in top left corner of the frame and some bare muscle and blood – some part of the animal in the rest of the frame. the metal object is making the whirring sound. it is a pneumatic saw, a handheld rotating blade powered by air, from a tube in the wall – but we can’t see all this in the frame, just the blade and the handhold and the butcher’s other hand, using a hole in the hide to pull the skin taught as the blade meets the threshold between body and skin. the butcher then pulls up with that same hand, moving seamlessly from using the handhold to pull down and separate skin to using the handhold to pull up and rotate the body. cut to medium shot with two hands and a knife, cutting along that nowfamiliar line where the skin is still attached to the body, only now the knife is pointing downward, tip-first, and a finger is pointed downward, poking for a moment (or pointing, it is a pointer finger) through this small hole to pull the skin away and allow the knife to cut, tracing a line and separating body from hide. then pointer finger pulls out, thumb presses down and into the same hole, holding the same way and pulling the skin away from the body as the knife blade continues to cut. then the whole hand grips onto folded flesh – there are no holes nor holds here, then grabs onto a far corner of the peeled-off skin, pulling away from here while continuing to cut, then giving slack on the skin, the butcher seems to stand upright, the knife disappears from the frame, and we see that this grip is through yet another hole in the hide – the hand lingers for a few seconds, holding through this cut hidehole, not cutting, just standing there and holding hide through the hole while human voices speak over machine sounds. then just machine sounds. wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 12 cut to a hand (a different hand? a different butcher? a different day?) holding through a cut in the corner of the skin, toward the edge of the hide and away from the place where it is still attached to the body – much like the previous shot. but this time, the butcher uses this handhold to pull the entire pig’s body and the metal “cradle” it is resting on, away from the camera and across what we now see is a red-floored room with stainless steel walls. as he pulls, we see two more humans, chest to feet, one is spraying water, one is standing at the edge of the space, the camera follows and we see for the first time the pig’s head, its face and eyes, crying upside-down dried blood and with bright red blood on the snout. the camera follows the butcher’s hands, and we see a metal piece: pointed and slightly hooked on each end, with a metal loop at the middle: the butcher is inserting the pointy hook ends into the two hind legs, just below a joint so the animal’s weight will be supported. a metal hook is placed through the loop at the center of this metal bar, and we see a butcher’s face for the first time as he presses a button on a hanging box, lifting the animal leg-first up to and then above face-height. cut to a new scene, more quiet than it has been, one butcher is cutting to separate the hide from the body right at the pig’s spine. then using a hole in the hide as a handhold, he pulls down, peeling the hide away from the body. another butcher stands at his side. wait – they are wearing brown aprons, and before the rubber aprons were all yellow. is this a different pig, a different butcher, a different day, a different slaughterhouse? the first butcher, the one who cut and pulled, now steps out of the frame and we hear a now-familiar [whirrrr-rumpf rumpf rumpf rumpf] of the winch raising the animal’s body. the pig rotates so we are facing its stomach, skinless, and the second butcher is behind the body with his hands hidden from our view. as the body raises, higher, higher, the butcher suddenly moves into a squat position, pulling his arms down with him and toward wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 13 the ground, peeling the hide off the back of the pig. as he stands, and the pig’s body swings back-and-forth, we see he is holding onto the hid through a hole, four fingers of each hand, then just one hand, invisible to us beneath the hide. the mechanical sound has stopped, and the first butchers uses his knife to separate hide from body, now parallel to the floor – he must be cutting near the top of the head now – then the whirring and the body raises higher and he jabs the knife, still parallel with the floor, cutting into someplace that makes dark red blood run out. we see his face, facing the back of the pig’s head, in profile, with the pig rotated away from us in profile. he keeps cutting, this looks hard, holding onto a cut in the hide to get a grip and pull down the whole time. he continues to cut – through bone perhaps, this is taking some time, and it is rough and sudden, not like the brushstrokes of knife moving left to right we watched earlier. his left hand is still hidden inside a handhold, his right keeps cutting, and then suddenly the whole hide and perhaps the head too?? are dangling by a thread of flesh: a few inches only, and then the knife cuts straight across, and the hide-and-head separates, its full weight moving onto the arm of the butcher, held up through the handhold. we see the two butchers now, from the chest down, the headless bloody neck-flesh of the pig disappears out of the top of the frame. the butcher hands this skin-head to the other butcher, for a moment they each have a hand in it, it is intimate, touching each other, inside of this body. the second butcher drags the skin-head over to a grey trash bin, lifts, and plops it in, head first, then the hide hangs inside out, hesitating for a moment, draped over the side before it slides into the grey barrel, disappearing from our view. the butcher walks back, the camera catches the open neck of the hanging pig, then follows its body upward, over the butcher’s shoulder, toward the ceiling. the screen goes black. [we hear the whirring, the click stop start of wentworth catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 14 the winch, then nothing]. [film by kara wentworth] [“handholds” © 2016] bio kara wentworth is a postdoctoral fellow in the acls/mellon public fellows program. her work blends participant observation with film recordings to understand how difference gets made in everyday practice. her latest writing is on black lives matter, microbial sociality and the future of meat. microsoft word 240-1502-1-schaeffer.docx schaeffer, f.a. (2018). biorobotics: surveillance and the automation of biological life catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-12. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © felicity amaya schaeffer. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives biorobotics: surveillance and the automation of biological life felicity amaya schaeffer ucsc fsg@ucsc.edu abstract new developments in state surveillance technologies and biorobotics at harvard university turn to nature, such as bees, with the goal of automating border control, labor, and to fill the vacuum of disappeared pollinating bees. the turn to insects for use in automated intelligence (ai) relies on a racialized understanding of biology, and the body rather than the brain, as the mechanism for automated intelligence with consequences for revitalizing binary notions of primitive from rational intelligence, stripping humans as well as the historical and social context from the violent causes and consequences of border governance, automated labor, and ecological disaster. in my broader book project, “tracking indigenous and latinx migrants: bio-surveillance across sacred borders,” i propose that the enforcement of border control aimed at migrants has intensified, leading to the expansion of what i call a border-biosecurity industrial complex. science and technology have become the solution to border control and security, 2 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) necessitating university, military and state research and funding loops back into the science technology engineering and mathematics (stem) fields as well as defense technology markets driven by war. to win this war, the government must identify and eradicate a host of threats: abnormal biology (biometrics); suspicious objects; and nuclear, chemical and viral threats. i refer to biosecurity to call attention to the automated detection of “suspect life.” the body’s biometric data, that is to say, the automated and precognitive physiognomy (e.g., heart-rate, eye movements) and the gait signatures of the body have become more authentic terrain to determine safe (white) versus threatening populations (non-white). stripping human-insect physiognomy and behavior from individual intention or agency is where the racial consequences of biometric technologies turn, especially as the governance of security relies more heavily on biological sciences to govern life at the borders. today governing institutions track not just (demographic) populations with predictable patterns of life and death but also the suspect biomass, a concept produced at the intersection of the life sciences and rapid computational algorithms that view risky or suspect life as automated matter that can be known in advance of deviant acts. as the life sciences meet artificial intelligence (ai), intelligent design and consciousness find the body’s behavioral movements as an intelligent pathway to coordinated action (rather than the brain), alienating the active properties of the body-as-matter (biomass) from human intelligence, intention, will, and agency. colonial binaries continue as racial otherness is relegated to a natural or evolutionary force automating the “erratic” body’s biological movements in need of control by whiteness, or the invisible hand of a techno future heralded by its ability to control nature. the automation of the body-as-lively matter turns suspect bodies into a primitive biology motivated by natural forces such as instinct, emotions, and the collective. scientists during the nineteenth century revered dead body parts, such as skulls, as empirical proof of hierarchies of primitive versus civilized and especially mental difference that would provide clues to unlock the past. anthropologist marcello levi bianchini 3 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) (1906), developed a kinesiological biotypology of race that separated “primitive” from “advanced” races. he states, “in primitive societies all the affective reactions of the individual and collective psyche are essentially manifested by phenomena of movement ....” (pugliese, 2010, p. 84). for bianchini, primitive societies displayed a wider range of motor expressions (or affect) than the more evolved societies. even earlier, the french doctor and early scientist of film, félix regnault (1898) thought those he called savages had no language, and instead spoke through the language of the body and that their “savage locomotion” was closer to nature, or untouched by cultural influences (p. 315). today the terrorist supposedly follows behavioral “laws of nature” that resemble automated life, or mechanization, offering science visible and predictable patterns of movement. as found by joseph pugliese (2010) in a statement by the international association of chiefs of police (iacp), suicide bombers display “an unusual gait, especially a robotic walk. this could indicate someone forcing or willing himself or herself to go through a mission" (p. 88). important to note here is the idea that suspicious gait turns the body itself into a primitive weapon since it is controlled by a force larger than the self-determined individual. while an extreme example, a suspect biomass refers to a body tethered to its web of connections (what the military calls a “pattern of life”), a mass not driven by individual rationality, the brain, or self, but dangerously susceptible to the “higher call” of religion, biology, instinct, and the collective. thus, the suspect biomass, (i.e., flesh stripped of human intelligence) meets the turn to “nature,” or insects for inspiration on how to detect human scent or chemical traces in cargo and as a model to replace the automated movements of racial labor. the assumption that we can know and see difference in the body re-packages a settler/colonial logic driven by what sylvia wynter (2003) details as the shift in genres during colonization from the supernatural (religious law) to the natural (laws of nature). with the dominance of the natural sciences in definitions of the human from the nineteenth century to today, secular science, mathematics and logic defined and tracked 4 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) human life in ways that conflated evolutionary notions of racial selection (i.e., white rationality at the apex of the species) and dysselection (i..e., racial primitivity at the bottom) with the invisible hand of the market. it is the racial consequences of the invisible hand of automated life (biology) that i explore in the rest of the paper. biorobotics, border governance, and war technologies center biology and life sciences as part of the core sciences that drive the “innovative” strategies in national security. as stated by the director of defense advanced research projects agency (darpa), “today and in the years ahead, our potential adversaries will still include nation states, but also smaller, less well defined bad actors and an increasingly networked terror threat." to get at the smaller nature of threat, he continues, “biology is nature’s ultimate innovator, and any agency that hangs its hat on innovation would be foolish not to look to this master of networked complexity for inspiration and solutions” (prabhakar, 2014). darpa, the department of homeland security (dhs), and harvard researchers seek to know what animates the mysterious movements of insects in order to mobilize this intelligence for border security. for instance, darpa and scientists at los alamos have been studying bee sensing of chemical and nuclear traces since 2005 in hopes of launching bees to detect bombs, narcotics, biological threats, and migrants at various land, sea, and transit borders. in a video called, los alamos national laboratory: the stealthy insect sensor project, they state: “honeybees are nature’s rugged robots.” given bees’ powerful odor sensors, “honey bees are one of nature’s most sensitive detection platforms" (2008). scholars in postcolonial ecology, science studies, and feminist materialism question the separation of nature from human intervention to interrogate how insects, animals, and the natural world become altered through human-environmental influences. these scholars trespass segregated epistemologies in the academy that separate the natural sciences from the human and social sciences, and nature from culture. for example, jake kosek (2010) argues that it is not enough to ask what 5 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) is happening to honey bees, but demands we look at the reengineering of human/bee environments, biology, and behaviors throughout the us empire or during years of military use in battle, intelligence, and testing. some material feminist scholars also repudiate the notion of an autonomous, self-sovereign human by reclaiming a more entangled notion of the human in the name of saving the earth. yet, indigenous world views that have long thought the intrarelated ontologies of the human-animal-spirit world are often absent (schaeffer 2018). i question the overlap of some materialist accounts with state science that, in a vital materialist turn to automated life, reinforce racial colonial divides between primitive and civilized science, labor, and ontologies. researchers in biorobotics at harvard university are currently developing “softer, smaller and smarter robotics,” attempting to get at more sensual, even organic relations between nature, humans, and robots. they hope to build robots that are less mechanistic and more organic, and to detour ai from the brain to embodied communication between the robots themselves and the environment. in 2009, radhika nagpal developed the controversial robobee project (with obama funding) to build a robotic pollinating bee that would temporarily replace the loss of 50% of bee hives between 1950 and 2006. many teams today hope to build bee swarms called kilobots across a range of uses including border surveillance and war, search and rescue missions, and as a future labor force that can build, not hives, but actual buildings. nagpal situates the rise of biorobotics at the intersection of computer science (ai/robotics) and biology. if robotics asks what makes things work intelligently in the world, the field of biology offers, she argues, the best example of autonomous systems. the push in ai to build robots that can act on their own behalf, without the constant direction of human operators, turns biology, and nature, into an ideal system to emulate with the goal of producing robot swarms that are “selforganizing,” an automated mass that relies on sensory intelligence to make collective decisions. cellular biology offers similar inspiration in computer science such as in the field of amorphous computing, which 6 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) looks to biology and physics to structure distributed computers that network across a mass scale (mcnally 2015, 2:37). by looking to cellular biology, they analyze how cells, miniscule parts of life, work together with millions of other cells to sustain the body’s life form. and while ai has predominantly debated whether consciousness, as a mental faculty, could translate to robots, nagpal and her associates want to think computation and intelligence beyond the brain and beyond the individual. similar to the parts of the body that work in concert to get us up a steep hill, even though we may not be conscious of each body part’s role in the act, each ant, bee, or termite is imagined to be a part, or cog that has insignificant power without the collective working together as a team. as nagpal states during an online interview, “the brain is really the colony, no individual in the colony actually has the full picture. the full picture is distributed over these many, many minds” (2015, 8:11). nagpal’s team has left the lab to trek their way to namibia to observe and study termites. along with other scientists, they investigate massive termite mounds, as well as bee and ant colonies, to think about decentralized computing algorithms. in an unsurprising move, nature’s collective, democratic, and autonomous structures drive the revolutionary language of biorobotics. nagpal states, termites are a classic system where people have studied decentralized cooperation or implicit cooperation. the idea is that with termites, there’s definitely no supervisor who’s telling them what to do, there isn’t even some sort of hierarchy. instead there’s sort of these chance encounters where information is propagating, but there’s also just encounters with the environment (2015, 8:11). rather than see robots at the mercy of fascist humans in control, automation here becomes part of the natural system that proceeds not through individual intention, or a pre-determined goal or plan of action. in fact, rather than locate consciousness in the brain or as an outside (divine/sovereign) force, a colony of insects feels, senses, and acts consciously through their bodies, in relation to each other and to changes in the environment. nagpal is clearly influenced by rodney brooks’s ai 7 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) research during the 1980s which argued that behavior-based robots (rather than human intelligence) offer a simple, or primitive intelligence in which behavior does not respond to a central brain that plans out actions in advance; instead, the body moves in response to the environment through non-hierarchical sensor signals (1999, pp. 138-9). while there is potential for disrupting the centrality of rationality and the human brain as the apex of consciousness, the racial imaginary driving the research, development, and use of this technology suggests otherwise. nagpal’s team developed what they called, “termes” in 2014, a robotic construction crew that can assemble blocks into 3d structures “without any human intervention; no foreman, no central brain” (2015, 30:30). one day they will scale up to a thousand tiny robots, or kilobots. in a ted talk podcast “taming the swarm: collective artificial intelligence (2016),” nagpal moves from a discussion of termites (that build massive structures without talking to each other) to a construction site. in her ted talk, our gaze is directed to a large screen behind her depicting dark shadowy human bodies taking a break at a construction site. consistent with harvard’s promotion of a softer robotic model that will replace massive, clunky robotics, here too, the tiny and lightweight kilobots are cheaper and more tasteful robotic accomplices. it is clear that the “robotic construction crew” will replace precarious workers (perhaps migrant laborers, or mohawk ironworkers) on the job site, workers who sit perched high up on dangerous high-rise buildings, who get tired and hungry and take breaks, and who labor at the bottom of a hierarchical labor structure, beneath the white-collar owners and creative/intellectual class (atanasoski and vora 2015). not only will kilobots remove dangerous, even exploitative, labor conditions, the thousands of tiny robots will learn how build without the need for human intervention (and salaries). not only are “low skilled” workers absented from the job site, thousands of fast-building kilobots enter the scene as quietly and efficiently as cells building the body and as a force of nature itself, an unremarkable presence in human perception. kilobots are the next phase 8 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) of a mechanized labor force whose invisibility and exploitation resemble the work of racialized laborers, the shadowy silhouettes who haunt this evolutionary scene where time automatically evolves to the inevitable tempo of a future when more efficient and less exploitative bio-bots will replace human laborers. nature’s demoted status as an automated, unintentional mass here becomes ideal for manipulation and replacement, especially as these movements are imagined without the aid of human intelligence. the title of nagpal’s talk, “taming the swarm,” offers a clue as to how absenting humans from the forces of the natural world (evolution), and from the invention of bio-robotics, hides from view the logic of whiteness as an ever-present force that must control the chaotic threat of nature’s unwieldy evolutionary design with a tame replacement. kilobots (1,000 robots) become an even stronger, and more docile breed, so cheap to produce they are easily replaced. nagpal asks, “so the field of engineered self-assembly is basically ─ how do we make the molecules or the robots or the cells to selfassemble the thing we want, as opposed to the thing that they’re naturally going to do?” (2015, 27:55). and ironically, the swarm concept driving the kilobots is depicted as a militarized force of nature, a docile army of insects ready to mobilize at any moment. this fascist visual iconography ironically shares interpretive logic with the democratic lure of bee colonies that drive researchers to reproduce bee and wasp swarms that can be tamed and controlled, unlike the potential threat of mass human laborers whose likelihood of revolt grows as they increase in numbers, or when they become a self-organizing mass that evolves into an intelligent or even rebellious swarm. the question guiding this cross-disciplinary research is: how do these little creatures coordinate when no one individual is in charge? this question of how insects determine their behavior is one scientists in other life sciences obsess about, such as how birds know when and where to migrate or, in physics, how snowflakes form. in her recent book, biocultural creatures, samantha frost asks a similar question about how proteins affect cells: “given we do not impute intention or self-conscious 9 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) deliberation to proteins, how can we account for the ingenuity, the precise coordination, and the efficiency of their actions?” (2016, p. 79). she argues that each act is done so that the next may be done ─ purposively or with a reason. but she struggled with this thesis because she thought, how absurd, molecules do not have reason and they do not intend what they do. through such astonishment she said, “i realized that, in spite of my theoretical training, i had a theological hangover, which is to say that i could not figure out how such processes could be possible without someone, somewhere, knowing what to do” (80).” frost’s resistance to theorizing matter as having its own logic and reason was held hostage to a lingering belief in god, or an outside totalizing force directing all life, that remains separate or above the material world. religious and spiritual beliefs must be banished, relegated to a primitive past and segregated from matter in order to engage in feminist science that views matter as self-directed, sovereign and with its own rationality. the process of how one sees proteins, through technological visioning, as matter with a distinctive intention and trajectory, naturalizes a secular western view of life. alienating life to its molecular scale shares conceptual space with state surveillance technologies that differentiate dangerous from safe border crossers by scanning bodies with sensors that compute unconscious physiological data such as heart rate and eye twitches. the state’s reliance on the body’s biological signatures to speak the truth of who we are and what we will do in the future increasingly trump human narration and testimony (schaeffer, forthcoming). within biorobotics, the life force of matter is segregated from humans. this alienation of material spheres preserves categorical divides between matter, animal, human reason, and the secular from the intraconnected spirit force that materializes constantly changing forms across the environment-insect-animal-human. turning to robotic insects to revolutionize and naturalize security imagines a world in which technological objects can outpace human intelligence and replace nature itself. replacing diverse bee species with robo-bees steers us away from 10 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) industrial agricultural practices that overwork and contaminate the pollinating bees on which we depend. in addition, by positing biology as an automated biomass, how might the biological stand in once again as the primitive racial other stripped of human intention, agency, and intelligence while humans disappear from the scene of racially motivated violence? in other words, might the current turn to automated biology in biorobotics, surveillance, and mechanized labor reinforce a racial logic of nature as an unknowable and threatening evolutionary force in need of white containment? acknowledgements i’d like to thank the participants on the two panels on whiteness and technoscience at the society for social studies of science (4s) conference in boston for the stimulating dialogue. and to banu suramanian for the invitation to publish our papers with the catalyst journal. references atanasoski, n. & vora, k. (2015). surrogate humanity: posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor, catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 1(1), 1-40. http://www.catalystjournal.org. brooks, r. (1999). cambrian intelligence: the early history of the new ai. cambridge, ma: mit press. frost, s. (2016). biocultural creatures: toward a new theory of the human. durham, nc: duke university press. kosek, j. (november 2010). ecologies of empire: on the new uses of the honeybee. cultural anthropology, 25(4), 650-678. los alamos national lab (march 21, 2008), the stealthy insect sensor 11 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) project. retrieved april 14, 2017 at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_t7d0bze4km. mcnally, t. (july 27, 2015). podcast interview, disruptive: bioinspired robotics. retrieved april 14, 2017 at: http://aworldthatjustmightwork.com/2015/07/auto-draft-16/. nagpal, r. (january 14, 2016). tedx talk, taming the swarm: collective artificial intelligence. retrieved april 14, 2017 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhgvr0lzfjc. prabhakar, a. (april 1, 2014). testimony to subcommittee on intelligence, emerging threats and capabilities, darpa launches biological technologies office. retrieved on september 2, 2017 at: https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-04-01. pugliese, j. (2010). biometrics: bodies, technologies, biopolitics. new york, ny: routledge. regnault, f. (october 15, 1898). le langage par gestes. la nature 1324, 315. schaeffer, f.a. spirit matters: gloria anzaldúa’s cosmic becoming across human/nonhuman borderlands. signs: journal of woman and culture in society, 43 (4), may 2018. schaeffer, f.a. automated border control: criminalizing the "hidden intent" of migrant embodiment, under review, kalfou: a journal of comparative and relational ethnic studies. wynter, s. (2003). unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation ─ an argument. cr: the new centennial review, 3(3), 257-337. 12 schaeffer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) bio felicity amaya schaeffer is an associate professor and chair of the feminist studies department at uc santa cruz. her book, love and empire: cybermarriage and citizenship across the americas, was published in 2013 with nyu press. she is working on a new project called tracking indigenous and latinx migrants: bio-surveillance across sacred borders that follows the entangled histories of indigenous, migrant, and u.s. techno-sovereignty that continues to erupt in surveillance practices along the u.s.-mexico borders and beyond. she has published articles in a variety of international journals in mexico, france, and brazil as well as u.s. journals such as signs: journal of women in culture and society, american quarterly, and sexualities. nguyen   review      review of life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor (university of minnesota press, 2015)   trung p. q. nguyen university of california, santa cruz tnguy214@ucsc.edu value, labor, and commodity remain key modalities through which arrangements of gendered and racialized socialities become, as feminist scholars such as angela davis (1983), maria mies (1986), and grace kyungwon hong (2006) have shown, sites driving systems of global capital. how might we interpret these modalities to explain the commodification of organs and bodies in india, as seen, for example, in the trafficking of kidneys to the global north? or to interpret in the ways in which low-cost surrogacy programs picture the wombs of women rendered subaltern as spaces for rent? or in the making and enacting (which is to say, selling) of alternate selves in india’s call centers? works by nikolas rose (2007) and melinda cooper (2008) identified how emerging biotechnologies stage new ways of extracting value from bodies, and works by lawrence cohen (2001), kaushik sunder rajan (2006) and amrita pande (2010) articulated how shifts in biocapital structure labor and subjectivity in india particularly. what are familiar about these arrangements, kalindi vora demonstrates, are the logics that extract life energies from subaltern subjects to support the lives of the elite. kidneys, wombs, and alternate selves—these are some of the affective and material commodities that vora addresses to demonstrate not-so-new divisions and territories of re/productive labor made both possible and necessary to sustaining global capitalism in biocapitalist times. vora's monograph, life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor (university of minnesota press, 2015), maps the very material arrangements and components of life and living that constitute the conditions and possibilities of differentiated distributions of life chances under global capitalism. vora situates this project across questions raised in postcolonial studies, critical race studies, and feminist materialist and science studies, reckoning with modes of accumulating wealth through increased formal structuring of reproduction, along with the new forms of subject formations and socialities that these formalizations enable (vora, p. 5). she juxtaposes the embodied figures of indian outsourced labor through ethnographic accounts, literature, and representations by and about call center agents, information technology workers, and gestational surrogates to argue that an analysis of contemporary relations staged by global capital requires a sustained attention to the imaginaries, subjectivities, and technologies shaping the projected capacities and extractability of certain human lives and human parts in service of others. charting objects both material (organs, biological substance, and activity) and immaterial (subjectivities, imagined capacities of exchangeability) which constitute and enable social arrangements under biocapital, life support troubles what we know about  "reproduction," "labor," and  "commodity," attending to global forms of structural violence affirmed by technologies of population management.  one of the key contributions of vora's project is the introduction of the concept of "vital energy," a concept with currency in object-oriented ontology and materialist feminism, to the interpretation of postcolonial knowledge production and labor in science and technology. contemporary works on vitality by monica greco (2005), mariam fraser, sarah kember, and celia lury (2006), jane bennett (2010), kember and joanna zylinska (2012) describe the substance of life as relationalities between actants that have the potential for change, creating new and unprecedented forms of being. vora turns vitality to contend with the politics of its uneven spatial distribution by identifying logics under global biocapital that commodifies the vitality of some to its accumulation elsewhere. describing vital energy as the "substance of activity that produces life," vora argues that its transmission from sites of life depletion to life enrichment under global capital is a continuation of colonial strategies of accumulation, where affective and biological labor transmit human vitality (p. 3). from scholars of biocapital such as sarah franklin and margaret lock (2003), vora illustrates ways biological sciences and technology open up new strategies of accumulation through the isolation and mobilization of specific reproductive capacities of body parts to produce and extract value. vital energy as commodity makes plain how biocapitalist accumulation strategies follow antecedent logics of colonial divisions of labor that extracts not only "economic (monetary) sources of value, or raw materials and labor-power," but "life itself" (p. 4). expanding how we conceive of biocapital, vora points to the limitations of a commodity exchange framework, which does not fully capture the role biological sciences and technology play in the global extraction of life and transmission of vital energies. she critiques this framework for not accounting for how colonial imaginaries of  "numerous and prolific and therefore replaceable" indian populations persist and endure despite present strategies of accumulation in outsourced labor (p. 106). of particular relevance to this argument is the book's chapter on transnational gestational surrogacy, in which vora argues that assisted reproductive technologies (art) render surrogacy a low-cost service by restructuring relationships that laboring-class indian women have with their wombs and biological functions, a restructuring that is undergirded by colonial management of reproduction. citing studies by david arnold (1993) and gyan prakash (1999) on the making of governable colonial subjects through the body, vora explains that surrogates become subject to governability through medicalized discourses enabled by art, disciplining how these women relate to their bodies. through interview data, vora shows that clinical staff and medical and visual technologies facilitate the surrogates' reimagined genetics-based, property-oriented view of their bodies, instructing them that the providers of the egg and sperm are the actual owners of the child and that the surrogate's uterus is an empty space for rent. this genetics-based, property-oriented medical discourse about the body encourages the surrogate to legitimate "the carrying of ‘someone else's child' without it being seen as a form of adultery" and delimits the conditions in which the surrogate would form an attachment to the child (p. 109). steering surrogates toward previously unimaginable relationships without providing a full understanding of how surrogacy technologies work, clinical relationships rearticulate colonial projects, foreclosing alternative ways of inhabiting one's body, which is disciplined into being a proper subject both for the colonial regime historically, and, for biocapital currently. vora shows how, though these means, knowledge production in the biological sciences and technology become a key strategy through which vital energies are produced and extracted under global biocapital. gestational labor exemplifies the inseparability of the worker from the commodity and complicates simple notions of biological exchange. the surrogates in vora's work understood it was their bodies, the "blood and nourishment" coming from them, that were "building" babies, an understanding that persisted regardless of what form of official parentage or natal ownership the surrogates were encouraged to imagine or recognize (p. 110). where gestation depends upon and redirects the vital energies of the worker (the surrogate) to successfully produce the commodity (the child), the surrogate's thriving is the simultaneous thriving of the commodity.  because of this inseparability, surrogates are instructed to take care of "themselves," their vitality thus naming both biological and social forms of life transmission that cannot be reduced to exchange. outsourcing in india, vora shows, cannot be solely described through quantitative markings of value: the work of representation (as demonstrated by surrogacy's renarrations of inhabiting the body) also points to the life capacities of indian embodiment and subjectivity, which become objects of extractability par excellence. vital energy, then, names "vitality" as the actual content which constitutes marx's conceptualization of value and exchange, enabling an expansion of marxist analyses of social arrangements under capital with differentiated systems and sites of extraction conditioned by colonial histories of domination and exploitation. life support connects colonial histories of life extraction in india with the multiple ways that biological sciences and new technologies produce re-narrations and inhabitations of the body, often marshaling feminist critiques of capital's dependence upon reproduction. the book thus provides an exciting addition to and productive cohabitation with feminist materialism, science and technology studies, postcolonial studies, and critical race and gender studies. vora provokes us to ask how vital energy is accumulated through other sites of depletion under global capital, such as temporary overseas labor, migrant seasonal work, and the precarious; as well as other ways that biological sciences and technology might be informed by histories of coloniality.  life support's attention to and theorizations of institutionalized forms of violence and socialities across material and immaterial components makes it a welcome addition to the difference incorporated series (edited by grace kyungwon hong and roderick a. ferguson through university of minnesota press) alongside recent works on global arrangements of capital and its rearticulations of violence such as represent and destroy: rationalizing violence in the new racial capitalism by jodi melamed (2011), humanitarian violence: the u.s. deployment of diversity by neda atanasoski (2013), and from orphan to adoptee: u.s. empire and genealogies of korean adoption by soojin pate (2014). at a moment when ethical relationships staged by science and technology must be accountable to the racialized and gendered realities of postcolonial histories that sustain the on-going processes of global capital, kalindi vora's book stages a politically urgent and needed intervention by asking us to rethink how knowledge production reinscribes colonial hierarchies predicated upon difference and uneven extractions of life energies across the globe. references atanasoski, n. (2013). humanitarian violence: the u.s. deployment of diversity. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. arnold, d. (1993). colonizing the body: state medicine and epidemic disease in nineteenth-century india. berkeley, ca: university of california press. bennett, j. (2010). vibrant matter: a political ecology of things. durham, nc: duke university press. cohen, l. (2001). the other kidney: biopolitics beyond recognition. body & society, 7(2-3), 9-29. cooper, m. (2008). life as surplus: biotechnology and capitalism in the neoliberal era. seattle, wa: university of washington press. davis, a. y. (1983). women, race, & class. new york, ny: vintage. fraser, m, s. kember, & c. lury. (2006). inventive life: approaches to new vitalism. london, uk: sage. greco, m. (2005). on the vitality of vitalism. theory, culture & society, 22(1), 15-27. hong, g. k. (2006). the ruptures of american capital: women of color feminism and the culture of immigrant labor. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. kember, s., j. zylinska (2012). life after new media: mediation as vital process. cambridge, ma: mit press. melamed, j. (2011). represent and destroy: rationalizing violence in the new racial capitalism. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. mies, m. (1986). patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale: women in the international division of labor. new york, ny: zed books. pande, a. (2010). " at least i am not sleeping with anyone": resisting the stigma of commercial surrogacy in india. feminist studies, 36(2), 292-312. pate, s. (2014). from orphan to adoptee: u.s empire and genealogies of korean adoption. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. prakash, g. (1999). another reason: science and the imagination of modern india. princeton, mj: princeton university press. rose, n. (2007). the politics of life itself: biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century. princeton, nj: princeton university press. sunder rajan, k. (2006). biocapital: the constitution of postgenomic life. durham, nc: duke university press. vora, k. (2015). life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. bio trung pq nguyen is currently a doctoral student and cota-robles fellow in the history of consciousness department at uc santa cruz, where he studies sexuality, global capital, technology, and the afterlives of us war in southeast asia. he received his ma in asian american studies at ucla. microsoft word 76929-1-11-_wong.docx wong, a. (2019). the rise and fall of the plastic straw: sucking in crip defiance. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-12. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © alice wong, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary the rise and fall of the plastic straw: sucking in crip defiance alice wong disability visibility project disabilityvisibilityproject@gmail.com [scene. exterior. campfire in a moonless night. a wizened asian american wheelchair user wrapped in a shawl tells a story to children gathered by the flickering light.] “there was a day when plastic straws, plastic bendy straws, straws by the pack and individually wrapped, roamed the earth. some used it for boba, others for their iced coffee. access was everywhere….and then there were the bans. the bans said plastic was bad. the bans made plastic straws disappear. the bans wanted to create a gateway to zero waste (ives, 2017). the bans intended to remove single-use disposables from this planet. the bans came in cities big and small, from seattle to san francisco, and from companies like starbucks (archie & smith, 2018; ho, 2018; starbucks, 2018). celebrities praised the #stopsucking campaign with the fervor of fornicating sea turtles. out of the internets, oozing from the muck and dumpster fires, arose #suckitableism...disabled people telling their stories on social media. these two tags of hash were in an epic 2 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) narrative battle over the right to be disabled in public, wholly and unapologetically. with each story and selfie, disabled people created culture, knowledge, and visibility against an ableist tsunami of interrogation, disbelief, and dismissal.” [camera pans to children spellbound by the tale, their eyes wide with terror and fear. from the west, a dust storm sweeps through the camp, extinguishing the fire as the children and the old wheelchair user retreat to a cave nearby. interior. cave. the wizened storyteller coughs, continuing her story.] “like canaries in a cave mine, the disabled ones said, ‘we need plastic straws to drink, for nutrition and hydration. we deserve access without requests. exemptions by the non-disableds cannot protect us.’ and like this howling wind, the voices of disabled people were drowned out as accessibility was sacrificed for a zero-waste life, not knowing the value of single-use plastics would have to save the human race postplague. now we search high and low for straws for first aid and other plastics to stay alive while the alien strain claim more of our kind everyday. we, the disabled ones, had stockpiles for our survival as the soft ones [a.k.a. the non disableds] withered away with their hemp bandages and pasta straws. we are still here, fighting for everyone. what is the lesson, my little ones?” [all the children reciting in unison against a backdrop of a makeshift clinic.] “believe disabled people!” [sounds of a wolf howling. fade to black. roll credits.] i often wonder how disabled people will survive in a post-apocalyptic world, whether it is from the arrival of aliens or the emergence of a zombie virus. what i do know is that disabled people are creatures of adaptation that design and build worlds that work for them. the skills that we have reimagining/hacking/surviving hostile ableist environments would serve us well in any dystopian future. 3 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) when is a straw more than a straw? it depends on who you ask. a plastic straw is an access tool i use for nutrition as a person with a neuromuscular disability. when sipping a latte at my favorite cafe, i use a plastic straw because i am unable to lift a drink to my mouth and it is safe for hot liquids. plastic straws are now seen as harmful and outmoded by environmentalists who are in favor of “safer: products (e.g., compostable, biodegradable plastics made of polylactic acid, silicone). some of these safer products are not safe at all for disabled people for various reasons, and this brings us to the conflict at hand (packwood, 2018). currently, i am a reluctant participant in the great plastic straw debate of 2018 (wong, 2018). i did not imagine spending the summer defending my usage of plastic straws, but this where we are. never mind my futuristic fantasies—there are some serious issues underlying the growing movement of plastic straw bans by governments, companies, and food service providers happening in the present. the popularity of plastic straw bans, and the subsequent cripping of narratives about these bans by disabled users, is a fascinating example of crip technoscience in action. aimi hamraie writes in a 2015 review essay, “cripping feminist technoscience,” the term technoscience conveys that scientific knowledge and technological worlds are active constructions of entangled material, social, and historical agents….cripping actively resists compliance with supposedly normal embodiment, behavior, and desired futures. instead, it understands disability as productive possibility and resource. (p. 307) the facts and arguments for plastic straw bans are situated in a capitalist system where sustainability and zero waste are on trend and in response to consumer demand. environmental activists, celebrities, corporations, and agents of the state promulgate the selection of plastic straws as a social prop and test case for future policies on waste (ives, 2017). all of these efforts come up against disabled bodyminds that challenge these attempts to change consumption patterns and individual behavior in public 4 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) spaces. plastic pollution is a problem, no doubt. environmentalists want to engage the public and raise awareness on the need to reduce, reuse, and recycle. i believe all of this can be accomplished without steamrolling over disabled people. the entire conversation about plastic straws is about power: who knows best, who decides how change is made, who is centered in all of these activities. one example of this power is the moral reframing of plastic. the simplistic binary of plastic = bad / compostable = good obscures the intimate complexity of plastic in every person’s life, including mine. i cannot live without access to electricity for my ventilator or plastic in the machine’s tubing and mask. figure 1. “but it only takes one to choke a bird.” screenshot from a tweet by enamelled pepper mill @godofthegallows on 7:08 pm, july 19, 2018: “....no it isn't actually single use plastic straws account for 0.003 percent of non recyclable waste. why is it that environmental campaigns disenfranchise the disabled but never address corporatal pollution.” below this tweet is a reply from jemaine clement @ajemaineclement, on 7:15 pm, july 19, 2018: “but it only takes one to choke a bird. there are many possible solutions and the thought people put into fighting and arguing could be put towards 5 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) finding the simplest one.” there has been a strong response to straw bans on social media by disabled people (pepper mill, 2018;) and much of that labor and expertise has been met with doubt (clement, 2018,) interrogation, and/or demands for “proof.” the crip push back on twitter by disabled people is significant, with numerous people telling their stories (rodriguez-cayro, 2018), blogging (barbarin, 2018), publishing op-eds (escalona, 2018), writing articles (smith, 2018), or being interviewed by major media outlets (molloy, 2018). disability culture, facilitated by social media platforms, provides diverse nuanced narratives in opposition to campaigners who focus on harm of plastic straws on marine life. how we inhabit and present our bodyminds in public spaces actively resists the ableism of today and the future. having our own space to connect, share, and find power in one another has been, dare i say it, inspirational (e.g., cortland, 2018). figure 2. screenshot from a tweet showing a young white man, matt cortland (user name medicaidmatthew, esq.), drinking out of a glass mug with a straw with the words 6 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) #suckitableism beneath in rainbow glittery colors. shared with permission by user. the bendy plastic straw was invented by joseph b. friedman, who saw his daughter struggle drinking her milkshake (real, 2018). with the advent of bendy plastic straws, “his first sale didn't go to a restaurant, but rather to a hospital, where glass tubes still ruled. nurses realized that bendy straws could help bed-ridden patients drink while lying down” (thompson, 2011, para. 9). the plastic bendy straw may have its origin in hospitals, but then it went mainstream as plastic straws became available in many establishments. with the bans, there is a return to medicalizing these aids. the current language in san francisco’s food service waste reduction ordinance (city and county of san francisco, 2018) cites “medical needs” in their exemption from banning plastic straws. the power dynamic shifts from a consumer who has access to a straw as they would a napkin or fork to a situation where individuals must disclose a need of some sort when requesting one with wait staff or bartenders who become de facto gatekeepers of access. the san francisco ordinance passed with little outreach or consultation with the disability community, resulting in two stakeholder meetings and a follow-up call after it passed for “input” on an amendment to their opaque exemption (san francisco department of the environment, n.d.). this is the opposite of “nothing about us, without us,” a phrase used by disability rights activists that highlights the exclusion of disabled people in decision making, representation, and participation in society. 7 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) figure 3. environmentalism as performative wokeness. an asian american woman wearing a black jacket, wearing a bipap mask over her nose, and holding a paper coffee cup with a straw at her mouth. on the right, an illustration of a cup in black with a bendable straw with text that reads, “shove your performative environmental wokeness in a cup and suck on it with a straw. #suckitableism #strawban @sfdirewolf.” suggestions by well-meaning lovers of the earth that disabled people can afford to stock up on plastic straws for their own use, bring and clean their own reusable straws when they are out, or rely on the kindness of others for assistance are oblivious to the lived intersections of class, poverty, and disability. environmentalism that shames disabled people is ableist and exclusionary (bynoe, 2018). this type of environmentalism is not a movement that brings people and marginalized communities together in collective action. plastic straw bans are neither environmental or disability justice. eighteen years after the americans with disabilities act (1990), i see these bans as regressive, not progressive; they place additional hurdles for people with disabilities to participate in society like everyone else (wong, 2018). the withholding and hiding of plastic straws in public spaces sends a message that people who use them are deviant consumers marked with a number of moralistic labels (e.g., wasteful, turtle killer, irresponsible). its aim is to make our worlds smaller and less accessible. on eugenics and the conservation of disability, rosemarie garland-thomson (2018) writes, “the shape of the shared material world we design, build and use together both expresses and determines who inhabits it now and in the future and 8 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) how we use it to exercise the duties and privileges of belonging within that world” (para. 7). the cripping of science, technology, and culture is an integral in creating inclusive worlds by reasserting/claiming space, amplifying the visibility of disabled people, and presenting alternate ways of being to the “normate” masses (garland-thompson, 1996). figure 4. fuck the #strawban. screenshot from a tweet by erin hawley @geekygimp on 8:27, august 25, 2018, “i noticed a thing while on vacation. every time i took my bendable, plastic straw out in public, i momentarily felt like people were judging me. no one should have to feel uncomfortable about using assistive tools to live. so, again, fuck the #strawban, and #suckitableism.” abled supremacy continues to exert its power, disciplining disabled bodies, social spaces, and public discourse (hawley, 2018). it is a continual struggle to be seen, taken seriously, and accepted as an organic part of the social landscape. we are always in the process of repairing and building what writer nancy mairs (1997) calls a “habitable world,” a world where disabled bodyminds are wanted and valued by society. what gives 9 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) me hope (and life) is knowing i am not alone and that our stories will build a better world. the questions i continue to ponder are who will tell our stories and who will learn from our crip wisdom? acknowledgements the author would like to thank the numerous disabled people who shared their wisdom and expertise about ableism, accessibility, and environmentalism online and locally. references americans with disabilities act of 1990, pub. l. no. 101-336, 104 stat. 328 (1990). archie, a., & smith, e. (2018, july 7). seattle becomes the latest city to ban plastic straws and utensils. cnn. retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/02/us/seattle-bans-plastic-straws-andutensils/index.html barbarin, i. (2018, july 17). the #strawban is the latest policy abled allies are choking on. crutches & spice. retrieved from https://crutchesandspice.com/2018/07/17/the-strawban-is-the-latestpolicy-abled-allies-are-choking-on/ bynoe, s. (2018, august 16). straw bans suck! asparagus. retrieved from https://medium.com/asparagus-magazine/straw-bans-suck440f991f7c8b city and county of san francisco. (2018, july 10). food service waste reduction ordinance. retrieved from https://sfgov.legistar.com/view.ashx?m=f&id=6356679&guid=90a8c8b 7-b89e-430d-8113-577439c4bb67 clement, j. [@ajemaineclement]. (2018, july 19). but it only takes one to choke a bird. there are many possible solutions and the thought people 10 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) put into fighting and arguing could be put towards finding the simplest one [tweet]. retrieved from https://twitter.com/ajemaineclement/status/1020129927990071296 cortland, m. [@mattbc]. (2018, july 22). #suckitableism #strawban [tweet]. retrieved from https://twitter.com/mattbc/status/1021204329183744000 escalona, d. (2018, july 11). think about the disabled before banning straws. chicago tribune. retrieved from http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspecstraw-plastic-ban-hurts-disabled-environment-0723-story.html garland-thomson, r. (1996). extraordinary bodies: figuring physical disability in american culture and literature. new york, ny: columbia university press. garland-thomson, r. (2018, march 22). a habitable world: eugenics and the conservation of disability. abc religion and ethics. retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2018/03/22/4820502.htm hamraie, a. (2015). cripping feminist technoscience. hypatia, 30(1), 307313. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12124 hawley, e. [@geekygimp]. (2018, august 25). i noticed a thing while on vacation. every time i took my bendable, plastic straw out in public, i momentarily felt like people were judging me. no one should have to feel uncomfortable about using assistive tools to live. so, again, fuck the #strawban, and #suckitableism [tweet]. retrieved from https://twitter.com/geekygimp/status/1033556562483265536 ho, v. (2018, august 25). “people need them”: the trouble with the movement to ban plastic straws. the guardian. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/25/plastic-straw-bancalifornia-people-with-disabilities?cmp=twt_gu ives, d. (2017, october 19). the gateway plastic. global wildlife conservation. retrieved from https://www.globalwildlife.org/2017/10/19/the-gateway-plastic/ mairs, n. (1997). waist-high in the world: a life among the nondisabled. boston, ma: beacon press. 11 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) molloy, p. (2018, july 2). there's an unexpected downfall to banning plastic straws: here's what to consider. upworthy. retrieved from https://www.upworthy.com/there-s-an-unexpected-downfall-to-banningplastic-straws-here-s-what-to-consider packwood, s. [@sarahbreannep]. (2018, may 21). types of reusable straws and risks they pose for a variety of disabled people. #strawban [image description in thread] [tweet]. retrieved from https://twitter.com/_sbsmith/status/998632056241307649 pepper mill, enamelled. [@godofthegallows] (2018, july 19). no it isn't actually single use plastic straws account for 0.003 percent of non recyclable waste. why is it that environmental campaigns disenfranchise the disabled but never address corporatal pollution [tweet]. retrieved from https://twitter.com/godofthegallows/status/1020128397761175552 real, s. (2018, february 2). last straws: inventing the modern “drinking tube” & flexible “bendy straw.” 99% invisible. retrieved from https://99percentinvisible.org/article/last-straws-inventing-moderndrinking-tube-flexible-bendy-straw/ rodriguez-cayro, k. (2018, august 17). 7 people share why they’re against plastic straw bans. bustle. retrieved from https://www.bustle.com/p/7-people-share-why-theyre-against-plasticstraw-bans-9962658 san francisco department of the environment. (n.d.). stakeholder discussion on plastic straws and the disability community. eventbrite. retrieved from https://www.eventbrite.com/e/stakeholder-discussion-onplastic-straws-and-the-disability-community-registration-49117248011# smith, s.e. (2018, july 10). valuable resources: the ableist fight over plastic straws. bitch media. retrieved from https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/the-straw-ban-harms-disabled-people starbucks. (2018, july 9). starbucks to eliminate plastic straws globally by 2020. starbucks newsroom. retrieved from https://news.starbucks.com/press-releases/starbucks-to-eliminateplastic-straws-globally-by-2020 12 wong catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) thompson, d. (2011, november 22). the amazing history and the strange invention of the bendy straw. the atlantic. retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/the-amazinghistory-and-the-strange-invention-of-the-bendy-straw/248923/ wong, a. (2018, july 19). the last straw. eater. retrieved from https://www.eater.com/2018/7/19/17586742/plastic-straw-bandisabilities bio alice wong is the founder and director of the disability visibility project, an online community dedicated to creating, sharing, and amplifying disability media and culture. you can find her on twitter: @sfdirewolf for more: https://disabilityvisibilityproject.com/ microsoft word 77065-1-11_sheppard.docx sheppard, a. (2019). staging bodies, performing ramps: cultural, aesthetic disability technoscience. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-12. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sheppard, a. 2019. | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary staging bodies, performing ramps: cultural-aesthetic disability technoscience alice sheppard artist, academic, activist wheelchairdancer@gmail.com i am a disabled dancer and choreographer; i dance in a wheelchair, in a wheelchair with crutches, and without either. interpreting disability as a creative aesthetic allows me to work the tension between impairmentspecific movement vocabularies and mainstream dance techniques. my practice frequently investigates connections between movement and the visual arts. sometimes, my dances address western canonical artists. sometimes, i feature the community conversations and traditions of disabled artists/artists of color. in all my work, technology—bodily, access, digital, architectural—becomes a provocation that i believe should maximize the expression of impairment not normalize, erase, or overcome what designers see as limitations. in many regards, my solo and group practices are easily recognized as instances of what aimi hamraie and kelly fritsch (2019) define in the introduction to this issue as crip technoscience. my collaborative of disabled artists, kinetic light, features disabled people in lead creative positions; our sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 commitment to disability culture and aesthetics is a defining principle. in my solo practice and in my work with kinetic light, access, in all its complexities, is an aesthetic in the work itself as well as a way of building a relationship with our audience. it is an invitation to relationship, not a checklist of things to be done. we immerse ourselves in the tensions of complex accessibility and the ongoing necessity of our own learning, while recognizing the potential for field-wide change and accepting the ramifications of pushing such work forward in the field of dance. i believe in the ideals of disability justice, as articulated by patty berne, mia mingus, and the sins invalid collective. that said, i find myself reluctant to commit unreservedly to crip technoscience as a name for what i do. my work engages technology, but it also is dedicated to intersectional disability culture and aesthetics. i think of cultural-aesthetic technoscience as a way of naming a practice that is rooted in and speaks to the ideas and work of other disabled culture makers. i make art where disability, in its many manifestations, is sometimes the content and always the aesthetic. i see technology not as a device or product, but as a body of knowledge (scientia) and a way of producing, developing, sharing, and accessing it (techne) that are held both individually and in community. this retro scholarly move of using definitions decenters acknowledged academic fields of science and technology, places disability culture and aesthetics in the center of scholarly conversations about access, disability identity, politics, and technology, and opens a space for the expert embodied cultural and aesthetic wisdoms that technoscience all too frequently moves to the margins.1 for this essay, i choose a presentation of two moving pictures: one on technology and embodiment and the other on dance, access, and architecture. alison kafer (personal communication, august 30, 2018) challenges me to consider the form of this essay, provoking me to view disability, race, and gender as lenses on linear, purposeful academic argument. the passage from one section to the other is a conceptual bridge: a discussion of the gif, a literal moving image, as an access sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 practice in itself. this transition functions as a liminal space, a place where the values of sections one and two can be examined. bodies figure 1. alice sheppard in where good souls fear. alice sheppard, seated in her wheelchair, holds two forearm crutches in a cross in front of her body. her spine arches as she looks behind herself. the photo is a mirror reflection. as alice looks back, her crutches seem to disappear into each other in a seamless touchpoint. photo credit: lisa niedermeyer. in where good souls fear, i dance in my chair with forearm crutches, with crutches and on my knees, and without any body technologies. i see all three as unified, working bodies, responsive to the built environment, mutable over time, and reconfigurable at my choreographic whim.2 the crutch and chair form is clearly an artistically designed body— emerging from disability culture and aesthetics—not because no one is born into a chair and crutches, but because in the world of impairment functional sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 design no one needs both kinds of mobility technologies at once. in fact, this doubling of technology rather denies its functional purpose in that it significantly restricts movement. in this form, mine is a disabled body disarticulated from medical need. countering the normative and medicalized understanding of the relationships between design, technology, and movement, this body is supplicant only to desire and a simultaneous urge to revel in the excess of disability. my crutches are superb technical design—carbon fiber, ergonomic, and with rotating articulating feet. to sidestep the dichotomy of “crutch” as a negative figurative support and “crutch” as positive movement enabler, i made them functionally useless—for walking—by making them too short to stand up “straight.” this choreographic use also inhibits the prescribed function of both my wheelchair (arms are in crutches: pushing is impossible) and my crutches (body is in chair: no need to walk, plus crutches are the wrong size).3 however, the reduced size and new embodiment drive artistic expression: i use the crutches as outriggers, balance points, and percussion instruments. my wheelchair becomes a spinning piece of architecture rather than a device for locomotion, and my body reveals a new and complex form. the unexpectedness of my appearance is a provocation that emphasizes sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 the movement of my wheels and extends my fleshly lines. figure 2. alice sheppard in where good souls fear. alice sheppard, holding two forearm crutches, swings her arms in large circles and drums the casters of her wheelchair fiercely into the ground. then, she uses the crutches to balance first to one side then on the other. her arms make large diagonal shapes in the air. gif credit: lisa niedermeyer. [ for gif please see html version of this article.] the alien use of crutch technology caused one audience member to approach me after a performance saying that i should be in a movie as a “trained assassin.” i must have looked confused; she continued, explaining that i handled “those pipes so well.” the “pipes,” i responded, were in fact crutches. unshaken, she replied that she would “pay to see a movie in which [i] play a trained assassin.” as i mull over the semantic and functional distance between “crutch” as prop or support technology and “crutch” as initiator of movement, i recognize that my work is another manifestation of the disability culture and history that are rooted in the generative gap between literal and figurative meaning. the popular use of crutch is always negative, suggesting that the sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 thing being used as a crutch is unnecessary or undesirable. i open my body to this desire, finding that the length of my arms with crutches feels integrated, dare i even say “normal” to me. because i do not use them for support, my crutches become wings that interpret the sensation of flight. to this particular viewer, however, the length of my arms is alienating; my wingspan extends over nine feet into the air.4 these cannot be arms. their length contravenes the laws of nature. my crutches become a different technology: her killer pipes. access, aesthetics, sharing embedded in this essay are two gifs or animated images. on social media, gifs are pithy, visual ways of expressing an emotional reaction. in my practice, gifs have become an essential part of our accessible communication. lisa niedermeyer is a producer for my work and a creative conversation partner. in one of her roles, she thinks about storytelling: how do we accessibly share the story of my work and not just the work itself? the mainstream dance world often communicates, inaccessibly, in video. this is, in part, a function of the difficulties of creating adequate description for dance and, in part, a consequence of a lack of awareness around access practices such as description. lisa has begun using gif files as a critical storytelling device. gifs emerge from a keen understanding of the core of an expression and are edited to communicate its essence, if not its full detail. lisa (personal communication, october 26, 2018) writes, selecting and describing an animated image (gif) rather than a still image comes from the desire to illustrate the essential kinetics in alice's dancing that can be missed entirely if we don't have the imagination to fill in what happens just before and after a photographed moment. moving beyond the captured moment is essential for opening both non-disabled and disabled people beyond their previous experiences of wheeled movement. selecting and sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 describing an animated image (gif) rather than a video excerpt is very much about choosing a movement idea that can be illustrated verbally and visually with equity. trying to describe a thirty-second dance clip that has multiple edits in it is difficult: there is a lot of visual information to convey. an animated gif asks us to be intentional about what we select as the most relevant part of the movement. i enjoy the prompts: what moments of the choreography stick with you long after the experience of the dance? what movements would the audience want to replay or re-taste in their minds and bodies? a gif on repeat makes sense to me. i listen to audience members for when they make sounds in response to certain movements and note those as possible animated images. someday, i imagine augmented reality excerpts of movement, so we can relate to choreography taking place in front of us at our own scale of body size. access, performing, stages named by sara hendren (n.d.) as one of galileo’s simple machines (the inclined plane), the ramp is an overlooked technology now often dedicated to facilitating the transition between one level and the next without the use of a step. richly present in architecture from ancient greece to twentieth century modern, interior and exterior ramps gracefully circled buildings and smoothed the passage from one part of a building to another…until they became accessibility ramps, designed for wheelchair users. suddenly, these desirable, central architectural features were hidden behind walls, moved to the back of buildings, fabricated cheaply without much regard for the equality of user experience, and designed with little or no attention to aesthetics or pleasure of use. yes, they ensured our entrances and exits, but they isolated us, denied us the company of our lovers and friends, and robbed us of the very pleasures that wheels offer: the joy of the freedom of a descent and pleasure in the labor of ascent.5 sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 ramps oriented to compliance with the americans with disabilities act (ada) are not the architectural ramps of the oscar niemeyer niterói contemporary art museum, the solomon r. guggenheim museum, le corbusier’s houses, james stirling’s neue staatsgalerie, grand central station, etc. like so many other wheelchair users, i am frustrated with the access ramp.6 architectural ramps release such pleasurable movement for me; access ramps are almost uniformly utterly unpleasant. i longed to soar in dance on a ramp that would give me movement pleasure. what if desire became a design that maximized the expression of impairment? could cultural-aesthetic disability technoscience sculpt a ramp? in my work, access and art are less about accessibility for audience and artist, but about access as art and aesthetic. the set for descent, an evening-length dance duet, transforms the access ramp into a work of art, demonstrating how kinetic light imagines access as aesthetic. my intellectual and political understandings of ramps and access informed my ideas for descent, but the act of yielding to movement desire created the art. when ada-compliance-oriented designers refused the project— wheelchair users would be unsafe, needed the protection of railings, could not use a ramp that was not an access ramp—sara hendren, yevgeniya zastavker, and a team of olin college students designed the sculptural ramp stage set. this ramp is not a “ramp.” the students designed for beauty and for the potential of wheeled movement. riotously and “aesthetically noncompliant with the ada,” as rosemarie garland-thompson (personal communication, july 30, 2016) puts it, this ramp is sensual, glorious, and inviting. as the descent ramp made its debut in new york, wheelchair users called it #rampporn: a ramp fantasy fulfilling every chair user’s dream, encouraging every ramp desire, seductive yet unattainable. one of the ironies of descent is that the ramp can be accessed only by people involved in the show. its inaccessibility strengthens its mystique and beauty; its beauty and rebelliousness hint at risk and danger. the scent of danger sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 makes the ramp irresistible. the ramp is inscrutable. figure 3. descent ramp works lights. dressed in shiny gray marley, the curvaceous descent ramp sits in a theater. overhead, rows of stage lights can be seen. a white projection screen is behind the ramp, and various black and purple mats are visible. without dancers and stage lights, the ramp gleams. photo credit: lisa niedermeyer. sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 figure 4. descent ramp animation gif. set against a black and white starscape, the descent ramp, a sculpture with sensual curves, sharp points, steep slope, and a platform, is lit in a sweeping diagonal of rocky terrain. beams of light ooze across its surface, delineating the borders of different areas of the ramp. light and projections by michael maag. gif credit: lisa niedermeyer. [ for gif please see html version of this article.] the very movement vocabulary of descent is created by the interaction of wheels, ramp, and physics of momentum. again, disability art emerges from the gap of literal and figurative. modern dancers repeatedly call the floor a partner, but the artistic reality of that fact usually does not manifest in their work. the descent ramp is an active partner in the dance: its slopes and curves render the dancers utterly vulnerable to gravity. the dancers use momentum and torque to create new lifts and moves; the ramp’s slopes teach us new techniques, challenging the “pedestrian” practice of wheeling on the flats, at once penetrating the sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 horizon/glass ceiling of wheeled movement for dancers and expanding our community’s knowledge of how wheels work.7 descent imagines the ramp as an art object immersed in disability culture rather than as a tool that serves or assists disabled people; it interprets disability culture as art, and the technologies of wheelchair and ramp become aesthetic in their own right. this is cultural-aesthetic disability technoscience. figure 5. descent: flying. set against a black and white starscape and the descent ramp, laurel lawson in her wheelchair balances on the footplate of alice sheppard’s wheelchair. lawson spreads her arms and looks down at alice; alice curves her arms and arches up towards laurel. photo credit: jay newman, courtesy peter britt arts and music festival. acknowledgements thank you, kinetic light. our work together inspires me. i would like to thank susan burch and alison kafer for their rigorous readings of early sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 drafts. thank you, aimi hamraie, for the generous invitation to contribute to this issue. notes 1 while my academic training is in medieval studies, my point here is not to assert the primacy of philology, but to allow etymology to make an intervention. that said, studying usage is an important part of my artistic practice: the gaps between contemporary usage, traces of historical record, morphology, and etymology often reveal critical insights that i then use to frame my movement. 2 where good souls fear and doors, my other piece in this form, are connected to disability dance, aesthetic, and cultural histories in particular through the work of lisa bufano (1972-2013). in one breath is an ocean for a wooden heart, bufano and sonsheree giles push the notion of prosthetic legs by dancing on four twenty-eight-inch wooden stilts. bufano describes the stilts as “tools,” but the dance reveals how tools become body. 3 responding to the life experience of sidestix company co-founder, amputee sarah doherty, the company’s marketing causally connects this “adaptive” “mobility enhancing” technology with “regain(ed) independence” (sidestix, n.d.). i wonder what they would make of my use. here, i also acknowledge the homeless man i saw in the snowy winter of 2005 making use of this dual technology. the ingenuity of his movement has stayed with me. 4 disability art makes great play with the notion of arm’s length: i think to mat fraser’s sealo and performance personas; to sunaura taylor’s self portrait with manatee; and to lezlie frye’s performances in heidi latsky’s gimp. doors and where good souls fear are part of this tradition. 5 i have been writing about my experience with ramps since 2006, but found clarity and community around the importance of equality of experience in linton (2006, pp. 172-193). descent is underpinned by this chapter, linton, s and von tippelskirch, c, (co-directors) (2014) invitation to dance, and our ongoing conversations. 6 as part of my work on descent, i held three twitter chats around the #rampfail; they reveal the deep unhappiness of the disability community as a whole (not just wheelchair users) with their daily ramp encounters. sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 7 pedestrian here is both ironic and a term of art in the dance world for contemporary movement practices that emphasize everyday “untrained” movement. i use it with keen awareness that while interest in “pedestrian” movement allowed disabled dancers to enter the studio, that interest also limits contemporary understandings of what disabled dancers can do. our untrained and, to the mainstream, untrainable bodies revealed new movement and possibilities that some dancers have eagerly welcomed. at the same time, this acceptance of everyday movement has led to the assumption that disabled dancers cannot be trained. i do not believe that disabled dancers cannot be trained; i believe the mainstream dance world has yet to perform the rigorous examination of its training principles and techniques that would enable a disabled dancer to succeed. references bufano, l. (2007). one breath is an ocean for a wooden heart. retrieved from http://www.lisabufano.com/work.php?page=woodenheart hendren, s. (n.d.). slope : intercept. abler [blog] https://ablersite.org/slope-intercept/ kinetic light. (n.d.). retrieved from https://kineticlight.org/ linton, s. (2006). my body politic: a memoir. ann arbor, mi: university of michigan press. linton, s., & von tippelskirch, c. (co-directors). (2014). invitation to dance [documentary film]. united states: kino lorber, inc. sidestix. (n.d.). our story. retrieved from https://www.sidestix.com/ourstory/ bio alice sheppard is the founder and artistic lead for kinetic light, a project based collaborative working at the intersections of architecture, dance, design, identity, and technology to show how mobility literal, physical, sheppard catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 and conceptual is fundamental to the conceptualization of civic life. an award-winning choreographer, alice creates movement that challenges conventional understandings of disabled and dancing bodies by intentionally engaging intersectional disability arts, culture and history. microsoft word lyons,parreñas,tamarkin.docx lyons, k.,parreñas j., and tamarkin, n. (2017). engagements with decolonization and decoloniality in and at the interfaces of sts. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, issue 3 (1), 1-47 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kristina lyons, juno parreñas and noah tamarkin, 2017| licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives engagements with decolonization and decoloniality in and at the interfaces of sts curated and introduced by kristina lyons, juno parreñas and noah tamarkin kristina lyons university of california, santa cruz krlyons@ucsc.edu juno salazar parreñas ohio state university junoparrenas@gmail.com noah tamarkin ohio state university university of the witwatersrand, johannesburg, south africa ntamarkin@gmail.com introduction this is not a manifesto, nor is it a prescriptive call for a new, decolonial, or decolonized science and technology studies (sts). instead, our critical perspectives in this issue are propositional offerings. we aim to provoke questions about how science and technology studies might intersect with decolonizing or decolonial practices and scholarship, and what kinds of 2 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) openings these intersections may or may not provide. we offer these reflections as invitations to think with us and to consider the worlds in which we live and work. they are entries into a conversation that, of course, does not start or end with us, but rather draws upon multiple intellectual genealogies and particular struggles and colonial histories. one intellectual genealogy that inspires some of us has been given the moniker of postcolonial science and technology studies. we find affinity in what warwick anderson emphasizes in his description of the work of helen verran (2001, 2002) and david turnbull (2000) as the “messy politics that emerge out of local performances of technoscience” (w. anderson, 2002, p. 650), and in the work of anna tsing (1993) as she disturbs ideas of centers and peripheries and shows politics in what could otherwise be analyzed through an overly narrow actor-network theory (w. anderson & adams, 2008). anne pollock and banu subramaniam (2016) and their special journal issue on feminist postcolonial sts also build on this thread in their efforts to think through the possibilities of justice in postcolonial technoscience. however, in the shared spirit of audre lorde’s (1984) perspective on the generative power of difference, we find that the sign of feminist postcolonial science and technology studies is not always capacious enough to include our commitments. in the worlds to which we are committed and in which we circulate, what is considered science or technoscience is far from stable, what justice would mean is neither certain nor predetermined, and what role the (postcolonial or colonial) nation-state plays is not always a centralized hegemony. working against colonialism, imperialism, and white heteropatriarchal supremacy takes many languages and vocabularies. theories of postcolonialism, decolonization, and decoloniality each offer different analytical and practical tools and challenges. all are grounded in particular historical conditions, spatial locations, colonial temporalities, intellectual legacies, political proposals, and contemporary geopolitics of knowledge that may share certain commonalities while also diverging in their interests. for us, the keywords to delineate are decolonization and 3 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) decoloniality. while these may appear to point to similar concerns about the ongoing legacies of colonization and efforts to think and do otherwise, these terms are not necessarily interchangeable and do not resonate in the same ways in different places and among different scholars, even among the three of us as coauthors of this introduction. decolonization is a concept that has become increasingly widespread and multivalent in scholarship and social movements alike and we in turn engage with it in diverse ways in the essays that follow. scholarly genealogies of decolonization inspire us to recognize the continuation of struggles for liberation, self-determination, and sovereignty following world war ii, contemporary iterations of coloniality and settler colonialism, and possibilities to imagine and incite otherwise (abdulgani, 1955; fanon, 1965, 1967; lugones, 2010; ngũgĩ wa, 1986; a. simpson, 2014; tallbear, 2013). for example, frantz fanon’s 1950s and 1960s inquiries into the psychological violence wrought by the identifications of the colonized with the colonizer and fanon’s embrace of violent, revolutionary struggle as a means of transforming and healing this foundational colonial violence have renewed relevance for scholars and activists working through what has and has not been achieved by postcolonial states and what other presents and futures might be possible. what is commonly regarded as science has, on the one hand, served as an arm of colonization and european political, cultural, and intellectual domination. on the other hand, it can offer a potential means of decolonization (smith, 1999). in this issue, noah tamarkin highlights one such example, in which dna tests get interpreted in different kinds of ways and by different kinds of communities. efforts by educational institutions to teach and foster indigenous languages like myaamia can be construed as another example (leonard, 2011; mosley-howard, baldwin, ironstrack, rousmaniere, & burke, 2016). yet another example is in the institutional work described by audra simpson to decolonize columbia university, which she discussed at a plenary of the 2016 national women’s studies association meeting in montreal. simpson’s 4 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) students have led a campaign to divest from fossil fuels and have held teach-ins on standing rock. additionally, students at columbia university’s native american council have compelled the university to recognize officially that it is built on lenape land. these are all crucial actions towards recognizing genocide, land theft, and their ongoing legacies. however, some question whether institutions of higher education can ever be decolonized, given that they are so firmly entrenched in hierarchical ways of knowing, as lesley green suggested at the 2016 society for the social studies of science meeting in barcelona. what decolonization could look like is not always self-evident, as juno salazar parreñas considers in this issue. as we think with contemporary decolonizing invocations, we also remain cognizant of decades of scholarship that positioned itself as anticolonial, in contrast to a postcolonial that is defined as a period of time following colonization instead of a time that indicates ongoing colonialism (b.r.o.g. anderson, 2005; hall, 1996; ileto, 1992; l.r. simpson, 2004). we recognize that there are multiple forms of colonization and that empires do not easily fall on a linear time scale of world history. rather, empires, with their differently aspirational forms of colonization and domination, were and are conversant across space and connective across time. for example, the qing empire drew upon aspects of the ottoman and portuguese empires (stoler, mcgranahan, & perdue, 2007). if we were to force a timeline of colonial models, we would too easily fall into the traps of world systems theory, with a eurocentric sense of time, linearity, and implicit ideas of progress that risks upholding european domination as a natural force with little resistance—which would be historically false (agard-jones, 2013; trouillot, 1995). another risk of such a timeline that centers european colonialism would be its potential to romanticize the precolonial or decolonization as devoid of oppression, which would ignore past and ongoing patriarchal hegemonies, as banu subramaniam suggests in this issue. during a specific historical juncture, as tania pérez-bustos and kristina lyons point out in their interventions, latin american and 5 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) diaspora-based scholars mainly located in the united states linked decoloniality in a triad with modernity and coloniality (castro-gómez, 2005) and also authored important concepts such as the “coloniality of power” (quijano, 2000). these scholars pull the horizon of debates on modernity back to the late fifteenth century, and extend them southward to take into account the colonial and imperial activities of southern european countries such as spain and portugal in the conquest of the americas and the role these processes played in the making of a capitalist world system. more recent north american conversations on decoloniality in settler-colonial contexts stress the consideration of socioecological relations and sovereignty not through forms of liberalism and multiculturalist inclusion, but through situated, land-based political struggles that may at times be incommensurable with social justice projects at large, including feminism (arvin, tuck, & morrill, 2013; tuck & yang, 2012). while much science-studies work has looked to the past to understand how we came to view science and technology as of the west and as rooted in colonial and imperial power, our purpose is to engage decoloniality and/or decolonization in and at the interfaces of science and technology studies. the idea of the interface is crucial. like marisol de la cadena and marianne e. lien et al. (2015), we enjoy teetering on the boundary, inside and outside sts, just as many of us enjoy the exchanges and political potential of cross-disciplinary, transdisciplinary, and intersectional inquiry. the preposition in is crucial as well: we address ourselves here to ongoing conversations within sts in the hopes of continuing to push its boundaries. we began our conversation by engaging with a series of questions that emerged from the situated contexts where we live and work (haraway, 1988). we asked ourselves: what might the lens of decoloniality or decolonization render imaginable in the worlds and worldmaking processes we study? what term(s) speak to the worlds and the world-making relations with which we are concerned, and what tensions can be uncovered in the distinctions between these terms 6 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) (decolonization, decoloniality, and postcolonialism, for example)? finally, why (or why not) decolonization or decoloniality now, in relation to sts and its interfaces? the critical perspectives herein consider the utility and limitations of these terms as they each engage in spaces of scientific knowledge production and in other world-making projects. banu subramaniam’s intervention troubles any easy association between anticolonial rhetoric and liberatory policies by discussing the ways the actions and ideology of the hindu right appear to recolonize india while making promises of decolonization. similarly, noah tamarkin thinks through the historical complexities of lemba dna testing in south africa as a tool for enlisting science in the service of decolonizing goals and also a political object that could buttress apartheid oppression. juno salazar parreñas proposes that the project of orangutan rehabilitation on borneo opens up difficult questions about whose vision of liberation or independence comes to matter in decolonization. lesley green suggests that decoloniality begins with a transformation of how we think about what it is to know within the context of contemporary south african environmental management. kristina lyons shares ethnographic lessons learned with farmers in the colombian amazon to propose the conceptual and political importance of considering decolonizing enactments and versions of asymmetry, while tania pérez-bustos asks whether a certain idea of decoloniality used by academics in northern contexts may be reproducing a neocolonial geopolitics of knowledge. our intention is not to affirm that it is possible or even desirable to “decolonize sts,” but rather to explore how decolonial and/or decolonizing analytics and struggles may or may not take on relevance through different forms of engagement and how these analytics might inform our scholarship. thus, we attempt to bring together different experiences of colonialism, decolonization, and decoloniality that are rarely placed in discussion together to ask what may be learned from the exercise of doing so. 7 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) references abdulgani, r. (1955). asia-africa speaks from bandung. djakarta, indonesia: ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia. agard-jones, v. (2013). bodies in the system. small axe, 17(3), 182-192. anderson, b.r.o.g. (2005). under three flags: anarchism and the anticolonial imagination. london, uk: verso. anderson, w. (2002). postcolonial technoscience. social studies of science, 32(5/6), 643–658. anderson, w., & adams, v. (2008). pramoedya’s chickens: postcolonial studies of technoscience. in e.j. hackett (ed.), the handbook of science and technology studies, 3rd ed. (pp. 181-204). cambridge, ma: mit press. arvin, m., tuck, e., & morrill, a. (2013). decolonizing feminism: challenging connections between settler colonialism and heteropatriarchy. feminist formations, 25(1), 8-34. castro-gómez, s. (2005). la poscolonialidad explicada a los niños. popayán, colombia: universidad del cauca. cadena, m. de la, lien, m.e., blaser, m., jensen, c.b., lea, t., morita, a., wiener, m.j., et al. (2015). anthropology and sts: generative interfaces, multiple locations. hau, 5(1), 437–475. fanon, f. (1965). the wretched of the earth (richard philcox, trans.). new york, ny: grove press. 8 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) fanon, f. (1967). a dying colonialism (haakon chevalier, trans.). new york, ny: grove press. hall, s. (1996). when was ‘the post-colonial’? thinking at the limit. in i. chambers & l. curti (eds.), the post-colonial question: common skies, divided horizons (pp. 242–260). london, uk: routledge. haraway, d.j. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question and the privilege of partial perspective. feminist studies, 14(3), 24. ileto, r. (1992). religion and anti-colonial movements. in n. tarling (ed.), the cambridge history of southeast asia (vol. 2, pp. 197–248). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. leonard, w.y. (2011). challenging “extinction” through modern miami language practices. american indian culture and research journal, 35(2), 135–160. lorde, a. (1984). sister outsider: essays and speeches. trumansburg, ny: crossing press. lugones, m. (2010). toward a decolonial feminism. hypatia, 25(4), 742– 759. mosley-howard, g. s., baldwin, d., ironstrack, g., rousmaniere, k., & burke, b. (2016). niila myaamia (i am miami). journal of college student retention: research, theory & practice, 17(4), 437–461. doi:10.1177/1521025115579249 ngũgĩ wa, t. (1986). decolonising the mind: the politics of language in african literature. london, uk: j. currey. pollock, a., & subramaniam, b. (2016). resisting power, retooling justice. science, technology & human values, 41(6). 9 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) quijano, a. (2000). coloniality of power, eurocentricism, and latin america. nepantla, 1(3), 533–577. simpson, a. (2014). mohawk interruptus: political life across the borders of settler states. durham, nc: duke university press. simpson, l.r. (2004). anticolonial strategies for the recovery and maintenance of indigenous knowledge. american indian quarterly, 28(3), 373–384. smith, l.t. (1999). decolonizing methodologies: research and indigenous peoples. new york, ny: st. martin’s press. stoler, a. l., mcgranahan, c., & perdue, p.c. (2007). imperial formations. santa fe , nm: school for advanced research press; james currey. tallbear, k. (2013). native american dna: tribal belonging and the false promise of genetic science. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. trouillot, m.-r. (1995). silencing the past: power and the production of history. boston, ma: beacon press. tsing, a.l. (1993). in the realm of the diamond queen: marginality in an out-of-the-way place. princeton, nj: princeton university press. tuck, e., & yang, k.w. (2012). decolonization is not a metaphor. decolonization: indigeneity, education & society, 1(1), 1–40. turnbull, d. (2000). masons, tricksters and cartographers: comparative studies in the sociology of scientific and indigenous knowledge. amsterdam: harwood academic. 10 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) verran, h. (2001). science and an african logic. chicago, il: university of chicago press. verran, h. (2002). a postcolonial moment in science studies: alternative firing regimes of environmental scientists and aboriginal landowners. social studies of science, 32(5/6), 729–762. recolonizing india: troubling the anticolonial, decolonial, postcolonial banu subramaniam postcolonial sts has proved immensely useful in my work in understanding the trajectory of science in india. after its independence in 1947, india embarked on a path to modernity, grounding its hopes for the future in the promises of science and technology, industrialization being the mode to modernity. governments developed five-year and ten-year plans in creating large-scale infrastructure projects and industrial development. india invested in scientific research and centers, largely conceived and engaging with international networks in india’s quest for modernity, i.e., investing in institutions that promoted knowledge on and about “western” science and technology. postcolonial and decolonial scholars remind us that “western” science and technology is an overdetermined category, rendering invisible the transnational circulations of science. while this is undoubtedly true, it is also interesting that the practices of “science” in postcolonial india (prasad, 2014)— the various patents, innovations, and, more importantly, the narratives at the center of the science and technology imaginary—have always been located squarely in the west (goonatilake, 1984). postcolonial india has seen few new or novel discoveries and innovations developed for the indian context. i suspect these are narratives ripe for new interpretations, and an important site of analyses for postcolonial sts. i enter this discussion on postcolonialism and decolonialism 11 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) troubled by recent political developments in india. over the last three decades, we have witnessed a steady rise in religious nationalism, in particular hindu nationalism. drawing on the region’s past, hindu nationalism reframes this past as decidedly “hindu” and grounds its jingoistic appeals to reimagine india as a “hindu” nation for hindu people. the rhetoric of hindu nationalists is decidedly anticolonial. they contend that colonialism and various colonial powers have erased the contributions of an ancient vedic civilization and decimated the immense science and technological capacities of india. hindu nationalists are equally critical of the postcolonial and secular state, which they feel has ignored india’s ancient legacies. india, they argue, must throw away these colonial shackles, reinvigorate itself by taking pride in its past, and reimagine itself as a science and technological superpower. in particular, hindu nationalists claim western science as their own, as an outgrowth of ancient vedic science and technologies. thus, to religious nationalists, india’s past and present, science and religion, modernity and orthodoxy blend effortlessly into a coherent ideology for a modern hindu nation. a steady rise of hindu nationalism over the decades finally saw the bharatiya janata party (bjp) come to sole power in the elections in 2014. the prime minister, narendra modi, ran on a platform of “development” nationalism (express tribune, 2014, 7 april). in particular, the development platform has gone hand in hand with a neoliberal platform of an extractive economy, emphasizing privatization. characterizing this government on the postcolonial/decolonial axis is difficult, since their practices and rhetoric align with neither. it may be more accurate to talk of the bjp as espousing a decolonizing vision rather than a decolonial one. its rhetoric promises to take india out of its colonial past into a modern and global future of a hindu india. while its vision and rhetoric are decidedly anticolonial and claims to have the goal of decolonizing india, they are perhaps best understood as recolonizing. for example, the government has embraced extractive mining technologies, high-input agriculture, and industrialization alongside a robust nuclear weapons program. indeed, it was the past coalition 12 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) government headed by the hindu right that tested nuclear fission in pokhran in 1998. in contrast, there has been little public investment in health care, education, or poverty reduction. the environmental consequences of development have been largely ignored. we have also seen a wholesale revival in narratives of a sophisticated, modern, ancient india with superior science and technological capabilities. these claims of modern technology in ancient india are not a revival of new epistemologies or ontologies of science, or even a challenge of western science. rather, they are a wholesale embrace of western science as hindu science. these include claims that modern practices of surrogacy, plastic surgery, genomics, evolution, atomic physics, air travel, chemistry, architecture, fluid dynamics, geology, botany, and zoology have their roots in the puranas and vedas. these claims have been repeated by members of the hindu right (including the prime minister), as well as other party members and government officials. further, we have seen the revival of many purported ancient sciences such as numerology, astrology, yoga, and vaastushastra as new consumerist technologies. this growth appears alongside the rise of numerous sadhus and god men/women, each of who embraces science and technology in various capacities in their ashrams (green technology, green agriculture, patenting techniques of meditation and yoga) as the new sites of hindu modernity (kumar, 2013). as always, the embrace of modern science/technology comes alongside regressive gender and caste politics. hateful rhetoric and violence against religious minorities have increased at an alarming rate. the rhetoric of modesty for women, the need to protect hindu women, and an ideological vision that puts women back in the home have flourished. recently, a politician repeated the long-enduring suggestion of asking women to dress modestly in order not to invite rape. the government continues to support the colonial-era laws of indian penal code 377, which criminalizes sexual acts that are “against the order of nature”; these laws are used to harass, intimidate, and brutalize nonheteronormative sexual subjects. the government has also sought to 13 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) abolish commercial surrogacy for anyone who is not a member of a heterosexual married couple from india (the hindu, 26 august). despite the use of anticolonial rhetoric and the promises of decolonization, the actions and ideology of the hindu right appear instead to recolonize india, contrary to any sense of liberatory politics. indeed, the reality on the ground promotes colonial-era laws. victorian visions of sexuality are reinscribed in the name of hindu modernity. india offers a sobering account of certain kinds of logics of decolonization. only a feminist and antiracist politics allows us to see the dangers of such a vision. references agence france-presse. (2014, april 7). india’s modi pledges development with hindu nationalism. express tribune (pakistan). retrieved from https://tribune.com.pk/story/692440/indias-modi-pledges-developmentwith-hindu-nationalism goonatilake, s. (1984). aborted discovery: science and creativity in the third world. london, uk: zed books. kumar, a. (2013, september 15). no business, like god business: india’s godmen find spirituality to be profitable. dna india. retrieved from http://www.dnaindia.com/lifestyle/report-no-business-like-god-businessindia-s-godmen-find-spirituality-to-be-profitable-1888934 prasad, a. (2014). imperial technoscience: transnational histories of mri in the united states, britain, and india. cambridge: mit press surrogacy bill gets the cabinet nod. (2016, august 26). the hindu. retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/surrogacy-billgets-the-cabinet-nod/article14591267.ece 14 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) genetic ancestry and decolonizing possibilities noah tamarkin i ground my approach to potential decolonizing possibilities in relation to genetic ancestry in my research with lemba people. the lemba are black south africans who became internationally known as “black jews” after they participated in genetic ancestry studies in the 1980s and 1990s that aimed to test whether their oral history of descent from jews could be genetically substantiated. in my research, i focus on three questions: how and why did genetic ancestry become imaginable and desirable for lemba people? how does dna matter socially and politically? and how might the answer to that question be different if we approach lemba people as producers of genetic knowledge rather than simply as research subjects who are caught up in the desires and politics of geneticists? at the heart of my research, then, is a shift in perspective that i think raises important questions about decolonization in relation to science and technology and also potentially in relation to science and technology studies. there is much to be said about the colonial, postcolonial, and potentially decolonizing politics of genetic and genomic research in south africa. for example, some have analyzed south african genomic research in relation to colonial histories and both established and emergent forms of identity and belonging (bystrom, 2009; erasmus, 2013; schramm, 2016). south african geneticists have also considered colonial and apartheid legacies as they have debated the potential benefits and challenges of postapartheid south african genomics projects that aim to more ethically obtain and use south african genetic samples to produce research that can benefit south africans (de vries and pepper, 2012; hardy et al., 2008; ramsay, 2014; slabbert & pepper, 2010; soodyall, 2003). others working in science and technology studies have considered the extent to which geneticists’ claims that a postcolonial, postapartheid genomics characterized by robust community involvement, informed consent, and espoused antiracism might be transformative or even possible (benjamin 2009, foster 2016). going 15 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) forward, these debates and discussions will necessarily be informed by new ethical guidelines published by the south african san institute that are addressed directly to potential researchers (including geneticists) to govern any future proposed research with san people, who have been the research subjects of many past genetic studies: these guidelines are also an opening through which to imagine decolonizing possibilities (south african san institute, 2017). but my focus on former research subjects, rather than on ideal futures or on geneticists or genetic discourses, frames south african genetics differently. i argue that genetic studies are not the culmination of the meaning of dna but rather, simply, one starting point; so by extension, it is the motivations and actions of research subjects, as much as or more so than those of scientists, that might help us to analyze the relation between genetics and decolonization. so why did lemba people decide to participate in genetic ancestry studies? from the early twentieth century and perhaps earlier, they had struggled to be known as ethnically distinct from the venda and pedi people among whom they lived. these identity-based struggles became more consequential under apartheid policies that began in the 1950s. lemba people, like all black south africans, were forced to carry identity passbooks, and in addition to labeling their race, these passbooks also required them to define themselves ethnically as either venda or northern sotho—lemba was not a possible option. these ethnic labels were also linked to local structures of power and territory in the form of tribal authorities, chieftaincies, and bantustan homelands. the apartheid state considered these homelands to be self-governing and independent, but in reality they were a means of denying black south africans citizenship rights while also dividing them based on ethnicity and subjecting them to leaders they did not choose. this violently oppressed all black south africans, but lemba people additionally experienced these policies as erasure. no lemba chiefs were recognized by the apartheid government, they had no recognized tribal authorities, and they were assigned to homelands defined by ethnic labels that they did not claim. beginning in 16 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the 1980s, when they were first asked to be part of genetic ancestry research, lemba leaders saw dna as a possible method through which to scientifically substantiate their ethnic difference and to potentially gain recognition and ethnically defined authority and territory (tamarkin, 2011, 2014). if we think about decolonization as a process through which colonized people and places move towards forms of sovereignty, then we might read lemba genetics as a decolonizing science or, in other words, a project of enlisting science in the service of decolonizing goals. but it is not that simple. in the larger context of 1980s and 1990s south african politics, to seek ethnic recognition and ethnically defined territory was to accept the logic of apartheid oppression while others were busy burning passbooks, joining banned political parties, and arming themselves in efforts to bring down the colonial system that lemba dna, as a political object, could only buttress. these politics, of course, were not mutually exclusive. many lemba people were in fact involved in these forms of antiapartheid action and did not necessarily see lemba ethnic recognition as antithetical to their goals of undermining the apartheid state and ending apartheid policies: they were able to hold these contradictions and pursue both strategies simultaneously. more complex still is how to think about the meaning of lemba dna in the postapartheid present. in recent decades, lemba leaders have continued the same struggles for recognition and territory that they, and in some cases their parents and grandparents, had enacted against the former apartheid state, now against a postcolonial state. this postcolonial state recognizes an ideal of generalized multiculturalism paired with nonracialism, rather than rights and recognition tied to ethnic difference. it is also a target of new student-led social movements that explicitly call themselves decolonial and argue that the statue of cecil rhodes must fall, university fees must fall, and jacob zuma—the current south african president—must fall.1 when lemba people use dna to petition a postcolonial state, how might they envision decolonization, and how might that be understood in 17 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) relation to others’ decolonial goals? i think that we cannot speak of decolonizing science and technology without reference to other invocations of decolonizing and/or decolonial politics that exist in the same times and places, particularly if we envision science and technology as situated, dynamic, and contextual. i’m opening up these complications in thinking through lemba dna to suggest that the questions about decolonization and science and technology may not be answerable—and that may be part of the point. there is a distinction here between the potential relation of who or what we study to the decolonization of science and technology (and also to other forms of decolonizing politics that may not have anything explicitly to do with science and technology), and the potential of our work to further some sort of decolonizing politics alongside with who or what we study, or in relation to the intellectual projects that constitute science and technology studies. i’m not comfortable diagnosing the extent to which one might be able to analyze lemba dna as part of a decolonizing project, but i do think that a shift in focus from geneticists to research subjects can potentially be a decolonizing move in three ways. first, it affirms the knowledge practices of marginalized people who are engaged in a project of self-determination. second, it asserts that analyzing scientific practice is inseparable from colonial, postcolonial, and decolonizing politics. third, it opens up the possibility for sts scholars, and potentially also geneticists, to move away from scientist/nonscientist and expert/nonexpert binaries when thinking about the source, content, and meaning of scientific knowledge. references benjamin, r. (2009). a lab of their own: genomic sovereignty as postcolonial science policy. policy and society, 28(4), 341–355. bystrom, k. (2009). the dna of the democratic south africa: ancestral 18 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) maps, family trees, genealogical fictions. journal of southern african studies, 35(1), 223–235. de vries, j., & m. pepper, (2012). genomic sovereignty and the african promise: mining the african genome for the benefit of africa. journal of medical ethics, 38(8), 474–478. erasmus, z. (2013). throwing the genes: a renewed biological imaginary of “race,” place and identification. theoria, 136(60), 38–53. foster, l.a. (2016). a postapartheid genome: genetic ancestry testing and belonging in south africa. science, technology and human values, 41(6), 1015–1036. hardy, b., séguin, b., ramesar, r., singer, p.a., & daar, a.s. (2008). south africa: from species cradle to genomic applications. nature reviews genetics—genomic medicine in developing countries, 2008(1), s19–s23. ngcaweni, w. (2016, september 30). the abcs of the decolonial paradigm of fallism. daily vox. retrieved from https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/wandile-ngcaweni-revisiting-abcsdecolonial-paradigm-fallism ramsay, m., de vries, j., soodyall, h., norris, s.a., & sankoh, o. (2014). ethical issues in genomic research on the african continent: experiences and challenges to ethics review committees. human genomics, 8(15), 1– 6. schramm, k. (2016). casts, bones and dna: interrogating the relationship between science and postcolonial indigeneity in contemporary south africa. anthropology southern africa, 39(2), 1–14. 19 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) slabbert, m., & pepper, m.s. (2010). “a room of our own?” legal lacunae regarding genomic sovereignty in south africa. tydskrif vir hedendaagse romeins-hollandse reg (journal of contemporary roman-dutch law), 73(1), 432–450. soodyall, h. (2003). reflections and prospects for anthropological genetics in south africa. in a.h. goodman, d. heath, & s.m. lindee (eds.), genetic nature/culture: anthropology and science beyond the twoculture divide (pp. 200–216), berkeley, ca: university of california press. south african san institute (2017). san code of research ethics. retrieved from http://trust-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/sancode-of-research-ethics-booklet-final.pdf tamarkin, n. (2011). religion as race, recognition as democracy. annals of the american academy of political and social science, 637(1), 148– 164. tamarkin, n. (2014). genetic diaspora: producing knowledge of genes and jews in rural south africa. cultural anthropology, 29(3), 552–574. orangutan rehabilitation as an experimental project of decolonization juno salazar parreñas the project of orangutan rehabilitation is a project of decolonization, both in the historical and contemporary senses of the term. rehabilitation began in 1956 when the forestry department of the british crown colony of sarawak started sending orphaned orangutans to the home of the curator of the sarawak museum. barbara harrisson, a museum volunteer who had divorced her german forester husband and then married the last british colonial-era curator, took on the project.2 she aspired to find an alternative to what she perceived as two impossibilities. on one hand, it 20 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) was impossible to return orangutan infants to the wild. logging decimated their habitats and they would likely die without their mothers.3 on the other hand, harrisson was unwilling to send them to old imperial zoos built in the nineteenth century, like the london zoo. she thus experimented with a third way: having them live independently with minimal support—a kind of independence that could carry on despite her absence. this particular experiment of fostering independence from afar was contemporaneous to active debate about political decolonization. neighboring indonesia, had hosted the asian-african conference the previous year in bantung, which aimed to represent the interests of the third world against colonialism in all of its manifestations (abdulgani, 1955; tsing, 2005). this was a decade after indonesia became the first nation to gain independence violently in the twentieth century (steedly, 2013). across the south china sea, communists in the british colony of malaya were actively fighting the “anti-british national liberation war,” otherwise known as the malayan emergency. that war became an example of the brutality of liberal warfare, with its use of carcinogenic herbicides, forced resettlement, and indefinite intention (khalili, 2013). sarawak’s official decolonization in 1963 meant incorporation into a new nation-state, malaysia, a plan hatched by the prime ministers of britain and malaya once war in malaya ended (leigh, 1974). the same tactics of liberal warfare used in malaya were applied in sarawak immediately after official decolonization (yong, 2013). harrisson’s experiment occurred at the peripheries of the colonial state, as revealed in her correspondence with the department of forestry, as well as at the peripheries of modern biology (as her memoir attests through its description of force-feeding infant orangutans with glass pipettes), and in the space of the colonial domicile, which was home to both of the harrissons, their malay housekeeper, and bidai, a young selako man who was the son of a shaman and a friend of the harrissons (harrisson, 1962).4 bidai lived with the harrissons to learn modern ways of living; ironically, he did so by teaching orphaned orangutans semi-wild 21 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) behaviors. this was decolonization in the historical sense: a self-professed british colonial actively experimented with instilling freedom for indigenous sarawakians while knowing that colonialism was reaching its end in the 1950s and 1960s. decolonization, historically, was about the anticipated end of direct colonial intervention. how that governance would end— through violent uprising, diplomacy, or a combination thereof—was unclear. what was clear was that the state of arrested autonomy in sarawak was untenable (parreñas, in press).5 when i did ethnographic research from 2008 to 2010, i saw how the older colonial aspiration for orangutans’ independence had remained a future aspiration. yet in this recent past, the actors are different. a private-public partnership between the branch of the forestry department that was privatized in the late 1990s and a british commercial volunteering company has replaced the efforts of colonial bureaucracies. people, mostly british women, pay thousands of dollars to volunteer by assisting sarawakian subcontracted workers (parreñas, 2012). the concerns of displaced wildlife continue to be as peripheral to the postcolonial state as they were to its predecessor. one small manifestation of this is that the staff has lacked a veterinarian since the 1990s. postcolonial institutions that still carry colonial legacies are responsible for orangutan rehabilitation, yet i believe there is a theory and practice of decolonization at stake here, especially when we turn to the way subcontractors regard their orangutan charges. the purpose of orangutan rehabilitation, for caretakers like nadim and layang, is to foster independence and mutual vulnerability with their charges who are acclimated to humans. the idea of independence is conveyed by the malay (and sarawakian malay) word bebas. the malay concept of bebas is significant. while merdeka is connected to emancipation and enfranchisement, which are key ideals in british liberalism, bebas is associated with license and lack of restraint.6 it is the legal term for acquittal and the term for liberation that 22 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) contemporary malaysian and indonesian youth now use in describing their aspirations (idrus, 2016; lee, 2016). it is the same word for freedom that anthropologist aihwa ong (1987) used to describe young malay factory women resisting the patriarchy in which they were raised. while the sociologist laleh khalili (2013, p. 6) writes that “the freedom of movement is an avowedly fundamental tenet of liberal rights,” what makes the decolonizing freedom of orangutan rehabilitation different from the liberal freedom espoused by former colonial masters and warmongers is the recognition of the bodily vulnerability that the freedom of decolonization would entail. both nadim and layang felt that caring for wildlife meant embodying personal risk. it meant the risk of feeling pain when an orangutan acclimated to humans bites human flesh. it meant that living out freedom, in the sense of bebas, meant living out the freedom of shared vulnerability. the contemporary purpose for orangutan rehabilitation is to have them be bebas (free). yet, as nadim points out, that freedom is mediated by biological sex and sexual dimorphism and it is gendered beyond human subjects: nadim: in the wild, there’s lots of trees, lots of space. here, it’s six kilometers and not enough. here, they meet every day! in the wild, they meet in a year or once every six or seven years…they [female orangutans] may be free, but living in fear…bebas, tapi takut [free but fearful]. i pity them when i see their faces. it’s only the males, when you see them, they’re happy. (parreñas, in press) the freedom afforded by the constrained space of the wildlife center exacerbates relations of forced copulation. thus the wildlife center generates a gendered social world for the orangutans held at this site.7 comparing nadim and barbara harrisson, we see that taking decolonization seriously entails not only considering the colonial legacies that structure the space of possibilities for orangutans and the people caring for them. following scholars working in the americas, like marisol de la cadena (2015), it also entails questioning deep-seated assumptions about who is a political subject and to whom we are responsible. this is 23 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) decolonization in its contemporary sense, one that finds genealogy in liberation movements of the mid-twentieth century without privileging enlightenment categories of the human above nonhuman others. like all projects of decolonization, the project of orangutan rehabilitation opens up difficult questions: whose vision of liberation or independence comes to matter in decolonization? how much license can we take when we use terms that are not directly circulating in our worlds, yet are useful for how we come to grasp what surrounds us? in other words, why do i hesitate to think through “decoloniality” when thinking about sarawak? what kinds of new political imaginaries become aspirational when we look across colonial legacies and geopolitical space and time? references abdulgani, r. (1955). asia-africa speaks from bandung. djakarta, indonesia: ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia. allman, j. (2013). phantoms of the archive: kwame nkrumah, a nazi pilot named hanna, and the contingencies of postcolonial history-writing. american historical review, 118(1), 104–129. anderson, w. (2002). postcolonial technoscience. social studies of science, 32(5/6), 643–658. anderson, w. (2006). colonial pathologies: american tropical medicine, race, and hygiene in the philippines. durham, nc: duke university press. anderson, w., & adams, v. (2008). pramoedya’s chickens: postcolonial studies of technoscience. in e.j. hackett (ed.), the handbook of science and technology studies, 3rd ed. (pp. 181-204). boston: mit press. cadena, m. de la (2015). earth beings: ecologies of practice across 24 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) andean worlds. durham, nc: duke university press. galdikas, b. (1981). orangutan reproduction in the wild. in c.e. graham (ed.), reproductive biology of the great apes: comparative and biomedical perspectives (pp. 281–300). new york, ny: academic press. galdikas, b., & wood, j.m. (1990). birth spacing patterns in humans and apes. american journal of primatology, 6(1), 49–51. harrisson, b. (1962). orang-utan. london, uk: collins. heimann, j.m. (1998). the most offending soul alive: tom harrisson and his remarkable life. honolulu, hi: university of hawai’i press. idrus, r. (2016). reading che guevara in kuala lumpur: the rise of independent, political, and intellectual youth collectives in malaysia. paper presented at the association for asian studies, seattle, washington. khalili, l., author. (2013). time in the shadows: confinement in counterinsurgencies. stanford, ca: stanford university press. kirksey, e. (2012). freedom in entangled worlds: west papua and the architecture of global power. durham, nc: duke university press. lee, d. (2016). activist archives: youth culture and the political past in indonesia. durham, nc: duke university press. leigh, m.b. (1974). the rising moon: political change in sarawak. sydney, australia: sydney university press; international scholarly book services. ong, a. (1987). spirits of resistance and capitalist discipline: factory women in malaysia. albany, ny: state university of new york press. 25 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) parrenas, j.s. (in press). decolonizing extinction: orangutan rehabilitation and the work of care. durham, nc: duke university press. parrenas, j.s. (ed.) (2017). gender: animals. farmington hills, mi: macmillan reference usa. parreñas, r.j.s. (2012). producing affect: transnational volunteerism in a malaysian orangutan rehabilitation center. american ethnologist, 39(4), 673–687. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2012.01387.x rutherford, d. (2012). laughing at leviathan: sovereignty and audience in west papua. chicago, il: university of chicago press. steedly, m.m. (2013). rifle reports a story of indonesian independence. berkeley, ca: university of california press. tsing, a. (2005). friction: an ethnography of global connection. princeton, nj: princeton university press. von oertzen, c., rentetzi, m., & watkins, e.s. (2013). finding science in surprising places: gender and the geography of scientific knowledge. introduction to "beyond the academy: histories of gender and knowledge." centaurus, 55(2), 73–80. doi:10.1111/1600-0498.12018 yong, k.h. (2013). the hakkas of sarawak: sacrificial gifts in cold war– era malaysia. toronto, canada: university of toronto press. thinking decoloniality with perlemoen lesley green a newsbill from cape town in november 2014 announced the military protection of perlemoen— haliotis midae or abalone—which is at risk of extinction.8 26 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) a flat mollusk living in the kelp forests that line the shoreline of the western cape, in south africa, perlemoen finds itself under assault by homo sapiens and by lobsters (jasus lalandii) in the anthropocene. archaeologists working along the coast of south africa suggest that perlemoen and other shellfish played a key role in human evolution in that their omega oils contributed to human brain development. if the archaeologists are correct, we humans owe them our sapiens. what will human futures be without them? regime-challenging fishers, the historical subjects of colonial expulsions, prise them off rocks with screwdrivers, in a 24/7 duel with fisheries management and a partnership with global illegal traders in abalone (platt, 2016). at the same time, rock lobsters have adapted to rising ocean temperatures and the effects of city sewerage outfalls by changing their location and diet. adult lobsters have migrated south and initiated what invasion biologists call “ecological regime shift,” changing their diets to consume the sea urchins that used to shelter baby abalone. however, amid a science caught in a nature-culture divide—in which the attention is almost always on either people or critters, but seldom both—it is against the poachers that the army has been called in. fishers ask: why and how, in a democracy, can a perlemoen have better representation in parliament than we do? the situation is surreal, and it strains the social contract. is it not surreal to mobilize a war machine to protect a snail? can the army protect the perlemoen from the lobsters that are migrating into the kelp forests? there are many other surrealisms. there is the surrealism of an environmental management regime financially dependent on the sale of confiscated poaching hauls. there is the situation of the environmental scientist who, in the neoliberal financialized version of the environment in south africa’s constitution, finds herself advising on policing the rights of some humans over others. 27 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) unsurprisingly, scientific authority is in question in south africa. where the environmentalist—almost always white—criminalizes poachers in order to save species from extinction, she or he slips into the role of the bearer of the white man’s burden”—the legacy of a colonial project to save the world via religion or science or both. when scientific authoritarianism is brought to bear on environmental resource management, there is an inescapable slippage into what in apartheid south africa was called baasskap, the relation of mastery. if environmental activism and environmental science is to be effective as south africans address climate-induced ecological disorder, the life sciences need to find a voice other than that of the master who will exercise military might. but in order to do that, a different articulation of subject-object relations is required. how to do that when that very relation is assumed in scholarly ways of knowing? unmaking that relation of mastery has been a focus in the postcolonial social sciences and human geography (de greef & raemaekers, 2014; de greef, 2014). yet it is the abalones’ multiple vulnerabilities, across species and across economies illegal and legal, that convoke us to think about ecologies in ways that are unfamiliar in the frames available in science via territorialist biology and in law via the humans-only social contract. the convergence of climate disorder with decolonial questions of how we got here puts to flight the idea that marine conservation is about ecologies becoming pristine again. instead of attending to beings and becomings, we find ourselves attending to hauntings and unbecomings. our choice amid this is to fight over who or what has mastery of the truth of the abalone and therefore what regime ought to be enforced, or to rethink the trope of mastery. for decolonial theorist sylvia wynter, that is the question that makes us think. in a recent reflection on the anthropocene, she criticized the “knowing we” in an intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) report: “the referent-we—whose normal behaviours are destroying our planet—is that of the human population as a whole. the ‘we’ who are destroying the planet in these [ipcc] findings are not understood as the referent-we of homo oeconomicus (a we that 28 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) includes themselves/ourselves as bourgeois academics)” (in mckittrick, 2015, p. 24). in other words, for wynter, addressing climate disorder requires addressing the entanglement of the figure of the knowledgeable human with the neoliberal gods of reason. for bruno latour, these are “technical efficiency, economic profitability, and scientific objectivity” (2007, p. 14). wynter wants to address the entanglement of the praxis of scholarship with the neoliberal cosmos. for perlemoen, homo oeconomicus has no answer to their dilemma of how to survive the lobster migration that is changing the kelpforest ecology at the same time as historical forces create a lucrative market for a desperate “precariat” tied in to gangs and the drug trade. their problem is surreal in the face of the realisms in which it is rendered, for it has the same roots as the situation contemporary poachers face. extinctions, expulsions, extractions, and ocean warming are inextricably linked; poachers, perlemoen, and lobster alike are trying to survive not only an ecological politics but a conceptualization of ecology and society that creates their hostile cosmos. their crisis is not only ecological or social, nor is it even social-ecological. it is cosmopolitical. in such a cosmopolitical crisis, we need the “dostoyevskian idiot” described by isabelle stengers (2005): someone who is unable to ask the right questions. as a white south african social scientist writing in a moment where the decolonial movement has put the university in crisis, i have found myself many times learning slowly to welcome not-knowing: learning to not be the keeper of a disciplinary kingdom, and to be alert to the practices of gods of reason in a university system (green, 2015) in which the very fact of whiteness has long served to authorize thought. part of escaping the habits of authority is learning to circle around a problem, to think the whole situation again—including its “obvious” and “of course” aspects. with that in mind, let us return to the situation of the perlemoen. that which authorizes logic in fisheries management has been a homo oeconomicus model of fisheries, in which the base stock is the capital, 29 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the juveniles are the interest, and you should only withdraw less than the interest earned (green, 2016). what that banking model does is enact the ocean as an atm from which cash has to be withdrawn. relations of care for the kelp forests and rock pools, which have a deep history along the coast, are expunged. might a different approach to the logic of conservation—not as dollarized ecosystem services—enable fishers to reclaim a different set of relations with the ocean that are based on care and on “thinking like a fish” (duggan, green & jarre, 2014)? it would be easy to dismiss the question as the naive ramblings of an esoteric social scientist who is out of touch with the “real world.” yet acceptance of the idea of “the real world” is bound up in the same gods of reason who created the economized and militarized relations that compound the very situations we entreat them to resolve. what is needed is a different approach to the problem: one that begins with conceptualizing the multiple experiences of a problematic situation without presuming that the authorized version encompasses all there is to know. a deep tradition of authority across sub-saharan africa that declines the rhetoric of authorial authority is that of the dilemma tale (bascom, 1975). in a dilemma tale, the art of authorship is not, as in the essay form, to persuade your listeners that you are right, but to stage a discussion of what is ethical or what each actor might do next. dilemma tales offer a mode of engagement very similar to amazonian perspectivism: understanding that the world is constantly in formation by the beings and actants that navigate it. in this approach, knowing is not simply a question of “understanding information of the world” but of “understanding the world in-formation.” the different form of authorship here is not the authorial “authority over,” but the authorial capacity to bring listeners into a “presence-to” the breadth of a situation (green & green, 2013). the knowledge they honor is less about the knowledge of the “beings” of each creature but about the “becomings” of a situation: who will do what next? being able to understand what will unfold next is also an art of 30 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) knowledge in chinese thought that attends to the propensities of things, as described by francois jullien (1995). in amerindian perspectivism, in african dilemma tales, and in chinese thought, we can begin to see that the attention of coloniality-modernity to things and direct causal relations is something of an anomaly among many intellectual heritages. with regards to the perlemoen, the form of the dilemma tale offers a way of staging an encounter of perlemoen, lobsters, fishers, poachers, environmental managers, the army, and marine biologists. to me, decoloniality is a praxis that is not about offering a new kingdom of thought to replace the disciplines nor about generating a new field of study: it begins with a transformation of how we think about what it is to know. references bascom, w. (1975). african dilemma tales. the hague, netherlands: mouton. duggan, g., green, l., & jarre, a. (2014). “thinking like a fish”: adaptive strategies for coping with vulnerability and variability emerging from a relational engagement with kob. maritime studies, 13(4). greeff, k. de. (2014, 15 august). fishing for answers at poaching’s ground zero. mail and guardian. retrieved from http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-14-fishing-for-answers-at-poachingsground-zero greeff, k. de & raemaekers, s. (2014). south africa’s illicit abalone trade: an updated overview and knowledge gap analysis. cambridge: traffic international. retrieved from http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/25583011/1414148973007/ w-traps-abalone report.pdf?token=j2jdwiqk8xi4ghzdtu6v7fhraiw%3d 31 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) green, l. (2016). calculemos jasus lalandii: accounting for south african lobster. in bruno latour (ed.), reset modernity! (pp. 139–151). cambridge, ma: mit press. ——— (2015, 24 june). the changing of the gods of reason: cecil john rhodes, karoo fracking and the decolonising of the anthropocene. e-flux supercommunity: apocalypsis. retrieved from http://supercommunity.eflux.com/texts/the-changing-of-the-gods-of-reason green, l. & green, d. (2013). knowing the day, knowing the world: engaging amerindian thought in public archaeology. tucson, az: arizona university press. jullien, f. (1995). the propensity of things: toward a history of efficacy in china (janet lloyd, trans.). new york, ny: zone books. mckittrick, k. (ed.). (2015). sylvia wynter: on being human as praxis. durham, nc: duke university press. latour, b. (2007). the recall of modernity. cultural studies review, 13(1), 11–30. platt, j.r. (2016, 5 february). poachers steal 7 million south african abalones a year. scientific american. retrieved from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/poachersabalone stengers, i. (2005). the cosmopolitical proposal. in b. latour & p. weibel (eds.), making things public: atmospheres of democracy (pp. 994–1003). cambridge, ma: mit press. 32 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) on the situated politics of analytic symmetry kristina marie lyons i begin with an important conceptual lesson taught to me by an animal husbandry technician and small farmer. our conversations occurred in the andean-amazonian foothills of colombia, where i have been conducting fieldwork and accompanying what i call agro-life popular processes over the last thirteen years. southwestern colombia has been an epicenter of what was, until recently, the country’s over-fifty-year social and armed conflict, as well as the focal point of militarized us– colombia antinarcotics policy since the late 1990s. this farmer friend, heraldo vallejo, explained to me that modernizing agricultural practices and neocolonial legacies of violent extractivism have alienated rural communities to the point where “they do not know where they were standing.” not knowing where one is standing does not refer to knowing the soil through a laboratory analysis of its chemical fertility, ph level, or scientific taxonomy. indeed, heraldo demonstrated how, rather than sending a soil sample off to an urban-based laboratory and paying for chemical analysis, farmers could compare the soil where they intend to cultivate with fecund animal manure on the farm. applying hydrogen peroxide to both the soil and the manure, then comparing the intensity of the effervescent cackle of microbial life is a way to determine whether a soil is healthy and apt for cultivating. the reason to avoid consulting a soil science laboratory is not only a question of reducing costs and external dependencies in a precarious peasant farmer economy where rural communities rarely have access to such technology.9 it emerges from the ontological differences between treating soils as artificial strata or, at best, natural bodies that can routinely be chemically manipulated and interacting with soils as living worlds that are inextricable from their ecological relations. in fact, as heraldo engaged in the experiment, he told me it was not a question of knowing but of learning how to cultivate (and also recover) different practices, aptitudes, dispositions, and affects. his emphasis on open33 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ended processes of learning that do not result in the accumulation of universally applicable knowledge reveals a tension that he, and other farmers i met, have not only with many agricultural sciences and their productivist imperatives but also with the category of knowledge itself, when it is separated from learning as a humbling, shared (as in multilateral and not only human), ongoing, and situated process.10 this is not because these farmers reject the teachings of soil science, ecology, or microbiology entirely, as evidenced in the above anecdote about relating to chemical versus biological soils. rather, heraldo and other farmers interface with these sciences and their technological apparatuses by subjecting them to the rigor of local demands, visions, and agroecological conditions. scientific practices that support farmers’ liberation from capitalist imperatives and extractivebased logics while also responsibly addressing and emerging from amazonian-based problems may be incorporated into their agricultural life projects. simultaneously, these farmers engage with specific practices they learn from their parents and extended family members and ones they continually learn in their exchanges with neighboring indigenous, afro-descendent, and other peasant farmers. for example, heraldo told me how his nasa indigenous neighbors taught him to plant in fields recently struck by lightning because these fields become more fertile. the nasa had reached this conclusion by witnessing the upsurge of mushroom caps after a storm. heraldo later read a scientific explanation of the way nitrogen molecules are shattered by lightning bolts, fertilize the air, and then penetrate the ground in falling raindrops. this was a case, he explained, where popular practices match up with scientific ones. however, there are innumerable popular practices that have no scientific equivalent and that form part of or are actively being reincorporated into farm and forest life.11 the recovery and innovational reworking of these practices is occurring after decades when rural communities eliminated most agrobiodiversity and food production to grow monoculture coca—what stigmatizing state antidrug campaigns call “narcocrops/narco-seeded plots” or la mata que mata (the plant that 34 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) kills). heraldo and other farmers i met throughout the andeanamazonian foothills and plains are not trapped in an either/or world that pits knowledge against belief. nor do they make a multicultural or hybridist move to simply place scientific practices that are “locally appropriate” in analytic and material symmetry with alternative or popular practices.12 scientific practices, even when they address amazonian problems responsibly, are categorically (and not only relatively) different from the kinds of practices and practitioners that emerge when one lives, dies, and defends a territory under military duress. for these farmers, the modernizing agricultural sciences can easily become parasitic. such practices can show their colonial sides when they are deemed “knowledge” that absorbs nonscientifically derived practices and/or renders them obsolete under the capitalist imperatives of standardization, competitiveness, and intellectual property. within science-studies scholarship, there have been moves to “democratize” knowledge production in different global contexts under more plural conceptualizations of science and modernity (see, for example, harding, 2008; medina, da costa marques, & holmes et al., 2014). more recently, scholars interested in decentering science studies from english/euro-american analytics have proposed what they call a “postcolonial version of the principle of symmetry” to ask “what might happen if sts were to make more systematic use of non-western ideas” (law & lin, 2015 p. 2). ethnographic conceptualizations at the interfaces of postcolonial and feminist science studies have made important contributions to understanding the kinds of ontological tensions that exist and that are necessarily maintained between divergent knowledge traditions and world-making practices (see, for example, verran, 2002; 2013, de la cadena, 2010; lyons, 2014; de la cadena & lien et al., 2015). of course, within and beyond the confines of academic debates, encounters between “western” and “non-western” ideas in the americas have been ongoing since the conquest and the control of the atlantic after 1492. focusing on the specificities of spanish and portuguese 35 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) colonialisms, latin american and diasporic scholars based in the united states have insisted that we think with the “triad modernity/coloniality/decoloniality” (castro-gómez, 2005; escobar, 2007; giraldo, 2016), arguing that these violent colonial encounters and their enduring structural effects are constitutive of modernity and the making of a capitalist world system. when indigenous, peasant, afro-descendent, feminist, and popular sectors chant “500 años de colonialismo” (“500 years of colonialism”) during mobilizations across latin america, they are engaged in struggles against specific forms of ongoing coloniality that are conceptualized in ways other than “postcolonial.”13 however, as tania pérez-bustos notes in this series, this does not mean that a decolonial paradigm should become a singular explanatory tool to discuss the commitments and practices of diverse popular struggles and radical thinkers across the hemisphere. in an epistemic sense, the production of modern scientific disciplines has occurred within asymmetrical power relations of ongoing coloniality. the historical production of scientific knowledge has always entailed its constitutive outsides: not only in terms of the making of the category of “science” pitted against “religion,” “superstition,” and “belief,” but also in the ongoing appropriation of diverse practices—and hence worlds—that continues to allow scientific practitioners to claim to authoritatively “know” a singular reality. my intention is not to gloss over diverse scientific traditions by simply defining them as rooted in the projects and practices of colonialism, or to underestimate the critical perspectives and subversive potential of scientists working within unequally distributed global positions. i am interested in exploring the limits of symmetry as a conceptual and political tool when placed in conversation with the kinds of alternative practices in which heraldo and other farmers engage as they strive to “decolonize their farms,” as they call it. the practices of the farmers i have been accompanying do not seek to democratize science—in other words, to open inclusive spaces for what some call ancestral, traditional, or popular saberes (wisdoms or 36 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) know-how) within neoliberalized science-policy culture, or place science at the disposal of the interests of civil society as though a dualistic division exists between the two. the promises and practices of democratization may or may not take on relevance and are always situated political and social processes, rather than universal aspirations. this is heightened when rural communities are criminalized due to their presumed engagement in illicit economic activities, their defense of territories against extractivism, and by the fact that they live in areas that are militarized and also occupied by paralegal armed groups. by illicit economic activities, i refer not only to the cultivation of illicit crops in colombia, but also to the incremental criminalization of a whole variety of popular and ancestral food production, commercialization, and seedpropagating practices vis-à-vis neoliberal reforms that favor the interests of multinational corporate chemical-seed conglomerates. certain modern agricultural technologies are actively incorporated into small farmers’ labor when they enable liberatory potential within the relational conditions of amazonian ecologies. however, peasant farmers in the western amazon taught me that asymmetrical engagements between practices remain ethically and strategically important as a political—or, better yet, life—proposal. this is an asymmetry that subverts the authority granted to scientific knowledge and its nexus with capitalist forms of accumulation over a myriad of other nonscientific practices and antiand noncapitalist ethics. these kinds of asymmetrical analytical and material engagements resist the appropriation of popular practices by different scientific disciplines and acknowledge the historical and ongoing debts these sciences owe to the worlds they marginalize(d). rather than assuming the fixed locations of subjugation that a “postcolonial symmetry” proposes to unravel, it is also conceptually and politically important to consider situated “decolonizing” enactments and versions of asymmetry. 37 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) references análisis de suelo, la mano derecha de los agricultores colombianos. (2017, february 24). food news latam. retrieved from http://www.foodnewslatam.com/6654-análisis-de-suelo,-la-manoderecha-de-los-agricultores-colombianos.html cadena, m de la. (2010). indigenous cosmopolitics in the andes: conceptual reflections beyond “politics.” cultural anthropology, 25(2), 334–370. cadena, m. de la & lien, m.e. (eds.). (2015) anthropology and sts: generative interfaces, multiple locations. hau, 5(1), 437–475. castro-gómez, s. (2005). la poscolonialidad explicada a los niños. popayán, colombia: instituto pensar, universidad javeriana, jigra de letras—editorial universidad del cauca. choy, t. (2005). articulated knowledges: environmental forms after universality’s demise. american anthropologist, 107, 5–18. escobar, a. (2007). worlds and knowledges otherwise: the latin american modernity/coloniality research program. cultural studies 21(2– 3), 179–210. freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york, ny: herder and herder. giraldo, i. (2016). coloniality at work: decolonial critique and the postfeminist regime. feminist theory, 17(2), 157–173. green, l. (ed.). (2013). contested ecologies: dialogues in the south in 38 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) nature and knowledge. cape town, south africa: hsrc press. harding, s. (2008). sciences from below: feminisms, postcolonialities, and modernities. durham, nc: duke university press. law, j & lin, w. (2015). provincialising sts: postcoloniality, symmetry and method. 2015 bernal prize plenary at the annual meeting of the society for the social studies of science, denver, colorado, 11–15 november. lyons, k. (2014). soil science, development, and the “elusive nature” of colombia’s amazonian plains. journal of latin american and caribbean anthropology, 19(2), 212–236. mbembe, a. (2017). critique of black reason. durham, nc: duke university press. medina, e., da costa marques, i., & holmes, c. (eds.). (2014). beyond imported magic: essays on science, technology, and society in latin america. cambridge, ma: mit press. subramaniam, b., foster, l., harding, s., roy d., and tallbear, k. (2017). feminism, postcolonialism, technoscience. in u.felt, r. fouché, c.a. miller, & l. smith-doerr (eds.), the handbook of science and technology studies, 4th ed. (pp. 407–434). cambridge, ma: mit press. verran, h. (2002). a postcolonial moment in science studies: alternative firing regimes of environmental scientists and aboriginal landowners.” social studies of science, 32(5/6), 729–762. ——— (2013). engagements between disparate knowledge traditions: toward doing difference generatively and in good faith. in l. green 39 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) (ed.), contested ecologies: dialogues in the south on nature and knowledge (pp. 141–161). cape town, south africa: hsrc press. a word of caution toward homogenous appropriations of decolonial thinking in sts tania pérez-bustos these lines are a provocation, a word of caution, a question posed in response to the questions asked about the role of decolonial theory in the thinking of science and technology studies (sts) nowadays. when i was invited to participate in this discussion, my first reaction was to say, “shall i be part of this?” i am familiar with these theoretical proposals, with the distinctions between postcoloniality and the triad of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality (santiago castro-gómez, 2005; giraldo, 2016), as much as with the tensions between them and within coloniality/decoloniality thinking. i do not, however, affiliate with any of these proposals—in fact, i do not affiliate with hardly any school of thought or particular theory. i find these proposals useful since they have helped me to think and question, in particular, the feminist politics of the circulation of popular science and technology in countries such as india and colombia (pérez-bustos, 2014). thus, my position toward decoloniality has mostly been marked by my anecdotal encounters with literature proposing the decolonial option (santiago castro gómez & grosfoguel, 2007).14 it is from anecdotal encounters with these ideas as partial tools that i can speak. i do not see them as paradigms. in the case of modernity/coloniality and decoloniality, i see the faces of particular people behind these concepts: mostly well-known male scholars based in the united states who attempt to think from latin america, but also male scholars based in different corners of latin america trying to differentiate themselves from their northern counterparts. i see invisible appropriations of feminist knowledge produced in the south as much as in the north.15 i see a game of mirrors and invisibilities propitiated by the inaudibility of knowledge produced 40 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) otherwise. i think about this, keeping silvia rivera cusicanqui’s words in mind: mignolo and company have built a small empire within the empire…have adopted the ideas of subaltern studies and have launched discussions in latin america, creating a jargon, a conceptual apparatus and forms of reference and counterreference which have produced an academic detachment with the commitments and dialogues with insurgent social forces. (rivera cusicanqui, 2010, my translation) with this, i am not saying that there is nothing to learn from what these authors write. better yet, i should say to what these autores write in order to emphasize their gender position. what i am saying is that certain discourses of decoloniality may run the risk of existing within certain politics of appropriation and decontextualization through which certain voices are audible and others are not, and it is with this politics that decoloniality becomes. or, as one of the reviewers of this paper helped me to highlight, these circuits of audibility, appropriation, decontextualization, gender, and coloniality shape the very possibility of discussing decoloniality in sts. while writing this, because i am latin american, i keep wondering what it means and what the implications of my words (or the expectations for them) are in relation to decolonial terms and the genealogy of these terms in latin america. i say this because i come from a region with very particular histories of colonization, one that has pushed a group of scholars to think about these categories for a very particular period. during this period these scholars discussed and highlighted (initially) the differences between processes of colonization and argued, in varied, intricate, and complex ways, the need to understand that modernity is a product of coloniality (santiago castro-gómez & grosfoguel, 2007; giraldo, 2016). thus, while recalling michelle murphy’s words (2016), decoloniality cannot be otherwise, cannot be thought outside those frames. this in the sense that decoloniality emerges out of coloniality as a counterface of modernity, and it is dissenting within (puig de la bellacasa, 41 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) 2012) these conditions of possibility that decoloniality can become. it is the triad concept we are dealing with. however, when i think of how the latin american genealogy of this concept is being used and appropriated in sts (harding, 2016), i do not necessarily see a triad. i see a fuzzy word filled with hope and expectations, a word being used in a homogeneous way, a word lacking history and complexity, plurality and entanglements. then i remember (how could i forget?) that language is an issue in the academic world (pérez-bustos, 2017: 59-72). that writing in english and not in castilian spanish or catalan or portuguese or, even more, in aymara or quechua is not neutral. it embodies a very particular coloniality of knowledge, of being, of power, depending on where you stand (or sit) (wöhrer, 2016). coloniality as a concept (because i insist that we cannot talk about decoloniality without asking how it is built by coloniality as a necessary precursor of modernity, and as a triad) emerged in latin america at 1998, and it was discussed for a decade. however, when this genealogy has more recently been used in the northern anglo-saxon world, it often relies on the translation of this work (see harding, 2016). however, what has been translated? what has not? why? are we only relying on translated sources or on decolonial thinking produced by latin american thinkers based in the north? what does it imply that perhaps one is reading certain people from caribbean and latin american critical thought but not others? there is something interesting in what is translated and heard, but we also need to recognize its partiality and its politics of appropriation and circulation, or else we may fail to acknowledge the impact of that partiality. i am not arguing that we need to be universal in any way, but rather that we must question the privilege of our point of view and take a reflective stand toward how decoloniality is used and produced in its incorporation into sts, and how this incorporation includes silences and blind spots. in this context, which frames the emergence of the triad of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality in latin america as much as its partial translation, i wonder to what extent using the term here, speaking about 42 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) decoloniality in latin america without acknowledging and understanding where it comes from and the differences it embraces, its inner heterogeneity, is not another (of many) examples of cognitive and epistemic injustice (visvanathan, 2009). with this i suggest that having and embodying the privilege of speaking and writing and being embedded in the lingua franca of science seems to give anglo-saxon scholars the right to appropriate concepts partially and make theory out of them. this is usually impossible for academics in the non-anglo-saxon south who do not have the privilege of whiteness (symbolically as much as materially speaking) or have not worked hard enough toward having it (studying in the north and building and being part of certain networks) (wöhrer, 2016). thus, how homogeneous is the idea of decoloniality being used in northern contexts? what kind of systematic ignorance accompanies this homogeneity? whose singularities are being lost in terms of theory? why? is the use of decoloniality, or better yet the search for decoloniality, decolonial enough? decolonial in what sense? or is this search for decoloniality actually reproducing certain geopolitics of knowledge and logics of colonialism? from my experience as a feminist sts scholar based in colombia and not representing anyone, with my singular voice, i would say it might be. references cabrera, m., & vargas monroy, l. (2014). transfeminismo, decolonialidad y el asunto del conocimiento: inflexiones de los feminismos disidentes contemporáneos. universitas humanística, 78(78), 19–37. castro-gómez, s. (2005). la poscolonialidad explicada a los niños. popayán, colombia: instituto pensar, universidad javeriana, jigra de letras—editorial universidad del cauca. castro-gómez, s., & grosfoguel, r. (2007). prólogo. giro decolonial, 43 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) teoría crítica y pensamiento heterárquico. in s. castro-gómez & r. grosfoguel (eds.), el giro decolonial. reflexiones para una diversidad epistémica más allá del capitalismo global, (pp. 9–24). bogotá, colombia: iesco-pensar-siglo del hombre editores. curiel, o. (2007). crítica poscolonial desde las prácticas políticas del feminismo antirracista. nómadas, (26), 92–101. femenías, m.l. (2007). esbozo de un feminismo latinoamericano. revista estudos feministas, 15(1), 11–25. http://doi.org/10.1590/s0104026x2007000100002 giraldo, i. (2016). coloniality at work: decolonial critique and the postfeminist regime. feminist theory, 17(2), 157–173. http://doi.org/10.1177/1464700116652835 harding, s. (2016). latin american decolonial social studies of scientific knowledge: alliances and tensions. science, technology & human values, 41(6), 1063–1087. http://doi.org/10.1177/0162243916656465 lugones, m. (2008). colonialidad del género. tabula rasa, 9, 73–102. retrieved from http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=s179424892008000200006#1 mendoza, b. (2010). la epistemología del sur, la colonialidad del género y el feminismo latinoamericano. in y. espinosa miñoso (ed.), aproximaciones críticas a las prácticas teórico-políticas del feminismo latinoamericano (pp. 19–36). buenos aires, argentina: en la frontera. murphy, m. (2016). to what extent is embodied knowledge a form of science and technology by other means? in science+technology by other means, 4s/east conference, barcelona. 44 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) pérez-bustos, t. (2014). feminización y pedagogías feministas: museos interactivos, ferias de ciencia y comunidades de software libre en el sur global. bogotá, colombia: editorial javeriana. pérez-bustos, t. (2017). “no es sólo una cuestión de lenguaje”: lo inaudible de los estudios feministas en américa latina en el mundo académico anglosajón. scientiae studia, 15(2). puig de la bellacasa, m. (2012). “nothing comes without its world”: thinking with care. sociological review, 60(2), 197–216. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.2012.02070.x rivera cusicanqui, s. (2010). ch’ixinakax utxiwa. una reflexión sobre prácticas y discursos descolonizadores. buenos aires, argentina: tinta limín. visvanathan, s. (2009). the search for cognitive justice. knowledge in question, 597. retrieved from http://www.indiaseminar.com/2009/597.htm walsh, c. (2004). geopolíticas del conocimiento, interculturalidad y descolonialización. boletín iccc-ary rimay, 6(60). retrieved from http://icci.nativeweb.org/boletin/60/walsh.html. wöhrer, v. (2016). gender studies as a multi-centred field? centres and peripheries in academic gender research. feminist theory, 17(3). http://doi.org/10.1177/1464700116652840 notes 1 the histories and complexities of these social movements are beyond the scope of this essay, but for an example of how the concept of the decolonial is circulating therein as an extension of franz fanon’s and 45 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) steve biko’s works, see ngcaweni (2016). 2 barbara harrisson was german by birth, although she spoke of herself as a british colonial when i interviewed her in 2006. during world war ii, she worked as a typist in the abwehr, the espionage group within the third reich’s armed forces that hitler disbanded toward the end of the war because of its internal subterfuge against his rule (heimann, 1998). her move to the tropics following world war ii seems to parallel the movements of nazi women closely associated with hitler, such as hannah reitsch, the pilot and iron cross recipient who became close to third world leader kwame nkrumah and helped establish ghana’s air force in the early years of independence (allman, 2013). however, harrisson’s efforts were not directed by a confident futurism of a new nation-state but were a series of uncertain trials and error. 3 orangutan infants usually spend around the first seven years of their lives with their mothers (galdikas, 1981; galdikas & wood, 1990). 4 barbara harrisson’s story is one where colonial science converges with gendered science (anderson, 2002, 2006; anderson & adams, 2008; von oertzen, rentetzi, & watkins, 2013). bidai’s father was a pengulu, a title that designated an indigenous leader. harrisson describes his father’s assumed role as that of both a political and shamanistic leader. 5 arrested autonomy describes the condition in which forcibly being made dependent is understood as the means of gaining independence. in effect, that independence is always indefinitely deferred. 6 like many abstract terms in malay, merdeka has roots in sanskrit, conveying roots in the ancient srivijaya and majapahit imperial courtly and elite cultures that connected the region. this word was distinguished from the term bebas, which orientalists like john crawfurd reckoned originated from johor on the peninsula; it spread through malay’s usage as the vernacular trade language throughout the archipelago. bebas seemed to represent something more excessive or even “wild,” distant from “civilized”courtly culture and even further from the ideas of liberty conveyed in the writings of john locke and john stuart mill and through the stately sense of the term merdeka (rutherford, 2012; steedly, 2013). marsden’s translations of the terms free and liberty in the 1812 edition of a dictionary and grammar of the malayan language convey this: “free 46 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) (manumitted) mardika…(unrestrained) bibas…liberty (enfranchisement) ka-mardika-an; (permission) mohon, bibas” (1984, pp. 451, 482). merdeka corresponds to liberal ideas of political independence (kirksey, 2012; rutherford, 2012; steedly, 2013). 7 for an explanation of how nonhuman animals have gender, please see parreñas (2017). 8 cape times newsbill, 14 november 2014. 9 the soil’s treatment in dominant agronomic circles almost exclusively prioritizes soil fertility and structure because of the roles granted to these properties in agricultural production and chemical input substitution. this is particularly evident in the colombian government’s new servientrega suelos service, which i euphemistically translate as “door-to-door soil analysis,” where rural farmers can send soil samples to an urban laboratory through a mailing service and within ten days receive a soil study and technical recommendations for the chemical fertilization of a particular commercial crop. see “análisis de suelo” (2017). i thank my colleague julio arias vanegas for drawing my attention to this article. 10 i am reminded of achille mbembe’s description of fanon’s situated thinking as “metamorphic thought” (2017, pp. 161–162), and the coconstitutive relationship that paulo freire (1970) proposes between knowing and learning. i thank my colleague tania pérez-bustos for connecting me back to freire’s critical pedagogy. 11 see green (ed., 2013) for further discussion about the decolonial possibilities that may emerge when environmental sciences push beyond simply selecting pieces of “alternative” or indigenous knowledges that appear to match up with scientific knowledges. 12 in his ethnographic exploration of environmental politics in present-day hong kong, tim choy (2005) alerts us to the fact that the imperative for scientific expertise to perform its “local appropriateness” may be a relativist critique already inhabited by the postcolonial state. 13 i am in no way arguing that postcolonial scholarship and subaltern studies have not been influential among political activists and scholars in and of latin america. however, my research is informed by a genealogy 47 lyons, parreñas and tamarkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) of latin american critical theory, which includes dependency theory, liberation theology, participatory action research, and a current of thought or movement that is sometimes referred to as pensamiento latinoamericano en ciencia, tecnología y sociedad (latin american thinking on science, technology, and society). see also subramaniam, foster, harding, roy and tallbear (2017). 14 i refer to this encounter as anecdotal in the sense that it is defined by my possible and partial access to the literature in the south, considering that the circuits of knowledge circulation tend to privilege north-to-south trajectories and not south-to-south fluxes (femenías, 2007). 15 i refer here to the work of feminists reflecting on decoloniality such as latinx feminists working in the north, like maría lugones (2008), breny mendoza (2010), and isis giraldo (2016); latin american feminists based in the south, like marta cabrera and liliana vargas monroy (2014), ochy curiel (2007), and silvia rivera cusicanqui (2010); and feminists from the north living in the south, such as catherine walsh (2004). microsoft word catalyst introduction-part1.docx subramaniam, b and willey, a. (2017). introduction to science out of feminist theory part one: feminism’s sciences. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), 1-23 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © banu subramaniam and angela willey, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license introduction science out of feminist theory part one: feminism’s sciences banu subramaniam university of massachusetts, amherst banu@wost.umass.edu angela willey university of massachusetts, amherst awilley@wost.umass.edu in 2012, sophia roosth and astrid schrader edited a special issue of differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies entitled “feminist theory out of science.” drawing heavily from feminist new materialism, the issue was devoted to revisiting the annals, practices, and knowledges of science to produce a revised scientific and more feminist account of the world. the essays in the volume uncovered a distinctly feminist, and imaginative landscape in the work of some of the most famous scientists and sciences of the west, revealing the degree to which social and historical forces have chosen and drawn on the more regressive elements of the scientific record. the issue called on feminists to go back to the “sources” of science to unearth more progressive and feminist sensibilities, theories, and imaginations. the editors argued that “what emerges from these diverse essays is an approach to critical thinking that 2 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) inhabits, elaborates, and feeds upon scientific theory, holding feminist theory accountable to science and vice versa.” roosth and schrader describe their project “as an attempt to refigure possible relationships and traffic between feminism and science,” offering the tantalizing possibility that other sciences, and other futures were always possible. as editors of this special issue of catalyst, we share roosth’s and schrader’s desire to move beyond tired arguments about whether the humanities and the sciences are “two cultures” (snow 1959, lee and wallerstein 2016), or more recent debates about “new materialism” in feminist studies. the provocation for “science out of feminist theory” comes in part out of a critique of the “traffic” metaphor and its limits as a resource for imagining science anew. traffic has emerged as an important metaphor for challenging the binary opposition of feminism and science by suggesting that they are connected by what “travels” between them, in both directions. ideas, theories, politics, and language constantly travel these “two way streets” (fausto sterling 1992) between feminism and science. in reading the wonderfully eclectic assortment of essays in our double special issue of catalyst, we suggest that, taken together, the authors’ visions of “science out of feminist theory” collectively highlight the vastly unequal and complex terrain on which this traffic traverses. indeed, to pay attention to this terrain is to recognize the many potholes, obstacles, dead ends, detours, accidents, and vehicles driven off the road. the fundamental argument that theories and knowledge travel between feminism and science is by now a foundational claim for feminist science and technology studies. as a result, over the last few decades, the field has developed rich accounts of the dense traffic between science and feminism, and between their proper objects—nature and culture. indeed, rather than nature and culture, we now talk about naturecultures. however, in the move to track naturecultures, we often elide the unequal status of feminism and science as knowledge projects. too often, feminism and science appear as known quantities, startlingly 3 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) monolithic in our rhetoric for all our claims to interrogate their meanings. the common proposition is that: we are feminists and science is never us, never what we’re doing. whether we are admonishing our peers for not “taking science seriously” (and conversely congratulating ourselves) or damning science for its part in the violence we see in our worlds, science is outside of feminism. moored in this logic, recent accounts of what we might call feminist science have called for a shift in feminism’s relationship with science. citing a historically antagonistic relationship, they argue that feminism needs to overcome its old “anti-science” attitudes and learn to embrace science. there are many versions of this call for re-engagement (alaimo and heckman 2008, coole and frost 2010, grosz 2011, hird 2004, wilson 2004; see also ahmed 2004). as sara giordano notes in this special issue, readings of “anti-science” feminism imagine feminist and scientific approaches as occupying a power-neutral relationship. willey (2017) argues that these accounts narrate a gendered romance, one that begins with adversity, trudges through hard-won growth, and leaves us with a newly “science friendly feminism” and “anti-essentialist science” that might beat the odds yet and wind up snuggling by the proverbial fire.1 this recent exhortation to feminists to embrace the institution of science is one both of us have found less critical than their authors’ ambitions call for. as editors, we are suspicious of the invocation of an easy parallelism between feminism and science, especially one where feminism is exhorted to sideline critique in order to learn from science, or to develop a more “affectionate” relationship (wilson 2004) with it. indeed, we can recover feminist genealogies in science, and scientific/materialist genealogies in feminism, because both science and feminism have too often emerged as monolithic overdetermined categories that ignore the heterogeneity within. perhaps, as subramaniam has argued, rather than trying to imagine that we have buried the colonial and gendered violences of our sciences in the past, we might instead imagine a scientific future that allows us to live with its 4 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ghosts—the elisions and erasures of our histories of feminism and science (subramaniam 2014). at the heart of “science out of feminist theory” is an interrogation of the term “science.” what do we mean by it? in mainstream representations, “science” is presented as a cohesive body of disciplines in the natural sciences that emerged in the west and focused on studying the natural world with a unique and objective “scientific method.” science and technology studies (sts) has long challenged this simplistic reading. thomas kuhn (1962: 42) argued that science was a “rather ramshackle structure with little coherence among its various parts.” scholars in sts have increasingly viewed science as a heterogeneous body of work created less by coherence and more by historical contingencies. most agree that there is no single enterprise of “science” but rather a large variety of “special studies” that have been grouped together under this label (dear 2012). of course, as with “science,” “feminism” is not a monolithic term, either. we have seen a wide variety of analytic frameworks produce a cornucopia of feminisms—postcolonial feminisms, indigenous feminisms, women of color feminisms, queer feminisms, socialist feminisms, ecofeminisms, just to name a few. most agree that there is no unifying analysis that all feminists share. thus, instead of thinking about “feminism” and “science” as separate and known quantities in relationship, we want to open up further space for thinking about feminism as a site for theorizing and reconfiguring the very meanings of science. rather than be stuck in the proverbial traffic jam of interdisciplinary travel, we propose excavating the diverse and eclectic genealogies and traditions within feminist theories to reimagine what science is and might be. 5 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) in our cfp for “science out of feminist theory,” we invited manuscripts that might address the following questions: * how does feminist theory help us shape the goals of inquiry— what do we need to know about our world/s? how might we best study these? * are all objects best studied by scientific methods or by the humanities? or are some necessarily interdisciplinary objects? * how might feminist thought help us re-articulate what constitutes scientific knowledge? what constitutes “usable” or “valid” knowledge? * how do we distribute epistemic authority on the proper objects of science and feminism? how might they be related? * how can feminist theories (of nature, embodiment, technology, behavior) be conceived as scientific inquiry? (we welcome case studies, hypothetical experiments, aligning the language of feminist theory and science, analyses from feminist theory that help us rearticulate scientific questions into new questions for feminism and science) * explorations of the “proper “objects of feminist thought and science * theorizing the idea of “feminist science”—is it possible? desirable? what is it? * what are the forms of scientific inquiry? what kinds of theories, experiments, methods constitute scientific inquiry? does critique also constitute knowledge? how might feminist theory help 6 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) reframe these questions? * how can feminist theory allow us a more capacious definition of science as a postcolonial, queer, feminist enterprise? the essays we received in response to the call did not disappoint. indeed, we received many more abstracts than we were able to include even as the special issue expanded to two. some aspects of the submissions were striking. taken together, they raise some profound and important questions. a critical question that emerged was how we understand the “proper objects” of feminism. in asking “how might scholars generate critical theories out of scientific ones?,” roosth and schrader (2012) clarify: “‘feminist theory out of science’ does not imply that feminist theory emerges from science. it implies, rather, that the world is already theory all the way down.” we want to express our appreciation of the struggle to name and describe a project that would help us to think about feminist theory as a site for theorizing the stuff of the world, what we refer to here as science’s proper objects. we also appreciate the impulse to think capaciously about what constitutes “theory.” at the same time, we want to push back on a persistent conflation of “science” with “the world” (willey 2016). science is a set of disciplines and interdisciplines and their attendant apparatuses, theories, methodologies, and practices. the world “all the way down” is its object of study. similarly, “culture” is understood as the proper object of study for the humanities, and “nature” outside its disciplinary bounds. if culture and nature are indeed entangled (barad 2007, haraway 2008), we need methodological tools for natureculture research. our project is thus partly a critique of proper objects (butler 2004, willey 2017), animated by the question: what might it look like to imagine critical theory as a site for knowing those objects we consider science’s domain (or even as “science” itself)? our approach, importantly, comes out of postcolonial science studies and some of its core insights, including the understanding that not all systems for making sense of science’s proper objects “count” as 7 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) science. science is not simply the name for knowledges of nature, bodies, and other manifestations of microscopic to cosmic physicality. as western colonial powers expanded, so much of knowledge across the world was written off as unscientific, backward, pseudoscience, magical, or more recently categorized as “alternative” or “indigenous” knowledges. this was precisely done to demarcate the contours of a “legitimate” “superior” knowledge called “science.” as postcolonial studies reinforces, science was not just mobilized in service of colonial agendas, but rather materialized through epistemic imperialism at the heart of colonization. the consolidation of the authority of particular (european) modalities and vocabularies to tell us who and what we are is a shared foundation of naturalized science and naturalized inequality. we should all be concerned by the fact that while “science” is in fact a particular set of epistemologies and methodologies, and quite a narrow one in the scheme of things, it simultaneously occupies a status so unproblematized that it can be conflated in critical theory with “the world itself.” many scholars have tried to resolve these troubling legacies. one important strategy in combatting epistemic imperialism has been to reveal science as we know it as one among many “ethnosciences” (harding 2006) and to rescale its authority thus. this redistribution of epistemic authority has opened doors for thinking about kitchen and garage experimentalism (jen 2015), science shops (weasel 2001), indigenous materialisms (tallbear 2017), alternate and indigenous sciences and medicine (nandy 1980, shiva 1993, viswanathan 2006), and indeed critical theory as sites of scientific knowledge production. we are quite alert to the risk of reinforcing the epistemic imperialism on which the idea of ever increasing knowledge accumulation depends merely by claiming to do science. we are also attuned to the trap of a naïve protonativism or a simplistic politics of authenticity where the past (or some supposedly subaltern theory or practice) is sometimes unproblematically valorized. we have each had our own struggles with articulating a sense that the risks that inhere in claiming science are worth taking and that 8 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) certain possibilities are opened up by going there. in simple terms, the benefit of this redistribution is twofold: first, to lessen the power of certain constituencies and institutional formations to define our problems and their solutions and thus to undermine the sadly naturalized place of profit in science (harding 1991, pollock 2012, sunder rajan 2017); and second, to offer new ways of thinking about the objects, problems, and solutions that science has studied. we believe that proliferating sciences has the potential to undo rigid boundaries around what counts and to make strange those entrenched conventions of reduction, framing, measuring, categorizing, and decontextualizing feminists have critiqued in science. even those sciences least determinist and most attuned to complexity (pitts taylor 2016; subramaniam and willey 2016) fall into these traps—they are endemic to the positivist epistemologies that produce them and conventionally mark the boundary between science and myth. as haraway (1991) argued so famously in “the cyborg manifesto,” we need science, our myth. science here is storytelling, not separate from non-science but like those theories that don’t count, another set of narrative resources for imagining what we are and might become, for undergirding less violent imaginaries about human/non-human/planetary futures. we want this proliferation in part to provide us with a rich array of narrative resources out of which to build these worlds and the projects that will support them. clearly, there is a strong materialist bent to such a project. we want to participate in readying the ground, if you will, for a materialism oriented to the undoing of the categories that structure our worlds, the critique of which is at the heart of critical theory. this is in part a project of reading critique as “science.” feminist scholars have done a great deal of work to trace complex histories of race, sex/gender, sexuality, reproduction, disability and attendant concepts of beauty, intelligence, strength, and so on. these histories, we argue, should not be read as merely “social constructionist,” but rather also for their materialist valances. if the destabilization of said categories is too often reduced to the social, the re/turn to “biology” is far too often a return to these 9 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) categories. willey offers the concept of “biopossibility” as a substitute for “biology” in queer feminist materialist projects oriented to undoing (willey 2016). it is a way of exploring the materiality of a phenomenon that acknowledges that its very intelligibility is historically and culturally contingent. we would like to extend that ethic of undoing not just to entrenched scientific epistemologies, practices, and forms and to the categories which structure our worlds, but also to the histories that have made the study of the materiality of things restricted territory. in undoing assumptions about what science is and what its goals might be, we hope to open up space for thinking about feminist studies as an institutional and conceptual space for knowledge-making that can encompass descriptions and theories of physicality-in-context. with this vision in mind, we sought submissions with strong critical orientations and which offered resources for thinking about the stuff of the world—or what it means to contribute to knowing the stuff of the world—grounded in feminist thought. we received an exciting and rich set of essays. some aspects are worth noting. it was clear that feminist sts had matured into a field where authors revealed diverse understandings and commitments to the projects of feminism and science, yet they shared some theoretical assumptions. to avoid repetition, we asked authors to take these assumptions for granted. we also asked them to join us in an experiment to try to implement a shared lexicon to aid us collectively in holding some important conceptual distinctions between objects and modes of inquiry. we share all of this here, because we believe highlighting this continuity suggests some key insights for the field. here are the guidelines we developed: first, we grounded these special issues on a few “givens.” feminist science and technology studies (fsts) is now a visible field, albeit diverse and porous. the contributions of fsts and sts over the last many decades have also solidified the claim that science and scientific knowledges must always be located within their historical, cultural, and political contexts. there is no neutral “science” that escapes 10 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) being implicated in various political and social projects; a myth haraway calls the “god trick” (haraway 1988). by the same token, there is no unmediated “nature” out there. anything we might say about the stuff of the world is mediated by observation, interpretation, and language and other mechanisms of representation. these assumptions are a starting place for this volume—we believe these are well-established claims by now. we have asked all the authors not to rehearse these arguments again. in particular, we shared with authors our conviction that we do need more accounts about “how” science is implicated in various projects, but not that it is. second, we noticed that different authors used the terms “science,” “science,” “biology,” “body/ies,” “matter,” and “materiality” differently. to aid the reader, and in the hopes of forging a more precise working lexicon that might inform methodologies for thinking science out of feminist theory, we developed suggestions for a consistent usage of these terms. we have found sandra harding’s distinction between “science” (capital s) and the world of sciences (lower case s) excluded from its definition so fruitful ourselves for imagining science out of feminist theory, we would like to extend that logic here to other frequently-used terms implicated in this same epistemological resignifying tension. thus, when we use the words “science” or phrases like “the biosciences,” we mean knowledge that is produced through the legitimizing apparatus of various institutions, approved by reviewers and published (or legitimated by patents), i.e., this is “official” knowledge. someone can produce scientific knowledge in their garage or kitchen, but not “scientific” knowledge. for the latter, we use “sciences“—small s, and plural—to mean knowledges that are scientific by all measures except that they are not authenticated by the official apparatus of science. in other words, sciences refers to vast and diverse disciplinary and extra-disciplinary contributions to knowing our worlds. we aim to avoid slippages among scientific disciplines, methods, and practices and science’s proper objects: i.e. bodies, matter, nature, etc. we can make these efforts visible by extending the use of capital and lowercase to 11 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) these other terms. biology is an especially slippery one, as it refers both to a discipline (hence the “-ology”) and to the “stuff” itself. in our writing, we suggest that we use the capital-b biology to refer to the disciplinary field of science. use lowercase-b biology/biological to refer to the processes of bodily and natural explications. similarly, “nature” and “the body” refer to hegemonic accounts of particular objects of science. in contrast “bodies” and “nature” can be sites that are opened up to more natureculture understandings. we seek specificity when naming the stuff of our worlds—from the molecular to the epi-phenomenal—and try to avoid the disciplining disciplinary traps in which the historic and persistent division of nature and culture has left us moored. this might mean extending these logics further to make visible the distance between the objects as imagined by science and as opened up by science out of feminist theory (e.g. “climate change,” “the fetus,” etc.). if authors invent additional terms, they have defined them in the piece. if they have used these terms in some other specified way, they have explained carefully the terms’ referent and the logics behind their usage. and on the matter of matter/the material/materialism: “matter” has emerged as an object for feminist thought in ways that often take for granted what types of representations give us access to it. scientific ways of knowing are consistently presumed to offer more direct and reliable access to matter, or materiality, than other ways of knowing. hence feminist materialism is sometimes undertheorized, presumptively meaning feminism as a beneficiary of scientific data. we resist this a priori assumption, and encouraged all authors to be specific about what sort of evidence they are drawing on to invoke matter or to articulate a materialist approach, and to steer clear of vague claims about matter's importance or marginalization in feminist or critical theory, etc. these types of claims, we believe, reinforce a hierarchy of disciplinary knowledge-making practices antithetical to the project of imaging science out of feminist theory. in keeping with the capital/lowercase strategy, we use “matter” if we are referring to the “stuff” as mediated/represented by scientific data and “matter” if we are 12 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) advancing some other more capacious definition. our aim, we hope it is clear, was not to prohibit nor prescribe, but to make visible our collective processes in order to generate and proliferate methodological possibilities for science out of feminist theory. we see feminist thought as ripe with under-theorized, under-utilized concepts, lexicons, archives, data, etc. each of the authors in the two special issues contributes something valuable to the project of culling resources that might enable our imagining of new accounts of our naturecultural worlds and new ways of describing and understanding those knowledge projects. we—feminist science studies scholars—must learn to think of ourselves not only as critics or students of science, but as makers of scientific knowledge. in response to our call, the authors of these essays do this in diverse ways, opening up new questions, epistemologies, and methods for doing science and, in so doing, troubling the concept itself. out of their combined efforts, we can begin to imagine feminist studies as a site for kinds of scientific knowledge production that can transform the political and epistemological landscapes of debates about a monolithic “science.” what sciences would we put on our proverbial boots to march for? what worlds do their varied knowledge projects come out of and lend themselves to materializing? this first of our two special issues suggests that something we might call “feminism’s sciences” exist and are ripe to be reckoned with. venla oikkonen’s essay makes a profound contribution to thinking about the methodological possibilities of feminism’s sciences as experiments in transdisciplinarity. by reading population genetics alongside queer theorizations of temporality, she demonstrates how temporality and belonging can help us to rethink the genographic project. importantly, in putting these concepts forth as transdisciplinary objects, oikkonen models a strategy for putting two epistemologically incommensurate approaches into dialogue to rethink the a priori assumptions embedded in each and to yield new natureculture insights. such an approach contributes both to “harm reduction” given the pervasiveness of 13 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) appropriations of a neo-darwinian evolutionism and to the proliferation of queerer stories about what we are. pratistha bhattarai interrogates what “source code” actually is, demonstrating how racial and colonial imaginaries are intricately bound into the logics of algorithms. her essay follows in the long tradition of looking behind the numbers and reinforces a central insight of feminist sts that there is no neutral position, all science, especially and including numbers are bound within matrices of power. thinking from feminist theory, bhattarai offers a spivakian lens that allows us to see a path to developing more deliberative, antiracist algorithms that challenge racist policies in the guise of neutral science. bhattarai provides us with a detailed case study for operationalizing the critical insight that values are embedded in modes and means of measurement. that feminism’s sciences might code for our own values is both a literal and metaphorical provocation. chikako takeshita beautifully weaves in a naturecultural vision by bringing together feminist critique of representations of reproductive bodies with recent scientific work on pregnancy and multispecies thinking. disrupting the pervasiveness of mother/fetus binary logics, and at the same time unsettling the a priori gendering of the pregnant body, takeshita suggests the model of holobiant creating holobiant as a way of rethinking pregnancy and upsetting the parameters of feminist debate on fetal politics. her contribution powerfully demonstrates how bringing a feminist lens to scientific data can enable us to develop frameworks to produce not a normative body but more words, richer vocabularies, manifold sciences, and thus more capacious forms and understandings of embodiment. harlan weaver’s essay demonstrates how sites of “science” function—drawing together bioscientific knowledge alongside thick descriptions and hands-on affective relationships with pets. drawing on theories of intersectionalities, weaver unpacks the “fuzzy” science of dog training to reveal racialized dimensions of human/animal interactions. locating these interactions within racialized histories of dog-care, weaver 14 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) reminds us that paying attention to histories and sociologies of the “objects” of science can help us produce a more reflexive, ethical, and deliberative feminist science. weaver’s account of the fuzzy sciences of feminist shelter work also provides a model for thinking about “fuzzying” as a way we engage and transform scientific knowledges in our everyday lives. this lens opens up space for reading dogs and the humans with whom they interact as participants in the making of knowledges about their own nature. thinking the “fuzzy” science of the dog training world of weaver alongside sharra vostral’s historical account of the science of menstruation demonstrates the elisions and erasures that render one unscientific and the second scientific. vostral describes the campaign of our bodies ourselves to standardize absorbency rates in tampons in the aftermath of toxic shock syndrome. vostral ably demonstrates the systematic ways that feminists developed innovative scientific techniques to better measure tampon absorbency to provide data for tampon labeling. yet, the total resistance of the tampon industry to these innovations has resulted in continued imprecision and potentially harmful practices. this episode demonstrates the continued privileging of profits over safety. a recent campaign points out that we still do not know the materials in tampons, and tampon makers continue to resist any accountability (rabin 2017). vostral cautions us to continue to monitor the many potentially harmful products that continue to shape our lives, and the importance of feminist sts in recovering these histories. the piece provides a powerful reminder that it is not accountability to a truth ideal, but rather to communities, that renders more reliable empirical data. such histories help us to understand not only why science cannot be trusted out of hand, but why we need feminist sciences that don’t “leave biology to scientists” who are not held accountable (birke 2000). sara giordano challenges feminists to develop a more nuanced and principled position in challenges to science. if feminist sts has revealed anything, it is that that the apparatus of science has been nourished and shaped by its colonial, imperialist, racist, sexist, ableist 15 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) and heterosexist legacies. she urges us to develop a richer vocabulary for telling stories of our engagements with science and our affective relationships to it, accounts that do not succumb to the romance of an overdetermined privileged science. rather, feminists must continue to build spaces and imaginaries of the sciences. giordano challenges feminists to revalue feminist teaching and to approach the work of critical science literacy as a “re-writing” project that is itself productive of new scientific knowledges. finally, one of the critical insights of feminist science studies is that genres of writing are epistemological tools themselves and enable and disable particular kinds of learning and understanding (subramaniam 2014). to this end, we have embraced catalyst’s multiple formats to strengthen the special issues by inviting and incorporating additional pieces. through these pieces, we hope to animate the generativity of the larger project of “science out of feminist theory.” michelle murphy’s splendid plenary lecture at the 4s meetings in barcelona in 2016 speaks directly to the larger theme of science out of feminist theory in asking to what extent embodied knowledge can be “a form of science and technology by other means?” in chronicling the cycles of chemical violence, murphy explores alter embodiment, alterlife that is both a site already severely damaged by the ravages of environmental toxicity but also one with the potential for other possibilities and futures. as murphy argues, “alterlife, as potential, challenges us to learn with a thick archive and dense present of projects of resistance and resurgence. it is also an invitation to consider what infrastructures and concepts have to be dismantled to make room for another way of being and knowing to emerge.” in the interview section, rachel lee introduces and curates a wonderful set of four interviews with scientists doing field and bench science. lee’s interviews are encouraging and hopeful about the legacies of feminist science and technology studies, as well as thoughtful about the challenges on how to foster greater diversity of personnel and interdisciplinarity in the sciences. in the interviews, scientists show us 16 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) that some of the key questions that have animated feminists, such as the importance of interrogating a binary sex/gender system, incorporating ethics and social justice as an important and legitimate part of science and scientific thinking, and nurturing a new generation of more diverse scientists are all elements that are embraced by some scientists as an important part of the scientific endeavor. the narratives are rich, complex and nuanced giving us a window into the challenges of the working lives of scientists today. the lab meeting format brings together individuals to informally discuss a common question or project. here, an interdisciplinary group of scholars reflect on the black lives matter movement. the collection is a wonderful display of the diversity, at times even incommensurable and contradictory impulses of various (inter)discplines. for example, some of the scientists in this section use feminism to promote an equity project focused on the need to recruit and retain more black scientists in the scientific enterprise. yet others use their standpoint to critique science, and the lack of support for and attention to scientific investigations into questions and foci that impact black lives. yet others take on a more radical suggestion that living in and understanding black communities should be central to anti-racist investigations of science. some of the authors argue that one cannot just produce health variables, diagnoses, protocols or solutions based on the experiences of elite white populations and expect them to serve everyone. there are no unmediated “variables”— the science/medicine that we need has to emerge from and ultimately help a diverse groups of populations. indeed, the scientists and health activists speak powerfully to how the questions they believe should be important, are not questions that they can possibly study as tenure track academics who need funding for their work. the “silences” as these scholars describe them are chilling. the diverse voices in these lab meetings also highlight feminists’ varying trust in the biosciences and the scientific method to solve “our” problems. for some it is a question of more resources, asking different questions, and for yet others nothing short of a thorough rethinking of the biosciences will suffice. 17 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) in the critical perspectives section, six scholars offer us a rich collection of commentaries on decolonization and decoloniality. in their wonderful introduction to the collection, kristina lyons, juno salazar parreñas, and noah tamarkin insightfully remark that “working against colonialism, imperialism, and white heteropatriarchal supremacy takes many languages and vocabularies.” of particular importance, all the authors remind us that understanding colonialism was/is not a singular project. rather, different continents and countries have very different histories and it is important that we recognize this heterogeneity in our theorizing colonial and postcolonial projects. they reinforce the idea of “interface” as a critical term that allows us to “teeter” on the boundaries of sts, inside and outside, belonging and not. these analyses coming out of investigations on the decolonial and decoloniality very much reinforces the “fuzziness,” the contingency, the partiality, the multiplicity, the heterogeneity that emerge in the rest of the essays. the importance of porous borders and boundaries is an important thread that runs through this collection. finally, in the news in focus section, mitali thakor and stephen molldrem reflect on the emerging field of queer feminist science studies (see cipolla et al 2017). their commentary reminds us of the multiple rich genealogies by which we could construct a qfss. newly emerging fields are ripe for understanding the complex and fortuitous paths through which fields emerge, the “thinkers” that come to be celebrated as the “core,” and the canon that emerges as key. official histories and genealogies eventually follow. claire hemming’s (2010) wonderful why stories matter is an important reminder of the importance of the stories we tell about our disciplines. we would do well to heed thakor and molldrem to develop and teach more rich genealogies for feminist science studies as well. rebecah pulsifer's book review of teaching with feminist materialisms explores some of the contours of the debates on feminism and new materialism. fuzzying the line between critiquing and researching/experimenting, asking better questions and posing new 18 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) “experiments”—thought experiments and wet ones—based on what we know is wrong, being willing to take risks and be accountable to the critiques of our peers: this is the work of feminism’s sciences being done and heralded here. even as fsts has developed such a rich understanding of science as text, we have struggled to read the textual approaches of critical theory as science. we think there is much potential here and we invite you to read these two special issues together as a collective ensemble of scientific theories, interventions, claims and quandaries. we invite you to mine them for conceptual and methodological tools to extend the projects of science out of feminist theory. acknowledgements many thanks to the editorial board of catalyst for their enthusiastic support for this special issue. thanks to our wonderful contributors for working with us. our gratitude to david serlin and mara mills for their insightful feedback on an earlier draft of this introduction. we are also deeply grateful to poyao huang for his superb editorial management of this double issue. many thanks to nora tataryan, rianka singh, patrick keilty, and michelle murphy for their superb work in publishing the double issue. thanks also to mara mills, david serlin, poyao huang and harris kornstein for their extensive editorial work in for this special issue. notes 1 see willey (forthcoming) section titled “a tale of two paradigm shifts: or, the romance of anti-essentialist science and science-friendly feminism” 19 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) references alaimo, s. (2008). material feminisms. bloomington: indiana university press. barad, k. (2007). meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham: duke university press. birke, l. i. (2000). feminism and the biological body. new brunswick: rutgers university press. butler, j. (1994). “against proper objects.” differences 6(2), 3. cipolla, kristina gupta, david a. rubin, angela willey. (forthcoming). queer feminist science studies: a reader. seattle: university of washington press. coole, d., & frost, s. (2010). “introducing the new materialisms.” in coole, d., & frost, s, eds. new materialisms: ontology, agency, and politics. durham: duke university press. dear, peter, (2012). “science is dead: long live science,” osiris 27: 3755. fausto sterling, anne. (1992). “building two-way streets: the case of feminism and science.” nwsa journal 4(3): 336-49. grosz, e. (2011). becoming undone: darwinian reflections on life, politics, and art. durham: duke university press. haraway, donna. (2008). when species meet. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. 20 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) haraway, donna. (1988). “situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective.” feminist studies 14: 3: 575-599. haraway, donna. (1991). “cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieeth century” (1985). reprinted in simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of nature. new york and london: routledge: 149-181. harding, sandra. (1991). whose science, whose knowledge? thinking from women’s lives. ithaca: cornell university press. hemmings, claire. (2010). why stories matter: the political grammar of feminist theory. durham: duke university press. hird, m. j. (2004). “feminist matters: new materialist considerations of sexual difference.” feminist theory, 5(2), 223-232. jen, c. (2015). “do-it-yourself biology, garagebbiology, and kitchen science.” in mattis wienroth and eugenia rodrigues, eds. knowing new biotechnologies: social aspects of technological convergence. new york and london: routledge. kuhn, thomas. (1962). the structure of scientific revolutions. 2nd ed. chicago: university of chicago press. lee, richard e. jr. and immanuel wallerstein. (2016). overcoming the two cultures; science vs. the humanities in the modern world. new york and london: routledge. nandy, ashis. (1980). alternative sciences: creativity and authenticity in two indian scientists. new delhi: allied. 21 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) pitts-taylor, victoria. (2016). the brain's body: neuroscience and corporeal politics. durham: duke university press. pollock, anne. (2012). medicating race: heart disease and durable preoccupations with difference. durham: duke university press. rabin, roni caryn. (2017). “period activists want tampon makers to disclose ingredients.” new york times (may 24, 2017). roosth, sophia, and astrid schrader. (2012). “feminist theory out of science: introduction.” differences 23:3. 1-8. shiva, vandana. (1993). monocultures of the mind: perspectives on biodiversity and biotechnology. new york: palgrave macmillan. snow, c. p. (1959). the two cultures and the scientific revolution. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. subramaniam, banu. (2014). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. urbana: university of illinois press. subramaniam, banu and angela willey. (2016) “on the derpy science of sexuality: commentary on sari van anders’s sexual configurations theory.” archives of sexual behavior 45:3, 513-515. sunder rajan, kaushik. (2017). pharmocracy: value, politics, and knowledge in global biomedicine. durham: duke university press. tallbear, k. (2017). “beyond the life/not life binary: a feministindigenous reading of cryopreservation, interspecies thinking, and the new materialisms.” in joanna radin and emma kowal, eds. cryopolitics: frozen life in a melting world. cambridge, ma: mit press. 22 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) viswanathan, shiv. (2006). “alternative science.” theory, culture, and society 23: 2-3: 164-169. lisa weasel. (2001). “laboratories without walls: the science shop as a model for feminist community science in action,” in maralee mayberry, banu subramaniam, and lisa h. weasel eds. feminist science studies: a new generation. new york and london: routledge. willey, angela. (2017). “engendering new materializations: feminism, nature, and the challenge to disciplinary proper objects.” in sarah ellenzweig and john zammito (eds) the new politics of materialism: history, philosophy, science. london: routledge. willey, a. (2016). “biopossibility: a queer feminist materialist science studies manifesto, with special reference to the question of monogamous behavior.” signs 41(3), 553-577. wilson, e. a. (2004). psychosomatic: feminism and the neurological body. durham: duke university press. bios banu subramaniam is professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts, amherst. trained as a plant evolutionary biologist, she seeks to engage the feminist studies of science in the practices of experimental biology. she is author of ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity (university of illinois press 2014), and coeditor of feminist science studies: a new generation (routledge, 2001) and making threats: biofears and environmental anxieties (rowman and littlefield, 2005). spanning the humanities, social, and natural sciences, she works at the intersections of biology, women’s studies, ethnic studies and 23 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) postcolonial studies. her current work focuses on the xenophobia and nativism that haunt invasive plant species, and the relationship of science and religious nationalism in india. angela wiley is associate professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts amherst. she works at the interstices of queer feminist theory, feminist science studies, and sexuality studies. she is author of undoing monogamy: the politics of science and the possibilities of biology (duke university press 2016) and co-editor of queer feminist science studies: a reader (university of washington press, forthcoming). her current work explores genealogies of materialism in feminist thought. microsoft word critical perspectives-204-1205-2.docx liboiron, m, et al. (2017). equity in author order: a feminist laboratory’s approach catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (2), 1-17 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © max liboiron et al. 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives equity in author order: a feminist laboratory’s approach max liboiron memorial university of newfoundland mliboiron@mun.ca justine ammendolia memorial university of newfoundland ja3836@mun.ca katharine winsor memorial university of newfoundland katewinsor9@gmail.com alex zahara memorial university of newfoundland ardz76@mun.ca hillary bradshaw memorial university of newfoundland heb176@mun.ca jessica melvin university center of the westfjords, university of akureyri jmelvin@mun.ca 2 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) charles mather memorial university of newfoundland cmather@mun.ca natalya dawe memorial university of newfoundland nad471@mun.ca emily wells memorial university of newfoundland eewells@mun.ca france liboiron memorial university of newfoundland fel480@mun.ca bojan fürst memorial university of newfoundland bfurst@mun.ca coco coyle harvey mudd college ccoyle@g.hmc.edu jacquelyn saturno memorial university of newfoundland jacquelynsaturno@gmail.com melissa novacefski memorial university of newfoundland mn2385@mun.ca sam westcott memorial university of newfoundland samwwestcott@gmail.com grandmother liboiron st john's, newfoundland mliboiron@mun.ca 3 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) abstract author order is crucial; it is the currency of academia. within stem disciplines, women and junior researchers--those who are the primary constituents of our lab-consistently receive less credit for equal work. our civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) is a feminist marine science laboratory at memorial university of newfoundland, canada. recognizing that the stakes are high for clear members, we have developed an approach to author order that emphasizes process and equity rather than system and equality. our process is premised on: 1) deciding author order vy consensus; 2) valuing care work and other forms of labour that are usually left out of scientific value systems; and 3) taking intersectional social standing into account. although clear’s approach differs from others’, we take author order seriously as a compromised but dominant structure within science we must contend with. that is, rather than attempt to circumvent author order, we stay with the trouble. this article outlines this process. introduction author order is crucial; it is the currency of academia. within stem disciplines, women and junior researchers—those who are the primary constituents of our lab—consistently receive less credit for equal work (rosser, 2004). our civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) is a feminist marine science laboratory at memorial university of newfoundland, canada. recognizing that the stakes of recognition are high for clear members, we have developed an approach to author order that emphasizes process and equity rather than system and equality. unlike most other labs, we do not attempt to objectively determine the value of contributions, nor do we reward only labor recognized as ‘intellectual’. although clear’s approach differs from others’, we take author order seriously as a compromised but dominant scientific structure with which we must contend. that is, rather than attempt to circumvent author order, we stay with the trouble. existing methods for determining author order author order norms for the biological and animal sciences, where we 4 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) publish most, understand the first author (what we call the hot young thang), as the most important author in terms of findings, writing, and study design. the last author (the white/wise old man), is the anchor of the paper, and provides the lab, training, and grants. these two positions receive the most credit for the research. other authors rank between them from most important contributor to least. how is this order best determined? the problem with existing approaches to author order is their reliance on metrics and systems that aim to accurately reward contributions to a paper. the vancouver protocol (international committee of medical journal editors, 1978) standardizes biomedical journal submissions and includes standards for what one must contribute to be considered an author: conception and design, or analysis and interpretation of data; drafting the article or revising for intellectual content; and/or final approval of the version to be published. however, it does not offer a standard for how to choose author order other than it “should be a joint decision of the coauthors” (1978: 4). in contrast, psychologist stephen kosslyn’s system measures contribution up to a maximum of 1,000 points, where anyone with less than 100 points is acknowledged in a footnote (kosslyn, 2002). this system aims to quantify unlike tasks–ideas versus bench work, writing versus note-taking (also see venkatraman, 2016). recognizing that the system is flawed, some research groups have used unconventional methods to draw attention to the problematic nature of the process. for example, author order has been decided by competitions that involve skill, such as games of: scramble (belyea & lancaster, 2002); tennis (griffiths & anderson, 1978); or a brownie bakeoff (young & young, 1992). others participate in games of chance, such as: rock, paper, scissors (kupfer et al., 2004) and coin-toss (miller & ballard, 1992). in situations where a paper requires additional authors, cats have been credited as co-authors (mcgaw & twitchit, 2012, hetherington & willard, 1975). these techniques are merely parodies of the current protocols to discern author order, recognizing that the system 5 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) is already compromised. others have sought to more explicitly circumvent the hierarchical system, such as j.k. gibson-graham, two co-authors who hyphenate their name so they receive equal credit on all publications (e.g. gibsongraham, 1996), even after half of the team, julie graham, died in 2010. some co-authors publish under their research group name rather than individual names (e.g. superstorm research lab, 2013). food geographer ian cook uses ‘cook et al.’ to acknowledge the collective work in any research-writing endeavor (e.g. cook et al., 2008). yet these practices do not accrue value to members that help them to acquire sought-after positions; we have collectively decided to privilege individuals’ names, even as we problematize hyper-individualism in science in other ways. rather than a metric system that remains stable across articles and contexts, clear uses a situated and context dependent process that assumes decisions about author order will be different for every paper. equity clear’s work is informed by the feminist value of equity, whether we are ordering supplies or building scientific instruments (see liboiron, 2016). equity is different than equality. equality involves treating everyone exactly the same, and as a result has no impact on the uneven positions from which different people start. equity, in contrast, is sensitive to the different positions of participants and so is potentially transformative of power relations. existing author order protocols favor equality. our own protocols foreground equity and are shaped by a shared commitment to consensus, care work, and acknowledgement of social location. we consider each of these in turn below. 6 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) consensus consensus allows a group to reach an acceptable and supportable resolution to an issue, even if that acceptance and support is uneven (see treloar, 2013 on the importance of differentiating between uneven consensus and unanimous agreement). we follow the consensus based decision-making process, as described by hartnett (2011), that involves identifying key concerns through open discussion, creating proposals that address them, then amending the proposal until everyone agrees to move forward. this can take a few minutes or a few weeks. the aim of consensus is to redistribute power and advocacy. tenured faculty do not have more say than undergraduate students, though we acknowledge that faculty still have greater power of persuasion and that unconscious biases are always at work. we support one another during the conversation by stepping up to advocate for another person’s work or ideas if they are quiet, modest, or absent, and stepping back if we have spoken more than others. we aim to ask questions as much as we make statements. the result is that these conversations tend to be fun, interesting, and supportive. care work is valued work care is a form of political and ethical practice that “holds things together” (de la bellacasa, 2011, p.90; martin et al., 2015). we also acknowledge that care work can disproportionately affect certain groups more than others depending on gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and perceived abilities. with this in mind, the lab aims to distribute and acknowledge care work in its various forms. different forms of care we consider when discussing author order have included: training new members on protocols; maintaining equipment; cleaning up; contributing to logistical tasks including note taking, scheduling, sending email reminders and booking rooms; caring for members’ physical and mental health by listening, sending sick people home, providing “time outs,” and telling 7 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) jokes; and thanking each other. social location clear has eighteen members. dr. max liboiron directs (non-tenured, woman). dr. charles mather facilitates (tenured, man). we have one male phd student, four female master’s students, and eleven undergraduates, ten of whom are women. we have one male staff member. we are one indigenous woman, and a whole lot of white people. we have a bunch of queers, but we’ve never actually counted. our members have had negative experiences in other labs: we have been mistaken for assistants rather than primary investigators (pis); have had names moved down lists of author order without discussion; are constantly spoken over and interrupted by senior and male colleagues; have experienced data and grant theft by advisors; have been told we are expected to work long hours without any credit since we do not make intellectual contributions to projects; are expected to prioritize our work over all other personal and professional goals and obligations; and have been represented in media interviews as “girly” and silly instead of intelligent. this is why we believe that simply bringing more women and people of color into science— equality—while maintaining the status quo only perpetuates the violence experienced. it is also why we seek to give our lab members authorship credit. for decades, feminist sts scholars have articulated how power circulates through science, differentially impacting people depending on their social location (haraway, 1988; harding, 2001). social location—the groups people belong to because of their place or position in history and society, including race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and educational status—influences not just how people encounter science (determining their wages, likelihood of receiving tenure, awards, etc.) but also how science is produced (influencing the values embedded within their research, the questions they choose to ask, methods they use and more) (tallbear, 2015; whyte, in press). for these reasons, we consider social 8 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) location when awarding author order. some of the aspects of social position we’ve considered include: • whether the author is an academic; the value of order to a nonacademic will be different than an academic. it is important to consider non-academics as full collaborators and value them as such via authorship and involvement in the consensus process. • affiliation; which affiliations do we want to highlight, and why? we may want to promote new, unsung, non-profit, or underfunded organizations and universities. • who needs the cultural capital most? is anyone going on the job market, going up for tenure, or applying for graduate school? • for whom is authorship a unique opportunity? publishing opportunities for faculty and graduate students can be numerous, while for others (such as undergraduate students) publishing may be a unique opportunity to be recognized. • hierarchical status; often undergraduate and technician work is not valued as much as graduate or faculty work, even where the same labor is performed. • payment status; are some members being paid wages or stipends for the work, while others are not? are they paid the same amounts or the same way? • number of publications authors already have; the publication may mean more to someone who has fewer. • direction of member’s research; if a paper fits particularly well with a member’s research trajectory, it may provide more value than if they are working on a different topic. • the past struggles of some members; some people have already encountered acute setbacks in their careers due to social location. • markers of difference: consider gender, race, indigeneity, age, disability, and other markers of difference and privilege. how can we address severe underrepresentation of certain demographics in stem right here, right now? 9 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) a snapshot of the process image 1: lab members during conversation about author equity, 2016. photograph by clear photographer-in-residence bojan fürst. image 2: white board with traces of our process. photo clear, creative commons attribution-sharealike 4.0 international license. 10 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) these are guidelines for practices, not rules. so, what does this look like, in practice? a trained facilitator facilitates each meeting. when making a decision, we use our fingers to indicate agreement or the need for more conversation. fingers wiggled upwards means yes; sideways means more discussion is needed; and downwards means no. we call them twinkle fingers. facilitation starts by writing the names of every participant on a whiteboard. we add names of absentees or people who contributed to the project who might not have been involved in writing. then, we “chunk” people based on the amount or type of labor contributed. for the paper you are reading now, these chunks included involvement in: 1) discussions; 2) editing and discussions; and 3) writing, editing, and discussions. people can move between chunks after they are added (image 2). the longest part of our process is ordering authors within these chunks. we choose the first and last author in a section by discussing types and values of labor and by reviewing the lists of care work and social standing explained above. people step up to ask for consideration, step back if they feel they are already considered, and recommend others based on the care and labor they’ve seen them perform. this last practice is important for absent members. when two people seem completely even, there is a strong temptation to resort to alphabetical order, but that is not staying with the trouble. we go down the list of care work and social location and think of other aspects of social location and care not already on the list. this often leads to discussions of what counts as social location, privilege, and care, and thus refines our commitment to intersectional feminism. the process of determining author order in clear is performative: it enacts and strengthens the values we hold dear. recognizing past care work leads to thanking each other. talking about what should be included in social standing hones our ideas of equity, and allows us to 11 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) stand in solidarity with one another. crucially, each iteration of determining author order is different in that we are always faced with a new set of issues to consider. our approach to authorship order is not, and can never be, systematized. the establishment of systems closes discussion. instead, we use a situated process that recognizes diversity and difference while at the same time rewarding the varied contributions to knowledge production, and most importantly, we become a more reflexive, stronger feminist lab every time we have these discussions. acknowledgements we acknowledge that clear operates on the unceded, unsurrendered ancestral lands of the mi’kmaq and beothuk. we acknowledge the inuit of nunatsiavut and nunatukavut and the innu of nitassinan, and their ancestors, as the original peoples of labrador. references belyea, l.r., & lancaster, j. (2002). inferring landscape dynamics of bog pools from scaling relationships and spatial patterns. journal of ecology, 90(2), 223-234. cook, i., & et al. (2008). geographies of food: mixing. progress in human geography, 32(6), 821-833. de la bellacasa, m.p. (2011). matters of care in technoscience: assembling neglected things. social studies of science, 41(1), 85-106. editorial committee. (2016). who cares? : the politics of care in radical organizing. upping the anti, 18. retrieved from http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/18-editorial/ 12 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) gibson-graham, j.k. (1996). the end of capitalism (as we knew it): a feminist critique of political economy. oxford, uk and cambridge, usa: blackwell publishers. griffiths, w.e., & anderson, j.r. (1978). specification of agricultural supply functionsempirical evidence on wheat in southern new south wales. australian journal of agricultural economics, 22(2‐3), 115-128. haraway, d. (1988). situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. feminist theory, 14(3), 575-599. harding, s. (2004). introduction: standpoint theory as a site of political, philosophic, and scientific debate. in s. harding, the feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies (1-15). new york: routledge. hartnett, t. (2011). consensus-oriented decision-making: the codm model for facilitating groups to widespread agreement. new society publishers. hetherington, j.h., & willard, f.d.c. (1975). two-, three-, and four-atom exchange effects in bcc he 3. physical review letters, 35(21), 1442. international committee of medical journal editors. (1997). vancouver protocol. american college of physicians, 126, 36-47. kosslyn, s.m. (2002). criteria for authorship. retrieved from http://kosslynlab.fas.harvard.edu/files/kosslynlab/files/authorship_criteria _nov02.pdf kupfer, j.a., webbeking, a.l., & franklin, s.b. (2004). forest fragmentation affects early successional patterns on shifting cultivation 13 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) fields near indian church, belize. agriculture, ecosystems & environment, 103(3), 509-518. liboiron, m. (2016). civic technologies for monitoring marine plastics. journal of ocean technology, 11(2), 36-45. martin, a., myers, n., & viseu, a. (2015). the politics of care in technoscience. social studies of science, 45(5), 625-641. mcgaw, i.j., & twitchit, t.a. (2012). specific dynamic action in the sunflower star, pycnopodia helianthoides. comparative biochemistry and physiology part a: molecular & integrative physiology, 161(3), 287-295. miller, s.d., & ballard, w.b. (1992). in my experience: analysis of an effort to increase moose calf survivorship by increased hunting of brown bears in south-central alaska. wildlife society bulletin (1973-2006), 20(4), 445454. rosser, s.v. (2004). the science glass ceiling: academic women scientists and the struggle to succeed. new york, ny and london, uk: psychology press. superstorm research lab. (2013). a tale of two sandys. white paper. tallbear, k. (2015). an indigenous reflection on working beyond the human/not human. glq: a journal of lesbian and gay studies, 21, 230235. treloar, m. (2003). the tyranny of consensus. clamor, 20, 38-40. venkatraman, v. (2016). conventions of scientific authorship. retrieved from http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2010/04/conventions-scientificauthorship 14 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) whyte, p.k. (in press). our ancestors’ dystopia now: indigenous conservation and the anthropocene. in u. heise., j. christensen, & m. niemann, routledge companion to the environmental humanities. new york: routledge. young. h.j., & young, t.p. (1992). alternative outcomes of natural and experimental high pollen loads. ecology, 73(2), 639-647. bios jessica melvin is a member of the civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) where her research focuses on marine microplastics in fish as well as how to tackle the problem through collaboration with the public (citizen science). she is a recent graduate of the coastal and marine management master's program at the university centre of the westfjords in iceland and holds a bachelor of science in marine biology from memorial university of newfoundland. emily wells is a member of civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) and an undergraduate in biology and french at memorial university of newfoundland. in addition to citizen science and marine plastic research with clear, she has a diverse background in genetics, ecology, and behavioral psychology. she has been awarded multiple research scholarships, including an nserc undergraduate research award. wells is an outreach demonstrator with naturenl and let talk science!, and her involvement in the local scientific community has been recognized by multiple awards. hillary bradshaw is an environmental science masters student working in the civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) at memorial university of newfoundland. her thesis monitors the bottom of the ocean in the far north for macro and micro plastics through video and 15 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) sediment sampling. jacquelyn saturno is a member of the civic laboratory of environmental action research (clear). she is pi for a microplastic ingestion study of atlantic salmon in newfoundland. from her education at university of guelph and niagara college and experience working for non-profits, academic institutions and environmental consulting, she has extensive knowledge in restoration ecology and conservation biology in terrestrial and aquatic systems. justine ammendolia is a member of clear. she has recently completed her m.sc. in marine biology at memorial university conducting a study on the effects of hydrostatic pressure on the biological roles of echinoderms. she is also a grantee of the national geographic young explorers grant for her research on arctic seabirds in greenland during her undergraduate degree at university of guelph. dr. charles mather works in the geography department, memorial university of newfoundland. his current work focuses on the historical and contemporary politics of atlantic salmon conservation in eastern canada in the context of debates on the anthropocene. alex zahara is an interdisciplinary researcher and phd candidate in the department of geography at memorial university of newfoundland, and member of civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear). his doctoral research examines the history and effects of wildfire management in northern canadian communities, focusing on discourses of smoke as a form of industrial contamination. his research interests include the role of pollution in settler colonialism; queer and feminist science methods; ethics of care in risk management; citizen science and direct action research. france liboiron is a member of the civic laboratory for environmental 16 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) action research (clear). she holds a b.sc. honors in marine biology from memorial university of newfoundland. natalya dawe is a member of the civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear) and a research assistant at memorial university of newfoundland. she holds a bachelor of arts in geography from memorial university of newfoundland. sam westcott is a writer and guitarist from topsail, newfoundland. he was a member of clear for eighth months in 2016/17, while studying english and creative writing in st. john's at memorial university of newfoundland, producing podcasts and writing poetry for the lab. his poetry and short fiction have been published by the paper mill press, and in 2016 his band ataraxia released their first ep. katharine winsor is a graduate student in sociology at memorial university of newfoundland and member of civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear). her research focuses on young offenders, social supports, and the role of disability in juvenile justice decision making and has presented on these topics. winsor's work with clear centres on citizen science, curriculum development of diy technologies, and feminist approaches to research. dr. max liboiron directs the civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear), a feminist marine science and technology laboratory. liboiron's research bridges the physical and social sciences in its investigation of how marine plastics are represented in science and how these methods of representation relate to action. liboiron is managing editor of discard studies, a member of the endocrine disruptors action group (edaction), and a co-organizer for the gathering for open science hardware (gosh). melissa novacefski is an undergraduate student in geography and earth 17 liboiron, et al. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) sciences at memorial university of newfoundland, and a member of civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear). coco coyle is an undergraduate student in engineering at harvey mudd college, california. bojan fürst is the manager of knowledge mobilization, the leslie harris centre of regional policy and development at memorial university of newfoundland, where he leads the harris centre's knowledge brokering team, connecting community needs with the resources available at the university. he is a member of civic laboratory for environmental action research (clear), where he is the photographer-in-residence. microsoft word 77063-1-11_hamraie.docx hamraie, a. (2019). roundtable introduction: crip technoscience activism, artistry, and social praxis. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-4. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © hamraie, a, 2019. | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license roundtable introduction crip technoscience activism, artistry, and social praxis aimi hamraie vanderbilt university aimi.hamraie@vanderbilt.edu as in the historical accounts of crip technoscience found elsewhere in this issue, much of the most significant discourse and praxis surrounding disabled knowing-making occurs in homes, on personal computers, in shared spaces, and in aesthetic opportunities facilitated by disability technologies that, once tinkered with, push back against demands for compulsory able-bodiedness. thus, in soliciting contributions for this roundtable, i focused on perspectives that academic discussions of disability and technoscience do not typically center: perspectives from disability artistry and nightlife, online activism, and spaces that intersect with but go far beyond the university. i invited contemporary artists and activists to explore what technoscience is coming to mean for crip culture and disability justice. i was particularly interested in the uses of technoscience to pursue accessibility as a source of aesthetic and relational praxis beyond legal compliance with the americans with disabilities act of 1990. the artists and activists represented here are part of a wider field that also includes fashion design (such as in the work of sky cupacub’s hamraie catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 rebirth garments, which cupacub describes as “gender non-conforming wearables and accessories for people on the full spectrum of gender, size, and ability”), critical architectural and industrial design (such as in the work of design researcher sara hendren, whose many projects include engineering at and slope : intercept), and performance (such as in the work of leroy moore of krip-hop nation, whose foundational disability justice work spans music, performance, public education, and comic book design; and the multidisciplinary contributions of the sins invalid performance collective, co-founded by moore and patricia berne, who are leading theoretical and practical discussions surrounding disability justice). “start your own good trouble” disability movement leader and social worker vilissa thompson examines the role of social media technologies in the disability rights movement, arguing that social media has enabled participation in activism by disabled people whose presence is not often anticipated in public protests, and in turn has made the contemporary disability movement more intersectional. thompson reflects on her groundbreaking project, ramp your voice!, a platform for “black disabled women/femmes,” and her hashtag #disabilitytoowhite, arguing that the activist use of hashtags has, for disabled activists, highlighted unacknowledged issues (such as racism within disability movements). in the spirit of non-compliant crip technoscience, thompson offers that social media activism enables us to “lend…perspective to the current conversations or start your own good trouble,” a methodology at the heart of crip technoscience. radical relationality, care, and exploration artist, dj, and scholar-activist kevin gotkin delves into the “good trouble” of what he terms “crip nightlife,” a methodology of technological manipulation and disability artistry combined to explore the possibilities of disability culture at the club. building on the do-it-yourself (diy) club scene hamraie catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 and histories of co-creation between deaf people and punk clubs, gotkin theorizes that crip nightlife could conjure accessible worlds on the dance floor, in the bathroom, and in the playlist itself, ultimately “divin[ing] the truth and complexity of disability history, culture, and resistance” through technoscientific tinkering. as gotkin notes, tinkering is “already what many nightlife artists understand in their work.” crip technoscience, as a philosophy for critical nightlife, further contributes the ethos of interdependence, care, and experimentation that pervades disability culture. “cultural-aesthetic technoscience” alice sheppard’s account of disability technologies and dance performance offers the critical concept of “cultural-aesthetic technoscience,” a term grounded in notions of disability culture as aesthetic possibility. her essay focuses on three technologies of access, understood otherwise as aesthetic technologies: the gif, the crutch, and the ramp. although each of these technologies functions on its own to facilitate understanding and movement, in sheppard’s practice they are rendered as critical design tools: the gif (produced in collaboration with producer lisa niedermeyer) acts as a “critical story telling device,” the crutch (here, shortened for use only in dance and not for walking) challenges notions of functional accessibility, and the ramp (designed in collaboration with design researchers at olin college of engineering) appears as itself a character in sheppard’s performance descent. as sheppard argues, these manipulations of technologies (such as to render them “non-compliant” with either ableist norms or even the standards of the americans with disabilities act) push cultural-aesthetic technoscience into “the tensions of complex accessibility,” ultimately “naming a practice that is rooted in and speaks to the ideas and work of other disabled culture makers.” here, “good trouble” becomes the basis of critique, conversation, and celebration. hamraie catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 “suck-it, ableism” activist and movement leader alice wong, founder of the disability visibility project, explores the “good trouble” of crip technoscience through an engagement with disability activists’ responses to the contemporary straw ban debate. juxtaposing speculative fiction with histories of the plastic “bendy” straw, wong explores the controversy over plastics and marine pollution by pointing to the ways that many disabled people not only need straws to survive, but also the ways that disabled people have adapted and hacked inaccessible worlds to survive present-day apocalypses. current dystopias are manifest in casual denials of access and care that recapitulate eugenicist notions of disabled lives as not worth living. wong’s essay suggests that these apocalypses manifest in the material world, and as such can be designed otherwise. it is my hope that these short pieces will serve as a teachable and even tinkerable archive of crip technoscience in the present moment, marking where this perspective touches other areas of disability activism and scholarship. references disability visibility project. (n.d.). retrieved from https://disabilityvisibilityproject.com/ engineering at home. (n.d.) retrieved from http://engineeringathome.org/ krip-hop nation. (n.d.) retrieved from http://kriphopnation.com/ rebirth garments. (n.d.). retrieved from http://rebirthgarments.com/ slope : intercept. (n.d.). retrieved from https://slopeintercept.org/about/ hamraie catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 sins invalid. (n.d.). retrieved from https://www.sinsinvalid.org/ orr   image & text     enchanting catastrophe: magical subrealism and bp's macondo jackie orr syracuse university jtorr@maxwell.syr.edu underneath what happened down here?1 in the hold of a ghosted ship, in the hold of their grip, in the thrall of an image circulating in newly subterranean form? brown cloud billows against patches of bluegreen etched here and there by shadow. the frame dials left, then right, in measured motion. a robotic arm rotates, reaches and grasps, fails and retreats. repeat. a small fish floats into the frame. zoom out. zoom in. seeing, here, is sequenced by algorithms of hyperindustrial focus. here, deep water’s horizon is blasted out of an infinite black into a fracked metric of light and time. zoom in. zoom out. zoom in. what can happen down here? live streaming new scholarly forms in the liquid rush of digital times raptured by disaster, and its release. "no way where we are is here ... and so it is we remain in the hold, in the break, as if entering again and again the broken world, to trace the visionary company and join it" (harney and moten, 2013, p. 94). in the live stream. occult ontologies (thinking with oil) "oil … [is] a substance that was, once, live matter and that acts with a force suggestive of a form of life."         -stephanie lemenager, living oil "the underworld is not really dead."         -victoria nelson, the secret life of puppets set on the edge of an oil field in southern california, fritz leiber's 1964 short story "black gondolier" narrates the mystical vision of one of its main characters, in which crude oil is revealed as an "ancient and enigmatic manifestation" of the occult world (thacker, 2011, p. 92). dreaming its dark dreams for millennia, oil's "chemical mind" manifests as a sentient form of viscous thought, patiently working to become the animating intelligence of modern industrial regimes. humans, it is revealed, did not discover oil. oil waited for millions of inhuman years, "sluggishly pulsing beneath earth's stony skin," to discover humans as its animate puppets, and modern technologic infrastructures as its geopsychic medium (leiber, cited in thacker, 2011). the brief, oozing horror story ends with the mystical theorist disappearing into a dark, desiring sea of midnight oil, the silent black gondolier at his side. in eugene thacker's extended meditation on occult philosophy, leiber's story marks the power of popular horror to conjure the "magic site, deep within the crusts and caverns of the planet, in which the hidden world oozes and gropes forth to the surface" (p. 91). the magic site performs a bewitching and always potentially fatal encounter at the border of the natural and the supernatural—that hidden realm that can nonetheless bleed through in underground fissures or mining operations when, perhaps, an accidental revelation invites the supernatural to suddenly gaze back, with unhuman eyes, at us (p. 82). channeling the science fantasy writer h.p. lovecraft, thacker imagines how today the magic site, mutated by modern sorceries of science and technology, radiates outward in a diffuse, atmospheric fallout that no longer marks a distinct border between natural and supernatural worlds, but which instead marks the oscillating, ungovernable boundary between them (pp. 76-77). once upon a time the magic circle—predecessor to the magic site, and evidenced for centuries in european pagan and theatrical practices—offered ritualized protections from the supernatural in the bounded spacetime of its conjuring. today, the human world stumbles without ritual safety through realms simultaneously empirical and occulted, through modes of time both perceivable and preternaturally unreal. in the dispersed psychogeography of the magic site, "natural and supernatural blend into a kind of ambient, atmospheric no-place…bathed in the alien ether of unknowable dimensions" (p. 77). how really to think the thought that thought may be unhuman? how to think with oil, that sentient philosophy living in the interstices, in the tiny voids in sedimented rock, gathering in unhuman dimensions of heat, pressure, dark, and time? millions of unthinkable human years to form itself into a viscous thought. how to re-think the bp disaster, erupting out of the offshore oil industry's subsea infrastructures, as a magic site? an enchanted catastrophe of supernatural time, compressed in the void, old time heaving into metaphysical motion by the blowout of an underwater oil well in the gulf of mexico that bp had curiously named "macondo," after that magical realist town in gabriel garcía márquez's one hundred years of solitude that blows away in the wind by the end of the story. it is deep time that burned on that flaming rig at sea. it is earth's millennial thinking that spread with a numinous, relentless geo-logic through the startled waters. you can say that sometimes thought tries to bend toward the dark, in the occult company of unthinkable forms of time. you can say that catastrophe cuts a portal between different modes of time, and the dead pour through the open door while a thousand possible futures are buried. you can say that the catastrophe of time itself—bursting into the sudden clearing of an accidental apocalypse, self-immolating in the mundane daily burn of petro-modern infrastructures—still tries to enchant at the supernatural site of its own undoing. "oil . . . is a medium," writes stephanie lemenager in living oil, "that fundamentally supports all modern media forms" (2014, p. 6). without the mediations of oil it would be difficult, she suggests, to hold on to the cultural category of "human." but oil also helps us to grasp some of the less thinkable contours of the unhuman, undulating us towards planetary temporal scales that petro-modernity effaces even as it requires them for its energetic foundations. oil thinks deeply as medium of the dead. as archivist of fossilized matters, from mammals to plant life to marine organisms, oil knows how to become the thought of decay that itself has not died. oil is a medium for a living repertoire of microbial matters, including hundreds of species of microorganisms discovered in the los angeles la brea tar pit, "living bacteria, progeny of soil microorganisms trapped in the petrol sumps tens of thousands of years ago" (p. 155). we can think, with oil, that time itself may be thinking in the sedimented form of "fossil" fuels. we can think with oil as a medium in which time thinks itself into form. "[i]t was always march there and always monday, and then they understood that josé arcadio buendía was not as  crazy as the family said, but that he was the only one who had enough lucidity to sense the truth of the  fact that time also stumbled and had accidents andc ould therefore splinter and leave an eternalized fragment in a room." -gabriel garcía márquez, one hundred years of solitude   the subterranean thought of time dwelling in the bodymind of oil is an indescribably slow thinking. a millennial thinking that gives notice to the slow disaster of time itself, as "petro-capitalism's omnivorous appetite for time" (nixon, 2011, p. 97) striates human and non-human worlds with depleted signs of exhaustion. if "energy wars are time wars as well" (p. 99), then the enclosures enforced by petro-modernity's primitive accumulations include the real and imaginary enclosure of time. capitalism becomes time's sorcerer; the slow thought of oil becomes its material engine and its infernal adversary. speed is the currency of speculative economies of future energy, as transnational fortunes rise and fall with the occult brokering of the price of a barrel of oil. to get a hold on the hold that petro-capitalism, as sorcery, has over us (pignarre and stengers, 2011), is to get a hold on how time's enclosure creates energetic binds by which we become beholden to our own capture. sorceries and superstitions are dangers that we "believe we have destroyed whereas above all we have lost the appropriate means of responding to [them]" (p. 40). how to see that the inability to protect ourselves from sorcery's hold is precisely why "in the eyes of these reputedly superstitious ‘others' . . . the disaster becomes perfectly foreseeable" (pignarre and stengers, 2011, p. 40)? how to inhabit the slow, accumulating thought that catastrophe's future is already, ineluctably, here? "macondo was in ruins. in the swampy streets there were the remains of furniture, animal skeletons  covered with red lilies .… [everything] seemed to have been  blown away in an anticipation of the prophetic wind that years later would wipe macondo off the face of the earth." -garcía márquez one hundred years of sorcery in 1901, oil blasts through six tons of drilling pipe to create the world's first accidental "gusher" in spindletop, texas, somewhat cataclysmically announcing (oil-drenched crews labored for over a week to stop the gush) the discovery of the largest petroleum reserve to date on u.s. land. this is land only recently settled into its manifest yet never-fully-destined national contours after the expansive capture of sovereign territory from mexico and the semi-legalized dispossession of indigenous land right from massachusetts to california and all the curiously ‘native'-named states-of-dispossession-in-between: alabama, kentucky, louisiana, minnesota, montana, oklahoma. to sing just a few. spindletop rises and crashes as home also to the first boom-and-bust cycle of wild oil speculation in the u.s. as 600 new companies move into town in the next twelve months (freudenburg and gramling, 2011, pp. 80-81). an oil well launched with a $10,000 investment soon sells for $1,250,000, as hundreds of millions of dollars pour like liquid gold into texas before the "exuberant" catastrophe of finitude—the oil stops—brings spindletop to its knees (buell, 2012). in texas and its kin in early u.s. oil exploration, pennsylvania, the search for oil stumbles over two distinct problems. first, how to find it? second, what to do with it? the black "rock oil," as it was called, is used as a medicinal cure by white settler colonists in the early 19th century for a wide swath of human sicknesses. by the end of that century, oil is alchemically conjured into kerosene and used to light the dark. kerosene lamps blaze a new geography of night and day for an increasingly enlightened industrial capitalism. finding a new geologic algorithm for continuous illumination is aided by late 19th century spiritualist practices of divination and spirit possession. popularly acclaimed "wizards of oil" wander the surface of the earth in a trance state with divining rods and witching sticks, searching for underground veins of oil (zuck, 2012). accompanied by indigenous spirit-guides from the dispossessed seneca nation, abraham james, on the 31st of october 1866, all hallow's eve, is travelling just south of pleasantville, pennsylvania, when he is "forcefully possessed by his spirit-guides and conveyed out of the buggy and over a fence on the east side of the road" where "spirits communicated" that he is "standing on an immense oil deposit" (zuck, 2012, p. 314, p. 332). in 1867, harmonial well no. 1 is dug near the spot and begins producing daily over 100 barrels of oil, followed by three other productive wells in the same area. as the "industrial aspirations of [american] spiritualism" (zuck, 2012, p. 316) vibrate together with the magical realism of early u.s. oil discovery, oil appears in the interstices between supernatural animations and capitalist sorceries of valued matter. abraham james, who also divines the psycho-geologics of the less successful "spirit well" under the auspices of the short-lived chicago rock oil company founded by members of the local spiritualist community, suggests that "oil itself could function as a kind of medium," communicating spiritualism's capacity to channel the materiel needs of modern capitalism (zuck, 2012, pp. 324-25). by the 1920s the discovery and production of u.s. oil is increasingly standardized by the monopoly power of the rockefeller enterprise. the spiritualist psychometrics of vibrational divination give way to the speculative arts of petroleum geology in pursuit of oil's subterranean lines of flight. militarized national economies of world war generate cascading use-values for fossil fuels, and by 1945 both petroleum and the instrumental polymerization of waste products from its industrial production begin to restructure the geographies and psychic economies of u.s. society. as petroleum becomes the "material and energetic basis of everyday life" in the cold war u.s. of a., the racialized class geographies of white suburbanization are built on an emergent petro-privatization built on oil, gasoline, asphalt, vinyl, and plasticized domestic interiors built on early intimations of the neoliberal dream of an ownership society built on automobility, nuclearized family relations, and the mandatory fantasy of self-entrepreneurship (huber, 2012, p. 302, pp. 305-307). the enchantments of petroleum-based plastic objects begin to offer, like their celluloid predecessors, a new materialism for simulation: proliferating plastic copies of commodity-objects begin to regularly disappear only to magically reappear in exactly the same form. the pen, the shampoo container, the nylons, the toy bucket. polymerized molecular derivatives of deep time perform disposability without loss. psychic and political economies attune to accelerating, repetitious circuits of replacement and obsolescence followed by serial renewal. post-war u.s. consumer cultures energetically lean on a capitalist alchemy of fossilized fuel and its technoscientific extraction and transmutation. the train winds its way over and around the infinity loop of track, travelling past a school, cheerful houses, a church, and a roadside texaco gas station tucked next to a miniature highway. the controls for the giant toy train set are placed in front of the crown prince sa'ud ibn 'abd al-'azīz, fêted in 1947 at a grand soirée at the waldorf astoria attended by 75 guests from new york city banks, the u.s. state department, bechtel, and several u.s. petroleum companies including aramco, which hosts the gala affair just as the industry enters an era of postwar but not quite postcolonial restructuring. at the end of the waldorf dinner, crown prince al-'azīz is entertained by an egyptian magician and a chorus line of dancing rockettes (vitalis, 2002, p. 207; vitalis, 2009, p. 32). a decade before the crown prince's visit, aramco builds the city of dhahran as a new company town in the desert of eastern saudi arabia after the discovery of oil in the region, drawing on the racist architectures of jim crow america and the spatial violence of similar oil "camps" run by u.s. business in columbia, venezuela, indonesia and elsewhere, which were themselves modeled on 19th-century mining towns blooming at the hungry borders of a colonial grab for subterranean minerals (vitalis, 2002, p. 200; also vitalis, 2009, pp. 54-61). by the early 1950s, aramco morphs into a miniature state department intelligence service mimicking the wartime office of strategic service's division for middle east intelligence and propaganda, and offering a hospitable regional outpost for early officials of the cia (vitalis, 2002, p. 190). in saudi arabia in 1948, a year after the enchanted aramco evening, the crown prince's father, king 'abd al-'azīz ibn sa'ud, reports to a visiting state department official: "the whole people are saying that my country is an american colony. they are plotting against me and saying ibn sa'ud has given his country to the united states, even the holy places…. i have nothing, and my country and my wealth i have delivered into the hands of america" (vitalis, 2002, p. 200). in 1953, after nearly a century of preeminence, the united states loses its global hegemony in oil production, no longer the sole nation mining over half the world's petroleum supplies. in 1954, iran nationalizes its oil industry after throwing out the shah who returns a year later, bringing back a more ecumenical petrol policy with the occult help of the cia and the british government. in 1954, british petroleum is born, shape-shifting from its previous colonial incarnations as the anglo-iranian oil company and, originally, the anglo-persian oil company founded in 1909 (freudenburg and gramling, 2011, pp. 100-106). as huge oil fields are discovered in the deserts of what are now known as saudi arabia, iraq, iran, bahrain, and kuwait, entrepreneurial spirits in the cold war u.s. turn to the gulf of mexico where offshore oil production was launched in 14 feet of water in 1938—the same year that mexico nationalizes its oil industry. created by millions of years of sand, soil, and salt deposits sculpted into a singular underworld edged by the continental margins and the mouth of a giant river recently named the mississippi, the gulf of mexico manifests as a potential "world class petroleum province." in 1957, the zapata offshore company—named after the assassinated mexican revolutionary and guerilla warrior for the poor by zapata's founder, the texas oilman and future millionaire, cia director, and u.s. president, george h.w. bush—successfully designs a new drilling platform that enables offshore oil production in the gulf to move for the first time into depths of over 100 feet (national commission, 2011, pp. 22-24). plagued regularly by monstrous hurricanes which ravage offshore infrastructure, and threatened by the political force of a u.s. environmental movement in the wake of the january 1969 blowout of an offshore well in the santa barbara channel that generates 30 miles of blackened california coastline, an 800-square-mile oil slick, and the first annual earth day in 1970—the u.s. offshore oil industry deepens its hold. drilling in depths of over 300 feet in the gulf of mexico by 1970, the industry is buoyed by a series of technoscientific innovations, including digital 3d seismic imaging to animate the speculative geophysics of locating oil, and the first successful remote control engineering of a subsea wellhead celebrated as an achievement "akin to john glenn's space orbit." by 1980, shell oil is drilling in the gulf in over 1,000 feet of water, the official definition of "deepwater" (national commission, 2011, pp. 25-31). british petroleum, staggered by expulsion from former colonial territories—iran after the 1979 revolution and nigeria, the same year, after its nationalization of oil—partners with shell in the late 1980s on a new deepwater oil well 3000 feet below the gulf's surface. the $1.2 billion project, code-named mars, saves british petroleum from bankruptcy. the company pursues deepwater drilling throughout the 1990s with speculative flair, emerging by the millennium as the largest oil producer in the gulf of mexico. atlantis, mad dog, crazy horse, and blind faith, compose a series of non-randomly signifying oil fields that the company christens in the gulf over the next several years, promising bp over two billion gallons of commercially exploitable oil at underwater depths of up to 7,000 feet (national commission 2011, p. 36-37 and 45-50). oil, however, is not an interminable thought. by the time bp begins drilling the macondo well in 2009, the wizardry of "subsea infrastructures" (markeset et al. 2013) for the globalizing offshore oil industry has been forced into deeply occulted territory. millennial matter grows exhausted; the macondo well lies 5000 feet below the water's surface, and its oil fields another 13,000 feet under the subsea floor. the sorcerer appears tireless. to work at the necessary depths, bp deploys the liquid robotics of remotely operated vehicles (rovs), first developed by the u.s. navy and used to recover underwater atomic bomb debris (wagner et al., 2010; newman, 2010). oceaneering international, inc., specialists in subsea hardware and manufacturers of the rovs used by bp to build and then destroy the macondo well, runs a parallel entertainment division that produces animatronics for robotically engineered theme park attractions including simulations of dinosaurs, alien bugs, and downtown tokyo. the live streaming of an exploding macondo well captivates millions of viewers in the u.s. with the real time aesthetics of disaster delivered by cameras attached via subsea ‘umbilical’ cords to a human operator with a joystick in a control room on the water’s surface (black, 2010; farbman, 2012). as the politician calls on the sorcerer to show his hand and supply submerged digital images for the people (black, 2010, p. 743); as privatized corporate screens for robotic command and control become public live streams of mesmerizing catastrophe; as time ticks online and off, from milliseconds, to minutes, to days, to nights, to months to 4.9 million barrels of deep time blasted out of the sea floor into acres of undulating water . . . oil keeps thinking. in the interstices. even as the sorcerer moves ever closer, ever confident, toward the occulted void. magic and method if magical realism is not only a genre of writing but also a genre of power, exercised through the binding of enchantment and the empirical—say, a ghost devil and a labor regime (taussig, 1980); contagious phantasms and an economic implosion (nelson, 2012). if energy infrastructures are assembled via both supernatural and material economies; if the exploding macondo well in the gulf of mexico is both a magic site and a singular node in a transnational nexus of multibillion dollar petroleum production and profits, then how to tell a story that can dwell long enough in the portal between magical efficacy and persuasive history to have a fighting chance to change perceptions of what’s really real? "reality is more than that which exists," writes eduardo kohn (2013, p. 216) from the ethnographic edge of a thinking forest in ecuador. how to write from other edges, toward a real that exceeds what exists? petro-magic-realism is jennifer wenzel's (2006) useful term linking literary production to the violent political ecologies of resource extraction in countries that produce both magical realist stories and petroleum as commodity exports to the global north.2 countering the "empty globalism" of magical realism as a genre-category in which "the magical might be anything unfamiliar to a european or american reader," wenzel's petro-magic-realism foregrounds "the relationships between the fantastic and material elements of these stories, linking formal, intertextual, sociological, and economic questions about literature to questions of political ecology" (welnzel, 2006, pp. 456, 450). abdelrahman munif's novel cities of salt (1987) conjures a light shimmer of petro-magic-realism across 600 pages narrating the americans' arrival in the saudi desert to drill the first oil field. the "inexplicable, the hallucinatory, and the realistic converge" as the radically displaced local bedouins witness the magic technologies used by the u.s. oilmen to penetrate both "geologic and spiritual substrates" in their relentless, bewitched forays underground (nixon, 2011, p. 93-94). theories of magical realism also look beyond literary practice to relations between the fantastic and the material located in the very heart of social power. michael taussig's (1984) analysis of another extractive economy—the rubber industry in late 19th-century south america—names magical realism as a political force. here, the "mysterious side of the mysterious," condensed through image, fantasy, and myth, "create[s], through magical realism, a culture of terror" animating a colonial imaginary: "what distinguishes cultures of terror is that the epistemological, ontological, and otherwise purely philosophical problem of reality-and-illusion … [becomes] a high-powered tool for domination and a principal medium of political practice" (taussig, 1984, p. 492). revealing the cultural work of magical realism in assembling business and terror into the intimate cut of everyday worlds, taussig moves magical realism toward an analytics of ordinary power, practiced through extraordinary renditions of torture and a political economy of terrors both fabulated and real.  but what if magic can move even further? beyond and beneath the fantastic im/materiality or efficacious murk of ‘reality-and-illusion' that constitute the storied formations of colonizing power and capitalist exploitation? what happens if we press through and beyond the "dialectic optic," offered by walter benjamin and re-incarnated in taussig, as an antidote to spiraling mysticisms (taussig, 1984, p. 469)? what if there are occult agencies, animate unknowns, coursing through the dense circuits of symbolic and political economies? subreal agencies that are not unreal. submerged but not always subordinate. impenetrable and yet still capable of penetrating culturenatures in subnatural and never fully knowable ways. "[t]he boy enjoyed the story of…the fisherman who borrowed  a weight for his net from a neighbor and when he gave him a  fish in payment later it had a diamond in its stomach, and the one about the lamp that fulfilled wishes and about  flying carpets. surprised, he asked ursula if all that  was true and she answered him that it was, that many years ago the gypsies had brought magic lamps and flying mats to macondo. 'what's happening,' she sighed, 'is that the world is slowly coming to an end and those things don't come here anymore.'" -garcía márquez eugene thacker's magic site is one image of subreal force. as an occult philosopher of contemporary horror, he evokes the technoscientific laboratory that has become the real, a dispersed, unbounded materialization of supernatural agencies inseparably mingled with techno-nature. the branded bp disaster unfolds within emergent subsea infrastructures of deepwater drilling and extraction, and also within a magical subrealist scene of prophetic catastrophe and enchanted time. the extraordinary power of enchantments pulses within the ordinary play of things when an oil well named after a doomed city in garcía márquez's 1967 tale of supernatural time is blown out of an imaginary future into the foreseeable disaster of the present, materializing in a relentless swell of mud and oil and subterranean force. enchantment arrives inside superstitious time, a time that can warp into curved lines of fate and chance as a spell of oblivion is cast across magical, real worlds. "every oil spill remembers every other," writes stephanie lemenager (2014, p. 64). and what if every oil spill remembers more than that? what if "the time of enchantment enacts repetition's strange power through relays across time that aren't supposed to happen" (burlein and orr, 2012, p. 17)? perhaps the bp oil spill does remember with uncanny precision the all-too-real history of the 1969 santa barbara oil spill, enacted with ferocious repetition in 2010:  that "the oil industry had no means of remediating spills; that industry had long been aware of the dangers of drilling . . . ; that corexit, the dispersant favored by union oil [and then bp] was toxic to marine life" (lemenager, 2014, p. 33). but the catastrophe of macondo, that dispersed magic site of time-shattered story, may also offer a strange, subreal relay of impossible timings as the blowout sinks the $350 million deepwater horizon oil rig in a red-orange inferno on earth day, april 22, 2010. in fact, on the fortieth anniversary of the first earth day organized on april 22, 1970, amidst the atmospheric fallout of the santa barbara spill and the spiraling smoke, visionary and real, from the bonfire of the birds—burned with the other bloating carcasses on the petro-drenched beaches by black and brown prison workers bused in from san lois obispo, santa clara, san diego to clean the spoiled surfaces of santa barbara (lemenager, 2014, pp. 60-62).3 to speak of magical subrealism is not to make a sociological claim, or a superstitious provocation. it is perhaps to speak on the order of what pignarre and stengers call the "witch's proposition," which does not "ask for the conversion of those to whom it is addressed. when witches address others, they do nothing other...than relay, echo the question that transformed them themselves—existential catalysis" (pignarre and stengers, 2011, p. 141). as a mode of relay and transmission, magical subrealism proposes that we look elsewhere or underneath our proliferate empirical scholarship and theoretical innovation to pursue more deeply a "hunger for entanglement" (lemenager, 2014, p. 194) between the human and unhuman, the visible and the subterranean, the living and the dead. between what is known and what will never be. magical subrealism proposes that if bp has partnered with magic earth, a 3d modeling and simulation software company, to launch a visualization center at the university of colorado, then it may be time for a critical feminist technoscience to pursue its own militant enchantments and counter-sorceries. to visualize its own subreal understandings of the hold that capitalist technoscience has, and the protections needed to evade our own capture. subreal infrastructures "with infrastructure, something both huge and hidden is conjured up—a dark and indistinct shadow of a thing that needs to function in order for it not to be thought about. beneath structure, below architecture, under life as we know it . . . . it [is] precisely within the infrastructural that societies articulate their political imagination, and guide how they want to live."         -céline condorelli, "infrastructure" how do you want to live? chanter (from the french—to sing, to chant) is at the etymological heart of enchantment.  chants can be heard as "resonant dwelling places;" to enchant is to reanimate the question "'where and how do we dwell?'" (bayer 2012, pp. 27-28). enchanting catastrophe at the edge of the sixth mass extinction, at the site of what is now a subsea desert soaked in degraded oil stretching across 3000 square miles in the gulf of mexico, is to wonder how to inhabit the times in which i live (ceballos et. al., 2015; juhasz, 2015). the infrastructural is a kind of dwelling place … hidden, unthought, beneath, shadowed, below, in céline conderelli's meditation. under life as we know it, the infrastructural builds material and imaginary enclosures between what's possible and what's not. "the petroleum infrastructure has become embodied memory and habitus for modern humans" (lemenager, 2011, p. 26). perhaps a collective encounter with infrastructures of the subreal might help us imagine, or remember, differently. perhaps today it is not our task to save the planet, but rather, to burn it. which we are doing. what we fail to do, repeatedly, is to read the hieroglyphs of our own incense, the patterns of temporary matter in time, which might tell us for what or for whom we really burn. or that might offer instruction for protecting ourselves from the fatal hold of this particular—but not interminable—inferno, in which we currently dwell. acknowledgements deep thanks to dovar chen for the digital artistry, and to gorda stanisic for research assistance on the bp disaster. for smart and generous criticism, my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers and, as always, the oxidate working group. notes 1 the digital video accompanying this text is archived footage of the bp oil disaster and the gushing macondo well recorded on may 22, 2010. the film was edited by digital editor dovar chen with a soundtrack added. the video was retrieved january 10, 2012 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kol41lu5aa 2 for more on postcolonial literatures and magic realism see slemon (1995). for more on literature and petro-capitalism see ghosh (1992). 3 for the full version of the stunning 1969 poem discussed by lemenager that narrates the bonfire of the dead, written by conyus, a member of the prison work crews sent by union oil to santa barbara, see: http://alyoung.org/2015/05/24/the-great-santa-barbara-oil-disaster-or-a-diary-a-poem-by-conyus-reissued/ references bayer, b. (2012). enchantment in an age of occupy. wsq 40(3-4), 27-50. black, b. (october 2010). on bp's deepwater horizon live video feed. environmental history 15(4), 741-745. buell, f. (2012). a short history of oil cultures: or, the marriage of catastrophe and exuberance. journal of american studies 46(2), 273-293. burlein, a. and orr, j. (2012). the practice of enchantment: strange allures. in a. burlein and j. orr (eds.), special issue on enchantment, wsq 40(3-4), 13-23. ceballos, g., ehrlih p., barnosky, a. et. al. (2015). accelerated modern human-induced species losses: entering the sixth mass extinction. science advances 1(5). retrieved from http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/1/5/e1400253.full condorelli, c. (2014). infrastructure. in v. venuturupalli rao (ed.), speculation, now: essays and artwork (pp. 265-267). durham, nc: duke university press. farbman, h. (september 2012). from the cold earth: bp's broken well, streaming live. postmodern culture 23(1). retrieved 20 september, 2013, from http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/postmodern_culture/v023/23.1.farbman.html freudenburg, w.f. & gramling. r. (2011).  blowout in the gulf: the bp oil spill disaster and the future of energy in america. cambridge, ma: the mit press. garcía márquez, g. (1970). one hundred years of solitude. new york: harper & row. ghosh, a. (2 march 1992). petrofiction: the oil encounter and the novel. the new republic, 29-34. harney, s. & moten, f. (2013). the undercommons: fugitive planning & black study. brooklyn, ny: minor compositions. huber, m. (2012). refined politics: petroleum products, neoliberalism, and the ecology of entrepreneurial life. journal of american studies 46(2), 295-312. juhasz, a. (2015, june). "thirty million gallons under the sea." harper's magazine. kohn, e. (2013). how forests think: toward an anthropology beyond the human (berkeley: university of california press. leiber, f. (2014). the black gondolier and other stories. open road media. [ebook.] available at http://www.openroadmedia.com/ebook/the-black-gondolier-and-other-stories/#overview-tab lemenager, s. (2014). living oil: petroleum culture in the american century. new york, ny: oxford university press. lemenager, s. (2011). petro-melancholia: the bp blowout and the arts of grief. qui parle: critical humanities and social sciences 19(2): 25-55. markeset, t., moren-trejo, j., & kumar, r. (2013). maintenance of subsea petroleum production systems: a case study. journal of quality in maintenance engineering 19(2), 128-143. munif, a. (1987).  cites of salt. trans. by p. theroux. new york: vintage international. national commission on the bp deepwater horizon oil spill (2011). deep water: the gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling. washington, d.c., unt digital library. retrieved 10 july, 2015 from http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123527/. nelson, d. (2012). banal, familiar, and enrapturing: financial enchantment after guatemala's genocide. wsq 40(3-4), 205-225. nelson, v. (2001). the secret life of puppets. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. newman, p. (2010, august 2). deepwater horizon oil spill showcases rov technology. engineering and technology magazine 5(12). retrieved from http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2010/12/beneath-the-horizon.cfm?savetopdf nixon, r. (2011). slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. oceaneering international, inc. website. accessed 9 september, 2013, at http://www.oceaneering.com/rovs/. pignarre, p. & stengers, i. (2011). capitalist sorcery: breaking the spell. new york: palgrave macmillan. slemon, s. (1995). magic realism as postcolonial discourse. in l. p. zomara and w.b. faris (eds.),  magical realism: theory, history, community, (pp. 407-426).  durham, nc: duke university press. taussig, m. (1984). culture of terror – space of death. roger casement's putumayo report and the explanation of torture. society for comparative study of society and history 6(3), 467-497. thacker, e. (2011). in the dust of this planet: horror of philosophy vol. 1.  winchester, uk: zero books. vitalis, r. (2009). america's kingdom: mythmaking on the saudi oil frontier. london: verso. vitalis, r. (2002). black gold, white crude: an essay on american exceptionalism, hierarchy, and hegemony in the gulf. diplomatic history 26(2), 185-213. wagner, r.j., randell, r.e., albaugh, e. k. (1 december 2000). subsea production technology—work rov contractors trying to evade cycle of more power, heavier umbilicals with depths. offshore magazine. available at http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-60/issue-12/news/subsea-production-technology-work-rov-contractors-trying-to-evade-cycle-of-more-power-heavier-umbilicals-with-depths.html wenzel, j. (2006). petro-magic-realism: toward a political ecology of nigerian literature. postcolonial studies 9(4), 449-464. zuck, r. r. (2012). the wizard of oil: abraham james, the harmonial wells, and the psychometric history of the oil industry. journal of american studies 46(2), 313-336. bio jackie orr is associate professor of sociology at syracuse university, and a performance theorist working at the crossroads of cultural critique, the politics of bodies, and the poetics of knowledge. her scholarship focuses on contemporary and cultural theory, and critical studies of technoscience and media. she is the author of panic diaries: a genealogy of panic disorder (duke, 2006). her live digital performance work includes "daddy does cybernetics," "the psychopolitics of bioterrorism," and "body animations (or, lullaby for fallujah)." her most recent performance piece, "slow disaster at the digital edge," stages the bp disaster in relation to the everyday catastrophe of deep time, and has recently been performed at the university of chicago, goldsmiths, buddies in bad times theater (toronto), and rhode island school of design. microsoft word oikkonen-116-1237-1.docx oikkonen, v. (2017). temporality and belonging as transdisciplinary phenomena: strategic encounters between queer theory and population genetic technologies. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (1), 1-25 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © venla oikkonen, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article temporality and belonging as transdisciplinary phenomena: strategic encounters between queer theory and population genetic technologies venla oikkonen university of helsinki venla.oikkonen@helsinki.fi abstract this article asks how to study evasive and seemingly immaterial transdisciplinary phenomena such as affective formations that organize our technoscientific societies and cultures. i argue that understanding such phenomena requires developing methodologies that engage fields of knowledge production that appear unrelated. the article uses the dynamics of temporality and belonging underlying population genetics as a case study. i show how two seemingly incompatible fields of knowledge production—queer theorization of temporality and population genetic technologies and practices—can together engender new insights on how temporality and belonging organize population genetic knowledge. i argue that neither field of knowledge production could achieve such insight alone; instead, insight emerges from the unexpected resonances as well as friction between the two fields. i develop this argument through an analysis of the configurations of temporality and belonging on the genographic project website. 2 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) as feminist science and technology studies (sts) scholars, we typically explore phenomena that are located between conventional academic disciplines. the phenomena we study are transdisciplinary in the sense that we need to interrogate their material, technological, cultural, and social dimensions in order to understand how they operate in technoscientific societies and shape our lives (e.g., haraway, 1991; lykke, 2004). for example, pregnancy, infertility treatments, chronic illness, and implantable medical devices are embodied phenomena that bring together molecular, hormonal, technological, emotional, discursive, and epistemic processes, as feminist scholars have shown (e.g., hird, 2007; meskus, 2015; thompson, 2005; oudshoorn, 2015). this article provides a new perspective to the question of how to study transdisciplinary phenomena. my starting point is the observation that feminist sts scholars often engage with transdisciplinary phenomena that have a materially grounded empirical referent: for example, how a particular technology is developed, used, experienced, or represented. such phenomena may be ambiguous or multiple, as annemarie mol’s (2002) exploration of the vascular disease atherosclerosis and charis thompson’s (2005) analysis of ontological choreography at infertility clinics show. i am interested, however, in what happens when the object of study is an affective formation—for example, nostalgia or belonging—that lacks a material referent. while such a phenomenon often emerges through, or is articulated in relation to, material practices, the phenomenon itself is largely immaterial and evasive. i want to emphasize that such phenomena differ from more clearly material phenomena in degree rather than in kind. that is, i am not suggesting a distinction between two kinds of transdisciplinary phenomena. rather, i want to explore what happens when the idea of transdisciplinary phenomena is applied to an affective formation that underlies and organizes technoscientific society and culture. the motivation for the article arises from my engagement with cultural studies, especially questions of belonging, temporality, nostalgia, and the circulation of emotions around biotechnologies. 3 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the primary focus of my article is methodological. the article is centered on the question: how can we investigate an evasive and largely immaterial phenomenon such as an affective formation in a way that accounts for its cultural as well as bioscientific entanglements? i argue that an analysis of affective formations benefits from strategic encounters between fields of study usually considered distinct or even incompatible. i develop this argument through a specific case study: the affective formations of temporality and belonging as they take shape around the discourses and technologies of human population genetics. i approach temporality and belonging through queer theorization of time and population genetic practices, two fields of knowledge production seldom explored together. such a strategic engagement refuses to render population genetics a mere object of queer analysis, seeing it instead as an active mode of knowledge production, while also acknowledging the potentiality of queer theoretical approaches as methods of studying practices conventionally understood as bioscientific. this kind of strategic engagement resonates with karen barad’s (2007) “diffractive methodology,” in which approaches or fields of study engage in an open and nonhierarchical co-production of phenomena. yet my analysis is not an application of barad’s methodology, but rather addresses the specific concerns involved in the study of affective formations. my article contributes to the goal of this special issue to think feminist theory as science by exploring the co-production of knowledge by queer theory and population genetic practices. this kind of co-production engenders both resonances and friction. the article suggests that it is precisely through such moments of recognition and departure that new insights may arise. in what follows, i trace how population genetic configurations of temporality and belonging articulate and reshape cultural conceptions of time and, at the same time, how temporality and belonging emerge through population genetic practices. temporality and its social configuration, belonging, underlie both population genetics and queer theory in crucial ways. population genetics explores how dna records 4 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the passage of evolutionary time and the movement of populations across the globe. it metaphorizes genetic material as a “molecular clock” that measures the temporal distance between populations through the gradual accumulation of mutations. in such a framework, genetic differences are seen as organized by temporality. temporality also plays a key role in queer theory, though seldom in the context of biotechnologies. queer-studies scholars have challenged the persistence of cultural conceptions of time as linear and future-oriented and envisioned alternative ways of approaching temporality. these studies have often focused on the disjuncture between embodied experiences and normative conceptions of historical time and the proper organization of life events related to marriage, reproduction, and ideas of maturity. in both population genetics and queer theory, temporality is closely connected to belonging, understood here as a temporal dynamic through which people and communities emerge as connected to culturally meaningful historical trajectories. for example, population genetic practices such as genetic diversity projects or commercial genetic ancestry tests refashion ideas of kinship and identity in foundational ways (e.g., hamilton, 2012; hinterberger, 2012; nash, 2005, 2012; skinner, 2006; tallbear, 2013a, 2013b; wald, 2006). similarly, queer explorations of time have highlighted the connections between past, present, and future marginalized communities and subjectivities, as well as theorized the affective structures of the present (e.g., boellstorff, 2007; dinshaw, 2007; freeman, 2010; halberstam, 2005; muñoz, 2009; povinelli, 2011). the first two sections of the article provide a brief overview of temporality in population genetics and queer theory. the following sections turn to the website of the genographic project, the national geographic society’s ambitious initiative of studying human genetic variation, through which i develop my analysis of temporality as materially and technologically enacted. through the critical lenses of queer theory, i examine how gender and sexuality underlie the ways in which the genographic project invokes and refashions temporality and belonging. at the same time, i complicate queer insights on temporality through the 5 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) material and technological situatedness of population genetic practices, especially the differences between mitochondrial, y-chromosome, and admixture analyses. through this two-way approach, i demonstrate how temporality and belonging are always connected to specific uses of technology. i propose that bringing queer theory and population genetic technologies into a strategic encounter may help us understand not only how temporality is gendered and sexualized, but also how those processes of gendering and sexualizing are inseparable from the materiality of technologies and their underlying epistemic premises.1 based on my analysis, i suggest that temporality and belonging benefit from an approach that engages in and brings together diverse and even incongruous fields of inquiry. temporality in population genetics human population genetics seeks to identify genetic differences between past and present human populations and to construct evolutionary trees that document the prehistoric divergence of human populations on the basis of these differences. for a significant part of its history, population genetics has been interested in genetic variation in noncoding dna: that is, in markers that do not directly control the physiology of the organism and are therefore not subject to natural selection in the same way as coding dna. as changes in noncoding dna generally result from random mutations, which often accumulate at a predictable rate, differences in noncoding dna can be used to evaluate the evolutionary distance between populations. this understanding of differences builds on the concept of the “molecular clock” developed in the 1960s.2 the molecular clock is based on the premise that the more mutations there are between two populations, the earlier in human evolution those populations diverged. at the same time, genetic diversity within a population suggests old age; for example, the great genetic diversity within african populations is commonly seen as evidence that anatomically modern humans first appeared in africa and that other populations are descended from smaller groups that migrated from africa. crucially, this model of 6 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) genetic variation understands genetic differences as organized by temporality: differences are both the result of and evidence for the passage of evolutionary time. human population geneticists have focused on various types of genetic material. one of the early breakthroughs was the use of mitochondrial dna (mtdna) to evaluate the genetic relatedness of populations in the late 1980s (cann, stoneking, & wilson, 1987; vigilant, stoneking, harpending, hawkes, & wilson, 1991). located outside the cell nucleus, mitochondria carry their own specific dna unrelated to the dna stored in the chromosomes in the cell nucleus. there were several practical reasons why mtdna analysis was feasible before other types of genetic analysis: mtdna mutates fast, it is concise compared to nuclear dna, and it exists in multiple copies in the cell. it is also inherited from only one parent, the mother, which means that it is not subject to recombination, the mixing of genetic material in sexual reproduction. this uniparental inheritance renders the evolutionary trajectories constructed through mtdna strictly maternal, and thus less complicated than the biparental dynamics of recombination underlying most nuclear dna. in the 1990s, advances in sequencing techniques led scientists to analyze another type of genetic material: a noncoding and nonrecombining section of the y-chromosome (hammer, 1995; whitfield, sulston, & goodfellow, 1995). passed from father to son, y-chromosome dna (ydna) rendered evolutionary history strictly paternal. y-dna analysis was seen by many as a parallel (and, in some accounts, a corrective) to the maternal focus of mtdna analysis (oikkonen, 2015a). this resulted in human evolution increasingly being conceived through two gendered reproductive trajectories. in the past ten years, fast developments in sequencing technologies have reshaped the temporal investments of population genetics. first, the feasibility of genome-wide analysis of genetic inheritance has complicated the patterns of evolution previously constructed through the uniparental inheritance of mtdna and y-dna. genome-wide techniques have enabled scientists to better understand 7 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the evolutionary processes that produced modern human genomes. as a result, evolution increasingly appears as a complicated process in which genetic material is constantly mixed and reshuffled through sexual reproduction and the intertwining patterns of prehistoric migration. yet the direction of evolutionary movement is forward, from an evolutionary past to an unfolding future. second, population genetic analysis has focused on smaller population units, on the one hand, and interspecies connections, on the other. while the explorations of mtdna ancestry in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused on large world populations, such as “african” or “east asian,” scientists have increasingly turned to specific haplogroups characterized by specific mutations. this has shifted the focus to the divergence of population groups in the past 20,000 years. at the same time, technological development has enabled the analysis of dna retrieved from ancient hominin remains such as neanderthals or denisovans. this has expanded the temporal scope backward, situating the evolution of modern humans in the context of the diverging trajectories of hominin species. these developments have rewritten evolutionary temporality as both more specific and more encompassing than previously envisioned. in the process, the affective appeal of evolutionary history as a means of enacting roots and belonging in contemporary culture has strengthened. queering time the idea of temporality as a future-oriented procession has been critiqued by queer-studies scholars, especially in the past fifteen years. queer explorations of time have typically focused on the intertwining of temporality and sexuality. in so doing, they have touched on three issues also central to the working of population genetics: linearity, futurity, and the affective structures of the present. the first issue concerns the hegemonic understanding of time as linear and progressive. this “straight time” organizes personal lives through symbolically charged events such as birth, marriage, and 8 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) reproduction or perceived periods such as childhood, the teenage years, responsible middle age, and harmonious old age. this personal timescale is connected to the societal level, as institutional forces “link properly temporalized bodies to narratives of movement and change” (freeman, 2010, p. 4) so that “people are bound to one another, engrouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestrations of time” (freeman, 2010, p. 3). this suggests that “straight time is an emically salient, socially efficacious, and experientially real cultural construction of temporality across a wide range of political and social positions” that is “shaped by linked discourses of heteronormativity, capitalism, modernity, and apocalypse” (boellstorff, 2007, p. 228). however, nonnormative experiences may be organized by alternative, queer configurations of time. according to jack halberstam, queer time may be embodied in “the dark nightclub, the perverse turn away from the narrative coherence” of expected life events (dinshaw et al., 2007, p. 182). it may also show, as elizabeth freeman notes, in “nonsequential forms of time” that “fold subjects into structures of belonging and duration that may be invisible to the historicist eye” (freeman, 2010, p. xi). the second issue centers on the relationship between queerness and forward movement toward a future. according to lee edelman (2004), the very idea of futurity is incompatible with queer politics. if society is organized by “reproductive futurity” that posits reproduction as a promise of continuity, then “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure of form” (edelman, 2004, p. 4). edelman critiques attempts to save queerness from the margins of reproductive futurity and argues that queers should embrace negativity and refuse futurity. scholars like josé esteban muñoz and elizabeth povinelli, by contrast, have theorized the possibility of alternative futures. according to muñoz, queerness is “essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world” (2009, p. 1). povinelli, too, theorizes “the conditions in which new forms of social life emerge” (2011, p. 5), focusing on “the virtual space that opens up 9 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) between the potentiality and actuality of an alternative social project” (p. 8). the third question concerns the nature of the present moment as part of history. carolyn dinshaw (2007) has explored the intricate temporal connections between communities and individuals across historical time. she focuses on experiences of anachronism, “of time falling outside” the temporal organization of historical processes (2007, p. 111). dinshaw identifies “an expanded present, a temporally multiple now” (p. 112), which enables “a sense of simultaneous belonging to one’s own time as well as to other times” (p. 119). lauren berlant, in turn, has analyzed the affective structures of the present. for her, “the present is perceived, first, affectively” before it becomes a series of events that can be narrated as part of historical processes (2011, p. 4). how we understand the present as an affective and temporal state structures how we orient ourselves toward the past and the future and how experiences become part of the passage of historical time. as i hope to show in the following sections, these critical engagements with temporality can shed new light on the temporal dynamics underlying population genetics while also gaining new depth through encounters with population genetic practices. the genographic project as a temporal endeavor the genographic project is a large genetic diversity initiative launched by the national geographic society in 2005. the project seeks to study the evolution of human genetic diversity by focusing on the genetic makeup of indigenous populations. the project also runs an online genetic ancestry testing service through which any of us (willing to pay 150 us dollars) can test our place in human evolution, or what the website calls “the human story” (genographic project, 2016a). in many ways, the genographic project is a continuation of the ill-fated human genome diversity project (hgdp), which was proposed with fanfare in the early 1990s but quickly came under heavy criticism by bioethicists and 10 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) indigenous organizations.3 while the hgdp was accused of appropriating indigenous dna for the benefit of non-indigenous communities, the genographic project has declared itself to be “anonymous, nonmedical, and nonprofit” (genographic project, 2016b). nevertheless, the unresolved issues about racial differences that underlay the hgdp—how to study genetic differences between populations without reinforcing the idea of race?—continue to inform the genographic project (tallbear, 2007; wald, 2006).4 a number of scholars have critically explored the role of race and conceptions of indigeneity in the genographic project. for example, catherine nash (2012) explores how racialized differences are produced through assumptions about geography and human mobility in the project, jenny reardon and kim tallbear (2012) analyze its reliance on assumptions of ownership over indigenous genetic material, and priscilla wald (2006) shows how it employs colonial rhetoric that posits indigenous people as locked in the past. while inspired by these inquiries into the racialized politics of the genographic project, my article focuses on how population genetics mobilizes heteronormative assumptions of being and belonging. the article uses an encounter between queer theory and population genetic practices as a case study to explore how to study affective formations as transdisciplinary phenomena. a more detailed exploration of the affective formations underlying population genetics would benefit from integrating postcolonial and other critical theorizations of temporality into the analysis as well. in what follows, i use the genographic project’s official website as an entry point to the analytical practices, material circumstances, and cultural discourses that underlie population genetic configurations of temporality and belonging. although the website is first and foremost a discursive space, it relies on a set of biotechnological practices. it also operates as an apparatus through which genetic tests are sold and justified and test results interpreted and given meaning. the discursive aspects of the website are thus entangled with the materiality of dna samples, genetic technologies, dna databases, and the exchange of 11 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) money and services on the website. the genographic project’s website opens with an introduction that clearly states the temporal stakes of the project: since its launch in 2005, national geographic’s genographic project has used advanced dna analysis and worked with indigenous communities to help answer fundamental questions about where humans originated and how we came to populate the earth. now, cutting-edge technology is enabling us to shine a powerful new light on our collective past. by participating in the latest phase of this real-time scientific project, you can learn more about yourself than you ever thought possible. (genographic project, 2016a; emphasis in original) the passage portrays the population genetic enterprise as progressive and future-oriented through phrases such as advanced dna analysis, cutting-edge technology, and latest phase. this future orientation of biotechnology is contrasted with the past-oriented gaze it provides as the project peers into what is portrayed as a “collective past.” between these two temporal orientations emerges a temporal trajectory characterized by a chain of evolutionary transitions through which “we came to populate the earth” (and, eventually, to ask questions about our ancestry). on the one hand, this framing casts evolution as a progressive and foundational trajectory that reflects the linear and future-oriented logic of “straight time” theorized by queer scholars like boellstorff, freeman, edelman, and halberstam: that is, the framing is marked by a sense of time as momentous, unswerving, incontestable, and totalizing. on the other hand, the temporal trajectory is characterized by ambivalence, as when the website states, “you will discover the migration paths your ancient ancestors followed thousands of years ago,” thereby casting the futureoriented promise of “will discover” against the past-oriented insistence on the primacy of the ancestral “migration paths” (genographic project, 2016b). these two tendencies suggest a multidirectional temporality in which the past, present, and future are defined through one another. interestingly, this underlying multidirectionality resonates with the 12 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) complicated relations between what has been and what will be addressed by scholars like freeman, povinelli, or muñoz in the context of sexuality, experience, and societal change. this does not mean that the two temporal arrangements concur; rather, their resonances suggest that the mutual embeddedness of the past, present, and future in population genetics and in processes of societal change are part of larger temporal tendencies that underlie culture. the multidirectional temporality constructed on the website renders the present moment an affective space in which the possibility of futurity is imagined. first, the present is given a sense of urgency by encouraging the readers to “take part in a real-time research project” by contributing their dna-test results to “the larger community” of genographic project participants (genographic project, 2016b; emphasis mine). this description posits the genographic project as attuned to the unceasing forward movement that is assumed to characterize the present. it also places the implied reader as the temporally organized subject through whom the presumably collective striving for futurity takes shape. this resonates with berlant’s (2011) observation that the present holds a precarious position as part of the procession of historical time and yet as the moment at which the future still appears as open. second, this multidirectional temporality coincides with the life course of the prospective reader through the description of the genographic project’s genetic testing service. “welcome to the expedition of a lifetime,” the website declares (genographic project, 2016b). this parallelism between evolutionary time and individual life reflects the mutual embeddedness of historical, national, and personal temporalities analyzed by boellstorff, halberstam, and freeman. like evolutionary temporality, the temporality of the individual life invoked on the website is distinctly future-oriented, as suggested by the promise that the readers will continue to learn about genetic history after receiving the test results. “your results are just the beginning,” the website explains. “it’s like having a subscription to your very own genetic history—and to the history of all of us” (2016b). these resonances and parallelisms between the rhetoric of the 13 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) genographic project and queer analyses of temporality suggest that queer theory may engender important insights on how biotechnologies are entangled with cultural assumptions about futurity and the potentialities of the present. queer theory may operate as a useful analytical lens to the larger affective structures within which scientific projects appear as appealing or urgent. at the same time, as i shall argue next, these affinities indicate that paying attention to the material specificities of biotechnological configurations of time is crucial to understanding the complexities of temporality and belonging. specific technologies, specific temporalities to show further possibilities inherent in encounters between queer theory and population genetics, i turn to the specific testing practices employed by the genographic project. the genographic project website markets a genetic ancestry testing kit called geno 2.0 next generation. the test uses a dna chip that analyzes three types of genetic inheritance— mtdna, y-dna, and admixture—covering altogether close to 750,000 genetic markers.5 while mtdna and y-dna components trace maternal and paternal lineages, the admixture test seeks to determine the percentage of (tested) genetic markers the test-taker shares with populations from different continents or with the prehistoric neanderthals.6 geno 2.0 thus provides three visions of belonging. the admixture test grounds belonging in the similarities between what are imagined to be clearly defined populations.7 the appeal of such tests often resides in their ability to surprise: for example, to tell an ethnically white north american that 5 percent of her genetic material is african or native american. underlying the test is the assumption that all humans are connected through the steady procession of evolution. at the same time, mtdna and y-dna tests encourage test-takers to interpret belonging as an exclusive maternal or paternal continuum. as the mtdna and y-dna tests highlight the (imagined) purity of the traced maternal and paternal lineages, temporality acquires a sense of geographic 14 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) specificity: it appears as a unique trajectory leading from a localized point in the past to a localized present. furthermore, while all three tests build on the mutual embeddedness of the past, present, and future explored above, they orient differently within this temporal dynamic. the admixture test addresses the complexities of the present by comparing populations, whereas the mtdna and y-dna tests reach toward a strictly gendered past in order to explain the present. these differences between mtdna, y-dna, and admixture components of the kit challenge the popular assumption that genetics engenders a uniform idea of belonging as biologically grounded. instead, belonging emerges as ontologically multiple, thus reflecting annemarie mol’s (2002) insightful observation that technoscientific phenomena are often ontologically more complicated and heterogeneous than they may first appear. my analysis approaches ontological multiplicity primarily as an outcome of material conditions and the use of technologies. that is, the affective dynamics of temporality and belonging emerge as multiple because of the diverse techniques and practices mobilized in the geographic project. each of the three tests manipulates specific biological material—particular genetic markers—in order to produce differences and similarities between people. this material, in turn, is derived from tissue, blood, or saliva samples or cultured cell lines used in population genetic research. it is also often circulated between research labs. indeed, amade m’charek notes (2005, 2014) that the choice of material in scientific study depends on the availability of samples, which is often limited by geographic distance, institutional policies, or personal networks. furthermore, the development of computer programs to process ever larger sets of data affects the shapes that temporality and belonging take in population genetics. the size and type of the genetic database also plays a crucial role, as genetic ancestries are produced through comparisons to other samples. yet the genographic website erases the materiality of the genetic technologies it markets and deploys: the differences between the three technologies, and their reconfigurations of temporality and belonging, 15 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) disappear under the language of kinship. this takes place through the metaphor of “the human family tree,” the genealogical tree of relatedness on whose “branches” we are each located (genographic project, 2016b). this familial and organic rhetoric masks how different modes of genetic analysis enact different configurations of temporality and belonging. instead, the website invokes an image of “our shared migratory history” (genographic project, 2016e), as if there was one monolithic, uniform, and indisputable movement in time that engulfed the myriad complicated molecular realities that characterize our personal genetic histories. the human family tree also foregrounds heterosexual reproduction. this reproductive emphasis is both literal and symbolic, as it emphasizes the material transmission of genetic markers across generations as well as the culturally sanctioned position of the heterosexual couple as a unit of reproduction. however, the multiple technologies that underlie the genographic project suggest that reproduction, too, is multiple. this is where engagement with queer studies again provides important insights. reproduction and population genetic belonging although queer and feminist scholars have explored assumptions of innate gender and sexual characteristics in behavioral genetics and evolutionary psychology (e.g., lancaster, 2003; oikkonen, 2013; o’riordan, 2012; roof, 2007), there has been much less interest in population genetics, which has been seen as primarily engaged with racialized differences.8 yet population genetic knowledge is organized by sexuality, as reproduction is the mechanism through which genetic markers are passed on through generations. that is, temporality and belonging are structured through specific arrangements of reproduction over evolutionary history. this is the case with the three modes of testing included in geno 2.0, as they each mobilize a slightly different reproductive dynamic. while the admixture test highlights reproduction, it does not depend on a specific reproductive tie, because individual genomes are seen as connected to populations through myriad 16 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) intersecting reproductive ties or molecular likenesses. mtdna and y-dna tests, by contrast, seek to detect a specific gendered chain of reproduction: purely maternal and purely paternal inheritance. while all three tests foreground reproduction and exclude nonreproductive ties (for example, communal and political affiliations), there is no single dynamic of “genetic reproduction” but multiple configurations of reproductive continuity. what counts as reproduction in one test does not count as reproduction in the others: for example, sex resulting in female offspring is not reproduction in y-dna tests, while sex resulting in male offspring is not reproduction in mtdna tests. as was the case with the multiple configurations of temporality and belonging, the different dynamics of reproduction that underlie geno 2.0 are also largely erased or trivialized. the genographic website highlights the apparent inclusiveness of the genographic project: “how did each of us end up where we are?” it asks (genographic project, 2016d; emphasis added), while emphasizing that the project involves as many as “75,000 indigenous and traditional participants” and “more than 640,000 public participants” (genographic project, 2016e). yet the mtdna and y-dna techniques leave out a large number of genetic lineages that cross the gender line, such as a lineage that runs, say, through mother, grandfather, great-grandmother, and great-great-grandfather. these erasures undermine the website’s promise to help test-takers “connect with others around the world who share your deep ancestry,” as “shared ancestry” refers only to those connections the analytical techniques are designed to track (genographic project, 2016b). furthermore, the project cannot tell us anything about sexual unions or affiliations that do not result in reproduction. thus it leaves out an array of sexual arrangements that organize communities. these exclusions underlie the temporalities that emerge on the website. most importantly, the temporal multiplicity inherent in the testing technologies is made to appear as longing for reproductive continuity. this is where queer theorization of temporality provides an important analytical perspective. viewed from a queer-studies angle, population 17 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) genetics appears as an epitome of the “reproductive futurity” edelman critiques, as it is only through reproduction that the chaotic temporalities of the past, present, and future constitute a culturally meaningful trajectory that promises futurity. furthermore, the configurations of reproduction in mtdna, y-dna, and admixture tests reinforce the assumption, critiqued by freeman and halberstam, that life events centering on heterosexual courtship and the birth of offspring signify proper passage of time. while the website promises that prospective customers will be “helping us fill in the gaps in the human story,” the website’s narrative of evolution is premised on another set of gaps—the omission of nonreproductive ties—that, if included, could challenge the very idea of a linear, future-oriented temporality (genographic project, 2016c). at the same time, attention to the specific effects of techniques and technologies is also required: reproductive futurity relies on success in passing on specific molecular material (i.e., having a girl, in the case of mtdna, or having a boy, in the case of y-dna). the material available for analysis also plays a role, as different samples, sets of comparative data, and computer programs lead to different forms of reproductive futurity, engendering slightly different connections between past, present, and future individuals and communities. the appearance of reproductive futurity through testing technologies also touches on another concern central to queer studies: the shape and potentialities of the present. alondra nelson (2008) and david skinner (2006) have argued that cultural fascination surrounding genetic ancestry tests arises largely from the affective possibilities of negotiating identities in the present. the genographic project website (2016c) appeals to the reader’s affective present by declaring that geno 2.0 will help the reader to “learn more about yourself than you ever thought possible.” the “you” invoked here, however, is a strictly curtailed subjectivity that falls neatly within the reproductive continuum of evolutionary history. the desire to “learn more” is also defined through this reproductive temporality, with the result that the limits of “possible” knowledge remain narrow. while the present emerges as a site of 18 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) longing, it opens only into directions defined through reproduction. this suggests that the reproductive underpinnings of population genetic temporalities posit people differently as affectively engaged subjects. in light of the specificities of the three testing technologies, the idea declared on the website that we all belong to the procession of evolution in similar and equal ways is misleading. i have shown that both a queer reading of the reproductive assumptions organizing temporality, and the specific materialities of testing technologies, play a crucial role in producing this analysis of temporality and belonging. in other words, it could not have been achieved without strategic encounters between queer theorization of time and an exploration of the material practices of genetic testing. conclusion this article set out to examine affective dynamics that underlie transdisciplinary technoscientific phenomena. i have argued that bringing together fields of knowledge production usually considered distinct or even incompatible may generate unexpected moments of resonance. while such moments are characterized by friction, it is precisely through these uneasy parallels and connections that unexpected insights emerge. in this case study, the encounter between the material specificity of technological practices and queer approaches to temporality enables me to view population genetic temporality and belonging as materially and technologically grounded, yet entangled with cultural narratives and affective frameworks in complex ways. it allows me to see how, despite the apparent simplicity of belonging on the website, population genetics is characterized by various configurations of temporality, belonging, and reproduction. i have demonstrated that the issues of linearity, futurity, and the affective present, central to queer studies, are at the heart of population genetics as well. in the genographic project, genetic belonging is organized by assumptions of unceasing and allencompassing temporal procession. this logic of movement embeds the 19 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) present moment of discovery within an affectively charged historical trajectory that is premised on reproduction. i have also shown that the various population genetic technologies the genographic project deploys enact different temporal dynamics and thus different configurations of belonging. this insight could not have been reached only through an account of the technological and material practices of population genetics, nor through a one-way application of queer theorization of temporality to the genographic website. instead, a strategic encounter between queer theory and population genetic technologies can provide fresh insights into these underlying complexities—but only when queer theorization is brought into dialogue with, rather than positioned against, the material practices of genetic analysis. in the strategic encounter between queer theory and population genetic technologies outlined in this article, the two fields of knowledge production become entangled. understanding how technologies operate enriches queer analysis of temporality by making visible the connection between different configurations of temporality and belonging and material practices. this in turn encourages a close analysis of the sexual and reproductive underpinnings of each of the temporally organized configurations of belonging. at the same time, queer theorization of temporality and belonging draws attention to the affective investments and narratives of inclusion and exclusion that make those technologies appear appealing and timely. one result of this focus on the connection between temporality and technologies is that the politics underlying population genetic knowledge emerge as both more specific and more complicated than is often understood in popular discourses criticizing genetics. in present analysis, queer theory provides the lens onto the cultural underpinnings of temporality. it is important to note that different theoretical approaches would make visible other aspects of population genetic temporalities. for example, a postcolonial approach might highlight how evolutionary temporality takes shape through geographic space, such as the idea of africa as the evolutionary origin of humanity 20 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) and thus implicitly past-oriented, or of relatively recently populated areas—greenland, for example—as “too young” to be properly rooted in evolutionary history. it could also highlight how prehistoric migrations operate as a mechanism that produces difference and thereby enables the view of evolution as future-oriented—that is, how the idea of genetic differences between populations is invested in futurity.9 at the same time, a critical disability studies approach might render visible ableist undertones in evolutionary discourse, such as assumptions of “fitness” and able-bodiedness in the idea of reproductive success at the heart of accounts of evolutionary continuity. a critical reading of class relations, in turn, might foreground how the individual life course the tests invoke and promise to cherish relies on middle-class ideas of proper ways of arranging personal lives and social relations. each of these approaches could be brought—alone or together—into a strategic encounter with the specificity of population genetic technologies, and each encounter would turn the studied object—population genetic temporality and belonging— toward a slightly different angle, rendering visible different constellations of temporality, belonging, technology, and materiality. finally, the purpose of the transdisciplinary encounter outlined in this article is not to produce a methodological synthesis—indeed, a systematic synthesis would, i believe, reduce the potential insights produced through the encounter. instead, the methodological crux is precisely in engaging two realms of knowledge production in an unpredefined encounter that seeks to reveal moments of resonance as well as departure. while my focus has been on genetic ancestry testing, the strategic encounters between bioscientific technologies and queer theory (or another critical approach) could be applied to other evasive and seemingly intangible phenomena emerging with technoscience. this would involve approaching the chosen phenomenon as materially and technologically enacted, and as potentially multiple. at the same time, it would involve recognizing differences between the gendered and sexualized (or racialized, ableist, and classed) underpinnings of these multiple configurations. 21 oikkonen catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) notes 1 i use the word gender (instead of sex) consciously here, since the evolutionary trajectories and kinship relations that emerge through population genetic practices invoke a range of assumptions about the cultural organization of gender even when they appear to be merely about molecular-level sex. 2 the molecular clock was developed by, among others, emile zuckerkandl and linus pauling (1962), emanuel margoliash (1963), vincent sarich and allan wilson (1967), and mary-claire king and allan wilson (1975). 3 the first director of the genographic project, spencer wells, was a former postdoctoral student of luigi luca cavalli-sforza, one of the key figures behind the hgdp. 4 in the wake of the holocaust and early-twentieth-century eugenics programs, population geneticists have emphasized that race is not a meaningful genetic category and that population genetics provides a way of challenging racism. nevertheless, population genetic terms like “population” and “haplogroup” refer to genetically related groups that can often be linked to specific geographical areas. see reardon (2005), who argues that a key reason why the hgdp ran into trouble was its failure to conceptualize human differences in terms clearly distinct from race. 5 the y-dna test is available only to those who are chromosomally male, i.e. have a y chromosome. 6 these three modes of genetic ancestry testing are used by many online genetic testing businesses, although the specific practices vary. for example, ancestry by dna, family tree dna, roots for real, and 23andme market similar tests. 7 this assumption of clearly defined populations has been challenged by many sts scholars. see, for example, hinterberger (2012). 8 for an exception, see nash (2015). 9 see oikkonen 2015b for some examples. 22 oikkonen 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(2005) making parents: the ontological choreography of reproductive technologies. cambridge, ma: mit press. bio venla oikkonen is currently research fellow at the helsinki collegium for advanced studies, university of helsinki. she works at the intersection of feminist science studies and feminist cultural studies. her research interests include evolutionary theory, population genetics, and vaccine controversies, as well as theoretical questions related to affect and intersectionality. she has published two monographs, gender, sexuality and reproduction in evolutionary narratives (routledge 2013) and population genetics and belonging (palgrave macmillan 2017) as well as a number of research articles in journals such as social studies of science, signs, feminist theory, european journal of women’s studies and science as culture. on language, scientific metaphor, and endocrine disruption: an interview with feminist scientist brilmyer, gracen. (2020). on language, scientific metaphor, and endocrine disruption: an interview with feminist scientist ana soto. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-8. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © gracen brilmyer, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license on language, scientific metaphor, and endocrine disruption: an interview with feminist scientist ana soto gracen brilmyer university of california los angeles gracenbrilmyer@gmail.com in the late 1980s, professor of immunology ana soto accidentally discovered the presence of synthetic estrogens in her lab equipment. her lab had designed an experiment to test the effect of estrogen on the proliferation of human breast cancer cells (mcf7). based on previous findings, soto and her research partner carlos sonnenschein believed that, contrary to popular wisdom, the introduction of estrogen would not directly induce the proliferation of the cells, but would instead interfere with a naturally occurring inhibitor in the blood. but the control setup containing positive and negative controls (used in the past without problem) was now producing odd readings: although no estrogenic compound had been introduced, the cancer cells were still proliferating. soto and sonnenschein methodically removed each item in the control setup that might be producing the estrogen-like result. when they discovered that the estrogenic activity leached from the plastic centrifuge tubes used to store components of the cell culture medium, they called the manufacturer to find out what could have changed. the manufacturer let them know that the constituent materials of the tubes had recently been modified in order to reduce the possibility of breakage during centrifugation but declined to reveal what specific changes had been made. so soto’s lab turned to studying the tubes themselves. after a year of further research, they concluded that the estrogenic activity was due to the lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 2 additive that had been introduced by the manufacturer—nonylphenol, an antioxidant used in numerous other applications, some of which are meant for human use (e.g., spermicide) and the synthesis of detergents. soto and sonnenschein’s assay is called e-screen and has been enormously influential; in fact, most of the environmental estrogens discovered in the 1990s rely on the assay. conducted by gracen brilmyer at ucla during the “chemical entanglements symposium”, this 2017 interview with soto highlights her experiences of sexism in the sciences and how those experiences have shaped her thinking on language, science, and scholarship. gb: i was really excited to talk to you especially because of the talk that you're giving at “chemical entanglements” about reflecting on your process and the question of "to whose benefit” science is conducted. can you speak about how you arrived at the work that you are currently doing? as: i went to science out of curiosity: curiosity to understand things, to look at nature, to find out, “how is this all related? what does it mean?” when i was a kid, i was asking questions about those kinds of things without knowing much about any of them. my parents always took this seriously, in a way, so that sort of stimulated this interest. and probably that is where the feminism starts. i didn't realize there was any difference in possibilities for career development for boys or girls. even though my mother was a very cultured person, this was in the ’50s, so she was taking care of the children. and then she went back to work, but not when we were children. so i couldn't see that i was going to be marked by the fact that i was a girl, because i was given all i wanted to read and understand the world. but later on, when i went to university, there were a bunch of women, but you wouldn't believe how obvious [sexism] was. my anatomy professor said that we were there to catch husbands and things of that sort. and i got so upset that i said to him, “how could you know?” in my family i had been allowed to say anything reasonable, you see? they thought that it was nice that i liked science and arts, so i didn't realize that there was a world out there that wasn't really going to help. i started realizing that that was the way of the world. i still thought, “okay, i'm accepted at the medical school, which is a place that not everyone goes.” i didn't think that it was going to be that discriminatory because in the exam to enter medical school then, in argentina, it was totally blind. there were no quotas for lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 3 women or anything like that; the people who got the appropriate scores got in. i could see that women were mostly at home and men were mostly working, although some women obviously worked. i thought that maybe it was different for people my age. so, after the first year [in medical school in argentina], i realized it was going to be very, very, very difficult. and that is when i realized, too, that i was going to leave my country because i thought that probably in the states or europe the situation of women was better. i was very young, and i knew already that i wasn’t going to die in the same place where i was born. and all that has to do with the fact that i am a woman. things started to be a little different once i was a postdoctoral fellow; there were women full professors and even a department chair at tufts in the mid-’70s. a decade later, by accident, my scientific partner carlos sonnenschein and i discovered the first plastic estrogen. thanks to contaminated lab results, we realized that [estrogen] was in the plastic [used to manufacture test tubes]. jean meyer, the president of tufts university, was as puzzled as us by the results; he suggested that we send the tubes to the fda. the fda response to our estrogenin plastic problem was, “we’ll get back to you soon.” we are still waiting for their answer…we thought that it was going to be a two-year job or something like that for us to clean up the source [of the estrogen contamination] and go back to what we were doing before. but this was almost thirty years ago, and this public health problem has yet to be properly addressed. back to gender, somehow every day there is something that makes me to think of disparities and discrimination. probably what i write professionally would not look much different if written by a male colleague. however, i would not use metaphors of domination or war; i am too aware of their nefarious effects. you know, there is that famous story [told by anthropologist emily martin] about how men talk about fertilization and how women talk about fertilization. [martin’s book the woman in the body] was written in the ’80s. from men’s viewpoint, the sperm is trying to penetrate the egg. the female’s story is about how the egg could really attract the sperm. sexism is everywhere and, being a woman, i am always sensitive to it. i try to make it clear to people to refrain from using language in such an unthoughtful way; a lot of it is unconscious bias—even women do it. but i also see hidden baggage in our concepts, and that is what took me to study philosophy of biology and to start doing theory of biology. for example, how the idea of a genetic program was adopted in biology. “program” comes from logics, from mathematics. and there is something there that is immensely interesting because lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 4 people didn’t use the words “program,” “information,” or “signal” in biology until they took it from the mathematical theory of information. this mathematical theory does not deal with processes or things that exist in nature: logic is a human creation, and so are computers. but people use these mathematical ideas as if there were things present in the material world. this is exemplified by the story that the brain is a computer, a description that is absolutely metaphoric. in brief, biologists took concepts from theories developed in mathematics and without any sort of examination incorporate them into biology, but not as strict and precise theories, but as metaphor. then they say that the environment “reprograms” something that is not and could not be programmed. we think that the misuse of these metaphors is hindering progress in the biomedical sciences. we are immersed in the world that we wish to understand. hence, we can only have direct access to the objects that share the world with us through our situated perspective. to circumvent this, we can pretend to have a transcendent god’s eye…but this is a dangerous scape. we perceive the world with our senses, and thus our way of perceiving it is per force different than that of an insect. in order for something to be science rather than science fiction or literature, we need to have a theory. theories construct objectivity and determine the proper things or objects that can be studied by a given theory. and that is the beauty of science, that theories could be proven wrong and dismissed. biology has only one general theory: this is the theory of evolution that deals with a very long-time scale, that of phylogeny. but we scientists interested in phenomena pertaining to the life cycle, from fertilization to death, in organisms, don't have such a theoretical frame. this is why i and a handful of colleagues are looking for principles to construct a theory of organisms. that, in a nutshell, is another dimension of this story of what we are doing, and it comes from knowing that the concepts we use to talk about things and processes are charged [with sociocultural meanings]. as the philosopher dan dennett stated, “there is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.’’ the hidden baggage is also contributing to the problems in regulating endocrine disruptors. for example, the problem is not just conflict of interest, and the fact that industry actively sells doubt, as established by historians of science naomi oreskes and erik m. conway. there is also the sociocultural imprinting of honest scientists. [for instance, with endocrine disrupting chemicals (edcs),] the industry says, “oh, you haven’t identified a mechanism by which to link edcs to a specific lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 5 disease outcome,” and many of these scientists immediately go to work again, when indeed we have enough evidence for regulating this class of chemicals. because science is in a way bottomless. one can never have enough evidence. science is not going to be complete anyway, so you keep going on. but that is science for its own sake. [we need to] become aware that when dealing with science for public health there is a point when enough is enough. instead, many scientists would like to obtain more and more data to get to “the mechanism,” and to arrive at “molecular explanations.” well, the idea that everything has to be explained via molecular mechanisms is not an immutable law of nature, but a philosophical stance called reductionism. those philosophical stances, already abandoned by physicists more than a century ago, begat vague theories. if a theory is vague, it cannot be proven wrong. so that is, in a nutshell, the status of biology today. we urgently need to produce critical work, rejecting bad theories, elaborating new ones that are precise enough to be rejected… i'm frustrated about the slow pace of regulatory action in the light of so much evidence that we’ve seen building up in the last twenty-five years. i'm frustrated because this is a very serious public health problem, not as much for people my age but for the people that are coming after us. gb: you’ve talked about being a woman and how that made you more aware of the ways in which people use language to talk about scientific concepts. do you think a feminist lens influences you in the way that you either understand the world or formulate questions about your own work? as: i think that i'm very much aware that nowadays women everywhere earn less than men. and even when they don't, like in the french university system, maybe they take longer to arrive at the same post. i won’t say that i’m obsessed by [feminism] because it’s not that i’m in a perpetual state of alertness about gender discrimination. i see it when it’s happening—when someone talks about a woman in a particular way without realizing that [what they are saying] is something that he or she wouldn’t say of a man. and women do that, too. of course, i’m a feminist and of course i was very much vocal about that when i was young; now i alert people when they use unconscious bias, so that they become aware of it and can choose to work on it. gb: do you think about the diversity of your students or of the people in your department? given that the way your being a woman influences the way that you perceive the world and, from my perspective, really benefits your work a lot, do lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 6 you try to prioritize diversity among students and the questions and different perspectives they bring in? as: i think that people bring with them a lot of different things and that is good, a real asset. i think that regardless of where you come from, when you enter a scientific discipline, you have to learn to ask questions about science and that is not as easy. i foster that in my students when i say, “if you are going to a conference, don’t leave that conference without asking publicly your questions.” asking questions is not because you don’t know something you should know, but because there is always some point that is not clear, some assumption that is hidden, etc. indeed, there are many things that we do not know. thus, it is normal and necessary that each of us have questions for anyone that is talking about her/his research. so you will sit there and ask questions mentally and then ask questions and observe how others ask questions. and by the end of the meeting— and it depends on how long the meeting is—you have to at least do one, two, or three interventions. once they try this a few times, it becomes second nature. this is the way it should be. gb: do you see science as a creative process? as: oh, yes! my sister is an artist and we can talk about our creative lives. it’s amazing because we can talk to each other about the constraints of our work and how you have to understand those constraints or else you’ll get knocked down by them. people think in metaphors. human language is metaphors. the difference for me is that you can use a metaphor as a painter, or a writer and it goes far, but when you’re a scientist the metaphor is useful to “see” something, but then you have to make it clear to yourself that this is a metaphor and avoid “reifying” it. once you make it thing-like, believing that there is a genetic program, you are doing something dangerous that sooner or later will lead you astray. this is exactly what happened with the introduction of the terms program, information, and signal in biology. that is why when people talk about why there are so many problems regarding lack of reproducibility, it has to do with this: if you don’t have a theory, you can push things this way or that way because you don’t have the constraints of a good theory (a theory that is not vague, and thus, could be found to be wrong and if so, refuted). and when you start to find results that cannot be explained by the theory, then you’ve got to change something about the theory. the theoretical constraints of a precise theory are necessary in order to do science rather than fiction. lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 7 gb: do think that makes you more careful in the way that you use language when you write about theories in science? as: yes. metaphors are the way we talk, and if they help you to flesh out the concepts, it’s fine. you can live everyday life saying that in winter, the trees are naked, but [there’s a problem] the moment you take it seriously. trees cannot be naked—they don't wear clothing. when you’re using a metaphor to express a scientific concept and all of a sudden you start to believe in it, that is a problem and philosophers have studied that. gb: but it is interesting, too, thinking about both the limits of language and using language as a communication tool and—like you’re saying—metaphor as a way to communicate but also [a limitation]. as: but it’s also the way you think to yourself. if you are thinking and you’re going to talk to a colleague, that metaphor is already inside you because you cannot think more abstractly than that. that is the problem. unless you are talking about doing mathematics and working with symbols, but even in that case, concepts cannot totally be reduced to symbols. another thing that helped me a lot is that i speak several languages. you learn that you are constrained differently by the structure of each of the languages you use. i’m not exactly the same person when i’m speaking english as when i’m speaking french or spanish, to the point—the absurd point—where, although i write much better in english than in french, i feel more at ease in french because it allows me to be more playful than when i am speaking in english. gb: you’re thinking about the way that scientists understand their own practice and critically reflecting on why and how they’re engaging with scientific discourse. in the vein of talking about language and communication, i have two last questions: do you think about the way that the science that you’re doing affects so many different communities? do you think about communicating broadly with those communities—how language plays into activism and community engagement in that way? as: sure. see, for science for its own sake, normally, you talk mostly among scientists. but when you touch on disrupting the endocrine system, for example, something that would impinge on public health and environment, you have to communicate with laypeople. it’s very difficult to do that, but yes, after so many years of doing it, i feel good talking to lay audiences. lab meeting | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) gracen brilmyer, 2020 8 a scientist who doesn’t talk to anybody doesn’t exist. newton said that he got where he was because he was standing on the shoulders of giants. that is a metaphor again, but it is a nice one because you don’t build on science as an individual. and everything that humans do—and not only humans, every biological [entity], every bacterium doesn’t exist on its own—and everything that is alive is in some sort of relationship [with] other things that are alive. i think that you have to communicate with other scientists, and you have to communicate with laypeople. i always say that if i'm paid by taxpayers to do something, i must communicate the results of my research to them. they have the right to know; i have the obligation to transfer this knowledge, particularly if it has consequences that affect their health and that of their families. some people may not want to know. they can choose; they are free, but i think i have the duty to communicate the results obtained with their economic support. author bio gracen brilmyer is a phd candidate in the department of information studies at ucla, whose research lies at the intersection of disability studies, archival studies and the history of science. for more: gracenbrilmyer.com jain & stacey   critical perspectives on writing about illness: a dialogue with s. lochlann jain and jackie stacey on cancer, sts, and cultural studies s. lochlann jain stanford university lochjain@stanford.edu     jackie stacey the university of manchester jackie.stacey@manchester.ac.uk js: at the end of your book, lochlann, you write: "malignant has mapped out some of the cultural containment strategies for this crazy disease, its everywhereand nowhereness." you describe cancer as having “a grammar all its own." “i offer this book," you write, “in an attempt to speak to—and from within—the cancer complex," the constituent parts of the experience of which spin a web that, "unless we are vigilant," will entrap us (jain, 2013, pp. 221-223). in thinking about our two books together, as we’ve been asked to do, it seems to me that the process of writing itself perhaps offered a way for both of us to try to reconfigure the imaginative landscapes of cancer cultures and to counter some of the destructive normativities of cancer’s dominant grammars. this feels important not simply in the face of particular experiences of diagnosis and treatments but also in order to index the cultural and political forces that constitute what you call this "cancer complex." for, as well as feeling out of control of our bodies, we are all thrown by cancer into a place of ontological uncertainty, rewriting our histories and our futures through its shifting narrative and discursive orderings and disorderings. there is an overabundance of advice and storytelling about cancer and yet a paucity of meaningful recognitions and communications.  in looking at our two books again for this dialogue, i am struck by our respective (and very different) desires to move between different registers to process the experience of being immersed in this confusing and unwelcome world, surrounded by prescriptive imperatives and tedious clichés—some promising solutions and others just drenched in the sentimentalities of "cruel optimism" (berlant, 2011). for an academic diagnosed with cancer while working on the social and political significance of how stories get told about injuries, as you were lochlann, or while working on feminist readings of idealised femininities in popular culture, as i was at the time, there is just so much material to process that it’s hard not to want to write a book about it. as my characterisation of our intellectual projects just prior to our cancer diagnoses here indicates, our books speak to very different audiences at very different times, even if they do share some common ground. in the early 1990s, when i was writing my book, i don’t think i knew quite who my audience was—i think maybe i was trying to constitute one. i was keen to speak to people beyond the academy, but i also wanted to be able to mobilise theoretical debates, in order to challenge the contours of the cancer cultures i found myself inhabiting (and trapped by).   lj:  jackie, thank you for starting us off in this way. yes. containment strategies, indeed. the way you put it here—ontological uncertainty—seems exactly right for the kind of shock that many feel on diagnosis; with a cancer diagnosis, one enters an entirely new world, and cancer is a very specific kind of world in terms of research methods, treatments, and the stories that get told around it. while i think your description of "imaginative landscapes" is deadly accurate, the tendency in cancer literature has been to distinguish the "objective, scientific" knowledge from the "subjective, experiential" knowledge, and then to elevate the former. in our respective ways, we each analyze how these forms of knowledge have been built on that distinction in ways that have led to consequential blind spots in the understanding and treatment of the disease. in that sense, i would not say that my goal was to reconfigure the imaginative landscape through writing, but rather to analyze how americans contain the major medical, economic, and industrial failure that cancer relentlessly presents. the scope of the sleight of hand required to simplify the story of cancer as one of personal tragedy rather than as a complex nexus that we have reached because of fundamental blind spots in modes of everyday accounting is absolutely breath-taking. law, science, progress, profit, environment, time, and lifespan are just a few of the domains that have worked in the service of this building, and building on, this deeply held common sense. many of our institutions that purportedly regulate industry and practices such as medicine are simply, and structurally, unable to address the multiple, and constantly shifting, uncertainties that we consolidate with the word "cancer" presents to them.   malignant (2013) hypothesizes that understanding how our society makes sense of cancer, a subject that has so carefully been segregated from the massive institutions that have constituted it in its current form (as if cancer were a separate subject that comes to these institutions and ideas fully formed), enables us to better understand not only cancer, but also the broader common sense ideas that inform our everyday lives, and the broader ways that violence (one of whose forms is cancer) underwrites our selfand national-understanding.   one way to contain the social failure of cancer is to name it as something situated outside of a united whole. this narrative goes something like: "cancer is a terrible disease, we are doing everything we can to cure it." this of course separates out a "we" and a "cancer," and ignores the fortunes being made and lost (redistributed) through the disease. another way is to dismiss or sentimentalize the people who have cancer. the attitude of dismissal is easily seen in the example of lung cancer: until recently, people with lung cancer who smoked have been characterized as having asked for it, rather than as having been part of a complex situation in which cigarette companies manufactured the notion of choice. sentimentalization appears especially around women’s and children’s cancers ("help a woman with cancer" rather than "get rid of bpa and other potential carcinogens"), or in the strategy of focusing on the individual’s supposed depressive personality. another way to obscure how central cancer is to the economy is to constantly separate the components of cancer so that it is nearly impossible to hold them together. the separation of cancer’s causes and treatments is just one of many ways to do this (for example, focusing on early detection as a means of "prevention" offers a convenient way to divert attention from military, medical, and industrial causes). these are just a few of many concrete examples i examine in my book, of examples of the ways in which the underbelly of american progress, cancer, is carefully, disparately, and unevenly managed. in that sense, yes, the writing style i adopted was critical to my method of making evident the relays across the scales in which cancer operates—but this was one among many methods.   to come back to the point about cancer having a grammar all its own: living in the cancer complex requires learning new forms of advocacy and masochism, learning insurance language and how to negotiate social security insurance, as well as learning a whole slew of unwritten codes for how to be a sick person. all this work of learning how to negotiate one's personal and social identities that are usually learned over years—such as how to live as a white or brown person, how to live as a gendered and queer person, as a child, or an adult, and so on—all this needs to be learned quickly as one is learning how to cope with the diagnosis of a life-threatening illness. and so a large part of learning the grammar is learning how to live with the containment strategies, but these also become virtually impossible to live with. i think this is why so many people with cancer speak about how language loses meaning in this new world.   js:  despite their very obviously different geopolitical and historical groundings (about which more in a moment), these two books both seem to me to assume that culture cannot be captured by language. both books address cancer cultures from an intellectual formation deeply influenced by poststructuralism, feminism and science and technology studies. their reflections upon the limited and damaging ways of thinking about, and living with, cancer (in the uk in the early 1990s and in the us in the last decade or so) are acutely aware of the fractured and uneven character of social processes and yet always grappling with the institutionalised and embedded power relations that organise those processes (however chaotically or unsuccessfully). i think it’s important to say that neither book seeks to capture the experience of illness through writing or aims to deliver a straightforward denunciation of the inadequacies of care through academic critique. rather, what these two books do, in very different ways, is to grapple with this uneven and bewildering discursive terrain through shifting scales of focus in order to push back against this disorientating world.   lj:  yes, exactly. susan sontag (1978) so elegantly traced cancer’s metaphors and asked us to try to see a "pure" disease. but while her work is historically significant, i doubt that either of us would subscribe to a notion of pure disease, and certainly both of our books seek to understand how those "metaphors" go so much more deeply than the literary trope would have it, infiltrating our very notions of gender, sexuality, health, stigma, medical progress, statistics, and so on. cancer is not a noun, but a conglomeration of interests.   the common sense notion that cancer is a name for cells that divide too quickly does not even come close to recognizing the world of cancer. jackie’s photos of herself before and after diagnosis get at this mysterious divide: cancer is surely there in the first image, when she looks so well. it’s gone (at least for the time being) in the second image, when she’s recovering from chemotherapy, and yet her baldness—as a signifier of treatment, and thus of cancer—puts her squarely in the world of cancer ("in the kingdom of the sick," as sontag [1978] put it). in other words, there is a structural uncertainty to the disease: is it there, are we causing it by eating fried food, will it stay gone after treatment, and so on. this medical, personal, legal, scientific uncertainty about what causes it, how to treat it, who should be treated, is encoded in different ways in different institutional and personal framings. for example, in law we most often err in favour of not seeing cancer, because legal odds often need a "more likely than not" standard. so one would have to have a more than 50% chance of developing cancer after an exposure in order to gain compensation. in essence, 49 out of 100 people exposed to a carcinogen could get cancer after a spill or other exposure, and nothing could be done to give compensation in a court of law. thus, the uncertainty encoded in the probability statistics resulting from randomized control trials in medicine becomes something very different in law. institutional framings seem mostly to err in favour of not picking up cancer. and so uncertainty has typically been resolved in favour of the interests of entities causing cancer, rather than seeing cancer as an injury. my approach was to think about the work that cancer does when it is understood as a meaningful, tidy word, rather than as a descriptor continually being shored up, and to demystify it as a way of understanding the work it does for different interests, which accrete something like a meaning. the resulting cognitive dissonances (we know what causes cancer but we can’t do anything about it, for example) have to be held together certainly at a societal level, but they condense particularly harshly in the bodies of those who are undergoing treatment (and their communities, for i want to insist that cancer is a communal event as much as an individual disease, and i think both of our books make that claim differently but clearly). js:  you mentioned my use of photographs. maybe we could pause on the selection of visual images and objects in the two books. some of these are examples of normative models of healthy and diseased bodies, showing which kinds are used to underscore popular narratives of rescue and survivorship; others gesture towards mismatch and discrepancy, or apparent revelation that is obfuscating and opaque, or satire that brings poignant absurdity into the frame. i use two photographs of myself to contrast the "being-sick-but-looking-well" moment of pre-diagnosis in hindsight with the "looking-ill-but-free-of-tumour" post-chemo moment. knowing the illusory nature of the photographic promise of transparency didn’t stop me from searching back through old photos for clues of the impending medical crisis in my life. you come to know what you thought you already knew in quite a different way.   another example is my book cover, which reproduces a portion of a work from the ongoing series beework by aganetha dyck, a canadian artist who places damaged found objects inside apiaries, where bees build honeycombs upon them, as if in repair. dyck writes: "the beework is about cells. fragile cells filled with sensuous mysterious substances. programmed cells, determined cells. cells which are shaped, reshaped, filled, drained, cleansed, painted, prodded, invaded, monitored" (see dyck in stacey 1997, back cover). in her art practice, dyck collaborates with bees, as she puts it, to produce sculptural pieces out of ordinary broken objects (which bear the mark of age and damage) left for months in specially designed apiaries; the original objects are slowly transformed through the gradual depositing of wax honeycomb. the result is a series of compelling forms that are not easily legible (dyck, n.d.).1 i loved the mixture of artistic and organic processes, the mingling of intentionality and transformation. mutating cells are programmed, but they also have their own agency: their division and multiplication not only create new life but also threaten death. beework blends wax honeycomb cell-like patterns with human technical structures, producing an exquisitely disturbing aesthetic encounter with the nature of form. given my interest in abnormal and deformed cell growth at this time, there was a strong resonance with the ways in which these bees worked with damaged objects to produce new hybrid forms, not as a process of repair or cure, but rather as an imaginative new mode of cross-species reproduction. and the kind of cancer i had was one that transformed the meaning of the forms of human reproduction.  teratologies means the study of monsters and marvel; a malignant teratoma is a tumour of the germ cell (in my case the egg cell), which can produce many different kinds of organs as it grows—hence the common allusions to "monstrous births,"as the cell can contain recognisable but distorted combinations of body parts such as nails, hair, eyes and bones. as i read about teratomas in the history of embryology, i realised how potent cells are when they become part of scientific imaginaries. i became interested in the weight of these associations and in the paradox of cells as signifiers of potentiality—of both potential life and potential death. to die from a teratoma would mean one’s body had been taken over and destroyed by the potentiality of life-giving cells. i thought dyck’s beework spoke beautifully to the ambiguities i had to learn to tolerate better when i had cancer. it’s one thing to enjoy the play and deferral of poststructuralist celebrations of ambiguity in your academic textual practices, it’s quite another to endure the non-transparency of one’s own body in the face of a life-threatening disease.   lj:  i think the question of the book cover points to a crucial point: how does one represent a book about a subject in which the author’s goal is to deconstruct the ways in which that subject is represented? the image on the cover of your book, jackie, is also shot with a short depth of field such that most of it is out of focus, and the image wraps around the spine to the back, so that no matter how one holds the book, a good chunk of the image of the sculpture is missing. that effect is perfect. i didn’t have any choice about my cover (though my publisher did allow me to nix the first two options), but i did have twenty-five images inside the book. i distributed these among the chapters to indicate the range of ways that cancer has been represented in, for example, early detection campaigns, male breast cancer advocacy, scientific graphs, and medical advertisements.   js:  if the contours of this terrain were unexpected for both of us as we reluctantly travelled across them, then the kind of writing we produced in response seems to share an ambition to offer readers both critical purchase and affective connection.   lj:  yes, beautifully put.  js:  in approaching the question of "how uncertainty can be reproduced as knowledge" (p. 221), as you put it, lochlann, perhaps there was a desire to register the intensely textured and conventionalised, yet always elusive and baffling, quality of the social significance of our encounters along the way. a mixture of first-person accounts and cultural analysis defines the shifting scales and registers of these books, their modes of address blending intimate narratives with social criticism. for me, the inspirations for this kind of "writing otherwise" (as i have come to think of it, see stacey & wolff, 2013) came less from feminist science studies, as this field was still relatively new terrain in my intellectual life, and more from feminist cultural studies. the inclusion of a range from digressive, poetic and anecdotal interruptions to conventional academic writing that i admired at that time came from writers such as carolyn steedman (1986) and valerie walkerdine (1990); their books seemed to me to have successfully combined stories from childhood with social and cultural criticism. more recently, feminists in science studies such as jackie orr (2006) have interspersed familiar forms of critical analysis with shifts in register to signal formal and discursive interference; and the wonderful creative non-fiction writer who is also an academic, mary cappello (2009), has written what she calls a breast cancer anti-chronicle. and, of course, in queer studies, eve kosofsky sedgwick’s famous elegy ‘white glasses’ (1993) triggered a more intimate style of theorising sexuality that has been continued by jack halberstam (1998), ann cvetkovitch (2003, 2012), and many others. more recently, mary bryson and chase joynt have produced a video/performance dialogue linking surgery and treatment for breast cancer with trans people's medical experiences (bryson & joynt, 2013) as well as sedgwick's own writing about cancer and mortality (2010). lj:  i like the way you speak of an "intimate style" of theorizing, and we both recognized the ways in which more traditional modes of academic theorizing were not going to get at the horrific and bizarre kinds of social structures we were encountering. you cite jackie orr and eve sedgwick, both of whom, along with audre lorde (1980), were models for me—for the sheer brilliance of their writing, the momentum of their narratives, and their commitment to understanding the deeper politics of experience. i can’t help but notice that these three are also all queer identified, which has given them a certain distance from, and insight into, normative cultures. the genealogy here may be as much creative nonfiction and a commitment to exploring and communicating the insights of rigorous academic perspectives as it is a contribution specifically to a narrowly defined discipline. in that sense, i see some of my mentors, such as adrienne rich and james baldwin, as writers and storytellers with strong narrative voices and political convictions. but i’ve also been influenced of course by a lifetime of reading novels, and italo calvino has recently become my favourite author. still, the most significant academic writer of my career has been my dissertation advisor, donna haraway. my method, and jackie tell me if i’m right here in thinking that this was at least part of your method as well, was to initiate the various analyses by taking very seriously a few of the many stomach-punching paradoxes that demonstrated significant and complex contradictions. in that sense, stories were a critical component of the narrative flow and argument, since the insights i gained from treatment would never have been accessible to me from a different observational location—one i had to consider extremely carefully and experiment with a lot.   js:  yes, that describes it really well, i think.   lj:  as a fairly private person, i had to think long and hard about "coming out" in my writing, the role that the personal experience/voice played, what purpose it served. for one thing, let’s not forget that ten years ago discrimination and fear around cancer was, and remains, rampant and virtually impossible to identify, so in that sense i worried about coming out, particularly pre-tenure. i also found cancer was humiliating as hell, so why go there in my writing? and then, personal writing can so easily become self-indulgent, or seem to speak for itself, or come with a defensive voice—all criticisms that would horrify me even though they can equally be levelled at "academic" writing, and even though they can be launched before someone has actually read the work.   ultimately, i decided to come out as someone who had undergone cancer treatment because i wanted to address, interrogate, and offer ways to bridge the vast chasm between modes of experience for doctors and patients and how these experiences situate knowledge claims. it was important for me to raise this issue because it really splits the literature on cancer in two and i wanted to illuminate the huge the stakes in, and costs of, this split. on the one hand we have studies in oncology and on the other we have personal memoir. but i don’t see these as complementary reports from different perspectives on similar phenomena. on the contrary, i think they are two forms of knowing that co-constitute each other, even as they dismiss and disavow one another. as a consequence of this divide, we miss an opportunity to understand how cancer science and research relies on notions of health, patienthood, sickness, economics, cause, and so on, that are worth understanding better since they underwrite not just the social life of living in cancer, but also actual treatment options. this gap has to be bridged before we can understand the central and prevalent economic role that cancer plays in the making of american political and social life.   a funny thing happens around cancer, and i noticed this in many of my talks and write specifically about it in my introduction. namely, people seem to gather around identities and, from that place, judge a claim. so in giving a talk, for example, if i do come out as a "survivor" i get a very difference response—even with the exact same paper—than when i don’t. thus, in either place—having, or not having had—cancer either taints or shores up one’s claims in a nearly identity politics kind of way. there is certainly something to that—something to be learned by laying one’s body on the radiation table. but to return to the main point, since one of the things i wanted to draw attention to is how knowledge on each side is incomplete, i had to work out the voice of my narrator very carefully as one that could both demonstrate the stakes in the separation and also bridge it.  i thought about how and what to write about extremely carefully, for i knew that i would have to be a trustworthy narrator, trustworthy to an audience who may not share my class, education, gender, perspective, or baseline about common sense: a modest witness, if you will. this is tremendously difficult in the cancer world because people have justifiably strong views about it and heavy stakes in believing in things such as trials, progress, and treatments (despite, or perhaps because of, the dismal success rates). on the other hand, some of the details of my story were important. butch-ish, brown-ish, youngish for the cancer world, canadian-ish—these details were important to the degree that their situatedness, i think, can be as expert, albeit in a different way, about cancer as a tall, cis-male oncologist, or as someone writing in an academic style that is more readily assumed to be "modest" and objective.   the narrator of the book is me but also not me. strictly speaking, the stories are true and they are selected such that every story about my experiences serves a larger point or argument. but the character of the narrator was crafted in hundreds of rewrites and with many collaborators reading drafts. malignant offers an analysis of north american cancer cultures; it isn’t an autobiography or a memoir. that separation of self and narrator, like the stories, is close to the bone simply because cancer is so humiliating. it’s also terrifying and very, very boring and lonely. so no, that wasn’t me. i never even had cancer.   i do think that among the risks, not the least of which is overwhelming vulnerability, one advantage of this approach, from a purely writerly perspective, is that we each gave the authorial voice a great deal of consideration and thought in ways that academic books sometimes do not. js:  it’s so interesting to read your account of that process. what i remembered when rereading the two books for this dialogue was how i had had to really grapple with making the more "personal narratives" an integral part of the project. i tried various methods: marking them out in a different font; beginning every chapter with a story; blending them in, as if seamlessly. lochlann—your book seems to me to have achieved the latter. in the end, i went for the first of these options (and sometimes also the second). these different styles of writing both bring the affective dimension of illness onto the page, whilst trying to avoid the constraints and clichés of the conventional sub-genres of the classic cancer narrative. but these were undoubtedly the hardest sections of teratologies to write and were also the most redrafted. motivated by various combinations of desire and anxiety (revenge, disavowal, shame, gratitude), these stories were reshaped many times. for example, i remember that one of the dialogues i had written just didn’t work; so, following the advice of a friend and colleague, i rewrote it, giving only one side of a conversation and left the other side for the readers to fill in themselves, which worked much better. when the tone of a story felt too confessional, i redrafted it with less pathos; and if the stories of my own naiveté in the face of a cancer diagnosis returned me to some of my unsophisticated pre-academic yearnings, sometimes i ironed out the embarrassment of this and sometimes i didn’t.  you are right, i think, to have been cautious about the implications of using these styles of writing in relation to cancer. i am increasingly drawn to interrupting more conventional academic styles with so-called personal, anecdotal, or digressive registers, but not without ambivalence. the trouble is that as soon as you write "otherwise" as an academic who was also a patient, your writing very quickly gets folded into the genres of self-disclosure characterising cancer writing generally. given that we’re both so sceptical about the sentimentality of those conventions, even the pairing of our books on the basis of this shared ground might cause us to hesitate. using the language of the "confessional" or the "personal" to describe the styles we each use threatens to reiterate the generic conventions of cancer narratives that we are trying to undo. recently i have wondered if a better way to describe those shifts in register would be to use a different language entirely; perhaps metaphors of scaling work better. for example, i could describe what i did in teratologies as a scaling up and down of my focus in order to read the multiple dimensions of cancer cultures. but this doesn’t quite get at the ways in which i wanted to move readers, as well as interest them. i hoped that the unpredictable routes i followed in the writing might produce unexpected moments for the reader.  my aim was affective engagement rather than directed emotional responses. lj:  yes, i like the way you put that: engagement rather than response. i think we both aim to open things up rather than offer any clear answers. teratologies is unquestionably successful there; you lead with a series of explanations about how shocking and unforeseen the experience of diagnosis and treatment was, and then as the book progresses, you move into a series of brilliant insights into how work in film theory, gender, spectacle, stigma, and monstrosity reflect and illuminate cancer discourses. you begin from the horror of cancer, its monstrosity, and take that seriously—rather than domesticating it— in examining really how horrific it can be. "the tumour which these rogue cells come to form is part of the body and yet separate from it. it is produced by bodily matter but its redundancy can kill. when it takes hold it can enlarge organs and break through the skin, bringing the inside to the outside. if only it came out immediately and could be routinely cut off like an unruly shoot, perhaps survival might stay within sight. but it hides inside instead, to protect itself until its roots prevent pragmatic amputation. it impersonates the subject long enough to establish the power of its real difference, often until it can overpower its host body" (stacey, 1997, p. 78). teratologies is the first academic book on an illness, as far as i know, to take this interdisciplinary, intermodal approach, and i read it nearly immediately upon diagnosis. (it was recommended to me by one of my mentors, lucy suchman.) because i read it so early on in my own process, far before i had any intention of writing a book on the issue, i regret to say that i did not acknowledge it nearly enough in malignant for the ways that it shaped my own thinking. as i reread my copy of teratologies for this dialogue, i found many highlighted sentences and exclamation points in the margins that took me right back to those early days of reading your book and that strong bond i felt with you, though i barely knew you (!). teratologies was unquestionably one of the first and the best of the literature that meshed one’s own experience as part of the ethnographic material with a hard-hitting intellectual and political analysis. i can’t even imagine how hard it must have been to have come out at that point in cancer’s cultural history, let alone pioneer a new style of work in which the method really fit the questions—but the fact that you did has changed the route of gender and queer studies in initiating the long road to destigmatization.  js:  one of the things i most admire (or, to complicate this mutual admiration moment, maybe i also envy) about malignant is the way you make these shifts in scale and register so elegantly. in chapter six, for example, we are introduced to your own ivf treatments through your affecting writing, and then we find ourselves in the midst of your careful and nuanced epistemological challenge to research (or its absence) in this medical field. and in the chapter on the cancer artefacts (and bodily prosthetics) that accumulated over the course of diagnosis and treatments, lochlann, you both detail the power of biological artifice (wigs, prosthetic breasts) in the context of the intensification of gender normativities in cancer cultures, and you show how identity knowledges are troubled by precisely the objects that promise their stabilisation. cancer prosthetics bring sharply into view how much gender is a question of reading and being read—of legibility. as you put it: "if the wellness could not be faked, the ‘femininity’ could" (jain, 2013, p. 209). this made me think of what joan riviere (1929) and mary ann doane (1991) argued (in psychoanalysis and then film theory respectively): femininity is a masquerade that performs itself for another—its achievement depends upon a having-been-read-ness. your story of how you might be read as the "bald dyke from san francisco" matches my own exploration of the queerness echoed between the unspeakable embodiments of the c word and the l word (in the uk in 1991 anyway). when i was rewriting these sections (the first draft was jotted down while i was still in hospital after the surgery), i was surprised not to find more written about sexual stigma and taboo; this was partly why i relied on my own affective registers as a starting point. i wrote much of the book in the early 1990s when queer theory and affect debates had yet to make their full impact. looking back, i can see so many ways to redo this chapter now (maybe heather love’s new work on the stigma archive will inspire me to return to this area [see love, 2015, forthcoming]).   lj:  alas! that’s the price of being the innovator: others build on and take courage from your work. your work on the l word and the c word prefigured and enabled the queer theory that then emerged, and deserves to be even more widely cited for both its content and its role in the development of the discipline. this is an example of the high cost of the ways in which scholarship is segregated, and in particular the segregation of work on medical issues, such that i suspect teratologies is understood more as a book on cancer than on queer/gender theory, cultural studies, or political theory. this is an opportunity lost and a genealogy disavowed.   js:  perhaps we should also pause further here on the differences between the books and on the hesitation we might want to express about the obviousness of their "pairing" here. it is important to say here that when we were first invited to have this dialogue, my tendency was to try and articulate the common ground between the two projects. as our dialogue has developed, it has also become important to question some of the underlying assumptions about the "shared" categories (cancer, lesbian, academic, feminist, patient, queer) that might be the grounds for the comparison. lj:  i completely agree. i think this pairing can itself be seen as symptomatic of the overdetermination of narratives that come to be seen overarchingly as cancer narratives. in fact, in most ways our books are completely different in terms of method and approach, subject matter, politics, and scholarly contribution.  i would love to see other kinds of pairings that start to engage the real substance, as well as the ostensible topics of the books. i’d imagine an amazing dialogue coming from you and doane or other film scholars who think through stigma, gender, precarity, and visuality. i’d love to be paired with folks who write explicitly on queer studies or political economy.  js:  exactly. if cancer has a "grammar all of its own," as you put it, lochlann, then it is surely an overdetermined one, in the general sense of saturated with contradictory significance and thus not easily intelligible in any definitive way. like multiple "dream-thoughts" condensed in a single image or potent thought displaced into an apparently trivial image, the grammar of cancer strains to contain an impossible overload. to pull at any sentence thread within this grammar is to find oneself unravelling the uneven and charged formations that constitute the cancer complex. whether causation, treatment, prognosis or future prevention, the conflicting advice and worldviews flood into the spaces of uncertainty. too much information of the wrong kind, too much advice and too little listening—cancer’s cultures proliferate so much knowledge they make it hard to come up for air. the c word and the l word chapter in my book turned to the weighty experience of representing stigmatised categories that generated a visceral sense of anxiety in others, which one then had to deal with, alongside the illness and its treatments. in the context of early 1990s british culture, the affective charge around cancer was always more than the sum of its parts. i suppose the easy way of saying this is that cancer generated an especially powerful psychic force (and i think it still does, even if things have changed a lot since then).  lj:  even in the last decade since i began writing my book, the landscape has completely changed. ten years ago young adults were a completely isolated group when it came to the diagnosis, treatment, and sociality of cancer. while the stunning financial hardships, lack of treatments, and late diagnoses are still rampant, there is an incipient medical recognition of the specific needs of this demographic and recently a lot of social networking and activism has emerged, so the whole experience is perhaps equally as hopeless, but at least not so isolating.   js:  yes, that change is really important i think. the general orientation of the two projects might be that they both attempt to take the pulse of cancer cultures at a particular moment in ways that speak outwards to the more generalised landscapes beyond them. in other words, they try to diagnose what articulates with what, when, how and why: a kind of history of the present (as berlant [2008] would call it), or a study of a cultural conjuncture (as stuart hall [1980] would have put it).  but, of course, my context was the british national health system and the welfare state (or what was still left of it after thatcherism) in birmingham in the early 1990s. unlike your focus on drug companies, private medical insurance and lawsuits (which come both from your north american context and from your previous research interests), my social criticisms were aimed at the ways that thatcherite policies had decimated financial support for the nhs by cutting government funding and by marketising internal structures and relations between departments and hospitals. a direct example from that time is my witnessing two nurses barter plasters for cardboard sick bowls, when the chemo ward i was on had literally ran out of them and there was nothing for me to throw up into.   in writing the book, i was also keen to challenge the discourse around self-responsibility, which not only reinforced a pernicious individualism but was also shaming (and blaming) of people with cancer, shining the spotlight away from the government’s social responsibilities and towards patients. it's not that there aren't plenty of pharmaceutical company policies of which to be rightly critical in the uk; it's just that the priority for social scientists of medicine at that time was to try and help maintain the foundational principle of the nhs which was (and continues to be) so much under threat: that is, that all treatments should be "free at the point of access." so that's one important difference between the contexts of our books; the other, of course, is our interdisciplinary backgrounds. i see you using your anthropological eye to caution against the economic and legal underpinnings of many of the alienating medical practices organising the "cancer complex." my own interest in film theory and cultural studies provided the framework for my focus on visualisation and fantasy. the phd project i was three weeks away from completing when i was diagnosed was about changing cultural investments in idealised female bodies on the cinema screen—as eventually explored in star gazing: hollywood cinema and female spectatorship (1994). my focus at that time on the surface perfections of female stars in 1940s and 1950s hollywood could not have contrasted more strikingly with the images of teratomas in the medical textbooks i looked at to find out about this kind of tumour. etymologically referring to "monstrous births," the photographs i found in those medical textbooks reminded me of the disgusting iconographies of body horror films—the complete opposite of the idealised "clean and proper bodies" (kristeva, 1982) that i had been studying on the hollywood screen. this led me into the exploration of a teratological imaginary, that fantasy landscape generated by the tension between fear and fascination, whose mise-en-scène was distinctly science fiction in tone.  in fact, it was reading science fiction criticism in film studies for teratologies that first led me into feminist science and technology studies more generally (an influence that has continued rather than being a passing phase). i'd been aware of this field at the centre for contemporary cultural studies (cccs) in birmingham, where i was completing my phd, but it was definitely at one remove from the psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship i was struggling to put into dialogue with ethnographic studies of audiences at that time. it's less that i developed a framework for the book after diagnosis and treatments, and more that i found myself plunged into this phantasmatic world of embryology and cell biology (of teratology) that seemed already populated by the iconographies of science fiction cinema (and vice versa). the only way i seemed able to find an orientation through this nightmarish world of excessive cell growth and monstrous births was to begin to theorise the other side of the surface perfections of femininity as the hidden horrors of the maternal body. our repeated need to return to scenarios that enable us to ensure a clear distinction between the two seemed to be evidenced in the popularity of science fiction genres and our fascination with medical dramas generally. this was my starting point for writing of book that emerged from having cancer. the affective familiarity of being diagnosed with a stigmatised illness (especially at my age then, 31) echoed responses i had noted to living a stigmatised sexuality (which i had announced to my family and friends relatively recently—5 years or so previously). i began to write notes about this affective echo while i was still in hospital rehearsing the news with visitors and other patients (who were mostly having hysterectomies). lj:  yes, and i found it especially incredible to re-read your chapter three, in which you so acutely worked out the layerings of monstrosity metaphors in thinking through different kinds of stigmatized bodies and through multiple theorists coming at this question from different angles. this chapter is brilliant. read it.  i don't see my book as an activist book per se. i'm less interested, for example, in figuring out who should have responsibilities to whom than in understanding the stakes of our blind spots and the logics that hold our attention away from seeing these stakes, or the implications of how we currently misunderstand this rogue-ish, noun-ish cancer. malignant examines the routes by which our attention swerves from understanding the depth of cancer as an economic decision and misleads us toward pseudo-questions, such as how much we as a society should spend on treatments, or whether we are winning the war on cancer. in that sense, my approach was to try to take away the natural analytic end point that cancer presents when it is closed off as an object in itself, and to rather see it as a window on the array of phenomena that have arranged it, and closed it off, as if it were an object. the most i can hope for with my book is to provide some language for those who suffer from similar cognitive dissonances, or those who seek more accurate ways of understanding the depth of the paradoxes that construct cancer as we know it. in that sense i aimed to take a hard look at the deeply vicious cycles and human costs of the simplistic and idealistic ways we understand the economy and its health, and provide routes to a richer understanding of the values that underlie what i'm calling the political-medical-economy.  js:  i see what you mean. not an activist book, unless we hope that intervening into blind spots and logics is its own modest kind of activism. academic activism perhaps?—if that's not a contradiction in terms. but that's the subject of a whole other dialogue topic for another day i think.  lj:  to question the construction of "cancer" in our society is to question some very deeply held beliefs, beliefs that won't change. in my view, the best we can do is to shine a bit of flicker, which i try to do methodologically through a form of writing and attention that i call, using the concept of my friend derek simons, elegiac politics (see simons, 2006 and jain, 2007). i certainly don't think that an elegiac structure needs an autobiographical component. but there are two parts to that approach that i do think are critical. the first is an attention to the ways that logics of thought (for example, in risk calculation) can systematically structure and at the same time obscure violence, and the second is an attention to the real human costs of those sacrifices that are contained by such ways of structuring an issue.   elegiac politics aims to "recognize the quiddity of both the violence and the ways we justify it, hide it, and render it logical and explainable—each time in slightly different ways. an elegiac politics recognizes the dangers of the narrative form, and commits to show rather than to describe, to question rather than explain, and to invite rather than inform." this is a definition of elegiac politics that simons and i have been working on together (see simons, 2006 and jain, 2007). perhaps this would be a good moment to turn to the question of queering temporality in our work.  js:  yes. thinking about this issue for this dialogue reminded me of what gunhild hagestad, wrote about getting cancer: it is like "falling out of time" (hagestad, 1996, p. 205)—everything around you continues to be organised through the conventional flows and routines of calendrical structures, while your own temporal structures fail to hold you anymore. in teratologies, i sought to link this feeling of temporal scrambling with a critique of the kinds of heroic stories that get published about surviving cancer. i loved the extract from miriam engelberg's cancer made me a shallower person (2006) in your book, lochlann, and i also enjoyed barbara ehrenreich's smile or die (2010), as both of these challenge the progress narrative of stories of endurance and survival (often presented as a steady upward curve towards wisdom, thanks to the "gift" of a cancer diagnosis). this is a reductive stereotype, i know, and actually today there are many more variations on this kind of heroic narrative. but when i was diagnosed, it felt to me that this was the pervasive discourse not only in the personal narratives and self-help books i was given, but also in everyday conversations.   looking back on teratologies now, it's obvious how much it was a book about queering temporalities. psychoanalytically, of course, the past-present-future distinction that has organised modern ideas of time makes little sense. if we can be returned to affective states from our childhood in ways that make the past feel like yesterday, then, in psychoanalytic terms, as melanie klein (1975) has argued, there is only ever present time. i have increasingly turned to psychoanalytic frameworks for understanding our attachments to the illusory (and reassuring) teleological organisation of modern notions of time. recent theories of queer temporality have given a new psychosexual charge to the strangeness of modern time (already much written about by philosophers for decades). what i appreciate about recent debates that have become so influential in the field in the last few years (edelman, 2004; freeman, 2010; halberstam, 2005; love, 2007; munoz, 2009; and so on) is that they make the double move of exposing the heteronormativity of teleological structures and narratives (see valerie traub, 2013) whilst also demonstrating the strangeness of time itself. i think what i was grappling with, in the context of what you so eloquently called "living in prognosis," lochlann, was how to write about the ways in which the embodiment of heteronormative temporality is articulated through conventionalised linear narratives that collapse with the onset of life-threatening illness. cancer, as you write, adds a particular charge to this loss because of its shaming capacities and the problem of its legibility. mary bryson and i (2013) have written about this in relation to queer representational politics and strategies.  one way to think about "living in prognosis" is as the scrambling of time: perhaps the past becomes overly present as it is scanned for possible aetiologies; perhaps the stretched-out future most (white, middle-class) 30to 40-year-olds take for granted shrinks to an unpredictably truncated span that makes the present feel always poignant; or perhaps all decisions feel so impossible (and absurd) that even the most trivial options become relative and contingent. without over-stretching the articulations between queerness and temporality (see the glq roundtable, including the critique of this connection by annamarie jagose, in dinshaw et al., 2007), we might argue that cancer brings to the fore a disturbance to patterns of self-narration and quotidian routines that have generally anchored heteronormative ways of organising one's life; in this sense, cancer's chaotic impact on the capacity to live one's life through the flows of modern time will echo and deepen a sense of queer temporal disturbances already familiar to many.   lj:  yes, that is beautifully put—i like this contextualization of temporal regimes within heteronormativity and your reading of the impossibility of pasts and futures, and you write of that beautifully in your introduction as well. i was particularly interested in thinking through time in two ways. first, i was interested in how capitalist structures of accumulation work to both consolidate normative ideologies of normative lifespans (that are so shattered for young adults, in a different way than for children, diagnosed with terminal or life-threatening illnesses of any kind).  in thinking through these temporalities and how they become taken for granted, i looked to economic structures such as social security and retirement savings accounts, normative social expectations/structures such as marriage and children, and read-early detection campaigns against those.   second, i became fascinated with the utter—and yet virtually impossible to bring together—difference between the constant population statistics generated in the studies around causation and treatment, and the singular individuality of a cancer diagnosis and prognosis. i call this effect "living in prognosis" (jain, 2007) and trace how the statistics move through medicine, medical malpractice law, and various laws and policies that might limit carcinogenic exposures. prognoses gain a solidity at the population level not reflected in the experience of individuals (or even for populations: institutions such as law courts and regulatory agencies have simply been unable to imagine how to deal with this paradox). uncertainty becomes a number, which lends it a sense of credibility that simply falls apart when you scratch the surface. the overlooking of this uncertainty by courts, physicians, and policymakers of good and bad faith without fail gives the advantage to cancer rather than to defending against cancer.    combining these two ways of understanding immortal and mortal time enables me to examine how effective the rhetorics of progress in a war against cancer have been, even despite all the evidence to the contrary both in causation and in treatment. it can be hard for people to hear that argument, because it goes against the grain of hope, common sense, medical promise, and progress, and it forces us to recognize just how misleading it is to think about cancer as an external, rather than an internal, social, medical and economic threat. js:  a good place to stop, as we've run out of time (and we are over the word count). but to be continued i hope. notes 1 during the mid to late 1990s, numerous art exhibitions featured works by and about women with breast cancer, following a decade of art exhibitions by and about people with hiv/aids. in 1995 aganetha dyck's work was included in the traveling exhibition "survivors, in search of a voice: the art of courage," curated by barbra amesbury and joan chalmers for the royal ontario museum, toronto, with the support of the chalmers foundation. this exhibition explored breast cancer through the work of 24 canadian women artists in collaboration with 100 women with breast cancer and was viewed by an estimated 250,000 in toronto and one million internationally (gordon 1997). two articles about the exhibition by lynna landstreet (1995a and 1995b) were published in xtra!, the toronto gay newspaper, now online only, founded in 1984 and published by pink triangle press. barbra amesbury (born 1948) is a canadian singer-songwriter, composer and filmmaker, and philanthropist who had several top 40 hits in canada in the 1970s as bill amesbury before coming out as transsexual. chalmers (born 1928), the renowned canadian philanthropist and supporter of the arts, is her long-time partner and collaborator on projects including the woodlawn arts foundation, through the support of which works from the survivors exhibition are in the collection of the 519 church street community centre in toronto. references berlant, l. (2008). thinking about feeling historical. emotion, space and society, 1, 4-9. berlant, l. (2011). cruel optimism. durham, nc: duke university press. bryson, m. & stacey, j. (2013). cancer knowledge in the plural: queering the biopolitics of narrative and affective mobilities. journal of medical humanities, 33, 197-212. bryson, m., & joynt, c. (2013). under the skin: imag(in)ing medicine's queer pedagogies as moving pictures. no more potlucks, 29. retrieved from http://nomorepotlucks.org/site/under-the-skin-imagining-medicines-queer-pedagogies-as-moving-pictures-chase-joynt-m-k-bryson cappello, m. (2009). called back: my reply to cancer, my return to life. new york: alyson books. cvetkovich, a. (2003). an archive of feelings: trauma, sexuality and lesbian public cultures. durham, nc: duke university press.  cvetkovich, a. (2012). depression: a public feeling. durham, nc: duke university press. dinshaw, c., edelman, l., ferguson, r. a., freccero, c., freeman, e., halberstam, j., jagose, a., nealon, c., & n. t. hoang. (2007). theorising queer temporalities: a roundtable discussion. glq: a journal of gay and lesbian studies, 13, 177-195. doane, m. a. (1991). femmes fatales: feminism, film theory, psychoanalysis. abingdon: routledge. dyck, a. (n.d.). the beework. retrieved from http://thebeework.weebly.com/the-bee-work.html edelman, l. (2004). no future: queer theory and the death drive. durham, nc: duke university press. ehrenreich, b. (2010). smile or die: how positive thinking fooled america and the world. london: granta. engelberg, m. (2006). cancer made me a shallower person: a memoir in comics. new york, ny: harpercollins. freeman, e. (2010).time binds: queer temporalities, queer histories. durham, nc: duke university press. gordon, s. (1997, april 13). an exhibit to inspire both action and tears breast cancer is often spoken of in a whisper. but an art show in king of prussia was designed to start conversations. the philadelphia inquirer. reprinted online at http://articles.philly.com/1997-04-13/news/25530024_1_radiation-oncologist-marisa-weiss-art-exhibit. accessed june 1, 2015. hagestad. g. o. (1996). on-time, off time, out of time? reflections on continuity and discontinuity from an illness process. in v. l. bengtson (ed.), adulthood and aging: research on continuities and discontinuities (pp. 204-22). new york, ny: springer publishing company. halberstam, j. (1998). female masculinity. durham, nc: duke university press. halberstam, j. (2005). in a queer time and place: transgender bodies, subcultural lives. new york: new york university press. hall, s. (1980). cultural studies: two paradigms. media culture and society, 2, 57-72. jain, s. l. (2007). living in prognosis: toward an elegiac politics. representations, 98, 77-92. jain, s. l. (2013). malignant: how cancer becomes us. oakland, ca: university of california press. klein, m. (1975). love, guilt and reparation and other works, 1921-1945. new york, ny: the free press. kristeva, j. (1982). powers of horror: an essay on abjection. new york: columbia university press. landstreet, l. (1995a). the art of surviving: a hard-hitting exhibit brings reality of  breast cancer home. review of the exhibition "survivors, in search of a voice: the art of courage." xtra! magazine. toronto: pink triangle press. reproduced on the blog "wild ideas" at http://www.wildideas.net/calyx/library/nihil273.html. accessed june 1, 2015 landstreet, l. (1995b). killing us not-so-softly: has technocratic civilization become cancer in itself? xtra! magazine. toronto: pink triangle press. reproduced on the blog "wild ideas" at http://www.wildideas.net/calyx/library/nihil273.html. accessed june 1, 2015.    lorde, a. (1980). the cancer journals. san francisco: aunt lute books. love, h. (2007). feeling backward: loss and the politics of queer history. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. love, h. (2015). doing being deviant: deviance studies, description, and the queer ordinary. differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies, special issue: queer theory without anti-normativity, 1(26). munoz, j. e. (2009). cruising utopia: the politics and performance of queer futurity. new york: new york university press. orr, j. (2006). panic diaries: a genealogy of panic disorder. durham, nc: duke university press. riviere, j. (1929). womanliness as masquerade. international journal of psychoanalysis, 10, 303-13. sedgwick, e. kosofsky. (1993). white glasses. in e. sedgwick (ed.), tendencies (pp. 247-61). durham, nc: duke university press. sedgwick, e. kosofsky. (2000). a dialogue on love. boston ma: beacon press. simons, d. a history of touching, unpublished manuscript on file with author simons, derek. (2006). projectile economics: crash. the journal of transport history, 27(2), 131-135. sontag, s. (1978). illness as metaphor. new york: farrar, straus and giroux. stacey, j. (1994). star gazing: hollywood cinema and female spectatorship. abingdon and new york: routledge. stacey, j. (1997). teratologies: a cultural study of cancer. london and new york: routledge. stacey, j. & wolff, j. (2013). writing otherwise: experiments in cultural criticism. manchester: manchester university press. steedman, c. (1986). landscape for a good woman. london: virago. traub, v. (2013). the new unhistoricism in queer studies. pmla, 128, 21-39. walkerdine, v. (1990). schoolgirl fictions. london: verso. bios s. lochlann jain is associate professor in the anthropology department at stanford university, where she teaches medical and legal anthropology.  jain's publications include, among others, injury (princeton university press, 2006) and malignant: how cancer becomes us (university of california press, 2013), which won the victor turner prize, the edelstein prize, the diana forsythe prize, and the fleck prize. jain is currently working on three projects. the first is developing methods for anthropology from theater and art practices, the second is studying origin stories of hiv, and the third is on the history and theory of automobile crashes. jackie stacey is professor of media and cultural studies at the university of manchester. she is author of star gazing: female spectators and hollywood cinema (1994); teratologies: a cultural study of cancer (1997) and the cinematic life of the gene (2010), and co-author (with sarah franklin and celia lury) of global nature, global culture (2000). in addition, she has co-edited a number of books, including: thinking through the skin (with sara ahmed, 2001); queer screens (with sarah street, 2007); and, most recently writing otherwise: experiments in cultural criticism (with janet wolff, 2013). she is also an editor of screen. her current research project is provisionally entitled: crossing over with tilda swinton. microsoft word woelfle-erskine-131-788-1.docx woelfle-erskine, c. (2017). the watershed body: transgressing frontiers in riverine sciences, planning stochastic multispecies worlds. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2), 1-30 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © cleo woelfle-erskine, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article the watershed body: transgressing frontiers in riverine sciences, planning stochastic multispecies worlds cleo woelfle-erskine university of washington cleowe@uw.edu abstract in conversation with eva hayward’s writing on transgender embodiment, this paper explores how beaver modify landscapes differently than human engineers, and how human engineering might be transformed through riverine collaborations with beavers. considering the body variously as a body of water — a river, which draws together all of the above and underground water in a watershed — as like our own trans bodies, and as a slippery double for the psyche of an anthropocene engineer, july cole and i argued that thinking with beaver as stochastic transgressors against manifest destiny engineering projects could transfigure engineers approaches to their work and river restoration more broadly. what if, rather than trapping beavers into service as “ecosystem engineers,” we assert that humans should engineer as beavers do, in ways that create porous boundaries between land and water and upand downstream, by way of stick-and-mud, leaky, temporary dams? here, i theorize a transfigured watershed body through human-beaver-salmon encounters at 2 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) three salmon recovery sites in the pacific west: a karuk-led project on the klamath river, agency-led beaver relocation projects in the methow and yakima watershed, and a citizen science-agency collaborative project in the beaverless salmon creek and russian river watersheds. all three stories concern river and salmon recovery in the pacific west, where either humans or beavers have initiated collaborative projects to raise water tables, keep rivers from going dry, and improve salmon habitat. these scientists and local knowledge holders’ encounters with beavers and their ponds thick with salmon are inspiring them to change how they undertake habitat restoration projects and also spurring some to reconsider the proper task of human ecologists and engineers, into a mode inspired by beavers themselves. “the plan [in the undercommons] is to invent the means in a common experiment launched from any kitchen, any back porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, any improvised party, every night. this ongoing experiment with the informal, carried out by and on the means of social reproduction, as the to come of the forms of life, is what we mean by planning; planning in the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible.” —harney and moten, the undercommons: fugitive planning and black study introduction the first time i touched a living beaver was during the summer of 2014, on a columbia river tributary, during an era of extinctions, loss, shock, reassessment, and disorientation that is coming to be called the anthropocene. i traveled there with july cole, continuing years of scientific, artistic, and political engagement with beaver-salmon-human worlds. but only now did we engage physically with the immediate lively heft and squirm and odor of castor canadensis in the flesh. we helped relocate “nuisance” beavers to territories where people welcomed them, with all their unpredictable land and water interventions. we were honored to pitch in and facilitate the beavers’ never-ending projects. 3 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) beaver works—dams, lodges, canals, and tree-felling projects—inevitably transgress private property lines, interrupt human irrigation and orchard schemes, and shift landscapes from fence-able pastures and tame drained fields to dynamic mosaics of thicket, meadow, water, bog, and woods. we liked thinking about how the beavers we met could be decolonizing the controlled territories of manifest destiny, and how we might be helping them do it. manifest destiny began as a rationale for westward expansion by white settlers in the 1850s; it was tied up in claims of white intellectual and technological superiority and professed a god-given mandate for white people to wipe out or subjugate indigenous people (lepner, 1837), and later to exclude black people and nonwhite immigrants and arrivants from land acquisition and resource-extraction benefits. manifest destiny thinking, as i use the term, is the notion of human separation from and dominion over other species and elementals. indigenous sciences and other epistemologies have always been central to salmon, river, and watershed governance in the pacific west, though settler science has often erased contributions of that knowledge.1 any project to reconfigure watershed governance in a mode that resists manifest destiny’s ongoing domination requires that i and other non-indigenous scholars take seriously indigenous epistemologies and the sovereignties in which they are rooted. i characterize large dams and levee projects of the twentieth century as manifest destiny projects—among other extractive industries. in this article, in conversation with indigenous, decolonial, and feminist scholars, i trace several ways that manifest destiny and its infrastructural legacies disrupt relations among humans and other species, imposing disproportionate burdens on indigenous, nonwhite, and poor communities. finally, i explore how queer and trans disruptions of manifest destiny thinking and legacies might contribute to decolonial projects. the beavers’ forests were burning all around july and me that summer; we wondered what effects their future interventions might have on fire regimes. at the same time, water-scarcity debates in our home 4 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) state of california zeroed in on technological salvation in the form of immense and static waterworks, including new large dams that would foreclose the possibilities of millions of beaver, salmon, humans, and what donna haraway would call their “messmates” (haraway, 2008). in a move that contradicts and rejects the logics of these massive waterworks, the biologists we met in washington relocate beavers to high mountain streams where they have been absent for nearly two centuries, hoping that they will build small, leaky dams not subject to human control. with time, these dams create pools in floodplain meadows that shelter juvenile salmon (oncorhynchus spp.) and release cool water downstream in the late summer. methods developed by us forest service biologists for live-trapping and relocating families of beaver on the methow river have traveled to the nearby yakima river, where state biologists are collaborating with the yakama nation on a wide range of salmon recovery projects, and to six other rivers in washington. in trying to reverse the damage of twentieth-century river engineering projects, human actors are entering into improvisatory riparian relations with this animal that they often call an ecosystem engineer. in an earlier article, cole and i (2015) thought with these beavers about how regenerative cuts can open possibilities of transformation for a human engineer who yearns against the totalizing assumptions of the anthropocene. the conception of the anthropocene as a global phenomenon arose together with global climate models and was accompanied, among the geophysicists who coined the term, by the figure of a single anthropos. this assumption of universal humanity erases differences of race, class, culture, and different legacies of colonialism and capitalism (foster, clark, & york, 2011; moore, 2000). people in different places bear unequal responsibility for changing the planet’s surface and climate, and those who have contributed least to greenhouse gas pollution bear the heaviest burden of changing climates, oceans, and ecological conditions (moore, 2015). indigenous, feminist, and anticapitalist critics have responded with other understandings of the epoch and with terms like capitalocene and chthulucene that 5 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) problematize a singular anthropos, draw attention to capitalism as a driving force behind climate change, and pay attention to the ways changing climates affect indigenous and postcolonial territories (haraway, 2016; moore, 2015; todd, 2016; tsing, 2012). in this article, i bring cole’s and my theory of a transfigured watershed body to bear on human-beaver-salmon encounters at two salmon-recovery sites in the pacific west: a karuk-led project on the klamath river and a citizen science/agency collaborative project along the beaverless salmon creek and russian river. these sites have different legacies of indigenous dispossession, resource extraction, hydrologic alteration, and salmon decline, resulting in different approaches to resource policy and tribal co-management. both stories concern salmon recovery in the pacific west, where humans or beavers have initiated collaborative projects to raise water tables, keep rivers from going dry, and improve salmon habitat. people’s encounters with beavers and their ponds thick with salmon are inspiring them to change how they undertake habitat restoration and also spurring some to reconsider the proper task of human ecologists and engineers, into a mode inspired by beavers themselves. however, these improvisatory, perhaps unconscious gestures have a long way to go before they actually decolonize riverine relations. and how to effect that transformation? let me recapitulate that 2015 article briefly. drawing on our own queer-trans experience on various front lines, and thinking with eva hayward (2008) about transgender embodiment and becoming, cole and i consider a body of water—for example, a river, which draws together all of the above and underground water in a watershed—as like our own trans bodies and also as a slippery double for the psyche of an anthropocene engineer. hayward’s theory helps cole and me think about how beaver modify landscapes differently from human engineers and how human engineering might be transformed. we argue that thinking with beaver as stochastic2 transgressors against manifest destiny engineering projects could transfigure engineers’ approaches and river restoration. what if, rather than trapping beavers into service as 6 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) “ecosystem engineers,” humans emulated beavers’ reshaping of water and land by creating porous boundaries between land and water and up and downstream by way of stick-and-mud, leaky, temporary dams? such an approach would undermine the thinking behind twentiethcentury water-engineering projects that diverted water from streams and wetlands to irrigation ditches and pipelines, benefiting settler agriculture and expanding cities at the expense of flowing rivers. now, as settler descendants increasingly collaborate with tribes on beaver projects, do these collaborations make decolonizing moves? i think they do if nonindigenous scientists and residents recognize that these rivers remain integral to indigenous economies and cultures and that tribes in salmon country have always been the most stalwart defenders of flowing rivers and opponents of practices that degrade riverine habitats. to quote eve tuck and k. wayne yang (2012), “decolonization brings about the repatriation of indigenous land and life.” as my cases will show, settlerdescendant collaborators work for decolonization in some, but not all, beaver collaborations. cole and my argument’s first main thrust is a trans theory of watershed embodiment: that changing engineered landscapes into beavered ones could realize the watershed’s many bodily potentials. our other thrust into trans theory argues against naturalizing arguments that trans (and queer) are not transgressive. where “queer is a not yet here” (muñoz, 2009), trans, as we theorize it, is a collective move to negotiate gendered movement through society that can accommodate many evolving expressions and categories of being. these negotiations take place within trans theory, over the definition of trans, over its unmarked whiteness and debt to womenand queer-of-color theories, and over its decolonial potentials (aizura, cotten, ochoa, & vidal-ortiz, 2014; stryker, 2006). in activist and feminist spaces, debates over whether masculine or nonbinary-identified people can claim trans and feminist, discussions of hierarchies of oppressions along gender and race lines, and generational differences over pronouns and categories abound. these debates are crucial and inform my evolving understanding of trans political potentials 7 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) within and beyond identitarian concerns; however, i will not delve further into these conversations here. instead, i focus on the transgressiveness of trans as embodied by those who, because of political identities or gender expressions at odds with established queer-trans categories, will never assimilate. in articulating this particular embodied trans politics, this spirit of always-crossing that can animate riverine politics through reciprocal engagements with beavers, i aim to sketch out a trans potential for scientists and others who work for watershed recovery but do not necessarily identify as queer or trans. i want to explore what such people’s taking up of trans moves or trans politics might do for watershed science and for trans theory. i bring cole and my concept of the watershed body back to specific encounters between salmon advocates and beavers to further explore whether and how river activists might translate physical transsexual survival techniques into psychological trans-species survival invitations, finding some way to follow the practice of hayward’s trans figures who “create embodiment by not jumping out of our bodies, but by taking up a fold in our bodies, by folding (or cutting) ourselves, and creating a transformative scar of ourselves (hayward 2008, 256)” (woelfleerskine and cole 2015, 308). as far as i have been able to discover, few of these beaver advocates identify with trans theory or ally themselves with (or are) trans people. nonetheless, it seems useful to ask whether their actions and discourses may be read as transformations of the watershed body, how deeply the watershed body may be transformed, and when this transformation might undermine manifest destiny thinking and support decolonial projects. the idea of a watershed body—which comes into being through relations among its multispecies inhabitants and the landscapes and weather systems that shape them—is also in conversation with haraway’s (2008) notion of becomings with more-than-human others and barad’s (2007) notion of phenomena as agential intra-actions among these constituents. 8 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) i draw out these and other resonances with feminist, queer, and indigenous theory below and in a forthcoming companion article. first, i consider what decolonizing ethics may emerge in the contact zone where queer, trans, and indigenous theory meet. beavers are not necessarily resistant to co-optation into manifest destiny projects. rather, they are good to think with about how or whether a project might enact a decolonizing ethic. i then travel with the beavers to the klamath river and salmon creek, tracing how their presence and absence have reshaped my own engagements with trans and queer theory and ecological science. decolonizing ethics decolonizing ethics, as zoe todd, audra simpson, and kim tallbear have argued, are not just worked out in human forums (simpson, 2011; tallbear, 2014; todd, 2014); some develop along ditches and sloughs behind dams, by humans working not alone but in collaboration with other beings. these ethics fundamentally threaten manifest destiny thinking, which assumes that only (white, male, settler) humans have ethics, which they then impose on other groups of people and on other species and the earth itself. although beavers’ ethics, if they exist, are not known to us, their physical undertakings on the continent transgress the territorial insistences and totalizing practices of manifest destiny. their activity thus brings about a physical decolonization; it also ties river systems and species back together in ways that increase resilience in the face of devastation. beavers do not recognize manifest destiny boundaries of human and natural, and many people who collaborate with them on flow or salmon rehabilitation projects also reject binaries between human and natural landscapes when they encourage beavers to build dams in city parks or reinforce beaver dams with posts to help them withstand high flows. when people recognize beavers’ actions and responses as the source for new ethics, their performance of this ethic is an act of decolonization to the extent that it dismantles the notion that 9 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) only humans have ethics, which they impose on others. anna tsing writes of local knowledge practices’ potential to disrupt colonial practices of “plantation science” in oregon forests and other places where matsutake mushrooms grow wild: in plantation science, experts and objects are separated by the will to power; love does not flow between expert and object….for those who love wild mushrooms, such control is not an object; indeterminacy is part of the point. wherever volunteers gather to promote disturbance forests, or pickers stop to ponder why the mushrooms come up, plantation science loses a little authority. (tsing, 2011, p. 19) in the beavery watershed body, these local knowledge practices are the intimate interactions among trappers, hatchery visitors who feed beavers their daily willows, and landowners who come to love beavers’ furry antics and appreciate their water-storage methods, even as they are exasperated by their taste for orchard trees. only some of these people say they love beavers, but they all have come to feel a sense of liveliness and luckiness in a watershed that holds them and to feel lack and grief when they find lodges burned and ponds drained after fires. this feeling of recognition, liveness, and rightness is a trans affect, akin to the feeling of coming into the right body that trans people feel when they see their inner sense of self reflected in how other people respond to their gender. while some trans people may articulate this “rightness” as the realization of a single, overarching conscious self, my own experience of trans becoming was of coming into a trans collective, through a sense of mutual recognition that my “self” was never singular. this notion of “right” is never predetermined but always constituted relationally with other people, with ancestors, and, for some, with nonhumans and landscapes. for example, wesley (2014) theorizes about such trans becoming in a coast salish two-spirit context, where her trans becoming is effected through her grandmother’s naming of her as a twinspirited woman, an invitation to dance at the funeral of another two-spirit tribal member, and her dance in a cedar dress she weaves. 10 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) as with the project of coming into one’s own trans body, the trans move of coming into a transfigured watershed body happens with others, never finished, always relationally, and always challenging the fixity of categories. thus the notion of what a “right” watershed body may be for a given place will always be negotiated in public forums (or in the bar after the science conference), and will change in response to climatic, social, and ecological dynamics or changing understandings of historical and future conditions. this understanding is sometimes tacit or latent. decolonizing moves along the klamath trans theory is only one optic for understanding interspecies relations. indigenous theory is another, sometimes resonant with trans and queer theorizing of the land-human-water relation and sometimes incommensurate. indigenous practices of watershed management in the pacific west have persistently fostered stochasticity on the landscape through relational practices of forest burning, fish and shellfish harvest, and recognition of beavers’ and other species’ world-making practices. when the yakama, the karuk, and other tribal watershed managers began to collaborate with beavers, they did not need to transfigure the degraded watershed body but recognized the beavers’ gesture within a different framework and responded to it. in this next story, harling, a nonkaruk biologist who works closely with the karuk tribe, describes a decolonial river transfiguration project that is undertaken collaboratively with and under the guidance of karuk tribal land managers and that centers yurok and karuk salmon science. this story is foundational to the self-appointed “beaver believer” movement—a loose network of biologists, geomorphologists, and watershed advocates who want to reintroduce beavers as a way to increase streamflow, create juvenile salmon habitat, and recharge groundwater. as such, the story has circulated through salmonrestoration networks across the pacific west and in beaver advocacy networks that span the atlantic. i first heard one version of it from brock 11 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) dolman, a beaver advocate who visited this dam later with will harling and had his own moment of reckoning with settler legacies of beaver removal while overlooking this beaver pond. i heard another version from my collaborator dan sarna on a long drive back from the klamath river, where our plans to install posts to support a beaver dam on seiad creek were thwarted by a forest fire. harling (n.d.) begins his story in the domestic sphere, tiptoeing out of the house with the baby on his back and his fishing pole over his shoulder, careful not to wake his wife and sleeping guests, out into the familiar body of the watershed to a good fishing spot. there he encounters geology, water, fish, a beaver, and willows all responding to one another and enters into a responsive intra-action with them. the relatively wide orleans valley gives the river a chance to meander a little here, reclaiming its sinuosity stolen over the past six million years as the klamath mountains began to rise from underneath, forcing it into steep sided canyons tracing fault lines in the uplifted bedrock just upstream and downstream of the valley. fall chinook salmon moving upstream to spawn left wakes in the glassy water as they navigated up through the shallows, and the klamath’s famed half-pounder steelhead run was coming in with them. across the river, i noticed a furry head moving slowly upstream. the light brown tuft of hair visible above the water looked like what i thought a beaver would look like, but couldn’t be sure. just then i heard a rustle of grass and a swish of a tail on the near shore and backed into the willows to watch. sure enough, a beaver was swimming up towards us along the edge of the river just twenty feet away. as it cleared the riffle, it moved out into the river and i slowly followed it upstream. big whiskers and a large black snout, those dark beady eyes and two cute little ears quickly disappeared when it spotted me, and a loud thwack of its tail as it dove alerted its kin that danger was near. walking home, giddy with excitement from this rare close encounter, i noticed all the 12 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) stripped willow sticks along the shore, even a clump of uneaten willow shoved under an algal mat, possibly left for a mid-day snack. beaver are slowly coming back to the klamath, recovering from intense trapping that began in the mid-1800s and continuing for nearly a century after until they were almost extinct. in 1850 alone, famed frontiersman and trapper stephen meek and his party reportedly trapped 1,800 beaver out of scott valley, which at the time was called beaver valley. the last beavers in scott valley were trapped out by frank c. jordan in the winter of 1929–1930 on marlahan slough. beaver throughout much of the klamath basin suffered the same fate, and even today as they return to less inhabited areas along the mainstem river and its tributaries, they are still shot and trapped in streams where their dams pose a perceived risk to residential and agricultural property. harling then sees something—is it a beaver? a fleeting sighting, but the biologist’s eye for a combination of characteristics clinches it. he responds by backing away into the willows. the beaver’s response to harling, a loud thwack of its tail, brings him into relation with the beaver’s kin, alerted…that danger was near. the beaver is startled. harling is giddy. that affective relation persists as he walks home to breakfast. now he notices the stripped willow sticks and willow snacks under an algal mat. in this passage, harling’s descriptions of the geologic features ascribe a certain animacy to the river that reclaims its sinuosity, the mountains that have stolen that sinuosity, forcing it into steep sided canyons, and the salmon that navigate up through the shallows. queer theorist mel chen describes such inversions of animacy hierarchies— ascribing humanlike agency to rocks, landforms, and animals—as a queer move of undoing normal categories and boundaries (chen, 2012). in noting these animacies and in speaking for and with the various riverine creatures and elementals in a multivocal chorus, harling is taking up a new position within and of the watershed body, refusing the position of 13 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the disinterested, unaffected engineer who sees rivers as drainage channels and water as an inert and lifeless fluid. to borrow from moten and harney (2013), he is taking up the fugitive art of social life, which is practiced “in animative and improvisatory decomposition of [politics’] inert body…[and] emerges as an ensemblic stand, a kinetic position.” in discussing this ensemble, moten later riffs on multiplicity and multivocality as key strategies in opposition to the single authoritative voice that characterizes state planning and also manifest destiny logics, which miss the signal in the stochastic noise. here harling is seeing the signal—what ecologists gloss as emergent properties, like biodiversity— as of, and emerging through, the noise of the predawn watershed body: its gurgles and thwacks and tweet-tweet-tweets, its multiplicities of relations and responses unfolding backward and forward and in circles through time. (as the next story will show, many engineers and biologists could not tune in to this chorus.) to continue harney and moten’s riff, “its encoded noise is hidden in plain sight from the ones who refuse to see and hear—even while placing under constant surveillance—the thing whose repressive imitation they call for and are.” as he engages with the beaver, harling is noticing multispecies entanglements along the shore and drawing himself into affective relations with the shoreline world. he extends this affect of care to beavers that were trapped and shot relentlessly long before his time. in imagining beavers’ experience of trapping (a manifest destiny project), he emphasizes the beavers’ own agency (the quick disappearance at the sight of the dangerous human, their foresight in stashing some willows to eat later) in their return to the klamath as a sign or possibility of subversive human-beaver relations. this agency is key to the later part of the story, in which humans recognize beavers’ improvisatory dambuilding gestures as collaborations for watershed renewal. like muñoz’s queer gestures on the dance floor, these interspecies gestures can allow people to reimagine the past as a different set of notyet-here potentials. i think that by holding these stochastic potentials and sense of the beaver’s beaverness and bodily habits in their minds 14 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) together with the methods of trapping and tools of trapping, scientists, tribal members, and settler volunteers who collaborate with beavers are undermining and overturning manifest destiny thinking. to use july cole’s (2010) term, they enact a manifest reversal. the tools used in beaver reintroduction—the traps, the snare pole, the bait, the snare—are the same tools and technologies used to kill millions of beavers and nearly erase their engineering approach from these landscapes. in “callout to nanotechnologists,” cole articulates a method for participating in or enacting a manifest reversal: “your tools, bought and employed by the heirs of manifest destiny, must now effect the manifest reversal.” here i see just such a reworking of tools. beavers make improvisatory noise within a multivocal chorus dan sarna and i retold part of will’s story a presentation at a queer animal-studies conference called funny kinds of love (““dam ’em all,” 2013). inspired by the possibility of bringing queer and transgender practice into my ecological work, i suggested to dan that we develop our own performative account of beaver-human interactions. in revisiting this script several years later, i see that beavers chewed their way into our collaborative research project, inspiring our transgressions of standard academic forms and our multidisciplinary conversations. dan sarna: in spring of 2010, the watershed council and the karuk tribe were in the process of collaborating on a stream restoration project in northern california. they were putting brush bundles into seiad creek to enhance habitat for endangered coho salmon by increasing channel complexity, deepening pools and improving stream cover. when they returned to monitor the results of their restoration efforts, they discovered that the brush bundles had all gone missing! biologists staked out their sites, and after some investigation discovered that a beaver family had been stealing their brush bundles, eating them and adding them to their own 15 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) dam upstream. their initial reaction to the incident was: cleo woelfle-erskine: dam you beavers!!! ds: that same spring, the tribe and the council had planned a “engineered log jam” project downriver near the mouth of boise creek. however, before they could bring out the ’dozers, beaver moved in and constructed a five-foot tall dam across the creek at the exact location of the proposed log jam! the watershed council and the tribe’s biologists observed thousands of juvenile chinook and coho utilizing the ponds. according to will harling, cwe: “the beaver were doing everything we had been trying to do. except the beaver were doing it better, faster, and at no cost to us.” they took it as a sign and surmised that the beavers “had received the proposal, but had decided to implement it in-house.” this story of beaver restoration on boise creek is a founding myth of the self-titled “beaver believer movement.” based on their encounters that summer, the mid-klamath watershed council and the tribe realized: ds: “the restoration of threatened coho salmon in the klamath river system may be intricately tied to enhanced beaver populations and restoration projects that mimic the positive benefits of beaver dams.” cwe: take note: here a group of humans are looking to beaver for advice on riparian repair. our version of the story recirculated: beaver advocates found a video of our presentation on the conference site and sent it out on their mailing lists. a year later, dan and i expanded on this story with our own probes into beaver histories, finding photographs of colonial “fur desert” policies 16 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) to control territory by eliminating beaver as a source of wealth (figure 1). we also found occasional latent destinies of human recognition of beavers’ ecological role, as when biologists dropped them from airplanes during the dust bowl in hopes that they would combat erosion (figure 2). figure 1: beaver pelts in warehouse, mid-1850s. source: smithsonian. 17 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 2: sketch of geronimo, a beaver dropped via parachute 100 times to test a special case that opened on release. source: california department of fish and game. our second multivocal beaver performance took place at the dimensions of political ecology conference, on a panel july cole and i organized called “latent destinies, manifest reversals” (cole & woelfleerskine, 2014). this time, we explicitly theorized beavers as agents working to overturn manifest destiny: dan sarna: part of the project of manifest reversal entails viewing 18 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) the actual process of manifest conquest as incomplete, fragmentary, and subject to multiple forms of resistance. even as fur brigades snagged millions of pelts and wiped out beaver colonies across the us, there were instances of micro-resistance by both humans and beaver themselves. seeking ghosts of lost beavers through dan sarna’s and my collaborative work along in the klamath basin, i came to think with beavers about my salmon creek field site, just over the hill from the russian river, where beaver have long been absent and coho salmon are now on life support in a conservation hatchery. local agencies working with private contractors are recreating the log jams, deep pools, and side channels that coho favor. members of the salmon creek watershed council are teaching their neighbors that residential water use (mostly groundwater wells) causes more of the stream to dry up each summer. looking back on my five seasons of collaborative salmon studies there, i realize i was caught up in what hustak and myers (2012) called an involutionary momentum, a gestural call and response with other species. i saw traces of lost beavers in the deeply incised channels, dry streams, and dry floodplain wells. like darwin when he described bees’ pollination of catasetum orchids in performative language suggestive of an interpretive dance, i waded through ponds not yet backed up, under overgrown alders not yet chewed down, imagining fat darting salmon smolts in the black anoxic pools left at the end of the summer, which held only dead young fish. curious if local scientists and residents saw the stream this way, i started asking people whether they thought beaver should be reintroduced to improve salmon habitats. the ones who did were a selfdescribed “misfit geomorphologist,” several ex-scientists, and local residents who had worked to reintroduce elk or bear or other vanished species. 19 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) dan and i went to see local nongovernmental organization (ngo) beaver advocate kate lundquist talk at a local sustainability center, where she lives and heads up a beaver reintroduction campaign. kate wore a baseball cap showing a beaver in place of the extinct grizzly bear on california’s state flag (figure 6). she showed will harling’s pictures of beaver-made ponds and pictures of her and colleague brock dolman thigh-deep in beaver ponds. kate wanted the local residents in attendance to catch the “beaver fever” (she and brock are famous for their unremitting wordplay and terrible puns) and to think seriously about how human inhabitation practices would have to change in order for beavers to return. kate worked to convince the california department of fish and wildlife that beavers were native to coastal california and should be introduced. she excavated evidence from the russian fur-trapping era and spanish settlement records to show that beaver pelts traded were from local streams and that translocating beavers here would be a reintroduction of a native species. the agency’s policy is shifting. now regulators acknowledge that beavers did occupy the coast range before the fur-trapping era and thus would qualify as a native species for reintroduction. but they propose that landowners wanting beavers would have to get permission from every landowner within eight river miles of their property. most of the audience was skeptical that this would fly. one person said that her old-timer neighbor “is pretty hardcore ‘don’t come on my land.’ he’d probably shoot the beavers.” 20 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) figure 6: the water institute’s beaver flag, available on a ball cap. source: occidental arts and ecology center’s water institute. some audience members seemed to catch kate’s “beaver fever” by watching her performance of love for beavers and their unpredictable ways. they suggested that beavers might reappear clandestinely on their properties or on public land. many residents are salmon lovers: local citizen-scientists working to make space for fish and native grasses and elk and bears in their rural residential landscapes. most talked of their work as nearly hopeless in the face of apathy, drought, greed, climate change, and private-property regimes. in witnessing kate’s performance of beaver love, her and brock’s joy at engagement and response across species lines, it seemed that some residents responded affectively with glimmerings of a “biocultural hope” (kirksey, shapiro, & brodine, 2013). but without face-to-face engagement with beavers—or with whichever of the multispecies kin with which one could step into the transfigured watershed body—few felt that they can engage directly with watershed processes and inhabitants to reshape the watershed’s wounds. instead, they delegate the daily work of reworking the watershed body to agency 21 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) scientists and ngos. but these scientists’ limitations, perceptually and institutionally, inform what they can accomplish. one early summer day, i climbed up fay creek’s narrow upper canyon with jay, a creek-walker born on a local commune who keeps track of steelhead and coho spawning on two nearby creeks. his two boys roamed ahead and startled a family of mergansers feeding in a deep pool below a high cascade. the ten-year-old climbed up a basalt outcrop and found a goose egg on top, hatched and fledged; he carried down the fragment of translucent shell. the pool was full of coho and steelhead fry; the ducks hunted them. jay was dismayed that only a thin trickle was flowing between the pools, with three more hot months to go until the fall rains. he had been talking to kate lundquist about beavers and was imagining them everywhere. fay creek could be a sanctuary for them, jay said, because no one ventures down the steep canyon to the stream, and the rancher who owns the adjacent land would welcome the extra water for his failing well. the rancher had fished for steelhead here as a boy and always asked me how many fish i had counted. then, in fall, i walked and crawled up the salmon creek mainstem with sierra cantor, a local agency biologist, snorkeling to count coho and steelhead parr. she told me that the rancher who owned this property wanted to restore floodplain connectivity and thought his property had once been home to beavers. overall, sierra thought that the landscape was too fragmented into residential lots for regulators to permit beaver reintroduction. since beavers can travel for miles when looking for a new lodge site, the chance of a complaint from a landowner was too high. in spring, i walked up lower fay creek with brian cluer and lauren hammack, geomorphologists checking up on a restoration project that anchored logs to large boulders in the stream, in some places creating pools, in other places buried under gravel. for years the county paid a local rancher to drive a bulldozer down the stream, scraping up logs that might back up floodwaters. now, the task of putting all that wood back is impossible—agencies are strapped for funds, and anyway all the large 22 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) redwoods that could actually make a pool in these flashy streams have been dragged out and milled. brian says, “it’s going to take more than just landscaping existing channels—we need to be in the real estate business and restore floodplains and wetlands.” lauren thought there were wetlands, probably beaver maintained, on the mainstem, and agreed with sierra that the rancher might be willing to come to the table. how, then, can this grief at extinction and other anthropocene destruction be overcome in landscapes where beavers and salmon are absent and which therefore lack their exuberant and profligate gestures of multispecies generosity? beavers dam prolifically and then move on. they give water away with no thought for its scarcity. they make abundant and dynamic habitats for mink and birds and fish willows and otters just by being beavers, chewing and building and living their lives. salmon swim all over the sea, storing up nitrogen and trace elements in their bodies, which they then hurl upstream as far as possible. they leave thousands of eggs and their very bodies to feed people, bears, raccoons, skunks, and eventually trees. perhaps, in settled and resolutely settlerminded landscapes like salmon creek, beavers can swim with people into this transfigured watershed. but in salmon creek, many settler descendants dismiss local pomo and miwok people as inauthentically indigenous because they have intermarried with white and mexican settlers. almost all residents and local scientists are white, and most recognize neither sovereignty nor pomo and miwok worldviews as central to watershed recovery. i asked local watershed activists and scientists why they did not reach out to graton rancheria biologists or tribal members on science and outreach projects. they asserted, in different ways, that graton members had lost their culture and needed to relearn traditional practices from anthropologists. they cited no conversations with actual living pomo or miwok people in making these claims. instead, in a move like that audra simpson (2014) describes in relation to settler perceptions of iroquois culture, they cited anthropologist kat anderson as their source of knowledge of pomo and miwok culture. these settler descendants did 23 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) not see that indigenous knowledge persisted alongside “modern” livelihoods, despite federal termination act policies and centuries of settler violence. nor did they mention sovereignty or know of treaty rights that would guarantee pomo and miwok people the right to harvest and manage local lands. the settler-descendant activists considered the watershed to be private property, with no valid indigenous claim. perhaps, in such places, transgressive potentials of watershed inhabitation will remain only partly realized. conclusion: beaver dreams in bringing trans theories of embodiment back to beaver-salmon worlds, i want to ask, “where or in whose imagination might this watershed body be emerging?” in order to more fully theorize the watershed body as an imaginary that is shaping science and watershed politics. following eva hayward’s “towards myself through myself” (2008), the transformation of watershed body into multispecies commons is not a change from one state or body into another. rather, it is the recognition of an already existing multispecies relation into which humans can enter. in the klamath river story, i see this move already partly enacted in how will harling talks about the beaver he meets, as call and response, with beavers and humans recognizing one another as reshapers of their shared worlds. the projects he describes are also enacting decolonial practices of science: collaborations between the karuk tribe and the mid-klamath watershed council (mkwc); studies funded by the forest service and carried out by the yurok and karuk natural resources departments; and engineering works funded by a hydroelectric company and the us fish and wildlife service and constructed by mkwc and the karuk tribe, on private land owned by settler descendants, then amended and reworked by beavers. in the methow and yakima stories i find a similar decolonizing approach, with the yakama tribe contributing land and personnel, the forest service lending equipment and expertise, and the state 24 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) department of fish and wildlife actually trapping and relocating the beavers on private lands. here, too, beavers provided a way for trappers, ranchers, and hydrological scientists to reimagine and reenact key strategies of manifest destiny (trapping, diverting water, logging, forest management) in a transfigured and relational way. in salmon creek and the russian river, which have been beaverless for at least 150 years, i see this watershed body imagined through people’s interactions with coho salmon, which went extinct in the late 1990s and have been reintroduced through a hatchery captive broodstock program. however, because state wildlife codes prohibit moving beavers from place to place, beaver advocates’ work is mostly historical and policy oriented; only ngo advocates like kate and brock, who travel to other rivers, meet beavers face to face. as a result, most salmon creek residents’ watershed imaginaries do not include beavers’ stochastic engineering of flows and riverine habitats. in this article i have drawn out two examples from my own research where using indigenous, queer, transgender, and feminist approaches, alone or in combination, can accomplish this reversal of manifest destiny modes of domination and killing. thinking with beavers and rivers and mountains and salmon, out in the watershed commons, i have sketched a way to transfigure what anthropologist anna tsing (2015) calls “capitalist ruins” into substrates for new modes of life. practices of world-making with beavers and salmon unveil the multispecies commons that is always-already there, in the land, ready for human acknowledgement and recognition. this joyful response to the leaps and thwacks and dives that are beavers’ or salmon’s modes of communication mixes with affects of loss and grief at their wanton killing and extinction. scientists and others who enter into this common watershed body describe feelings of recognition and joy and sensuous pleasure in fur and musk and slippery fins that is akin to queer recognition in muñoz’s punk clubs and queer dance floors: that touch and wink of recognition, a falling into relation that is felt on a visceral level as kin-making. once that kin25 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) making happens, it triggers all the other emotions that go along with it— protectiveness, grief at death and loss, joy at birth and growth and promiscuity, empathy for past depredations: a shift in ethics. maria puig de la bellacasa, thinking with haraway about caring across species lines, could be speaking of beavers and salmon in their stochastic worldmaking when she writes, because “nothing comes without its world” we do not encounter single individuals, a meeting produces a world, changes the color of things, it diffracts more than it reflects, distorts the “sacred image of the same” (haraway, 1994: 70). knowing is not about prediction and control but about remaining “attentive to the unknown knocking at our door” (deleuze, 1989: 193). but though we do not know in advance what world is knocking, inquiring into how we can care will be required in how we will relate to the new. (de la bellacasa, 2012) in developing practices of caring for beavers and salmon, i find people transgressing boundaries around institutions, at the streambed, and between wildlife and water management. these boundary crossings reveal these boundaries and binaries as manifest destiny fantasies of dominion and control, which can be flipped over as spawning female salmon flip over gravels with their beating tails. the undersides of those fantasies reveal anew more relational material entanglements. they inspire new modes of watery engagement, a call and response, and improvisatory learning from an interspecies other via hatchery reconfigurations, starter lodges, beaver deceivers, and pond levelers. in new studies by pollock, woodruff, the karuk tribe, and ranchers in the scott valley, beavers have insinuated their world-making practices and flipped old manifest destiny questions. in these studies and field experiments, they are asking new kinds of questions. rather than studying how to drain water away, how can we preserve hyporheic flows? rather than trapping out a (generic) nuisance tree predator, how can we entice this particular beaver family to live here by matchmaking and enacting practices of interspecies care? like wildlife undercrossings that 26 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) reconfigure material and affective relations between humans driving along roads and animals moving across them, material accommodations like beaver-pond levelers and starter lodges evidence a new practice of world-making with the more-than-human other. how these incipient collaborations will play out—for beavers and humans—is not settled. these different people who love beavers do not talk of the present, past, or future in the same way. but there are points of convergence. maybe this holding another’s perspective in mind—this reckoning and grappling with different lifeways that has been so crucial to environmental justice and feminist politics—can now also extend to other watershed inhabitants. as one queer gesture towards that utopian future, i close with another excerpt from sarna’s and my script. this section closed out our second performance with a wish and a prophecy inspired by the ones clovis and larch unearthed in cole’s (2010) unmoored frontier. dan sarna: in entering into this multi-species collaboration, humans can join in transgressive ecologies that re-engender symbiotic relations of becoming-with. the ensuing improvisations can break through political impasses and undo the cataloging impulses that underlie antagonistic human-nature constructs. these changing relationships between people and beavers, and accompanying legal and policy changes, may be signs that a manifest reversal is underway. cleo woelfle-erskine: we found the following prophecies scratched in mud banks by beaver claws and scribbled in the interstices of our interview transcripts: signs of latent destinies: settlers acknowledge indigenous sovereignty through comanagement and repatriation of ancestral lands, return stolen artifacts, and protect access to ceremonial sites. 27 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) humans and beavers develop collaborative practices, installing pond levelers, and beaver deceivers. for every beaver deceiver, there is some trade in territory to beaver’s advantage. evidence of ontological shifts, such that humans no longer think they must dominate natural processes at the expense of nonhuman others. in recognition that human and nonhuman fates are bound up together, beavers are no longer seen as furbearers to be killed frivolously, but as collaborators in ensuring the world’s continuing liveliness. ds: when manifest reversal is at hand, rivers will retake many of their floodplains. rivers will no longer be fixed by riprap so that property lines may also remain fixed. beavers will chew their way up all of their former streams, and where they encounter humans, will be aided with support structures and accommodated with pond levelers, but everywhere be permitted to grow enough willows that they can chew in peace. salmon will return in silver hordes. their dead bodies will turn into giant trees, which will be permitted to grow to a great size. where some are cut for human uses or put back into streams, they will be cut selectively and dragged out over the snow, one by one. such a reversal would be as large in scope as manifest destiny was, rolling out across the continent and transforming every river, aquifer and floodplain. 28 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) both: and the beaver slaps resound! notes 1 in a project in process, i trace the unacknowledged debt that us fisheries science owes to indigenous knowledge through visual and textual analysis of archival materials on the first pacific salmon hatchery (woelfle-erskine, 2017). at the baird hatchery on the mccloud river in winnemem wintu traditional territory, winnemem men and women taught settler biologists everything about salmon—where and when they spawned, how to harvest them, their life histories, and sustainable harvest practices. other tribes and first nations throughout pacific salmon territories likely played foundational roles in fisheries and hatchery science elsewhere, though these encounters are less well documented in the archive. current tribal and intertribal fish and wildlife science programs emphasize that “new” ecological science paradigms of diversity and dynamism are in fact reworkings of indigenous knowledge, particularly in relation to fire and riverine processes. see woelfle-erskine, in preparation, underflow: salmon, beavers, and science in a queertrans mode. 2 stochastic, literally meaning “randomly determined,” is used by information scientists, hydrologists, geomorphologists, and ecologists to describe phenomena that cannot be predicted precisely, although the probability that they will occur can be analyzed using statistics. beavers’ dam-building actions, combined with other stochastic phenomena like storms and floods, contribute to the stochasticity—randomness, unpredictability—of the riverine landscapes they inhabit. 29 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) references aizura, a.z., cotten, t., ochoa, m., & vidal-ortiz, s. 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(2012). decolonization is not a metaphor. decolonization: indigeneity, education & society, 1(1). retrieved from http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/download/18630 wesley, s. (2014). twin-spirited woman: sts’iyóye smestíyexw slhá:li. transgender studies quarterly, 1(3), 338–351. woelfle-erskine, c. (2017). settler sexualities in and through fish culture. presented at environmentalism outside the box: an ecosex symposium, santa cruz, ca. retrieved from https://earthlab.ucsc.edu/ecosexsymposium/ woelfle-erskine, c., & cole, j.o. (2015). transfiguring the anthropocene: stochastic re-imaginings of human-beaver worlds. transgender studies quarterly, 2(2), 297–316. 32 woelfle-erskine catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bio cleo woelfle-erskine is an assistant professor at the university of washington. his research focuses on ecological and social dimensions of human relations to rivers and their multi-species inhabitants. trained in ecology, hydrology, geomorphology, critical social science, and feminist science and technology studies, he facilitates collaborative research in partnership with tribes, agencies, citizen scientists, and local community members. his phd work in the energy and resources group at uc berkeley involved a collaborative of scientists and local residents who are experimenting with storing winter rain to increase summer streamflow. he is developing research projects on hydro-ecological and social effects of beaver relocation in eastern washington, and environmental justice dimensions of fishing and shellfishing in urban puget sound. as a uc president’s postdoctoral fellow in feminist studies at uc santa cruz, he explored queer, transgender, and decolonial possibilities for ecological science. his manuscript in progress, underflow: transfiguring riverine relations, imagining queer-trans ecologies considers the lingering presences of manifest destiny (ecological, socio-scientific, and psychological) and the ways that this injurious “destiny” can be transfigured and overturned to renew human-water-fish relations . helmreich, stefan. “ghost lineages, ghost acres, and darwin’s “diagram of divergence of taxa” in on the origin of species: critical commentary inspired by banu subramaniam’s ghost stories for darwin.” catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2): 1–13. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © stefan helmreich 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license ghost lineages, ghost acres, and darwin’s “diagram of divergence of taxa” in on the origin of species: critical commentary inspired by banu subramaniam’s ghost stories for darwin stefan helmreich massachusetts institute of technology sgh2@mit.edu just after page 116 of charles darwin’s original edition of on the origin of species appears the book’s only illustration, a gatefold diagram of descent with modification, a branching-tree schema that would later come to be known as the “diagram of divergence of taxa” (darwin himself described it as charting “divergence of character” [darwin, 1859, p. 116]) (figure 1). the visual rhetoric of the tree diagram and the conditions and entailments of its theoretical declarations about change and inheritance over time have been expertly interpreted by historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and literary scholars of science (see browne, 1980;ospovat, 1981; beer, 1983; klapisch-zuber, 1991; o’hara, 1992; smith,2006; hacking, 2007; ingold, 2007; pietsch, 2013; lima, 2014; bouzat,2014). what i offer here is a reading inspired by banu subramaniam’s ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity (2015), a book in which subramaniam reflects on the history of breeding experiments that aided in theorizing variation, on collections of old and new sentiments that have valued “native” over “alien” species, and on a range of eugenic scripts that have drawn upon theories of difference derived from readings and misreadings of darwin. writing as an experimental geneticist and feminist studies scholar, subramaniam argues that inquiries into genetic variation have not been merely or abstractly intellectual enterprises alone. rather, because they treat matters to do with relations among diversity, life, and death, such inquiries have necessarily been biopolitical in their implication, inflected by histories of colonialism, structural racism, sex/gender inequalities, and human-non-human hierarchies. subramaniam writes that, “the seemingly innocuous history of genetic variation holds within it the countless bodies of the dead, the mutilated, critical perspectives 2 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 the tortured, the irredeemable, the unwanted….” (pp. 7-8). in other words, the history of thinking about and working on genetic variation (in the lab, in the field, in the world, with model and wild organisms, with non-humans and humans) is a history that is crowded with ghosts. figure 1. william west’s lithographed diagram of the divergence of character, from darwin 1859. in what follows, i trace some ghostly lineages we might read within the form of darwin’s diagram and i also consider those multispecies bodies layered into the material history and political economy that made possible the lithograph and its reproductions. the point here is not to ask after darwin’s individual intentions (though his uneasiness with his theory will come up) so much as it is to ruminate upon a scientific representation and its conditions of possibility, both apparent and occluded. following avery gordon, whose ghostly matters (2008) is a touchstone for subramaniam’s book, i am interested in darwin’s diagram’s hauntings — both formal (how is death or extinction represented or managed in the image?) and material (out of what substances, organic and otherwise, were the diagram and its copies made and in what ecological and economic relations?). as a drawn and published artifact, darwin’s diagram can be read not only as a schematic for evolutionary plots (beer, 1983), but also as a suggestive pointer to the absent and vital presences of the dead in nascent evolutionary theory and in the material substances of the theory’s presentation. let us think about such material substances from a presentist angle for a moment: just as today’s digital critical perspectives 3 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 texts (including the one i am writing now) sometimes seem to hover above the material world but in fact depend upon rare earth and conflict minerals, underremunerated labor, and environmental toxins (see gabrys, 2011; parikka, 2014 on the “anthrobscene,” alaimo, 2016), so too did darwin’s lithograph sit within the unequal material economy and ecology of its time. i begin, though, with the diagram’s form, with the lines that give the diagram its purpose. lines of organismic descent travel upward from the bottom of the page, representing species lineages ramifying into new, naturally selected varieties (see bouzat, 2014), their classificatory thresholds marked by horizontal lines labeled on the diagram’s right side with clock-face roman numerals, ticking upwards one through fourteen. the space between one horizontal line and the next above marks the passage, darwin writes, of a thousand — or better, he speculates, ten thousand — generations. he explains: let (a) be a common, widely-diffused, and varying species, belonging to a genus large in its own country. the little fan of diverging dotted lines of unequal lengths proceeding from (a), may represent its varying offspring . …only those variations which are in some way profitable will be preserved or naturally selected . … when a dotted line reaches one of the horizontal lines, and is there marked by a small numbered letter, a sufficient amount of variation is supposed to have been accumulated to have formed a fairly well-marked variety, such as would be thought worthy of record in a systematic work. (1859, p. 117) those offspring that do survive, darwin continues, will “partake of those more general advantages which made the genus to which the parent species belonged, a large genus in its own country” (p. 118) folded into this account is the theme of the fittedness of species to their native land — to, in darwin’s language, their “own country.” this moment in darwin hints at the valuation of native species that subramaniam analyzes across a range of later evolutionary accounts indebted to this model of natural selection. darwin’s diagram is suffused too with the hauntings of those creatures possessed of variations in some way unprofitable. study the diagram: the off-white expanse around the lines of surviving lineages is empty. but this blankness is also full — of the dead. as darwin observes, during the process of modification, represented in the diagram, another of our principles, namely that of extinction, will have played an important part . … [t]here will be a constant tendency in the improved descendants of any one species to supplant and exterminate in each stage of descent their predecessors and their original parent. (p. 121) critical perspectives 4 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 the empty space of this diagram is thus a space of ghosts. these were ghosts that had an upsetting resonance for darwin himself, who was famously unsettled by the cruelty in his model of evolution — and personally devastated by the death of three of his ten children, two in infancy, one at age ten. “if he had any inclination to think about his theory of natural selection at … [the time of his children’s deaths],” writes janet browne, “he might easily have reflected on the melancholy fact that his ideas of struggle required the death of the weakest individuals, even of his own babies. his theory was a bleak theory of elimination” (2002, p.37). the ghosts in this diagram may also be prefigurings, premonitions of the ghosts subramaniam identifies as at the heart of many of our received evolutionary theories.1 these may be the ghosts of eugenics future — ghosts of both a theoretical kind as well as of what subramaniam names as the “ghostly dispossessed,” the coming victims of projects animated by social darwinisms that would take a version of darwin’s account not just as an attempt at description, but as a political prescription. darwin’s diagram is inhabited by ghosts inside its lineage lines too. darwin, before settling on describing this divergence as a tree, wrote in his 1837 notebooks: “the tree of life should perhaps be called the coral of life, base of branches dead; so that passages [between one variety and another] cannot be seen” (darwin, 183738, p. 25; and see beer, 1983, p.261, note 12). julia voss, in darwin’s pictures, reports that, “for this reason, darwin drew the trunk as a dotted line” (2010), borrowing a convention he had used in depictions of coral reefs, which indexed with a dotted line those portions submerged or out of view (figure 2) (and see sponsel, 2018). life grows upon the dotted-line bodies of the dead. fast-forward for a moment to the late twentieth century to another use of dotted lines, to indicate species inferred, but not definitively known, in a phylogeny. biologist mark norell, in his 1992 taxic origin and temporal diversity: the effect of phylogeny (figure 3), calls these ghost lineages. he writes: “these additional entities are taxa that are predicted to occur by the internal branching structure of phylogenetic trees.... i refer to these as ghost lineages because they are invisible to the fossil record” (p. 105; see wray, 2001, figure 1a, reproduced as figure 3, below, for a diagram).i want to leverage and amplify norell’s ghost lineages, using the term to also name those lines of inheritance that have been disavowed or forgotten in the many dominant modes of narrating or drawing lines of descent. critical perspectives 5 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 figure 2. dotted lines in darwin 1842. patrilineal pedigrees that assign women to subsidiary roles as mothers and daughters under a ramifying patronymic grid are a significant and telling example (for a history, see klapisch-zuber, 1991, p.108; mitchell, 2014; for a contemporary instance from the realm of genetic genealogy, see scully, 2018). most diagrams of family pedigrees during the victorian period in which darwin lived saw lines of sons and fathers given pride of place — patrinominalism, patrilineality, and patriarchy all reinforcing one another in concert with a wider cultural dedication to paternity as that socially fashioned, sanctioned, and naturalized tether that could legitimate property inheritance (see delaney,1986).2 women could appear in such mappings of ancestry only insofar as they were included as daughters, sisters, and mothers in patrilines (see helmreich, 2001). the very form of the family tree representation in those european systems of patriarchal kin reckoning that conditioned darwin’s usage was thus crafted in ways that subordinated and ghosted women’s lives, keeping in shadow what might rather (or also) have been recorded through matrilines or through other genealogical or a genealogical formats(see richards 2017 on the naturalization of sexed asymmetry in the pedigree accountings of those gentlemen pigeon and horse breeders whose work inspired some of darwin’s thinking about artificial, natural, and sexual selection). think, too, of the effaced lineages — the erased mothers and children — resulting from the reproductive subordinations of women under racialized chattel slavery (cf. spillers, 1987; roberts, 1997). these, too, are ghost lineages critical perspectives 6 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 figure 3. a diagram of ghost lineages from figure 1 of wray’s 2001 “dating branches on the tree of life using dna”: “thick bars represent periods for which there is a fossil record for the lineage; dotted lines represent ‘ghost’ lineages, times when a group is inferred to have been present but left no record.” what other ghost presences reside in darwin’s diagram? the diagram, figuring life on the dotted-line bodies of the dead, itself depended, as a material made paper thing, on a network of once living materials become dead. the diagram was created for darwin’s book as a lithograph even though he had hoped it might be a copper engraving (see darwin’s 31 may 1859 letter to publisher john murray [darwin correspondence project, “letter no. 2465”] and see paisley, 2016, 2017). lithography is a printing technique invented in germany in 1796 that employs smoothed limestone as a substrate on which an image is drawn using oil, fat, or wax. that image is then treated with gum arabic, a substance that permits the image to transfer to a piece of paper. limestone is a sedimentary rock composed of calcite or dolomite, often incorporating the fossilized remains of marine creatures such as coral, algae, sponges, microbes, and bryozoans. in darwin’s day, british limestone would have been sourced from yorkshire, derbyshire, dorset or lincolnshire, quarried from deposits dating from the permian to the jurassic periods (the source of the limestone used by william west of 54hatton garden, middlesex, to create darwin’s diagram is not, to the best of my knowledge, critical perspectives 7 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 recorded, though it almost certainly came from limestone suppliers in london; whether they sourced their limestone from inside the country or from common sources in france or germany is not a question to which i know the answer). the bodies of dead creatures (perhaps even extinct species) were thus the very matter on which the diagram was drawn (as indeed would have been the case for lithographs in many other books during this period). or, following environmental historian etienne benson’s call to “go beyond the important work overreading the traces that non-human animals have left in human texts”(2011, p. 7), lithographs were materializations of non-human writing because they embodied traces and tracks of past organismic vitality (see also sir joseph boehm’s 1885 statue of charles darwin, made of marble, which is metamorphosed limestone — and therefore composed of the crystallized carbonates that were once the sedimented accumulation of dead marine creatures). the gum arabic sourced from acacia trees from the western sahara —that vegetal resin used for fixing lithograph images — used to transfer darwin’s diagram from stone to paper, meanwhile, would have been of much more recent origin than the limestone. as historian of west africa james webb writes: “[f]rom the late seventeenth century until the 1870s,gum arabic was the single most important product traded by the europeans who stopped along the ‘gum coast’ of southern mauritania or traded at the mouth of the senegal river” (1985, p. 150). the gum would be seasonally harvested from acacia groves by people laboring, perhaps as slaves or indentured labor, for overseers from the zawāyān nomadic tribes of mauritania, who would have in turn traded with europeans, primarily from france and england. there is also a tale to tell about darwin’s book as a thing itself. its paper, made by spalding paper makers (peckham, 1959), would likely have been from wood pulp, a process invented in 1843 to replace rag content. since england’s forests had been depleted because of charcoal production (see nef, 1977) — an early signal of the anthropocene? — the wood for the pulp may have come from outside england.3 the material making the reproduction of the tree of life lithograph and its carrying medium of copies of origin, then, likely points in many ways away from england to a network of european, colonial, and subaltern suppliers and to a collection of human and non-human bodies bound up in relations of difference and inequality. (origin is of course not unique in this way; a similar story could be told for many other victorian books created in the webworks of the british empire. and, as i remarked above, today’s digital publishing is also bound up in networks of unequal economies and ecologies — often obscured by rhetorics of data storage that would have us believe that our texts exist in some ethereal form, in something called “the cloud”). critical perspectives 8 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 figure 4. sir joseph boehm’s 1885 statue of charles darwin — a material ghost of the marine skeletons making up its marble substance — at the natural history museum, london. historian kenneth pomeranz, in the great divergence: china, europe, and the making of the modern world economy (2000), argues that british dominance during the industrial revolution depended on production in the colonies, on what pomeranz called “ghost acres,” land outside the nation that produced cotton, sugar, corn, and tea. of course, for people not in britain who were working in these lands, these were not ghost acres at all. these plots were likely those stages on which played out what subramaniam names “the lives of the ghostly critical perspectives 9 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 dispossessed— the bodies displaced, starved, colonized, violated, sterilized, experimented upon, maimed, killed, exterminated” (p. 122). ghost lineages, then, on ghost acres. what i am gesturing toward here, with my attention to the form as well as substance-infrastructure of darwin’s diagram, are further material lineages for what subramaniam calls “ghost stories for darwin” —stories, in their way, paradoxically (?), imaginable because of darwin’s own theories of excess and extinction (themselves a transcription of victorian views of nature as red in tooth and claw [beer, 1983], the grim side of the “grandeur” darwin forwarded [1859, p. 490] as a possible aesthetic for the unfolding tale of natural selection). trained in evolutionary genetics, subramaniam centers her analysis on the formal frameworks of canonical evolutionary theory — their mathematics, their hypotheses — a crucial vantage point from which can begin to be unpacked their conditions of possibility as well as the way historical contexts often disappear when theories start to circulate. she observes, for example, that mid-twentiethcentury questions to do with whether variation in a population is due to mutation or to balancing selection— referring to hermann muller and theodosius dobzhansky — are haunted by eugenic debates about whether variation is good or bad. population genetic formalisms like the “genetic load,” she argues, are ghostly survivals of these debates. “ignoring the historical backdrop of eugenics debates dooms scientists,” writes subramaniam, “to a future as co-conspirators in the production of inequality” (p. 226; and see mackenzie, 1978 and norton, 1978). her call to think carefully about our inheritances from this history follows, but also amplifies, the “thought collective” analytic of ludwig fleck (1935), that scholar for whom the fleck prize was named, which ghost stories for darwin received in 2016from the society for the social studies of science. subramaniam goes ingeniously beyond fleck’s analytic of the “thought collective” to think about the lively, deadly, material, and deathly ghosts that haunt such imaginaries, ghosts around which thoughts themselves may be formed and given substance. my sketch here on both the form and matter of darwin’s diagram is meant as a companion think piece, a way to ponder the history, at once material and ghostly, of the tools created to draw scientific conclusions — and diagrams. .acknowledgments i thank janet browne, michelle murphy, peter paisley, heather paxson, nick seaver, harriet ritvo, and sophia roosth for their help in thinking with me through the reflections i present here. i thank jenny reardon for inviting me to join evelynn hammonds and kim tallbear on a 2016 panel on ghost stories for darwin at the meetings of the society for the social studies of science, for which an early version of this paper was written. i am also in debt to banu subramaniam for writing such an amazing book. critical perspectives 10 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 notes 1 lenora ledwon, in “darwin’s ghosts: the influence of darwinism on the nineteenth-century ghost story” (1989), argues that, in the wake of darwin, victorian ghost stories became populated by bestial, sub-human spirits imagined as disowned and disavowed ancestors. these were not so much prefigurings of where darwinian phantasms might travel in the future, but rather, she suggests, returns of the repressed racist anxieties of nineteenth-century white europeans. 2 such representations — and their legal supports in laws of “coverture”— came, however, also during the victorian period, to be contested in early feminist activism that sought to undo gendered inequalities in marriage and inheritance law (see shanley 1993). 3 the original version of this article erroneously stated that the first edition binding was of goatskin from tanneries in morocco. this was true of one singular copy; the book in its many reproductions was in green publishers’ cloth. for general information on book binding in victorian england, see https://www.adelaide.edu.au/library/special/exhibitions/victorian-bindings/. err0r was corrected 6/15/2021. references alaimo, s. (2016). exposed: environmental politics and pleasures in posthuman times. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. beer, g. (1983). darwin’s plots: evolutionary narrative in darwin, george eliot and nineteenth-century fiction. london, gb: routledge and kegan paul. benson, e. (2011). "animal writes: historiography, disciplinarity, and the animal trace." in linda kalof and georgina montgomery (eds.), making animal meaning. (pp. 3-16). east lansing, mi: michigan state university press. bouzat, j. (2014). darwin’s diagram of divergence of taxa as a causal model for the origin of species. quarterly review of biology, 89(1), 21-38. browne, j. (1980). darwin’s botanical arithmetic and the principle of divergence, 1854-1858. journal of the history of biology 13(1), 53-89. browne, j. (2002). charles darwin: (vol. ii) the power of place. princeton, nj: princeton university press. darwin, c. (1837-38). notebook b: [transmutation of species (1837-1838)]. culdar121.transcribed by kees rookmaaker, at darwin online, http://darwinonline.org.uk/ darwin, c. (1842). the structure and distribution of coral reefs. london, gb: smith elder and co. https://www.adelaide.edu.au/library/special/exhibitions/victorian-bindings/ critical perspectives 11 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 darwin, c. (1859). on the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. (1st ed.).london, gb: john murray. https://www.baumanrarebooks.com/rarebooks/darwin-charles/on-theorigin-ofspecies/70218.aspx?itemid=70218 darwin correspondence project, “letter no. 2465.” retrieved 12 january 2018, http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/dcp-lett-2465 delaney, c. (1986). the meaning of paternity and the virgin birth debate. man 21(3), 494-513. fleck, l. (1979). genesis and development of a scientific fact. (f. bradley & t. j. trenn trans.) chicago, il: university of chicago press, 1979. (original published 1935). gabrys, j. (2011). digital rubbish: a natural history of electronics. ann arbor, mi: university of michigan press. gordon, a. (2008). ghostly matters: haunting and the sociological imagination (2nd ed.). minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. hacking, i. (2007). "trees of logic, trees of porphyry." in j.l. heilbron (ed.), advancements of learning: essays in honour of paolo rossi. (pp. 219-263). florence, it: leo s. olschki. helmreich, s. (2001). "kinship in hypertext: transubstantiating fatherhood and information flow in artificial life." in sarah franklin and susan mckinnon (eds.), relative values: reconfiguring kinship studies. (pp. 116143). durham, nc: duke university press. ingold. t. (2007). lines: a brief history. london, gb: routledge. klapisch-zuber, c. (1991). the genesis of the family tree. i tatti studies: essays in the renaissance 4(1), 105-129. ledwon, l. 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(1978). karl pearson and statistics: the social origins of scientific innovation. social studies of science 8(1): 3-34. o’hara, r. (1992). telling the tree: narrative representation and the study of evolutionary history. biology and philosophy 7: 135-160. ospovat, d. (1981). the development of darwin’s theory: natural history, natural theology and natural selection, 1838-1859. cambridge, gb: cambridge university press. paisley, p. (2016). the lithography business at 54 hatton garden: from obscurity and celebrity to prolific success. micscape 242: https://www.microscopyuk.org.uk/mag/may16ind.html paisley, p. (2017). tuffen’s artistic brother, william west. micscape 251: https://www.microscopy-uk.org.uk/mag/feb17ind.html parikka, j. (2014). the anthrobscene. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. peckham, m. (ed.). (1959). the origin of species: a variorum text. philadelphia, pa: university of pennsylvania press. pietsch, t. (2013). trees of life: a visual history of evolution. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. pomeranz, k. (2000). the great divergence: china, europe, and the making of the modern world economy. princeton, nj: princeton university press. richards, e. (2017). darwin and the making of sexual selection. chicago, il: university of chicago press. roberts, d. (1997). killing the black body: race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty. new york, ny: pantheon books. scully, m. (2018). constructing masculinity through genetic legacies: family histories, y-chromosomes, and ‘viking identities.’ genealogy 2(1), https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy2010008 shanley, m. (1993). feminism, marriage, and the law in victorian england, 1850-1895. princeton, nj: princeton university press. smith, j. (2006). charles darwin and victorian visual culture. cambridge, gb: cambridge university press. spillers, h. (1987). mama’s baby, papa’s maybe: an american grammar book. diacritics 17(2): 64-81. sponsel, a. (2018). darwin’s evolving identity: adventure, ambition, and the sin of speculation. chicago, il: university of chicago press. subramaniam, b. (2016). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. champaign, il: university of illinois press. voss, j. (2010). darwin’s pictures: views of evolutionary theory, 1837-1874. (l. lantz, trans.). new haven, ct: yale university press. (original work published 2007). critical perspectives 13 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4 (2) stefan helmreich 2018 webb, j. jr. (1985). the trade in gum arabic: prelude to french conquest in senegal. the journal of african history, 26(2), 149-168. wray, g. (2001). dating branches on the tree of life using dna. genome biology 3(1): reviews 0001.1–0001.7. author bio stefan helmreich is professor of anthropology at mit. he is the author of alien ocean: anthropological voyages in microbial seas (university of california press, 2009) and sounding the limits of life: essays in the anthropology of biology and beyond (princeton university press, 2016). his essays have appeared in critical inquiry, representations, american anthropologist, and the wire. microsoft word 273-1500-1-keilty .docx keilty, p. (2018). pornography’s white infrastructure. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(1), 1-9. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © patrick kelity. 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical perspectives pornography’s white infrastructure patrick keilty university of toronto p.keilty@utoronto.ca abstract in preparing my talk for a panel on “whiteness and technoculture” for the society for the social study of science in boston, i wanted to think about the relationship of my research on the technocultures of the online pornography industry to the events in charlottesville, which had occurred only weeks earlier. two trends within the online pornography industry came immediately to mind. the first is the way corporate gay pornography has at times colluded with national white supremacy. the second is the emergence of affiliate networks that aim to curate content for “unique male viewers” because the internet is, curiously, awash in “female-focused” content. both of these phenomena seem particularly relevant at a time when white fragility, toxic masculinity, “men’s rights,” and xenophobia have been given explicit approval by the newly elected us president, donald trump. these forces have long defined the united states, but they also reveal the way in which this presidency is uniquely awful and dangerous. 2 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) before i begin my discussion, let me briefly introduce the scale of online pornography as a media industry. globally, pornography is a $97 billion (usd) global media industry (morris 2014). as the primary platform by which people interact with pornography today, online pornography companies wield enormous influence over the ways we learn about, play with, explore, and construct sexuality and sexual desire. each day, tens of millions of people visit pornographic video streaming sites. these websites may seem like amateurish distribution services but, instead, are sophisticated technology companies that employ hundreds of technical staff to design and develop interfaces, algorithms, data mining software, data analytics software, video streaming software, and database management systems. they are part of an innovative industry engaged in the kinds of algorithmic and data science practices that drive the profits of more widely recognized industries, such as social media, online gambling, online games, search engines, and electronic commerce. their staffs are responsible for making strategic choices about information management and the graphical organization of content that translates into large profits, innovative capitalist media techniques, and dominant modes for curating, distributing, and regulating our experience of sexual desire today. in the weeks following the “unite the right” rally in charlottesville, virginia, in august 2017, a number of journalists, pundits, and fashion critics commented on the new uniform of white supremacy: a polo shirt and khaki pants. the washington post’s fashion critic, robin givhan (2017), echoed hannah arendt’s phrase “banality of evil” in arguing that polo shirts and khaki pants participate in a normalization of neo-nazis. “white nationalists,” givhan writes, “are moving through communities cloaked in the most mundane, banal kind of fashion. clothes that do not inspire a double-take. clothes that are acceptable and appropriate. clothes that make them look like they belong.” writing for gq, cam wolf (2017) makes a similar observation while summarizing the evolution of white supremacist outfits in the united states, from white robes to polo shirts, a shift in political strategy that articulates racism as mundane. he 3 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) writes, “for years, white supremacists dressed to set themselves apart, to hide and to scare. charlottesville showed us that the most sinister evolution of their uniform, and the hate it symbolizes, isn't about fear and ghosts and standing apart. it's meant to achieve inclusiveness and assimilation. it means that hate doesn't need to live underground when it can blend in right next door.” in detailing the history of the polo shirt for teen vogue, jared michael lowe reveals that the polo shirt had, in its inception as a tennis shirt in the 1920s, a close association with racial and class politics, before moving through a number of subcultures, from reggae to punk to brit pop, and finally becoming a commonly worn piece of clothing found in most closets. he concludes that its ubiquity today represents an unspoken endorsement that goes along with it: “just like polo shirts, racism, white nationalism, and kkk rallies are as american as apple pie.” meanwhile, guardian reporter gavin haynes (2017) notes that the look at the charlottesville protest was anything but accidental. before charlottesville, andrew anglin, founder of the daily stormer (the american neo-nazi and white supremacist website), urged his supporters “to be extremely conscious of what we look like, and how we present ourselves” alongside advertisements for a european brotherhood polo shirt. yet the contrivance of self-display among white supremacists in charlottesville went beyond simply wearing a polo shirt and khakis. in addition, it included clean-shaven faces and short, clean haircuts. the style gives the impression not only of ordinariness and inclusion, as many commentators observed, but also a boyish look of “white innocence.” that a number of actors and studios within the mainstream gay pornography industry “flirt” with or explicitly embrace white supremacy (and vice versa) comes as no surprise to those of us who have followed the industry over the years. yet the relation has taken on a new prominence since donald trump’s campaign for president. in the run-up to the 2016 us election, a number of prominent white gay pornography performers voiced their support for donald trump’s campaign, including colby keller and jacob ford (zach 2015). meanwhile, goproud, a 4 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) republican gay and lesbian organization, hosted a “gays for trump” event at the republican national convention (rnc) in cleveland, ohio, that featured anti-muslim, anti-black, and pro-trump speeches. the event displayed an exhibit of erotic photography of boyish, shirtless, hairless, white, clean-shaven young men wearing “make america great” (maga) baseball caps, entitled “twinks for trump.” (stuart 2016). the art featured in the exhibit can be found on the pro-trump erotic website daddywillsaveus (http://www.daddywillsaveus.com/). earlier this year, fraternityx, a studio known for its portrayals of white, homophobic, hyper-masculine fraternity brothers that sexually punish another young man for being “queer” or a “fag”, recently featured a scene entitled “trump pump,” in which the members of the fraternity wore maga hats while gangbanging a member of their fraternity who declined to declare his support for trump (fraternityx, 2018). jake porter, another prominent performer in the gay pornography industry, revealed on twitter that he had cultivated an onscreen look in the style of milo yiannopoulos, a prominent anti-muslim speaker at the goproud event, in order to cash in on the provocateur’s growing celebrity (zach 2017). for more explicit examples of white supremacy in gay pornography, one need only search the gay versions of xtube.com or pornhub.com for “nazi” or related terms to find professional and amateur pornography that features white, clean-shaven performers with swastika or confederate flag tattoos, or nazi or confederate symbols in the mis en scene (gremore 2017). one porn studio, joe schmoe videos, specializes in portraying white twinks who have nazi or confederate flag tattoos or symbols. (http://www.joeschmoevideos.com/). writing for the black youth project, sherronda brown (2017) reveals the way in which white supremacy itself is a sexual fantasy. brown writes, “fear of the corruption of ‘white purity’─ whether by non-white immigrants and citizens gaining institutional power over white nationalists or by the black phallus gaining sexual power over white cuckolds and miscegenating with white women ─ is also a fear of sexual and social humiliation. both of these fears are tied 5 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) up with the fetishization of power and power play. and these fears often result in apocalyptic whiteness, a violent response to the white genocide fable.” less explicitly, a number of mainstream gay pornography studios, such as helix studios, belami, blumedia, and seancody, cultivate an image of the “white innocent” who has long been a consumable, stock character in gay pornography: white athletic or thin young men known as “twinks.” these studios’ performers often feature hairless bodies, tidy, short haircuts, clean-shaven faces, and “ordinary” clothes such as polo shirts and khaki pants. they rarely if ever feature performers of color, thereby cultivating a sexual fantasy of a world exclusively comprised of white bodies, a white homonationalist utopia to contrast with the white genocide fable. many of the neo-nazi marchers in charlottesville bore a remarkable similarity to twink stock characters in gay pornography, while ironically chanting, “fuck you faggots” ─ a tableau reminiscent of a fraternityx scene. this is not to say that all portrayals of twinks in polo shirts and khaki pants or any form of race play necessarily signals white supremacy. however, the current political moment has seen the commercial industrialization of certain forms of sexual aesthetics sometimes colluding with national white supremacy. one might argue that cultivating an image similar to a stock character in gay pornography turns fascism on its head. however, what that analysis misses is the way in which white supremacists in the united states have begun to welcome cisgender white gay men into their movement. in addition to the goproud event at the rnc, donna minkowitz details the efforts by white supremacist organizations in the united states to include gay conservatives. she notes that several prominent white supremacist authors in the united states today openly identify as gay men, including james o’meara, author of the homo and the negro, and jack donovan, author of the way of men, in addition to milo yiannopoulos. that so many white supremacist men in charlottesville cultivated a similar image of “white innocence” found in stock characters in gay pornography points to the ways in which a 6 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) particular mode of whiteness can at times serve as a signaling function of sexual desire predicated on an anti-blackness. white nationalism and mainstream gay pornography are engaged in a cultural and aesthetic conversation with each other that circulates the desirability of “white innocence.” there is a complicated story to tell about the politics of “white innocence” and its distribution in the increasingly dominant infrastructures of ubiquitous online pornography distribution. part of that story is the emergence of man's world media (2018), one of the pornography industry’s largest affiliate networks. the company’s motto reads: “the internet serves all mankind but ironically underserves men in particular.” affiliate networks are intermediary technology companies that connect publishers with merchant affiliate programs. in other words, they help retailers advertise on sites like pornhub. advertising is one of pornhub’s largest sources of revenue, along with selling browsing data to third parties, licensing software, subscription services, and the sale of content from its studios, including seancody. man's world media uses methods such as search engine optimization, browsing data, search engine marketing, and the graphical organization of content to increase revenue for both the publisher and retailer. at last year’s internext convention, part of the adult entertainment expo, man's world media had one of the largest booths on the convention floor. they boast over 20 million visitors and 300 million page views each month. in context, these numbers are relatively small for the pornography industry. by comparison, pornhub has more nearly 100 million unique viewers per day. but man's world media claims to be targeting a niche audience, “largely composed of professional, college-educated males between the ages of 18 and 35.” according to the company, “millions of millennial males have shifted to the web as their primary source of entertainment, only to find countless pop culture and entertainment blogs that are decidedly female-focused.” the company continues, “finding compelling, topical content for the unique male appetite has become a challenging endeavor.” their goal is to “fill this void of quality content 7 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) touchstones for the millennial male.” in this rendering, the “millennial male” is both unique and monolithic. if one wonders what kind of male man's world media has in mind, their website offers a number of clues, including a quote from marilyn monroe: “i don’t mind being in a man’s world, as long as i can be a woman in it.” their splash page features a black leather background and a membership card (as if a literal boy’s club) with a man's world media logo on it. their twitter page, with hashtags like #bymenformen and #manosphere, features mid-century drawings of white men fixing their ties or smoking a pipe in the style of mad men. their latest tweet features a video of an interview with tommy sotomayor, a self-described men’s rights activist, who argues that the father’s natural role in the home has been displaced by feminism, and that affirmative action policies hurt black people. a survey of man's world media’s self-avowed “malecentric brands” reveals that their content is almost exclusively white cismen. on the one hand, man's world media is invested in a narrative about the feminization of the internet and the need to reclaim it as a space for masculinity. on the other hand, mainstream gay porn sells consumers a site of white masculinity that cultivates a similar iconography of white supremacy. taken together, man's world media and the authentication of “white innocence” might help expand our understanding of how the homosocial and homosexual deploy similar iconographies of whiteness in the service of white nationalism, toxic masculinity, and white supremacy. what role do particular modes of whiteness play in gay porn to perpetuate white supremacy and antifeminism, and how might white supremacy take up the cultivation of the sexual desirability of wholesome white bodies or of iconographies of clean-cut mid-century toxic masculinity to further an anti-feminist and white nationalist agenda? acknowledgements 8 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) i would like to thank jennifer hamilton, peter hobbs, lilly irani, daniel laurin, michelle murphy, lilly nguyen, falicity schaeffer-grabiel, mitali thakor, kalini vora, and the generosity of the blind reviewers that improved this essay from its hasty beginnings. references brown, sherronda. (2017). erotic race play reveals how white supremacy is a perversion of unmatched proportions. black youth project, october 2, 2017. retrieved january 8, 2018 from https://blackyouthproject.com/white-supremacy-perversion-unmatched/ fraternityx. (2018). trump pump. retrieved february 25, 2018 from http://fraternityx.com/episode.php?id=188 givhan, robin. (2017). neo-nazis are using fashion in an attempt to normalize. the fashion industry needs to speak up. the washington post, august 22, 2017. retrieved january 8, 2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2017/08/22/neo-nazis-are-using-fashion-in-anattempt-to-normalize-the-fashion-industry-needs-to-speakup/?utm_term=.43a62bf974c2 gremore, graham. racist neo-nazi gay films are having quite a moment right now. queerty.com, august 25, 2017. retrieved january 8, 2018 from https://www.queerty.com/racist-neo-nazi-gay-adult-films-quite-momentright-now-20170825 haynes, gavin. (2017). the white polo shirt: how the alt-right co-opted a modern classic. the guardian, august 30, 2017. retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2017/aug/30/the-white-polo-shirthow-the-alt-right-co-opted-a-modern-classic lowe, jared michael. (2017). how polo shirts became a white supremacist uniform. teen vogue, august 29, 2017. retrieved from https://www.teenvogue.com/story/polo-shirts-white-supremacist-whitenationalist-charlottesville-uniform man world media. (2018). retrieved january 8, 2018 from http://www.manworldmedia.com/ morris, chris (2014). porn industry feeling upbeat about 2014. retrieved 9 keilty catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(1) january 8, 2018 from http://www.nbcnews.com/business/businessnews/porn-industryfeeling-upbeat-about-2014-n9076. stuart, tessa. (2016). inside rnc’s hottest ticket: the big gay islamophobia party. rolling stone, july 20, 2016. retrieved january 8, 2018 from https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/inside-rncshottest-ticket-the-big-gay-islamophobia-party-w429967 wolf, cam. (2017). the new uniform of white supremacy. gq, august 17, 2017. retrieved january 8, 2018 from https://www.gq.com/story/uniform-of-white-supremacy zach. (2015). surprise: racist gay porn star jacob ford supports donald trump. str8upgayporn.com, september 24, 2015. retrieved january 8, 2018 from http://str8upgayporn.com/surprise-racist-gay-porn-star-jacobford-supports-donald-trump/ zach. (2017). hot or not: jake porter’s milo yiannopoulos-inspired dye job. str8upgayporn.com, september 16, 2017. retrieved january 8, 2018 from http://str8upgayporn.com/donald-trump-supporter-jakeporter-died-his-hair-blond-so-hed-look-more-like-his-other-hero-miloyiannopoulos/. bio patrick keilty is assistant professor in the faculty of information at the university of toronto. his primary research interest is the politics of digital infrastructures in the online pornography industry. his work spans issues in visual culture, sexual politics, technology studies, media studies, information studies, critical algorithm studies, political economy, database logic, critical theory, and theories of gender, sexuality, and race. ives, sarah (2019). “more-than-human” and “less-than-human”: race, botany, and the challenge of multispecies ethnography. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © sarah ives, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution noncommercial no derivatives license “more-than-human” and “less-than-human”: race, botany, and the challenge of multispecies ethnography sarah ives city college of san francisco sarah.f.ives@gmail.com in a growing body of humanities and social science research, plants and animals have moved from the background to the center, as scholars examine how diverse organisms are “entangled in political, economic, and cultural systems” (kirksey, schuetze, & helmreich, 2014, p. 1; kirksey & helmreich, 2010; tsing, 2015). de-centering the human also brings attention to ways of knowing, such as indigenous animism, that disrupt narratives of human exceptionalism common to western philosophy. while multispecies ethnography and theories about the anthropocene have gained traction in recent years, discussions about the human–nonhuman interface date to the origins of anthropology. for instance, in her influential work, “a cyborg manifesto,” donna haraway challenged strict partitions between nature/culture, male/female, and self/other foundational to western philosophical thought. she wrote that while these dualisms are part of the logics and practices that inform the domination of women, people of color, nature, and workers, they can be challenged through strategies that deploy “pleasure in the confusion of boundaries” (haraway, 1991, p. 151). building on this research, multispecies ethnography attempts to blur the boundaries of human and nonhuman to disrupt hierarchies of power. in this sense, multispecies approaches celebrate the political and theoretical possibilities of critical perspective | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah ives, 2019 2 foregrounding more-than-human worlds and human–nonhuman relations. as we move beyond a humancentric lens, however, it is critical that multispecies approaches engage further with scholarship on race and colonialism to remember a history in which blurring lines between the human and nonhuman was not celebratory, but rather distinctly violent, a history in which “the management of populations and race undergird[ed] the human–nonhuman interface” (ives, 2014, p. 703). colonial agents constructed connections between race and nature by portraying those they colonized (such as indigenous peoples) as less-than-human and closer to nature and, in turn, depicting whites as producers of culture and superior to nature. these constructions reinforced white supremacy by establishing dualisms of “white” and “nonwhite” to justify political, social, and economic hierarchies. in considering new directions in research on peoples and plants, my research asks how scholars can engage with the more-than-human, while recognizing the history of violent connections drawn between race and nature whereby certain groups were (and still are) considered less-than-human. i explore this question through two interrelated themes: (1) colonial histories that rendered people as a part of the natural landscape to justify land dispossession and even genocide; and (2) the deliberate alteration of the landscape through the introduction of invasive plants. together, these lines of inquiry can inform critical approaches to systems of power and knowledge embedded in human–plant relations. in the wretched of the earth (1965), frantz fanon brings attention to colonial language that associates certain peoples with nature by showing how colonists spoke of the native in zoological terms. he argues that this language saddled the native with the violence of “exclusionary humanism.” books such as the natural history of the negro race, for example, placed plant taxonomy alongside racial classification (virey, 1837).1 i explore these colonial associations in my own research by addressing how naturalized ideas of race and plants intersected with both political and scholarly representations of—and discussions related to— khoisan (or “bushmen”), which is an umbrella term used to describe ethnic groups in south africa who share physical and linguistic characteristics distinct from the bantu-speaking majority. the very label “bushmen” exemplifies colonial practices of equating indigenous peoples, in this case khoi and san, as “nature” and thus rendering them less-than-human. in this context, the blurring of distinctions between human and nonhuman was (and remains) violent in part because it constructs and reinforces racial hierarchies that place whites at the top. for critical perspective | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah ives, 2019 3 example, while making his classificatory schemes in the eighteenth century, carl linnaeus said he had difficulty convincing himself that europeans and “bushmen” shared the same origins.2 and unlike the “pleasurable” confusion discussed by haraway as a means to challenge relations of power, colonial governments “confused” and conflated the boundaries between the “native” and “nature” to deny khoi and san humanity and justify land seizures, slavery, and genocide. colonists not only conquered people and territory; they also sought to alter fundamentally geography and ecology, thereby upending understandings of place. for example, in the nineteenth century the british brought australian eucalyptus to southern africa. the invasive trees thrived in the new environment, and eucalyptus soon “stood out as one of the most distinctive features of the…landscape” (bennett, 2011, p. 130). given their seeming ability to eliminate malarial mosquitoes, the trees even helped facilitate colonial settlement in what was considered a “challenging” ecosystem. by transforming the ecosystem, eucalyptus disrupted relationships between local people, plants, insects, and soils. framing foreign plants as inherently “bad” and native plants as inherently “good” erases the multiplicity of roles invasive species play in social, political, and economic relations and can easily reinforce violent, eugenicist notions of nationalism (see, for example, stern, 2005; subramaniam, 2014). nevertheless, the resulting landscape change (whether or not it was a conscious rationale for introducing invasive species) helped lay a foundation for colonial dispossession of those historically viewed as part of the natural world, including khoi and san. in a planet increasingly affected by human-caused climate change, research that foregrounds the legacies of indigenous peoples, colonial histories, transformed ecosystems, and multispecies entanglements is more urgent than ever. attention to human–plant relations can add depth to this research by undermining essentialist dualisms. the focus can also offer hope in what feels like apocalyptic times by emphasizing our shared futures with a “multitude of creative agents,” from trees to insects (kirksey, 2015, p. 217; kohn, 2013; marder, 2013). yet i argue that we must remain aware of the differential ways in which certain people are included in the human world, while others are relegated to the nonhuman world. acknowledgements i would like to thank laura foster for her feedback throughout the writing and revising process and for her efforts in bringing together diverse perspectives on plants, colonialism, and race. i am also indebted to the editors and anonymous reviewers for their insights. critical perspective | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah ives, 2019 4 notes 1 i have written about this topic extensively elsewhere (ives 2014, 2017). 2 violent connections between race and nature have hardly been relegated to africa, as demonstrated by research connecting plants and eugenics in the united states (stern, 2015). references bennett, b. m. (2011). a global history of australian trees. journal of the history of biology, 44(1), 125-145. fanon, f. (2004). the wretched of the earth (r. philcox, trans.). new york, ny: grove press. (original work published in 1965) haraway, d. j. (1991). simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature. new york, ny: routledge. ives, s. (2014). farming the south african “bush”: ecologies of belonging and exclusion in rooibos tea. american ethnologist, 41(4), 698-713. ives, s. (2017). steeped in heritage: the racial politics of south african rooibos tea. durham, nc: duke university press. kirksey, e. (2015). emergent ecologies. durham, nc: duke university press. kirksey, e., & helmreich, s. (2010). the emergence of multispecies ethnography. cultural anthropology, 25(4), 545-576. kirksey, e., schuetze, c., & helmreich, s. (2014). introduction. in e. kirksey (ed.), the multispecies salon (pp. 1-24). durham, nc: duke university press. kohn, e. (2013). how forests think: toward an anthropology beyond the human. berkeley, ca: university of california press. marder, m. (2013). plant-thinking: a philosophy of vegetal life. new york, ny: columbia university press. stern, a. m. (2005). eugenic nation: faults and frontiers of better breeding in modern america. berkeley, ca: university of california press. subramaniam, b. (2014). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. champaign, il: university of illinois press. tsing, a. l. (2015). the mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins. princeton, nj: princeton university press. critical perspective | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) sarah ives, 2019 5 virey, j.-j. (1837). natural history of the negro race (j. h. guenebault, trans.). new york, ny: d.j. dowling. author bio sarah ives is the author of steeped in heritage: the racial politics of south african rooibos tea. she currently teaches anthropology at city college of san francisco. leong article    the mattering of black lives: octavia butler’s hyperempathy and the promise of the new materialisms    diana leong university of utah diana.leong@utah.edu black lives matter and black lives matter and black lives matter. this homographic reading of the most salient political statement of recent years speaks to the torsions of blackness, matter, and life that have come to define our contemporary era. in “unbearable blackness,” jared sexton (2015) argues with regard to the triangulation of these concerns that anti-black fantasies “do not render blacks, like so much of the planet, subject to death in an economy of disposability; rather, they subject blacks to ‘the interminable time of meaningless, impersonal dying’” (p.168). in the wake of recent grand jury decisions not to prosecute the murders of tamir rice, eric garner, and michael brown, to name only the most widely publicized cases, sexton’s claims register most strongly in the state’s refusal to allow these deaths to die. they are caught instead in a biopolitical apparatus that suspends racial blackness between a life unrecognized as such and an illegible form of death that can never pass into reason. against this timeless, spectral dying, we can read the declaration that “black lives matter” as a call to return racial blackness to a form that matters, to a form, in other words, that is matter. on this score, i ask: how do black life and death become matter, and what is at stake in the demand that they should assume such form? octavia butler’s afrofuturist novels parable of the sower (1993) and parable of the talents (1998) dramatize these questions through protagonist lauren olamina and her condition of hyperempathy. in this article, i explore hyperempathy as a speculative embodiment of “pornotroping” (spillers, 2003) to understand how racial blackness structures current theorizations of matter. questions about the proper scale, scope, and character of matter have assumed a renewed sense of urgency given the emergence of the anthropocene, a distinct geological epoch in which human activity has become so influential as to alter fundamental aspects of the earth system. while ecologist eugene stoermer and nobel prize-winning atmospheric chemist paul crutzen introduced the current definition of the term in the 1980s, we have since witnessed a growing scientific consensus about the rigor of the concept. a recent article published in the journal science by the anthropocene working group (2016) provides the latest example of this support, demonstrating that fluctuations in the content and pace of sediment deposits and extinction rates are anthropogenically driven. however, the very nomenclature of the “anthropocene” has been subject to critique from within the humanities for allowing an abstract notion of the “anthropos” to anchor an implicit philosophy of history. daniel hartley (2015), for instance, comments in a recent issue of the uk-based magazine salvage, “inherent to the anthropocene discourse is a conception of historical causality which is purely mechanical: a one-on-one billiard ball model of technological invention and historical effect, which is simply inadequate to explain actual social and relational modes of historical causation” (para. 4). hartley takes special issue with the presumed origins of the anthropocene, which many geologists date to the industrial and nuclear revolutions. this determination, he suggests, interprets the environmental impact of technology as the “net effect” of an undifferentiated “human” activity (waters et. al., 2016, p. 139). in order to assert a causal link between technological development and ecological catastrophe, any consideration of the roles race, class, and gender have played in engineering our historical present must be obscured.1 the benefits and consequences of technological development and environmental disaster, after all, are rarely if ever distributed symmetrically among and within human populations. “it is not all people that are indicted by the onset of the anthropocene,” writes nicholas mirzoeff (forthcoming 2016), “but a specific set: colonial settlers, enslavers, and would-be imperialists” (pp. 19-20). at the same time, this remodeling of human history and ecological philosophy is not unique to geologists. indeed, the anthropocene’s scientific definition may have become matters of debate only recently, but its constitutive concerns—global warming, genetic technology, biodiversity loss, environmental racism—have thrown our prevailing concepts of nature and culture into crisis well before the epoch’s formal identification. at stake is not only the fate of homo sapiens as a species, but also the basic composition of a world yet to come. the challenges of analyzing the effects of non-human systems (e.g., weather patterns or ocean currents) and actors (e.g., viruses or pesticides) while attending to the uneven distribution of environmental risks and resources have generated a range of philosophical responses. for example, publications like dipesh chakrabarty’s (2009), “the climate of history,” elizabeth kolbert’s (2014) the sixth extinction, and roy scranton’s (2015) learning to die in the anthropocene recommend a universal or existential “species thinking” necessary for grasping the complexities of climate change. other responses, like jane bennett’s (2010) vibrant matter and jeffrey jerome cohen’s (2015) stone, interrogate fantasies of human mastery as a way of reckoning with the power of non-human agents. over the last decade, one particular variety of response has acquired critical purchase within the academic left: the new materialisms. as part of what richard grusin (2015) has named “the nonhuman turn” in contemporary thought, the new materialisms join affect theory, critical animal studies, and object-oriented ontology in calling for enhanced attention to matter and materiality. the popularity of this approach, evidenced by a growing number of monographs, special journal issues, and anthologies, appears grounded in the need to develop strategies of coexistence attuned to the anthropocene’s political and ecological crises.2 how, for example, should we understand agency and embodiment in light of recent developments in biotechnology and the increasingly unpredictable behavior of non-human objects? the promise of the new materialisms thus inheres in the notion that a focus on materiality can offer us more comprehensive and efficacious ways to respond to these developments. as diana coole and samantha frost (2010) write in their introduction to the new materialisms anthology, “what is at stake here is nothing less than a challenge to some of the most basic assumptions that have underpinned the modern world, including its normative sense of the human and its beliefs about human agency, but also regarding its material practices such as the ways we labor on, exploit, and interact with nature” (p. 4). there is much to recommend an intensified engagement with matter, not least of which is coole and frost’s proposal that such engagements can disrupt our “normative sense of the human” and of “human agency.” given this professed interest in dismantling human exceptionalism, it is curious then that, as zakiyyah jackson (2015) and other critical race scholars point out, the new materialisms have systematically “[ignored] praxes of humanity and critiques produced by black people, particularly those praxes which are irreverent to the normative production of ‘the human’ or illegible from within the terms of its logic” (p. 216).3 black thought has long challenged the enforced description of africans and their descendants as non-human objects of science, as specimens for study and experimentation, as commodities for market exchange, as things. in fact, from at least the 16th century onward, black bodies provided crucial raw material for the development of natural history, the natural sciences, and the life philosophies in enlightenment thought.4 both geology and biology, for example, pursued notions of species and evolution that preserved early racial taxonomies; the techniques of observation and interpretation used to analyze geological activity were the same as those employed by the racial science of phrenology. mirzoeff (forthcoming 2016) leverages this history to argue that “the very concept of observable breaks between geological eras in general and the definition of the anthropocene in particular is inextricably intermingled with the belief in distinct races of humanity” (p. 2). his claim that the concept of the anthropocene reproduces race-making technologies gestures to the historical fact that the human as such has emerged through the exclusion and extermination of black bodies. proscribed from the realm of the human, black intellectuals have had to think within and through the categories of the non-human and the inhuman to pursue new ways of being in the world. philosophical questions about the vitality and agency of the human, the animal, and the object are therefore longstanding in the fields of black studies. alexander weheliye (2015) observes in habeas viscus that across sylvia wynter’s oeuvre, “it is the human—or different genres of the human—that materializes as the object of knowledge in the conceptual mirror of black studies” (p. 21). the scholarly work of hortense spillers (2003) and fred moten (2003), and the afrofuturist contributions of nalo hopkinson (1998; 2000) and nnedi okorafor (2010), similarly confront the “most basic assumptions that have underpinned the modern world,” including our notions of history, temporality, and modern science.5 and yet, as it is with the anthropocene’s implied philosophy of history, much of the scholarship produced under the banner of the new materialisms tends to reduce race to a crude “identity politics” or to endorse a model of difference-without-race.6 this reduction and disavowal of race, i contend, is something of a structural necessity for the new materialisms. in what follows, i trace the general theoretical principles of the new materialisms to a dissatisfaction with the linguistic and cultural paradigms of post-structuralism. i then demonstrate how this dissatisfaction enables an ethics of relation or affect that further legitimizes the reduction and dismissal of race. however, as a close reading of butler’s parable duology reveals, one of the primary figures of the new materialisms—the material body—is defined by and through disavowed social fantasies about black female flesh that are linked to the global legacies of modern slavery. my examination of the critical responses to butler’s novels further suggests that such fantasies are necessary to secure a libidinal investment in the ethical potential of materiality. i argue, thus, against a misrecognition of black female flesh as a resource against the violence of hierarchical differences, rather than the site of their active production. finally, i turn to a reading of butler’s parable duology as an allegory about the dangers of proceeding in the anthropocene without a robust analysis of the formation of racial blackness. because a proper survey of new materialist literature is beyond the scope of this article, the comments below should be taken as entry points for probing the (absent) place of racial blackness in theories about matter.7 the promise of the new materialisms the new materialisms are drawn from a long genealogy of philosophical materialism, in which spinoza, nietzsche, bergson, marx, and deleuze are cited as major touchstones. in recognition of this legacy, coole and frost (2010) assert that the interventions loosely gathered by the term “new materialisms” are better “categorized as renewed materialisms,” with the qualifier “new” acknowledging the “unprecedented” ecological, biological, and technological conditions under which we currently live and labor (p. 4, italics in original). although their specific objects of analysis are appropriately diverse, the new materialisms collectively insist on a post-humanist matter that is lively, self-directed, agential, creative, and always in the process of becoming. in this regard, matter is better thought of as materialization, or the process by which complex phenomena are temporarily and contingently stabilized to varying degrees. the ontological shift entailed here is towards a philosophical monism, inspired most notably by the work of deleuze. following spinoza and bergson, deleuze (1994) develops a notion of the virtual as a generative field of difference, or a “plane of immanence,” where “all the varieties of differential relations and all the distributions of singular points [coexist] in diverse orders ‘perplicated’ in one another” (p. 206). these differences are then formatted into distinct phenomena or entities by processes of actualization that “[bring] the object back into relation with the field of differential relations in which it can always be dissolved and become actualized otherwise, as something else, by being linked through other differential relations to other particles” (cheah, 2010, pp. 85-86). while not all new materialist theories cleave to a strictly deleuzian philosophy, there is general agreement that the dynamic interactions among objects, bodies, and phenomena turn us away from the anthropocene’s “billiard ball model” of causality, and more significantly, away from some of post-structuralism’s critical trends. according to the new materialisms, the linguistic and cultural turns of the last half century have resulted in both an intellectual and a political poverty. specifically, social constructivism (coole & frost, 2010) and cultural representationalism (barad, 2007) have overdetermined matter to the extent that it appears as a passive product made meaningful only through cultural and discursive practice. coole and frost (2010) even write of a theoretical “exhaustion,” claiming that they “share the feeling current among many researchers that the dominant constructivist orientation to social analysis is inadequate for thinking about matter, materiality, and politics in ways that do justice to the contemporary context of biopolitics and global political economy” (p. 6). somewhere and sometime during the rise of the anthropocene, cultural theory, broadly conceived, lost its explanatory power. this assessment of inadequacy repeats across much of the recent new materialist scholarship, condensing the cultural turn into a discursive reductionism that rebuffs the empirical for the ideal, or the material for the symbolic. elizabeth grosz’s (2004) the nick of time opens with a telling “reminder to social, political, and cultural theorists, particularly those interested in feminism, antiracism, and questions of the politics of globalization, that they have forgotten a crucial dimension of research…not just the body, but that which makes it possible and which limits its actions: the precarious, accidental, contingent, expedient, striving, dynamic status of life in a messy, complicated, resistant, brute world of materiality” (p. 2). social, political, and cultural theory, in other words, have overlooked the material conditions of life that render the body available for inscription and enculturation in the first instance. so too in the recently published gut feminism does elizabeth wilson (2015) rebuke “social constructionism” for “[tending] not to be very curious about the details of empirical claims in genetics, neurophysiology, evolutionary biology, pharmacology or biochemistry” (p. 3). her ensuing conclusion is that focusing on how social structures produce and discipline bodies comes at the expense of recognizing the ways bodies radically alter and organize social structures themselves. it appears that cultural theory harbors an “allergy to ‘the real’” that dissuades “critical inquirers from the more empirical kinds of investigation that material processes and structures require” (coole & frost, 2010, p. 6). however, the very aspects that would make matter more “real” than language or culture are the same aspects that restrict its ethical potential and facilitate a conceptual rejection of race. in line with their post-humanist agenda, the new materialisms evoke matter and materiality as existing in excess of human subjectivity and its attendant domains. mechanistic theories of causality hold that objects are composed of inert matter acted upon by external forces, which presumes that an object’s potential or possible capabilities are already present and fixed in some initial moment of creation. but, as the new materialisms emphasize, the virtual field of differential relations is immanent to matter in such a way that it is impossible to anticipate all of the effects a material configuration may have, or the organizational forms it may take. this ability to act independently of the subject’s will and desire is variously construed as “impersonal and preindividual forces,” an alterity that “comes from outside the capability or power of the subject” (cheah, 2010, p. 80, 89), “degrees of indetermination” that represent the “‘true principle of life’” (grosz, 2010, p. 149), and a “powerful reminder…that life will always exceed our knowledge and control” (bennett, 2010, p.14). differences in terminology aside, the new materialisms are united by an understanding of materiality as a spectral, impersonal force with material effects, one that escapes reason and disrupts systems of meaning, including modernist binaries like mind/body, culture/nature, and inside/outside (dolphijn & van der tuin, 2012). the latter aspect is key because, while matter can frustrate representation, its “excessive” properties do not mean that it exists “outside” of the subject. rather, matter and materiality are “real” because they actively produce reality in unpredictable ways (cheah, 2010). it is here that the ethical impetus of the new materialist project is located. if we accept our embeddedness in mutually transformative, non-human networks, the ground of ethics shifts accordingly. first, a responsibility to an externalized other gives way to an accountability for the many relations that constitute becoming. and second, ethics are no longer reducible to the decisions or actions of individuals that are initiated by a properly historical judgment. in rosi braidotti’s (2010) terms, “accepting the impossibility of mutual recognition and replacing it with one of mutual specification and mutual codependence is what is at stake in postsecular affirmative ethics” (p. 214). i find nothing immediately problematic with an ethics that aspires to keep pace with advancements in science, philosophy, and technology. what i find troublesome is how our acquiescence to these ethics is solicited. new materialist ethics necessarily manifest as affective encounters that operate best on micropolitical scales. because materiality is figured as an impersonal force of the real, it runs the risk of becoming a transcendental signified that merely replaces language or culture as an organizing principle. doing so would severely diminish its import as an inducement to a posthumanist ethics. to circumvent the “tension between universalistic theory and specific mode of inquiry,” chance, contingency, and creativity in micro-level encounters are prioritized over more obstinate assemblages that congeal at the global or macro-levels (zhan, 2016, p. 26). further, as the nucleus of the new materialisms, the embodied subject or material body compels an ethics that unfolds on a parallel plane, meaning between and within bodies. “this implies,” rosi braidotti (2010) proposes, “approaching the world through affectivity and not cognition: as singularity, force, movement, through assemblages or webs of interconnections with all that lives,” and “accepting the impossibility of mutual recognition and replacing it with one of mutual specification and mutual codependence” (p. 214). in the quotation above, braidotti invokes an ethics of relation, in which sensation and perception comprise the “zone of [ethical] effectivity,” and attunement and affirmation take precedence over social transformation (tumino, 2011, p. 555). because material interand intra-actions are preconscious and multisensorial, ethical practice is based not on the ability to evaluate right from wrong, but on a commitment to feeling right. we can observe this adjustment in appeals to “an ongoing responsiveness to…entanglement” ((barad, 2007, p. 394), “a heightened sensitivity to the agency of assemblages” (bennett, 2010b), a “wakefulness” to the “feel [of] what makes us laugh, lament, and curse” (orlie, 2007, p. 127) and an “experience of the vitality of being” (connolly, 2010, pp. 196-197). as a consequence, the experiences of living under conditions of crisis are fetishized at the expense of addressing the causes of these conditions themselves. the imperative to “[live] with the open wound...through a sort of depersonalization of the event” (braidotti, 2010, p. 213), for example, not only depoliticizes the claims of historically oppressed communities, but also flattens distinctions between traumas inflicted through happenstance and persistent intergenerational harm. how else could one, as braidotti does, list as equivalent examples: those who survived the holocaust, frida kahlo’s deadly tram ride, and missing the train to the world trade center on september 11th (p. 214)? the limits of a new materialist ethics appear most forcefully, then, as we attempt to move from an embodied “responsiveness” to the dislocation of structures. when patterns of materialization are addressed, it is generally as the amalgamation of “perpetual circuits of exchange, feedback, and reentry” that thereby “[inflect] the shape of political experience” (connolly, 2010, pp. 190-191). on the one hand, there is nothing innately objectionable about attributing the creation and transformation of political structures to any number of quotidian, embodied experiences. this is in fact common in political theory and historiography.8 on the other hand, it becomes more difficult to reconcile the effects of chance, unpredictability, and indeterminacy with the endurance and repetition of something like antiblack violence.9 the new materialisms are therefore at pains to clarify why the structures of global antiblackness continue to function as if “neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as the human subject is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise” (spillers, 2003, p. 208). interpreting and describing our entanglements with non-human, materialist forces are not enough to account for, much less dislodge attachments to, social categories and representational arrangements. by this i mean that becoming more aware of material forces will not inevitably reduce the weight of discursive or psychic formations. it could even obstruct change by making forms of affect and sensation newly available for inscription. as timothy morton (2007) states, when “contact becomes content,” perceptions of difference collapse into identity (p. 37). granted, these complications are not unique to the new materialisms as changes in scale almost always require a re-calibration of ethics. the point is, however, that the framing of the new materialisms as inherently more ethical generates, and is generated by, a disavowal or misreading of race as a stagnant analytical framework.  as i submit above, since at least the enlightenment period intellectual genealogies have maintained an almost overwhelming racial homogeneity. critical theories produced by non-white scholars may have increased in terms of production or representation, but these are consistently marked as minority perspectives that have little to do with universal or ontological questions.10 hence, black bodies especially are rendered objects for theoretical development, rather than subjects of universal philosophy. coole and frost (2010) continue this trend, revealing that even as “feminists and class theorists have often insisted upon” the importance of material bodies and environments, the authors remain “[concerned] that such material dimensions have recently been marginalized by fashionable constructivist approaches and identity politics” (p. 19). the latter, they continue, “had a good deal to say about the body and its imbrication in relationships of power, but we are not convinced that they pay sufficient attention to the material efficacy of bodies or have the theoretical resources to do so” (ibid.). such a statement is heavy with longstanding racial charges of intellectual primitivism and parochialism. the unfortunate request to be “convinced” of identity politics’ intellectual merit effectively seals an historically white critical theory as the standard for authoritative knowledge production.11 one must also wonder about the referents for these insufficiently materialist identity politics, given that the new materialisms anthology fails to cite even one example that might be taken as representative of a larger trend. even if coole and frost employ “identity politics” as a shorthand for idealist approaches to subjectivity, their statement betrays both a misunderstanding of studies of “identity,” and a symptomatic desire to abandon race. to be clear, coole and frost never openly reduce “identity politics” to racial identity. but in many if not most of new materialisms’ founding texts, race receives only casual mention alongside the “other so-called axes of social difference” like sex, gender, and class, and often to specify a concept that has been “paralyzed by [a] ‘binary’ take on dualism” (dolphijn & van der tuin, 2012, p. 88, 143), or to name potential beneficiaries of one’s theorization (barad, 2007; grosz, 2004). we could perhaps attribute this treatment of race to an obdurate politics of attention (ahmed, 2008) that determines which issues receive consideration.12 nonetheless, to ascertain if and how the new materialisms might furnish us with a timelier ethics, we must first ask what purpose the omission of race serves. the movement for black lives has forcefully reminded us that black bodies have historically provided the standards against which the human subject and non-human objects are measured. this is to say that the “rupture in the quality of being” inaugurated by modern racial slavery is not limited to black lives (brand, 2001, p. 29). black critical theorists repeatedly insist on the world-historical scale of this rupture, tracking how it conditions our thinking about humans and matter, and the movements of this thought itself. what this means for our current discussion is that “the question of race’s reality has and continues to bear directly on hierarchies of knowledge pertaining to the nature of reality itself” (jackson, 2015, p. 216), or on what dionne brand (2001) calls our “cognitive schema” (p. 29). as a conceptual orientation or method of “way-finding,” the prevailing cognitive schema articulates a libidinal economy of antiblackness to the history of ideas, ensuring, as spillers (2003) maintains, that “dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation;” “sticks and bricks might break our bones, but words will most certainly kill us” (pp. 208-209). by inverting a childhood rejoinder about the supposedly limited reach of the symbolic, spillers lays out a provocative proposal: the metaphors of slavery are immanent to the force of the material. although “‘race’ alone bears no inherent meaning, even though it reifies in personality,” it “gains its power from what it signifies by point, in what it allows to come to meaning” (spillers, 2003, p. 380). black lives matter, and blackness enlivens matter. it is possible, then, that the elaboration of thought, the conditions of its enunciation and reception, are always part of a racial praxis, even when those “personalities” that absorb the reification of race are most absent. this is a paradigmatic example of the prevailing cognitive schema at work. antiblackness conditions the force of materiality by determining the logic of both its actualization and its theoretical manifestations. these functions become clearer when we turn our attention to octavia butler’s parable duology. parables for our time the parable novels are set in a dystopian america, produced by a fifteen-year period of “coinciding climactic, economic, and sociological crises” known collectively as “the pox” (butler, 1998, p. 8). amid the ongoing economic and political collapse of the u.s. and its de facto elimination of social services, protagonist lauren olamina lives with her family in the southern california gated community of robledo, which is spanish for “oakwood.” the community’s walls offer an illusion of security to the semi-professional, non-white residents, and despite the increasing violence just outside, they refuse to consider alternatives. angered by this inability to acknowledge the permanence of change, lauren devises a line of flight in the form of a political theology she names “earthseed.” she becomes the titular “sower” of the first novel, guided by earthseed’s central principle that “god is change.” after the eventual massacre of the people of robledo, lauren travels to northern california with fellow itinerants she recruits along the way. parable of the sower closes with their founding of the town of acorn—a name that transforms a community once mature and moribund like a “sturdy old oak” into a community committed to earthseed’s doctrine of adaptability, self-sufficiency, and education. while both novels are narrated through lauren’s journal entries, parable of the talents includes contributions from lauren’s daughter, asha, and lauren’s husband, bankole. talents picks up five years after the events of sower and details the imprisonment and dispersal of the acorn community by a fundamentalist christian sect. in the second half of talents, lauren sets out to find a missing asha while attempting to rebuild the earthseed movement. the narrative culminates with the departure of the world’s first interstellar spaceships, sponsored by the now powerful network of earthseed acolytes. what makes the novels imminently relevant to our discussion is that the apocalypse-inducing “pox” begins in 2015. while lauren’s narration commences in 2024, the overlaps between the diegetic and extradiegetic levels endorse a reading of the novels as cautionary tales for the anthropocene of our present. to be sure, the eponymous “parables” of the titles refer to the new testament’s instructional stories, and there is a great deal in butler’s novels deserving of our caution. all of the anthropocene’s most troubling possibilities, however farfetched, are realized by 2024. the rapidly warming climate decimates crops and creates monster storms, displacing millions of people and exacerbating the spread of hunger, poverty, and disease. as u.s. citizens attempt to flee to alaska, “the last frontier” eventually secedes from the union to form a northern bloc with russia and canada. by 2033, warfare has broken out. as butler makes clear, these events were set in motion prior to the onset of the pox and considerably before 2015. this warp of time and history situates the novels in the future perfect by foregrounding the priority of blackness, figured here through lauren’s recounting as an eternal condition of being “prior” that returns to the present as a not-yet realized future.13 blackness, which will have been there, is the specter that haunts the anthropocene and its possible futures. what i find intriguing is that this haunting appears most strongly in the scholarly reception of the novels. there is much to say about the novels’ methods, including their retrofitting of the slave narrative, and about their themes, like the ideological functions of technology, the privatization of natural resources, and the constitution of community. but one theme in particular that receives consistent attention among critics deals explicitly with the question of the human body itself. lauren is hyperempathic, an “organic delusional syndrome” that obliges her to share other people’s pain and pleasure (butler, 1993, p. 11). this heightened sensitivity is visually-activated; in her own words, “i feel what i see others feeling or what i believe they feel” (butler, 1993, p. 12). despite being entirely imaginary, lauren’s ability to “share” renders her dangerously vulnerable to the violence that permeates both novels. speaking to bankole, she laments, “self-defense shouldn’t have to be an agony or a killing or both. i can be crippled by the pain of a wounded person. i’m a very good shot because i’ve never felt that i could afford to just wound someone…. the worst of it is, if you got hurt, i might not be able to help you. i might be crippled by your injury—by your pain, i mean—as you are” (butler, 1993, p. 278). as a consequence, lauren’s social interactions are governed by a kind of strategic calculus; the “golden rule” enacted not just at the level of bodies, but essentially between them. for many critics, hyperempathy encourages more ethical approaches to difference by releasing the body from its historically fixed positions. variously described as the “right medicine for our present ‘compassion fatigue’” (miller, 1998, p. 357), “the living embodiment of the subversion of difference” (stillman, 2003, p. 29), and “a crucial metaphor for re-defining social relations,” hyperempathy seems to bear an almost utopian ethical potential (melzer, 2002, p. 13). in this regard, hyperempathy accomplishes what e.p. thompson identifies as the pedagogical function of utopia, or “the education of desire” (qtd. in wegner, 2007, p. 17). the scholarly reception of the parable duology therefore announces that a radical break with our attachments to the body is not only possible, but also desirable. we are now firmly within the scope of the postand non-human turns. the body hailed in the parable duology is precisely the body theorized in the new materialisms. for instance, coole and frost (2010) define bodies as “open series of capacities or potencies that emerge hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes,” indicating that the materiality of the body exceeds whatever provisionally coherent and stable form it may take (p. 10). the material body is a temporary, albeit stubborn, configuration of a deeper flow of difference. to illustrate, after experiencing several incidents of sharing pain, lauren notes: “i had no sense of my own body. i hurt, but i couldn’t have said where—or even whether the pain was mine or someone else’s. the pain was intense, yet [diffuse] somehow. i felt…disembodied” (butler. 1993, p. 297). lauren’s inability to distinguish between her pain and “someone else’s” prevents her from locating her body in space and time, demonstrating that the body’s inhabitation of “an umwelt that remains ambiguous, indeterminate, and resonant with an expressive significance…affects the body's perception of spatial relations” (coole, 2010, p. 104). this loss of proprioception, or the ability to make immediate “sense of” her body, suggests not only that bodies can act and respond prior to rational cognition, but also that the body is a non-deterministic form produced through and traversed by the “open series of capacities or potencies” foregrounded in coole and frost’s definition. hyperempathy also shares with new materialist philosophies a capacity to disturb the social and political hierarchies that regulate our encounters with difference. as critic jerry phillips (2002) agrees, “in a hyperempathetic world, the other would cease to exist as the ontological antithesis of the self, but would instead become a real aspect of oneself” (p. 306). for one, hyperempathy is not limited to connections between human bodies. before the destruction of robledo, lauren and a group from the community venture beyond the walls to hunt for her brother. after her father shoots a feral dog, lauren realizes that it is still alive: “i saw its bloody wounds as it twisted. i bit my tongue as the pain i knew it must feel became my pain…. with my right hand, i drew the smith & wesson, aimed, and shot the beautiful dog through its head…. i walked, then rode in a daze, still not quite free of the dog i had killed” (butler, 1993, pp. 45-46). for lauren, the dog’s death lingers, as the ethical ramifications of violence are translated into an exchange of affect between bodies. her killing of the dog is as much an act of mercy for it as it is for her, which seems to confirm braidotti’s (2010) supposition that “affectivity in fact is what activates an embodied subject, empowering him or her to interact with others….it follows that a subject can think/understand/do/become no more than what he or she can take or sustain within his or her embodied, spatiotemporal coordinates” (p. 210). that one of these bodies is coded as non-human or animal has little effect on its ability to act as a causal force. without a doubt, differences exist between lauren and the dog; but at the level of the materialist body, these differences do not cohere into social categories. additionally, lauren’s experiences with difference resolve into a central tenet of earthseed: “embrace diversity/unite—/or be divided,/robbed,/ruled,/killed/by those who see you as prey./embrace diversity/or be destroyed” (butler, 1993, p. 196). the implied choice is between two perspectives on difference: the first—diversity—views difference as the foundation for collective empowerment, while in the second, difference continues to scaffold a social hierarchy in which some people emerge as prey. the events of the pox have created an economy of survival, where “people are expected to fear and hate everyone but their own kind” (p. 36). in defiance of this view, lauren saves, and then invites, a young family to join her group, commenting, “we’re natural allies—the mixed couple and the mixed group” (p. 208). hyperempathy demonstrates that like the walls around robledo, the limitations of difference, and the social and political hierarchies that sustain them, are provisional. perhaps unsurprisingly, then, literary critics tend to minimize the significance of lauren’s racial blackness. patricia melzer’s (2002) evaluation of the parable novels is representative of a common reading strategy that positions butler as a science fiction writer who is black, rather than as a black woman who writes science fiction. she states: butler's approach to race issues that at first appear to be in the background of her social critique can be understood as a (narrative) strategy that undermines the binary of white/black that dominates u.s. discourse on race relations…by insisting on the presence of people of color in her narratives as normal, not exceptional, butler also implicitly rejects the tokenism that categorizes her work primarily in terms of her identity as african american. (p. 10) as it is within the new materialisms, “race,” which is really a placeholder for “the binary of white/black,” is dissolved into a vague “tokenism” that is itself a stand-in for “identity politics.” this may seem peculiar, given that butler’s work regularly employs narrative strategies and themes consistent with black literature and experience (e.g. kindred, the lilith’s brood trilogy, and fledgling). after the publication of her patternist series in the early 1980’s, she was hailed as a welcome corrective to science fiction’s largely white, colonial, and patriarchal overtones. but for her part, butler (2001) has expressed in interviews that “it is a writer's duty to write about human differences, all human differences, and help make them acceptable” (qtd. in mehaffy and keating, p. 46). gregory hampton (2010) draws out the implications of this undertaking, declaring that “butler’s fiction is successful largely because it produces narratives that are easily comparable to african american experiences but also because it considers the perspective of a universal marginalized body” (p. 69). if we follow the lead of critics like meltzer, or the new materialist refusal of “identity politics,” the “universal marginalized body” manifests as a body suspended in a static nexus of identity and representation, which is to say that all bodies, to varying degrees and at different times, are marginalized bodies. what we lose in this rush from the particular to the universal is any consideration of how the material-semiotic history of race governs, from the outset, what can and cannot be made legible as a universal. what lauren’s hyperempathy elucidates is that in order to free difference and the body from its humanist constraints, we must attend to one particular difference to which the human and the body are bound, namely, racial blackness. this may seem paradoxical when we consider that new materialist scholarship almost uniformly rejects any consideration of race in its return to the body. but entrapping race in “identity politics” (i.e. the new materialisms), or the “white/black binary” (i.e. literary criticism of the novels), is more correctly a disavowal that untethers the non-, in-, and post-human from their historically proper site of production. or more precisely, disavowing the associations between the non-/in-/post-human and racial blackness defends interactions with the former against the ontological and conceptual provocations of the latter. for melzer (2002) to write that hyperempathy yields a “shared identity and life experience that [is] not based in a particular unified racial or cultural background” (p. 12), or for jerry phillips (2002) to declare that butler “employs a race-transcendent communalist ethics” (p. 307), the material and hyperempathic body must be free of race. an anxiety that race might follow the body, however sublimated or symptomatic, is well founded, given how butler remarks that hyperempaths make good slaves. after learning of her brother’s horrific death, lauren asks, “if everyone could feel everyone else’s pain, who would torture? who would cause unnecessary pain? i’ve never thought of my problem as something that might do some good before, but the way things are, i think it would help” (p. 115). however, in a 2001 interview with npr, octavia butler explicitly argues that “the threat of shared pain wouldn't necessarily make people behave better toward one another.” the return of a renewed slavery in the novels makes this clear as company “bosses” or “drivers” pay extra for workers with hyperempathy syndrome. moreover, in the novels, hyperempathy syndrome is induced in utero via maternal abuse of paracetco, a drug originally designed to impede the degeneration of brain functions caused by alzheimer’s disease. paracetco increased the energy and intellectual capabilities of non-afflicted users and so became the stimulant of choice for those in the working and middle classes like lauren’s mother. also evoking the antebellum law of partus sequitur ventrem that mandated children follow the condition of their mother, the children of hyperempaths can inherit the condition even if they are several generations removed from the original drug use (butler, 1993/1998). despite these connections to antebellum slavery, hyperempathy is not racially exclusive. and yet, the relationships between hyperempathy and a slavery of the future are telling insofar as they bring the specter of blackness back to the fore. in black women like lauren, hyperempathy recalls the process by which black bodies are violently revealed as flesh, or what hortense spillers terms pornotroping, or the sexually violent and spectacular reduction of the captive body to flesh.   in her seminal essay, “mama’s baby, papa’s maybe: an american grammar book,” spillers (2003) presents a concept of flesh as the material-semiotic inheritance of africans in the diaspora, and of black women specifically. she “make[s] a distinction in this case between ‘body’ and ‘flesh’ and impose[s] that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions...before the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh,’ that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography” (p.206). unlike the socially legible and historically-given “body,” the material conditions of captive and ungendered “flesh” cannot be altered by either the symbolic—“the brush of discourse”—or the imaginary—“the reflexes of iconography.” flesh instead serves as a structuring dynamic for the coherence of both registers, and as such, must be eternally reproduced. this repetition-without-a-difference may appear through “various symbolic substitutions,” but in effect, these substitutions “repeat the initiating moments” that mark the captive body as flesh (p. 207). as a scene of negation, black flesh is also available for pornotroping as a first order process of racialization, where “race is constituted by a repeated sadistic white pleasure in black female suffering” (nash, 2014, p. 52). during their incarceration, acorn community members are fitted with electronic devices called “slave collars” that deliver painful shocks or “lashes” to the nervous system. after she is collared, lauren discovers that her hyperempathy subjects her to both the pain of her fellow captives and the pornotropic pleasure of her captors; she writes, “there are a few men…who lash until they have orgasms. our screams and convulsions and pleas and sobs are what these men need to feel sexually satisfied. i know of three who seem to need to lash someone to get sexual pleasure. most often, they lash a woman, then rape her” (butler, 1998, p. 233). in these scenes, the relationships between consent, pleasure, and sentiment collapse as lauren is forced to reenact the crisis of will and desire that characterize the female slave’s existence.14 while all hyperempaths, regardless of race, would experience a similar crisis under these conditions, black women are assured neither a restoration of their will and desire nor a discernible “end” to the crisis. lauren needs neither the condition of hyperempathy nor the slave collar to bear the “marks of the cultural text” of slavery (spillers, 2003, p. 207). despite the episodic nature of hyperempathy, black women’s fleshly existence remains a structural vulnerability to violence, a condition that is also a “grammar”—an unconscious system of rules—that marks black women as the “zero degree of social conceptualization” (spillers, 2003, p. 206). as such, black female flesh is the quintessentially productive site of modernity’s symbolic order, where the value and meaning of our conceptual categories are both challenged or renewed. lauren performs this function in the novels, as her unavoidable reductions to flesh guide earthseed’s development into a global movement. in this context, lauren’s black life, or the blackness of her life, matters, but only in its ambivalent capacity to make all lives matter. the movement for black lives the approach to life promoted under earthseed’s banner responds to our desires for new modes of existence appropriate for the anthropocene. for lauren, embracing change enables notions of self and community capable of navigating complex socioeconomic forces and their differential embodiment. in earthseed, “god is a process or a combination of processes, not an entity. it is not conscious at all…. god can be directed, focused, speeded, slowed, shaped. all things change, but all things need not change in all ways” (butler, 1998, p. 46). moreover, change is not driven simply or only by the dialectics of historical progress. the chapters in both sower and talents open with epigraphs from earthseed’s doctrinal text, the book of the living. modeled after the aphoristic style of the tao, these epigraphs acknowledge the potential of political, economic, and social structures to affect and be affected by all matter: “we have lived before/we will live again/we will be silk,/stone,/mind,/star,/we will be scattered,/gathered,/ molded,/probed./we will live,/and we will serve life” (butler, 1998, p. 60). the confluence of silk, stone, mind, and star rejects the idea that the active properties of “life” are confined to the human or organic, constituting what weheliye calls a “radically different political imaginary,” where “suffering appears as utopian erudition” that “[summons] forms of human emancipation that can be imagined but not (yet) described” (butler, 1998, pp. 126-127). the destiny of earthseed to “take root amongst the stars” is precisely this imagined yet indescribable emancipation (butler, 1998, p. 46). once the starships leave earth at the end of talents, humanity becomes earth-seed, open to possibilities that we cannot predict or control as we spread to worlds unknown. visions like these suggest, among other things, that oppressive conditions do not exhaust the variabilities of life, and that the transvaluation of the organic body and human being can encourage comprehensive ethical bearings. then again, perceiving hyperempathy and earthseed as means to “liberate...assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed” requires us to detach pornotroping from the sexually violent production of racial difference (weheliye, 2014, p. 137). the celebrated material body thus betrays a desire to harness the radical potential of black flesh without paying the social and historical costs of being black. in the new materialist formulation, pornotroping is revised as a radical interruption in the order of things, one that produces a material body without race. certainly, in black women’s “absence from a subject position,” spillers does locate the potential for a sui generis naming that claims the “insurgent ground” outside of “dominant symbolic activity” (p. 229). the difficulty here is that the monstrous female “with the potential to ‘name’” emerges out of the specific histories of black women (spillers, 2003, p. 209). this is not to say that a capacity for life does not exist in other conditions of oppression, or that pornotroping is a structural totality from which nothing escapes. however, in order to confront effectively the consequences of the anthropocene, we first need to reckon with our political and libidinal investments in black flesh. this would require us to address how the entanglements of blackness, matter, and the human make only certain forms of matter both legible and desirable. to be clear, my objective is not to reject wholesale the new materialisms. their attempts to offer a broader theorization of matter and being are appropriate and necessary for our techno-scientific age. indeed, a planetary crisis requires a more expansive philosophy. what i am suggesting instead is that challenges to human exceptionalism should proceed through a critique of race, or we risk reorganizing old privileges (“all lives”) under new standards of being (“matter”). notes 1 nicholas mirzoeff notes in his forthcoming essay, “it’s not the anthropocene, it’s the white supremacy scene, or the geological color line,” that a recent publication by geologists locates the origins of the anthropocene in the arrival of europeans to america. while this preliminary acknowledgement of the large scale impact of colonialism and slavery is hopeful, any discourse on the anthropocene should also be accompanied by “a politics that challenges [the racial and humanist] hierarchy” often implied by its philosophy of history (mirzoeff, forthcoming 2016, p. 22).    2 in addition to the works referenced in this article, see also alaimo and heckman (2008), barrett and bolt (2012), benson-allott (2015), bryant (2011), clough and halley (2007), connolly (2013), hinton and van der tuin (2014), luciano and chen (2015), morton (2013), and shaviro (2014). 3 see also jones (2011), luciano and chen (2015), mcmillan (2015b), and mirzoeff (forthcoming 2016). 4 for an overview of how african and african american bodies have informed scientific thought from the enlightenment onward, see curran (2013), jackson and weidman (2004), and wynter (2013). 5 other noteworthy examples include fanon (2000), gordon (2000), hartman (1997), jones (2004), keeling (2005), and wilderson (2011). 6 clearly, not all critical engagements with matter participate in the reduction and/or disavowal of race. many feminist, postcolonial, and critical race studies scholars insist that studies of matter and materiality must occur through an interrogation of race. noteworthy examples include uri mcmillian’s (2015a) embodied avatars, rachel lee’s (2014) the exquisite corpse of asian america, mel chen’s (2012) animacies, stacy alaimo’s (2010) bodily natures, and donna haraway’s foundational texts primate visions (1989) and simians, cyborgs, and women (1991). 7 my decision to draw heavily on two of the more recent new materialist anthologies, new materialisms: ontology, agency, and politics, and new materialism: interviews and cartographies, is guided by the fact that both anthologies feature contributions from some of the most notable figures in the materialist or non-human turns. as such, these analogies provide a representative selection of current new materialist scholarship while indexing its more common themes. 8 coole and frost cite althusser, foucault, and some strains of neo-marxism and ethnography as examples of similar approaches (pp. 20-36). intriguingly, ian buchanan (2015) points out that they can also yield observations so “obvious” that “one does not even need a concept to make this claim. this is history in the mode of one damn thing after another” (p. 388). 9 to her credit, in an interview with peter gratton for his blog, “philosophy in a time of error,” jane bennett (2010b) admits that she needs to “focus more carefully” on how assemblages assume the characteristics of repetition, duration, and stability; she writes, “i want to get better at discerning the topography of becoming, better at theorizing the ‘structural’ quality of agentic assemblages. for the question of ‘structure’—or maybe that is the wrong word, and the phrase you suggest below is better, i.e., ‘linkages’ between and within ‘open relations’—does seem to fall in the shadow of the alluring image of an ever-free becoming…inside a process of unending change, bodies and forces with duration are somehow emitted or excreted. but how?” (qtd. in “vibrant matters”). while this is a hopeful development, i maintain that our scholarly activity is intimately shaped by the legacies of transatlantic slavery. going forward, then, the new materialisms must consider how blackness informs their major concepts or they risk reproducing the kind of race-thinking that holds these legacies in place.  10 while mapping black studies’ tireless examination of the human and its others, alexander weheliye (2014) observes that there exists an equally long tradition “in which theoretical formulations by white european thinkers are granted a conceptual carte blanche, while those uttered from the purview of minority discourse that speak to the same questions are almost exclusively relegated to the jurisdiction of ethnographic locality” (p. 6). 11 the combahee river collective statement (1982), penned by the black feminists of the combahee river collective, is widely credited with introducing the term “identity politics.” their assertion that modes of political organizing are intimately connected to the social groups with which we identify not only laid the groundwork for later theories of intersectionality, but also offered much-needed interventions into feminism, marxism, and sexuality studies. 12 sara ahmed (2008) argues that a politics of attention have dictated the new materialisms’ “founding gestures” by allowing for a reading of feminist scholarship as fundamentally anti-biology. her position paper, “imaginary prohibitions: some preliminary remarks on the founding gestures of the ‘new materialism,” provoked responses from noela davis (2009) and iris van der tuin (2008), the latter of which comments more extensively on the debate in her co-edited collection of interview and essays, new materialism: interviews and cartographies. what ahmed’s paper tracks is a pattern of disappointment with feminism’s purported anti-biologism that stretches back to the early 90’s. however, driving this disappointment is an assumption that feminist scholars should “know better,” particularly because a set of theories historically concerned with the body can and should be at the forefront of materialist innovations. while this does not seem like a ringing endorsement, the fact that new materialists claim (white) feminism as their generative field suggests that these feminisms have access to the “theoretical resources” to re-conceptualize the role of matter in embodiment (coole & frost, 2010, p. 19). or, at least those feminisms in which “material dimensions” have not yet “been marginalized by fashionable constructivist approaches and identity politics” (coole & frost, 2010, p. 19). read with coole and frost’s critique of “identity politics” as theoretically impoverished, it is clear that (white) feminism is granted an intellectual complexity that “identity politics” are not. 13 this understanding of the “future perfect” derives from what i identify as a central tenet of afrofuturism, a literary and aesthetic movement that remixes fantasy, technoscience, and non-western cosmologies to reconfigure the past, present, and future through the multifocal lens of the african diaspora. in his 1994 essay, “black to the future,” journalist and cultural critic mark dery writes that “african americans are, in a very real sense, the descendants of alien abductees. they inhabit a sci-fi nightmare in which unseen but no less impassable force fields of intolerance frustrate their movements; official histories 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(2014). habeas viscus: racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human. durham, nc: duke university press. wegner, e. p. (2007). jameson’s modernisms; or, the desire called utopia. diacritics, 37(4), 2-20. wilderson, f. (2010). red, white & black: cinema and the structure of us antagonisms. durham, nc: duke university press. wilson, e. a. (2015). gut feminism. durham, nc: duke university press. wynter, s. (2003). unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—an argument. cr: the new centennial review, 3(3), 257-337. zhan, m. (2016). cosmic experiments: remaking materialism and daoist ethic outside of the     establishment. medical anthropology, 35(3), 247-262. bio diana leong is an assistant professor of english and environmental humanities at the university of utah. her research interests include environmental justice, contemporary african american literature and culture, and science and technology studies. her current book project theorizes the slave ship as a set of ecological relations that persist beyond the formal abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. microsoft word 71616-1-11_kafer.docx kafer, a. (2018). review of brilliant imperfection: grappling with cure by eli clare (duke university press, 2017. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © alison kafer, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license review brilliant imperfection: grappling with cure by eli clare (duke university press, 2017) alison kafer southwestern university kafera@southwestern.edu what would it take to understand disability as something ordinary or familiar, to frame it “not as a tragedy, but a truth, a shrug of the shoulders, water over rock” (p. 5), “as common as morning coffee” (p. 145)? or what about gender transition? is it possible to abandon the language of disorder in favor of metaphors of possibility, seeing “transition [as] a door, a window, a cobalt sky” (p. 177)? for writer and activist eli clare, such shifts are possible through a deep and sustained “grappling with cure.” brilliant imperfection, clare’s lyrical new book, offers exactly that, a record of his reckoning with the ideology of cure. moving from memoir to history, from poetry to theory, clare describes the impact of cure (i.e., the belief that bodies and minds can be determined to be broken and thus in need of fixing) on his own life and the lives of others. the book chronicles clare’s shifting politics, as he moves from a fiercely anti-cure stance to a more ambivalent, knotty, position. 2 kafer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) ultimately, “we need neither a wholehearted acceptance nor an outright rejection of cure,” he argues, “but rather a broad-based grappling” (p. 14). given the hold that cure has on us culture, however, any such examination will require an intensive dismantling of curative logics. clare devotes most of the book to explaining how cure constrains our imaginations and condones, if not encourages, violence and discrimination. “at the center of cure lies eradication,” asserts clare. this claim is essential to his understanding of how cure works (p. 26). as an ideology, cure expects and requires intervention (e.g., medical, political, educational, familial, juridical); cure frames difference as deviance and deviance as the site for action. we miss something essential about the workings of cure if we fail to recognize the compulsory nature of this action as a kind of violence. clare offers eugenic histories, practices of mass incarceration, and the acceptance of forced and coerced “treatments” to support his position. although clare places eradication at the center of cure, he recognizes that it is not the only dimension of curative logics; “diagnosis, treatment, management, rehabilitation, and prevention” (p. 70) are all essential to the workings of cure. diagnosis is of particular interest to clare, and he spends most of the book uncovering how diagnosis makes violence possible. the centerpiece of brilliant imperfection is an extended discussion of how the diagnoses of “feeble-mindedness” and “mental retardation” led to various manifestations of violence against two white girls: carrie buck, whose sterilization and institutionalization were upheld by the us supreme court in 1927, and molly daly, who was removed to oregon’s fairview hospital in the 1950s, where she seems to have suffered intense neglect if not outright violence. clare foregrounds these two stories because of the instructive ways they resonate and depart from his own, but also because they offer such clear examples of how diagnoses, especially diagnoses of mental and intellectual disability, transform violence into “treatment.” he extends his mosaic around these two stories, underscoring how diagnosis and cure are used in the service of racism, settler colonialism, 3 kafer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) sexism, xenophobia, transphobia, and classism. clare insists, however, that humans are not the only targets of curative logics. to put it differently, he suggests the primacy of “the human” is part of what fuels such logics. he connects the terri schiavo case, in which a woman’s feeding tube was removed at the request of her husband and over the protests of her parents, to an extended rumination over what it means to be alive and whose lives have value. here he turns to the language of bodymind not only as a way of disrupting the medicalized distinction between physical disabilities and mental disabilities or body and mind, but also as a more inclusive frame than “personhood” or “human.” by bodymind, as he explains, he means not only “our own human selves,” but also “heron, firefly, weeping willow . . . , dragonfly, birch, barn swallow . . . , goat and bantam rooster, mosquito and wood frog, fox and vulture — the multitude of beings that make home on this planet. i mean all body-minds, regardless of personhood,” because all these bodyminds have value (pp. 29-30). to care about the fate of marginalized people, then, is to care about the fate of the firefly and the wood frog, and vice versa; we cannot draw lines between different kinds of bodyminds. indeed, it is that act of drawing lines — another manifestation of diagnosis — that makes violence possible. as long as “the human” or “the person” are cast as meriting particular care, then both those categories will be used to render other beings violable. although there is a kind of narrative arc to the book, it is more accurate to describe it as a constellation of histories, experiences and theories than a straight forward linear narrative. clare describes brilliant imperfection as a “mosaic” composed of “fragments and slivers” through which multiple patterns emerge (p. xv), and the book’s format makes manifest this framing. the book’s ten chapters are each divided into smaller essays, not all of which explicitly connect, and short pieces of poetry and prose — clare names them “brilliant imperfections”— serve as transition points between chapters. but these moves are not merely matters of style; they mark method as well. brilliant imperfection often makes its theoretical moves through juxtaposition, comparison, definition, 4 kafer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) and repetition. clare wants his readers to recognize the resonances between seemingly disparate phenomena, asserting that “the desire for eradication is …. a pattern reaching across time and space” (p. 135), and who better than a poet to trace lines between cornfields and incarceration, between native grasses and desire? brilliant imperfection: grappling with cure is an accessible and engaging read for those new to trans* or disability theory and politics, providing useful introductions to ableism, the medical-industrial complex, and the structuring power of diagnosis/diagnoses (including “gender identity disorder” and “gender dysphoria”). scholars and activists more familiar with these fields will recognize the many places where clare is both joining and extending current conversations in queer/trans*/disability studies. the second half of the book, in which he dives deeply into the tensions between his desire for gender transition and his distrust of medical interventions, or between his extended critique of institutionalization and his voluntary commitment to a psych ward, are particularly generative. as much as the book is an argument for recognizing the brilliance of imperfection, clare recognizes that pride often co-exists with shame, and he does not shy away from sharing his own struggles with his readers. near the end of the book, clare details some of his strategies for self-care, and those tips, paired with the “thinking about trigger warnings” section in the preface, make clear that clare imagines people using this text not only as a provocation to think disability differently but also as a tool-kit for survival. or, rather, thinking disability differently is a tool for survival. “cure promises us so much, but it will never give us justice” (p. 184), and perhaps those who have been marked as abnormal, deviant, deformed, diseased, dangerous, criminal, contagious, excessive, incompetent, irrational, tired, weak, dependent, sick, ill, or broken can find common ground in trying to imagine otherwise. brilliant imperfection offers: a matter-of-fact acceptance of our tics, tremors, stutters, seizures, knots, scars, pain, quirks . . . ; an appreciation for missing teeth and the smarts that stretch food stamps to the end of the month, 5 kafer catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) for big bellies and wide hips, for the flash of hands signing american sign language and typing on assistive communication devices, for dark skin and kinky hair; . . . an embrace [of] our wild femmeness, our handsome butchness, our glorious androgyny.” (p. 167) loosening the hold of an unexamined belief in cure makes possible “a world where these moments are common and unremarkable” (p. 167). bio alison kafer is a professor of feminist studies at southwestern university and the author of feminist, queer, crip.     original research feeling around for the apparatus: a radicley empirical plant science     kristi onzik uc davis konzik@ucdavis.edu   monica gagliano southern cross university university of sydney monica.gagliano@scu.edu.au     abstract scientists are oft trained to think that “feeling” is not simply irrelevant but antithetical to their methodologies. that scientists are not simply objectively trained minds but also bodies that feel has been an important feminist contribution towards reimagining scientific knowledge—not as the product of self-directed teleological discovery, but as situated in time, place, and transformed through relations that oft exceed the binary logics of scientific representation; those founded upon rationalist distinctions between feeling/knowing, body/mind, object/subject. through a collaborative methodological lens we (ethnographer + scientist) are calling radicle empiricism, we ask how a scientist comes to make sense of feeling and knowing—and the relations “between”—throughout shifting configurations of a pea plant decision-making apparatus. by focusing this study at the level of the apparatus (barad, 2007), we provide an empirically based description—not a proposed model or theory—of some of the material-discursive relations through which the concepts of “feeling” and “knowing” are (re)configured through a scientist’s unexpected encounters with pea plant root tips or radicles. as such, we offer a perspective that does not assume “feeling” or “knowing” as distinct categories of a scientist’s knowledge making endeavors, nor as categories of experience that function independently of the historical, social, and material conditions through which they are made perceptible. immanent to this description is an invitation to explore creative and collaborative practices of science-making in which the phenomena we study—whether pea plants or other persons—have the opportunity to reformulate not only our categories of “feeling” and “knowing” but the conditions through which they are made possible.     keywords critical plant studies, plant cognitions, sts, multi-species ethnography, apparatus, radical empiricism     introduction in a feeling for the organism, historian of science evelyn fox keller (1983) details the life and work of nobel prize–winning scientist barbara mcclintock. though it wasn’t until the end of her career that mcclintock became famous for her “discovery” of genetic transposition in corn, she was long made infamous amongst her colleagues for the incoherence of her scientific reasoning. despite her perceived lack of appreciation for the institutionalized norms of scientific communication, she was accepted by her male colleagues as a “hard worker,” and nonetheless had what it takes to be a committed researcher in the nascent field of genetic science. the molecular techniques that came to define genetic science—and later biological “life itself” (rose 2001, 13–17)—in the mid-twentieth century were still being developed, and mcclintock’s studies of genetic inheritance were yet to be inhibited by disciplinary expectations. though she shared with her colleagues a desire to reveal the lawful patterns of natural organization, she did not share, nor was she afforded the same opportunities to share, the power to isolate her discoveries to the objective coordinates of the experiment itself. such narratives of discovery are often reserved for a scientist’s nobel prize–winning speech or autobiography, articulated in the sensational language of “eureka” or “aha” moments, in which the missing piece of an experimental objective was suddenly received by the unassuming mind of the scientist. for example, while riding in a streetcar in bern, einstein recalls tapping into “god’s thoughts,” as the theory of relativity suddenly hit him as a “storm that broke loose in [his] mind” (kaku 2004, 60–62); the ring structure of benzene arrived in a dream to kekulé, in which a snake appeared to be eating its own tail (rocke 2010, 194); and while in a cinema, francois jacob was jolted—“as though a line of fire cut through the darkness”—by a “glare of evidence” into the nature of gene regulation (jacob 1995 398). these are stories that describe insight as instantaneous, decisive, and external to the “normal” processes of science, as the miraculous effects of a scientist’s mind making a brief foray into the realm of the “mystical” or “subjective experience,” only to return to the laboratory with visions of an apparatus whole and complete in its objectively discernible performance.   the story of mcclintock’s discovery, as both she and keller tell it, was markedly different. mcclintock’s desire to know the processes through which corn kernels inherit their particular organizations developed through years of “losing herself” in the subtle variations of the corn she had planted—of spending long hours with each individual plant throughout their development, informing in her an ability for “direct communication.” what her colleagues understood to be irrational “vision” and poor scientific description were, for mcclintock, the ineffable findings of a reverence and commitment to listening to “the material itself” (keller 1983, 179)—a knowing made possible through years of cultivating “a feeling for the organism” (xxii). it was only after mcclintock had long been dismissed into the margins of scientific rationality, and molecular scale technologies later developed, that her colleagues could bear witness to the vision she had spent the majority of her career trying to translate into a language of objective reason. mcclintock’s story works to partially situate (haraway 1988, 578–81) our inquiry into the feelings that make a scientist’s insight possible, and differently so. we (ethnographer + scientist) draw inspiration not only from the more-than-human connections that give shape to mcclintock’s empirical practice, but from keller’s accounting of them—her honoring of a scientist’s desires to know and represent her knowledge as objective, while choosing to contextualize, embody, and pluralize such pursuits; to add to, rather than subtract from, a scientist’s experience of knowing. building upon mcclintock and keller, we borrow insights from a rich tradition of feminist science studies and sensory-based ethnographic approaches that have laid the grounds for studying not simply the empirical compositions of a science but the empirical compositions of a scientist. those studying the affective, more-than-human dimensions of bodies in experimental formation (prentice 2013, 171–98; myers and dumit 2011, 241; myers 2015b, 99–117), and the shapeshifting, “involutionary” (hustak and myers 2012, 78) encounters through which the relations “between” scientists and plants, subjects and objects, feeling and knowing, are made susceptible to reconfiguration. we foreground the unfurling of a pea plant decision-making “apparatus”—as a “dynamic set of open-ended practices, iteratively refined and reconfigured” (barad 2007,167)—as a means of inquiring into the affective, material-discursive conditions through which monica gagliano, a plant scientist, comes to feel and know differently. in so doing, we simultaneously inquire into and offer a different translation of those narrative habits that locate a scientist’s insight, the locus of their knowing and making decisions, inside of their head—as an isolated “aha” moment or as the objective, unmediated discernments of an apparatus “out there.” what grows out of this attention to an unfurling apparatus is not only a re-articulation of the empirical grounds of scientific insight, but a different constitution of “the empirical.” traversing into unexpected experimental terrains, the pea plants invite gagliano to slow down and pay a different kind of empirical attention—from one bent on separating “feeling” and “knowing” through a perceived distance between observer and observed, words and things, to one that takes all categories of analysis, including “empirical,” “experiential,” “feeling,” and “knowing,” as contextual, contested, and contingent (scott 1991, 796). from within the wily “outgrowths” of this apparatus sprouts a situated, more-than-human response to an event in which it becomes possible to trace how a scientist’s senses are reconfigured through unexpected encounters with pea plant root tips or “radicles”: an ethics of response we describe as “radicley empirical.” radicle, like radical, describes a rupture—a root sprouting from seed. in our experience, or rather, the experience which we found ourselves responsive to, radicle simultaneously describes an object of empirical inquiry—the primary roots of pea plants—and the morphology of the context—a nonlinear feeling around for the creative potentials of experimentation. in this sense, our notion of radicle empiricism stems from and builds upon its jamesian alliteration “radical empiricism” by inquiring into, rather than assuming, the relations that constitute the “between” of feeling and knowing (james [1912] 2003, 51–68). as such, our concept of radicle empiricism aspires towards what feminist scholar lindsey andrews calls a “minor empiricism” (2015, 6). in refusing the terms of a rational organization of the senses, especially the privileging of vision, as a fixed, ahistorical, and value-neutral source of knowledge, pea plant radicles invite us to explore a “minor” awareness of experimental senses, an awareness that unfurls from within their ongoing constitution and reorganization. radicles are, after the seed, considered to be a plant’s “first” sensory organ. highly sensitive and rapidly shapeshifting, radicles are charged with the capacity not only to break through the hard casing of embryonic primordia but to drop into and navigate the dark unknowns of subterranean earth. for darwin and the few who call themselves plant neurobiologists today, the radicle is equipped with “neuronal-like” signaling capacities, the electrochemical wherewithal to translate messages from their surrounds into a coordinated trans-organismal response (darwin 1880, 573; masi et al. 2009, 4048–53). but radicles, as we have come to make sense of them, are masters in sensing. siphoning around through soils for stories of potential lifeways, radicles can forecast possible atmospheric futures through the touch of earthly matter. their power, or rather the mystery of their power, lies in their meristematic indeterminacy, the courageous sensitivity of undifferentiated cells to reach into the unknown and gather insight. with natasha myers, we have come to see these “million-fold nodes of growth” as “centres of indetermination, each an ongoing experiment in and with the world” (myers 2015a, 37). and akin to deboleena roy’s stolonic inspiration, radicles can lure us out of a transcendent trance and into immanent connection, inviting us to not simply “feel for” the organism or apparatus, as if it’s already “out there” waiting to be revealed, but to “feel around for” the possibilities of our milieus (roy 2018, 57–89)—to re-root and ground our senses into the demands of the present for a more responsive and response-able (haraway 2016, 34–36) plant science. that is, a more radicley empirical plant science.   situating encounters from january to april 2019, kristi onzik, an anthropologist and feminist science studies scholar in training, had been studying and working as a research assistant with gagliano, an evolutionary ecologist and pioneer of the emerging fields of plant cognition and communication. gagliano’s name is perhaps readily recognized by many feminist scientists and science studies readers, particularly those “differently” interested in plants. over the last decade, she has published several provocative experimental studies, in “prestigious” journals such as scientific reports (gagliano et al. 2016) and oecologia (gagliano et al. 2017, demonstrating preliminary evidence for phenomena such as memory, habituation, and associative learning in plants. such phenomena have long been thought to require not only a “proper” nervous system but a highly sophisticated one. further amplifying her knack for what she has described as “unthinkable plant science” (see her phytobiography thus spoke the plant, 2018), gagliano has also catalyzed the field of “plant bioacoustics,” in which she and a very few others have begun to explore the sonic realms of plant communication. it is within this burgeoning and highly experimental field of phytonic soundscapes that our collaborations in cultivating new kinds of empirical senses with plants began to take shape. since 2016, onzik has been working to ethnographically ingather a sense of how the novel and still highly experimental (and controversial) sciences of plant neurobiology, cognition, and communication are being made. if onzik’s studies inquire into scientists attempting to, as myers has best described it, “sense and make sense” of plant sensing (2015b, 2), then the scientists onzik studies are attempting to make sense of plant sensing through apparatuses common to the domains of cognitive science and neurobiology. as such, there is a peculiar kind of tropic twist that happens in conversations and experiments with these plant scientists, and not others. onzik’s field notes evoke stories of plants responding to scientists in ways that not only displace the centrality of the brain and vision from longstanding theories of cognition but, in so doing, challenge the cognitive theories embodied and prefigured by the scientist’s methods of prehension. lured into the nutational curiosities of roots and shoots, through spacetime encounters that challenge the language and techniques of a scientist’s a priori “cognition,” these scientists are, quite publicly, losing grip on those rationalist certainties that sustain their knowledge and their careers. the feelings—the doubts, fears, and hesitations—that once lurked in the shadows of their objectifying confidence become not simply palpable but part of their experiments. grasping for the stabilized explanatory grounds of cognition in the languages and techniques of neuroand animal behaviors sciences, these scientists find that no such stable ground exists. the plants once naively assumed to be the objects of objective investigation become increasingly and unexpectedly responsive to scientists who are no longer certain where the “true” boundaries of knowing reside. at the time of onzik’s fieldwork, gagliano had recently been awarded a two-year grant at the university of sydney. her position as a “natural scientist” was unusually co-funded by the sydney environment institute, an interdisciplinary cast of humanities and social science scholars broadly working to “collaboratively design and implement strategies for just and sustainable environmental transformation” (sydney environment institute, “about us”). and while gagliano was considered part of these conversations, she was also given space in a large lab in a stately old (re: imperial) biological sciences building, replete with portraits of darwin, cook, and a rich display of nineteenth-century taxidermy, where she could continue her experimental work. shortly after onzik’s arrival, we began building an apparatus designed to test pea plant decision-making behavior in response to the sound of water. the apparatus was to be a more complicated variation of a previous one, in which pea plant roots were asked to make a choice inside of a two-way y-maze: to either grow towards the sound of water, or away. water is here understood to be an evolutionarily necessary and thus desirable resource for peas, and sound being one possible modality through which pea plant roots can sense and locate water. gagliano noticed the germinating pea plant radicles not only grow towards the sound of water (% of time) but anticipate its direction prior to reaching the “node” or “decision-making obstacle;” the radicle having already chosen to grow into the arm of the y-maze that would prove the path of least resistance—the most “efficient” path— towards water (gagliano et al. 2017, 151–60). as scientific apparatuses, gagliano explains, mazes have generated much insight for cognitive and behavioral scientists and are themselves considered amongst the most “efficient” ways of studying spatial awareness and discriminatory learning behaviors in a variety of animal species. as pea plants have a different bodily organization with different sensory organs, perceptions, and speeds than animals, gagliano has designed a maze out of two panes of plexiglass, nylon rope, a thin layer of soil, and a small hole at the center in which the pea seedling (figure 1) is positioned. beneath the glass are time-lapse infrared cameras, so that gagliano can record the decision-making behaviors of the growing roots in the dark. with this new apparatus, gagliano aims to test whether pea roots can make the right decisions to explore efficiently and choose the path of least resistance when navigating the more complex four-way maze (figure 2). based upon the findings of gagliano’s prior research (gagliano et al. 2017), she expects to find that peas can sense the location of water through sound vibrations, and can do so efficiently—that is, they can avoid energetically expensive detours by using sound waves for sensing and deciding upon the most direct path to water.   figure 1. pea plant radicles sprouting inside water-soaked paper towel roll; a hydroponic germination technique gagliano learned during training. seeds are considered germinated and ready for planting inside a maze when the radicles are >5mm long   figure 2. time series infrared photography of a pea root navigating a four-way maze. (a) experimental time t0: the germinated pea is planted in a small circular pot whose base is positioned at the center of the maze as indicated by the green dotted line (circle of choice, coc). the base of the pot sits on a glass panel and has been cut open to allow the root to exit and explore the maze once the glass panel is reached. no root is yet visible. (b) experimental time t1: the root reaches the glass panel and becomes visible within the coc area as indicated by the green arrow. (c) experimental time t2: the root starts growing within the coc area. (d). experimental time t3: the root grows directionally towards one arm of the maze and exits the coc area as indicated by the green dotted line. the root is recorded as “making the choice.” (e–f) experimental time t4–5: the root grows into the chosen arm of the maze.   through her trainings as an evolutionary ecologist, gagliano has come to accept efficiency as a defining parameter for knowing and making right decisions across all life forms—in humans as in peas. as gagliano described it to onzik, the right decision pivots upon a pea’s natural tendency to move through the world teleologically—motivated by an innate desire to achieve fitness and duration in the world—and this is embodied as a natural predisposition for making good predictions, for knowing one’s world and anticipating one’s place within its evolving conditions. thus, the one who knows best—the one who knows how to make the right decisions—is the one who has what it takes to not only “sense” or “feel” but to “know” where they ought to be and how to get there on the path of least resistance. implicit in this way of knowing how right decisions are made is the assumption that not knowing where one is going is, evolutionarily speaking, a risky energy expenditure—constitutive of detours, mistakes, or “wrong” decisions. wrong decisions are thus revealed not simply in actions of moving away from what is assumed to be the desired stimulus but by parameters that recognize non-goal directed actions as behaviors lacking predictive value—those behaviors based on bodily guesses, heuristics, or feelings, not “true” cognition. in the design of this experiment, wrong decisions take on the appearance of pea roots growing in a variety of directions, or those that make “detours” before finding the clear path. early in the construction of the mazes, gagliano began to feel overwhelmed by the particular constraints and affordances of the lab. while it offered her science the possibility of controlled temperatures, sound-proof isolation, and sterile conditions, it also espoused the privilege of generating waste in the name of science. as we unpacked the plexiglass of her mazes, engineered according to her specifications, we found ourselves surrounded by plastic wrap and styrofoam boxes—materials of short-term use and long-term terrestrial consequences. an unbearable sense of ethical disconnect imposed upon gagliano’s ecologist senses, demanding of her to change course. without much hesitation, and the support of her new colleagues, we packed up the mazes, water tanks, cameras, and pea seeds into the back of her van and headed north to the subtropical part of new south wales. we found ourselves a house surrounded by forest, crawling with spiders, newts, and snakes, and equipped with a large backyard shed, spacious and barren enough to perform as gagliano’s new lab. we began setting up the pea plant decision-making apparatus immediately, so as not to waste any more time on her short contract. we also incorporated the styrofoam boxes into the apparatus itself, so as not to waste any more materials. the experiment began with what appeared to be several weeks of successful piloting. the initial design was based on two groups: the treatment group (i.e., water sound is randomly assigned and applied to one of the four arms for each replicate maze) and the control group (i.e., no sound is applied, all arms are intended to be equal and hence, seedlings are expected to grow randomly into any one of the arms). as the experimentation proceeded to testing phase (after approximately five days of seed germination), something unexpected arose. when removing the plexiglass covering to peer at the growing roots beneath, gagliano noticed that almost all pea plants in their individual mazes, both those in control and treatment groups, were making the same decision. irrespective of treatment but far from random, the young root tips are responding to a stimulus, albeit not the one provided by gagliano. the apparatus worked to generate a collectively oriented behavior of the young pea plants, though gagliano did not know, or control for, this decision.   figure 3. images of maze apparatuses in construction. (a) onzik adhering nylon rope to plexiglass at the university lab. (b) after the four nylon rope “arms” are adhered, mazes are, after being moved north to new lab, covered in soil (c) then topped with dark plexiglass to protect roots from light radiation, pot with germinating pea seedling placed center. (d) an image of the four replicate four-way mazes inside of the new backyard lab.   unfurling expectations gagliano’s initial response to the unexpected performance of the apparatus was what she described as a “visceral,” “gut feeling” of frustration, a frustration that comes with the sense that she, not the peas, had failed to know correctly. in previous studies she had considered herself successful, and knowledgeable, after demonstrating that pea roots sense and make the right decisions by growing efficiently towards the sound of water. so what went wrong with her design of the apparatus? where did she go wrong? rather than assessing all the details in which gagliano’s experiment could be rationalized as “wrong,” we explore how it is that gagliano came to feel, and know, the response of the apparatus as the effect of her own cause, her own wrongdoing. in meeting the universe halfway, karen barad describes a situation in which a scientist’s apparatus becomes palpable as a “dynamic set of open-ended practices, iteratively refined and reconfigured,” rather than a mere instrument of observation (2007, 167). she gives the example of otto stern and walther gerlach’s magnetic spatialization experiment, in which a simple exhalation, rich in the sulfuric residues of cheap cigars (the only kind stern could afford), left its mark on a silver plate. in so doing, the liveliness of the apparatus was revealed to stern, and evidence for a different phenomenon—the angular momentum of the electron—a difference that was previously inconceivable, became possible. for barad, the example of stern’s cheap cigar makes poignant the material-discursive natures, the indeterminate and dynamically shape-shifting potentials of an apparatus. the cigar is, in barad’s rendering, a “condensation” or “a nodal point” of the “workings of other apparatuses, including class, nationalism, economics, and gender, all of which are part of the stern-gerlach apparatus” (2007, 167). as barad’s account works to demonstrate, scientists tend to take for granted that the outside boundary of an apparatus ends at some “obvious” visual terminus, or that the boundary circumscribes only that set of items a scientist learned to list under “equipment” during lab exercises in science class. they tend to trust the habits of their training, a training that encourages “an immediate grasp of the “apparatus” in its entirety” (barad 2007, 165). such habits, barad suggests, make a scientist susceptible to preconceptions. they work to manage uncertainty by diverting attention away from the lively, agential propensities of matter—of the creative potencies of silver and sulfide or, in our case, a laboratory porousness made perceptible, and significant, through radicle recalcitrance—and focusing attention on the stabilizing forces of past experience. these are embodied conceptions of how an apparatus and a scientist, entangled with the habits of another, ought to perform. in gagliano’s initial response, we trace a sense of success and failure—the “right” and “wrong” outcomes— of her experiment pivot upon a habit of knowing in which gagliano considers herself solely responsible for defining and predicting all possible parameters and outcomes of the apparatus. this is a habit that, in facing the unexpected, affects a feeling of frustration and a concomitant story of individual failure. in this response, feeling corresponds to a wrong kind of knowing, of being uncertain and lacking control. the right kind of knowing is, like that inscribed into the design of the apparatus, an achievement of goal-directed foresight or “planned” action (suchman 1987, 27–48). it takes shape as an assumed clear line of intent, where action proceeds from a plan made inside of an actor’s body, inside the scientist’s head. such explorations are, to gagliano’s disciplined senses, not only inefficient but also difficult to articulate and prove as objectively knowable. they are expressions of feeling bodies whose experiences of knowing are porous to their milieus in ways that run the risk of expending too much energy. in this narrative, such bodies lack the ability to transcend the temporality of the present into the realm of the future abstract—the realm in which, according to the design of gagliano’s apparatus and that learned through her training—is what constitutes true “knowing,” and the conditions in which true “knowledge” of the world can be presented. these feelings of wrong kinds of knowing, as disciplined senses or what barad calls “habits,” can be traced from within the material-discursive relations of a highly competitive evolutionary ecology department, where gagliano was trained to feel that having what it takes to be a good scientist is a “natural predisposition.” in their ethnographic studies of physicists and protein crystallographers, respectively, anthropologists sharon traweek (1988, 123–25) and natasha myers (2015b, 23–25) propose that what comes to count as “natural predispositions” are sociotechnical achievements—embodied in time, through ongoing practice, and subject to change through technological, material, and sociohistorical contingencies. we briefly explore some of the material-discursive practices through which gagliano became entrained to a particular narrative of knowing—through which gagliano learned to embody an image of herself as a scientist already predisposed to making those decisions that lead to the most efficient or “immediate” grasp of an apparatus and its outcomes—towards generating knowledge in objectively definable and probabilistic terms. from within gagliano’s response, we can trace the subtle cues of her teachers and peers, iteratively articulating and reinforcing the conditions in which she was put to the test as “fit” or “not” to know as a scientist. through coursework and lessons to familiarize herself with her biases, or “subjective feelings,” gagliano embodied the distancing protocols of an objective observer, developing what was presumed to be an affectively “neutral stance” between herself and her apparatus. repeated practices of checking “biases”—incorporating cameras as technologies to stand in support, or as counter to, her potentially fallible vision, searching for ways in which one’s “social” body, the influences of unscientific experience, might get in the way of proper knowing—aggregate and condense to become experimental habits. throughout her training she came to make sense of herself as either already having what it takes to accurately, and efficiently, predict and demarcate the parameters of a knowable outcome, or not. feeling emerges from within this narrative as part of this realm of “subjective bias.” as subjective it formulates an experience of knowing that, while at times insightful, cannot be taken seriously, or made legible, as a true form of knowing—or not the kind of knowing through which objectively right decisions get made. in revealing some of the material-discursive compositions of gagliano’s apparatus, the narrative of “knowing” affectively entrained into her practice as a “natural predisposition,” we work not to reduce such sensory dexterities—such habits of feeling for knowing “objectively”—to being “inherently wrong.” rather, in foregrounding the feelings made possible by encounters with the unexpected, we suggest that feeling is neither antithetical to objectively knowing nor is it a sense, or experience, that a scientist has and that may prove insightful “at times.” rather, we seek to demonstrate how feeling is a phenomenon both affectively constituted by and constitutive of a particular habit of a scientist’s knowing experience. and, like all habits, such feelings are susceptible to reconfiguration, “made and unmade on the level of immanence and radical experience” (stengers 2011, 27). from within the material-discursive contingencies of an apparatus, in which it becomes possible for gagliano to feel—to sense and make sense of—herself a failure, insight reaches out like the roots of the peas, luring us into experimenting with the indeterminacies of an apparatus as the grounds for a radicley empirical plant science.   feeling around for the apparatus in getting lost, feminist scientist and science studies scholar patti lather (2007) proposes a practice of learning to work within the “ruins” of science, despite its many disappointments (i.e., deterministic biological theories, biotechnological waste, the violence of positivism and belief in pure objectivity). like donna haraway’s invitation to “stay with the trouble” (2016, 1–8), lather asks of us to renegotiate the conceptual limitations of our scientific ruins, suggesting that “terms understood as no longer fulfilling their promise do not become useless. on the contrary, their very failures become provisional grounds, and new uses are derived” (2007, 10–11). in their “preferring not to” (stengers 2005, 996) respond, or at least, not to respond in “the right way,” the pea plant roots invite us to slow down and pay a different kind of attention to “the limits and necessary misfirings” (lather 2007, 11) of an unfurling pea plant decision-making apparatus. from within the mess of a scientist’s newfound experimental entanglements, it becomes possible to not only reimagine gagliano as the “one who knows,” designs, and speaks for the performance of the peas, but to translate such imaginings into more-than-human empirical formations. turning toward the undetermined, albeit collectively shared interests of the peas, gagliano, like the peas, begins to feel around for the potentials of a new possible apparatus—one in which the design, performance, and outcome are no longer constrained to the visual or “knowable” spectrum of gagliano’s prior trainings but opened to radicley empirical formulations. the guiding inquiry is thus no longer concerned with whether or not the individual plants respond to the sound of water within their individual mazes—efficiently or aimlessly—but with what it becomes possible to know within the porous and indeterminate contingencies of the apparatus. in so doing, gagliano becomes a scientist whose knowing is made possible by not simply “losing herself” but by becoming herself, “a scientist who knows,” differently. for her capacity to know is no longer trapped inside of her body as a “natural predisposition,” revealing itself as either right or wrong, objective or subjective, efficient or aimless. rather, in feeling herself as a failure in response to the unexpected outgrowth of the apparatus, gagliano begins to feel herself as part of its empirical formulations—both constitutive of and partially constituted through the very phenomena the apparatus was designed to reveal. from within this disorienting space of no longer being the “one who knows”—the feeling of being immersed with one’s apparatus—the boundaries between scientist and object, knower and that which is to be known, are unclear. gagliano is absorbed into unexpected experimental relation with the peas, where the boundaries between the two, are subject to radicley empirical innovation. for a scientist’s insight, her capacity to know, is not a matter of “aha” or “objective” revelation but a matter of feeling around—a matter of unfurling in time, space, and intimate, more-than-human relation. a matter of becoming responsive to asynchronous outgrowths, to the inevitable sproutings and spreadings of the unexpected, to those radicle ruptures in rational conformity in which new possible plants and scientists take shape. from within these newly responsive iterations of the apparatus, the individual pea seedlings are still positioned within individual mazes, but the four arms are now reduced to two, with both arms oriented towards the common, albeit still unknown, a stimulus. the difference between the treatment group and the control group is constituted by a small roadblock. the roadblock, a rectangular cutting of polystyrene foam, is randomly assigned and placed at the entrance of one of the two arms for each replicate maze. no roadblock is added to the control group, and therefore the seedlings are expected to grow randomly into either arm of the maze, as both arms are equally uninhibited. by adding a roadblock between the pea plants and their desired direction, gagliano is interested in observing how plants decide the best route to reach stimulus a are they able to identify the arm of the maze with no obstruction before arriving to it? and would they change the direction once the obstacle is encountered, or would they attempt to overcome it? neither decision is more right or wrong. rather, gagliano is now interested in observing the spatial and temporal patterns that arise from “the root collective”—including the pea roots, maze boundaries, and roadblocks, time-lapse recordings, stimulus a and the in situ, that is intra-active cultivations of the apparatus—through which gagliano, too, is figured. her recordings and observations are not only generated in response to the direction of the pea roots’ growth and whether they reach the target inside of the maze (i.e., can the peas make right decisions), but also how roots move and traverse through soils in relation with the shifting boundaries of the maze (i.e., the relational encounters through which pea roots are responding to different constraints and affordances within and beyond the maze) (figure 4). cultivating a heightened attention to the qualities of the medium through which knowing can be felt or experienced as knowledge—the transparent panes of glass through which both the scientist and the camera can visualize the pea plant roots inside a maze—gagliano relinquishes the capacity to claim unmediated transparency to an objectively discerned experiment. instead, the panes of plexiglass, the soil, the cameras, the pea roots growing towards an unknown stimulus, activate a “vision beyond the visible” (scott 1991, 794). a vision that both conducts and challenges the fantastic projections that form the basis for gagliano’s scientific investigation into “pea plant decision making.” in this story, the phenomena of feeling, knowing, and making a decision originate not in a presumably unmediated experience of a “natural” or “inherent” predisposition, but out of an intra-active or affective prehension of the moving, differentiating qualities of the apparatus: the displacement of soil by growing roots, the light diffracting through the lens of the cameras, the sonic vibrations of water, the emanations of an unknown albeit significant signal somewhere beyond the walls of the lab, and gagliano’s trained senses, expanding and feeling around for the potentials of a living, growing, unfurling apparatus.   figure 4. (a) construction of two-way maze with roadblock. (b) image of radicle growing into unobstructed arm of maze.   conclusion gagliano’s radicley empirical inquiries remain ongoing, though not in any form easily translated into the representational demands of science. the peas continue to lure her into feeling around for the creative outgrowths of an apparatus—spurning a curiosity in more porous, ecologically responsive and response-able modes of experimentation. having since expanded into a meshwork greenhouse adjacent to the lab, and thereafter into the unruly bounds of the vegetable garden, the once sterile expectations of a properly controlled apparatus have given way to the fervor of the surrounding forest—to the cacophony of birds and insects, the fluctuations of light, moisture, wind, etc. the apparatus through which gagliano’s insights become possible is subject to dynamically more-than-human composition. the perceptions of both gagliano and the peas are a matter of perpetual cultivation. and while such radicley empirical modes of experimentation have the potential to provoke new insights about how a scientist comes to feel around for knowing differently, it nonetheless proves difficult for a scientist charged with the task of generating replicable data in a timely manner. in pointing to the limitations and tacit conditionings of a scientist’s knowledge-making habits, the peas invite us to slow down and feel around for new possible conditions through which science can be made. while the peas point away from the expected, from the conventions of an a priori knowing, they do not point to a “something else” out there waiting to be revealed. this is, as we see it, the radicley empirical invitation. it is not simply a reformulation of the scientist’s question but a reconstruction of the very terms through which a scientist’s questions become possible. not simply a renewed epistemic attention to a scientist’s “feeling body” but an interest in the material-discursive histories through which the very concept of “feeling” is made possible within the empirical practices of a scientist. in accepting such an invitation, we endeavor to expand our potentials for response. feeling around for the potentials of a pea plant decision-making apparatus is less a practice of generating new knowledge about peas than it is a collaborative experiment in cultivating a radicley empirical ethics of transdisciplinary and transspecies response-ability. as such, feeling and knowing do not precede their experimental encounters as inherent capacities, natural predispositions, or experiences that one “has,” but are rather experiential categories made possible through intra-active, more-than-human encounters. particular scientists and plants, feelers and knowers, precipitate out of these intra-active entanglings at the expense of others. no “decision,” or theorizing of “decisions,” is innocent, but rather is partially constitutive of the very world it claims to represent. like many scientists, gagliano continues to grapple with such ruptures in convention. for such empirical habits are not easily broken. they are instilled in the canons of her discipline, the expectations and policings of colleagues, and the maze-like network of institutions that demand efficiency and control—at the expense of curiosity—out of both herself and the processes she studies. but as we have come to see it, gagliano’s struggles against the habits of science are, all the while, indications that gagliano is feeling around for openings into a differently possible science—sensing and making sense of herself anew from within the mess, the ruins, the failures, and ethical entanglings of the scientific venture. we suggest that this is perhaps all the while the kind of science the peas invite us to craft. as robin wall kimmerer reminds us, learning to listen to plants requires us to “unlearn hurrying,” to relinquish “the parameters of efficiency and controlled for precision” from our scientifically trained preconceptions (2013, 233). such modes of listening require much more time, and trust, that scientific insights can be generated without fully knowing the conditions in which, for example, “right” or “wrong” kinds of knowing can be rendered knowable. as a minor empiricism, our radicley empirical proposition is neither better nor worse, more right or wrong, but a different way to go about crafting inquiries into the sensorial (re)configurations of knowing. from within the creative unfurlings of an apparatus in unexpected formation, it becomes possible to amplify the responsive potentials for radicle and all kinds of radically empirical means of knowing. evoking different translations of a scientist’s detours, their feeling around for an apparatus without a clear knowing of what’s to come not as wrong but as perhaps immanent to the act of novel inquiry; extending the invitation to feel around for, and therefore about knowing, plants, scientists, and all kinds of feelers and knowers, differently.   acknowledgements monica gagliano is supported by the templeton world charity foundation under the diverse intelligences initiative (grant # twcf0313 & twcf0541). kristi onzik is supported by the uc davis department of anthropology graduate student summer fellowship and uc davis feminist art and science shop hatch (mellon research initiative) research award. with special thanks to dr. joseph dumit, dr. marisol de la cadena, and dr. suzana sawyer for their comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript and for the generous encouragement received from anonymous reviewers throughout the publication process.   references andrews, lindsey. 2015. “black feminism’s minor empiricism: hurston, combahee, and the experience of evidence.” catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 1 (1): 1–37. https://doi.org/10.28968/cftt.v1i1.28808. barad, karen. 2007. meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. durham, nc: duke university press. darwin, charles r. 1880. the power of movement in plants. london: john murray. http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemid=f1325&viewtype=text&pageseq=1. gagliano, monica. 2018. thus spoke the plant: a remarkable journey of groundbreaking scientific discoveries and personal encounters with plants. berkeley, ca: north atlantic books. gagliano, monica, mavra grimonprez, michael renton, and martial depczynski. 2017. “tuned in: plant roots use sound to locate water.” oecologia, no. 184, 151–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-017-3862-z. gagliano, monica, vladyslav v. vyazovskiy, alexander a. borbély, mavra grimonprez, and martial depczynski. 2016. “learning by association in plants.” scientific reports 6 (1): 38427. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep38427. haraway, donna. 1988. “situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective.” feminist studies 14 (3): 575–99. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066. ———. 2016. staying with the trouble: making kin in the chtulucene. durham, nc: duke university press. hustak, carla, and natasha myers. 2012. “involutionary momentum: affective ecologies and the sciences of plant/insect encounters.” differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies 23 (3): 74–118. https://doi.org/10.1215/10407391-1892907. jacob, francois. 1995. the statue within: an autobiography. new york: cold spring harbor press. james, william. (1912) 2003. essays in radical empiricism. mineola, ny: dover publications. kaku, michio. 2004. einstein’s cosmos: how albert einstein’s vision transformed our understanding of space and time. new york: w.w. norton. keller, evelyn fox. 1983. a feeling for the organism: the life and work of barbara mcclintock. new york: w.h. freeman and company. kimmerer, robin wall. 2013. braiding sweetgrass: indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge, and the teachings of plants. minneapolis, mn: milkweed editions. lather, patti. 2007. getting lost: feminist efforts toward a double(d) science. albany, ny: suny press. masi, elisa, marzena ciszak, george b. stefano, luciana renna, elisa azzarello, camilla pandolfi, sergio mugnai, frantisek baluska, tito f. arecchi, and stefano mancuso. 2009. “spatiotemporal dynamics of the electrical network activity in the root apex.” proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america 106 (10): 4048–53. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0804640106. myers, natasha. 2015a. “conversations on plant sensing: notes from the field.” natureculture, no. 3, 35–66. https://doi.org/10.18910/75519. ———. 2015b. rendering life molecular: models, modelers, and excitable matter. durham, nc: duke university press. myers, natasha, and joseph dumit. 2011. “haptic creativity and the mid-embodiments of experimental life.” in companion to the anthropology of the body and embodiment, edited by frances mascia-lees, 239–61. oxford: wiley blackwell. prentice, rachel. 2013. bodies in formation: an ethnography of anatomy and surgery education. durham, nc: duke university press. rocke, alan j. 2010. image and reality: kekulé, kopp, and the scientific imagination. chicago: university of chicago press. rose, nikolas. 2001. “the politics of life itself.” theory, culture & society 18 (6): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/02632760122052020. roy, deboleena. 2018. molecular feminisms: biology, becomings, and life in the lab. seattle: university of washington press. scott, joan w. 1991. “the evidence of experience.” critical inquiry 17 (4): 773–97. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343743. stengers, isabelle. 2005. “a cosmopolitical proposal.” in making things public: atmospheres of democracy, edited by bruno latour and peter weibel, 994–1003. cambridge, ma: mit press. ———. 2011. thinking with whitehead: a free and wild creation of concepts. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. suchman, lucy. 1987. plans and situated actions: the problem of human-machine communication. new york: cambridge university press. sydney environment institute. “about us.” accessed january 17, 2022. https://sei.sydney.edu.au/about-us/about/. traweek, sharon. 1988. beamtimes and lifetimes: the world of high energy physicists. cambridge, ma: harvard university press.     author bios kristi onzik is a phd candidate in the uc davis anthropology department. for information please visit https://anthropology.ucdavis.edu/people/konzik.   monica gagliano is an associate professor of evolutionary ecology and director of the biological intelligence lab. for information please visit www.monicagagliano.com. microsoft word 77061-1-11-gotkin.docx gotkin, k. (2019). crip club vibes: technologies for new nightlife. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5 (1), 1-7. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kevin gotkin, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license critical commentary crip club vibes: technologies for new nightlife kevin gotkin new york university kgotkin@nyu.edu i’ve been thinking about what it would mean to design nightlife around disability. we need all nightlife spaces to become accessible, of course, something that calls for a thoroughgoing restructuring of the built environment, transportation systems, and access labor. but i’m imagining the possibilities for creating a world within the inaccessible status quo, a nightlife community that could divine the truth and complexity of disability history, culture, and resistance. when i ask my disability community in new york city about nightlife, i get a series of sighs. nightlife is exhausting. that’s not because being disabled in nightlife spaces is in itself exhausting. it’s exhausting because ableism is exhausting and because nightlife is a nexus of many inaccessible cultural forms that make parties, clubs, and bars feel like one marathon after another. we don’t often think of nightlife as a technology itself, but we should. it’s hard to decide the status of nightlife in basic terms: is it a community? an industry? a social function? if we take up the call in the manifesto that inspires this special issue, we can locate nightlife within the “non-compliant knowing-making” of crip technoscience that relishes the world-making possibilities for disabled living (fritsch & hamraie, 2019). technoscientific gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 protocols for thinking about nightlife offer what has traditionally been absent: deliberation, design, and aesthetics as a toolkit for shaping our collective imaginations and desires. tinkering, often the kernel of technoscientific practice, is already what many nightlife artists understand in their work. take, for example, the collaboration among djs and sound engineers in the production of sonic and vibrational spheres of a party. what anthropologist biella coleman (2013) calls the pleasures of hacking, the skein of frustration and excitement in self-directed realization of goals and problem solving (p. 12), is an apt description of how djs move extemporaneously through their libraries as they read and respond to the energy of a dance floor. crip tinkering in nightlife has the potential to rework just about everything we know about how nightlife should work. the 120 to 130 beatsper-minute tempo that is often assumed to be the standard to energize a dance floor could work in vastly different registers for wheeled movement. the aesthetics of diy spaces could relish the invitation to modify the height of a counter or install grab bars in a bathroom. the technoscience of crip nightlife is what scholar and poet sami schalk (2010) witnesses in her poem “our dance dance revolution” at the society for disability studies conference dance, where bodies and limbs soar into the air onto the floor against chair poppin' wheelies against crutch spinning in circles against shoulder supporting dips against stage supplying lift and gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 it's all fair game *** one story about how the punk scene grew in san francisco involves a legendary venue called the deaf club. “trashy-looking teenagers dressed in thrift store chic, mingle with studiously stylish art types,” wrote san francisco chronicle music reporter joel selvin in october 1979 (p. 6). the “highspots” of the scene included a “former filipino supper club,” “an exsynagogue,” and “the san francisco club of the deaf on valencia street, where spike-haired fans mix with the club members, who can’t hear the music but feel the vibrations.” the manager for a band called the offs, the story goes, was on his way to get a burrito when he saw a “hall for rent” sign and wandered in. he negotiated on a piece of paper with deaf man named bill, “a mustachioed, lascivious, cigar-chewing character” (as cited in boulware & tudor, 2009, p. 96). soon, the club was drawing sizable crowds with no advertising, mixing young punk fans with older members of the deaf community who had used the space as a cultural center since the 1930s (schneider, 2014, para. 1). “ear-shattering, heavy-artillery live performances” (selvin, 1996, p. 109) featured bands like the dead kennedys, d.o.a., the subhumans, tuxedomoon, x, flipper, and the germs. figure 1. the deaf club in san francisco, photo by sue brisk (likely 1979). gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 artist alison o’daniel (2013-ongoing) recreates the deaf club in one scene of her film the tuba thieves. as a band on stage starts a song for a rowdy young audience, a number of women several decades older play a game of cards and drink budweisers. people sign and raise their glasses to each other. the emcee tells the crowd the neighbors are through with the noise and the weirdos. an older couple nearby gets into an argument in asl about whether their granddaughter should move to new york. when o’daniel curated an evening of music and storytelling as an extension of her film in new york in 2016, she tried to recapture the bizarre and beautiful meeting of these two powerful communities. “punk is perfect,” said opal gordon, one of the evening’s performers about the intersection of deaf and punk cultures “because it’s loud, it’s heavy, it’s in-your-face” (as cited in reese, 2016, para. 4). beyond debunking the idea that deaf people can’t enjoy music, the evening also buoyed a dream of a more inclusive and innovative nightlife scene that the deaf club modeled decades earlier. when we talk about disability and nightlife, we often talk only about the physical accessibility of venues, like whether an entrance has a ramp or the bathroom has proper stall width. this kind of access is essential, and in fact the deaf club, located up a flight of stairs and routinely cited for unsafe conditions, was inaccessible in some of these key ways. in the wake of the deadly 2016 fire at an artist collective warehouse called ghost ship, city officials and activists alike have homed in on the regulatory apparatus that ensures accessibility and safety. figure 2. the deaf club in new york, photo by eli schmidt for the new york times (2016). gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 but missing in these conversations is an enlarged notion of meaningful access, one predicated on radical relationality, care, and exploration. this must include thinking of disability as a cultural and aesthetic force, where we cultivate the possibilities of bodies and minds by thinking anew about how to share and create space. at the club, we create worlds. we have an array of technologies for it: our clothing, our intoxications, our sounds, our artwork. club technologies plug us into creative outlets that transcend disciplinarity and individuality. dj artists can find disability aesthetics all around, like in an enthrallingly glitchy remix of lady gaga’s (2016) “joanne,” the title track from an album dedicated to her exploration of the death of her artistsurvivor-aunt who lived with lupus. and the dj can work—and pay for—the music of artists who identify as disabled, like collander (2017) whose song “sickbed” attests to the crip innovations in what others might call “bedroom pop.” but the dj must also refuse the audism of nightlife spaces. they must resist any simple ideas about how to make music accessible (like the notion that simply transcribing and projecting lyrics is what deaf clubgoers need or want). perhaps, instead, the dj collaborates with a poet who scribes the score live and a choreographer who transmutes the vibrations into a sighted and perhaps haptic experience. accessible nightlife artistry is, in this way, properly anti-disciplinary. there can’t be a single ideal modality. those who have had the fortune to attend the saturday night dance at conferences of the society for disability studies know the unique possibilities for crip world-making in the club (or the hotel ballroom that is the club). so much speculation about the wonders of technology to erase or eliminate disability calls for a response that refuses the eugenic drive and models the brilliant alternative: spaces where disabled drag queens send up stereotypes of desexualization, deaf djs send vibrations through the whole body, bartenders prize care over cash, where inclusion is not merely pragmatic but transcendent. gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 acknowledgements thank you to aimi hamraie and the members of the critical design lab at vanderbilt university who have helped me think through this stuff. gina gibney, kara gilmour, joy douglas, and my cohort-mates in the gibney moving toward justice program have been wonderful supporters of my disability nightlife project. jerron herman, shannon finnegan, ezra benus, and marissa perel are my fellow party-artists who help me imagine the worlds we create at night. references boulware, j., & tudor, s. (2009). no one’s listening. in gimme something better: the profound, progressive, and occasionally pointless history of bay area punk from dead kennedys to green day (pp. 96-109). new york, ny: penguin books. coleman, e. g. (2013). coding freedom: the ethics and aesthetics of hacking. princeton, nj: princeton university press. collander. (2017). sickbed. fritsch, k., & hamraie, a. (2019). crip technoscience manifesto. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1). gaga, l. (2016). joanne. on joanne. los angeles, ca and new york, ny: streamline and interscope records. o’daniel, a. (director). (2013-ongoing). the tuba thieves. united states. reese, n. (2016). scenes from a punk rock and storytelling show, for deaf people. t magazine. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/tmagazine/entertainment/punk-rock-for-deaf-people-queens.html schalk, s. (2010). our dance dance revolution. disability studies quarterly, 36(3-4). retrieved from http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1281/1306 schneider, m. (2014, october 22). the roots of san francisco punk: the deaf club, 1978-1980. dangerous minds. retrieved from https://dangerousminds.net/comments/the_roots_of_san_francisco_punk_ the_deaf_club_1978-1980 gotkin catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 selvin, j. (1979, october 22). s.f. goes punk. san francisco chronicle, p. 6. selvin, j. (1996). san francisco: the musical history tour. san francisco, ca: chronicle books. bio kevin gotkin is a visiting assistant professor of media, culture, & communication at new york university and co-director, with simi linton, of disability/arts/nyc (dant). microsoft word lab-lee interviews.docx lee, r. (2017). four interviews with scientists on “science out of feminism”. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3 (1) 1-39 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © rachel lee, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license lab meeting four interviews with scientists on “science out of feminism” introduced by rachel lee; interviews conducted and edited by alexandra apolloni and rachel lee rachel lee ucla rlee@humnet.ucla.edu introduction across the 2016-17 academic year, ucla’s center for the study of women conducted interviews with select scientists at ucla’s campus to explore their thoughts on “science out of feminist theory.”1 interviewers alexandra apolloni and rachel lee asked their subjects to describe their research and then to ponder how their practices were informed by feminism. their answers were wide-ranging but some common themes emerged. all of these interviewees recognized that feminist networks – communities of female scientists—required fostering, and that they, themselves, were indebted to strong female role models. while we tend to think of scientific research as that which occurs at the bench or in the field, these interviews clarified the enormous impact of interpersonal mentoring and affirmative networking in diversifying stem (science technology engineering and math) fields. the two women we 2 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) interviewed also related personal experiences in which either the desire to be or actually being a part of a robust and supportive community-withina-community made the difference in persisting through strings of “failed” experiments or convincing them to transfer horizontally to a related field. below, we publish selections from four of the interviews, one with tracy johnson, professor and maria rowena ross chair in cell biology and biochemistry at ucla, another with hilary godwin, currently associate dean of academic programs and professor of environmental health sciences at the ucla fielding school of public health, another with root gorelick, professor of biology at carleton university in ottawa, and finally, one with patrick allard, assistant professor of toxicology and in the institute of society and genetics at ucla. the subjects are all researchers with a connection to ucla’s center for the study of women. locating interview subjects was somewhat challenging, as most scientists do not publicly identify themselves as feminists in their publications or publicly posted biographies. in seeking interviewees, we found that those who are engaged in diversity work on their campuses (through mentoring programs, etc.) were more likely to identify themselves and their work as feminist. while the work of these researchers suggests promise for a feminist scientific future, many spoke about gender-bias that continues to prevail in their fields, professional organizations, and departments. where we see cause for hope, however, is in the efforts of these researchers to mentor a new generation of scientists equipped to challenge such views. was the scientific content of these researchers’ work recognizably feminist? in the instances of two of the researchers whom we interviewed, the answer was yes, even as each of them had contrasting aims in terms of assuming or demolishing the biological naturalness of sex differences in their research. in a presentation titled “no essential differences between the sexes” for the ucla institute of society and genetics which occurred immediately prior to our interview, gorelick reviewed the criteria with which we differentiate organisms as male versus female;2 and then 3 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) pointed to zoological and botanical examples that cast doubt on these criteria. following in the wake of feminist biologists such as anne faustosterling and joan roughgarden, gorelick’s research unseats male and female as the primary mechanism for differentiating kinds within a species. put more provocatively, gorelick claims that the view that “male and female [are the] only natural sexes is false.” scholarship in this vein, contesting the naturalness of binary sex, helps to destigmatize intersex individuals and also to underscore the specious quality of arguments that attempt to rationalize as “only natural” (i.e., as rooted in biology) the extant social and political inequalities between men and women.3 on the other side of the coin are those who contest past findings in biological science that have proceeded as if sex does not matter, or put more precisely, as if the universal body is the male body. allard’s research practice explores the data gap regarding the effects of hazardous chemicals, especially the subset of endocrine-disrupting compounds (those having hormonal effects), over the life course of female organisms. historically, toxicology preferred collecting data on male specimens due to their perceived hormonal constancy (given, for instance, their lack of menstrual cycles). the resulting gender bias in results, in short, was excused by way of seemingly non-gendered rationales (i.e.: the “easier” experiment to run was on males). for those investigating how chemicals that mimic estrogens and androgens interfere with and alter a host of “normal” biological functions (metabolism, neuro-endocrinological pathways, immunity, fertility), time of exposure and fluctuations in rates of growth and development across the life course have become crucial factors to consider in experimental design. moreover, for scientific research to be responsive and meaningful to more than half the population, recognizing sex differences—the gathering of data on female organisms with their so called “complex” hormonal cycles as well as male organisms—remains crucial to the translational value of this research to human policy, regulation, and healthcare. in terms of the research practices of the other two researchers 4 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) whom we interviewed, the relation of their science to feminism was, arguably, more subtle. johnson’s remarks, however, indicate that gender and race do matter to the scientific method. gendered and/or racialized experiences of the world shape the kinds of issues that individuals care about, and, as such, the questions that researchers ask, the lens they employ when observing experiments, and the kinds of conclusions that they draw. thus, regardless of whether or not a scientific project is about gender or a purportedly feminist question, gender matters to that project. for that reason, johnson called our attention to her pedagogy and mentoring as key sites of feminist and racial equity work that benefits science. “molecular biology,” she tells us, “requires visualizing phenomena that are inherently hard to visualize. the first step is to come up with a model of what one thinks is happening, and then design an experiment that will get at that.” for johnson, homogeneity amongst science practitioners can lead to homogeneity in the models for visualizing molecular phenomena. her laboratory work involves cultivating an ethos among her students—these journeymen scientists--of openness to the unexpected and to the pleasure and fun of having freshmen of diverse and underrepresented backgrounds hypothesize models in ways less constrained by years of traditional training. giving younger students a taste of the pleasures of ‘being a scientist’ builds community in ways that are both rigorous and supportive. it is that community that sustains underrepresented minority women in stem fields when “they encounter things that are negative” so that they don’t feel that they are “outsiders who are looking in at what [real] scientists do.” for hilary godwin, whose early work in chemistry focused on how (lead) atoms bond, the desire to render her research more applicable to everyday contexts led her, first, to investigate, chemically, why lead was poisonous and then, to incorporate social factors into the equation of how poor and racial minority populations become more vulnerable to lead poisoning. moving into the school of public health at ucla, godwin found more like-minded interlocutors for her work. in pondering how 5 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) chemistry would be different “if [it] were really diverse” and if women were at the center, godwin pointed to her dialogues with female chemists from cameroon in which their being oriented toward making a difference in people’s lives was always front and center. in contrast, shearing social concerns from the research platform is not an uncommon practice in traditional inorganic chemistry as practiced in u.s. universities. what kind of science, then, has emerged out of feminism according to these select scientists? if one were expecting these scientists to identify a particular subfield as the place to do feminist research, then our interviews did not yield a straightforward answer. nor did the interviewees see their own enrollment in science, with its commitment to objective findings, as compromising their acknowledgment that the gender, class, and race of the observer— his/her sociohistorical situation—affects the research practice. reflecting perhaps the salience of women-of-color, transnational, and indigenous feminisms, all of our interviewees also emphasized the braidedness of their feminism with their pedagogy of underrepresented minorities (johnson and allard), their conversations with “native” epistemologies (gorelick), or their direct collaboration with women in the global south (godwin). additionally, all our interviewees had stories to tell about the subtleties of sex discrimination in their fields and how tuning into those effects (e.g., women being channeled into botany while men were channeled into zoology) could be difficult to articulate at the time of the event’s occurrence or could only be identified upon later reflection with other sympathetic colleagues. conditions for working—the infrastructures of scientific research including mentoring and letter writing—in other words, were as much a central part of what could be considered the scientific practice that emerges from feminism. in short, each of our interviewees embraced multiple key insights from feminist science and technology studies. all acknowledged the scientist’s ethical obligations to his/her students and affirmed the importance of social justice to their practices of science. their recounted experiences also attest to science as a contested field of power, with 6 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) some confronting outright hostility toward their efforts to broaden the terrain of science. our interviewees contestations within science included their movements sideways within their institutions or across institutions to find more hospitable homes to address the way that disparate outcomes can follow upon seemingly neutral research designs. finally, with their emphases on their own indebtedness to feminist mentors and collaborators, they all help move the story of what makes a scientist away from the myth of the “individual genius.” what these interviews reveal, then, is that feminist theory can and does shape science. it provides researchers with the tools to recognize and respond to gender bias and discrimination in their disciplines and in their labs. it moves them to advocate for and engender a diversity of perspectives in their labs--and in so doing, it brings to light new questions and methods. finally, it can bring scientists to question commonly-held “truths” about the nature of sex and gender. hilary godwin aa: could speak about some of your first experiences with science. what brought you to the work that you're doing now? hg: my parents are field biologists, so actually my first experiences with science were as a very small child doing field work with them. so from a very small age, the question was not whether or not i wanted to be a scientist, but rather, what kind. getting to where i am now was complicated. when i went to college i thought that i wanted to major in either anthropology or psychology, and i took both the anthropology and psychology classes my freshman year and did not like them. in the meantime i was taking freshman chemistry because i thought i might want to get a medical degree and i loved chemistry so i ended up majoring in chemistry and doing research in chemistry and then going to graduate school in chemistry, and i got a phd in chemistry. and by the time i finished my 7 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) phd., which was in very traditional inorganic chemistry [looking at how different atoms bond with each other], i decided that even though i really enjoyed doing it, i wanted to do something that was more relevant to people. i chose to do post-doctorate research at johns hopkins university in the school of medicine and transitioned into biochemistry, and then after that, started a faculty position at northwestern university in the chemistry department and worked on the program that i set up there looking at why lead is poisonous. [this direction] married my interest in people and chemistry. after being there for ten years, i had the opportunity to move public health [at ucla], which was much more aligned with the research that i was doing and also my interests. i felt like i spent a lot of time trying to explain to my colleagues why i cared about people. so, so it was nice to moveto be with people who also cared about people. it’s been very liberating being in public health. my research has broadened significantly since then. i still do some toxicology work but i also do work looking at health impacts of forest conservation, water conservation, and toxics policy. it's very, very diverse compared to what i was doing when i was a chemist. so i consider myself a reformed chemist. aa: when you were first doing chemistry were there mentors who were pushing you in the direction of doing work that involved people or were you on your own? hg: this sounds crazy to most people who have had the experience of taking organic chemistry, but i actually really just loved organic chemistry and particularly loved the organic chemistry lab. my organic chemistry ta said, 'you should try doing lab work.' he was the one who encouraged me to start doing independent research and i just loved doing it and i loved making things. i really like to cook so to me organic chemistry is kind of the same thing. it was really passion driven. it wasn't until halfway through grad school that i thought, “what about the people?” 8 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: do you remember what made you start asking that question? hg: i felt the work i was doing was very esoteric and, not to be morbid, but i sort of felt like if i died it wouldn’t have made any difference that i had spent all that time working on my precious little molecules. i wanted to do something that had broader impact. the work that i was doing in graduate school [regarding the bonding of atoms] was very fundamental chemistry. i made a conscious decision when i did my post-doctoral work to switch to working on biological molecules, while still working on ones that had metals in them. and then i started looking at how poisonous metals impact the proteins that naturally have good metals. aa: and do you think of that as feminist work? hg: yeah, do i think of that as feminist work. i mean certainly there is an important maternal and child health component to it. another part of it that felt feminist: i was actually the first female faculty member that was hired in the chemistry department at northwestern university, and then the first one to get tenure, and the first one to be department chair. i felt very profoundly how it was isolating; it created pressure that i wouldn't have felt if i had been male. that was really the point in my life when i became more conscious of feminism and women's rights, and inequities. in terms of my research, around the time i left northwestern and came here, which was ten years ago, i started working with a grassroots organization [at its inception comprised of] all female chemists [running] women's leadership and empowerment workshops in the united states (and now globally). this was definitely an important component of the service work that i do. in terms of research, i have a project looking at health impacts of forest conservation on indigenous populations; there is a significant component of it that to me feels feminist without question. there are very different impacts not just on indigenous versus majority populations in 9 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) terms of male and female populations [within those categories]. it has been super interesting talking to the women in the villages that we work with about it. to me, one of the most poignant moments was when the women in one of the villages were explaining to me why they thought it was important to have job training programs for women. they said, “we want to work!” and i was like “i know, i'm here working,” and they're like “oh right!” i was like, “this is why we're here! you don't have to explain to me why you want to work, i get it.” and it was really where i saw how differently the women in the village interacted with me versus the all-male researchers that have been working in that village for literally decades. the first time i visited the main village we work with there, in cameroon, my colleague was like, “wow! the women talk to you!” i said of course they talk to me, like duh, of course! he said that, over the past 10 years that he’d been working there, he hadn't felt like the women had ever really engaged with him but also that he had women researchers who were biologists doing field work whom he felt like the women didn't engage with. and i asked, “well, it was because they were doing work that the women identified as male work, right?” and he said that that was true because there was one male researcher who really liked to cook and had actually spent a lot of time with the women, cooking with them, and he said that was the only person from his whole team over the years who had done so. i was asking them questions about their kids and the challenges they face and talking to them about things that women talk about, right? so that part of it definitely feels feminist. aa: going back to what you were saying about your time at northwestern as the first woman in that department: what kind of climate do you see for your students now? hg: it’s definitely much better in public health than it is in chemistry, even today. i started as a faculty member about 20 years ago. even chemistry, things have improved since then. yet, women chemists still mention having a lot of the same issues that i experienced 20 years ago. some of 10 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) those things are just better in public health because we have better gender ratios. where students identify issues in public health is as it relates to underrepresented minority groups. [at ucla] we actually have pretty good representation of hispanic students and latino students but we don't have great representation of african-american students. it's better here than at most schools of public health, but it's still not great, so i would say [it’s important to listen] to african-american students [and find] kinship. the other group of students who i feel are struggling with issues that are similar to the things that i remember feeling being the only person from a certain group and being identified as other – are our transgender students. we have a really strong careers in public health student group and i think the gay and lesbian students feel like they have a good support group there, but i still hear from the transgender students that they feel like there are comments that people make without realizing it that touch them to their core. that part of it, to me, reminds me of when i would hear people saying [sexist or racist] things and wonder, “did that person realize he said that? i just can't even believe it” you know? so that part of it, i don't think it's completely gone. aa: and do you think that having that experience of being the one woman or being, you know, one of very few students of color or few transgender students, do you think that shapes the kinds of questions that people ask as a scientist? hg: for sure. it actually makes me feel like more of a complete person as i don't separate social issues from science. a lot of times scientists separate social stuff as subjective, saying science is clear cut and has nothing to do with any of that stuff. i have a view of science [as also influenced by subjective factors, for instance, in] the questions that people choose to ask, and the way that they choose to answer them. rl: so what if you were teaching chemistry but you were teaching in a 11 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) women's studies department? would the course be structured differently? for instance, would you start with cooking a meal and what happens to atomic bonds in cooking versus, i don't know, the making of the hydrogen bomb? how would you do it? hg: yeah that's a good question. i’ve actually never thought about that. the easy answer is 'yes' i would do something differently. so, i teach a fundamentals of chemistry in the environmental health department, which is basically a refresher of general chemistry, and it was because my colleagues kept complaining that people didn't remember what they had learned in freshman chemistry. but, of course, they don't. in their minds it was something completely irrelevant to what they're doing now, so why would they remember that stuff. the way that i teach chemistry in the environmental health department is completely different from the way i used to teach freshman chemistry. i found a really great book that focuses on concepts as opposed to problem solving which is really the focus of most general chemistry classes. the core concepts are the same it's just different in terms of the focus, which is on their relevance to environmental problems. so i would imagine that if i were in a women's studies department that i would similarly develop a class where you take a step back and say what are the core things that i want to teach to the people who are in the class, what's the best way to convey that information, and what do the people who would be taking this course actually care about? aa: along these lines, i wonder if you could talk a little bit about your approach to mentorship and how you engage with students in your lab. hg: i sort of have this philosophy that, not that suffering is good, but having gone through difficult life circumstances makes people more humble and more appreciative, that different people struggle with different things, and those are valuable perspectives to have as a mentor. when i was in the chemistry department i felt like there were a lot of 12 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) times when people would say to me, you know you mentor people that way because you're a woman and i would always push back and say actually my post-doctoral adviser who was a man had the same mentoring style. it has nothing to do with being female or male; it has to do with valuing people as human beings and a fundamental philosophy that it's important to treat people well. but you know some people think that that is gender related and i just happen to think that it's not. but would i say like, being a woman, does it influence my mentoring? of course it does. aa: you are interested in communicating science to non-scientists. could you talk a bit about your work in that regard, and whether that desire also has a social justice or a feminist grounding? hg: the origins of that desire started when i was at northwestern communicating about lead poisoning. it really was about communicating why do we do the things we do as scientists and what the implications of the results of science are. but it comes back to the core idea that it's not enough to do science, that you have to make sure that you're communicating it to critical stakeholders and the general public. i think it goes back to my original desire to be an anthropologist. there's something i just love about the process of trying to figure out how people conceptualize the world around them and how to communicate effectively to people. rl: how does gender or gender theoryand that can be also you know trans theory affect the practice of chemistry? hg: to me the biggest impact still, even, you know 20 years after starting as a faculty member or as the only woman, is that chemistry still is really white, and straight white male dominated. it's not that there aren't other people but it's really dominated by [straight white men] and to me that really impacts the way they conceptualize what are important problems 13 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) and how to attack them as discipline. that [formation] made me reach out to public health and service. what i care about is much more in alignment with what most people in public health care about than it is what most people in chemistry care about. i tried to explain that to people – intellectually, public health, is like finding the right home. but if chemistry really were diverse, how would it be different? so for instance, to me it's fascinating when i go to work in cameroon. i often get together with women chemists through the women’s leadership development program in science. and it's so fascinating to me to see how different the interests are in terms of what's considered to be important chemical topics in cameroon versus in the united states. the things that they, as a community, tend to be interested in, to me, seem much more practical and useful. they still don't seem as practical and useful as what someone in public health is interested in, but compared to chemists in the united states they're way more practical. so for instance, there's a big interest in natural products and extracting things from plants. that's a big topic in the united states but in the united states it's very focused on “i'm going to isolate this really complicated molecule that comes from this obscure plant or animal and then i'm going to synthesize it in fifty billion steps,” with the connection to the practical world becoming very tangential. whereas in cameroon, the thinking is “we know that this particular plant product is used by this community for this purpose and so we know there is some useful thing here. we want to extract that thing so that we can then market it and develop it.” it's not really about a desire to make something in its pristine, pure form; it's really about how we can create a product that could be marketable and that can cause development in the economy. that could help people. patrick allard aa: do you think of your research as a creative practice? pa: i'd say it's a very creative practice, absolutely. 14 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: and so do you think that being aware of social inequality, or gender inequality, or issues related to justice broadly defined do you think that they shape the creative choices that you make in the lab? pa: i think they do, but not necessarily in the direct way that you're thinking. in my lab we look at exposures and the way they affect reproduction, and i've historically focused on female reproduction for the reason that hasn’t been researched as much as male reproduction. but the reason why it's not being researched as much is because reproduction is inherently very complex and the female oocytes or female germ cells develop over the entire lifetime of an individual from in utero all the way to adulthood, which is slightly different from the way males do. for males you can quickly just look at an adult and know what's going wrong; with females it's really hard; much, much harder to do. i realized that there was this gap of data around harmful impacts on female reproduction. i decided to look at what had not been historically looked at too much. i don't think the data gaps necessarily come from social inequality. i just think there's an inherent biological difficulty in looking at things through the models that we used to have to use, and so i decided to develop new models to address that. of course sometimes, and i've not encountered this directly, there's the thought that “well if you figure out how males are affected then it's probably the same thing with females.” i've heard those things being said before but people have not rejected my work because of that. and i think it's a very male-centric view because it's inherently actually different, but i think some people are willing to brush off the female side easily. parts of my work directly connects to the question of inequalities. in an ideal world where we would all be equal, magically; if there were no social differences or chemical factor differences between all of us, would our health really improve? would we all be equal with regards to our 15 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) health? and what i'm finding through the models i’ve developed in the lab is that through our histories, our chemical history, we carry [our history] with us. your ancestors still determine, in terms of chemical exposure, your health now. even if everything was equal now we would not be equal because exposures may have effects several generations down the line but not right now. i try to actually address that question of inequality through this angle of transgenerational exposures. there's mounting evidence that those are real, that for generations you carry the burden from your ancestors sins; 'toxics sins' i call them. and finally there is still the question of women in science. i'm lucky to be surrounded by very powerful women. i have a split appointment and both of my deans are female, and one of the leaders in my field is female. so these figures exist, but i also look at my students and i see a lack of confidence in whether they belong here, or at least that's the way i perceive it. i feel like there's a lot of confidence infusion that i need to do: "yes you belong here," "yes your work is fantastic" "you're a fantastic researcher," "you're a fantastic educator," those kind of things. i find that i tend to do that a lot more with my female students than i do with my male students who don't even take compliments anyway. aa: i think it's true that a lot of women are conditioned to think that they don't belong somewhere, so i think it's interesting that you put it that way. pa: listening to my female colleagues during my post-doc at harvard medical school, which was a high-pressure environment, i saw the frustration from their end. they would talk about the experience of giving advice to someone but being ignored, only for a male colleague to repeat that same advice and have it taken up. or hearing people say things like "oh that pi? she's a bitch." and then you wonder: is it just only people like that who can make it to the top? all of these things that were said that really during my post-doc time made me think a lot more about gender in research. not the research of gender, but the place of gender in 16 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) research and how people are being perceived. aa: i want to go back to what you were saying about your research, and about how you're doing work on the female reproductive system and it sounds like you're asking--correct me if i'm wrong—asking questions that had not been asked before? pa: i'm not necessarily asking questions that have not been asked, i'm just providing much, much faster tools to get to an answer. people asked questions about the reproductive impact of certain chemicals, but they were either not able to do it comprehensively for a lot of chemicals, or finding answers was extremely expensive. what i try to do is develop tools to specifically address that, so that if we have to screen hundreds of thousands of chemicals on the female reproductive system we'll be able to do it, as opposed to testing the male assuming that impacts on the female will be the same as the male. i try to directly address that by designing new tools. aa: and do you think of that as an activist project at all? pa: i do and i don't. what i mean by this is, to me, it's just curiosity. we know so much about the other side and we don't know about the female, and i understand that biology in itself has been a barrier. i never saw it as a societal error to correct, but then sometimes i do feel like i want to tell people off when they tell me, "oh, but you know we already know some stuff about the male so why the female?" i think that's such a short sighted question and i often wonder why people are asking me that question because it's obvious that the biology's very different. if you know anything about biology you would know that the male and female reproductive system are inherently different from each other and the way germ cells developed are inherently different. aa: hearing this as someone with a background in gender studies it 17 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) sounds like activist work because it’s filling a gap caused by the lack of research done on female bodies. pa: i think to a vast extent it's being corrected, or trying to be corrected by a generation who know that now we need inclusive studies. if you're going to work with people, you have to be able to include genders, and races, and ethnicities. historically, in toxicology, people tended to stay away from the female side because it was too variable and if you wanted to get a straight answer you probably should work on the male side because there would not be hormonal changes over the course of the month so it would be easier to get a clear answer. fortunately, i think we're already starting to move away from that approach, but there is still that data gap that existed. aa: so you spoke a little already about your work with students. do you see your students asking new kinds of questions motivated by concerns about justice, representation, etc.? pa: i've seen a lot concern about minorities and their place in science, and the issues facing first generation researchers. two of my female students are both minority but one is recognized as a minority in science, and one not recognized as a minority. one is latina and one is asian, but they're both first generation students. they deal with the question of being a minority and how you can be considered not a minority although you are a minority. a lot of the most intimate things that i've learned from my students i've learned thanks to the fellowships that exist for minority students. this is where i learn about their family histories, what happened to their families, what it means to them to be doing research. i write letters of recommendation for them based on their essays, and it’s a great platform for me to talk about these issues with them. i find that i'm definitely more focused on racial minority issues, rather than gender issues. 18 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: all those issues do tend to connect, though. pa: right, but i do think that one takes precedent over the other. i think sometimes both are accounted for when an application is reviewed. the first goal might be 'let's get minorities in science', and 'oh yeah there's the gender thing', 'oh she's minority and she's female, that's great!' right? aa: and i wonder if those students end up feeling kind of additional pressure then to succeed? pa: obviously i'm a white male, but if you're asking my perspective: i do think that it has to compound and make students feel even more so that they don't belong? i mean how many women of color are in leadership positions? all the ones i know are white females. if you start thinking intersectionally then you don't see full representation. root gorelick rl: you describe yourself as a theoretical biologist. can you tell us what that means? rg: i devise hypotheses, but i don't test them. or if i do test them, i test them with my memory. i learn about as many weird organisms as i can, so i can devise a hypothesis and instantly say whether or not it is wrong. i was originally trained as a mathematician, and that's what they do: they build up a back pocket full of counterexamples. and i do that as a biologist. aa: do you think that coming at your work as someone who's interested in feminism, social justice, and equality changes the kinds of questions that you ask? i know that much of your work focuses on sex, so does feminism shape your approach there? 19 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) rg: of course! absolutely! it has to. it's meant that i end up spending a lot of time talking to my friends who do trans issues or making connections that no biologist in their right mind ever does. part of it is that i think you get to see that there's more variation out there; that individuals really are different. biologists tend not to want to see that; we want to think that all humans are alike. it's very weird, we think all humans are alike and then biologists as a whole can be often awfully sexist and racist. rl: and your current work is informed by indigenous science as well could you speak about how you came to that approach? rg: i did my graduate school in southern arizona and southern new mexico where there really was a large indigenous presence, and a large hispanic presence, and many students were first generation from mexico. i was teaching a statistics class, and i had to teach the following phrase: “fail to reject the null hypothesis.” it's either a double or a triple negative. and double negatives mean the opposite in spanish that they mean in english, and so i realized that cultural and linguistic things truly make a difference. i moved from there out to canada, and i wanted to do the same research locally. carleton is a university that's on first nation territory and there are first nation peoples nearby. we were hardly doing anything for first nation students, and the little we were doing was over in the humanities. what could we do in science? we have indigenous students, but we don't even identify them or ask them if there's anything that we can help them with. so i thought that we should give something back to these people whose land we’re on. i didn’t know anything but i thought that i could learn a little bit and facilitate a conversation. so i suggested that in biology, we offer a course in indigenous perspectives on ecology in evolution. i know ecology and evolution, i can figure out traditional ecological knowledge and things like that, at least well enough to get a 20 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) conversation started. the biology department said no, in a racist way, actually. they said that indigenous knowledge is nothing more than myth and folklore. and i thought, wow, these people have hypotheses just like you do, they falsify them just like you do, and as far as i know it sounds [a lot like my] evolutionary research. most of the evolution i've learned is also western myth and folklore. and it's no better; it's no worse. and so i finally went to the dean of arts and social sciences, and i mention this to him and he says, "i'll pay for you to teach that, but you have to teach in the indigenous studies program." i was a bit intimidated then. i started to develop relationships, both learning from the students but from the people who are actually studying indigenous cultures in other departments. sociology, indigenous studies, political science, and other fields had started talking about pluralversality. both feminist perspectives and indigenous perspectives are different epistemologies, and they also have different ontologies. it's seeing the world differently, right? and we probably do have different ontologies, we all have different backgrounds, and there's nothing wrong with that. hopefully there could be synergism that could be reciprocal. so i look at the way that i do science as a theorist. the way i work, is i take an idea or hypothesis and then i look for exceptions--the counter examples and weird stuff. and if you look at western ways of knowing, we have a concept for that: black swans. it’s an idea from the greeks: they said all swans are white, and seeing another white swan won't tell you anything, the only thing that's really interesting is if you see a black swan, and the greeks, the ancient greeks, had never been to australia where they do actually have black swans which do tell you something. and so it's the exceptional things that matter. when you look at what is modern day canada and north america--turtle island--the metaphor here is the white buffalo. you have the black swan and the white buffalo; they're showing the exact same thing. these exceptions give you the really basic and important shifts in your knowledge. so in this place there seems to be little bit of reciprocity. 21 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: another element of your work is about questioning our binaristic notions of sex. could speak about what brought you to that question? rg: as a graduate student, i met [molecular biologist] shirley tilghman. her work opened up doors and i started realizing that a molecular mechanism could be the way that sex--in terms of femaleness and maleness--is actually determined. so i started to develop a theory around that--how a process called cytosine methylation determines sex. but i wanted to know not just what causes femaleness and maleness but all aspects of sex: how do meiosis and cell divisions arise, and things like that. rl: the idea that you could determine femaleness and maleness by way of differences in cytosine methylation is really striking to me. rg: so what we have are plants like the cycad or the papaya that will express their genes for femaleness in various ways -through production of eggs, etc. there are also genes for maleness, and it is possible in the same individual to sometimes have them both turned on, and in most plants they are both turned on. but in some plants only one is turned on. but we know in some organisms, if we subject them to environmental shock, it suppresses maintenance methylation. so what ends up happening is that these methyl groups turn off genes for, let's say, maleness. but when you impose an environmental shock, after meiotatic division they will not acquire the methyl group and the genes for maleness will be expressed. these processes were my weird entry into all of this. and i don't believe there is universal mechanism at all anymore. rl: if you were to try to then come up with an alternative hypothesis that would be more functional and more useful and that would replace binary sex what would it look like? 22 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) rg: to me, with regards to sex, the interesting binary or quasi-binary is self-sex versus sex with someone else. i mean that in terms of selffertilization. and it's not really a binary, there are certainly individuals that will do both. but to me that's where the interesting dichotomy comes in, and that's where the interesting testing comes in. one researcher said basically, sex is what creates diversity and variation, and i don't think it is. we can test this by looking at self-sex versus sex with someone else, and see whether one does generate more diversity--i don't think it does. which makes for a whole other interesting story. rl: right, there are also so many different ways to put it together that you can see, and that are very socially constructed. rg: it's totally socially constructed, i think. and the whole notion of biological sex--you were reluctant to use that term, and it was good that you were reluctant to use it. it's terminology that we use for convenience so i try not to use it because i still think that what we call biological sex is also social construction. it's also why i intentionally muddle sex with gender, because i think that both are social constructs, so i use them both interchangeably. but it's because of my weird biological notions of what sex means. and people will criticize me for that, and maybe i should do better. rl: we're also at a moment in the history of science, where this idea that you can extrapolate from studies conducted on men and apply the same results to women is coming under fire. rg: i've had a really hard time reconciling what to say over the years and i guess my best answer to this, as an evolutionary biologist, is that i do not think that sex in terms of female and maleness is real, but sexism absolutely is. as an evolutionary biologist i don't think that race is real but racism sure is. 23 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: was there a moment when you came to this kind of realization – say, that sex isn't real but sexism is -and did that kind of shift the kinds of questions that you were asking in your research? rg: yes. it really did shift. it got me to pick up a line of research that i had abandoned: how do we quantify diversity, including incorporating intersectionality into it. i'm developing some really cool, new notions on how we can quantify diversity, but also on how we can turn it into policy-how we can get more underrepresented people in academia or anywhere. rl: do you mean how you quantify diversity in terms of how many students are coming into let's say stem fields, or is it more like how to quantify diversity in a biological light? rg: so i'll give an example. let's say for a minute that sex is real, that male and femaleness is real, and let's say that race is real. and we take a place like ucla. what we’d do is build an array for each department asking how many people in it are female of this race, male of this race, we'll count them up. so you've got this data array, but then how do you measure diversity with that, including the intersectionality issues? how do you then say to somebody who's doing policy that our levels of diversity have increased over time? how do we compare ucla to another school next door, who has a different number departments, a different number people, and can we say whether ucla has greater or lesser diversity than they do, in a statistically meaningful fashion. and once we can do that, then we can really start tying policy to [effects that increase or decrease diversity], and if you see a statistical increase in diversity or decrease in diversity, you can ask what you can and should do about it. aa: how do you see these diversity issues playing out in your field? 24 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) rg: the issue that annoys me is that our faculty, when i look at them, do not reflect the diversity of our students. i'm in a biology department, the majority of the phd's are earned by women, but less than twenty percent of the faculty self-identify as women. and then the percentage has dropped since i've been there. we had one job search where we interviewed five people, five white men. [when] i complained, nobody cared, the dean didn't care, the equity people didn't care. we need to go do something about it. when you look at biological fields, the women are all in botany. historically, the biology [of animals] was considered the domain of men, plants were considered the domain of women, and that still persists to this day. so for instance, when you talk about epigenetics, many of those who were feminists were willing to have a more fluid look at [biological] development and things like that, so they were much more willing to bind to the epigenetic stories than the zoologists who were men were. so there's some really interesting history to be done there. rl: what are some of your students working right now? rg: my students are doing pretty much everything. one person is working on sexuality versus asexuality or self sexuality in blackberry trees, especially as it goes further towards the range edge. so we know that as plants get further towards the range edge they get more and more sets of chromosomes instead of having two of each, they have four of them, or eight of them. so what does that do for the self-sexuality or asexuality of those plants. another is studying how maple trees make maple syrup. two of my students just graduated. one is working on how climate change is affecting flowering and fruiting time in a place where climate is changing more than almost anywhere else, which is the northern end of ellesmere island. the other was looking at climate change and how it affected diets and size of grasslands where things browse or graze while the climate was changing. i do have people who study evolution of sex. my very best 25 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) graduate student was doing work on the evolution of sex as pertaining to sperm not having nuclear pores and stuff like that. i had another grad student who was studying two products of female meiosis--how two basic egg cells can fuse with one another to form another generation. she had the wherewithal to get funding from the lambda foundation. rl: i'm curious about the undergrad teaching you do too. do you find that undergrads come in receptive to these ideas about nonbinary notion of sex and gender, or is it a hard sell with them? rg: one of the classes i teach is the evolution of sex. and i basically teach two things. i teach what is meiosis, and we probably spend half the term on that. so we tear down all the silliness, and spend the other half of the term building up something that's real. the female male differences, we do the same thing. we tear it down, but i'm not sure that we actually build anything back up. [the students] start totally frustrated with me, and at the end of the day they go home really happy. but i've basically told them everything that they've learned in the rest of their lives is a lie. and it fits in with their politics sometimes, but they don't like hearing that they wasted their time learning things that are not quite accurate, or just downright wrong at times. so that's kind of fun. our job is to mess with them, right? to be disruptive in a constructive way and to show them to see the world differently. rl: you flip for them what they think of as theory and fact in the sense that they think meiosis is a fact that they learned in high school biology. you've actually flipped it to say “actually that was a story we told, and a theory which i've now disproven for you.” rg: i've now disproven it, and here's an alternative which is probably closer to truth. but you know i hope [they learn] the beauty of coming up with hypotheses, and how the only good thing is if someone falsifies them. i want people to falsify them. i have been hoping that someone 26 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) would come up with some good criteria for how you could distinguish eggs from sperm, [criteria] that worked on everything. and someone could pull that out of thin air. if somebody could get some weird inspiration, or have a weird background, or a different background from mine, and these cool ideas sometimes fall out of the sky. rl: i’m trying to get a sense of the extent to which feminism has changed the practice of your science, or influenced the practice of your science, and what i got from what you just said is that sometimes you let the surprise chance encounter drive what you're curious about. rg: right: it's luck and it's just paying attention to see what's around you right and looking to see what individuals look like or act like. but it's also looking at all of the weird variation and [understanding that] people are different. when people ask me what is your sex or gender right, well i say well can i change it every ten minutes, or check none of the above, because these are meaningless terms the more you look at individuals, and rather than at data points. tracy johnson aa: what led you to your current career as a researcher? were there early mentorship opportunities that set you on this track? tj: i think the most significant influences probably happened while i was an undergraduate, when i was in college. i was initially interested in literature and was really enjoying it. then i took my first chemistry class and really loved it and part of it was that i was working in a group with other students, and we did workshops together and i realized that thinking about chemistry, talking about chemistry was really fun. and so then i had a professor who, whatever it is that he saw, was really encouraging, and suggested that i focus on the sciences. that was a real motivator. it was exciting to see that someone saw a particular talent. 27 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) and over the course of the time that i was a student, he continued to be really supportive. and then the first time i worked in a research lab, the person who ran the lab, also really encouraging, created an environment that was fun and welcoming, and then by that point it was just clear to me that that’s what i had to do. so it was really having great mentors who were encouraging, and who modeled also what it’s like to create a vibrant and inclusive research environment. aa: and how does that experience learning from those mentors affect the work you do now? tj: i think that’s a great question. probably the most significant impact is i realized that if just a few things had been different, if i had contact with just a few, fewer people, if they hadn’t reached out the way they did, if they hadn't taken an interest when they did, it’s unclear to me that i’d be a scientist. and i feel like i have a great job, i love what i do, but it could have easily not been that way. so the importance of mentors and people who are willing to engage really hit home for me. and so that’s motivated my thinking about the possibility of [increasing participation of underrepresented minorities and women in science], knowing that there’s probably, there’s undoubtedly a lot of amazing talent out there that may go unrecognized if we don’t keep our eyes open. aa: so, have there been other instances where these social justice issues emerged for you? how did they shape your approach to mentoring? tj: i sort of grew up with it because my parents were very, very vocal and aware of the social justice issues. but they also really taught us about the significance of being both comfortable in our own skin but aware of what the impact of being, frankly, being a young woman of color was. and so i think i sort of grew up with an awareness of these conversations, of the issues. but i think probably one of the things that really struck me the most is toward the end of high school, the beginning of college, it was so 28 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) clear that– the disparity between what was happening in some schools, some high schools, some junior high schools, and what was happening in others within, you know, five miles of each other, and the complete difference in the students’ experiences based on access to resources through no reason other than luck. things can be very, very different. and so that, i think that was really striking for me. and i felt like i got lucky, you know. i got lucky to be where i was with the parents that i had and the situation i was in. so i think that really impacted the way i thought about and have thought about the way i want to conduct my own research, mentorship, and teaching. aa: and so, what do you think is different about your research, mentorship, and teaching because you are mindful of these things? tj: i feel like it’s easier for me to see talent in a lot of different places. i think that in science there’s this sense that science is somehow objective and so pure that anybody can come up with the same questions and the same answers. and i think that when you say it out loud it sounds kind of ridiculous, but there’s this sense that somehow science is free from any subjective notions. but the reality is that the way we ask questions, who asks the questions, the answers we come up with, in fields that may seem as objective as, you know, biology or physics, are completely influenced by who’s doing the work and what the scientist brings to the discipline. and so, given that, i feel like i’ve been fortunate to see talent in a lot of different places. i feel like my eyes have been much more open to [the importance of who is asking the questions] just because of those experiences early on. aa: and do you think that you ask different types of questions than some of your colleagues because you’re thinking about social justice, or you’re coming from this position of being informed by that? tj: you know, i feel like the answer is probably yes, it’s hard for me to 29 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) articulate why, but i feel like i see the practice of science differently. and yeah, i think so, but it’s hard to articulate. aa: we read a bit of your work getting ready for the interview, and i found in some profiles and interviews that you talked about the elegance of organic chemistry. you also mentioned earlier the fun of seeing things come together. so i wonder if you could talk a bit about science as a creative process, or what makes organic chemistry seem elegant to you? tj: what struck me when i first [encountered organic chemistry] was that there was something very visual about the way molecules come together. and there was an order, there was a systematic way in which you [could] build reactions. but that there were a lot of different ways of coming at that. and depending on how you saw the molecules, you could take different steps. the idea that you could build something, whether it’s building reactions or building an organic compound or whatever, that you could build it from component parts. depending on which ones looked right and appropriate, those are the ones you could select as part of the building process. it felt very fun. i think that that was how, for me, organic chemistry felt elegant. aa: when you’re working with the students in the lab, what do you do to get them to have that [same] experience of fun and creativity? tj: molecular biologists are interested in things that are very small or usually are happening too fast to see, or they’re too small to see. and so, the creative part of it is figuring out how to see what seems like the unseeable. how to visualize things that are hard to visualize. and so, the first step is to come up with a model of what one thinks is happening, and then design an experiment that will get at that. but the creativity comes in because the experiment has to be designed to unveil something that is usually really, really hard to see. and so what i find to be so much fun with students is building models of what we think is happening, 30 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) developing hypotheses, and then thinking about what it takes to test those. science can be incredibly creative. and different people are going to come up with different ways of looking. two people will look at the same piece of data and will be drawn to different aspects of it, and then ask different questions to get at those aspects. and i think that’s a fun process. aa: that speaks to what you were saying before --why it’s so important to have more people and different perspectives in science. tj: for example, the reaction that my lab explores is something called rnase blasting, and just the way in which that was discovered reveals an example of this. and so these are essentially regions of the genome that don’t appear to code for proteins, right, they don’t seem to be critical. and in fact they sort of get removed by the cell; there’s this sort of cutting and pasting process that happens. but for the original discovery, you know, nobody anticipated that there’d be these long stretches of sequence in the genome that did not seem to have a function and that had to be removed. and so just to discover that you had to have your eyes open to something else. you had to be willing to see that these sequences could just be looped out and removed. we’re interested in now asking two questions: first of all, how does [rnase blasting] happen? secondly, maybe there’s something more to the existence [of this removal of these noncoding regions of the genome]. maybe there’s some other way in which the process of splicing feeds back and communicates important information to the cell. so i think just being able to see that there are these events that you wouldn’t expect, i think it happens when there are people with different sets of eyes who have these questions. i’m teaching a class of freshmen right now and it’s wild, it’s really fun. but, you know, we’re asking a very basic question about splicing to the lab class that’s, basically,very similar to the kind of work that we do in the lab. freshmen who have very little molecular biology knowledge are 31 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) coming up with so many really interesting hypotheses about how the molecules that my lab has spent years looking at, how they work. and it’s partially because they don’t have the constraints of all of the things that we’ve been making assumptions about for years. you know, not all of it is accurate, not all of it’s right, but sometimes there are these nuggets of information, because the students are drawn to certain aspects of the question. aa: i know you do a lot of work around retention and getting people to stay in the sciences. so how do you approach that? what do you think needs to happen to create a more diverse discipline? tj: the first question is why do students who start the process saying they want to be a scientist, why do they leave? and i think nationally the statistics are really sobering. nationally, about 40% of the students who say they want to be stem majors graduate with stem majors, that’s across the board. and for students who are underrepresented it’s about half of that [around 20%]. and there’s no difference in the degree to which those students are committed when they come in. so what happens? even at a place like ucla where our students come in with very strong backgrounds, again, across the board, we lose our students from underrepresented groups, and the persistence rate is half of what it is for other students. and these are students who are coming in with extraordinary gpas, everything on paper looks great, so what is happening once they get here? we don’t give enough students a taste of what it means to be a scientist. to be committed to the endeavor of science where they feel like part of who they are is being part of this community, as opposed to being outsiders who are looking in at what scientists do, but starting to identify as scientists very early. and this isn’t just coming from me, there’s data out there that talks about this idea of students who perceive themselves as scientists tending to stay in the sciences longer. particularly in the life sciences, we just don’t do that. we give them all of these hoops to jump through before they get to do what i 32 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) think is the fun stuff that they come here to do, which is to do research, or to think about biological questions, or to be involved in the process of discovery. we tell them here, you jump through all these hoops first, and then maybe we’ll let you be part of a club. and i think that’s what i’ve been interested in seeing disrupted so that students can start to see themselves as scientists very early and see what they have to contribute very early and become committed to being part of this community, and so then when things get really tough, or when they encounter things that are negative, it’s not as much of a crisis because they’re already part of a community and these things can be put into the perspective that they deserve to be in, which is not immobilizing, but things that you just push through. aa: what kinds of things do you do, either in your classroom or in your lab, to create that for students? tj: it’s part of the motivation for this lab class that i’m teaching, so that students do authentic research as freshmen. and the students can go to seminars and hear scientific talks and maybe engage in the practice of trying to really deconstruct what the talk is about, and not assuming that you have to have this enormous wealth of knowledge before you can begin to understand what’s happening in a scientific lecture. and maybe students can start to work together as a community, creating communities around scholarship as opposed to communities around surviving difficulties of the discipline, communities around thriving as scientists. that’s what i’ve been really interested in, in trying to find ways of doing this early, the earlier the better, i think, before they’re done with their freshman year. aa: do you think that there are particular challenges for your women students that are maybe getting in the way of retention? tj: i think that the challenges facing students of color, women of color, 33 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) women generally, men of color, i think that they’re all a little bit different. there are nuances to each. that said, i think that one of the commonalities is this idea of inclusivity, being included, feeling not being included, feeling like you belong in the scientific realm. and it’s hard to send that message when you look around and there’s nobody at the levels that you’re striving to be who looks like you. when you’re in a department where, you know, there are no women faculty, or a few women faculty. that doesn’t really send the message that you belong here as a scientist. so i think that one of the challenges is embracing the identity of a scientist early, but all the way through to graduate students and post-docs it’s difficult when there’s not a lot of representation. aa: and when somebody’s through grad school, through a post-doc, do you think those challenges are still there? tj: oh absolutely, absolutely. and we’ve heard some very high profile cases of blatant sexism, and wildly inappropriate behaviors that go completely unchecked, which happens when you have fields that are dominated by very a particular, a very specific and narrow group of people. and then there are these subtle things too, for example, when young women are applying for fellowships or postdoctoral positions, there’s really interesting data about what goes into their letters and how that compares to their male colleagues. so there are a lot of ways in which young women still are getting the message that is not very inclusive, or that’s not very supportive of true diversity. and it’s an uphill battle because we’d all like to believe that all of those issues are resolved, but they’re not. aa: you have a fellowship with the howard hughes medical institute? could you talk about the work that you do on behalf of them? tj: yeah! i’m so excited about that: i feel like i’m just really lucky to be part of that community. so it’s a howard hughes medical institute 34 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) professorship. it’s a society of faculty at research universities around the country. the year that i was awarded there were fifteen of us nationwide who received a million dollars over five years to do something innovative in undergraduate education. and so part of that was the motivation for starting this hhmi pathways to success program, which is very conscious of thinking about what it takes to support diverse groups of students’ success in sciences. it’s based on some of the principles that we talked about–early engagement in research, early exposure to authentic research experiences, being part of a learning community that’s both rigorous and supportive, deep mentoring that’s both horizontal as well as vertical mentoring–these are all, again, based on the work of other people who’ve thought about what does it take to generate a successful learning environment for students across the board but certainly one that works for students from underrepresented groups. and so that’s what i’ve been doing. it’s been the most rewarding thing. it’s challenging to undertake all of that with all of the demands of research because that doesn’t go away, but it’s also liberating to have an organization of the stature of hhmi that takes a step back and says, we get how important it is to do research, but now let’s have a conversation about how research scientists can engage in generating real educational innovations. and that’s just been a wonderful thing. and i look at the other people who have this same professorship and there are so many people who i’ve respected for my entire scientific career, and now the ways in which they’ve approached beautiful research, they’re applying to questions of how do you change what we do in education. and it’s been so much fun to see that creativity transferred across those two foci. aa: so now that there are people taking interest in these diversity questions, these education questions, do you think that the challenges faced by your students (particularly students of color and women), have changed? tj: so the short answer is yes, and now i have to think about what i 35 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) mean. you know, to be honest, i think a lot of what i dealt with was much more overt, even when i was a student. young people are growing up in a supposedly post-racial society in which feminism has complicated connotations for young women, and that, i think, has been one of the challenges because it’s hard to meet things head-on when everyone wants to pretend like they’re not there. even though there were some aspects that were more difficult when i was starting off, it made addressing issues head-on much easier. and now students are sort of living in this world where they’re all trying to pretend like things aren't happening when they are. but it’s also exciting to see some of the social movements on campuses where i feel like the awareness is much more transparent, and students are much more vocal in demanding recognition [for] things [like sexual harassment?] that we should have been addressing for them all the time. so that part actually is exciting. but i think that it’s been a little bit of a time coming. aa: so, i have a very open-ended question. what do you think that a feminist anti-racist scientific practice could look like? or in an ideal world, what would an approach to scientific research that's founded in social justice, what would that entail? what kinds of questions do you think would get asked? tj: i’d say, number one, the scientific environment would look very different. i would not go to a meeting of hundreds and hundreds of people and be one of three or four african american scientists. the place where you’d truly come to that anti-racist feminist scientific practice would look fundamentally different than it does now. because, the reason why it’s not that way is not because the talent isn’t there. we have to look deeper about what’s really going on. so that’s the first thing. the second thing is that i think that the sense of community would look different. the way in which we think about building communities of scholars. i’m in one field where some of the key people in the field, the stars of the field, are women. and when i go to those meetings, they’re 36 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) totally different from the meetings i go to which is, my other field, which is pretty male dominated. and in that first field, there’s a sense of different standards of behavior, differences in the way you treat junior scientists, the fact that in one night at dinner there was a conversation about how our practice fits in with the larger questions in society. that happens, i think, because there are smart, committed women who have decided that they are not going to just be women scientists, scientists who happen to be women, but they’re going to think about what it means to be a woman scientists. and i feel really lucky to be part of that community. so that’s what i mean when i say that the community looks different. the other thing is that i think that a lot of our questions would be different. if you look at great research, very little of that research has focused on and thought deeply about whether or not we should be looking at female and male subjects. even if you’re talking about model organisms, for instance, mice, i think that there would be an increased awareness that you cannot just look at male mice and make all of these assumptions about the way the brain works, and how hormones affect the brain, or epigenetics and hormones… you can’t do that if you’re only looking at one gender category of organisms. we’re not going to get the big picture. and i think for a lot of women that seems so obvious, and so i think that that would be different. aa: do you think you ask different kinds of questions because you’re thinking about race, thinking about gender? tj: i think i do. it’s easy for me to ask a question about a molecule or a part of a molecule that could easily be disregarded. i wonder, sometimes, if i’m somehow drawn to the idea that there might be more there and to trying to understand what it is. and so this is all now happening at a molecular level, but i just feel like some of that scientific curiosity, i can’t help but think it may be tied to kind of who i am and how i’ve thought about the world in other ways. 37 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) aa: i was thinking about that earlier when you were talking about bringing different perspectives to the table and even being able to look at society and recognize injustice, and recognize when people are overlooked-does that perspective tie in to asking different kinds of questions. tj: yeah, i think it does. i don’t have any proof of that but, somehow, i feel like it might influence the way i think about the science. i can see this in my class. with a room full of students we can generate a class dataset and different students are going to pull different things out of that. and if they’re all coming from the same narrow perspective of privilege and class and parents who are scientists, or whatever, if they’re all coming from the same place, i’m not convinced that we’re going to get the same nuanced complexity of answers. and if we don’t ,we’re really missing a lot. is that influenced by gender, race, socioeconomics? probably, but in ways that we don’t necessarily know. the other thing i will say is that science is hard work, and there’s a lot of failure. there’s a lot more failure than success! and there’s a certain kind of person who can embrace the failures, learn from them and actually begin to see them maybe not so much as a failed experiment. because a lot of times those failed experiments are actually telling us things that are really interesting, maybe not what we initially thought we were looking for, but something interesting. the kind of person you are influences how you’re able to move. aa: did you have anything else you wanted to say or add? tj: one thing, i don’t really know how to bring this into our discussion, but one thing that’s sometimes a little frustrating: when we have conversations about the women in science, one of the easy places to go is the time commitment of being a scientist in the context of family, and the challenge of dealing with that. there are women who do it, who do both, and enjoy both, and we don’t talk enough about those examples. it feels a little bit like a cop out for there to be an assumption that the 38 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) underlying reason why we have fewer women in science is because of family commitments. and certainly, there are ways of creating structures that make it feel less like a mutually-exclusive choice. that was just one thought i had. aa: it ties back to what you were saying about the community looking different and [synergies between that goal with] making science more open to women with families. tj: right, right, absolutely. if a woman decides that she’s going to have a child, the policies in every institution to support it often treat pregnancy like a disease. the message there is that there is something wrong that the institution’s accommodating. once we start shifting those conversations, then i think that that’s going to be real progress [toward normalizing the assumption] that men and women should be taking, or can be taking, the same amount of responsibility automatically [for postpartum childcare]. you know, let’s make family leave not just about a woman having to ask for something special, a recognition that parents may want to and need to take time for other responsibilities. normalizing it so that it’s not about women needing something exceptional. i wonder if anyone’s ever done a study of the children of academic women, who they are, how they see themselves. for the women who i know who have children, there are a lot of ways in which those children benefit from having a mom who’s a scientist. and we don’t talk about that as much as the issue of compromise. and then we send that same message to undergraduates and graduate students, and everybody’s having the discussion about how this career is hard. it’s not easy, but there’s little [that’s easy] that’s worth having. notes 1 for instance, the cfp to this special issue highlights that “no knowledge-project, including those typically granted the epistemic status 39 lee catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) of science, can offer us unmediated access to the stuff of the world. might feminist theories’ different mediations into our worlds offer new knowledges about them, and new ways of understanding those knowledge projects themselves? we contend that feminist thought can do more than offer us resources for the sciences, rather, we wish to demonstrate that sometimes feminist thought *is* science.” 2 gorelick tackled this question by speaking of differentiating criteria of organisms in both their diploid phase (e.g., as fully formed organisms) and in their haploid phase (e.g., as gametes). 3 extant inequalities between men and women politically and economically can be gauged, for instance, by comparative data on income earned, history of the franchise, positions of political leadership, and so forth. microsoft word 71496_1_11_hausken,papenburg,scmitz.docx hausken, l., papenburg, b., and schmitz, s. (2018). introduction to the processes of imaging / the imaging of processes. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 4(2), 1-23. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © liv hausken, bettina papenburg and sigrid schmitz, 2018 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license introduction the processes of imaging / the imaging of processes liv hausken university of oslo liv.hausken@media.uio.no bettina papenburg university of freiburg bettina.papenburg@mkw.uni-freiburg.de sigrid schmitz humboldt-university of berlin sigrid.schmitz@hu-berlin.de abstract this introduction outlines the main topics of this special section on “the processes of imaging / the imaging of processes” and situates them in their specific theoretical and historical contexts. drawing on feminist science and technology studies (sts), on feminist new materialism, and on media studies based in the arts and the humanities, we frame the exploratory studies assembled in this collection of essays with respect to the dynamic entanglement of matter, technology, and meaning-making practices. we attend to the question how the construction of scientific images and imaging technologies is tethered to 2 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) hierarchical social relations and discriminatory practices. politics of imaging this special section of catalyst explores how imaging technologies shape the complex processes through which scientific images are constructed and how imaging technologies drive processes of inclusion and exclusion. the section takes up these questions by bringing together approaches in feminist science technology studies (sts) and feminist new materialisms with perspectives from critical media studies. the articles gathered here offer in-depth analyses of the dynamic entanglement of matter, technology, and meaning-making practices taking shape within and around imaging modalities, such as ultrasound, embryo imaging, sonar, computer tomography, functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography. the assembled articles emphasize the question of how the dynamic and processual qualities of phenomena are captured and recorded and what the implications of such capturing and recording practices are for the relations between the subjects and objects of research. focusing on the nexus of change and development of living matter and the capturing of the movement and flux of such matter in sequences of images throws questions of animation and liveliness into sharp relief. feminist engagement with moving image techniques employed in the life sciences suggests that dynamic imagery animates thinking and enlivens a static notion of life. live-cell imaging, in particular, came into focus as a method that makes palpable the processual qualities of cellular life by foregrounding the interactive and dynamic processes happening within cells. live-cell images present life as animate and suggest a conception of cellular life as relational and process-oriented (landecker, 2012; myers, 2006; myers & dumit, 2011; for a position that challenges this claim, see wellmann, 2017). however, by stressing the functional and emergent qualities of cellular life, scientific discourse on live-cell imaging risks tacitly re3 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) inscribing a mechanical model of life and glossing over the labor involved in the making of scientific images (myers, 2015). therefore, we need to attend to the manifold steps required to produce a sequence of images in both the wet and dry lab, the politico-economic conditions under which these images come into being, the ways they circulate and are employed, as well as the political projects into which they are enlisted. in medical and scientific contexts, the term imaging is often used to describe particular procedures, modalities and tools for producing technical images (see for instance bruhn, 2015, p. 127). in this special section of catalyst we would like to broaden this concept to include the productive and constructive aspects of such procedures, modalities and tools. using the notion of imaging in a broader sense helps us to gloss various practices associated with making phenomena observable and intelligible (see lynch, 2006). in line with michael lynch’s conception of visualization, we hold that imaging should not be reduced to perceptual processes (lynch, 2006, p. 28). imaging refers to the technical procedures and materializing processes that produce visual displays of information. these images will be studied not as representations of objects but as technical visualizations of phenomena by imaging technologies that do not just present them visually but constitute them ontologically. we suggest the term processes to emphasize the need for analyzing step by step how meaning is inscribed in technical images through the dynamic interchange between the procedures, modalities and tools of imaging and the larger socio-cultural context to which they belong. we adopt a constructivist perspective that allows us to consider the politics of imaging practices. the structure of the title of this special section, “the processes of imaging / the imaging of processes”, references the rhetorical notion of chiasm, the abba pattern of mirror inversion (see for instance lanham, 1991). with this chiastic approach to imaging, we highlight the dynamic intra-actions and enactments in the investigated processes. focusing on the processes of imaging allows us to foreground the dynamics of imaging and the ways in which these dynamics are embedded in 4 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) established conceptual landscapes as well as to assess how they contribute to changing such landscapes. examining the imaging of processes is one way to attend to the processual qualities of the objects of investigation such as plasticity, movement, temporality, development and the relational dynamics of the objects under study in visualization (ranging from brains and bodies to technologies and social formations). as such, the first part of the chiasm (processes of imaging) does not just transform the second (imaging of processes) but is also transformed by the second. the title signals our approach that involves more than a combination of two perspectives, with one privileging an understanding of the entire processes of imaging, the other indicating a certain interest in the visualization of dynamic objects. rather, the object in the second part of the chiasm is considered processual, no matter how pre-defined its processual qualities may seem to be. it is produced and reconfigured in the imaging process. situating imaging practices between feminist sts and feminist new materialisms this special section focuses on contextualizing the construction and deployment of scientific images within social, political and economic discourses and gauges the implications of referencing scientific visualizations to legitimate power relations in the social sphere. combining feminist sts research on the powerful effects of images with a feminist materialist perspective opens up a space for critically assessing the discriminatory effects built into imaging technologies as well as for exploring alternative ways of enlisting scientific images in practices of resistance. although sts research has examined both the processes through which scientific images are produced and the deployment of images in a variety of social fields, the myth of “objective authority” of scientific images still holds (see burry & dumit, 2008). the medical field and the life sciences visualize structures and processes of the interior body down to cellular and sub-molecular levels in colorful digitalized images using 5 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) imaging technologies such as ultrasound, functional magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography, and live-cell imaging. the environmental sciences, including geography, employ imaging technologies such as sonar to screen structures of earth, rock, and water and offer fine-grained maps of phenomena ranging from the geosphere to the atmosphere. astrophysicists use space probes and telescopes to generate data and to detect signals from the far ends of our galaxy that are rendered into "pretty pictures" of nebulae and supernovae for popular, educational and commercial use. maps, graphs and images constructed with imaging technologies are conceptualized as immutable mobiles (latour, 1990) traveling between academic disciplines and society that promise to provide more detailed and adequate insight into the objects under investigation. the idea that enhancing the performance of particular imaging apparatuses by way of technological developments will eventually lead to "better" knowledge and generate more truthful representations of microscopic, macroscopic, and cosmic phenomena is still at the heart of science and society with its regimes of funding and governance (van dijck, 2005). yet, as sts research has pointed out, imaging technologies and the images they produce are mutable and imbued with politics and power relations that shape the way we perceive the world and how we think we should act in it. this has been impressively demonstrated, for example, with regard to the scientific and social discourse on climate change (schneider & nocke, 2014). this research shows that imaging technologies not only shape and change our experience, knowledge and conceptualization of the objects under investigation, but the resulting images also impact social practices, discourses and power relations. feminist science and technology studies scholars have longstanding engagements in offering critical analyses of how culturally shaped meanings and norms are inscribed into imaging technologies and into the processes through which scientific images are produced. they have effectively assessed the political implications of the production, circulation and deployment of scientific images and the roles that imaging 6 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) technologies play in the making of race, gender, sexuality, and ability with regard to socio-cultural norms. scientific images of the gendered body, taken as "facts," invoke gendered narratives that legitimate social hierarchies by manifesting a masculinized sphere of production versus a feminized sphere of reproduction (martin, 1987). with regard to imaging the human body, catherine waldby (2000) has shown how gendered and racial hierarchies have been inscribed into the digitalized repertoire of human anatomy in the visible human project; kelly joyce (2005, 2008) pinpointed the gendered assumptions that guide processes of brain imaging; and amade m’charek (2014) uncovered the racialized history of reference models for gene sequencing, to name a few relevant examples. feminist and postcolonial critiques have disclosed the foundations of imaging technologies in colonial, capitalist, and military projects as well as the relevance and use of scientific images for ongoing practices of discrimination. the important work in this field 1) has revealed, for instance, discriminatory practices of body scanning technologies at airports that target transgender or racialized groups (magnet & rodgers, 2011); 2) has shown how the enlisting of fetal ultrasound imaging in current bio-politics moves authority in decision-making away from women and relocates it within medicine and science (roberts, 2012); 3) has identified racialized inscriptions through technologies that construct facial images from dna sources (m’charek, 2010); and 4) has uncovered how colonial heritage comes to the fore in the use of images of invasive species in anti-migration politics (subramaniam, 2014). building on donna haraway’s concept of situated knowledges (haraway, 1988) feminist sts research has traced the question of the politics of imaging to analyses of the construction processes of making images. it is not sufficient to uncover the deployment of scientific images for discriminatory ends; equally important is the disclosure of the inscription of cultural beliefs and norms into the technical instruments and practices involved in constructing images. situating the scientific and technological concepts as well as the aims and beliefs of researchers and developers in their cultural milieu opens up a space of critique of the 7 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) apparent representational status of images much more profoundly. images then come into view as “naturecultural” phenomena (haraway, 2003) that incorporate the processes and meanings with which they are constructed. the need for in-depth analyses of the multiple entanglements that frame the constitutive processes of phenomena has been taken up in the last decades by parts of feminist sts scholarship within the framework of feminist materialisms (van der tuin, 2011). coining the term "intra-action" – to replace the term interaction – karen barad explored how the constitution of phenomena always unfolds in a zone of dynamic agential forces (barad, 2007, pp. 140-141). this notion reframes the assumption that pre-established entities with inherent properties interact with one another. for barad, subjects and objects are always in-the-making within experimental configurations, and, consequently, she demands that entities that make up an experimental configuration should not be researched separately. instead, phenomena “come to matter” (ibid.) through the intra-actions of material-discursive practices. the specific enactment of these intra-actions shapes the conditions of possibility for the phenomena that materialize in a given experimental configuration. intra-active processes establish boundaries within phenomena and these agential cuts – as barad terms them – constitute the meanings and significance of the phenomena. however, phenomena are always in-themaking and in an ongoing process of exchange and formation, with their outcomes themselves being enacted within the experimental configuration. barad thus shifts the concept of agency from a humanist notion of intentionality to an understanding of agency as enactment. adopting barad’s insights for studying the imaging of processes means to research how the agential intra-actions of matter, technology and meaning-making within a particular experimental configuration shape the phenomenon that is being displayed visually. this research can expose the agential cuts (i.e., the inclusions and exclusions that characterize the particular realization of images in “spacetimematter relations”) (barad, 2007, p. 178). 8 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) diana coole (2013) has proposed to take the feminist materialist framework as a “multidimensional ontology” (p. 464) in order to address the political dimension already within analyses of phenomenal constitutions. addressing the boundary-making intra-actions as a constitutional part of the political effects of phenomena has spurred critical feminist scholarship that analyzes how notions of gender are inscribed into specific bodies and how these inscriptions reinforce practices of discrimination (for an overview, see hird, 2004) as well as racialization, racism, and colonialisms (hinton, mehrabi, & barla, 2015). the feminist materialist concept of agential intra-actions, we suggest, can also guide analyses of the processes of imaging and imaging of processes. the articles assembled here seek to broaden the perspectives offered by feminist and postcolonial sts by opening up the field to include approaches from postcolonial geography, feminist critical neuroscience, critical media studies, and continental philosophy, to autoethnography, and cultural analysis. interdisciplinary crossroads this special section of catalyst emerged from a working group on “new materialisms on the crossroads of the natural and human sciences” in a eu funded research network on new materialism.1 the group focused on how to “rework the ‘two cultures' gap [through] new frameworks of knowing in which different kinds of actors and onto-epistemic practices can be made visible and negotiable.”2 out of this framework grew an interest in the topic of imaging and in the development of critical terms such as dynamic and agential matter, imaging technologies, and apparatuses of research.3 this special section of catalyst is among the results of these efforts. this special section aims to mobilize new-materialist, critically and theoretically engaged feminist interventions for the study of the aesthetics and epistemic status of images and imaging technologies across the visual cultures of science, arts, media, and everyday life. this research 9 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) does not belong to any one discipline but represents rather a set of perspectives that may inscribe themselves into a range of disciplines. rather than present a unified theoretical front or create an inevitable historical trajectory, we aim to contribute to an interdisciplinary arena for research on imaging. for this special section we have solicited and selected in-depth studies of imaging technologies and practices. we will argue for the importance of exploring processes of imaging across the university through a variety of specific case studies. we have collected a small number of such studies here, crisscrossing the visual cultures of science, arts, media and everyday life. we will argue, that instead of treating science and art as two fields in an open terrain where one can travel between, back and forth, along a two-way street (see subramaniam & willey, 2017), the diverse practices and discourses associated with these two apparently homogenized and distinct fields (see jones & galison, 1998; subramaniam & willey, 2017; werrett, 2008) should be opened up and investigated as parts of the more general sociocultural histories to which they belong. among the many historical conditions for the development of an interdisciplinary arena for discussions and research on imaging across the university, four parallel developments should be mentioned. the first is the ambition to develop an imaging science across the natural sciences during the 1980s and 1990s. such an initiative can be seen when the usbased national academy of sciences organized a colloquium entitled “images of science: science of images” in 1992. at this colloquium, robert n. beck, a pioneer in nuclear medicine and the founder (1986) and director of the center for imaging science at the university of chicago, gave a noteworthy lecture where he claimed “the same set of principles, concept, strategies, and methods, may be used to address the generic issues involved in the production and use of all digitized images.” he demonstrated these generic imaging issues through his talk and argued that recognition of these generic issues across imaging modes in a whole range of different disciplines “is giving rise to the new discipline of 10 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) imaging science” (beck 1993, p. 9746). one sign that something was indeed afoot, could be seen when the reputable journal of photographic science (established in the early 1950s) was renamed and transformed into the imaging science journal (1997 – present).4 at the same time, something similar happened in the humanities; this is the second of the conditions for the development of an interdisciplinary arena for discussions and research on imaging across the university that we hope to underline here: during the 1980s and 1990s, we witnessed increasingly interdisciplinary research across media and cultural studies and the various disciplines in the humanities concerned with questions of aesthetics. the most important impulse in this context is the development of the interdisciplinary study of visual media, launched by w.j.t. mitchell (1986) and others, and now a central feature of the humanities. in contrast to the imaging science initiative in the natural sciences sketched above, it is here less a question of highlighting generic issues across image genres, different media or various art-historical epochs as it is a change of perspective from studies of images as artifacts to questions of historically situated re-examinations of modern visuality. the american art historian jonathan crary (1992) provided a decisive contribution to this new perspective on visual culture by analyzing the historical construction of the observer through interweaving the histories of science, technology, philosophy, popular culture, and the visual arts. lisa cartwright (1995), among others, adds a feminist dimension to this development, assessing the impact of modernist art on medical imaging in the first decades of the twentieth century by addressing the intersection of scientific and cultural practices with a particular emphasis on cinematic practices in medical studies of and experiments on female bodies. intervening in the debate about the formation of a field that came to be known internationally by many names – visual studies, visual culture, image studies, and last but not least, visual culture studies – the dutch art historian and founder of both cultural analysis and visual culture studies, mieke bal (2003, p.19) drew attention to the synaesthetic and 11 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) discursive aspects of the visual. bal foregrounded questions of cultural change and put an emphasis on practices of power and resistance. she urges us to spot and dislodge master narratives and be mindful of practices of visual essentialism that obscure the situatedness of the viewer and equate looking with knowing. bal’s ideas resonate well with what in feminist technoscience studies has been identified as “the view from nowhere” and the call for situated knowledges (haraway, 1988, going back to nagel, 1986). the third historical condition for the development of an interdisciplinary arena for discussions and research on imaging across the academy takes place in what can be broadly referred to as media studies, which during the 1990s witnessed a growing awareness of the materiality of communication, particularly stressed by the two german scholars hans ulrich gumbrecht and k. ludwig pfeiffer (1994). meanwhile, both the concepts of ‘media’ and of ‘communication’ were in crisis. in response to the growing integration of information, of communication networks, of media platforms, and of different markets, the simple model of communication between senders and receivers based on an idea of separate media (film, television, newspapers, the postal system) was undermined. for media scholars with an interest in the form and materiality of media, this meant a reorientation and a shift from “medium” to “mediality” or “mediation”. inspired by, among others, the german literary scholar and media theorist friedrich kittler, media studies began to take an interest in how the technological logics of mediality influence the way we think of the world, of ourselves, and of the future. turning toward materiality and embodiment from a radically different perspective, north-american film phenomenologists like vivian sobchack (1992) and feminist philosophers and gender theorists like judith butler (1993) contributed to this reorientation towards materiality by stressing embodied vision and a rethinking of the materiality of the body as determining rather than determined, constructing rather than constructed (see also rooney, 1996). 12 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) finally, the fourth condition for the development of an interdisciplinary arena for discussions and research on imaging across academic fields is the turn to technology in feminist and social studies of science. feminist philosophers of science explored the gendered character of technology (harding, 1986); numerous feminist scholars conveyed the idea of technology as an aspect of identity and embodiment (balsamo, 2011; davis, 1995; haraway, 1991; hayles, 1999; turkle, 1984), and argued for the significance of everyday life technologies (cowan, 1976). in the 1980s and 1990s the more mainstream social studies of science also turned to technology (woolgar, 1991), which is vital in this context because it attracted scholars from social science and the humanities unfamiliar with feminism and/or science studies but interested in the technologies of media and everyday life. with this fourth historical development the circle may be seen to be closed and the conditions present for interdisciplinary studies of imaging across, in principle, all academic spheres: 1) the possibility of identifying generic issues across imaging modes, genres and media; 2) a fundamental understanding of historicity and sociocultural situatedness of the observer; 3) a particular attentiveness toward the materiality of mediation, and finally, 4) an imperative understanding of the social and cultural implications of technology. drawing on these developments, we are not just addressing an interdisciplinary field but a heterogeneous landscape of disciplinary and interdisciplinary subfields. we aim to foster interdisciplinary contact and exchange between these various perspectives. this, we argue, can be acquired best in research based on concrete case studies. assembled articles taken together, the framework offered by feminist materialisms and visual culture studies provides a number of tools that open up innovative and creative ways to look at, think through and theorize the multiple 13 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) relations between dynamic and agential matter, meaning-making processes and imaging technologies involved in the construction of images. within the broader framework of sts, the combination of indepth analyses of processes of imaging with research on the politics of imaging can generate insight into discriminatory effects as well as inspire alternative modes of image construction. two of the articles assembled in this special section speak to the question of how capitalism informs imaging technologies and analyze how scientific imaging practices inscribe normative ideas into human bodies, brains and the division of cells at an early stage of embryo development. in their article, hannah fitsch and kathrin friedrich critically engage with specific imaging technologies (fmri and ct) as technologies of normalization. the authors show how ideas about the body and the brain changed in the late nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century and came to rely on a model of calculability. they assess what role the turn to mathematical models and algorithm-based calculation played with regard to this change. inspired by a feminist materialist background, fitsch and friedrich pinpoint how the concept of computational rationality intra-acts with scanning technologies and algorithmic computation throughout the production processes of digitalized images. the latter then serve as standardized maps or templates of bodies and brains that curb diversity. in her article, lucy van de wiel shows how imaging technologies such as time-lapse embryo imaging tie into neo-liberal economic practices. the author discusses how in vitro fertilization (ivf) industries employ techniques such as photomicrography and embryo imaging (an embryo screening technique) to unlock new target groups. photomicrographs of embryonic cells lure fertile women into pre-emptive fertility treatment involving egg freezing. time-lapse videos of dividing embryonic cells are offered to clients of fertility clinics as an "add-on" in the ivf cycle for selecting the most “viable” embryonic cells for further development. these interventions in treatment rationales reconfigure the various timescales involved in the monitored reproductive process, 14 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) reinforce gendered notions of reproduction and imply pre-emptive overtreatment, constant monitoring as well as physical and financial risk. the processual nature of imaging, however, also opens up possibilities for using scientific images towards political ends, especially to fuel forms of resistance against discriminatory power relations. ashton b. wesner in a study of land measured using digital sonar technology, attends to indigenous oral poetry as an alternative modality to relate to land, and demonstrates how the enlisting of the pictorial outcome of sonar measurements in the frame of settler colonialism and claims to “american innocence” come to be reconfigured for liberating purposes when appropriated by native people in oral performances at celilo falls, oregon. the author shows how native poets at celilo falls employ the oral production of meaningful sound in the recital of poetry as a way to intervene into a debate about land rights that places trust in visual evidence as it is offered through sonar imaging. one further article addresses the complex interplay between digital imaging procedures and alternative modes of expression and/or diagnosis as well as other sensory modalities. karolina kazimierczak, in her contribution, asks: how do multimodal modes of expression or diagnosis and sensory modalities other than the visual both complement and challenge the evidence ascribed to the images that result from technical imaging procedures? karolina kazimierczak’s paper incorporates the haptic into the diagnostic apparatus aiming at the detection of breast cancer, a diagnostic apparatus that relies on ultrasonic imaging. to point out the complex entanglement of the various sensory modalities involved in breast cancer examination, the author analyzes the technical processes in which sound waves in ultrasound become transduced into light waves. ultrasound, she continues to show, is employed in tandem with diagnostic modes that involve touch. to underscore her point, the author mobilizes an understanding that she gained through auto-ethnographic experience as a patient in a breast cancer examination ward. it is via effectively accentuating this attunement to alternative sensorial modalities in medical diagnosis that kazimierczak 15 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) challenges the predominance of the sense of sight in analyses of contemporary clinical practices. the articles assembled in this special section of catalyst all constitute exploratory thought-movements. they address questions that grow out of the encounter with tangible phenomena and the experience of specific situations and offer answers to these questions that have theoretical relevance beyond the specific analyses. the case studies presented exemplify the aim of our larger project to attend to the social, cultural and political dimensions of imaging practices through careful analysis of both the ways in which processual phenomena are rendered palpable using imaging technologies and the processes in which scientific images are constructed, circulated and deployed. in line with this project, the articles foreground the political dimension of imaging practices, open up anew the discussion on how imaging technologies perpetuate cultural values and beliefs, and suggest avenues for further research on practices of resistance that occur in conjunction with or in response to imaging practices. acknowledgments this special section was came into existence in association with the eu cost action is1307 “new materialism: networking european scholarship on ‘how matter comes to matter’”. we thank the members of our working group for inspiring discussions on this topic. we would like to offer our special thanks to contact editor natasha myers for invaluable input during the development of this special section and for detailed comments throughout all the texts. her willingness to give her time and expertise generously has been very much appreciated. notes 1 the action grant “new materialism: networking european scholarship 16 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) on 'how matter comes to matter'” (2014-2018) was financed by the european cooperation in science & technology’s (cost) funding scheme that supports europe-wide networking activities among researchers, engineers and scholars. the working group brought together scholars from the humanities, practicing scientists and feminist scholars with a background in the natural sciences. 2 the aim of the working group was to develop “new materialisms at the boundaries of the human and natural sciences.” see the working group’s abstract on the website of the cost action: http://newmaterialism.eu/ working-groups/working-group-2/about. retrieved 28 may 2018. 3 in order to develop these topics and terms, we organized a workshop at the 7th annual conference on the new materialisms in warsaw, 21-23 september 2016, to which we invited potential contributors to this special section to present and discuss their ideas. 4available at https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/yims20 references bal, m. 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"haptic creativity and mid-embodiments of experimental life." in frances e. mascia-lees (ed.). a companion to the anthropology of the body and embodiment (pp. 139-261). hoboken, nj: wiley-blackwell publishing. nagel, t. (1986). the view from nowhere. new york, ny: oxford university press. pauwels, l. (2006). visual cultures of science: rethinking representational practices in knowledge building and science communication. lebanon, nh: university press of new england. roberts, j. (2012). the visualised fetus. a cultural and political analysis of ultrasound imaginary. london, gb and new york, ny: routledge. rooney, e. (1996). what can matter be? american literary history, 8(4), 745-758. schneider, b., & nocke, t. (eds.). (2014). image politics of climate 21 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) change. visualizations, imaginations, documentations. bielefeld, de: transcript verlag. sobchack, v. (1992). the address of the eye: a phenomenology of film experience. princeton, nj: princeton university press. subramaniam, b. (2014). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. champaign, il: university of illinois press. subramaniam, b., & willey, a. (2017). introduction to science out of feminist theory part one: feminism’s sciences. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), 1-23. turkle, s. (1984). the second self: computers and the human spirit. new york, ny: simon and schuster. van der tuin, i. (2011). new feminist materialisms. women’s studies international forum, 34(4), 271-277. van dijck, j. (2005). the transparent body: a cultural analysis of medical imaging. seattle, wa: university of washington press. waldby, c. (2000): the visible human project: informatic bodies and posthuman medicine. london, gb and new york, ny: routledge. wellmann, j. (2017). animating embryos: the in toto representation of life. the british journal for the history of science, 50(3), 521–535. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007087417000656. werrett, s. (2008). art and science: historical perspectives. science studies network colloquium, april 21 2008. http://courses.washington. edu/ uwsts/ docs/ssnet-werrett-art-&-science.pdf [retrieved june 18, 22 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) 2018] woolgar, s. (1991). the turn to technology in social studies of science. science, technology, & human values 16.1 (winter), 20–50. bios liv hausken is dr.art. and professor of media studies at the department of media and communication at the university of oslo and head of the interdisciplinary research group media aesthetics. she seeks to engage the arts and the humanities in studies of everyday technologies and their significance in the production of knowledge and power. relevant publications in english include: “media aesthetics” in oxford bibliographies in communication (2018), ”the media aesthetics of brain imaging in popular science” (mößner and nordmann (eds.), reasoning in measurement, 2017), ”the archival promise of the biometric passport” in blom et al. (eds.) memory in motion, (2016), ”the visual culture of brain imaging” in leonardo: journal of the international society for the arts, sciences and technology (2015), and ”forensic fiction and the normalization of surveillance” (in nordicom review 2014). she is also the editor of thinking media aesthetics. media studies, film studies and the arts (2013). bettina papenburg (dr. phil., m.sc.) is assistant professor at the department of media and cultural studies at albert-ludwigs-university freiburg, germany. she held a marie skłodowska curie postdoctoral fellowship at the department of media and cultural studies at utrecht university (2009-2011). her research interests lie at the intersection of media theory and aesthetics, cultural studies, science and technology studies, gender and queer studies, theories of perception and affect, visual culture, and the grotesque. she is author of the new flesh. the grotesque body in the cinema of david cronenberg (in german, 2011), co-editor of the volume carnal aesthetics: transgressive imagery and feminist politics (ib tauris, 2013) and a special issue of discourse: journal for theoretical studies in media and culture on motion pictures. politics of perception (2014), as well as editor of the macmillan handbook gender: laughter (2017). she is currently working on her second monograph tentatively entitled “affect and evidence: visualizations in the life sciences and popular culture”. sigrid schmitz (dr. habil.) is a trained biologist whose research and teaching focuses on how gender aspects frame knowledge production in the life sciences and in technological developments, and how scientific knowledge 23 hausken, papenburg and schmitz catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 4(2) impacts social gender relations, particularly covering gender aspects in brain sciences and contemporary neurocultures, body discourses in neo-liberal society, and feminist epistemologies. she edited neurocultures. feminist and queer perspectives on current brains discourses (zaglossus, vienna, 2014, together with grit höppner). she headed the forum of competence “gender studies in computer and natural sciences“ at the university of freiburg, germany (1999-2009), held the chair of gender studies at the university of vienna (2010-2015), and was visiting professor for “gender and science” at the university of graz, austria, the humboldt-university of berlin and the university of oldenburg, germany. recently, as member of the joint project “gendering stem digital”, she and her team at the center for transdisciplinary gender studies at the humboldt-university of berlin are developing interactive open science modules for transferring knowledge and promoting a reflective discussion about gender aspects into stem fields. microsoft word 77046-1-18-kenney.docx kenney, m. (2019). fables of response-ability: feminist science studies as didactic literature. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(1), 1-39. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © martha kenney, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license article fables of response-ability: feminist science studies as didactic literature martha kenney san francisco state university mkenney@sfsu.edu abstract recent literature in feminist science studies is rich with stories about how we are constituted by and in relation to (sometimes toxic) chemicals. scholars such as natasha myers, mel chen, and eva hayward have written vivid accounts of the chemical ecologies of late industrialism, arguing that we cannot think of bodies as separate from environments. in this article, i read feminist scholarship on chemical ecologies as fables of responseability, stories that teach us to attend and respond within our more-thanhuman world. amplifying their didactic registers, i pay attention to moments in the texts that are speculative, poetic, and personal, moments that work on the bodies, imaginations, and sensoria of their readers. by reading these texts together, i hope to both acknowledge the didactic work that feminist science studies scholars are already doing and encourage others to experiment with telling their own fables of response-ability. kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 introduction: reclaiming the didactic thinking back on my favorite articles in feminist science studies—donna haraway’s “situated knowledges,” emily martin’s “the egg and the sperm,” or siobhan somerville’s “scientific racism and the invention of the homosexual body,” for example—it is their didactic qualities that i admire most. not only as a classroom teacher but also as a reader, and someone who was once a student, i am compelled by writing that teaches us to attend and respond to the politics of scientific knowledge-making practices. didactic, of course, is usually intended as a pejorative, not a compliment; it is a word that critics reach for when they want to dismiss a work of art as moralizing and patronizing to its audience. didactic always means too didactic. there are, however, no positive adjectives for work that intends to teach. we have preachy but not teachy. pedagogical is a mouthful. and educational is too much like nutritious—signaling something joyless but good for you. in the absence of another word, why do we continue to use the word didactic only as an insult, as if teaching should never be the goal of writing, scholarship, or art? the implication is that when art tries too hard to teach, it necessarily fails on all other aesthetic counts. however, as anyone who has ever been a teacher knows, aesthetics are often the medium of pedagogy. charismatic texts—texts that are stylish, funny, vivid, poetic, or wry—have the incredible power to grab ahold of their readers and compel us to see, feel, think, and relate differently. in this article, i suggest that we embrace these didactic qualities in feminist science studies scholarship, qualities that often go unexamined when we talk about academic writing. the prevailing negative associations of didactic, i believe, are consistent with the way that teaching is both gendered and devalued in contemporary american culture. this attitude will be familiar to any teacher who has heard the awful phrase (often spoken directly to one’s face), “those who can’t do, teach.” seen as feminine reproductive labor, rather than masculine productive labor, teaching is undervalued, even at universities, where the quality of one’s pedagogy rarely makes or breaks a tenure case (especially at so-called research universities). to reclaim the kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 didactic is, therefore, a feminist project because it insists that teaching is not only valuable, but that it requires extraordinary skill, savvy, complexity, and especially style. i would, therefore, like to propose a revised definition of didactic literature: writing that by virtue of its aesthetic qualities is able to teach. this definition moves us away from the drudgery of rote learning and opens up the possibility of being moved, influenced, or re-oriented though aesthetic encounters with texts in unexpected ways. although didactic literature traditionally refers to stories that teach specific lessons in predictable ways, a feminist reimagining of this genre recognizes that the effects of reading are always situated and contextual and cannot be determined in advance. the frustrating and beautiful reality is that teaching is always unpredictable and it is difficult to account for what has been learned and how, especially using institutional metrics such as teaching evaluations or “student learning outcomes.” this does not mean that it is futile to wonder about the situated effects of the texts we read and write; on the contrary, this means that questions of learning and teaching require our time, care, and attention, rather than our scorn or our indifference. to read (and write) feminist science studies as didactic literature is to become curious about what words do, how they flow through or influence us. isabelle stengers (2008) calls the transformative power of writing efficace (efficacy), which she likens to witchcraft and other forms of magic.1 for stengers, “theories are always efficacious, they always add to the situation, even when they only aim at diagnosing it” (p. 53). reclaiming the didactic requires a “speculative commitment” (puig de la bellacasa, 2010) to asking what a text might add to the situation. this involves a different set of reading practices oriented around teaching and learning. when we read a given text in this way, we sometimes find the most efficacious passages, the most seductive passages, the most tentacular passages (hayward, 2012) are those that “seek not to explain but involve” (halberstam, 2011, p. 15, emphasis mine); passages that are speculative, allegorical, poetic, or farfetched; passages that we, as teachers, cannot help but read aloud in the classroom or that we, as writers, cannot help but cite again, and again. kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 going back into familiar texts with this set of reading practices, we are reminded that their didactic force is not always located in the explanation, information, or diagnosis it offers but in how language gets under the skin, offering new structures of feeling and perception. for example, langdon winner’s (1980) famous story about robert moses’s low bridges that kept buses from bringing low-income people of color to jones beach is the most efficacious example in his classic article “do artefacts have politics?”; however, it seems that it is also apocryphal. in 1999 an exchange between bernward joerges and steve woolgar & geoff cooper brings to light the fact that the low bridges on the long island expressway did not prevent people of color from going to jones beach and, indeed, do not currently prevent buses from traveling on the expressway (joerges, 1999a, 1999b; woolgar & cooper, 1999). given the fact that this is now common knowledge, what should we make of the fact that “do artefacts have politics?” continues to be taught in introductory science and technology studies (sts) classes (including my own)? if its most compelling passage is a fabrication, what does this article have to offer? in their response to joerges, woolgar & cooper draw our attention to the didactic force of winner’s bridges: “the power and significance of the story lies not in its referential adequacy but elsewhere—that is, in its rhetorical strategies and its pragmatic value within the field of s&ts argumentation” (1999, p. 442, emphasis mine). the value of winner’s exemplar, it seems, is not as a factual account of us history (because it isn’t), but how it models a way of paying attention to technology, infrastructure, architecture, and public space that is central to sts analysis. against the common perception of technologies as neutral or progressive, winner teaches his readers to consider the exclusions and inclusions (intentional and unintentional) in our built environments, and how material things uphold, resist, or intensify configurations of power and authority. in this almost forty-year-old article with somewhat musty academic language and a handful of now-arcane cold war military acronyms, my students reliably and enthusiastically grab ahold of winner’s racist bridges because he introduces them into a new way of seeing. kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 in this way we might read articles like “do artefacts have politics?” as fables of attention (kenney, 2013), texts that teach us to pay attention to our world in new ways. these fables initiate us into unfamiliar “arts of noticing” (tsing, 2015), draw us into alternate “economies of attention” (daston, 2004). the fable is a classic genre of didactic literature, teaching moral lessons through short, well-crafted stories. the skill of popular fabulists like aesop and jean de la fontaine lies in their ability to address, to charm, to teach, and to gather, century after century. however, despite its remarkable longevity, the fable does not immediately strike us as an appropriate genre for academic writing. talking animals and moral lessons seem opposed to the kind of “serious, adult thinking” (stengers, 2008) that counts as scholarly. it feels risky to embrace a genre that could undermine rather than strengthen one’s intellectual authority. it seems childish to make up stories to entertain, not just inform. and besides, doesn’t fabulist also mean liar? to think of feminist science studies as, among other things, didactic literature means that we will have to learn to live with these anxieties. this is difficult in the humanities and social sciences, as we often have to defend the legitimacy of our research in the face of the epistemological dominance of the stem fields. however, if we want to do scholarship that will influence our readers, i argue that we must risk the terrible schoolmarm femininity of the didactic and the childishness of the fable, dare to embrace the fickle magic of language and ask: what do our stories teach?2 fables of response-ability the fable genre, first and foremost, teaches its readers how to be responsible. for example, in jean de la fontaine’s “the cicada and the ant,” the cicada sings all summer long, neglecting to store up food for the winter; when she asks the ant to share some of hers, the cicada is rebuked. this story is addressed to its reader; it teaches us to plan for the winter ahead because our neighbor might fail to respond with generosity, and in so doing it “renders me responsible” (keenan, 1997, p. 58). in fables of kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 6 responsibility: aberrations and predicaments ethics and politics, thomas keenan highlights the role of this moral address in defining what kinds of stories fables are and how they work on their readers: “what is at stake in the fable is, more than anything else, the interpretation and practice of responsibility—our exposure to calls, others, and the names with which we are constituted and which put us into question” (p. 45). like the “cicada and the ant,” winner’s story about robert moses’s bridges is a moral tale addressed to his reader. his argument isn’t just that artifacts have politics, but that we ought to take collective responsibility for technological change. technological innovation, according to winner, requires as much scrutiny as “changes justified on political grounds” (1980, p. 135). if we don’t scrutinize new technologies, they become part of the fabric of everyday life and it becomes increasingly difficult to contest their ubiquity; those who do will be “dismissed as dreamers or fools” (p. 134). to illustrate the dangers of adopting new technology without democratic debate, winner uses the example of the mechanical tomato harvester introduced in the 1940s, one of the many technologies that ushered in the era of industrial agriculture. as a direct result of the mechanical tomato harvester, farm laborers lost their jobs, wealth became more concentrated among very large growers, and tomatoes were increasingly bred to be handled by machines—with thicker skins and less flavor (p. 126). like la fontaine, winner details the consequence of inaction: the cicada will go hungry and we will eat tomatoes that are less than tasty. in doing so, he addresses his reader, implicates us, and insists that we pay attention to the politics of new technologies; he renders us responsible. the way i see it, the key difference between feminist science studies and the broader field of sts is that writing in feminist science studies always implies this moral address.3 for feminist science studies scholars, the histories of science, technology, and medicine are inextricable from the histories of colonialism, imperialism, and warfare; scientific knowledge is part of the fabric that constitutes and transforms consequential categories like sex, gender, race, dis/ability, and sexuality. the purpose of this scholarship is not only to chronicle the historical relationships between kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 7 technoscience, power, and privilege, but in doing so, to show that these developments are socially and historically contingent, not the result of inevitable scientific progress. as s. leigh star (1991) reminds us, “it might have been otherwise” (p. 53). it could still be otherwise. and, knowing this deep in our marrow, it becomes our collective responsibility to create and sustain more livable technoscientific worlds. or perhaps responsibility is too heavy-handed, too serious, too adult a name for what feminist fables teach. maybe feminist fables aren’t so much about imparting duty or moral obligation as they are about cultivating the capacity for response. recent works in feminist science studies have proposed response-ability as a term that might whet our imaginations for more relational ethics and politics enacted in everyday practices of living in our more-than-human world (haraway, 2008, 2012; myers, 2006; schrader, 2010; hayward, 2010; barad, 2012; hustak & myers, 2012; reardon, 2013; reardon et al., 2015). the feminist ethic of response-ability focuses not on being responsible but on learning how to respond and “opening up possibilities for different kinds of responses” (schrader, 2010, p. 299). donna haraway (2008) writes about response-ability working on agility training with her australian shepherd, cayenne pepper; astrid schrader (2010) describes how scientists succeed and fail at responding to pfiesteria piscicida in toxic algae bloom research; reardon et al. (2015) discuss how cross-disciplinary pedagogical initiatives can foster more response-able research. in each of these examples, what counts as response-ability is not known in advance; it emerges within a particular context and among sometimes unlikely partners, who learn how affect and to become affected by one another (despret, 2016). thus, response-ability captures the spirit of thomas keenan’s “exposure to calls,” but also recognizes that not only humans call and not only humans respond. how we pay attention affects whether we can hear these calls and how we learn to respond (despret, 2016). in this way, fables of attention are also fables of response-ability (see also kenney, 2015). haraway insists that response-ability is not only cultivated in labs, on agility training courses, or in other multi-species encounters, but also in the kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 8 way we tell stories about these (and other) phenomena. in haraway’s recent work she foregrounds how the desire to cultivate response-ability guides her own approach to writing. for example, in her article “awash in urine,” haraway narrates personal and political histories of diethylstilbestrol (des) and premarin connecting disparate actors across geographic and historical contexts. for premarin, an estrogen medication made from the urine of pregnant mares, haraway’s history brings together: fetal calves stripped of amniotic fluid, urinating pregnant canadian women, pregnant mares and their foals and consorts in manitoba and beyond, activists in horse rescue and women’s health, economically strapped contract farmers, a california menopausal woman worried about familial heart disease in the company of a lucrative marketready crowd of other menopausal americans, and german zebras in zoos in the 1930s. (2012, p. 312) she describes this storytelling practice as “conjugating” or “yoking,” joining together what had otherwise been apart. bringing these surprising actors together, haraway tells stories where neither bodies nor chemicals like premarin are entities unto themselves but are made in and through these relations: “‘our bodies, ourselves,’ includes mares and their foals (and a few stallions)” (p. 307). since these kinds of relational stories have become so common in feminist science studies (due in large part to haraway’s influence), it can be difficult to remember that this is a deliberate narrative style, chosen for its aesthetic and political effects. haraway writes: “why tell stories like this, when there are only more and more openings and no bottom lines? because there are quite definite response-abilities that are strengthened in such stories” (p. 312). here, she draws attention to the didactic quality of feminist storytelling, specifically, how it can enable and shut down our capacities to attend and therefore also to respond “within and as part of the world” (barad, 2007, p. 37). if we understand feminist science studies scholars as fabulists committed to crafting response-able stories, we need to pay attention not only to what our stories say, but what our stories do as they move through social worlds (frank, 2010). this approach draws us toward questions of kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 9 efficace (stengers, 2008): does this story enroll? how does it sensitize us to the world? what modes of attention does it teach? who does it gather together? what response-abilities are strengthened? which are eroded? to illustrate what this proposal might look like, i read recent writing in feminist science studies as fables of response-ability, amplifying their didactic registers and paying attention to moments that are more speculative, poetic, and personal, moments where they loosen their grip on reality and take us somewhere else. in what follows, i will read work by natasha myers, mel chen, eva hayward, and their collaborators not only as explanatory but as involutationary (hustak & myers, 2012)—stories that involve their readers, sensitizing our bodies, imaginations, and sensoria to more-than-human worlds. like haraway, these authors tell relational stories about chemical ecologies, where species, bodies, and environments shape one another through absorption, ingestion, respiration, and sensation. these articles offer important insights about how we are constituted in and through “chemical kinships” (murphy, 2016). however, to read them only on the level of their ontological claims (i.e., that the world is relational) would miss how they teach us to pay attention to the calls of others and render us response-able. by reading these authors together, i hope to both acknowledge the didactic work that feminist science studies texts are already doing and encourage others to experiment with telling their own fables of response-ability. chemical ecologies recent literature in feminist science studies is rich with stories about how we are constituted by and in relation to (sometimes toxic) chemicals (e.g., murphy, 2008; hayward, 2010; chen, 2011; haraway, 2012; hustak & myers, 2012; murphy 2013; agard-jones, 2014; davis, 2015; shotwell, 2016). drawing on the environmental justice movement, disability studies, queer theory, and indigenous studies, this literature offers narrative resources that help us account for uneven geographies of exposure that enable certain forms of life and disable others (murphy, 2016). for example, kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 10 we see how us and us-backed military operations have lasting chemical legacies that continue long after the wars are over; agent orange in the vietnam war (gammeltoft, 2014), depleted uranium in the gulf war (nixon, 2011), and glyphosate (roundup) in the us–colombia war on drugs (lyons, 2016)—none of which are officially considered “chemical weapons”—have transgenerationally altered human and non-human life in vietnam, iraq, kuwait, colombia, and elsewhere. this literature models how to pay attention simultaneously to the spatial, temporal, material, and political dimensions of living in a “permanently polluted world” (liboiron, 2016, p. 104). as michelle murphy (2008) explains, “molecular relations…not only move spatially across the earth on currents and winds, and not only spread transnationally through the proliferation and redistribution of industrial processes in global capital, but also are part of transnational conjunctures of militarism, activism, research, citizenship, and dispossession” (p. 701). accounting for the ways of living and dying made possible by pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, plastics, and pesticides is necessary political work. yet, despite the fact that our relations with these chemicals are ubiquitous, banal, and everyday, we can easily become desensitized to their effects on our own bodies and the bodies of others who are differently located in cycles of production, consumption, and waste. as we participate in consumer capitalism, it is difficult to attend to the many ways in which we are implicated and imbricated in ongoing chemical violence, both spectacular and everyday, especially violence that seems “far away.”4 as heather swanson (2017) writes in “the banality of the anthropocene”: we are all entangled with the everyday violences of industrial agriculture and [other] nationalist projects in a way that…shopping at whole foods won’t solve…how is it that americans, especially white middle-class ones, learn not to notice such entanglements, to not be affected? how do we learn not to see the damage around us? disaffection, it seems, is central to the perpetuation of business-as-usual in late industrialism (fortun, 2012). in this context, feminist literature on chemical ecologies is didactic; by teaching their readers to become affected kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 11 by relations we have learned to ignore, these authors “makes relations sensible” (murphy, 2016) and create occasions for different kinds of response. as liboiron, tironi, and calvillo (2018) argue: “a permanently polluted world is one that, because of its deep alteration, reclaims the need to incite new forms of response-ability” (p. 332). although “fables of response-ability” is intended as a capacious category that can encompass diverse matters of care in feminist science studies, the literature on chemical ecologies illustrates why it is vital to attend to the affective force of our writing. evidence of environmental injustice is available at our fingertips; but evidence alone is not enough to transform the structures of feeling and perception that authorize environmental violence. it is important not only to know, but also to feel how boundaries between people and their ecologies are “permeable, silted, breathing, and relational” (voyles, 2015, p. 218). fables of response-ability, therefore, might not always be true stories, but useful fictions that open up possibilities for inhabiting ecologies otherwise. since living well in an unjust world requires a range of complex and contradictory feelings, it is crucial that these stories not only focus on damage, illness, and violence (tuck, 2009), but also the kinds of pleasures and possibilities of chemical kinship. to illustrate how attention to chemical ecologies can also encourage joyful curiosity, i turn first to carla hustak and natasha myers’s (2012) “involutionary momentum: affective ecologies and the sciences of plant/insect encounters”—an article that offers poetic and theoretically rich descriptions of the chemical chatter between plants and insects. by telling stories that take the lives of plants seriously, hustak and myers sensitize us to the pull of forces we have been taught to ignore, and open the question of ecological response-ability. involutionary momentum: darwin’s body experiments hustak and myers’s article “involutionary momentum” offers a feminist account of the relations among insects, plants, and the people who study them. the article engages with findings in chemical ecology, a field that “is kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 12 devoted to promoting an ecological understanding of the origin, function, and significance of natural chemicals that mediate interactions within and between organisms” (journal of chemical ecology, n.d.). while on the one hand, the work of chemical ecologists teaches us about the fascinating chemical communication between species via pheromones and other chemical signals, they often employ neo-darwinian language that emphasizes individualism, competition, and efficiency to the exclusion of all other ways of understanding these relations. the encounters between ophrys orchids and male bees, for example, are narrated as trickery and “sexual deception” (p. 75) because ophrys mimics the sex pheromones of their insect pollinators, luring them to participate in their pollination without offering nectar as a “reward.” these metaphors not only naturalize neoliberal, capitalist, and military values, but, as hustak and myers demonstrate, they constrict our collective imaginations and shut down our ability to recognize and respond to agencies other than our own. neodarwinian accounts give us mechanistic “ecologies, populated by blind, reactive automatons” (p. 79). in “stultify[ing] both orchid and insect agency” (p. 79), the standard narratives are not able to “admit pleasure, play, or improvisation within or among species” (p. 77). hustak and myers devote relatively little space to critiquing dominant accounts; instead, they begin to spin a different set of tales. in their article, they counter neo-darwinian storytelling with involutionary storytelling, offering vivid accounts of how organisms become involved with one another’s lives. their descriptions of orchid and insect encounters are sensuous, sensual, and, depending on your interspecies proclivities, downright sexy. these are seductive narratives where “mimetic relations among plants and animals take shape in the thickness of the space between bodies, where affects and sensations are transduced through excitable tissues” (p. 78). we learn about how the specialized anatomy and volatile chemicals released by the ophrys orchids “entice male bees to ‘indulge’ in the pleasures of pseudocopulation” (p. 78) and how tobacco plants “synthesize and release a concentrated plume of volatile chemicals” to attract carnivorous insects to sup on the tobacco’s herbivorous predators kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 13 (p. 99). hustak and myers’s writing style goes beyond thick description; they weave a poetics of encounter that invites the reader to indulge her imagination in these remarkable scenes of ingestion and pollination. these interspecies encounters are taken from the field of chemical ecology (as well as charles darwin’s writing on orchids), but do not mirror their stories back—they are positioned “athwart” (p. 77). hustak and myers read chemical ecologists as if they were involutionists (p. 101), grabbing ahold of radical claims of plant communication, savoring the most savory speculations (e.g., talking trees!) before they are retracted by their authors in favor of more conservative narratives (e.g., trees that “eavesdrop” to enhance their own fitness). they skip over the functionalism in darwin to identify and amplify more muted stories of “affinities, attractions, and intimacies” (p. 79). they glean suggestive phrases from biological texts and involve them in other stories—stories of affective ecologies, intimate encounters, and articulate orchids. here they use darwin’s own words to sensuously describe his scientific practice: [darwin] took special note of each species’ labellum, that special petal that extends out of the flower like a platform and “affords” both an “excellent landing-space” (98) and a “good standing place” (57) for the insect. in one species, he showed how its “two prominent ridges, sloping down the middle” acted as a “guide” to lure the insect towards the nectary. the insect’s “flexible body” would allow it to reach the nectary and contact the pollinia (25)…he wanted to understand how the labellum “induced” an insect “to alight” (77). to do so, he noted the pleasures of taste that might attract the insect. in one case he noted, the labellum secreted enticing drops of nectar at a distance from “the true nectary” (77). (p. 86) here, hustak and myers practice a kind of involutionary poaching, hunting for precious empirical details from the game preserves of respectable scientific history (de certeau, 1984). they invite us to share in the secreted bounty, beckoning their readers with meaty latinate words like “pullulate” and “loquacious” (p. 79). kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 14 while all of these stories are didactic and open up different ways to understand orchids, insects, and scientific practice, i want to draw attention to one specific moment in the article where the authors move more fully into the genre historical fiction, igniting new imaginings for what it could mean to do evolutionary biology. hustak and myers’s telling of darwin’s intimate encounters with orchids offers a useful reminder not to overlook the affective force of speculative, poetic, or fictional stories as we learn to attend and respond within our more-than-human world. to be sure, these vignettes are, in part, grounded in darwin’s own papers. darwin documented many of the curious methods by which he studied orchids, for example, probing the flowers to discover what kind of stimulation would persuade each species to eject its pollenium (pp. 86-90). alongside lush retellings of these practices, hustak and myers engage in a kind of speculative ethnography, imagining how darwin involved his own body in his experiments. they discuss a passage where he translates the position of catasetum antennae to human anatomy, describing the differences between species by invoking a man holding his arms at different angles. hustak and myers read this not as an anthropocentric metaphor, but as possible evidence that darwin was conducting “body experiments” (p. 93), bending his arms into the shape of the catasetum antennae. this reading is animated by myers’s anthropological work, which details the experiments performed by protein crystallographers when they move their bodies into the shape of proteins (2006; 2015) and phd scientists who dance their dissertations (2012). reading this moment as a “speculative fabulation”—a fable—rather than as realist history of science helps us pay closer attention to how this article teaches (haraway, 2016). even if darwin never performed these kinds of body experiments, this story is didactic.5 it teaches us to pay attention to the bodies of scientists and how they become animated by their curiosity. here hustak and myers open up a space of possibility within a history we thought we already knew, offering a vision of biology as the pursuit of passionate, embodied inquiry. the purpose of telling this story is not to advocate that we reproduce darwin’s experiments with orchids—his practices, they point out, were often as violent as they were tender—but to kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 15 show that there are other ways of knowing than the disembodied and disinterested version of scientific objectivity that we see in more official histories of evolutionary biology. in myers’s (2017) most recent project, becoming sensor, she takes up her own provocation, developing new forms of passionate, embodied inquiry. in becoming sensor, myers seeks to cultivate feminist, queer, decolonial modes of attention to the ecologies within the ancient oak savannah in toronto’s high park. in the oak savannah, she “experiment[s] with sensory practices that can document the growth, decay, combustion and decomposition that are essential to the life of this remarkable land” (“becoming sensor,” n.d.). myers and her collaborators attune their bodies and instruments to the land, producing sound, images, movements, and knowledge different from those of the restoration ecologists with whom they share the park. whereas restoration ecologists control invasive species, prescribe burns, and manage wildlife, natasha myers and ayelen liberona—both trained dancers—take long-exposure photographs while they move their bodies in response to the plant life: “it is by hitching a ride on the growth movements of trees and plants, letting their slow movements lure our bodies, that our kinesthetic images blur the distinction between animator and animated. letting the wild arc lines of tree limbs set our bodies and cameras in motion, we experiment with ways to intra-animate with the trees” (myers, 2017). they imagine becoming sensor, speculatively, as a hundred-year project—because it is not clear in advance what it will take to undo ecological thinking and doing that is "indebted to capitalist and colonial logics” and find new ways to inhabit the oak savannah (“becoming sensor,” n.d.). this is a risky project, i think, because it takes seriously the sentience of landscapes and approaches epistemological/political questions with humility; the question “how to relate?” is “insistent but not easily answerable” (atkinson-graham, kenney, ladd, murray, & simmonds, 2015). in this context, imagining darwin, alone in his study, bending his arms into the shapes he learned from a flower, might give a certain kind of permission to sustain uncertain inquiry, even if it is ultimately historical fiction. kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 16 and this, to me, is the moral of the story—that we need to take epistemological and narrative risks if we want to interrupt the neo-darwinian status quo in evolutionary biology. why does it seem so natural to have militarized orchids, but so absurd to suggest, as joan roughgarden (2009) does, that friendships might be important for the evolution of some animal species? if we cannot imagine life outside of the “calculating, functionalist logic” (hustak & myers, 2012, p. 76) of neo-darwinism, it is impossible to feel or to know the biological world any differently. by telling stories of affective ecologies “shaped by pleasure, play, and experimental propositions” (p. 78), hustak and myers activate new questions about the beings and doings of plants and insects. and with these questions comes the matter of response-ability: what is at stake in this involutionary approach is a theory of ecological relationality that takes seriously organisms’ practices, their inventions, and experiments crafting interspecies lives and worlds. this is an ecology inspired by a feminist ethic of “responseability” in which questions of species difference are always conjugated with attentions to affect, entanglement, and rupture; an affective ecology in which creativity and curiosity characterize the experimental forms of life of all kinds of practitioners, not only the humans. and it is this mode of ecological thinking that we believe we will need in order to do more effective work in challenging the status quo of ecological irresponsibility. (p. 106) although hustak and myers do not explicitly invoke anthropogenic environmental destruction in this article, it is unmistakably the context out of which they are writing. however, rather than focusing on damage caused by disaffection, the stories they tell are explicitly crafted to move their readers to attend to our shared world differently. hustak and myers ask us to take the most radical claim of chemical ecology seriously—“the air hangs heavy with significance” (p. 105)—and ask how we can further attune our senses, our bodies, and our instruments to the ways that “plants articulate their experience and desires in an aromatic atmospherics of volatile chemicals” (p. 100). even, and especially, in an historical moment of kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 17 accelerating environmental violence, hustak and myers show the importance of “crafting our stories with attentive, wondering care” (bynum, 1997, p. 25). toxic animacies: mel chen’s couch in their article “toxic animacies, inanimate affections,” mel chen (2011) teaches us how to attend to and respond within twenty-first-century chemical ecologies that enable and disable unevenly. chen is interested in toxicity both as figure and as lived experience. living with the ongoing legacies of industrialism, we risk ingesting, inhaling, and absorbing toxic substances and becoming with chemicals that do not promote uncomplicated survival. however, chen challenges us to restrain knee-jerk panic about toxic exposure and learn to dwell inside the toxic relations of late industrialism. in this article, they develop toxicity into a figure of queer relationality and tell stories of the intersubjectivies and interobjectivies enabled through toxic bonds. chen begins by analyzing media coverage of the 2007 us panic about lead paint in children’s toys imported from china. chen is interested in the two principle figures in the news stories: “the vulnerable child, most frequently a young, white, middle class boy, and a dangerous painted toy, thomas the tank engine” (p. 268). these media representations, chen argues, rely heavily on the discourses of the war on terror. they present secure boarders as the automatic response to biological vulnerability. consumer safety is figured as a matter of “homeland security.” the invasive toxic threat is not only racialized as “chinese,” but also evinces a nasty strain of us exceptionalism. the problem is not that lead paint exists, but that it has invaded our territory and put us at risk: “these environmental toxins were supposed to be ‘there,’ but were found ‘here’” (p. 267). “we” (interpellated by the news stories as the parents of the threatened child) are entitled to be free of the toxic consequences of global industrialization, especially in the safety of our own homes. the risk of the lead paint to the kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 18 chinese workers making the toys falls outside the political frame altogether; transnational environmental justice questions are foreclosed. similar to hustak and myers, though, “toxic animacies” does not continue in the genre of critique. instead of focusing on xenophobic anxiety around national borders, chen homes in on the queer love story between the little boy and his toy train. chen notices that this scene of danger—boy with train in mouth—is conspicuously absent from the media representations. the locus of toxic permeability is displaced onto the national border in the form of demands for “quality control” of imported products; to show the boy licking the phallic train is simply “too much” (p. 271), a site of contamination too emotionally, politically, and sexually charged to represent directly. chen argues that this displacement gives rise to the fantasy of absolute impermeability, as if a more secure boarder could prevent the act of “queer licking” (p. 271) itself: “it is not only a fantasy that not-licking is a viable way to contain heterosexuality within its bounds, but it is also a fantasy that not-licking is a viable way to contain the interconstitution of people and other people, or people and other objects” (p. 275). when we contain toxic threats within the discourses of homeland security, we miss how bodies are constituted with toxins within the specific histories and geographies of transnational industrialization. instead, we pour economical and emotional resources into creating zones of exception, further protecting already protected life (p. 272) and refusing responsibility for exposures that fall outside of our protection. when i teach “toxic animacies,” this discussion of queer licking is one of the two places in the text that students immediately want to discuss. they are simultaneously titillated and horrified by the suggestion that a boy with thomas the tank engine in his mouth constitutes a queer threat to norms of sexuality and healthy embodiment. the admixture of queerness, toxicity, and the sexuality of children makes everyone squirm; it is difficult to know how to respond. surely we do not actually want to encourage queer love between little boys and poisonous toys? this discomfort, i suggest to my students, might be the point. what i think this story teaches is a particular habit of critical thinking, the habit of generating narratives that run kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 19 counter to dominant stories to get us unstuck from the morass of conventional thinking and to see where they take us. not all counternarratives will generate new forms of response-ability. however, as hustak and myers demonstrate, it is incredibly difficult to think outside of neoliberal, capitalist, and military logics; therefore, in our writing and in our classrooms we must cultivate the art of hitching a ride on a counter-narrative, even, and perhaps, especially at the risk of feeling foolish. what if we begin with what is disavowed in the xenophobic media accounts of lead poisoning and performed a queer reading of the phobic scene: the potentially toxic encounter between a child and his painted toy. i encourage my students to sit with their discomfort and take seriously chen’s argument about the unavoidable interconstitution of bodies and chemicals; however, i do also find that this story of queer licking is ultimately a dead end. although it helps us move away from the fantasy of impermeability, it doesn’t offer a way to respond to the problem differently. this is why, i believe, chen switches narrative track, introducing stories of their personal experiences with the “peculiar intimacies and alienations” (p. 265) of multiple chemical sensitivity induced by chronic mercury poisoning. in the second half of the article, chen describes the everyday practices of wearing breathing masks in public places and the pain, overstimulation, and exhaustion of toxic attacks brought on by inhaling the wrong chemical (perfumes, gasoline, cleaning agents, cigarette smoke). the story of one of these periods of toxic exhaustion is the second place in the text that students gravitate towards. specifically, the moment when chen describes how they remembered being embraced by their lover, when in fact it was the couch’s embrace that had comforted them (p. 277). chen narrates this misrecognition not as a failure, but instead asks after the “inanimate affections” that transpired between their injured body and the supple form of the couch. chen describes this relationship as one of “interobjectivity” since it “is made possible only to the degree that i am not in possession of human sociality” (p. 280). chen’s first-person accounts of living with multiple chemical sensitivity opens up different political and affective responses to living in a kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 20 toxic world. against fantasies of impermeability and their attendant biosecuritization regimes, chen draws our attention to the fact that many already experience the disabling effects of capitalist cycles of production, consumption, and waste. and, as chen argues, these experiences are not only negative; it is also important to take seriously “the desires, the loves, the rehabilitations, the affections…that toxic conditions induce” (p. 281). telling these personal stories about the queer relationality of multiple chemical sensitivity in an academic article, chen performs an autobiographical vulnerability that—even in the genre of queer theory, which recognizes the political value of the personal and intimate— nevertheless risks embarrassment, impropriety, and illegibility. it risks illegibility precisely in the places where the story matters most; each time i read “toxic animacies,” i find myself struggling to grasp the significance of this encounter between chen and the couch. this, perhaps, should not be surprising, since, as elizabeth povinelli (2016) points out, the distinction between life and nonlife is central to western thought. it is, therefore, likely that we will fail to connect with a story that attempts to push against the opposition between the animate and the inanimate that structures conventional storytelling. but by coming back to this encounter twice in the article (pp. 277-278, pp. 280-281) and again in the final paragraph of animacies (2012, p. 237), chen challenges their reader to pay close attention to the story despite (or even because of) its ambiguity. although chen has “no ready answers” (p. 281) about what lesson we ought to take away, this leaves the reader with the challenge of how to respond. it renders me response-able. like hustak and myers, chen shows us that “the air hangs heavy with significance” (hustak & myers, 2012, p. 105), carrying molecules that can trigger toxic reactions in their encounters with sensitive tissues. and although what we breathe in may harm us, the question should not be how to secure our borders, but “which bodies can bear the fiction of independence and of uninterruptability” (chen, 2011, p. 274) and which cannot. “toxic animacies” gives us different stories, different channels, different registers to orient ourselves around the challenge of how to “think kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 21 more broadly about synthesis and symbiosis, including toxic vapors, interspersals, intrinsic mixings, and alterations, favoring inter-absorption over corporeal exceptionalism” (p. 272). these are pragmatic questions that require action (e.g., industrial regulation), but also the ability to sit with and think from experiences of susceptibility, porousness, receptivity, and vulnerability (2012, p. 237). and rather than carve out zones of exception like in the anxious media accounts, learn to tell stories that strengthen care, resilience, and repair within our sometimes toxic chemical ecologies. telling stories about toxic bonds allows us to map geopolitical and environmental interconnectedness and disparity, helping us to see harm but also the relations made possible in contaminated places. the point here is not to celebrate relationality and chemical agency as such (we see how deadly these can be), but to better account for the ways that we become with damaged environments and “blasted landscapes” (tsing, 2015, p. 282). carnal light: ragoût alba à la provençale fables of response-ability, as we have seen, are often born out of anger at the casual violence of dominant narratives. eva hayward’s (2011) article, “when fish and frogs change gender,” like chen’s, takes hyperbolic media panic as its starting point. hayward is troubled by the proliferation of articles with sensationalistic headlines that link pollution with the changes in the sex organs of animals, such as “female fish develop ‘testes’ in gulf dead zone” and “sex-changing chemicals found in potomac river” (see also kier, 2010; di chiro, 2010; murphy, 2013; ah-king & hayward, 2014; shotwell, 2016). in these articles, hayward finds pervasive anxiety about contaminated categories in the place of a real ability to grapple with the changing chemical ecologies of our industrial waterways. like chen, she is looking for strategies to account for uneven vulnerability without recourse to purity discourses: i wonder how we can address the impacts of toxic substances on vulnerable people and animals without appealing to society's basest fears about sexual disruption. can we foster environmental kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 22 responsibility without invoking anxiety that our most intimate reproductive environments have been infiltrated by an industrial world? (2011) hayward sets out on a project of narrative remediation, to re-story these contaminated landscapes in ways that allow us to respond differently. i use narrative remediation here to name both a desire to remedy harm done by dominant stories and to re-mediate, to stage our “matters of care” differently (puig de la bellacasa, 2010). following bailey kier, hayward (2011) notes that life goes on for the bass in the polluted potomac: “male bass…produce eggs that can be fertilized by their former gender mates.” chemically induced sex change, then, might be narrated as “an adaptive response” rather than “an alteration of the ‘natural order’ of things” (2011). hayward’s work is characterized by an attention to bodies and species as creative responses to their environments (2010, p. 245). “our bodies,” she writes, are “open to the planet” (2011). therefore, rather than telling lurid stories that traffic in fantasies of corporeal purity and biosecuritization, we must create “concepts of life and embodiment adequate” to the ways in which life—including human life—has already been altered by industrial chemicals (murphy, 2016, 2017). there are up to eight hundred chemicals used in everyday consumer products that are known or suspected endocrine disruptors (liboiron, 2016, p. 99); “every human and animal body tested in the past decade contains chemicals that leach from plastics” (p. 89). we, therefore, need to be able to account for the effects of endocrine-disrupting chemicals on human and animal bodies, acknowledging harm without pathologizing those affected. as alison kafer (2013) argues: “what is needed then are analyses that recognize and refuse the intertwined exploitation of bodies and environments without demonizing illnesses and disabilities, and especially the ill and disabled bodies that result from such exploitation” (p. 158). although sex changes, illness, and disability should not be conflated, recent work in queer/trans theory and disability studies highlights the shared importance of critiquing eco-normative discourses (di chiro, 2010), reframing those affected by pollution as “queer survivors” (murphy, 2013) rather than “tragic mistakes kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 23 caused by unnatural incursions or disruptions of the natural body and environment” (kafer, 2013, pp. 157-158). hayward asks: “is there a way to re-evaluate ecological resilience—such as the sex-changing response— and meet the future organisms that we are becoming?” (2011). the point is not to romanticize pollution or accept environmental violence, but to ask who we are and who we become in relation to industrial chemicals. hayward continues her project of narrative remediation with evolutionary biologist malin ah-king in their article “toxic sexes: perverting pollution and queering hormone disruption” (2014). drawing on ah-king and nylin’s (2010) concept of “reactive sex,” they discuss how environmental sex change and environmental sex determination are a normal part of the life course for many animals. the peer-reviewed literature is replete with species of fish, amphibians, and reptiles that demonstrate remarkable phenotypic plasticity with respect to sexual morphology and behavior. in crocodiles, for example, embryos with the same genotype can become either male or female hatchlings, depending upon on the temperature during incubation (ah-king & nylin, 2010, p. 235). in one species of clownfish, all individuals are born male, but can then develop into females later in life depending upon the social environment (p. 241). although sex determination in mammals and birds is more stable and more strongly influenced by genes, ah-king and hayward (2014) argue that sex in all species is “better understood as a responsive potential, changing over an individual's lifetime, in interaction with environmental factors, as well as over evolutionary time” (p. 6). shifting the definition of sex from fixed trait to a potential or capacity for response allows ah-king and hayward to provide an alternate accounting of the effects of endocrine disruptors on human and non-human bodies: sex potential is just that, an opening out, responsiveness that is ontologically more dynamic than static. while some organisms have a narrow regular range of sex possibilities—their potential is more delimited—the effects of endocrine disruption provide a reworking of even these limits. in other words, while some species of fish more kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 24 easily shift from female to male as an environmental response to pollution, others, such as polar bears, shift with more trouble. and yet, hormonal disruption assures changes across borders of sexes. (p. 6) if sex is a potential that responds to environmental stimuli, endocrine disruptors may already be involved with (sexual) development processes in many species—though their effects differ depending upon species and the specificities of exposure. this allows for a different understanding of animals who change sex in response to pollution. rather than evidencing unnatural incursion, these examples illustrate that sex has always been responsive to environments, which now include toxic chemicals. told this way, these are no longer scandalous stories, but mundane facts of life in late industrialism. “neither utopic nor dystopic,” they write, “toxic sex opens the realization that bodies are lively and rejoinders to environments and changing ecosystems, even when those same engines of change provide exposure to carcinogens, neurotoxins, asthmagens and mutagens” (pp. 89). although it is important to work to prevent toxic exposure and combat environmental injustice, hayward insists that we must also be able to account for life already altered and tell stories about the future organisms we are becoming. these stories are not innocent and their politics are not always comfortable; they are risky reworkings of contemporary ecological imaginaries. especially when i teach these articles, i am cognizant that hayward’s accounts of toxic sex risk romanticizing chemical exposure, risk associating queer and trans people with chemical pollution and animality, risk naturalizing environmental violence, risk replacing genetic determinism with environmental determinism, risks reinforcing the norms that underpin neo-darwinian concepts of adaptation (see kenney & müller, 2017). however, as i have emphasized in my analysis of myers and chen, political and epistemic discomfort are a necessary part of learning to tell more response-able stories. the most comfortable stories are those we are already accustomed to hearing; discomfort can clue us into consequential shifts in the narratives that orient us in the world (see also schrader, 2015). kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 25 hayward teaches us that “human sex is responsive rather than recalcitrant” (ah-king & hayward, 2014, p. 7) and that our bodies respond to our environments in spite of fantasies of purity and containment. while her work with ah-king makes biological claims that should be taken seriously not only by feminists but by evolutionary biologists, hayward’s writing might best be understood as offering imaginative propositions about what it might mean to be embodied. her wider body of work explores the dynamic relations between bodies and environments in poetic, autobiographical, theoretical registers (2010), through readings of songs (2008), films (2005), artworks (2010), and aquarium exhibitions (2012). these readings work as much through aesthetics as biology, providing different imaginative pathways into questions of response and responseability, becoming and unbecoming, in an era when life’s limits are being profoundly reworked (cooper, 2008). to emphasize the more speculative strain in hayward’s thought, i conclude by turning to an article about marvelous becoming and ethical response. in “carnal light” (2013), lindsay kelley and eva hayward do art criticism as speculative fantasy asking what it would be like to eat alba, the subject of eduardo kac’s infamous bio-artwork gfp bunny (2009). alba was a white rabbit who was genetically engineered to carry the green fluorescent protein (gfp) gene from a jellyfish, so that she would glow fluorescent green under blue light. kac had intended to take alba home as a pet, but she was ultimately unable to leave the laboratory at the institut national de la recherche agronomique in france where she was born for fear of environmental contamination. kelley and hayward found that the critical art ensemble (cae) had written a recipe for ragoût alba à la provençale, inspired by the notion that if alba could not leave the lab alive to become a pet, she might be able to leave as meat. kelley and hayward take the recipe as an occasion to theorize the recombinant sensuality induced by ingesting this unfamiliar protein: with cae’s recipe we can imagine that glowing food intensifies vision through tactile registers; the verb “to taste” is conjugated through sight. glowing at the edges of the mouth, ragoût alba à la kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 26 provençale cannot be digested without visual recourse. for homo sapiens consuming this entree, the mouth is solicited by light, undoing the eye’s propriety of vision. although for alba this is an unbecoming, a transformation from companion to meal, for the humans involved, vision is reworked by orality…and jellyfish biomaterialities are sent further adrift. (p. 123) in this article we are invited to join the authors in an involutionary daydream about eating a genetically engineered rabbit. as our bodies adapt to consuming gfp bunnies, they speculate, our tongues might respond by “growing light receptors in our taste buds” (p. 124). if, as kelley and hayward contend, “ontology is about what there is and what debts we owe to it” (p. 116), fables of response-ability might give us a way of imagining how to respond to these ontological obligations, which includes questions of how we are already responding and what responsive capacities (real and fantastic) we might yet acquire. returning to hayward’s work on toxic sex, we see how she composes a world where inter-animacies are not only about corporeal vulnerability but also about resilience and creative response even in the most polluted waters. as ah-king and hayward remind us: “nonhumans and humans are vulnerable, but also exuberant, adaptable, resilient and constantly changing in interaction with environments” (p. 9). these stories of darwin’s body experiments, chen’s couch, and the bass in the potomac are fables of response-ability, stories that teach us how to pay attention to the lively agencies around, within, and among us, such that we become more responsive creatures, able to relate within more-thanhuman ecologies and meet the future organisms that we are becoming. like kelley and hayward’s homo luxivorus, a being whose tissues and appetites are attuning to her radiant meals, the reader of these fables might also find herself generating new sensitivities, caught up in unfamiliar economies of attention, moving differently through worlds. as hustak and myers (2012) put it: “the world is full of ‘propositions’ waiting to be registered by interested bodies. those who invest their energies in attuning themselves to others can learn over time to discriminate increasingly subtle differences in one kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 27 another’s utterances” (p. 105). at its best, feminist science studies can sensitize us to the calls of others, through didactic storytelling where narrative and sensorium remake one another. the question becomes: how can we cultivate these kinds of response-able writing practices in the face of prevailing academic conventions that do not always promote artful or efficacious storytelling? conclusion: a fable for tomorrow rachel carson’s (1962/2002) silent spring famously begins with a fable. she imagines a near future when life in an idyllic american town is slowly poisoned by synthetic pesticides. humans, farm animals, plants, and wild animals like birds, fish, and bees, all become sick and many die, leaving the previously abundant landscape lifeless and bereft of birdsong. this first chapter of silent spring, titled “a fable for tomorrow,” has become iconic in environmental writing, inspiring decades of environmentalists to write their own eco-apocalyptic stories that illustrate the world-destroying power of industrial capitalism. however, it seems that we may learned the wrong lesson from carson. teaching silent spring in 2019, what feels most significant to me isn’t its dystopian vision but how, like the authors discussed above, carson’s writing “makes relations sensible.” ddt is not a pesticide, she argues, because it is impossible to target pests without harming all life; pesticides are really biocides. “a fable for tomorrow” is a charismatic story, a work of speculative fiction that begins the non-fiction book that is widely credited with ushering in a new environmental consciousness in the united states and, importantly, the creation of the united states environmental protection agency in 1970. silent spring, from all historical accounts, was powerfully didactic; it made us see our bodies not as citadels, but as porous, vulnerable to toxic chemicals, and always in relation with our environment. in the twenty-first century, as industrial chemicals accumulate and unevenly participate in specific forms of living and dying, we will need more kinds of stories (not fewer) to teach us how to respond to our changing chemical ecologies. the greatest challenge in teaching transnational kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 28 environmental justice, i have found, is to make the relations between consumption in our own lives and environment justice issues “elsewhere” present, palpable, unbearably alive. beyond the warm glow of “awareness” and sharp sting of guilt, we need to nurture alternative “affective economies” (ahmed, 2004), where regulating or abolishing corporate emissions, tailings, and other “externalites” feels fundamental and urgent—and not only for those whose bodies and lands are directly affected. more than fifty years after silent spring, michelle murphy (2017), alongside others in anthropology and the environmental humanities (e.g., robin & rose, 2004; shapiro & kirksey, 2017; van dooren & rose, 2016), struggles to tell stories that will make relations sensible: i am looking for words, protocols, and methods that might honor the inseparability of bodies and land, and at the same time grapple with the expansive chemical relations of settler colonialism that entangle life forms in each other’s accumulations, conditions, possibilities, and miseries. we need to continue asking what kinds of stories, academic or otherwise, can help us account for everyday environmental violence in ways that engender meaningful, collective response in many forms: as policy, as activism, as pedagogy, as care, as knowledge-making, and as the intimate practices of everyday life. although feminist science studies has been a field that has consistently challenged dominant technoscientific storytelling (e.g. hubbard, 1979; haraway, 1989; martin, 1991), the conventions of academic writing discourage us from asking which genres, styles, and forms might cultivate the capacity for response. even mel chen expresses reticence at departing from academic conventions by including personal stories in a peer-reviewed article: “as academics are often trained to avoid writing in anything resembling a confessional mode,” they write, “such a turn is fraught with ambivalence” (2011, p. 273). however, as i argue above, chen’s accounts of living with multiple chemical sensitivity are some of the most efficacious passages in “toxic animacies.” my students often express confusion about why a scholar is writing about a particular topic or making kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 29 a particular argument; autobiographical writing can be a powerful way to situate your knowledge and draw new readers into your matters of care. my point is not that we should all write autobiographically. rather, in order to influence our readers (which can include our students), scholars will need to tell stories that defy academic conventions and risk being seen as too personal, too speculative, didactic, or sentimental, too kitschy, too ambiguous, angry, sad, or beautiful, too naïve or unsophisticated, not serious, or “just” poetry. i offer the term fables of response-ability not to suggest that everyone drop what they are doing and write fables, but as an incitement to proliferate different kinds of reading and writing in feminist science studies.6 for example, it gives us license to play with the relational properties of language—its viscosities, conductivities, velocities, to experiment with “the arts of mediation that would incite absorption, attunement, and excitement” (berlant, 2013), and ask what our stories do, who they enroll, and how they circulate in our communities, our classrooms, and beyond. what counts as a responsible story and what stories enable responsiveness cannot be known in advance; storytelling is a pragmatic art and, therefore, requires us to try different approaches and, as i have argued, risk failure, illegibility, and being thought foolish. some fables of response-ability will be empirical, others imaginative; some haunting and poetic, others no-nonsense practical; some energetic, full of brilliant paradigm-shifting neologisms, others plain spoken and heartfelt. different kinds of stories engender different ways of attending, responding, and relating. when we read feminist science studies scholarship as didactic literature, we understand ourselves not just as researchers but as participant storytellers who influence worlds in mostly mundane, but sometimes extraordinary ways (kenney, 2015). silent spring, for example, created the conditions whereby regulating chemicals based on “unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment” became thinkable in the united states. most books, obviously, will not have the worldchanging power of silent spring. but, as we have become inured to the never-ending news of oncoming apocalypses, environmental or otherwise, kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 30 we will need stories that make us feel again, wake up our senses to our more-than-human-world and teach us how to respond anew. despite our aversion to didacticism, in a certain sense, teaching is all we have. acknowledgements i am grateful to donna haraway, karen barad, jenny reardon, ruth müller, jesse goldstein and the participants of the “we are compost not posthuman workshop” at the university of cologne (2018) for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. thanks also to the editors at catalyst and the two anonymous reviewers for helping me to clarify my arguments and position myself more carefully. notes 1 in this article, i am working with isabelle stengers’s efficace, rather than the more common science and technology studies concept of “performativity.” karen barad’s notion of “posthumanist performativity” was explicitly designed to contest the “excessive power granted to language to determine what is real” (2003, p. 802). in “experimenting with refrains,” stengers (2008), on the other hand, uses efficace explicitly to call attention to the transformative power of words and theories—their liveliness, their animacy, their magic. 2 there are, of course, many indigenous storytelling traditions, where stories simultaneously teach, entertain, impart knowledge, and nourish relations between humans and non-humans ( see e.g., kimmerer, 2013; simpson, 2014; nelson, 2017). in conversation with indigenous scholars working within these traditions, i am interested in contributing to an academic vocabulary that values the arts of storytelling and what stories have to teach us. however, to avoid appropriating indigenous cultures, i work within the european fable tradition and attempt to breathe some life back into the genre of didactic literature. 3 key moral questions at the center of feminist science studies literature include: “whose science, whose knowledge?” (harding, 1991), “what counts as nature, for whom, and at what cost?” (haraway, 1997), and “cui bono?” (star, 1991). haraway, in particular, emphasizes the nonkenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 31 innocence of all knowledge-making practices, including those of feminist science studies. in “situated knowledges” (1991), she famously asks, “with whose blood were my eyes crafted?” (p. 192), drawing attention to the ways that our technologies and techniques of vision implicate us in systems of power and privilege. 4 teaching my gender, health, and the environment class i continue to butt up against the widespread belief that pollution always happens “elsewhere”—be it the global south, the american south, south of the border, the desert, the far north, or even just across the san francisco bay. while it is important to realize that exposure to industrial pollution is unevenly distributed, this kind of thinking can naturalize other places as endemically polluted and thus continuously pollutable (see voyles, 2015). the pedagogical challenge, then, is to dismantle this ideology by making our relations to environmental problems sensible—from the bhopal gas disaster (fortun, 2001; speigel 2013), to the tar sands (huseman & short, 2012), to the maquiladoras at the us–mexico border (johnson & niemeyer, 2008). 5 here i depart from vinciane despret’s (2013) reading of “involutionary momentum.” she argues that hustak and myers do not enchant or reenchant the world; they simply pay attention to evolutionary biology before neo-darwinian disenchantment. “animation, [not de-animation]” she explains quoting latour, “is the essential phenomenon” (p. 36, emphasis mine). despret goes on to argue, “hustak and myers did not have to reenchant, they just had to carefully follow a scientist who did not deanimate the world he was observing” (p. 36). here, despret’s insistence on a historical darwin moved by an essential animated nature takes our attention away from the creative activities of reading, writing, speculating, and theorizing. i discuss the example of darwin’s body experiments to foreground how fiction and speculation work alongside historical and biological claims in “involutionary momentum.” although despret recognizes that hustak and myers’s creative storytelling cannot be separated from the darwin they describe—“i do consider hustak and myers’s analysis to be actively part of the agencement [assemblage]” (p. 42n52)—her analysis does not allow for the transformative power of fiction. for despret, these stories about darwin are simultaneously historical and constructed. my argument is different—namely, that historical fiction can be an efficacious form of feminist science studies storytelling. 6 while many of the citations in this article can be classified as “new feminist materialism” or “multispecies ethnography,” i resist naming these kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 32 trends here to avoid giving institutional legitimacy to some kinds of academic storytelling at the expense of others. stories that center “matter” or “non-humans” are not the only kinds of stories that can help us respond within twenty-first-century chemical ecologies. stories about people or stories about stories, for example, also have transformative power. no one story or one kind of story is ever enough. references agard-jones, v. 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(2013). subterranean flows: water contamination and politics of visibility after the bhopal disaster. in a. neimenas, c. chen, and j. macleod (eds). thinking with water: an anthology of cultural theory of water (pp. 84-103). montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. star, s. l. (1991). power, technologies and the phenomenology of conventions: on being allergic to onions. in j. law (ed.), a sociology of monsters: essays on power, technology and domination (pp. 26-56). new york, ny: routledge. stengers, i. (2008). experimenting with refrains: subjectivity and the challenge of escaping modern dualism. subjectivity, 22(1), 38-59. swanson, h. a. (2017, february 22). the banality of the anthropocene. cultural anthropology. retrieved from https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1074the-banality-of-the-anthropocene tsing, a.l. (2015). the mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins. princeton, nj: princeton university press. kenney catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 39 tuck, e. (2009). suspending damage: a letter to communities. harvard educational review, 79(3), 409-428. van dooren, t., & rose, d. b. (2016). lively ethography: storying animist worlds. environmental humanities, 8(1), 77-94. voyles, t. b. (2015) wastelanding: legacies of uranium mining in navajo country. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. winner, l. (1980). do artefacts have politics? daedalus, 109(1),121-136. woolgar, s., & cooper, g. (1999). do artefacts have ambivalence?: moses’ bridges, winner’s bridges and other urban legends in s&ts. social studies of science, 29(3), 433-449. bio martha kenney (assistant professor, women & gender studies, san francisco state university) is a feminist science studies scholar whose research examines the poetics and politics of biological storytelling. her latest project on environmental epigenetics uses speculative fiction to interrupt dominant biological narratives and imagine more radical ecological futures. microsoft word 32833_krisha hernandez_nj.docx hernández, krisha (2019). co-creating indigenous futurities with/in academic worlds. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-3. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © krisha hernández, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license co-creating indigenous futurities with/in academic worlds krisha hernández university of california, santa cruz kjh@ucsc.edu i dream again of babok the toad, the deliverer of fire to humans and bringer of rain to earth. babok, an excellent storyteller, holds my hand and shows me the way to the river and to myself—a reminder of responsibilities and possibilities. the dream ignites a vision: in the place of flowers, where their power far surpasses their beauty, all beings are regarded as having purpose(s)—with bodies and lives worthy of living and thriving to fulfill those purposes. here, our community acknowledges each other’s roles and accepts our own as meaningful contributions. in this community, one seeks out the hu’upa (mesquite) and cho’i (palo verde) trees to ask for guidance because trees have revealed many truths to our yoemem ancestors from long ago and continue to teach us still. the vision becomes reality, a way of being and moving among worlds where many persons, such as insect beings, plant beings, soil bodies, elder stones, caretaker plants, and water beings, for example, are relegated to “natural resources”—objects of exploitation who are often taken up in servitude or generally mistreated. doing academic work that listens to and thinks with more-than-human beings as having bodies and lives worthy of living through to their fullest meaning is indeed a challenge in arenas where settler futurities take precedence over all else. place/land and all beings tied up with them, despite having much to teach, are critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) krisha hernández, 2019 2 rarely treated and centered as living beings in academic analysis (tuck & mckenzie, 2015). in other words, taking up this sort of work has proven to be such a challenge that it is often skipped over by academics, and quite possibly for good reason. engulfment in worlds largely filled with settler logics creates seemingly insurmountable barriers to those who may otherwise wish to co-create indigenous futurities with/in academic, and in particular, with indigenous land. scholars who work to co-create bridges that link the gaps between humancentered worlds and the many more-than-humans already living among them/us are of particular guidance to me in the challenge of co-creating indigenous futurities with/in academic worlds. i am grateful to geographer sarah whatmore (2006) for gifting communities in/beyond the academy with “more-than” terminology, where, in english, one is provided with language that shifts landscape as a plane to land—a living actor. i look to tonawanda band of seneca scholar on literature, race, and ethnic theory mishuana goeman (2013) when considering the necessary decolonizing work that is to (re)claim, (re)name, and (re)vitalize—where “(re)” creates indigenous futurities that are simultaneously past and present but made anew. sisseton wahpeton oyate anthropologist kim tallbear’s (2013, 2014) work illuminates the ways in which worlds and beings are co-constituted in relation with others, where collaborations are sites for new knowledge formations, thus creating space for academe that is more-than research. i often think with the work of kanaka maoli political scientist noelani goodyear-ka‘ōpua (2016), who reminds one that indigenous peoples forge their relationships with place/land and land-bodied beings, and, therefore, researchers are obligated to such land beings far beyond the scope of a research project. political scientist audra mitchell (2018), a settler of ukrainian, polish, scottish, and english ancestry who lives on the ancestral and treaty lands of the attawandaron (neutral), haudenosaunee, and mississaugas of the new credit, demonstrates ways in which non-indigenous scholars might honor the efforts of indigenous resurgents who seek to repair protocols and relations between particular peoples, plants, animals, and many land and water beings. drawing on these lineages of thought and scholarship, my work strives to co-create indigenous futurities with more-than-human beings, an effort that simultaneously envisions indigenous futurities as it takes up and works against settler colonial modes of being and separation. i find an academic home in the emerging discipline of indigenous science, technology, and society (i-sts), a community of scholars who contribute to the interplay of emerging worlds, realities becoming. together, this community honors land-bodied beings seen, unseen, and felt, while co-creating indigenous futurities through scholarship. critical perspectives | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) krisha hernández, 2019 3 acknowledgements i thank dr. laura foster for the invitation to contribute to this special section on plants, colonialism, and race. much of my un/learning and re/learning is attributed to tongva, cahuilla, kanaka maoli, and serrano land and peoples. i send my heartfelt gratitude to yoeme language instructors for their ongoing work and guidance. references goeman, m. (2013). mark my words: native women mapping our nations. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. goodyear-ka‘ōpua, n. (2016). reproducing the ropes of resistance: hawaiian studies methodologies. in k. oliveira & e. k. wright (eds.), kanaka ōiwi methodologies moolelo and metaphor (pp. 1-29). honolulu, hi: university of hawai’i. mitchell, a. (2018). revitalizing laws, (re)-making treaties, dismantling violence: indigenous resurgence against “the sixth mass extinction.” social & cultural geography, 1-16. doi:10.1080/14649365.2018.1528628 tallbear, k. (2013). native american dna: tribal belonging and the false promise of genetic science. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. tallbear, k. (2014). standing with and speaking as faith: a feminist-indigenous approach to inquiry. journal of research practice, 10(2), n17. tuck, e., & mckenzie, m. (2015). place in research: theory, methodology, and methods. new york, ny: routledge. whatmore, s. (2006). materialist returns: practising cultural geography in and for a more-than-human world. cultural geographies, 13(4), 600-609. author bio krisha hernánez krisha j. hernández (yaqui/xicanx/bisayan), raised on tongva/gabrieleño land near the village of nacaugna—in so-called los angeles, california—is an indígenx ph.d. candidate and teaching fellow in the department of anthropology at the university of california, santa cruz (ucsc) whose work is relationally grounded through indigenous queer feminist politics. they are a researcher in the indigenous science, technology, and society (indigenous sts) international research and teaching hub chaired by dr. kim tallbear, and writes with the creatures collective. chemical kinship: interdisciplinary experiments balayannis, angeliki, & garnett, emma. (2020). chemical kinship “keeping them down”: chemical kinship: interdisciplinary experiments with pollution. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-10. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © angeliki balayannis & emma garnett, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license chemical kinship: interdisciplinary experiments with pollution angeliki balayannis university of exeter a.a.balayannis@exeter.ac.uk emma garnett king’s college london emma.garnett@kcl.ac.uk abstract feminist technoscientific research with chemicals is proliferating. this paper considers how this scholarship extends environmental justice research on pollution. we are concerned with two key questions: how can we do/design ethical research with chemicals? and what methods allow for researching chemicals without resorting to an imagined space of purity? we consider unfolding projects which reorient relations with chemicals from villainous objects with violent effects, to chemical kin. we imagine chemical kinship as a concept, an analytical tool, and a mode of relating. emerging through feminist and anticolonial work with chemicals, chemical kinship involves a tentativeness towards making normative claims about chemicals because, like kin, these materials are never entirely good nor bad; at once, they can both be enabling and harmful. this paper considers what the unfolding research with chemicals generates and consolidates conceptualizations of chemical kinship; we ultimately articulate an agenda for ethical research with chemicals as an experimental process of invention. critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 2 introduction feminist technoscientific research with chemicals is proliferating. this paper considers how this scholarship enriches and extends environmental justice research on pollution and its violent effects. we are concerned with two key questions: first, how can we do and design ethical research with chemicals? by this we mean, how can we do research that takes into account effects of living with chemicals and pollution without producing “disaster-based research”— scholarship that reinforces the very infrastructures that we seek to critique (liboiron, tironi, & calvillo, 2018). and second, what methods allow for researching chemicals without resorting to an imagined space of purity? this paper will outline a series of unfolding projects that move beyond representations of chemicals as villainous objects to practices of intervening with chemical kin. chemical kinship is a concept, an analytical tool, and a mode of relating. emerging through feminist and anticolonial work with chemicals, this particular notion of kinship involves a tentativeness towards making normative claims about chemicals because, like kin, these materials are never entirely good nor bad; they can be both enabling and harmful (agard-jones, 2013, 2014; lamoreaux, 2020; liboiron, 2019; murphy, 2018). the paper has two specific aims: first, to think across different research projects that we have found offer innovative ways of working with chemical relations, and second, to extend conceptualizations of chemical kinship by approaching research and practice as processes of invention (marres, guggeinheim, & wilkie, 2018). making sense of chemicals across the humanities and social sciences, chemicals have hitherto been narrated as a grim spectre that wreak havoc with the natural order of things; they remain focal points for fears of the of the harmful capacities of technological progress (bensaude-vincent & stengers, 1996). of course, there is much to be concerned about. industrial chemical production, consumption, and disposal is structured around violent political economies. these processes unfold through, and reinforce, axes of injustice. but to reduce chemicals to their violent effects is to deaden their capacities and overlook their material politics. for the social sciences, chemicals have, up until recently, largely remained within the epistemological purview of environmental justice research. this work has mapped structuring relations of power and developed an important attunement to the unevenness of chemical exposures. but environmental justice research can be quick to reduce chemicals to their violent effects, overlooking the material ways critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 3 they participate in the structuring of social and political life. this has repercussions for political action–as nicholas shapiro, nasser zakariya, and jody roberts argue (2017), “quantifying and contextualizing a potential toxicity also works to direct us towards straightforward, but potentially superficial, solutions” (p. 579). in response to the limits of knowledge practices that quantify and contextualize toxicity, an ontological and epistemological interest in the chemical is unfolding— what is increasingly being articulated as a “chemical turn” (liboiron et al., 2018; romero et al., 2018; shapiro & kirksey, 2017). researchers experimenting with modes of sensing and sensing technologies are leading this shift, reimagining exposure, and reframing the (human) body from a site of violence to a site of knowledge with capacities for collective political action (e.g., calvillo & garnett, 2019, gabrys, pritchard, & barratt, 2016; ottinger, 2010; shapiro, 2015). in geographic research, even the most coherently defined pollutants have been shown to be materially unstable and always in transformation (liboiron, 2015; balayannis, 2020). the tendencies of chemicals to overflow the boundaries of toxic sites, and the scientific methods for defining what is harmful or not, remain challenges for research and regulation because they render invisible “the qualitative conditions of toxicity” (calvillo, 2018 p. 372). not taking seriously the socio-material relations of chemicals runs the risk of reproducing infrastructures that generate environmentally embedded violence (liboiron et al., 2018; murphy, 2012; shapiro et al., 2017). take air pollution, for instance. government monitoring stations often measure fine particulate matter, or pm2.5, as weighed mass to determine whether safe limits have been reached. however, it is increasingly recognized that smaller particles are the most harmful to human health. furthermore, these particles also have unruly interactions with other airborne pollutants. measurements and legal standards in chemical worlds co-construct each other in ways that enable certain kinds of responses whilst always producing blind spots and therefore inaction (hepler-smith, 2019). codes, categories, and molecular models render chemicals analyzable and manageable (balayannis, 2020). however, these representations “don’t just depict a world “out there”; they also have the recursive power to condition and sediment how people come to see the world” (myers, 2015, p. 129). approaching chemicals in terms of their relations is a way to move beyond the molecular and to open up new possibilities for research and action. to continue to develop this work, we argue that research with chemicals requires methods that are more inventive—methods that are participatory and experimental. drawing from marres, guggeinheim, and wilkie (2018), we imagine critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 4 invention as “an active search for alternative ways of combining representation of, and intervention in, social life” (p. 18). like other critical researchers we find data practices a practical starting point for building chemical kinships because chemicals are often quantified as data. by critically examining how data are made and used we can intervene in the actions they enable and foreclose. this is a response to the call from shapiro, zakariya, and roberts (2017), for a wariness to the collaborations social science and humanities researchers make with science in the name of environmental justice. chemical interventions three ongoing collaborative research projects are outlined here to consider how multiple voices around chemicals can be facilitated in ways that allow for other forms of engagement and imagination to take place. these different interdisciplinary projects involve research practices that facilitate new social formations around chemicals. these examples are in no way a representative sample; nor do we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis that the richness of these ongoing projects demand. rather, we are interested in the specific ways each of these projects work with chemicals as data in order to materialize chemical relations through social, ethical, and politically meaningful forms of engagement. the first project is air south asia,1 a platform set up by air quality scientist pallavi pant and environmental health scientist anobha gurung. air south asia disseminates and catalogues information on various aspects of air pollution, and its impacts on health; environment/climate; and the economy. this platform facilitates users to connect with policy, research, and public engagement initiatives around air pollution. as well as providing easy access to different sources of pollution and emissions data, the platform also shares critical discussions and everyday stories about air pollution and place-based actions to improve air quality. along with a range of numerical data sets, interviews with different “stakeholders” provide multiple viewpoints and experiences on this complex issue. the platform is a space where data practices (from making measurements to telling stories) creatively support knowledge translation in ways that are actionable and relevant to affected publics. although there are epistemological challenges in drawing connections between environment and health data, or making claims based on anecdotal evidence, the strength of collating different knowledges is that these practices begin to make lines of responsibility visible. critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 5 data are not only used to plug evidence gaps, they can also materialize responsibility and offer new pathways for action that regulatory data in isolation often erase or close down. this is something to which the second project—the asthma files (taf)2—is particularly attentive. taf is a collaborative ethnographic research project that supports the sharing of diverse kinds of data and analysis (see fortun et al., 2014). like air south asia, this bringing together of different data as an interpretive practice creates discussions beyond the dominant narratives of scientific uncertainty and the call for more data (shapiro et al., 2017). taf starts with asthma and its complex relationship to air pollution, and the challenge this relationship poses to environmental public health. asthma demands an attunement to chemical kinships. the data archived in taf takes many forms, including the analysis of scientific publications; interviews with scientists and practitioners involved in policy and activism; media coverage; and photo essays. through this research, the project empirically and analytically fleshes out ways to imagine new connections for collaborating with governance regimes. taf also harnesses the complex gene-environment interactions that are shaping contemporary scientific understandings of asthma (fortun et al., 2014b). in a practice like exposomics (vineis et al. 2017), for instance, the search for environmental exposures and universal molecular features is reconfiguring disease risk, including asthma. yet it is unlikely that this ‘holistic’ and dynamic view of chemical exposure will be sufficient for identifying complex causal mechanisms that can enable political responses (garnett, 2020). for taf, the challenge of making sense of the relations between disease and lived environments is a starting point for multiplying understandings of exposure and generating cross-disciplinary dialogue. our third example of research that facilitates new social formations around chemicals is the mexican exposures (mexpos) project.3 led by anthropologist elizabeth roberts in collaboration with environmental health scientists, mexpos works with chemical data and chemical knowledges through the relations they mobilize and (re)produce. like taf and air south asia, attention is focused on data’s analytical and inventive potential and is similarly realized through a research platform that is open to different kinds of data and expertise. roberts collaborates with scientists who are undertaking longitudinal environmental health research on early life exposures to environmental toxicants in mexico through molecular analysis of chemicals in bodies. she performs ethnographic research with the families involved in this study to produce data on “household and neighbourhood environments and geopolitical processes relevant to the critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 6 production of bodily states” (mexpos, n.d.). the resulting “bioethnographic” research platform includes a coding lab where new scientific methods merge with inventive ethnographic practices (e. roberts 2017; 2019). by joining ethnographic observation with biochemical sampling, this project generates new understandings of how body-environment interactions shape health and inequality. chemical kinship these three projects refuse to start with overdetermined objects of concern. through their expansive approach to data practices they instead facilitate modes of analyzing chemical relations that keep lines of inquiry open, and multiply possibilities for action. chemical kinship in this context is a form of inventing the social (see marres et al., 2018). we invoke the concept of invention to queer the notion of kinship as lines of ancestry. this is also, in part, a response to the call to make multi-species kin as a matter of survival (clarke & haraway, 2018). in doing this, we move beyond enduring concerns with life and the biopolitical (see povinelli, 2016) to bring materials into the more-than-human fold. this expands relations of care and responsibility to the stuff routinely reduced to hazards and harm. our entanglements with these chemicals are of course intensely fraught (j. a. roberts, 2010), demanding approaches that inquire more creatively into what a kinship with plastics or pesticides, for instance, might look like. the collaborative and participatory ways of working with data considered here help us imagine what making good kinship with “bad” kin might look like. they assemble alliances through the careful curation of data in ways that have new analytical and political potential. returning to our opening questions, these projects are examples of ethical research with chemicals because they intervene in how chemical relations are materialized in ways that reject an imagined space of purity. there are three key dimensions to good chemical research present in each example that we would like to highlight as we conclude this paper: first, these projects have extended temporal relations of care —a sense of obligation to the material over time, sustained through the involvement of different actors. in highlighting this expanded temporal engagement, we recognize that the political economy of research often resists this form of work; the neoliberal university’s demand of “high productivity in compressed time frames” (mountz et al., 2015, p. 1236) places boundaries on our ability to develop chemical kinships in research. second, these extended and slow relations are made through infrastructures—platforms, archives, coding labs—as spaces for participation and collaborative analysis. critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 7 infrastructures that allow for and anticipate the involvement of different voices expand what counts as a data practice and open up possibilities for different chemical relations. and third, by variously involving citizens, comparing “expert” knowledges, and combining methods, each of these projects are fundamentally interdisciplinary. they refuse to smooth over ontological and epistemological differences in data and instead use them as starting points for making in(ter)ventions4. acknowledgements we would like to thank fay dennis, emily jay nicholls, and jade henry for the opportunity to present an iteration of this paper in the centre for invention and social process (cisp) at goldsmiths college, university of london in december 2019. this work has developed in conversation with many others over the past year, and we would particularly like to thank andrew barry, véra ehrenstein, and the contributors to our “chemical kinship” session at the 2019 royal geographical society (with ibg) annual international conference in london. emma garnett would also like to acknowledge financial support from the economic and social research council es/r008612/1. notes 1 air south asia, https://airsouthasia.org. 2 the asthma files, https://theasthmafiles.org. 3 mexican exposures (mexpos), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mexican-exposures/. 4 we borrow the term in(ter)ventions from the 2019/20 cisp salon series on “care in(ter)ventions,” organized by fay dennis, emily jay nicholls, and jade henry at goldsmiths college, university of london. references agard-jones, v. 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(2018). making kin not population. chicago, il: prickly paradigm press. fortun, k., fortun, m., bigras, e., saheb, t., costelloe-kuehn, b., crowder, j., price, d., & kenner, a. (2014). experimental ethnography online: the asthma files. cultural studies, 28(4), 632-642. fortun, m., fortun, k., costelloe-kuehn, b., saheb, t., price, d., kenner, a., & crowder, j. (2014). asthma, culture, and cultural analysis: continuing challenges in brasier, a (ed). heterogeneity in asthma. texas, usa: springer. gabrys, j., pritchard, h. and barratt, b. (2016). just good enough data: figuring data citizenships through air pollution sensing and data stories. big data & society, 3(2), 1-14. garnett, e. (2020). breathing spaces: modelling exposure in air pollution science. body & society. https://doi.org/10.1177/1357034x20902529 hepler-smith, e. (2019). molecular bureaucracy: toxicological information and environmental protection. environmental history, 24(3), 534-560. lamoreaux, j. (2020, january 17) toxicology and the chemistry of cohort kinship. somatosphere. liboiron, m. (2015). redefining pollution and action: the matter of plastics. journal of material culture, 21(1), 1-24. liboiron, m. (2019, january 9). anti-colonial science & the ubiquity of plastic, frank interviews, retrieved at: http://www.franknews.us/interviews/206/anti-colonialscience-the-ubiquity-of-plastic. liboiron, m., tironi, m., & calvillo, n. (2018) toxic politics: acting in a permanently polluted world. social studies of science, 48(3), 331-349. marres, n., guggenheim, m., & wilkie, a. (2018). inventing the social. manchester, uk: mattering press. mexican exposures (mexpos). (n.d.). retrieved from https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mexican-exposures/ mountz, a., bonds, a., mansfield, b., loyd, j., hyndman, j., walton-roberts, m., … & curran, w. (2015). for slow scholarship: a feminist politics of resistance through https://doi.org/10.1177/1357034x20902529 https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mexican-exposures/ critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 9 collective action in the neoliberal university. acme: an international e-journal for critical geographies, 14(4), 1235-1259. murphy, m. (2012). chemical regimes of living. environmental history, 13(4), 695-703. murphy, m. (2018). against population, towards afterlife. in a. e. clarke & d. haraway (eds.), making kin not population (pp.101-123). chicago, il: prickly paradigm press. myers, n. (2015). rendering life molecular: models, modelers, and excitable matter. durham, nc: duke university press. ottinger, g. (2010). buckets of resistance: standards and the effectiveness of citizen science. science, technology, and human values, 35(2), 244-270. povinelli, e. a. (2016). geontologies: a requiem to late liberalism. durham, nc: duke university press. roberts, e. (2017). exposure. cultural anthropology, 32(4), 592-619. roberts, e. f. s. (2019, november 19). bioethnography and the birth cohort: a method for making new kinds of anthropological knowledge about transmission (which is what anthropology has been about all along). somatosphere. roberts, j. a. (2010). reflections of an unrepentant plastiphobe: plasticity and the sts life. science as culture, 19(1), 101-120. romero, a. m., guthman, j., galt, r. e., huber, m., mansfield, b., & sawyer, s. (2017). chemical geographies. geohumanities, 3(1), 158-177. shapiro, n. (2015). attuning to the chemosphere: domestic formaldehyde, bodily reasoning, and the chemical sublime. cultural anthropology, 30(3), 368-393. shapiro, n., & kirksey, e. (2017). chemo-ethnography: an introduction. cultural anthropology, 32(4), 481-493. shapiro, n., zakariya, n., & roberts, j. (2017). a wary alliance: from enumerating the environment to inviting apprehension. engaging science, technology and society, 3, 575-602. vineis, p., chadeau-hyam, m., gmuender, h., gulliver, j., herceg, z., kleinjans, j., kogevinas, m., kyrtopoulos, s., nieuwenhuijsen, m., phillips, d.h., probst-hensch, n., scalbert, a., vermeulen, r., wild. c.p., the exposomics consortium. (2017). the exposome in practice: design of the exposomics project. international journal of hygiene and environmental health, 220(2), 142-151. author bios angeliki balayannis is a lecturer in human geography, in the department of critical commentary | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) angeliki balayannis and emma garnett, 2020 10 geography at the university of exeter. emma garnett is a research fellow in the social science and urban public health institute at king’s college london. cohenibanez article     military utopias of mind and machine    emily cohen ibañez university of california, santa cruz eccohen@ucsc.edu imagine a world where more than 2 billion people are connected through a computer network. imagine a world where people can immerse themselves totally in another world in the privacy of their own home. imagine a world where millions of people connect across the globe playing video games. rick,1 venture capitalist and psychologist, stops clicking through his powerpoint slides. he pauses. and then he looks up with squinted eyes. i am sitting amongst an audience of clinical psychologists at the new york academy of sciences (nas) in manhattan. we look upon an image of the galaxy. we wait for rick to resolve the dramatic tension of his performance. “well, folks,” rick audibly releases his breath, “that world is today. at virtual therapeutics,2 we are inviting you to join today’s world. you can choose to join today’s world, or be left behind.” at this moment, rick’s powerpoint presentation spins out of his control, flipping through slide after slide in rapid succession. a man sitting next to me leans over and quietly says in my ear “this is crazy bullshit” and then walks out of the room. rick tries to regain control of the powerpoint, to no avail. the images continue to flash in rapid succession on the large screen behind him. the audience sits quietly. rick decides not to acknowledge the powerpoint problem and looks back at the audience. he goes on to describe the variety of cybertechnologies that are redefining clinical psychology and our world.  one could brush off rick’s performance as just some “crazy bullshit,” but absurdity is no stranger to the machinations of power in daily life. a clinical psychologist by training, rick is a former president of the american psychological association (apa), and the nas lends its own prestige to its presenters. i introduced myself to rick after his presentation and we met a week later to discuss his transformation from clinical psychologist to venture capitalist. rick described having visions of virtual worlds at the tender age of 8, which accompanied his affinity for science fiction novels. as an adult, he read zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance, which inspired him to drive from new york city to california. on his american road trip, he discovered buddhism, computers, and visions of capital expansion. he saw cybertechnologies’ potential for accomplishing “inner peace.”  rick envisioned computers as an interface between the human mind and its machines. using computers, he wanted to help people calm psychological instabilities. later, he helped establish a new kind of discipline called “cyberpsychology.”  rick hopes to be a key player in widening the distribution of virtual therapies designed to treat and prevent post traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) among military personnel. to rick’s delight, i too was headed out west to southern california via a road trip through the american heartland. as an anthropologist, i wanted to learn more about the rise of military utopic visions of mind that involve the creation of virtual worlds and “hyper-real simulations” in military psychiatry.  california dreaming marked the lives of many involved in the creation of immersive therapeutics for the us military. when i met rick, i had already spent a year conducting ethnographic research and shooting a documentary film on virtual therapeutics for the experimental treatment of ptsd at a veterans affairs (va) hospital in new york city. more specifically, i had become fascinated by the introduction of vre (virtual reality exposure) therapy at new york city va hospitals. in vre, a person wears a headset that projects 360-degree animation, surround sound, and smells that approximate the particular war event that haunts his or her daily life.  using vre, clinicians aim to virtually expose and acclimate trauma sufferers to distressing scenarios within the purported safety of virtual worlds. dr. rainer,3 who performed vre at the va where i had spent a year conducting anthropological research, is a new jersey native who ventured out west to los angeles in pursuit of an acting career before he returned to new york to train as a clinical psychologist at cornell university. at cornell, he discovered vre. intrigued by the technology, rainer spearheaded the establishment of virtual therapeutics when he gained employment at the manhattan va medical center. with vre, rainer could merge his professional interests in acting, psychology, and cinematic technologies.  research on vre has primarily been produced by a small group of psychologists and psychiatrists, most notably barbara rothbaum, joann difide, albert “skip” rizzo, and brenda wiederhold, who collaborate with computer scientists. in 1993, a group of researchers which included barbara rothbaum, began the first investigations into “using virtual environments to conduct exposure therapy of individuals with psychological disorders,” studying the effects of virtual reality exposure for the treatment of acrophobia, or the fear of heights (hodges et al, 1995; rothbaum et al., 1995a, 1995b). acrophobia was chosen in particular since “systematic desensitization” (imaginal exposure) had long been effective in treating phobias (marks & gelder, 1965). in imaginal exposure, the therapist asks the patient to imagine the situation or object that arouses a phobic response. likewise, in vivo exposure asks patients to expose themselves to feared objects in the real world until they no longer evoke irrational fear.  researchers were uncertain whether virtual reality headsets could provide enough "sense of presence" to activate the phobic response targeted for treatment, in this case the fear of heights. the researchers focused on measuring “sense of presence” since, according to emotional processing theory, “the fear structure must be activated” for the patient to elicit a response (i.e., grasping onto railing while wearing vr goggles) and exhibit symptoms (sweating, abdominal discomfort, heart palpitations, etc.). here, a sense of presence depends upon human-computer interaction, not visceral realism (hendrix & barfield, 1995). other studies followed, looking at other specific phobias like the fear of flying (rothbaum et al., 1996; wiederhold et al., 1998). the application of virtual reality headsets for the treatment of ptsd occurred later. in 1999, rothbaum published a case study about a vietnam veteran using vre for ptsd treatment (rothbaum et al., 1999), reporting modest improvement of certain ptsd symptoms with vre treatment. following the research trajectories of vre researchers, i was struck that rothbaum's initial investigations into ptsd and therapy involved a collaboration with dr. edna foa on gender violence against women, more specifically rape, using a technique called prolonged exposure (pe). in pe, the therapist asks the patient to relive a traumatic scene in his or her imagination through storytelling. while the patient narrates the traumatic story, the therapist records it with a tape recorder and asks the patient to listen and retell the story over and over again until the story seems to lose its emotive power. if all goes well, the patient gains control over the memory and no longer experiences the cluster of symptoms described as post traumatic stress disorder (foa, rothbaum, riggs, & murdock, 1991; foa, steketee, & rothbaum, 1989; rothbaum & foa, 1992).  foa and rothbaum determined pe to be effective. rape, however, is not seen as appropriate for virtual reality exposure and systemized desensitization. in our conversations, foa remarked that she viewed vre as a departure from prolonged exposure. systemized desensitization, or what was later called “habituation” to war scenarios, which engages primarily male patients, seems suitable and has become the new frontier for virtual reality psychiatric therapies. creators of virtual worlds and simulated enactments aim to create immersive environments that capitalize on sensorial ecology of sight, smell, sound, touch, and spatial orientation. today, video game platforms using virtual reality and hollywood studios to create “hyperreal” simulations have come to dominate military training, combat, and post-war rehabilitation. from drone aircraft to vre, virtual applications and simulation techniques in the military mark a significant change in how war is defined across a spectrum of political, operational, legal, and clinical frames. virtual technologies are transforming the temporal, aesthetic, and spatial framing of war, and are linked to changing notions of fitness and work within the military. deployment cycles have increased while rest periods between deployments have decreased. institutionally, the military has become focused on psychological resilience and cognitive responsiveness as important components of military fitness. virtual hallucinations, which might have been formerly deemed psychotic episodes, are now valued for their ability to transform situated realities into virtual ones through the senses. these shifts in time, space, and labor are not isolated to the us context or the military, but rather reflect larger global processes and capitalist flows. as i have noted in my ethnographic writing on an amputation and rehabilitation unit in bogotá’s central military hospital and the rapidly growing prosthetics industry in colombia, phantom limbs went from being a sign of psychosis to a valued condition allowing patients to more successfully incorporate industrial prostheses into the body. phantom limbs have gained popular and scientific appeal in colombia and the united states for their capacity to telescope in and out of the body and incorporate an entire political and economic system into the body. virtual technologies that enhance human sensory capacities to telescope in and out of the body, from phantom® used in the da vinci precision surgical system to dji phantom camera drones and 3d phantom diagnostic imaging, have gained ground in a capitalist world system that decentralizes and automatizes human labor (cohen, 2012).  at conferences and in one-on-one conversations, gamers and psychiatrists frequently discussed virtual reality’s capacity to immerse the user/viewer in traumatic scenes. vre proponents explain that for patients who are not imaginative or good storytellers, the virtual platform helps fill in the gaps where imagination fails. in laboratory settings, this sense of immersion is termed “sensorial presence.”  vre proponents claim that “sensorial presence” is key to vre’s success as a treatment. albert “skip” rizzo invented virtual iraq, a vre program tailored to combat in iraq, at the institute for creative technologies (ict). he based it on an earlier program called virtual vietnam. created in 1999 for a pilot study of vre, virtual vietnam involved two scenarios:  a jungle scene and a helicopter scene. virtual iraq also includes two primary scenes—driving a humvee and walking through an urban marketplace (figure 1). from the marketplace, patients may also go into iraqi people’s homes to mimic combat missions that require soldiers to enter homes and search the inhabitants. according to the ict website video,4 virtual iraq is a storytelling platform. however, in practice and within the scientific literature, the treatment elides narrative and privileges behaviorist and neurobiological models of the human mind.  figure 1. virtual iraq/afghanistan. film still from virtual war: memories of abu-ghraib by producer/director emily cohen ibañez.  rizzo et al. (2009) and rothbaum et al. (2014), among others, have published scientific articles reporting extraordinary high cure rates of ptsd among iraq veterans in vre clinical trials. here, “cure” is defined as not responding physiologically to traumatic stimuli presented in the prescribed virtual scene. the latest vre clinical trials combined the treatment with d-cycloserine, an antibiotic shown to augment psychotherapeutic anxiety and phobia treatments, to reduce the amount of therapeutic sessions to two, rather than the formerly prescribed six sessions.5 vre proponents clearly want to free soldiers of ptsd in a time-efficient manner so that they suffer less and acquire the psychological resilience to perform military work. the trouble is that the definition of “cure” focuses on “optimization,” a term borrowed from technological work management systems (taylor, 1998).  rather than improve access to va health services, the department of defense invests in psychiatric treatments like vre and stress inoculation training (a form of cognitive behavioral therapy administered as prophylaxis before deployment) that are not geared towards helping patients adjust to civilian life but that further military agendas and optimize soldiers’ cognitive-sensory abilities to perform military labor, work that might include driving a humvee, surveilling homes, and walking through marketplaces without phobic responses evoked by explosions, rpg fire, and verbal insults. as prophylactics, these treatments serve as filtering systems for men and women who are deemed not cognitively "fit," or psychologically resilient enough for combat. here, human and virtual interactions are imagined as closed systems of stimuli and response that habituate the senses to prescribed forms of condoned violence in a timely manner.  in this article, i am centrally concerned with how virtual iraq and similar immersive techniques reduce the subjectivity of soldiers to biometric readings on the body's surface, creating a closed system that conceives the mind as an amalgam of physiological reflex responses. this closed system relies on a fantasy of control that i am calling military utopias of mind and machine. military utopias of mind and machine aspire to have warfare without trauma by instrumentalizing the senses within a closed system.  in the context of this closed system, i note that discussions of gender violence as a prevalent condition of war trauma is remarkably silenced while concerns about the senses are amplified. this article is not an indictment of vr and other immersive technologies as i believe there are creative and generative ways to use these technologies. this is an exploration of the current use of the senses and immersive techniques and technologies in the u.s. military, an exploration that has allowed me to think through my own experimentation with vr technologies as a documentary filmmaker and storyteller. as a feminist anthropologist, i am tracking shifts in american rationality before what is deemed rational is so normalized it becomes too obvious to question. the stakes are no less than people's sense of their own humanity in a supposed posthuman world. re-enactment when i first met rainer6 at the va, he wanted to clarify some misconceptions about vre.  rainer: emily, i am going to explain virtual reality exposure therapy to you like i explain it to my patients. cohen ibañez: okay. how does vre work? is the goal to desensitize people? r: well, not quite. vre will help you habituate to your bad memories. “habituation” is like desensitization, but not quite. there are important differences. ci: how so? r: habituation is like jumping into cold ocean water. does the water feel like it warms up after you spent a little time in the cold water? ci:  i guess…ah, yes. r: well. the water doesn’t get warmer. i mean your body doesn’t heat the entire ocean. rather your perception of the water changes. first you assess if the water poses a threat. will this cold cause deadly hypothermia or is it just a bothersome cold that i can get used to? you realize it’s a bothersome cold and not a dangerous cold, so you stay in the water. am i right? this encounter involved a reenactment of a vre session in which rainer played therapist, terry,7 his patient, played patient, and i played invisible anthropologist behind a two-way mirror while national geographic filmed. in the vre room, there is a desk with two computer monitors and a keyboard. to the left of the desk sits a machine that emits a palette of odors—a hundred different ones including body odor, rpg fire, and cardamom. next to the scent machine is a platform with a chair where the patient sits. the platform rumbles to simulate what it is like to sit in a humvee while driving and shakes to simulate the impact of an ied. the patient places a pair of goggles over his eyes and headphones over his ears. he has a choice to hold a joystick or a toy machine gun. the vre system involves a screen where the therapist sets up a scene. there are two available backdrops—driving a humvee or walking through a marketplace which can be set with different lighting to simulate different times of day and brightness of the sun. as the therapist listens to the patient retell his traumatic memory, he can add or remove “variables,” which include different visual, sonic, and olofactory sensoria.   rainer explains to everyone that this reenactment is not real. “habituation needs optimal anxiety. terry has come such a long way with the treatment, we may not get that today.” rainer and terry take their positions at the vre system. camera operator: okay. rolling. rainer: right now, what is your anxiety level? one to ten. terry: a one. r (speaking through a headset microphone): “can you hear me?” t (holding the joy stick): yeah, roger. are you going to start with the convoy? all right, got a visual. we all see what terry is seeing on one of rainer’s computer screens. the screen shows an image of a road through the front window of a humvee from the perspective of the humvee driver. r: can you move? t: yeah. r: is it moving 360 degrees? t: yup. terry’s headset includes a sensor that looks like a small box centered on top of his head. when terry turns his head to the left, the screen displays the perspective of the driver looking out the side window toward the roadside. when he turns to the right, we see the passenger: a fellow comrade in uniform.  when terry looks up, we see another soldier standing through the turret maneuvering a large machine gun. r: okay. where do i put you? t: i was not the driver. i was always the tc [tactical commander]. never the driver. with a click, terry is suddenly sitting in the passenger seat and we all see the humvee, the road, and the fellow soldiers from this perspective. rainer adjusts the clouds on the visuals to create dusk. terry starts moving the vehicle forward with his game controller. along the roadside, he passes a statue of saddam hussein and civilians lying on their backs, and then approaches an overpass. r: we need to make it as much like iraq as it was. terry, we’re going to drive over the overpass. speak about the memories you have. you got the stick so go ahead and move. tell me about the variables. does this conjure anything for you, anything specific? t: what gets me is the maneuver. you stayed center lane to prevent ieds. we headed center mass. you scatter your maneuvers. civilians lie on their backs and wait for combat servicemen. the procedure was to scatter. don’t exit the same lane you entered. r: go over the overpass with no variables. then we’ll go over with the variables. this is the maneuver. t: the maneuver shouldn’t be taken for granted. the visual has put me in a memory. points of contact i remember. action came right, action came left. r: anxiety rating? t: two. they repeat the overpass again. rainer clicks “explosion” on the computer screen. the explosion blasts from terry’s headphones. the platform he is sitting on shakes. the screen is filled with smoke. t: that was a surprise. r: any change in anxiety level? t: a two. rainer clicks on his keyboard. a person appears on the overpass and there are sounds of small arms fire. pra! pra! pra! t: that was unexpected. r: i’ll do another two variables and then see if we can kick up the distress. t: with regards to people popping up, what was difficult as a soldier was that civilians would reveal themselves as friendlies but they were not. you couldn’t trust them. you would clear the bridge if someone unexpected should pop up. sounds of bombs go off. again, the platform shakes. rainer is trying to evoke sensorial presence clicking the variables and creating a distressing scene. t: that was interesting. r: you described superiors asking you to stop. t: wait. you don’t want me to move? r: yeah. just like your superior. sorry, but it’s therapy. any change in anxiety? t: it’s a good three. my impulse right now is to call in where contacts are coming in. aerial is not in place. these rounds are being fired. it’s a strong three. might go higher. r: what will make it go higher? t: the repetition. the audio is being ramped up and the seat is what’s triggering. it’s very, very, yeah. terry stops talking and swallows. rainer allows him to silently watch and then asks: r: moving is what you want to do. but i don’t want you to move. report your memories. t: i was in a scenario like this once. the elements. the fine grains of sand. r: rating? t: a three or a four. the session ends. r: you’ve come a long way, terry. wow. camera operator: what were the ratings for? r: it’s not the number. it’s looking at him. to me, terry looks upset. rainer begins the reenactment on the premise that the therapeutic session is not real. reality within the therapeutic session is measured by “optimal anxiety”—the existence of a trigger that signals the patient is sensorially present within the vre session and having a truly immersive experience. without evidence of optimal anxiety and sensorial presence, the session is just play-acting for the camera. one of the reasons rainer sees reality in this way is because his understanding of habituation relies on the notion that vre affects the brain physiologically only when signs of bodily distress, called “biomarkers,” are present: sweaty palms, a sweaty forehead, rapid heartbeat, and tense composure. terry’s self-evaluation, according to rainer, is beside the point. you only need to look at him. but then, what does it mean to be cured of ptsd? for rainer, terry’s ability to make meaning out of his experience is not necessary, neither are the narrative structures of his traumatic memory. the aim of the therapy is to surpass the intellect and access fear structures located in primitive regions of the brain, in the amygdala, so that they can be altered. rizzo, the inventor of virtual iraq, explained to me that the goal of vre therapy is to induce “extinction,” a process that researchers discovered when training rats to fear light through shock therapy and then habituating them to the light through repetitive exposure. sensorial presence allowed direct access to the amygdala and the vagus nerve to affect the brain’s allostatic processes. the results were striking: the rats exhibited low heart rates when faced with what they feared most—the light. in neuroscientific literature on crime, a calm vagus nerve and subsequent low heart rate indicates psychopathology, a condition where people kill or perform other cruel acts upon others without arousal (raine, 2014). in the military, a calm vagus nerve during combat is a desirable goal. rizzo’s team designed virtual iraq to “split” emotional distress from traumatic stimuli. they argue that vre therapy is ideal to perform before, during, in between, and after deployments since results are almost immediate—achieved in as little as six sessions, or possibly two sessions when vre is combined with the antibiotic d-cycloserine.  in conversation, rizzo cited b.f. skinner's notion of “extinction,” which inspired me to visit the film archive and the b.f. skinner foundation at harvard university (figure 2). there, i met skinner's granddaughter, julie vargas. in my conversations with her, i learned that skinner's concept of operant conditioning does not emphasize "repetitive exposure" as a way to produce extinction. rather, for skinner reinforcement (delivery of food pellets to a rat inside the operant chamber) shapes desired behavior whereas the absence of reinforcement causes extinction of the conditioned response. attempts to extinguish a behavior within the operant chamber is similar to a parent ignoring a child who is misbehaving in an attempt to not reward an undesired behavior (skinner, 1979). in vre, however, the shock of the scene loses its emotive response due to the realization that there is no real danger when virtually exposed to violence, so rather than extinction the patient learns that driving a humvee in a war scene is not dangerous—this is a conditioned response to warfare, not an elimination of one. figure 2. b.f. skinner superimposed on maze. film still from virtual war: memories of abu-ghraib by producer/director emily cohen ibañez. what concerns me is that the governing conception of ptsd that underlies current vre therapies is a phobic response, rather than a complex one contingent on historical, political, and quotidian realities of war. an example would be the normalization of rape in the military or even the traumatic responses induced by the routine dehumanization process involved in military training. rainer and rizzo recognize the effectiveness of the therapy within a closed language system—one that objectifies emotional response and abstracts it from its original cause. the sounds, smells, and animation are refined but the system itself remains primitive, based on a further simplification of behaviorist theory.8 the experimental system necessitates the assumption that trauma is solely fear-based, rather than based on a complex configuration of feelings that include entanglements of action and relationships informed by guilt, shame, integrity, and desire—complex emotional configurations that bring people into relations with each other and invite an exploration of their shared values and transgressions. feminist scholars have long challenged reductionist conceptualization of the mind and body, turning to phenomenological approaches that incorporate the embodiment and breakdown of politically volatile cultural systems (grosz, 1994; martin, 1994). feminist science studies critiques "modernist epistemologies" that value "separation and autonomy, rather than relatedness" (suchman, 2008).  feminist psychologists have forged more inclusive understandings of subjectivity in the psy-sciences, defying individualist assumptions and identifying "power in social structures and interactions" (morawski, 1994). disability scholars and queer theorists (elman, 2014; kafer, 2013), as well as theorists at the intersection of feminist science studies and critical race theory (atanasoski & vora, 2015) have pushed feminists to further trouble notions of autonomy through a reconsideration of personhood and human-technology interfaces that incorporate the recognition of bodily difference, racial and class inequities, and labor relations. in the following section, i discuss how storytelling is one means to bring meaning and relationships into embodied action. story, action, and meaning in the vre session, terry speaks, but he does not tell a story. telling stories is not only the act of speaking, but “a manner of speaking about events” (white, 1980, emphasis in original). while i disagree with hayden white's point that all narratives adhere to chronological time with a clear beginning, middle, and end (white, 1980), i agree that stories have a kind of grammar that distinguishes them from other kinds of discourse.  while not all stories have a well-established plot where the end is immanent in the unfolding of all events, at some level stories do bring “intelligibility of personal action” (schafer, 1980)—a totality that helps the author find meaning in the world and their own personal experiences.  as feminist anthropologist barbara myerhoff (1987) suggests, stories allow people to become self-aware, the protagonists of their own social dramas, and draw relationships between the world and their own actions. narratives that employ cyclical notions of time and repetition do so in time and over time. the temporality of “rapid fire” described by rainer does not allow for interpretation, as the quickness elides the ability to reflect; it is intentionally limited so that the patient successfully habituates to the sensory input without too much intellectual elaboration. this may be effective for treating phobias (like the fear of heights, spiders, and flying), but war trauma is a politically complex phenomenon. killing is an act that challenges most people’s sense of morality and humanity (grossman, 2009). habituating to flying is different from habituating to combat. feeling in control (lowered heart rate and maintaining full cognitive abilities while under stress) in combat situations has dire consequences for a soldier’s ability to integrate back into civilian life where the rules of combat do not apply. habituation may be good for training, but can we call it therapeutic? does it heal?  white (1980) has brilliantly argued that narrative requires the establishment of law—without law, the subject has no moral agency. in this sense, history and story are forms of state making and political action that follow a desire to represent reality and establish order. for white, stories are moralizing and inaccurate portrayals of reality. i see stories in a more positive light. stories provide a center, a continuity of self, that allows people to act in the world and draw relations of responsibility between themselves and others. in light of my ethnographic inquiry, i argue that a turn to the senses as "outside" of narrative, or privileged over narrative, can replicate colonial violence. colonialism imposes domination by regulating labor and instrumentalizing time. listening to stories takes time, time worth taking.  moreover, the closed system constitutive of vre bifurcates trauma into combat vs. gender violence.  here combat is elevated into sensorial immersion, while the realities of gender violence are ignored. the gaming and psychiatric communities i encountered during my fieldwork were remarkably silent about gender and sexual violence in the military. in stark contrast, when i listened to the stories of gulf war, iraq, and afghanistan veterans, sexual violence figured prominently in their daily experiences of war; sexual intimidation and rape carried different gendered meanings for men and women. one gulf war veteran i discussed my research with confided that it is common for women soldiers to seek sexual partnership with an “alpha male” within their troop, even when they do not desire sex with this male, to avoid being gang raped by the other male soldiers in their troop. she had engaged in such a relationship and described continuing feelings of guilt, shame, anger, and depression long after her deployment. a male veteran told me about how he survived childhood sexual violence—an experience that continues to figure into his life and relationships. he eventually escaped the abuse that led to unstable teenage years within the foster care system and joined the military to find a sense of belonging, a group of comrades that could become a kind of family. for him, the way military officers treat rape, especially against men, left him feeling betrayed. he described a tacit understanding that that if a soldier reported being raped or reported other soldiers who raped, he or she faced further stigmatization and career dissolution. these are not isolated stories. studies show a high percentage of men who enlist also have a history of childhood sexual abuse (zaramba, 2014a) and that the military often condones gender violence (castro, kintzel, schuyler, lucas, & warner, 2015; o’brien, keith, & shoemaker, 2015). vre researchers do not discuss meaning, poetics, or expression nor do they discuss the role of sexual fantasy and exploitation; instead they elaborate on a puritanical measurement of anxiety levels, variables of stimuli, and patients’ physiological responses. what has been made visible and optimized are the operational skills needed to navigate humvees while improvised explosive devices (ieds) and rocket-propelled grenades (rpg) fire are present. sexual violence and the everyday complex relationships of trust and betrayal within the military, however, elicit a phobic avoidance and are made invisible within the therapeutic scene.  here, sexual exploitation is the elephant in the room, ignored through a mythic bifurcation of rape vs. combat trauma. the bifurcation of rape vs. combat is a myth that does not respond to the prevalence and normalization of rape in the daily life of combat and to its centrality in combat trauma. in this mythic tradition, rape equals feminization, a total loss of male privilege and virility. this mythology only seems rational in a rape culture that can only speak of rape against women and not men and a fraternal value system that excludes women and fears any possible ‘feminization’ of men. the preferred choice then is to ignore and in effect silence rape against both men and women in virtual therapeutics. if, however, vre is construed as a “cure” for ptsd and combat trauma, the myth falls apart. in the military, the soldier (like the colonial subject) is always already subjugated. to then remove the soldier’s ability to tell his or her own story evacuates the soldier’s ability for political and personal action—to author his or her own story, to find a center of meaning from which to act in the world.  stories involve “reflexivity, a past, a history” (white, 1980). sensorial presence denies the past in the ever-present quest to habituate the nervous system to anxiety-provoking stimuli. this lends sensorial presence its temporal flexibility. due to its focus on sensorial presence over symbolic meaning, vre can be applied before or after the soldier experiences combat trauma. increasingly, vre is being imagined by its practitioners as a form of “stress inoculation”—a psychological vaccine to be administered to soldiers before combat (rizzo et al., 2009).  “stress inoculation” imagines an ideal world where ptsd no longer exists because people can be habituated to their traumas before they even experience them—a military utopian imaginary of having war without trauma. rizzo et al. (2012) propose that stress inoculation is a kind of "mindfulness" training, borrowing terminology from yoga and zen buddhism. swimming in a pool of repetitions figure 3. “stress inoculation” training in san diego, ca. film still from virtual war: memories of abu-ghraib by producer/director emily cohen ibañez. at the time of my research, the ict was developing strive (stress resilience in virtual environments) as a "multi-episode narrative experience" with "combat situations, relational development, stress and loss, and emotional trauma...to raise the service member's threshold for the stress of combat" (buckwalter et al., 2012). here, ict employs narrative as a series of scenarios that include interaction with virtual artificial intelligence (ai) characters, simulating stress inoculation training already performed by outdoor tv studios in southern california which use live action role players, hollywood sets, and special effects. as a part of my fieldwork, i performed as an afghan role player at a tv studio in san diego for combat soldiers and military medics. dressed in tradition afghan garb, my work involved a ten-hour day of play-acting the same twenty-minute scenario over and over again. the scenario felt more like a video game than narrative; each reenactment involved slight variations of the same thing. sometimes i would get shot and be tapped on the shoulder to lie down and act dead; other times i was told to confiscate weaponry from the soldiers. we were given ten-minute breaks between each scenario before we performed the scenario again. this gave some time to reflect with other afghan role players, but as "afghanis" we were not allowed to interact and speak with soldiers outside the scenario. we were told to taunt soldiers and yell at them. figure 4. photograph of emily cohen ibañez dressed as an afghan role player. i did not say much because i was the only role player who did not speak farsi or pashto. a team of coaches who were post-deployment soldiers directed us role players. one of the coaches asked me to confiscate the weapon of a “dead” soldier inside an abandoned house. as a team of combat soldiers entered the home, i was instructed to point the gun at them. the coach instructed the men to lie on top of each other in sexually demeaning positions and then taunted the soldiers, “look, a woman is pointing a gun at you.” the coach disciplined the combat soldiers in training for their carelessness, using my gender to emasculate them. i felt i had lost my moral compass, swimming in a pool of repetitions. all day we were exposed to different stressors—an ied explosion which involved smoke and a loud boom that did not actually kill or maim, rpg fire which involved soldiers shooting empty shells at us that sometimes burned and scarred the skin's surface (as afghan role players, we were not given protective gear) but did not result in our actual death or life-threatening injury. i felt terror playing this game. in an interview i conducted, the studio’s co-founder explained that researchers swabbed the soldiers’ cheeks after each re-enactment to measure cortisol levels. these seemed to decrease with repetitive exposure, proving the effectiveness of stress inoculation. we did not discuss the literary aspects of a story, but rather surface areas of the body like cheek swabs and electrocardiogram (ekg) readings. the mind was understood as a cognitive-behavioral machine that could be optimized. the studio co-founder pointed to a graph on a cardboard poster—an arc that charted the rise and fall of cortisol levels with each exposure. a vertical line was drawn at the point of optimization for deployment when cortisol levels lowered but before the precipitous drop that signified no rise in cortisol levels at all.  everyone knew i was an anthropologist conducting research and agreed that role playing would allow me to better understand how stress inoculation works. i completed a ten-hour day of role-playing, a form of labor that afghan role players perform daily for low wages. that night my ears rang, my head hurt, and i had no ability to write or reflect. my heart felt glum. the next day i was able to maneuver my camera through the war zone scenario like an expert video game player, capturing scenes with a steady body and sensorial acumen.  the following day i could not help but wonder what would become of the soldiers in training who would deploy a few days later. would their experience of warfare bear any resemblance to the games we played? in actual war, even when wearing augmented hardware, people die and they do not get back up. in the scenario, death felt undead, inconsequential, and at the same time very real because we were all involved in training for actual warfare and we knew real death was looming—real and virtual, killing and consequence were somehow split apart, making for a profoundly alienating experience. i was capable of navigating the war zone, but without much feeling.9  stories and exposure therapy are kinds of performances; they, however, differ significantly in meaning. rather than paying attention to narrative tone and wording when the patient tells his story (is he triumphant, masochistic, histrionic, or flat?), rainer looks to biomarkers (is he sweating, shaking, tense, or relaxed?). the former refers to meaning and form, the latter records cognitive and bodily function. in the vre session, rainer supplies the variables that construct the generic memory of driving a humvee.  rainer and terry do not co-author a story. rather rainer interrupts terry in mid-description, inhibiting terry’s ability to string together events in a meaningful fashion. rainer turns terry’s attention away from meaning toward a numerical assessment of anxiety and habituation to stress, which in the end matters little to rainer’s assessment of terry. this is wholly different from sigmund freud’s notions of introspection and transference (freud, 1913). in freudian psychoanalysis, the analyst and the analysand co-author a story, a dialogic form of authoring in which interpretation of symbolic forms take center stage. the analysand witnesses his or her own story, a kind of objectification and externalization of the story. the psychoanalytic introspective stance is a meta-narrative, not a numerical reduction that ultimately gets ignored. vre proponents argue that virtual reality assists patients who are less imaginative. in valuing certain patients as less imaginative and able to tell good stories, will the psychologist, clinician, and social worker forfeit his or her own abilities to a machine—the computer and its reductive virtual scenarios, variables, and binary logic? concluding remarks why are we huddling about the campfire? why do we tell tales, or tales about tales—why do we bear witness, true or false?...is it because we are so organized as to take actions that prevent our dissolution into the surroundings? —ursula k. le guin (1980), “it was a dark and stormy night; or, why are we huddling around the campfire” the survival of veterans in the united states is precarious. rates of suicide for iraq and afghanistan veterans under the age of 35, especially within three years of service, are significantly higher than for the civilian population. in 2014, the los angeles times reported that “veterans who had been enlisted in the rank-and-file committed suicide at nearly twice the rate of former officers” (zaramba, 2014b), suggesting that war’s devastation and despair affects veterans differently and correlates with social status in the military. so why do we tell stories? people tell stories to “prevent [their] dissolution into the surroundings” (le guin, 1980). this draws us in relation to each other and allows us to escape containment—we can ascribe meaning imaginatively to our experiences and actions in ways that affirm social relationships and our sense of place in the world.  contemporary ethnographers follow daily life, listen to stories by a diverse set of constituents, and assemble an analysis often from disparate places. the best ethnographies are as poetic as they are methodologically sound. in a world where data analytics and algorithms predominate as modes for understanding our world, listening to and telling stories carry more urgency than ever before. as anna tsing beautifully writes, “it is in listening to that cacophony of troubled stories that we might encounter our best hopes for precarious survival” (tsing, 2015). poet and iraq veteran jennifer cole served in baghdad in 2003. she was discharged in 2004 after being diagnosed with ptsd and gulf war syndrome. here is an excerpt from her poem, “veteran of war: a poem” (2014): i feel like my body and mind have turned against me they no longer work with me my body is a vessel that is constantly broken i am in constant pain all day and all night there is no ceasing my pain i can only ebb it fatigue weighs on me like kevlar gear in the hot sun the simplest of tasks now require more than i have to give i feel pathetic and incapable i have a soul that is independent trapped in a body and controlled by a mind that are dependent cole’s poem is a story of alienation and severe fragmentation—“my body and mind have turned against me.” she experiences her mind as controlling her sense of personhood, or soul, from the outside, leading to a kind of dependency that feels confining, an independent soul trapped in a dependent body. some relief may be found in recognizing that all people are always already dependent in the sense that people must rely on each other to survive, and yet cole’s extreme precarity comes from being a veteran in a post-draft culture in which less than 1% of americans currently serve in the us armed forces.  i can imagine the reader critiquing my attention to storytelling, pointing to the works of brian massumi (2002), deleuze and guatarri (1983), and william connolly (1999) where sensation is the basis of liberation. these scholars have invited readers to ask: can the virtual person exist outside his or her body and outside of language? can we forget about intention altogether and focus our attention on an amalgam of brain waves and sensorial intensity? for scholars like massumi and others, coherence attained through narrative represents unwelcome forms of constraint. i am arguing that the fantasy of pure sensation does not always equal desirable liberation—feminist and/or other forms of liberation. in light of my research findings, i do not see a turn to the senses as necessarily challenging to western dominance and its binary gender system—in fact, such attention can reassert dominance in perverse ways. this is not to say that scholars should not be concerned with the senses. but this concern cannot be divorced from the political, economic, historical, technological and linguistic realities that govern the sense we make of them. i am not proposing an anti-technology or even an anti-neuroscientific stance. nor am i proposing that theorists stop talking about the senses. i am inviting a critical examination of a current popular and academic fascination with, and even a romanticization of, the senses and the emergent technologies associated with them. through critical inquiry, we can better think about how technologies that capitalize on the senses remake our worlds in ways that may be desirable or may not be. we can challenge ontological binaries between language and sensation and seek open perceptual fields of language and aesthetic forms that can be accessed, changed, and rescripted in ordinary ways and in everyday life.   anthropology came to fruition within a colonial context. with early british expeditions to the torres straits, anthropologists compared the rationality of europeans with their colonized subjects. they subjected torres straits islanders to a series of tests to measure visual and spatial perception (rivers, 1901); they made film recordings of their body movements and rhythms (haddon, 1898). in his essay “vicissitudes of the self,” jean rouch (2003) describes how film historically provided anthropologists the capacity to decompose embodied experience into fragments—an approach wedded to anthropology’s colonial legacy. early ethnographic films documented the ways different peoples walked, squatted, and climbed things, breaking people down into component parts rather than coherent subjects. similarly, haptic experimental systems enhanced by immersive technologies and techniques involve a decomposition of embodied experience into elements like smell, sound, and spatial orientation labeled “biomarkers” whose capacities can be measured, controlled and linked to a self regulating alleostatic neurological system. to write against a colonization of the senses, i turn to jean rouch’s description of dziga vertov’s cine-eye experiments (rouch, 2003). vertov discovered the camera’s ability to capture reality from every angle shattering unidirectional vision into a multitude of perspectives. rather than stasis, multiperspectivism reveals the artifice in perception revealing the open-endedness of everyday life itself. it reveals what is often concealed in science, that seeing and knowing are always framed by the very technologies and techniques at hand. foucault (1995) has argued that it is through the senses that the self becomes disciplined into a new way of seeing. if the advent of freudian analysis provided a way to see the self as individual and interior, virtual therapeutics reconfigure the self as an “out of body” experience and a site for virtual exposure.10  in other words, differently from psychoanalysis, vre figures trauma as always coming from the outside and victimizing a passive subject. vre therapy is based on american behavioral psychology and neurobiological studies on fear, which propose that one can quantify and control the invisible drives of the human self. what if instead we saw the mind, human action, and reality as whole configurations, constituted by a broad perceptual field where the subjectivity of the patient matters? thinking through whole configurations, the aspect of the human mind known as the ‘unconscious’ cannot simply be reduced to a measureable reflex action. instead the porous boundaries between subject and object, awareness and the unknown, and sensation and linguistic category are recognized as intersubjective and in continual relation. as amanda baggs has shown with her video, in my language, sensation does not always have to be imagined as pre-linguistic or be based on the tired evolutionary scheme that divides our minds and brains into binary hierarchical relations of the civilized (prefrontal lobe) and the primitive (amygdalla), or person and non-person. if we let go of these evolutionary schemes, of our fantasized closed worlds, could we then re-design this virtual reality machine into a storytelling machine, a dream machine, a machine where the sensory apparatus opens up to subjective evaluations, humor, and differences that can be recognized as difference? laughter, reflections and feelings of hate, rage and joy matter, as do people’s desires for freedom. is it possible to design a virtual reality machine where the content of our desired desensitization and trauma matters, where we question what we are adapting to in our repetitive enactments of trauma? let’s design a machine that shatters into a multitude of perspectives, tones and complications. let’s break down the signal system that monitors the body and open up to conversations and stories, where we can speak of sexual repression and violence as well as desires for community, camaraderie, and belonging and have those things recognized as central to the healing process. as neurobiological explanations for human behavior and mind become dominant modes for making sense of ourselves and the dimensions of our world, my goal as a feminist anthropologist is not to become conditioned by this language but to engage with such explanations—to read against the grain and to think through multiple modes of embodiment that draw relations between words, actions, feelings, and ordinary life. my goal is to call attention to the intersubjective relations of mind and body, self and world, which both limit and open horizons of possibility. this takes time: a slow approach to science, a science steeped in cultural analysis. if behavioral scientists are metaphorically mice—a model organism widely used in scientific laboratories—that can rapidly reproduce predictive analytics and outcomes, ethnographers are elephants that see totalities developing in lived timed.  what happens when an elephant breaks open the mouse’s cage? the mouse escapes and ventures into the daily unfolding of life—the middle of the story lost in “rapid fire.” acknowledgements i had the fortune of presenting versions of this paper at the science seminar at nyu, the anthropology department at uc berkeley, the ethnographic engagements workshop at uc santa cruz, and the american anthropological association annual meeting. thank you to the students and faculty at these presentations who provided stimulating dialogue and engagement with my work. i’d like to extend a special thanks for the thoughtful commentary from neda atanasoski, aaron bornstein, lisa cartwright, rose cohen, brian goldfarb, ben kilgust, emily martin, and danilyn rutherford. the research and writing for this paper has been supported by the national science foundation, psc-cuny, and the wenner-gren foundation for anthropological research with institutional support from the anthropology department at columbia university and the communication department at uc san diego. notes 1 pseudonym.   2 pseudonym.   3 pseudonym.   4 see http://ict.usc.edu/prototypes/pts. 5 neuroscientific research suggests that fear conditioning can be extinguished with the use of drugs that interfere with memory recall by targeting “reconsolidation,” where memories are labile. these chemical interventions, however, are not compatible with life, so have not been applied to humans (liu et al., 2012; schiller et al., 2010). d-cycloserine, so the argument goes, has side effects that would perhaps interrupt memory recall, however, the biological mechanisms for this are unclear. 6 pseudonym. 7 pseudonym. 8 the discovery of a nervous center that controls blood pressure dates back to the late 1800s, a discovery that inspired scientists like ivan pavlov to study the functioning of the "animal machine," mostly in terms of digestion—the function of hunger and satiation in relation to conditional reflexes (todes, 2014). despite the astounding results pavlov culled from the lab, physicians with clinical experience disputed pavlov's lab results based on the "impossibly complex mass of interconnected phenomena in their daily practice" and their aims in trying to keep patients alive after surgery, in contrast to pavlov's dogs which usually did not survive his surgical interventions (todes, 2014). it was not until much later in his experimentation that pavlov applied his work to psychiatric illness and observed "depth phobia" in one of his laboratory dogs he named "john." by observing john, pavlov determined that phobias are "exaggerated inhibitions" that the experimenter could effectively remove and restore by inducing states of hypnosis and excitation with alternations of a metronome (a speeding up and slowing down of the rhythm). gestalt psychologists, who dominated psychiatry in russia at the time, challenged pavlov's results. pavlovians looked at how the brain "joined together individual sensations;" gestalt psychologists opposed mechanistic reductionism that saw the mind and human action in terms of an "accumulation of small perceptions" (todes, 2014). rather, gestalt psychology focused on whole configurations, "the structure of an entire perceptual field" that involved relationships between elements rather than a simple sum of them (todes, 2014). fascinatingly, pavlov saw understanding the subjectivity of his dogs as essential to his experimental design and analysis of research outcomes. in vre and contemporary neuroscientific studies on fear and conditional reflexes (ledoux, 2002), the subjectivity of the patient or research subject does not matter. 9 other afghan role players had differing perspectives on our shared experience. for example, verda, an older afghan woman, explained to me that she felt her work as a role player would ultimately save innocent civilians in afghanistan because soldiers encountering her would realize that not all afghanis are bad. while she did not support the war, she felt no resentment towards americans in particular since war had become a fact of life in afghanistan and it did not matter whether domination came from russia, the united states, or some other foreign power. her niece, sameer, on the other hand, shared the terror i felt, but was happy for the employment as it was a means for 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(2014b, 14 january). detailed study confirms high suicide rate among recent veterans. los angeles times. retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-veteran-suicide-20150115-story.html bio emily cohen ibañez is an anthropologist and filmmaker. she is currently the assistant director at the science and justice research center and a research associate at the center for documentary arts research. her work explores the ways science, technology, and medicine influence the ways people come to know themselves and their world. her first book bodies at war: an ethnography is under consideration at duke university press. the book examines what it means to rehabilitate after landmine injury in colombia, one of the countries with the highest incidents of landmine injuries in the world. her debut feature film bodies at war/mina (2015) premiered at el festival de cine de bogotá and is currently screening at universities nationally and internationally. her short work has also screened at the society for visual anthropology film festival, the santa fe independent film festival, and is available on public access platforms. she was recently awarded the wenner-gren fejos fellowship in ethnographic film to complete her second feature hybrid film virtual war: memories of abu-ghraib. she has received grants and fellowships from the national science foundation, wenner-gren foundation for anthropological research, american council for learned societies, nyu torch prize, psc-cuny, the flaherty film seminar, and fulbright colombia. troubling figures: endocrine disruptors, intersex frogs, and the logics of environmental science o’laughlin, logan natalie. (2020). troubling figures: endocrine disruptors, intersex frogs, and the logics of environmental science. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), 1-28 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license troubling figures: endocrine disruptors, intersex frogs, and the logics of environmental science logan natalie o’laughlin duke university logan.olaughlin@duke.edu abstract this essay examines the figure of the pesticide-exposed intersex frog, a canary in the coal mine for public endocrinological health. through feminist science studies and critical discourse analysis, i explore the fields that bring this figure into being (endocrinology, toxicology, and pest science) and the colonial and racial logics that shape these fields. in so doing, i attend to the multiple nonhuman actors shaping this figure, including the pesky weeds and insects who prompt pesticides’ very existence, “male” frogs who function as test subjects, and systemic environmental racism that disproportionately exposes people of color to environmental toxicants. i encourage careful examination of galvanizing environmental figures like this toxic intersex frog and i offer a method to do so. introduction “the second most commonly used pesticide [in the united states], atrazine,…led one of my frogs to develop a set of testes here, ovaries here, another testis, and more ovaries…which is not normal, even for amphibians,” chuckles dr. tyrone hayes while gesturing to the image of a frog’s gonads in his 2010 ted talk (hayes & chaffer, 2010; figure 1). in his words, atrazine makes frogs “abnormal,” “gender-bending,” “homosexual,” and therefore “unsuccessful at mating” (hayes et al., 2002; hayes et al., 2003; hayes & chaffer, 2010). other environmental scientists have studied the concerning effects of toxicants on frogs. for instance, special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 2 david skelly found that frog populations living in manicured suburban ponds have a high female-to-male sex ratio and higher rates of frogs who are intersex, both of which he has described as “creepy” and “bizarre” in interviews (barringer, 2008; skelly, bolden, & dion 2010; zimmer, 2011). hayes’s creative performance style, which incorporates rhyme and comedy, has helped popularize inflammatory language about intersex frogs and make this toxic animal figure all the more compelling. in hayes’s and skelly’s work, frogs become a touchstone for broader anxieties about pesticide effects on sex and sexuality. figure 1. slide representation of frog with hermaphroditic traits (hayes & chaffer, 2010). it is no surprise that this environmental anxiety has been picked up by right-wing extremists such as alex jones (2017), who asserts that “the government is putting chemicals in the water turning the frogs gay!” and by comedian-journalist john oliver (2017), who, in a 2017 episode of last week tonight, projects an image of a pair of frogs on a lily pad with a rainbow flag. pop science news sites riff of skelly’s frog research with titles such as “your lawn is giving frogs a sex change” and “frogs a-courtin’ trouble on tidy lawns” (knapton, 2015; philpott, 2015). these examples highlight how anxiety about sex and sexuality is not only ubiquitous but directly informed by the figure of the pesticide-exposed frog. feminist and queer environmental scholars have contested this kind of language for its implicit slandering of being queer, trans, or intersex (di chiro, 2010; kier, 2010; sturgeon, 2010). few have spent time deconstructing this figure and its colonial underpinnings, however. in this article, i examine the figure of the toxicant-exposed intersex frog, a figure which has been puzzling me for several years.1 through feminist science studies and critical discourse analysis, i explore the colonial and racial logics undergirding endocrinology, toxicology, and pest special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 3 science that bring this figure into being. responding to queer ecologies and feminist new materialisms this essay brings together several fields that often speak past one another, including queer and feminist environmental studies, critical science studies, critical animal studies, and critical race studies. queer ecocriticism and feminist environmentalisms have recently drawn attention to the role of heteronormativity and homophobia to popular conceptions of the environment, building upon a history of ecofeminist scholarship highlighting the gendered implications of environmental destruction. the amalgamation of fields sometimes referred to as “queer ecologies” has made important interventions, particularly in highlighting how western myths of queerness as “unnatural” surface at moments of ecological crisis (di chiro, 2010; mortimer-sandilands, 2010; sturgeon, 2010; alaimo, 2016; pollock, 2016). contributors to queer ecologies have playfully framed endocrine-disrupting toxicants as opportunities to disrupt the social equation of binary sex and biological reproduction and/as indicators of wellbeing (di chiro, 2010; pollock, 2016). mel chen (2012) and vanessa agard-jones (2013) have helpfully tempered some of this excitement about environmental toxicants by highlighting the racialized and sexualized trajectories of environmental toxicants. the related scholarship of queer and feminist ecological thought, feminist new materialism, and object-oriented feminisms has offered generative ways to think about environmental harm from the perspective of seemingly inanimate objects, such as rocks, plants, or environmental toxins and toxicants. however, the feminist new materialist turn, even when attentive to race, fails to think about the unique function of entities commonly understood as animate nonhumans under western scientific paradigms (animals). i have been shaped by growing scholarship at the intersection of critical race theory and critical animal studies that attends to the ontological collusion of the human/animal divide with the dehumanization of people of color; using theories produced at this intersection in tandem with decolonial analytics, i explore how nonhuman animal figures are crucial mechanisms for the biopolitical functions of dominant scientific method, both dehumanizing humans racialized as non-white and obfuscating indigenous onto-epistemologies (wynter, 1994; deckha, 2006; murphy, 2007; kimmerer, 2013; weheliye, 2014; kim, 2015; ahuja, 2016; ko & ko, 2017). in reifying logics of science, the figure of the toxicant-exposed frog functions as a specific kind of immaterial animal capital. in using the phrase “animal capital,” i invoke nicole shukin’s (2009) eponymous analytic, which traces how nonhuman animals are special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 4 rendered into both symbolic and material capital. animals can function as cultural stand-ins for nation-states as well as physical flesh commodities that feed human economies (shukin, 2009). in this work, i examine how the scientific uptake of nonhuman animal figures as indicator species enacts a racially charged and sexualized affective symbolic power. a map of the essay: to conduct a feminist science studies analysis of the figure of the pesticide-exposed intersex frog, i seek to understand it from multiple angles. to better peel the layers back of this palimpsestic test subject, its contradictions, and its effects, i interrogate the many actors that shape it: the pesky weeds and critters who prompt the production of pesticides, african clawed frogs who function as indicator species, endocrinological ontologies of sex, and systemic environmental racism that disproportionately exposes people of color to toxicants. i ask several questions to query the making of this figure: how do colonial pest sciences bring the toxic frog into being? what kinds of logics subtend the production of pesticides? and, on the other hand, how has this figure affected pesticide production? how have african clawed frogs come to function as an indicator species? whence do endocrinological norms about intersex emerge? to explore the first two questions, i provide an abridged review of disturbance ecology and pesticide history from key scholars in the field to reveal how the rise in pests was likely stimulated by european colonialism of north america. i trace how scientific development of pesticides codified understandings of species difference as a means of making “progress.” by interrogating the colonial roots of pest science, i highlight how these logics devalue humans who are racialized as non-white and vilifies racially charged nonhuman plants. i argue that we must use this historical context to understand the frog. in returning to this figure, i study why african clawed frogs are used as indicator species and conduct a close reading of a study by hayes et al. (2010) to unpack how traditional endocrinological approaches frame intersex as both a pathology and a disability, conveniently ignoring the impossibility of binary sex. noting this figure’s entanglement with contemporary racial formations in the united states, i trace how hayes explicitly constructs this frog as a rallying cry against environmental racism. the essay concludes where it begins by exploring how pests are framed as being contrary to progress in racially charged ways, focusing on one chemical company’s rebuttal of the validity of the toxic frog figure. along the way, i use toxic as an adjective to identify something exposed to toxicants as well as to indicate harmful discursive formations that emerge from encounters with toxicants.2 special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 5 through this winding and seemingly circular trajectory, i argue that toxic animal figures, such as the intersex frog, are shaped by harmful scientific logics about sex, gender, and race, and obfuscate histories of violence. i urge us, as feminist environmental scholars and activists, to recognize the complexity of these galvanizing environmental figures. reviewing colonial ecological histories: (un)making agricultural pests to understand the figure of the toxic frog, we must trace how the ontologies and epistemologies of the past haunt the present moment.3 pesticides are not often described as colonial technologies in popular environmental discourses in the us. but a (de)colonial analysis of pesticide development is necessary to understand this figure and its effects; colonialism shapes dominant institutions of science and obfuscates indigenous scientific epistemologies. the work of disturbance ecologists is useful to understand the stakes of pesticides because the intersex frog figure is entangled with the looming specter of “invasive” pests. recognizing the limitations of the environmental historical scholarship that often makes sweeping claims, i nonetheless query these histories. after all, these pesky critters have not been a constant and timeless feature of north america. the creation of pesticides likely facilitated the rise of pest animals and ironically co-produced their bodies and immaterial figures. according to several disturbance ecology historians, european colonial settlement of north america likely stimulated the need for pest control (williams, 1992; taylor, holley, & kirk, 2007; mcwilliams, 2008). settler colonialism thrived by carrying plants, insects, animals, and viruses from europe that helped ensure the success of white settlers against the indigenous residents, a process that alfred crosby (2015) has described as “ecological imperialism” (subramaniam, 2014).4 despite the trope of the pristine and untouched “new world” that circulated among colonial settlers, many tribes carefully cultivated and maintained forests. one prominent indigenous scientific method used was controlled burning of plants and trees to foster biodiverse ecosystems, including moist forests, open oak forests, and grasslands (mcwilliams, 2008; stewart, 2009; crane, 2014; lake et al., 2017). for instance, a member of the coquille tribe explained that burning was a means of preventing the douglas fir from “encroaching on the open prairies and crowd[ing] out the other timber” (lucy thompson qtd. in wells, 2011). this practice was likely not recognized as the scientific method that it is today in large special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 6 part because colonial sciences operated in direct opposition to indigenous ontoepistemologies of the natural world (verran, 2008; kimmerer, 2013). the eviction and genocide of indigenous peoples and the subordination of indigenous sciences often coincided with and facilitated the overgrowth of forests. in other words, settler colonialism likely encouraged the proliferation of what many deem “pest” species, especially insects and plants that may grow along or in competition with food crops in these forests (mcwilliams, 2008; wells, 2011). european settlers’ apparent aversion to these overgrowing forests led to another kind of disruption for forest-dwelling nonhuman species of north america. settlers’ destruction of the woods killed many natural predators of insects and upset ecosystems on a large scale. for instance, thinning tree cover from previously lush woods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made many winter freezes less severe (mcwilliams, 2008). many european settlers hypothesized that thinning out woods and clearing land for farming would reduce insect populations by decreasing the amount of moisture and foliage protection. however, the opposite likely occurred; the ground thawed faster during winter freezes, allowing insect larvae that would have previously died under the severe cold to survive and even thrive (cronon, 2003; mcwilliams, 2008; steinberg, 2012). while deforestation led to the demise of many plants, it also encouraged the growth of plants that thrive under direct sunlight; these kinds of plants often have thicker leaves with denser nutrients and are thus especially appealing to insects (mcwilliams, 2008). it would be inaccurate to suggest that settler colonialism had a singularly detrimental effect on the nonhuman landscape, that indigenous stewardship of the land was always oriented towards environmental longevity, or that competition among nonhuman species only existed after colonialism. however, colonial destruction of habitats has had marked effects on the land through encouraging the proliferation of densely nutritious plants. pests and pesticides are thus always materially and discursively connected to colonialism. this material history is often obscured from the popular framing of pests as invaders. this obfuscation gives them more power as animal figures who maliciously foist themselves onto unsuspecting humans, rather than creatures whose existence has been co-produced by humans. despite the major influence that “american” settlement played in the proliferation of unwanted insect and plant populations in north america, pests have often been described as being un-american in their obstruction of us agricultural progress. ontologically, the very categories of “pest” and “invasive special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 7 species” are founded in colonial logic, as others such as banu subramaniam (2014) have noted: one is described as a justified resident and the other as an intruder (kim, 2015; head, 2017). it is revealing that species marked as “invasive,” “alien,” or “non-native” do not match a specific biological taxonomy. on the contrary, these are loosely used signifiers that can span many unwanted species. this discourse demonstrates the arbitrariness of which colonial values are placed on nonhuman species. many different kinds of “pests,” such as mosquitos, moths, and beetles as well as plethora of “weed” plants, were seen as unpatriotic simply because they threatened the colonial agricultural economy in the us. for instance, the hessian fly received its name during the american revolution because it seemed to appear just after the arrival of hessian troops, otherwise known as german soldiers hired by britain (mcwilliams, 2008). the hessian fly continued to be a scourge on wheat, barley, and rye crops, and its name functioned as a reminder of its foreignness. plants and insects thus became useful vessels and vectors of nationalist sentiment. the labels “invasive” and “pest” are subjective and capacious. “invasive,” for example, indicates nothing about the comestible value of a plant. these labels demonstrate how abstract and arbitrary values become attached to plants. many of the weeds ostensibly encroaching on food crops were and are nutritious to humans. sometimes the invasive plants were even more nutrient dense than the crops they invaded, but their inferior sociocultural value justified their continued vilification. other plants that were cultivated during the eighteenth century in us colonies as valuable crops—such as velvetleaf, a rich source of dietary fiber—are now deemed invasive. velvetleaf is currently listed as invasive in forty-eight us states and “noxious” in four (integrated pest management, 2015). portrayal of pests as invasive is thus geographically and temporally specific. the ideological variation over time further emphasizes the socially constructed nature of the term invasive. growing anxieties about pests in the us in the mid-1800s became especially palpable through the concomitant development of biological sciences, including entomology (the study of insects), botany (the study of plants), and economic ornithology (the study of birds as key actors in pest management). these fields of study provided a rich opportunity for us settlers to codify colonial ontologies of nuisance species and to justify the need for pesticides (mcwilliams, 2008). under the rubric of objectivity, these life sciences articulated differences across plants and animals not only to understand but also better control them. in so doing, they attributed differential value to species by determining their potential usefulness and/or harm to human civilization. the biological sciences were helpful in special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 8 engraining white settler ideologies in popular farming cultures; cross-industry collaboration meant that farmers were soon taught how to identify species and subspecies of invasive insects and plants by their morphologies, assessed via observation of roots, leaves, and flowers, in order to apply the appropriate antidote to the “problem,” though, at the time, the available pesticides were largely ineffective (mcwilliams, 2008). though the biological sciences operated under the scientific method to ensure accurate findings, there was infrequent interrogation of the logics of pests. since the us is a nation centered around monocropped corn, pesticides are helpful to its survival. this is the landscape from which the pesticide-exposed intersex frog figure emerges. with this history, we can appreciate how the frog is a figure of friction because it focuses on a different enemy: pesticides. carrying this history forward, i will use the next section to demonstrate that the toxic intersex frog reveals important insights about normative and dehumanizing logics in endocrinology and environmental science. scientia intersexualis: the construction of “creepy” hermaphroditic frogs frogs are culturally significant in the us, which makes them powerful as environmental soothsayers. they are often gregarious and lovable creatures in children’s stories that anthropomorphize them, such as the princess and the frog, kermit the frog from sesame street, and frog and toad. frogs are featured in backyard-science projects that invite children to approach and gently study how these amphibians diligently catch flies with their lightning-fast tongues. these frogs are what skelly has described as the “look mom i found a frog!” frogs (qtd. in barringer, 2008). in this capacity, frogs are valued as nonhuman teachers of how the natural world works. reports of their declining populations and their sex “anomalies” thus evoke concern and dismay, as the international save the frogs! campaign demonstrates. but frogs are not just an indicator species based on people’s observation of them in the wild. frogs are also captured, bred, studied, and euthanized as test subjects. the seeming contradiction of their simultaneous value and disposability complicates the toxic intersex frog figure. frogs’ cultural significance is in their longevity as a population rather than their sentience. african clawed frogs (xenopus laevis or x. laevis, for short) in particular are subjected to scientific testing because they are perceived to be an invasive species. their resilience in new habitats and their ability to crowd out competitors have prompted african special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 9 clawed frogs to be listed as illegal to own without a permit in many us states and sometimes even illegal to possess at all (california department of fish and wildlife, n.d.; matier & ross, 2007). x. laevis’s disposability as a species is what makes them logical test subjects in a utilitarian sense: extracting, breeding, confining, and studying them can help prevent environmental harm to other more valuable animals such as humans and can help regulate their populations. x. laevis’s famed history in one of the first pregnancy tests in the 1930s has also made them a common choice in endocrinological research (kirksey, hannah, lotterman, & moore, 2016). x. laevis frogs have been particularly useful in this field because they develop in ways similar to humans. they can live remarkably long lives, from fifteen to thirty years, and can thus be part of longitudinal studies. so, too, are x. laevis frogs easy to control because they spend a great deal of their lives underwater. african clawed frogs in the lab live very different lives from the tree frogs in people’s backyards and public ponds in large part because of this cultural value. frogs who have been exposed to environmental toxicants become vectors for slandering rhetoric of non-normative sex organs. for instance, hayes reports that exposure to low levels of atrazine led his male frogs to develop eggs in their testes, to develop multiple testes and ovaries, and to mount other males to copulate, a phenomenon he calls “chemical castration” (hayes & chaffer, 2010). as mentioned earlier, skelly refers to frogs who develop hermaphroditic traits as “creepy” and “bizarre” in public news about his research (skelly qtd. in barringer, 2008; zimmer, 2011). though these value-laden descriptions of these frogs are inflammatory, they are not dismissed wholesale since they are based on consistent findings and otherwise sound science.5 the fact that these inflammatory descriptions evoke laughter, shares, and retweets suggests that they align with longstanding ideologies in contemporary us society that presume intersex is (1) an aberration of traditional anatomical development; (2) a sexual perversion (lacking an easily identifiable binary sex is an immediate failure to be a heterosexual subject, since heterosexuality presumes the existence of only two sexes); and (3) an immediate sign of infertility. this resistance to sex and sexual norms rears its head most commonly in fears about intersex as a sign of permanent sterility. it often manifests as a failure to recognize that fertility, sex, and sexuality exist on a spectrum across humans and nonhuman animals. the figure of the endocrine-disrupted frog functions because it often collapses special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 10 several forms of alterity: intersex, infertility, and homosexuality. for instance, hayes draws out the ongoing social discomfort with intersex by describing intersex frogs as “genetic males,” implying an essential trait from which the frogs have veered, and who engage in sex with other males, both traits which he implies are associated to atrazine (hayes & chaffer, 2010; hayes et al., 2010. hayes positions intersex as sexually deviant when he projects an image of two frogs engaging in intercourse and says, “these are just two brothers consummating their relationship” (chaffer & hayes, 2010). environmental toxicologists ring the alarm on “genetic males” being “feminized” by pesticides, both morphologically and behaviorally. but the shock value of the toxicant-exposed frog only functions under the assumption that intersex is indeed a pathology. despite intersex justice organizing as well as feminist science studies scholarship reminding the public that intersex is common, irrespective of the presence of endocrine-disrupting chemicals, this scientific literature emphasizes the novelty of these findings. for instance, hayes et al. (2002) note, “these abnormalities [of intersex] were never observed in control animals in the current experiments or in over 10,000 observations of control animals in our laboratory over the last 6 years” (p. 5477). missing from the public discussion of these studies, however, is the fact that many animals lack easily distinguishable sexes in the first place (roughgarden, 2004; avise, 2011). the making of a male test subject: closer analysis suggests that environmental scientific research, which posits intersex as a pathology, requires both a social and biological construction of binary sex in the first place. by analyzing the making of the intersex frog in the lab, we can witness the biopolitics of science through its binaristic articulation and regulation of sex. to delve into greater detail, i interrogate the scientific method of one such study, hayes’s and his colleagues’ 2010 study, “atrazine induces complete feminization and chemical castration in male african clawed frogs.” in it, i examine how studying endocrinological effects of toxicants requires creating “true” males, which hayes et al. (2010) explain in their “supporting information, data & methods” appendix. i juxtapose it with the history of intersex violence against humans in order to evaluate the implications of articulating intersex as a nonhuman phenomenon resulting from and in toxicity. despite the dramatic, binary language of demasculinization castration, and feminization in both scientific literature and popular culture, african clawed frogs cannot be sexed on sight alone. male and female african clawed frogs do have some differences on average: females are generally larger, males often have darker colored pads on their arms (nuptial pads), and females have slightly larger special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 11 bumps between their legs (cloacal labia). however, a frog that might have “male” characteristics cannot be presumed to be male. biological sex in frogs is elusive and this is part of its rambunctious power. because hayes’s study uses “sex chromosomes” as the primary indicator of sex, i will first remain in this register to trace the differences between human and frog sex chromosomes (and what they reveal) and will then critique the sexchromosome model used in this project (a multispecies logic). humans, unlike frogs, can have any permutation of x and y chromosomes, having a single or multiple x chromosomes, which are quite large, and y chromosomes, which are small. the presence of a single y chromosome in humans usually marks that human as “male,” even though many xy humans develop as phenotypically as female. (humans cannot survive without an x chromosome, as it carries the bulk of genetic information necessary for life.) the y chromosome is often described as “dominant” in humans because it carries the sry gene, which activates the shift in development of ovaries to the development of testes. there are many permutations of x and y chromosomes, each with different possible physical expressions (phenotypes). researchers can look at the number and size of human chromosomes (karyotype) by breaking apart a single cell to examine the genetic material therein, assembling each of the chromosomes as pairs, and displaying it as an image called a karyogram (figure 2). figure 2. karyogram of human chromosomes. image adapted by author from wiki commons. frogs’ chromosomes differ dramatically from humans’, and african clawed frogs’ chromosomes are particularly unique. frog chromosomes have been named different letters to help distinguish them from the human x and y chromosomes: w (female) and z (male). unlike humans’ chromosomes, which are commonly described as male-dominant, african clawed frog chromosomes are “female special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 12 dominant,” meaning the existence of a single w chromosome triggers a development cascade for the growth of ovaries. thus, zw is intended to denote a female african clawed frog and zz a male. unlike the large x chromosome and the small y chromosome, which are easily viewable on a human karyogram, the sex chromosomes of this frog cannot be morphologically distinguished on a karyogram (figures 3 and 4). in other words, you cannot visually distinguish zz and zw frogs by examining a karyotype because both z and w chromosomes usually look the same in size and shape. figure 3. karyogram modified to emphasize the sex chromosomes of a xenopus laevis zw female, identical in size (uno et al., 2008). special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 13 figure 4. ideogram of a x. laevis zw female to demonstrate identical alleles on the sex chromosomes (adapted from uno et al., 2008). figure 5. rearing process for the zz colony prior to experiment conducted by roger liu (hayes et al., 2010). note: e2 refers to estradiol exposure used to convert the frog population to femaleappearing frogs, both zw females and zz “sex-reversed” genetic males. f0, f1, and f2 refer to the multiple breeding phrases necessary. given the phenotypic similarities across amphibian sexes, and because phenotypic differences are not reliable indicators of genetic sex, it was not possible for hayes’s team to put together a sample of genetically male (zz) frogs through visual sorting. hayes and his team had to construct such a group by creating “sex-reversed” wild frogs, as they called it (hayes et al. 2010 p. 4614 ). this tedious process was delegated to a research assistant and only discussed in the appendix (hayes et al., 2010; see figure 5). the genetically male frog population (zz) was developed in the following manner: first, the researchers captured a sample of wild x. laevis frogs, which presumably contained a mix of male and female (zz and zw) frogs, and exposed them to estradiol in order to stimulate the production of female traits in the developing frogs. these frogs were still both male and female genetically, even though they all had female characteristics. the second phase (f1 in figure 5) entailed breeding these now special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 14 phenotypically female frogs (both zz and zw) with male-appearing wild frogs (presumed zz but not confirmed for the aforementioned reasons). after this breeding cycle, hayes identified the lab-altered phenotypically female frogs (again both zz and zw) who produced only male-appearing offspring (when mated with the wild zz but possibly also zw frogs), since these must have been zz “sex-reversed” genetic males. (estradiol-exposed zz frogs who bred with wild zz males would always result in zz offspring; whereas zw frogs who bred with zz frogs would be expected to produce a mix of zz and zw offspring.) the labaltered zz frogs identified through this step (albeit exposed to estradiol at this point and thus phenotypically female) were then bred with already confirmed zz frogs from a former study to produce the f2 generation of zz male frogs. the offspring of this second and somewhat queer phase of breeding were ultimately the sample population that hayes and his colleagues used in his study of atrazine (hayes et al. 2010). this method is revealing: researchers studying the “feminizing” effects of hormones have to do extensive work to create a test group of confirmed males before even starting their experiments. hayes’ et al. acknowledge the importance of their study in acknowledging “the possibility of natural variation in sex differentiation processes between species and even between populations (or strains) within a species” (2010, p. 4614). their controlling for variations of sex is far more rigorous than studies of other species, such as humans who have more easily observable chromosomal differences.6 yet frogs are still somehow deemed a good indicator species for predicting human health. it is revealing that the “natural” genetic males who haven’t yet been affected by endocrine disruption are not actually naturally occurring in the sense that genetic males cannot be identified outside of the laboratory; the frogs used in hayes’s research have been bred twice under human supervision before ever arriving at the state of a confirmed “genetic male,” waiting to be possibly feminized by atrazine. the optics of pop science frame atrazine as causing same-sex mating, yet it is crucial to remember that hayes has already been mating “genetic males” together to develop his f2 generation. moreover, it is worth noting that the model of using sex chromosome as a measure of sex is risky in and of itself. intersex activists and feminist scholars have critiqued the language of y-chromosome dominance for its assumptions (y chromosomes are “dominant” and “active” and x chromosomes are “passive”). as vernon rosario (2009) has asserted, “rapid advances in the genetics of sex determination have completely trashed the 1950s notion that the human y special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 15 chromosome alone determines male sex” (p. 274). the discovery of sexdetermining genes on non-sex chromosomes in particular have challenged the myths of only x and y chromosomes determining sex, as well as y-chromosome dominance (rosario, 2009). intersex scholars have urged endocrinologists and geneticists to nuance their conception of sex, for instance, calling for a “shift [in molecular genetics] from binary sex to quantum sex, with a dozen or more genes each conferring a small percentage likelihood of male or female sex that is still further dependent on microand macro-environmental interactions” (rosario, 2009, p. 279). the fact that z and w sex chromosomes are treated as the indicator of biological sex in frogs (who are female dominant) reifies the antiquated logic of sex chromosomes in humans. certainly, it is easier to rely on a single variable to determine sex, and analyzing a full profile of the chromosomes (both traditionally marked as sex chromosomes and not) would be an extensive study. but ruminating upon the failures of the sex-chromosome model are crucial. analyzing frogs’ chromosomal differences compared to humans’ may have highlighted that frogs are not a good indicator species for humans in the first place. so, too, could it pose important questions for humans about the stability of sex across species, à la anne fausto-sterling (2000). the figure of the atrazineexposed intersex frog, thus, is created through an omission of how frogs’ sexes exist in the first place and reifies a myth that sex chromosomes are the identifier of sex. toxic frog rhetoric and/as pathologizing human intersex: in obscuring that wild x. laevis frogs cannot technically be test subjects for this study yet because their sex is unknown, hayes contributes to a broader scientific and cultural practice of othering intersex as a sex/ual pathology and a disability of reproductive capacity. endocrinological studies rely on the construction of a control group against which to compare the rates of “abnormality,” whether existing in controlled exposure to chemicals in the lab (such as in the work of hayes) or in that of observing rates of naturally occurring intersex depending on proximity to households (as in the work of skelly.) the implications of these complex discourses are significant, as many intersex activists and scholars have emphasized. by assuming that non-normative sex is a specifically toxic phenomenon that might someday affect humans, these figures enact discursive sex/ual violence. contrary to popular belief, intersex precedes the advent of synthetic pesticides, substantiated by the archives of intersex activism, and thus cannot be characterized as a quintessentially new phenomenon. failing to mention current and historical intersex humans is awkward (and not in a particularly generative special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 16 way). since hayes positions humans that are intersex as a forthcoming anomaly, they should theoretically not exist. these panics ignore the existence of past and present intersex people by placing them temporally out of sync. failing to describe intersex as an extant human trait follows the historical rhetoric that has objectified and dehumanized people with intersex traits as somehow animal. in particular, this ontology echoes thirteen-century european literary descriptions of intersex and hermaphroditism, where it was thought that what distinguishes a human from an animal is the possession of an easily distinguishable sex (devun, 2014). certainly hayes does make allusions to human intersex but only as evidence of the presumed recent effects of endocrinedisrupting chemicals. for instance, hayes juxtaposes pictures of his dissected intersex frogs with different images of disembodied human genitals that do not neatly fit the category of male. he shows these images to emphasize that what frogs are experiencing may indeed be foreshadowing what could happen to humans. intersex thus continues to live at the edge of the human and nonhuman, through bringing certain humans into the fold of the subor nonhuman (devun, 2014). though hayes’s pathologization of intersex frogs never mentions historical ontologies of intersex, he uses the same frames when he describes intersex as never fully human. according to many intersex activists and scholars, asserting that sex is naturally binary is not only inaccurate but is also violent (fausto-sterling, 2000; karkazis, 2008; creighton, greenberg, roen, & volcano, 2009). the rhetoric of binary sex not only ignores the ubiquity of intersex traits among humans and nonhumans but has pronounced material effects. for instance, medicalization of intersex has justified the nonconsensual medical surveillance of infants, children, and adults with non-normative sex morphologies (karkazis, 2008). infants born with genitals that are not easily identifiable as male or female have historically undergone surgeries to “correct” their bodies without adequate informed consent, often even to the parents. unwanted surgeries create long-term health issues for many intersex people, including discomfort when urinating or having sex (faustosterling, 2000; dreger & herndon, 2009). anxieties about intersex children in the 1950s and the toll they might take on society at large ushered in the era of john money’s “optimum of gender rearing model,” which strictly policed intersex children to present and behave exclusively as either a boy or girl with heterosexual desires and punished any who failed to do so (money, hampson, & hampson, 1955; dreger & herndon, 2009). the pathologization of intersex continues to be haunted by the vestiges of money’s widely-used model, even if it has largely fallen out of favor. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 17 ableist language describing toxicant-exposed frogs has important implications for intersex politics for human. for instance, hayes describes his intersex frogs as “impaired,” “retarded,” and “messed up inside” (hayes & chaffer, 2010). this language flies in the face of recent and ongoing debates in the intersex justice movement surrounding the recent medical nomenclature shift from “intersex” to “disorders of sex development” (dsd). though some had hoped this would improve the lives of people with intersex traits, many activists felt that “dsd” marked an assimilation of intersex justice work to fit the needs of a mainstream audience of non-intersex physicians and a broader public. intersex activist-scholar georgiann davis (2015) herself believes that the “renaming of intersex as a disorder of sex development allowed medical professionals to reclaim their authority and jurisdiction over intersex” (p. 57). while the discursive histories and implications are, indeed, different, hayes’s pathologization of intersex in nonhuman animals does recenter his authority and jurisdiction over nonhuman animals. more broadly, environmental toxicology research on endocrine disruptors undermines the lively destigmatization campaigns of intersex activists. constructing “darnell,” the african american frog: the toxic frog has significant and lasting effects in the way it is constructed as intersex. to fully understand it, though, it must simultaneously be understood from a critical race analysis. after all, one of the key wielders of the toxic intersex frog figure, tyrone hayes, uses his frogs as a rallying cry against environmental racism. some context about hayes is necessary to understand how he constructs this figure. in discussing his findings, hayes often centers his experiences as a black scholar. the tenured berkeley professor tells his students, lecture attendees, and interviewers that he grew up in the segregated us south and faced ongoing, systemic racism to reach his current position (hayes & chaffer, 2010; slater, 2012; mock, 2015). in interviews, hayes has said that he feels privileged having gone to go to harvard on scholarship and thus feels obligated to tell people the truth about the effects of chemicals on their communities (slater, 2012). he speaks frankly about how systems of poverty and regulatory academic norms often prevent scholars of color from attaining tenured research positions. hayes connects this structural inequality in the field to his own research by explicitly critiquing environmental racism and the corporate greed at the core of contemporary pesticide production. he does so even in the face of vociferous slander campaigns from the behemoth pesticide producer syngenta (nadel, 2010; slater, 2012; democracy now!, 2014; beroset, 2016). hayes used to do research for the chemical company but severed ties when they asked him not to publish his special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 18 findings. by depicting hayes as unprofessional, unhinged, and possibly threatening in online forums and through hired op-eds and planted audience members at his lectures, the company has tried to discredit hayes (nadel, 2010; slater, 2012; democracy now!, 2014; beroset, 2016). hayes projects his own racial identity onto his african clawed frogs, playing on the link between his own african americanness and the african origin of the species. hayes joked in a lecture in december 2017 that these are technically african american frogs since he often collects them as discarded test subjects from other labs in san diego (hayes, 2017).7 he sometimes describes atrazine as affecting a single frog, who he affectionately calls darnell. “the big news this year,” hayes says, “will be darnell (xenopus laevis) and his atrazine-treated brothers and sisters…brothers with severely impaired fertility and sisters (genetic males) who lay eggs” (hayes in nadel, 2010). hayes has also said he is reclaiming the power of his traditionally black name, tyrone, in a largely white-dominated field. he teased a chemical industry employee who referred to him as “black and quite articulate” by adding an abbreviation of “articulate black man” to his email signature: “tyrone hayes, phd abm” (aviv, 2014).8 naming his frog darnell, a black name in contemporary us culture, is thus a related move. naming the frogs as a singular darnell connects them to the frogs that he studied in his backyard when he was growing up, and even taking photos with one of his amphibian subjects conveys hayes’s complex relationship to x. laevis frogs (aviv, 2014). hayes’s social construction of his intersex frog as african american is intended to be disruptive from its inception. the strategic construction of the african american frog allows hayes to allude to the racialized effects of pesticides, even though he doesn’t talk about the effects of atrazine on black people specifically. citing us department of agriculture data that the majority of us farmworkers are latinx, hayes notes that “they have levels of atrazine in their urine that are 24,000 times what we use in our laboratory” (hayes & chaffer, 2010). in his public lectures, hayes often notes that people of color across the globe are more likely to experience atrazine-exposed infertility or reduced sperm count. the toxic animal figure of darnell thus acts as a powerful reminder of the environmental racism that pesticides enact (hayes & chaffer, 2010). hayes implicitly suggests that we critically examine why certain crops are deemed more valuable than the reproductive health of the workers applying the pesticides to them, many of whom reside in his own home state of california. special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 19 in this context, hayes positions darnell as a rallying cry of environmental reproductive justice, though he does not explicitly use this language. the environmental risks of agricultural labor have long shown effects on fertility and reproduction, and here hayes contributes to growing attention to this issue. for instance, in the 1970s and ’80s, many of the majority male latinx workers overseeing the production of the pesticide nemagon in california discovered they were infertile. the same was true of nicaraguan banana workers who applied the same chemical to crops well after the discovered effects in california. many became sterile or had children with health complications (bohme, 2014). there was also documented evidence that the employing companies—dow chemical, dole food companies, united fruit, and chiquita—had been aware of the serious health risks of pesticide use and nonetheless allowed workers to be exposed (bohme, 2014). this collateral damage has been profitable to pesticide producers, albeit less so when they are successfully sued by affected workers (see tellez v. dole, for instance). hayes uses darnell to remind us that pesticides have disproportionate effects on communities of color who are more likely to be exposed through their place of residence (near agricultural facilities) or as an occupational hazard (spraying pesticides on crops, for example). the anxieties he wields about fertility, though relying on misconceptions about intersex, are grounded in fraught politics of environmental reproductive violence in north america. hayes has expressed gratefulness that his work has reached “minorities who would never have had access to this information” because he recognizes the barriers and paywalls the public has to accessing scientific research (qtd. in slater, 2012). he believes his unconventional presentation style and using inflammatory language “to piss off the chemical companies” is central to this success (slater, 2012; democracy now!, 2014). hayes’s construction of race in this incendiary nonhuman figure further demonstrates how scientific norms shape these galvanizing environmental figures. these figures are shaped not only by normative logics about binary sex, but also by the racially charged norms of knowledge production and the disproportionate exposure of toxicants to marginalized communities. these galvanizing animal figures, thus, require careful and nuanced analysis. syngenta’s resistance fighter campaign: reifying a familiar pest figure special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 20 “frogs are doing quite fine in kansas,” said the head of the kansas corn growers and kansas grain sorghum producers associations, a major proponent of syngenta’s pesticides and herbicides. “anecdotally, i’d say they must not have read dr. hayes’ studies” (qtd. in slater, 2012). after failing to slow hayes’s research, syngenta rerouted the conversation away from darnell, as is evidenced by the fact that there is no mention of frogs on the company’s website. this is common practice in public relations, as spending time debunking claims might inadvertently add credence to them. instead, syngenta seems to have put its energy into attempting to construct a different galvanizing figure: pests. analyzing one of their advertising campaigns can demonstrate the effects of darnell and trace the colonial scientific logics of pesticides discussed at the start of this paper. figure 6. syngenta, resistance fighter home page, 2017. syngenta’s resistance fighter campaign, once housed at the aptly named web domain resistancefighter.com, reveals the company’s broader strategy in countering the figure of darnell (figure 6). in this campaign, us farmers work are encouraged to work with syngenta to fight against weeds that are not killed by the common pesticide glyphosate. one advertisement pitches the campaign succinctly: “resistance is a problem. be part of the solution. become a resistance fighter” (syngenta, 2017). in this campaign, syngenta (2017) raises awareness about regional-, state-, and crop-specific invasive species and provides the ammunition to fight “the enemy,” wherever in the us a farmer might be. to encourage public participation, syngenta chooses annual resistance fighter leaders for each major region of the us to be model farmers and mentors for other farmers in the area. the resistance fighter campaign posts training videos on its website and maintains a strong twitter presence via the hashtags #toughweeds or #resistancefighter. syngenta (2019) continues its long history of special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 21 recruiting farmers to use their products, which have been developed in “collaborat[ion] with university experts,” and reinforce the idea that chemical pesticides are necessary. it frames an invasive species as “the enemy” to reify xenophobic logic, constructing certain beings as worthy insiders and others as intruders, eerily similar to the environmental nationalism that historians noted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the us. this seemingly run-of-the-mill marketing campaign reveals the long history of racial violence in the production of pesticides. the rallying logo is a stark yellow fist emerging out of a rocky ground paired with the phrase “resistance fighter.” at first glance, this might look like a call for political resistance solidarity. on the contrary, syngenta uses the power fist to depict the rambunctious weeds who refuse to be squelched. though the clenched power fist has been used across social movements from socialist uprisings in mexico in the early 1900s to various secondand third-wave feminists to the black panther party, the specific clip-art style fist with a thick outline most resembles the power fist used by the black panther party. recently taken up in the black lives matter campaign in the us. syngenta's appropriation of this fist to symbolize that corn treated with its products will prevail, and therefore result in economic gain, obscures the colonial, racist roots of pesticide development. as evident in syngenta’s simultaneous efforts to first debunk the power of darnell as “bad science” and later to silence hayes, being a good resistance fighter means fighting resistance from environmental activists who might use the very power fist that syngenta appropriates. the racial politics here are no coincidence. hayes’s activist-scholarship in african american vernacular english, his formulation of darnell as an african american frog, and the company’s obfuscation of environmental racism work in tandem. syngenta’s white-washing of its power fist ignores racism as an issue here, whereas hayes points out that environmental racism is endemic to pest science and endocrinology alike. figuring environmental futures exploring the well-traveled figure of the toxicant-exposed intersex frog has important implications. deconstructing the different elements that comprise it— pesticides and their historical ontologies, endocrinological norms on creating clearly sexed subjects, racialized environmental violence, and inflammatory advertisement campaigns by chemical producers—provides a helpful opportunity to understand and rethink how we conceptualize environmental health. hayes has begun to question his own “freaky” frog figure, darnell. in a 2017 special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 22 lecture hosted by the ucla center for women, hayes notes that the language of binary sex is alienating to people who should be involved in the conversation: “words like top and bottom [to describe frogs’ coitus], male and female, can be isolating to individuals that we really need to be our allies outside of the scientific community. i think we can all learn a lesson and…get rid of our binary thinking about what sex means so that we can really be more effective at spreading this [information about pesticides].” as feminist and queer anti-racist scholars and activists, it behooves us to further recognize the entanglement of sex/uality, dis/ability, race, and species in environmental panics. doing so through analyzing toxic animal figures like darnell is one important avenue. these widely circulating figures of environmental harm usher in colonial and normative logics. querying the disciplinary ontoepistemologies of these figures and the histories they obscure can foster more ethical modes of being in and of the world. acknowledgements this project was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship in feminist environmental studies at duke university. thank you to priti ramamurthy, amanda swarr, maría elena garcía, louisa mackenzie, kathryn gillespie, and anna luisa patiño west for your invaluable input. i am also grateful for the detailed and generative suggestions from rachel lee and joanne muzak at catalyst as well as from two anonymous reviewers. notes 1 in this essay, i focus primarily on intersex rather than a more explicit transgender and/or queer analysis. this is intentional. i have examined the blurring of queer and trans in endocrine disruptor discourses elsewhere (2016) and there has been rich scholarship at this intersection by bailey kier (2010), giovanna di chiro (2010), and cleo woelfle-erskine and july cole (2015). as a non-intersex transgender person who has watched as intersex debates are casually folded into queer and trans studies, i take time in this essay to examine the specificity of intersex as a unique regulatory formation. 2 here i am informed by max liboiron, manuel tironi, and nerea calvillo’s “toxic politics” (2018). 3 here i nod to avery gordon’s framework of hauntology (2008) and i channel maría elena garcía’s conceptualization of “multispecies hauntings” (2015, p. 161). while i argue for tracing the legacies of historical violence, i do not intend to special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 23 suggest that colonialism and xenophobia exist in the past; they are well and alive. 4 i refer to settler colonialism here as the material invasion of north america by europeans during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, as exploration, colonization, and settlement. i recognize there are far more modes of settlement that have occurred and continue to occur on the continent. 5 chemical castration is a value-laden phrase often associated with the punishment of sex offenders and male prisoners. using chemical castration to discuss potential effects on human fertility thus alludes to the involuntary and coercive aspect of this “castration.” 6 “observable” here refers to the chromosomes examined via karyotype, not phenotypical traits. 7 hayes describes the african clawed frog as the “lab rat of amphibians” because they were useful as a human pregnancy test given their hormonal similarities with humans. 8 former us president barack obama remarked on the racialized politics of being described as an articulate black man (mills, 2007). references agard-jones, v. 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(2017, december 4). from silent spring to silent night: a tale of toads and men. lecture presented at trinity university's distinguished scientists lecture series. trinity university, san antonio, tx. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sloka5jeojk&t=1814s hayes, t., & chaffer, p. j. (2010). the toxic baby. ted talks [video file]. retrieved from http://www.ted.com/talks/tyrone_hayes_penelope_jagessar_chaffer_the_toxic_baby ?language=en hayes, t. b., collins, a., lee, m., mendoza, m., noriega, n., stuart, a. a., & vonk, a. (2002). hermaphroditic, demasculinized frogs after exposure to the herbicide atrazine at low ecologically relevant doses. proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 99(8), 5476-5480. hayes, t., haston, k., tsui, m., hoang, a., haeffele, c., & vonk, a. (2003). atrazineexposed hermaphroditism at 0.1 ppb in american leopard frogs. (rana pipiens): laboratory and field evidence. environmental health perspectives, 111(4), 568-575. hayes, t. b., khoury, v., narayan, a., nazir, m., park, a., brown, t., … gallipeau, s. (2010). atrazine induces complete feminization and chemical castration in male african clawed frogs (xenopus laevis). proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america, 107(10), 4612-4617. doi:10.1073/pnas.0909519107 head, l. (2017). the social dimensions of invasive plants. nature plants, 3(6), 1-7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gyfzsorl5r8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urzel7p371o https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sloka5jeojk&t=1814s special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 26 integrated pest management, university of missouri. (2015, may 28). weed of the month: velvetleaf. retrieved from https://ipm.missouri.edu/ipcm/2015/5/weed-ofthe-month-velvetleaf/ jones, a. 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(2015, september 8). frogs a-courtin’ trouble on tidy lawns. telegraph. retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/11850084/frogs-acourtin-trouble-on-tidy-lawns.html ko, a., & ko, s. (2017). aphro-ism: essays on pop culture, feminism, and black veganism from two sisters. new york, ny: lantern books. lake, f. k., wright, v., morgan, p., mcfadzen, m., mcwethy, d., & stevens-rumann, c. (2017). returning fire to the land: celebrating traditional knowledge and fire. journal of forestry, 115(5), 343-353. liboiron, m., tironi, m., & calvillo, n. (2018). toxic politics: acting polluted in a permanently polluted world. social studies of science, 48(3), 331-349. matier, p., & ross, a. (2007, march 12). the killer frogs of lily pond: san francisco poised to checkmate amphibious african predators of golden gate park. sfgate. retrieved from https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/the-killerfrogs-of-lily-pond-san-francisco-2610411.php mcwilliams, j. e. 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(2015, january 27). how a black kid who grew up in the segregated south https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_eplkam8i2s https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/11850084/frogs-a-courtin-trouble-on-tidy-lawns.html https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/11850084/frogs-a-courtin-trouble-on-tidy-lawns.html https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/the-killer-frogs-of-lily-pond-san-francisco-2610411.php https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/the-killer-frogs-of-lily-pond-san-francisco-2610411.php https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-the-articulate_b_39919 special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 27 became a barefisted biologist. grist. retrieved from http://grist.org/climateenergy/tyrone-hayes-amazon-new-yorker-hannibal-buress/ money, j., hampson, j.g., & hampson, j.l. 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(2016). queering endocrine disruption. in k. behar (ed.), object-oriented feminism (pp. 183-200). minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. rosario, v. a. (2009). quantum sex: intersex and the molecular deconstruction of sex. glq: a journal of lesbian and gay studies, 15(2), 267-284. roughgarden, j. (2004). evolution's rainbow: diversity, gender, and sexuality in nature and people. berkeley, ca: university of california press. shukin, n. (2009). animal capital: rendering life in biopolitical times. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. skelly, d. k., bolden, s. r., & dion, k. b. (2010). intersex frogs concentrated in suburban and urban landscapes. ecohealth, 7(3), 374-379. slater, d. (2012). the frog of war. mother jones. retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2011/11/tyrone-hayes-atrazine-syngentafeud-frog-endangered steinberg, t. (2012). down to earth: nature’s role in american history. oxford, uk: oxford university press. stewart, o. c. (2009). forgotten fires: native americans and the transient wilderness. http://grist.org/climate-energy/tyrone-hayes-amazon-new-yorker-hannibal-buress/ http://grist.org/climate-energy/tyrone-hayes-amazon-new-yorker-hannibal-buress/ http://www.atrazine.com/amphibians/combined_large_pdf-r-opt.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xecev4dsaxe&t=875s https://www.motherjones.com/food/2015/09/your-lawn-giving-frogs-sex-change/ https://www.motherjones.com/food/2015/09/your-lawn-giving-frogs-sex-change/ http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2011/11/tyrone-hayes-atrazine-syngenta-feud-frog-endangered http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2011/11/tyrone-hayes-atrazine-syngenta-feud-frog-endangered special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 28 norman, ok: university of oklahoma press. sturgeon, n. (2010). penguin family values: the nature of planetary environmental justice. in c. mortimer-sandilands & b. erickson (eds.), queer ecologies: sex, nature, politics, desire (pp. 102-133). bloomington, in: indiana university press. subramaniam, b. (2014). ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity. champaign, il: university of illinois press. syngenta. (2017). resistance fighter. retrieved from http://www.syngentaus.com/herbicides/resistance-fighter syngenta. (2019). resistance fighter: herbicide resistance management. retrieved from http://www.syngenta-us.com/herbicides/resistance-fighter taylor, e. l., holley, a. g., & kirk, m. (2007). pesticide development: a brief look at the history. southern regional extension forestry. union of concerned scientists. (n.d.). syngenta harassed the scientist who exposed risks of its herbicide atrazine. retrieved from https://www.ucsusa.org/harassingscientistmessenger-exposing-risks-herbicide-atrazine united states department of agriculture. (2017). corn policy. retrieved from https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/policy/ uno, y., nishida, c., yoshimoto, s., ito, m., oshima, y., yokoyama, s., nakamura, m., & matsuda, y. (2008). diversity in the origins of sex chromosomes in anurans inferred from comparative mapping of sexual differentiation genes for three species of the raninae and xenopodinae. chromosome research, 16(7), 999-1011. verran, h. (2008). science and the dreaming. issues, 23-26. retrieved from http://www.issuesmagazine.com.au/article/issue-march-2008/scienceanddreaming.html weheliye, a. (2014). habeas viscus: racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human. durham, nc: duke university press. wells, g. (2011, november 23). native american forestry combines traditional wisdom with modern science. resilience. retrieved from http://www.resilience.org/stories/2011-11-23/native-american-forestry-combinestraditional-wisdom-modern-science/ williams, m. (1992). americans and their forests: a historical geography. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. woelfle-erskine, c., & cole, j. (2015). transfiguring the anthropocene: stochastic reimaginings of human-beaver worlds. transgender studies quarterly, 2(2), 297-316. wynter, s. (1994). no humans involved: an open letter to my colleagues. forum http://www.syngenta-us.com/herbicides/resistance-fighter http://www.syngenta-us.com/herbicides/resistance-fighter http://www.syngenta-us.com/herbicides/resistance-fighter https://www.ucsusa.org/harassing-scientistmessenger-exposing-risks-herbicide-atrazine https://www.ucsusa.org/harassing-scientistmessenger-exposing-risks-herbicide-atrazine https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/policy/ http://www.issuesmagazine.com.au/article/issue-march-2008/science-anddreaming.html http://www.issuesmagazine.com.au/article/issue-march-2008/science-anddreaming.html http://www.resilience.org/stories/2011-11-23/native-american-forestry-combines-traditional-wisdom-modern-science/ http://www.resilience.org/stories/2011-11-23/native-american-forestry-combines-traditional-wisdom-modern-science/ special section: chemical entanglements | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) logan natalie o’laughlin, 2020 29 n.h.i.: knowledge for the 21st century, 1(1), 42-73. zimmer, c. (2011, february 21). unraveling the mystery of the bizarre deformed frogs. yale environment 360. retrieved from https://e360.yale.edu/features/unraveling_the_mystery_of_the_bizarre_deformed_fr ogs author bio logan natalie o’laughlin is a visiting research scholar in the gender, sexuality and feminist studies program at duke university. their current book project, toxic animal encounters: queer environmental threats & racialized reproduction anxieties, traces contemporary environmental panics and their feared effects on sex, sexuality, and reproduction in north america. dr. o’laughlin has taught courses on reproductive justice, environmental justice, and queer theory at duke as well as at the university of washington, where they completed their ph.d. in feminist studies in 2018. https://e360.yale.edu/features/unraveling_the_mystery_of_the_bizarre_deformed_frogs https://e360.yale.edu/features/unraveling_the_mystery_of_the_bizarre_deformed_frogs microsoft word commentary-murphy.docx murphy, m. (2017). what can’t a body do? catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), 1-15 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © michelle murphy, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license commentary what can't a body do? michelle murphy university of toronto michelle.murphy@utoronto.ca this is the text of a keynote plenary lecture delivered on august 31, 2016, at the 4s/easts meeting, barcelona, on the theme of “to what extent is embodied knowledge a form of science and technology by other means?” take a deep breath. with every inhalation, industrially produced molecules are drawn into your being. once inhaled, synthetic molecules may pass through membranes, connect with receptors, nestle in fatty tissue, mimic a hormone, or modulate gene expression, thereby stimulating a cascade of further metabolic actions. breathe in. we cannot help it. you must breathe to live, like you must drink and eat. there is no choice in the matter. it is a condition of our being. with each breath we are recommitting to an ongoing relationship to building materials, consumer products, oil spills, agricultural pesticides, factories near and far that all contribute to the emission of these synthetic molecules. every one of you here, like all people living today, have persistent organic pollutants woven into your being. pcbs and dde (a metabolite of 2 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) ddt) are in every one of us, joining up with other more regional or idiosyncratic mixtures of chemicals exuded by capitalist exuberance: phthalate plasticizers, bisphenol a, pbde, lead, and organochlorine pesticides. the list could go on and on. we are enmeshed in these chemical infrastructures. i can say all this with the help of a motley array of disciplines – metabolomics, toxicology, biomonitoring, epigenomics, and so on – each of which offers an instrument-mediated micrological glimpse into the vastness of our chemical relations, relations that extend far out from our skin, out into electrical systems that used pcbs as thermal insulation, out into postcolonial pesticide regimes that sprayed ddt around the world in the name of crop yield and public health, out into the plastosphere of packaging and cheap consumer products, out into the infrastructures of environmental racism that concentrate chemical violence in some bodies, and security in others. the chemical relations of our embodiment expand out into messy and violent histories of colonialism, racial segregation, and labor, into homemaking, heteropatriarchy, and war. and our chemical relations overflow these structured exposures to become mobile on winds and currents, disobeying territorial and social stratigraphy, stretching forward into time, after the factory is gone, after the war is over, after the product is no longer on the shelf, after you no longer have a job, and even after any individual life, or any one body. sometimes chemical exposures are sensible, but mostly they are not, so we are often guessing that we sense them, retroactively, in the symptom, the brain fog, the miscarriage, the worry, the lump, the grief that comes later. chemical relations connect us backwards in time, but also forward into what our bodies will become, into the future environment that we are cumulatively assembling in our complicities and inability to extract ourselves from the webs of capitalist and industrial exuberance. we are all here already altered by industrial chemicals, though in profoundly uneven ways. we are all here already more-thanbodies. this material, not metaphorical, entanglement in environmental 3 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) violence is a condition of being alive today. so, here we are together in barcelona, breathing in, participating in temporal loops and the expansive interdependencies of chemical relations. our topic here tonight is “embodied knowledge by other means.” but what is embodiment anyway? the body does not exist as a detached and sovereign unit, despite what liberal political structures tell us. why do we think we know what a body is, or what it can do? where does it end and begin? what relations compose it? in 1985, donna haraway (haraway, 1985) posed the question, “why should our bodies end at the skin?” i want to stay with this unsettling query. as researchers, we might look to acknowledging differently situated bodies in order to correct the exercise of power in knowledge making. this is especially pressing in institutional conditions where embodiment is denied, but also because mobilizing embodiment can be a diy practice that you can do without a lot of institutional support. yet, the demarcation of the singular, discrete body is non-innocent, even when described in a fine resolution of particulars. it is caught up in infrastructures of individual property, wage labor, citizenship, and even whiteness, infrastructures that, for researchers working in relatively elite settings, tend to operate by obscuring the support systems—the transportation networks and service labor for example —that allow particular kinds of normative bodies to appear as it if they are operating as solo units. yet, non-innocent bodies are caught up in each others conditions of life support and diminishment. from the epidermal schema of antiblack racism to the heteropartriarchy of gender, bodies are already caught in painful and contradictory matrixes of support and negation. my livelihood requires me to take in an injury. drinking water, i am exposed. your gas is linked to the destruction of this territory, and hence the fish and our bodies. embodiment is a collective binding of profoundly uneven relations of porosity to exposure: my vulnerability to injury is entangled with your comfort. the side effect accompanies the treatment. i am kept 4 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) alive even as i am being killed. at the material metabolic and chemical level, embodiment is already altered, already non-innocently embroiled in uneven violent relations of being and doing. if we accept as a starting point that embodiment does not provide a respite or escape from history, from infrastructures, from relations of power, if we accept that bodies cannot get you out of entanglements, then we might want to find alternative genealogies for grappling with “embodiment by other means” for sts. taking frantz fanon as a starting point for a decolonial sts, for example, we might begin by noticing how he navigated, and refused to disavow, the contradictions making up embodiment, how fanon theorized within a set of tensions or toggles: for example, the toggle between the hopeful care for embodied difference, and the pessimistic ways bodies are already materialized in colonial and racist worlds, the toggle between medicine’s racist apprehension of pathological bodies, and the ways that bodies also exceeded those materializations (fanon, 1963, 1965, 1967). fanon held these tensions together beautifully in his theorizations of blackness, but also in his work theorizing how medicine and science might break with their colonial complicities. learning from and making kin with the decolonial projects of frantz fanon, as well as other fields like black studies, indigenous studies, and queer studies, a decolonial sense of embodiment might embrace fanon’s anti-colonial call to become a new humanity, or a new life form, one which requires destroying the version of the human that histories of deep violence have created. it is in this bundle of tension that we might fashion a politics of decolonial sts both with and against “the body.” rerouting sts through fanon also requires that we consider the question of what has to be seized, rebuilt, and dismantled to make room for decolonial potentials. white supremacy? petrochemical extraction? i am sure you have other things to nominate for destruction! the individualized body, as given to us by western liberal political structures, as a container for rights, labor, risks, capital, and biological processes, 5 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) will not do. the singularized body alone cannot dismantle the disturbing entanglements of knowledge-making within violent infrastructures. moreover, “the body” itself is in need of dismantling, if we are to stay in the toggle of recognizing violence and becoming something else. what materializations of life and embodiment might we think with and against to confront the 21rst century condition of industrial chemical enfleshment? how to conjure decolonial futures, and not just accounts of bodily damage, along with the industrial chemicals that are part of us and at the same time remaking the planet? at stake in conjuring alterembodiments is the very sense of what constitutes life and its relations. within the biological sciences, there is no unified theory of life, even as the units of gene, body, species, and ecosystem have become so commonplace that they may appear to exist in the world itself, and not as historically particular materializations of it. making decolonial possibilities requires retheorizing life with and against technoscientific framings.1 a politics of embodiment by other means might learn from and propagate politics and concepts in the toggles between violences that have already happened and the need to undo them nonetheless, between the condition of being already altered and the struggle to become otherwise in the aftermath. we might, i suggest, call this alter-embodiment alterlife — a state of already having been altered by environmental violence that is nonetheless a capacity to become something else. the concept of alterlife is forged in recognition of the realities of large-scale and everyday environmental violence. alterlife is not waiting for the apocalypse – apocalypses of many kinds have already happened, livable worlds keep being snatched away. alterlife resides in what frantz fanon called “an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (frantz fanon, 1967, p. 109). it is a condition that is shared, but unevenly so; it divides us as much as binds us. i have come to alterlife while studying chemical violence on the great lakes, as industrial chemicals deliver concentrated injury and premature death to indigenous, black and poor communities already 6 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) living in hostile conditions. the great lakes were the portal to the colonial conquest of canada, and in the twentieth century the lower great lakes became rimmed by the industrial exuberance of car manufacture and petrochemical refining, more recently giving way to histories of deindustrialization and abandonment. the great lakes, are a jurisdictional patchwork, cut up by two settler nations, over one-hundredforty-five indigenous territories, two provinces, and eight states. overwhelmingly the great lakes are governed by a permission to pollute regulatory regime and our data about emissions are self-reported by industry. a legacy of persistent industrial chemicals has spread ubiquitously across the region. in the aftermath, environmental researchers gather the evidence of the damage in bodies. alterlife has become a political concern for me as i live in toronto, on lake ontario, on anishinaabe and haudenosaunee territories, and in canada, a settler colonial and petro-extraction state. the question of alterlife is shaped by a sense of political and personal responsibilities, to the great lakes region, to its water and land, to histories, and to my own position as a white skinned métis person originally from winnipeg with responsibilities to my complicities in settler colonialism and whiteness as well as to histories and current activations of indigeneity. so i recognize that alterlife for me is partially biographical and emplaced in north american particularities. alterlife is a concern as my neighbors are bodies of water that hold 21% of the worlds fresh surface water, and 84% of north america’s.2 while what you might mostly see in the media about canada these days are photos of handsome justin trudeau, on the ground a canadian neoliberal managerial governance combined with capitalist settler colonial extraction have formed a potent environmentally violent and even genocidal mix which expresses itself in the pollution of the great lakes. around my home is a surge of environmental, reproductive justice and anti-colonial activism focused on the water that my sense of alter-embodiment learns from and aspires to collaborate with. i want to pause here and point out a shift in the way i have posed 7 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) the research question of alter-embodiment. in the past, i have typically approached histories of environmental and reproductive practices by asking: how do activist practices mobilize bodies in order to create alternative materializations of bodies. or put more simply: how do particular practices materialize particular modes of being? how does doing materialize being? tonight, i want to play with the question of embodied knowledge from the opposite direction, going from being to doing. i want to start with creating alter-embodiments, alter-objects of care– even if only conjecturally – that call in our complicities, that require less-violent practices, that require different worlds. i want to think with you about tactically moving from being to doing– calling forth alter-embodiments, alter-being, or what i am calling here alter-life. calling forth new life forms is a work in progress, and from the start has been made with students and friends, activists and artists.3 alterlife is just one attempt at conjuring alter-embodiment with a particular sts inflection and in solidarity with the vast labors of reproductive and environmental justice, especially on the great lakes. with alterlife, and thinking back to fanon as a guide, i want to draw out for you three of the political dimensions toggling within alterlife. first, alterlife is about a politics of entanglement, kinship, and responsibility.4 the entanglements making up alterlife are not just the symbiosis of multispecies being, but the material enmeshments with chemical exposures: these exposures include pollution as we might habitually think of it, but also the molecular manifestations of stress from living in assaulting racist conditions, and the inhalation of war dusts that extend the violence of bombing into the very act of breathing. no single person on this planet escapes enfleshments with exposures, even as their violent effects are profoundly concentrated in hotspots of hostility, and even as many of us here live in conditions of dense privilege that encourage a willful ignoring of these tentacles of violence. alterlife, as a becoming with exposures, exists in the profoundly uneven and interdependent distribution of life chances. 8 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) those of us who benefit from whiteness have much work to do in calling forth alterlife, not least of which is the responsibility to dismantle the work of whiteness in the sciences and in the institutions that we inhabit that are often densely enriched by capitalist, colonial, and racist systems. no matter who you are – even if you’re just trying to get by – quotidian and humble complicities are entangled with the very acts of sheltering, eating, cleaning, and surviving that are in turn knotted to a cacophony of consumption and harms within supply chain capitalism, and tied to discard systems built into objects, tethering ordinary survival to the continual spewing of injury. our relations are not just supportive. they can also be injurious and toxic to each other. vanessa agard-jones calls this “chemical kinship” (agard-jones, 2013; vanessa agard-jones, 2014). thus, a crucial aspect of calling forth alterlife is that it is about an understanding of oneself, the researcher, in kinships with beings “of politics and care” (puig de la bellacasa, 2011). attention to alterlife asks, not for a politics of fixing the other, but in the words of fred moten, “your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. i don’t need your help. i just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you too, however much more softly” (harney & moten, 2013, p. 140-1). within the condition of alterlife the potential for political kinship and alter-relations comes out of the recognition of your imbrications in the tangle supports and harms. second, with alterlife i am trying to think with and against technoscientific materializations of embodiment and chemical exposures. i want to push back against the framings of injured, disturbed, or “abnormal” life in scientific fields such as ecology, toxicology, and epigenetics – what we might call damaged-based research. with alterlife, i want to push back on the eugenic residual that calculates lives worth living, deviant lives, risky lives, unproductive lives, and killable lives. the work of carla hustak has brought home to me just how deeply entwined eugenics has been in the history of progressive and even feminist scientific projects (hustak, 2010). thus, in materializing alterlife, i am 9 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) collaborating with and pushing back against scientific understandings of damaged lives in environmental violence. let me give you one example. epigenetic ways of investigating chemical exposures render legible (and erase) environmental violence by tracking damage in bodies, with a tight focus on biochemical micrological processes. in environmental epigenetic, which focuses in excruciating detail how, in mice and rats, endocrine disruptive chemicals like pcbs can substitute in for molecules like estrogen or thyroid that act as transcription factors modulating the expression of target genes during critical developmental periods (such as the prenatally) when dna methylation patterns are being established, thereby altering the neurological, metabolic, and sexual development of bodies. such findings in rats and mice are compared with epidemiological studies in humans that show associations between the presence of metabolites of toxic chemicals, epigenetic biomarkers, and findings on cognitive tests, or diagnoses of autism, asthma, diabetes or obesity. focused on collecting the data of damage, such studies often focus on communities who have experienced intensive environmental violence often shaped by environmental racism and who live in conditions of persistent multigenerational exposure. thus, studies of environmental epigenetic can end up describing the bodily effects of racism as a community pathology, labeling communities as perpetually diminished by racism. such technoscientific materializations of the already-altered body help to give substance to alterlife, but need to be challenged with critical knowledges from fields like black studies, indigenous studies, and queer studies, that have many lessons for how to craft existences that rise from the ashes of structural violence. to this end, i find inspiration in the work of indigenous feminist scholar eve tuck (tuck, 2009) who has called for “suspending damage” as a refusal to participate in “damage based research” that concentrates the scope of attention on the dissection of bodies and biologies that are then reductively constituted as pathological and devalued. invasive organisms are to be removed, bird damaged in oil spills culled, disturbed land becomes a terra nullius – land and life coded 10 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) by a colonial gaze as empty, unproductive, and in need of capitalist possession. designations of damage feed circuits that amplify damage, where to be altered and unfixable is held as a diminished state, perhaps better not to exist at all. a refusal to re-enact damage based research is a challenge to environmental justice habits, and at the same time an invitation to create new kinds of research questions that are about building decolonial supportive worlds now, without waiting for a better moment to arrive. this brings me to my final political toggle within alterlife: the capacity to become otherwise. embodiment has not just been altered, it is more generally open to alteration. alterlife is already recomposed, pained, and damaged, but potentiality nonetheless. alterlife, as potential, challenges us to learn with a thick archive and dense present of projects of resistance and resurgence. it is also an invitation to consider what infrastructures and concepts have to be dismantled to make room for another way of being and knowing to emerge. it is an invitation to begin inhabiting alter-embodiments now. a core teaching of indigenous reproductive and environmental activism is that bodies are not separable from the land, waters, airs, and other beings (native youth sexual health network & women’s earth alliance, 2016). for indigenous women, two-spirit, and young people on the front lines of pipeline blockades, water walks, fasting, and land defense actions, whose lives are ongoingly violated by extractive industries, this teaching is unavoidable. what happens to the water, is a part of what happens to its relations. violence on the land is violence on bodies. this includes you too. i share this image with you (figure 1) with the permission of their creator, the métis activist and artist erin konsmo, who is a coordinator at the native youth sexual health network, and member of the onaman collective, an amazing group of anishinaabe and métis artists who combine land-based art creation with reactivations of indigenous knowledge. terra nullius is a legal term, or better yet a legal fiction, meaning 11 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) empty territory, which is used to support a state’s claim of sovereignty over land they “find.” in canada, terra nullius has been crucial to the state’s claim to ownership of indigenous territories that it then leases to multi-national petrochemical and mining companies, from suncor to debeers, thereby resulting in not only the theft of territory, but the concentration of environmental violence in indigenous communities. we see this history in this image in the way both colonial vessels and extractive industries are inscribed onto the body. “our bodies are not terra nullius” is thus a declaration of land defense and prior indigenous presence in territory. yet, this image, captures a second sense of “our bodies are not terra nullius.” colonial and environmental violence has already happened, and here we can see the body in trauma, as already surrounded by and formed through toxic violence. yet the very creation of this image, in a social justice collectivity, with people on the frontlines of blockades, in spaces that welcome queer and gender-nonbinary indigenous being, toggle the making of the image into an activation of decolonial embodiment, a laying claim to sovereignty and care of body/land entanglements in the aftermath. bodies are not terra nullius. our bodies are the land. they are of toxic chemicals, and they are something more. they are a manifestation of something bigger, that stretches outward to water, air, ancestors, and other beings, that stretches backwards to messy histories, and forwards to a something else. in this image we find an alter-embodiment of survival-as-resistance –what indigenous scholar gerald vizenor calls “survivance” (vizenor, 2000; dillon, 2012). survivance is not just about making newness, it is also about what has to end, what has to come apart, to make less violent worlds. the responsibility is not just to build alter-relations, but to dismantle violent infrastructures. to shut it down. #shutitdown alterlife is life damaged, life persistent, and life otherwise; life materialized in other ways and life exceeding our materializations i can almost imagine a politics of alter-embodiments, or better yet, alter12 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) collectivities, that need new kinds of solidarities, interdisciplines, practices, and pedagogies, and does not reproduce the same. almost. #alterlifeintheaftermath figure 1 13 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) notes 1 on thinking a politics within and against, i am drawing on (harney & moten, 2013) 2 https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/great-lakes-facts-and-figures 3 alterlife was developed with the help of the graduate students of the four campus alterlife, conditions, aftermaths seminar, and in conversation with the other seminar instructurso. joseph dumit, tim choy, and jake kosek. conversation and scholarship by indigenous feminist and indigenous resurgent scholars, artists, and activists karyn recollet, eve tuck, christi belcourt, onaman collective, elizabeth lapensee, kim tallbear, and zoe todd have also been crucial. in coming to alterlife, i have also listened to black studies and black activist thinking about possibility in the wake of anti-blackness, especially the work of blmto, fred moten, vanessa gard jones, kathrine mckittrick, rinaldo walcott, christina sharpe, alondra nelson, ruha benjamin. 4 (tallbear, 2011; tallbear, 2013; todd, 2017) references agard-jones, v. (2013). bodies in the system. small axe, 17(3 42), 182– 192. dillon, g. l. (2012). walking the clouds: an anthology of indigenous science fiction. university of arizona press. fanon, f. (1963). the wretched of the earth. (c. farrington, trans.). new york: grove press. fanon, f. (1965). medicine and colonialism. in h. chevalier (trans.), a dying colonialism (pp. 121–146). new york: grove press. 14 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) fanon, f. (1967). black skin, white masks. (c. l. markmann, trans.). new york: grove press. haraway, d. (1985). manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology and socialist feminism in the 1980s. socialist review, 80, 65–108. harney, s., & moten, f. (2013). the undercommons: fugitive planning & black study. autonomedia. hustak, c. (2010). radical intimacies: affective potential and the politics of love in the transatlantic sex reform movement, 1900-1930. university of toronto, toronto. native youth sexual health network, & women’s earth alliance,. (2016). violence on the land, violence on our bodies: building an indigenous response to environmental violence. retrieved from http://landbodydefense.org/uploads/files/vlvbreporttoolkit2016.pdf puig de la bellacasa, m. (2011). matters of care in technoscience: assembling neglected things. social studies of science, 41(1), 85–106. tallbear, k. (2011). why interspecies thinking needs indigenous standpoints — cultural anthropology. fieldsights theorizing the contemporary, cultural anthropology online. retrieved from http://culanth.org/fieldsights/260-why-interspecies-thinking-needsindigenous-standpoints bio michelle murphy is professor of history and women and gender studies. she is a historian of the recent past and feminist technoscience studies scholar who researches and theorizes about the politics of 15 murphy catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(1) technoscience and infrastructures; sexed and raced life; environmental politics and chemical exposures; biopolitics; as well as economics, capitalism and finacialization particularly in contemporary, cold war, and postcolonial conjunctures associated with the united states, canada, and more recently bangladesh. she is co-organizer with natasha myers of technoscience salon and director of the technoscience research unit. she has graduate appointments at the institute for history and philosophy of science and technology, as well as the school of environment. in addition, she has graduate appointments in science and technology studies and the faculty of environmental studies at york university. professor murphy has a phd in the history of science from harvard university (1998). microsoft word catalyst introduction-part2.docx subramaniam, b and willey, a. (2017). introduction to science out of feminist theory part two: remaking sciences. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(2), 1-9 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © banu subramaniam and angela willey, 2017 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license introduction science out of feminist theory part two: remaking science(s) banu subramaniam university of massachusetts, amherst banu@wost.umass.edu angela willey university of massachusetts, amherst awilley@wost.umass.edu this is the second part of a special double issue of catalyst focused on the theme “science out of feminist theory.” part one, “feminism’s sciences,” outlined the motivation and broad contours of the larger project.1 we will not repeat it here. but if “feminism’s sciences” focused on excavating and re-interpreting feminist thought as a site of science, part two, “remaking sciences,” focuses on reimagining recognized sciences through the lens of feminist theory. the authors and artists featured in “remaking sciences” add new layers to questions of what it means to “do” science, especially empirical research, whom we should call scientists, and what kinds of knowledge we might count. as a collection, the essays and thought pieces here share two characteristics. first, the authors all rethink and rework ideas, theories, and frameworks that we already consider scientific—be it 2 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) riverine sciences, veterinary sciences, ecological sciences, environmental sciences, health sciences, medicine, robotics, ecology, climatology, psychiatry, invasion biology, or marine biology. second, in rethinking and reworking these fields, the authors begin with ideas, theories, and frameworks from feminist theories. interestingly, the theories, ideas, and frameworks developed in feminist theory which have proven most useful to the contributors here represent precisely those resources marginalized, ignored, rendered invisible, or rejected by the sciences. these include: fiction, fantasy, failure, fragmentary knowledge, humor, politics, subjectivity, activism, as well as theories of affect, emotion, love, partial knowledge. in remaking sciences, they use methodologies such as auto-ethnography, autobiography, reflexivity, parody, genealogy, embedded histories, and art installations as modes that illuminate, make knowledge, and are science. these are provocations that force us to ask critical questions about the proper objects of science, of what science is, where science can be practiced, who can practice science, whose interests science serves, when something can be considered a s/science, and finally what the stakes of the debates are and who decides whether something is a science and is “legitimate” knowledge or not. this body of work offers up vast genealogies and archives of discourse upon which we might draw in the remaking of science and the imagining of science out of feminist theory. the essays in “remaking sciences” build upon several topics, questions, and concerns that emerged in “feminism’s sciences.” animal studies again takes on a prominent role. we find this rather striking. we wonder the degree to which thinking with non-human animals presents an opportunity to engage with the materiality of bodies in ways that seem less fraught with the baggage of the differential valuation of human lives associated with the eugenic biosciences. we suspect animal studies will continue to play a vital role in the development of science out of feminist theory, both for its decentering of the human and for its creative contributions to methodologies for studying bodies-in-context. it is clear 3 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) that “power” is front and center in the remaking of science our contributors undertake. the authors working with more-than-human animate matter—woelfe-erskine, gundermann, myers, schrader and johnson and smiley—attempt to produce a science located in time and place, and deeply grounded in the messy politics of race, sexuality, and colonialism. similarly, in the pieces on robotics and cyborgs, forlano and treusch place an ethics of care at the center of their visions of science. brault and asher shift the scale of analysis, again exploring the politics of knowledge, as they each probe the limits of our disciplined imaginations in thinking about planetary futures. in an ambitious field biology project in riverine science, cleo woelfe-erskine brings an embodied trans politics into effective engagement with ecology of beavers to extend our understandings of both through the concept of the “watershed body.” in a style that brings careful ethnographic detail reminiscent of early naturalist traditions, woelfe-erskine describes the complex politics of “rescue” in an era of ecological devastation. we were particularly moved and impressed with the many ethical questions that emerge from such “thick” descriptions. what must be the experiences of these animals? who is rescuing whom and to what effect? in these transformations, woelfeerskine powerfully demonstrates how interdisciplinary and interspecies methodologies and practices can inform both ecology and queer theory. like harlan weaver does in “feminism’s sciences,” christian gunderman explores the fuzzy sciences of life with animals. gundermann movingly describes his quest to save his horse. what emerges is the inability of biomedicine and veterinary science to diagnose or cure his horse (certainly in ways that persuade the author or the audience). juxtaposing “cold-body anatomy” and “warm-body science,” gunderman introduces us to approaches informed both by affective and physical intimacy between bodies and by the collaborative worlds of informal networks of veterinary “sciences” including affected horse owners, doctors, scientists. these problem-focused networks, working against the narrow epistemologies of bioscience, offer a vision of 4 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) sciences more attuned to the realities of embodiment. through the author’s curation of a capacious archive of body knowledges, the very knowability of bodies emerges as an important theme. kiran asher reminds us of the limits of disciplines and disciplinary imaginations and the difficulties in getting beyond them. how does one bring together the diverse epistemologies, methodologies and methods it takes to understand a complex planet? asher takes us through her own formal and informal training across multiple fields and narratives to demonstrate how the depths of natureculture can develop through a sequentially or simultaneous engagement with new resources for investigating aspects of the task at hand. in so doing she elegantly illustrates the metamorphosis of said task. her essay provides feminist science studies an important nudge to think more and more creatively about to how to craft an inter/trans/a-disciplinary education. laura forlano brings crip theory to the cyborg body to open up assumptions about disability and the contours of science. using autoethnography as a methodology for redirecting research, forlano demonstrates the inexact science of diabetes management and the bodily inconsistencies that pose a challenge to the idea of easy maintenance. using carefully collected data, alongside a powerful narrative of experiencing diabetes, forlano challenges any binary of the passive patient and successful science. rather, in a deeply moving essay she describes the immense scientific/logical/calculable data that can emerge from attunement to symptommanagement. tracking calculations of food and insulin alongside the unpredictability of how the body utilizes both, forlano allows us to imagine individual bodies as sites of inventiveness, innovation, and indeed science. moya bailey and whitney peoples remind us of the importance of genealogies and embedded histories and how they inform the elisions and erasures in science and feminist theory. by carefully constructing a “thick” history of race in the health sciences, bailey and peoples powerfully explore the systematic violence done to black female bodies 5 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) throughout history. they demonstrate how both feminist theories and science and medicine have marginalized and trivialized this violence. drawing on black feminist thought, bailey and peoples make a persuasive case for a black feminist health science studies (bfhss). what is critical in their analysis is the importance of recognizing that there is not and has never been a “normative” body in biomedicine and the health sciences. bodies have always been racialized and gendered. understanding the specificity of this history is critical—not just for rewriting and correcting history—but to rewrite and correct biology. these histories have shaped bodies profoundly and we need a bfhs to rethink and rewrite “the body.” michelle jamieson retrieves early to mid twentieth-century psychosomatic medicine as a feminist science. reading the work of helen flanders dunbar through contemporary feminist theories of the entanglement of matter and meaning, jamieson's essay offers us the space "between sciences" as a space of possibility, a space where science becomes sciences. she uses dunbar's work to offer a grounded exploration of what feminist psychosomatic methodologies can look like. this type of historiographic work delivers us rich archives of discourse on holistic approaches to embodiment from which the interdisciplinary feminist sciences might draw. jamieson’s essay reminds us that the cracks between disciplinary ways of knowing are filled with conceptual and methodological resources we would do well to remember in our attempts to build inter/trans-disciplinary natureculture sciences of embodiment. pat treusch, not unlike sara giordano in “feminism’s sciences,” uses “failure” to illuminate the immense insights to be gleaned when things go “wrong” or when experiments do not culminate in producing positive “results.” indeed, much has been written about the pervasive disregard for negative findings. for example, while studies may repeatedly find no evidence for sex differences, a single study (even poorly designed and conducted) that finds some evidence of “difference” becomes the cover story. the ubiquity of this frustration makes us 6 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) wonder if one feminist contribution to knowledge making would be to initiate a feminist journal of negative results!2 bringing queer theory and robotics together, treusch uses queer theory to explore what we know and can know about artificial intelligence and to introduce the queer science of “low robotics.” indeed, in analyzing humanoid robotics through halberstam’s theory of queer failure, treusch’s work forces us to question the epistemological and ontological usefulness of the concept of failure/success in this setting. rather, her work suggests that the failure/success binary is already immanently questioned in the enactment of the human/robot interface. claire brault brings us parody to shake us out of the complacent narrative exercises of academe. using imagination and humor she powerfully demonstrates both the depth of our faith in technology and the narrowness of our assumptions about possibilities for our planet. drawing on the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) scenarios, brault reminds us about the biological, political and economic assumptions that shape visions of the future and attendant plans for arriving there. using parody as a methodology, she opens up more imaginative and radical possibilities for our planetary futures. developing isabelle stengers’ concepts of stupidity and idiocy, brault offers us a carefully theorized “feminist idiocy” as a site of resistance and of radical imagination and intervention. we extend the theme of “remaking sciences” across the multiple formats that catalyst affords. in a wonderful commentary piece, myers brings decolonial theories to bear on ecological experimentation. drawing on a deep ethical, sensory and artistic repertoire, myers conjures an experiment using an imaginative selection of feminist methodologies. what emerges is a new “sensorium” opening up possibilities that we may re-introduce ourselves to the land, and find new ways of living with the world around us. in the lab meeting section, astrid schrader and elizabeth johnson bring together a group of biologists to meditate on the question of “killability” in our era of ecological devastation. what we found particularly powerful was the deep ethical reflection, care and 7 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) concern that these interdisciplinary scholars exhibited, a synergy that remains undertheorized in disciplinary silos. in the news in focus section, sam smiley brings art to our methodological repertoire for theorizing and engaging our naturecultural worlds in a profoundly political local debate on national belonging— when does something become “native” and who decides? how do we reconcile ecological evolutionary change, the histories of colonialism and migration, and contemporary nationalism about people and plants? the specificity of the community context brings natureculture theory home in ways that highlight the importance of art, activism, and the everyday to science out of feminist theory. in the critical perspectives section, max liboiron and colleagues illustrate how something so elementary as author order is fraught with politics. they demonstrate ways a lab can take on ethical questions and re-formulate and interrupt “science as usual.” if we are committed to transforming the hierarchies of knowledge that shape our worlds as feminists, we need to rethink everyday laboratory life, acknowledging that all kinds of labor are critical to a lab’s productivity— the labor of thinking, writing, editing, tending experimental organisms, collecting data, as well as washing dishes. finally, in the texts and images section, kara wentworth’s brilliant visual account of butchering animals in “handholds and other kill floor mnemonics,” reminds us about the intimacies of not only life, but also death. with vivid descriptions of the process of butchering, wentworth reminds us that “handholds” are material mnemonic processes. bodies and their instruments of disassembly shape and are shaped by each other. together these pieces bring to the fore the profound stakes of cultivating sciences grounded in critical approaches to knowing our worlds. we are watching a fast-changing planet riddled with global ecological problems on the one hand, and rising authoritarian nationalisms on the other hand. together this double special issue reminds us that disciplinary silos are ill-suited to the task of analyzing our worlds. only a radically interdisciplinary feminist science lens allows us to 8 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) understand how we got here, and only such a lens will allow us to reimagine and remake the sciences we need. and yet, while the essays and imaginations in “remaking sciences” suggest pathways to some place different, they also remind us about the deep institutional resistance to such visions. here, we cannot but bemoan the tendency to institutionalize normative practices (around timelines, productivity, and value) in academe within departments and programs in women’s, gender, and sexuality studies (wgss) and in both undergraduate and graduate training. in navigating a disciplinary academy, scholars in wgss, and feminist science studies in particular, are stifled in their imaginative capacities. under the guise of rigor, individual genius, high ranked journals, and recognition in disciplinary locations, we see the transformative possibilities of wgss severely curtailed. how can we allow disciplinary promiscuity, methodological abandon, epistemological pluralism, multi-individual and indeed multi-species collaborations, and the fostering of research practices that encourage generosity, ethical engagement and mutual credit to all involved? this undisciplining is at the heart of science out of feminist theory. notes 1 http://catalystjournal.org/ojs/index.php/catalyst/issue/view/11 2 we do realize that there exists a journal of negative results (https://jnrbm.biomedcentral.com), although it largely ignores the kind of feminist work we intend here. 9 subramaniam and willey catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 3(2) bios banu subramaniam is professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts, amherst. trained as a plant evolutionary biologist, she seeks to engage the feminist studies of science in the practices of experimental biology. she is author of ghost stories for darwin: the science of variation and the politics of diversity (university of illinois press 2014), and coeditor of feminist science studies: a new generation (routledge, 2001) and making threats: biofears and environmental anxieties (rowman and littlefield, 2005). spanning the humanities, social, and natural sciences, she works at the intersections of biology, women’s studies, ethnic studies and postcolonial studies. her current work focuses on the xenophobia and nativism that haunt invasive plant species, and the relationship of science and religious nationalism in india. angel willey is associate professor of women, gender, sexuality studies at the university of massachusetts amherst. she works at the interstices of queer feminist theory, feminist science studies, and sexuality studies. she is author of undoing monogamy: the politics of science and the possibilities of biology (duke university press 2016) and co-editor of queer feminist science studies: a reader (university of washington press, forthcoming). her current work explores genealogies of materialism in feminist thought. book review | what’s the use?: on the uses of use, leff, jack r. (2020). review of what’s the use?: on the uses of use, by sara ahmed (duke university press, 2019). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-4. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © jack r leff, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution noncommercial no derivatives license book review | what’s the use?: on the uses of use, by sara ahmed (duke university press, 2019) jack r leff virginia polytechnic institute and state university leffjr@vt.edu sara ahmed’s latest work, what’s the use?: on the uses of use, is as useful as it is use full. completing a trilogy that includes the promise of happiness (2010) and willful subjects (2014), what’s the use? explores the ways use makes itself felt. ahmed beautifully combines genealogy and phenomenology to explore how using, not using, or being put to use shapes our encounters with the world. this book, like much of ahmed’s work, is fundamentally interdisciplinary in nature. to try and run through the different fields she engages would mean reaching my word count here. at its core, ahmed’s project is about critically interrogating the various “straightening devices,” to borrow an older term of hers (ahmed, 2006, p. 107), that makes certain people, things, and outcomes seem natural while excluding others. immediately, feminist scholars of science and technology studies (sts) ought to hear this description and feel a sense of familiarity, especially in the arena of naturalization. yet, despite the powerful and interdisciplinary work ahmed has produced over the last twenty-five years, her uptake in the field of sts, even feminist sts, has been rather limited. in this review, i want to focus on how this book in particular marks an opportunity for sts to begin incorporating ahmed’s scholarship in a serious way. ahmed’s examination of the history of biology and the uses of technology creates a path for feminist sts scholars to incorporate her ideas, and hopefully one that leads to other rich concepts that she has developed over her career. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) jack r leff, 2020 2 where the introduction sets up ahmed’s archive and begins her exploration of the uses of use, chapter 1 brings us immediately to a discussion of use and technologies. drawing from disability and trans studies, ahmed examines how the selective uses of the bathroom door (among other everyday technologies) shapes who can use spaces. as she writes, “doors are not just physical things that swing on hinges; they are mechanisms that enable an opening and a closing” (p. 60). the way a door is used and is made useful delimits who can use it to enter or leave a given space. two examples are discussed here. the first is how the design of a door can prevent disabled people from accessing a space. its heft, the way it swings, the surrounding architecture, and the presence (or absence) of an automatic opening mechanism changes how doors can be used and by whom. second, the sign on bathroom doors signifying gender becomes a technology that uses social norms to transform bathroom doors into gates. either you comply with the gender norm and can pass unhindered, or the gate shuts and the door becomes a wall. despite functionally being usable, the door is unusable. these everyday encounters with useful technologies, like doors, are a site of key feminist analyses for ahmed. how we come to understand these technologies can be understood through their relative uses and in asking who is unable to use them. by examining “use” closely, ahmed gives feminist sts a language that captures the interplay between the social construction of technological function and how the usefulness of a technological artifact shapes social spaces. the second chapter in what’s the use? sees ahmed reading together the work of biologists jean-baptiste lamarck and charles darwin. while lamarck and darwin are traditionally taught as polar opposites, ahmed finds that “[e]ven if lamarck and darwin explain variation differently, both understand use as a mode of directionality” (p. 79). in this way, both theories of evolution put a high value on use even if the ways use is used vary. the emblematic example here is that of the blacksmith’s arm, which is often used to distinguish how darwin and lamarck understand the development and inheritance of traits.1 where darwin might say that the strength in a blacksmith’s arm is an inherited trait that is used advantageously by a lineage of blacksmiths, lamarckian thinkers would argue that the arm’s strength is a result of blacksmiths using their arm more and more over generations. in either case, use is center stage. more than this, the example of how a blacksmith’s arm inherits strength through various accounts of usefulness is also, for ahmed, the story of how the blacksmith inherits work. moving from a contrast of darwin’s and lamarck’s debates to marx and eventually to contemporary society, ahmed demonstrates a powerful linkage between biology, technology, and society. the politicization of biology here will not be a surprising move for feminist scholars of sts, but how ahmed speaks on book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) jack r leff, 2020 3 embodied usefulness gives us important tools for considering biology’s role in embedding usefulness in bodies as a way for capitalism to extract value. chapter 3 moves us into different terrain. here, ahmed wants to understand use not simply as a function of technology, but as a technique in itself. ahmed accomplishes this by examining how utilitarianism makes use of use and how the utilitarian jeremy bentham uses use-as-technique as a governing principle in his monitorial schools and panoptic prisons. of particular note for policy inclined feminist sts is ahmed’s critique of utilitarianism as an organizational principle. here, her argument serves as a warning against those who make policy arguments based purely on the usefulness of any given outcome. given how utilitarian, cost-benefit analyses are often the moral lynchpin in policy discourse, this chapter reminds us of how utilitarian binaries of usefulness/uselessness conceal the ways institutional violence can manifest. the critique of the uses of use in bentham’s monitorial schools leads ahmed to chapter 4, where she dissects use in the contemporary university. building on her activist work against sexual violence and white supremacy at goldsmiths, this chapter offers powerful organizing tools as well as a preview for ahmed’s next book on feminist complaint. in the academy, usefulness becomes a way of maintaining institutional inertia or, to borrow her metaphor, a wall that keeps marginalized people isolated. for instance, she describes how the overuse of the term diversity in academic settings can simultaneously make it useless for creating actual diversity while also making it exceedingly useful for those who never wanted diversity in the first place (p. 148). this oscillation between making something useless to make other things useful is elaborated on in the case of complaints, where complaints are made useless so that the institution does not have to change. drawing from experience, ahmed discusses how institutions, as environments, can be structured to disallow complaints at every turn in order to exhaust the diversity worker registering the complaint. at every step of the complaint process, paths are “funneled” so that the diversity worker sees no end in sight or, worse yet, the end is being blacklisted from their profession (p. 185). this chapter, disheartening though the wall may be, offers crucial strategies to feminist activists and feminist sts for making our own marks on the wall and guides us to recognizing the marks left by others. like most of ahmed’s books, the conclusion takes a moment to reflect on how we can resist the ways use forecloses queer horizons and employ queer use to scratch at the walls of hegemony. why take the effort to queer use? as she writes, “misfitting can be understood as generative precisely given it involves friction; when bodies do not fit seamlessly into space, things happen” (p. 224) or, in other book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) jack r leff, 2020 4 words, queering use generates otherwise possibilities in a world hostile to those who don’t fit. however, we should avoid seeing queer use in simply how it can be useful to us; rather, “queer use can be offered as an ethics of finitude, an appreciation of the wrinkle or the scratch, expressions of time on the surfaces of bodies and things, loving what does not, and will not, last” (p. 226). the lesson being that queer use is not capturable in a dialectic of useful and useless, as utilitarianism might propose, but instead creates opportunities to recognize people as not disposable. if, as ahmed suggests, capitalism and white supremacist cisheteropatriarchy rely on extracting use from bodies, then queer use’s declaration that people are not disposable resists the extractionist tendencies of institutions.2 i have, by necessity, excluded many of the uses of use that ahmed works through across this book. this book is a must-read for any feminist scholars of sts and hopefully represents an opportunity for sts more broadly to engage the work of one of the most generative scholars. the tools and language sara ahmed details here are invaluable for discussing the social impacts of technologies and for creating worlds in which usefulness is not a prerequisite for existence. notes 1 this is despite the fact that lamarck himself never really used the example. 2 of particular note to feminist sts are the tendencies of the academy to chew people (especially marginalized people) up. this includes the increasing reliance on precarious adjunct labor, publish or perish, how university’s excoriate complainers, the unwillingness of administration to be transparent, administrative unwillingness to listen to students, and a host of other everyday violence that the institution inflicts upon those who work for it. references ahmed, s. (2006). queer phenomenology: orientations, objects, others. durham, nc: duke university press. author bio jack r leff is a ph.d. student in science, technology, and society (sts) at virginia tech whose work focuses on the politics of breath, breathing, and atmosphere. microsoft word 32370_kathryn cai dr.docx cai, kathryn (2019). review of chinese surplus: biopolitical aesthetics and the medically confined body, by ari larissa heinrich (duke university press, 2018). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 5(2), page 1-4. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © kathryn cai, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution noncommercial no derivatives license book review | chinese surplus: biopolitical aesthetics and the medically confined body, by ari larissa heinrich (duke university press, 2018) kathryn cai wake forest university kathryn.cai@gmail.com what do mary shelley’s frankenstein, plastinated cadavers, and the medical commodification of organs and other body parts have in common? in chinese surplus: biopolitical aesthetics and the medically commodified body, ari larissa heinrich traces the historical and aesthetic linkages between these wide-ranging cultural phenomena to show how an “aesthetics of corporeality” (p. 29) has taken shape in china in relation to (post)coloniality and the global marketplace throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. beginning with western anxieties and human rights critiques about the alleged chinese origins of cadavers preserved and displayed as part of the traveling body worlds exhibit, heinrich asks whether instead of universalized questions of origins and authenticity that “suppress” (p. 5) race’s centrality to definitions of the human, we might trace transnational linkages in the dispersal of body parts to consider contemporary bodily commodification within a longer arc of the “historically overdetermined idea of chinese life as surplus” (p. 6). rather than a derivative effect of contemporary biotechnical developments that increasingly dismember the body, “corporeal aesthetics” (p. 14) in china, heinrich asserts, has long been central to artists’, writers’, and thinkers’ attempts to consider the chinese body within the intertwined transnational workings of power—geopolitical, economic, and biotechnological. special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) kathryn cai, 2019 2 chinese surplus is an ambitious project that weaves together a transnational and transhistorical consideration of aesthetic production and biomedical commodification. heinrich proposes a theory of “biopolitical aesthetics” (p. 14) and realism that diverges from the history of a western realism that imagines the dissolution of a unified and authentic body in correspondence with biomedical technologies such as dissection and blood transfusion (p. 31). the “recovered genealogy” (p. 17) of chinese art and history demonstrates the continued resonances of very different cultural and historical preoccupations rooted in china’s evolving geopolitical situation. to establish this genealogy, heinrich dwells in the first chapter on nineteenth-century qing dynasty and early twentieth-century engagements with bodily fragmentation tied to china’s place in the world. heinrich convincingly makes the case for the improbable connection between popular nineteenth-century chinese and western depictions of china as a “sleeping lion” and mary shelley’s frankenstein, which was first published in 1818 and, as heinrich notes, not translated into chinese until 1980 (p. 34). drawing on historical records, popular discourses, literary texts, and museum artifacts, heinrich traces the ways in which prominent chinese political actors came to transform western discourses of china as a frankenstein that reflected “deep anxiety about whether sharing technology with china might backfire, inadvertently giving china the power to destroy its ‘creator’” (p. 33). these chinese thinkers drew on the reference of frankenstein to meditate on china’s semi-colonial status and geopolitical position. this transnational conception of frankenstein as a “compartmentalizable political body” (p. 47), heinrich argues, presents a historical precursor of an already fragmented body that speaks to race, imperialism, and global politics, rather than one of holism and unity. this divergent genealogy rooted in chinese particularities leads to contemporary chinese cultural production and cultural politics in a “more biopolitical modality: a modality of the dead, the disassembled, the deconstructed, the decomposed, and the instrumentalized” (p. 50). this modality is also “diasporic” (p. 32), in that it speaks to body parts parceled out and on the move. in the subsequent chapters, heinrich turns to the work of chinese “body artists,” such as those in the cadaver group (p. 50), twenty-first-century usand hong kong-based films that involve the organ trade, the undergirding role of race for discourses of the human and human rights in the body worlds exhibit, and the mechanization and abject lack of agency ascribed to reproductions of iconic paintings by chinese painters in dafen oil painting village in shenzhen. across these diverse arenas, heinrich analyzes how discourses of originality, authenticity, and agency, which are predicated on a western-centric view of world history, obscure continuities in a cultural awareness of and preoccupation with bodily fragmentation and special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) kathryn cai, 2019 3 circulation that long predates and extends beyond contemporary biotechnologies. heinrich’s project does the groundbreaking work of connecting the global power dynamics of contemporary cultural productions engaged with fragmentation and labeled inauthentic with longer histories of imperialism. as such, chinese surplus will be of particular interest to both cultural critics and theorists who are considering cultural production in relation to biotechnical developments and who seek to develop frameworks from within non-euroamerican histories and spheres of influence. rather than a coherent and linear historical progression, heinrich’s project can be better said to propose surprising linkages and avenues of contemplation that, like the aesthetic works it examines, begin to gesture to a non-euroamerican history of aesthetics through transhistorical traces and resonances. this work contributes to the ongoing project of developing frameworks rooted in chinese histories and cultural lineages, including shu-mei shih’s the lure of the modern: writing modernism in semi-colonial china, 1917– 1937 (2001) and xiaomei chen’s occidentalism: a theory of counter-discourse in post-mao china (1995). as scholarship in literary studies suggests,1 these frameworks emerging from historical and cultural particularities can also serve as models and foundations for broader theories and histories of aesthetic and cultural production. heinrich builds on and extends this ongoing project by proposing generic histories in which “realism” in a chinese context includes a long engagement with bodily fragmentation across diverse forms of cultural production, into contemporary works’ explicit meditations on biotechnically mediated fragmentation. as such, it also resonates with scholarship that considers the development of biomedical knowledge and technologies within longer histories of imperialism and global power dynamics, such as work in feminist science studies that situates forms of clinical and embodied labor within these histories. while the book’s definition of western realism as an aesthetic category is at first somewhat difficult to place, particularly for those readers who may not be familiar with theories of western realism as a literary genre, the trade-off that heinrich makes to gloss only a selection of relevant examples of western realism is understandable given the wide range of genres and disciplines the book engages. moreover, this methodological choice also enacts the primacy of chinese histories and forms of production that heinrich’s study theorizes. in doing so, heinrich reveals how the cultural politics of aesthetic production is integral to understanding the wideranging ramifications of biotechnical developments. reaching beyond the sociocultural, technoscientific, and aesthetic as bounded categories of analysis, special section | plantarium: human-vegetal ecologies | book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 5 (vol 2) kathryn cai, 2019 4 heinrich’s work presents another recent example of how methods and frameworks from different disciplines can illuminate conversations in and between one another, until perhaps one day these boundaries will no longer be so taken for granted. note 1 eric hayot’s on literary worlds (2012) engages and complicates theories of world literature and euroamerican histories of genre categories beyond a chinese context in part through considering chinese cultural production. author bio kathryn cai received her ph.d. in english from the university of california, los angeles in 2019 and is currently a mellon postdoctoral fellow in the interdisciplinary humanities at wake forest university. her research focuses on broadening the spectrum of affects associated with care labor in transpacific circuits of migration and capital through attending to bodily states and body-environment interactions in asian american cultural productions. brandt article     simulated war: remediating trauma narratives in military psychotherapy    marisa r. brandt michigan state university marisarbrandt@gmail.com “it matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.” –donna haraway (2013) the virtual reality (vr) war simulator called bravemind has been one of the most well publicized military simulations to emerge during the “war on terror.” it was invented in 2005 at the university of southern california’s institute for creative technologies (ict), the military-funded digital media research center developing immersive technologies methods including artificial intelligence, graphics, virtual reality and narrative that has been dubbed the heart of the military-entertainment (or “militainment”) complex for its innovative work in creating and studying video games and training simulations and studying in the service of diverse military ends.1 formerly called virtual iraq/afghanistan, bravemind is distinct from most of the virtual war zones created at ict in that it was designed as a therapy system to treat psychologically wounded warfighters, and not to train for battle. though not fully capitalized, the system’s name is in fact an acronym, standing for battlefield research advanced virtual environment for military individual neuro-disorders.2 through a practice called “virtual reality exposure therapy” (vret), service members and veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) interact with vr interfaces to become immersed in simulations of their traumatic experiences of war, with the goal of amelioration and cure. in this article, i draw upon feminist science and technology studies’ theorization of human-machine interaction to interrogate bravemind’s role in reconfiguring agency in the practice of healing the traumatized self. by the term reconfigure, i draw on lucy suchman's and donna haraway’s concept of technologies as materialized figurations that stabilize assemblages of things and meanings, and which imply ways of associating humans and machines (suchman, 2007, p. 227, explaining haraway 1997, p. 11). i argue that bravemind is an instrument of governmentality, a technology that aligns post-traumatic care for veterans with the interests of the state in managing this particular population. yet this role is not determined by the technology itself; rather, it is contingent upon the techology’s development specifically as a tool for conducting prolonged exposure (pe), a therapy which has recently ascended in popularity as a medicalized regimen of ptsd treatment. i argue that pe’s treatment protocol depoliticizes the production of trauma narratives in ptsd treatment, which i illustrate by contrasting its configuration of therapy against that of an approach oriented to social justice. further, bravemind codifies this medicalized configuration at the same time that it reconfigures therapy. analyzing bravemind as a site of reconfiguration, i also draw on the work of karen barad to reveal its role as an apparatus that makes agential cuts between subjects and objects in therapy (barad, 2003). these cuts further configure aspects of human subjectivity, such as memory, affect, and behavior, as objects for technological intervention. i characterize these specific practices as ones of therapeutic remediation. comparative analysis of different modalities of therapeutically remediating trauma narratives demonstrates how the politics of therapy for ptsd are embedded in the ways in which therapists, patients, and nonhuman actants are configured as subjects and objects with different forms of agency.  my argument here is based on a broader project entailing a multi-sited ethnographic study of vret’s development and dissemination in the military clinical psychology community since 2009. this includes surveying the scientific literature on exposure therapy for ptsd with and without vr, and analyzing more than 150 popular-media accounts of vret. i have also interviewed dozens of therapists who treat military veterans, both with and without virtual reality, and attended military and department of veterans affairs (va)-sponsored workshops, conferences, and seminars on ptsd treatment. these sources provide the basis for my analysis of bravemind’s politics as both a cultural and clinical object. here, however, i will focus on the politics of therapeutic remediation to illustrate that, as a material technology, bravemind’s role in reconfiguring therapy cannot be separated from the practices and protocols that define the contemporary regime of evidence-based treatment for ptsd in systems of service member and veteran mental health care.  though this analysis applies to ptsd therapy broadly, it has a special salience in the context of care for military veterans because this population is so inherently politicized in american culture, serving as a kind of avatar of the state due to their unique position of service. veterans have a special kind of citizenship wherein they can make claims upon the state for their care. the care they receive scales between individual experience and the cultural meaning of warfighting itself.3  there are several important processes of figuration through which bravemind reflects the disarticulation of science and morality in therapy: 1) by figuring efficacious therapy as an impersonal, technical, and empirically supported technique rather than as an intimate, personal, and political practice; 2) by figuring ptsd patients’ pathology as avoidance of traumatic memories, rather than as either the original traumatic experience or its effect on the body, and thus situating trauma narratives as behaviorists’ tools for habituating patients to stimuli rather than to sources of historical truth; and 3) subsequently depoliticizing war itself as a source of trauma. each of these sites configures the relative agency of patients, therapists, and technology by mediating their interactions within the process of therapy.  to illustrate the politics of therapeutic remediation in the case of bravemind, in the following sections i trace figurations of the relationship between the clinical science of ptsd care and the subjectivity of the service member across several sites. first, i examine the public representations of bravemind to show how these do political work by producing a new visual culture of therapy that conforms to imaginaries of the cybernetically militarized mind while also performing the military’s dedication to ptsd care. then, turning to the question of what bravemind does within the clinical setting, i introduce the concept of therapeutic remediationas a conceptual tool for interrogating the politics of producing trauma narratives. i use this conceptual tool to analyze approaches to the (therapeutic?) production of trauma narratives before bravemind in ptsd treatment as an explicitly social-justice-oriented political project. from there, i introduce pe, the technique upon which vret is based, to illustrate how it creates a depoliticized approach to trauma narratives. having done this, i revisit bravemind’s design and use to show how bravermind, as a tool for remediating pe, extends and reifies depoliticized logics of trauma-narrative production. i conclude by asking how we might imagine different configurations through which vr might be reimagined and reclaimed as a feminist technoscientific therapeutic tool. militarized therapy or medicalized media? though not the most widely practiced ptsd therapy, vret using bravemind is the most powerfully evocative and publically visible configuration of the us military’s contemporary efforts to provide post-traumatic care. bravemind has been the subject of hundreds of news stories, and it has appeared on television crime dramas, in an exhibit in the museum of modern art, and even in a question on the game show jeopardy. in journalism as well as in fiction, bravemind has been portrayed as a technology that provides access to true experiences of military trauma, allowing the therapist to reach beyond the defenses of a warrior’s traumatized mind to access a horrific memory, bring it to the light of day, and heal the psychological wounds it has left.  for example, elaine zimmerman’s 2007 salon article, "getting blown up again and again,” performs a collapse of soldier kevin smith’s military experience and his immersion in vr in its opening paragraph: kevin smith and his unit have just finished an unsuccessful search for snipers inside a house in fallujah and are headed back to their base. smith is behind the wheel of a humvee, the seat beneath him vibrating from the familiar roaring engine. he makes a left turn and suddenly there is an ear-splitting boom, an explosion right behind him that rocks the vehicle. the sky goes dark and smoky, and smith senses the piercing pain of shrapnel in his neck and hands. the humvee's radio crackles with voices asking for information, as his mind races. will there be more explosions or a hail of bullets from unseen snipers? are his fellow soldiers hurt? time seems at once to speed up and slow to a crawl. then, just as suddenly, a voice cuts into the nightmare: “what are you thinking right now?” (zimmerman, 2007) zimmerman further explains that smith was not actually having a nightmare about his deployment with the us army in iraq; rather, he was engaged with “a cutting-edge therapy that uses a high-tech virtual reality system to treat war veterans afflicted by post-traumatic stress disorder" (ibid.). in popular accounts like this, bravemind presented as a technology that provides access to the private nightmare of war trauma. yet what is at stake in vret is not the ability of warfighters to share their memories of war, but rather their ability to take control of their affective responses to reminders of war, both internal and external, and, though i will not focus on it here, creating a new visual culture for therapy that aligns with ideas of militarized masculinity. in these ways, bravemind enacts what emily cohen (2016) calls a “utopia of the militarized mind”: an aestheticized fantasy of simulations with the capacity to rewire and repair the traumatized self.  this is evident in the visual culture of these stories. patients shown using the bravemind system are in most instances men in uniform or sporting sporting a military-style high-and-tight haircut. fitted in vr stereoscopic goggles, with digital desert images projected on the screen behind them, these men appear to be conducting a kind of military training exercise that will enable them to leave the war behind, rather than a psychotherapy that will help them to make sense of their experience. the therapist is in most cases excluded from these representations, suggesting the autonomy of the system. this exclusion follows the logic of the discourse that surrounds drone systems, in which the pilots who remotely operate these “unmanned” aerial vehicles are similarly rendered invisible (see chandler, 2016).4 when therapists are included in representations, they tend to be characterized as technicians, a figuration that reorients viewer attention from the patient-therapist relationship to the relationship between the patient and the computer terminal (through which the therapist nonetheless controls imagery). these visual tropes lead viewers to understand that the military has created a vr technology that can rewire the minds of troubled warriors, one that any therapist could step into and use. the question of professional identity is further complicated by that fact that the majority of the va clinical psychotherapy staff is composed of civilians—and of civilian women, therapists with no military experience. indeed, these stories and accounts about the technology imply that bravemind’s interfaces are set up so that even civilians with no military experience can readily call up their patients’ traumas “over there,” and though most therapists are female, they may perform their job without themselves invoking any of the “feminized” skills of psychotherapy, such as asking questions, listening, and empathizing, as the program engages the patient through the screen, and not through the therapist. bravemind’s digital archives already “know” what is traumatic about war and how this needs to be sensorially experienced to be overcome, it would seem. in this way, as several commentators have noted, bravemind extends the militarized techno-subjectification performed by programs in which digital representations “prehearse” trainees in the experiences of war, bringing the logic of contemporary simulation-based military training into the therapeutic realm (brady, 2012; dyer-witheford & de peuter, 2009; power, 2007, 2009). as the other authors in this issue show, the american military has invested great hope in simulations as tools for pre-exposing new service members to the “reality” of war. but what does this mean for the politics of care? scholarship on military simulation and training often focuses on nonverbal human-computer interaction as form of affective indoctrination through which recruits are trained to become killers (levidow & robins, 1995; protevi, 2008). extending this critique to vret, valiaho (2012) argues that it is a video-game-like biopolitical tool for rewiring the traumatized mind through affective engagement with nonverbal media. during vret, however, patients do speak: they tell the narratives of their traumas. but stories are no less political than nonverbal media in their role of configuring subjects. since the late 1990s, military simulations have become increasingly narrative as well. this is why both ict and fort irwin (see rice, 2016) are located so close to hollywood and employ screenwriters. as both a material spectacle of military power and an interactive procedural technology, the military-industrial-entertainment network is an enactment of a fantasy that through simulation-mediated exposure to virtual war, new service members can be inoculated against the real thing (ghamari-tabrizi, 2011). it is predicated on what suchman calls the “productive elision of the difference between the real and the virtual in technoscientific military discourses” (2016). on the ambiguous battlefields of contemporary counterinsurgency, one’s own morality, and that of the mission, often is provoked into question. for many critics of military simulation, the political problematic of simulations lies in simulations’ erasure of actual death and dismemberment at the same time that they promise inoculation against the fear of what are in fact very real potential outcomes. in other words, military simulations depoliticize war through narratives that attempt to contain the traumatic. vret differs from military video gaming and training in a key way: rather than using simulation to provide users with digitally mediated experiences of war zones—either in anticipation of actual interaction with them or as a space of militarized play—they simulate war for those who are already intimately familiar with its violence. some scholars therefore see vret as evidence that even though simulation might not be able to protect against combat trauma, it at least has the power to heal (blascovich & bailenson, 2011; gilsdorf, 2009; mileham, 2008; zagalo & morgado, 2011). even scholars who are otherwise critical of digital militainment look to vret as evidence that the same kinds of new media technologies can heal the trauma of war (mead, 2013).  i argue that bravemind’s politics is best understood by analyzing its role in both clinical healing and military subjectification. care-giving itself is biopolitical. what is seen as a wound, how these wounds are treated, and whose wounds receive treatment, are questions that point to sites where care divides the world. the advent of vret illustrates jennifer terry’s contention that “medical techniques and violent warfare function in a relationship of mutual provocation, provoking one another in a manner that indicates the close ties between hygienic and military logics in modern us empire building” (terry, 2009, p. 202). bravemind helps the military not only to meet its need to treat service members with ptsd but, just as importantly, to publicly perform that it is fulfilling this need with the same level of high-tech efficiency with which it strives to conduct all other aspects of its operations. but in what ways does this logic of techno-efficiency actually affect the practice of therapy? how does it affect the ways that service members and veterans are imagined to heal from traumatic experience and reorient themselves in relation to their traumatic memories? reading bravemind as a technology of therapeutic remediation enables us to see how the politics of trauma narratives extend beyond questions of their veracity and into the ways that their agency is configured in care. despite its frequent framing as cutting-edge and high-tech, vret actually represents a conservative approach to ptsd treatment. its primary innovation is to codify a medicalized and depoliticized understanding of the role of the narrativization of traumatic experience in post-traumatic healing. in contemporary clinical psychology, trauma narratives have come to take on an instrumentalized role as a tool for exposure of the past that often precludes a future-oriented ameliorative politics. seeing the production of trauma narratives as a mediated practice allows us to ask how other configurations of simulation technology in therapy might produce different kinds of agential cuts with different kinds of politics equally worthy of investigation as modes of post-traumatic healing. therapeutic remediation and reconfigurations of the self in analyzing the moral implications of new technologies in therapy, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that therapy itself is a technology. elizabeth wilson makes this point eloquently about eliza, the artificial intelligence program designed to mimic the conversational patterns of a rogerian non-directive psychotherapist (wilson, 2010; see also weizenbaum, 1976). wilson draws attention to two paradoxes that lie at the heart of psychotherapy. first: “the counter-intuitive notion that psychotherapy is an artificial encounter.” it is a “model relationship” structured by “dispassionate rules about how long treatment will take, about what will be said, and about what it will cost, about where it will take place, about what may and may not pass between therapist and patient.” second: “the paradox that psychotherapy builds autonomy through relatedness” (p 83). wilson’s analysis draws attention to the fact that all therapeutic encounters seek to transform aspects of human subjectivity through artificially structured practice. the artifice of therapy is often disregarded because it is conventionally an intimate encounter performed only through the exchange of words during face-to-face interaction. the setting itself and the set of rules that govern it are easily overlooked as central material apparatuses. eliza is a technology, one of the variety that michel foucault calls a technology of the self—an apparatus that defines the workings of inner life and makes it available for reworking (foucault, 1988). technologies of the self are distinct mediators of configuration because the objects they are designed to act upon—human minds—are also subjects. to use the language of materialist feminist science and technology studies (sts) scholars, such as karen barad and donna haraway, therapy is a performatively posthumanist reconfiguration that centers on the transformation of human subjectivity (barad, 2003; haraway, 1997).  i describe the material-semiotic practice through which the dispassionate rules that structure this model relationship are used to reshape subjectivity as therapeutic remediation. media theorists jay david bolter and richard grusin define remediation as the process through which content is transformed in its transfer between material media forms (bolter & grusin, 1996). drawing on this, therapeutic remediation describes processes whereby aspects of the self—especially those defined as disordered—are made accessible and reworkable with the intent of fixing those defined as dysfunctional. though therapies treat the accessed aspects of self as preexisting the processes of mediation, i take more of an agnostic, symbolic interactionist view on this point: there is no way of knowing selfhood outside of interaction.  in keeping with this logic, i use the term “remediation” instead of “mediation.” the former term brings into view the context of therapy itself, and its technologies, as a primary aspect of mediation, and as a situation that defines the patient’s affects as mental illness in the first place. this concept i am proposing, “therapeutic remediation,” provides an alternative framework for interpreting the activities that take place in therapy and the mechanism of change than those provided by the clinical theoretical regime of the therapy’s creators. it draws attention to therapy as an intersubjective material-semiotic practice through which subjects and objects are produced and interpreted while acting within broader cultural contexts. the artificial structure of therapy can vary greatly between different therapeutic practices. across the range of psychotherapeutic practices, the inner world is therapeutically remediated through a variety of media tools as diverse as language, role-playing, art therapy, and biofeedback to make emotions, cognitions, and memories available for reworking. each provides a meditational structure through which therapeutic power is enacted. but even within a particular therapeutic medium, its affordances can be used to configure the processes of therapeutic mediation differently both materially and discursively. in so doing, each practice makes different kinds of agential cuts between subjects and objects, including therapists, patients, affects, behaviors, traumatic memories, and narratives. practices of therapeutic remediation are political because they enact an understanding of the source of the patient’s lost agency and the mode through which it can be restored. for example, therapy can be used as a tool for encouraging patients to see themselves as victims of injustice or as sick and disordered individuals (halleck, 1971). specific therapies, the psychological theories that justify them, and the ways they are practiced configure understandings of selfhood and disorder. this is inherently a site for the enactment of power. the politics of remediating trauma narratives the politics of therapy is especially salient in the treatment of ptsd because it is among the few diagnoses in the corpus of western psychology defined not only by symptoms and biology but also experience.5 to receive a diagnosis of ptsd, a patient must not only exhibit specific symptom clusters but also have experienced or witnessed a traumatic event. the dsm defines a traumatic event as one “that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others” (american psychiatric association, 2000). numerous efforts have been made to define ptsd biologically and neurologically, but from a psychotherapeutic perspective, ptsd is regarded primarily as a disorder of time (young, 1995). the symptoms that define it are viewed as originating in a past experience of violence. the politics of therapy for ptsd lie within how such therapy encodes an understanding of the relationship between traumatic experience and long-term dysfunction and how to restore patient autonomy in the wake of trauma. many forms of psychotherapy for ptsd posit that to restore agency, the patient’s memory of the trauma must be accessed, reproduced, and reconstructed. these “trauma-focused therapies” (as opposed to “present-centered therapies” that focus on building skills for coping with the present) include various mediational practices such as telling the story of the trauma, writing it down, or role-playing. i consider many of these to entail the production of trauma narratives, by which i mean any mediational practice that aims to organize the fragmented, sensory elements of traumatic memory into a form with coherent structure including a beginning, middle, and end. yet the ways that agency is imagined to be restored through the production of trauma narratives vary greatly across different ptsd therapies. i have shown elsewhere through comparative analysis of vret systems, analyzing how therapies distribute the agency involved in producing the trauma narrative and contextualizing its meaning provides a valuable method for evaluating the politics of ptsd therapy (brandt, 2013). this matters because trauma narratives themselves have been so deeply politicized. therefore, to show how bravemind depoliticizes therapy for military ptsd, it is valuable to examine how trauma narratives became politicized in the first place and then examine how a politicized therapy configures agency in care. since the social-justice movements of the late twentieth century, the narration of traumatic experience has been considered a cornerstone of activism, providing the communicative basis upon which to form allegiances between the personal and political. but the political status of trauma narratives is historically contingent on the way that the ptsd diagnosis itself shored up the memory sciences as a resource for the moral status of victimhood (fassin & rechtman, 2009, pp. 8-9). that is, scientific research on traumatic memory became a tool for validating claims of psychological injury. using the history of military psychiatry as a case study, fassin and rechtman show how the therapeutic interpretation of psychological war trauma its narration shifted. early 20th century military medicine saw it as malingering and trauma narratives as evidence of cowardice. only after wwii did war trauma come to be seen as a normal response to an abnormal situation, with trauma narratives as tools for making sense of senseless violence (see fassin & rechtman, 2009, pp. 40-93). the authors argue that the therapies developed by caregivers working with combat veterans have reflected attitudes towards the waging of war more broadly, as the mythical heroism of the great war gave way to the tragedy of the vietnam war (see also danziger, 2008). at the culmination of these processes during the late 1970s, antiwar activist veterans formed a coalition with antiwar psychiatrists (including, most visibly, robert j. lifton and chaim shatan) to petition the american psychiatric association (apa) to recognize war trauma—which they called “post-vietnam syndrome”—as a legitimate diagnosis. these activists saw the creation of this diagnosis as a political act, one that would hold the government accountable to treating the invisible psychological wounds of war (nicosia, 2004; scott, 2007). the official recognition of war trauma proposed not only a political diagnosis but a political therapy: lifton argued that the only way that veterans who had experienced the atrocity of war could heal would be to commit to a life of activism, which itself entailed sharing the stories of what they had witnessed to counter the war propaganda and dismantle nationalist myths about war’s glory. though lifton was adamant that veterans were not victims, they nevertheless were situated as victims of a corrupt government that had drafted them into an unjust war (dean, 1997; lifton, 1973). to gain legitimacy in their effort to have the apa recognize a mental illness with an etiology of catastrophe, the veterans formed a coalition with feminist therapists and others working with populations such as victims of rape, child abuse, terrible accidents, and disasters. the medicalization and moralization of trauma culminated in 1980, when the apa included ptsd in the third edition of the dsm in 1980. the feminist and social justice-oriented psychotherapists involved in this movement often developed their therapies based on political reinterpretations of psychoanalytic trauma theory (fassin & rechtman, 2009).  though a wide variety of therapies emerged from this work that use different practices for therapeutically remediating trauma memories as narratives, they share a similar understanding of why this restores agency for patients with ptsd. in what i generically refer to as “social-justice-oriented therapy,” ptsd is seen as a literal registration of an atrocity onto the patient (kaplan, 2005; leys, 2000). the traumatic event is figured as an agential actor that causes symptoms by acting upon the mind and body of the victim. crucially, from this perspective, trauma is prediscursive: violent experience overwhelms the viewer such that “the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it” (caruth, 1996, pp. 91-92). these symptoms semiotically index traumatic experience; they are seen as evidence that atrocity has taken place. traumatic experience is figured as an agent in this view. it takes agency away from subjects, decentering and objectifying them while writing itself upon them. for some thinkers, traumatic experience is actually a proxy for social injustice itself: only those forms of violence that are socially disavowed can be so overwhelming as to produce trauma in the first place (edkins, 2003). according to this approach, before traumatic memory can be remembered—before it can be known to the mind as part of the story of the teller's life—it must be narrated. the process of constructing narratives restores agency by transforming the inarticulate, vividly felt, structureless collection of sensations imprinted on the body into a story. in this view, therapeutically remediating traumas as stories is healing because it turns them into culturally meaningful objects. in producing the trauma narrative—in media including stories, art, and role-playing—the patient acts as a creative agent, transforming the traces of trauma’s agency over the self into objects that they themselves can control. in this view, therapeutic healing through the production of trauma narratives must be social. therapists empower their patients by facilitating their ability to remediate the trauma and provide structure to it. they are competent subjects who teach decentered ones how to regain autonomy by scaffolding their agency against trauma’s overwhelming incoherence. this role has a second, specifically relational function because the therapist also acts as a witness to the telling. feminist psychotherapist judith herman thus views the therapy relationship as inherently political: “to study psychological trauma means bearing witness to horrible events…when traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator. it is morally impossible to remain neutral in this conflict” (herman, 1997, p. 7). to facilitate the patient’s healing, the therapist must identify trauma as evidence of collectively structured atrocity and not individual pathology. producing trauma narratives thus entails a second form of patient empowerment: by speaking the truth about the conditions that had caused the trauma—whether it be sexual violence, child abuse, or the atrocities of war—victims’ trauma narratives are seen as a kind of political witnessing against the violence in society that might otherwise remain invisible. a patient heals by telling this story, which itself is a kind of activism. herman explains, “remembering and telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims” (herman, 1997, p 1). patients who learn to tell their stories through therapy can then use this skill to share those stories broadly. in this way, therapeutic remediation of trauma as narrative is figured as a prerequisite for the kinds of self-narrativation that has long been considered a cornerstone of feminist praxis, and was also central to lifton and other antiwar activists’ understanding of the role of narrative in treating war trauma.  analyzing the configuration of agency in the social-justice-oriented approach to therapy provides a valuable point of comparison through which to support the claim that vret is part of a regime of ptsd therapy that depoliticizes trauma narratives. but i do not intend to present the social-justice orientation uncritically. several important issues arise from this configuration of ptsd therapy. for one, it does not require recognition of the victimhood of the enemy other: those human beings who consistently die at much higher rates than american service members during us military interventions. another key issue is that in helping patients to produce stories, then, therapists working from a social justice perspective see themselves as producing documentation of atrocity. it is taken for granted in this perspective that these narratives are true; the processes through which they are mediated and the ways power might be enacted between therapist and patient must be disavowed, lest the therapist admit that the atrocity being narrated may have been adulterated in the process of producing the narrative. as marita sturken explains, "it is narrative integration that produces the memory of the traumatic event.  it is when they become full-blown narratives that these memories tell stories of blame and guilt" (sturken, 1999, p. 235). but as ian hacking has shown in his work on false memory, suggestion is all too common among therapists who see themselves as doing good (hacking, 1998).  this can actually serve to politicize certain sites while depoliticizing others. in his ethnographic study of one of the first veterans’ ptsd treatment centers in the us, allan young (1995) describes how group therapy taught vietnam veterans to describe their current suffering—including problems with homelessness, unemployment, and substance abuse—as stemming from their combat experience rather than from societal problems in the united states. though widely influential in the humanities, activism, and feminism more broadly, social-justice approaches represent only a subsection of clinical care for ptsd. for many researchers working to develop therapies within a medical model of mental illness, the moral status of representing the trauma is not considered as important as demonstrating measurable symptom reduction. in this paradigm, which serves as the basis for vret, the only moral good in treating ptsd is the capacity to reduce individual suffering. in the following section, i analyze how the configuration of agency in pe therapy—for which bravemind was designed and marketed as a tool—evacuates the politics of producing trauma narratives. these therapies, especially for veterans, produce therapeutic healing in ways that subsume and efface issues of political activism, empowerment, and social justice. evidence-based therapy and depoliticized trauma ptsd was medicalized in order to hold the military accountable for treating the psychological wounds of veterans, but doing so reopened the production of knowledge about post-traumatic care to medicalized rationality with an intensity not seen since the first world war. (danziger, 2008; shephard, 2001). for academic clinical researchers working outside of the activist milieu, the newly defined mental illness ptsd became an object of disinterested study. in 1980, when ptsd became officially recognized as a legitimate diagnosis, clinical psychologists pushed to develop new kinds of therapy based on medical models of mental illness that could serve to replace the creaking edifice of psychoanalysis. these clinical researchers—foremost among them the cognitive behaviorists—sought to develop standardized therapies that could be systematically studied as treatments for specific diagnoses defined through quantifiable diagnostic questionnaires and validated through clinical trials with statistically significant treatment populations defined by a shared illness category.6  in the mid-1980s, a team of researchers led by dr. edna foa and colleagues at the university of pennsylvania began to develop prolonged exposure as a technique for treating female sexual-assault victims. pe is a category of clinical behavioral interventions used in the treatment of anxiety disorders. during the mid-20th century, behavioral psychologists developed a range of exposure techniques, such as systematic desensitization and flooding (a form of respondent conditioning), as treatments for anxiety disorders, especially phobias. these practices were premised on the behaviorist view that in conditions of irrational anxiety, an organism becomes overwhelmed by fear of stimuli in the world in excess of their capacity to be harmed by them. through repeated, controlled exposure to anxiety-provoking stimuli, the organism—be it a mouse or a veteran—learns that it will not be harmed and eventually come to fear the stimuli less. foa and her colleagues hypothesized that ptsd is similar to a phobia, with the key difference that ptsd originates not from an “irrational” fear but from a specific, often life-threatening experience (foa, steketee, & rothbaum, 1989). foa and kozak proposed an “emotional processing theory of trauma,” a behaviorist model of trauma as a learned fear response (foa & kozak, 1986).  according to this model, during a traumatic event where someone is in great physical danger or sees another person in danger, they will become hyper-attuned to the situation. their mind will create a “fear structure,” a set of associations between all the stimuli present in the situation, including not only those that it is rational to fear but also ones that were previously neutral.  invoking the cognitivist language of the mind as information-processing apparatus, foa and her disciples refer to the fear structure as a “‘program’ for escaping danger” (foa, hembree, & rothbaum, 2007, p. 12).7 based on this model, the researchers developed a protocol for an exposure therapy, one of the primary components of which is using the patient’s trauma narrative as a source of stimulation in order to rewrite the escape program. in essence, the patient is treated as if they have a “trauma phobia.”   protocols are technologies that standardize the therapeutic intervention so that it can be studied. they describe what the therapist should be doing with the patient throughout the course of treatment, as well as how long the treatment should last and what measures should be taken to produce evidence of effectiveness. since the 1990s, foa and her colleagues have become among the foremost researchers in the united states developing treatment protocols for ptsd and running clinical trials to study their efficacy. based on this work they published a manual in oxford university press’s “treatments that work” series titled prolonged exposure therapy for ptsd: emotional processing of traumatic experiences. the manual objectifies therapy in the form of a latourian “immutable mobile”; as a “manualized” therapy, pe can serve not only as a mediator of affects and memories, but also as a social actant that diverse groups can recognize as a “treatment that works” independent of the specific therapist doing the treating. pe was the first therapy for ptsd to be systematically studied using clinical trials, which has had important policy repercussions. during the war on terror and the revelation of high rates of ptsd, the va has become the largest funder of ptsd treatment research in the world (morris, 2015). even though veterans are not the largest population of ptsd sufferers—a greater number of individuals are diagnosed with ptsd after sexual assault and motor-vehicle accidents—the military’s responsibility to provide care for ptsd as a wound of war has positioned the illness as an important biopolitical issue in the operations of the war on terror. the social toll of ptsd extends beyond individual suffering, as high rates of suicide, homelessness, substance abuse, domestic violence, and unemployment have been linked to the illness, creating not only social strife but also terrible public relations for the military. subsequently, the goal of military-funded ptsd research has been to support the development and dissemination of efficient, evidence-based, and highly scalable treatments. in this milieu, prolonged exposure has thrived, receiving more research funding and dissemination efforts than any other therapy for treating ptsd in military populations. since 2008, va regulations require all therapists to be trained in empirically supported treatments and all veterans seeking ptsd care to be offered the option of pe.  thus, when accused of using a “war game” as therapy, vret advocates have been quick to defuse this criticism by drawing attention to the fact that systems like bravemind are based on pe (hanafin, 2010). they recognize that while the media is attracted to the narrative of bravemind as a modification (or “mod”) of a military video game, its legitimacy within military funding agencies and therapeutic community has been contingent upon that of pe more generally. in the contemporary milieu of department of defense and va funding for clinical research on ptsd treatment, technology is legitimized largely by its capacity to deliver treatments that are already evidence-based through novel formats believed to increase their dissemination or efficacy. pe entails four main components, which are introduced throughout the course of the protocol:  psychoeducation, breathing retraining, in vivo exposure exercises, and prolonged imaginal exposure exercises. each of these steps is a site where the subjectivity of the patient in relation to the experience of trauma, its memory, and the meaning of remembering is potentially reconfigured. the standard protocol lasts for roughly 12 sessions, usually with one or two sessions per week. success is formally defined as when the patient’s subjective units of distress on a 100-point scale are lower, when they say they feel better, and/or when they have a sub-threshold score on a diagnostic questionnaire used to assess ptsd symptom severity.  bravemind uses almost exactly the same therapy protocol as traditional pe. indeed, barbara rothbaum, foa’s former student and coauthor of the standard pe manual, helped develop the first vret system for ptsd—called virtual vietnam—and is a co-author of the manual for conducting vret with bravemind. the only difference between the protocols is that during the imaginals, the patient narrates their index trauma while they are interacting with the interfaces of the vr system, which is partially controlled by the therapist. practices of therapeutic remediation in pe are no less influential on the political configuration of agency than they would be if bravemind was, in fact, a war game. but it is only by taking it and other vrets seriously as therapeutic technologies that this becomes apparent.  while patients produce trauma narratives, the theoretical framework and practices through which these narratives are mediated—those of pe—serve to technicize the process and pathologize the patient’s behavior instead of the event. at the same time, the pe framework elevates the agency of the therapy itself as an actant that produces healing and diminishes both the patient’s agency and the importance of the therapeutic relationship in tandem. at the beginning of the therapy, the therapist provides what is called “psychoeducation.” during this phase, the therapist explains the emotional processing theory of trauma, which provides the theoretical underpinning of pe as an intervention. this step serves as a primary mediation through which the patient’s past experiences are interpreted as traumatological and their affects and behaviors are interpreted as symptoms of ptsd. in training seminars i have attended, therapists usually use examples from nonmilitary contexts to explain fear structures in psychoeducation, which serves to make trauma into a non-gendered, universal experience. during one pe clinical-training session i attended, for example, the trainer explained that if we are in a bank at the time of an armed robbery by a bald man, we may develop a fear of not only guns but also of banks and bald men. the therapist will explain that this situation is “normal” and “evolutionarily advantageous.”  like the humanistic view, the evolutionary view of ptsd figures traumatic events as agents that act upon the subjectivity of the patient. yet, crucially, this influence is not seen as the source of pathology in ptsd. in psychoeducation, the patient learns that it is not the traumatic event that caused their ptsd, but rather the strength of their will in avoiding triggers. continuing our previous example, everyone in the bank robbery may be traumatized, but over time, those who go back to the bank and other places where they see other bald men will unlearn their association between these elements and the terrifying experience of armed robbery. these neutral elements, in other words, will disarticulate from the fear structure, while elements that are rational to fear, such as a person with a gun, will remain.  experiencing this habituation entails being willing to experience the distress of these triggers and re-learn the safety of the everyday. for those who choose not to allow themselves to experience this loss of control in relation to the material force of the trigger, the fear structure remains intact and may even become stronger. in working with military populations, therapists may highlight that veterans’ combat training makes them especially good at suppressing feelings of distress. to heal, they must let down their guard and bravely face the event again in a “safe” context to “learn” that the event itself is not to be feared.  at the end of the first pe session, the therapist introduces breathing retraining. this is the only skill that the protocol directs the therapist to teach the patient as a way to control feelings of distress consciously. breath control is a tool for ensuring that the patient remains calm and does not hyperventilate or pass out while narrating the trauma, which would offer them an effective means of avoidance. as a tool, it originates in the pe protocol, which is mediated by the therapist to the patient, who then uses it to overcome the body’s defenses against the agency of triggers. it configures the patient as an agent over their own autonomic responses, but only to the extent that breathing enables the body to feel, control, and regulate the affective intensities generated by the story.8 after the patient has received psychoeducation and breathing retraining, they decide on what trauma they will repeatedly narrate during imaginal exposures. this is called the “index trauma.” during imaginals, as some therapists call them, patients repeatedly narrate their selected index trauma. they narrate in the first person, in the present tense, with their eyes closed. while they are doing this, the therapist directs them to give more detail, asking questions like, “what happened next?” “what are you seeing?” and “what are you hearing?” the therapist tries to get the patient to produce a full narrative of the event with a beginning, middle, and end, in as much detail as possible. rather than see this work of structuring the narratives as a way of empowering the patient by stabilizing the story as a cultural object, in pe the purpose of this work is to create the most complete representation of the trauma possible to maximize its power as a stimulus. in pe, narrative is not a tool for speaking truth to power or uncovering repressed memories that need to be witnessed and shared. it is not seen as a source of meaning, a representation of true events, or even a representation of the patient’s interpretation of the event. instead, it is figured as a collection of stimuli, a tool for activating the fear structure by re-exposing the patient to the situation of the trauma. its “truth” is performed only through its effectiveness in producing affect.  this configuration erases the social and cultural role of trauma narratives. rather than serving as a political witness, the therapist’s role is figured as that of a fear technician who makes sure the patient stays affectively engaged as they produce the narrative. by performing the task, the stated goal is to help the patient “habituate,” or decouple their fear response from the stimuli. while social-justice-oriented therapy sees value in having patients share the emotional intensity of their stories as a way to produce collective recognition and condemnation, for pe therapists the ultimate goal is to erase the affective charge of the story. repetition reprograms the patient’s fear structure so that the trauma narrative becomes “just” a story, a series of words. indeed, sessions are audio-recorded and the patient is assigned the “homework” of repeatedly listening to the narrative. though some patients may choose to share this recording with others, the possible social role of the narrative is not something taken into consideration by the emotional processing theory. in one clinical training i attended, a trainer instructed therapists to discourage their patients from sharing this recording with loved ones as it would be irresponsible to expose others to trauma narratives who do not themselves have access to therapy.  this framing of the purpose and therapeutic action of constructing a trauma narrative also figures the meaning of being a patient: rather than being seen as a victim of politicized social violence who must speak against it to heal, the patient is seen as exhibiting a normal behavioral response to fear-inducing stimuli which they must overcome through exposure. instead of emphasizing the importance of sharing stories with others, the emphasis is on facing fears.9  while the selection of an index trauma may seem to be a moment of agency for the patient, it can also be a site where the material agency of narrative as a formal structure may constrict what is said. for example, david morris describes the decision to focus on the experience of riding in a marine helicopter while it was under fire over fallujah rather than the “moments of moral chaos” that haunted him because it was easy to narrate (morris, 2015, p. 170). if a patient decides partway through therapy that they would rather work on a different index trauma, the therapist may interpret this as a sign of avoidance and insist they stick with the original trauma. of course, the patient may want to switch index traumas for other reasons, such as building trust with the therapist and becoming willing to discuss past actions that they may feel too ashamed to describe at first. this is especially salient for military patients who worry about being judged by civilian therapists for traumas like the discovery of their own pleasure in killing.  this difficulty of locating the “true” index trauma, that which the patient is avoiding and which can be seen as both the source of pathology and key to dismantling it, is one of the greatest challenges in configuring pe therapy for military populations.  however, pe’s characterization as an empirically supported therapy, an agent that works in treating ptsd, can serve to stabilize and contain this challenge to pe’s legitimacy. some pe therapists will suggest to patients who do not comply with the protocol—including sticking with the index trauma—that they are not ready to get better. as one pe therapist explained to me, she tells such patients that by failing to comply with the therapy protocol, they are setting themselves up for failure. rather than have the patient blame the therapy—which she believes in—for their lack of improvement, she prefers to stop therapy altogether. of course, a therapist could do this with any therapy, but the definition of pe as an empirically supported therapy lends gravity to this decision, which makes it more difficult for the patient to insist that another therapy would serve them better.10  in his autobiographical account of ptsd, david morris describes his interaction with a clinical researcher at the va in san diego as he was about to enter a study on pe as a way to get off of a therapy waitlist.  the study coordinator, mark, tells morris that “the cool thing about prolonged exposure” is that, “this is a treatment that we know absolutely works for ptsd. i know it sounds arrogant but if you get into this kind of treatment and do the work that your therapist tells you to do, you’ll have a huge improvement in your symptoms. if you don’t, you won't (morris 2015, p 169). among pe’s true believers, like mark, there is strong skepticism towards patient agency in directing the treatment, even when it exacerbates patient symptoms. similar to mark’s warning, i have often heard training pe therapists advise each other to tell patients that therapy is like working with a personal trainer at the gym, because if patients do the exercises incorrectly, they may think the program is working but will not see the same benefit or may even hurt themselves. “feeling the burn” is a good thing. a few weeks into his treatment with pe, when morris finds himself increasingly agitated and suicidal, his therapist assures him that the problem is not the therapy: if he will only stick to the protocol, he will eventually get better. fearing for his life, morris opts to terminate treatment instead. perhaps the greatest opportunity for patient agency within pe is the step called in vivo exposure. this step occurs between meetings, when the patient is not with the therapist. these are activities from patients’ day-to-day life that they have stopped doing since they have had ptsd because they cause so much anxiety. common examples include many aspects of american consumerist and leisure culture, including shopping at the grocery store, going to sporting events, and watching movies in the theater.  though framed as exposure—an inherently passive and objectifying process—in vivos can be the most agential component of pe for patients, since they are able to choose activities that help them to regain a sense of autonomy in their lived worlds.  bravemind as augmented pe and political agent if pe is already empirically supported, why augment it with virtual reality? for one thing, pe has not proved as effective in combat trauma populations as it has in other ptsd populations. many reasons have been hypothesized, including the complex nature of war traumas, gendered norms around masculinity and personal confession, and lack of trust between military patients and civilian therapists, among others. vret advocates often frame this problem of ineffective therapy as both stigmatic and signaling inadequate engagement on the part of the patient. they suggest that vr can help overcome the stigma of therapy and make it more effective by making it more engaging via its remediating qualities: the advantage of using vr in pe is to give the therapist even more agency in the therapeutic process. bravemind’s inventor skip rizzo explained this ethos to me during our first conversation in 2008:  vr provides a tool that's an equalizer so that somebody's who a good therapist who understands exposure can do exposure therapy more effectively with the vr application than if they have to be real creative and artistic in how they help guide a person through the treatment, never knowing if the person's really imagining or engaging in that imagery or if they're even relevant. at least we know what the person is seeing there on the outside. we don't know what they're seeing in their minds, but we know what they're seeing, what they're hearing, what they're smelling, [and] the vibrations that we've pumped in through the floor system. in other words, the objective properties of the simulation system give the therapist more control over patient experience, minimizing the mystery of the subjective. figure 1. two uniformed soliders demonstrate the bravemind virtual reality exposure thearpy system, virtual iraq. photo credit: skip rizzo, university of southern california institute for creative technologies  bravemind is designed to simulate scenarios and experiences that have been reported in military research on ptsd to be common experiences of deployed combat service members (mclay et al., 2012). sitting at a computer control panel with a variety of settings controlled by buttons on a display, the therapist-user customizes the simulation during therapy (figure 1). in human-computer interaction, this is called a “wizard of oz” set-up, because what appears autonomous to the end-user (the patient) is being manipulated by the therapist-user. the current version of the system has 14 different scenarios, including an iraqi village, a city, a checkpoint, and a strip of land resembling kandahar province in afghanistan. these are each independent, unlinked virtual environments. in order for the patient to enter one of these environments, the therapist must use her control panel to select one—this should be the environment that she and the patient have decided best approximates the site of the index trauma.  within each environment are about half a dozen potentially meaningful locations, such as city blocks with markets and checkpoints along sections of highway (figure 2). once an environment is selected, she can “teleport” the patient to these specific locations and then customize the lighting to settings like morning light, dusk, and green night vision. finally, she can add individual animations and sound files, like a person shouting “go home cowboy,” a helicopter passing by, sniper fire, or an exploding improvised exploding device (ied). the person in the patient position wears stereoscopic vr goggles while sitting or standing on a base-shaker. they can do very little in the environment except press buttons on the gamepad to virtually “walk” through it. figure 2. a screenshot of a marketplace inside the bravermind system, virtual iraq. photo credit: skip rizzo, university of southern california institute for creative technologies  though bravemind is often compared to a video game, its dynamics of interaction are very different, precisely because the therapist is positioned as the “wizard” in a machine that structures the patient’s interaction with the virtual environment. most video games are at least partially governed by algorithms that allow the user to interact with them autonomously; interaction is scripted, and the player has varying degrees of agency according to the script. an individual can sit down and initiate actions in the virtual environment by interacting with the interface—such as pressing buttons on a gamepad or making specific behaviors in front of a motion-tracking sensor. the game itself will produce additional actions to which the player can respond. in bravemind, however, very little takes place autonomously. throughout the interaction with the virtual environment, the therapist has primary control over what happens to the patient. bravemind is designed to extend the logic of control endemic to the emotional processing theory of ptsd and pe. it is a behaviorist tool that materializes common features of military trauma narratives as controllable digital objects. indeed, harkening to behavioral psychology’s efforts to develop physical tools for reshaping subjectivity, rizzo frequently calls vr “the ultimate skinner box.” this colloquialism refers to midcentury american behavioral psychologist bf skinner’s “operant conditioning chamber,” an artificial environment into which researchers could place an organism—often a small animal—to observe its response to stimuli they administered. it offered experimental psychology a tool for literally black-boxing the mind. like the operant conditioning chamber, bravemind is a technology of control; its interfaces immerse the patient’s sensorium in controllable, computer-generated information with the purpose of altering the fear structure. bravemind creates two loops of computer-mediated action during the imaginal exposure portion of vret. the first is between the system and the patient, and appears typical of interactions with immersive vr; the second is that of the therapist and the cyborg unit of patient plus vr system. contrary to many analyses, vret is a form of talk therapy, though it is an augmented one. the vret protocol instructs the patient to narrate traumatic experience, just as someone would in traditional pe. the difference is that the therapist uses the wizard of oz display to try to match what the patient is describing, to create affective intensity through the use of nonverbal, computer-generated triggers, beyond what the patient either can or chooses to remember through narrative. simulation intensifies stimulation. figure 3. this screenshot of the bravermind system, virtual iraq, depicts a car bomb explosion in a marketplace. photo credit: skip rizzo, university of southern california institute for creative technologies  jennifer terry (2009) argues that the kinds of wounds left on warrior’s bodies are the semiotics of war.  drawing on tanielan and jaycox (2008), she calls these “signature wounds.” terry argues that the medical technologies that are created to treat these signature wounds are therefore a complementary semiotics: they treat those traces. ptsd is one of the signature wounds of the war on terror on the bodies of warriors. therefore, the virtual scenarios, animations, and other controllable elements that make up the bravemind software-interface suite can be read as a digital materialization of developers’ understanding of places and stimuli that are associated with trauma, as well as what their military funders will permit them to simulate. it is an effort to archive traumatic experiences, but only those that take place from the perspective of american war veterans. while the patient-user navigates the system using a gamepad mounted on a realistically weighted plastic rifle, the system does not allow its users to kill within the virtual environment. even though characters representing iraqi or afghan women and children may walk the virtual streets, only male civilians can be injured and, even then, only by ied explosions (figure 3). in the driving scenarios, the other service members in the humvee or mrap can be hurt, too, but only by ieds or by shots fired by a middle eastern sniper (figure 4). at no point does the system allow the user to embody the subject position of a perpetrator of violence that results in the death of a civilian. in this way, bravemind codifies a specific perspective on ptsd. though rizzo and his collaborators have discussed the possibility of developing a version of bravemind from an iraqi or afghan perspective as part of a humanitarian effort to help the traumatized civilian populations created through us military occupation, finding funding for such projects has proven less of a priority than expanding the system’s scenarios to additional american military populations, including vietnam veterans and survivors of military sexual trauma (rizzo et al., 2015). figure 4. inside virtual iraq: this screenshot depicts the view of a passenger inside a mrap vehicle. photo credit: skip rizzo, university of southern california institute for creative technologies bravemind augments pe by transforming it from a universal tool for treating a generically conceived response to trauma to one that specifically targets military ptsd. bravemind “matters” both politically and materially because it aims to objectify military patients’ subjective experiences of war. this serves a function beyond structuring who can be treated by the system. as a kind of artificial memory prosthetic, bravemind’s design temporarily encodes and standardizes specific conceptualizations of what “counts” as a traumatic experience of war. it implicitly normalizes and validates specific kinds of experiences—especially the actions of the enemy other—as being traumatic. this could be destigmatizing for patients who see their traumas represented, since they would know they are not the only ones to have been traumatized by these events. the system materially suggests that their traumas can be cured with high tech. bravemind is performatively biopolitical because it promotes a vision of any trauma it represents as one that the machine can cure and, by omission, that any trauma the system does not represent is not worthy of investing in treating. in this medicalized configuration of care, the material component of the therapeutic apparatus—the protocol, the manual, or the machine—is figured as the primary agent of post-traumatic healing. by making this agential cut, trauma narratives become generic and impersonal tools and therapy itself a technological fix to the complex problems that service members and veterans face when they struggle to reconcile past experiences of war with their present condition.  bravemind’s inventor, skip rizzo, once told the digital media scholar elizabeth losh that he felt the system could be read as a form of political resistance because it raises public awareness about ptsd as an invisible wound of war (losh, 2006, p. 83). but this elides the essential biopolitics of care.  bravemind promises both the public and traumatized warfighters that there is nothing permanently wrong with them or the war they have participated in, but rather that they are suffering from a temporary ailment, one that can be fixed using advanced technologies. the digital-generation warfighter in the minds of technocrats, then, is one who chooses to be made and does not want to question or reflect on wartime experiences, but rather is committed to using virtual technologies to shape and reshape himself or herself into an instrument of state projects. studying how technocrats imagine how warfighters should be healed if they do become traumatized helps us see how therapy can serve to depoliticize warfighters’ subjectivity, while at the same time legitimizing this depoliticized view in the name of healing. as a technology for therapeutically remediating trauma narratives, bravemind and similar technologies provide a material object through which these meanings are both codified and disseminated.  conclusion some might argue that this analysis as a whole is tangential to the central problem of lack of access to care faced by many warfighters, especially veterans, with ptsd. my goal here has been to show that it matters not only that wounded warriors receive care, but also what kinds of selves and what knowledge about the war trauma are produced through that care. of course, it is an important caveat to this article that therapists have a large degree of flexibility in their practice. unless they are participating in a research study, most therapists work without direct supervision of their practice. there is nothing stopping a therapist who has a patient describe their trauma through a social-justice configuration from saying that they are using pe or a variant thereof, provided that the patient is indeed constructing their trauma narrative. the scientistic discourse of pe can thus serve as a way to create legitimacy for otherwise overtly political therapy. i like to imagine that bravemind, too, could be enrolled into a variety of political configurations. in her analysis of vret, losh has suggested that the openness of virtual environments allows for tactical counter-reading and modes of engagement that are only limited by the presence of monitoring spectators, like therapists and military funders (2006, p. 84). what if these limitations did not exist? what other therapeutic worlds could we imagine for virtual technologies? what stories could they be used to tell and to whom? could they be sites of feminist praxis? what communication and healing might take place if the patient were at the helm of the wizard of oz display and the therapist in the stereoscopic goggles? jacquelyn ford morie, feminist game developer and former head of the ict’s virtual worlds research group, has explored similar questions about therapeutic remediation of war trauma through her work in the online virtual world second life. for example, she created a virtual iraqi village in which a warrior-patient could walk with their therapist—or anyone else they chose—telepresent together as avatars, with neither in control of the other. the warrior could use the space as a method of walking to remind them of their experiences and share these with others. in a portion of this village morie created a memorial space, where warriors could post their own photos. she also developed a tool for warfighters to leave a customized avatar-bot, a kind of digital mannequin that, when prompted, plays an audio file of a story they have recorded in their own voice (morie, haynes, & chance, 2010). as a persistent world, each of these projects is inherently social, creating a palimpsest through which each visitor can see traces of others. morie’s projects do not simply remediate existing therapies but ask how the affordances of new media might lead to fundamentally new ways of therapeutically remediating trauma narratives. in her work, the technology is not a medicalized tool but a platform through which to explore the healing potential of storytelling. her projects help me to imagine how military simulations—with their rhetorically powerful aesthetics—could create new configurations of post-traumatic healing. notes 1 for accounts of the development of ict and its various military-funded digital media research projects see der derian (2001), ghamari-tabrizi (2004), lenoir and lowood (2005), mead (2013), and suchman, this issue. 2 several military vret systems have been developed, bearing names like virtual fallujah and iraqworld, but among them bravemind has been the best funded, researched, and widely disseminated. 3 zoë wool’s ethnography of soldiers recovering at walter reed, after war: the weight of life at walter reed (2015)  illustrates the ways that everyday experiences of their recovery intersect with the myth-laden status of being seen as war heroes. 4 bravemind provides a structural counterpoint to drone warfare, as described by both ali and chandler in this issue. as a cyborg assemblage that distributes the labor of warfighting between human and machine, drone warfare enables women to participate in combat operations in ways traditionally restricted due to physical limitation.  these new “boy’s toys” allow women to perform historically masculine roles. as a “boy’s toy” bravemind, however, transforms the feminized practice of psychotherapy into a masculinized military cyborg assemblage. 5 contemporary versions of both the international classification of diseases (icd) and diagnostic and statistical manual of mental health disorders (dsm) are purely descriptive and therefore agnostic with regards to the origins of mental health disorders, offering neither biological nor psychodynamic explanations of their underlying causes. 6 for ptsd, this is usually either the pcl or the caps, or both. 7 fear structures are similar to the “affect systems” described by sylvan tompkins (see rice, this volume) but are structured around the affect of fear instead of shame. as a model for action, they do not assume an effort to avoid the interruption of pleasure as a motivating force, as tompkins does, but rather simply the avoidance of fear. 8 in order to monitor the level of fear, the therapist and patient develop a suds scale, which stands for subjective units of distress. the patient will describe what feels like a 100, which would be totally overwhelming, and what would be their minimum. then they create a scale of other activities to facilitate communication with the therapist about how they are feeling during the exposure components of the therapy. 9 this is in keeping with behavioral therapy more broadly. as an effort to develop a reproducible science of behavior, behavioral therapists have historically seen their work as primarily technical and subsequently politically neutral. 10 recently, challenges to pe are surfacing, as in morris’ own work. references american psychiatric association. 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(2016). simulation at ft. irwin. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 2(1). rizzo, a., difede, j., rothbaum, b.o., buckwalter, j.g., daughtry, j.m., & reger, g.m. (2015). update and expansion of the virtual iraq/afghanistan ptsd exposure therapy system. in m.p. safir, h.s. wallach, & a. “skip” rizzo (eds.), future directions in post-traumatic stress disorder: prevention, diagnosis, and treatment (pp. 303-328). new york, ny: springer. scott, w.j. (2007). ptsd in dsm-iii: a case in the politics of diagnosis and disease. social problems, 37(3), 294-310. shephard, b. (2001). a war of nerves: soldiers and psychiatrists in the twentieth century. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. sturken, m. (1999). narratives of memory: repressed memory as cultural memory. in m. bal, j. crewe, & l. spitzer (eds.), acts of memory: cultural recall in the present (pp. 231-248). hanover, nh: university press of new england. suchman, l.a. (2007). human-machine reconfigurations: plans and situated actions. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. suchman, l. a. (2016). configuring the other: sensing war through immersive simulation. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 2(1). tanielian, t., & jaycox, l.h. (2008). invisible wounds of war: psychological and cognitive injuries, their consequences, and services to assist recovery. santa monica, ca: rand corporation. terry, j. (2009). significant injury: war, medicine, and empire in claudia’s case. women’s studies quarterly, 37(1-2), 200-225. valiaho, p. (2012). affectivity, biopolitics and the virtual reality of war. theory, culture & society, 29(2), 63-83. weizenbaum, j. (1976). computer power and human reason: from judgment to calculation. san francisco, ca: w.h. freeman and co. wilson, e. (2010). affect and artificial intelligence. seattle, wa: university of washington press. wool, z. (2015). after war: the weight of life at walter reed. durham, nc: duke university press. young, a. (1995). the harmony of illusions. princeton, nj: princeton university press. zagalo, n., & morgado, l. (2011). virtual worlds and metaverse platforms: new communication and identity paradigms. hershey, pa: igi global. bio marisa brandt is an assistant professor of practice in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science and core faculty at the center for gender in global context at michigan state university. her scholarship interrogates technoscience and/in media. she is currently working on a book manuscript on the cultural politics of the development of virtual reality as a psychotherapeutic modality. her research has appeared in venues including social studies of science, media/culture, and the international encyclopedia of media studies: media futures. microsoft word 76964-1-11_rusert.docx rusert, b. (2019). review of the biopolitics of feeling: race, sex, and science in the nineteenth century, by kyla schuller (duke university press, 2017). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, issue 5(1), 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © britt rusert, 2019 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license review the biopolitics of feeling: race, sex, and science in the nineteenth century, by kyla schuller (duke university press, 2017) britt rusert university of massachusetts amherst brusert@afroam.umass.edu kyla schuller’s the biopolitics of feeling takes a refreshingly head-on approach to the historical entanglement of race and sex in the united states. in a stunningly convincing argument rooted in the rise of biopower, modern theories of heredity, and eugenics, schuller argues that beginning in the nineteenth century, sex became a racial-imperial project, in which binary sex begins to “accomplish the work of racial differentiation” (17), a strategy that stands at the center of the biopolitical production, sorting, and relative valuation of populations.1 such an argument has crucial implications for the rooting of feminist origin stories in the women’s suffrage movement, a historical narrative propped up, as schuller shows, by a nefarious presumption about the innocence of white women’s actions and political subjectivities: “as the struggle for the rights of women coincident with the category’s new ontological status [the category of woman], feminism derives its political purchase from and within the larger framework of biopolitics. if woman is the product of racial thought, nineteenth-century feminism itself becomes a civilizational and biopolitical strategy, and not only in its explicitly imperial variants” (p. 18). refusing self-congratulatory origin stories, schuller reminds her readers rusert catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 2 again and again of feminism’s historical alignment, not just with the neglect of antiracist action, but with the operations of white supremacy itself. meticulously tracing the rise of what she calls “evolutionary feminism,” she refuses to let readers be naïve or nostalgic about the history of (white women’s) feminism and the way it has continued, if sometimes obliquely, to shape contemporary movements and epistemological frameworks. the biopolitics of feelings offers a careful history of us feminism’s imbrication in theories of biological inheritance in order to produce a history of the present that might take the field in new and less racist directions. throughout, it offers a crucial pre-history to many conversations and controversies in feminism and queer studies today: the deployment of gender and enforcement of the gender binary as a tactic of securitization; the overdetermination of white women’s feminism as feminism itself; trans-exclusionary radical feminism; new materialism’s grounding in a disingenuous, pre-political innocence that turns out to be the position not of the object but of whiteness itself. for scholars working in the nineteenth century, the biopolitics of feeling provides a new way to think about the animating power of sentimentality across the century: rather than offering new readings of sentimental novels, schuller suggests that, by the late nineteenth century, the tropes of sentimentality could be found across evolutionary discourse, articulating and solidifying what she calls “sentimental biopower.” perhaps most crucially, schuller reveals the long reach of lamarckianism across the entirety of the nineteenth century. while feminists have battled over charles darwin and the question of his salvageability, the biopolitics of feeling instead suggests that the overemphasizing of darwin has obscured lamarckian theories that had a powerful afterlife in the united states, long after the 1859 publication of the origin of species and the mainstreaming of the theory of descent by natural selection. focusing on the lamarckian “sciences of impressability,” schuller traces how such theories reproduced ideas that anglosaxon people could direct evolution and thus the course of civilization itself. populations of color, on the other hand, “were assigned the condition of unimpressability, or the impaired state of throwing off affects but being incapable of being affected by impressions themselves” (p. 13) and thus unable to direct evolution. moving from the imperial and eugenical dimensions of impressability, two chapters take up the transformations of impressability for anti-eugenical purposes in the writings of frances e. w. harper and w. e. b. du bois. the rusert catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 3 strongest chapter, “vaginal impressions,” delves into the detailed and sometimes fantastical theories of sex and reproduction produced by white women physicians of the period such as elizabeth blackwell and mary walker. that chapter turns into a surprising excavation of postbellum homonationalism routed through medical discourse. schuller shows how queer white women physicians such as walker actually participated in the project of white supremacy through the valorization of white women’s reproductive control and civilizing influence. yet again sounding a warning about feminist self-righteousness and claims to innocence, schuller reminds readers of the dangers of a feminism that does not center the intellectual work, materialities, and experiences of women of color. the biopolitics of feeling is perhaps most admirable for how it follows but also fruitfully extends foucault’s (2007) “historico-philosophical” method. while scholarship on biopower has convincingly shown the many ways that the politics of life itself determines and shapes both structures and subjectivities, that work has, at times, been too presentist, and not enough attuned to the historical development of this regime of power. schuller contributes to the biopolitical turn by carefully historicizing biopolitics; in this way, she suggests how our own moment came to be, but also how we might escape its biopolitical grip on the present. in an optimistic gesture at the end of the study, schuller suggests that activism, art, and protest serve as crucial sites of resistance to biopower. her own attention to the eugenical and imperial dimensions of the women’s movement in the postbellum and progressive era would at the same time warn us against uncritical embraces of activism today, pointing instead to the emancipatory micro-politics that animate social movements in and against the micro-fascisms they sometimes reproduce.2 while drawing on a broad and interdisciplinary nineteenth-century archive, schuller boldy draws connections to debates within feminist, queer, and trans studies, suggesting that these fields have inherited and continue to bear the traces (or impressions) of biological models of sex, as well as presumptions about how genital morphology relates to both identity and desire. by turning back to a set of neglected and surprisingly influential theories of heredity, schuller suggests that the field should unmoor itself from these dangerous nineteenth-century inheritances—including the persistence of what she calls “vaginal feminism”— while finding new and more nuanced approaches to embodiment and materiality rusert catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 4 more broadly. moving from the nineteenth century to the present, schuller’s epilogue encapsulates both the risk, but also the necessity, of feminist, queer, and critical race engagements with the biological. in an age of climate change, police brutality and death, and the increasing precarity of and risk to human life (always unevenly distributed), schuller suggests that we ignore bodies and their differential valuation by biopower at our own peril. nearing the end of the study, she moves from impressability to plasticity, ultimately landing on and finding hope in theories of neuroplasticity that help to illuminate “biological processes as imbricated effects, rather than causative agents, of power relations” (p. 210). here, schuller makes reference to recent studies of gender as being produced and reinforced through “dopamine reward cycles” in young children as well as sylvia wynter’s (2003) interest in an ontogenic theory of consciousness that includes findings from neuroscience. given the warnings issued from the archive throughout the book, i wonder, is it possible to positively value the hormonal, and the neurochemical more broadly, without reproducing essentialisms of the past or the neoliberal capitalist captures of the present (including, in this case, the global pharmaceutical industry). do theories of plasticity help to illuminate or possibly continue to obscure how differentially valued populations are interpellated within structures of state violence? for example, i’m thinking about sayak valencia’s (2018) recent arguments about the brutal and often spectacular forms of violence that undergird contemporary drug markets, including the production of hormones. in her account, the production of emancipatory models of (white) gender through the hormonal, like those found in paul preciado’s (2008) testo junkie, actually obscure the violence exacted on non-white populations through the markets and forms of “extreme neoliberalism” that are currently being constructed on the frontiers of capital. in schuller’s final turn toward more nuanced approaches to race, affect, and materialization, i further wondered if psychic life can be accounted for within feminist and queer materialisms. in other words, how do we theorize embodiment in an expansive way—in schuller’s terms, as the specific ways that race and affect take bodily form—while not losing sight of imagination, fantasy, and the psychic life, especially since all three are crucial to the reproduction of white supremacy but also to liberation itself? midway through the study, schuller articulates her most urgent and timely intervention this way: “biopower is feminism’s enabling condition” (p. 105). rusert catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 5(1) 5 readers will find an abundant resource of theoretically informed readings of postbellum and progressive era science and literature throughout the study, but they will be also unable to ignore schuller’s urgent warning about feminism’s embeddedness in the machinations of biopower. notes 1 on the specificities of biopolitical surveillance and control today through the production and sorting of populations according to capacity, see puar (2017). 2 on micro-fascism, see deleuze & guattari (1983). references deleuze, g., & guattari, f. (1983). anti-oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia, vol. 1. (brian massumi, trans.). minneapolis, mi: university of minnesota press. foucault, m. (2007). politics of truth. (lysa hochroth & catherine porter, trans.). los angeles, ca: semiotext(e). preciado, p. (2008). testo junkie: sex, drugs, biopolitics in the pharmacopornographic era. new york, ny: the feminist press. puar, j. (2017). the right to maim: debility, capacity, disability. durham, nc: duke university press. valencia, s. (2018). gore capitalism. south pasadena, ca: semiotext(e). wynter, s. (2003). “unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—an argument.” cr: the new centennial review 3.3: 257-333. bio britt rusert is the author of fugitive science: empiricism and freedom in early african american culture (nyu press, 2017) and co-editor of w. e. b. du bois’s data portraits: visualizing black america (princeton architectural press, 2018). she is an associate professor in the w. e. b. du bois department of afroamerican studies at the university of massachusetts amherst. kaishian, patricia, & djoulakian, hasmik (2020). the science underground: mycology as a queer discipline. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(2), 1 26 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © patricia kaishian and hasmik djoulakian, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license the science underground: mycology as a queer discipline patricia kaishian purdue university pkaishian@gmail.com hasmik djoulakian hasmikdjoulakian@gmail.com abstract this article explores the science of mycology through a queer theory framework with the intention of situating the state of the field in a historical and social context. with the understanding that everything is in community with fungi, we look to the biology and ecology of these organisms for transformative inspiration and a deep-time sense of belonging. our scientific understanding of mushrooms and other fungi has been shaped and indeed impeded by mycophobia, a condition of fear and revulsion that we compare here to queerphobia. in this work, we argue that mycology relies upon queer methodologies for knowledge acquisition given both the nonbinary, cryptic, and subversive biological nature of fungi as well as a hegemonic, western, cultural rendering of fungi as perverse and unworthy of formal investigation. we further argue that the queer methodologies of mycology that developed in response to these conditions have enhanced rather than hindered our knowledge of fungi. because our ultimate quest as scientists is the pursuit of truth, as best as we can determine, we suggest that scientists would do well to meaningfully reconcile with the inescapable and oftentimes queer reality of bias and subjectivity. we are human only in contact and conviviality with what is not human. original research 2 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 —david abrams, becoming animal introduction clustered in supergroup opisthokonta, fungi, animals, and amoebae share a more recent common ancestor than with plants or bacteria. the vegetated environment that enabled the transition of animals to land and evolution of amphibians, reptiles, birds, then mammals, was bound to symbiotic fungi known as mycorrhizae. over 90 percent of plants form these associations (smith & read, 2008), and myceliated landscapes sustain cascades of nested biological systems, from which every evolutionary layer of our human biology is indistinguishable, arising and persisting in conviviality with fungi or fungal-bound organisms. as terraforming bodies, fungal transindividualism is our collective ecological history. fungi are engaged in continual processes of renewal, interfacing with death, creating life through decomposition, nutrient reallocation, and the spectrum of symbiosis. fungi can remediate environments by digesting fossil fuels and converting them into fungal sugars. fungi can accumulate heavy metals and radioactive materials, and a fungus has even been found to metabolize ionizing cesium-137 in the reactors of chernobyl. both single cellular forms and filamentous, hyphal networks of fungi can be found in almost any conceivable niche: of, on, within, and for human and nonhuman bodies. despite this dynamic profile of fungi complex social histories have influenced outcomes and trajectories of mycology, rendering it a marginalized science. kingdom fungi has been persistently maligned, feared, and misunderstood, and these cultural forces have directly sabotaged scientific understanding of this group for hundreds of years. in western europe and in the united states particularly, children are typically raised to fear all mushrooms, which are unilaterally viewed as poisonous, diseased, and degenerate. although science, in its ideal form, should be an equal-opportunity investigative methodological tool, we know that the history of modern science has been disproportionately written by white, often christian, men from western europe, excluding other voices. consequently, dominant cultural lenses—heteronormativity, racism, sexism, ableism, and binaries inherent to them—have influenced scientific understandings. tiokasin ghosthorse, a member of the cheyenne river lakota nation of south dakota and scholar at yale divinity school and the yale school of forestry and environmental science, explores relational and egalitarian thinking processes familiar to the lakota people, as compared to rational, hierarchical thinking processes within western cultures. ghosthorse says that, for lakota people, original research 3 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 language is inherently relational and all things are bound together. ghosthorse (2019) writes, the rational mind is the human living within the hierarchy of a box that seeks to capture it through its own narcissistic addiction to the anthropocentrism of a society or a people who hold themselves up as somehow more grandiose than others in that box of conscience. it deadens the intuitive or non-dogmatic life. this is where the separation begins—with a concept and a word that doesn’t exist within many intuitive languages, such as lakota. that word is domination. (paras. 10–11) by invoking rationality over intuition to defend a viewpoint, a person makes the assertion that the intuitive—often feminized—lens is neither legitimate nor legible, with no footing in any discursive cultural space. often with derision, it is written out of the conversation. such disregard for intuition is part of the pathway toward domination that ghosthorse describes. dualistic thinking about life and non-life, male and female, and other categories ghosthorse alludes to, permeate mycophobic discourse. western scientific thinking seeks security through objective assessment, but objectivity is meaningless when it comes to gender and queerness because attempts to determine the bounds of queerness are already exercises of power. donna haraway (1988) discusses the falsity of objectivity in her essay on situated knowledges, which describes the partial perspective any one person is able to have depending on sociopolitical factors influencing their gaze; these partial perspectives form a patchwork of messy, layered knowledge that inches toward some measure of shifting objectivity. this encourages rethinking scientific endeavors not as observations of subjects, but as interactions with them. similarly, fungi defy objectivity and standardization. specifically, sporadic, ephemeral, and unpredictable appearances of fruiting bodies complicates mycologists’ ability to obtain thorough population data. the complex biotic and abiotic forces that lead to a species producing a fruiting body remain unknown in many cases. while some fungi, like some species of morels, can be reliably found in the same place on more or less the same calendar day every year, other species, such as members of genus ionomidotus, may be seen once in a given location and then never again. but is its mycelium still present in that spot? we often do not know. if so, does that count as being present? then there is the issue of quantification of an individual. if you find a scattered grouping of mushrooms growing around a tree, are they one genetic individual? if so, do you quantify them as one mushroom? or do you count the number of mushrooms, reporting them as individuals? there is not a clear and universally applied answer to these original research 4 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 questions. this lack of conformity to quantifiable boxes has put many fungi at a greater risk of extinction. their biological realities are not given necessary accommodations in our current conservation assessment framework, whose attempts to standardize data diminish many essential properties of fungi. interrogating our dualistic, mycophobic view of fungi—and our often pathologizing attempts to understand them—can help make science more accountable. mycology is a science that, by its very nature, challenges paradigms and deconstructs norms. mycology disrupts our mostly binary conception of plants versus animals, two-sex mating systems, and discrete organismal structure, calling upon non-normative, multimodal methodologies for knowledge acquisition. mycelium is the web-like network of fungal cells that extends apically through substrate, performing sex, seeking nutrients, building multispecies and multikingdom symbioses. this essay seeks to remediate our relationship with fungi and all organisms—thereby queerness—by collapsing and myceliating the emotional space between human and nonhuman. in order to do this, we explore dogma of institutional (capital s) science, as well as the biology, history, and methodologies of mycology through a queer theory framework, as seen by a queer mycologist and a feminist educator. history of queer” historically, “queer” was used pejoratively to describe non-heteronormative behaviors. people now self-identify as queer, to describe their existence outside heteronormativity. in the united states, “queer” was reclaimed and gained popular usage during aids political activism of the 1980s and 1990s. “we’re here! we’re queer! get used to it!” was the rallying cry of queer nation and act up, which sought to unify subgroups not quite captured by the terms “gay” and “lesbian.” the word “nation” suggested a coalition of queer people, bound together in their non-heteronormativity, redefining what it meant and what it looked like to have a sense of belonging rooted in shared identity and struggle (chen, 2012, pp. 61–63). whether people identify as queer to describe their homosexuality, gender noncomformity, or transgender identity, “queer” is fluid, invoking a spirit of community and a history of defiance (butler, 1990; sedgwick, 1990/2008; clare; 2015). queer theory explores the constructed dichotomy of “normative” and “deviant” sexuality and systems and frameworks that interact with sexuality, including race, nationality, dis/ability. this field grew from feminist and gay and lesbian studies, which focus on challenging “essential” qualities of women and femininity, as well original research 5 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 as the normativity of heterosexuality, which becomes posited as the unspoken, unnamed standard and expectation for romantic and sexual relationships. while this essay interrogates the relationship between mycology and queerness by defining “queer” as non-heteronormative identities and expressions, there is value in thinking more broadly of “queer” as referring to identities, bodies, and behaviors pushed to the margins of western, hegemonic, heternormative life. queer theory has drawn from a number of philosophers and theorists, including poststructuralists and postmodernists such as jacques derrida. one of derrida s contributions to semiotics is the concept of deconstruction,” which seeks to deconstruct” logocentrism, the idea that there are inherent, stable truths, calling attention to the importance of language in the formation of our framework of truths. derrida (1981) writes, by means of this double play, marked in certain decisive places by an erasure which allows what it obliterates to be read, violently inscribing within the text that which attempted to govern it from without, i try to respect as rigorously as possible the internal, regulated play of philosophemes or epistimemes by making them slide—without mistreating them—to the point of their nonpertinence, their exhaustion, their closure. (p. 6) probing the limits of socially ingrained concepts is an exercise of deconstruction and reshapes systems of power. a project of queer theory is deconstruction of heteronormative concepts, such as a family as a procreative unit, which exposes contingencies, obsolescence, and fallacies in these norms, reinforcing the viability of alternative structures and spaces. by challenging protected social groups and their associated dogmas, queer theory seeks to make plastic seemingly stable notions of fact, knowledge, knowledge acquisition, and science, whose otherwise reified, institutionalized standing maintains commonly held assumptions. queer ecology is an intervention specifically targeted against institutionalization of heteronormative modes of scientific thought, unraveling abounding queerness. history of science people all over the world have systematically documented their surroundings and interactions with nonhuman organisms, abiotic factors, and ecologies for millennia. by way of reproducible knowledge acquisition, mass observational patterns and longitudinal documentation, many systems of knowing have long existed. despite this, some forms of knowing and conceptions of truth have been given priority over others. in western europe, women had historically been keepers of ecological knowledge, but their voices were excluded from formal original research 6 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 participation in science, their knowledge often dismissed as “folk tales,” “witchcraft,” or “old wives’ tales,” meant to indicate that their knowledge was irrational—sometimes, unnatural, evil, otherworldly—with no basis in reality, because women’s knowledge was fundamentally threatening to hegemonic institutions of knowledge-creation (barstow, 1994). val plumwood (1993) writes, “feminine ‘closeness to nature’ has hardly been a compliment” (p. 19), and instead an assertion that women did not possess rational, intellectual, and positively human capacities of liberal, modern, western men, who channeled “untamed” nature into reputable, reified scientific knowledge. the culture of institutional science has been disproportionately shaped by a small subset of people, and the consequences can be limiting to research and dangerous for posterity. with the spread of institutional science, christianity continued to spread, in part through colonialism. it is well known and documented that christianity strongly influenced scientists. scientists, such as descartes, euler, and newton, often were loyal to the church in their supposedly objective pursuits of knowledge. largescale agriculture also interacted with science and christianity, with scientific discoveries enabling new manipulations of land and crops, and with christian domestic and marital structure organized in connection with agriculture in what can be termed agro-heterosexuality. rachel stein (2010) states, christian thinkers compared human sexual actions to planting a field and only those activities that corresponded to “seeding,” or procreation, were accepted as natural; other activities impeding or ignoring reproduction, whether performed with members of the same or opposite sex were forbidden as against nature (bullough & bullough, 1977, p. 28). (p. 286) bodies that perform forbidden actions become forbidden themselves, marked as unnatural, offensive, defiant. this is also where queer sexuality meets queer ecology, including the effect of fungi on agriculture and agricultural metaphors. anna tsing (2012) explores the relationship between emergence of intensive agriculture as the standard of modernity and progress, and solidification of fungi as the enemy of those ideas of modernity and progress. the relationship is tinged with irony: when agriculture disrupts and strips bare natural ecologies, the resulting monocultures are increasingly vulnerable to pests and pathogens, some of which are fungal. tsing (2012) writes, “the emergence of vast fields of grain offered fungal plant parasites a field day—and a reputation as the enemy of civilisation and, later, progress” (p. 147). this notion of “progress” implies forward original research 7 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 movement, productivity, growth, and improvement, concepts which queerphobic discourse suggests become hindered through a lack of heterosexual procreation. science is not inherently a capitalistic endeavor, but discourse of progress can strap capitalistic notions of productivity to scientific spaces and pursuits. tsing (2015) explores this idea with the word “scalability”: the capitalistic drive of perpetually scaling up, making research questions apply to greater and greater scales without changing the research question, which is apparent with industrial agriculture. tsing (2015) even refers to mushroom forests, sites of boundless “indeterminate encounters” with no prescribed measures of productivity or success, as “anti-plantations” (p. 51). it is through interplay of these factors— dominant heteronormative structure and capitalist drive—that disdain for fungi crystalized within western europe, and later within postcolonial us. tsing (2012) writes, biological and social diversity huddle defensively in neglected margins…most everywhere, a negative correlation exists between diversity and intensity of capital investment and state control!” (p. 151). as cereal farming under capitalism intensified throughout eurasia, families were expected to give a portion of their yields to elites. mushrooms grew wild on untended margins of these farms, and were incorporated into people s diets under the table,” providing a form of nourishment beyond the reach of the state. under large-scale agriculture, crops are organized through capitalist logics of commodification,” within which things are torn from their lifeworlds to become objects of exchange” (tsing, 2012, p. 158). these wild-growing mushrooms demonstrate non-extractive, non-capitalist entanglements with surrounding ecosystem lifeworlds. one type of truth is that humans are different from fungi due to our evolutionary history and genetics. another type of truth is that we are similar because we both respond to the intensity of capital investment and state control in a similar way. we die. in science, a tool can look tantalizingly like a truth, until the tool is deconstructed into its foundational elements. as scientists, we use tools and methods to access knowledge, and we standardize our work to create a common language. this is of tremendous power and value, as it allows for a language for globalized participation in knowledge formation. with all potential knowledge being infinite, science is collective incrementalism, each finding leading to infinity minus one. replication and standardization are hallmarks of science for good reason. the difference between “pseudoscience” and alternative ways of knowing should be clarified: purporting to be science and failing to abide by the scientific method is fundamentally different from openly and explicitly operating outside the confines of the scientific method, and it is essential that they be regarded differently. original research 8 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 “pseudoscience” can be destructive and dishonest, and is rightfully criticized. trouble arises, however, when replication and standardization are conflated with knowledge itself. some will argue knowledge cannot exist absent these structures, and while science requires these structures, it is critical to emphasize the difference between tools and truth. the strength of science can also be its weakness: linear, logical atomization of information excavates clean and standardized data, but in our infinitely complicated universe, such expectations for cleanliness seem improbable; to choose, at times, messiness is to see more fully. taxonomy, the naming, describing, and classifying of organisms, is a vital and often undervalued tool for communication in organismal science. taxonomy is often undervalued because it is considered simple, observational, basic research.” within our system of categorization, species concepts for fungi can be ambiguous, shifting depending on the objective of the investigator. while a phylogenetic or biological species concept might be true in the context of phylogenetics and evolution, the ability to strictly define a species is not a requisite for accessing the truth of all organismal relationships. for example, a yeast (a single-celled fungus) could hardly be more morphologically and genetically distinct from a human body, and yet, there is a suite of yeasts found within human bodies (the mycobiome) upon which we depend for basic bodily functions (seed, 2015). these species are critically interdependent but this understanding cannot be derived from species concepts. scientists have found that common morphologies are not always an indicator of relatedness; that populations within a species are sometimes on the verge of speciation; that data organization by way of dna is data organization for the sake of data continuity. things are fluid, scientific inquiry happens in a snapshot of deep-time, and this is also a truth. the construction and imposition of units in taxonomy and biological surveys mimics individualized concepts of self, specifically the reified notion of self coveted historically through western standards of white, masculine, selfsufficient personhood. discrete units of self diminish the relational and interdependent nature of humanity and deny the labor of others in accounting of one’s success and viability. declaring units of fungi feels forced and coercive because their fluid, indeterminant biology clashes radically with such abrupt and linear constructions. clean taxonomic and population units deny the messiness of fungal biology—almost always embedded, connected, and dynamic—forcing scientists to question our own objectives in this pursuit. failure to reassess objectives in science can leave one clinging to tools at the expense of better original research 9 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 answers. from some perspectives, science during the age of enlightenment stressed difference over similarity. carl linnaeus’s work on taxonomy specifically was organized around the pursuit of an inherent quality that differentiated, rather than bound, organisms into their own discrete taxonomic units (wilchins, 2004). but queer differences in fungi went misread by linnaeus, and many mycologists agree that linneaus’s treatment of fungi did more of a disservice to the group than good. linnaeus called lichens “rustici pauperrimi'' or “poorest peasants” of vegetation (plitt,1919). fungi were given the mycophobic title of “lower plants,” which directly references perception of fungi as inferior and, hinting at teleological notions held at that time, less evolved. based largely on nutritional modes, with fungi being heterotrophic and plants autotrophic, fungi were properly established as their own kingdom within the five-kingdom system proposed by robert whittaker in 1969. even after this, however, mycology was placed under the purview of plant and/or forest pathology. currently, if an institution has a mycology dedicated lab at all, and few do, it will most likely be placed in a department or sub-department titled plant or forest pathology. scientific understanding of fungi has therefore been constrained by confirmation bias and social forces; fungi are approached through a pathologizing framework as something to be fought, controlled, and eliminated. no one should doubt the importance of these perspectives—after all, many fungi are pathogens, parasites, and disease agents of agriculturally and economically important crops—but the vast majority of fungi are not limited to those roles, if they fill them at all. mycophobia fungi are not plants, nor are they animals, and this binary conception is how many people today are inclined to interface with the natural world. fungi are seen as poisonous, agents of disease, degenerate, deadly, freaky, gross, and weird— language historically leveled against both queer and disabled people—and as having no positive interrelationships with their environment(s). mycology is rarely taught to undergraduate students, never mind sufficiently addressed in primary and secondary schools. examples of dramatic and disdainful characterizations of mushrooms are abundant in many facets of western european culture. in magical mushrooms, mischievous molds, george hudler (1998, p. 73) explores socially important fungi throughout history and presents examples of these characterizations, such as the following poem by emily dickinson (1896): had nature any outcast face could she a son condemn original research 10 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 had nature an iscariot that mushroom – it is him. —emily dickinson, “the mushroom” dickinson compares mushrooms in her poem to judas iscariot, the disciple who betrayed jesus christ to the chief priests, leading to his crucifixion. she suggests there is a sanctity to nature that is defiled and betrayed by mushrooms, as if they were not only an aberration of nature, but also an active, malicious threat to a holy place. a later section of the poem refers to mushrooms as the elf of plants,” echoing the linnaean title of lower plants.” the following is an excerpt from sir arthur conan doyle s sir nigel (1906): a sickly autumn shone upon the land. wet and rotten leaves reeked and festered under a foul haze. the fields were spotted with monstrous fungi of a size and colour never matched before—scarlet and mauve and liver and black—it was as though the sick earth had burst into foul pustules. mildew and lichen mottled the walls and with that filthy crop, death sprang also from watersoaked earth. doyle intentionally uses language grounded in ableist and queerphobic sentiment to create a picture in which, instead of being integral to forest health, mushrooms are seen as dirty, foreign, and frightening markers of death. for instance, his ignorance—and resulting insecurity and hostility—about the critical ability of fungi to decompose organic matter and help maintain the nutrient cycle necessary for life leads him to depict fungi as foul pustules,” suggesting illness and a visceral sense of wrong. mycophobia and queerphobia mycology is queer at the organismal level. fungi are nonbinary: they are neither plants nor animals, but possess a mixture of qualities common to both groups, upending the prevailing binary concept of nature. it is rare for a fungus to have only two biological sexes, and some fungi, such as schizophyllum commune, have as many as 23,000 mating types. when two compatible fungi meet, their mycelia will fuse into one body, sexually recombine, then remain somatically as one as they” continue to live, grow, and explore in their environment. members of phylum glomeromycota are only known to be asexual. fungi in order laboulbeniales sometimes have distinct bodies for male and female reproductive structures (dioecious), or both may be found in the same body (monoecious), and sometimes monoecious and dioecious bodies co-occur. mycology has queer investigators. of respondents to the mycological society of america 2018 survey, original research 11 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 12 percent of mycologists identified as lgbtq, which is three to four times the national reported average (haelewaters, personal communication, 2019). one will quickly notice that mycological spaces have dispensed with certain expectations of formality, and even academic mycological conferences have a comforting, casual air of an odd family reunion. mycology is queer methodologically. mycologists use sensing, intuition, experience, and storytelling, with experts operating outside of institutional affiliation more often than with other organismal fields. for many mycologists, our relationships with fungi stir powerful emotions tied deeply to our core. we sometimes cry or burst into song when we find these special and beautiful beings. organisms, bodies, and behaviors that are difficult to neatly categorize stir insecurity and a lack of control within the viewer, who responds with fear, revulsion, and hatred. what becomes difficult to discern or dominate through heteropatriarchal systems of oppression and dogmatic scientific understandings becomes a threat to institutions that codify bodies of knowledge. queer bodies are seen as less fit” and functional,” which calls on ableist language in similar ways as mycophobic language does. this includes the relegation of mycology to subfields of pathology” within ecosystem sciences, coloring institutionalized understanding of the many lives of fungi. whatever poisonous and destructive qualities exist among a small subset of fungi have become mapped onto the character of fungi as a whole. this is indicative of the devaluation of fungi, as the same could not be said of kingdom plantae, even though there exist subsets of poisonous and destructive plants. plants and other organisms classified as belonging to “higher” kingdoms are recognized as possessing a greater degree of social capital (bourdieu, 1986)—for example, they are more likely seen as helpful, valuable, and capable of performing some service—that allows them to encompass an abundance of attributes in people’s imaginations. in contrast, fungi and other “lower” kingdoms, such as archaea and bacteria, do not occupy this elevated space in people’s imaginations. in general, people who belong to marginalized groups experience a flattening of their person into a static state that suggests behaviors by individual members of a group can be generalized onto the supposedly singularly definable quality of the group as a whole; this is one of the ways mycophobia and queerphobia operate using similar logics. it is worthwhile to wrestle with the apparent tensions when marginalization is referred to as “dehumanization,” because while language that compares humans to nonhuman animals and other life forms is meant to strip those humans of empathizable qualities, leaving them vulnerable to “justifiable” violence and harm, it is crucial to resist human/nonhuman binaries and hierarchies original research 12 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 that are part and parcel of violent, oppressive systems. plumwood (1993) writes about this tension: “thus, for example, behind the view that there is something insulting or degrading about linking women and nature stands an unstated set of assumptions about the inferior status of the non-human world” (p. 26). well-intentioned scientists have utilized queerphobic rhetoric in depictions of environmental hazards. whether or not this usage is unwitting, it stems from deep-seated, subconscious knowledge that sensationalizing and heteronormative language spurs public condemnation. giovanna di chiro (2010) writes about the concept of “eco(hetero)normativity” in regards to ableist, queerphobic, and heterosexist language—such as “sexual abnormalities,” including “male-to-female gender shifts and intersex conditions” among fish and other animals— environmentalists and popular media may use to rouse concern about environmental pollution and toxicity (pp. 201–202). such language moves beyond the need conduct science, inform readers, and demand a healthy environment—it sensationalizes depictions of queer and disabled bodies as tragic aberrations from a supposedly (hetero)normative order to life that must be upheld and protected. analysis around the harmfulness of this language must be extended to discourse around fungi. mycophobic language paints fungi almost as unnatural toxins themselves—a force whose specter of invasiveness is constructed through a similar mobilization of queer-fear. this depiction of fungi sustains legitimized and “respectable” bodies of scientific thought and methodologies of research. even when researchers are not actively queerphobic it is impossible to act fully outside hegemonic discursive norms. it is only once this tension is named and a person recognizes that their perceptions of reality are culturally mediated that they can perform methodologically thoughtful research. articulating the way this cultural entrapment functions, monique wittig (1992) writes, there is nothing abstract about the power that sciences and theories have to act materially and actually upon our bodies and our minds, even if the discourse that produces it is abstract. it is one of the forms of domination, its very expression, as marx said. i would say, rather, one of its exercises” (pp. 53–54). in a general sense, people struggle to imagine the enormous breadth of fungal life because fungal bodies exist well outside gender binaries, heterosexuality, and other exercises of power that create, as wittig says, false absolute meaning[s]” of gender, sexuality, nature, and health. in her writings on feminism, sara ahmed (2017) discusses the idea that being a lesbian/queer means inhabiting a body that feels constantly questioned. ahmed (2017) states, “sometimes, whether or not you are asked a question, you feel original research 13 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 questionable…you feel like a question mark; you feel marked by questions” (pp. 120–121). mycology is marked by questions by those on the outside: why would you possibly study those things? will you get sick or poisoned? what kind of job can you get with that degree? this further evokes parallels to “coming out.” queer people are often met with confusion, fear, and even disgust and abuse if they reveal their orientation or identity. even in more mycophillic countries where foraging for mushrooms is more likely a shared cultural pastime, scientific passion and research focused on this kingdom of life is often seen as whimsical, confusing, or even disturbing. a slippery space often exists between revulsion and commodification. simon estok (2009) introduces the term “queer ecocritcism” on the pretext that “the commodification of nature and sexual minorities are similar, each depending on a large consumer base that seeks a vicarious experience, rather than the thing itself” (pp. 213–216). people may desire a superficial, extractive experience while maintaining distance from the queer subject. within mycology, there are examples of how people engage with fungi opportunistically, but fail to regard them as the essential, deeply ecological beings they are. many people have had their lives saved by penicillin, without realizing that the medicine is derived from a fungus, penicillium. only a small handful of mushrooms that can be cultivated for culinary purposes, such as the portobello (agaricus bisporus), have made their way into the realm of acceptability. they are accepted for two reasons: (1) they can be controlled and they exhibit predictable behaviors that can fall neatly under the domination of a cultivator; and (2) they serve a direct purpose to humans, in this case as a food source. fungi that fit into only one of those categories, such as wild “choice” edible mushrooms, are sometimes deemed acceptable. there is an increasing popularity in dining on wild mushrooms, but in the us, these gourmet mushrooms are often sold at a high price, tying them to wealthy and often white clientele, who are often gatekeepers of acceptability within dominant culture. the consumer of expensive “wild” mushrooms may feel adventurous, daring, knowledgeable, and perhaps even superior to those who cannot afford those mushrooms. the excitement felt from exclusive access to a queer(ed) other is a hallmark of commodity culture. bell hooks (1992) writes about commodification and objectification of black bodies through an analysis of white (often male) fascination with and desire for sexual contact with dark others—“the consumption of the dark other,” as hooks puts it (p. 30). hooks explains that this fetishization of the body of the other helps white people to feel like transgressive and bold subjects, while black people remain in the position of “primitive” objects. while hooks’s argument is about white cultural imperialism and not original research 14 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 queerness, her argument about the thrill white people feel when they come into close contact—a type of consumption—with an “unknowable” other can be extended to queerness as well. consumers of expensive “wild” and “rare” mushrooms also assert their power over mushrooms, queer symbols and representations of death, and the seemingly mysterious origins they sprang from. among people who forage for mushrooms they will later sell, however, exist more complicated social, cultural, and economic relationships with mushrooms. tsing (2015) describes these as “pericapitalist” spaces, or sites of “salvage accumulation,” in that they “take advantage of value produced without capitalist control” and both are, and are not, capitalist interactions with mushrooms (in tsing’s research, specifically matsutake, a highly coveted and costly mushroom) (p. 83). pericapitalist spaces allow enactment of people’s own sense of freedom, often tied up in their cultural legacies, that connect them with mushrooms. even when mushrooms are not so costly as to fall along these economic pathways, they are still sites of social convergence, bringing together academic and nonacademic scientists and an assortment of people who feel their freedom is theirs to reclaim. mushrooms offer witness to human vulnerability. stacy alaimo (2008) identifies nature as a critical ideological junction in feminist thought: “the contradictory, ubiquitous, and historically varied meanings of ‘nature’ have made it a crucial site for various feminist social struggles, including feminist anarchism, socialism, birth control, racial equality, and lesbianism” (p. 229). alaimo asserts that, although the wedge driven between nature and body is understandable as a reaction to the intentionally demeaning historical association of women and nature, this “flight from nature” is “one of the most unfortunate legacies of poststructuralist and postmodern feminism” (2008, p. 229). calling for inhabitation of “trans-corporeality,” alaimo seeks to reestablish a feminist intimacy between bodies and nature by emphasizing material engagements of space and time. in this trans-corporeal, space-time partnership of beings, human and nonhuman bodies exert their own intermingled agency and life-making power, leading alaimo to ask, “how is it possible to understand agency without a subject, actions without actors? how can we rethink matter as activity rather than passive substance?” (2008, p. 245). these questions strike at the heart of feminist efforts to de-naturalize the pervasive grip of dualistic thinking. fungi, with their ability to decompose and transform matter across space-time, enabling reconstitution of bodies into new materialities, are crucial agents of noncapitalist, anti-dualistic interchange. plumwood (1993) writes that mutually reinforcing dualisms, such as culture vs. nature; male vs. female; reason vs. emotion (nature); subject vs. object; and self original research 15 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 vs. other, result from a certain kind of denied dependency on a subordinated other” (p. 41). plumwood goes on to argue that virtually the whole set of dualisms can be mobilised for this purpose of inferiorising the sphere of nature and those human-beings who may be counted as part of nature” (1993, p. 47). human experience of the world becomes categorized, understood, and curtailed by the alienation and domination these dualisms naturalize and sustain. queer people are simultaneously compared to animals, but also characterized as unnatural, which itself utilizes the false divide between nature and culture. similarly, fungi are regarded as wild and unruly elements of nature with no connection to humans, and simultaneously unevolved or somehow representatives of another, more evil realm. haraway (2007) offers an intervention into binaristic discourse that alienates humans from the natural world; we assert that such discourse also ensnares our fungal kin. haraway communicates the inextricable dynamicism and coconstitutive relationship between nature and culture through her term “naturecultures,” which says that any invocation of nature has a cultural context, and similarly, cultures do not exist apart from nature (2007, p. 25). haraway argues that companion species—organisms whose communal and corporeal existence and identity demand interdependence—arise from naturecultures. she writes, “i am not a posthumanist; i am who i become with companion species, who and which make a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind. queer messmates in mortal play, indeed” (2007, p. 19). messmates occupy space together; they witness one another’s intimate moments, and their day-to-day lives depend on synchronous interplay with one another. this includes humans and the fungi we coexist with on a daily basis, from yeast cells mingling in our guts and nutrifying our foods, to symbiotic fungi whose role in forests sustains our global environment. when language is limited to a binary conception of gender, those who do not fit squarely in those constructs are often thought to not exist, and explicitly written out of existence through their exclusion. fungi are often unnamed—only about 120,000 of an estimated 2.2 to 3.8 million fungi have been named and described (hawksworth & lücking, 2017). while the call to name all currently undescribed fungi will be a step in the right direction, and is in fact the pursuit of one of the authors of this paper, taxonomy alone cannot cure this problem, because it does not break from the need to delineate the bounds between fungi and humans which, to borrow from derrida, is a hierarchical regime. derrida (1981) argues, to deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. to overlook this phase of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition. therefore original research 16 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field untouched, leaving one no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the field effectively…the necessity of this phase is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable analysis: the hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself...that being said—and on the other hand—to remain in this phase is still to operate on the terrain of and from within the deconstructed system. by means of this double, and precisely stratified, dislodged and dislodging, writing, we must also mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new "concept," a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime. (p. 42) extending this linguistic idea to the material, fungal realm, we argue that naming all fungi would be an oppositional act, but such an engagement would leave us wrought in the same oppositional tension of our current framework. rather, we must phase shift into a newly imagined, but simultaneously ancient, nonhierarchical space in which human–nonhuman (fungal) oppositions are deconstructed. robin wall kimmerer (2007) reflects on western scientific discourse s need to mark the bounds of existing knowledge. she explains that the term puhpowee” in potawatomi means the force which causes mushrooms to push up from the earth overnight. a member of the potawatomi nation and an academically trained scientist, she writes, as a biologist, i was stunned that such a word existed. in all its technical vocabulary, western science has no such term, no words to hold this mystery. you’d think that biologists, of all people, would have words for life. but in scientific language our terminology is used to define the boundaries of our knowing. what lies beyond our grasp remains unnamed...the makers of this word understood a world of being, full of unseen energies that animate everything. (kimmerer, 2007, p. 49) this inability—or refusal—to engage with language that reveals the limitations of our perception curtails our engagement with fungal life (and as a parallel, with queerness). but as kimmerer points out, this disconnect is inherent to the english language and its naturalized assumptions of animacy or lack thereof; science then institutionalizes these assumptions. it is not impossible, however, for englishlanguage speakers to recognize flaws and fissures in language, even if words to meaningfully bridge them do not exist. original research 17 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 religious ideology and discourse influences understandings of animacy and relations between beings. some biblical scholars believe that dominion” was a mistranslation, and the original text used a word more closely synonymous with stewardship.” it is through this translation that some christians felt empowered to dominate and exploit earth (weldon, 2016). riki anne wilchins (2004) writes about this drive for dominion: we want to have, as the bible says, the word made flesh, something we can have dominion over” (p. 46). the remarkable ability of fungi to subvert human domination and defy expectations has bound fungi with other supernatural forces often feared by christians, including witches, devils, and the demonically possessed. whether the context has to do with religion or any other institution, culture and language cyclically reinforce discourse. wilchins writes, discourse is a set of rules for producing knowledge that determines what kinds of intelligible statements can be circulated within a given economy of thought. for example, in the discourse on gender, you can only say meaningful things about two kinds of bodies that will make sense. references to third genders will always sound fanciful, nonsensical, or just ridiculous. discourse is the "cookie cutter"…the social truths we have about gender have to do not with the body, but with the cutter. (2004, p. 73) in this analogy, science and methodology are the cutter, and the dough is all that can be learned. the cutter is shaped to accommodate biological and methodological realities of non-fungal organisms. this cleaves off entire sections of what we can know about fungi so that they keep shape with other organisms. biological discourse has limited our framework of possibility for fungal biology because this discourse was formed in the context of mycophobia. mycology is on the margins, where biological discourse has been abruptly cut by the cookie cutter; on the boundaries of discourse that prioritizes and enforces normalcy of other organisms. psilocybin within psychedelic mushrooms was posited to have evolved to defend mushroom bodies against mycophagous insects (reynolds et al., 2018). however, a subsequent study disputed this, finding evidence for a mutualistic role of psilocybin between insects and fungi (awan et al., 2018). this same compound facilitates the birth of alternative epistemologies in human minds by connecting and energizing regions of the brain that have atrophied in our sterile, individualized, and isolated position atop the self-declared hierarchy of western philosophy. much like a mycorrhizal network, neurotransmitters flow like carbon, original research 18 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 nitrogen, and phosphorus, connecting and reconnecting regions of our brains, reminding us of our deep-time home, the sentience of earth, and interlocking biotic systems of we. psychedelic mushrooms take people to a vulnerable site of deconstruction, where what was once considered to have social or cultural significance suddenly feels obsolete and what was once seen as static and inert is suddenly pulsing and humming with animacy. it is not a coincidence that the relational discipline of ecology (from greek oikos “house”) gained public traction in the 1970s, in concert with psychedelic, anti-war, civil rights, and environmental movements—a greater recognition of the interdependence of all beings was taking shape. the experience of marginalization lends a critical vantage point and potential for subversive examination. patricia hill collins (2000) discusses using “alternative epistemologies,” which are entirely new frameworks of thought, as fundamentally subversive challenges to dominant “knowledge claims” (pp. 253, 256). mycological history is replete with numerous alternative epistemologies, such as the concept of mutualism—a humbling concept often seen as an insult to the primacy of humans—which has historically gained and lost traction, mirroring trends in the zeitgeist. original hypotheses on mutualisms of mycorrhizal networks put forward by a. b. frank in the late nineteenth century were considered revolutionary when introduced and were therefore highly contested. around the same time, the biology of lichens was being fiercely debated, with mycologists such as debary and swchendener first probing into notions of symbiosis between fungi and algae (plitt,1919). a century and a half later, these ideas are only just becoming well-integrated into scientific literature and lexicon, and remain poorly understood and underrecognized outside of mycology (trappe, 2005). scientists are typically quite conservative when treating alternative epistemologies; there is extreme pressure to “just follow the data.” and yet, according to philosopher of science thomas kuhn (1970), this is what scientific revolution looks like: embracing what was marginal and elucidating new epistemologies. queer pedagogy and methodology as amy e. winans (2006) states, queer pedagogy entails decentering dominant cultural assumptions, exploring facets of the geography of normalization, and interrogating the self and the implications of affiliation” (p. 6). in an attempt to challenge dominant logics and cultural assumptions, queer pedagogy asks, what has been normalized, why, and how can knowledge be produced differently by taking into account the function of power? original research 19 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 for most mycologists, mycological education was fostered outside the traditional classroom. there is often a reliance on individuals who were/are autodidactic, pursuing knowledge of this subject apart from dominant education systems. many mycologists remember their first mycological experience very clearly; usually, it was by way of a charismatic teacher who brought to focus this queer world. upon realizing that there was actually this other world, where the rules did not quite apply, many mycologists felt at once safe and awakened. mycology speaks to the personal, sexual, and/or political lives of its often-marginalized investigators. mycological societies are also an example of alternative sites of knowledge. they de-center institutions as the sole source of knowledge, and challenge hierarchies through a structure that is member-supported, low-cost, and often provides free, public educational experiences. this type of structure is central to feminist methodology, which insists that learning and thinking are never confined to the classroom, and in fact are richer when experienced in community with others, out in the world. anarchist organizers, designers, architects, and others look to nature, including fungi, for inspiration through a process called biomimicry, a term popularized by janine beynus’s 1997 book biomimicry: innovation inspired by nature. examples of this include an architecture group based in brooklyn, ny called terreform open network ecology, which looks to nature to design sustainable architecture, and a group called fungi for the people, which brings people together for educational workshops. artists are even increasingly looking to fungi for inspiration. whatever the group, those who learn and borrow from fungal biology are compelled by its dynamic, mutualistic, and transformative possibilities. despite this burgeoning, eclectic appreciation for fungi, funding is typically hard to come by for mycologists because the field is still largely in the phase of “basic research.” in an academic environment mired in capitalistic notions of progress, application, patents, and “impact,” funding basic research is difficult because it lacks a certain thrill. curiosity for curiosity’s sake is a hard sell to a person who compulsively asks the claustrophobic, capitalistic question, but what's the point? mycological societies have flourished because they allow people to explore in peace, for the sake of exploration. the simple state of curiosity is the only requisite for joining such societies. while many classical american naturalists such as henry david thoreau, aldo leopold, and rachel carson were not tuned into mycology, many of today s mycologists drew early inspiration from their patient, holistic, and arguably sacred original research 20 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 and dutiful art of observation. this art, this deep, daily, ritualistic communion with patterns, phenology, and nonhuman beings gives many of us a sense of purpose. naturalism is beautiful because it is not inherently directed, there are no required hypotheses, practitioners need not have an academic affiliation. in fields such as mycology, as well as facets of organismal biology and ecology, lineages of classical naturalism have persisted, holding the practice of simple observation close to our hearts. these naturalists are the observers, the ones whose indeterminate encounters,” as tsing (2015, p. 50) says, without a script or fixed set of goals, create mutually transformative relationships. by forging messy, shifting, anarchist human and nonhuman kinships, these encounters demonstrate the creative and productive energy possible outside capitalist bounds. such nonextractive, transformative mingling of beings requires communication that listens, not demands, and research that seeks to observe and understand, not suture any sites of ambiguity. in the age of climate change, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the tiny pin pricks of data recorded by observers have incrementally built enormous bodies of knowledge. museums containing vast collections of organisms that most would call too insignificant to know, have been diligently preserved, catalogued, and curated by observers. we can use these treasure troves to understand how life once was, before such destruction, and to reimagine our future. the project now is to help break the obsession with progress by de-emphasizing scalability, challenging research frameworks, and supporting the world’s observers. science prioritizes quantitative data, but disciplines adjacent to or entirely outside of science understand that qualitative data are also informative and sometimes carry greater explanatory power in certain contexts. jack halberstam (1998) posits that queer methodology is a multimodal “scavenger methodology,” which points to a process of searching and excavating that does not come easily at first glance. mycologists might prefer the term “forager methodology,” as mycology is similarly built on a mix of quantitative and qualitative data that includes sensing, intuition, oral histories, and literally foraging. stacey waite (2015) encourages embracing messiness as necessary and fruitful. [waite] invites readers to think about and experience logics that contradict, tenses that shift, genres that mix, futures that are messier than what the present moment seems to allow…[and] asks scholars of composition and teachers of writing to become scavengers and to make seemingly disconnected worlds collide. (waite, 2015, p. 52) mycological surveys are difficult to do with the quantified, restricted methods that botanists use. mycologists use and publish methods such as “timed wander” original research 21 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 to survey a site (victoroff, 2020). extremely standardized transects and plotbased work of botany often feel unnecessarily limiting to mycologists, who are often guided to find fungi by a combination of intuition, sensing, and an intimate knowledge of the landscape and macro/micro habitats that foster mushroom growth. smell and taste are important methodological tools in identifying fungi; the communal, instinctual, cultural, and emotional reverberations of these senses potentiate more personal, nuanced research. people working in groups to identify fungi may often ask one another, what does this smell (or taste) like to you?” and form inexact, but deeply provocative, systems of organization based on these senses. even this invitation to smell carries a queer intimacy. the affective attachment mycologists have with fungi is apparent at mycological summits and conferences when someone asks, for example, what inocybe smells like, and people respond with descriptors such as spermatic” or swimming pools!” there is indeed a queer and joyous sense of community when a group of people collectively comes up with a verbal smellscape of increasingly silly descriptions of ejaculate smell to describe a fungus. for those who have smelled inocybe, the descriptions spark memories of those embodied and ephemeral moments, layered with dimensions of others descriptions; for those who have not smelled inocybe, listening to others share their impressions can sketch a full, patchwork, and memorable picture. initiating newcomers into tasting mushrooms for experiential identification is a vulnerable and exciting moment. some mushrooms, such as members of genus russula, are difficult to identify to species level without incorporating taste because they are morphologically similar. however, some species are edible and taste mildly “mushroomy,” and others will cause gastronomic distress, such as russula emetica (from greek emetikos meaning emetic or vomit-inducing), and will have a spicy or acrid taste. few people know that all mushrooms are safe to touch (unlike plants) and fewer know and viscerally believe that all mushrooms are also safe to put in your mouth, so long as you spit them out! in our classrooms, we sometimes ask a brave volunteer to come forward and take a small nibble of two similar-looking russula mushrooms and taste for difference. an intimate space is created as students gather around to witness their classmate’s reaction as curious tastes roll over their tongue. with some of these methodologies, there is risk of losing the ability to cleanly replicate, but the benefit is that there is a richer understanding of the lifeworlds of mycoflora in a given area. forgoing straightforwardly replicable methodologies original research 22 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 opens a multitude of pathways, perspectives, and points of entry for mycologists who appreciate that notions of objectivity constrict ability to understand fungi. this creates friction with some of the foundational tenets of traditional science, but mycology stretches and redefines the idea of replicability, because fungal growth does not lend itself to clean replicability. mycological methodologies rely on a greater sense of intimacy between mycologists and both fungal organisms and the landscape, which speaks to ahmed s (2017) reflections about intuition: a gut has its own intelligence. a feminist gut might sense something is amiss” (p. 27). a mycologist s feminist gut demands that intuition, a feminized mode of knowing, be trusted. fungi, in turn, demand the same of mycologists, and all those who seek to make kin with fungi. maybe not coincidentally, human guts are home to an assemblage of microbes, fungi and bacteria, that communicate with and impact our brains. conservation the hologenome concept asks, what is the relevance of an isolated human genome? bodies are, in fact, communities, and there are more fungal and bacterial cells in the human body than there are human cells. as haraway (2007) puts it, to be one is always to become with many” (p. 4). we become with, because there is no us without others; even words such as us” and others” are misleading, as our bodies are mutually constitutive entanglements. recently, scientific investigations have begun to attach quantitative data to interdependencies that have been recognized outside of western culture for millennia. the notion that humans exist and function independent of other beings stems from a fear of our vulnerable dependencies and often indecipherable, queer entanglements, and that, as myra hird (2004) says, the penultimate embodiment of queer may be bodies themselves” (p. 87). by embracing this queerness, we chip away at fallacious, capitalist myths of the neoliberal, individually agential western subject. belief in human exceptionalism has devastating consequences for humans and all life. impacts of mycophobia are immediately, materially apparent. according to state of the world’s fungi, only 56 species of fungi have been evaluated for placement on the international union for conservation of nature red list, with 43 species ending up listed (ainsworth et al., 2018). comparatively, 25,452 species of plants and 68,054 species of animals have been evaluated (ainsworth et al., 2018). this list aims to be the world’s most comprehensive inventory of species and their risks of extinction, and yet a kingdom with over one million species has only 43 species listed. this poor representation is not due to some miraculous ability of fungi to move unscathed through the anthropocene and the world’s sixth great original research 23 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 mass extinction event. rather, it is because there is a failure to achieve quantification-based standards proving a species is endangered. this is largely because the ephemeral nature of many mushrooms and fungi makes their documentation patchy. the relative lack of mycologists compared to botanists and zoologists also means there is less data available to argue for protected status. this lack of protected status means there is less funding available for their protection, therefore fewer studies are conducted, and fewer mycologists are paid to do necessary work to generate more data. holding fungi to biological determinations of more normative groups—say trees or birds—is to deny their basic biology, which puts them at risk for extinction. the solution is not to find out how to force fungi into the normative box. the capitalistic drum that beats towards extinction will not slow its tempo for the painstaking assessment of fungi, no matter how diligently mycologists work. the solution is to recognize that fungal data should not have to match that of trees or birds. mycologists’ experience, intuition, and sensing should be given priority in establishing whether or not a fungus is threatened or endangered. conservationists should also be deferential to modes and practices of traditional ecological knowledge, which has a rich history of profound, intimate knowledge of earth. radical circumstances such as mass extinctions demand radical solutions, and fungi demand to be seen in their messy totality. we must disentangle science from capitalism and western hegemony. we must trust and support observers, turning to our deep-time microbial gut to draw strength in our advocacy for our interdependent communities. to deny the value of these systems of knowing is to shore up colonialist and queerphobic mindsets. conclusion mycology is queer insofar as it is marginal, subordinate, contested, ridiculed, but more critically, mycology is queer insofar as it is disruptive, collective, transformative, revolutionary. fungi show us cooperative, alternative, promiscuous, entangled, interdependent, more-than-individuated, and morethan-human modes of living worth studying, imitating, learning from, and which queerness in humans has often shared. just as fungi are capable of reclaiming land, bodies, and nutrients, so too can humans reclaim our relationship with fungi as siblings. much like mycorrhizae, humans can forge mutually beneficial relationships with fungi. we can steward their land, and care for their bodies, much like how they have persistently continued to steward our land and care for our bodies. we can remediate poisoned relationships by challenging the paradigm in which they have been demonized and dispossessed, much like how they can remediate waters and lands poisoned by capitalist greed. moreover, we can apply lessons learned from fungal biology to our human organization and forge stronger original research 24 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 networks of interdependence and mutual aid. science can be and has been instrumental in challenging dangerous, exploitative notions of hierarchy, but it has also been employed at the service of those hierarchies. through a thorough and honest recognition of the limits of human investigative reasoning and methods we can become better and more ethical scientists. through challenging assertions of objectivity and purity, we push ourselves into the unknown, both with optimism and a critical outlook. it is past time that humans turn to the fungi to which we are bound, step into our mutual totality, and create space and futures for our wild ways of being. references ahmed, s. 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(2010). “the place, promised, that has not yet been”: the nature of dislocation and desire in adrienne rich's your native land/your life and minnie bruce pratt's crime against nature. in c. mortimer-sandilands & b. erickson (eds.), queer ecologies: sex, nature, politics, desire (pp. 285–308). indiana university press. trappe, j. m. (2005). a. b. frank and mycorrhizae: the challenge to evolutionary and ecologic theory. mycorrhiza, 15(4), 277–281. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00572-004-03305 tsing, a. (2012). unruly edges: mushrooms as companion species. environmental humanities, 1(1), 141–154. tsing, a. (2015). mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins. princeton university victoroff, c. (2020). fruiting responses of ectomycorrhizal fungi to nutrient additions in bartlett experimental forest, new hampshires. [unpublished master’s thesis, state university of new york]. waite, s. (2015). cultivating the scavenger: a queerer feminist future for composition and rhetoric. peitho journal, 18(1), 51–71. weldon, n. (2016). a biblical hermeneutic for dominion: domination vs stewardship. obsculta, 9(1), 73–81. wilchins, r. a. (2004). queer theory, gender theory: an instant primer. alyson books. winans, a. e. (2006). queering pedagogy in the english classroom: engaging with the places where thinking stops. pedagogy: critical approaches to teaching literature, language, composition, and culture, 6(1), 103–122. wittig, m. (1992). the straight mind. beacon press. https://doi.org/0.1101/cshperspect.a019810 original research 27 | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 2) patricia kaishian & hasmik djoulakian, 2020 author bios patricia kaishian received her phd in mycology from suny college of environmental science & forestry in syracuse, ny, in 2020. she is currently a postdoctoral researcher at purdue university, where she serves as curator of the arthur fungarium and kriebel herbarium. patricia is a fungal taxonomist who classifies, names, describes, and cherishes fungi. hasmik djoulakian is a writer and educator who currently lives in syracuse, ny, where she works in the field of sexual and domestic violence prevention. she received her ba in women’s and gender studies and civic engagement from syracuse university in 2017, and shortly afterwards completed a fulbright english teaching assistantship in armenia, where she deepened her commitment to transnational feminist activism. roberts, celia, and catherine waldby. 2021. “incipient infertility: tracking eggs and ovulation across the life course.” catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1): 1–25. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license incipient infertility: tracking eggs and ovulation across the life course celia roberts school of sociology, australian national university celia.roberts@anu.edu.au catherine waldby research school of social sciences, australian national university catherine.waldby@anu.edu.au abstract tracking in/fertility—through ovulation biosensing, menstrual and perimenopausal apps, and ovarian reserve testing—is becoming increasingly commonplace amongst relatively privileged women in the global north. taking place on and through platforms comprised of devices, bodies, and discourses, such self-tracking articulates forms of in/fertility and reproductive futures that are, we argue, closely entwined with emerging forms of biomedical capitalization. while reproductive medicine focused on the creation of children has been entwined with corporate interests since the development of in vitro fertilization in the 1980s, fertility as an asset, or future value, is increasingly targeted by the new innovation sectors as a specific capacity, separable from reproduction per se, in which women should invest if they are not to fall prey to incipient infertility. synthesizing our separate empirical work in this field, this paper theorizes the connections between the emergence of self-tracking logics and cultures, the burgeoning of consumer-oriented, clinical services, and contemporary social anxieties around fertility decline. even in countries such as australia and the united kingdom, where birth rates are stable, (some) women’s fertility is being special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 2 refigured as precious and vulnerable, something to be tracked, documented, and attended to in the name of individual future happiness and fulfilment. women with enough financial and cultural capital are encouraged to monitor their periods, come to know their ovulation patterns, and become aware of their ovarian reserve, and, importantly, to act prudently on such knowledge to safeguard their reproductive futures. introduction this article considers the growth of ovarian reserve (or) testing, elective egg freezing, the lucrative market for ovulation and conception apps and biosensing devices, and the expanding footprint of menopause (the newly articulated perimenopause), synthesizing results from several empirical projects in the uk, the united states, and australia (waldby 2015, 2019; wilkinson, roberts, and mort 2015; mort et al. 2016; roberts et al. 2016; roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019). viewed as a set, we argue, these examples suggest a broad historical reorganization of the way women’s reproductive capacities in the developed economies of the global north are both shaped and interpreted. it is widely understood that women’s fertility declines over the life course, and that the decline accelerates from the mid-thirties onward as part of normal reproductive physiology (faddy and godsen 2003; balasch and gratacós 2012). despite this, age-related low fertility is increasingly framed as a pathological biomedical condition, a condition that should be prevented (baldwin 2019). to put it another way, women, although not all women, are increasingly interpolated as incipiently infertile (martin 2010). in a global context of increasing (some would say “over”) population, some women’s fertility has become a quality to secure, identify, track, and foster, to measure, diagnose, and mobilize. across a range of sites, these women’s fertility is presented as an elusive quality, requiring significant personal investment (of time, money, resources, planning) in order to use it before it dissipates. at the same time, other women’s fertility remains a “problem”— something to be controlled or governed in the name of development, social security, progress, and/or environmentalism (clarke and haraway 2018). the dynamics underpinning this contemporary bifurcated norm are extremely complex. historically, women’s reproduction has been subject to various forms of pronatalism, state-sponsored moral panics that claim, frequently without evidence, that national child bearing is in decline and women’s failure to have more children is at the heart of the problem (waldby 1984). barbara baird (2006) special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 3 argues that, in australia, pronatalism (which she traces from the late nineteenth century to the twenty-first century) has been primarily concerned with the reproduction of middle-class, white families. historically, the exhortation to increase the number of children has been addressed primarily to these “valuable” segments of the population, while indigenous and working-class reproduction is depreciated and indeed deliberately repressed by both medical and social means in the case of indigenous women (baird 2006). in the uk, similarly, there is a long history of biomedical, state, and ngo practices encouraging white, middle-class women to reproduce and discouraging poorer women (davis 2012; moscucci 2003; roberts et al. 2016). similar dynamics can be discerned in the united states, canada, and taiwan, among many other places (benjamin 2018; huang and wu 2018). more recently, public health and women’s health academics, sector regulators, and clinical coalitions have raised concerns about women’s alleged lack of awareness about age-related fertility decline. in australia, for example, the victorian assisted reproductive treatment authority coordinated a “fertility is ageist” advertising campaign during 2014 and 2015 to raise public awareness of women’s diminution of fertility after their mid-thirties (green 2014). similar campaigns have been run in the uk, as peak reproductive medicine organizations such as the british fertility society (n.d.) sponsor a fertility education initiative to improve fertility knowledge among school children. these campaigns are motivated by the demographic shift to later motherhood, a transition evident right across the oecd countries (organisation for economic co-operation and development 2017). as women attempt to conceive their first child during their thirties, they become more likely to encounter the “fertility cliff” (the rather alarmist term for the normal decrease in fertility that takes place in the later thirties) and hence are more likely to seek in vitro fertilization (ivf). public education campaigns encourage women to conceive at a younger age, and not risk the distress that may come with failed ivf treatment (throsby 2004). in the united states, a social movement involving feminists, lgbtq activists, and clinicians is arguing for the expansion of the definition of infertility to apply to same-sex couples and to single people who require access to assisted reproductive technologies (arts) and medical insurance to conceive (sussman 2019). in each case, these campaigns, while laudable in themselves, raise the specter of infertility in the public domain, and extend its threat to an everwidening demographic, as younger and younger women of all sexualities, and indeed children, are exhorted to view themselves as the future infertile. special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 4 the reshaping of fertility and infertility we discuss in this paper is enabled by broader histories of pronatalism and public health, but it is not primarily state sponsored. rather. it is the most recent development in a twentiethand twentyfirst-century history of global commercial innovation focused on women’s reproductive biology (waldby and cooper 2008, 2010; cooper and waldby 2014). new corporate business models are developing around longstanding clinical fertility practices, particularly egg freezing and or testing. at the same time, established data companies (google and apple) and smaller start-ups are rushing into women’s healthcare technology and related apps. each of these developments can freeride on current fertility public health campaigns and build on the higher levels of awareness and anxiety they generate to constitute consumer markets for their services and pursue multiple opportunities for revenue.1 in the case of health tracking and consumer diagnostics, business models extend beyond immediate point of sale and subscription fees from consumers, to harvesting yields of invaluable data for the innovation sector, facilitating the development of additional “premium” services based on customer data, and the “on selling” of data and collaboration with corporate and university biomedical researchers around intellectual property opportunities.2 in/fertility tracking is becoming an important element in health big data companies’ portfolio of revenue streams and in their stock market value in the case of public companies (austin 2019; kuch, kearnes, and gulsoon 2020; thiebes et al. 2020). in the case of egg freezing, at least in the united states, the sector is a target for private equity firms and venture capital, as new start-ups experiment with different ways to monetize women’s concerns around their future fertility (van de wiel 2020). this recent diversification of business models has produced more market segmentation in the area. clinical fertility tracking and egg-banking services are expensive and tend to target women with secure incomes or good credit ratings, as diligent, self-disciplined consumers. self-tracking, however, is accessible to anyone with a smartphone or the capacity to purchase a diy device costing less than fifty us dollars. hence, tracking can secure a wide potential market among younger or less wealthy women who are concerned about their fertility. while they may be addressed to consumers with different levels of spending power, both sets of practices, we argue, inculcate a form of disciplined subjectivity that monitors the value and viability of current fertile capacities in order to prudently prepare for a likely future. as we will see in the following sections, even for younger and less wealthy women, the future is often envisaged as a time when one may expect a higher income and more financial security, and hence be able to special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 5 pay for fertility services. in this sense, fertility tracking and testing reiterates some features of state pronatalism and selects for a similar demographic, recast as a market (see also bhatia and campo-engelstein 2018, 871–72). although beyond the remit of this paper, it is important to note that coercive forms of juridical and administrative state intervention into other women’s reproductive lives coexist with these developments. this is true for developing economies like india and china, where forced sterilization may coexist with booming fertility service markets (cooper and waldby 2014; shi 2014; vora 2015; wahlberg 2018), and it is true for the countries that form the focus of our paper, particularly as it pertains to welfarized populations (sasser 2018). ruha benjamin argues, for example, that in the united states, repressive eugenic practices, like the reduction of prison sentences for black women who agree to be sterilized, “are tied to seemingly more liberal, market-based, ‘positive’ eugenic practices that encourage those deemed valuable to reproduce and even select the traits of their offspring. two sides of the same reproductive coin” (2018, 56).3 so, while for many women fertility is constituted as a scarce, elusive quality to be carefully fostered and managed in the present if it is to be realized in the future, for others it is deemed all too abundant, a wasteful capacity to be curtailed. in both cases, “anticipation”—the intensifying demand to optimize one’s medical future through forecasting and adjusting present conduct—appears as a virtue of biomedical citizenship that some women exemplify and others cannot (adams murphy, and clarke 2009). fertility self-tracking and testing, like contributing to the right pension fund or getting the best mortgage, become part of privileged women’s careful investment in their future well-being (rose 2007). in effect, we argue, testing, banking, and tracking practices are transforming some women’s fertility into a tangible asset, a material resource controlled and managed by the woman herself with the expectation of future value. just as commercial surrogacy transforms the woman’s uterus into an asset that can be rented to others for use in gestating their child (cooper and waldby 2014), the practices of tracking, testing, and banking place the material capacities of individual fertility under value management, requiring investment and careful tending to realize a future return. fertile assets depreciate rapidly, losing value over the first half of women’s life course: this accelerating loss is exactly the quality that tracking and banking technologies are designed to pinpoint and arrest. special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 6 in what follows we draw upon a series of empirical studies carried out by the authors and their collaborators, as well as other studies in the field. one of our studies investigated the history and contemporary practices around or testing and elective egg freezing in the us, australia, and the uk, and includes fieldwork at fertility clinics in each location (waldby 2015, 2019). another was a long-term project examining biosensing practices across the life course, including ovulation and menstrual tracking (wilkinson, roberts, and mort 2015; mort et al. 2016; roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019). our main foci are australia and the united kingdom, but the arguments here apply more broadly to the global north, albeit with significant differences in regulation that shape the commercial dimensions of reproductive medicine in any particular country (on differences across europe, see adrian and kroløkke 2018; carroll and kroløkke 2018; hudson et al. 2020). in each case we explore how, in contrast to the forms of reproductive control described by benjamin and others, relatively privileged women’s reproductive capacities are being reframed as precious, vulnerable assets, requiring continuous monitoring, careful investment, and biomedical intervention. social egg banking and the ovarian reserve test: buying time? both or testing and egg banking have their origins in longstanding clinical practice in reproductive medicine. ovarian reserve is a term designating the number of primordial oocyte follicles detectable in the ovaries, which declines with age. clinics use or tests as an indicator of likely treatment success. clinics typically estimate ovarian reserve using three techniques; the anti-müllerian hormone (amh) test, measuring serum levels of follicle stimulation hormone, and scanning the ovaries to do a visual antral follicle count. none of the tests directly informs about egg quality. the amh test is widely considered a test for responsiveness to ovarian stimulation protocols and for assessing a woman’s risk of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, rather than as a stand-alone measure of ovarian reserve per se (anderson, nelson, and wallace 2012). to this extent it is a test useful within the walls of the fertility clinic as a pragmatic guide to treatability, and as a way for clinicians to determine stimulation protocols and other procedural aspects of ivf treatment. in other words, amh testing is oriented towards the immediate clinical management of conception and reproduction. a recent meta-analysis of the clinical literature highlights its limitations outside the art clinic: “variations in the amh decline trajectory in the general population do not support the accurate prediction of menopause. the ability to predict pregnancy in infertility treatment and natural conception is poor” (iwase et al. 2018, 998). special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 7 egg freezing has been used since the 1980s to preserve fertility for female oncology patients, whose treatment often compromises their capacity to conceive (kondapalli, hong, and garcia 2010). its efficacy was extremely poor until cryobiologists began to apply vitrification protocols (flash freezing to 100ºc), around 2007–2008. a few clinical trials have compared vitrified oocytes with fresh cycles and found only slight, or no, differences in terms of fertilization and pregnancy rates (cobo and diaz 2011). after reviewing these data, both the european society for human reproduction and embryology and the american society for reproductive medicine declared that oocyte vitrification was now sufficiently advanced that it should no longer be regarded as experimental (eshre task force on ethics and law et al. 2012; american society for reproductive medicine 2013). both of these established clinical practices have migrated out of fertility clinic settings and are now at the heart of emerging forms of entrepreneurial biomedical services. women’s health advocates and some bioethicists in the us, the uk, and australia argue that expanded access to the amh test would promote good reproductive decision making (tremellen and savulescu 2014; azhar 2015; evans, de lacey, and tremellen 2018). this advocacy effectively aims to transform the amh test into a screening test, despite a lack of clinical validation for such an application. amh testing is now widely available, not only in general practice but also through online direct to consumer testing services. despite public warnings by the uk national health service (nhs) (n.d.), for example, women can readily order at home do-it-yourself test kits at a fraction of the cost of a full clinical investigation. start-up companies such as modern fertility (n.d.) and future family (n.d.) are rapidly scaling up their testing services and tweaking the range and combination of testing they provide, offering value-added services like telephone consultations and fertility planning guidance to their customers. the sector has become an attractive investment proposition for venture capital as low entry costs and global reach expand the potential market to more and more women (pesce 2018). how do women interpret the results of these tests? as moira kyweluk (2020) notes in her ethnography of women who have used online amh tests, the logic of the test itself, the notion that it measures an ever-dwindling ovarian reserve, inclines its interpretation towards the idea that it is a measure of incipient infertility. in waldby’s fieldwork, women who had frozen their eggs understood the or tests conducted by clinics as measuring their remaining quotient of fertile special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 8 time. the idiom of the “biological clock” was frequently mentioned in interviews, and most of the women regarded the tests as a verdict on their future. in the words of two of the interviewees, interviewer: ok. so, were you—did you feel kind of anxious waiting for the test results? or were you fairly calm about it? participant: uh…yeah, a little bit, i suppose, because, well, things like the ovarian reserve, it’s quite a big determining factor of your future, isn’t it? it’s one of those things that you can’t really change. so i have to get on with it…it was good news when it came through. (meredith, early thirties, occupational therapist) * interviewer: did you have the test when you presented to the clinic to tell you what your fertility level was? participant: [yes, the] amh test that you can get. it came back really low. i was like, “oh, damn. i’m too old, i waited too long.” (phoebe, late thirties, engineer) only two of the fifteen women in waldby’s study had made any prior attempts to conceive, so test results were their first concrete indications of the likely state of their fertility, a situation shared by the twenty-one interviewees in kyweluk’s study, who expressed a similar understanding of test results as indicators of time—as measuring remaining fertile time, or its absence if test results are poor. the test results by definition demanded a response from the women tested. kyweluk argues, “[the results] marked a…decision point, forcing the active acknowledgment of age-related fertility decline, rather than continuing with passive denial, acceptance, or, in some cases, a complete lack of prior knowledge…a series of other, seemingly endless decisions then emerge—about egg freezing now, the future need for art like in vitro fertilization, the use of donor sperm, or the pursuit of single motherhood—and become more pressing even if they are logistically or financially out of reach” (2020, 6). we can see here that the availability of direct to consumer or testing effectively expands the potential market or biomedical fertility treatments. by alerting more and more women to the state of their ovarian reserve (however inaccurately), they powerfully shape the decisions and action of those tested, as they grapple with the implications of their results. these women need to consider different options to stabilize and secure their fertility, to optimize its value and potency, special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 9 and better plan for its future mobilization. while for some this will mean simply bringing forward attempts to conceive, or doing nothing at all, others will be propelled towards repromedical solutions—seeking ivf, sperm donation, or egg freezing. while or tests have low cost barriers to initial entry, and hence can capture many women deterred by the costs and commitment of initial investigation in a fertility clinic, they will tend to channel their customers into treatment over time, a phenomenon that kyweluk (2020) terms “the new infertility pipeline.” one of these treatment options is elective or social egg freezing. while so-called medical egg freezing, to preserve fertility through cancer treatment, is subsidized in both the australian medicare scheme and the uk nhs, “social” egg freezing, to preserve personal fertility, is classified as elective and hence is offered only in the private health system, with all costs borne by the client. despite this, egg freezing has become a highly desirable option for many women. in one australian study of childless women aged eighteen to forty-five, 40 percent stated that egg freezing would be their preferred response to a low or score (evans, de lacey, and tremellen 2018). in a 2019 survey into the fertility knowledge of a thousand premenopausal women carried out by the royal college of obstetricians and gynaecologists (2019) in the uk, 44 percent of women aged eighteen to twentyfour said they would consider freezing their eggs in the future. egg freezing is an attractive possibility for many women because, we argue, it is the decisive technology in the constitution of fertility as an asset. it materializes the notion that fertility is a potential capacity separable from reproduction per se, a quality that can be isolated, preserved, and managed ex vivo. like all banks, egg banks manage value (waldby and mitchell 2006). banking one’s eggs does not commit one to a particular reproductive outcome; rather, it sequesters fertile capacity and removes it from the depredations of time and aging, thus giving a sense of “control.” it is this quality that leads naomi, in waldby’s (2019) study, to describe egg freezing as “banking time.” speaking of her sense of pressure to find a relationship, she stated, “i was getting anxious. i felt out of control, especially the fact that i was single and all that…[with egg freezing] i just felt like i’d bought some time, i’d done all i can. you’ve banked some time” (naomi, late thirties, recruitment consultant. previously unpublished interview data). the women interviewed for waldby’s (2019) study were clear that they banked their eggs because it kept all their options open—to find a partner or be a single mother, to try to conceive sexually and have a backup if that failed, to consider special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 10 whether to have children at all without the pressure of incipient infertility looming over the decision. in other qualitative studies of women’s decision to use egg freezing, the fear of lost fertile time, of running out of time, and the felt necessity to preserve fertility into the future form the participants’ central experience (van de wiel 2015; baldwin et al. 2018). egg-freezing services are now central elements of the fertility clinic business model. the human fertilisation and embryology authority (2019) notes that egg freezing is the fastest growing treatment type in the uk sector, with a 10 percent increase between 2016 and 2017 and a threefold increase since 2012. in australia and new zealand, the number of egg-freezing cycles almost doubled between 2015 and 2017 (newman et al. 2019) and in the us cycles increased 79 percent between 2014 and 2017 (peyser and hershlag 2019). however, at this point, the raw numbers of women using elective egg freezing remain fairly low. for example, in the uk there were 1,462 elective egg freezing cycles in 2017, and the majority of women using the service are over 35 (human fertilisation and embryology authority 2019). personal egg freezing remains only a remote possibility for most women because of high financial barriers to entry. at time of writing (2020) freezing costs around a$10,000 per cycle in australia, £7000 in the uk, and $us12,000 in the us. hence clientele tend toward women in their late thirties with better financial resources (human fertilisation and embryology authority 2019; inhorn et al. 2018). the possibility of extending the potential market to more and younger women is being pursued in the us by a disruptor sector: boutique, stand-alone egg freezing facilities, which may or may not include reproductive services. these facilities feature spa treatments, in-house vitamin supplements, and yoga classes, and they market themselves through social media and party-like information nights. in other words, they seek to appeal to twenty-something career women through associations with millennial glamor and self-care rather than thirty-something women interested in immediate family formation. the company kindbody (n.d.), for example, with clinics in new york, los angeles, and san francisco, describes itself as “a new generation of health and fertility care” and offers subscription membership, as well as fee-for-service pricing structures. costs for freezing remain high, but more and more large us companies offer egg freezing benefits packages to their female hires, and egg-freezing companies provide access to credit so that women can take out fertility loans (pflum 2019). the possibilities this business model presents for profitability is evident in the rush of private equity and venture capital into clinics, as the ambitions of big data companies special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 11 focus more and more on the health sector (mody and taylor 2019). as lucy van de wiel (2020) notes, “since 2016, millions of dollars of private equity (pe) and venture capital (vc) have been invested in egg freezing businesses, which materialize the promise of egg freezing as a growth technology that may be targeted at a wide group of younger, fertile women, who may or may not want to have children in the future—a far greater segment of the population than those currently accessing ivf” (6). indebting their customers through in-house loans is key to this business model, because it promises to expand the currently narrow demographic for egg freezing to younger women who lack the ready cash to purchase services but are able to commit to repayment schedules. as van de wiel argues, it is this potential catchment and concomitant debt facilities that have transformed the sector in the us from one dominated by corporate ivf clinics, which manage reproduction, to financialized start-up clinics, which manage future fertility. in this sense, not only are frozen eggs an asset for the women themselves, they are also a corporate asset for innovation capital, a material base for speculative financial investment (cooper 2008). while it seems likely that the more closely regulated environments in australia and the uk would pre-empt the development of such extreme forms of entrepreneurial fertility commerce, such developments nevertheless speak to the business opportunities made available by casting all women as incipiently infertile and encouraging those with the present or future means to spend their incomes on fertility management. even in more regulated environments, the proliferation of or tests, egg freezing options, and digital self-tracking devices all develop not only their own consumer markets but also the latent market for ivf and other biomedical treatments. in the next section we will examine the self-tracking phenomenon in more detail. ovulation self-tracking: fertile windows? ovarian reserve is a core element of human fertility. the processes of ovulation— releasing one or more eggs from the ovaries—are another central feature increasingly brought into the realm of women’s self-management labors. using relatively cheap over-the-counter devices and/or free mobile phone apps, ovulation tracking is now available to millions of women globally, including young women who have no immediate desire to conceive and women who wish to sell their capacity to conceive in surrogacy arrangements rather than to have babies within their own families. the manufacturers of ovulation monitoring systems claim that monitoring special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 12 ovulation over a period of time can be more effective than ivf in producing a desired pregnancy (wilkinson 2016). roberts argues elsewhere that in the english nhs such devices function as a kind of placeholder activity for those enduring the twelve-month average wait for nationally funded infertility treatment (roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019, 48–49). in other national contexts such as the united states and australia, where ivf is paid for privately, ovulation monitoring is used by younger and less wealthy women and couples as a relatively cheap, early and non-invasive alternative to biomedical intervention (wilkinson 2016; lupton 2015). the range of relevant systems, from free mobile phone apps through cheap over-the-counter diy devices that measure hormone levels in spit or urine (repeat or one-off use), through to more expensive body-worn thermometers linked to online services providing expert analysis of digitally collected data, means that some kind of ovulation monitoring is available to most women in the global north. ovulation monitoring, manufacturers claim, allows women and their partners to know in advance when their “fertile window” is likely to open, so that they can time sexual intercourse or insemination appropriately (wilkinson 2016, 104–28). in biomedical discourses articulated in advertising about ovulation monitoring, and more materially through the associated devices, any woman’s monthly “fertility window” or “fertile period” is brief and potentially unpredictable. collecting tens of thousands of temperature measurements to be analyzed by algorithmic experts is necessary, manufacturers claim, to make accurate predictions. women’s self-knowledge of bodily changes (changes in vaginal or cervical fluids, ovarian pain, sexual desire) are figured as only tangentially important: devices and apps provide opportunities to manually record these, but it is unclear if or how they are taken into account algorithmically when predicting ovulation. in an ethnographic study of ovulation monitoring undertaken as part of roberts and colleagues’ wider project on health biosensing, however, joann wilkinson (2016) found that ovulation biosensing does not provide clear indications of ovulation for many women, and thus can produce more infertility (in the sense of embodied feeling) as well as a sense of partial fertility in others: the feeling that “at least i ovulate, even if i can’t conceive.” in one-to-one, qualitative interviews, women who were trying to conceive or who had recently given birth reported that ovulation monitoring helped them to come to know their bodies better, but that such knowing often involved a recalibration of their bodies as less fertile than they had previously thought. as in the following conversation with julie, although initially exciting, ovulation tracking often ended up feeling like quite a weak way special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 13 to “help” a process that after months or years of failing to conceive eventually had to be handed over to clinical experts: joann: how did you feel about monitoring your temperature? julie: it was fun at the beginning because i was curious about it, i’d not spoken to the doctor at that point so in my mind i didn’t know whether i was ovulating or whether there was a problem there, so it was fun plotting the graphs and seeing what happened because you read the information that tells you that you’ll see a dip and then your temperature will go up so seeing that happen. it was fun and it was exciting, and then i think after a while it was less fun because you’d see the dip and temperature go up and then it would repeat the same the following months. i think i actually stopped doing it after a year just to see what happened. joann: was it difficult to stop monitoring or to forget about ovulation? julie: it was, it was because i think i’d gotten into the habit of doing it, the sticks i wasn’t bothered about, it was more the temperature chart which was giving an indication of when things were happening, and it felt like i was doing something, it felt as though i was at least trying to do something to help. (wilkinson 2016, 154–55) ovulation monitoring is closely linked to the increasingly widespread and normalized practice of digital menstrual tracking. no longer a somewhatmaligned contraceptive practice (associated with the “rhythm method” promoted by the catholic church) or esoteric feminist pursuit, menstrual tracking and recording can be easily undertaken through one of hundreds of available apps, many of which are free (although they require a smartphone and internet access). smart watches, from companies such as apple and garmin, routinely include menstrual or fertility tracking apps on or alongside their devices. with an estimated 200 million users, such apps are second in popularity only to running apps within the health app market (roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019, 39). as noted earlier, these devices and apps can also provide data to researchers and technology and app development companies. although menstrual apps are typically not designed for this purpose, evidence suggests that they are also used to make contraceptive decisions; indeed, in 2017 one app was approved for use as a contraceptive in the us and europe (roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019, 34). as a way of coming to know one’s menstrual cycle for purposes of contraception or conception (or indeed, simply as self-knowledge), menstrual tracking, like ovulation monitoring, articulates fertility as something rather obscure that one special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 14 needs to both digitally record and analyze to understand (see also lupton 2015). for those with adequate means, or who are starting to attempt conception (monash ivf [n.d.] talks about those having tried unsuccessfully for “a few months”), private ivf clinics in australia now offer “ovulation tracking” services. these services are also framed as something women and couples “who do not wish to undergo infertility investigations and treatments” (monash ivf, n.d.) could do. involving clinic appointments, blood tests, and pelvic ultrasounds, however, means it is rather difficult to disentangle such services from “infertility investigations”: the key difference appears to be that clients do not meet with a fertility specialist, but rather a nurse (meaning they can be scaled up rather more cheaply, of course). unsurprisingly, clinics assert that their services offer a “more accurate and more comprehensive understanding” (ivfaustralia, n.d.) than home tracking systems. such websites are intense arenas of information and exhortation around in/fertility—women and couples are encouraged to attend seminars, sign up for alerts, book online appointments, consume pages and pages of text and images. it seems clear to us that the offering of ovulation tracking services stretches ivf clinics’ clientele group about as far as they can go in relation to women wanting to conceive: that is, women with enough money can now legitimately begin their engagement with ivf clinics within “a few months” of trying to conceive. the use of the phrase “ovulation tracking” is important: this term is typically associated with non-clinical, domestic self-tracking. its use by ivf clinics is a clear attempt to capture a market segment that is “not yet” enrolled in biomedical interventions. tracking the perimenopause: taking control? closely linked to ovulation tracking and related exhortations that women should come to know and act responsibly in relation to their fertility is an emerging set of knowledges and practices pertaining to the (peri)menopause. although marketed as innovative, many menopause tracking apps are simple digital diaries that notify users when they are twelve months post their most recently recorded menstrual period (this follows the biomedical definition of menopause). more complex apps can also provide a method and digital space to record symptoms such as hot flushes, interrupted sleep, mood changes, and sexual difficulties, connecting users to others experiencing similar symptoms in hosted discussions and providing educational articles and videos on a range of topics. other apps, such as menopro (sponsored by the north american menopause society of clinicians), make suggestions about biomedical treatments of such symptoms and are intended for women to use with their clinicians to make “personalized decisions” about special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 15 hormonal treatment options (menopro, n.d.). all of these apps articulate mainstream biomedical understandings of the menopause as the “end of fertility,” a time when women have no more viable ova and will be unable to reproduce “naturally” and/or with their own eggs (although ivf cycles with donor or frozen eggs may still be possible). in the context of the current argument, what is most interesting to us is the newly prominent state of the “perimenopause,” defined by the australian menopause centre (n.d.) as “the phase which takes place before the final cessation of periods. it can take place over several years leading up to menopause, with some women experiencing perimenopause for 4 to 8 years.” this “phase” involves decreasing levels of estrogen, creating symptoms such as sleep disturbance, hot flushes, irritability, urinary tract problems, lower sex drive, vaginal dryness, pain during vaginal intercourse, irregular periods, and, importantly, lower fertility. across a range of apps, internet sites, and forums, within self-help literature, and in gp and fertility clinics, women are encouraged to learn the signs of the perimenopause and to act swiftly in relation to the associated decline in fertility. women are also warned that menopause can come “early,” and, indeed, that many may be unable to conceive due to low egg reserve well before any physical signs of menopause or before their periods cease. menstrual tracking app companies articulate the perimenopause as a time to act, to take “control.” on clue’s extensive, chatty website, ceo ida tin (2015), for example, exhorts women to take back control: stop waiting and start tracking. we talk a lot about waiting when it comes to our reproductive health: waiting for your period, waiting for menopause or waiting to get pregnant. but, in fact, we don’t need to wait for menopause because we can proactively track its arrival. peri-menopause can start up to 10 years before your last menstrual period and irregular periods are characteristic of this time in addition to the classic menopausal symptoms: hot flashes, night sweats and vaginal dryness. by understanding these signs, and discussing them with other women, you will immediately feel more in control. here, the perimenopause becomes a distinct, yet very long, phase that can and should be monitored. astonishingly, the landing page of the mysysters perimenopause app describes perimenopause as occurring “between puberty and the menopause.” given that puberty now regularly begins before girls’ tenth birthday (roberts 2015), such a framing articulates an extraordinary shift in the special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 16 framing of fertility as incipient loss across female lifetimes. this framing is not elaborated in the rest of the website, where the possible age of perimenopause is nonetheless described as “mid-30s,” which, given that medically menopause is defined as “early” if it starts at forty-five, stretches the app user pool to its widest possible remit. like users of clue, mysysters subscribers are advised to “take control of your perimenopause experience: “no one told us that hot flashes could start in our mid-30s and continue into our 60s. the same for other signs of menopause such as night sweats, migraines, weight gain, anxiety and many other symptoms. the mysysters app was created to help women grow their knowledge and help them to make informed decisions about their own care during this sometimes-difficult stage of life.” materially, the practices of tracking the perimenopause are the same as those used to track menstrual cycles, albeit with a somewhat different set of symptoms for users to document. articulating a demise in ovarian reserve and the end of a woman’s physiological reproductive life, however, (peri)menopausal tracking is inflected with a sense of inevitable reproductive decline. currently, these are the final months or years in which women with means can be sold fertility services and related products—that is, of course, unless they have previously frozen eggs. the poorly defined and highly stretchable perimenopause is, we suggest, rapidly becoming a feature of contemporary figurations of incipient fertility through which women are encouraged to document, come to know, and manage their long-presaged fertility decline. discussion in the uk, australia, and the us, the causes of “delayed” maternity are social, related to extended credentialing, the organization of the workforce, the time structure of careers, the deferral of partnering, and the high costs of household formation (mills et al. 2011; office for national statistics 2018; inhorn et al 2018). these social dynamics mean that, for most women, motherhood during their most fertile years is impossible, and for many may be undesirable. in the absence of social policy to make family formation less onerous, tracking and banking technology offers (some) women a degree of agency over their reproductive lives while deferring broader questions of social equity. we have argued here that ovulation tracking and egg-banking technologies enroll women into chains of consumption and platform-enabled circulation of promissory discourses about what (fertility) biosensing or self-monitoring can achieve. the new ways of living and knowing involved reframe notions of the life special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 17 course and what constitutes a good life. in effect, these interventions organize a woman’s life course, from childhood, as defined by their fertile capacity, so that each point in a lifetime (except extreme old age perhaps) demands an equivalent type of fertility self-assessment and investment. while fertility tracking promises to reconcile the incongruities between the demands of the economy (household formation, labor, education) and the constraints of women’s reproductive physiology, it transforms fertility from an immanent quality of female embodiment into an abstractable, calculable resource, an asset subject to various forms of metrology and real-time evaluation. once fertility is a quantifiable resource, it is more easily reconciled with processes of planning, management, and decision, and with economic, algorithmic, and clock-time logics more broadly (waldby 2019). however, if fertility is an asset to be managed for the future, it is also an asset that dwindles over time. according to the epidemiology of ovarian reserve, its value constantly diminishes, a diminution that begins before birth (trounson and godsen 2003) and continues until menopause. fertility tracking always measures decline, and transforms it into ever smaller increments, to be plotted not in the longue durée of a life but in months, days, hours, and even minutes, mapping an ever more granular, diminishing return. we argue that it is this logic of fertility as a precious, always dwindling asset that renders it such a lucrative target for both innovative clinical services and app and technology developers. as declan kuch and colleagues argue, the rush of big data companies into health applications “aim[s] to disentangle medical interventions from clinics through the development of continuous monitoring devices” (kuch, kearnes, and gulson 2020, 529). we can see in the struggles between the ivf clinic sector and the new or testing, egg freezing, and fertility self-tracking disruptor sector a contest over which business model can best capitalize on the metrification of fertility. in the accounts we have provided of the ways women experience self-tracking and over-the-counter testing, it is evident that the prospect of constant decline presses them into decisions that entail expensive courses of action—egg freezing, fertility treatments, or more exhaustive forms of or testing and tracking. hence, metrified fertility presents multiple business opportunities, both through consumption of the apps, devices, and services necessary to measure, and through the treatments necessary to act on measurement. it is not surprising, in these circumstances, that private equity and venture capital is finding its way into the sector and further reshaping its speculative possibilities (van de wiel 2020). contemporary framings of incipient infertility focus on the physical capacities and special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 18 properties of bodies (how many eggs remain, which hormone levels are evident, what symptoms bodies present), and treat physiological processes such as ovulation as modularizable. they make no reference to the social and cultural causes of infertility or low fertility, and bear little relation to wider population figures that indicate relatively stable rates of reproduction in many parts of the global north such as australia and the uk (organisation for economic cooperation and development 2017). while many women may embrace ovulation tracking and testing practices and associated biomedical interventions, their abundance and high visibility mask profound social and political questions about the shape of contemporary women’s lives and the continued stratification of reproductive rights. we can see this stratification clearly when we consider another instance where women’s fertility is constituted as an asset: in the case of transnational commercial surrogacy. here, relatively poor women in the global south, as well as in wealthy jurisdictions like some states in the us, can be contracted by clinics and intending parents to use their “surplus” gestational capacity as a rentable asset. they can lease their ability to conceive and carry a pregnancy to others in exchange for a fee. in this case, however, the woman’s fertility only becomes valuable when it is made available for use by wealthy others. it is not an asset in relation to her own child-bearing capacity, which will be figured typically as a form of excessive and wasteful fecundity, contributing to welfare mothering or overpopulation in the developing world nations in which much transnational surrogacy is situated (cooper and waldby 2014). this is only one example of profound stratification in the value attached to women’s reproductive capacities, but we can see how, put in this context, the technologies and practices we describe in this paper contribute to the contemporary reshaping of health and life inequalities. acknowledgements research for this article was supported by an australian research council grant ft100100176 c. waldby ‘the oöcyte economy: the changing meanings of human eggs in fertility, assisted reproduction and stem cell research’ and by intel’s university research office under the biosensors in everyday life program, led by dawn nafus. special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 19 notes 1 in interviews with clinical staff at egg freezing facilities in london, several noted that they did not need to publicize their services very vigorously because of the high level of public media attention paid to egg freezing (waldby 2019). 2 practices of data selling and sharing in the fertility tracking field are discussed in roberts, mackenzie, and mort 2019, 54–63. 3 for an overview of feminist, queer, and anti-racist work on the interconnections between reproductive justice, stratified reproduction, and new reproductive technologies, see smietana, thompson, and twine 2018. references adams, virginia., michelle. murphy, and adele e. clarke. 2009. 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"is the increase in egg freezing cycles https://modernfertility.com/ https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/09/millennials-are-driving-down-the-cost-of-egg-freezing.html https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/09/millennials-are-driving-down-the-cost-of-egg-freezing.html http://www.monashivf.com/ https://mysysters.com/ https://www.nhs.uk/news/pregnancy-and-child/hormonal-fertility-tests-waste-time-and-money/ https://www.nhs.uk/news/pregnancy-and-child/hormonal-fertility-tests-waste-time-and-money/ special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 23 related to increased numbers of single women in the united states?" fertility and sterility 112 (3): e119. pflum, mary. 2019. 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"the speculative turn in ivf: egg freezing and the financialization of fertility." new genetics and society 39 (3): 1–21. vora, kalindi. 2015. life support: biocapital and the new history of outsourced labor. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. wahlberg, ayo. 2018. good quality: the routinization of sperm banking in china. oakland: university of california press. waldby, catherine. 1984. “the political regulation of motherhood in australia, 1880– 1920.” honours thesis, university of sydney. ———. 2015. “‘banking time’: egg freezing and the negotiation of future fertility." culture, health & sexuality 17 (4): 470–82. ———. 2019. the oocyte economy: the changing meaning of human eggs. durham, nc: duke university press. waldby, catherine, and melinda cooper. 2008. "the biopolitics of reproduction: post-fordist biotechnology and women’s clinical labour." australian feminist studies 23 (55): 57–73. ———. 2010. "from reproductive work to regenerative labour: the female body and the stem cell industries." feminist theory 11 (1): 3–22. waldby, catherine, and robert mitchell. 2006. tissue economies: blood, organs, and cell lines in late capitalism. durham, nc: duke university press. wilkinson, joann. 2016. “ovulation biosensors: emerging practices of knowing and sensing.” phd diss., lancaster university. wilkinson, joann, celia roberts, and maggie mort. 2015. "ovulation monitoring and https://helloclue.com/articles/life-stages/8-reasons-to-talk-openly-about-menopause https://helloclue.com/articles/life-stages/8-reasons-to-talk-openly-about-menopause special section: self-tracking, embodied differences, and the politics and ethics of health | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience 7 (1) celia roberts and catherine waldby, 2021 25 reproductive heterosex: living the conceptive imperative?" culture, health & sexuality 17 (4): 454–69. author bios celia roberts is a professor in the school of sociology at the australian national university. her most recent books are living data: making sense of health biosensing, (with adrian mackenzie and maggie mort, bristol university press, 2019) and the routledge companion to actor-network theory (with anders blok and ignacio farías, routledge, 2019). she is currently working on reproduction during the 2019-20 australian bushfires. catherine waldby is director of the research school of social sciences at the australian national university and visiting professor at the department of global health and social medicine at king’s college, london. her recent books include clinical labor: tissue donors and research subjects in the global bioeconomy (with melinda cooper, duke university press 2014) and the oöcyte economy: the changing meanings of human eggs, duke university press (2019). book review | reclaiming our space: how black feminists are changing the world from the tweets to the streets, by feminista jones (beacon press, 2019) madenga, f. (2020). s review of reclaiming our space: how black feminists are changing the world from the tweets to the streets, by feminista jones (beacon press, 2019). catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 6(1), page 1-5. http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © florence madenga, 2020 | licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license book review | reclaiming our space: how black feminists are changing the world from the tweets to the streets, by feminista jones (beacon press, 2019) florence madenga annenberg school for communication, university of pennsylvania florence.madenga@asc.upenn.edu in reclaiming our space, feminista jones traces a much-needed accessible history of black feminist activism online and off, in the age of twitter and the eras before, and in the united states and beyond. jones, a queer black woman, activist, writer, and community organizer, draws her frameworks from many sources, including black feminist thinkers who would be considered part of the “canon” in academia (e.g., bell hooks, barbara smith, angela davis, and the voices that were an integral part of the combahee river collective of the 1970s), as well as female hiphop icons (from queen latifah and salt-n-pepa to lil’ kim and cardi b). she thinks with fellow black feminists who are invested in dialogue online and social justice mobilization offline in their communities, and includes snippets and screenshots of exchanges that have led to fruitful collaboration. jones’s book contributes to past and ongoing conversations in media and internet studies: the conceptualizations of black digital communities. on the “validation” of black twitter as a digital community in such a space, jones marks dr. meredith clark’s work as some of the first to “definitively” write about black twitter as an online community, with multilevel networking processes and unique cultural dynamics. jones builds on this conversation by situating black feminist twitter’s existence in this broader community space as “a subculture” (p. 15). on this book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) florence madenga, 2020 2 community within a community, jones tackles questions around misogyny and racism (including harassment and violence by some, mostly male, members of black twitter towards black feminist activists) and the simultaneous hypervisibility and marginalization of black feminist voices in spaces on social media. before the era of twitter and facebook, lisa nakamura asked what happened to race online and offline in her important book cybertypes: race, ethnicity, and identity on the internet (2002). she critiqued earlier frameworks of the internet that saw it as a “utopia” where race could be transcended; instead, she asserted, “the internet is where race happens” (nakamura, 2002, p. xi). overly idealized views of racial harmony in “cyberspace” now seem obviously naive, but nakamura’s work was, and still is, important in addressing how the internet shapes perceptions of race, gender, and ethnicity—identity wholesale. she argued that marginalized identities were being shaped online through “cybertypes.” race could be performed via avatars and through identity tourism in the chat rooms preceding the social media platforms and the online social movements that jones focuses on. nakamura’s (2002) intervention is that “attention must be paid to discourses with rather than appropriations of the other” online (p. 60). looking at black online communities on social media and how conversations are facilitated between members and with non-members is one avenue through which to pay attention to those discourses. cybertypes raises major concerns regarding the discursive gaps in online discourse at the time, and how those gaps were a major obstacle to a “progressive” internet future. nakamura calls for more and newer perspectives on critical race theory to interrogate cyberculture, beyond literary analysis in more traditional fields (and within a system that severely lacks enough scholars of color). she also points out the “lack of internet discourse often found along raced, classed, and still to a narrowing extent, gendered lines [that] continue to cut particular bodies out of various histories in the making” (nakamura, 2002, p. 3). towards the end of the book, she poses these questions: “whose ideas have power? whose discourse is privileged? and why haven't these questions been asked before?” (nakamura, 2002, p. 138). while the internet may look different and more “inclusive” now than it did in the early 2000s, and as social media platforms serve as sites for discourse, the questions nakamura asks should still be central in internet studies. they should be important to any discipline concerned with intersectionality, and should be used to continuously interrogate what is considered “scholarship” and what is not. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) florence madenga, 2020 3 jones joins other black feminist writers, scholars, and social commentators, such as tressie mcmillan cottom (thick: and other essays, 2019) and brittany cooper (eloquent rage, 2018), who have recently used stories of their own personal journeys (beyond the academy) to critically engage with what it means to galvanize communities on twitter and encourage discourse centered on intersectionality. jones’s work also responds to nakamura’s call by spotlighting bodies of black women who have been cut out of the history of the internet, social media, and activism. she points to how black feminist activists have contributed significantly to cyberfeminism, as well as how they have been innovative in the social media space, particularly twitter, but are often unnamed and/or completely left out of its history. in chapter 1, she explores the use of hashtags by black women on twitter in organizing resistance and carving out a space for their activism. throughout the book, she provides ample examples of when “hashtags have been important mechanisms in modern movement-building, and black women, black feminist women especially, have exemplified best practices when it comes to hashtag utilization” (p. 16). these hashtags include #youoksis, #blacklivesmatter, #girlslikeus, #rhodesmustfall, #rapecultureiswhen, #whyistayed, #nmos14 (national moment of silence 2014 for michael brown, which led to 119 vigils across 42 states and 5 countries), and countless others. jones also connects the way in which twitter functions as a platform (how to @ someone, twitter threads, retweeting and related twitter etiquette) to ways in which black women are already familiar with communicating—namely, call-andresponse communication structures rooted in widespread african cultural contexts, the concept of “tweeting as antiphony” from ashton t. crawley’s black pentecostal breath: the aesthetics of possibility (2016), and the legacy and style of hip-hop cypher (coded language) and rap battles. in magazine pieces and other popular media, the story of how twitter threads came to be has been attributed to venture capitalist marc andreessen, who began linking tweets in his timeline before the feature was available on the platform. but jones reveals that actually, as early as 2013, a black woman activist, @thetrudz, linked her tweets together by replying to herself, so that she could connect her tweets to tell a story that her followers could digest with a click on the original tweet. jones then asks, “could someone before @thetrudz have done this also? perhaps. could @thetrudz and andreessen have started linking tweets near the same time? possibly. but @thetrudz is not mentioned in the same breath as andreessen as an innovator. and remember, origin stories matter” (p. 42). book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) florence madenga, 2020 4 jones wants to make it very clear in the book that black feminist scholars and activists have a strong and quantifiable presence on social media, and they are dedicated to pushing for and maintaining spaces where their voices can be heard. she is also speaking to the next wave of activists after her, “millennial women who grew up with caller id and google in their pockets” (p. 5). to all the various, overlapping generations of black feminists, jones says, who could have imagined that the pound sign, once valuable primarily for its use on touch-tone landline phones, would become one of the most powerful weapons for black feminism? who could have predicted that people who never set foot on a college campus, much less in a specialized journalism school, would have international audiences reading their cultural and sociopolitical analyses? or have their work be part of a rigorous academic curriculum at universities they could never afford to attend? that is what black feminist activism looks like today. (p. 6). indeed, twitter has become a space that many may have never imagined, especially when cybertypes was published. however, it is still important, as we look towards the future of discourse and intersectionality on social media, to move cautiously. like overly optimistic notions of a post-racial internet in our past, beliefs about the “democratizing” force of social media have also dissipated as concerns over privacy issues and surveillance, online harassment, and lack of responsibility on the part of platforms to foster a truly welcoming space for marginalized people continue to come to the fore. the present is located in a world where the algorithmic methods tethered to platforms are not neutral (and often are often discriminatory), or can be so undiscerning that the same platform that can facilitate community building can also, as techno-sociologist zeynep tufekci (2017) describes, “easily cater to the interests of nazis.” while jones acknowledges that when it comes to social media platforms, “the onus of responsibility for minimizing online harassment and abuse is put on victims” (p. 99), she does not go much further in interrogating the structural obstacles that future black feminist activists may face and potential interventions they may employ. references cooper, b. c. (2019). eloquent rage: a black feminist discovers her superpower. new york, ny: picador. book review | catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience issue 6 (vol 1) florence madenga, 2020 5 crawley, a. t. (2016). black pentecostal breath: the aesthetics of possibility. new york, ny: temple university press. macmillan cottom, t. (2019). thick: and other essays. new york, ny: the new press. nakamura, l. (2002). cybertypes: race, ethnicity, and identity on the internet. new york, ny: routledge. tufekci, z. (2017, september 23). facebook’s ad scandal isn't a “fail,” it's a feature. the new york times. retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/opinion/sunday/facebook-ad-scandal.html author bio florence madenga is a doctoral student at the annenberg school for communication, university of pennsylvania, and a research fellow at the center for advanced research in global communication. her work explores the evolution and boundaries of media as it pertains to expanding globalization as well as new and old conceptualizations of identity building. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/opinion/sunday/facebook-ad-scandal.html microsoft word lab-pollock,roy.docx pollock, a. and roy, d. (2017). how do black lives matter in teaching, lab practices, and research?. catalyst: feminism, theory, technoscience, 3(1), 1-38 http://www.catalystjournal.org | issn: 2380-3312 © anne pollock and deboleena roy, 2017| licensed to the catalyst project under a creative commons attribution non-commercial no derivatives license lab meeting how do black lives matter in teaching, lab practices, and research? anne pollock georgia tech apollock@gatech.edu deboleena roy emory university droy2@emory.edu in this lab meeting, we have invited lab scientists, social scientists, and humanists from the working group on race and racism in contemporary biomedicine, of which we are both members, to consider the following question: “how do black lives matter in teaching, lab practices, and research? convened by anne pollock and deboleena roy for the working group on race and racism in contemporary biomedicine