making sure you're not a bot! making sure you're not a bot! loading... please wait a moment while we ensure the security of your connection. sadly, you must enable javascript to get past this challenge. this is required because ai companies have changed the social contract around how website hosting works. a no-js solution is a work-in-progress. protected by anubis from techaro. made with â�¤ï¸� in ðÿ‡¨ðÿ‡¦. mascot design by celphase. bayerische staatsbibliothek | impressum | datenschutzerklã¤rung -imprint this website is running anubis version 1.23.1. 1 editorial introduction power, the state, and belonging in central europe elizabeth dillenburg the ohio state university at newark welcome to the 2020 volume of the central europe yearbook. i along with the other editors— cathleen giustino, darin hayton, howard louthan, timothy olin, lisa scott, and brian vetruba— are excited to showcase the interesting and dynamic work being done on this region by students from both north america and europe. in this introduction to the volume, we wanted to draw your attention to some of the features and themes of this volume. the issue opens with a forum on empress maria theresa (1740-1780), which contains a book review, available in both english and german, of barbara stollbergrilinger’s recent biography, maria theresia: die kaiserin in ihrer zeit (maria theresa: an empress in her time) and an interview with the author. it also features an article about the empress’s use of art to bolster her imperial power. this theme of propaganda and power is also central to a digital project featured in the issue, which examines how emperor maximilian i (1493-1519) crafted a legend about himself in theuerdank, an epic poem described by some literary scholars as the greatest book of the german renaissance. of course, art was not the only way that emperors and empresses sought to consolidate their power, and another article in this issue looks at how a different holy roman emperor, in this case rudolf ii (1576-1612), used alchemy to solidify his power and sought to bring harmony to a divided empire. this article on rudolf is part of a thematic section in the volume on “alchemy in the holy roman empire,” which also features an interview with professor tara nummedal about her work on alchemy and her recent book, furnace and fugue: a digital edition of michael maier’s “atalanta fugiens” (1618) with scholarly commentary. our second thematic section takes us forward around three hundred years and discusses an ostensibly much different topic, sexuality in central europe, but themes in earlier sections, namely the means employed by rulers to strengthen their power, resonate in this section. we see how states and leaders not only sought to solidify power through patronage of arts and alchemy but through the control of people’s behavior and actions. this theme is explored in an article about efforts to control youth sexuality in the third reich and in an interview with dr. christiane brenner on her work on prostitution and vigilance in socialist czechoslovakia. in addition to these two thematic sections, the forum, and digital project, this volume contains articles on a range of topics, from pietism in prussia to south slav-russian relations to dueling and masculinity to debates about israeli sovereignty over jewish cultural production in central europe. these articles, like the other components in this volume, reflect on questions of power and the state and particularly issues of belonging: who is included, and who is marginalized? how does this change, and why? 2 as we hope you can glean from this brief overview, the issues and questions raised in this volume are not ones consigned to the past but resonate strongly in our present moment. we hope you enjoy exploring this issue of central europe yearbook. we are always looking for submissions for our next volume. we welcome a variety of features—including book reviews, digital projects, interviews, and research articles—and accept submissions in english and german. if you are interested in submitting to the yearbook or know of someone who might be, you can see the website for more information, including the submission guidelines, or contact us at ceuy@umn.edu. https://pubs.lib.umn.edu/index.php/cey/ https://pubs.lib.umn.edu/index.php/cey/policies mailto:ceuy@umn.edu 22 book review: barbara stollbergrilinger’s maria theresia: die kaiserin in ihrer zeit (maria theresa: the empress in her time). munich: verlag c.h. beck, 2017. pp. xxviii+1083. fabia weisser ludwig maximilian university of munich english translation by james brueckel (university of minnesota) a queen-empress out of a picture book, maria theresa is remembered as a beguiling beauty and kind-hearted, wise regent with constant concern for the wellbeing of her court and subjects. she is said to have ruled over her people with the same benevolence and warmth as each of her sixteen children. in this comprehensive thousand-page biography of the empress, barbara stollberg-rilinger makes it clear that, with few exceptions, this trope has dominated the historiography in the centuries after maria theresa’s death in 1780. however, through her use and analysis of a wide-range of primary sources and secondary literature, stollberg-rilinger succeeds not only in reforming the biographical representation of maria theresa, but she also offers historians and enthusiasts an impressive and meticulously researched view into courtly life in the eighteenth century. in her biography, stollberg-rilinger utilizes an underestimated source to clear away some old myths about the merciful maria theresa. oberhofmeister johann joseph von khevenhüller conscientiously fulfilled his task as court chronicler, and his testimonies provide an almost inexhaustible source material, which stollberg-rilinger deftly utilizes. the image of the nearly supernatural, ever-loving mother of her people put forward by great nineteenth-century admirer and biographer alfred von arneth in his sweeping ten-volume biography was fostered by later historians, who likewise were taken in by this carefully crafted image of a compassionate and popular empress-queen. building her analysis on a multitude of sources, stollberg-rilinger demonstrates how maria theresa’s behavior and actions owe more to cold political calculation than love for her people. stollberg-rilinger notes how the popular historical depictions of the empress still found today, with even the poorest of the poor asking for an audience, or the child of a beggar nursing at her breast out of sheer kindness (as the well-known 1868 painting by alexander von linzen-mayer suggested), do not match up with the real empress. the exaggeration or fabrication of these myths does not to deny the fact that the regent acted with a comparatively extraordinary steadfastness, modesty and kindness towards her subjects. one only needs to look at how maria theresa held an unusually large number of audiences and received many supplicants. 23 this widespread benevolent image of maria theresa is connected to a theme running throughout the book, namely her femininity. maria theresa’s enemies viewed her femininity as a weakness and as grounds for abuse, contempt, and skepticism, especially during the war of succession. however, the hapsburg dynasty and the empress-queen herself knew how to present maria theresa as a fertile and loving mother. according to stollberg-rilinger, love for her own many children seemed to be a ubiquitous symbol of her role as a loving mother of her country, a description maria theresa would use herself. stollberg-rilinger shows that her iconization as the mother of the country was a representation that historians have long misunderstood as emphasizing femininity. in reality, this symbolizes the relationship between empress-queen and her subjects. maria theresa's unique ability to separate her role as ruler and her femininity, demonstrated for instance by her use of the title rex, as opposed to the female counterpart regina, illustrates this point. stollberg-rilinger’s biography also provides new insights into maria theresa’s relationship with franz stephan i, who stollberg-rilinger rightly describes as the “hapless husband.” historians have considered franz stephan’s independent role to be minor, partially due to the deliberate destruction of sources by maria theresa herself. his wife’s significantly superior rank and greater respect at the court meant that he was often left in the shadows and his masculine honor was often questioned by the public. being identified as the supposedly more masculine between the two led to a balancing act by the empress-queen. stollberg-rilinger shows that the various historical depictions of the relationship between the two spouses can be clearly classified as ideals typical of their time. for example, historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tried to portray the regent and her husband as bourgeois, since this corresponded to the contemporary ideal. in addition to examining the relationship between maria theresa and franz stephan, stollberg-rilinger devotes a large part of the book to the regent's sixteen children, of whom only ten survived their mother. in particular, the biographer reports in detail about, as the name of one of the sub-chapters reveals, the “unruly daughters”: marie antoinette, carolina of naples, and amalia of parma. a clear strength of the biography is the comprehensive contextualization of all stages of maria theresa’s life. the detail with which the biographer covers the regent herself and does not neglect the context of greater events in all their complexity is demonstrated throughout the biography and proves particularly profitable for the reader. stollbergrilinger succeeds in introducing the reader to the fundamental changes in the european world in the eighteenth century. for instance, stollberg-rilinger references maria theresa’s attitude toward the emerging enlightenment, which the empress-queen abhorred not least because of her own legitimation through divine right and jesuit religiosity. the constant secularization driven by the enlightenment and the increasing criticism of belief by intellectuals affected maria theresa and led to the habsburg monarchy’s luster being tarnished by the end of the regent's life. against the backdrop of multi-layered relationships, duties, and the everyday challenges and phenomena of the eighteenth century, the biography offers the reader an extremely well-grounded, multidimensional picture of the regent. ultimately, barbara stollberg-rilinger has managed to cover maria theresa’s life and reign in—it must be said—just 1000 pages. the biography is richly illustrated with various pictures of paintings and other works of art related to the empress. the book itself is well organized with clear divisions of the subject matter that enables readers to 24 find information efficiently. also noteworthy is the four-hundred-page, comprehensive appendix with sources and literature references, which clearly reflects stollbergrilinger’s meticulous investigation of primary sources and secondary literature. the biographer does not neglect a single aspect of the queen-empress and sheds light on the broader world of the eighteenth century. these features, among others, make the book valuable both for historians and enthusiasts. 19 buchrezension: maria theresia: die kaiserin in ihrer zeit von barbara stollberg-rilinger munich: verlag c.h. beck, 2017. pp. xxviii+1083. fabia weisser ludwig-maximilians-universität eine königin-kaiserin wie aus dem bilderbuch. maria theresia als die gutherzige, weise regentin, die gegenüber ihrem volke dieselbe güte und warmherzigkeit walten ließ, wie gegenüber jedem einzelnen ihrer sechzehn kinder. obendrein von betörender schönheit und in steter sorge um das wohlergehen des eigenen hofes und der untertanen. barbara stollberg-rilinger macht in ihrer 2017 erschienenen und rund 1000 seiten umfassenden biographie über die einstige kaiserin deutlich, dass dieser topos in der historiographie der jahrhunderte nach dem tode maria theresias im jahre 1780 mit wenigen ausnahmen die forschungsliteratur dominierte. so gelingt es stollberg-rilinger nicht nur die biographische darstellung maria theresias zu reformieren, sie bietet mit diesem buch historikern wie auch geschichtsbegeisterten einen eindrücklichen und mit akribischer quellenarbeit fundierten blick in das höfische leben des 18. jahrhunderts. bemerkenswert ist auch der etwa 400 seiten umfassende anhang aus anmerkungen, quellenund literaturverweisen. stollberg-rilinger zeigt dem leser damit deutlich ihre beeindruckende, nahezu erschöpfende und äußerst sorgfältige untersuchung von primärquellen und sekundärer literatur. des weiteren enthält die biographie diverse abbildungen von gemälden und kunstgegenständen auf welche stollberg-rilinger bezug nimmt. eine nicht außer acht zu lassende rolle für die schier unerschöpfliche quellenlage habe der oberhofmeister johann joseph von khevenhüller gespielt, welcher gewissenhaft seiner selbst bestimmten aufgabe als chronist am hofe nachkam. stollberg-rillinger zeigt auf, dass dessen zeugnisse von historikern lange zeit unterschätzt wurden, wodurch es ihr gelingt, mit so manchen veralten mythen über die barmherzige maria theresia aufzuräumen. das bild der nahezu übernatürlichen, stets aus liebe getriebenen landesmutter wusste allen voran maria theresias großer bewunderer und biograph alfred von arneth in seiner zehn bände umfassenden biographie aus dem 19. jahrhundert zu erklären. auch weitere historiker, folgt man stollberg-rilingers ausführungen, seien den kalkulierten inszenierungen und darstellungen einer stets liebevollen und volksnahen kaiserin-königin – forsch formuliert – auf den leim gegangen. zeigt die biographin doch eine vielzahl von quellen auf, in denen maria theresias verhalten und handeln vielmehr auf herrschaftliche kälte und politisches kalkül, als auf durch liebe zum eigenen volk getriebenen taten deutet. wenngleich stollberg-rilinger der regentin eine vergleichsweise außergewöhnliche standhaftigkeit, bescheidenheit und gutherzigkeit gegenüber ihren untertanen keineswegs abspricht: so habe maria theresia etwa ungewöhnlich viele audienzen gehalten und bittsteller empfangen, wie die 20 biographin in den quellen durchaus feststellen konnte. den auch heute noch anzutreffenden populärhistorischen darstellungen der kaiserin, welche selbst die ärmsten der armen zur audienz gebeten hätte, oder gar das kind einer schwachen bettlerin aus bloßer gutherzigkeit an ihrer eigenen brust gesäugt hätte (wie es das vielseits bekannte gemälde von alexander von linzen-mayer aus dem jahre 1868 dem publikum suggerieren möchte), habe die kaiserin jedoch ganz und gar nicht entsprochen. eindrücklich beleuchtet stollberg-rilinger auch die fokussierung auf die weiblichkeit maria theresias, welche ihren feinden häufig als schwäche im sinne des bekannten ausspruchs „das schwache geschlecht“, anlass zu schmähung, verachtung und infragestellung insbesondere während des erbfolgekrieges gab. das herrscherhaus der habsburger und die kaiserin-königin selbst wussten maria theresia jedoch als fruchtbare und liebende mutter zu inszenieren. dabei schien laut stollberg-rilinger die liebe gegenüber ihren eigenen vielen kindern als allgegenwärtiges sinnbild für ihre rolle als liebevolle landesmutter, als welche sie sich im übrigen auch gerne selbst bezeichnet habe, zu stehen. die biographin zeigt dabei auf, dass es sich bei der ikonisierung als landesmutter um eine von historikern lange als betonung der weiblichkeit missverstandene darstellung handelte. vielmehr sei hier das herrscherverhältnis zwischen kaiserin-königin und ihren untertanen versinnbildlicht worden. in diesen zusammenhang passt auch die erklärung stollberg-rilingers der einzigartigen fähigkeit maria theresias, ihre rolle als herrscherin und ihre weiblichkeit wohl zu trennen. dies sei nicht zuletzt an ihrer bezeichnung als rex, im gegensatz zum weiblichen pendant regina abzulesen. dass maria theresias gatte franz i. stephan nicht nur im schatten seiner im herrschaftlichen rang deutlich höher stehenden und bei hofe angeseheneren frau stand, sondern auch schwierigkeiten hatte neben seiner gemahlin überhaupt achtung zu erfahren, stellte laut stollberg-rilinger nicht nur dessen standhaftigkeit und ehre als mann gegenüber der öffentlichkeit in frage, sondern hätte auch zu einem balanceakt der kaiserin-königin geführt, sodass diese selbst gar als die vermeintlich männlichere person unter den eheleuten identifiziert worden wäre. zurecht bezeichnet stollberg-rilinger den herzog und späteren kaiser als den „glücklosen ehemann“. insbesondere in der vergangenheit hätten historiker die eigenständige rolle franz i. stephans deshalb und auch wegen einer absichtlichen vernichtung von quellen durch maria theresia selbst als gering geschätzt. stollberg-rilinger zeigt auf, dass die variierenden darstellungen der beziehung beider eheleute deutlich in der historiographie als zeittypische idealbilder eingeordnet werden können. so seien beispielsweise historiker des 19. und 20. jahrhunderts bemüht gewesen, die regentin und ihren gatten als bürgerlich zu inszenieren, da dies dem zeitgenössischen idealtyp entsprach. stollberg-rilinger widmet einen großen teil des buches den ausführungen über die sechzehn kinder der regentin, von welchen nur zehn die mutter überlebten. insbesondere über die, wie der name eines der unterkapitel verrät, „widerspenstigen töchter“ marie antoinette, carolina von neapel und amalia von parma berichtet die biographin ausführlich. eine klare stärke der biographie ist an der umfassenden kontextualisierung aller lebensabschnitte maria theresias durch stollberg-rilinger auszumachen. wie detailreich die biographin die regentin selbst erläutert und gleichzeitig die einbettung in das gesamtgeschehen in all seiner komplexität nicht außer acht lässt, zeigt sich in der biographie durchgehend und erweist sich für den leser als besonders gewinnbringend. vor dem hintergrund der vielschichtigkeit herrschaftlicher beziehungen, pflichten, sowie 21 alltäglicher herausforderungen und phänomene des 18. jahrhunderts bietet die biographin der leserschaft ein äußerst fundiertes bild der regentin. stollberg-rilinger nimmt auch bezug auf maria theresias haltung gegenüber der aufkommenden aufklärung, welcher die kaiserin-königin nicht zuletzt aufgrund ihrer eigenen legitimation durch gott und ihrer tief jesuitisch geprägten religiosität abscheu entgegengebracht habe. dabei gelingt es der biographin auch, dem leser den fundamentalen wandel der europäischen welt im 18. jahrhundert nahezubringen. auch maria theresia selbst war von der durch die aufklärung vorangetriebenen stetigen säkularisierung und der zunehmenden kritik am glauben durch intellektuelle betroffen, weshalb die habsburgermonarchie zum ende des lebens der regentin an glanz verloren habe. letztlicht hat barbara stollberg-rilinger es geschafft, maria theresias leben und regentschaft auf – und das muss gesagt werden – nur 1000 seiten wiederzugeben. dabei vernachlässigt die biographin nicht einen aspekt der kaiserlich-königlichen, wie auch der allumfassenden lebenswelt des 18. jahrhundert. stollberg-rilingers leistung zeichnet sich insbesondere durch die beeindruckende fülle an quellen und sekundärliteratur aus, durch welche sie ihren aussagen fundierten nachdruck verleiht. nicht zuletzt aufgrund dieser tatsache ist das werk ein gewinnbringendes buch sowohl für historiker, als auch für geschichtsbegeisterte. die kluge unterteilung der themengebiete ermöglicht lernenden und lehrenden auch mithilfe ausgewählter kapitel in kurzer zeit großen wissensgewinn. sign in google accounts sign in use your google account email or phone forgot email? type the text you hear or see not your computer? use guest mode to sign in privately. learn more about using guest mode next create account english (united states) afrikaans azé™rbaycan bosanski catalã  äœeå¡tina cymraeg dansk deutsch eesti english (united kingdom) english (united states) espaã±ol (espaã±a) espaã±ol (latinoamã©rica) euskara filipino franã§ais (canada) franã§ais (france) gaeilge galego hrvatski indonesia isizulu ã­slenska italiano kiswahili latvieå¡u lietuviå³ magyar melayu nederlands norsk o‘zbek polski portuguãªs (brasil) portuguãªs (portugal) romã¢näƒ shqip slovenä�ina slovenå¡ä�ina srpski (latinica) suomi svenska tiếng việt tã¼rkã§e î•î»î»î·î½î¹îºî¬ ð±ðµð»ð°ñ€ñƒñ�ðºð°ñ� ð±ñšð»ð³ð°ñ€ñ�ðºð¸ ðºñ‹ñ€ð³ñ‹ð·ñ‡ð° ò›ð°ð·ð°ò› ñ‚ñ–ð»ñ– ð¼ð°ðºðµð´ð¾ð½ñ�ðºð¸ ð¼ð¾ð½ð³ð¾ð» ð ñƒñ�ñ�ðºð¸ð¹ ñ�ñ€ð¿ñ�ðºð¸ (ñ›ð¸ñ€ð¸ð»ð¸ñ†ð°) ð£ðºñ€ð°ñ—ð½ñ�ñœðºð° ქáƒ�რთული õ°õ¡õµõ¥ö€õ¥õ¶ ‫עברית‬„ ‫ø§ø±ø¯ùˆâ€¬â€ž ‫ø§ù„ø¹ø±ø¨ùšø©â€¬â€ž ‫ù�ø§ø±ø³ûœâ€¬â€ž ᚠማር᚛ नेपाली मराठी हिनà¥�दी অসমীয়া বাংলা ਪੰਜਾਬੀ ગà«�જરાતી ଓଡ଼ିଆ தமிழà¯� తెలà±�à°—à±� ಕನà³�ನಡ മലയാളം සිංහල ไทย ລາວ မြန်မာ áž�áÿ’មáÿ‚ážš 한국어 中文（香港） 日本語 简体中文 ç¹�體中文 help privacy terms 52 parasites, prostitution, and everyday vigilance in socialist czechoslovakia an interview with dr. christiane brenner victoria skelton auburn university i had the pleasure to sit down virtually with dr. christiane brenner this summer and ask a few questions about her new project on prostitution in socialist czechoslovakia. dr. brenner is affiliated with collegium carolinum, a german research institute devoted to the study of the czech and slovak republics. she is also the editor of the journal bohemia, which publishes work on the history and culture of central europe. with her current project she is part of a collaborative research center at ludwig maximilian university of munich with nearly fifty scientists from different disciplines. the aim of this project is to analyze the historical and cultural foundations of vigilance.1 the interview has been edited for length and clarity. victoria skelton (vs): you began your career studying nationalism. how do you see those early career interests playing out in your current work? dr. christiane brenner (cb): when i began studying central european history, i was mostly interested in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. at freie universität in berlin i had a wonderful professor, bedřich loewenstein, who encouraged us to read the works of nineteenth-century historians. loewenstein asked us not only to understand how modern nations were “invented” by those intellectuals. it was also important to him that we discuss the impact of those narratives on actual people’s lives. there are many reasons why studying nationalism as ideology and everyday practice can be important to understanding socialism. after 1945, the so-called “people’s democracies” in east-central europe were established with the argument of creating social and national justice. considering the experience of german occupation and the war, it is not surprising that this promise of nationalism was attractive to many people. vs: in what ways have these experiences informed this new project’s emphasis on czechoslovakian national public health measures? cb: as a historian, i’m always curious about continuity and change. i want to know how ideologies transform over time. with regard to czechoslovakia during the socialist period, 1 for more information, see the cultures of vigilance website: https://www.en.sfb1369.unimuenchen.de/index.html. 53 i’m fascinated with the paradoxes in gender and family policies. on the one side, there was a strong conservative orientation towards the family, rooted in a nineteenth-century understanding of the nation, the dangers it faces, and women’s duties in this struggle. on the other side, czechoslovakia did a lot for women’s emancipation—because in the communists’ view, equal rights for women were part and parcel of the better republic that they were building. by the late 1940s, the czechoslovak government passed a new progressive family law. a huge number of women entered the job market and higher education. thus, many demands from the women's movement of the interwar period were fulfilled—and this did, indeed, change society. this duality between gender-conservatism and modernization efforts can be observed throughout the entire socialist period. vs: this interest in lived experiences during this socialist nation-building in czechoslovakia certainly shines through in your current project. what can your work on prostitution in socialist czechoslovakia tell us about socialism as both a political system and a lived experience? cb: the motivation behind my project is to find out how the socialist state tried to establish what was called the “socialist way of life.” i’m interested in how social rules were implemented after the communist takeover in 1948 in czechoslovakia and how those who did not stick to these rules were treated. i assume that the state needed the cooperation of the citizens and that this cooperation worked best where socialist norms and traditional norms coincided. “vigilance” was a key term for socialist societies, but it was mostly understood in political way. prostitution, however, was not classified as directed against the regime, but as a something that contradicted socialist as well as bourgeois morality. at first glance, choosing to report your neighbor who (you think) is a prostitute, who doesn’t regularly work within the socialist labor system, has nothing to do with politics. you don’t have to agree with a particular program of a political party or be a party member to tell the police your neighbor is a prostitute. instead, we see a recurring sentiment that prostitution is bad because people should go to work every day, and prostitution does not conform to the socialist labor regime. vs: you have specifically looked into local, municipal archives for many of your sources. can you elaborate on why these archives are so important to your work and for understanding an everyday-life perspective on state control? cb: finding archival sources for my work turns out to be more difficult than i had imagined. but i am beginning to understand that these difficulties are related to how prostitution was treated under socialism. according to marxist-leninist theory, prostitution was characteristic of capitalist societies. thus, it was expected to disappear in socialism and although it was not completely taboo, it was not considered a question to be seriously dealt with. i found several traces of prostitution in the chronicles of police departments, and i have seen many court records with women accused of prostitution. where the local is concerned, there is lots of evidence of prostitution. on the state level—in the government, including ministries—prostitution for the longest time was a non-topic, and it was not clear who from the state authorities was concerned with it. only in short periods like the late 1960s, in the context of the general liberalization, or early 1980s, when 54 aids became an important issue, was it something that played a role in committee discussions. vs: discussions of both prostitution and the aids crisis of the 1980s specifically seem to highlight disparities between government efforts to control already-vulnerable populations and their premise of providing help. are you drawing similar conclusions from your research so far? cb: i am still in the process of finding sources for my project, and therefore it is too early for far-reaching conclusions. but there are some things i am beginning to see more clearly. for one thing, i can see in the sources how the socialist state dealt with people who did not fit into the system or violated norms and how this changed over time. from violence and open repression in the 1950s to a discourse treating “difficult people” with the help of experts in the 1960s, we see an ongoing attempt to establish a complex network of control. what strikes me most is the huge gap between this discourse of helping, curing, and integration and the reality of the stigmatization and exclusion of people who would—or could—not adapt. vs: that sounds incredibly difficult, tracking down people who weren’t supposed to exist in socialist society—the process of rendering invisible members of society visible. in the midst of a global pandemic when increasing numbers of men and women are working from home, we have seen a number of conversations about who performs domestic labor, a historically invisible form of labor. sex work, also often under the purview of women, has been written off as separate from traditional “work.” how does this speak to the gendered understanding of work and labor, even in a supposedly equitable system like that of socialist czechoslovakia? cb: i think it’s a crucial question for the project. a topic like sex work didn’t make sense in the socialist world. the socialist understanding of work centered on productive labor, and productive labor was given and assigned by the state. the state organized the whole world of labor, so there was no legal work outside the state. but prostitution belonged to the world outside the state, meaning that it was regarded as a dishonest way of making one’s living or making money. this put those women who earned part or all of their living by selling sex at the margins of society. when the revolution came in the late-1980s, nearly everybody knew that prostitution existed. after all, one could see prostitutes in the center of prague, at the railway station. so, it really wasn’t a secret. since then, there has been an ongoing discussion of whether to regulate or legalize prostitution. to date no prostitution law has been passed in the czech republic. however, municipalities can decide on how to deal with prostitution individually. especially in the region that borders germany, many towns have imposed rather strict rules for regulating prostitution. of course, these restrictions do not put an end to prostitution, and they make it even more unsafe or dangerous for the people to engage in. vs: the stigmatization of prostitution as a danger to society—this moralizing attitude— seems to be a theme regardless of political circumstances. 55 cb: the approach of socialist states to prostitution was strongly moralizing. there is nothing especially “socialist” about this view. what was indeed characteristic for socialist states was the practice connected with this discourse—the partial tabooing, or “hiding,” of the existence of prostitution behind other crimes, especially the crime of not working. this tabooing drove and kept people in prostitution in the margins of society. vs: we still have these debates about prostitution today, and the arguments seem to have remained the same: that prostitutes or poor people or marginalized people don’t contribute to society and the economy. and although socialism ended in the czech republic, the attitudes, it seems, did not. cb: talking about the approach to prostitution in the czech republic today, we consider not only the experience of the socialist period but also about the years following the collapse of communism. after 1989, there was this enormous “sex boom” seen by a part of society as a chance to catch up with the west and experienced by others as liberalization with shocking consequences. perhaps this explains, at least partly, why the differences in the debate about a prostitution law are so sharp. at the same time, there is a huge lack of empathy for women in prostitution in this debate. they are not seen as valuable members of society but as threats to society and its health. interest in guaranteeing their rights and making their life and work safer is scarce. vs: speaking of empathy, i noticed that you did not name the women you use as examples. were their names redacted, or are you trying to shield them from any potential impact on their current lives? cb: for one thing, this is really, really sensitive material, and i always had to provide assurances that i will treat the material with respect and discretion. for sure, it’s exactly as you say. most of these people are still alive. they have family, kids, and as i said before, they cannot count on support from today’s czech society. i’m not sure what i will do with naming these women. i do not want to sound like the police, nor do i want to suggest an inappropriate familiarity and talk about the women as if they were my friends or sisters. vs: how do you handle naming the police officers and other officials who were enacting this sort of state surveillance on women accused of prostitution? cb: i could identify one of the judges who presided over numerous processes with women accused of prostitution because she was also involved in a scandalous trial with a member of charter 77. so, i can reconstruct her professional career with published material on her. she is a public person, so i don’t see a problem using her name. vs: over and over again, there seems to be a theme of almost social or class distinction in socialist czechoslovakia—between this judge and the women accused of prostitution, for example—the women who are marginalized and those who are not. this is fairly common 56 in most conversations about prostitution, but the socialist political context complicates our understanding of that disparity. to what degree does your current project deal with how the state managed inequality in czechoslovakian society? cb: that’s a very important question. czechoslovakia was, at least, since the 1960s, a society with a high degree of social equality. this was largely because of the enormous shifts caused by social policies after the communist take-over in 1948. while the vast majority of society was rather homogenous, the percentage of really poor people was small. likewise, the milieu of so called “asocial people” was not numerous, but it was exceptionally burdened with difficult living. when looking at the life stories i can reconstruct from my sources, the one thing i can say is that it was not easy to make a fresh start after being sentenced for prostitution. once you were part of this non-society at the margins, you were put on a register, and it was very hard to find a way out. after the stalinist period, the socialist state gave up the utopian idea of turning all people into “new socialist men” and accepted that deviant behavior would continue to exist. but it is important to see that the policies toward criminals and so-called parasites—forgiving on the discourse level, repressive in practice—also served to discipline and integrate the majority society. vs: this project sounds exciting and multifaceted. where do you see yourself going from here? cb: if i could, i would go back to the archive tomorrow. among the things i want to do next is visiting the archives of “spa towns” like karlovy vary and places where events like huge fairs attracted an international public to understand how prostitution was monitored or silently tolerated in those contexts. i am also in the very beginning of researching the files of the secret police, who probably not only tolerated prostitution but also used it for their own purposes. but i think the most important thing now, after a year of working mainly with sources of control and correction, is talking to witnesses. i’m thinking of experts in law, psychiatry, and sexology, but first, i want to do interviews with former prostitutes. of course, the court records provide basic information about their lives, but they give very limited insight into their experiences, emotions, their individual agendas. their perspective should play an important role in my book. the editors of the central european yearbook are grateful to dr. christiane brenner and ms. victoria skelton for taking the time to provide our readers with this fascinating interview about new research. we wish both of them much success with their ongoing and future projects. 57 christiane brenner earned her ph.d. at the freie universität in berlin and has studied modern central european history in lyon, munich, berlin, and prague. since 1998 she has been a researcher at the collegium carolinum research institute for the history of the czech lands and slovakia and the editor of bohemia: journal of history and civilization in east central europe. most of her research is dedicated to the history of post-1945 czechoslovakia. in recent years, she has focused on youth, gender, and sexuality in socialist societies. in july 2019 she became part of the sfb (collaborative research center), “cultures of vigilance,” at the ludwig maximilian university of munich with her project “guardians of socialist morality: prostitution and vigilance practices in czechoslovakia (1945/48–1989).” her publications to date on the history of sexuality in socialist czechoslovakia include: “doing it the right way. pronatalism and sexuality in socialist czechoslovakia (1948-1989),” in odvaha nesouhlasit. feministické myšlení hany havelkové a jeho reflexe, eds. věra sokolová and l’ubica kobová (prague: fakulta humanitních studií univerzity karlovy, 2019), 426-439; and “nová společnost – nová láska? partnerství a sexualita v osvětových knihách pro mládež,” in mezi pionýrským šátkem a mopedem. děti, mládež a socialismus v českých zemích 1948-1970, eds. jiří knapík and martin franc (prague: academia, 2018), 513-521. 58 victoria skelton is a doctoral candidate in the history department of auburn university where she is writing a dissertation on international women’s organizing in the context of sisterhood, nationalism, and. she earned her b.a. in history at texas a&m university. her dissertation, “women in a changing world: the international council of women, global power, and the boundaries of sisterhood, 1888-1966,” explores the relationship between feminist, national, and imperial identities in the international arena of the first multipurpose feminist organization, the international council of women. she has presented papers on her work at the national women’s studies association and the western association of women’s historians, among others. she teaches courses on twentieth-century europe, women in media, and world history. she has received a number of honors, including a margaret scharnagel award, an award from the donna j. bohanan endowed fund for excellence and a graduate instructor fellowship. her leadership roles have included graduate teaching assistant captain and president of the phi alpha theta honor society. 86 nazi germany a class timeline students of hist 4273/jwst 4998 nazi germany course loyola marymount university abstract in spring 2019, students in nazi germany (hist 4373/jwst 4998), an undergraduate course at loyola marymount university in los angeles, collaborated on the creation of a digital timeline about the history of nazi germany. the timeline project explores the origins of nazi ideology and its development over time, the nature of the nazi state and german society under nazism, and some of the legacies of nazism in postwar germany. introduction to the digital project in spring 2019, students in nazi germany (hist 4373/jwst 4998), an undergraduate course at loyola marymount university in los angeles, collaborated on the creation of a digital timeline about the history of nazi germany, a project inspired by an assignment developed by professor jennifer evans of carleton university. the timeline project explores the origins of nazi ideology and its development over time, the nature of the nazi state and german society under nazism, and some of the legacies of nazism in postwar germany. each student chose a theme for their individual research and then contributed ten entries based on primary sources related to that topic. students focused on a variety of topics in their individual research, including the nature of the nazi state, the role of law, nazi foreign policy, the role of the military, women in the nazi state, sexuality, nazi eugenics, the catholic church in nazi germany, and nazi cultural policy. the primary sources used for the timeline included a mix of documents and images, with primary source documents accompanied by an image as illustration. most of the primary sources came from the german history in documents and images (ghdi) digital archive, with additional sources from the german propaganda archive and other digital repositories. some documents and images appear twice, with different students approaching the same document or image from different perspectives. students also wrote analytical essays about their chosen topics on the basis of these primary sources. the timeline project thus required students to work closely with primary sources as a step in the process of writing a research paper. elizabeth a. drummond associate professor & chair department of history loyola marymount university timeline contributors veronica backer-peral, history & film/tv production double-major, lmu ‘22 https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1n9i15seuo6c8ya6x07mbwk1_jkluvczwlllc2our3m0&font=default&lang=en&initial_zoom=7&height=800 https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1n9i15seuo6c8ya6x07mbwk1_jkluvczwlllc2our3m0&font=default&lang=en&initial_zoom=7&height=800 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/home.cfm http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/home.cfm https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/ww2era.htm https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/ww2era.htm 87 eva baudler, history & english double-major, lmu ‘20 dwayne cox, history & screenwriting double-major, lmu ‘19 thomas duncan, history major, lmu ‘19 riis irving-peterson, international relations & communication studies double-major, lmu ‘19 preston joiner, history major, lmu ‘21 william lighthart, history & international relations double-major, lmu ‘21 meghan long, english & music double-major, lmu ‘19 michael malinowski, english major, lmu ‘19 christopher mansdorfer, political science major & history minor, lmu ‘19 emily massey, history major, lmu ‘20 thea mckay, history & theatre arts double-major, lmu ‘20 nicolas medina, history major, lmu ‘19 sophia notter, international relations major, lmu ‘21 nathaniel salvini, history major, lmu ‘21 nana turkson, history major, lmu ‘21 59 an enlightenment of spirit pietism and prussian politics grace vowels salem college abstract this article covers the political effects of the pietist movement in the prussian territories. it details basic pietist thought and how these doctrines were secularized, particularly in the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century, as germany became a unified nation-state. in particular, it examines the question of how these religious beliefs were stripped of their original contexts and then secularized and politicized to encourage devotion first to the militaristic prussian state and then to the unified nation of germany in the late nineteenth century. this article utilizes various pietist texts such as philipp jakob spener's pia desideria and the works of august hermann francke as a basis for analysis, as well as various other primary and secondary sources to make the argument that pietist virtues were secularized by heads of state throughout prussian and unified german history, ultimately creating a brand of strict, unique citizenship. article religious revolution has a long tradition in germany. as the birthplace of the reformation, non-conformity spread and took root, despite the opposition of the established catholic church and the holy roman emperor. pioneers like martin luther and ulrich zwingli were influential in the foundation of modern protestantism, and religious groups such as the anabaptists persisted in their worship even under the greatest persecution, often resulting in death. the pietist movement was another manifestation of this long tradition, breaking off from the mainstream lutheran church due to ideological disagreements over worldliness and the importance of formal theology. pietism was initially a nonconformist movement that stressed personal faith and belief and was most influential in the kingdom of prussia, a lutheran majority state with calvinist leaders. however, throughout the eighteenth century, it began to be increasingly incorporated into formal church and state doctrine within prussia. pietism proved beneficial to both church and state despite its focus on the individual faith and resistance to organized orthodoxy, ideas which seem opposed to the burgeoning absolutist prussian state. as time went on, pietism became more and more incorporated into popular religion, eventually enforcing an orthodoxy originally antithetical to the movement. how is it possible for a movement to be manipulated this way, abandoning its original tenets and becoming a means of enforcing state homogeny? the answer may lie in the politicization of pietist values, separated from their original devotional context and incorporated into the methods of governance and control. although a religious movement within the lutheran church, pietism worked alongside growing political absolutism in prussia, where it was used especially by leaders throughout the 60 eighteenth in state-building, thus highlighting the historical theme of using widespread cultural movements to enforce political dominance. pietism as a movement emerged in the seventeenth century in the wake of widespread dissatisfaction with the established lutheran church. during the reformation, one of the main complaints of protestants was what they perceived as the worldliness and idolatry of the catholic church, coupled with the inaccessibility of religious knowledge and spiritual connection to the common people. after a century of being an established church, some within the lutheran community began to feel that this was becoming an issue within their faith as well. the “father” of pietism was the german theologian philipp jakob spener, who was born to a lutheran family near france in 1635.1 he had a thorough theological education at the university of strasbourg and published his most well-known work, pia desideria, in 1675, where he lays out his hopes of reformation for the lutheran church.2 spener writes in pia desideria of the issues that he has with the spiritual state of germany, admonishing both the clergy and society at large. of the clergy, he writes: “behold how they seek promotions, shift from parish to parish, and engage in all sorts of machinations,” criticizing the worldliness of these ministers who prioritize their own earthly prosperity over the spiritual wealth of the bible and church.3 he also writes that in the life of the common people “it is evident on every hand that none of the precepts of christ is openly observed,” while citing drunkenness and desire for possessions as critical issues that affect the general public.4 spener manages to tie all of this back to the papacy, which he believes is the cause of the deterioration of the “true doctrine.”5 he adheres steadfastly to luther’s beliefs, but believes that the people, while having broken away from the catholic church, have not yet embodied the spirit of the luther and, as such, are not even worthy of calling themselves “lutherans.”6 because spener’s complaints lay with church practice rather than the doctrines of luther himself, pietism remained as an offshoot of the lutheran church. another factor influencing the rise of pietism was the complete destruction suffered by so many german places during the thirty years war and the following years. for instance, the german city of halle, a region which was heavily influenced by the pietist august hermann francke, was decimated by invading armies, suffered economic despair due to its annexation to brandenburg-prussia and had over half of its citizens perish from the plague.7 the desolation felt following the thirty years war drove down morale, and many turned to what pietists considered to be “sin,” patronizing taverns and brothels of which 1 k. james stein, “philipp jakob spener (1635-1705),” in the pietist theologians, ed. carter lindberg (malden: blackwell, 2005), 84. 2 stein, “philipp jakob spener (1635-1705),” 84. 3 philipp jakob spener, pia desideria, trans. theodore g. tappert (minneapolis: fortress press, 1964), 45. 4 spener, pia desideria, 57-62. 5 spener, pia desideria, 40. 6 spener, pia desideria, 57-58. 7 robert gawthrop, pietism and the making of eighteenth-century prussia (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1993), 127. 61 there were a disproportionate number.8 francke, born in 1663, was from lübeck and raised in gotha, where his father worked for the duke, a deeply religious man called “ernest the pious,” who like pietists, worked to spiritually improve his subjects. exposure to such religiosity likely had an effect upon the young francke.9 he himself relates to this struggle towards morality, as in his autobiography, he describes himself as “a man of the world” who “drew evil to myself” even though he had conducted years of theological study. this internal conflict regarding morality emphasizes an important uneasiness, shared by many people, common and notable, centered around a sense of hollowness and desolation in both the modern world and the orthodox faith.10 a new way of worship, one which altered the negative aspects of the established church while remaining true to its fundamental creed, would be able to serve as a balm to the suffering soul, much like how francke’s soul was soothed through his devotion. as such, pietism, particularly under francke, expanded in these places because the enhancement of spiritual health was thought to aid societal health.11 for these reasons, the pietist movement was formed, serving as a fresh branch off of a still flourishing lutheran tree. pietists ultimately sought to purify the church from the previously noted corruptions found in the german lutheran church. this was to be done by the establishment of a true evangelical church on earth. the formal founder of the pietism was the aforementioned phillip jacob spener, whose work pia desideria (pious desires) provides the basis for pietist theology, which rests upon several fundamental tenets, the exploration of which leads to a greater understanding of the subsequent applications of pietism into the constitution of the prussian state and people. one of the most crucial of these tenets was the priesthood of all believers, a concept that spener ties back to the earliest days of the christian church, as described by paul.12 while spener does not object to “pulpit preaching,” he feels that the lutheran church has become much too reliant on it and prescribes, in addition to this traditional form of preaching, an assembly in which “others who had been blessed with gifts and knowledge would also speak and present their pious opinions … to the judgement of the rest.”13 with this, he also highlights the importance of personal interpretation of christ’s doctrine in conjunction with the official position of the church and its ministers. in order to accomplish this, spener recognized that an understanding of the entire bible on an individual basis was necessary as well, a position which while not disavowed by lutherans as it was by catholics, yet was seldom practiced.14 he calls for every head of the household to “keep a bible, or at least a new testament, handy and read from it every day.”15 of course, due to the spiritual deprivation that pietists felt afflicted much of the german lands, these programs for private bible reading and faith formation would have to be led, at first, 8 gawthrop, pietism, 127-128. 9 markus matthias, “august hermann francke (1663-1727),” in the pietist theologians, ed. carter lindberg (malden: blackwell, 2005), 100-101. 10 august hermann francke, “autobiography,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 99. 11 gawthrop, pietism, 128-129. 12 spener, pia desideria, 89-90, 92-94. 13 spener, pia desideria, 87-90. 14 spener, pia desideria, 88-89. 15 spener, pia desideria, 88. 62 by the heads of congregations, with the hope that the congregation would soon be proficient enough to carry this practice of christian piety into their own lives.16 another critical aspect of pietism is the living practice of the faith. spener writes that knowledge of christ and his words is not enough.17 instead, people must carry these values into their personal lives; the foremost of these values is love, which spener defines as a sacrifice of self, even urging people, in certain cases, to give up one’s rights “for fear that their hearts may betray them and feelings of hostility may become involved,” if a confrontation occurs.18 such a “priesthood of all believers” might put pietism at odds with the absolutist state that would develop in prussia, but a possible explanation for their relationship can be found in the very same individualized worship which lies opposite the absolutist state. the leaders of the prussia had converted to calvinism in the early seventeenth century, a conversion which set them apart from the majority of their subjects who continued to aid state-supported lutheranism.19 this put the political leadership at odds with the religious and cultural leadership of prussia. although the reformation brought about a change in the international hierarchical structure of christianity, with the reduction of the pope from absolute authority, the hierarchical structure was still in place on a regional level. this meant a disconnect between the church, a critical aspect of the average person’s life, and the government, another important facet of daily life. it is possible to read such a power struggle regarding hierarchy in the average prussian’s daily life as a factor in the prussian monarchy’s alliance with pietism. with the pietist focus on individual interpretation, unquestioning allegiance which may have once been directed to the church could now be directed at the state. this decentering of religious authority combined with the monarchy’s advancement of pietist doctrine and theologians in positions such as university lecturers and army field chaplains likely helped to lay the framework for prussian absolutism. as such, with an understanding of the basic theological tenets of pietism, particularly the political context surrounding their application, it becomes easier to understand just how they came to be politicized by the prussian state. as a movement, pietism was predominantly influential in the kingdom of prussia. long a protestant territory, the majority of the people in the kingdom were lutherans, which interestingly contrasted with the calvinist faith of prussia’s rulers, who belonged to the hohenzollern dynasty.20 initially, the relationship to pietism was tenuous, as pietist doctrine strayed from the orthodoxy as the established lutheran state church. even so, the welcoming of protestant refugees was a well-known aspect of the prussian government, one which set it apart from many other german states.21 for example, the kingdom of prussia accepted french huguenot refugees who had been expelled when louis xiv revokes the edict of nantes, revoking their status as a protected religious group.22 in his 1685 response to louis xiv, the edict of potsdam, the “great elector” frederick william 16 spener, pia desideria, 89. 17 spener, pia desideria, 95. 18 spener, pia desideria, 96. 19 gawthrop, pietism, 42, 204. 20 benjamin marschke, “pietism and politics in prussia and beyond,” in a companion to german pietism, 16601800, ed. douglas shantz (leiden: brill, 2015), 488. 21 marschke, “pietism and politics,” 484. 22 marshcke, “pietism and politics,” 485. 63 and his co-signers promise to aid the french immigrants in their move to their respective territories, stating that they would aid in the cost of transport, the establishment of profession, and self-government in many disputes.23 although pietists were not refugees and were instead part of a domestic movement, the existence of varied denominations within the state indicates a tradition of welcoming dissenters, as well as moderate religious toleration, as indicated by the coexistence of calvinists and lutherans within the same territory, a gap highlighted by the hohenzollern dynasty and the majority of their population. as such, the principle of “cuius regio eius religio,” or the augsburgian edict that declared the ruler of a territory determined that territory’s religion,24 was not upheld in prussia. this provided a modicum of religious freedom for subversive theologians, freedom which would be seized upon by pietists to develop and spread their doctrine across the state. some of the movement’s popularity may be explained by the fact that spener himself lived in prussia for a period of his life, and other influential pietist thinkers like francke were based in prussia. in fact, the town of halle, newly annexed by brandenburg-prussia and which francke helped to restore after years of devastation in the late seventeenth century, was the center of a powerful pietist movement in prussia. as previously mentioned, halle had been particularly affected by the thirty years war, as well as a plague during the latter years of the seventeenth century. due to these tragedies, the town had suffered a steep decline in religious devotion, and francke’s alcoholic predecessor was a chief unholy influence upon the town.25 in response, francke set upon a path of reform for halle. he challenged orthodoxy by promoting pietist theology of a personal relationship with god, one which would be expressed through shows of outward morality. he demanded a genuine change in lifestyle from his parishioners in order to receive communion, thus ensuring his parishioners were serious about their newly developed beliefs, in a manner which ensured devoted adherents, further contributing to the longevity of pietist beliefs.26 another critical aspect of pietism was the establishment of institutions for the public good. schools specialized in the education of youth in the pietist tradition at both the elementary and university levels.27 they also established orphanages and poorhouses that emphasized pietist teachings.28 such institutions, as well as public ministry to the common people, worked to increase public opinion of the pietists, particularly in devastated areas like halle.29 additionally, various pietist business ventures were economically powerful and were able to generate a substantial income for francke and his continued evangelical 23 frederick william, elector, “the edict of potsdam,” german history in documents and images, accessed may 15, 2019, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document_s.cfm?document_id=3636. 24 hans knippenberg, "the political geography of religion: historical state-church relations in europe and recent challenges," geojournal 67, no. 4 (2006): 253-254. 25 mary fulbrook, piety and politics: religion and the rise of absolutism in england, wurttemberg and prussia, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1983), 154. 26 fulbrook, piety and politics, 155. 27 spener, pia desideria, 103. 28 gawthrop, pietism, 130-131. 29 gawthrop, pietism, 129. 64 missions.30 pietists did business in publishing, medicine, and trade, which encompassed a great deal of secular, worldly goods, goods which were not congruent with pietist ideology; he also managed to acquire tax breaks for his charitable institution, cementing an initial relationship between pietists and the prussian government, even if at this point, the government was a local one.31 there were other factors at play concerning the emergence of pietism as a popular faith practice besides their establishment of schools, orphanages, and businesses. one of these, to be explored further later, is the encouragement that pietism eventually received in the royal court and at a governmental level, despite initial hesitation. it is again important to note that pietism in and of itself is less of a denomination and instead is a worship practice within the lutheran tradition. this distinction is important, as it indicates that pietism never broke off into a separate church, instead remaining at odds, yet still affiliated, with the widespread lutheran orthodoxy. while the prussian monarchy was initially hesitant about pietism, in the early eighteenth century, attitudes towards pietism at the uppermost levels of government turned in favor of the pietist tradition. initial skepticism was due to attempts to convert the calvinist prussian monarchy to lutheranism through pietism, seen largely in the case of frederick i and his wife, although they had previously attempted to work together politically.32 despite initial clashes, pietists and the state did come to work in tandem, as prussian absolutists adopted pietist rhetoric. this relationship was largely due to the influence of king frederick william i, who became close with francke.33 efforts had previously been made to convert prussian leaders, but they had largely failed; even frederick william i was opposed to the pietists at first, largely because he felt that they had slighted his father.34 this was balanced with his recognition of the fact that the pietist movement was likely the best way to reconcile the majority lutheran population of prussia with the predominately calvinist establishment.35 yet this was not a personal connection or endorsement of pietism. this close connection would come about later in frederick william’s life after he had a religious awakening. already a deeply religious man, he underwent a deep change in his calvinist faith following the death of his young son; from this, he began to desire a more personal connection to god, through whose grace he believed that he and everyone else may be saved, a far cry from the calvinist doctrine of predestination.36 this emphasis on personal connection and grace led him to become more welcome to pietist ideas. despite this, he remained a reformed calvinist all his life, though he still incorporated pietist beliefs into his personal faith.37 his cultivation of a personal relationship with francke began when he visited halle, and evolved further when one of his officials came to advocate for francke’s doctrines to him.38 the connection deepened, and francke became personally involved 30 fulbrook, piety and politics, 157. 31 fulbrook, piety and politics. 158-159. 32 gawthrop, pietism, 203-204. 33 gawthrop, pietism, 200. 34 gawthrop, pietism, 203-204. 35 gawthrop, pietism, 204. 36 gawthrop, pietism, 205. 37 gawthrop, pietism, 206. 38 gawthrop, pietism, 208-209. 65 with frederick william i as he ascended to the throne in 1713.39 a more concrete reflection of similarities between the personal life of frederick william i and conservative pietist beliefs can be seen in the running of his court. unlike other nations, prussia had no elaborate baroque court culture, which was characterized by decadence and glamour.40 instead, in line with both pietist beliefs of hard work and discipline and his own personality, frederick william created a military culture much different from the baroque court of favors and privileges found in other regions, such as france and england.41 much of pietist literature and thought, while focusing on one’s spiritual character, could be adapted to apply to the state and one’s responsibilities as a citizen. for instance, spener’s work the spiritual priesthood contains a section answering seventy questions about “the word of god.” spener writes, when asked if love of god should lead to neglect of secular affairs, that christians “are also placed by god in certain positions for the general good, when they have bodily work and business, they do so diligently according to the ability god gives, avoid all idleness.”42 the assertion that love of god can be expressed by diligence and work is useful in state-building, as it urges citizens to remain servile, not neglecting their earthly duties in favor of spiritual pursuits. this philosophy was extended to obedience and service to the state, since frederick william i would interpret the “general good” to mean “the good of the country.”43 with this, frederick william was able to establish work as a “divinely—and royally—required duty.”44 spener’s pietist beliefs, as expanded upon by francke and implemented in halle, were not very popular with local guilds and landed estates; this unpopularity led them to have a strong appeal to the political tastes of prussian leadership, who sought to ensure the formation of a centralized absolutist state, a state which required the submission of junkers and estates.45 the enforcement and further implementation pietist conventions, such as tax breaks and compulsory education, helped to further submission.46 such policies also worked to create an economy filled with hard workers whose loyalty to the state both bolstered the economy and allowed the militaryobsessed frederick william to build up his war chest of both liquid cash and physical resources. however, in order to ensure enthusiastic participation in this system, it was necessary to convince the prussian people of its intrinsic ideological correctness. this was done through another pietist idea: education. one of the tenets of pietism highlighted by spener in pia desideria was the education of the people in the pietist tradition, from the university level all the way down to primary schools. this can be seen further in francke’s 1698 “outline of all the institutes at glauch near halle,” which lists extant institutions including schools for the education of noble 39 gawthrop, pietism, 209. 40 fulbrook, piety and politics, 166. 41 fulbrook, piety and politics, 166. 42 jakob philipp spener, “from the spiritual priesthood,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 59. 43 gawthrop, pietism, 210. 44 gawthrop, pietism, 252. 45 fulbrook, piety and politics, 159. 46 fulbrook, piety and politics, 159. 66 children, burgher children, and poor children, as well as an orphanage and a poorhouse.47 these charitable schools founded by pietists, schools which instilled pietist religious values such as discipline and order served served as important precursors to later schools founded by the pietist-influenced prussian state. the state established public schools for the education of common children, which was truly revolutionary for the time; however, these schools were largely centers for drilling civic virtues, blended of course with religious virtues, into the youth of the nation.48 this would hopefully ensure a diligent public whose values aligned with those of the hohenzollerns. these institutions, particularly state-run orphanages and poorhouses, also worked for the economic benefit of the kingdom, as those inside were compelled to work for their keep, highlighting the aforementioned pietist values of diligence and self-reliance.49 discipline was another important aspect of pietist state-building. self-denial was emphasized, and moderation was encouraged in all earthly things. this is emphasized in a document written by francke in 1722, well into frederick william i’s reign. his advice to german students traveling to the lapland included such precepts as “humility, modesty with decorous parrhesie [openness] towards all men” and “true denial of self.”50 perhaps the most severe of all of these guidelines was the importance of “shunning dangerous and idle conversation.”51 all of these implied a strict personal discipline and asceticism, which frederick william i and other prussian leaders would use to create a strong military, bureaucracy, and workforce. all said, it becomes very clear that the bulk of “prussian virtue,” for which the kingdom was well known in the eighteenth century, is derived from pietist values that have been subverted to influence political and national character in addition to religious character. while pietists were largely in charge of educational and religious institutions, the monarchy largely controlled the military and bureaucracy.52 the overlap between the two, emphasized by the effects of compulsory schooling and military conscription, shows a working relationship between pietists and the monarchy, wherein each feeds into the other. parallels between pietism and secular prussian civic values can be seen in the worship literature of the period, particularly in hymns and exhortations. pietist hymns, such as those from johann anastasius freylinghausen’s spiritual songbook, often contained lyrics seemingly applicable to both religious practice and state devotion. hymn 732 states: if one wishes to break off roses one must suffer in stillness; the thorns prick us. 47 august hermann francke, “outline of all the institutes at glauch near halle which provide special blessings partially for the education of youth and partially for the maintenance of the poor, as the institutes exist in december, 1698,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 163164. 48 gawthrop, pietism, 253-254. 49 gawthrop, pietism, 251. 50 august hermann francke, “admonitions to the twelve students traveling to lapland,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 165. 51 francke, “admonitions,” 165. 52 gawthrop, pietism, 215. 67 all happens as god wishes; he has pointed out the goal for us which one reaches only in battle. if one wishes to find the treasure here, one must first be a conqueror53 these lines, on the surface, follow a common christian theme of an “army for christ,” one which will restore christendom and lead believers into a better world. in order to achieve this glory, one must first fight for the lord and conquer those who do not believe, thus defending the faith. yet it remains very easy to see just how these words could be applied to the practice of state-building, especially under frederick william i, previously described as “the soldier king,” who sought to expand and protect prussia militarily. his use of other pietist beliefs like discipline and education helped him to “find the treasure” and make prussia a nation of “conquerors.”54 the emphasis on suffering as purification and stoicism through pain, shown by the mention of “suffer[ing] in stillness,” is a direct continuation of the ascetism advocated for both by pietists and the prussian state.55 other hymns make mention of sitting at god’s feet and kissing his scepter, images evoking devotion to the king of heaven, but also highly reminiscent of devotion to one’s earthly rulers.56 however, the connections between pietist literature and prussian state values do not end in similarities expressed in hymns but also in the exhortations put forth for believers to follow in pietist theologian johann friedrich starck’s 1728 daily handbook for days of joys and sorrow.57 exhortations are reflections and suggestions of ways in which the reader can live a more godly and christian life. since they are based upon pietist ideals, they often stress a personal relationship with god, and the handbook itself is a way for one to cultivate his relationship with the church outside of orthodox methods. yet in their urgings, the exhortations also double as civic lessons, including particularly unique ones for women, who have largely been overlooked by pietist literature. one of starck’s exhortations focuses upon the pregnant woman, whom he urges to “commit the fruit of their bodies to the holy providence of god,” a suggestion which seems similar to the sentiment expressed in prussian policy, wherein the state is substituted for god, and this devotion is done through participation in government programs such as standardized schooling and military conscription.58 other exhortations, such as for “the true believer gives thanks unto the lord, after having heard his holy word,” reinforce the importance of prussian severity and asceticism, urging believers, even on their day of rest, not to “seek the comforts of the flesh” or worldly comforts.59 by living a life of sacrifice, believers secure themselves a place in 53 johann anastasius freylinghausen, from “spiritual songbook,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 179. 54 freylinghausen, “spiritual songbook,” 179. 55 freylinghausen, “spiritual songbook,” 179. 56 freylinghausen, “spiritual songbook,” 171. 57 starck operated out of halle throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, publishing some of the most popular german-language prayer books. peter c. erb, “introduction,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 10. 58 johann friedrich starck, from “daily handbook for days of joy and sorrow,” in pietists: selected writings, ed. peter c. erb (new york: paulist press, 1983), 210. 59 starck, “daily handbook,” 189. 68 heaven. the stately counterpart to this, a life of modesty and self-denial, ensures sufficiency and prosperity for the state, as no one becomes indolent and lazy, invigorating prussia with the “protestant work ethic,” which so shaped prussian virtue and statehood. from these examples, the role of religious literature as political creed becomes clear and the methods for spreading such values among the prussian people, through indoctrination in both the streets and the pulpit, are greatly enlightened. with this, the basis of the eighteenth-century prussian state can be seen as resting heavily upon pietism, as well as just how influential pietism was in prussian policymaking. such influence is shown most explicitly through the similarities between devotion of a church congregation and that of patriotic subjects. in addition to its use in developing a citizen army, pietism also served to unify the varied and diverse regions of prussia, thus cementing absolutism. eastern prussia was made up largely of people who were not ethnic germans, such as poles and lithuanians. pietism spread to these largely undeveloped and alienated regions where it formed some sense of a unified prussian culture, especially as pietist education in native tongues was implemented and ministerial appointments throughout the kingdom were made and approved by pietists.60 the political usefulness of pietism is certainly an explanation for why it remained a hallmark of prussian culture even under a largely non-religious leader, such as frederick ii. after the death of frederick william i, his son frederick ii (the great) took the throne. frederick ii was much less religious than his father and was himself steeped in enlightenment ideology. while some men under the name of pietists did become involved in the enlightenment and used it to advocate for political and social reform, the movement was largely secular or, at the very least, deist.61 frederick ii seems to have had a largely negative view of religion, writing to the deist philosopher voltaire in 1766 that bohemia and other catholic nations were “steeped in fanaticism,” and that while protestant countries were less superstitious/more rational, there was still work to do, writing that “perhaps in a century we shall entirely extinguish the animosities born from the parties sub utroque et sub una.”62 sub utroque et sub una here represent rival factions of christianity with different beliefs regarding the sacrament of the eucharist.63 this passage highlights that frederick views religious disputes and differences as unnecessary and something to be entirely eliminated. when tied in with his observations about religious fanaticism, it can be inferred that he is criticizing all devout christian practices, claiming that they are something to be overcome. this is a far cry from the beliefs of his father, who held religion very closely. nevertheless, as many of the policies instituted under the pietist influence of francke remained in practice under frederick ii, emphasizing the extent to which pietism became 60 fulbrook, piety and politics, 168-169. 61 hartmut lehman, “pietism and nationalism: the relationship between protestant revivalism and national renewal in nineteenth-century germany," church history 51, no. 1 (1982): 39. 62 voltaire and frederick ii, king of prussia, letters of voltaire and frederick the great, trans. richard aldington (new york: brentano's, 1927), 273-274. 63 joseph hughes, “utraquism,” in the catholic encyclopedia, vol. 15 (new york: robert appleton company, 1912), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15244b.htm. 69 secularized and incorporated into prussian culture. these include the national importance of discipline and service, as frederick ii, although a so-called “enlightened” leader, was not shy about using military might to retake land that he desired. frederick the great sought the expansion of the state, gaining territory through regional wars.64 yet he also hoped to ensure domestic hegemony. the institutions doubly manned by the pietists in religious positions and efficient and loyal bureaucrats helped to ensure this compliance, and the individual was convinced on both sides to act in the best interest of others. additionally, the enlightenment under frederick the great, was more deeply entrenched in pietism than it seems at first glance. “enlightenment” philosophy oftentimes coincided with pietist goals, as frederick the great’s deeply religious father had laid the framework for much of his son’s deist reign. richard gawthrop argues that like the religiously influenced state his father created, frederick the great used pietist ideals of education and a strong (protestant) work ethic to mold a model state.65 both rulers sought to prepare civicminded subjects with great devotion to the state, a task which was different in ideology but identical in task, a “concord of action rather than concord of belief,”66 indicating a secularization that owed much to its pietist roots. an example of the continuing use of pietism as a tool of cultural unification across expanding prussian territory, can be found in one government official stating that in lithuania, the average person, once unassimilated and coarse, is now, in 1756 “quite a different person in civil society” and “fulfills his duties towards authority,”67 emphasizing a single-minded devotion to the state possible under both frederick william i and frederick the great. as the nature of pietist principles evolved from being intertwined with secular interests to serving as an enlightenment blueprint, it becomes apparent that pietist practices still continued to shape prussian policy even after its ruler no longer held a marked interest in organized religion. one could convincingly argue that pietism’s true home is in prussia. here, the religious movement, originally focused upon personal faith, a priesthood of all believers, and selfdenial, was transformed into a political tool, creating in prussian citizens as sense of “prussian virtue” defined by obedience to the state and diligence in all matters. this political tool was subsequently used in the state-building of the eighteenth century under hohenzollern rulers, showing just how influential the implementation of pietist-influenced policy can be. even throughout the nineteenth century, pietist values continued to remain important to prussians, perhaps most importantly to otto von bismarck who engineered the unification of germany and personally held pietist beliefs. in the twentieth century, the weimar republic was established. for the first time in german history, a true republican government was being implemented, and its marked liberalism was a far cry from the conservatism of previous regimes. yet this period was marred by economic devastation and national humiliation on the global stage, leaving many people disillusioned with the powers of both democracy and liberalism to improve the lives of the common people and looking to an absolute leader in the vein of past prussians, who realized their citizens’ suffering by encouraging single-minded stately devotion. from this, the most infamous 64 gawthrop, pietism, 274. 65 gawthrop, pietism, 276-277. 66 gawthrop, pietism, 277. 67 oberkonsistorialrat sussmilch, report, 1756, in fulbrook, piety and politics, 173. 70 government of the twentieth century arose: the nazis. the nazis idolized the kingdom of prussia and the prussia virtues of obedience and self-denial. in doing so, they did emulate the worst aspects of the pietist-influenced state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. yet, at the same time, they removed the heavy religious connotations that the movement had even when secularized in practice, embodied by its devout leaders, instead replacing it with a cult of personality surrounding adolf hitler. thus, scholars can recognize the mixed legacy of the applications of pietism to politics. nevertheless, it becomes clear just how much influence that pietism has had on the creation of germany as a nation throughout the centuries, for better or for worse. 104 caught between continents the holocaust and israel’s attempt to claim the european jewish diaspora zachary kimmel columbia university abstract israel’s idea of its sovereignty over jewish cultural production has been essential in defining national mythology and self-consciousness ever since its founding as a state in 1948. but by what right does israel make such claims? this article examines that question through exploring three legal cases: franz kafka’s manuscripts, the historical records of jewish vienna, and the literary estate of lithuanian-born chaim grade. all three cases reveal a common jurisprudential and cultural logic, a rescue narrative that is central to the state of israel itself. to this day, israel maintains an idea of its sovereignty over jewish cultural production, and a study of these cases demonstrates how the holocaust plays as decisive a role in the creation and implementation of israeli policy and jurisprudential practice as it has in its national identity more broadly. article after decades of legal wrangling, a tel aviv court ruled in june 2015 that the manuscripts of franz kafka must be handed over to the national library of israel.1 the final batch of kafka’s papers arrived in jerusalem on august 7, 2019.2 despite the fact that kafka died in prague in 1924, israel’s lawyers argued that his manuscripts ought to be the legal property of the jewish nation-state. yet by what right does israel make such claims—even over the claims of other nations where the artists in question were citizens, or ignoring the ethnoreligious identifications of the artists themselves? this article examines that question, exploring the fate of kafka’s manuscripts as well as legal battles over two other important archives with jewish lineage: the historical records of jewish vienna and the literary estate of lithuanian-born chaim grade. the decisions in all three cases, adjudicated over many years, reveal a common jurisprudential and cultural logic, a rescue narrative that is central to the state of israel itself. to this day, israel maintains an idea of its sovereignty over jewish cultural production, a defining national mythology since its founding as a state in 1948. and the 1 ofer aderet, “court rules: kafka's papers belong in israel's national library,” haaretz, june 30, 2015, accessed november 6, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/culture/.premium-court-rules-kafkaspapers-stay-in-israel-1.5374660. 2 isabel kershner, “a yearslong battle over kafka’s legacy ends in jerusalem,” the new york times, august 7, 2019, accessed august 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/books/kafka-archive-jerusalemisrael.html. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/culture/.premium-court-rules-kafkas-papers-stay-in-israel-1.5374660 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/culture/.premium-court-rules-kafkas-papers-stay-in-israel-1.5374660 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/books/kafka-archive-jerusalem-israel.html https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/books/kafka-archive-jerusalem-israel.html 105 bedrock of this national story is laid bare in the kafka case. for in the historical vacuum produced by an untimely death and inter-generational conflict over wills and inheritance, the new state of israel laid claim to the kafka papers as an orphaned, endangered legacy otherwise vulnerable to extinction. although he was a czech writer who was not an observant jew and who died a quarter-century before its founding, israel nevertheless celebrated the return of kafka’s work as a homecoming, using the historical memory of the holocaust to assert itself as the rightful guardian of jewish cultural material created anytime, anywhere in the world. prague: the orphaned legacy of franz kafka franz kafka never wanted his work to be published—or, for that matter, to be read at all. when kafka died of tuberculosis in 1924, at age 41, he left all of his unpublished manuscripts to max brod, a friend and colleague, on the explicit condition that they be burned unread in their entirety.3 brod, of course, ignored the requests of his late friend, securing the posthumous publication of three of kafka’s most recognizable works in the first few years following kafka’s death: the trial (1925), the castle (1926), and amerika (1927).4 however, brod soon recognized the existential threat posed by the rise of nazism, not just to his own life but to the entire material legacy of franz kafka. brod fled prague in march 1939, the same evening the nazis annexed czechoslovakia, and made his way to tel aviv.5 he carried with him a suitcase stuffed with kafka’s drawings, travel diaries, letters, and manuscripts.6 it was in tel aviv that brod met esther hoffe, a similarly situated, german-speaking jewish refugee from czechoslovakia, and the two became immensely close. while there is some speculation that they were lovers, what is known is that brod made hoffe his secretary and passed the kafka manuscripts to her upon his death with explicit instructions that they be donated to a public institution, if not in life, then immediately following her death.7 while brod left the final decision of where to donate the works up to his secretary, israel’s national library was at the top of his list of suggested public institutions.8 just as brod disregarded kafka’s dying wishes, hoffe neglected brod’s preference that the manuscripts be housed in a public institution. in 1988, hoffe sold the manuscript for the trial to a private collector for nearly $2 million, and the text eventually made its way to the literature archive in marbach, germany.9 when hoffe died in 2007, at the age of 101, she bequeathed the kafka manuscripts left to her by brod to her two daughters, eva hoffe and ruth wiesler, who intended to sell more work to the archive. almost immediately, the 3 elif batuman, “kafka's last trial,” the new york times, september 22, 2010, accessed november 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.html. 4 batuman, “kafka's last trial,” the new york times. 5 adam kirsch, “who gets to claim kafka?,” the atlantic, september 2018, accessed november 6, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/franz-kafka-archives/565763/. 6 batuman, “kafka’s last trial,” the new york times. 7 daniel k. eisenbud, “franz kafka's manuscripts belong in national library, tel aviv court says,” jerusalem post, july 1, 2015, accessed november 6, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/culture/franz-kafkasmanuscripts-belong-in-national-library-tel-aviv-court-says-407639. 8 eisenbud, “franz kafka's manuscripts belong in national library,” jerusalem post. 9 batuman, “kafka’s last trial,” the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.html https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/franz-kafka-archives/565763/ https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/franz-kafka-archives/565763/ https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/culture/franz-kafkas-manuscripts-belong-in-national-library-tel-aviv-court-says-407639 https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/culture/franz-kafkas-manuscripts-belong-in-national-library-tel-aviv-court-says-407639 106 israeli national library challenged the legality of hoffe’s will and claimed that kafka’s work legally belonged in its possession.10 the tel aviv district court ruled in june 2015 that the manuscripts must be handed over to the national library of israel.11 nearly a century after the writer’s death, the recent kafka decision is significant—and intriguing. it opens questions not only about the literary bequest of a master of western modernism who never wanted to be read, but also the conceptual and material legacies of the jewish diaspora with which he never identified.12 the legal case began with a simple enough argument: eva hoffe and ruth weisler claimed their mother was the lawful inheritor of brod’s entire estate, which, they maintained, included the kafka papers. citing a 1952 gift-letter written by brod to esther hoffe, the daughters argued that they had the legal right to do what they wished with the manuscripts, including selling them.13 furthermore, the sisters contended that the kafka manuscripts were too valuable to be housed in an israeli institution and could be better maintained at the state-of-the-art archive in marbach.14 lawyers for the national library, however, interjected a complex argument that meshed legal reasoning with a larger, more conceptual self-understanding of the state of israel relative to the jewish diaspora. the national library first contended that brod left kafka’s manuscripts to hoffe as an executor rather than as a beneficiary of the material in her own right. citing brod’s will from 1961, which clearly articulated that his literary estate be placed “with the library of the hebrew university of jerusalem, the municipal library in tel aviv or another public archive in israel or abroad,” israel’s lawyers argued that the kafka papers should revert to the wishes articulated in brod’s will upon hoffe’s death.15 then, in addition to this strictly legal argument, israel’s lawyers articulated a sweeping conceptual claim. kafka’s national and ethnic identity as a jew, they contended, meant that his manuscripts ought to be the legal property of israel, the jewish nation-state. david blumberg, the chairman of the board of directors of the israeli national library, claimed kafka’s literary legacy by explicitly asserting that “the library does not intend to give up on cultural assets belonging to the jewish people.”16 the object of blumberg’s prepositional phrase—“cultural assets belonging to the jewish people”—bears extraordinary legal and cultural weight. it suggests that kafka’s mere identity as a jew is sufficient for israel to legally inherit his manuscripts. the logic is grounded in israel’s belief in its status as the cultural epicenter of international jewry, the rightful legal inheritor of jewish materials produced in the diaspora. 10 batuman, “kafka’s last trial,” the new york times. 11 aderet, “court rules: kafka's papers belong in israel's national library,” haaretz. 12 benjamin balint, kafka’s last trial: the case of a literary legacy (new york: w. w. norton & company, 2018), 94. 13 eisenbud, “franz kafka's manuscripts belong in national library,” jerusalem post. 14 jack buehrer, “battle for kafka legacy drags on,” prague post, march 9, 2011, accessed november 6, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20110615064737/http://www.praguepost.com/news/7768-battle-for-kafkalegacy-drags-on.html. 15 batuman, “kafka’s last trial,” the new york times. 16 judith butler, “who owns kafka?” london review of books 33, no. 5 (march 3, 2011): 2, accessed november 6, 2018, http://www.f.waseda.jp/norm/noconts/judith%20butler%20kafka.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20110615064737/http:/www.praguepost.com/news/7768-battle-for-kafka-legacy-drags-on.html https://web.archive.org/web/20110615064737/http:/www.praguepost.com/news/7768-battle-for-kafka-legacy-drags-on.html http://www.f.waseda.jp/norm/noconts/judith%20butler%20kafka.pdf 107 out from europe: the holocaust and the assertion of israeli cultural ownership debates about the relationship between the state of israel and the jewish populations of the diaspora spring from the same source as israel itself. the claim that the relatively new nation is the rightful home of all jewish culture, no matter when it was created or the country of origin of its creator, is firmly rooted in the way the modern state of israel internalized the historical memory of the holocaust. from the earliest days of the new state, israeli policymakers formulated the “ingathering of the exiles” approach to jewish immigration.17 early zionist leaders understood the function of the new state to be a shelter for persecuted jews throughout the world, a mandate that seemed particularly urgent in the wake of the destruction of europe’s jews. the ingathering framework operated on a cultural level as well, for the young state understood itself as the sole safe haven for jewish art and culture in a world that had so recently sought the annihilation of the jews.18 judah magnes, an early administrator of the hebrew university in jerusalem, emphasized the role that israeli institutions would play in the preservation of jewish material culture, remarking in 1946 that a jewish state must be “the trustee of [the] spiritual goods which destroyed german jewry left behind.”19 under magnes’ leadership, hebrew university formed the committee for the salvaging of diaspora treasures, a body of university faculty and administrators charged with identifying and gathering the property left behind by the jewish communities murdered by the nazis into the british mandate.20 thus, the holocaust has served—and continues to serve—as the conceptual lynchpin for israel’s early desire “to be recognized as the national and spiritual center of the entire jewish collectivity,” its core justification for why it is the lawful inheritor of the cultural record of the diaspora.21 with that said, historians seem to disagree on when in israel’s history the holocaust became a prominent feature within its national consciousness. yehiam weitz and idit zertal, for example, posit that the memory of the holocaust was actually quite marginal to the state’s collective identity during its early years. for one thing, weitz and zertal argue that the destroyed shtetls of central and eastern europe were geographically removed from the new jewish state and felt particularly distant amid israel’s turbulent early years, namely the war of independence.22 most crucially, they argue that the devastating memory of the holocaust was not easily reconciled with the desire of the founding generation to construct a new jewish identity of strength, bravery, and self-reliance. much of the early discourse surrounding the holocaust was wrapped in what weitz and zertal call the “guilt 17 “declaration of israel's independence, 1948,” the avalon project at the yale law school : documents in law, history and diplomacy, 1996, accessed august 5, 2019, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/israel.asp. 18 for a more comprehensive overview of early jewish efforts in israel/palestine to recover european cultural artifacts, and the cultural ideology that centered the jewish state as the sole safe repository for these artifacts in the post-holocaust world, see elisabeth gallas, “building the new state: israel and the european jewish cultural heritage,” in a mortuary of books: the rescue of jewish culture after the holocaust (new york: new york university press, 2019), 163-193. 19 balint, kafka’s last trial, 104. 20 gallas, a mortuary of books, 165. 21 gallas, a mortuary of books, 165. 22 hanna yablonka and moshe tlamim, “the development of holocaust consciousness in israel: the nuremberg, kapos, kastner, and eichmann trials,” israel studies 8, no. 3 (fall 2003): 9. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/israel.asp 108 of the victim”—the deep psychosocial shame associated with the conception that millions of european jews passively walked to the gas chambers without resisting the german soldiers who engineered their murder. for many of israel’s founding leaders, the pervasive “sheep to the slaughter” narrative was a profound humiliation, a desecration of the jewish national honor. thus, the historical narrative of the holocaust itself—what zertal calls “the shame of their mothers and fathers”—was often marginalized within early zionist discourse and israeli collective memory.23 conversely, prominent israeli historian anita shapira disagrees with weitz and zertal, articulating that holocaust memory has been a permeating current throughout the entirety of israel’s conceptual history. for her, the holocaust served as a foundational justification for the very existence of the israeli state since 1948: the memory of the holocaust in israeli socio-political life “emphasized the historical continuity of jewish life in the diaspora, the jewish tragedy, and the mission of israel as a state of refugees and a living monument to the memory of those who perished.”24 when it comes to the material record, shapira’s argument seems vindicated. indeed, the connection between the pre-state jewish tragedy and the post-holocaust jewish state is prominently and concretely reflected in israel’s early laws. two years after establishment, israel’s knesset passed the law of return, which allowed for the unconditional acquisition of israeli citizenship for any jew in the diaspora. certainly, the law of return was not crafted in an ideological vacuum. implemented only five years removed from nazi germany’s surrender in europe, the law of return demonstrated israel’s understanding that the jews could, at any moment, be “exposed to the possibility of another holocaust with no place to flee.”25 the law of return provided the legal framework for the vast influx of central and eastern european jewish refugees to israel during its early years. between establishment and 1960, nearly half a million holocaust survivors emigrated to israel.26 later, in 1953, the knesset passed the yad vashem law, which not only established the yad vashem museum as israel’s official memorial to the holocaust but also formed the holocaust martyrs and heroes remembrance authority, which was tasked with documenting european jewry in the new state.27 in 1960, with those half a million survivors firmly in israel, the knesset passed the nazi and nazi collaborator punishment law; not only did this legislation codify a new a criminal category—crimes against the jews—but it also established the implicit understanding that, even as a young state, israel felt strongly that the prosecution of nazi war criminals was a unique responsibility it had to bear.28 perhaps most critical for the kafka case is the israeli archives law. passed in 1955, the archives law gave vast discretionary oversight to the israeli chief archivist, limited the extent to which historical materials could be removed from israel, and, crucially, affected documents and historical 23 yablonka and tlamim, “the development of holocaust consciousness in israel,” 10. 24 anita shapira, israel: a history (waltham, ma: brandeis university press, 2014), 261. 25 irving greenberg, “cloud of smoke, pillar of fire,” in holocaust: religious & philosophical implications, eds. john k. roth and michael berenbaum (st. paul, mn: paragon house, 1989), 337. 26 yablonka and tlamim, “the development of holocaust consciousness in israel,” 9. 27 shapira, israel: a history, 262. 28 “nazi and nazi collaborators punishment law,” israeli knesset, accessed june 23, 2019, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/nazis%20and%20nazi%20collaborators%20punishment-%20law-%20571.aspx https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/nazis%20and%20nazi%20collaborators%20-punishment-%20law-%20571.aspx https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/nazis%20and%20nazi%20collaborators%20-punishment-%20law-%20571.aspx 109 artifacts that, regardless of where they are found or currently located, “might be an interest to examine [in order] to study the past of the nation, country or society, or [materials] connected to the memory or the deeds of the anshei shem [jewish people].”29 all of these political developments had significant conceptual impacts for israeli society, as the state came to understand itself as the singular jewish safe haven in the post-holocaust world. shapira articulates that the “state of israel [became] the symbol of the jewish people continuing to live despite catastrophe, a concise expression of the lust for life and vitality of a nation that was on the verge of annihilation. the ability to translate the energies born of great despair into acts of creation and rebuilding made israel the jewish people’s postholocaust rehabilitation project.”30 in other words, israel in the 1950s understood its role in the world as the epicenter of post-holocaust jewry and cultural jewishness. as such, several decades later, the kafka lawyers argued that the holocaust illustrated the urgent need to concentrate the diaspora’s material legacies, all surviving cultural artifacts of the jewish people, in the jewish state. but kafka was not killed in the holocaust. in fact, he died in 1924, nine years before hitler came to power in germany, fifteen years before the german invasion of poland, and eighteen years before the infamous wannsee conference and the conceptualization of the “final solution.” if israel’s self-understanding as the cultural inheritor of the diaspora is predicated on the calamity inflicted on european jewry by the nazis, israel’s use of this same argument to claim kafka’s work should have seemed unsubstantiated and relatively unconvincing because kafka’s own death long preceded auschwitz. and yet, despite the temporal gaps between kafka and the holocaust, the destruction of european jews was still used to justify the national library’s legal claim on brod’s estate and the kafka manuscripts. indeed, the memory of the holocaust was manifest both in the formal legal language and in the historiographic literature surrounding the kafka case. in the proceedings, significant attention was paid to the fact that esther hoffe had sold some of kafka’s manuscripts not just to any archive but an archive in germany. this was interpreted by those directly involved in the case and other commentators as a profound insult, citing the fact that several of kafka’s family members died in the camps and ghettos of europe and that brod himself had fled nazi persecution in 1939. aviad stollman, a curator for the national library of israel, wrote during the case that “there is nothing brod would have wanted less than for his writings to go to germany...not only because of his own experience, but kafka had two siblings murdered in auschwitz.”31 while stollman’s assertion is slightly off—kafka had three sisters murdered in auschwitz— the holocaust is still a prominent justification for israel’s acquisition of kafka’s work despite the fact that he himself died beforehand.32 otto dov kulka, an israeli historian at 29 “archives law, 1955,” israeli knesset, accessed november 7, 2018, https://fs.knesset.gov.il//2/plenum/2_ptm_250508.pdf. 30 shapira, israel: a history, 471. 31 buehrer, “battle for kafka legacy drags on,” prague post. 32 phillip roth, “kafka would have savored the irony of being a german treasure,” the new york times, november 27, 1988, accessed november 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/opinion/l-kafkawould-have-savored-the-irony-of-being-a-german-treasure-934088.html. https://fs.knesset.gov.il/2/plenum/2_ptm_250508.pdf https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/opinion/l-kafka-would-have-savored-the-irony-of-being-a-german-treasure-934088.html https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/opinion/l-kafka-would-have-savored-the-irony-of-being-a-german-treasure-934088.html 110 the hebrew university of jerusalem, slyly derided the daughters’ argument that they should be free to sell kafka’s works to the archive: “well, the germans don’t have a very good history of taking care of kafka’s things. they didn’t take good care of his sisters.”33 such arguments have two implications. for one thing, they seek to refute any conceptualization of kafka as an inherently german writer. rather, the israeli lawyers sought to argue that kafka’s jewish identity and the memory of german anti-semitism forbid the possibility that his literary legacy be claimed as an example of german national culture, even while kafka himself spoke fluent german.34 these arguments further assert that the materials should remain in israel as the center of post-holocaust jewry. taken together, the holocaust can be understood as fundamental to the relevant israeli selfconceptualization in the kafka case. the destruction of europe’s jews is deployed to justify israel’s claims to legally inherit the materials of the diaspora, even when the creator him/herself was not a victim of the nazis. vienna: holocaust memory and cultural ownership in central europe interestingly, the role of the holocaust in defining the israeli diaspora archival relationship manifests in scenarios far removed from franz kafka. the fate of the archives of vienna’s jewish community, for example, raises equally compelling questions. the jews of vienna had been collecting archival evidence of their community’s existence since the seventeenth century and had accumulated almost three-hundred years’ worth of material by the outbreak of world war ii.35 in the wake of the destruction of european jewry, community leaders decided in 1952 to send the collection to the central archives for the history of the jewish people in the newly created state of israel for fear its contents would not be treated properly in post-holocaust austria.36 in 2011, the revived and vibrant jewish community of modern vienna filed a lawsuit in a district court in jerusalem against the central archives arguing that the materials should be returned to austria.37 in an unprecedented legal maneuver, the israeli chief archivist issued his own opinion on the matter (a document which will be discussed at further length later on), articulating that the materials ought to remain in israel rather than be returned to their community of origin. crucially, both the jerusalem district court and the israeli supreme court endorsed the chief archivist’s position, keeping the three-hundred-year-old viennese archive in the legal possession of the israeli state.38 as in the kafka decision, it is essential to analyze the legal and conceptual arguments put forward by both the viennese jewish community and the israeli chief archivist. the viennese lawsuit, led by community leader dr. ariel muzicant, articulated that the transfer of historical materials from vienna to jerusalem in the 1950s was only undertaken to protect the integrity of the materials at a challenging historical juncture for central 33 batuman, “kafka’s last trial,” the new york times. 34 balint, kafka’s last trial, 13. 35 aderet, “battle over viennese jewish archive,” haaretz. 36 aderet, “battle over viennese jewish archive,” haaretz. 37 benjamin weinthal, “vienna's jewish archives to remain in israel's hands,” jerusalem post, october 16, 2012, accessed november 9, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/jewish-world/jewish-news/viennas-jewisharchives-to-remain-in-israels-hands. 38 aderet, “battle over viennese jewish archive,” haaretz. https://www.jpost.com/jewish-world/jewish-news/viennas-jewish-archives-to-remain-in-israels-hands https://www.jpost.com/jewish-world/jewish-news/viennas-jewish-archives-to-remain-in-israels-hands 111 european jews: “they [the archival materials] belong to us, and when times were difficult, we sent them to israel as a loan… now we are trying to retrieve documents… and build a jewish archive for them in austria, and the archive in jerusalem is ignoring us.”39 the argument put forward by israel’s central archives is considerably more complex. first, from a strictly legal standpoint, the israelis contended that the transfer was permanent. before the jerusalem district court deferred to the decision of yaacov lozowick, the israeli chief archivist at the time, lozowick wrote publicly that the transfer from vienna was intended to be permanent because the community was unable to properly preserve jewish documents in the late 1940s and early 1950s: “in the years following world war ii, the community was left with no assets and no ability to guarantee the preservation of the documents in a protected and proper mode. for these reasons, the community chose to deposit the collection for safekeeping in the central archives.”40 however, it is clear from reading lozowick’s writing that the primary argument for retaining the viennese materials in israel rather than returning them to central europe is a conceptual one. like the national library lawyers argued over kafka, lozowick contended that the archives of jewish vienna belong in israel because they are historical materials of the jewish people and are therefore able to be claimed as the legal property of the jewish state. israel, according to lozowick’s conceptual framework, is the cultural axis around which the entirety of the jewish world rotates: “the transfer of the collection [from vienna] to israel was an ideological expression of the viennese jewish community accepting the centrality of the new jewish state—otherwise it could have been transferred to london or new york...the founders of the archival world in israel in the middle of the twentieth century regarded the state as the center of world documentation of the jewish people.”41 within this framework, lozowick understands israel to be the essential jewish cultural hub, and as such, he is able to assert a legally viable claim of ownership over the historical materials produced elsewhere in the jewish world. such a sweeping argument has incalculable consequences for the status of property ownership and cultural production in the jewish diaspora, and lozowick’s claim would be almost indefensible if he had not grounded it in the unique calamity of the holocaust. in his decision, lozowick asserts the following: “when [the viennese archive] is in jerusalem, it is part of jewish heritage. its expulsion from jerusalem would send it to the periphery of the jewish world. the leaders of the community after the holocaust understood this well, so they sent their archives to the center so that their community would be remembered forever in the center.”42 as in the kafka case, the historical memory of the holocaust serves to justify israel’s selfconceptualization as the center of the jewish world. as lozowick states, the role of israel, particularly in an archival sense, is to keep the memory of the murdered jews of central and eastern europe alive in the modern jewish state. this implicitly asserts that adequate holocaust memorialization can only be achieved in the state of israel, for the memory of the 39 weinthal, “vienna’s jewish archive,” jerusalem post. 40 yaacov lozowick, “the decision of the state archives on the collections of the archives of the jewish community in vienna,” israel state archives, october 15, 2012, 4, accessed november 9, 2018, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0b45gjhlddcqqdnjpm05taxbrrxc/view. 41 lozowick, “the decision of the state archives,” 13. 42 lozowick, “the decision of the state archives,” 13. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0b45gjhlddcqqdnjpm05taxbrrxc/view 112 murdered jews of vienna would be memorialized far from the epicenter of jewish cultural life if the archive were returned to austria. vilnius: a hebrew claim on a decidedly yiddish writer still, the examples of the viennese archive and the kafka manuscripts each have two significant complications. for one thing, both cases concern claims made by israel over materials that were already physically located in israel: the viennese archive had been in israel since the 1950s and the kafka manuscripts had arrived in 1939 in the suitcase of max brod and were sitting in a tel aviv apartment at the time of the lawsuit. the fact that the materials were already in israel, or the territory that would later become the modern state, strengthened israel’s claim considerably since any other nation would need to convincingly demonstrate, to an israeli judge, that the artifacts could be better preserved outside the country for any such move to be justified. what’s more, both examples cited thus far have had significant legal factors at play relative to their sweeping cultural implications. in the case of the viennese archives, the legal question was whether or not the transfer to jerusalem was permanent; for kafka, it was whether or not brod named hoffe as a beneficiary or simply an executor of his estate. these legal factors could obscure the extent to which israel’s post-holocaust understanding of itself was at play when asserting its claim over these historical artifacts. one final example solidifies that israel’s logic when claiming ownership over the cultural artifacts of the jewish diaspora is inherently linked with the memorialization of the holocaust. that example is the fate of the literary estate of chaim grade. grade was a writer and poet born in an orthodox family in vilnius in 1910.43 during the war, grade fled eastward and sought refuge in the soviet union. when he returned to lithuania after the war, he discovered that the nazis had killed both his wife and his mother; in 1948, the same year israel was established, grade emigrated to the united states and settled in the bronx.44 grade’s literary career dealt exclusively with ashkenazi themes and philosophy. his most highly acclaimed novels, the agunah (1961) and the yeshiva (1967), are both set in prewar lithuania and the majority of his poetry dealt with the immense trauma of the holocaust.45 after his death, grade’s second wife, who died in 2010, failed to legally file her will. as a result, his entire estate fell into the hands of the public administrator for bronx county.46 detached from any legal provenance, where, then, should grade’s orphaned legacy—“40 boxes of [his] letters, manuscripts and photographs, and 20,000 books from [his] personal library”—be housed?47 in 2013, the bronx public administrator awarded 43 richard f. shepard, “chaim grade, yiddish novelist and poet on the holocaust, dies,” the new york times, july 1, 1982, accessed november 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/01/obituaries/chaim-gradeyiddish-novelist-and-poet-on-the-holocaust-dies.html. 44 shepard, “chaim grade, yiddish novelist and poet on the holocaust, dies,” the new york times. 45 shepard, “chaim grade, yiddish novelist and poet on the holocaust, dies,” the new york times. 46 adam soclof, “yivo, national library of israel team to acquire chaim grade collection,” jewish telegraph agency, february 13, 2013, accessed november 7, 2018, https://www.jta.org/2013/02/13/artsentertainment/yivo-national-library-of-israel-team-to-acquire-chaim-grade-collection. 47 soclof, “yivo, national library of israel team to acquire chaim grade collection,” jewish telegraph agency. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/01/obituaries/chaim-grade-yiddish-novelist-and-poet-on-the-holocaust-dies.html https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/01/obituaries/chaim-grade-yiddish-novelist-and-poet-on-the-holocaust-dies.html https://www.jta.org/2013/02/13/arts-entertainment/yivo-national-library-of-israel-team-to-acquire-chaim-grade-collection https://www.jta.org/2013/02/13/arts-entertainment/yivo-national-library-of-israel-team-to-acquire-chaim-grade-collection 113 joint ownership of grade’s literary estate to the yivo institute of jewish research in new york and the national library of israel.48 at least half of this decision is bewildering. grade, after all, was a yiddish writer, not a hebrew one. in fact, he was quite resistant to his works being translated from yiddish to any other language during his early career.49 furthermore, he was decidedly not an israeli, as he left europe in the wake of the holocaust and settled in new york, the quintessential metropole of the jewish diaspora. grade neither traveled to israel during his lifetime nor chose to write about “israeli” themes typical of modern hebrew literature, such as the kibbutz movement, the ethos of the new, muscular, and self-sufficient jew, or the cultivation of the land in israel. instead, his work depicted a distinctly ashkenazi, yiddish-speaking, old-world jewish experience. given these factors alone, it is rather remarkable that yivo’s claim to the entirety of grade’s work was deemed insufficient. but what is more, yivo was established in grade’s own hometown, vilnius, in 1925 to serve as a cultural archive for jewish life in eastern europe. with the outbreak of world war ii, yivo recognized the need to move jewish historical materials out of europe and felt that the united states represented the essence of the jewish diaspora.50 once relocated to new york, yivo’s collections sought to be “the primary source of the documentary history of east european jewry and the surviving record of millions of lives of jewish victims of the holocaust.”51 yivo’s historical trajectory is almost identical to grade’s: both were born in vilnius but established themselves in new york with an exclusive focus on documenting jewish life in eastern europe, particularly relative to the nazi horror from which they both survived. yet even though yivo appeared able to put forward the stronger claim, the national library of israel was successful in securing shared successor rights.52 importantly, the grade decision does not possess any of the legal quagmires seen in the kafka or vienna cases, nor were grade’s manuscripts physically located in israel at the time of the decision. rather, israel was able to successfully claim grade’s literary legacy as its own simply by virtue of grade being a jew and by his proximity to the holocaust. in the national library’s statement after the decision, grade is described as having “lost his family in the 48 soclof, “yivo, national library of israel team to acquire chaim grade collection,” jewish telegraph agency. 49 curt leviant, “translating and remembering chaim grade,” jewish review of books, winter 2011, accessed november 7, 2018, https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/272/translating-and-remembering-chaimgrade/. 50 silvia schenkolewski-kroll, “jewish archives and archival documents: israel and the diaspora,” archival science 16 (2016): 309-326, accessed november 7, 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282545878_jewish_archives_and_archival_documents_israel_and _the_diaspora. 51 cecile esther kuznitz, yivo and the making of modern jewish culture: scholarship for the yiddish nation (new york, ny: cambridge university press, 2014), 12. 52 for a discussion of the competing cultural ideologies that drive the “latent rivalry” between yivo and israeli cultural institutions, such as the national library of israel, see bilha shilo, “when yivo was defined by territory: two perspectives on the restitution of yivo’s collections,” in contested heritage: jewish cultural property after 1945, eds. elisabeth gallas, anna holzer-kawalko, caroline jessen, and yfaat weiss (göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht gmbh & co., 2019), 79-90. https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/272/translating-and-remembering-chaim-grade/ https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/272/translating-and-remembering-chaim-grade/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282545878_jewish_archives_and_archival_documents_israel_and_the_diaspora https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282545878_jewish_archives_and_archival_documents_israel_and_the_diaspora 114 holocaust.”53 although a brief biographical detail, this inclusion seems to suggest that the holocaust was an important explanation for israel’s pursuit of grade’s work in the first place, and a crucial justification for awarding shared ownership to israel. thus, the grade decision, perhaps even more clearly than the kafka and vienna cases, underscores israel’s deep—and very effective—assertion that the memory of the holocaust centers israel as the cultural locus of all jewish materials and artistic contributions, even those produced by jews in the diaspora who neither traveled nor expressed any connection to israel. caught between continents: sovereignty, identity, and the claim to inherit jewish history from these three cases, it is clear that the holocaust plays as decisive a role in the creation and implementation of israeli policy and jurisprudential practice as it has in its national identity more broadly. as israeli institutions have launched legal cases to inherit the works of jewish artists, even those who may have died before the wholesale destruction of european jewry, they have used the memory and trauma of the holocaust to legitimize and empower their claims. at first, the close association between the holocaust and the israeli state may not seem so contentious, considering the state was founded three years removed from germany’s surrender with the explicit intention of ingathering jewish refugees. however, such articulations posit several sweeping implications that could potentially redefine the form of holocaust commemoration and assert israeli primacy over all other jewish communities across the globe. to begin with, these articulations imply that israel alone bears the trauma of the holocaust. while it should be noted that israel has the highest population of holocaust survivors in the world today (189,500), israel is not the only country to which survivors of the death camps fled following liberation.54 the united states, for example, is home to roughly 100,000 survivors, half of whom live in the metropolitan area surrounding new york city.55 australia has the largest per-capita holocaust survivor population outside israel with particularly high concentrations in sydney and melbourne.56 as such, it seems rather odd that israel has been successful in using the holocaust—a european tragedy occurring in the years preceding the establishment of the jewish state—as a justification in court. even more important, these articulations, while specifically related to holocaust memory and commemoration, posit dangers to the israeli-diaspora relationship. indeed, the ability of israel to legally inherit the art and historical materials of jews born abroad poses an 53 “beshutafus: forming partnerships to preserve yiddish literature,” national library of israel, accessed november 7, 2018, http://web.nli.org.il/sites/nli/english/collections/jewishcollection/pages/beshutafus.aspx. 54 marcy oster, “worldwide population of 14.7 million jews falls short of pre-war numbers,” jerusalem post, april 21, 2020, accessed july 25, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/worldwide-population-of-147million-jews-falls-short-of-pre-war-numbers-625299. 55 shachar peled, “on holocaust remembrance day: a third of survivors in the us are poor,” cnn, january 27, 2017, accessed november 26, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/us/holocaust-survivorpoverty/index.html. 56 charmaine joffe, henry brodaty, georgina luscombe, and frederick ehrlich, “the sydney holocaust study: posttraumatic stress disorder and other psychosocial morbidity in an aged community sample,” journal of traumatic stress 16, no. 1 (february 2003): 39-47. http://web.nli.org.il/sites/nli/english/collections/jewish-collection/pages/beshutafus.aspx http://web.nli.org.il/sites/nli/english/collections/jewish-collection/pages/beshutafus.aspx https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/worldwide-population-of-147-million-jews-falls-short-of-pre-war-numbers-625299 https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/worldwide-population-of-147-million-jews-falls-short-of-pre-war-numbers-625299 https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/us/holocaust-survivor-poverty/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/us/holocaust-survivor-poverty/index.html 115 existential threat to the very vitality of jewish identity in the diaspora. if the holocaust can be employed as an argumentative trump card to claim the cultural legacy of the diaspora— even when the artist was only tangentially or posthumously impacted—then israel has secured the right to hold and possess anything jewish. as such, israel’s broad claim to own the diaspora essentially destroys the diaspora, for it rejects the idea that jewish materials can retain their essential jewishness outside of the state of israel. in the largest sense, these decisions threaten to shift the most basic foundations not only of cultural ownership but of jewish identity altogether. with a few favorable decisions, israel has effectively obtained a monopoly on the material and historical legacy of the entire jewish people and has asserted itself as the central gatekeeper for what it means to be a jew in the world. and with the holocaust holding almost invincible argumentative sway, it remains to be seen how far israel’s self-proclaimed cultural powers will extend. 222 the 1958 us trade mission to yugoslavia and the united states' “wedge” policy a technocratic connection jacob smiley university of minnesota abstract this article examines the 1958 us trade mission to yugoslavia through the lens of technocratic internationalism, which is—borrowing gabrielle hetch's definition of the term—a “less visible, but sometimes more powerful means of shaping and reshaping” international relations during the cold war. this article examines how trade fairs, personal relationships, and international business networks functioned as sites of technocratic internationalism and considers mid-level bureaucrats from the united states and yugoslavia who believed that expertise and technical advice in areas such as transportation, industrial management, travel, and marketing could bridge political differences between cold war actors. the article focuses in particular on fred wittner, an important figure in american advertising who was part of the trade mission. utilizing wittner’s personal papers, housed at the wisconsin historical society, this article explores how technical expertise served as a conduit through which the united states attempted to strengthen ties with yugoslavia and reveals the political importance of personal relationships and networks, even within a framework that encouraged seemingly “apolitical” information exchange and expertise. article the cold war is often imagined as a period of political rigidity and isolation, mediated through terse diplomatic initiatives, armaments escalation, and explosive international crises. hungary 1956, the space race, and the prague spring dominate conversations about europe and the cold war, buttressed by traditional political and diplomatic histories of the period. in recent years, this top-down narrative has been challenged by historians who study the cold war from the perspective of cultural exchange and transnational connection. as historian vladislav zubok writes, a new wave of scholars has “begun to link traditional political questions about the cold war with transnational experiences,” creating cultural analyses that have a “renewed focus on individuals, as opposed to the emphasis on 223 the state and state structures.”1 in the same vein, historian patryk babiracki highlights the importance of transnational analysis, writing that it has become “increasingly difficult to understand” the cold war “without thinking about networks of people, flows, circulations, and exchanges.”2 influenced by new trends and innovations in the field of transnational history, this article analyzes the 1958 us trade mission to yugoslavia and its outcomes. a transnational analysis of the 1958 trade mission, with a specific eye towards us foreign policy, sheds valuable light on technocratic information exchange and the mid-level bureaucrats who participated in cultural and economic diplomacy during the cold war, forming a clearer picture of both the cold war and the us-yugoslav diplomatic relationship. to begin, it is important to briefly sketch the early history of socialist yugoslavia and its unique relationship with the united states. historian elidor mëhilli once wrote that the cold war “created unexpected possibilities for small states to make big claims.”3 this was especially true of yugoslavia, a country which, according to historian john b. allcock, existed in a “constant dialectical movement between internal events and their international environment.”4 while this could be said of nearly every country in an increasingly globalized world, yugoslavia’s unique and important place in the cold war makes this claim especially meaningful. following the country’s acrimonious break with the soviet union in 1948, yugoslavia began to pursue a policy that the us state department described as “seeking to avoid alignment with either the soviet bloc or the western alliance,” taking independent positions on foreign policy, trade, and domestic reform.5 this policy would eventually culminate in yugoslavia’s prominent role in the non-aligned movement, founded in 1961.6 while yugoslavia pursued this policy of informal non-alignment, the united states sought to strengthen ties with the country, hoping that it could “serve as a beacon to the satellite states” in east-central europe and provide the “wedge it needed to dislodge the soviets’ control there.”7 the diplomatic relationship between the united states and yugoslavia in the early years of the cold war is complicated and of exceptional importance to the history of the cold war, the united states, and yugoslavia. scholars such as ivo tasovac, lorraine lees, and john r. lampe, among others, have thoroughly investigated us foreign policy towards yugoslavia during the second world war and in the subsequent decades. lees, in particular, has investigated the united states’ “wedge policy,” first articulated and studied by john lewis gaddis in his 1988 book the long peace: inquiries into the history of the cold war. this 1 patryk babiracki and kenyon zimmer, eds., cold war crossings: international travel and exchange across the soviet bloc, 1940s-1960s (college station: texas a&m university press, 2014), 1. 2 patryk babiracki, “interfacing the soviet bloc: recent literature and new paradigms,” ab imperio 4 (2011): 380. 3 elidor mëhilli. from stalin to mao: albania and the socialist world (ithaca: cornell university press, 2017), 9. 4 john b. allcock, explaining yugoslavia (new york: columbia university press, 2000), 240. 5 foreign relations of the united states (frus) 1958-1960, eastern europe; finland; greece; turkey, vol. x part 2 (washington, d.c.: u.s. government printing office, 1958-1960), 474. 6 for an analysis of the history of the non-aligned movement, see jürgen dinkel, the non-aligned movement: genesis, organization and politics (1927-1992) (boston: brill, 2018). 7 l. m. lees, keeping tito afloat: the united states, yugoslavia, and the cold war (university park: pennsylvania state university press, 1997), 235. 224 wedge policy, as lees writes, “was the focal point of an attempt by the united states to promote fissures within the communist world,” receiving “its most sustained application in u.s. policy towards yugoslavia.”8 at face value, the policy seems contradictory at best and self-defeating at worst. following the 1948 tito-stalin split, both the truman and eisenhower administrations, buttressed by the likes of george f. kennan and john foster dulles, sought to encourage the independent-minded tito in an attempt to “sustain the damage” that the 1948 split left in its wake.9 in a case of sublime cold war irony, the united states sought to contain the spread of soviet communism by encouraging the growth and development of another communist state. this policy, as lees writes, “raised questions about the ties that could exist between communist, noncommunist, and neutral states,” a fact that finds evidence in the complicated outcomes of the 1958 trade mission.10 as a fundamental component of the wedge policy, economic relations between yugoslavia and the united states “broadened significantly” in the early 1950s, as yugoslavia became a major recipient of monetary aid, foodstuffs, and loans from the united states.11 total trade between the two nations saw consistent growth throughout the decade, though it fell as a percentage of total yugoslav imports and exports.12 as a part of the united states’ wide ranging efforts to improve economic and diplomatic relations with yugoslavia, trade missions were sent in the years 1956, 1957, and 1958 to provide technical expertise to the country’s burgeoning heavy and light industries. these trade missions, though ultimately serving the united states’ interests, operated under the mystique of technocratic internationalism, something that historian gabrielle hecht describes as a “gesture toward transcending cold war politics.”13 in other words, advocates of technocratic internationalism believed that cooperation in issues such as transportation, industrial management, and marketing could bridge political differences between cold war actors. the case of american trade missions and the expertise they provided are examples of—to build on hecht’s observations—“less visible, but sometimes more powerful means of shaping and reshaping” international relations during the cold war.14 though archival information on the 1956 and 1957 missions has proven to be elusive, the two missions’ main objective was to provide technical expertise regarding the development of yugoslavia’s heavy industry.15 this article focuses on the 1958 trade mission, which took 8 lees, keeping tito afloat, xiii. 9 lees, keeping tito afloat, xiii. 10 lees, keeping tito afloat, xv. 11 john r. lampe, russell o. prickett, and ljubiša s. adamović, yugoslav-american economic relations since world war ii (durham: duke university press, 1990), 73-75. 12 the period following the tito-stalin split saw an entrenchment of central planning and a turn towards a policy of “extreme self-reliance” as yugoslav economists sought to bolster domestic industry in the face of political and economic isolation (see lampe, prickett, and adamović, yugoslav-american economic relations). workers’ self-management, which can be seen as a reaction to the failure of these semi-autarkic policies, helped open the yugoslav economy to international competition. thus, from the mid-1950s onwards, there was a fairly large expansion of foreign investment and trade with both europe and the united states. 13 gabrielle hecht, “introduction,” in entangled geographies: empire and technopolitics in the global cold war, ed. gabrielle hecht (cambridge: mit press, 2011), 9. 14 hecht, “introduction,” 3. 15 “report of the 1958 u.s. trade mission to yugoslavia,” fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 225 place from august 18 to september 26 and was composed of experts in the fields of advertising and marketing. of these experts, the primary focus will be on fred wittner, an important figure in american advertising who ran a successful firm in new york city. before founding the fred wittner company in 1939, he was the publicity manager for aviator amelia earhart and a sports journalist, contributing to such magazines as the new yorker, sports illustrated, and the american golfer.16 wittner carried his lifelong passion for magazines and writing into the advertising industry, molding the fred wittner company into something of a pioneer in industrial advertising by focusing on international business publications and technical literature, something wittner called the “backbone of overseas trade missions.”17 utilizing wittner’s personal papers, archived at the wisconsin historical society in madison, wisconsin, it is possible to analyze the functions of trade missions, technical expertise, and information exchange in the united states’ foreign policy towards yugoslavia during the cold war. this technical expertise served as a conduit through which the united states attempted to strengthen ties with yugoslavia, amid the broader context of competition with the soviet union. this type of analysis also sheds light on the political importance of personal relationships and networks, even within a framework that encouraged seemingly “apolitical” information exchange and expertise. “what happens at a us trade mission” the year 1958 was a pivotal moment for the united states’ relationship with yugoslavia. in that year, international developments threatened to derail the united states’ wedge policy as yugoslavia and the ussr seemed to be moving towards something of a political rapprochement. domestically, criticism of the us relationship with yugoslavia mounted, as some members of congress went as far as to threaten resignation over a proposed yugoslav diplomatic visit to the united states.18 it was within this context that the department of commerce sent a trade mission to yugoslavia, tasked with the ultimate objective of improving economic and political relations between the two countries. for six weeks in the late summer of 1958, fred wittner, accompanied by robert c. gordon of time magazine and several other american diplomats and businessmen, completed a trade mission tour of yugoslavia. the mission visited over twenty-five cities in the six republics of yugoslavia, meeting with a variety of local industrialists, government agents, and tourism officials. the trip followed on the heels of two previous trade missions to yugoslavia, hoping to expand on the work of the preceding missions and venture beyond advice for heavy industry. the mission’s express purpose was to provide technical expertise to yugoslavia’s growing industrial economy and tourism industry, with the hope of ultimately “encouraging two-way trade” between yugoslavia and the united states.19 it is important to understand that the us government, and non-state actors operating within it, crafted a very specific image of the work done by trade missions. a 1958 department of commerce pamphlet described the work of these missions as a “patriotic 16 “fred wittner of ad agency dies expert on industrial accounts.” the new york times, july 7, 1972, 35. 17 “american business publications serve as prime support for overseas trade missions program,” press release, august 12, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 2, wisconsin historical society, madison. 18 lees, keeping tito afloat, 214-215. 19 “united states trade missions overseas” pamphlet, u. s. department of commerce, 1959, 1, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 226 duty” wherein businessmen “promote world friendship and expand two-way trade.”20 fred wittner echoed these sentiments in a 1959 industrial marketing article entitled “what should trade missions do?” for wittner, trade missions spread “goodwill of inestimable value,” so much so that he could “conceive of no more valuable contribution by private enterprise to better long-term international relations.”21 in his article, wittner utilizes several foils against which he defines the value of trade missions. the first of these foils is ironically americans themselves. for wittner, american tourists often act as “illwill ambassadors” who are welcomed for their hard currency but end up contributing “hostility instead of understanding.”22 trade missions, with their focus on sharing “knowledge and self-sufficiency,” correct the bad impressions that american tourists had left in yugoslavia.23 additionally, wittner defines us trade missions as a fundamentally different enterprise than the missions of countries with “state-controlled industries.”24 for wittner, countries with non-capitalist modes of production, acting in their own self-interest, emphasize import/export negotiations in their trade missions. this contrasts with us missions, which, as wittner said in a 1959 speech to the fourth annual circulation seminar for business publications, “bring only information.”25 wittner’s consistent focus on the spread of knowledge and information as a “patriotic duty” highlights the importance of technical expertise and technocratic information exchange for the united states’ policy towards yugoslavia. in this regard, the focus on bringing “only information” functions as a way of transferring agency from united states’ diplomats onto the information and expertise itself. in doing so, trade missions are able to transcend the usual confines of cold war politics and discourse. for the united states department of commerce, trade fairs played a similarly crucial role in the creation of international business relationships and the establishment of new trade networks. us trade missions utilized these fairs to “tour the principal commercial centers of a country” and “confer with businessmen, public officials, and organizations.”26 these trade fairs could also be sites of intense cold war competition and spectacles of consumption, as was the case in 1957, when the american pavilion displayed a true-to-life model of an american way grocery store at the zagreb fair.27 as for the 1958 trade mission to yugoslavia, the belgrade and zagreb international trade fairs provided the mission with an avenue to disseminate information, give “group and individual consultations,” and answer “several hundred questions” from yugoslav businessmen.28 at the zagreb international trade fair, exhibitions were centered around various themes, ranging from 20 “united states trade missions overseas,” 1. 21 “what should trade missions do?,” reprinted industrial advertising article, 1959, 2, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 1, wisconsin historical society, madison. 22 “what should trade missions do?,” 2-3. 23 “what should trade missions do?,” 3. 24 “what should trade missions do?,” 4. 25 fred wittner, “u.s. trade missions and expanding world-wide circulations of american business magazines,” circulation seminar for business publications, pick-congress hotel, chicago, august 12, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 1, wisconsin historical society, madison. 26 “united states trade missions overseas,” 1. 27 tracey deutsch, building a housewife’s paradise: gender, politics, and american grocery stores in the twentieth century (chapel hill: university of north carolina press, 2010), 192. 28 “united states trade missions overseas,” 1. 227 contemporary yugoslav architecture to international literature and the family. over twenty-five countries participated in the zagreb international trade fair, several of which established pavilions to showcase exhibitions that were based on these themes. most notably, the soviet union, czechoslovakia, poland, the united kingdom, and the united states were all present, representing several sides of the cold war.29 the us exhibitions were exceptionally popular, attracting some 70,000 visitors on one single day. these exhibitions were praised by president tito for their show of “technical developments'' and specific “interest [in] yugoslavia.”30 the us exhibitions at the zagreb fair featured displays on the manufacturing of cellophane bags, blue jeans, and ice cream. the travel and recreation exhibit featured a model motel, which, according to local reports, greatly impressed president tito. the belgrade fair, taking place from august 23 to september 2, featured exhibits on various new technologies, including radio, television, and telephones. the belgrade fair saw an overall attendance of over 600,000 and was praised by local press and news. the 1958 trade mission built upon the previous involvement of the united states in yugoslav trade fairs, choosing to emphasize “how we produce rather than what we produce” and prioritizing the fields of manufacturing and tourism in their exhibits.31 a yugoslav magazine, privedni pregled, emphasized the importance of the 1958 trade fairs in an article entitled “les foires internationales yougoslaves,” written by olga divac. tellingly, divac writes that yugoslavia was in a moment of “economic and geographic bifurcation” and that international trade fairs served as a meeting place where new economic and ideological paths could be forged.32 a similar opinion prevailed in the united states, as investment in international trade fairs was solidified with the 1958 construction of a permanent american pavilion in belgrade, encompassing some 45,000 square feet of indoor space and 20,000 square feet of outdoor space. personal and professional relationships upon his return from yugoslavia, fred wittner maintained a personal correspondence with several professional and private individuals that he met during the course of the 1958 trade mission. these contacts were, as historian igor tchoukarine writes, part of “growing professional and transnational networks of tourist and advertising experts” between the united states and yugoslavia.33 among wittner’s professional contacts were businesses such as yugoslav export, interpublic, and dalmacija cement. yugoslav export was an english-language trade and business publication, headquartered in zagreb. wittner became acquainted with the commercial manager of yugoslav export, gosporden d. liebhardt, at the 1958 zagreb fair. through the next decade, wittner maintained a correspondence with liebhardt and several other staff members involved with yugoslav export. in these letters 29 olga divac, “les foires internationales yougoslaves,” privredni pregled (belgrade: privredni pregled, 1958), 2. 30 sinclair weeks, “u.s. production highlights fall international trade fairs,” u.s. department of commerce, 1958, 1, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 1, wisconsin historical society, madison. 31 weeks, “u.s. production highlights fall international trade fairs,” 2. 32 divac, “les foires internationales yougoslaves,” 2. 33 igor tchoukarine, “playing the tourism card: yugoslavia, advertising, and the euro-atlantic tourism network in the early cold war,” in tourism and travel during the cold war: negotiating tourist experiences across the iron curtain, eds. sune bechmann pedersen and christian noack, routledge studies in the history of russia and eastern europe, (london: routledge, 2019), 159. 228 wittner provides american industrial contacts to yugoslav export and networks with advertising and tourism agents in yugoslavia. wittner sent american trade publications to yugoslav export, commenting that he “read[s] each issue” of their publication.34 this relationship, according to yugoslav export editor-in-chief b. bucalo, provided yugoslav businessmen with “invaluable assistance.”35 the tone of these correspondence reveals the personal quality of the acquaintance, as both fred wittner and his yugoslav counterparts habitually invited one another to visit and stay in their respective countries. wittner maintained similar contact with interpublic, another yugoslav advertising publication. wittner took personal interest in establishing a relationship between interpublic and the new york-based advertising agency gotham. wittner, in correspondence with editor-inchief stipe vojnovic, established a “gentlemen’s agreement” with interpublic, in which both american and yugoslav agencies would mail one another their “most serious” information and advice on prospective partners, future advertising plans, and industry data.36 wittner’s relationship with dalmacija cement followed a similar trajectory. wittner served as an intermediary for dalmacija cement and several american and international businesses. in this role, wittner introduced slavko zvezdic, a head manager at dalmacija cement, to representatives of cement companies in locations ranging from new york to belgium.37 wittner’s relationship to these three companies hints at a larger network and nexus of exchange between american and yugoslav businesses. wittner’s contacts emphasized the importance of knowledge around advertising and tourism in these exchanges. these relationships and the transnational exchange of information that they fostered were an integral part of a growing nexus of trade and exchange between the united states and yugoslavia, which was a key component of the us wedge policy. alongside these professional contacts, wittner maintained a personal correspondence with private yugoslav citizens that he met during his time in yugoslavia for several years. of these correspondences, two stand out as particularly important, one for its demonstration of the sometimes politically fraught nature of trade missions and another for its deeply personal quality. the first case is wittner’s correspondence with nenad. d. popovic, a yugoslav economist and statesman turned dissident and defector. popovic was instrumental in several successful loan and credit negotiations with the united states and, in the early 1950s, represented yugoslavia at both the international monetary fund and the world bank.38 in 1961, he came to the united states as a visiting professor in international finance at syracuse university, choosing to defect to the united states in that same year. wittner had met popovic in the course of his trade mission tour of yugoslavia, visiting with popovic in his capacity as undersecretary of state in yugoslavia. popovic corresponded with wittner in the days following his defection, writing that he fondly 34 b. bucalo, letter to fred wittner, may 14, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 2, wisconsin historical society, madison. 35 stipe vojnovic, letter to fred wittner, april 6, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 2, wisconsin historical society, madison. 36 vojnovic, letter to fred wittner, april 6, 1959. 37 slavko zvezdic, letter to fred wittner, may 27, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 2, wisconsin historical society, madison. 38 associated press, “ex-belgrade aide tells of defection: difficult decision,” the christian science monitor, december 29, 1962, 11. 229 remembered meeting wittner in yugoslavia, and inviting him to syracuse for a visit.39 popovic’s rationale for defecting from yugoslavia was complicated and mainly based on an ideological opposition to communism, reflecting that “in a communist country, one feels that he should not be allowed to have personal integrity,” as “the only rule of behavior is to always conform.”40 in 1968, popovic published a scathing critique of yugoslav politics in a monograph entitled the new class in crisis, taking much inspiration from milovan djilas’s 1957 work, the new class: an analysis of the communist system. in his critique, popovic writes that tito’s government had “produced a mutilated, servile, and pliable pseudodemocracy in its politics” and had “formed a moral vacuum everywhere.”41 though popovic never explicitly connected his defection and critique of yugoslavia with his contacts in the united states and western europe, his relationship and later correspondence with wittner reveal that, for as much as the wedge policy sought to avoid explicitly political diplomacy, contacts between the united states and yugoslavia nevertheless came with political risks. high-profile defection, followed by ruthless and public critique, posed a risk to the united states’ attempt to strengthen ties with yugoslavia. additionally, wittner and popovic’s friendship is especially interesting, as their written correspondence occurred some three years after the trade mission, providing insight into the length and substance of the relationships and networks that the trade mission helped create. the second important case is wittner’s correspondence with aleksander “sasha” ozerovic, a yugoslav citizen working for the united states information service (usis) in belgrade. throughout their correspondence, ozerovic and wittner discuss the quality and performance of yugoslav tourism and business publications. what is remarkable about this correspondence is its personal and candid nature. in his correspondence, ozerovic writes about the kind and “gentle” nature of his relationship with wittner.42 additionally, ozerovic frequently confides in wittner as a friend, often writing about his grief. in several letters ozerovic describes his attempts to receive compensation from the west german government and his “tragic memories” of the holocaust, in which his father and ten others in his family were murdered.43 these relationships speak to the type of personal connections that were forged between americans and yugoslavs during the 1958 trade mission. some of these contacts were friendly and genial, falling under the “apolitical” category of technocratic internationalism. others, such as wittner’s friendship with popovic, reveal that for as much as us policy attempted to avoid it, complicated and public political negotiations were also taking place. within the cold war framework 39 nenad popovic, letter to fred wittner, october 24, 1961, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 40 “ex-belgrade aide tells of defection,” 11. 41 d. j. r. scott, “reviewed work: yugoslavia. the new class in crisis by nenad d. popovic,” soviet studies 21, no. 1 (july 1969): 121-122. 42 aleksander ozerovic, letter to fred wittner, december 14, 1959, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 43 aleksander ozerovic, letter to fred wittner, june 29, 1961, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 230 despite a professed interest in “information alone,” the us relationship with yugoslavia and the 1958 trade mission were inextricably tied to the broader conditions of the cold war. in an article published in the american business magazine industrial marketing, fred wittner asked a question that he thought may be on the minds of many americans: “why should the united states send a trade mission, at taxpayers’ expense, to a communist-controlled country such as yugoslavia?”44 wittner’s answer to this question was complex, portraying yugoslavia as a country that occupied a unique position within the framework of the ever heightening cold war. for wittner, yugoslavia was “not behind the iron curtain” but was a country in which communism could be molded and adapted, unlike the “monolithic structure” of other eastern european countries.45 yugoslavia was of tremendous strategic importance to the united states, offering an “important window” from which the west could “watch the satellite bloc.”46 in this regard, wittner’s statements mirror almost the exact same language as the us state department. as historian lorraine lees writes, “the united states had a large investment in tito,” and senior members of the state department, such as secretary of state john dulles, believed that yugoslavia could “lead the satellite states to a greater degree of independence.”47 wittner’s statements shed valuable light on his perspective towards the 1958 trade mission and more broadly on his perspective towards yugoslavia itself. in addition to the country’s strategic importance, wittner writes that yugoslavia’s people were, among other things, “markedly brave” and “tenacious,” always responding to westerners with “surprise and pleasure.”48 for wittner, the specter of the cold war weighed heavily upon his understanding of the trade mission to yugoslavia and of yugoslavia itself. in an unpublished article entitled “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” written shortly after his return from yugoslavia, wittner expounded upon his view of the atypical socialist country. the title of the article itself is revealing in its language of the cold war, and in it, wittner and robert c. gordon, a sales manager at time magazine who would later become director of corporate relations for the council on foreign relations, analyze both the advertising industry in yugoslavia and their own personal experiences on the trade mission. throughout the article, wittner and gordon associate “salesmanship” with american values and capitalism. the authors were pleasantly surprised to find evidence of these “american” values throughout yugoslavia. with the exception of portraits of marx, lenin, and tito, wittner and gordon compliment the lack of “communist propaganda” in yugoslavia.49 here, wittner and gordon echoed a rising sentiment within the popular press in the united states. just one day prior to the trade mission’s arrival in yugoslavia, the new york times published an article that seemed to challenge traditional cold war narratives about the country. in an article entitled “yugoslav laxity surprises visitor,” paul underwood wrote that, to his surprise, yugoslavia exhibited no “evidence of a police 44 “what should trade missions do?,” 2. 45 “what should trade missions do?,” 4. 46 “what should trade missions do?,” 4. 47 lees, keeping tito afloat, 223. 48 “what should trade missions do?,” 4-5. 49 robert c. gordon and fred wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” unpublished manuscript, 1958, 1-2, fred wittner papers, box 3, folder 11, wisconsin historical society, madison. 231 state.”50 despite the fact that the communist party “dominates every aspect of yugoslav life,” the average citizen attended “western plays, operas, and movies” and bought “western books, newspapers, and magazines… freely.”51 this article is of interest for multiple reasons, not the least because it highlights a change in american cultural representation of yugoslavia. the article also represents an understanding of freedom based on consumption, especially of “western goods”—something that wittner and gordon consider a highlight of yugoslavia. wittner and gordon continue along similar lines in their assessment of yugoslavia’s tourism industry. the industry was ripe for development as the “average tourist from the west must constantly remind himself … that he is not in a western democratic country.”52 in fact, in the eyes of wittner and gordon, yugoslavia had spent the last decade trying to “emulate and identify” with the west.53 a robust advertising industry was already in existence. posters were found throughout the six republics advertising soft drinks, soap, and electronic devices. state-controlled radio and news media were laden with commercials for consumer products and some 10,000 television sets were found throughout the country. cooperation with private companies in the united states, like rca, promised to greatly expand this growing industry.54 there was even evidence of market competition in the advertising industry, with window dressings being adapted to public interest and demand in sarajevo and belgrade.55 hotels, “built to western tastes,” were being constructed in belgrade, macedonia, and croatia.56 these hotels featured airconditioning, night clubs, and fine architecture, “comparing favorably to the most luxurious new miami beach hotels.”57 mirroring the “westernization” that was occurring in the economic sphere, the average yugoslav citizen found themselves identifying more and more with the west: listening to rock music, learning “american-style dancing,” and mingling with us marines.58 for wittner and gordon, yugoslavia’s tourism and advertising industries were making impressive developments and strides in the right direction. advertising agents in yugoslavia were moving in the direction of “salesmanship and competition,” basing their product design on popular demand and quality.59 this behavior was in sharp contrast to the previous method of “simply having labels with general instructions concerning use, content, and quality.”60 wittner and gordon trace these changes back to the early 1950s economic reforms in yugoslavia towards the establishment of workers’ councils and 50 paul underwood, “yugoslav laxity surprises visitor,” the new york times, august 17, 1958, 29. 51 underwood, “yugoslav laxity surprises visitor,” 30. 52 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 3 53 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 3. 54 “yugoslavia finds ads are a capitalistic ‘must’ even in a communist nation,” printer’s ink, october 31, 1959, 2, fred wittner papers, box 2, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 55 for more on this issue, see patrick patterson, bought and sold: living and losing the good life in socialist yugoslavia (ithaca: cornell university press, 2011). 56 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 5. 57 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 5. 58 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 3. 59 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 9. 60 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 7. 232 workers’ self-management. for wittner and gordon, this “complete break from the soviet version of communism” allowed for the creation of markets and competition in yugoslavia.61 velimir kovacic, manager of the advertising agency, ozeha, agreed with wittner and gordon, writing that though “living with workers’ councils … hasn’t always been easy,” it has increased the “interest in the processes of advertising, publicity, and sales promotion.”62 conclusion ultimately, in their final report, representatives from the trade mission presented yugoslavia’s tourism industry as suffering mainly from an image problem. the largest obstacle that this “western-facing” country came up against was the popular image they possessed in the united states and in the west at large. despite yugoslavia’s developing consumer culture and growing advertisement industry, americans, by and large, saw yugoslavia as “behind the iron curtain.”63 members of the department of commerce sought to solve this problem by creating “a greater understanding” between citizens of the united states and of yugoslavia.64 the answer to these problems lied in the creation of a new “mind picture of today’s yugoslavia,” a country that, “although communist in ideology, has dedicated itself to sharing the american traditions of independence and friendliness with other peoples.”65 to achieve this goal, the trade mission laid out a series of steps for yugoslavia to take, from the rehabilitation of existing hotels to the establishment of a ground floor tourist office in new york city.66 these recommendations were not unexpected or out of the ordinary. as historian igor tchoukarine writes, “the increasingly interconnected world of tourism favoured the creation of networks and spaces,” which is reflected in the emphasis on solidifying ties between american and yugoslav business ventures.67 these networks and spaces were important to the members of the 1958 u. s. trade mission and were an integral part of technocratic internationalism. professional contacts between publishers in the united states and yugoslavia, such as those between interpublic and gotham, serve as just one example of a broader trend. personal contacts, such as the relationship between wittner and popovic, highlight the sometimes politically fraught nature of international development and trade projects between socialist and nonsocialist nations during the cold war. furthermore, the 1958 us trade mission to yugoslavia enriches understandings about the role of technical expertise and information exchange in the united states’ policy towards yugoslavia. the trade mission accomplished several of its goals through the establishment of professional ties between advertising agents and industrialists in yugoslavia and the united states and personal connections between local yugoslavs and private american 61 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 9-10. 62 gordon and wittner, “two americans look at economic propaganda in a communist country,” 10. 63 “report: the 1958 united states trade mission to yugoslavia, august 18-september 26, 1958,” united states department of commerce, 1958, 9, fred wittner papers, box 3, folder 4, wisconsin historical society, madison. 64 “report: the 1958 united states trade mission to yugoslavia,” 1. 65 “report: the 1958 united states trade mission to yugoslavia,” 2. 66 “report: the 1958 united states trade mission to yugoslavia,” 9. 67 tchoukarine, “playing the tourism card,” 166. 233 citizens. trade fairs, as well as exhibitions and production displays, were also reaffirmed as an important vehicle for the transnational circulation of expertise and information. as explored in this article, the trade mission, and especially the experience of fred wittner, provides insights into the changing nature of us-yugoslav relationship and showcases the oftentimes personal and political nature of international trade and information exchange during the cold war. 73 an inconceivable odyssey the czechoslovak legion in russia, 1914-1920 nicholas william fixler university of minnesota abstract a great deal of the material produced regarding the czechoslovak legion that fought in russia focuses on its story rather than the reasons for its remarkable successes. this article begins by briefly summarizing the legion’s activities in russia, then outlines the various military and geopolitical challenges that beset this army, and finally explores why the legion was able to overcome these difficulties, which, i argue, was due to the legion’s unorthodox structure, its adaptable diplomatic policy, and its ability to supply itself. along with secondary sources, newspaper articles, and contemporary accounts of both the legion’s campaigns and the allied intervention in siberia, this article primarily uses the memoirs of gustav bećvář, a former legionnaire who published the lost legion, an account of his time in the legion, in london in 1939. article introduction the czechoslovak legion’s achievements on various russian fronts between 1914 and 1920 cannot be understated. a small force of men, initially fighting under the banner of the russian empire, was forced, during the russian civil war, to transform itself into an army and to make its way across thousands of miles of desolate and potentially hostile territory, going all the way from the ukraine to vladivostok in the russian far east. for much of its existence, this detachment operated as an army without a country. it was an army whose aim was to aid in the creation of a country through military service with the entente against the central powers. even after that aim had been fulfilled with the creation of czechoslovakia on october 28, 1918, the situation on the ground remained unchanged, and the czechoslovak legion stayed in russia until its final evacuation was complete in 1920.1 the legion was obliged to conduct its campaign on unfamiliar terrain, surrounded by foreign forces, and without the prospect of steady supply and reinforcement from the czech lands, as czechoslovakia did not achieve independence until october 28, 1918 and was unable to support an expeditionary force in the middle of russia even after it had achieved self-rule, and the legion itself was blocked from overland supply routes by the red army. 1 john f. n. bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 1914-1920 (new york: columbia university press, 1991), 148-156. 74 with hindsight, the odds stacked against the soldiers of the czechoslovak legion seem nearly insurmountable to any modern army. they belie the question of how was the legion able to successfully fight across and extricate itself from russia? however, the legion was not an ordinary army. predating the creation of czechoslovakia, in the eyes of the entente the legion was one of the greatest legitimating forces for the nascent czechoslovak liberation movement. it behaved akin to a state unto itself, as, for all intents and purposes, it was one. it was viewed as a co-belligerent with the entente, though the volga-ural campaign would show this to be a double-edged sword. it had its own command hierarchy, independent from a central government prior to czechoslovak independence, and far too removed for effective governmental control afterwards. though it did receive some blanket directives from czechoslovak political leadership, the legion by and large pursued its own foreign policy. it also maintained its own independent economy as it traveled through russia from 1918 onward. in this regard, it can be viewed as a czechoslovakia in absentia. despite the difficulty of its journey through russia, the various military forces and political entities it had to contend with, and the lack of a supply and reinforcement base, the czechoslovak legion was mostly able to maintain its cohesion as a unit and successfully extricate itself from russia to an independent czechoslovakia in 1920. it did so through an organized yet unorthodox structure that allowed flexibility when dealing with the warring soviet and white russian governments as well as with british, french, american, and japanese interests, and successfully creating and maintaining its own supply base. this article focuses solely on the czechoslovak legion that fought in russia. through four sections, this article first examines the origin of the legion in imperial russia. it then briefly traces the legion’s various campaigns across russia. the final two sections are devoted to analyzing the various obstacles the legion faced during its time in russia and the solutions it undertook in response to these challenges. this article shows that, thanks to its unusual structure and state-like attributes, including an independent foreign policy through an independent command and its own mobile economic infrastructure, the czechoslovak legion had the wherewithal to fight in and withdraw from russia successfully. the legion’s creation world war one provided the impetus for the creation of the czechoslovak legion. there was a large expatriate population of around 120,000 czechs and slovaks living in the russian empire by 1914.2 this fact did not go unnoticed by the tsarist government, which had issued a proclamation at the outset of hostilities declaring the first world war to be a conflict between germanic and slavic cultures, regardless of the government’s actual interest in independence movements.3 thus, saint petersburg was extremely receptive to—or at least eager to pay lip service to—the idea of pan-slavism, wherein russia would lead and protect a united slavic world, and to a military force that embodied this vision. in this context, the czechoslovak unit was made all the more attractive as it could provide valuable service against the central powers. sensing russian interest, the czechoslovak 2 ibid., 14. 3 henry baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand (new york: arno press, 1971), 20. this is a reprint of an account of the legion first published in 1926. 75 nationalist committees, which had been formed in russia, were only too happy to assist in this endeavor.4 despite dissension both within the various czechoslovak political organizations in russia and between those organizations and the russian government, the formation of the česká družina, or czech brigade, was approved by the russian army council on august 20, 1914.56 this was the initial unit of what became the czechoslovak legion. despite the enthusiasm surrounding its formation, the brigade had a relatively muted beginning. the first volunteer drive within the czechoslovak expatriate community was only able to produce 777 men willing to serve in the brigade’s ranks. this inability to recruit would continue to challenge the družina as well as the later legion.7 furthermore, many of the brigade’s higher-ranking officers were russian rather than czech or slovak.8 despite this, several talented czech and slovak soldiers went on to have distinguished careers in postwar czechoslovakia. for example, stanislav čeček, zdeněk fierlinger, and vojtěch klecanda joined the družina at its inception and helped provide the backbone for its later success.9 the legion’s activities following some further expansion to reach a strength of around 1,000 men, the družina was assigned to the southwest front to fight against austro-hungarian forces.10 it soon distinguished itself in combat and in intelligence gathering.11 until 1917 the družina was engaged primarily in intelligence rather than combat, as the ability to glean information from the czech and slovak troops fighting for the central powers was deemed to be more important than fighting on the front lines.12 then, in the late spring and summer of 1917, the družina saw real action as an entire unit for the first time and distinguished itself in galicia at the battle of zborov.13 this was a critical juncture in the history of the legion. it was at this point that the legion evolved from an intelligence unit into a fully fledged fighting force. at the close of the 1917 offensive, the former družina, now part of the 1st czech division, was sent behind the lines in ukraine for rest, replenishment, and reorganization.14 by the end of 1917, the czechoslovak legion had become a reality, consisting of two divisions and at least 28,000 soldiers.15 during the interim, another 4 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 16. 5 ibid., 18-21. 6 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 22. 7 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 17. 8 george kennan, “the czechoslovak legion,” the russian review 16, no. 4 (october 1957): 4. 9 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 26. 10 ibid., 27. 11 ibid., 29. for example, seven men under then-lieutenant čeček captured 127 prisoners on december 2425, 1914. 12 ibid., 42. 13 ibid., 54-55; edwin p. hoyt, the army without a country (new york: macmillan, 1967), 48. at zborov, the družina captured over 4,000 enemy troops while suffering less than 1,000 casualties of its own. 14 vladimir nosek et al., “the odyssey of the czecho-slovaks,” in source records of the great war, vol. 6, eds. charles f. horne et al. ([new york]: national alumni, 1923), 148. 15 ibid.; bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 57; hoyt, the army without a country, 56. there are numerous estimates of force size within the sources i have used for this article. bradley gives the most 76 revolution had convulsed russia in november 1917, this time advancing the cause of vladimir lenin and the bolsheviks.16 czechoslovak leadership, worried that the legion might find itself entangled in the russian civil war, counseled a policy of nonintervention, and, outside of some early november engagements in kiev, this was adhered to.17 the legion spent the remainder of 1917 actively abstaining from the conflict.18 at the beginning of 1918, it was clear that the situation in ukraine was becoming untenable. the country had declared independence in january 1918, but was heavily dependent on germany, and, in any event, it was roundly defeated by the red army at the end of the month.19 the czechoslovak legion, though ostensibly neutral in “russian” internal affairs, was still an army of a belligerent power fighting on the side of the entente, and it became increasingly threatened by german and austro-hungarian forces throughout the late winter of 1918, being compelled to make a fighting retreat out of kiev at the beginning of march.20 on march 15, 1918, czechoslovak representatives concluded an agreement with the soviet government for the legion’s free and unmolested passage across russia to vladivostok, and units immediately began to embark on trains.21 however, this agreement broke down by mid-may 1918 due to an incident between the legion, repatriated prisoners of war, and bolshevik officials in chelyabinsk.22 as a result, the legion had to engage in open conflict with red forces in order to withdraw from russia, and, by september, it had fought its way into control of a contiguous portion of almost the entire trans-siberian railway, the sole transportation artery in 1918 that crossed the whole of russia and upon which the czechoslovak forces were moving.23 it seemed that a rapid redeployment to the western front was in the offing. however, this was not to be. tomáš masaryk, who would later become the first president of czechoslovakia, was instrumental in the czech legion and had by this point engaged in talks with the americans, british, and french, and, despite his “tokyo memorandum” urging recognition of the new soviet government, anti-bolshevik elements prevailed upon him.24 at the urging of the entente powers, it was decided that the legion would, in conjunction with an allied expeditionary force and white counterrevolutionary troops, open up an anti-bolshevik front.25 conservative estimate, at 28,000 troops, which is the one listed. hoyt gives a figure of 40,000 men, and nosek claims that there were between 60,000 and 80,000 effectives within the legion at this time. 16 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 54-55. 17 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 61. 18 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 92. 19 ibid., 94. 20 ibid., 98-99. 21 ibid., 80. 22 gustav bečvář, the lost legion: a czechoslovakian epic (london: s. paul & co., 1939). 88. this was the only full original account from a legionnaire’s perspective that i was able to find in english. bečvář began the first world war serving in the austro-hungarian army, was taken prisoner by the russians, and later joined the legion in 1917. he served though the final evacuation in 1920. 23 ibid., 151. 24 josef kalvoda, “masaryk in america in 1918,” jahrbücher für geschichte osteuropas 27, no. 1 (1979): 86-90. 25 r. ernest dupuy, perish by the sword: the czechoslovakian anabasis and our supporting campaigns in north russia and siberia 1918-1920 (harrisburg: the military service publishing co., 1939), 78. 77 the front took shape along the volga river in the late summer and fall of 1918 and despite early victories, the legion soon found itself engaged in a fight it could not hope to win.26 it was outnumbered by four red armies in the volga area and was stretched out with other military formations in a 150,000 man army across an 800-mile front.27 the hold on the front grew steadily more tenuous while morale began to drop precipitously, and several regiments mutinied.28 this demoralization had become so pervasive that the legion was ordered off the line for good in january 1919 and was instead assigned to guard the length of the trans-siberian railway.29 from then on, the legion was not involved in any frontline combat. at this point, it seemed nigh-on-impossible that the legion would be able to successfully remove itself from russia, and if not for its innovation in the face of such adversity, this would have almost certainly been the case. figure 1: a patrol of czechoslovak legionnaires in russia., c.1918.30 throughout 1919, the czechoslovak legion stood guard along the railroad, while the white government in siberia lurched from crisis to crisis.31 it became increasingly clear that the legion would need to be evacuated from siberia for good or face its own destruction, as the white armies had collapsed and internal dissension became more pronounced by the day.32 finally, on september 28, 1919, the official order for a final retreat to vladivostok and subsequent departure from the port was given.33 the evacuation—a chaotic and grim affair 26 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 186; dupuy, perish by the sword, 194. the important town of kazan, along with the state bank of russia’s gold reserves, fell in early august, but was evacuated in september. 27 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 187. 28 ibid. 29 hoyt, the army without a country, 186. 30 a czechoslovak legion patrol in russia. 1918, wikimedia commons, accessed april 22, 2019, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:czech_legion_in_forest.jpg. 31 ibid., 187-189. 32 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 137-139. 33 ibid., 141. 78 that witnessed the final breakdown between the legion and the white siberian government and subsequent handover by the legion of the head of that government, admiral kolchak, to leftist elements—finally ended on november 30, 1920, well over a year since it had begun.34 czechoslovak military involvement in russia was over, more than six years after the družina was formed. though it had been a bloody, complicated, and drawnout journey, the czechoslovak legion was eventually able to make its way across russia to be sent home at long last. the legion’s obstacles in order to appreciate the how the legion was able to succeed, it is first necessary to examine how it could have failed. the three greatest issues that dogged the legion were bolstering morale, the geopolitical circumstances in which the legion found itself entrapped, and the lack of a supply base. the maintenance of morale and unit cohesion in an entirely foreign setting was of great importance to the czechoslovak legion. this is an issue that plagues any army, especially those that are isolated without the recourse of calling up fresh troops, but, due to various events that transpired in europe from late 1917 onward, was made doubly important for the legion. the russian revolutions brought with them a breakdown in the social hierarchy, as illustrated by this episode witnessed by gustav bečvář, a former prisoner of war who joined the legion prior to the retreat from ukraine: just then a policeman rode up and shouted at the carter to stop torturing his beasts. long custom had taught the officer to expect almost abject servility in response to the smallest complaints, and it was clear that he was astonished at the immediate effect produced by his words. instead of obeying the order, the carter shook his whip furiously and swore aloud. “you—, you have nothing to say any more. your time has gone for good. clear out of my way, or i’ll smash you as you deserve.” in the old days such a reply would have been utterly inconceivable. now the constable looked round awkwardly to see if anyone had witnessed the incident, and, turning his horse, rode away without a word in reply to the insult that had been offered to his authority and to the uniform he wore. we watched this scene with amazement. “that,” said fiala solemnly as we passed on our way, “means that the tsarist regime is finished.”35 this phenomenon was, of course, not solely limited to the home front in russia. in fact, the russian army and navy experienced even more extreme versions of it, with unpopular officers being removed from their units and occasionally lynched.36 such attitudes were extremely common in russia during the civil war, and so this kind of revolutionary fervor was always going to be a threat to unit cohesion in the legion, given its regular interactions with russian soldiers, officials, and civilians who espoused these views, as well as its extended and steadily more unpopular stay in russia. 34 ibid., 148-156. 35 bečvář, the lost legion, 50. 36 s.a. smith, russia in revolution: an empire in crisis 1890-1928 (oxford: oxford university press, 2017), 115. 79 morale was also negatively impacted by events happening outside of russia. the declaration of czechoslovak independence and the armistice on the western front both occurred at roughly the same time and were twin blows to legion morale when word arrived of their occurrence in late fall 1918.37 as czechoslovakia now existed and the german empire was no longer fighting on the western front, the legion now had no reason to continue to fight, and many legionaries began to question why they were still in combat in russia.38 mutinies and more mundane acts of insubordination happened with greater and greater consistency throughout the last quarter of 1918, to the point that the czechoslovak legion was no longer viable as an offensive fighting force, and it was ordered off the line in late january 1919.39 the hungarian invasion of czechoslovakia was a further blow to morale, though this occurred after the legion had been pulled off the line.40 another challenge that the legion faced was that it was isolated on foreign soil and caught between competing interests at almost all times. these interests were not necessarily welldisposed towards the legion, especially since the legion’s nominal allies could prove troublesome. the družina did not engage in much front-line combat while the tsar was in power, and even after the february revolution the družina’s status was very much murky, as kerensky, the defense minister in the provisional government, did not trust czechoslovak soldiers and considered them to be “reactionary.”41 as a result, the challenging task of negotiating with kerensky and the provisional government had to be undertaken, and it would require an exceptional individual to do so. the october revolution was a further complication. when the legion was withdrawn from the front following the 1917 kerensky offensive, it was stationed in ukraine, and there it found itself in an unenviable position following the bolshevik takeover in petrograd.42 at the beginning of 1918, it was clear that the situation in ukraine was becoming untenable. the country had declared independence in january 1918 but was heavily dependent on germany, and, in any event, was roundly defeated by the red army at the end of the month.43 however, german forces began to pour into ukraine at the ukrainian rada’s request, and thus the legion was caught between german forces and, because it had fought under the provisional government the year before, unfriendly red ones.44 eventually, the legion chose what it perceived to be the lesser of two evils and negotiated with the bolsheviks rather than fighting them along with the germans. on march 15, 1918, czechoslovak representatives concluded an agreement with the soviet government for the legion’s free and unmolested passage across russia to vladivostok, and units immediately began to embark on trains.45 unfortunately for the legion, this agreement was only honored in the breach throughout its journey to the russian far east, and subsequent 37 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 104 38 bečvář, the lost legion, 198-200. 39 hoyt, the army without a country, 186. 40 bečvář, the lost legion, 207. 41 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 51. 42 nosek et al., “the odyssey of the czecho-slovaks,” 148. 43 ibid., 94. 44 bečvář, the lost legion, 63. 45 ibid., 76-78. 80 confrontations with the bolsheviks were commonplace.46 some units found themselves almost completely disarmed, as the bolsheviks sometimes demanded the surrender of most weapons and left only the bare minimum for self-defense.47 furthermore, the legion also encountered many german and austrian former prisoners of war in the process of repatriation, and, as bečvář illustrates, violence could break out: the train was actually beginning to move slowly out of the station when suddenly a piece of iron was hurled from one of the prisoners’ coaches. the missile struck a czech named duchacek in the head. duchacek collapsed, badly wounded. furious anger seized the friends of the victim of this malicious and entirely unprovoked attack. leaping on the running-boards of the coaches, they succeeded in stopping the still slow-moving train. other czech troops came running, and when they heard what had happened they assisted in dragging the prisoners from their coaches, and only the strenuous efforts of officers saved the austrians from being lynched on the spot. the legionaries had had previous experience of the lenience often extended by the bolshevik authorities towards the austrian and german prisoners, and so they now insisted that the matter should be investigated on the spot, and the identity of the aggressor established before the train was allowed to proceed on its way. the prisoners were, therefore, interrogated at once, and, frightened by the threatening attitude of the czechs, they indicated the man who had thrown the piece of iron. fierce shouts broke out in the crowd, and a moment later the legionaries had thrown themselves upon the culprit. it was useless for the officers to intervene. when, after a few minutes calm was restored, the austrian’s limp body lay still upon the ground.48 this incident, which occurred on may 14, 1918 in the town of chelyabinsk, resulted in a complete breakdown in relations between the legion and the bolsheviks, and open hostilities had commenced by the end of may.49 this interrupted the already disorderly evacuation, and czechoslovak forces were once again obliged to fight in order to leave russia. diplomacy with its allies was also problematic for the legion. the entente powers wished to keep the legion in russia to fight the soviets alongside white forces, even after the legion’s purpose for fighting in russia in the first place had been fulfilled with czechoslovak independence and the end of the first world war.50 the entente powers pinned their hopes in a counterrevolution against the bolsheviks on admiral kolchak, the white dictator of siberia after november 18, 1918 who was manifestly unsuited to the task set before him and greatly ill-disposed toward the legion, both of which made him 46 kevin j. mcnamara, dreams of a great small nation: the mutinous army that threatened a revolution, destroyed an empire, founded a republic, and remade the map of europe (new york: publicaffairs, 2016), 178. 47 bečvář, the lost legion, 80-81. 48 ibid., 88. 49 nosek et al., “the odyssey of the czecho-slovaks,” 149-150. 50 bečvář, the lost legion, 199. 81 extremely difficult to deal with.51 however, the entente’s support for an independent czechoslovakia was of the utmost importance, even after official czechoslovak independence, and so the legion had to find some sort of accommodation with them, in spite of the frustrations such a course engendered. finally, the legion was also faced with the task of staying supplied. it had to deal with either mistrustful or outright hostile russian governments, who were loath to grant it assistance and sometimes even demanded the legion’s own supplies in exchange for safe passage.52 the legion did not have a home country for much of its existence, and even after czechoslovakia had declared independence, it had to organize its own internal affairs and deal with a hungarian invasion, so there would no help coming from that quarter.53 the legion’s allies in the entente were attempting to supply white forces in russia and encountering enormous amounts of corruption and apathy, so any help from them would be limited as well.54 therefore, the legion had to assume the lion’s share of responsibility for supplying itself. the legion’s solutions the reasons for the legion’s success can be distilled into three distinct factors. it was well organized, and yet it had an unorthodox structure. given that the legion acted akin to a state unto itself and adopted its own diplomatic stance in lieu of direction from prague or the rest of the entente, it was able to deal with various political and military bodies flexibly, no matter the alignment of those bodies, while, for the most part, keeping in mind its goal of eventually reaching the western front to fight the german army and then going on to an independent czechoslovakia post-victory. finally, the legion was obliged to make its own supply base and did so with great success. the czechoslovak legion’s structure and organization stood it in good stead throughout its sojourn in russia, especially given the social upheaval that unfolded around it. some of the russian officers in the družina feared revolutionary fervor in their men like that which had gripped the russian armed forces, but in 1917, these fears were not realized.55 the družina’s structure, as stated by bečvář, helped to prevent this: in certain respects our organization was curious, for we were certainly not a military group in the ordinary sense of the term. discipline was strict, but the relationship between officer and private was brotherly. that is to say, we called each other “brother,” and when speaking to an officer the correct form of address was “brother captain,” “brother lieutenant,” as the case might be. and under all circumstances the second person singular, the intimate “thou,” was used.56 51 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 222-226. 52 bečvář, the lost legion, 76-81. 53 ibid., 207. 54 phelps hodges, britmis: a great adventure of the war (london: jonathan cape, 1931), 74-76. 55 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 53. 56 bečvář, the lost legion, 53. john reed mentions a similar relationship existing between the officers and men of the serbian army in his the war in eastern europe (new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1916). given that comparatively small force’s surprising successes against the austro-hungarian forces in the early days of 82 the importance of the relationship between officers and enlisted men cannot be overstated, particularly in the extremely demoralizing context of revolutionary russia. the closeness of the enlisted legionaries and their officers played a large part in insulating the czechoslovak legion from the instability and upheaval that characterized russian formations during this period. it provided for the retention of pre-revolution organization and discipline. furthermore, the legion had its own “parliament,” giving the soldiers a sense of representation in government, though it was dissolved by milan štefánik in late 1918 after czechoslovak independence had been declared and the legion was no longer obliged to act as a nation unto itself in that regard, as it now had a central government to direct it from prague, though this did not change the situation on the ground.57 this stability enabled the legion to embark on its campaign to vladivostok and maintain the campaign for an extremely long period of time. the fact that discipline in the legion only broke down well after the way to vladivostok had been cleared is due in large part to the fact that the enlisted men trusted and obeyed their officers, at least in some measure due to their “brotherly” bond and to the feeling that even an enlisted man’s opinion counted for something in the legion, despite the horrendous circumstances in which they found themselves. furthermore, this meant that officers were able to retain their positions and gain valuable experience without having to worry about their men deciding to remove them from their positions or worse. this produced an experienced officer cadre, which was a great asset to the legion when it was facing the less experienced, less organized, but numerically superior red forces in 1918. though the legion did foster an extremely unorthodox officer-enlisted man dynamic and was far more democratized than armies generally are, this proved greatly beneficial in the long run, notwithstanding its “unmilitary” aesthetic. the legion was also caught between powers which were at best unreliable allies and at worst bitter enemies, most of which could destroy the legion if pushed hard enough. therefore, the second factor contributing to the legion’s success in the face of challenges was its flexibility. the czechoslovak legion had to deal with most of the players in prerevolutionary and revolutionary russia in one form or another, outside of the central powers, and its pliability in handling various agendas was a major factor in its successful movement across russia. tomáš masaryk was supremely important in this regard. he had contacts within the russian provisional government, such as paul miliukov, and he not only utilized those contacts but also personally intervened with kerensky in order to ensure that the družina was properly looked after.58 after the october revolution, the legion was faced with the reality that it could no longer count on russia as a patron and that it would have to find a way to leave the country. meanwhile, german troops were closing in on the legion’s positions in ukraine.59 rather than retreat pell-mell or engage the germans alone, the legion fought alongside bolshevik troops.60 following that, in march 1918, after the first world war, as well as the aforementioned feats of the czechoslovak legion, there is some merit to the idea that a degree of familiarity between officers and men can be highly beneficial to an army. 57 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 198. 58 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 52-55. 59 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 98-99. 60 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 79. 83 protracted negotiations, the legion was granted permission to cross russia by the sovnarkom.61 unfortunately, the price of this freedom was the loss of a good deal of the legion’s equipment to rapacious commissars who either modified or ignored moscow’s instructions.62 this willingness to work with the bolsheviks was not a mistake, however. as the volga-ural campaign of the summer and fall of 1918 illustrated in stark detail, the legion was simply not capable of fighting a protracted land war on a wide front with the bolsheviks. by negotiating with them, the legion was able to buy itself valuable time to continue sending contingents down the trans-siberian railway, as a break with the bolsheviks was most likely inevitable in any case. along with the bolsheviks, the czechoslovaks had to handle white russian entities and their erstwhile allies in the entente. although it was not in outright conflict with the entente or the whites, the legion still encountered difficulties with both of these groups, yet it was necessary to work with them. though there was no real reason to stay in siberia and fight the red armies, the legion acquiesced to an entente-white request to remain on the volga-ural front, and then continue to guard the trans-siberian railway once it had been withdrawn from the front lines.63 this was necessary for several reasons. thanks to a 1917 agreement, the legion was technically considered to be part of the french army.64 allied ships and money would have to be used in the final evacuation from vladivostok, and the french, british, and americans had to be kept mollified in order to ensure that, when the time came, the resources necessary to depart from russia for good would be forthcoming.65 further complicating matters in this regard, there was a great deal of dissension among the entente powers concerning the degrees of responsibility britain, france, and the united states would take when the legion was evacuated, adding a greater sense of urgency to the legion leadership’s efforts to forestall tensions with the entente.66 additionally, there were some allied troops fighting in russia alongside the legion, and, as such, the legion had to accede to at least some entente requests or risk abandonment and the destruction of the entire czechoslovak army corps.67 to boot, admiral kolchak, the dictator of white siberia after november 18, 1918, virulently disliked the legion and could have easily worsened its situation had they not nominally been on the same side.68 thus, the legion had to work with the allies and the whites to leave russia, though it paradoxically meant delaying its departure from vladivostok. this flexible foreign policy would not have been possible if the legion was not empowered to act with a remarkable degree of independence. had it been more constrained by higher political authorities, there is a chance that the legion would have either acted too slowly or simply would have made incorrect decisions due to directives that were not issued with an 61 ibid. 62 bečvář, the lost legion, 80. 63 dupuy, perish by the sword, 78; hoyt, the army without a country, 186. 64 karel herman, “the czechoslovak national liberation movement in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries,” east european quarterly 24, no. 2 (june 1990): 222. 65 rowan a. williams, “the odyssey of the czechs,” east european quarterly 9, no. 1 (spring 1975): 25. 66 ibid. 67 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 278. 68 ibid., 212, 223-224. 84 understanding of the situation in russia. although there was some direction from higher authorities that could prove costly, most notably when the legion was ordered to stay in siberia to fight the bolsheviks, the legion exhibited a remarkable state-like autonomy, and this independence proved to be supremely valuable asset. creating and maintaining a supply base was another large part of the czechoslovak legion’s success in russia. czechoslovakia had not declared its independence in 1917, and, even after it had in 1918, there was simply no feasible way for the legion to be supplied from czechoslovakia. it was alone in a foreign country, without its own stocks of weapons, ammunition, and other necessities of war, let alone food and clothing for the cold climate. in this regard, the february revolution and the failure of the 1917 kerensky offensive were of great help. these two factors combined to form a heavily demoralized and almost entirely impotent imperial russian army, which was apt to leave the field in a hurry, minus its weapons. for example, “at tarnopol … they [czechoslovak soldiers] came upon the very heart of the russian retreat, and found field guns, rifles, ammunition, stores, and every military item lying on the roadside. but … the men managed to salvage only two rifles apiece, ammunition, and some machine guns.”69 furthermore, the provisional government continued to supply the legion before the october revolution.70 the ukrainian collapse of early 1918 also afforded the legion similar opportunities to those found in galicia.71 additionally, the legion was able to avail itself of captured stocks on several different occasions.72 the legion also had an independent financial infrastructure that helped to spur economic development in its environs and helped ensure a steady supply of purchased supplies. this was the legionaries’ bank. founded in 1918, the bank was funded by czechs and slovaks both in russia (as part of the legion or otherwise) and abroad.73 it was used (in russia) to revive the war-torn economy of siberia and restart production at munitions factories, as well as to make purchases of foreign weaponry, munitions, and parts.74 this was a truly unique entity, and further evidence of the legion’s state-like qualities. conventional armies generally do not operate their own banking systems, nor do those banking systems purchase munitions, provender, and other martial supplies, or help sustain regional economies. however, the legion did just that and, in doing so, helped to secure its supply base. thanks to the capture of foreign supplies as well as the purchase and production of the same financed by the legionaries’ bank, the czechoslovak legion was able to sustain its operations in a foreign country without a country of its own upon which it could depend for supplies. the creation of its own supply base and network was one of the greatest coups accomplished by the czechoslovak legion in russia, and without it, the legion would almost certainly have been destroyed or severely diminished. 69 hoyt, the army without a country, 52. 70 bradley, the czechoslovak legion in russia, 56. 71 ibid., 74. 72 hoyt, the army without a country, 141; nosek et al., “the odyssey of the czecho-slovaks,” 150. 73 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 200-201. this entity has alternately been referred to as a “financial office.” however, “legionaries’ bank” is the term baerlein gives. 74 baerlein, the march of the seventy thousand, 202. 85 conclusion the legion did not fade into irrelevance after it returned home. the legion bank in particular assumed great importance during the postwar years. the bank followed the legion home in 1920 and immediately became a crucial part of the czechoslovak central banking system.75 though the bank would eventually decline before its nationalization after the second world war, the legion bank building in prague remains as both a memorial to the legion and a testament to its lasting legacy in postwar czechoslovakia. figure 2: the façade of the bank of the czechoslovak legions in prague. 76 the czechoslovak legion faced overwhelming odds during its service in russia and still managed to accomplish its primary objective. this success would not have been possible without the legion’s exceptional qualities. a conventional army with a conventional hierarchy that did not have the wherewithal to act as a sovereign power unto itself would most likely have met its doom on the steppes. however, the legion was not a conventional army, and it acted with a state-like autonomy, and thus, it triumphed. though the czechoslovak state was not forged during the legion’s trek, it is not at all a stretch to state that the czechoslovak state’s shield was. marching and fighting across the vast russian wastes nearly broke the legion, but it soldiered on and helped foster the hopes of an unborn country until it triumphantly returned after that country had been made a reality. 75 jakub šiška, “bank der tschechoslowakischen legion-sonderbare kreditanstalt der zwischenkriegsära,” radio praha auf deutsh, march 3, 2015, https://www.radio.cz/de/rubrik/geschichte/bank-dertschechoslowakischen-legion-eine-sonderbare-geldanstalt-der-zwischenkriegsaera. 76 photo by nicholas fixler. “the façade of the bank of the czechoslovak legions in prague,” april 15, 2019. 25 a mercurial monarch and his magical metropolis rudolf ii’s prague and its alchemical association charlie smith university of cambridge abstract in 1583 the habsburg emperor rudolf ii established prague as his residenzstadt and thus shifted the political center of gravity within central europe to his bohemian capital. as a result, the city emerged as the focus of europe’s intellectual and creative universe. rudolf, whose curiosity was legendary, amassed a celebrated cabinet of curiosities with objects from afar afield as india. his imperial court attracted the renaissance’s best artists and architects, while also cultivating an esoteric enclave in which alchemists vied for the sovereign’s patronage. indeed, rudolf sponsored the fervent exploration of alchemy in an attempt to create harmony within his discordant world. this article further demonstrates the ubiquity of alchemical intrigue within prague, revealing a lexicon which served numerous interests both within and without the royal court. alchemy, hermetic philosophy, and mystical theosophy were indelibly inscribed onto the urban canvas by rudolf ii but were also pursued by various actors throughout the holy roman empire and beyond. whether as a pathway to apotheosis sought by european rulers or as route to fame and favor for interlopers of the state, alchemy was a mutable concept that spawned expansive connections throughout central europe. article the german cartographer heinrich bünting (c.1545-1606) presented bohemia as the beating heart of the entire continent in his anthropomorphic map of 1587, europa regina (figure 1).1 certainly, rudolf ii, newly crowned as holy roman emperor in 1576, pre-empted bünting’s visualization, as he had transferred the seat of his habsburg government from vienna to the kingdom’s capital by 1583.2 the eminent german astronomer johannes kepler supported this appreciation of prague as the veritable center of europe’s intellectual universe by writing in his deliberation on a bohemian sojourn (1600), “prague is fitting for my studies; there is lively interaction between nations here.”3 in one sense, its position as the new imperial capital meant that 1 peter meurer, “europa regina: 16th century maps of europe in the form of a queen,” revue belge de géographie, 3-4 (2008): 8, https://doi.org/10.4000/belgeo.7711. 2 r. j. w. evans, rudolf ii and his world: a study in intellectual history 1576-1612 (oxford: clarendon press, 1973), 22. 3 johannes kepler, “deliberation on a bohemian sojourn (1600),” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 160. 26 it became rapidly filled by visiting ambassadors, each hoping to marvel at the emperor’s famous “cabinets of curiosities” (wunderkammern) within the imperial palace. similarly, the finest flemish landscapists and italian sculptors aspired to have their work displayed in rudolf’s metropolitan, mannerist showcase. figure 1: heinrich bünting, europa regina, 1587. yet, in spite of this influx of foreign interest, bohemia represented a region that was already defined by cultural and social heterogeneity. throughout the preceding centuries, prague had witnessed the emergence of a variety of confessional voices, all vying for supremacy within its urban space; naturally, this conflicting sectarian cacophony resulted in frequent incidents of violence. by acknowledging the latent divisions present within the habsburg territories, we can contextualize the emperor’s interest in those fields which advocated an underlying unity within the world. rudolf ii’s distinct patronizing of alchemical pursuits symbolized a concerted effort to promote a novel, conciliatory “language” that stressed cooperation and cross-over between different religious authorities.4 it was in accordance with his yearning for divine illumination and universal harmony that the emperor began to shape his imperial center in both physical and political terms. 4 pamela h. smith, “alchemy as a language of mediation at the habsburg court,” isis, 85, no. 1 (1994): 4-5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/235894. 27 the bohemian crown lands, comprising of bohemia, moravia, the lusatias, and various small silesian duchies, had been riven by the hussite wars of the early fifteenth century. these conflicts witnessed a pre-lutheran reformism gain the support of a significant proportion of the local population. its leader, jan hus, was burned at the stake at the council of constance in 1415. in the wake of this convulsive episode, the supporters of hus continued his agenda, establishing a strongly ingrained utraquist tradition within the bohemian estates and maintaining urban strongholds such as those of kutná hora throughout rudolf’s entire reign. what’s more, these territories were characterised by cultural and linguistic dissimilarities, as well as this formidable utraquist presence. whilst those areas near the silesian border spoke predominantly german, in the lusatias a slavic dialect, wendish, was spoken.5 in addition to this varied confessional landscape of bohemia, the surrounding german principalities were among the main stakeholders of luther’s protestant movement, whilst the more rebellious, calvinist activity centered upon the palatinate. all in all, rudolf ii was confronted with a true confessional concoction to administer, and this task was made harder by the constant pressure exerted from rome. in direct response to these various strands of protestant reformism, the pope convened the council of trent (1545-1563), whose jesuit supporters hoped to impose a stricter form of catholicism on rudolf’s imperial and monarchical territories. it is paramount to understand here that rudolf ii was an elected sovereign of both his royal hungarian and bohemian lands, the majority of which were not catholic. he did not possess his uncle philip ii’s zeal to carry out a central european reconquista and was eager to sponsor “an imperial ideology that did not subscribe to a narrow religious formulation.”6 during a prolonged period of ottoman threat to his balkan frontier as a result of the long turkish war (1593-1606), an intra-imperial conflict would have been a disastrous occurrence for the habsburg monarch.7 thus, rudolfine bohemia represented a confessional “contact zone” within latin christendom in which several hostile sects of the sixteenth century hoped to grapple with, and assert dominance over, one another.8 in order to negotiate this uneasy religious climate and for his empire to prosper rather than internally disintegrate, rudolf’s fascination with magic and alchemy was a “serious attempt to reconstruct certainty” in a world of “division and doubt.”9 it was alchemical science, posits pamela smith, that “functioned as a language of mediation” because it possessed a potent metaphysical dimension that stressed universal unity.10 it was alchemy’s constant reflection upon the balance and harmony of the material and spiritual worlds that 5 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 23. 6 hugh trevor-roper, princes and artists: patronage and ideology at four habsburg courts, 1517-1633 (london: thames and hudson, 1976), 86. 7 gábor ágoston, “the ottoman empire and europe,” in the oxford handbook of early modern european history: 1350 – 1750. volume ii. cultures and power, ed. hamish m. scott (oxford: oxford university press, 2015), 612-637. 8 mary louise pratt, ‘the art of the contact zone’, profession (1991): 34. 9 paul monod, the power of kings: monarchy and religion in europe, 1589-1715 (new haven: yale university press, 1999), 56; james r. palmitessa, “the prague uprising of 1611: property, politics, and catholic renewal in the early years of habsburg rule,” central european history, 31, no. 4 (1998): 300, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4546814. 10 smith, “alchemy as a language of mediation,” 4. 28 proposed an ideological alternative to both militant tridentine catholicism and unyielding calvinism. this notion of universal harmony and conciliation had been theorized well before the advent of rudolf’s “magic circle” in prague, however, and there were several ideological antecedents: jean bodin (1530-1596) and guillaume postel (1510-1581), two renowned french scholars, had stressed the possibility of a religious and political unity within all humanity by the mid-sixteenth century.11 by closely studying alchemy, astrology, and occult texts saturated with mystical inscriptions, natural philosophers hoped to uncover the multivalent connections that existed between the macrocosmic workings of the universe and those minute details of terrestrial existence. the alchemical belief in hermetic consonance — "as above/as below” its oft-cited maxim — propagated further neoplatonic ideas that the world of man and the world of nature were not only linked, but inherently reflective. therefore, in order to have complete control over his temporal domain, rudolf ii believed that he needed to access the information hidden within the earth’s substance. in commanding and redeeming disparate written sources into one virtuous whole, reflective of his territories’ religious heterogeneity, the habsburg ruler believed that he was protecting his domain from destructive corruption.12 essentially, by accruing all available knowledge, regardless of its religious or textual source, rudolf ii hoped to gain a deeper insight into nature’s code and, from that, augment his own power over a cosmopolitan empire. whilst rudolf ii’s ”letter of majesty” of 1609 was undoubtedly a measured political expedient, it can also be interpreted as a manifestation of this ”accommodating intellectual humanism” that mirrored alchemy’s objectives to reconcile and redeem.13 within it, rudolf wrote concerning both the catholic crown and the bohemian estates, ordering that “they shall not worry one another, but keep good friends with one another, nor shall one party vituperate the other.”14 admittedly, this proclamation of religious freedom was intended first and foremost as a bargaining chip to ensure the estates’ loyalty against the hostile austro-hungarian confederation led by the emperor’s brother matthias.15 rudolf also decreed that the “cities of prague, kutná hora, and other cities shall be allowed to practice their religion sub utraque and in any place they like.”16 nonetheless, in avoiding ruinous sectarian friction when faced with an invasionary threat, rudolf believed that a congenial relationship between christian denominations would mirror god’s intended balance of the cosmos, thus imputing his divine kingship with a powerful pansophic precedent. in a similar vein, the alchemist giordano bruno’s (1548-1600) 160 articles against the mathematicians (1588) was dedicated to the holy roman emperor and rehearsed the ideal philosophy of a single, universal religion rooted in occult tradition.17 it was through reciprocal dialogue between all of nature’s 11 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 17-18. 12 ivo purš, “rudolf ii’s patronage of alchemy and the natural sciences,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 147. 13 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 42. 14 rudolf ii, “letter of majesty 1609,” in the czech reader: history, culture, politics, eds. jan bažant, nina bazantová and frances starn (durham: duke university press, 2010), 81. 15 palmitessa, “the prague uprising of 1611,” 302. 16 palmitessa, “the prague uprising of 1611,” 302. 17 giordano bruno, “one hundred and sixty articles against contemporary mathematicians and philosophers (prague, 1588),” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe 29 assorted elements, whether inanimate or living, confessional or cultural, that natural philosophers believed that god’s true power would be made apparent. as r.j.w. evans argues, for rudolf and his alchemists, “the creator was approached through the harmony of his universe.”18 the “leitmotif” of this esoteric field was the transformation of the “lower” to the “higher”: by deepening his understanding of different creeds, he hoped to unlock a more holistic celestial power. resultantly, since prague was the center of rudolf’s world, he sought to attract as many alchemical and magical experts as possible to aid him in his intellectual quest. whilst his imperial predecessor charles iv (r. 1355-1378) had been an assiduous collector of relics that emphasized his personal piety, rudolf instead hoped to collect a variety of different perspectives upon esoteric manuscripts and occult practices, and thus display instead the universality of his knowledge. jan jesenský (1566-1621) was one such scholar who embodied this accretive approach to different and opposing ideas, an approach that was common among the imperial court’s intelligentsia. jesenský himself reprocessed and cannibalized various aspects of oriental wisdom, combining these notions with classical platonism and christian theology. it is therefore no surprise that jesenský gravitated towards rudolf’s court and then, in contrast, fervently opposed the hostile catholicism of his brothers matthias and archduke maximilian of austria later. 19 not only was alchemy a “language” that supported a more clement attitude towards different christian denominations within the habsburg court, but it was itself a practice that facilitated the close collaboration of these different sects. the english alchemist john dee and his assistant edward kelly were both nominally protestant, yet due to their renowned expertise in alchemical practice, they were first accepted by polish lord albrecht łaski, before entering prague in the mid-1580s to appear in front of the emperor. dee had in fact dedicated his monas hieroglyphica (1564) to rudolf’s father maximilian ii, which included a combined astral and alchemical symbolism that supposedly precipitated “universal spiritual transformation.”20 whilst hugh trevorroper claims that it was in “the more tolerant, protestant courts under learned, eccentric princes where these views throve,” the example of dee and kelly’s progress through the bohemian lands exhibits how they were equally accepted by the catholic nobility. in fact, what unified various bohemian rulers, even those of small duchies, was the same desire as rudolf to express the universality of their sovereignty. to do so, they had to engage with those alchemists who could reveal the hidden forces of the microcosm, those disguised natural “semiophores” that would then engender a more complete individual understanding.21 to take one example, the powerful vilém rožmberk hoped to attract various alchemical practitioners to his court and tap into their mystical mastery regardless of their reputations. rožmberk, the burgrave of bohemia, employed in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 169; evans, rudolf ii and his world, 230. 18 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 247. 19 györgy e. szónyi, “scientific and magical humanism at the court of rudolf ii,” in rudolf ii and prague: the court and the city, ed. eliška fučı́ková (london: thames and hudson, 1997), 224. 20 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 221. 21 alexander marr, “introduction,” in curiosity and wonder from the renaissance to the enlightenment, eds. r.j.w. evans and william marr (aldershot: ashgate, 2006), 9. 30 approximately fifty alchemists to work in his numerous laboratories dispersed across his lands.22 just as he welcomed edward kelly following the englishman’s departure from prague, his brother petr vok entertained oswald croll (c.1563-1609), another of rudolf’s former physicians as well as an alchemist. evidently, the wide-ranging obsession with alchemy and natural philosophy provided another important link between prague and those provincial courts that often differed in their religious and political outlook. a shared desire to gain a stronger grasp of the world’s microcosmic realities, and thus a path to greater personal power, drew these actors towards prague’s palace complex. alchemical interest, whether real or feigned, provided an exclusive opportunity to communicate with, and relate to, a more reclusive emperor. the prague residences of the lobkovic and rožmberk families were situated adjacent to the imperial kunstkammer in the hradčany castle district perched high on the west bank of the moldau; these nobles hoped to access the emperor during his most contemplative and relaxed state. alchemy was thus also utilized by the habsburg court to arouse the interest of several bohemian power-brokers, such as the rožmberks, and to keep them in constant communication, and favor, with the metropole. this intellectual drive to unveil the hidden mysteries of nature, and the belief that alchemical secrets were stored within ancient and occult texts, also brought christian, natural philosophers into closer contact with central europe’s ashkenazi jewish community. running in parallel to the hermetic strivings of the late sixteenth century was a popularizing of the kabbalah, a strand of jewish mysticism founded on a body of mystical writings.23 heinrich khunrath, an influential german theosopher of the period and resident physician of the emperor, produced the sigillum dei engraving in 1595.24 this contained the hebrew text of the ten commandments, along with the twenty two letters of the hebrew alphabet from which the torah is composed.25 within this work alone, there was a definite interest in the combination of differing strands of information, regardless of their provenance and religious context. crucially, the alchemists and natural philosophers present within this scholarly environment all shared an “irenic impulse” that hoped to access a greater level of complete knowledge via the collaboration of different sects and confessions.26 rudolf ii invited many jews to pursue the metallurgic arts under his patronage, granting josef zoref the privilege of working gold at the imperial castle with the option of employing christian journeyman as the need arose.27 the mantuan jew alberto colorni was invited to prague in 1590, and provided an imperial stipend to work on improving the production of saltpeter for the imperial powder works. here, again, the conciliatory atmosphere engendered by alchemical and scientific engagement is manifest. for the 22 ivo purš and vladímir karpenko, “alchemy at the aristocratic courts of the lands of the bohemian crown,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 59. 23 evans, rudolf and his world, 236. 24 christopher partridge, the occult world (routledge: abingdon, 2016), 547. 25 peter forshaw, “curious knowledge and wonder-working wisdom in the occult works of heinrich khunrath,” in curiosity and wonder from the renaissance to the enlightenment, eds. r.j.w. evans and william marr (aldershot: ashgate, 2006), 122. 26 noah j. efron, “‘our forefathers did not tell us’: jews and natural philosophy in rudolfine prague,” endeavour 26, no. 1 (2002): 15. 27 efron, “our forefathers did not tell us,” 16. 31 early modern jew who potentially faced occupational discrimination and communal violence throughout much of central europe, the opportunity to work directly under the emperor, and to employ gentile staff, was novel. moreover, one of the most noted examples of christian and jewish interaction occurred between the emperor himself and judah loew ben bezalel (1525-1609), the maharal of prague.28 in 1592, the rabbi was personally summoned to the royal court to discuss several “mysteries” with rudolf though the details of this “long and secretive conversation” went unrecorded.29 whilst alchemy and other occult studies were heavily patronized by the emperor, he did not have a monopoly on its usage. the sixteenth century saw the creation of an ebullient market for natural philosophy, which although catalyzed by the vernacular printing and elite interest within bohemia, spread far beyond its boundaries. both dóra bobory and jennifer rampling note that alchemical practitioners from “the far ends of the continent” exchanged scientific information through “epistolary correspondence, recipes, and books traded by commercial networks.”30 those wandering scholars naturally disseminated a wide variety of ideas and methods, all in the hope of currying favour with their next courtly audience.31 the ability to impress and captivate local patrons not only provided a “passport to the emperor” but also secured a valuable safety net if one was to encounter financial difficulty.32 for example, following a failed experiment in front of the rudolf ii, john dee was offered a residence at the court of his previous employer, the polish noble albrecht łaski in 1584. similarly, the opportunistic polish alchemist, michael sendivogius, exploited previous contacts to enter the circle of ludvík korálek of tešín, another magnate fascinated by the occult arts. following the same experiment he had performed for the emperor, in which he transmuted several nails into “solid silver,” sendivogius was able to earn a substantial sum from the lord.33 evidently, alchemists exploited this specialized interest of wealthy local lords and benefitted handsomely from their fierce competition to attract their services. besides, even if transmutations were unsuccessful or certain mysteries remained unrevealed, the production of detailed manuscripts that were dedicated to local princes were frequently deployed as forms of esoteric tribute. in this way, would-be patrons received mystical objects that could be displayed to enhance their personal fama. regardless of the item’s efficacy or originality, it “redounded the credit of the ruler and his territory.”34 it was not just its spiritually edifying and intellectually empowering effects which made alchemy a desired pursuit of the habsburg court; its practical utility with regards to 28 noah j. efron, “maharal of prague,” in encyclopedia of the renaissance, ed. paul f. grendler (new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1999), 24. 29 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 241. 30 dóra bobory and jennifer rampling, “introduction. alchemy on the fringes: communication and practice at the peripheries of early modern europe,” early science and medicine 17, no. 5 (2012): 469, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41723213. 31 bobory and rampling, “introduction,” 469. 32 m. c. jacobs, strangers nowhere in the world: the rise of cosmopolitanism in early modern europe, (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2006), 65. 33 rafał t. prinke and mike a. zuber, “alchemical patronage and the making of an adept: letters of michael sendivogius to emperor rudolf ii and his chamberlain hans popp,” ambix 65, no. 4 (2018): 334, https://doi.org/10.1080/00026980.2018.1512776. 34 smith, “alchemy as a language of mediation,” 4. 32 metallurgy was also an important factor. tara nummedal focuses on how fiscal issues were at the forefront of the empire’s agenda during the close of the sixteenth century and how individual princes consulted alchemists to solve the mining crises that afflicted their territories.35 inauspiciously, the steady decline in productivity of central european mines coincided with the explosive introduction of new world silver. by the early 1600s, it has been estimated that around two million silver pesos annually flooded into the european market via the potosí-japan trade cycle, causing the price of continental silver to plummet.36 in order to compete with this influx of specie, princes and nobles approached alchemists and other technological engineers to improve the yield and value of these metallic ores. for example, in 1574, lazarus ecker (1528-1594) produced a treatise on smelting and assaying methods for vilém rožmberk, who operated laboratories in the rich mining territory of silesia.37 some alchemists went further than offering mineralogical advice, however, and claimed that they could transmute worthless compounds into refined precious material with the legendary philosophers’ stone capable of such miraculous transformations. one such practitioner was georg honauer, who assured friedrich i of württemberg that he could produce “100 pounds of gold per week” from the duke’s iron-rich territory of mömpelgard.38 in conjunction with the empire’s reduced mining output, the numerous habsburg-ottoman conflicts that intermittently broke out throughout the early modern period significantly eroded any remaining resources. it was this urgent need for funding, precipitated by further ottoman expansion into royal hungary and the near incessant pressure of the balkan military frontier (militärgrenze), that alchemy was seen as a fiscal panacea.39 even when alchemical processes failed to produce large quantities of gold (which was often the case), the adept’s specialized metallurgical knowledge was still thought indispensable by governments hoping to increase their income.40 the minting of currency itself was a useful vehicle for the sovereign to spread his royal image and the quality of his coin reflected his personal preeminence. on a more personal level than the empire’s financial woes and internal religious friction, alchemy was inherently acknowledged as being a physically restorative practice. in this sense, many ailing members of rudolf ii’s court engaged with alchemy in order to combat ill-health. this medicinal strand of alchemy emerged from paracelsian iatrochemistry, whose foremost practitioner was the german physician oswald croll.41 croll visited several princely courts in the southern german lands during the 1580s before ending up at prague’s hradčany in 1597. during his tenure under rudolf ii, he 35 tara e. nummedal, “practical alchemy and commercial exchange in the holy roman empire,” in merchants and marvels: commerce, science, and art in early modern europe, eds. pamela smith and paula findlen (hove: psychology press, 2002), 210. 36 dennis o’flynn and arturo gíraldez, “cycles of silver: global economic unity through the mideighteenth century,” journal of world history 13, no. 2 (2002): 414, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078977. 37 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 215-216. 38 nummedal, “practical alchemy and commercial exchange,” 211. 39 see william o’reilly, “border, buffer and bulwark: the historiography of the military frontier, 15211881,” in frontiers and the writing of history, 1500-1850, eds. steven g. ellis and raingard eßer (wehrhahn: hanover, 2006), 229-244, for a good overview on the history and historiography of the militärgrenze. 40 smith, ‘alchemy as a language of mediation’, 4. 41 bruce t. moran, the alchemical world of the german court: occult philosophy and chemical medicine in the circle of moritz of hessen (1572-1632) (stuttgart: f. steiner verlag, 1991), 55. 33 perfected complex remedies, which were recorded in his basilica chymica (1609) and dedicated to the emperor.42 as well as croll’s collection of cures, martin ruland the younger, a bavarian practitioner, issued the lapidis philosophici vera conficiendi ratio (1606). this tract provided further alchemical treatments that were grafted from both classical and modern sources.43 within these two works, we again witness the underlying themes of harmony and coalescence associated with early modern alchemy. in both, various intellectual sources are combined to produce a powerful treatment. it was this admixture of wide-ranging ingredients that gave alchemical medicine its cultural potency. the plague, which had never completely disappeared since its arrival in the fifteenth century, added a sense of urgency and expedited the preparation of medicines and hastened the call for a universal cure.44 the iii h manuscript, stored at prague’s national museum library, contains several alchemical works from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, many of which mention recipes for aqua vitae.45 alisha rankin’s study of anna of saxony reveals how nobles who engaged in the production of such remedies became revered within aristocratic and intellectual circles, attracting their own cultish following across the continent.46 although alchemy constituted an irenic exercise, both in theory and in practice, throughout the princely courts of the holy roman empire, it was by definition an exclusive pursuit. nature’s secret code was not accessible to any common scholar, and alchemists believed that complete immersion within various forms of esoteric knowledge was required to acquire “universal” understanding. the physical setting of the emperor’s workshops contributed to this perception. located in the castle complex perched above the city, these workshops commanded a dramatic view over old town across the river and the malá strana district directly below.47 it was from this vantage point that the philosophically astute could as paracelsus once advised “make visible” the “virtue inhabiting each material thing.”48 working above the city and its everyday hustle and bustle, the castles’ alchemists were able to “read” the outward signs inscribed within nature and thus compose a more holistic view of god’s creation and the secrets 42 paula findlen, “commerce, art. and science in the early modern cabinet of curiosities,” in merchants and marvels: commerce, science, and art in early modern europe, eds. pamela smith and paula findlen (hove: pyschology books, 2002), 214. 43 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 204. 44 vladimír karpenko, “a path to the rudolfine world,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 38. 45 ivo purš and vladimír karpenko, “alchemy at the aristocratic courts of the lands of the bohemian crown,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 54-56. 46 alisha rankin, “becoming an expert practitioner: court experimentalism and the medical skills of anna of saxony (1532–1585),” isis 98, no. 1 (2007): 23-53, https://doi.org/10.1086/512830. 47 pierre bergeron, “description of prague during the time of rudolph ii (1585-1638),” in in the czech reader: history, culture, politics, eds. jan bažant, nina bazantová and frances starn (durham: duke university press, 2010), 77. here, bergeron describes the hradčany castle complex in great detail, especially its elevation, writing that the ‘imperial palace… looms high above the city.’ 48 paracelsus, astronomia magna (1537), 173, quoted in james joseph bono, the world of god and the languages of man: interpreting nature in early modern science and medicine, vol. 1, ficino to descartes (madison: university of wisconsin press, 1995), 135-136. https://doi.org/10.1086/512830 34 lying therein.49 the site of these laboratories was itself a statement of the emperor’s power and a way to display the “mystique of his majesty” to the surrounding city.50 rudolf’s seclusion within the fortress walls was not completely born out of mercurial melancholy but was a contrived absence befitting an individual engrossed by such esoteric pursuits.51 we can interpret rudolf’s mysterious palace as the emperor’s “front stage,” the outward portrayal of his occult agenda.52 he believed that he and his “magical” coterie had a more powerful perspective on the natural world, one that transcended mere ocular sight. thus, the emperor hoped to keep his learned inner sanctum free from the quackery and malpractice so rife within european esotericism. like dora thornton’s assessment of the renaissance italian studiolo, the princely study carried connotations of “intimacy, privacy, and secrecy” far removed from prague’s burgeoning burgher community.53 for rudolf ii and those adepts who enjoyed his patronage, the prague castle was a beacon of learning. here scholars focused on uncovering the pansophic relationship between the earthly ephemera over which it was raised. this imperial residence represented a “town above a town,” whose select citizens strove to reveal the divine essence of the natural world through alchemical and astrological observation.54 thus, its topography perfectly suited the purpose of its internal projects. it is no wonder, then, that the hradčany captivated franz kafka’s imagination, inspiring his 1926 novel the castle. even in the industrialised twentieth century, the castle remained “clearly defined within the glittering air,” the distinct legacy of an emperor obsessed with the attainment of divine knowledge.55 rudolf ii’s obsession with neoplatonic order and symmetry, those same principles targeted by alchemical investigation, was reflected in the modelling of his palace gardens. hans puechfeldner’s 1593 garden books reveal the intricate designs of the hradčany’s green plots, presenting a useful primary source with which to approach the emperor’s relationship to art and nature.56 continuing the theme of scholarly solitude, puechfeldner suggested in his notes that the gardens should be walled, thus forming a shielded oasis conducive to contemplation and consolation. furthermore, the plans also 49 william o’reilly, wolfgang lazius, the scientific revolution and the rise of the expert observer of nature (manuscript), 13-14. 50 robert grudin, “rudolf ii of prague and cornelis drebbel: shakespearean archetypes?,” huntington library quarterly 54, no. 3 (1991): 183, doi:10.2307/3817706. 51 peter marshall, the mercurial emperor: the magic circle of rudolf ii in renaissance prague (london: pimlico, 2007), 44. 52 erving goffman, the presentation of self in everyday life (new york: doubleday, 1956); see also evans, rudolf ii and his study, 229, for a mentioning of this “bohemian stage” in a continued, dramaturgical metaphor for the displaying of alchemical practice. 53 dora thornton, the scholar in his study: ownership and experience in renaissance italy (new haven: yale university press, 1997), 132. 54 ivo purš, “rudolf ii’s patronage of alchemy and the natural sciences,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 166. 55 franz kafka, the castle (original 1926), trans. willa muir and edwin muir (london: vintage classics, 2005), 15. 56 erik a. de jong, “a garden book made for emperor rudolf ii in 1593: hans puechfeldner’s “nützliches khünstbüech der gartnereij,” studies in the history of art 69 (2008): 191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42622438. 35 demonstrate the array of “rare trees, flowers, and herbs” that occupied these plantations; without doubt, they truly possessed a kaleidoscopic collection of flora.57 this description is corroborated by pierre bergeron, an assistant to the french ambassador, who observed the “fruit trees,” “orchards,” and “figs” present within these gardens during his 1603 visit.58 indeed, giuseppe arcimboldo’s portrait of rudolf as vertumnus (1591) (figure 2) truly reflected the emperor’s innate desire to unite all aspects of nature, hoping that by condensing this diversity into one microcosmic space he may achieve a fuller understanding of the temporal sphere.59 figure 2: giuseppe arcimboldo, vertumnus, 1591 paula findlen has argued that nature was collected also for more traditional scientific purposes. a menagerie, complete with an extensive deer park and aviary, were part of 57 de jong, “a garden book made for emperor rudolf ii in 1593,” 194. 58 bergeron, “description of prague during the time of rudolph ii (1585-1638),” 78. 59 trevor-roper, princes and artists, 88. michal preusz, kateřina kodýdková, petr kočár, and zdeněk vaněček, “exotic spices in flux: archaeobotanical material from medieval and early modern sites of the czech lands (czech republic),” interdisciplinaria archaeologica: natural sciences in archaeology 6, no. 2 (2015): 223-236. 36 the royal grounds.60 these landscape designs and animal parks were more than simply a means to observe nature. puechfeldner created a “geometrical and architectonic garden space,” which imposed order and control, physically and optically, onto nature.61 these labyrinthine parterres were a visual representation of the emperor’s power over nature (figure 3). figure 3: folio 5 from hans puechfeldner nützliches khünstbüech der gartnereij, 1593 similar to this shaping of outdoor space to accommodate rudolf’s philosophical ambition, the interior of the imperial palace itself was restructured to house a personal museum of naturalia and artificalia.62 this was, as both thomas dacosta kaufmann and peter marshall propose, a “theatre of the world.”63 moreover, the emperor hoped to appear as a “new maecenas,” imparting common benefit to his realm from his patronage of art and funding of scientific discovery.64 on this point, it is important to look beyond the image of the kunstkammer merely as an eclectic collection of objects appealing to the emperor and challenge the viewpoint that this space amounted to no more than a “melancholic solitarium” for a troubled soul.65 instead, one should view its “cabinets of curiosities” and art collections as an extension of the emperor’s alchemical and 60 findlen, “commerce, art, and science,” 213. 61 de jong, “a garden book made for emperor rudolf ii in 1593,” 195. 62 eliska fucíková, ‘the collection of rudolf ii at prague: cabinet of curiosities or scientific museum?,” in the origins of museums: the cabinet of curiosities in sixteenthand seventeenth-century europe, eds. arthur macgregor and oliver r. impey (oxford: clarendon, 1985), 65. 63 thomas dacosta kaufmann, “remarks on the collections of rudolf ii: the kunstkammer as a form of representatio,” art journal 38, no. 1 (1978): 25, doi:10.2307/776251. 64 findlen, “commerce, art, and science,” 210. 65 frances yates, the rosicrucian enlightenment (london: routledge, 1972), 45. 37 intellectual interests. this was an arena of analysis in which the “material-spiritual substance” of the universe could be identified.66 the “collecting mania of the period was thus not idle curiosity,” but an attempt to curate such diverse objects in a way that “would reflect their original disposition, their place in the chain of creation.”67 here the work of rudolf’s artists should also be considered. in the 1590s, rudolf had lured the acclaimed german artist hans von aachen from augsburg to prague. he brought other mannerist artists to his court including the goldsmith wenzel jamnitzer.68 the antechamber that led directly into his kunstkammer was adorned with a ceiling fresco that depicted jupiter “supervising” the seasons: this allegorical imagery reflected the emperor’s fixation on the mastery of the world.69 jamnitzer’s fountain, which stood in the middle of the room, depicted an imperial crown resting upon the anthropomorphized four elements. a closer survey of items of the imperial collection demonstrates rudolf’s universal inclinations. there were not only turkish dictionaries and arabic bibles held in prague castle but also an ottoman sword embellished with the inscription: “where hatred reigns, justice is blind.”70 if the habsburg monarchy was indeed a “mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements,” then rudolf ii certainly saw alchemy as a means to find order within his own personal world.71 whilst sectarian strife simmered throughout his bohemian lands and unsettled the realm’s stability, the emperor sought to focus on various strands of natural philosophy that he hoped would increase his control. however, rudolf’s obsession with alchemy was not one merely focused on ideals but one that also considered the practical benefits and material wealth that could accompany successful investigations. like johannes kepler’s heliocentric system, the emperor made the imperial court the center of europe’s alchemical constellation. alchemy was indeed a language of mediation within the habsburg court at prague, but it simultaneously was a language of power, order, and wealth for those adepts who knew how to manipulate their social standing, and the environment in which they operated. 66 vladmír karpenko, “a path to the rudolfine world,” in alchemy and rudolf ii: exploring the secrets of nature in central europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, eds. ivo purš and vladímir karpenko (prague: artefactum, 2016), 29. 67 evans, rudolf ii and his world, 247. 68 trevor-roper, princes and artists, 105; dacosta kaufmann, “remarks on the collections of rudolf ii,” 26. 69 findlen, “commerce, art, and science,” 210. 70 findlen, “commerce, art, and science,” 211. 71 evans, the making of the habsburg monarchy 1550-1700 (oxford: clarendon press, 1979), 447. 17 aufstand oder fehde franz von sickingen and the implications of the feud against trier (1481-1525) glenn callihan messiah college abstract this article focuses on dismantling the narrative of rebellion surrounding franz von sickingen’s feud with trier in 1522-1523. through an examination of sickingen’s material circumstances, the reactions of both the princes and the lower nobility to the feud, this article demonstrates that the narrative of the “knight’s rebellion” lacks historical credibility and is best examined as a private feud. this article utilizes the flerscheimer chronik, letters, and contemporary accounts as well as various secondary sources in both english and german to demonstrate that the feud against trier is not evidence of a declining nobility in the early modern period, but rather it is dramatic example of the “feud culture” prevalent throughout the later middle ages and early modern period. article introduction “all germany is a gang of bandits and, among the nobles, the more grasping the more glorious.”1 so remarked a roman cardinal concerning the state of affairs in germany during the later middle ages. who better typifies this notion than franz von sickingen? supported by his contemporary ulrich von hutten, sickingen led a knightly revolt against the princes of the holy roman empire in 1523. when combined with anti-clerical sentiment, it is hardly surprising to find that the chosen target of this rebellion was a center of ecclesiastical power: the electorate of trier. futilely, these noble rebels fought the powerful princes until their eventual defeat at the hands of the dreaded cannon, with the walls of the knights’ castles, symbols of their crumbling power, crashing down around them. according to the nineteenth-century scholar belfort bax, after the death of their leader and last hope, franz von sickingen, at landstuhl in 1523, “the knighthood as a distinct factor in the polity of europe henceforth existed no more.”2 however, more recent scholarship has called into question the old paradigm of noble decline during the late medieval and early modern periods. these shifts in the narrative bring along new questions, particularly about 1 hillay zmora, state and nobility in early modern germany: the knightly feud in franconia, 1440-1567 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997), 1. 2 belfort bax, german society at the close of the middle ages (london: swan sonnenschein & co., 1894), 184. 18 franz von sickingen’s daring uprising. hillay zmora, writing in 1997, claims that, “[i]t was not—as it is commonly labelled—a knights’ revolt.”3 did sickingen have the support of the knighthood to such an extent that it could be characterized as a rebellion? does the socalled rebellion hold any characteristics of rebellion: evidence of economic destitution among the nobility and franz von sickingen in particular, a reaction to rapid, radical changes in governance, or widespread acceptance by the target audience of the rebellion? by examining the material and sociopolitical circumstances of franz von sickingen and the reactions of not only his peers in the lower nobility but also the princes to sickingen’s “rebellion,” it becomes clear that the knights’ revolt of 1522-1523 is better characterized as a feud between franz von sickingen and the elector of trier, richard von griefenklau. thus, franz von sickingen’s attack on trier is better contextualized within the confines of fifteenthand sixteenth-century “feud culture.” feud culture feud culture is best described as the tendency amongst the german nobility during the mid to late fifteenth century and into the sixteenth century to engage in extra-legal confrontations against one another, usually involving small skirmishes, burning, looting, and abductions.4 a feud may break out for any number of seemingly insignificant reasons: small debts, minor land disputes, or slights against another’s reputation might all be cause of a feud.5 in one striking example, a feud broke out between christoph fuchs von bimbach and the prince-bishop of bamberg over grazing rights worth no more than 3 gulden.6 often, these feuds occurred between parties intimately familiar with one another and many were preceded by lengthy peaceful mediation that would often continue throughout. many successful feuders wielded rhetoric against their antagonists as well as their swords. killing, especially in large numbers, was an infrequent occurrence during a feud. feuders were expected to conform to a generally accepted set of rules involving how, where, and what sort of violence might be utilized.7 importantly, the letter of feud (fehdebrief) detailed the list of offenses for which the perpetrator of the feud engaged in his endeavor and signaled to all the beginning of hostilities. the importance of reputation in late medieval and early modern noble circles cannot be overstated. many nobles both lent and borrowed funds and strove to impress their peers; thus, the feud served to demonstrate to both creditors and debtors their seriousness while simultaneously improving their social capital.8 the feud has been the subject of much historiographic debate and interpretation. previous understandings of the feud revolved around the so-called “robber-knight” narrative, that is, the notion of widespread economic destitution among the nobility that had ostensibly cropped up during the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. werner rösener claimed 3 zmora, state and nobility, 120. 4 it should be noted that feuding was explicitly outlawed after the imperial diet of worms in 1495. 5 hillay zmora, the feud in early modern germany (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2011), 1-45, 4777. 6 ibid., 44-45, 63. 7 ibid., 44. 8 ibid., 47-61. 19 that the knight, having had his existence threatened, operated “in the grey area between a just feud and flagrant robbery.”9 however, hillay zmora’s more recent research suggests a different conclusion. he argues that the feud resulted from an interplay between two distinct processes: princely-state building and the social stratification of the nobility.10 through careful examination of the franconian nobility between 1440 and 1567, zmora arrives at a most penetrating finding. the nobility was not in the midst of a general crisis at this time and the feud is therefore not emblematic of decline.11 a key aspect of the robberknight (raubritter) thesis relies on the notion that the primary source of income for the nobility was agrarian in nature and that only those in the nobility who were in financially tenuous situations would engage in the feud. zmora contests both of these statements vigorously.12 instead, he argues that the feud was carried out by successful and unsuccessful members of the nobility alike. through a study of feuding noblemen zmora arrives at the conclusion that the majority of principal feuders were, in fact, high-status noblemen, and that these noblemen carried out the majority of the feuds.13 thus detailed, zmora demonstrates that the core pillar of rösener’s thesis, the connection between poor nobles and feuding, stands on shaky ground.14 furthermore, he zeros in on the most salient issue of the feud: lordship.15 put simply, “being a lord was an ongoing process. lordship had to be created, maintained, and reproduced.”16 feuding served to separate the chaff from the wheat among the nobility. by creating a problem (violence, abductions, burning, and pillaging), the nobility offered a shield against this same problem and thereby justified their role as lords.17 thus, franz von sickingen’s feud with trier—viewed from this lens of creating, reproducing, and maintaining lordship—cannot be viewed simply as a means of extracting wealth. instead it must be seen as an effort to obtain the highest form of lordship: a principality.18 franz von sickingen: material circumstances yet, it remains prudent to examine in more detail the events that led up to the feud with trier and historically locate its principle perpetrator, franz von sickingen. understanding that franz von sickingen’s experience exists as the pinnacle of noble success does not place him as a likely candidate to lead a class revolt against the princes. born into a wellestablished line on march 2, 1481, little is known of sickingen’s life as a young man. his father, schweikard viii, brought the family to a position of power in the palatinate of the rhine. after a fortuitous marriage to the heir of the house of hohenburg, margarethe puller 9 werner rösener, “zur problematik des spätmittelalterlichen raubritter,” festschrift für bernet schwineköper zu seinem siebzigsten geburtstag, eds. helmut and hans patze (sigmaringen: j. thorbecke, 1982), 487-488. 10 zmora, state and nobility, 88. 11 ibid., 67. 12 ibid., 9-10. 13 ibid., 78, 85. it is important to note that zmora used the following parameters to differentiate high and low status noblemen: (1) the holding of high office in a princely administration, (2) financial transactions with princes, and (3) the quality of individual marriage alliances. 14 ibid., 10-11. 15 ibid., 85, 109. 16 ibid., 109. 17 ibid., 108. 18 ibid., 120. 20 von hohenburg, the sickingen line found itself in a strong economic position. between 1466 and 1485, schweikard von sickingen invested heavily in their seat of power, the castle of ebernburg. already by 1482, he was in the position to lend the count palatine of the rhine, philip, the massive amount of 24,300 gulden.19 his father continued to vigorously expand the sickingen assets. for example, in 1488 he became embroiled in a feud with the city of cologne, which solidified the family as an economic powerhouse on the rhine. perhaps more importantly, it landed schweikard a high office in the palatinate court as the master of the household.20 this high office and more importantly the economic basis would benefit the young sickingen greatly in the years to come. with the death of his father in 1505, franz von sickingen became the sole inheritor of the familial holdings. an adroit administrator, franz von sickingen wasted no time in exploiting his privileged upbringing. between 1507 and 1515, sickingen engaged in a series of undertakings aimed at continuing to build himself up not only as an economic powerhouse but also as a political figure of great import. for example, in 1508, acting as a court officer (amtmann) for the count palatine, he mediated a dispute between the parish of pfaffensnschwabenheim and the local cloister.21 by 1509, sickingen had secured several fiefs for himself from the bishop of straßburg. between 1510 and 1514, he made several purchases from the local citizenry (bürgerschaft), buying both farms and a quarry. with such economic standing, franz von sickingen found himself in the position to lend large amounts to the count palatine of the rhine, which resulted in favorable trading deals through his princely benefactor. his ore mines in rheingrafenstein, for example, became duty free in 1511.22 in sum, franz von sickingen’s formative years were relatively peaceful, and they afforded him an opportunity to greatly expand upon the advantage his father had provided for him. despite his rather meager office in the count palatine’s court, franz von sickingen’s financial successes would prove pivotal in his next great undertaking: his feud with the city of worms.23 balthasar schlör, a citizen of worms, had previously sold his debt to sickingen, which provided the impetus for sickingen to declare the feud: he wanted to collect.24 on november 1, 1514, franz von sickingen sent the city of worms a letter which stated that a particular citizen, nicolas knobellach, should pay a debt that he owed to balthasar schlör. sickingen was prepared to settle the matter in the imperial chamber court, however, due 19 reinhard scholzen, franz von sickingen: ein adeliges leben im spannungsfeld zwischen städten und territorien (kaiserslautern: institut für pfälzische geschichte und volkskunde, 1996), 33. 20 zmora, state and nobility, 119. 21 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 33. “in sein jungen tage ist er der rheingraven obrister amptman worden, darnach der pfaltz amptman zu creutzennach.” otto waltz, ed., die flerscheimer chronik: zur geschichte d. 15. u. 16. jh. zum ersten mal nach vollst. handschr. (leipzig: hirzel, 1874), 52. 22 ibid., 42. 23 ibid., 44. 24 ibid., 55. in 1513, the people of worms were incited against the city council. the rebellion was eventually suppressed by local princes and guild-masters. the rebels were punished, assets seized, and so on. in particular, schlör had his assets seized and therefore turned to sickingen to protect his rights. 21 to extenuating circumstances, he was unable to pursue this action.25 when the peaceful avenue ground to a halt on march 22, 1515, franz von sickingen began his feud against worms in earnest, seizing a merchant vessel on the way to frankfurt and further harassing merchants along the road, despite these merchants carrying “safe conduct letters” from the count palatine.26 these merchants were taken to ebernburg and held at ransom. the citizens of worms complained that all of this had been done before the proper proclamation of the feud. the letter of feud (fehdebrief) did not arrive until march 25. his actions were noticed by the emperor maximilian i and on april 16, sickingen was named a breaker of the general peace (landsfriedenbrecher).27 by may 15, the emperor had placed sickingen under the imperial ban (reichsacht), and assisting sickingen was made illegal under the punishment of a heavy fine. the conflict continued to escalate, culminating in sickingen securing the support of many of his peers (standgenossen) and laying siege to the city in late june.28 despite heavy bombardment and an attempt to cut off the city’s water supply, sickingen was unable to force a capitulation. thus, after disbanding a large portion of his force, sickingen simply set what remained of his army loose on the countryside, capturing citizens and disrupting commerce severely. this lasted through 1515 and 1516. the feud ground to a standstill and ended without schlör being recompensed. however, due to the disruption of trade fairs and the seizure of merchant assets, the city suffered grave economic damage and had lost over 86,000 gulden.29 despite the failure to achieve the original goal of the feud, sickingen arose out of it as a “feared and famed warlord” and quite wealthy from the ransoms and seized goods to boot.30 sickingen was released from the imperial ban on july 17, having also repaired his relationship with the emperor. one critical reason for the habsburg rulers to set aside their differences with sickingen became apparent when they realized that franz von sickingen had entered into a contract with francis i, the king of france and the house of habsburg’s primary rival in their constant wars in italy.31 while little came out of this contract, fears of sickingen transferring his allegiances and considerable wealth and military might to the french monarch was certainly a concern. it is perhaps for this reason that maximilian choose to loosen his sanctions against sickingen. this relationship (and later lack thereof) would prove vital in other feuds.32 after a meeting in innsbruck, maximilian extended his forgiveness towards the transgressions of sickingen, and offered him a place in the service of the house of habsburg saying, “no, franz, what happen, has happened: it has been a misunderstanding. i wish to be to you a merciful emperor.”33 25 ibid., 57. scholzen notes that the extenuating circumstance in this case was the sudden death of his wife. scholzen additionally notes that it is unlikely that sickingen would have taken the ruling of the imperial chamber court seriously. 26 ibid., 59. 27 ibid., 60. 28 ibid., 61. 29 ibid., 101. 30 zmora, state and nobility, 119-120. 31 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 66. 32 ibid., 100. 33 “nu, nu franntz, was geschehen, ist geschehen; es ist ein missverstanndt gewesen. ich will dir ein gnedigister kaiser sein.” waltz, ed., die flerscheimer chronik, 62-64. 22 his success against worms kicked off a rapid series of feuds that continued to build upon his ever-increasing financial and socio-political standing. sickingen feuded against the city of metz in response to the death of one of his peers at the hands of a citizen. this feud was quickly resolved and the city was forced to pay 25,000 gulden to sickingen on the september 7, 1518.34 shortly after his confrontation with metz, sickingen entered into a new feud with the landgraf von hessen, philip. his reasons in this case were twofold: he supported conrad von hattein’s claim to the castle of reifenberg, which von hessen had previously annexed, and von hessen had laid claim to holdings that belonged to sickingen as well. he campaigned against the landgraf, extorting his citizens in the area. it proved to be quite lucrative, as sickingen walked away from the feud with 14,842 florins in plunder and an additional 35,000 gulden at the conclusion.35 however, it was the death of emperor maximilian i in 1519 that changed the dynamic for franz von sickingen. despite receiving a hefty bribe from the habsburgs to support charles i of spain, some still commented that, “it would not be good to lose him since he is planning an attack on the hereditary lands.”36 this hinted at a possible alliance between the erstwhile knight at the french monarch. these fears proved to be unfounded as franz von sickingen endeavored to make himself indispensable to the habsburg cause, yet many remained skeptical, as margareta von habsburg notes in a letter: “one negotiates with him too frivolously, no prince is able to supply to him great service.”37 even so, these doubts did not stop the habsburgs from using his services to attempt to resolve a conflict between the swabian league and duke ulrich von württemberg. on february 17, 1519, sickingen was ordered to collect 1,000 horsemen and assist the swabian league in the defeat of the wayward duke. with the added assistance of sickingen, victory was all but assured for the swabian league.38 the campaign ended by april 28 of that same year when the city and castle of tübingen was handed over. despite the short campaign, franz von sickingen again made out quite well. through a combination of extortion, plunder, and wages, sickingen continued to profit off the endemic violence of the time.39 yet the good times were not to last for sickingen. three years after the campaign against the duke of württemberg, emperor charles v called upon sickingen’s services once more. on july 4, 1521, sickingen was ordered to assemble an army of 2,000 horsemen and 15,000 foot soldiers for a campaign against france.40 the emperor promised to reimburse the cost of the campaign at a later date. sickingen completed his task by the end of july and set off 34 ibid., 111-112. 35 ibid., 125, 129. 36 “es wäre nicht gut, ihn zu verlieren, da man, wie er (zevenbergen) hört, anschläge gegen die erblande plant.” deutsche reichstagsakten 1, no. 20 (1893): 182. scholzen, franz von sickingen, 140. 37 “man verhandelt mit ihm etwas zu leichtfertig: der kein fürst vermag ihm größere dienste zu lesiten.” armerstroffs to margareta, 8th of march, 1519. deutsche reichstagsakten 1, no. 134 (1893): 374. scholzen, franz von sickingen, 142. 38 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 151-152. 39 ibid., 153-159. 40 ibid., 192. 23 for straßburg, where he arrived on august 5, 1521. there he combined his forces with another commander, count heinrich von nassaeu, and laid siege to the fortress of mezières. despite a heavy bombardment, they were unable to capture the fortress. powder shortages, a lack of funds, and nearby french support troops forced the imperial commanders to withdraw. by the end of september, sickingen sent the emperor a list of the expenses from the failed campaign. he received partial reimbursement on december 5, 1521 in the amount of 76,500 gulden.41 what is most interesting about the events leading up to the feud with trier is that they demonstrate, quite clearly, that franz von sickingen’s financial situation did not, for the most part, exemplify that of a poor nobleman. that sickingen was able to withstand the costs of a campaign against france at all is a testament to just how wealthy he had become. however, the unpaid portion of his reimbursement, combined with a need to collect on a loan from emperor charles v forced him to travel to brussels to meet with charles in person to discuss repayment for the loan and to discuss his full reimbursement.42 the emperor was not forthcoming with his payment. it seems prudent to also mention the knightly brotherhood in landau, a union of 600 of his peers brought together in 1522 primarily to discuss conduct during a feud. at the outset, one might assume this constitutes some evidence of revolutionary intent—that the knighthood sought to band together to better deal with threats external to their social class. franz von sickingen’s election as “captain of the union” in the summer of 1522, weeks before his feud with trier, certainly seems to give credence to this view. however, the articles of the brotherhood, which focused primarily on the conduct between its members during the feud, could hardly be considered aggressive or revolutionary.43 what the articles did provide were guidelines for a proper knightly lifestyle and how the knighthood might live together without fighting.44 even as the “captain of the union,” sickingen’s position was tightly regulated and centered around resolving internal disputes between members. it was not a war confederation.45 moreover, this union was not founded on the principle of resisting territorial, that is princely, authority.46 franz von sickingen’s experience as a noble does not simply conform to the notion that the nobility of the sixteenth century were in some sort of economic slump. privileged from birth, sickingen capitalized on the successes of his father with successes of his own. he 41 ibid. 42 waltz, ed., die flerscheimer chronik, 70-71. “unnd ist er, franntz zu key. mat. gehn prüssel geritten, daselbst viel zeit vergeblich gelegen, zuletzt; und bezalung halben ein abschiedt nemmen muessen unnd kein gelt empfanngen; unnd ist ime damals biss uber die 96000 fl., darfur frantz versprochen, schludig blieben, das ime nach gelegenheit unnd beschehener seiner treuen dienst nit wenig beschwerlich gewesen.” 43 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 203. “die inhalte der vereinigung sind weder direkt noch indirekt als aggressives programm einer revolutionsbereiten ritterschaft zu werten.” 44 reinhard scholzen, “franz von sickingen (1481–1523). fehde als geschäftsmodell,” reformation in der region: personen und erinnerungsorte 21 (2018): 68–69. 45 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 202. 46 “franz von sickingen: wortführer des adels, vorkämpfer der reformation und freund huttens,” adel im alten reich (tübingen: volker press, 1998), 326. 24 utilized the feud to build up his fortune and his prestige until he rivaled even some princes.47 while the time leading directly up to the feud with trier displays some level of short-term economic difficulty, the general trend for most of sickingen’s life does not suggest that he was in particularly dire economic straits. quite the contrary, he seems to have made out quite well for himself up until the campaign against france. it would be foolish to suggest that there were no economic motivations or considerations for the feud with trier; sickingen had incurred a significant pecuniary loss. yet this loss was not so significant that it prevented him from engaging in his preferred method of acquiring funds, namely feuding. his position in society as one of the most influential nobles makes him an unlikely candidate to lead a “revolt” against the princes of the empire generally. as things stood, he had done very well with the system as it was. yet how exactly did the feud play out and how was the feud reacted to by both the princes and sickingen’s contemporaries? the feud against trier on august 27, 1522, franz von sickingen sent his letter of feud to his rival, richard von grieffenklau, the elector of trier. in the letter, sickingen claimed that two men, citizens of trier, jacob von kröv and richard zu seenheim, had failed to repay him for an outstanding debt that they owed to sickingen. kröv and seenheim had been previously captured by two other knights, johann hilchen von lorch and heinrich von der tann, who had set their ransom at 5,150 gulden, which sickingen paid.48 this debt was quickly forgotten by the two citizens, but not by sickingen. further, sickingen claimed that the elector had acted against god, emperor, imperial mandates, and equity.49 in 1519 the elector of trier received bribes from the french crown, which had swung his vote in favor the french contender in the imperial election, francis i, king of france, in opposition to charles v, which sickingen drew upon for his accusations against the elector.50 sickingen’s letter of feud arrived on august 29. by september 3, 1522, sickingen had already captured two towns in the archbishop’s territory. a mandate from the reichregiment forbade anyone from assisting sickingen and demanded that the imperial estates assist the electorate. unfortunately for grieffenklau, help was not forthcoming. despite this, the archbishop mustered what troops he could and after the seizure of nearby st. wendels, the city of trier redoubled their preparations for war. by september 8, sickingen and his army had reached the city of trier. after a failed negotiation attempt by trier, sickingen moved his army with his cannons closer to the city and, on september 10, began his bombardment.51 the bombardment, however, accomplished very little. the defenders were quite successful, having been able to remove several of sickingen’s cannons from play and forcing sickingen to reposition. bombardment began in earnest once more on september 10. the city chronicler, johann falder, suspected that sickingen’s army did not have the firepower to make a breach in the 47 zmora, state and nobility, 120. 48 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 205-206. “die beiden treulosen vnnd meyneydigen jacoben von croff zu zell im hammen vnd richardem zu syenheym schultheißen.” 49 ibid., 204. “wider gott, kayserliche mayestat, des heligen reichs ordenung vnd billicheyt gehanndelt.” this quotation from is from the letter of feud. 50 ibid., 217. “der bischoff von tryer hab der kronen vill empfangen wider dye kl. m.” 51 ibid., 221. 25 wall, which suggested that sickingen’s army did not have much in the way of artillery.52 the bombardment continued until september 12. the city chronicler sums up the damages: “but by the will of the almighty and the protection of the saints, no men were shot with heavy shot, rather alone, a magpie, a mouse, and two chickens were killed.”53 as the bombardment of the city proved to be a complete failure, sickingen sent a letter to the people of trier, where he claimed that his feud was not against the citizens of the city, but rather with von grieffenklau himself. he claimed that he would do them no harm and grant them freedom, should they choose to surrender the city to him the following day. he additionally claimed that he would seize the property of the clergy and the archbishop, to whatever extent his assertions in were sincere, the citizens of trier did not surrender the city. after a brief repositioning of his artillery, the bombardment of the city resumed on september 13. that very day, a mediation attempt by the council of cologne, count johann von wied, and count bartholomew von der leyen failed; their request for 200,000 gulden on behalf of sickingen was rejected. in response, the archbishop requested 200,000 gulden from sickingen in compensation for the damages that sickingen had wrought.54 on september 14, 1522, sickingen withdrew from trier. in a letter addressed to balthasar schlör, sickingen detailed his reasons for withdrawal: (1) the commander of his reinforcements, nickel von minkwitz, had been captured and imprisoned by the landgrave of hessen, an old enemy of sickingen and a man with whom sickingen had previously feuded; (2) hessen and the count palatine of the rhine had thrown their support in for trier and sent the archbishop a large number of support troops; (3) further support troops had been sent by the duke of kleve to the aid of the archbishop; (4) the ruling of the reichsregiment had created a number of logistical problems for sickingen and his followers.55 following his abrupt withdrawal from trier, sickingen’s financial situation continued to deteriorate, despite help from one of his peers, hartmut von kronberg. trier, hessen, and the count palatine of the rhine met that winter to discuss further action against sickingen.56 as they targeted and systemically removed all of sickingen’s allies, they closed in for the kill. as the coalition of princes drew near, sickingen grew increasingly desperate and asked the franconian nobility for aid in 1522. he claimed that “the princes were aiming at nothing less ‘than to violently force all of us of the knighthood into obedience in their own terms.’”57 for all his prestige as a warlord, a feuder, and a knight, sickingen was unable to rally the franconian nobility to his side. retreating to his fortress at ebernburg, sickingen planned to carry on the fight. yet, while in his castle in landstuhl, sickingen found himself besieged, and within a week, the walls of 52 ibid. “flade vermutet, die heer sickingens büchsenmeister hätte die folgen des trierischen überfalls noch nicht beheben können, wodurch nur wenige geschütze einsatzfähig gewesen seien.” 53 ibid., 222. “doch uß willen des allmechtigen und vurbitt der heiligen keinen menschen mit allem hefftigen schiessen, sunder allein ein atzel, ein mus, und zwei hoener (als man sagen will) am leben geletzet.” this quotation is from the flerscheimer chronik. 54 ibid. 55 ibid., 224. 56 ibid., 233. 57 zmora, state and nobility,138. quoted: robert fellner, die fränkische ritterschaft von 1495-1524 : mit einer einleitung : hauptsächlich nach quellen aus dem hochstift würzburg (vaduz: kraus reprint, 1965), 235. 26 his castle were destroyed and he was mortally wounded by a cannonball. he died may 7, 1523 shortly after surrendering.58 reactions to the feud: the princes and the lower nobility in response to sickingen’s letter of the declaration of feud, richard von greiffenklau worked quickly to try and form a coalition of his peers against sickingen and his army. on august 28, just a day after sickingen had dispatched his letter, the archbishop had already sent further letters requesting assistance from the prince-bishop of mainz, albrecht von brandenburg. this appeal to a colleague, it seems, fell on deaf ears, despite claims that greiffenklau would aid brandenburg had their positions been reversed.59 the princebishop of mainz claimed that he could not help for fear of being attacked himself and that, moreover, he had already sent military aid to the swabian league and was not in a position to assist. further requests “in his need” were ignored.60 in sharp contrast to the inaction of mainz, the reichregiment responded quickly. on september 1, they called for the imperial estates to assist the electorate of trier and forbade any from assisting sickingen in any meaningful way.61 these demands, however, proved to likewise fall on deaf ears. by september 10, the reichregiment repeated its demands that sickingen not be supported under heavy penalty. it is likely that emperor charles v’s absence in spain had a great deal to do with the ineffectiveness of the reichregiment to rally effective support against sickingen. without the monarch on hand to lend his weight to the demands of the reichregiment, their ordinances resulted in few gains for trier’s position.62 the factor that in the end proved to be the undoing of sickingen’s chances of victory was the union of trier with the count palatine and hessen. the count palatine had, since 1518, grown increasingly wary of sickingen and, since september of that year, had entered into a loose association with the archbishop of trier. moreover, hessen and trier signed a treaty in 1521, assuring one another that they would assist each other in case of attack. the former, the association of trier and the count palatine, was done in the interest of keeping the peace, whereas the latter was done against the “increasingly threatening armaments of sickingen.”63 indeed, the alliance between hessen and trier proved to be immediately useful; hessen promised to send 200 cavalrymen and 1,000 infantry to the aid of trier on august 30, just one day after the declaration of the feud.64 what is also noteworthy is the lack of interest that sickingen’s own peers had in his plight. balthasar schlör had indicated as much in a letter to sickingen, warning him against a feud 58 “franz von sickingen: wortführer des adels, vorkämpfer der reformation und freund huttens,” 330. 59 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 212. “der brief endete mit der zusicherung richards, dass er den mainzer erzbischof in einer vegleichbaren situation ebenfalls bereitwilling unsterstützen würde.” 60 ibid. “vnß in vnseren nötten nit uerlassen.” 61 ibid., 213-214. 62 ibid., 227. 63 ibid., 230. “gegen die immer bedrohlicher werdenden rüstungen sickingens…” 64 ibid., 233. 27 with trier.65 notable by his absence is götz von berlichingen, a notorious feuder, who was imprisoned in heilbronn at this time. indeed, when the bishop of würzburg issued a call for 240 knights, no small portion of the knights dwelling in that area, 200 of the 240, were ready to proceed against sickingen in support of trier.66 while sickingen’s actions may have inflamed the nobility in franconia, who met in schweinfurt in late november, the purpose of their meeting was not to discuss support for sickingen. rather they met to discuss and justify the use the feud as a means for self-defense.67 that is not to say that sickingen had none of his peers take his side for his undertaking; hans rosenhoffer, a messenger for trier, noted that, among others, two counts of fürstenburg, the count of ewerstein, the count of löwenstein, schweikard von sickingen, franz’s son, and ulrich von hutten had all thrown their lot in with the wayward knight.68 it is hardly surprising that the franconian nobility displayed caution throughout sickingen’s rhetorical attempts to stir them to action. on january 29, 1523, the nobles of franconia gathered in schweinfurt to discuss, among other things, the offensive of the rhinish princes against sickingen.69 the knights of franconia formed an alliance; a selfdefense pact that stipulated that should any member of the alliance be attacked, the rest would support the beleaguered member.70 critically, all members of this alliance were to suspend their feudal obligations in favor of providing assistance and solidarity to their peers who were in need when unlawfully attacked.71 this union contrasts starkly with the stipulations found in sickingen’s knightly brotherhood in landau the year before. in the case of disputes under sickingen’s union, members who owed oaths were exempt from the stipulations of the union in order to fulfill their oaths.72 additionally, the franconian league of schweinfurt excluded those guilty of any crime, which specifically precluded sickingen’s ability to influence the knightly union or even gain access to it after being placed under the imperial ban.73 ironically, sickingen’s claims that the princes of the empire would come to franconia and destroy their power bases turned out to be true; the franconian war (fränkischer krieg), in which the swabian league invaded franconia and destroyed nearly 500 castles and seized a great deal of land, was caused in no small part by the league of schweinfurt.74 while significant, this swabian retaliation has very little to do with sickingen’s feud, save for the fact that his name and rhetoric held enough sway to cause some 400 franconian knights to meet. simply put, they were not interested at all in sickingen’s plight. with no significant support from the nobility, it becomes increasingly difficult to see franz von sickingen as some sort of knightly revolutionary leader. 65 ibid., 208-209. 66 w. r. hitchcock, the background of the knights’ revolt. 1522-1523. (los angeles: university of california press, 1958), 33. 67 zmora, state and nobility, 138-139. 68 ibid., 217. 69 ibid., 139. 70 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 139. “da die hilff not ist, ermandt werden, alszbald zuziegen und also jrs vermögens treulich helffen.” 71 zmora, state and nobility, 139. 72 scholzen, franz von sickingen, 201-202. 73 hitchcock, the background of the knights’ revolt, 33-34. 74 zmora, state and nobility, 139. 28 the princes—hessen and the count palatine aside—provided relatively little help to richard von grieffenklau. in the end, the mandate of the reichregiment did prove to have enough of an effect on the logistical situation of sickingen’s camp to force his withdrawal, and as the feud drew on and it became increasingly likely that sickingen would fail. increasingly, the princes jumped to trier’s aid, such as with the duke of kleve and the archbishop of köln. yet it must be said that sickingen’s army, while formidable, did not constitute an army of his peers. his conflict, fought on his own behalf, did not inspire the “flagging” nobility to rise and fight against a symbol of princely power. the feud was understood by his peers as just that: a feud, a personal matter in which most had no special obligation to take part and certainly very little to gain should sickingen have succeeded. conclusion to paint sickingen as a reformer or a rebel requires that sickingen’s motivations for his feud with trier go beyond merely recouping losses and implies that sickingen sought to redefine and reassert the status of the knighthood in germany. however, sickingen was neither a reformer nor a rebel, and certainly after his death, the knighthood as polity in europe continued to exist. his feud with trier was nothing more than that, a private conflict, an attempt on sickingen’s end to recoup losses incurred previously, which backfired spectacularly. lacking significant support from his peers, his feud did not achieve widespread appeal among the nobility. his own socio-economic standing was also not indicative of decline, and while he stood to gain from a successful feud, the overarching trend of his financial position throughout his life was anything but precarious. quite the contrary, while hurt by his unsuccessful campaign against france and the failure of charles v to repay a substantial loan, sickingen retained enough wherewithal to mount a major offensive against a powerful prince. while sickingen began his feud having incurred significant financial losses, he did so as a powerful noble, certainly not one in decline. sickingen was hardly reacting to a rapid change in governance but rather a trend of increasing terroritalization among the princes that had been an ongoing affair for the better part of a century. in sum, then, sickingen’s “revolt” is better classified not as a revolt, but as a feud. 3 women, royal power, and enlightenment in eighteenth-century europe the case of maria theresa elinor anderson university of minnesota abstract in 1741 maria theresa became the first and only woman to ascend the throne to the holy roman empire. this article discusses the challenges maria theresa faced as a female ruler and how she strengthened her power through the use of art as propaganda. the article traces how her image evolved over time and also examines her prolific use of her son and heir joseph ii in art. article in 1741 the austrian empire was in the middle of the austrian war of succession. it was a difficult time for empress maria theresa; her father had died only a short time ago, and she ascended the throne with little instruction on how to navigate her new position. while the majority of european powers had previously accepted maria theresa as her father’s successor, her gender was perceived as a weakness that could be taken advantage of.1 with the support of france, charles vii of bavaria claimed he should be in possession of her title.2 around the same time, frederick of prussia took the opportunity to invade silesia, a precious territory he had long desired to add to his kingdom.3 maria theresa desperately needed the help of the hungarian army to defend her title and keep her empire together. during this time, a story emerged about a meeting between maria theresa and an assembly of hungarian nobles. according to contemporary accounts, she approached them carrying her infant son and future ruler joseph ii close to her chest.4 the scene, later imagined in a book written by voltaire, was apparently very moving to the nobles. according to voltaire’s 1 karl vocelka, “many defeats, few victories. maria theresa’s foreign policy,” in maria theresa 1717-1780: strategist, mother, reformer, eds. elfriede iby, martin mutschlechner, werner telesko, and karl vocelka (vienna: amalthea, 2017), 82-84. 2 vocelka, “many defeats, few victories,” 82-84. 3 barbara stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia: die kaiserin in ihrer zeit (munich: verlag c.h. beck, 2017), 76-77. 4 hanne egghardt, maria theresias männer (vienna: verlag kermayr & scheriau gmbh & co. kg), 36. 4 account, by the time maria theresa had finished speaking, the men were crying and pledging their loyalty to their new ruler.5 he wrote: [maria theresa] quitted vienna and threw herself into the arms of those hungarians…having called an assembly of the four orders of the state, she appeared there, holding in her arms her eldest son, who had hardly left his cradle, and addressing them in latin…she spoke to the following purpose: abandoned by my friends, persecuted by my enemies, attacked by my nearest relations, i have no other source but in your fidelity…i deliver into your hands the daughter and son of your kings, whose safety depends on your conduct. sensibly affected by these words, the hungarians drew their sabres and cried with one voice…“we will die for maria theresa”…[w]hile they were protesting their readiness to lay down their lives in her defence, she was the only person who refrained from tears.6 it is significant that voltaire emphasizes the presence of her son, joseph. according to voltaire, maria theresa’s appearance as a mother who wanted to assure the safety of her son was what made her plea for aid successful. when maria theresa had first come to power, many worried that it would be a challenge for a female leader to effectively assert her authority. however, this story shows that maria theresa was adept at turning a potential weakness into a valuable strength early in her reign.7 the story of maria theresa appearing before the hungarian nobles demonstrates not only her effectiveness as a ruler but her skill at using her gender as an advantage for her public image. she used this strength effectively throughout her reign. however, her image as a monarch underwent changes as she got older and her role within her family changed. maria theresa’s image as a monarch can be divided into three eras: in the first era she was represented as a virtuous young woman, in the second as a vigilant mother, and in the third as a devoted widow. throughout her life, she perfected her image as the ideal woman, whose virtues justified her position as ruler. when maria theresa came to power in 1740, the idea of a female ruler was fairly new in habsburg history. for centuries of habsburg rule, it was not possible for a woman to inherit the family’s territories. however, that changed when charles ii, the last male in line of spanish habsburg, died in 1700, and leopold i, an austrian habsburg, inherited his kingdom and title.8 leopold i decided that his son charles would take the spanish throne, but charles ii’s death prompted leopold and his two sons to agree on a change of inheritance laws, which would prevent a future break-up of the habsburg territories.9 leopold i, joseph, and charles signed an agreement called the pactum mutuae successionis 5 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 91-92. 6 voltaire, the age of louis xv. being the sequel of the age of louis xiv. translated from the french of m. de voltaire (glasgow: printed for robert urie, 1771), 60-61. emphasis in the original. 7 michael yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art (university park: the pennsylvania state university press, 2011), 27. 8 irmard pangerl, “the pragmatic sanction and its consequences. the succession policy put to the test,” in maria theresa 1717-1780: strategist, mother, reformer, eds. elfriede iby, martin mutschlechner, werner telesko, and karl vocelka (vienna: amalthea, 2017), 57. 9 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 16. 5 (mutual pact of succession), which made it possible for a female child to inherit the habsburg lands when neither brother produced a male child. when leopold i passed away in 1705, joseph i became emperor, and when joseph i passed away in 1711, charles came to power as charles vi. joseph i left behind two daughters who were in line to inherit if charles vi passed away without a male heir. however, charles vi wanted his children— whether they were sons or daughters—to inherit the habsburg empire after him.10 to ensure his offspring would be first in line for the throne, charles vi implemented the pragmatic sanction. for the pragmatic sanction to take effect, charles vi needed the approval of the habsburg territories of bohemia, hungary, and italian territories, as well as the kingdoms of prussia, spain, russia, england, denmark, and the netherlands. over many years and through various methods, all of the habsburg territories and almost all foreign powers had agreed to acknowledge the pragmatic sanction.11 however, as previously noted, this acceptance did not stop various nations from attacking austria when charles vi’s death left it in a state of weakness. the pragmatic sanction was not enough to make maria theresa’s government strong—she needed precise and powerful propaganda that would support her claim to power and assert her authority in the austrian empire and europe. representation of women and maria theresa in the habsburg family initially, maria theresa’s gender presented a problem to habsburg tradition. the habsburgs’ method of representing a monarch was a finely tuned propaganda machine that had been developed over hundreds of years of rule to suit male rulers. maria theresa, as the dynasty’s first female ruler, did not fit the precedent set by her ancestors. such a drastic change in the history of the habsburg rulers required a change in representation.12 maria theresa’s importance to her nation and to her family lineage was different and had to be represented as such. to bolster her strength as a ruler, maria theresa used paintings, medals, and other media traditionally employed by habsburg rulers. however, unlike her predecessors, she used them to emphasize the virtues of habsburg women within the context of ruling. the traits she emphasized were fertility and motherhood. after her husband passed away, she also used the virtues of a devoted and devout widow. there had been virtually no attempt to define maria theresa’s image as future monarch before her father passed away. this was due to continued hope that a male heir would be born to either charles vi’s wife elisabeth or to maria theresa.13 prior to charles vi’s death, maria theresa was portrayed as the traditional, ideal habsburg woman. as michael yonan observes in his analysis of maria theresa’s use of art, “the commonplace habsburg conception of femininity…[was]...predicated upon piety, modesty, and more than anything the ability to bear children.”14 before she was married, she was portrayed as a good future wife, since the central purpose of paintings of women before marriage was to portray them 10 pangerl, “the pragmatic sanction and its consequences,” 57. 11 pangerl, “the pragmatic sanction and its consequences,” 59-63. 12 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 15-16. 13 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 19-20. 14 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 19. 6 as desirable, fertile, and devoted wives.15 early portraiture of maria theresa largely adhered to these standards. male habsburg rulers were subject to their own rules of portrayal. there were many traditions of representation that they could draw from when creating their propaganda. the virtues traditionally attributed to habsburg rulers were piety and military prowess, which could be displayed through various media such as paintings, monuments, and coins.16 the cult of the image of the king reached new heights under maria theresa’s father charles vi, whose works include karlskirche (st. charles’s church), which still stands in vienna. works like karlskirche emphasized the ruler’s piety. here, it was specifically made as a reminder of the role charles vi’s devotion played in saving the city from the plague.17 charles also created a monument with a specific emphasis on the earthly rewards for piety. in an allegorical altar painting in the augustinerkirche (the augustinian church), charles vi asked god to provide him with a son.18 displays of piety were important for rulers. this one was particularly important because it asked for a male heir and because the possession of a male heir was viewed as a sign of god’s favor.19 the hope for a male heir and that goal’s representation in art and other works remained central to charles’s reign. family genealogy was another important propaganda tool for the habsburgs. for centuries, their rulers had constructed extensive family trees which connected them to various great mythological, historical, and biblical figures.20 the purpose of these family trees was not to be accurate but to link the current ruler to ancestors who would justify or consolidate their power.21 they were often used to justify a claim to the kingdom of rome. in these trees the habsburgs presented themselves as the descendants of important people, in order to assert that they were the rightful heirs to the holy roman empire.22 charles vi commissioned an interesting genealogical work. this was a large, colorful book chronicling his family lineage called genealogia habsburgicae.23 researching and displaying the royal family’s genealogy was an effective tool in strengthening a monarch’s claim to power, as it presented one’s ancestry and ancestral virtues as justification for the current monarch’s right to rule. charles vi needed to bolster his standing because his lack of a male heir weakened his image. published in 1737, genealogia habsburgicae used lavish illustrations and extensive family trees to display an impressive and largely mythical family history and generate the 15 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 19. 16 franz matsche, die kunst im dienst der staatsidee kaiser karls vi.: ikonographie, ikonologie und programmatik des "kaiserstils” (berlin: de gruyter, 1981), 64. 17 matsche, die kunst im dienst der staatsidee kaiser karls vi, 64. 18 ilsebill barta-fliedl, familienporträts der habsburger: dynastische repräsentation im zeitalter der aufklärung (vienna, böhlau, 2001), 66. 19 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 19-20. 20 marie tanner, the last descendant of aneas: the hapsburgs and the mythic image of the emperor (new haven: yale university press, 1993), 103. 21 tanner, the last descendant of aneas, 105-107. 22 tanner, the last descendant of aneas, 105-107, 137. 23 andrew wheatcroft, the habsburgs: embodying empire (london: viking, 1995), 217. 7 public’s interest in their ruler and his ancestors.24 however, since the book emphasizes family lineage, it draws one’s attention to charles’s lack of a male heir. although maria was charles’s likely successor at this point, she was not incorporated in the traditional habsburg imagery the way a male might have been. as a woman, maria theresa’s role in habsburg family history was to produce children. genealogia habsburgicae chose to utilize maria theresa’s image in this tradition. instead of being presented as charles vi’s heir, she was presented as the source of a possible male heir. if maria theresa gave birth to a son before charles vi died, he would inherit the throne instead of her. therefore, she appears in genealogia habsburgicae as a bridging figure between charles vi and a yet unborn male heir among maria’s children. she appears in a less precise and specific way in the book than any of the male habsburgs. charles vi and a number of his male predecessors appear in an illustration near the beginning of the book. they are drawn in a row of busts, whose faces are precisely made to represent past monarchs and whose names are written at their bases. in contrast, maria theresa’s appearance in the book is as an allegorical figure rather than as a specific person. the female figure who represents maria theresa is unnamed, with generic, idealized female features (figure 1).25 figure 1: unpaginated illustrations in geneaologia habsburgicae 24 marquart herrgott, genealogia diplomatica augustae gentis habsburgicae: qua continentur vera gentis hujus exordia, antiquitates, propagationes, possessiones [et] praerogativae, chartis ac diplomatibus ....(vienna: ex typographia leopoldi joannis kaliwoda, 1737). 25 unpaginated illustrations in herrgott, genealogia diplomatica augustae gentis habsburgicae. 8 an illustration on one page shows a woman standing in a chariot pulled by two lions, accompanied by two putti—one holding a cornucopia, symbolic of prosperity, and the other holding a two-faced bust, accompanied by a book and medals. the woman is holding an imaginary baby who represents the future archduke of austria.26 the picture predicts a prosperous future where the dynasty is continued by the probable birth of a male grandchild. therefore, the strength and hope of maria theresa during her father’s lifetime was to provide a male heir for the family. hopes for a male heir were bolstered when maria theresa married francis stephen of lorraine. their marriage has drawn much interest from biographers and the general public since it was a love marriage, which was uncommon for the time. however, the marriage also had political implications. francis was from the house of lorraine, which had a long history with the habsburg monarchy as well as the bourbons in france.27 francis’s father, leopold of lorraine, was the grandson of habsburg and holy roman emperor ferdinand ii.28 the lorraine family wanted to marry one of their sons to one of charles vi’s daughters to solidify the two families’ relationship and to bolster the lorraine family’s status.29 he planned to send their son clemens to visit the habsburgs in prague during charles vi’s coronation as the king of bohemia to further his marriage plans. however, clemens passed away unexpectedly and it was quickly decided that francis stephen would go in his place.30 once charles met francis stephen in 1723, he agreed to the marriage of their children, although the decision was not yet made known to the public.31 maria theresa and francis stephen were finally married in 1736.32 after her marriage, maria theresa’s pregnancies were highly anticipated events.33 during charles vi’s lifetime, maria theresa was pregnant several times. each birth was eagerly awaited, but to the disappointment of the nation and the royal family, all resulted in a female child.34 despite the disappointment in the gender of the babies, it had at least become obvious that maria theresa was fertile, so there was much hope around her fourth pregnancy.35 when charles vi passed away in 1740, they were still without a male heir, and maria theresa became the ruler. however, the birth of a male heir was not far off. in 26 herrgott, geneaologia habsburgicae. 27 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 27. 28 renate zedinger, “francis stephen of lorraine and maria theresa. the fight for inheritance in the european power struggle,” in maria theresa 1717-1780: strategist, mother, reformer, eds. elfriede iby, martin mutschlechner, werner telesko, and karl vocelka (vienna: amalthea, 2017), 94. 29 stollberg-rilinger maria theresia, 28-29. 30 egghardt, maria theresias männer, 8-9. 31 zedinger, “francis stephen of lorraine and maria theresa,” 94. 32 karl vocelka. “maria theresa. strategist—mother—reformer. key biographical information,” in maria theresa 1717-1780: strategist mother reformer, eds. elfriede iby, martin mutschlechner, werner telesko, and karl vocelka (vienna: amalthea, 2017), 28. 33 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 292. 34 egghardt, maria theresias männer, 23. 35 stollberg-rilinger. maria theresia, 291, 297. 9 1741 her first son, the future joseph ii, was born. this long-anticipated event was celebrated with great excitement and pomp.36 representing the monarch as a mother joseph’s birth caused an immediate change in the way maria theresa and her family were represented in royal propaganda. joseph was suddenly introduced as a vital part of maria theresa’s image as a monarch. she was now the mother of a future male monarch. in addition to the events around joseph’s birth, the day was commemorated in coins. coins were important to a monarch’s image and were considered one of the most enduring medium of royal propaganda.37 they were produced for a variety of events, including royal births, marriages, and deaths. they were distributed to nobility, many of whom were avid coin collectors.38 maria theresa’s daughter, maria anna, was interested in coins and produced a book with an extensive record of the various coins released under maria theresa’s reign.39 a large section of the coins featured in maria anna’s book commemorated the births of her brothers and sisters, including a large number of coins for joseph ii. the use of coins remained important each time maria theresa gave birth to a son during her reign, helping to show the ever-strengthening line of possible heirs she was creating. several coins commemorating maria theresa’s sons’ births are interesting. on one coin, joseph is already described as the future king of austria, hungary, and bohemia.40 the medal features a picture of baby hercules—a traditional male allegorical figure that could not be applied to maria theresa—strangling a snake. joseph’s birth was important because it allowed for these historically powerful and masculine representations to be used by the monarchy again. they were also comforting, since they reminded austrians that joseph’s birth meant a male heir was prepared to rule over the next generation. even more powerful than the image of joseph alone was the image of mother and son together. maria could now assume the role of mother and bridging figure in the habsburg family imagined in genealogia habsburgicae. there were many portraits created of maria theresa and joseph together. one that is particularly interesting places joseph and maria in separate spaces. in it, maria occupies the central, large portrait space while joseph hovers above in a small circular space under a crown.41 it is a strange image and one wonders why the two are pictured separately. this is a question michael yonan asks in his analysis of the art of maria theresa: why is maria theresa not cradling or playing with her baby?42 i argue this is to emphasize their individuality. maria theresa is presented as the current ruler and joseph as the future ruler. rather than a typical mother-son portrait, this portrait relates to 36 stollberg-rilinger. maria theresia, 311. 37 matsche, die kunst im dienst der staatsidee kaiser karls vi, 67. 38 barta-fliedl, familienporträts der habsburger, 83. 39 maria anna, schauund denkmünzen welche unter der regierung der kaiserinn königinn maria theresia geprägt worden sind. medailles frappees sous le regne de l'imperatrice marie terese. (vienna: krauß, 1782). 40 maria anna, schauund denkmünzen welche unter der regierung der kaiserinn königinn maria theresia, 25. 41 martin van meytens, double portrait of empress maria theresa and archduke joseph as a child, ca. 1744, oil on canvas, wien museum, vienna. the image is reproduced in yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 26. 42 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 27. 10 another tradition of early modern portraiture, in which male and female family members are pictured inhabiting separate, gendered spheres. kate retford analyzes such portraits within the context of eighteenth-century england. she analyzes a family portrait where a mother, father, three daughters, and two sons are all pictured. however, not all family members are present in the room.43 the room is at home in a private, familial, female space where the mother and three daughters are present. the three males included in the portrait do not all inhabit the same space. the eldest son and father are not present in the room. the father is pictured in a portrait on the wall, and the eldest son is present in a painting being held by one of his sisters. the youngest son is present in the room, interacting with the four women. retford argues that this represents the various distances of the men in relation to the women and their space. the father is entirely removed. the eldest son is removed to a lesser degree, as he is not in the room but is being held by his sister. the youngest son is still entirely in the female realm, but looks up to his father, in anticipation of a future where he too will join him in the public sphere.44 the portrait of maria theresa and joseph is not as straightforward as the portrait analyzed by retford. instead of picturing the mother in a domestic realm, it places her in the public realm. unlike the women in the english painting, maria theresa is a female ruler who must inhabit a public, male space. i argue that this painting attempts to establish maria theresa firmly as a ruler, who represents a temporary female entry into the public realm. however, the presence of joseph in the portrait reminds the viewer that her time in the male sphere is limited, and that someday her son will restore order and male, monarchical tradition by taking over the public space inhabited by the ruler. the smaller portrait of joseph is separate from, but also joined with, the larger portrait inhabited by maria theresa. he is neither fully independent of nor fully attached to his mother. the double portrait represents both his present and future status. in the present, he is still a child who is very connected to his mother as a son. however, his distance from her also reminds the viewer of his future, when he will be entirely separate from his mother’s influence. the portrait almost seems to hint that someday joseph will come down from the smaller, higher portrait and occupy the center of the portrait inhabited by maria theresa. in the future, it is implied that joseph will take his mother’s place as the focus of the portrait and reclaim the position of the monarch for the male sphere. however, maria theresa is still clearly the power figure of this portrait. as yonan points out in his study of the painting, joseph’s portrait acknowledges his power as a future male monarch, but his connection to maria theresa in this portrait reminds the viewer that it was maria theresa who gave birth to joseph and provided a male heir for the next generation.45 the painting points to a hopeful future and emphasizes maria theresa’s virtue as a mother and her role in creating a hopeful future for the dynasty and nation.46 43 antonio di bittio, elizabeth countess of bristol with her children, 1773, oil on canvas, courtauld institute of art, london 44 kate retford, the art of domestic life: family portraiture in eighteenth-century england (new haven: yale university press, 2006), 105-106. 45 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 28. 46 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 28. 11 now that maria theresa had a male heir to continue the habsburg line, their relationship became a powerful image in assuring people of austrian strength and inspiring them. this can be seen in the use of this portrait to motivate soldiers. while they were in the field, austrian general khevenhüller showed the troops a portrait of maria theresa holding her son joseph. according to a contemporary account, the soldiers were visibly moved and motivated by the image: “they have defied their sorrows...[they] threw kisses to the portrait, and swore there, to forever stay true to the queen, then filled the air with the oftrepeated cry of ‘long live queen maria theresa!’”47 the image of their monarch with their child was an inspiring image; it reinforced the importance of defending the country for their current and future rulers. maria theresa’s large family also became an important part of her image as monarch. this marked a divergence from what past monarchs had emphasized. her father in particular avoided family portraits, because they emphasized the absence of a son in the family.48 however, unlike her father, maria theresa had an unusually large number of children, and it was a powerful and frequently used visual practice to present them situated around her.49 one portrait where this effect is especially evident is by martin van meytens that places the family at an imaginary terrace (figure 2).50 figure 2: martin van meytens, the imperial family, 1754, oil on canvas, schönbrunn palace, vienna. 47 anonymous, 1743/45, volume i (1743), 660, quoted in barta-fliedl, familienporträts der habsburger, 72. 48 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 19. 49 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 292. 50 martin van meytens, the imperial family, 1754, oil on canvas, schönbrunn palace, vienna. 12 maria theresa is surrounded by her husband and numerous children. in a break with tradition, the male children are situated around maria theresa, and the female children are around francis stephen. francis stephen and all the boys are gesturing toward maria theresa, showing that the power belongs to her.51 representing the monarch as a widow in 1765, maria theresa was forced to revise her image entirely. her husband francis stephen passed away suddenly while the family was attending a wedding in innsbruck. this left the family and maria theresa in shock. following francis stephen’s death, maria theresa went into deep mourning. she immediately changed her image to suit that of a widow. there were strict rules as to how early modern widows, particularly royalty, could be represented. the transformation started with the maria theresa herself. she wore all black and a widow’s hood, and she cut her hair. the only color in her clothing that remained was her sternkreuzorden (order of the starry cross) insignia, which she wore on her chest.52 widowhood impacted her daily life as well. at that time, women were expected to conduct themselves differently during widowhood. according to the spanish humanist juan luis vives, the “ideal widow” remained loyal to her deceased husband. they were to focus on “chastity,” “obedience,” and “self-control” in the years before their own deaths.53 widows were expected to become more reclusive and reflect on their own lives and preparing to die themselves. women often secluded themselves to a place called a witwensitz (dowager’s residence) for this purpose.54 in widowhood, every aspect of a woman—her clothing, her daily habits, her identity—became connected to her deceased husband. at first it might seem like a widow’s individual power was diminished in the wake of her husband’s death, since much of her life and identity had to center around him. however, widowhood came with powerful virtues and imagery that could bolster a woman’s personal authority.55 the image of a chaste widow dedicated to raising her children and preserving her husband’s memory was used by many female rulers who came to power upon their husbands’ deaths. as a widow-ruler, maria theresa became a more familiar figure to early modern europeans. her position was now very similar to that of a female regent, that is, someone who ruled in place of their deceased husband while they waited for their son to become old enough to wield power. one example of a prominent female regent is caterina sforza, whose representation as a widow regent has been analyzed by joyce de vries.56 caterina sforza came to power as her son’s regent when her husband, giralmo 51 barta-fliedl, familienporträts der habsburger, 92. 52 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresia, 521-522; yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 46-48. 53 sandra cavallo and lyndan warner, “introduction,” in widowhood in medieval and early modern europe, eds. sandra cavallo and lyndan warner (london: pearson education limited, 1999). 54 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 89. 55 joyce de vries, “casting her widowhood: the contemporary and posthumous portraits of caterina sforza,” in widowhood and visual culture in early modern europe, ed. allison levy (burlington: ashgate publishing company, 2003), 80. 56 de vries, “casting her widowhood,” 78. 13 riaro, was assassinated in 1488. de vries argues that caterina sforza used her image as a widow and her connection to her deceased husband, as well as her son, to assert her own rule in sixteenth-century italy.57 unlike an actual widow-regent, maria theresa had ruled long before her husband’s death. additionally, her son joseph had already been crowned holy roman emperor and was old enough to take over the throne when his father died. however, maria theresa maintained power, and in many ways, widowhood amplified the positive feminine qualities that maria theresa had cultivated during her husband’s lifetime. as a widow-ruler, maria theresa emphasized her dedication to her late husband, and her influence on her children. maria theresa’s portraiture adapted to assert her power while still adhering to the traditional portrayal of widows. by looking at the portraits that she commissioned, and by looking at which ones she decided to display and which ones she did not, we can get a sense of the exact image she was trying to present. in one portrait commissioned but never displayed by maria theresa, it is possible to discern what she did not want to convey to her subjects (figure 3). 58 in this portrait, maria appears as a very powerful and active figure and there is an emphasis on her personal impact as a ruler. in a way, it is one of the most masculine imaginings of maria theresa. as yonan points out in his analysis of the portrait, she is pictured holding the plans of schönbrunn, showing her role in the creation of her summer residence.59 maria theresa played a large part in designing her palace, but it is rarely linked to her in an overt a manner as it is in this painting. 60 connecting a ruler with the architecture they commissioned is something typically done with male rulers. the portrait also places several books in front of maria theresa, signifying knowledge and study. yonan argues this is partially because reading was an important part of widowhood, but the inclusion also emphasizes her own personal intelligence and work.61 overall, the painter’s choice to picture maria theresa with architectural plans and books transforms her into a more active ruler in the wake of her husband’s death. her decision not to display that picture shows that this is not the way she wanted her subjects to view her rule. this portrait was originally meant to be part of a pair of portraits featuring maria theresa and the deceased francis stephen. while she never displayed her portrait, she did display francis’s.62 rather than emphasizing her independence in her years as a widow, maria theresa chose to represent her power indirectly through loyalty to her husband’s memory and her commitment to her children and their future roles in the monarchy. 57 de vries, “casting her widowhood,” 77-92. 58 anton von maron, portrait of empress maria theresa as a widow, 1773, oil on canvas, kunstistorisches museum wien, vienna, http://www.khm.at/objektdb/detail/2415/?offset=9&lv=list, accessed september 12, 2020. 59 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 55. 60 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 55. 61 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 52. 62 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 56. 14 figure 3: anton von maron, portrait of empress maria theresa as a widow, 1773, oil on canvas, kunstistorisches museum wien, vienna it is useful to compare maria theresa’s propaganda strategies from her years as a widow to those of catherine de’ medici, queen of france in the mid-sixteenth century.63 when her husband henri ii was killed in a jousting accident, it fell to catherine to rule as her son’s regent.64 in many ways, catherine de’ medici’s position as a ruler was as tenuous as maria theresa’s was in its early years. salic law prevented women from inheriting the throne, so france was unprepared for a queen to assume the position of ruler.65 additionally, catherine de’ medici was of foreign birth, so she needed a convincing system of imagery and propaganda to convince france she was the right person to assume rule in her husband’s place.66 a major part of establishing her authority involved emphasizing her 63 sheila ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia: figuring the powerful widow,” in rewriting the renaissance: the discourses of sexual difference in early modern europe, ed. by margaret w. ferguson, maureen quilligan, and nancy j. vickers (chicago: chicago university press, 1986), 227. 64 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 228. 65 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 228. 66 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 228. 15 connection to her husband and children. rather than trying to project the traits of a good male ruler, she emphasized her virtues as a mother and widow.67 family and power represented in the vieux-laque zimmer the core of maria theresa’s propaganda strategy in the later years of her reign is represented well by the vieux-laque zimmer. this room, which was francis stephen’s old study in schönbrunn and renovated by maria theresa as a memorial, masterfully presents maria theresa as the creator and supporter of a strong, future family line, and it accomplishes this without displaying a portrait of herself.68 the vieux-laque zimmer achieves its goal as royal propaganda in a unique way. it combines two types of symbolically important rooms created in early modern europe. the first and most obvious tradition connected to it is that of the gedächtnisraum (memorial room), which was created to honor a widow’s deceased husband.69 however, the room was especially important to maria theresa because she combined this tradition with a second one, which is the royal tradition of creating rooms or other monuments dedicated to the memory of family members. these monuments, called ahnengalerien (galleries of ancestors), were often used by rulers as part of their propaganda and not meant to present a realistic image of the rulers’ family history but rather to depict the virtues of their family and to present a coherent claim to power through lineage. members of the family could be included or excluded depending on the message the ruler was trying to send.70 maria theresa never commissioned a room dedicated to a long family history. like the creators of genealogia habsburgicae, maria theresa had reached the conclusion that emphasizing her role in the present and future of the family was a better approach than trying to reconcile her rule with the past. although maria was now past her childbearing years, the vieux-laque zimmer shows a continued focus on her role in her family as her central claim to power. the earlier portraits of her family were important because they showed a bright future for the habsburg family. now that her children were growing up, marrying, and having their own children, those promises of a bright future were coming true. it conveys maria theresa’s power by showing her family and her strong connections to it and to its future prosperity. as yonan argues in his analysis of the vieux-lauque zimmer, maria theresa’s part in continuing the habsburg line is displayed in two of the three portraits in the room. in addition to a portrait of francis stephen, the room contains the portrait of her two sons, leopold and joseph, and the portrait of leopold’s wife maria luisa with their children, including their son.71 the portraits of her children and grandchildren played various roles in maria theresa’s propaganda and conveyed different things about her to her subjects different things. 67 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 228, 240. 68 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 99. 69 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 99. 70 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 97-98. 71 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 118. 16 the first and most obvious point of the portraits is their emphasis on the long line of possible heirs to the habsburg throne. this was maria’s strongest virtue and strongest claim to power. she had come to the monarchy due to the absence of a male heir. now, she was able to proudly display her many sons and grandsons—a solid line of men to draw on for the next generation of rulers. joseph, leopold, and leopold’s son were all on display in the vieux-laque zimmer. however, as yonan notes, leopold’s son was not pictured with him but rather with his mother.72 according to yonan, this effectively de-emphasized the father-son relationship and put greater focus on the boy’s relationship to his grandmother, maria theresa.73 maria theresa is presented as the central, organizing figure responsible for the three men in line for the throne. by focusing on her two oldest male children in the vieux-laque zimmer portrait of leopold i and joseph ii (figure 4), maria theresa emphasizes her own personal virtue as a ruler, and their continuation in the next generation.74 this can be seen in the portrait of her sons that she picked, and how she modified it from its original form. figure 4: pompeo batoni, portrait of the holy roman emperor joseph ii and grand duke leopold of tuscany in rome, 1769, oil on canvas, kunsthistorisches museum wien, vienna. 72 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 118-119. 73 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 118-119. 74 pompeo batoni, portrait of the holy roman emperor joseph ii and grand duke leopold of tuscany in rome, 1769, oil on canvas, kunsthistorisches museum wien, vienna, http://www.khm.at/en/objectdb/detail/185/?offset=8&lv=list, accessed july 8, 2020. 17 the painting of joseph and leopold, by italian painter pompeo batoni, was not the original version of the painting. it was a later version, made specifically for the room. two major changes were made to the portrait, both of which, according to yonan, can possibly be traced back to maria theresa. in the second painting, villa medici was replaced by minerva, and instead of handing joseph a symbol of power, she hands him an olive branch. 75 maria theresa was often associated with minerva, so we can assume that minerva is meant to represent her in this portrait.76 the olive branch also symbolizes maria theresa’s own foreign policy. in the later years of her reign, maria theresa placed a greater emphasis on maintaining peace.77 additionally, she was particularly concerned about joseph’s continued interest in the military and his admiration for her rival, frederick the great.78 the choice to insert herself and a symbol representing her own foreign policy removes power from joseph in favor of maria theresa.79 through this painting, maria theresa displays her influence on her sons and her part in shaping a peaceful future for the habsburg empire. the depiction of joseph ii’s power as inseparable from her own power is reminiscent of catherine de’ medici’s use of her own son in artwork. in one of the artemisia tapestries, she and her son appear in front of the estates-general.80 artemisia appears at her son’s side. he is in the traditional position as ruler; he sits on the throne and is dressed in roman attire. shelia ffolliott argues that since artemisia cannot directly appear in the central role of king, she “must rule indirectly.”81 her son occupies the traditional male throne, but artemisia looms behind him, guiding and advising his movements as ruler. the viewer knows that, while her son must appear in-charge for visual representations, catherine de’ medici, as represented by artemisia, is the true power behind the throne. this is similar to joseph ii’s visual position vis-a-vis maria theresa. while joseph ii is the holy roman emperor, her positioning of minerva behind him in the painting is a reminder to the viewer of who holds the real power in the family. commonalities in the presentation of catherine and maria theresa and their sons are not confined to these portraits, and in fact the vieux-laque zimmer in its entirety is reminiscent of a structure commissioned by catherine de’ medici. after henri ii’s death, catherine decided to build a chapel in which his memory would be honored and where henri, catherine, and their children would all be buried. while on a surface level, the monument honors her late husband, ffolliott argues that the valois chapel also represents catherine’s own power. it highlights her own virtue as a pious, dedicated widow. it is also built in the roman style, which reflects her italian heritage.82 like catherine de’ medici’s chapel, the vieux-laque zimmer is a memorial used to subtly display maria theresa’s virtues. in the painting of joseph ii, as well as the painting of her deceased husband, maria 75 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 112. 76 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 112. 77 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 112. 78 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 114. 79 yonan, empress maria theresa and the politics of habsburg imperial art, 114. 80 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 238-240. 81 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 241. 82 ffolliott, “catherine de’ medici as artemisia,” 236. 18 theresa appears in the form of allegory. maria theresa effectively used a memorial to her deceased husband to assert her own virtues as a ruler. conclusion from the time of maria theresa’s birth in 1717 to her death in 1780, her image underwent many transformations. originally she was portrayed no differently from ordinary female royalty. when she became queen, her image had to change. she approached the problem from several directions, but overall maria theresa chose to take the virtues applied to her as a woman and apply them to her new position as ruler. most importantly, the birth of a male heir allowed maria theresa to claim god’s approval and to promise a stable future with a male heir. after maria theresa’s husband passed away, another change in representation was required. maria theresa projected the powerful image of a dedicated widow, who indulged little in worldly pleasures and ostentatious pageantry but spent her days in the honorable pursuit of preserving her husband’s memory and caring for her large family. maria theresa based much of her image as a ruler in her male relations. she put particular emphasis on her son joseph ii. she encouraged her subjects’ anticipation of his eventual ascension to the throne, while quietly reminding them that she was their current ruler and he was influenced by her wisdom. to joseph ii’s chagrin, his mother’s claim to power was not just for appearances. even after joseph was named her coregent, maria theresa held the power to make all final decisions. maria theresa created an effective and long-lasting image of a strong, female monarch whose respective roles as wife, mother, and widow earned her subjects’ respect and supported a long, stable reign. please update your browser your browser isn’t supported anymore. update it to get the best youtube experience and our latest features. learn more google chrome mozilla firefox microsoft edge opera safari remind me later about copyright contact us terms privacy policy & safety © 2025 google llc 38 “get yourselves under control!” youth sexuality in the third reich sydni zastre university of alberta abstract the nazis were a party of youth and obsessed with controlling every aspect of the lives of young people, including their sexuality. this article explores efforts by the nazis to divert the energies of youth into (re)productively acceptable channels, such as forced membership in organizations like the hitler youth and the league of german girls, mandatory service during wartime, and legal policies centered on racial purity. however, their efforts proved incoherent, inconsistent, and largely unenforceable. as demonstrated by the increase in female sexual freedom and prostitution and homosexual activity in the military during the second world war, young people often disregarded, and even challenged, nazi prescriptions about sexuality and continued to engage in sexual behaviors, both “anti-social” and otherwise. article introduction the nazis were a party of youth.1 the party’s membership was significantly younger than that of most other parties, from the rank and file to the leadership, “with a mean age of approximately thirty-one for all new joiners in the period from 1925 to 1932.”2 and more importantly, the nazis were the prophets of a cult of youth—obsessed with ensuring germany’s glorious, racially sound future, of which young people were both the substance and the saviors. as pioneer of nazi alltagsgeschichte detlev peukert has noted, “during the twelve years of the nazi state three separate age groups passed through adolescence, that is the years between the fourteenth and eighteenth birthdays. each group had its own distinctive experiences.”3 but common to these experiences was a level of control, or attempted control, by the nazi state over every aspect of their lives, mostly by means of the mass youth organizations, the hitlerjugend (hitler youth, hj) and the bund deutscher mädel (the league of german girls, bdm). some of the aspects upon which the nazis fixated were sex and sexuality—natural and inevitable parts of youth for many people and 1 the title of this paper comes from “sexual indecency on active duty,” first published anonymously as “…unzucht in der soldatenzeit,” in das schwarze korps, 5 march 1936, 8, in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 14 (source 162). the “younger generation” is exhorted to “show some respect for the great men of our german history and get yourselves under control!” 2 michael kater, hitler youth (cambridge: harvard university press, 2004), 10. 3 detlev peukert, “youth in the third reich,” in life in the third reich, ed. richard bessel (oxford: oxford university press, 1987), 25. 39 ones which had the potential to either strengthen or destabilize the totalitarian “racial state,” a power of which the nazis were well aware. despite propaganda efforts and bombastic theoretical pronouncements, however, the nazis were not able to control youth sexuality as well as might be expected (or they might have hoped). official state policies regarding youth sexuality and sex education were often contradictory and difficult to enforce; sex played an important, if unofficial, role within the hj, the bdm, and the nonstate-approved youth groups, such as the edelweiss pirates and the swing kids; considerations of race and gender often took precedence over lofty ideological goals, further weakening the official stance(s) of the party on youth sexuality. the second world war and the experiences of total war also affected youth sexuality in ways which were often beyond the party’s control, as demonstrated by the increase of female sexual freedom and prostitution and incidences of homosexuality in the armed forces. an exploration of these topics highlights the variability and inefficiency of nazi control over the sex lives of young people. official policy the nazis came to power on the heels of what has been widely recognized as a period of liberalization and experimentation, particularly in the sexual realm: the weimar republic, marked by, to name only a few examples, the expansion of the science of sexology, the popularity of the nudist (or “naturist”) movement, and a push to decriminalize abortion and homosexuality. almost immediately after hitler’s accession, the party began attempting to undo the strides made by the reformers, physicians, and activists of the weimar years—but the backlash was by no means total or consistent; and indeed, in some ways, the wave of liberalization continued. as historian of sexuality dagmar herzog has explored in her important work on sex and the nazis, great emphasis was placed on sexual pleasure within marriage, for both males and females; contraception was more widely available than may be assumed; and preand extramarital sex were by no means shunned, but indeed often condoned, both tacitly and otherwise. however, underlying these positive incentives was the racial divide inherent to nazism, which both disavowed overt sexuality as “jewish” filth and enshrined it as a german privilege. in essence, as herzog states, “the goal was not so much to suppress sexuality. rather the aim was to reinvent it as the privilege of non-disabled, heterosexual ‘aryans.’”4 this uneven approach is characteristic of official nazi policies towards sexuality; but although initially they seem so contrary as to even be hypocritical, historian of sexuality annette f. timm has noted that “[i]t is possible to make sense of the seemingly contradictory positions [of the regime] if one recognizes the underlying consistency of policies that were all directed toward the same goal: the creation of a racially sanitized state with the power to rule europe and beyond. sexuality, in other words, was viewed as a means to an end.”5 this was true for young people as well as for adults. conference minutes from the horst wessel school in kassel decree on 1 december 1933 that “sex education in the classroom is banned by ministerial ordinance,” and just under three weeks later, that “[m]ore emphasis shall be placed on the study of 4 dagmar herzog, “sex and the third reich,” sex after fascism: memory and morality in twentieth-century germany (princeton: princeton university press, 2005), 4. 5 annette f. timm, “sex with a purpose: prostitution, venereal disease, and militarized masculinity in the third reich,” in sexuality and german fascism, ed. dagmar herzog (new york: berghahn books, 2005), 225. 40 genealogy.”6 race education took precedence over sex education—but as we have seen, sex and race were inseparable for the nazis. practical sexual education was far less important than imbuing youth with a sense of their place in the machinery of the nazi regime and the future of the german people. as geoffrey giles notes, “their bodies were not theirs to do with as they wished, but belonged to the aryan race, the propagation of which they held in sacred trust.”7 thus, the general tenor of nazi policies toward youth sexuality was twofold: first, youth should be kept pure, protected from even the sight or knowledge of unacceptable manifestations of sexuality, for example sex work and homosexuality;8 but second, if they were going to have sex, it should be with a racially appropriate partner. if that union happened to produce illegitimate offspring, they would at least be providing the reich with one more aryan soldier or citizen, as is hinted at by an order of himmler’s issued after the invasion of poland in september 1939: “beyond the boundaries of perhaps otherwise still necessary bourgeois laws and customs it will also outside of marriage be an important responsibility for german women and girls of good blood, not lightly, but rather in profound moral seriousness, to become the mothers of children of soldiers who are going to the front and of whom fate alone knows whether they will return or fall in battle for germany.”9 to prevent both domestic and international controversy, however, this particular aim could not necessarily be explicitly promulgated on the home front: to do so would have been contrary to what historian robert g. waite calls the nazis’ “exaggerated interest in morality.”10 as summarized by herzog, “what a reading of a broad array of nazi writings on sex suggests is that no prior regime in history had ever so systematically set itself the task of stimulating and validating especially young people’s sexual desires—all the while denying precisely that this is what they were doing.”11 not all sexual desires were encouraged, however, and not all young people were entitled to them. among the most problematic sites of this internal conflict were the nazis’ own youth organizations, the hitler youth and the league of german girls. sexual double standards in the hj and the bdm as in many other areas, when it came to youth organizations, the nazis proved themselves deeply sexist. a 1932 sex education book proclaimed that “[i]t is particularly seductive for the woman to gain power over men by means of the erotic…it is an ancient piece of wisdom 6 “conference minutes from horst wessel school in kassel,” 1933, in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 9 (source 100). 7 geoffrey j. giles, “straight talk for nazi youth: the attempt to transmit heterosexual norms,” paedagogica historica 32, no. 1 (1996): 312-313. as giles has noted, however, “there is no indication whatever that this [sex education] literature did anything to reduce levels of homosexual activity, to curb widespread masturbation, to prevent premarital sex, or decisively to assist in building happy relationships” (307). 8 timm quotes the nazi “vd expert” bodo spiethoff on the matter of sex work: “it is the duty of the state to call a halt to the appearance of prostitution in all its forms and particularly to protect children and youth from coming into contact with prostitution.” see timm, “sex with a purpose,” 239. 9 quoted in herzog, sex after fascism, 51. 10 robert g. waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” journal of the history of sexuality 8, no. 3 (january 1998): 435. 11 herzog, sex after fascism, 18. 41 when in the very first bible story eve is seen to proffer the seductive fruit to the man.”12 even the girls of the bdm, custodians of the german future, were not spared from this disparaging view. historian of the hitler youth michael kater has argued that “nominally, hitler boys and hitler girls were coequals, in terms of the leadership structure, the basic psychological and ideological schooling, and many of the daily tasks to be performed,” such as the wearing of uniforms, the mandatory sports encouraged by both organizations, and the participation in mass rallies demonstrating support for the führer, but the organizations’ essential qualities and their hopes for their young members were divided along gendered lines.13 boys learned how to drill, march, and shoot, while girls sang in choirs and were taught the skills that would prepare them to be good german mothers— confirming kater’s assessment of german boys and girls as “future biological partners who in the hj and bdm were being conditioned for their reproductive missions.”14 most likely unintentionally, however, the official structure and activities of the hj and bdm themselves also offered youth new sexual freedoms and a space in which to exercise them. while the boarding-school pupil peter brückner contended that “young people’s pleasure in using their bodies, in fending off their sexual instincts, their liking for physical competition, and the ideology of the nazi state all came naturally together on the playing fields of the third reich,”15 the official policy of the bdm subgroup, glaube und schönheit (faith and beauty), explicitly linked sports and athleticism with female beauty and sexual attractiveness: “taking pleasure in human beauty must emanate from feminine vanity and must be accompanied by a rigorous culture of physical hygiene and a certain elegance. but participating in athletics and the desire to maintain a strong and well-trained body are part and parcel of the well-groomed appearance.”16 while such emphasis on good looks and physical health may have been officially intended to promote racial awareness, driving home the superiority of the “aryan” race to its young members, it is once again difficult to separate racial from sexual issues in this case. “feminine vanity” and “a certain elegance” are unquestionably tied up with sex appeal, and it is highly unlikely that the young people of the hj and the bdm would have been ignorant of this. in the youth organizations, sports were not only an outlet for sexual energies but also a tool used to prepare german youth for sexually desirable and (re)productive futures. it would soon become apparent, however, that not all young people were willing to wait for the “future” to begin these “reproductive missions.” spates of teenage pregnancies among bdm girls have been well-documented by waite, herzog, and others, including elizabeth heineman, who notes that “nine hundred girls from the league of german girls…returned pregnant from the 1936 party rally.”17 at first sight it may seem ironic that party rallies, the most public, fervent, and collective expressions of nazi identity, should be the site of so 12 quoted in giles, “straight talk,” 306. 13 kater, hitler youth, 73. 14 kater, hitler youth, 103. 15 quoted in detlev peukert, inside nazi germany: conformity, opposition and racism in everyday life, trans. richard deveson (new haven: yale university press, 1982), 147. emphasis mine. 16 günter kaufmann, “faith and beauty,” in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 9 (source 115). 17 elizabeth d. heineman, “sexuality and nazism: the doubly unspeakable?,” journal of the history of sexuality 11, no. 1-2 (2002): 29. 42 much apparently “un-nazi” sexual behavior. but as we have seen, these instances of premarital sex between healthy young aryans, resulting in pregnancies which would deliver still more aryans to the reich, were in fact by no means antithetical to nazi ideals and goals. the diarist victor klemperer makes the association between teenage sex and the nazi youth organizations abundantly clear in a 1935 entry from dresden: “annemarie koehler tells us in despair that the hospitals are overcrowded with fifteen-year-old girls, some pregnant, some with gonorrhea. the bdm. her brother has vehemently refused to allow his daughter to join.”18 here, the bdm itself is positioned as the source of the problem—but how did these young girls get pregnant or infected with sexually transmitted infections (stis) in the first place? no mention is made of the boys or young men with whom they had engaged in intercourse, revealing the myopic and misogynistic double standard that would define nazi reactions to teenage sexuality among the ranks of its youth organizations. as kater explains, it is likely that boys and girls were equally responsible, acting on their own accord…but because girls had previously lacked the opportunity for this sexual freedom, the change was viewed primarily as an emancipation for girls and young women, who thus posed a threat to males. for it is generally true in any authoritarian polity that “by all those who see military discipline, self-sacrifice, austerity, and worship for the leader as the highest social ideals, the power of female sexuality will be seen as a dire threat.”19 considering the nazis’ claims of “emancipation from emancipation” for women, such a stance can hardly be shocking.20 even female sexuality, however, was less feared than male homosexuality, a manifestation of youth sexuality that would be preached against and pursued within the hitler youth all the way until the end of the war. in her pioneering work on girlhood in the third reich, german historian dagmar reese has explained: while for some the demand for a community between the sexes with simultaneous strict sexual abstinence led to an atmosphere of “sterile innocence,” others feared boys could become more “effeminate” and girls more “masculine.” at the beginning of the 1920s, the debate led on the one hand to a fundamental acceptance of sexual relations and on the other hand to a more pronounced separation of the sexes.21 this separation is evident in the division of the nazis’ mass youth organizations into girls’ and boys’ sections, the bdm and hj respectively. in line with the fears mentioned by reese, it is perhaps unsurprising that two organizations so rigidly separated by sex should find themselves plagued with the specter of homosexuality. herzog and others have 18 dagmar herzog, “hubris and hypocrisy, incitement and disavowal: sexuality and german fascism,” in sexuality and german fascism, ed. dagmar herzog (new york: berghahn books, 2005), 8. 19 kater, hitler youth, 107. 20 herzog, sex after fascism, 13. 21 dagmar reese, growing up female in nazi germany (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2006), chapter 5. 43 acknowledged the problematic nature of associating fascism in general and nazism in particular with an inherent or latent homoeroticism, and to do so is not my goal here. the possibility of homosexuality within the ranks of the hj, and indeed the sturmabteilung (storm detachment, sa) and schutzstaffel (protection squadron, ss), was never denied or ignored by the nazis: in fact, they were acutely aware of it as a looming threat, particularly after the 1934 röhm purge.22 goebbels went so far as to recommend the introduction of the death penalty especially for the boys of the hj, who ranged from fourteen to eighteen years of age: “in one organization every case of homosexuality must be punished with death, namely, in the hitler youth. if that is one day going to represent the pick of the nation, then no other verdict must ever be passed within its ranks.”23 fortunately this appalling policy was never implemented, and indeed little was officially done to combat homosexuality within the hj—for as giles has observed, “there was a feeling that too open a discussion of homosexuality would positively encourage youths to experiment in this direction.”24 the very nature of the hj—single-sexed, with hormonal teenage boys living, playing, and sometimes (as on overnight camping trips) sleeping in close proximity, united (at least in theory) in shared, passionate idealism—was also, arguably, an encouraging factor for homosexual experimentation. but rather than accept responsibility for having created an ideological atmosphere which thrived and relied upon the power of male bonding, the nazis chose to blame the youth groups of the weimar and kaiserreich years for setting a precedent of homosexuality. in a 1936 article in the ss organ das schwarze korps (the black corps), provocatively titled “…unzucht in der soldatenzeit” (sexual indecency on active duty) it is explained that in these pre-nazi youth groups, “a few pathologically inclined leaders exploited the susceptibility of a specific age group in order to spread their viciously anti-völkisch tendencies. using an exaggerated sense of camaraderie, they exalted friendship with men among these male youth,” which eventually led to overt homosexuality (“same-sex aberrations”).25 such “anti-social” expressions of sexuality were safely distanced from the morals with which hitler youth boys were imbued. ironically, however, this passing of the blame onto “anti-völkisch” youth groups could not explain the homoeroticism in such hitler youth training materials as the short story “pimpfe sind treu” (pimpfe are loyal) of 1941, in which one pimpfe (a nickname for a member of the deutsches jungvolk or german youngsters in the hitler youth) thinks to himself after witnessing his friend hanne’s bravery during a forest fire, “hanne, you’re such a great guy. from now on, i’ll go through the fires of hell for you any time!”26 such language of ardent devotion was read as an 22 more data is available for the hj than for the bdm, reflecting a deeper nazi anxiety about male homosexuals than about lesbians, and the focus of this section will be skewed accordingly. 23 from die tagebücher von joseph goebbels, ed. elke fröhlich (munich, 1996), 272. quoted in geoffrey j. giles, “same-sex incidents in himmler’s ss and police,” in sexuality and german fascism, ed. dagmar herzog (new york: berghahn books, 2005), 268. emphasis in the original. 24 giles, “straight talk,” 312. 25 “sexual indecency on active duty,” in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 14 (source 162). 26 anonymous, “a hitler youth scout is loyal and true!,” first published as “pimpfe sind treu,” in sommerlager und heimabendmaterialfürdie schulungsund kulturarbeit (berlin: reichsjugendfuhrung der nsdap, summer 1941), 24–26, in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 5 (source 112). 44 expression of nationalism and loyalty to one’s hitler youth comrades rather than as a reflection of personal feeling and especially not if those feelings might have been same-sex desire. this is in line with the nazi state’s conception of love and emotions in general, as european historian alexander geppert explains in his work on love letters to hitler: “at least in theory, emotional ties and bonds were supposed to be exclusively oriented toward the state, the volk and, above all, the führer, and far less toward a personal ‘significant other.’”27 however, it is not difficult to imagine that such passionate language could easily provide an acceptable smokescreen for real, “aberrant” feelings. whether or not they were acknowledged by the hj or the state, homosexual incidents certainly did occur within the ranks of the youth organizations, and with such frequency that even das schwarze korps felt bound to comment—being sure, however, to suggest that homosexual “potential” was “unconsciously” inherent in every man and was especially liable to emerge circumstantially, particularly during puberty, thus absolving young men of blame and assuring them that they were not “real” homosexuals and therefore had nothing to worry about.28 the bombastic schwarze korps thus essentially admitted that combating homosexuality among the youth groups was a functionally fruitless endeavor. despite attempting to channel young people’s sexual energies into productive, stateoriented channels such as sports and national loyalty, the nazi youth organizations ultimately could not prevent incidences of teen pregnancy and homosexuality from occurring at an alarming rate. some of this can likely be attributed to the sex-segregated nature of the hj and the bdm, which both provided convenient opportunities for homosexual encounters and made the opposite sex into “forbidden fruit,” likely inciting increased sexual desire which was then more easily acted upon in the youth-centered, lesssupervised atmosphere of hj and bdm activities, such as camping trips and party rallies, than it would have been at home. however, such incidents also occurred outside of the youth organizations. as waite has noted, the hitler youth organization worked hard at keeping teenagers in line, but it also contributed to a general uneasiness. some parents held it responsible for the misbehavior of their children…some of the children returning home got into trouble as they roamed the streets. other teens went truant, telling their parents they were going to the meetings but in fact they hung out with friends.29 some young people simply did not attend hj and bdm meetings or join the groups at all— and these teenagers still found opportunities for sexual experiences, without having to worry whether these experiences conformed to nazi ideology or were examples of appropriate behavior for young “aryans.” this can be seen for example in the 27 alexander c.t. geppert, “‘dear adolf!’: locating love in nazi germany,” in new dangerous liaisons: discourses on europe and love in the twentieth century, eds. luisa passerini, liliana ellena, and alexander c. t. geppert (new york: berghahn books, 2010), 160. 28 see herzog, sex after fascism, 35. 29 waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 447. 45 countercultural youth movements, particularly the edelweiss pirates and the swing kids, as explored in the next section. sexuality in non-nazi youth groups in 1944 heinrich himmler issued a decree on “youth gangs”: gangs are associations of youth who are not in the hitler youth and who lead a separate and extraordinary existence based on principles not in accordance with national socialist ideology. they all share a rejection of or disinterest toward their obligations within the volksgemeinschaft or the hitler youth; this is especially evidenced in their lack of willingness to conform to the exigencies of war. these gangs have made their appearance under a variety of names (clique, mob, gang, pack, the platters, the shufflers, the edelweiss pirates, and so on). a centralized organization does not, in general, exist. outward association is often only very loose and irregular. occasionally they wear special identifying insignia (for example, an edelweiss emblem, death’shead ring, colored pins, and the like). membership dues are usually not collected, but in some cases identification insignia are issued.30 the very fact of this decree, as well as the alarmist language of its first sentence, make clear the apparent threat which these so-called gangs posed to the regime. like the hitler youth and the bdm, the countercultural youth groups represented a continuation of the (“antivölkisch”) youth movement which dated back to the imperial era, including such groups as the wandervogel (wandering bird) and other bündisch (free youth) organizations. unlike the hj and bdm, however, groups like the edelweiss pirates stuck much closer to their roots, defining themselves not in accordance with any particular set of political ideals (and often, in fact, identifying themselves apolitically), and instead devoting themselves to the more earthly pleasures of youth: hiking through the countryside, making music, taking train-trips, and more—including “bash[ing] hitler youth patrols doing their rounds”—with their friends.31 it ought not be surprising that sex was among these pleasures. also unlike the state-sanctioned organizations, the edelweiss pirates and other countercultural groups were mixed-sex, and as peukert has noted, “the presence of girls at the evening gettogethers and on the weekend trips into the countryside gave the adolescents a relatively unrestricted opportunity to have sexual experiences.”32 in his examination of the edelweiss pirates based on allied intelligence archives, however, perry biddiscombe has pointed out that “it was suspected…that the edelweiss [pirates] was a gathering point for young homosexuals.”33 in all likelihood, just like the teenagers of the hj and bdm, members of the 30 heinrich himmler, decree on youth gangs “erlass des reichsführers ss und chefs der deutschen polizei, heinrich himmler,” 25 october 1944, first published in detlev peukert, ed., die edelweisspiraten: protestbewegungen jugendlicher arbeiter im dritten reich: eine dokumentation (cologne: bund-verlag, 1983), 123–33. see the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 30 (source 406). 31 peukert, “youth,” 30. 32 peukert, “youth,” 32. 33 perry biddiscombe, “’the enemy of our enemy’: a view of the edelweiss piraten from the british and american archives,” journal of contemporary history 30, no. 1 (1995): 44. 46 edelweiss pirates were simply eager for sexual experimentation in whatever form it might take, and found such opportunities in their youth-centered activities; the countercultural groups did not even have to contend with the supervision of older “leaders,” as did members of the hj and bdm. additionally, as peukert has observed, in a comparatively high number of instances the fathers [of edelweiss pirates] are recorded as being dead…this seems to indicate that it was easier for those young people who were not subject to paternal authority to undertake extended weekend excursions, pick quarrels with the boss, or spend their evenings outdoors with friends in contravention of the decree for the protection of young people.34 parental absence, an unfortunate side effect of their workingor lower-middle-class status, proved a blessing in the realm of sexuality for the edelweiss pirates. but another countercultural group had additional advantages when it came to sexuality. the swing kids came from the middleand upper-middle classes, and the privileges of their social standing extended to their opportunities for sex. swing kids were aficionados of american jazz music and “english ideals, language, demeanor, [and] dress.”35 boys wore plaid jackets, “eye-catching scarves,” and “an umbrella over the arm in every kind of weather”; their hair was long, as was that of the swing girls, who penciled their eyebrows and wore lipstick and fingernail polish.36 all devoted themselves, not to the nazi state, but to “a cult of ‘casualness’ (laessigkeit) and ‘sleaziness’ (lottern),” and this rebellion (unpolitical and self-centered as it was) did not go unnoticed by the authorities.37 in his 1944 decree, himmler warned that “[t]he members of these gangs come primarily from the ‘upper middle class’ and want to pursue their own pleasure and sexual or other excesses. they thereby soon conflict sharply with national socialist ideology.”38 this pursuit of pleasure was made much easier by the swing kids’ station in life: “a relaxed regime in their parents’ houses, or lack of nighttime supervision offered ample opportunity for gaining sexual experience,”39 which, according to the fearmongering and voyeuristic reports of the party, included group sex, sex with minors, homosexuality, and even sex with “fully jewish girls between fifteen and eighteen.”40 the swing kids’ transgressions included not only the passive resistance of not joining statesanctioned youth organizations but also the explicit inversion of reich sexual mores by (allegedly) sleeping with members of the same sex and with “non-aryans.”41 despite the 34 peukert, inside nazi germany, 163. 35 himmler, “decree on youth gangs.” 36 kater, hitler youth, 142. 37 peukert, inside nazi germany, 167. 38 himmler, “decree on youth gangs.” 39 peukert, “youth,” 38. 40 kater, hitler youth, 143. 41 as peukert has noted, “sexual life in these groups was no doubt much less orgiastic than contemporary authors of official reports believed, or wanted others to believe” (“youth,” 32). however, these examples have been chosen from among the nazis’ many claims as being more reasonable: jewish teenagers were accepted by the swing kids, and homosexuality seems a more likely occurrence than, say, frequent orgies. 47 internal hypocrisies and contradictions of nazi policies on youth sexuality, it was abundantly clear that the swing kids, like the edelweiss pirates, stood in inherent contradiction to all of these policies because of their non-nazi orientation. the extensive lists of exceptions and bent rules—most often granted in accordance with racial and gendered considerations—were not extended to include the swing kids’ behavior. in this, at least, the nazis’ views on sex were consistent: those not aligned with the nazis and their project could be almost certain to find their sexual behavior deemed transgressive. swing kids, however, remained a threat from within the volk, while the advent of war would bring about a new host of sexual enemies from outside it. youth sexuality on the home front on the home front, the war led to greater sexual freedom, especially for women. when the war started, many fathers, brothers, husbands, boyfriends, and other men who may previously have been able to exercise some control over the sex lives of the women in their lives were called away from home. we have already seen that the state youth organizations were not effective in controlling, and in some cases even provided opportunities for, the sexual behavior of young people; and other state apparatus—such as the reichsarbeitsdienst (reich labor service, rad), in which all youth were supposed to serve a year—were no more conducive to sexual morality. as herzog describes: one woman remembered the reich labor service as having a “very sexual climate…a thoroughly sexual climate.” females in the reich labor service were deliberately brought together with young military men for coed “social evenings”; the expectation was clearly that romantic pairings would occur…the overall message young people received was that nazis were in favor of premarital sex.42 amid the stress, excitement, and generally extenuating circumstances of wartime, it is hardly surprising that young people, especially young women, sought new sexual experiences regardless of marital status. moreover, the new presence of foreign forced laborers—and, as the war progressed, prisoners of war—on german soil presented on one hand the threat of racial contamination, since most came from the “inferior” slavic races of eastern europe, and on the other a new sexual opportunity. the reich ministry of justice warned in 1943 that “german women who engage in sexual relations with prisoners of war have betrayed the front, done gross injury to their nation’s honor, and damaged the reputation of german womanhood abroad.”43 however, as we have previously seen, official reich policies did not often reflect or affect the sexual lives of its citizens, and it soon became apparent that many german women and girls were happy to indulge in forbidden relations with foreigners. for example, as waite notes, “in detmold, an eighteen-year-old girl was prosecuted in early 1945 for affairs with french pows. at the same time, two school girls, ages fourteen and sixteen, came before a special court in nuremberg because of their involvement with french pows two years previously”; he adds that “girls involved 42 herzog, “hubris and hypocrisy,” 17. 43 birthe kundrus, “forbidden company: romantic relationships between germans and foreigners, 1939 to 1945,” in sexuality and german fascism, ed. dagmar herzog (new york: berghahn books, 2005), 205. 48 with foreigners were sometimes arrested by the gestapo and frequently received severe jail sentences.”44 incredibly, however, the nazis’ sexist double standard still applied, favoring and protecting german men even when the offence was as gravely damaging to the volk as sex with a foreigner. the gestapo ruled that “sexual intercourse with female foreign workers, even when they are citizens of an enemy state and a significant affront to the public is apparent, cannot be prosecuted.”45 considered in the light of the nazis’ overarching views—namely, that “the male’s sexual gratification was deemed to take precedence over the female’s” (and, apparently, even over “racial” considerations)—this hypocrisy makes sense.46 however, the double standard did not go so far as transgressing prewar social norms, such as allowing german sex workers to ply their trade with foreign laborers. instead, designated brothels for foreigners were soon established: “the official justification for this policy was that providing foreign workers with prostitutes (particularly when the prostitutes were themselves foreigners or ‘gypsies’) would protect german women from sexual danger and defilement.”47 with female foreigners sleeping with other foreigners or with german men (and thereby chancing the spread of german seed, at no potential legal cost for the man), young german women and girls found themselves able to take advantage of an economic opportunity: that of prostituting themselves, whether overtly or “covertly,” to german soldiers. “support our boys” the attraction of young women to soldiers was not a new or even exclusively german phenomenon—one need only look to the first world war in britain to find ample evidence of “khaki fever,” when respectable young women were supposedly driven mad with lust by the sight of tommies in uniform.48 coupled with the much-touted nazi ideal of soldierly manliness and the widely propagated injunction to racially fit aryan women to produce more children for the führer, it is unsurprising that similar results arose when war broke out in germany. as waite writes: soldiers stationed at bases near villages and cities and the frequent movement of troops through the railway stations, some local officials maintained, attracted teenage girls. the striking uniforms and demeanor of older men, some not much older than themselves, and war propaganda to “‘support our boys,” led some girls to shamelessly chase after the soldiers.49 not all young women slept with soldiers for money, or at all, but enough of them did that, as kater notes, “soldiers got to know this situation well and ruthlessly took advantage of it, 44 waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 455. 45 see waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 457. 46 timm, “sex with a purpose,” 226. 47 timm, “sex with a purpose,” 247. 48 for an excellent exploration of this phenomenon, see angela woollacott, “‘khaki fever’ and its control: gender, class, age and sexual morality on the british homefront in the first world war,” journal of contemporary history 29, no. 2 (1994): 325-347. 49 waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 448. 49 to the point where authorities were charging them with gross irresponsibility, indecency, and rape…because the bdm, as well as somewhat older rad (reich labor service) girls, often accepted small gifts and even money from men, authorities were inclined to speak of ‘covert prostitution.”50 “covert” did not mean “harmless”: kater indicates rising rates of stis and illegitimate pregnancies, which waite would surely include among his assessment of the "sharp rise in immorality” during the war, including the “alarming” trend of younger and younger teenagers having sex.51 but young german women were often flippant about their “immoral” activities, with frequent (and clever) retorts to criticism including “the führer wants more children, does not he?” and “what do you want, i’m a german mother,” or even, in direct defiance of the nazis’ sexism, “the boys do this, so we can do it too.”52 these women perceived the loopholes and inconsistencies in nazi sexual regulations and took full advantage of them, seizing hold of opportunities for their own gain, both material and sexual. and those “boys” were indeed “doing it,” too: older hjs were drafted into the wehrmacht and ss with the outbreak of war and encouraged to make use of military brothels like other soldiers. herzog cites the testimony of one christian hj-turned-soldier who was markedly uncomfortable with the army’s sexual climate: “‘every little hans must have a little sabine’ [jedem hänschen sein sabinchen], that was the motto. it was disgusting. the nazis constantly insisted that sex before marriage or outside of marriage was morally acceptable, even necessary.”53 even policies as “liberating” as this one—which it might be imagined would have been eagerly welcomed by young, unmarried people curious about sex—were not universally taken to heart, demonstrating once again the nazis’ inability to fully reshape the sex lives of their citizens. overall, however, the increased sexual opportunities and license wrought by the war seem to have been eagerly (and sometimes profitably) seized upon by many young people, from freshly minted soldiers to newly unsupervised girls on the home front. homosexuality, though, remained taboo even within the chaotic and liberalized conditions of wartime. homosexuality in the armed forces das schwarze korps’s report on “sexual indecency on active duty” was first published three years prior to the outbreak of war but soon became relevant. the article describes soldiers soliciting sex workers and then contracting venereal disease: “some foolhardy, promiscuous girls show up, the beer and the booze help things along. many a young man who began his tour of duty pure and clean comes home with dark stains on his conscience, and perhaps even with some disease in his body.”54 but another threat lurked between the lines: “you’re all thrown together as a group of young men, all bursting with health and brimming with the exuberance of youth—by that fact alone, there is a great risk of sexual indecency on active duty.”55 even the temptations posed by “foolhardy, promiscuous” girls 50 kater, hitler youth, 111. 51 waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 445 and 449. 52 waite, “teenage sexuality in nazi germany,” 445. 53 herzog, sex after fascism, 60-61. 54 “sexual indecency,” in the third reich sourcebook, eds. sander l. gilman and anson rabinbach (berkeley: university of california press, 2013), chapter 14 (source 162). 55 “sexual indecency.” 50 were not so severe as the danger posed by “the aberrant tendencies of youth who are attracted to members of the same sex,” merely hinted at by the euphemistic language and mention of a single-sex environment—but “which, if they are not discovered in time, can have a devastating detrimental effect on the volk as a whole.”56 as peukert has explained, the nazis’ “dominant image of the ‘strict’ soldierly man” was one of the sources of their homophobia; such a man was “obliged to repel with brute force all temptations to ‘soften’ the identity and sexual role indoctrinated into him,” including of course an attraction to the same sex, whether present in himself or others.57 the thought that soldiers themselves might engage in homosexual acts was therefore abhorrent to the nazis, as can be seen, for example, in the swift removal of ernst röhm as the head of the sa on several pretexts, his homosexuality being one which should not be ignored. paradoxically, however, the nazis’ party structure and ideology rested on an emotionally charged brand of male “comradeship” that had its roots in notions also borrowed by the pre-nazi gay rights movement, specifically the idealized male community or männerbund. as historian giles has noted in his work on homosexuality and the ss, whether comrade or friend, many nazis developed relationships with other men that were laden with emotion and eroticism and often ran too close to the edge of sexuality to be pulled back…the nazis celebrated bonds with members of their own sex as more noble than relationships with women, but they were too embarrassed to admit that there was an emotional and therefore and labile and not easily controllable side to them.58 intense, arguably homoerotic devotion to male friends, comrades-at-arms, and fellow party members gave the nazi party and military its strength, and yet homosexual acts and expressions of romantic love between men were ruthlessly ferreted out and often punished quite severely, including when occurring among youths in the form of harmless “sexual horseplay” such as mutual masturbation.59 but while on one hand, “the central office for combating homosexuality continued business as usual, even when the country was collapsing,” in characteristically inconsistent nazi fashion, even punishment for homosexual offences among the armed forces—the very seat of german masculinity—was by no means evenly enforced.60 giles cites the case of two young ss men, aged seventeen and eighteen, found naked in bed together in early 1940, in which the court ruled that “lying side by side in a bed does not in itself constitute an indecent act in the sense of the criminal code.”61 from this sterile legal language, giles makes a strangely touching inference: “perhaps [the court] realized that soldiers in wartime do sometimes sleep together, simply for warmth or companionship.”62 the irregular and often irrational nazi policies of sexuality did occasionally—even if accidentally—allow for human tenderness. 56 “sexual indecency.” 57 peukert, inside nazi germany, 219. 58 giles, “same-sex incidents,” 260-261. 59 giles, “same-sex incidents,” 311. 60 giles, “same-sex incidents,” 288. 61 giles, “same-sex incidents,” 265. 62 giles, “same-sex incidents,” 265. 51 conclusion youth sexuality is arguably always a slippery and frustrating issue to police, even under a repressive totalitarian regime like the third reich. teenagers having sex will go out of their way to conceal this fact from their parents and from the law. as elizabeth heineman has wryly noted, “we can only conclude that, well, young people had sex,” despite the repressive regime that tried to stand in their way.63 even regimented organizations that lay claim to young people’s free time, like the hj and bdm, cannot prevent youth from having and acting upon sexual desires; in some cases these very organizations may even incite sexual experiences, purely by virtue of putting plenty of young people in close quarters and removing them from parental supervision. as long as these youth did not engage in “antisocial” behaviors, such as homosexual sex or prostitution, they did not face legal consequences, even in the case of teenage pregnancy. youth acting outside these approved constraints, however, including the edelweiss pirates and swing kids, were subject to intense scrutiny due to their alleged homosexual and cross-racial sexual contacts. the war changed the priorities of the regime to some degree, with the law’s primary focus shifting to preventing sex between foreigners and germans in the name of maintaining the purity of german blood. but the nazis’ inconsistency also revealed itself in cases such as casual homosexuality within the armed forces, incidences of which, despite the fiery rhetoric against it, were by no means always punished. when it came to youth sexuality, as to many other situations, the nazis’ policies were incoherent, exaggerated, and quite often unenforced, if not unenforceable. 63 heineman, “sexuality and nazism,” 29. introduction official policy sexual double standards in the hj and the bdm sexuality in non-nazi youth groups youth sexuality on the home front “support our boys” homosexuality in the armed forces conclusion 56 the ideal woman sexology, sex reform, and engineering marriage in weimar germany cassie lee epes eastern connecticut state university abstract the end of the first world war marked a period of profound change for the german nation, giving birth to germany’s first democracy, the weimar republic. the weimar republic ushered in one of the most creative and uninhibited periods of the twentieth century. this period witnessed advancements in the field of sexology and unprecedented change for german women as they flooded the workforce and gained full suffrage. as an increasing number of single women became financially independent and disillusioned with the prewar construction of the family unit, german men found themselves rendered impotent. already humiliated by the loss of the war, men desperately clung to the prewar, wilhelmine ideal of the quintessential real man by turning their attention to the sexual behavior of women and fostering a culture of systematically engineered marriages through sex reform. this article draws upon the works of several prominent sexologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most notably richard von krafft-ebing and theodoor hendrik van de velde, as well as a variety of articles published in german magazines during the 1920s. by comparing these works, spanning from the end of the wilhelmine era to the 1930s, it becomes clear that the great war fundamentally altered the way that women conceptualized female identity, sex, and the family. article it was the women themselves, due to an easily understood hunger for air and life, who shattered the bell jar in which they were vegetating. they have become comrades in work in play, in pleasure and struggle, and among comrades everything is equal.1 this short anecdote from the article, entitled “the defenseless: a conversation between men,” published in the progressive german magazine uhu in 1928, narrates a conversation had between a father and son on a bustling streetcar in berlin. the older man asks his son why he had neglected to get up and offer his seat to a woman who was forced to stand, noting that his son’s aversion to chivalry made him feel unsettled. his son explains that the woman of his father’s time was not the same woman who stood on the streetcar with them. the woman of his own time would not want or expect him to offer her his seat. if he did, 1 alfred polgar, “the defenseless: a conversation between men (1928),” in the weimar republic sourcebook, eds. anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 204. 57 she would most likely refuse it, or possibly even be offended by the well-intentioned gesture. the modern woman of his time did not concede to weakness or accept that the structure of her body made her any less capable than a man. she had emancipated herself from the constrictions of marriage and motherhood and embraced the newfound strength that was given to her by the war and the weimar constitution. as the son states, “gender, father, has become a secondary human characteristic.”2 between 1914 and 1918, nearly thirteen million german men were dispatched to the warfront to defend the fatherland. by the time the armistice was signed in 1918, over two million soldiers had been lost.3 those who survived were unaware that the homes and families to which they were returning bore no resemblance to those they left behind. men returning from the war did not have the luxury of reclaiming their former existence. they limped their way back onto german soil as ghosts, unsure of how to navigate what now felt like foreign land. it quickly became clear to the soldiers that women had endured a war of their own. food scarcity had called for strict rationing, and fuel shortages left women scouring rail yards for fallen coal when they were not working or standing in obscenely long food queues.4 the long, arduous work days and overwhelming shortages were especially burdensome for women with families, who were forced to shoulder the financial responsibilities associated with housing and feeding several children. german women are often still lumped together in historical works as a collective and enthusiastic fighting force, despite the fact that many women were eager for the war to end. as detlev j.k. peukert points out, the most common portrait of the new woman was a male-generated fantasy and did not reflect the way that most women conceptualized themselves during the war. “the ‘vamp’: the glamour girl, a bit too independent to be true, armed with bobbed hair and made-up face, fashionable clothes and cigarette, working by day behind the sales counter in some dreamland of consumerism, frittering away the night dancing the charleston.”5 in reality, most women working in industry more closely identified with the gender-specific notion of the woman as a substitute member of the workforce.6 nevertheless, while married women and mothers anxiously awaited the return of their spouses, many city-dwelling single women became increasingly independent and uninhibited. for these women, the war was not a burden but an opportunity. the “new woman,” as she became known, took root in the throes of the first world war and blossomed just as the haggard, defeated soldiers began to make their way home. the germans had lost the war, and their failure ran alongside a surge of unprecedented female empowerment that dramatically reshaped the structure of imperial german institutions and blanketed the male population with discontentment. as grueling as life on the war front was, there was also a sense of liberation pulsating beneath the boots of women working in metal and munitions factories. for many young, single women who were 2 ibid. 3 eric d. weitz, weimar germany: promise and tragedy (princeton: princeton university press, 2007), 8. 4 ibid., 10. 5 detlev j.k. peukert, the weimar republic: the crisis of classical modernity (new york: hill and wang, 1992), 98. 6 ibid. 58 mobilized to support the war effort at home, germany’s circumstances allowed them a taste of independence without stepping outside of the boundaries of their customary social positions. the demand for industrial workers in cities pulled young women away from the watchful eyes of their more conservative communities and allowed them to experience the fulfillment that came along with earning their own money.7 as mel gordon notes in his study of weimar culture, “no longer wide-eyed innocents, these newly enfranchised women had witnessed an implosion of moral values.”8 after the war, these women quickly formed the bedrock of the weimar republic, and today the emancipation of the new woman is tied inextricably to the birth of germany’s first constitution in 1919. by granting women full suffrage and declaring men and women equal before the law, a cause that feminists had been rallying for since before the wilhelmine period, the republic definitively declared that men no longer held authority over women. still struggling to come to terms with their extraordinary defeat in the war and shamed by the provisions of the treaty of versailles, article 109 of the weimar constitution was yet another twist of the knife for men.9 during the war years, german leaders watched apprehensively as they were forced to rely on female laborers to sustain the war effort. when the war came to an end, they were eager to push women back into their traditional roles as wives and mothers, but the utter devastation and loss of life caused by the first world war simply would not allow for that to happen. germany was no longer a nation bonded by men; for the first time in history, the german economy was undeniably reliant on women. the introduction of a large female population into the workforce and sudden shift in gender-based labor division eventually triggered a resurgence of the scientific field of sexology and sex reform. as an increasing number of single women became financially independent and disillusioned with the prewar construction of the family unit, german men found themselves rendered impotent. already humiliated by the loss of the war, men desperately clung to the prewar, wilhelmine ideal of the quintessential “real man” by turning their attention to the sexual behavior of women and fostering a culture of systematically engineered marriages through sex reform.10 the great war and its aftermath destroyed any lingering legitimacy that the german government may have had, and the lack of both order and authority created a collective sense of juvenile defiance, leaving young people asking, “what are you going to do about it?” revolutionary soldiers abandoned their epaulettes and prowled city streets with shirts unbuttoned.11 women cut their hair and traded their long, conservative dresses for short skirts and silk stockings, unapologetically brandishing their slender, feminine figures. describing the new attitude and clothing of women of this period, gordon notes: “the light 7 ibid., 11. 8 mel gordon, voluptuous panic: the erotic world of weimar berlin (port townsend, wa: feral house publishing, 2006), 14. 9 article 109 of the weimar constitution stated that all germans are equal before the law and that men and women have the same fundamental civil rights and duties. 10 norman domeier, “the homosexual scare and the masculinization of german politics before world war i,” central european history 47, no. 4 (december 2014): 737-759. 11 gordon, voluptuous panic, 53. 59 clothing she wears moves like a wave over the line of her bright, free body. on this sunny day she takes in the wind the air and every male glance.”12 the wilhelmine bubble had popped. centuries of sexual repression had been unleashed, and there was a palpable sense of eroticism in the air. as a result, the postwar weimar era is commonly associated with a surge of unparalleled sexual expression. thirty years earlier, however, germany had been a different world. dominated by nobility, elites, and the military, imperial germany was comparatively rigid and dull. in this era, “proper” woman were seen as devoid of all sexual desires and shamed if they gave any indication such desire existed. diagnosing sexuality toward the end of the nineteenth century, the up-and-coming field of sexology was piloted by the antiquated sexologist richard von krafft-ebing, one of the first and most influential figures in the field of human sexuality. krafft-ebing pioneered the study of sexual perversity in men, women, and children through a series of primitive case studies. these case studies, some of the first examples of the medicalization of sexual behavior, were revolutionary in that they characterized behaviors that had previously been labeled criminal, immoral, or unnatural as identifiable, diagnosable, and often treatable diseases.13 throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, most of the discourse surrounding the relationship between science and sex was dominated by medical doctors, but by the turn of the century, the study of sexual behavior had been largely overtaken by psychiatrists who believed that “abnormal” sexual desires were a sickness of the mind rather than the body.14 conceived within the constrictions of the exceptionally prudish victorian era, latenineteenth-century sexology pushed the limits of what was considered “moral” sexual behavior by acknowledging that female sexual impulsivity was a natural part of the biological process. krafft-ebing and his fellow sexologists subsequently utilized that information to deduce that the sole purpose of any female sexual desire was to encourage reproduction, not to experience physical pleasure. krafft-ebing’s prior “diagnoses” were skewed to curb the changing nature of marriage and intimacy at the end of the nineteenth century, but by the 1920s his ideas were unable to withstand the germans’ desire for uninhibited, enjoyable sex. nevertheless, the goal of weimar era sexologists, most notably theodoor hendrik van de velde, remained the same: fortify marriage and birth rates and ensure the continuation of a male-dominated society. krafft-ebing and van de velde, both leading sex reformers of their times, had a similar objective but applied variable strategies to reach this objective. krafft-ebing, motivated by a desire to keep sex under lock and key, used his position as an established and respected doctor to present female sexual expression as a disease that required aggressive treatment and rehabilitation. in his study of krafft-ebing, harry oosterhuis has drawn attention to the problematical legacy of the reformer: “because he wrote about sex when polite society was silent about it, and because he wrote about it as if it were a disease or medical problem, krafft-ebing has been mistaken as a progressive force in the struggle against sexual 12 weitz, weimar germany, 309. 13 harry oosterhuis, stepchildren of nature: krafft-ebing, psychiatry, and the making of sexual identity (chicago: university of chicago press, 2000), 2. 14 ibid., 43. 60 prejudice and prudery.”15 but by 1926, when van de velde published his famed work, the ideal marriage, krafft-ebing’s blueprint for sexual repression was outdated and inapt. recognizing that krafft-ebing’s approach was no longer effective, van de velde devised a new plan, incentivizing sex to encourage women to marry and bear children. sex, van de velde discovered, was a valuable tool that if used properly, had the potential to repair a broken germany. the war and the weimar republic were not solely to blame for germany’s convoluted attitudes toward marriage in the early twentieth century. rules regarding dating, intimacy, marriage, and sex had begun to change long before the war. this shift coincided with the growth of modern city life at the turn of the century; between 1850 and 1900, berlin blossomed into a vibrant metropolis.16 city life dramatically altered the ways in which people became acquainted with one another, and as a result, the concept of casual dating— or what tim carrington refers to as verhӓltnis—became commonplace.17 if the women of the wilhelmine era began to create a crack in the foundation of traditional family life, the women of the weimar era definitively shattered wilhelmine attitudes toward sex and motherhood. the cruel legacy of the great war had mutated into a culture of experimentation, indulgence, and unconventional relationships. those who survived the war were awakened to the transitory nature of life. new opportunity was ubiquitous. sexual autonomy became obtainable. much like the reactionary sexology that was produced in the late nineteenth century, twentieth-century sex reform was designed to retrench female sexual expression. as detlev j.k. peukert has observed, “the ideas and methods of the new sexual enlightenment were themselves still very much the offspring of the nineteenth century, particularly of its faith in science.”18 the gradual emergence of the surplus woman beginning in the nineteenth century became synonymous with sexual deviancy and disease, but after the war, the recently emasculated male populace became even more eager to find a cure. science, some believed, was a viable recourse. in an earlier effort to curtail the looming threat of female sexual expression that had begun to emerge before the war, many pioneers of the study of sexual behavior set out to determine the root cause of the degeneration of the traditional family unit. german neurologist p. j. mӧbius, who published concerning the physiological feeblemindedness of the female in 1907, focused his attention primarily on what he considered to be biological causation. mӧbius asserted that the size of the female brain was far less developed than the male brain, causing women to be incapable of analytical thinking and thus driven entirely by instinct.19 in this treatise, mӧbius asserted: “instinct makes woman animalistic, dependent, naïve and cheerful … like animals have behaved from times immemorial, so too would mankind remain in its primal condition, if there were only women. all progress 15 ibid., 8. 16 tim carrington, love at last sight: dating, intimacy, and risk in turn-of-the-century berlin (new york: oxford university press, 2019), 65. 17 ibid., 17. 18 peukert, the weimar republic, 101. 19 barbara hales, “woman as a sexual criminal: weimar constructions of the criminal femme fatale,” women in germany yearbook 12 (1996): 102. 61 originates from man.”20 according to mӧbius, the woman’s instinctual nature and lack of both intellect and restraint endangered the structure of german society and, as a result, threatened the very fabric of their nation. prior to the war, there was a collective, clear vision of what the construction of the family should look like and what it should provide. that vision was driven by “specialists” of human sexual behavior like mӧbius and krafftebing and, broken by the war, was resurrected in the twenties by prominent sexologists like van de velde and magnus hirschfeld to combat the postwar crisis of the family. while mӧbius’s theories were rooted in physiological science, most prominent sex reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like krafft-ebing, had backgrounds in psychology and natural sciences. krafft-ebing published the first edition of his major work, psychopathia sexualis: a clinical-forensic study, in 1886, addressing for the first time taboo subjects, like masturbation, fetishism, masochism, and incest. psychopathia sexualis was assembled from a series of case studies in which krafft-ebing categorized a myriad of sexual perversions ranging from “abnormally” increased sexual desire and erectile dysfunction to violent and sometimes deadly sadism.21 keeping with the widely accepted nineteenth-century belief that men had a more intense sexual appetite than women, krafft-ebing viewed a heightened female libido as a disease, deducing that “a predominating sexual desire in her arouses a suspicion of pathological significance. when this finds expression in desire for adornment, coquetry, or male society, which passing beyond the limits set by good breeding and manners, becomes quite noticeable.”22 krafftebing’s case studies effectively validated the widespread belief that women were more susceptible to psychological anomalies and insanity, especially when sex was involved. in two case studies documenting “hyperesthesia,” which by his definition meant “abnormally increased sexual desire,” krafft-ebing likened an inflated sex drive to insanity, explaining that one of his female patients was sent to an asylum because “she was unable to control herself, so she would shut herself in a room until the storm had passed. at last she gave herself up to the men of her choice, but neither coitus nor masturbation brought relief.”23 in another evaluation, he reported that a mother of five was driven to attempt suicide as a result of her sexual impulses, and was also sent to an asylum. even once she had been “rehabilitated,” she refused to leave the institution because she did not trust her ability to control herself in the outside world.24 krafft-ebing never explicitly clarified what constituted abnormally increased sexual desire, but based on his assertion that the female sex drive was “naturally small,” it can be assumed that in some cases, any sexual desire at all could be deemed increased and abnormal. krafft-ebing’s crude case studies were the embodiment of the wilhelmine era. to him, women were merely vessels. their existence was necessary for the continuation of the german race—and nothing more. 20 quoted in ibid. 21 richard krafft-ebing, psychopathia sexualis, with especial reference to contrary sexual interest, trans. charles gilbert chaddock (philadelphia: f.a. davis publishers, 1893), 57. 22 ibid., 48. 23 ibid., 51. 24 ibid., 52. 62 examining the way that educated men conceptualized female sexuality at the end of the wilhelmine era is essential to understanding the complex social environment in which weimar era sexology was conceived. krafft-ebing’s belief that sexual females should be condemned to institutions and denied the opportunity to marry and have children indicated a desire to contain what he thought might be hereditary. in the majority of his case studies, he provided a brief family history of the patient and overwhelmingly established some form of mental illness on the mother’s side, as seen for example in his description of the case of “d.”: “case 3. d., aged 33, had a mother who suffered with insanity of the persecution. the woman’s mother became insane in the perpetual state. three of her mother’s children died in babyhood, and those that lived longer had an abnormal character.”25 the idea that “d.” was sexually abnormal because there was a family history of what he very loosely defined as “insanity” is rooted in the theory of eugenics formulated by francis galton in 1883. eugenics deduced that abnormalities caused by environmental factors could be passed down over time.26 viewed in this context, krafft-ebing’s push to quarantine sexually explicit women was his attempt to dictate the direction of evolution. however, by the 1920s and 1930s, progressive sexologists like van de velde became less interested in eugenics and more focused on replenishing the german population after the war, meaning that women should be free to enjoy their marital sex lives, provided that the result was an increase of births. while the weimar era is often viewed as an era of radical sex reform, not all professionals who involved themselves with sexology advocated for female sexual emancipation as van de velde did. in 1923, state prosecutor and legal reformer erich wulffen published woman as a sexual criminal, which argued that “female crime is rooted in sex.” wulffen contended that a woman’s biological premise, caused by the processes of pregnancy, menstruation, and menopause, made her more susceptible to criminal behavior.27 like krafft-ebing, wulffen believed that the male sex drive was naturally stronger than the biological female impulse, and the bedrock of his argument was reminiscent of wilhelmine era attitudes toward women, sex, and the family. according to wulffen, sexual submissiveness was the only way to prevent women from developing an “excess of sexuality.”28 without the sexual passivity provided to a woman by her husband, she would undoubtedly collapse under the pressure of her congenital vanity and lust and turn to a life of crime. echoing mӧbius’s early twentieth-century assertion that women were driven entirely by instinct, wulffen believed that dominant women were unable to grasp the concepts of authority and justice, rendering them unable to control their compulsion to commit criminal offenses. in woman as a sexual criminal, wulffen explicitly stated what more progressive sexologists later wrote more obliquely. the sexually emancipated, single woman posed a direct threat to the welfare of society as a whole. “as long as a woman has a connection to childbearing, she is in bondage to sex.”29 without marriage, her unrestrained sexual instinct would cause 25 ibid., 42. 26 laurie marhoefer, “degeneration, sexual freedom, and the politics of the weimar republic, 1918-1933,” german studies review 34, no. 3 (2011): 530. 27 hales, weimar constructions of criminal femme fatale, 104. 28 ibid. 29 ibid. 63 her to become recalcitrant and depraved. wulffen viewed female sexuality and vanity as a weapon, inspiring women to commit crimes like prostitution, murder, and shoplifting.30 her narcissism triggered extreme jealousy and hatred toward both sexes, resulting in a myriad of volatile relationships and unsettled vendettas. according to wulffen, not only did the sexual woman feel drawn to engage in criminal behavior herself, she also had the ability to manipulate others into doing so as well. one of wulffen’s fellow criminologists, hans schneickert, shared his concern regarding the manipulative powers of women. schneikert went so far as to condemn women for the vast majority of crimes that were committed by males, theorizing that woman devised devious schemes and enlisted men to provide the strength to carry them out.31 criminologists and sexologists like wulffen and schneickert were the embodiment of postwar anxieties regarding sex and male incompetency. the idea that women were to blame for virtually everything, including the actions of men, reinforced the sentiment that germany had lost the war because the nation had become weak and effeminate. it was not men who lost the war; it was women, and it was women who continued to tarnish germany’s former prestige. the ideal woman the conviction that women were responsible for germany’s exceptional defeat in the great war exacerbated the already widespread fear that the new women had become the majority. in reality, the new woman was and continues to be an enigma. by some accounts, like that of elsa herrmann, the new woman was a worker: “for the sake of her economic independence, the necessary precondition for the development of a self-reliant personality, she seeks to support herself through gainful employment.”32 to others, like else kienle, she was an outspoken feminist and advocate for women’s rights: “there is a law that stands above all paragraphs, and that is the law of human dignity and women’s dignity.”33 to the mass media, she was a young, attractive socialite: “they were more lightly and provocatively clad or altogether naked, and they could be seen live onstage and at the beach, walking down the street, or in magazines or at the cinema.”34 she could have been one of those things, or all of those things, and as a result it can be difficult to gauge how many women were actually “new.” according to anton kaes, women were often perplexed themselves about what behavior was expected of them throughout the changing times.35 rüdiger graf suggests that the new woman was more of an expectation for the future than an actual entity, an anticipated force that needed to be contained.36 30 ibid., 105. 31 ibid., 106. 32 elsa herrmann, “this is the new woman (1929),” in the weimar republic sourcebook, eds. anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 206. 33 else kienle, “the kienle case (1931),” in the weimar republic sourcebook, eds. anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 216. 34 weitz, weimar germany, 312. 35 anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg, “the rise of the new woman,” in the weimar republic sourcebook, eds. anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 196. 36 rüdiger graf, “anticipating the future in the present: ‘new women’ and other beings of the future in weimar germany,” central european history 42, no. 4 (december 2009): 647. 64 popular memory of the birth of the new woman often gives the impression that in august of 1919 every single woman in germany took a pair of scissors to her hair and all of the dresses of her closet. however, during the early years of the weimar republic, the idealized image of the new woman that was popularized by the media was largely assumed by middleand upper-class women who had the means to afford high-end clothing and city entertainment. but for the one-third of women who worked long hours in low-wage factory and office jobs, the glamour and excitement of modern nightlife was an unattainable fantasy.37 to conservative onlookers, the new woman of berlin represented everything that was wrong with germany. the kaiser was gone, and to some, it appeared as though he had taken every ounce of victorian morality with him, leaving berlin to rot as “a new hell on earth.”38 for the first few years, financial demographic disparities had helped to keep the new woman contained, but eventually the influence of city life began to seep into the countryside. the new woman, growing in numbers and in capability, now threatened the future of the german race by ignoring her responsibility to replenish the population.39 the “problem” had begun to spin out of control, and for conservative christian sexologists like van de velde, the solution was an “ideal” marriage. only thirty years after krafft-ebing released the first volume of psychopathia sexualis, van de velde, a prominent dutch physician and gynecologist, published a book that shocked the world by openly accepting and celebrating female sexuality. in 1926, van de velde went on a lecture tour of germany. massive crowds and reporters gathered in berlin to listen to him speak, his words perfectly complementing changing attitudes toward sexuality in the weimar republic. harkening back to the “real man” complex of the wilhelmine era, van de velde introduced the idea that “real men” should be able to satisfy their wives’ sexual desires. het volkomen huwelijk, or, the ideal marriage, published in 1926, was a detailed guide written to free-thinking married couples from an epidemic of what he deemed “sexual misery.” van de velde, a husband and father himself, was able to draw upon his own experiences with sexuality and combine them with his extensive knowledge of the female anatomy. in doing so, he was able to effectively blend his personal reassurances with physiological explanations for sexual impulses, creating a comfortable, safe environment for couples to explore and break the cycle of sexuelle not (sexual misery). moving away from the sexually repressive convictions of mӧbius and krafft-ebing, van de velde encouraged women to find joy and pleasure in their sexual relationships. van de velde revealed his inspiration for the ideal marriage in his personal introductory statement, declaring that “[t]here is a need of this knowledge; there is too much suffering endured which might well be avoided, too much joy untasted which could enhance life’s worth.”40 van de velde felt that it was not only his personal duty but also his responsibility as a medical professional to abolish unspoken sexual frustration in marriages, most importantly by telling women that they had a right to sexual fulfillment. the book became 37 weitz, weimar germany, 307. 38 gordon, voluptuous panic, 8. 39 weitz, weimar germany, 328. 40 theodoor hendrik van de velde, the ideal marriage: its physiology and technique, trans. stella browne (kingsport: kingsport press, 1926), 24. 65 immensely popular throughout europe and the united states, where it was reprinted fortyfour times between 1941 and 1966.41 van de velde likened a woman’s sexual frustration to physical abuse, criticizing men for their rushed and sometimes “brutal” lovemaking. in the first chapter of the ideal marriage, he shared a lengthy quotation by a fellow doctor and mother of two, gina lombroso. lombroso stated that, “the loneliness of mind and heart to which a man can condemn his wife, is much more painful and injurious than tyranny and violent brutality.”42 she went on to promote the idea of comradeship within a marriage, encouraging husbands to involve their wives in both their work and personal lives. any form of exclusion was a sign of inequality, and any inequality within a marriage translated to unequal and unsatisfying sexual relationships. this, van de velde believed, was both the sickness and the cure; but while he claimed that his intention was to heal the people suffering from sexual misery on a personal level, his ultimate objective was to rescue the institution of marriage as a whole. van de velde’s innovation was hinged upon his recognition that the beliefs of sexologists like krafft-ebing were outdated and unsustainable. women, especially those who lived in cities where casual dating and sex had been more common before the war, had become far less likely to believe that their sexual desires were worthy of a diagnosis. van de velde’s modern theories regarding sexual emancipation were designed not only to revive maternal instincts but also to reinvigorate the masculine propensity that had been shattered by the war. he believed that fostering pleasurable sex within a marriage would bring happiness and productivity to the german people, and in turn create a more prosperous and robust german society. volkstod van de velde’s plan for a resurgent germany went far beyond what most women saw when they flipped to part iii of the ideal marriage, where van de velde explained in vivid detail the act of intercourse. these women, eager to explore their bodies and enhance their sex lives, flocked to his lectures in large numbers, embracing van de velde as their trusted advocate. he preyed upon their dissatisfaction and loneliness, accusing their husbands of mistreatment and validating their vexation. van de velde, however, had his own aims. after all, healthy marriages produce healthy children, and marriage and birth rates had been in steady decline since the beginning of the first world war. although it was predominantly women who blamed for the deterioration of the traditional family unit, there were a considerable number of women who did not marry simply because there were not enough men. within the twenty-five to fifty-year-old age group, most notably men from ages thirty to thirty-five, the number of surviving men fell well below the level of 1910, a year that had experienced a significant population growth. concurrently, there was a surplus of women born between 1865 and 1900. according to the 1925 census, there were 1,067 females for every 1,000 males, resulting in observable demographic disparities.43 as a result, many women that were of appropriate marriageable age had no choice but to remain single and therefore childless. meanwhile, the average family size had been reduced to an average of 41 weitz, weimar germany, 297. 42 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 4. 43 weitz, weimar germany, 305. 66 only one child per family, and by 1933, more than one-third of married couples remained childless, causing the german birthrate to plummet far below the rest of their european neighbors.44 many germans, particularly conservative men, believed that the traditional family, the heart of conservative ideology, was in a state of crisis at the hands of female sexuality. the crippling humiliation brought on by the loss of the war and the treaty of versailles, coupled with the germans’ inability to cultivate a new, powerful generation, reinforced the idea that germany’s collapse had little to do with imperialism and much to do with a combination of femininity and sexuality. in the ideal marriage, van de velde claimed that the most effective means of defense against marital woes, aside from sex, was strong mutual interest.45 and what mutual interest, he asked, could be more unifying than children? as he wrote in the ideal marriage, “children are the strongest mental link in normal married life, and those who ignore this ancient truth will often have occasion to repent.”46 the movement for health and hygiene during the weimar era, a movement in which van de velde was a fundamental presence, advocated for healthy and normal marital sexual relationships, but it also ran alongside the principle of bevӧlkerungspolitik, or population policy. proponents of bevӧlkerungspolitik harbored deep anxieties regarding dwindling birth rates, fearing that further decline would ultimately lead to volkstod, or the extinction of the german race.47 the stark decline in births during the postwar years was alarming for professionals like van de velde who felt compelled to uphold the welfare of the broader community by telling people how to behave in their marriages. what was marketed to women as a guide to freedom from sexual emancipation was, at its core, part of a much larger surreptitious plan to bolster the birth rate and ease natalist panic. by not upholding their duty to replenish the population after the war, women exposed male impotency on all fronts. if van de velde’s solution to a happy marriage was as simple as good sex, he certainly faced a quandary when it came to encouraging reproduction. contraception greatly eased the anxieties of women who avoided sex in fear of unwanted pregnancies, but it also allowed couples to limit the number of children that they had, ultimately resulting in less births. for women who were against the use of contraceptives or did not have access to them, unintended pregnancies were of great concern. many women were forced to work in factories in addition to their extensive housewifely duties. in the article, “my workday, my weekend,” first published in berlin in 1930, a wife and pregnant mother described her typical work week in a textile mill. the demands of the factory coupled with the responsibility of caring for a family barely allowed for women to sleep, leaving them both exhausted and desperate. “six days of vacation once a year, but that’s no relaxation, just the opposite. … that’s how the life of a woman working in a factory goes all year round.”48 for working women, multiple unplanned pregnancies were an enormous burden, and as a result, many women were forced to seek illegal abortions. 44 peukert, the weimar republic, 86. 45 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 5. 46 ibid. 47 peukert, the weimar republic, 102. 48 textile workers, “my workday, my weekend (1930),” in the weimar republic sourcebook, eds. anton kaes, martin jay, and edward dimendberg (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 208. 67 else kienle, a german doctor and writer, was briefly imprisoned in 1931 on charges of professional abortion that was uncompliant with article 218 of the weimar constitution, criminalized abortion without legitimate medical necessity.49 in an article published in die weltbϋhne in 1931, kienle challenged the stereotype of the typical woman who sought an abortion, shattering the notion that only debauched, city-dwelling women would reject an unintended pregnancy. in doing so, she revealed the true reason why many women chose to terminate their pregnancies; they were tired, poor, and indisposed. kienle explained that 80 percent of all women who sought a doctor to terminate their pregnancies were mothers who had already birthed several children and were deeply ashamed of their decision to end their pregnancies. kienle sympathized with the “modern woman” who had become modern because she had entered the workforce, but was still buried beneath her maternal responsibilities, rendering her unable to truly assume the identity of the new woman. after having experienced the effects of war on the homefront firsthand, all women in weimar germany were “new,” but not all of them were liberated. going against the maledominated natalist sentiment, kienle made the bold assertion that an additional child had no right to enter a family that was already struggling to feed itself: “hunger and love have been and remain the primal drives of human beings, and love is quite likely the only diversion a family of workers can afford in 1931.”50 toward the end of the ideal marriage, van de velde did acknowledge the reservations that many couples felt toward pregnancy and advised them how to overcome this hinderance. “fear of pregnancy often impairs sexual processes and reactions on the psychic side to such a degree that bodily reactions are sympathetically affected and even inhibited or checked.”51 ironically, as a cure for this psychological block, van de velde prescribed more sex, claiming that it had “very happy” biological and anatomical effects that might help to outweigh the burden of anxiety concerning unwanted pregnancy. yet van de velde either failed to recognize or ignored how encumbered women became by the demands of large families. contrary to his professions in the ideal marriage, sex was not a cure-all for many woman, but especially not for the working poor. van de velde actively framed his work as being “for the women,” but he fundamentally failed to identify a root cause of celibacy that could easily be found in the hollowed eyes and slumped posture of any working mother: she was unbearably and irrevocably exhausted. in a botched effort to resurrect germany’s diminishing birthrates by criminalizing abortion and encouraging married couples to have more unprotected sex, an estimated 4,000 to 12,000 women died as a consequence of backalley abortions, and an additional 50,000 experienced various other health complications, many of which caused permanent infertility.52 communion 49 legal abortions were permitted if the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother or if the fetus was deformed or incompatible with life. 50 “the kienle case,” 213. 51 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 265. 52 weitz, weimar germany, 305. 68 working women rose before the sun and settled into bed long after it had gone down. while van de velde’s stages of the ideal sexual communion—prelude, sexual union, and the epilogue or “after-glow”—are designed to satisfy the sexual needs of women, if executed as van de velde intended, sex became quite a lengthy process. once again, van de velde’s flawless methodology has forgotten one crucial determining factor: when do women have the time for such a prolonged sexual experience? as expressed by the female textile laborer mentioned above: “i am always so tired. when i get home, i first have to sit down and rest for fifteen minutes. often i just sit there and howl like a child for no reason. … but i always have to pull myself together again.”53 for the many women who found themselves in similar positions, sex was a luxury that they simply did not have the time or energy for. the new woman was not only the vivacious, uninhibited woman who dressed provocatively and danced in cabarets in berlin. often, she was a mother and a member of the workforce as well. this new way of life was an incredibly difficult adjustment for women, but men struggled to cope with changing gender dynamics as well. soldiers were promised prosperity and endured the brutality of war for years, only to stand by as their wives were forced to go to work every morning to keep their families alive. they had not only lost the war, they lost the core of their male identity: the ability to provide for their wives and children. despite his lack of attention to the realities of the 35 percent of women who were a part of the german labor force, many of whom had children, van de velde continuously emphasized the importance of sexual satisfaction for both partners, arguing that women have become “sexually frigid” as a result of their suspended gratification.54 van de velde attempted to combat this frigidity by framing the female orgasm as the ultimate objective of “sexual communion.”55 again, sex always serves a purpose, and van de velde’s gynecological training had taught him that the female orgasm did as well. in his exceptionally detailed chapter on sexual positions, he stated, “it may be said that every position in coitus which tends to promote the intensest possible orgasm in both partners simultaneously, or almost simultaneously, increases the possibility of conception.”56 as a result, he discouraged the practice of coitus interruptus as a means of preventing pregnancy, arguing that it leaves the man feeling satisfied but not the woman, implying that simultaneous orgasm was the only way for both partners to reach sexual satisfaction. for women, van de velde’s methods had nothing to do with satisfaction and everything to do with pregnancy. with this, van de velde also harkened back to the wilhelmine era ideal of the “real man” by indicating that the inability of men to please their wives was a sign of inadequacy. in this sense, the female orgasm was an opportunity for redemption. van de velde’s perpetuation of the importance of the simultaneous orgasm is rooted in the centuries-old belief that the female orgasm increased the likelihood of successful conception. this theory can be dated back as far back as the hippocratic corpus, which states, “pleasure and warmth reach their height at the same time as the seed falls into the 53 “my workday, my weekend,” 209. 54 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 7. 55 ibid., 194. 56 ibid., 211. 69 womb.”57 to van de velde, any pleasure that a woman experienced as a result was merely a byproduct. ideally, her husband’s attention to her sexual needs would encourage her to remain committed to both him and their mutual desire to produce a robust family. while van de velde dedicated twenty-five pages of the ideal marriage to “the anatomy and physiology of the male sexual organs,” pages fifty-one through 114 revolved entirely around the sexual physiology of the adult woman, more specifically the processes of menstruation and ovulation. out of the eight colored diagrams in the reference section of the book, only two were reserved for the male organs, while the other six, including two fold-out pages that chart menstruation and ovulation cycles, focused on the female anatomy. the ideal marriage was supposed to free women from sexualle not, but if that were true, this information would serve no purpose. the sexual instruction that van de velde provides in the ideal marriage conforms to the standard gender ideology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. he instructed the man to take the initiative and the woman to respond accordingly. he established the process by which the man should dominate the act of sexual intercourse by nature and indicated that the woman should organically follow suit, stating: what both man and woman, driven by obscure primitive urges, wish to feel in the sexual act, is the essential force of maleness, which expresses itself in a sort of violent and absolute possession of the woman. and so both of them can and do exult in a certain degree of male aggression and dominance—whether actual or apparent—which proclaims this essential force.58 with this assertion, van de velde implied that any instance in which a woman denied her customary submissive role was somehow an abnormal sexual act that defies the laws of traditional “mating.”59 he challenged the earlier theories of sexologists like krafft-ebing by concluding that the woman is an entirely sexual being, while the man is merely an accessory to her biological impulse to reproduce. motherhood, the intended destiny of all women, could not exist without an innate dependence on the male sex. the essence of female dependence had been dismantled during the war years. despite the absence of thirteen million men, women had survived. this reality could not be avoided, which is why van de velde worked to calculatedly engineer marital sexual relationships to ensure that women would promptly lose sight of their wartime independence and gracefully reintegrate into family life. the hell-gate considering van de velde’s preoccupation with reproduction, it comes as no surprise that he denounced any sexual act that had no possibility of resulting in a child. unlike some of his fellow colleagues, most notably the prominent german sexologist magnus hirschfeld, van de velde discouraged homosexual relationships in favor of what he called “normal” heterosexual relationships. in part iii of the ideal marriage, he explained to the reader that 57 ann ellis hanson, hippocrates: diseases of women i (chicago: university of chicago press, 1975), 582. 58 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 159. 59 ibid., 145. 70 there may be rare cases in which he could not avoid referencing certain deviant sexual practices—but promised that he would emphatically state that they were abnormal to avoid any confusion: “but this will only occur very seldom, for as postulated above, it is our intention to keep the hell-gate of the realm of sexual perversions firmly closed.”60 concerned by the onslaught of unapologetic lesbian tendencies percolating in cities like berlin, van de velde reassured men that there were ways to conquer such “abnormalities.”61 he promised that with enough instruction, a husband should be able to teach his wife to develop appropriate sexual desires. perhaps even more important than the inability of same-sex couples to conceive children was the utter emasculation attached to lesbianism. van de velde was far more invested in preserving the male ego and containing female sexuality than he was with enhancing women’s sex lives. while popular memory venerates van de velde as a revolutionary sex reformer, his true crowning achievement was his ability to successfully disguise misogyny as feminism. despite his success, van de velde was not the first nor the most memorable medical professional to encourage radical sex reform in the twenties. magnus hirschfeld published his first work, sappho and socrates, under a pseudonym in 1895, but began publishing in his own name as early as 1900.62 hirschfeld had been an outspoken advocate for sexual minorities and a pioneer of gender studies since the imperial period, but his work was not as widely circulated or as well received as the ideal marriage. hirschfeld’s emphasis on gender, or lack thereof, was unnerving for many, as it stood in direct opposition to the ideals that sexologists like van de velde were frantically working to reestablish. hirschfeld, an openly gay man, was genuinely interested in sexuality and sex reform and did not have an agenda like van de velde; he was not concerned with preserving the family unit or healing damaged masculinity. he unabashedly fueled debates surrounding sex and gender following the war, while van de velde merely gave antiquated wilhelmine ideals a makeover. van de velde’s work was exceptionally provocative for an audience that had just barely been exposed to the concept of sex reform, but it was just conservative enough to be considered tolerable. in 1935, hirschfeld published sex in human relationships, which unlike the ideal marriage, is utterly devoid of gender. hirschfeld focused more on the concept of love than sex, encouraging men and women to find spouses that complemented their personalities without regard for traditional gender expectations: “contrasted temperaments may often complement each other admirably. a very active temperament, for instance, demands to complement it, a partner whom passivity predominates.”63 unlike van de velde, he did not establish which members of a relationship should assume either passivity or dominance, reinforcing the importance of comradeship between men and women in their relationships. most importantly, he did not tell women how to behave in their relationships or accuse them of sexual deviancy. unsurprisingly, hirschfeld faced backlash for his ideas, which many people believed explicitly encouraged the degeneration of the family unit. opposition 60 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 144. 61 weitz, weimar germany, 301. 62 magnus hirschfeld, sex in human relationships, trans. john rodker (new york: ams press, 1935), 12. 63 ibid., 54. 71 to hirschfeld’s beliefs became violent, and in 1920, he was beaten so severely that he was initially pronounced dead by police.64 nothing illustrates the postwar crisis of masculinity like hirschfeld’s near-death attack. it had been two years since the war, but many wounds remained unhealed. despite hirschfeld’s attempts to destigmatize sex, the notion that abnormal or devious behavior was inherent in unmarried women remained a common one throughout the first half of the twentieth century. while earlier sexologists, psychologists, and criminologists were more brazen in their assertions that unmarried women were prone to mental illness, feeblemindedness, and deviant behavior, the core of van de velde’s work was inspired by the conservative ideologies of the “sex experts” who came before him. van de velde genuinely believed that marriage was the only way to save women from their own sexuality, more palatably reiterating what krafft-ebing had concluded thirty years earlier: “normally developed mentally and well bred, her sexual desire is small. if this were not so the whole world would become a brothel and marriage and a family impossible.”65 while van de velde did challenge the consensus that women possessed very little sex drive, he had his own reasons for doing so. van de velde was concerned about the precarious position of the traditional family unit during the 1920s, but he also recognized that female sexuality had already been unleashed, and he knew that any attempt to force women back into their traditional molds would be met with resistance. in this sense, the ideal marriage served as an unspoken treaty between the contemporary sexologist and the new woman. the sexologist would support the existence and normality of female sexuality with natural science and logic, and in return the woman would do what van de velde instructed her to do, get married, start a family, and preserve the patriarchy. van de velde’s apprehension toward the new woman and concerns regarding the crisis of the family were not nearly as transparent in 1926 as they are today. as a middle-aged, christian male, van de velde understood that he was putting his reputation at risk by releasing a book as provocative as the ideal marriage. he announced his martyrdom in the first sentence of his personal introductory statement writing, “this book will state many things that would otherwise remain unsaid. therefore it will have many unpleasant results for me.”66 he went on to explain that his acquired knowledge of human nature had taught him that humans had a tendency to condemn anything that was considered unusual and unconventional, therefore he felt that it would be prudent to wait for the appropriate time, when he had gathered a sufficient amount of medical and personal experience, to publish a book about the joys of sex: “so long as a doctor has to meet the requirements of his practice, he cannot permit himself to transgress the bounds of custom.”67 he could have published under a pseudonym to avoid the inevitable backlash, he said, but as a scientist he felt that it was his duty to legitimize his work with his own name. 64 ibid., 5. 65 krafft-ebing, psychopathia sexualis, 13. 66 van de velde, the ideal marriage, 1. 67 ibid. 72 as van de velde had predicted, the ideal marriage was not readily accepted by all. initially, it was predominantly the church that spoke out against sex reform. they viewed the new woman and her “public display of her lightly clad body” to be a visibly ominous sign of spiritual crisis.68 conservatives were utterly horrified by this public display of sex, which was not only displayed by the clothing that women chose to wear but also in van de velde’s lecture tour of germany that promoted a book about pleasurable sex. when conservatives conceptualized the sex reform movement, all they saw was an onslaught of illegal abortions, an epidemic of venereal disease, and the extinction of the german race. the church waged war on sex reformers like van de velde, campaigning for the preservation of the “holiness” of marriage, despite the fact that religion was present in every chapter of the ideal marriage. as eric weitz has observed in his study of the weimar period, half of germany celebrated the sexual emancipation that had been stimulated by the republic, and “the other condemned it as the very fount of immortality, the cause of all that was wrong in german life.”69 whether they were trying to cultivate it, or bury it, germans simply could not bring themselves to leave sex alone. when german women were propelled into the workforce during world war i, the general consensus was that it was a temporary solution to sustain what they were told would be a quick and expeditious war.70 the new women, whether glamorous and vibrant or weary and maternal, existed as representatives of the excitement of the weimar era and its legacy. while the concept of liberation is often considered to be the touchstone of the weimar republic, the sexologists that pioneered modern sexology in the 1920s, as demonstrated by theodoor hendrik van de velde, were still very much intent on restoring imperial german institutions and returning women to their traditional social positions as dutiful wives and mothers. what was marketed to women as “sexual emancipation” was, in reality, nothing more than a lightened form of sexual repression that was designed to safeguard the continuation of the german race. men, still reeling from the horrors of world war i, were desperate to reclaim their virility and reassert their dominance over the very women who had carried the nation through the war. while sex and war are not always commonly associated with one another, the reactionary sex reform of the 1920s illustrates how a crisis of masculinity was able to bridge the gap. 68 weitz, weimar germany, 323. 69 ibid, 327. 70 peukert, the weimar republic, 98. 1 portraying the enemy two german lutherans’ turkish travelogues and the letters of ogier ghiselin de busbecq thorin wenner university of minnesota abstract in the 1570s, austria sent an embassy to the ottoman capital of constantinople in order to maintain contact during a fragile period of peace. this article examines the writings of two theologians, stephan gerlach and salomon schweigger, who were sent with this embassy and compares them to those of another traveler to the ottoman empire, ogier ghiselin de busbecq, in order to better understand the motivations and biases of these writers. this article also examines these writings within the broader contemporary literature on the turks. article in the 1570s, two german lutherans, stephan gerlach and salomon schweigger, traveled to constantinople as part of a diplomatic mission to the sublime porte on behalf of the holy roman empire. both recorded the events that took place during their journeys to constantinople and during their time there. ogier ghiselin de busbecq, their predecessor who had conducted diplomacy in the same city in the 1550s, wrote about his experiences in constantinople in letters that were later collected into a single text. all three men wrote about what they saw, did, and heard in the same city at similar points in time, and yet their characterization of turkish society and culture differed, sometimes greatly, especially in the case of busbecq as compared to gerlach and schweigger. these two religious zealots, who were educated in theology, displayed a more belligerent and altogether less forgiving attitude toward turks, finding essentially no redeeming qualities in their culture or society. on the other hand, busbecq, a classically educated and trained diplomat, while antagonistic toward the turks, still found qualities of theirs worth praising and presents a more nuanced view toward them. their backgrounds thus influence the texts that they passed on concerning their experiences. the wider political and religious context of the 1570s establishes the importance of these diplomatic missions, as well as why it was possible that two lutherans would be sent to the ottoman empire under the auspices of a diplomatic mission from the ostensibly catholic habsburg emperor at the time, maximilian ii. during the sixteenth century, the habsburg and ottoman empires were in conflict. vienna had been besieged in 1529, and further conflict raged over hungary, resulting in its partition. peace was first negotiated in 1547 2 with a truce that required the habsburgs to pay a yearly tribute of 30,000 gold pieces.1 however, this truce proved to be only temporary, with the ottomans again pushing into hungary and seizing the town of sziget. the resulting treaty of adrianople, signed in 1568, established an eight-year period of peace and was renewed until 1593.2 despite this negotiated peace, however, turkish soldiers continued to raid the hungarian countryside, taking livestock and people.3 this unstable peace and the continued payments of tribute to the sultan required a habsburg presence in constantinople in order to ensure that the sultan could be contacted about irregularities in the execution of the peace agreement. in addition, both the ottoman and habsburg rulers desired peace on the hungarian border due to other threats. in the case of the habsburgs, they had to deal with the reformation and protestant unrest. the ottoman sultans had a powerful rival far from hungary in the assurgent persia of the safavid dynasty.4 the reformation, which dramatically divided german society, affected diplomacy by directing the attentions of the emperor to domestic matters rather than allowing him to expend effort in foreign lands. maximillian ii was the first emperor who reigned during the diplomatic mission to constantinople, led by david ungnad von sonnegg. maximillian was unique in that he did not zealously fight on behalf of the pope and catholicism, stating that he would be “neither a papist nor a lutheran.”5 he wished for a universal christian church that would embrace all people, catholic or lutheran, and sought agreement between the denominations in order to achieve this peacefully, in contrast to the militant approaches of his predecessors. he even established a limited freedom of worship for nobility in 1569, just five years prior to david ungnad’s mission to constantinople.6 in the 1560s and 1570s, maximilian ii’s interference in church affairs in austria led to frayed relations with rome that remained strained in some areas for decades.7 a mission to constantinople intended to create religious unity between lutherans and the greek orthodox became possible due to the university of tübingen’s faculty desiring contact with the east for reasons of faith as well as general interest in the greeks, and an imperial climate which was more tolerant of the existence of lutheran nobles. this brought stephan gerlach and salomon schweigger to constantinople. the peace with the turks that was negotiated in 1547 also required its own diplomatic mission to constantinople. in 1554, ogier ghiselin de busbecq was sent to the ottoman 1 victor-lucien tapié, the rise and fall of the habsburg monarchy (new york: praeger publishers, 1971), 61. see also: james d. tracy, “the habsburg monarchy in conflict with the ottoman empire, 1527-1593: a clash of civilizations,” austrian history yearbook 46 (2015): 13. 2 tapié, the rise and fall of the habsburg monarchy, 62. 3 ibid., 63. 4 tracy, “the habsburg monarchy in conflict with the ottoman empire, ” 1. 5 bertrand buchmann, österreich und das osmanische reich: eine bilaterale geschichte (vienna: wuvuniversitätsverlag, 1999), 112. 6 paula sutter fichtner, emperor maximilian ii (new haven: yale university press, 2001), 153. 7 joseph patrouch, “the investiture controversy revisited: religious reform, emperor maximilian ii, and the klosterrat,” austrian history yearbook 25 (1994): 68. 3 empire in order to ensure the terms of the peace were maintained.8 busbecq was born the illegitimate son of george ghiselin ii, seigneur de busbecq, in 1522 and legitimatized by emperor charles v in 1549.9 his first journey to the ottoman empire, where he would return after his first brief mission and remain until 1562, came early in his diplomatic career: he had previously been sent to witness the wedding of philip ii of spain and mary of england.10 during his mission to the sublime porte, busbecq wrote letters to contacts in the holy roman empire and kept notes detailing events and encounters that he would later use in publishing his letters in 1589, three years before his death in 1592.11 busbecq was also interested in antiquities and botany, both of which he would indulge in during his time in the ottoman empire.12 this mission was led first by david ungnad von sonnegg, who was appointed as imperial envoy to constantinople in 1572.13 ungnad was a zealous lutheran, and prior to his second mission to constantinople in 1574, he asked for a chaplain from tübingen to accompany him and his men. jakob andreae, chancellor of the university, chose stephan gerlach—at the time an impressive student—to accompany ungnad. stephan gerlach was born in the duchy of württemberg, in the town of knittlingen, in 1546.14 gerlach studied theology at the university of tübingen, where he became a professor after his return from constantinople. when gerlach returned to germany in 1578, salomon schweigger was chosen from the university of tübingen to replace him and to continue his work.15 both schweigger and gerlach received their education in theology, and this was a primary reason for their being chosen to accompany the mission to constantinople; their official title was gesandtschaftsprediger, preachers of the diplomatic mission.16 like gerlach, salomon schweigger was born in württemberg (both the towns of sulz am neckar and haigerloch are mentioned in sources as birthplaces) in 1551 and also studied at the university of tübingen, earning a degree in theology in 1573.17 he then became ordained as a preacher in 1576 and accompanied joachim freiherr von sinzendorf, who replaced fellow austrian nobleman david ungnad von sonnegg as the leader of the diplomatic mission, to constantinople in 1577/78. beyond his stay in constantinople, schweigger traveled across the ottoman empire through egypt and jerusalem, returning to 8 karl a. roider, foreword to the turkish letters of ogier ghiselin de busbecq (baton rouge: louisiana state university press, 2017), ix. 9 ibid., viii. 10 ibid., ix-x. 11 ibid., x. 12 ibid., xii. 13 george zachariades, tübingen und konstantinopel: martin crusius und seine verhandlungen mit der griechisch-orthodoxen kirche schriftenreihe der deutsch-griechische gesellschaft (göttingen: gerstung & lehmann, 1941), 18. 14 julius hartmann, "gerlach, stephan," allgemeine deutsche biographie 9 (leipzig: duncker & humblot, 1879), 23. 15 zachariades, tübingen und konstantinopel, 40. 16 bernhard ebneth, "schweigger, salomon," neue deutsche biographie 24 (berlin: duncker & humblot, 2010), 45-46; and hartmann, "gerlach, stephan," 23. 17 ebneth, "schweigger, salomon," 45-46. 4 germany in 1581. he published an account of his travels in 1608 and later translated the koran in 1616 using an italian translation from 1547, showing a continued interest in islamic culture.18 although both stephan gerlach and salomon schweigger are referred to as “chaplains” of the diplomatic missions, what they were tasked with was more akin to a diplomatic mission of their own. jakob andreae had a dream of uniting the protestant and orthodox churches, creating an allied front against rome by coming to a theological consensus.19 martin crusius, a professor at tübingen who was fascinated with the greeks, supported the idea wholeheartedly and wished to establish contact with the patriarch in constantinople, jeremias ii. thus, schweigger and gerlach were tasked with being intermediaries to give letters from the faculty of tübingen to the patriarch in order to facilitate this dialogue. ogier ghiselin de busbecq was not alone in writing on his time among the turks, the first of his letters being published in 1581. both salomon schweigger and stephan gerlach kept records of their travels and their stay in the ottoman capital, and schweigger even published his account in 1608 during his lifetime, while gerlach’s was published posthumously in 1674. all three accounts provide the authors’ interpretations of turkish culture and society. however, there is a marked contrast between the accounts of schweigger and gerlach and that of busbecq. the former two writers often conform to the tropes present in the polemical writing of the time, showing biases against the turks and islam and showing little nuance in their portrayals of the turks, instead giving the impression that they are barbaric and without any redeeming qualities. busbecq, on the other hand, is willing to give the turks credit for what he sees as being the positive characteristics of their empire, even though he views it as an antagonist of christian europe. an interesting aspect of the writing of gerlach and schweigger in particular is the language they use when referring to turks. both writers use the word “turk” to mean “muslim,” only differentiating between muslims of different ethnicities when discussing arabs, in which case, words derivative of “moor” are used. this was a linguistic practice dating back to the mid-fifteenth century in europe and served to counterpose christian europe with the society of the muslim turk.20 when an officer of the imperial army converted to islam, according to schweigger, the “traitor … became a turk.”21 stephan gerlach describes eight prisoners “becoming turks” when they converted to islam.22 such language would seem to suggest a civilizational divide between the turks and the europeans predicated upon religion, and converts crossed this divide, abandoning their “europeanness” and adopting not just the religion of the turk but the culture and identity of the turk as well. for the 18 ibid. 19 zachariades, tübingen und konstantinopel, 18-19. 20 felix konrad, “from the ‘turkish menace’ to exoticism and orientalism: islam as antithesis of europe (1453–1914)?,” european history online, march 3, 2011, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-andstereotypes/from-the-turkish-menace-to-orientalism. 21 salomon schweigger, eine newe reiss beschreibung auss teutschland nach constantinopel (nuremberg: christoff locher, 1639), 32. 22 stephan gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch (frankfurt am main: zunner, 1674), 226. 5 authors and their contemporaries, this dichotomy between “european” and “turk” persisted in areas of europe controlled by the ottoman empire including the hungarian territory that had just been taken by the ottomans three decades prior, illustrating that the importance of european identity lay not in geography but in culture and religion. considering the historical context of the mission to constantinople, with the ottoman empire having made large incursions into hungary and besieging vienna, the seat of habsburg and imperial power, it is not surprising that all three writers saw the turks as a threat. following these invasions, a great number of writings portraying the turk as a scourge of europe and a horde that threatened to engulf the whole of christendom were published, with atrocities supposedly committed by ottoman forces spread by the printing press across the continent.23 broadsheets warned of turkish brutality, such as feeding innocents to lions or blaming them for earthquakes, some even blaming turkish brutality for the birth of deformed children in hungary.24 lutheran discourse on the turks created more fuel for the flames of anti-turkish rhetoric. martin luther described the turks as enemies of god and a divine punishment against sinful christians.25 luther also described the defeat of the turks in their 1529 siege of vienna as a “work of god” that was a respite in what he believed to be an apocalyptic conflict pitting the christians against the muslim turks.26 the turks were referred to as the “archenemy of the christians” (erbfeinde der christen). similar expressions are used by both gerlach and schweigger. gerlach uses “erbfeind” (archenemy) to describe the turks in a letter on the potential union between the habsburg realms and poland (as they were electing a new king, and maximilian ii was a favorite candidate in these elections).27 salomon schweigger calls the turks the “enemies of the name of christ” (feind des christlichen namen).28 this identification of the turks with islam shows that both viewed the turks as enemies of the germans, not just politically but also religiously. the use of the word “erbfeind” to identify the turks had an extensive history. in her study of the figure of the turk in the holy roman empire and germany, zsuzsa barbarics traces its history all the way back to the turkish seljuks, who invaded persia and were the enemies of the first crusade and considered a threat to christendom.29 thus, the authors are not only using tropes of the literature on turks of their own time, but also perpetuating turkish tropes from centuries before the ottoman empire’s rise. both authors also reflect luther’s conception of the turk as a divine punishment being used against christendom. stephan gerlach relates the ottoman conquest of cyprus and concludes it by saying that “when god wishes to punish a land or city, no fortifications shall 23 konrad, “from the ‘turkish menace’ to exoticism and orientalism.” 24 paula sutter fichtner, terror and toleration: the habsburg empire confronts islam, 1526-1850 (london: reaktion books, 2008), 50-51. 25 konrad, “from the ‘turkish menace’ to exoticism and orientalism.” 26 johannes ehmann, luther, türken, und islam (gütersloh: gütersloher verlagshaus, 2008), 312. 27 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 182. 28 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 303. 29 zsuzsa barbarics, “‘türck ist mein nahm in allen landen…’ kunst, propaganda und die wandlung des türkenbildes im heiligen römischen reich deutscher nation,” acta orientalia academiae scientiarum hungaricae 54 (2001): 260. 6 help.”30 salomon schweigger writes multiple times that god uses the turks to punish the sins of europeans, whether they be the inhabitants of constantinople in 1453, the germans, or other europeans. schweigger says that the destruction of a castle of matthias corvinus by the turks was “earned by us with our sins.”31 schweigger also writes that god is the causa principalis that fights against christians in their battles against the turks, thus explaining why the turks seem to be an unconquerable foe for the europeans.32 this is therefore another area where the authors are in agreement with luther’s characterizations of the turk. in addition, another connection to the broader german characterization of the turks can be found: zsuzsa barbarics describes the apocalyptic narrative, constructed by luther, as yet another significant aspect of this characterization and the genesis of the stereotypes of the turk in the german psyche, which would go on to influence a variety of writings on the ottoman empire.33 barbarics specifically notes the influence of luther’s turkish writings on religious polemic between protestants and catholics, but also mentions its role in “anti-turkish traditions.” this tradition is seemingly reflected in the writings of gerlach and schweigger, providing yet more evidence of their reliance on tropes in characterizing the people who they saw before their very eyes while in constantinople. for his part, busbecq states that the turks were “a scourge sent against us by the anger of heaven.”34 however, this is the only reference to the turks as a divine punishment in all of busbecq’s letters. he does not refer to defeats of christians as being brought about by divine intervention and instead prefers to analyze turkish military success from a more secular perspective, focusing on turkish discipline, technology, tactics, and other factors. when busbecq refers to the turks as a scourge sent from heaven, he is attempting to persuade his readers that hasty military action against the turks is inadvisable. were he following the same logic that schweigger and gerlach utilize in their writings, busbecq might write that it is the moral failings of the christians that led to turkish success and would not need to find other reasons why fighting the ottoman empire impatiently would be a fool’s errand. however, busbecq supplements his rationale with the assertion that the ottoman sultan is “at the head of an army equipped with the resources of many kingdoms”— a terrible foe who, along with his soldiers, is hardened by the experiences of prior successful wars.35 busbecq uses this description to claim that emperor ferdinand i is heroic and brave for refusing to retreat yet also refusing to fight the turks, assessing the situation properly and knowing that he is outmatched at the moment. therefore, busbecq’s description does include some reference to divine intervention, but only as a small portion of his overall argument on the impossibility of war in his time and in favor of recognizing the greatness of his ruler. the difference between busbecq and scheigger and gerlach could perhaps be connected to the fact that the latter two were educated in theology and brought this religious background to their interpretation of history. busbecq avoided this 30 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 216. 31 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 22. 32 ibid., 155. 33 barbarics, “’türck ist mein nahm,’” 300-301. 34 ogier ghiselin de busbecq, turkish letters of ogier ghiselin de busbecq, trans. edward forster (oxford: clarendon press, 1927), 238. 35 ibid., 239. 7 type of interpretation, coming from a more secular background in his work as a diplomat and having a more secular education focused on the classics and ancient history.36 schweigger and gerlach also criticize the german armies in their journals. for example, gerlach writes about the slowness of the holy roman empire’s bureaucracy as compared to that of the ottoman empire, stating that the sultan can accomplish in one council meeting what the germans require months and multiple sessions of the reichstag to do.37 gerlach even suggests that god has blinded the turks to this, otherwise they would be capable of simply going to vienna and conquering it. this mention of divine intervention is interesting, as gerlach had written that god helped the turks, but in this case, god is apparently handicapping them, showing the extent to which gerlach saw him as guiding the course of war between the germans and the turks. gerlach also suggests more “earthly” reasons for turkish success, such as that the organization of the turkish army is superior, with the soldiers content and the proper number of soldiers being raised without any problems.38 this can be contrasted with what he writes in his diary about the imperial soldiers on the hungarian border being paid later. gerlach states that they often struggle to receive their salary and actually have to bribe people in order to receive the money they deserve. he also describes how, at some stations along the border, the soldiers “go about like beggars,” half naked.39 schweigger corroborates the efficiency of the turks in supplying and maintaining their armies in times of both peace and war. he writes that, when the turks take to the field during war, they have precisely the amount of food, drink, and other provisions that they need, “which the german soldiers do not.”40 he goes on to write about the german bureaucracy, again agreeing with gerlach’s assessment: the germans require a great amount of labor in getting their forces assembled. not only this, but while the reichstag deliberates and the nobles bicker, the enemy will have already taken its chance to attack imperial lands. schweigger writes that the quick manner in which the divan operates, as compared to the laborious manner of the reichstag’s deliberations, is part of the reason for their victories.41 both authors are therefore in agreement about the weakness of the imperial war bureaucracy. not only does god seem to favor the turks in battle in order to punish the sinful germans, but even before the battles take place, their efficient government has already given them an advantage. busbecq presents a quite different view of turkish war materiel. he writes that it is only during dire times, when the army cannot live off the land, that the sultan allows his own resources to be used to feed the soldiers, and even then, only the janissaries receive “just enough food to sustain life.” other soldiers must exercise 36 ibid., xxi. 37 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 244. 38 ibid., 52. 39 ibid., 305. 40 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 161. 41 ibid., 176. 8 extreme economy in managing what little they have in way of food for months at a time.42 this paints a picture greatly different from that of schweigger and gerlach. busbecq writes at the same time that the german soldiers, rather than not getting what they need, seem to not get what they want, being especially greedy and expecting luxury in their camps.43 both schweigger and gerlach write further comments on ottoman bureaucracy aside from its effectiveness in matters of war. gerlach, for example, refers to the payment for offices in the ottoman empire multiple times, claiming that the grand vizier accepts payments of “thirty to forty thousand thalers” from those who wish to become a pasha or beylerbey.44 he later states that this is such a pervasive practice that “one must buy all offices,” even professorships.45 stephan gerlach paints a picture of an ottoman empire where corruption is commonplace and where money is the defining factor in one’s mobility. salomon schweigger, who often verges on the polemical in his writing on the turks, and many times also exaggerates in his claims against them, takes a very different view of ottoman bureaucracy. he writes that those occupying important offices are not there because of their noble birth, as was the case in so much of europe, but rather because they earned a noble reputation based on their courageous deeds and industriousness.46 he also does not make any claim of corruption with regards to the selection of candidates for offices. no matter which of the two authors is more accurate in their portrayal of ottoman bureaucratic corruption, schweigger interestingly uses the lack of ottoman political dynasties to criticize european practices of claiming people to be “noble” and therefore worthy of important positions simply by virtue of their parentage. he cites ovid in stating that it is not ancestry which makes someone great, but rather their character. however, schweigger makes sure to write that the value of nobility cannot be completely ignored, since nobility can be passed down and inherited by the children of the nobles. where he directs his scorn is toward the awarding of military offices to those with no experience in war simply on account of their nobility.47 in a sense, then, salomon schweigger is portraying the ottoman empire as a positive example in contrast to european society. it would seem that even the archenemy of christendom can offer ideas for societal reforms. in this case, salomon schweigger is arguing not for the elimination of the nobility as a ruling class, but rather for allowing for greater meritocratic influence in military and perhaps other appointments. he can see value in the ottoman system rather than dismissing it wholesale, while stephan gerlach writes it off as a hotbed of corruption, not addressing any merits which he may see in it. in terms of the relation of schweigger’s praise of meritocracy in the ottoman empire to tropes and past writings on the ottoman empire, a connection can be found in the writings of busbecq. he described the ottoman system as meritocratic and used this to criticize the 42 busbecq, turkish letters, 110-111. 43 ibid., 111. 44 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 38. 45 ibid., 93-94. 46 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 160. 47 ibid., 160-161. 9 practices of the nobility, just as salomon schweigger did in his book.48 while it is technically possible that both authors observed the same practices in ottoman society and compared them favorably to german hereditary privilege independently, it also does not seem altogether unlikely that schweigger may have read about his predecessor’s travels and been influenced by them. schweigger would likely have read some works on ottoman society prior to his stay in constantinople, and travel literature, especially relating to the orient, was quite popular at this time. this is speculation, but the fact of their both having made the same sort of observation seems to indicate a connection of some kind. the way in which busbecq discusses meritocracy in the ottoman empire differs, however. he seems to have much more outright praise for the meritocratic system without necessarily tying it to chastisement of the holy roman empire. he writes that meritocracy is the reason why the turks “succeed in all that they attempt and are a dominating race and daily expand the bounds of their rule.”49 he does also write that the german system is predicated entirely on birth but purposely avoids further discussion of the subject.50 busbecq’s appraisal of ottoman meritocracy is therefore more laudatory than schweigger’s. perhaps then this is another reflection of the backgrounds of the authors. busbecq, as the illegitimate son of a nobleman, would have been predisposed toward approving of a form of government that cared less for the origins of one’s birth; though he had been legitimatized by the emperor in 1549, he had to earn this through talent rather than mere circumstances of birth.51 schweigger and gerlach, meanwhile, do not seem to have experienced any such difficulties. another area where salomon schweigger concedes that the germans might learn from the turks is in public morality, specifically with regards to bathing. while it may sound odd, schweigger believes that the turkish bathing custom of being partially clothed in the bathhouses is morally superior to german bathing habits, since the germans apparently are completely naked when they bathe.52 schweigger writes that the christians could “learn discipline and respectability from these barbarians” in this context. interestingly, he was not the only german in the ottoman empire to chastise his people along these lines. johann wild, a captive in ottoman lands from germany, wrote an account of his experiences there which appeared a few years after schweigger published the stories of his travels. in this, he also wrote on turkish baths and stated that the germans should learn from the turkish practice of wearing a towel around the waist.53 that is not to say, however, that schweigger goes without criticizing the turks and other europeans on this subject. his continued use of the word barbarian, even when praising a turkish cultural practice, is in itself a way of maintaining the negative presentation of the turk that had existed to this point in his account. schweigger makes clear that, although the turks may behave in a way that the germans should aspire to, they are still a deplorable people who are below the europeans 48 konrad, “from the ‘turkish menace’ to exoticism and orientalism.” 49 busbecq, turkish letters, 59. 50 ibid., 59-60. 51 ibid., viii. 52 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 115. 53 gülbeyaz kula, “vom wissen um die leserschaft. zur bedeutung der apodemik für die reisebeschreibungen von salomon schweigger und johann wild am beispiel des türkischen bades (hamam),” zeitschrift für germanistik 24 (2014): 17. 10 or, at the very least, the germans. schweigger also goes on to compare another aspect of german bathing to the practices of the turks, namely that german men and women bathe together. he writes that it is a great wonder to the greeks and turks that germans of the opposite sex can be next to each other naked without any infidelity occurring, and that the “geilen völker” (lustful peoples)—such as greeks, italians, spaniards, and turks—would not be able to follow this example. he references tacitus’ description of german chastity, using this example to praise the germans over south europeans and turks.54 thus, schweigger still manages to portray the turks negatively in talking about the bathhouses, in a way balancing out his negative portrayal of the germans. as mentioned, johann wild, the captive german in the ottoman empire, wrote on the bathhouses there as well, around the same time that schweigger’s account was being published. what is intriguing is not just that wild and schweigger make incredibly similar statements with regards to turkish bathing customs, but also that they had a working relationship—schweigger actually wrote the foreword to the first edition of wild’s account.55 this shows that they were in dialogue and that they may perhaps have spoken of their experiences. if this is true, it may have influenced wild’s conclusions about the bathhouses, explaining the similarities between their descriptions and claims regarding turkish bathing customs. this could perhaps, then, show evidence of a dialogue on a larger scale through the reading of travel literature which resulted in the proliferation of certain tropes and beliefs about the orient and, more specifically, the turks. unfortunately, stephan gerlach does not write about the bathhouses in constantinople. he does acknowledge the existence of a bathhouse in buda but writes nothing about the turkish bathing practices, and therefore a comparison of his reaction to that of schweigger’s is impossible.56 this is somewhat strange, as most travelers to the ottoman empire who reported on their travels seem to have mentioned the bathhouses there due to the novelty of the oriental bathhouse as compared to european baths.57 however, busbecq also does not write extensively on turkish bathhouses, aside from saying that the wealthy have private baths while the lower classes tend to bathe publicly, as well as that cleanliness is morally important for the turks.58 busbecq, in a sense, is portraying turkish cleanliness positively, stating that these are not dirty barbarians, and he also does not mention any sort of criticism of the germans in relation to this, nor does he couple it with moral criticism as schweigger does, and so it could once again be said that busbecq is more moderate in his portrayal of the turks. the reason for this discrepancy could lie in the fact that busbecq, in his writing, shows more evidence of having interacted with average turks than schweigger or gerlach. it does not seem implausible that busbecq, interacting with more turks than the other writers, would have had a more personal and therefore nuanced understanding of turkish societal norms. in contrast, schweigger and gerlach, relying on 54 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 115. 55 kula, “vom wissen um die leserschaft,” 15. 56 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 11. 57 kula, “vom wissen um die leserschaft,” 13. 58 busbecq, turkish letters, 119. 11 hearsay or their biases, would lean more toward making negative assumptions, except where personal experience, such as in schweigger’s bathhouse visit, made it impossible. it is worth noting an important implication in salomon schweigger’s separation of the turk and the german in terms of their chastity. schweigger claims that the turks are one of the unchaste peoples just as the southern europeans lack german chastity. while this may seem innocuous, it in fact follows in a tradition of casting the turks as a race of sexual deviants. as printing spread throughout europe and in the wake of the turkish conquest of constantinople in 1453, the continent experienced an explosion of literature about “the turk.” these works often included writing upon turkish sexuality and how it differed from the norms of christian europe.59 quite relevant to the previously cited passage from schweigger is that, in some cases, the turk could also be presented in a positive light in terms of his sexual morals in order to shame the christian reader. while schweigger represents the turks as both promiscuous and, in some ways, more chaste than the germans, this should not be taken as contradictory; schweigger seems to be implying that, though the turks are an unchaste people, even they have some habits which the germans may take after if they are to be even better. as it is clear that schweigger is censuring the germans by comparing them negatively to turkish custom, he may have been following in an existing line of literature in which this practice was common. a heritage could also be established in the writings of luther, who had mentioned what he saw as the boundless illicit sexual practices of the turks.60 this would again imply that schweigger, as a theologian, refers back to religious texts in his assessments of the ottoman empire, whereas busbecq does not. gerlach and schweigger also cite many turkish sexual practices that they apparently had heard of and which draw attention to turkish hedonism and moral deficiency. returning to gerlach, he mentions fairly early in his journal that the turks, “to their shame,” sexually abuse boys, and he says this practice is very common in the ottoman empire.61 what is also interesting about this passage is that gerlach writes that “honorable turks” blame the italians for bringing this into their lands. this once again drags the italians into the moral failings of the ottoman empire, drawing a sort of continuity of moral deficiency between the mediterranean realms. gerlach refers to sexual relations with boys again later, stating that it is fully tolerated within the empire, while adultery is punishable by death.62 this, of course, shows the moral hypocrisy and deviancy of the turks, as their justice and enforcement of morality is not consistent with divine law and morality as was familiar to european christians. the idea of pedophilia being tolerated while adultery was so harshly punished seemed absurd most likely not just to gerlach but to most of his readers as well. gerlach also writes that boys in constantinople wait outside the houses of noblemen, having “cleaned themselves up,” in order to receive favorable attention from them, 59 silke falkner, “‘having it off’ with fish, camels, and lads: sodomitic pleasures in german-language turcica,” journal of the history of sexuality 13 (2004): 403-404. 60 ibid., 408. 61 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 16. 62 ibid., 97. 12 implying a sort of child prostitution culture in the city among the elites.63 later, he writes that there are many boys in the city whose main profession consists of earning the attractions of older men, with some even accompanying men into war. this practice of child prostitution is said to extend to the turkish prisons as well.64 salomon schweigger elaborates further upon this theme. in a section on ottoman legal punishments, he lists punishments for crimes such as treason and stealing, and then states that the legal punishment for child abuse is to be thrown from a church tower. however, he also says that this rarely occurs, despite this legal requirement, because “fornication is completely in fashion.”65 thus, the rampant pedophilia supposedly occurring in the ottoman empire is not simply ignored or unpunished but rather is socially encouraged or, at the very least, seen as something which society has no qualms with. in addition, this blindness toward these acts goes against the turks’ own laws, showing once again their arbitrary nature and lack of consistent morality. schweigger also writes about homosexuality in the ottoman empire, comparing the turks to the sodomites and recalling the biblical commands of god that man should not lie with boys or men as with a woman and that men and women should not lie with animals in this manner. he writes as well that they have always been “tainted” by this “abominable, unnatural wantonness,” again painting a picture of the turk as a sexual deviant, unrestrained by divine law and morality. he concludes this passage by wishing for god’s protection over the faithful in the ottoman empire against “these and similar abominations.”66 in presenting the reader with supposed widespread immorality in the ottoman empire, schweigger hopes to inspire fear and despise of the turk, against which god’s protection is needed. the view of the turk as an enemy of christendom is aided by this presentation of turkish sexual deviancy. it also, of course, continues the aforementioned tradition of identifying turks with a sexuality different from that considered normal in christian europe. if turkish pedophilia and homosexuality were rampant in their empire to the extent that both schweigger and gerlach felt it necessary to mention, in spite of neither directly observing homosexual or pedophilic actions, it is interesting that busbecq never mentions turkish sexual impropriety. in fact, he praises the chastity of their women and the restraint of men in their conduct toward women, citing the “high standard of morality” in the ottoman empire in these areas.67 since busbecq is content to criticize the turks in other areas and has no reason to hide the sorts of immoral acts that schweigger and gerlach stressed in their accounts, he must not have observed them. this would mean that he either missed something widespread occurring around him, since gerlach implied a sort of omnipresence of pedophilia, or that schweigger and gerlach exaggerated the supposed immorality of ottoman society. however, since busbecq recounts stories of his interactions with average turks, such as his encounters with a coppersmith who melted down antique 63 ibid., 313. 64 ibid., 347. 65 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 173. 66 ibid., 81. 67 busbecq, turkish letters, 117-118. 13 coins and the owner of hyenas in constantinople, while the other writers do not, this could be another area where their lack of personal interaction colors their writing and results in further bias against the turks and a perpetuation of polemic tropes. 68 when gerlach describes the aforementioned bath in buda, he praises its architecture, calling it a “schönes bad” (nice bathroom).69 this draws attention to another aspect of representation of ottoman society in both schweigger’s and gerlach’s writings: their views of turkish buildings and the appropriation of local architecture. according to gerlach, the turks allow the most beautiful castles in hungary to fall apart and they do not build or renovate anything.70 they do not care for the aesthetics of these buildings and do not seem to see any value in them. the turks also are said to have allowed the most beautiful buildings in the city to turn into “pigsties,” destroying the artwork in them and vandalizing them in various ways, which gerlach sees as demonstrating a sort of divine threat.71 this could again be interpreted as showing the turks to be barbarians who do not appreciate so-called civilized ways of life, such as aesthetic architecture. where religion comes into the equation is perhaps less obvious, however. nevertheless, gerlach was not alone in seeing the attitude toward hungarian fortifications as being particularly turkish. christian travelers in ottoman hungary viewed this the same way.72 in pest, gerlach describes a “gewerbs-stadt,” his invented term for a merchants’ district, which he describes as being enormous.73 this seems to have made a positive impression. however, less impressive were the houses, which he describes as being “uncountable but gloomy.”74 he also writes in the same passage that there were stone buildings with latticed windows that were once beautiful, but which he claims the turks have since desecrated so that nothing would look better than the city’s mosques. this implies that the turkish attitude toward architectural aesthetics subordinates the appearance of buildings that are not important to them, and perhaps it is for this reason that the old hungarian fortresses and castles were desecrated. this also could add the religious element mentioned before, which gerlach adds to the story of the desecration of artwork inside the hungarian castles. if gerlach believes that the turks do not want christian, or at least secular buildings, to outshine turkish religious buildings, he may have seen this as a sort of suppression of christian identity through architecture. the representation of turkish architecture given by schweigger is much more critical. for example, he writes that the houses in constantinople are made of simple materials cobbled together messily without the tact or knowledge that germans and italians supposedly have of proper architecture. moreover, the turks do not know how to move materials efficiently, carrying them by donkey rather than wagon, which schweigger claims inflates the cost of 68 ibid., 49. 69 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 11. 70 ibid., 11. 71 ibid., 12. 72 ludá klusáková, “between reality and stereotype: town views of the balkans,” urban history 28 (2001): 364. 73 ibid., 365. 74 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 10. 14 housing. schweigger also writes that even the houses of rich turks cannot compare to homes in germany, showcasing once again a lack of turkish architectural sophistication in the eyes of the author.75 schweigger follows up this description of turkish housing with a chapter on turkish mosques and begins it with a note on the building of the mosques. he states that the turks follow what he calls the age-old practice of “heathens and frauds,” spending on the aesthetics of the place of worship in order to compensate for the falsehoods that they peddle within. schweigger contrasts this in the introduction to the chapter with turkish home-building, saying that the turks are much more flamboyant in the building of their temples.76 busbecq, again contrasting with these two authors, presents a more nuanced view on the subject of turkish architecture. he corroborates gerlach’s claim that they have allowed fortresses in hungary to crumble. however, he writes that the reason for turkish neglect of the “splendid” buildings is not due to a lack of respect for civilized architecture or some sort of attempt to desecrate christian places, but rather meager pay for turks who have greater concerns than repairing old buildings, as well as their frugality, which means that they do not see it as necessary to have all the amenities that a maintained fortress would provide—they “care little if the rain comes through or the walls are cracked.”77 busbecq sees the turks as eschewing pride and vanity and actually blames the lack of fine dwellings in hungary on the hungarians’ way of life rather than the turks. he once again avoids exaggeration and gives a nuanced, as well as perhaps less biased, view of turkish society, greatly contrasting with schweigger and gerlach. the writing of those authors on the subject of ottoman religious architecture shows a continued view that even the “positives” of ottoman society can hide negative facts about it. the construction of beautiful mosques, for gerlach, seems to be tied to an architectural suppression of non-muslims and secular architecture. for schweigger, the mosques being built in such a magnificent style in contrast to what he saw as dour domiciles in constantinople shows the deceit of the turk, who tries to lure people to islam with aesthetics rather than religious substance. there is certainly not much credit given to the turks, even when they do something that impresses the travelers. in everything they do, deceit, immorality, or an opportunity for admonishment of germans is seen, rather than a complex or admirable society. this aspect of european writing on turks is mentioned by felix konrad in his article on representations of turks as the antithesis of europeans after the fall of constantinople.78 in this way, then, even the writing that seems to break the mold by offering praise rather than criticism still conforms to an overarching european theme in writing on the ottoman empire that preceded gerlach and schweigger in criticizing the turk. in addition, this is yet another area where the religious background of schweigger and gerlach affect their interpretation of aspects of turkish society. their cynicism regarding islam seems to extend even to the architecture of mosques and does not allow them to appreciate the architecture without tying it to the religion of which it is a part. 75 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 105-106. 76 ibid., 107. 77 busbecq, turkish letters, 10-11. 78 konrad, “from the ‘turkish menace’ to exoticism and orientalism.” 15 a topic not yet covered but which konrad also references in his article is that of turkish cruelty, another stereotype of turkish barbarism in sixteenth-century texts concerning the ottoman empire. both gerlach and schweigger cover this extensively. gerlach has a unique manner of recording turkish atrocities and deceit. since his book is chronological, it allows him to use the end of each year of his stay as a sort of recollection of that year’s events. in 1573 and 1574, the ends of these years do not seem out of the ordinary. however, starting with 1575, gerlach begins to include yearly summaries of turkish “offenses against the peace” that occurred, such as people and cattle being taken away from a village and turkish attacks on imperial forces.79 by separating these events into their own section and listing them extensively, gerlach creates an image of persistent turkish violations of the peace agreement between them and the holy roman empire on the hungarian border. there is no similar list of german offenses against the peace, or of any other party’s actions. thus, the turks are painted as being deceitful and barbaric, devoid of honor despite the peace treaties and the tribute that they receive from the emperor. salomon schweigger has no such lists in his travel account, but does take many opportunities to describe what he sees as turkish tyranny and cruelty. for example, in describing the fall of constantinople in 1453, schweigger tells of children being torn apart and slaughtered before their parents’ eyes while churches were desecrated and turned into brothels.80 he also attempts to analyze the etymology of the word “turk” and states his belief that it means “destroyer,” implying the destructive qualities of the turkish nation. schweigger elaborates further, stating that whatever the ottoman sultan gets his hands upon, it is ravaged, spoiled, and destroyed. he says that they began this process in asia and have extended it to the whole of greece and hungary, where many “marvelous cities” have wasted away.81 the way schweigger describes the turks makes them seem more like a hoard of locusts than human beings, with them covering the territories of asia and the balkans and ravaging them almost by instinct rather than as a conscious process. this shows the turks in an extremely cruel light. in doing so, schweigger once again perpetuates a stereotype of the turks, rather than analyzing them in an objective manner, propagating tropes of european literature. busbecq, on the other hand, provides an image of the turk, which while critical of their methods and society, still allows for some praise. he does, in some places, refer to the turks as barbarians, such as when talking about their rule in constantinople.82 however, when mentioning turkish border raids in habsburg territory, busbecq does not refrain from mentioning that there were raids coming from the other side of the border too.83 he also writes about the abuses of turkish frontier garrisons, noting that in his role as ambassador, he had to complain to the porte on this subject “twice or three times a year.”84 79 gerlach, des aeltern tage-buch, 139-140. 80 schweigger, eine newe reiss, 138. 81 ibid., 140. 82 busbecq, turkish letters, 40. 83 ibid., 121. 84 ibid., 132. 16 this contrasts with gerlach’s great lists of supposed abuses of the peace each year by the turks. with respect to schweigger’s portrayal of the turks as a ravaging horde, busbecq actually mentions a turkish love for public works, such as finding ways to provide water throughout settlements, the complete opposite of his claims of turks causing desolation and the spoiling of the places which they touch.85 throughout their texts, salomon schweigger and stephan gerlach present views on the turks and the ottoman empire that seem to stem from pre-existing literature on these subjects, such as polemical writing and prior travelogues and that perpetuate overwhelmingly negative stereotypes, generalizations, and biases against the turks. busbecq, in contrast, presents a nuanced view of turkish society as having both flaws and positive aspects. the similarity of his text to those of schweigger and gerlach in terms of its origins, being the writings of a member of an imperial diplomatic mission to the ottoman empire in the middle of the sixteenth century, calls into question the reason for the later authors’ caricatured portrayal of the turks. considering what sets schweigger and gerlach apart from busbecq—their role in contacting the greek orthodox church and establishing ties with the patriarchate—it seems possible that their portrayals, reminiscent of polemical writing, were intended to rouse sympathy for the greek christians or, at the very least, were theologically motivated in order to combat the ottoman empire and encourage conflict at a time when the diplomatic situation had changed significantly from busbecq’s day. by the date of publication of their travelogues, the long turkish war had already occurred, which had resulted in a partial habsburg victory and greater stability on the frontier. perhaps at this time, there was higher morale in the holy roman empire. meanwhile, busbecq had published his turkish letters in 1581, when the unsteady peace was still intact. he may have seen little need for polemical writing, since he had praised in his letters the reluctance of the emperor to fight the turks as being prudent.86 thus, the writings of schweigger and gerlach, ostensibly travelogues meant to impart the authors’ knowledge of the places that they had journeyed through, function as a rallying cry for christianity against the turkish scourge and employ tropes and generalizations common in the polemical literature of their time. 85 ibid., 46. 86 ibid., 240. 41 musicology and german national identity a review of the issues in scholarship on the late eighteenth century emily clink university of alberta abstract this article explores the concept of german national identity as it has been used by musicologists and offers an alternative, fuller understanding of that concept by placing it in its late eighteenth-century context. this is done by discussing the protean nature of identity and the importance of the german conception of it in the eighteenth century, explicating the literature in musicology on the development of this identity in music, and pulling from other academic work specifically on the neglected period. the goal of this work is to showcase the multifaceted understandings of identity and how this approach is to the benefit of musicology. article in the foreword to richard leppert and susan mcclary’s ground-breaking book music and society: the politics of composition, performance, and reception, janet wolff gives a striking interpretation of the state of musicology and its history. her short summary of the history of musicology as a discipline ties the themes of all the essays together as it attacks the assumption upon which most academic writing on music has been grounded: autonomy. by this, i am referring to the belief that “art—at least great art—transcends the social, the political, and the everyday.”1 according to wolff, the belief that art is “aesthetically autonomous” is a historical construction that became a useful selling point for artists in the nineteenth century. this process was part of a larger shift towards elitism that included a preference for male novelists over female, professional artists over amateurs, and a clear distinction between what was popular and what was “great.”2 published in 1987, wolff’s sociological deconstruction of the historiography of musicology argues not just for the inclusion of social context in the analysis of art but shows how social values about art have dominated, and ultimately constrained, the academic field of musicology. wolff paints a damning picture, but not an irreparable one. she herself says that “the idea of aesthetic autonomy … is beginning to disintegrate. we should not exaggerate the extent 1 janet wolff, “the ideology of autonomous art,” in music and society: the politics of composition, performance, and reception, eds. richard leppert and susan mcclary (new york: cambridge university press, 1987), 1. 2 ibid., 6. 42 to which this socio-critical work has gained acceptance and incorporation within the mainstream of art history and literary criticism.”3 as a sociologist, part of her method in this chapter is comparing musicology to other disciplines that study “great art.” it is a compelling comparison that allows her to attach a caveat to this statement: “the striking exception to all of this, until recently, has been music.”4 here, the core of her criticism comes through. wolff declares that “there is nothing preventing anyone from learning about harmony and composition,” and argues that the reticence of academics from other fields towards the technical aspect of musicology should not prevent them from offering the necessary perspective of their field on the history of music.5 her conclusion is that this barrier must be breached. for wolff, “the sociology of music may benefit from what we have learned from developments in other areas of cultural studies.”6 to her, the interdisciplinary approach to understanding music is necessary in order to develop the discipline of musicology further and to gain a fuller picture of the development of music. while wolff’s insights are specific to sociology and cultural studies, it has become very clear throughout my reading that a similar shift needs to be made with musicology, history, and historiography. the assumption that music stands outside the social context in which it was developed has been challenged since the release of leppert and mcclary’s book but is still pervasive in musicology. several academic works have been published in an attempt to connect this supposedly autonomous “great art” to society as a whole. one of the most important is nicholas till’s mozart and the enlightenment: truth, virtue, and beauty in mozart’s operas.7 till’s method is an uneven one, but the intent is clear. he contends that music cannot be understood separately from society. only through considering all of the social, political, and economic ways the enlightenment influenced mozart’s work along with elements from his personal life can his operas be fully understood.8 one concept that has emerged again and again in the work that has attempted to place music in its sociocultural context is that of national identity. specifically, scholars have addressed the question of german identity and its development as connected to music. this is unsurprising as the question of how to define and apply “nation” and “national identity” has been debated by cultural historians for two centuries. what is curious about these new, expansive works is not their specific understanding of nation or national identity, but a complete lack of one. rather than clearly defining these concepts, the norm has been to assume that the reader knows what the concepts mean and how they are being used in the analysis. the danger of this is that it perpetuates a misunderstanding of these concepts and fails to acknowledge their protean natures. instead of a rigorous commentary on the meaning of national identity and how it has changed over time, scholars in musicology have tended to use a vague, modern understanding of the topic. hence, the literature on german 3 ibid., 8. 4 ibid. 5 ibid., 10. 6 ibid., 12. 7 nicholas till, mozart and the enlightenment: truth, virtue, and beauty in mozart’s operas (london: faber & faber, 1992), xi. 8 ibid., xi. 43 identity in music has been adversely affected by a lack of engagement with a time when nationalism was still a debated concept and german identity was just emerging. nationalism has primarily been recognized as a concept that was influential in the nineteenth century because of its association with the establishment of nation-states. musicologists certainly have known this, so they have restricted their work on german identity in music to the impact of nationalism in this time period. the issue with this is that it ignores a body of evidence that suggests that a unique german identity emerged during the enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, long before the establishment of germany. this narrow understanding of national identity, one that associates it with a specific nation-state, ignores the history of the concept and the changing german understanding of it in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. although historians and musicologists have studied the development of german identity in music, many have consistently glossed over the important contributions made to its formation in the late eighteenth century. this is likely due to an essentialist understanding of identity which believes that nationalism must be a component of national identity. this error can be rectified by applying more multifaceted definitions of nation and identity to an analysis of the german national singspiel program and the works that came out of it. this article demonstrates that a richer and more nuanced understanding of the development of “nation” and “identity” has the potential to enhance our understanding of the development of german national identity in music. first, it must be acknowledged that discussions surrounding german identity from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century can be difficult due to identifying which “germans” are being discussed. before the twentieth century, most musicologists have used “german” to speak of the people in vienna and the greater habsburg empire, austrian empire, and later austro-hungarian empire. this is usually because studies surrounding nationalism and national identity have focused on the multitude of cultures and identities in this territory. conversations around german identity in germany are usually restricted to the emergence of leipzig as a musical center and popularly coalesce around the nazis’ use of music to promote their vision of “germans.” in this article, i focus on germans in vienna and the habsburg empire. vienna was the epicenter for music and musicians, so the german identity discussed will be of those in the empire in the late eighteenth century. defining national identity why is it so important to distinguish national identity from nationalism? what can be gained from treating these concepts as social constructions, and understanding them in their historical context? providing definitions for concepts like “nation,” “nationalism,” and “identity” allow a scholar to acknowledge that they have meant different things to different people in different times and places. definitions acknowledge the power of the concepts that, in their different forms and perceptions, have had a profound impact on society. german national identity was not chosen randomly as a way of connecting music to society. the musicologists who examine music and its social contexts have repeatedly seen german national identity grow and change as an impactful idea through music. however, that change is not accounted for in their work. 44 in his foundational work, imagined communities: reflection on the origin and spread of nationalism, benedict anderson defines “nation” as a concept and explores the ways national identity is created and then connected to the emergence of nation-states. anderson believed that nation “is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”9 one of his primary issues in defining “nation” comes from what he describes as a central paradox: “the objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.”10 his identification of nations as modern comes from his discussion of them within the context of nation-states, but the tendency to historicize “national identity” by nationalists is key. one of the primary ways in which nation-states declared themselves to be separate from others in the nineteenth century was to connect to some constructed history that would justify their identity. for example, german historicism was “integral to german selfdefinition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”11 what a “nation” was supposed to be was kept purposely vague because it was more malleable, and therefore powerful, when asserting the existence of one in the past as it was not restricted to the borders of a nation-state. when nationalism is clearly treated as a modern concept, as demonstrated by the restriction of scholarship on german identity in music almost entirely to the period after 1800, it has prevented any rigorous analysis of national identity before the emergence of nationalism. this understanding does not appreciate the longevity of the existence of national identity, or help us understand how that identity emerged and changed over time. the oxford english dictionary (oed) is itself a construct by scholars and it is certainly ironic to use an english dictionary to help understand german identity, yet it offers information that has no german counterpart. accordingly, while definitions from the oed will be used, they will be informed by discussions from historians on the development of german identity. the brothers grimm do have their deutsches wörterbuch (dwb)—a compilation that has a definition for deutschtum (german-ness) and has often been called the german equivalent for the oed. however, the concepts i wish to discuss using the oed have not been updated to current academic standards in the dwb, so i will consequently stick to the oed. the earliest definition for identity in the oed is from 1545. identity is defined as “the quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness.”12 under this entry is friedrich schelling’s metaphysical doctrine of absolute identity. this alone shows that while this particular understanding of identity can be traced to the sixteenth century, schelling’s identity philosophy emerged as an important contribution in the early 1800s. german people in the habsburg empire would have been generally familiar with the 9 benedict anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, rev. ed. (london: verso, 2006), 6. 10 ibid., 5. 11 maike oergel, culture and identity: historicity in german literature and thought (boston: de gruyter, 2008), 6. 12 “identity, n.” oxford english dictionary online, accessed april 11, 2019, http://www.oed.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/view/entry/91004?redirectedfrom=identity#eid. 45 concepts of individual and collective identity, but important developments for our modern understanding were still to come. the concept of “nation,” on the other hand, has been around for even longer. the first mention of it surfaces around 1330, but the entry pointedly comments on the changing understanding through time from early examples of race and common descent to territory, political unity, and independence. it states that nation is “[a] large aggregate of communities and individuals united by factors such as common descent, language, culture, history, or occupation of the same territory, so as to form a distinct people.”13 this definition emphasizes the physical aspect of nation compared to anderson’s definition, which stresses how the historical and cultural elements of national identity are constructed. the oed definition, however, really highlights the importance of the changing meaning of “nation.” both emphasize that “nation" refers to the group that feel some sense of community with each other. both therefore distinguish the concept of national identity from nationalism, stressing that this group of community identity can exist prior to the establishment of their unique territory. in his discussion of the word “nation,” pieter m. judson says that “the term ‘nation’ meant many things in 1789, but few of these approached the mass-oriented ethnic, linguistic, religious, or territorial understanding of the term that had become standard by 1914.”14 judson takes a political approach to understanding the historical perspective on german identity when he argues that “as a form of identity that was often situationally defined, when it was considered at all, germanness rarely referred to qualities or interests that transcended a local perspective.”15 judson sees late eighteenth-century and even early nineteenth-century german identity as reflective of a scattered nation that was hardly unified in an understanding of its essence across territories. thus, while the concept of german national identity existed, there was not a single or uniform understanding of what its characteristics were. for judson, it lacked unity. nationalism was first used as a term in 1798 in the english language, but did appear earlier in german in 1774. it is defined in the oed as “advocacy of or support for the interests of one's own nation, esp. to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations. also: advocacy of or support for national independence or self-determination.”16 most historians stress the importance of this ideology in the nineteenth century, but when it is being used in broad strokes, scholars may often use a modern understanding of the concept instead of engaging with the changing meaning of it in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. christian jansen looks at nation and nationalism “as modern phenomena whose roots, 13 “nation, n.” oxford english dictionary online, accessed april 12, 2019, http://www.oed.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/view/entry/125285?rskey=sdhqov&result=1&isadv anced=false#eid. 14 pieter m. judson, “changing meanings of ‘german’ in habsburg central europe,” in the germans and the east, eds. charles w. ingrao and franz a.j. szabo (west lafayette: purdue university press, 2008), 110. 15 ibid., 113. 16 “nationalism, n.” oxford english dictionary online. 46 however, can be traced back to pre-modern times.”17 for jansen, the historiography acknowledges that “‘modern nationalism emerged between 1740 and 1830,” which is earlier than the traditional date of 1800.18 however, he also says that “when recent research shifts the beginnings of nationalism to an earlier date, it also prolongs the incubation period during which nationalist topoi and patterns of argumentation, as well as a nationalist culture, are argued to have developed.”19 this is the clincher. this is what historiography on the topic of german identity in music has missed. when a scholar refuses to engage with the changing understandings of concepts and ideologies in the time period they are studying, they lose the full picture of what it is they are discussing. they miss the opportunity to present a richer and more complex account. the major oed definition is followed by the caveat that, “whereas patriotism usually refers to a general sentiment, nationalism now usually refers to a specific ideology, esp. one expressed through political activism. in earlier use, however, the two appear to have been more or less interchangeable.”20 this again proves the need to use concepts carefully and with full recognition of what they mean to the people of the specific time and place being studied. it is not that all literature on german musicology does not acknowledge that the meaning of german national identity changes, or even that applying a modern understanding of national identity to the past is ahistorical. it is the complete lack of discussion in the literature of the meaning of these concepts and how people at the time would have understood them that is problematic. this is a trend across much of the historiography on german national identity in music. german national identity in musicology celia applegate and pamela potter’s book music & german national identity is the most complete monograph on this topic. their introduction, “germans as the ‘people of music,’” is intended to act as a brief overview of the increasing importance of music to the development of german identity over the centuries. applegate and potter assert that “most historians would agree that the eighteenth century marked the beginning of an emerging consciousness of german identity among speakers of german, as well as accompanying forms of cultural and political activism aimed at defining a putative national culture and debating the cultural future of central europe.”21 they clearly connect nationalism to german national identity, which is absolutely correct in the time period that they claim historians say it emerged. however, the research they are citing was published in 1988 and 1991, and is dated when compared to the beliefs of current major scholars like judson and jansen. the authors do not attempt to pull apart the conflation of german national identity 17 christian jansen, “the formation of german nationalism, 1740-1850,” in the oxford handbook of modern german history, ed. helmut walser smith (oxford: oxford university press, 2012), 234. 18 ibid., 235. 19 ibid. 20 “nationalism, n.” oxford english dictionary online. emphasis in the original. 21 celia applegate and pamela potter, “germans as the ‘people of music’: genealogy of an identity,” in music & german national identity, eds. celia applegate and pamela potter (chicago: the university of chicago press, 2002), 3. 47 and nationalism. this becomes even clearer later in their narrative about the emergence of german national identity. even though applegate and potter acknowledge that “musical life in the eighteenth century was not, however, wholly without national significance,” they stress that “the one nationalizing milieu that existed in central europe was that of literary culture.”22 the group that they focus on, then, were writers such as johann matheson and friedrich nicolai who were exploring the new concept of nationalism that was part of the greater debate referred to by jansen during this period. applegate and potter do admit that “early music periodicals began to suggest the importance of at least opera to national culture” but do not offer any further insights or analysis.23 they also suggest that this may be the result of the influence of the enlightenment in this connection between literary culture spilling over into musical matters, but once again, do not probe further.24 instead, they transition to focusing on the nineteenth century where nationalism and national identity are neatly tied together. as they are the editors framing the seminal collection of essays on german national identity, it is frustrating that they refuse to engage significantly with this earlier period. despite applegate and potter’s conflation of concepts, they do have remarkable insights on the development of german identity. they argue that “when musicologists place finnish, czech, russian, or spanish musical compositions under the heading of ‘musical nationalism,’ they implicitly compare them against a universally accepted german music and presume that other nations tried to distinguish themselves by deviating from the german standard.”25 this insight reveals how looking at the emergence of other national identities and studying their derivative from the “norm” demonstrates that german identity was already well established and recognized. this is one of the most astute observations that they make and can be applied to works that focus on another identity in a german context to learn more about german identity’s development. the first chapter after applegate and potter’s essay is bernd sponheuer’s “reconstructing ideal types of the ‘german’ in music,” and it improves on the introduction in its handling of “nation” in eighteenth-century german national identity in music. first, sponheuer spends a significant amount of time on eighteenth-century developments and acknowledges that “one has to be careful not to rely on hindsight in reconstructing the intellectual and cultural milieu.”26 this is a big step away from applegate and potter’s overview; however that is about as far as sponheuer goes in discussing eighteenth-century context. he does not clarify that this refers to concepts and, while identifying the german nation-state as a modern construction, obscures the geography of the german groups he is analyzing. sponheuer’s use of “nation” to refer to the “nation-state” of germany is also troublesome 22 ibid. 23 ibid., 4. 24 ibid., 3. 25 ibid., 1. 26 bernd sponheuer, “reconstructing ideal types of the ‘german’ in music,” in music & german national identity, eds. celia applegate and pamela potter (chicago: the university of chicago press, 2002), 43. 48 when trying to identify his use of national identity in the eighteenth-century context he is discussing. to his credit, sponheuer identifies two early types of german national identity as expressed through music that originate in the eighteenth century. he identifies one that “responded to the specific historical situation of the eighteenth century” and another that “represented the genesis of both the exclusivist and the universalist ideal types.”27 that he has taken the time to locate the origins of different german national identities in music is more than most others can say. in particular, his discussion of the “german sonderweg [that] arose in the eighteenth century” is powerful because while it is no longer in favor as a theory by historians, it solidified in the nineteenth century and was used prolifically in the twentieth century.28 he also highlights the importance of germans defining their identity against a “foreign” one. as he states, “eighteenth century writers … reinterpreted germany’s historical and cultural backwardness, especially evident in its dependence on italian musical culture, as a superior trait.”29 this relationship with italian musical culture is an important one and his work is elevated by his identification and appreciation of it. still, his muddling of time and geography concerning “germany” shows an inconsistency in how he applies his insights to his argument. sponheuer, despite making important steps towards appreciating the historical context of key concepts, falls into the musicological trend of not fully embracing etymology, and the clarity of his argument suffers for it. sponheuer sees a continuity in german national identity in music in which “an underlying dichotomy persists, best expressed by hanslick’s ‘being beautiful’ versus ‘having profound meaning.’”30 this insight, while lacking a rigorous understanding of the german “nation” in the eighteenth century, does express the importance of looking at the end of this century for answers concerning german identity in music. this is particularly stirring as the other major work on german identity in music uses eduard hanslick as a primary source and focuses on him to understand german identity in his lifetime. it also fails to engage with german national identity in the eighteenth century. defining deutschtum was written by david lee brodbeck and published in 2014. in his book, he aims “to reveal the very great extent to which contemporary political ideology and political developments on the ground were tied to questions of german identity in latenineteenth-century austria, and to show how, in turn, these questions were implicated in the musical culture and above all articulated by vienna’s music critics.”31 brodbeck is interested in liberal german identity, so is it fair to criticize him for not including eighteenth-century material? the german national identity that brodbeck focuses on encourages “the idea of collective patriotism.” though at the same time, “there was no doubt in hanslick’s mind about what lay in the center and what in the periphery.”32 the 27 ibid., 44. 28 ibid., 42. 29 ibid., 44. 30 ibid., 56. 31 david lee brodbeck, defining deutschtum: political ideology, german identity, and music-critical discourse in liberal vienna (new york: oxford university press, 2014), xiii-xiv. 32 ibid., 4. 49 patriotism he refers to is the early nationalism cited in the oed definition, though he does not engage with this. the hierarchy of nations is also alluded to, which is central to german liberalism. the essence of the identity that brodbeck is analyzing is that: deutschtum (germanness) and bourgeois cultural values were treated as though they were one and the same: to be liberal was to be german; to be german was to be liberal. the idea of race or what would later be called ethnicity had little to do with this particular construction of social identity. indeed, liberal nationalists—as [johann nepomuk] berger’s imperative suggests—tended to treat national and class identities not as fixed categories, but as contingent ones, insofar as one could theoretically remedy inadequacies in either through education and acculturation.33 german national identity in this form is not a fixed to a single group, but rather, people can become german. culture has far more to do with german national identity than ethnicity. this idea has its roots in the enlightenment, which empowered the bourgeoisie and, as kant said, “is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage.”34 this age encouraged religious toleration, cultural inclusion, and emphasized the power of individual reason. it was also central, as will be expanded upon later, to the early formation of german national identity as alluded to by sponheuer. despite the german liberal identity being central to his work, brodbeck fails to explore the late eighteenth-century origins of this identity. brodbeck does a masterful job exploring the development of german national identity as it relates to music, musicians, and music critics. his summary of the political scene in vienna in the mid-nineteenth century and the effects that other national groups growing in austrohungary had on german national identity are explored from social and political angles. the rise in nationalism from groups like the czechs and the gains they made in the viennese parliament ultimately led to “a new kind of exclusionary process, whereby deutschtum came to be defined in racial rather than cultural terms.”35 brodbeck clearly understands how german national identity developed throughout the nineteenth century in austriahungary and knows how different identities relate to one another and affect each other’s developments. what weakens his study is a tentativeness regarding where german liberal identity came from. while he recognizes in his reference to german patriotism that german nationalism has not yet solidified into a unified concept, he is reluctant to dive into the complexities surrounding national identity and nationalism. this shows a lack of comfort with the state of flux these concepts were in after the enlightenment and results in a lack of clarity. like applegate and potter in music & german national identity, his lack of engagement with his topic’s origins limits the impact of his research. one of the few musicologists actually to engage with the historical construction of concepts is philip v. bohlman. bohlman writes not on german identity but jewish identity in music. of course, aspects of german identity can always be drawn from the creation of another 33 ibid., 9. 34 immanuel kant, “what is enlightenment?,” trans. mary c. smith, sources of medieval history, columbia university, accessed april 16, 2019, http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/ccread/etscc/kant.html. 35 brodbeck, defining deutschtum, 11. 50 national identity because, as applegate and potter assert, german identity in music is the norm from which all others differentiate. in a section entitled “inventing music and culture,” bohlman states that “i intentionally call into question the nature of what we assume jewish music to be; clearly, i wish to challenge assumptions about the history that produced such a concept, hence the metaphysical relation of jewish music to that history.”36 he acknowledges the constructed nature of the associations made between music and identities. for him, part of communicating his method is also exploring the conceptions of music, identity, and history and how they relate. this is quite different from the previous two works that focus on solely german national identity without interrogating their concepts so deeply. the format that bohlman uses in this chapter allows him to begin his argumentation by noting that “with the onset of the modern era, new historical processes were rapidly unleashed as the jewish community entered into a struggle for control over the signs of power and identity.”37 he identifies how important historicism became to jewish identity in music during the age of modernism. bohlman clearly recognizes the importance of knowing how his subjects understand the concepts he is analyzing in their music. this elevates his argument as he is able to trace how the construction of jewish identity changes while not being taken in by the new identity’s historicism of itself. bohlman drives home the importance of exploring both the history of the concepts he is using and explaining how he intends to use them in his discussion of the concept of “invention.” he states, “i am interested not so much in what jewish music has been assumed to be, but rather with how such assumptions acquire an ontology of their own,” and so takes the concept further.38 he explores the etymology of the concept and breaks it down to explain how he intends to apply it in this chapter. his clarification of how he understands “invention” enhances his work and makes it a more thorough investigation of the development of jewish identity in music than either of the works on german national identity. it is this method that should be used by all musicologists who are interested in studying concepts that not only have had major impacts on music but also have an important history of their own. this should be applied to work that focuses on the creation of german national identity in music in the eighteenth century. germanness and the eighteenth century the first step in rectifying the gap in the scholarship in musicology on the development of a german national identity in music is to turn to work that focuses just on the eighteenth century. if scholars pull from sources that look at the relationship between music and society in the late eighteenth century, they will be able to show a fuller picture. in contrast to scholarship that focuses on society and music in the eighteenth century, musicological work on identity draws heavily on sources from the literary culture. for example, in brodbeck’s analysis of how the political landscape was affecting deutschtum in music, he relies on the critic culture of the nineteenth century. this would explain much of his 36 philip v. bohlman, jewish music and modernity (new york: oxford university press, 2008), 78. 37 ibid., 79. 38 ibid., 78. 51 wariness towards the eighteenth century, as music criticism in this period was not yet so widespread. critics also had yet to take on a major role in the music scene as the culture of music performance was still dominated by a tradition of private performance for selected audiences. the market to sell music publicly had not yet taken off and the patronage system was still the most prominent way to make money as a composer, though that was changing by the time of mozart. what this means is that musicologists who focus their work on the development of german national identity must turn to a different set of sources than they are used to working with if they are to adequately engage with the period. in her dissertation “the national singspiel in vienna from 1778 to 1785,” elizabeth manning discusses mozart’s work die entführung aus dem serail (the abduction from the seraglio) in the context of a program instituted by emperor joseph ii. manning’s work is very unusual in that it dates from 1975 and its primary purpose is to put music in its social and political context. this was an unusual practice at the time as janet wolff previously highlighted. what is so important about this work is the way in which it uses the influence of a political figure to discuss a vested interest in the late eighteenth century in developing a german national identity in music. manning argues that joseph ii “desire[d] to improve the destiny of his subjects thereby making them conscious of their german nationality. the establishment of [a] national theatre in vienna in 1776 is directly linked with both these aspirations, but it is unlikely that such an event could have occurred had the emperor not taken a personal interest in theatre and music.”39 manning points to the influence and the strategy of a political leader in moving forward the development of a german national identity in music. the music created for the national theatre fulfilled the specific vision of joseph ii. this argument is very different from sponheuer’s analysis of the eighteenth-century roots of german national identity. sponheuer turns to literary figures, much in the same way that brodbeck looks at critics, for his sources on early german national identity. while literary culture is incredibly important, especially since an enlightened despot like joseph ii read and liked the ideas published by that literary culture during the late enlightenment, sponheuer never turns to politics or politically created musical institutions for answers about identity. manning, on the other hand, fails to explain why joseph ii is so invested in creating a german national identity in music; she just says that he is. if the evidence of manning could be combined with the interests of sponheuer, we would be much closer to a complete understanding of the origins, nature, and implications of german identity in the late eighteenth century. after manning’s dissertation came nicholas till’s mozart and the enlightenment, which, in 1992, was an important book in musicology that directly challenged autonomous understandings of music. till saw die zauberflöte (the magic flute) as the first truly german work because he believed: 39 elizabeth manning, “the national singspiel in vienna from 1778 to 1785” (phd diss., durham university, 1975), 25. 52 die zauberflöte is a quintessentially viennese work: magical, street-wise, spectacular and farcical. in the folk theatre of the viennese suburbs (attended by all classes of society), mozart at last found the indigenous german art, rooted in community and tradition, which he had always sought, and which enabled him to write the german opera that had always eluded him (die zauberflöte was mozart’s greatest work, beethoven asserted, because it was the only work in which he showed himself as a “german master”).40 till’s aim is to connect the enlightenment and its ideas to as much of mozart’s work as possible, but the best argument that comes out of his book is that mozart achieved something in his music and characters in die zauberflöte that reflected a german national identity. that beethoven thought the themes expressed in this singspiel made him a specifically “german master” shows that there is something that originated in mozart’s work that went on to be seen as an expression of german national identity in music. this connection between mozart and beethoven, the national singspiel, enlightenment understandings of identity, and early nationalism all comes together in the literature written by musicologist martin nedbal. in 2009, he published a dissertation entitled “morals across the footlights: viennese singspiel, national identity, and the aesthetics of morality, c. 1770-1820,” which was later made into the book, morality and viennese opera in the age of mozart and beethoven, published in 2017. the titles alone are stirring when considering the question of german national identity and its treatment as it was taken out of the second title. nedbal examines the “musico-dramatic features” present in viennese singspiel in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries “in tandem with archival documents and published writings by eighteenth-century german theater aestheticians, censors, and critics (including johann christoph gottsched, joseph von sonnenfels, gotthold ephraim lessing, and friedrich schiller) who claimed that the germans and their culture should be (or already were) morally superior to other nations and their cultures.”41 nedbal takes the material that manning and till discuss but puts them in many sociopolitical contexts. his method is a multi-faceted one that allows for many different perspectives, but does it contend with the different understandings of national identity and nationalism in this period? nedbal begins his dissertation by addressing the topic of nationalism in german music and how other scholars have dealt with it in the eighteenth century. he criticizes richard taruskin’s oversimplified construction of “a rigid dichotomy that postulates a neat distinction between earlier and later versions of german nationalism—i.e., between a nonaggressive, civic, cosmopolitan patriotism in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the later nineteenth-century chauvinist, exclusive nationalism.”42 nedbal asserts that the cosmopolitanism of the earlier period had exclusionary features that would 40 till, mozart and the enlightenment, 272. 41 martin nedbal, “morals across the footlights: viennese singspiel, national identity, and the aesthetics of morality, c. 1770-1820,” (phd diss., university of rochester, 2009), iv, http://hdl.handle.net/1802/10986. 42 ibid., 1. 53 also show up in nineteenth-century nationalism, so to treat them as mutually exclusive is incorrect. this culminates in his statement that “other scholars have more recently called for a reconsideration of eighteenth-century german culture and politics and of the enlightenment period in general as marked by great heterogeneity and as combining both universalist and exclusivist tendencies.”43 this is as close as nedbal gets to exploring the history of the idea of national identity apart from nationalism in this period. in his dissertation, despite its thoroughness in other areas, nedbal fails to really engage with what he means in his use of the concept of “nationalism” in the context of the eighteenth century. he rectifies this in his 2017 book in a section dedicated to it in the preface. that he put this information outside the main body of text shows the continuous devaluation in musicology of clarifying concepts: this eighteenth-century german nationalism is quite different from its nineteenthcentury continuation, however. scholars often refer to nineteenth-century german forms of national consciousness as “political nationalism” and distinguish it from the so-called cultural nationalism of the eighteenth-century; instead of militaristic, political, and chauvinistic rhetoric that became prominent in the discussions of the german national identity in the nineteenth century, eighteenth-century conceptualizations mainly focused on aesthetics and morality.44 this “cultural nationalism” seems to fall in between the definitions of “nation” and “nationalism” that were discussed earlier. the scholar he cites from for his use of “cultural nationalism” is michael j. sosulski. this nationalism is still exclusionary, but it also fits within the ancien régime of the habsburg empire. the term almost acts as a placeholder in the text for a discussion of the state of these concepts. while it is not his intention to discuss how the meaning of terms changes over time, this “cultural nationalism” implies that everyone in this period understood the concept this one way. nedbal’s work focuses on nationalist thinkers in the eighteenth century such as gottsched, sonnenfels, lessing, and schiller.45 they were a minority and espoused one particular construction of german national identity. nedbal primarily engages with this group as his focus and does not speak of other understandings of nation and national identity in this period as they relate to music. the point of his work is to highlight the cultural nationalism that has been often overlooked when examining singspiel. when applying nedbal’s work to the greater scope of the development of german national identity in music, the other perspectives on german national identity from the time must also be weighed alongside it, whether or not they had a significant impact. only then can the changing nature of “nation,” “national identity,” and “nationalism” be expressed as they relate to music. conclusion 43 ibid., 4. 44 martin nedbal, morality and viennese opera in the age of mozart and beethoven (abingdon: routledge, 2016), 10. 45 nedbal, “morals across the footlights,” iv. 54 after considering the current scholarship on the issue of german national identity in the late eighteenth century in music, it is clear that there is a need for a more nuanced approach. i would call on all scholars to consider more deeply the implications of national identity as a concept and appreciate more both the turbulence of its definition and the importance of etymology in this field. clarity is essential in moving musicology even further as a discipline. wolff was right to believe that “the sociology of music may benefit from what we have learned from developments in other areas of cultural studies.”46 in fact, she should have taken that statement even further. music and musicology could only be helped from the informed inclusion of expertise from other fields. this has happened more and more in recent scholarship; however, studies like those celia applegate and pamela potter and david lee brodbeck, which are built around national identity, fail to fully interrogate the meaning and contextual importance of that concept. they are absolutely correct to focus on that subject matter; the array of essays in music & german national identity span from topics such as “einheit-freiheit-vaterland: intimations of utopia in robert schumann’s late choral music” to “american jazz in the german cold war,” which display how broadly national identity can be studied in german music. applegate and potter consistently demonstrate in the work they curated for that collection that they have an excellent understanding of the important role german national identity has played in the development of music, particularly in the nineteenth century. the issue is with their reticence regarding the concept’s origins and their tendency to shy away from its context in the eighteenth century. a more rigorous look at its beginnings would undoubtedly elevate the entire work. nicholas till and elizabeth manning demonstrate this fearlessness regarding the context of the eighteenth century but fail to fully engage with concepts like german national identity. they are more interested in discussing the institutions and political and social situations that were present in vienna in that time, rather than asking why that was the case. till spends a bit more time musing over possibilities, though he has the unfortunate habit of framing these statements as facts without much justification. an example of this is when till implies in his writing that mozart actually believed in rosicrucian christianity rather than just invoking elements of it in his work. he states plainly that “rosicrucian christians such as mozart seem to have come to believe that redemption was both a cosmic event embracing all time and history” despite no evidence that mozart truly believed that.47 an ideal approach would be a marriage between the content of martin nedbal’s work to philip v. bohlman’s method. bohlman appreciates the importance of understanding the historical context of concepts and uses this to great effect in jewish music and modernity. he is also unafraid to examine the origins of the national identity he discusses as proven when he argues that “inventing jewish music depended on the conscious extension of music in nineteenth-century europe back to that in eretz yisrael prior to the destruction of the 46 wolff, “the ideology of autonomous art,” 12. 47 till, mozart and the enlightenment, 307. 55 temples, and if at all possible to the music of the first temple.”48 bohlman appreciates the importance of not just the timeline of musical developments but the timeline of how words and concepts were understood by the people making those developments. he digs into the purpose. nedbal focuses on the right period and asks the right questions, but his hyperfocus on one group’s understanding of the concept of german national identity creates a skewed picture of the state of that identity in the late eighteenth century. future works should be able to balance several perspectives on the issue, or at least acknowledge them, even if they focus on one in particular. it is by looking and learning from the current scholarship in musicology on german national identity that future studies should shape themselves. they should be conscious of the importance of historical context and the meaning of concepts but also be bold in the questions they ask and in the material they cover. the web that is german national identity and how it ties to music is the late eighteenth century is a difficult one to unpick, but it is through methodical unravelling and sensitivity that the truth will be revealed. 48 bohlman, jewish music and modernity, 79. 29 austrian high enlightenment josephinism, literature, and state building joshkin aziz sezer university of minnesota abstract this article examines state building under joseph ii in the habsburg empire between the period of 1780-1790 and considers the intellectual successes of josephinism. it analyzes the context of his targeted intellectual audience and focuses in particular on the work of austrian author johnn pezzl who was a contemporary of joseph ii and a member of masonic and other enlightenment era groups. article the reign of joseph ii was at the peak of enlightenment sensibilities, and in many ways, he personified the ideal of an enlightened monarch. to be an enlightened monarch was to embody the state in your every action and be dictated not by the church or emotional sentimentality but by logic and reason; joseph certainly worked towards this ideal. after the death of his mother maria theresa in 1780, joseph oversaw a number of reforms in the habsburg realm. from his edict of tolerance in 1781 to his lifting of censorship on the press to his attempts to modernize agriculture in the empire, joseph was a figure of modernity. this is not to say austria was the backward land that it is often portrayed as in popular history; its many different legal systems, languages, and lack of centralized structures were not dissimilar to france, england, and even prussia.1 yet austria and joseph ii were subtly different in this era and marked by continual contradictions. joseph ii liberalized censorship laws, yet at the same time, he went against theatre and ballet, pushed for greater “germanization” throughout his empire, and took part in the dismantling of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth. joseph ii clearly embodied the contradictions and transitions that austria and much of europe underwent at the end of the eighteenth century. historical scholarship on his rule gives much attention to his role in the creation of the bureaucratic state and to how he focused his energies on reforming the habsburg monarchy with his policies of state building, such as state schools, agricultural reform, and abolishment of serfdom.2 the culture of high enlightenment vienna is also given attention. 1 pieter m. judson, the habsburg empire: a new history (cambridge: belknap press of harvard university press, 2016), 49. 2 derek beales, joseph ii, vol. 2, against the world 1780-1790 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009), 307-315, 363. 30 much of the scholarship on the reign of joseph ii is about the culture of music in vienna during the late classical and early romantic era. a major gap that is missing from this period is material on literature during joseph’s reign. while one of joseph’s primary biographers, derek beales, wrote extensively on the joseph’s reign, he does not give much attention to the literary culture of the era, devoting only a chapter or article to it.3 this article examines the function of the enlightenment in austria through a little known novel from the era. the text, faustin oder das philosophische jahrhundert (faustin or the philosophical century) by joseph pezzl, was composed during joseph’s reign. while work such as faustin oder das philosophische jahrhundert does not carry the same weight in the so-called canon of western literature as its french counterpart, candide, pezzl clearly saw austria as part of the enlightenment—and even the center of it.4 therefore, historians should also recognize that austria was an essential part of the enlightenment.5 unfortunately, much of the historical literature gives very little attention to the interaction of literature with the public sphere, instead preferring to look at either newspapers, periodicals, or even works of theater. this article therefore focuses on this interaction between the public and relevant literature. the study of the enlightenment in austria is complicated by its chronology and nature. while it can be solidly argued that joseph was a figure of enlightened absolutism, it becomes more problematic when one looks at the achievements of the enlightenment and josephinism in the austrian context. while the era following joseph was marked by greater levels of conservatism and sometimes reactionary responses to the french revolution, figures such joseph rohrer and charles sealsfield actively engaged the enlightenment in their writings and actions.6 while not an exhaustive study of the era, this article intends to shine some light on the historical origins of the enlightenment in austria and how it relates to the culture of tolerance, censorship, arts, and contradictions that were part of the era of josephinism. it focuses specifically on the period of 1780 to 1790 when joseph reigned as sole emperor. it looks at the effects that joseph had on the book and printing industry and his enlightened ideas towards the state and the church. this serves as a springboard to examine the effects on literature that his reign had, along with other activities related to the culture of the habsburg monarchy. the article further examines how literature of this period interacted with and affected the developing austrian public sphere. 3 for example, see ibid. see also derek beales, “was joseph ii an enlightened despot?,” in the austrian enlightenment and its aftermath, eds. ritchie robertson and edward timms (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1991). 4 johann pezzl, faustin oder das philosophische jahrhundert (hildesheim: gerstenberg verlag, 1982), 380-381. originally published in zürich in 1783. 5 beales, “was joseph ii an enlightened despot?,” 13-15. 6 ritchie roberson, “joseph rohrer and the bureaucratic enlightenment,” in the austrian enlightenment and its aftermath, eds. ritchie robertson and edward timms (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1991), 142. hartmut steinecke, “charles sealsfield and the novel as a means of enlightenment,” trans. ritchie robertson, in the austrian enlightenment and its aftermath, eds. ritchie robertson and edward timms (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1991), 132-144. 31 when discussing the concept of “austria” before 1804, one has to be careful with the meaning of the word. austria as a state did not exist until the napoleonic wars, with the destruction of the holy roman empire. before 1806, it was simply a duchy that the habsburgs controlled. figures like joseph ii or pezzl would not have seen themselves as austrians. pezzl was a bavarian by birth and viennese by his adopted city of vienna. 7 while joseph attempted to create an austrian state, his efforts were largely limited by the size and scope of the habsburg monarchy and the inability of one man to alter the course of several million people. despite these challenges, it should still be noted that there was a growing sense of identity within the empire, even if it was limited to the upper echelons of society.8 for the sake of simplicity, this article defines austrian literature as that which was written in german and published in the german-speaking sections of central europe that the habsburg monarchy ruled directly. while central europe is often overlooked by historians in favor of france or england, it is especially egregious to do this with the enlightenment. vienna was a major cultural and intellectual center for europe, especially during the reign of joseph ii. he was clearly engaged in a dialogue about the state and the role of the ruler with the rest of europe, modeling himself after the enlightened despotism that characterized frederick the great, peter the great, or louis xiv. joseph grew up in a court dominated by jesuits, who censored most information and practiced large amounts of religious pomp.9 this in part led to joseph’s wishes to undermine the powers of the jesuits and, at the same time, maintaining his catholic orthodoxy. the enlightenment itself can be defined as a movement in opposition to the restrictions placed on intellectual freedom by the catholic church.10 joseph’s policies when he came to power can easily be perceived as part of an enlightened viewpoint on state and church relations. once on the throne, joseph enacted major policies of toleration, and lifted much of the censorship built up by the baroque institutions of his predecessors. joseph saw himself as a servant of the state, which he claimed in his last will and testament.11 therefore, for joseph, it made perfect sense to change the course of the monarchy in the direction of other european states through abolishing much of the censorship that his mother had created and allowing progressive voices to rise within the empire. under joseph, the list of banned books decreased from five thousand to under nine hundred, and over a thousand brochures were published within the first eighteen months of his rule.12 he went so far in abolishing censorship that he even allowed works that criticized his leadership, though he did not allow works that criticized foreign leaders or anti-christian pieces. however, joseph did this largely out of a fear that they would be taken negatively by the uneducated public. he wrote: 7 similarly, figures like wolfgang amadeus mozart would be considered a salzburger at the time and not austrian. 8 lucjan puchalski, imaginärer name österreich: der literarische österreich-begriff an der wende vom 18. zum 19. jahrhundert (vienna: böhlau, 2009), 140. 9 derek beales, joseph ii, vol. 1, in the shadow of maria theresa, 1741-1790 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1987), 32. 10 beales, joseph ii, 2:69. 11 t.c.w. blanning, joseph ii (new york: longman group, 1994), 56. 12 judson, the habsburg empire, 64. 32 come down strongly against works that contain unbridled obscenities, from which no learning or enlightenment can ever arise, and to be all the more indulgent in the case of those in which learning knowledge, and coherence are to be found, since the former are read … by the multitude and by the weak souls, while the latter come into the hands only of those with well-prepared minds and well-established principles.13 yet this did not stop joseph’s wishes to create a society in which almost anything could be published, as joseph was trying to reform austrian society into a model of the enlightenment. he was not without his critics; even joseph’s friend, princess eleonore liechtenstein, wrote: “everything is to be feared from the emperor’s spirit in this field, from his love of novelty, his perversity, his mania for rousing subordinates against their chiefs, and still more from the hardening of his heart and, finally, abandonment of god.”14 while joseph lifted much of the censorship within the empire, he ruled the state as an autocrat at the same time. the habsburg monarchy under joseph ii was characterized as an “enlightened police state: everything for the people, nothing by the people.”15 thus in some ways he sought to liberalize the empire in ways that he thought would make it run more efficiently, such as the lifting of censorship, while still maintaining control over the matters of state. this paradox of despotism in the age of the enlightenment continued not only within the monarchy but throughout europe. during this time, a figure like joseph wished for the betterment of his state and sought to accomplish such goals through policies such as mass education, tolerance, and freedom of the press. yet, at the same time, he ruled the affairs of the state with an iron fist, treating the state as more of a military institution rather than something run by civilians. in line with this paradox, joseph had complete and utter disdain for hereditary institutions, yet he was the inheritor of a dynastic power that had maintained control over central europe for three-hundred years.16 unlike his peers, joseph lacked the patience for slow and steady reforms. this desire for the state to change immediately to his liking is illustrated by the way joseph presented his court. his court was described as “the meanest, most masculine, and least attractive in europe.”17 in contrast to his mother, he shunned the luxury of the schönbrunn palace and instead preferred the simplicity of his villa, where his bed quarters were spartan and he wore his military uniform at nearly every opportunity. for many, joseph’s schemes seemed almost quixotic in their scope, from his plowing the fields in moravia to his “incessant traveling” to his edict of tolerance.18 the criticism of his 13 beales, joseph ii, 2:91. 14 ibid., 95. 15 robert a. kann, a history of the habsburg empire: 1526-1918 (berkeley: university of california press, 1974), 184. 16 paul b. bernard, joseph ii (new york: twaine publishers, inc, 1968), 91. 17 beales, joseph ii, 2:56. 18 blanning, joseph ii, 72-75. 33 policies by figures such as princess eleonore liechtenstein did not do much to slow joseph down, as he was single-minded in his goals for the empire. joseph thus continued his mother’s practice of mass education. joseph regarded the goal of achieving mass literacy to be of the utmost importance in developing society. he wrote that mass literacy was “as one of the most important objects of my concern for the general good.”19 here again joseph is engaging in concepts from the enlightenment, with not only the correct terminology but also the same intent that was originally used by rousseau when he wrote about the general or common good. joseph would thus make sure his state followed the models set out by the enlightenment. the state was to be logical and standardized, which itself explains his affinity for the military and his disdain towards the catholic church as a political actor. for joseph, the two things he disliked most in the world were privilege and insubordination.20 both of these attributes were embodied by the catholic church, who rationalized their function to society not through utility (at least in the mind of joseph) but through existing as a continuous institution for so long. inevitably, joseph would try to curb their power, as he also saw them as a force for fanaticism. joseph sought to combat the excesses of the church and specifically their unfiltered power and privileges in several different ways. most notably, he asserted sovereign control of the clergy, whom he viewed as subjects subservient to him. for joseph, the church was to have the same role in society “in just the same way there is an army to defend the state, courts to administer justice and a bureaucracy to deal with political and economic matters.”21 to this end, joseph sought to utilize the church as an institution of the state through re-educating the clergy along the lines of secularism and making them beholden to him and the world around them. all of this is not to say that joseph was anti-clerical along the lines of a figure like voltaire or even frederick the great of prussia. joseph believed in the catholic church, but he ultimately saw himself as a servant of the austrian state first and as a catholic second.22 joseph was also highly influenced by his advisor, state chancellor and foreign minister wenzel-anton, prince of kaunitz-rietberg, better known as kaunitz.23 kaunitz and joseph had a similar worldview about what the habsburg monarchy should look like. both ultimately disdained the confessional state that had been created in austria since the counter-reformation. it was kaunitz in his function as chancellor who worked radically against the catholic church as an institutional structure and instituted policies, such as requiring those who wish to join a convent to live outside of it for two years or his opposition to holy days and pilgrimages.24 most radical of all his policies was the abolition of approximately seven hundred monasteries and convents throughout the habsburg monarchy.25 19 ibid., 68. 20 ibid., 92-93. 21 ibid., 95. quote from joseph ii from a letter to baron kressel in june 1783. 22 ibid., 98. 23 bernard, joseph ii, 106. 24 franz a.j. szabo, kaunitz and enlightened absolutism: 1753-1780 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1994), 236-240. 25 kann, a history of the habsburg empire, 191. 34 kaunitz was not the only figure in joseph’s government that worked towards establishing his vision of an enlightened austrian state. gottfried van swieten was the son of the dutch physician gerard van swieten, who himself was not only maria theresa’s personal physician but also her most trusted advisor and confidant. swieten first served as a diplomat to berlin in the 1770s and, due to the close connections of his father to the government, became a trusted and favorite advisor of joseph. in 1781, joseph made swieten a councilor of state and director of the state education commission. the following year, he appointed him as the director of the new censorship commission. due to his close ties with the habsburg monarchy, swieten was by far the most influential and important figure of the austrian enlightenment with notable political clout.26 however, the austrian enlightenment was not a movement strictly limited political reform and state crafting, with many different members of austrian society having their own take. partially because of joseph’s reforms towards censorship and the press and partially due to his educational reforms, there was a growing revolution in reading. when joseph lifted much of the censorship that had dominated creative and intellectual activity within the empire, people began to feel that they could have a say over the course of the empire. it is not likely that joseph would have listened to them, but they were nevertheless allowed to voice their opinions.27 under the reforms that joseph instituted, the middle class in austria began to take on a greater role in society, most notably as part of the burgeoning austrian bureaucracy. this growing middle class started to see themselves less as subjects of the monarchy and more so as citizens. the role of the bureaucracy in the habsburg monarchy was meant to promote the best and brightest minds in the empire. to accomplish this, it did away with the hereditary institutions that had previously dominated the monarchy. the bureaucracy contained not only members of the middle class but also members of the aristocracy, thus forcing these two groups to interact with on a professional basis.28 johann pezzl remarked in 1787 that “an army of ca. four and half thousand men marching; it is an army of bureaucrats. after these follow three hundred wagons … all of these headed for the department of state, the imperial chancellery, the department of war, the austrianbohemian chancellery, etc.”29 in theory, these bureaucrats were promoted based on merit. in as early as 1763, joseph had written that personal merit was what mattered and the hereditary system hid talent from the monarchy. 26 nicholas till, mozart and the enlightenment: truth, virtue and beauty in mozart’s operas (london: faber and faber limited, 1992), 100-101. 27 franz m. eybl, “enlightenment in austria: cultural identity and a national literature,” in german literature of the eighteenth century: the enlightenment and sensibility, ed. barbara becker-cantarino (rochester: camden house, 2005), 252-253. 28 waltraud heindl, gehorsame rebellen: bürokratie und beamte in österreich 1780 bis 1848 (vienna: böhlau, 1991), 165. 29 judson, the habsburg empire, 60. 35 it was not only middle-level bureaucrats who enjoyed a booming effect from joseph’s reforms; the freemasons also became more widespread throughout the empire, with vienna seeing the greatest development. in 1742, only one lodge existed there. by 1780, there were six different lodges in the city, with some 200 people as members. freemasons made up a great number of the cultural elite in enlightenment vienna, with its members including figures like mozart, aloys blumauer, michael denis, joseph hadyn, pezzl, emmanuel schickaneder, and swieten.30 nineteenth-century novelist karoline pichler remarked on the prevalence of freemasons in her formative years, stating, “the order of freemasons carried on its affairs with a publicity and ostentation that was almost ridiculous. freemasons’ songs were printed, composed, and universally sung. masonic insignia were worn as pendants on watches … ladies received white gloves from apprentices and craftsmen.”31 while freemason lodges had begun to grow in the 1740s under the guidance of joseph’s father, francis stephen (who was also a freemason), it was with joseph’s reforms that lodges boomed in numbers and freemasons were able to organize and participate without fear of repercussions. by 1784, there were sixty-six lodges in the habsburg monarchy, and the lodges had voted to secede from the leadership of the berlin-centered lodge, grosse landesloge (grand landlodge), to have their own national lodge in vienna.32 interestingly, despite their deistic tendencies, freemason lodges throughout the habsburg monarchy saw a large number of ex-jesuits join their ranks under the reign of joseph. this waning of the counter reformation was yet another signal of the rise of civil society under joseph. the freemasons operated as the middle ground between secular and religious society. 33 outside of his literature, another notable way that author johann pezzl interacted with the public sphere was through his membership of the freemasons. the society interacted in the public sphere in numerous ways, most notably with their periodical journal für freymäurer (journal for freemasons). this journal was published quarterly by christian friedrich wappler between 1784 and 1787, and allowed for freemasons to publish not only academic and journalistic endeavors but also their creative works. this journal was associated with the lodge zur wahren eintracht (true harmony), which was led by idnaz von born.34 throughout vienna, there were numerous printing presses releasing different works of varying levels of seriousness. some discussed day-to-day occurrences of chambermaids, while others tackled more significant issues such as the papacy or the state. what these publications all had in common was that they showed that the public had a growing eagerness to read what was being published, no matter the content. the growth of the publications under joseph ii came to be known as the broschürenflut (pamphlet flood). this 30 ibid. 31 ewan west, “masonic song and the development of the kuntslied in enlightenment vienna,” in the austrian enlightenment and its aftermath, eds. ritchie robertson and edward timms (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1991), 72-73 32 james van horn melton, the rise of the public in enlightenment europe (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2001), 257. 33 ibid., 264. 34 eybl, “enlightenment in austria,” 253. 36 environment allowed johann pezzl to thrive as an author. pezzl was born in bavaria in 1756 and grew up in the benedictine monastery in mallersdorf where his father was the chief baker. between 1768 and 1775, he was a novice at the monastery but left to study law in the archduchy of salzburg in 1776. after publishing briefe aus dem noviziat (letters from the noviate), an inflammatory work of antimonasticism (something that nearly all enlightenment figures would support in one way or another), he was forced to leave the archduchy in 1780 and moved to zürich. here he continued to write and published multiple scathing critiques of monasticism and the catholic church. in 1783, he published the semi-autobiographical novel and panegyric for the reign of joseph ii, faustin oder das philosophische jahrhundert. in 1784, pezzl moved to vienna, where he lived for the rest of his life. during his early years there, he worked as a freelance writer and became involved in the freemason lodge, zur wohltätigkeit (for charity). through the lodge, he came into contact with figures such as mozart, van swieten, and kaunitz. by the next year, pezzl had become the personal librarian of kaunitz. through kaunitz, he was able to come into close contact with other josephinist statesmen and philosophers. following the growing discontent with joseph’s reforms and his tendency towards absolutism, pezzl began to work on a more critical and cynical piece of writing, skizze von wien (sketch of vienna). in 1791, after the death of joseph, pezzl worked as a public employee for the geheime ziffernkabinett (secret cabinet of numbers), which was chiefly concerned with spying and the monitoring of letters. while pezzl remains relatively unknown in the anglophone world, during his lifetime faustin was one of the most successful works to come out the holy roman empire. pezzl’s book received the distinct honor of being translated into french and was thus able to reach a wider reading audience throughout europe. furthermore, the work was reprinted numerous times, both legally and illegally, testifying to the popularity of the book. it was the only book that mozart had in library upon his death.35 the novel can be described as the austrian answer to candide and, in many ways, feels like a direct copy of candide. yet this is hardly surprising, given voltaire’s status as one of the greatest figures of the enlightenment; pezzl’s copying him can consequently be viewed as a form of flattery. overall, one gets the sense from pezzl’s work that he is partially driven by a desire not necessarily to prove austria’s greatness in literature but, at the very least, add his contribution to the enlightenment project through an austrian viewpoint. fundamentally, both are works of social critique, but while voltaire criticized the prevalence of barbarism and the lack of enlightenment, pezzl critiques the perceived sense of enlightenment that the west thought it had. overall, pezzl’s work does deserve note for his prose which, while mildly sentimental at times, is well conceived. the plot itself is the standard eighteenth-century picaresque, but pezzl delivers the plot with both force and feeling. the hero of the novel, faustin, grows up in a bavarian monastery and is taught that he lives in an age where reason reigns supreme. his teacher, father boniface, clearly a nod to st. 35 georg knepler, wolfgang amadé mozart¸ trans. j. bradford robinson (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997), 116-117. 37 boniface, the patron saint of germans, instructs faustin at the start of the novel on what virtues an enlightened monarch should embody: “each monarch tries with others to promote tolerance, enlightenment and freedom of thought in his own state, and to banish superstitions, barbarism, fanaticism, stupidity, chicanery and misery from his people.”36 yet as one would expect, this statement does not hold true when put to the test of reality. shortly after, faustin and father boniface leave the monastery to travel the world in search of countries that represent the enlightenment as father boniface describes it. throughout their journey, they constantly come to people who are the antithesis of the enlightenment, finding only pain and misery. they travel throughout both the americas and europe. during their travels, they are beaten by workers who are angry that feast days have been abolished; their anger stems not from any sense of piety but because they no longer have a holiday. in france, they are imprisoned for possessing the works of voltaire, claude adrien helvétius, pierre bayle, montesquieu, and even frederick the great. in another chapter, they come across a crowd being entertained by a catholic priest and exorcist, johann joseph gaßner, who is based on a real austrian priest from the eighteenth century. the crowd attacks them. they later insult monasticism and are forced to flee from the holy roman empire to venice. in venice, they are attacked and robbed by bandits, and once there, they meet the magistrate in venice to tell of their ordeal. however, they end up criticizing the constitution and are banished from the city. in spain, they find some respite in the court of charles iii and his settlement project of sierra morena. they eventually make toward way to portsmouth in england and then to london. once there, they find themselves in the middle of the gordon riots. father boniface is killed by the rioters, and faustin is appalled not only by their barbarous attitude but also by the intolerance and fanaticism in a country that is supposed to be the embodiment of the enlightenment. disgusted by the english, faustin volunteers to go to america as a soldier but is tricked into becoming a slave. once in port royale, he is sold as a slave and forced to work on a plantation. pezzl here launches into a tirade against the evils of new world slavery. eventually, faustin escapes slavery and returns to europe. near the end of the novel, faustin makes his way to prussia and the court of frederick the great, where he thinks that he has at last found the place that truly embodies the enlightenment. upon his arrival, he prays at an altar and praises that the works of voltaire are respected in berlin and that tolerance is the chief virtue of the land. unfortunately for faustin, his beliefs are shattered when a conflict between churches arises over the use of hymns by paul gerhardt, a composer of the seventeenth century. frederick the great declares, “the priests must not forget tolerance, because no persecutions will be tolerated.”37 dejected, faustin again leaves in search of the land that father boniface had described to him at the beginning of the novel. at last, he reaches vienna, where joseph ii reigns 36 pezzl, faustin oder das philosophische jahrhundert, 15. “eifert ein monarch den andern vor, toleranz, erleuchtung und denkensfreiheit in seinen staaten zu beförden: agberglauben, barbarei, fanatismus, dummheit, schikane und elend ferner von seinen völkern zu verbannen.” 37 ibid., 321. “die priester müssen die toleranz nicht vergessen, denn ihnen wird keine verfolgung gestat tet werden.” 38 supreme. at first, faustin is unsure what to make of the place, but the more time he spends there, the more he realizes that joseph’s vienna is the embodiment of the enlightenment. he declares: the creation of free thought, cleansed of religion; the right of the throne against roman influence; the right of reason against pedants, against stiff schoolbooks and apostles of superstition the right of mankind from the harassment and oppression of tyrants.38 clearly pezzl would like the readers to connect vienna with how father boniface described the perfect enlightened place. no longer are people slaves to the catholic church; instead, in vienna, they are their own masters motivated by reason and rational thought. pezzl goes on to compare joseph to sesostris—the first chinese emperor—as well as orpheus, titus, and marcus aurelius. the last sentence declares that under joseph ii, there will truly be a “philosophical century.”39 ultimately faustin is a tale of optimism triumphant, unlike candide. the story not only serves as a panegyric ode to the greatness that is joseph ii but also illustrates the uniqueness of vienna in the eighteenth century. while other states might have writers and philosophers writing texts on the nature of mankind and what the most just state is meant to look like, it is only in vienna that such a thing is possible. fundamentally, pezzl portrays an optimistic worldview that came with the accession of joseph as the sole ruler of the habsburg monarchy. while pezzl was not the only author to declare glory from joseph’s reign, he is by far one of the most vocal and successful authors writing in his favor. furthermore, pezzl wrote this work as a counterpoint to the attitude towards the enlightenment in the protestant parts of the holy roman empire. while pezzl was a deist, with very little love of catholicism, he was still culturally catholic and thus sought to prove that catholicism was not incompatible with the enlightenment. for pezzl, protestants were just as capable of intolerance as catholics. the death of father boniface at the hands of an angry protestant mob can be seen as a direct parallel to the death of doctor pangloss at the hands of the inquisition in candide. pezzl also expresses his numerous discontents with the catholic church and the jesuits in particular, which were shared by pezzl’s fellow freemasons and superiors. throughout the book, there are several of references to the jesuits practicing pederasty on their students. following the death of joseph in 1790, pezzl wrote a biography of him in which he characterized the emperor as being both the root of the liberalism that had taken hold in vienna and within the monarchy but also as the cause of the repression and authoritarianism that tried to stamp it out.40 it is likely that pezzl suffered much of this resentment towards joseph due to not only his failings but also his misplaced trust in 38 ibid., 378-379. “dem hersteller der denkenfreiheit, der gereinigtern religion; der rechte des thrones gegen die römischen eingriffe; der rechte der vernunst gegen pedanten, steife schulsüchse und apostel des aberglaubens; der rechte der menschheit gegen die schikane und unterdrükung der schwelgenden untertyrane.” 39 ibid., 283. 40 till, mozart and the enlightenment, 223-224. 39 joseph. by creating an almost saint-like figure in joseph, pezzl sets himself up for disappointment. nevertheless, pezzl expressed in his work skizze von wien that, following the reign of joseph, nobles in vienna no longer stood along the walls, waiting for the attention of the monarch. instead, they worked to gain the respect of the sovereign and the public through service to the statement.41 what pezzl’s novel succeeds in doing is taking the enlightenment and demythologizing much of the traditional aspects of central european culture. the problem here is that pezzl tries to rationalize the paradox of being an enlightenment thinker who believes in ideals like the equality of mankind and religious tolerance, yet at the same time, he is forced to confront the fact that he supports a hereditary monarchy that is an anathema to the concept of equality. fundamentally, pezzl’s critique of the european system does not push the reader hard enough, which leads the reader to either conclude that pezzl was willfully ignorant of his own paradoxical thinking or that he simply did not conceive his thinking as contradictory. despite pezzl’s rosy portrait of austria as compared to the rest of europe, much of what he describes as happening to faustin throughout the novel could also easily happen to his protagonist within the habsburg monarchy. one can easily imagine pezzl’s hungarian counterpart pointing out the flaws of his thinking by looking at conditions that magyar speakers were experiencing. one could also see pezzl retorting that the hungarians oppress the slavic speakers just as readily. the further you go, the more myopic it becomes. while some liberal thinkers thought joseph’s reforms did not go far enough, others who agreed with him became alienated due to his dictatorial tendencies. for instance, although he was an ally of joseph, kaunitz expressed frustration at joseph’s inability to negotiate or slow down his reforms. kaunitz was largely able to pursue policies in the way that he wanted because of his venerable position as state chancellor.42 however, he expressed bitterness due to joseph’s inability to handle criticism and that his state building had alienated the habsburg monarchy from much of the holy roman empire. thus, when kaunitz learned of joseph’s death, his response was “[t]hat was very good of him.”43 yet, within a few weeks, kaunitz had tempered his criticism of joseph, and expressed that he had been a “great man.”44 it was only the ardent defenders of the old regime that truly were happy with his death. figures ranging from ludwig van beethoven to pamphleteers honored the reign of joseph and his role as an enlightened monarch.45 they praised him for such things as his willingness to innovate agriculture, his reformation of censorship, and his concern for the poor and social outcasts. he was praised for not only being a devoted catholic but also advocating and enacting toleration. even protestants sang the praises of joseph. for instance, the evangelical lutheran theologian, johann georg fock, eulogized the monarch in a sermon: 41 blanning, joseph ii, 103. 42 ibid., 61. 43 ibid., 198. 44 ibid. 45 for example, beethoven’s cantata on the death of joseph ii was written when the composer at the age of nineteen but would not be published until the late nineteenth century. 40 through joseph, god raised the glory and prestige of the house of austria, together with the fortunes and prosperity of its extensive provinces: through joseph he gave an improved organization to the internal structure of the state and administration of justice and a greater strength to the military… he purged from religion the many abuses and accretions which prevented its beneficent power from reaching the hearts of men.46 while his successors would be far less radical than joseph—and in some cases were outright reactionary, like francis ii—joseph’s reign nevertheless altered the course of the habsburg monarchy. his creation of the merit-based bureaucracy would see itself continued into the nineteenth century and beyond. the culture of liberalism that arose around his court and followers would endure and the print industry would continue to grow, despite the monarchy attempting to roll back the clock in the face of the french revolution. the reforms instituted by joseph proved to be incredibly vital to the development of the public sphere in austria, reaching its apex at the turn of the nineteenth century. the coffeehouse—which became so inseparable from later historiographical memory of vienna and the habsburgs—as a public institution originated under joseph and allowed for the intersection between reform, the state and literature. fundamentally, it becomes a rather flawed point of view to try to ascribe the enlightenment of a country to one man. yes, joseph certainly was a highly influential person who sought to reorganize his country along the lines of the enlightenment, but at the same time, this narrative leads to undervaluing the contributions of figures such as pezzl. pezzl does himself a disservice by creating an almost mythical figure in joseph, leading him to largely ignoring the fact that the enlightenment is happening because of people like him and his colleagues. it is through this lens that the enlightenment ceases to be an intellectual movement. once historical figures become mythologized, it makes it seem almost impossible for anyone else to contribute to the enlightenment idea. so, fundamentally, the reader has to take what pezzl is saying with a grain of salt and realize that he himself is too self effacing of his own successes. 46 blanning, joseph ii, 199-200. 91 the cult of the duel giving satisfaction at the university of vienna and in the joint army, 1867-1914 sophie hammond university of southern california abstract in the habsburg empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dueling was a crucial way for university-educated men, as well as joint army officers, to assert the value of their own honor. it was a terrible insult when, in 1896, german-nationalist university dueling fraternities (burschenschaften) in germany and austria passed the waidhofen resolution, officially declaring jewish men unable to give satisfaction in a duel and therefore incapable of possessing honor. this article argues that the passage of the waidhofen resolution was not an isolated incident of bigotry but an evolution of the german-nationalism of the burschenschaften as they increasingly valued an exclusionary definition of what it meant to be “racially german,” and that the burschenschaften’s definition of honor fought against the more inclusive (and pragmatically self-serving) definition of honor espoused by the army. article introduction “a half-dozen duels,” wrote theodor herzl in 1893 to the society for defense against antisemitism, “would very much raise the social position of the jews.”1 in his diary, herzl fantasized about what those duels might entail. he, alone and unaided, would bravely challenge one of the three most influential leaders of austrian antisemitism. perhaps he would die a martyr in the duel, his death proof of jewish honor. or, if that failed, when brought to trial for murder (and illegal dueling), herzl, in an impassioned speech, would “[compel] the court…to respect his nobility,” and, by implication, to understand the horror of antisemitism.2 but herzl’s fantasy required that one of these great antisemites would agree to duel him in the first place—something antisemites were increasingly unlikely to do. three years after herzl planned to use the duel to defeat antisemitism, burschenschaften—pan-germanic dueling fraternities based at universities throughout austria and germany, all part of the same organization—passed the waidhofen resolution. the resolution banned jewish students from joining burschenschaften and forbade burschenschaft members from dueling 1 carl e. schorske, fin-de-siècle vienna: politics and culture (new york: vintage books, 1981), 160. 2 schorske, fin-de-siècle vienna, 160. 92 jewish men, claiming they were unable to give satisfaction.3 individual burschenschaften had declared members of zionist dueling fraternities to be unable to give satisfaction even before the resolution, but this uniform, international, bureaucratic stance against jewish students was new and hotly contested even among burschenschaft members.4 the cultural importance of dueling rested on the idea that a man could possess an inner honor so valuable that, if he was insulted, he should take up a sword to defend that honor. public recognition for private offenses was his right. but it was thought that only an elite group of men had such priceless honor; only those men were able to give satisfaction. by announcing that jewish students were unable to give satisfaction, the resolution proclaimed that all jews, on the sole basis on being jews, lacked the honor which other burschenschaft members naturally possessed. it was a piece of gross, institutionalized antisemitism. this new stance of the burschenschaften on university students’ honor—a stance decided by pan-germanists in austria and germany—directly opposed the stance taken by the multiethnic habsburg empire’s joint army. according to the army, every single male university student in the empire could duel, no matter his religion or ethnicity—as long as he had completed his year of training to become a reserve officer. gymnasium graduates had only one year of compulsory military service, at the end of which they would be recognized for life as an officer in the joint army. men not lucky enough to have received such an education spent three years as common soldiers.5 rather than naming religion and ethnicity as the basis for honor as the burschenschaften did, the joint army—which enlisted men from throughout a very diverse empire—made army rank the determining factor for honor. officers, whether reserve or career, possessed sufficient honor to have to duel to protect it. their status as officers gave gymnasium graduates like theodor herzl the right and obligation to demand satisfaction for insults in duels. it was a shrewd move on the part of the army. the ability to give satisfaction added a touch of mystique to the empire’s reserve and career officers, elevating their reputation, and it also (in theory) created a lifelong loyalty to the empire and to the kaiser in the university-educated reserve officers. this article explores what dueling culture in the burschenschaften at the university of vienna and among officers in the joint army reveals about ideals of honor in austria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. it is especially interested in comparing the two institutions in terms of to whom they granted honor. while both had narrow definitions of honor, the joint army accorded honor to any male citizen who was a reserve or career officer, while the burschenschaften’s privileging of christian austro-germans created a system where just a narrow sliver of the population was properly able to give satisfaction. after 1896, only the joint army granted jewish men the necessary honor to duel. the official exclusion of jewish men from austrian burschenschaften also came at a 3 lisa fetheringill zwicker, “the burschenschaft and german political culture, 1890-1914,” central european history 42, no. 3 (2009): 402. 4 lisa fetheringill zwicker, dueling students: conflict, masculinity, and politics in german universities, 18901914 (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2011), 42 and 403. 5 arthur schnitzler, my youth in vienna, trans. catherine hutter (new york: holt, rinehart and winston, inc, 1970), 82. 93 time when antisemitism in german-speaking lands became ever more grounded in an idea of racial difference.6 this article argues that the passage of the waidhofen resolution was not an isolated incident of bigotry but an evolution of the german-nationalism of austrian burschenschaften as they increasingly mythologized what it meant to be “racially german”, and that the burschenschaften’s definition of honor fought against the more inclusive (and pragmatically self-serving) definition of honor espoused by the army. historiography the history of burschenschaften in germany has been explored by a few historians, including lisa zwicker and kevin mcaleer. this scholarship has been helpful for this particular study, especially when it tangentially refers to austrian burschenschaften, since similarly detailed english-language scholarship on austrian burschenschaften is lacking. this article is careful, though, to distinguish information about german burschenschaften from information about austrian burschenschaften. burschenschaften became slightly more conservative in austria, since unlike german students, austrian students had no aristocratic, apolitical alternative fraternity system like the corps. burschenschaften came into existence at the end of the napoleonic wars in the lands that became germany. as student organizations, they were a reaction against the aristocratic dueling corps, whose members were usually wealthy and titled. promoting the honor of all “virtuous men,” no matter their class or creed, the burschenschaften existed within a strong tradition of german nationalism and protestantism.7 long before there was a unified german state, there were burschenschaft members clamoring for a großdeutschland. in austria, where burschenschaften were founded after 1848, burschenschaften pangermanism came to imply rebellion against the catholic habsburg empire, and often against its multiethnicity. every single member of the austrian burschenschaften, which were so publicly antisemitic, was also a reserve officer in the joint army. if he was not a reserve officer at the time he entered university, he became one within only a few years. in the existing secondary scholarship, there is no acknowledgement of the tension these competing identities caused other than in the 1915 “guide for reserve officers” quoted by istván deák, specifically in the anecdote of the burschenschaft member stripped of his army rank for failing to duel his jewish fellow officer. yet in his autobiography, arthur schnitzler, a well-known viennese writer in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, explains as a matter of course that for many antisemitic students, it was a constant struggle to make “officer honor” agree with “student behavior.”8 there were strong ideological clashes between burschenschaft members’ race-based, pan-germanic definition of honor and the joint army’s rank-based, multiethnic definition of honor. the burschenschaft member 6 shulamit volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code: reflections on the history and historiography of antisemitism in imperial germany,” the leo baeck institute year book 23, no. 1 (1978): 39. 7 zwicker, dueling students, 32. 8 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 129. 94 antisemitism had been a part of the ideology of many burschenschaften, austrian and german, long before 1896. ever since the establishment of burschenschaften, debates had raged over whether jewish men should be admitted, and many jewish members found only an uneasy welcome among their new brothers. as a student, theodor herzl joined burschenschaft albia at the university of vienna because of his strong belief in pangermanism. but he resigned in protest in 1883 after the burschenschaft rallied behind a member who led a student ceremony in commemoration of the composer richard wagner’s death, a ceremony so antisemitic that the police intervened.9 herzl expected an apology and to be begged to rejoin his burschenschaft; instead, his burschenschaft shrugged and let him go. for supporters of an ideology that hoped to unite all german-speaking peoples, pan-germanists often had specific ideas about how germanic manhood should look and behave. burschenschaften routinely demanded such unquestioning conformity and loyalty from their members. in their first year, the pledges, or “young foxes,” of most burschenschaften were expected to meet with each other daily, immediately call each other by the informal “du,” and submit to general hazing—all of which forged quick and strong emotional bonds between the men.10 burschenschaften relied on regular pageantry to showcase the strength of their presence in the student body. in vienna, saturdays were an opportunity for the burschenschaften to promenade down the city streets and in the university’s courtyard in a farbenbummel [parade of colors], showing off the caps and sashes adorned with the colors and insignia of their burschenschaft—and sometimes showing off their willingness to fight.11 brawls often broke out on these promenades, usually between burschenschaften and jewish and catholic student organizations. burschenschaften were frequently anti-catholic in addition to being frequently antisemitic.12 taking their cue from the older burschenschaften in protestant-majority germany, burschenschaft members in catholicmajority austria looked down on members of catholic student organizations, even though many austrian burschenschaft members were themselves at least nominally catholic. the overwhelming dedication of these burschenschaft members to their burschenschaften is further demonstrated by the fact that the pope had made dueling an excommunicable offense in 1867, and in 1890 even the mensur was confirmed to count as a duel.13 (the mensur was a strictly-regulated student duel arranged between burschenschaften which took place simply to show off burschenschaft members’ skill with a sword, not to avenge any insults.) it was a not uncommon cruelty in austria to challenge pious catholic reserve officers to a duel and force them to choose between their honor and their faith.14 and yet 9 schorske, fin-de-siecle vienna, 151. 10 ernst pawel, the labyrinth of exile: a life of theodor herzl (new york: farrar, straus & giroux, 1989), 66. zwicker, dueling students, 50. 11 john haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” central european history 17, no. 4 (1984): 300. 12 john haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” 300. 13 zwicker, dueling students, 45. 14 kevin mcaleer, dueling: the cult of honor in fin-de-siécle germany (princeton: princeton university press, 1994), 154. 95 duels were so important to catholic burschenschaft members that they were worth defying the head of the catholic church. duels meant the permanent, public, constantly visible confirmation of a man’s bravery and honor—because they led to scars, called schmissen. burschenschaft members never armored their faces when they dueled, and most happily collected a few prominent facial scars. schmissen were so desired that some men who were not members of a burschenschaft sliced open their cheeks with razors and let the cuts scar.15 as crucial as receiving the wounds in the first place was receiving the wounds without flinching. routinely, pledges were ejected from burschenschaften for failing to show the required stoicism (and therefore, honor) in their first duel.16 duels were, in fact, illegal at this time in austria (though that certainly did not stop them from occurring). the only permissible duel was the mensur. but students did challenge each other to illegal duels for reasons of personal insult, and quite often. there was a hierarchy to these insults. impolite behavior (like shining a light in someone’s eyes) demanded only the less dangerous “light swords.”17 verbal insults were more offensive and required heavy swords. heavy swords were also needed for the most offensive type of insult of all: physical threats—blows or slaps, whether real or mimed—constituted a deeply mortifying “violation of another’s physical integrity.”18 in the eyes of burschenschaft members at least, to fight by these rules and to fulfil all the many duties of a burschenschaft member was to prove one’s eliteness. this eliteness went beyond class (though burschenschaft members came from families wealthy enough to support a university education and a burschenschaft’s extra fees) and became about the soul. burschenschaft members congratulated themselves on having untarnished honor, on being true men. male jewish students, at least until the antisemitic waidhofen resolution was passed, were often enthusiastic participants in burschenschaft life. they found the duel to be especially critical as a way to insist upon their honor. peter gay writes, “a schmiss on the face of a jewish student had a particular poignancy: the scar was a symptom of defense, a proof of bravery, an assertion of equal status and manly self-respect.”19 but it could be difficult to earn one. even among the burschenschaften at the university of vienna that admitted jewish students in the years before the waidhofen resolution, most were happy to edge their jewish members out. theodor herzl’s burschenschaft albia was in the 1880s “relatively more moderate than most of its rival saber rattlers” with “two other jews and several converts on its active rolls, as well a fair number of jewish alumni.”20 however, the albia official record was extremely self-conscious about the religious make-up of the burschenschaft. the record-keeper wrote, presumably after herzl’s resignation, that herzl 15 mcaleer, dueling, 147. 16 zwicker, dueling students, 41. 17 zwicker, dueling students, 42. 18 mcaleer, dueling, 47. 19 lisa fethergill zwicker, “performing masculinity: jewish students and the honor code at german universities,” in jewish masculinities: german jews, gender, and history, eds. benjamin maria baader, sharon gillerman, and paul frederick lerner (bloomington: indiana university press, 2012), 130-131. 20 pawel, the labyrinth of exile, 66 and 67. 96 was “unpopular with both his fellow tribesmen as well as with the far more numerous pure-blooded germans.”21 as jews became increasingly defined as racially other, jewish students, however secular, became a threat to those who valued the “pure-blooded german[ness]” of their burschenschaft. the joint army officer the great majority of men in the habsburg empire, and an even greater majority of women, did not attend university. attending university was in and of itself a conferral of social privilege, among other benefits allowing men to spend only one year in the military, anytime from when they left the gymnasium until they reached their legal majority at twenty-five.22 these university-educated reserve officers could quickly become career officers by retraining at a shortcut school. but men without university educations who wanted to attain the rank of officer had to spend years working their way up through a brutal system that demanded from them a very specific code of behavior. boys mainly trained to become officers during adolescence at military academies or at the less prestigious cadet schools. reforms in military law in the habsburg empire in 1868 relaxed the intensity of the academies, which had been full of religious instruction, corporal punishment, and restrictions on students’ movement and reading material.23 even with this new greater freedom, academies and cadet schools were rigorous and harsh, giving their students a technical and physical education as elaborate as the classical education of the gymnasium. the boys came from all over the habsburg empire, and, as future officers, they were meant to shed their own personal nationalistic affiliations in favor of a sense of duty to the entire empire.24 the methods for achieving this could be psychologically painful. istván deák writes, “in the first year, a student was forbidden to speak his mother tongue, and some students were forced to relearn their native languages later in courses offered by the school.”25 while german was prized as the “universal language of command and service,”26 officers were certainly not encouraged to value pan-germanism. rather, they swore personal fealty to the kaiser.27 career officers were raised in a hierarchical, claustrophobic environment, where their entire education was designed to create deep loyalty to the empire as a whole, rather than to their own specific region of it. the military academy at wiener neustadt’s famous motto was “treu bis in den tod!” (loyal until death!).28 officers had to remain especially loyal when their regiment was sent to vienna for five years, as every regiment was. for officers, these years in vienna were meant to be a time of 21 pawel, the labyrinth of exile, 67. 22 arthur schnitzler, the road into the open, trans. roger byers (berkeley: university of california press, 1992), 86. 23 istván deák, beyond nationalism: a social and political history of the habsburg officer corps, 1848-1918 (new york: oxford university press, 1990), 88. 24 deák, beyond nationalism, 184. 25 deák, beyond nationalism, 83. 26 deák, beyond nationalism, 28. 27 deák, beyond nationalism, 4. 28 deák, beyond nationalism, 84. 97 fun and luxury, full of balls, operas, and sex. it was also a time of strict and exacting etiquette rules meant to uphold the honor of the officer corps. an officer’s pay was abysmal before the compromise of 1867, when many nearly starved in order to afford the upkeep required for their uniform.29 but even when their pay was raised to higher than a university-educated civil servant’s, the army’s “psychological pressure to ‘enjoy life’” in the empire’s most expensive city plunged many officers deep into debt.30 the emperor sometimes personally bailed out “deserving officers,” but the army’s military funds and other money-lending operations imposed strict penalties on the officers who borrowed from them, as many officers did.31 for these men, most of them raised in isolated academies and cadet schools where “no one had prepared them for the real world,” as one officer complained, it was socially imperative that they take out ruinous loans to be able to afford signs of culture and affluence like sending their daughters to fashionable schools.32 they were representatives of the emperor and had to behave as such. their rules of conduct were rigid and aristocratic: “officers were forbidden to eat in a low-class restaurant, to ride an omnibus (at least until the twentieth century), to travel third-class, or to carry the smallest of packages (unless it appeared to contain chocolate or candies).”33 the sense that joint army officers should be not only defenders of their own honor but also of the emperor’s led to the onerous obligation of ehrennotwehr [the urgent necessity to defend one’s honor]. if an officer heard a civilian, in front of one or more other people, insult him, the officer corps, the military, or the emperor and the only way to stop the insult was to use physical force, the officer was supposed to attack the civilian with his sword and, if need be, his service revolver.34 as might be expected, an officer exercising the ehrennotwehr was a legal nightmare and almost always resulted in anger from the public. the ehrennotwehr required the officer to decide on the spot that there was no other option to avenge the insulted party—and also required him to challenge the civilian to a duel rather than simply attacking him if the civilian was able to give satisfaction. however, officers could be punished if they challenged a civilian to a duel if that civilian was unable to give satisfaction, because in that case they had failed to properly exercise ehrennotwehr.35 (the entire process also assumed that only a male civilian would think to insult any of these groups.) after unification, newspapers increasingly argued that officers should never be in a public place out of uniform or without their sword, so that everyone in the surrounding area would know to avoid insulting any group in front of the officer which would trigger the need for the ehrennotwehr to be exercised. officers were also advised to flee any social gathering where they sensed the possible need to exercise the ehrennotwehr.36 in contrast to the moral minefield of the ehrennotwehr, a duel between officers was seen as ennobling. though the army’s criminal code forbade it, the army 29 deák, beyond nationalism, 117-118. 30 deák, beyond nationalism, 120-121. 31 deák, beyond nationalism, 124. 32 deák, beyond nationalism, 124. 33 deák, beyond nationalism, 125. 34 deák, beyond nationalism 128-129. 35 deák, beyond nationalism, 129. 36 deák, beyond nationalism, 129. 98 expected its officers to duel and routinely looked the other way when it came to punishing them for it.37 jewish men saw great social benefits from this practice of dueling in the army, which gave even reserve officers the right to demand satisfaction through a duel. there was a high number of jewish university students in the empire, and by 1900, over 18.3% of the reserve officer corps was jewish.38 a 1915 “guide for reserve officers” warned readers that a refusal to duel a jewish fellow officer could result in a humiliating loss of military rank. it described an incident where, insulted by a jewish man and challenged to a duel, a burschenschaft student (and reserve officer) refused to fight. he was stripped of his rank because, the guide states, he violated “the army’s notion of honor.”39 but in contrast to the number of jewish reserve officers, the number of jewish career officers was few. deák assumes this was the case both because the officer’s lifestyle was “completely alien to jewish tradition” and because of individual antisemites blocking the paths of interested jewish men. 40 in 1901, the viennese newspaper dr. bloch’s wochenschrift revealed that general edmund krieghammer, the new war minister, was “systematically denying study stipends to jewish doctors interested in pursuing a military career,” making it “nearly impossible for jewish reserve medical officers to become career soldiers”.41 no jewish career officer was ever advanced to a rank higher than that of a two-star general at a time when the highest rank was that of a five-star general.42 despite the empire’s multiethnicity, biases against various ethnicities and, likely, religions were rampant when admitting students to the elite military academies.43 yet even though most jewish career officers did convert, conversion was not required. furthermore, the highly decorated feldmarshalleutnant eduard ritter von schweitzer kept kosher and even received permission from the emperor to keep kosher when dining with him.44 in exchange for a less bigoted attitude about who was honorable enough to give satisfaction, the joint army demanded a reverent loyalty from its officers, which they were meant to maintain even when they were no longer on active duty. arthur schnitzler was stripped of his rank as a reserve officer for his novella lieutenant gustl, a scathing portrait of a sex-obsessed and stupid officer who decided he must commit suicide after receiving a small insult from a baker, a man whose low status means gustl cannot demand satisfaction. the insult—which translates as “fathead”—would have been equally offensive to a burschenschaft member, prompting a duel necessitating heavy swords rather than light swords.45 a student, an officer, and a jew: a case study 37 deák, beyond nationalism, 130. 38 deák, beyond nationalism, 133. 39 deák, beyond nationalism, 133-134. 40 deák, beyond nationalism, 176. 41 deák, beyond nationalism, 176. 42 deák, beyond nationalism, 177. 43 deák, beyond nationalism, 188. 44 deák, beyond nationalism, 177. 45 zwicker, dueling students, 42. 99 arthur schnitzler’s disillusionment with the joint army grew slowly. when he served his required year in the army in the early 1880s while attending the university of vienna, he enjoyed himself. though this was more than a decade before the waidhofen resolution was passed, schnitzler was an incisive observer of the pressures of honor and antisemitism which affected the lives of students at the university and in the army. his autobiography my youth in vienna provides insight into the way one man, at least, juggled the competing identities of student, officer, and jew. a medical student pursuing his education halfheartedly, schnitzler belonged to neither the burschenschaften nor the zionist dueling fraternities. he was, however, a practiced fencer long before his time in the army. my youth in vienna criticized his father for his aversion to letting schnitzler join a variety of popular sports during adolescence, but schnitzler said that “[f]encing was another story. even my father had to admit that a future soldier and reserve officer should know how to handle a sword, so, with passing interest and without putting myself out in the slightest, i took a course with fencing-master domaschintzky, a gray-bearded, genial, savage giant.”46 serving in the army was both a way to gain honor and a requirement of citizenship, which was granted to jews in 1867, only about fifteen years before schnitzler served in the army. to train a future officer to handle a sword properly was a critical matter, even to a man like schnitzler’s father who otherwise had little use for sports. for schnitzler, joining the army just after passing his third-year exams meant taking on the posture of genteelly dissipated, aristocratic loitering an officer was supposed to evidence. some of the more studious future reserve officers hurried back to the university to catch a few lectures during breaks, but schnitzler considered his days in the army less a time for learning than for carousing: “[e]ven the hours from twelve to two, which was when my more diligent comrades went to hear späth on obstetrics, i usually spent, with a few others, eating my lunch so that nothing could prevent me from wielding my billiard cue at two.”47 schnitzler also took on the officer’s stereotypical sexual prowess: “i had scarcely donned my uniform—it was as if i or my fate had been waiting for such a banal cue—when i began to aim more consciously for what is designated—all too heroically—as ‘conquests.’”48 before serving in the army, schnitzler had had several flirtations with varying levels of seriousness, but it was in the army, he implies, when he first began having sex. the ample unstructured time and lack of parental supervision allowed him this freedom. schnitzler remembered with amusement the daughter of a hungarian aristocrat, a major in the army, who had an affair with his friend and “would enter into intimate relationships only with army medical students—one finds specialization in every field”49—evidence, too, of the diversity of ethnicity and class in the joint army. despite the billiards and sexual conquests, schnitzler’s time in the army did not always go smoothly. antisemitism pervaded this branch of the habsburg military. medical students serving in the army, many of whom were jewish, were called, derogatorily, “moses 46 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 116. 47 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 127. 48 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 117. 49 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 118. 100 dragoons.”50 schnitzler writes that not only were there divisions between the gentiles and jews serving in the army, but his service came during a time of widespread debate over whether there were merely religious or also ethnic differences between the groups.51 schnitzler dealt with one instance of antisemitism by reporting an assistant doctor who wanted to punish schnitzler and some (ostensibly also jewish) friends for tardiness with several weeks of confinement to barracks. his senior medical officer had the request “quash[ed],” much to the assistant doctor’s disgust.52 but schnitzler was also very aware of antisemitism at the university, and what the duel could mean to jewish students as a weapon against bigotry. looking back on a conversation he had with some of his fellow future reserve officers, he writes: we were talking about dueling, and all of us, without exactly feeling that we were supporters of the tradition as a matter of principle, but more out of the general spirit of those student days and especially as inductees and future reserve officers, stressed our willingness to give satisfaction if it were demanded. theodore was the only one who declared that under no circumstances would he duel, and in answer to our question: why, replied with a smile—because he was a coward. it was not so much the unestablished fact of his cowardice that astonished us, as the courage it took to confess it, something we weren’t ready to admit at the time, not to him nor to ourselves. none of us were brawlers nor were any of us expert duelers, yet there wasn’t one among us who would have tried to evade a student duel or any other kind of duel, if the prevailing rules of conduct made it unavoidable.53 even though they were not members of a burschenschaft, schnitzler’s friends felt the duel was deeply important. the idea of not fighting a duel when challenged—of not “giv[ing] satisfaction if it were demanded”—was unthinkable to them. theodore’s refusal to duel is something that he self-deprecatingly calls “coward[ice],” but that schnitzler, thinking back, recognizes as a type of “courage.” schnitzler ends his recounting of this incident by saying, “the question was very topical at the time for us young men, especially for the jews among us, since antisemitism was spreading rapidly in student circles.”54 by the time he was at university, schnitzler explains: [the] burschenschafte[n] had already started to expel all jews and jewish descendants, and conflicts during the so-called “promenade” on saturday mornings, and during student carousals, also street fights, were not so rare in those days between the antisemitic [burschenschaften] and the radical-liberal landsmannschaften, formed by those coming from the same native areas, some of 50 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 115. 51 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 131. 52 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 131. 53 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 126-127. 54 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 127. 101 which were predominately jewish. (dueling corps with a solely jewish membership did not as yet exist in those days.) provocations between individuals in lecture halls, corridors and laboratories were daily occurrences….this was one of the reasons why many jewish students considered it necessary to become exceptionally expert and dangerous fencers.55 a few of schnitzler’s details are inaccurate. there were, in fact, “dueling corps with a solely jewish membership” during his time at university. schnitzler entered university in 1879 and was there when the first zionist dueling fraternity kadimah was founded in 1882. perhaps he intentionally altered these details—or was unaware of when kadimah was founded, which might also show how small kadimah’s initial influence was. but this passage, however hazy it is on small details, makes it clear that for schnitzler, the university was a literal as well as an ideological battleground. any encounter with a bigoted fellow student could quickly go wrong and provide the pretext for a duel, the only way to force a recognition of jewish equality—or even jewish superiority. with pride, schnitzler writes: tired of waiting for the opponent’s effrontery and insults, [jewish students] quite frequently behaved in a provocative fashion, and their superiority in dueling, which was becoming an increasing embarrassment, was certainly the main reason for the priceless waidhofen manifesto with which the german-austrian student body declared all jews once and for all incapable of giving satisfaction. i have no intention of omitting the exact words of this decree; it went like this: every son of a jewish mother, every human being in whose veins flows jewish blood, is from the day of his birth without honor and void of all the more refined emotions…he is ethically subhuman…it is impossible to insult a jew; a jew cannot therefore demand satisfaction for any suffered insult. this decree was not declared official until a few years later but the spirit that sponsored it and the sentiments it expressed existed at the time i am describing here, at the beginning of the eighties therefore.56 my youth in vienna was first published in german in 1968, thirty-seven years after schnitzler’s death. schnitzler wrote this passage long after the waidhofen resolution was passed, and his supposedly word-for-word write-up of the resolution contradicts the version which lisa zwicker consulted. her version of the resolution has an entirely different tone to it: the burschenschaften “now have no jewish members and do not plan to have any in the future.”57 the language of the resolution she cites is dry, straightforward, and bureaucratic; the language of the resolution schnitzler cites is vitriolic racist rhetoric. rather than questioning whether schnitzler dramatized his version of the resolution, or 55 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 128. 56 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 128-9. 57 zwicker, “the burschenschaft and german political culture,” 402-403. 102 whether there were many versions of the resolution with different wording publicized in different outlets, or whether the waidhofen resolution was simply very long and varied in style, with the limited evidence available, it is most useful to explore how deeply the waidhofen resolution affected a man who never joined a burschenschaft or even fought a duel at university. schnitzler, decades later, was still intensely, personally furious with the resolution. the waidhofen resolution passed after his time at university, but its antisemitism reflects his own experience with student duels and the jewish students who trained intensely to gain their “superiority in dueling,” only to have their accomplishments, as he felt, stripped from them by austro-german students unable to put up with being bested by jewish students. even if the burschenschaften were the ones who created and enforced the resolution, schnitzler thought that the entire “german-austrian student body” was, at least ideologically, also behind the resolution. if accurate, this paints a very bleak portrait of student antisemitism at the university of vienna. not only does schnitzler’s resolution strip jewish men of their honor, it strips them of their humanity. his version of the resolution accuses them of being “void of all the more refined emotions,” “ethically subhuman,” and “impossible to insult”—and then schnitzler goes on to say that this resolution reflects the feelings of all the (christian) austro-german students. in the face of deeply entrenched antisemitism, the officer status of the jewish students who had been through military training allowed them to push back against the waidhofen resolution. “[w]hen actual insults had been exchanged and especially when officer honor could not be made to agree with student behavior,” schnitzler admitted, it was not always possible “to apply the waidhofen principles as strictly as their followers would have liked.”58 to refuse to duel a fellow officer, no matter his religion, would after all result in a stripping of one’s military rank if the incident was reported.59 though it did so for its own reasons, the joint army stood behind its jewish reserve officers, giving many jewish university students a means of forcing other students to acknowledge them as equals. conclusion the duel created a physical expression for the fraught issues of who was seen in austrian society as equally honorable to whom. its proponents elevated the duel to something more than a sport, a sacred ritual where honor was defended and courage forged, and these same proponents created a system by which very few people were viewed as having honor. in the army, a certain rank was required to possess honor, whether that rank had been won through years of military training or gifted as a consequence of a certain education. in the burschenschaften, possessing honor required having a certain education, a certain ethnicity, and a certain sex. (women might possess honor, but their honor was tied to a reputation which they could not, so the thinking went, defend for themselves.60) the 1880s and 1890s were a time when antisemitism was wielded in vienna as a political weapon by demagogues like georg von schönerer and karl lueger. the waidhofen resolution was as much an expression of the era’s political trends as of mere personal bigotry, but the 58 schnitzler, my youth in vienna, 129. 59 deák, beyond nationalism, 133-4. 60 mcaleer, dueling, 159. 103 resolution had to fight against the more open definition of honor espoused by the joint army. in june 1914, on the eve of world war i, the waidhofen resolution was revoked.61 in 1917, duels were again banned in the armed forces62, but this time the ruling was enforced more harshly. during wartime, a near majority of students at the university were women from austria and jewish refugees of both sexes from galicia.63 many leftists at the university thought that the war meant the end of an era of for the burschenschaften’s self-styled pangermanic student aristocracy. but by june 1918, there were again antisemitic speakers at the farbenbummeln.64 by 1932, the burschenschaften had officially allied with the national socialists.65 arno j. mayer wrote that “[i]t would take two world wars and the holocaust…to finally dislodge and exorcise the feudal and aristocratic presumption from europe’s civil and political societies.”66 but even after society at large turned away from the duel, the burschenschaften clung to their ideal of an exclusive, easily-injured honor. the mensur still exists in its original form today. even during the height of dueling’s popularity, there were people who agitated against it. vienna had an anti-dueling league founded in 1902 that was made up of a thousand members, including influential aristocrats, and organizations as disparate as the catholic church, the freemasons, and the social democrats decried the duel as an institution.67 but again and again, across political affiliations, men who had the training or education to socially qualify as worthy of gaining satisfaction took to the sword or pistol. especially after the passage of the waidhofen resolution, the need to publicly prove their honor must have been especially strong for men struggling to negotiate the complexities of being both jewish and austrian. sometimes grabbing a weapon and stepping onto the field of honor must have seemed the only way to meaningfully fight back. 61 haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” 302. 62 haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” 308. 63 haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” 306. 64 haag, “students at the university of vienna in the first world war,” 309. 65 zwicker, “the burschenschaft and german political culture,” 390. 66 arno j. mayer, the persistence of the old regime: europe to the great war (new york: verso books, 1981), 329. 67 deák, beyond nationalism, 132. 1 editorial introduction howard louthan university of minnesota we are delighted to introduce and share with you our third volume of the central europe yearbook. in three short years the yearbook has grown in significant ways. though the center for austrian studies at the university of minnesota hosts the yearbook, we are not a minnesota publication, but one, as reflected both by our editorial board and contributors, that is decidedly international. this year’s edition includes the scholarship of gifted and dedicated students from seven countries and three continents! from harvard university to victoria university of wellington, new zealand, we are presenting contributions this year from literally across the globe. we are also becoming the multilingual publication we had envisioned from our inception, as we feature articles in both english and german this year. the 2021 yearbook also captures the geographic and cultural diversity of central europe. though, as one would expect, there is treatment of the german-speaking lands of the continent, this year we also provide coverage of bohemia, transylvania, poland, northern italy, and the former yugoslavia, while two of our articles stretch even further and consider north american connections with central europe. we are also developing into a multidisciplinary publication as we showcase an impressive range of research on central europe across a variety of academic fields. our contributors examine the ephemeral art and architecture of eighteenth-century funerals and the poetry of german expressionists responding to the rapid urbanization of early twentieth-century society. in a special forum we take an in-depth look at one region in particular, early modern transylvania. from vampires to religious radicals, our three authors consider the social and cultural particularities of this fascinating region caught between the habsburgs and the ottomans. we also feature a pair of articles that deal with cultural exchange and transatlantic diplomacy in two very different settings. we start with an investigation of protestant immigrants from salzburg and their encounter with native groups in eighteenth-century georgia before moving later to cold war america and a critical trade delegation to yugoslavia in 1958. in this edition we also revisit old themes of the region from new perspectives. nationalism is a thread that runs through many of our articles. we trace it in a more traditional manner with an investigation of giuseppe mazzini working for italian unification against the backdrop of an austrian state eager to quell patriotic sentiments in their territory. two of our essays pair nationalism with a consideration of military developments. we explore the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and seek to understand how failed military reforms contributed to the collapse and ultimate disappearance of the state in the late eighteenth century. we then move to the nineteenth century and the habsburg lands as we examine 2 how the army as a multiethnic institution actually contributed to the stability and longevity of the habsburg state, a bulwark against swirling nationalist currents. our authors also tackle some of the thorniest political questions of nineteenthand twentieth-century central europe. in a fascinating investigation of one of the most iconic figures of the german past, otto von bismarck, we consider one of the most radical steps he undertook as chancellor. his 1885 expulsion of non-naturalized poles and jews from prussian lands foreshadowed the more dramatic population transfers that would occur in the next century. our edition also includes a thoughtful examination of salzburg at the end of the world war i and the emerging influence of austrian socialists. what tactics did salzburg’s socialists adopt with the collapse of the habsburg monarchy? were they leading a “revolution”? how did the term “revolution” itself take on different meanings and significance in the politically dynamic postwar period? finally, a few words about our first two contributions that set the tone of this edition in important ways. we begin by commemorating the 350th birthday of one of the most celebrated figures of the czech past, john amos comenius. comenius, the last bishop of the bohemian brethren, is best known for his contributions in the field of education. in a creative digital project that blends both czech and english, we are introduced to two of comenius’s great masterpieces: the orbis pictus (visible world in pictures; 1658), the first illustrated children’s book and language primer, and the labyrint světa (labyrinth of the world; 1623), a powerful dystopia that chronicles the wanderings of a seventeenth-century pilgrim through a dark and distorted landscape eerily reminiscent of our planet today. despite the dangers and deceptions of his world, comenius ultimately has a message of hope that is equally relevant, one that embraces human dignity and worth. we hear echoes of comenius in the opening interview of our edition where we feature a conversation with one of the most prominent scholars of central europe in north america today. professor mary lindemann, former president of both the american historical association and the german studies association, reflects on her journey to the university and her subsequent career in academia. in words that could have come directly from comenius, she offers an eloquent defense of the humanities and social sciences in our own time of crisis in this new age of covid. 71 south slav-russian relations in the second half of the nineteenth century intrusion, resentment, and mutual naiveté david crockett university of minnesota abstract this article examines the myth of “eternal friendship” between bulgarians and russians and how their mutual failure to understand the other’s motives gave way to resentment, estrangement, and mutual naiveté, straining this supposed natural affinity. the article begins by examining the russo-turkish war of 1877-1878 and its aftermath, which provides a case study of the ambiguous and changing relationship between russia and the south slavs. the second part of the article examines in greater detail the cultural and political affinities between two peoples—including pan-slavism, a common orthodox religion, and similar languages—and why these commonalities still failed to overcome bulgarian national self-interest and desires for national independence. while this article focuses on bulgaria, many of the arguments can also be applied to serbia and other south slavic countries. article for nearly five hundred years, russia has been affectionately known as dyado ivan—“grandfather ivan”—by the bulgarian people, and during the long, cruel years of turkish oppression, they looked towards moscow with hope and longing, in the unshakable belief that their russian elder brothers would come and liberate them.1 so repeats historian mercia macdermott the “myth” of “eternal friendship” between russians and bulgarians that has been sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected by both historians and the general public. the origins of this myth are many, both subtle and obvious, and will be discussed later in this article. language certainly played an important role in the development of close ties between the two peoples, as did dissatisfaction with 1 mercia macdermott, a history of bulgaria 1393-1885 (london: george allen & unwin ltd., 1962), 56. the genesis of this paper was a course in eastern european history taught by professor igor tchoukarine. professor tchoukarine then graciously agreed to supervise an independent study on the paper’s specific thesis. professor theofanis stavrou contributed new insights on the christian uniate movement by his dissertation student denis vovchenko. 72 the constantinople-based, greek-dominated early orthodox church. however, the basic tie between them was pan-slavism. most history books comment on commonalities among bulgaria, serbia, montenegro, macedonia, and russia. all five share slavic ethnicity and orthodox christianity, as well as having similar languages and cultural proximity. in the opinion of diplomatic historian barbara jelavich, these commonalities gave russia an advantage in creating autonomous states in the balkans not shared by any other world power.2 in spite of these affinities, the pride and parochialism of russian government officials and the russian orthodox church inhibited their effectiveness. largely due to geography, russia frequently intruded in the affairs of south slavic countries, which caused people in those regions to harbor resentment towards moscow. in many cases russia failed to recognize that south slavs were no less nationalistic than russians. likewise, south slavs naïvely failed to understand that russia was acting in what it perceived to be its own best interests, not necessarily those of balkan slavs. while this article focuses on bulgaria, many of its arguments are generally applicable to serbia and other south slavic countries.3 the article argues that strong factors worked against “eternal friendship.” the article begins by examining the russo-turkish war of 1877-78 and its aftermath, which provides a case study of the ambiguous and changing relationship between russia and the south slavs. while the war’s direct focus was on bulgaria, russian diplomatic and military efforts were part of a chain of events that significantly affected not only serbia and other south slav countries, but also the ottoman and austrian empires and the great powers in general. in its analysis of diplomatic aspects of this question, this paper uses primary sources including government memoranda, newspapers, pamphlets, and contemporaneous writings, as well as other sources. however, russia’s involvement in the war does not fully explain the origin and “failure” of the myth. the second part of the article turns its analysis to the cultural and political affinities between the two peoples, which transformed from the myth of eternal friendship to bulgarian resentment of russia’s actions and the mutual naiveté exhibited by both countries. this second part specifically examines the themes of pan-slavism; common orthodox religion; language, culture, modernization and nationalism; and russian autocracy and bulgarian nationalism. the russo-turkish war 1877-78 and russian involvement in south-eastern europe both bulgarians and russians demonstrated chauvinism and naivete in expressing concerns about their relationship. in 1870, seven years before the russo-turkish war, bulgarian writer and revolutionary liuben karavelov predicted the attitude of his fellow countrymen towards russia with these words: “if russia comes to liberate, she will be received with great sympathy; but if she comes to rule she will find many enemies.”4 2 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements 1806-1914 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991), 30. 3 even though the focus is bulgaria, one cannot study russian-bulgaria relations in this period without considering interactions with serbia and austria-hungary. whether it is in relation to bosnia and herzegovina or macedonia, russian and bulgarian actions and reactions are greatly influenced by both serbia and austria-hungary. 4 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism: russian influence in the internal affairs of bulgaria and serbia, 1879-1886 (berkeley: university of california press, 1962), vii. 73 russia’s “victory” in the war was followed within one year by national elation with the creation of an enlarged bulgaria through the san stefano settlement, followed by prompt disillusionment with the polity’s halving by the congress of berlin (to which bulgarians were not even invited). bulgarian revolutionary-turned-statesman stefan stambolov bitterly stated that bulgaria was better-off with the ottomans before berlin than it was after the war.5 expressing a different attitude towards the “turkish yoke” in 1886, russian foreign minister nicholas giers, in a secret communication to british ambassador sir robert morier, displayed resentment and unrealistic expectations about bulgarian attitudes.6 after the russian soldier “spent his best blood and half his treasure in rescuing the christian [bulgarians],” they “repudiate[d] the obligations they are under to russia.”7 as will be discussed later, expected bulgarian gratitude towards russia for its defeat of the ottomans resulted instead in growing resentment and estrangement. rather than “cruel years of turkish oppression” and longing for russia to liberate them, evidence demonstrates that bulgarians were relatively successful under ottoman rule and actually better off than they were in the second bulgarian kingdom (1185-1396).8 russian motivations for its involvement in bulgaria and willingness to expend “blood and arms” for bulgarian independence through the russo-turkish war are more complicated than bulgarian gratitude. russia’s principal goal was a desire for access to bulgaria’s warmwater ports on the black sea, access to, or control of, the dardanelles straights, as well as the geographic position of the south slavs in general.9 russian efforts to gain free access to the black sea and dardanelles straights dated to the time of peter the great.10 its chief goal in the balkans was control of the dardanelles straights, which represented the “key” to russia’s back door, or as charles jelavich summarizes, “all balkan interests were 5 duncan m. perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 1870-1895 (durham: duke university press, 1993), 38. 6 edward dicey, the peasant state: an account of bulgaria in 1894 (london: john murray, 1894), 265. 7 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 193-204. morier to rosebery, no. 253 most secret, st. petersburg, july 21, 1886, public record office, fo 65/1260, the national archives, uk. 8 karel durman, lost illusions: russian policies towards bulgaria in 1877-1887, upsala studies on the soviet union and eastern europe, no. 1 (stockholm: acta universitatis upsaliensis, 1988), 9-52. while acknowledging that “hope and longing” existed within the orthodox clergy throughout the south slavic lands, durman contends that there was no substantial evidence of anything more than a vague feeling towards russia. quoted from f. dostoevsky, diary of a writer, vol. 2 (new york: george braziller, 1954), 892. instead of “an impoverished country exposed by the turks to permanent, intolerable privation,” fyodor dostoevsky reported in 1877 at the beginning of the russo-turkish war that russian troops found “charming little bulgarian cottages…cultivated land yielding almost hundredfold harvest, and…three orthodox churches to [every] one mosque….they should be welcoming us almost on their knees. but they are not on their knees…and it even seems that they are not glad we are here.” 9 m. s. anderson, the eastern question 1774-1923 (new york: st. martin’s press, 1966), 227. 10 cyril e. black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” in the balkans in transition: essays on the development of balkan life and politics since the eighteenth century, eds. charles and barbara jelavich (berkley: university of california press, 1963), 149. along with other provisions, russia gained from the ottomans with the 1774 treaty of kutchuk kainardji the important black sea ports of azov and kherson. by the nineteenth century, grain from southern russia represented one-third to one-half of its exports and guaranteed water passage became a major motivating factor in its balkan policy. 74 subordinated to the problem of the straights.”11 regardless of a perceived setback in the congress of berlin, russian interests were nevertheless advanced with the russo-turkish war. russia, like many european powers in the 1860s, was grappling with the “eastern question”: how to deal with the expected failure of the turkish empire?12 russia believed that it could improve its geopolitical position and play a key role in determining the fate of the region. barbara jelavich discusses three strategic options for russia in the case of the demise of the ottoman empire: preservation of the empire through dominance of the ottoman government by russia; partition of the area in cooperation with other powers; or, creation of autonomous national regimes, with russia then attempting to dominate those regimes.13 all russian options and actions were severely constrained by western powers, particularly austria-hungary.14 the latter clearly understood the advantage russia held, being both slavic and orthodox, and was convinced that independent south slavic states would become either satellites or allies of russia, and that the danube could become a “russian river.”15 the very existence of multiple ethnicities in the catholic, germandominated austro-hungarian empire made it particularly sensitive to the possible addition of more orthodox, slavic subjects. the habsburgs preferred to maintain the status quo, that the northern border of the ottoman empire be the sava-danube line as set by the treaty of karlowitz in 1699 and that no new autonomous states be established in the balkans.16 russia believed that bulgarian independence, as advanced by the russo-turkish war, was the initial step towards jelavich’s third option. in addition to the constraints placed upon russia by austria-hungary and other western powers, russia became caught in a confluence of factors beginning in 1875 that seemed to leave it with no options for maintaining its influence in the peninsula, except to favor bulgaria over serbia. after centuries of exploitation, non-muslim peasants rebelled against landowning muslim beys in bosnia in july 1875, followed in 1876 by serbia and 11 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 3-4. while he does not disagree with this assessment of russian orientation, it should be noted that historian m. s. anderson considered russia’s policy towards the balkans and the ottoman empire irrational, more complex and “more influenced by conflicting cross-currents, than that of any other power.” much of the blame for russia’s “irrational” involvement in the balkans anderson attributes to “unofficial russia,” pan-slav officials, societies, and newspapers. in anderson’s opinion, russia should have placed much more importance on strengthening its black sea fleet and less on the straights. he points out that the kattegat sound between denmark and sweden was in nonrussian hands and yet had always provided russia with unimpeded commercial and military passage. see anderson, the eastern question, 392-393. 12 since the mid-1850s, the imperial interests of britain and russia competed for the expected demise of the “sick man of europe,” the ottoman empire. britain’s general approach was to attempt to strengthen the ottomans. russia attempted to further pro-russian sentiments to the detriment of the ottomans through orthodox and slavic affinities, especially in using autonomous serbia. 13 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 28-30. 14 anderson, the eastern question, 180. 15 anderson, the eastern question, 128-130. 16 as has already been mentioned, austria was concerned about its ability to compete with russia for the loyalty of its various slavic nationalities. if the status quo were not maintained, the habsburgs preferred an apportionment of the balkan countries among the great powers, thereby limiting russia’s influence. 75 montenegro independently going to war with the ottoman empire.17 bulgarian revolutionaries saw an opportunity for action against the ruling ottomans in the various futile attempts by russian and austrian representatives to restore peace as well as british opposition to “putting a knife to the throat of turkey” and existing political chaos in constantinople.18 bulgarian prime minister stefan stambolov, with the encouragement of factions in the russian government (i.e. russian ambassador to the ottoman empire count nicolai pavlovich ignatiev), led revolutionary activities against the ottomans beginning in april 1876, followed by terrible turkish reprisals conducted by muslim irregulars (i.e., bashibazouks or circassian emigrants from the russian caucasus).19 these turkish reprisals resulted in international condemnation of the ottoman empire. 20 russian pan-slavists encouraged serbian hostilities against turkey and russian public opinion strongly favored the serbs, but serbia was not up to the task.21 with the threat of a 17 r. j. crampton, bulgaria (oxford: oxford university press, 2007), 90. dennis p. hupchick, the balkans from constantinople to communism (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2002), 257. 18 anderson, the eastern question, 178-183. in their first serious attempt to restore peace, austrian foreign minister julius andrassy and russian ambassador to vienna, prince a. m. gorchakov, circulated to the great powers the andrassy note in december 1875. seen as “window-dressing,” the note provided for religious liberty, the end of tax farming, and land reform. britain and turkey reluctantly agreed to the andrassy note, but britain refused to require written acceptance by turkey. as the threat of hostilities between austria and russia increased, andrassy and gorchakov met a second time, which resulted in the berlin memorandum of may 1876 (being almost entirely the work of andrassy). if the ottoman empire failed, the memorandum called for austria to take part of bosnia and russia to take southern bessarabia. 19 denis vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism: imperial russia and ottoman christians, 1856-1914 (new york: oxford university press, 2016), 194. to counter the european powers’ general distrust of russian intentions in the balkans, ignatiev believed that international opinion would be especially important in any russian intervention in the balkans. ignatiev encouraged stambolov to take the initial steps towards revolution. ignatiev’s goals were to destabilize the ottoman empire and to give russian an adequate reason for military intervention in bulgaria, as well as to dispel the prevalent opinion that bulgarians never had and never would fight for their independence. crampton, bulgaria, 93. cited in encho mateev, dǔrzhavnikǔt stefan stambolov (sofia: letopisi, 1992), 111. to incite revolutionary actions against the ottomans, stambolov repeated often what he had been told by ignatiev in 1875: “russia can do nothing for bulgaria now if the bulgarians do not provide grounds for it.” 20 anderson, the eastern question, 184. stambolov and other revolutionaries had previously realized that publicity would be crucial to their efforts and effectively used bulgarian, romania, french, and british newspapers to ensure that any reprisals were “europeanized” (especially in western media). particularly effective was gladstone’s the bulgarian horrors and the question of the east, which was published in september 1876 and sold 200,000 copies within a month. this publication played upon prevalent christian emotionalism and destroyed pro-turkish feelings in britain more than any other publication in the century. investigations into the “april uprising” were led by russian and american diplomats and resulted in sensational photos and “lurid accounts of all sorts of violence done to helpless local christian subjects by their cruel muslim masters.” the press coverage of these events represented an important landmark in the development of the mass circulation press in russia and europe. see vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 195. 21 anderson, the eastern question, 186-187. serbia was encouraged to go to war with turkey by russian general cherniaev, a leading pan-slav, who expected decisive russian help for serbia. cherniaev had resigned his military commission and went to serbia to lead its army against the express wishes of alexander ii who did not wish to become involved. prayers were offered for serbian success in russian orthodox churches and contributions of money to serbia increased. in december 1876 the great russian journalist i. s. iksakov wrote: “all that has happened in russia this summer is an unheard-of phenomenon in the history of any 76 larger war increasing and their interests at stake, russia and austria-hungary were forced to immediately enter into a verbal, ambiguous reichstadt agreement specifying territorial annexations and spheres of influence upon the conclusion of serbian-turkish hostilities.22 disillusioned and irritated with serbia’s military weakness, russian pan-slavists saw bulgarians more firmly russophile and more immune to western power influences. 23 in his 1860 letter to the serbs, russian theologian and philosopher aleksei khomiakov expressed this same concern: that serbs were renouncing pan-slavism and orthodoxy and were instead following a western path. khomiakov specifically mentioned austria as a “corrosive” influence.24 while russia’s policy in the past had been to support all orthodox peoples in the balkans, it realized after the crimean war that such commitments were too far-reaching and that the geographic position of bulgaria superseded traditional russian sympathies for serbia.25 even though intervening in bulgaria would certainly revive western power concerns, russia reasoned that any alternative exercise of military power in the western balkans (e.g., serbia, bosnia and herzegovina) would more immediately and seriously lead to conflict with its two dreikaiserbund partners, germany and austriahungary.26 russia’s plan was to agree to austria-hungary annexing bosnia and herzegovina, to the detriment of serbia, as compensation to austria-hungary for prospective russian gains in bulgaria.27 with serbia’s pending collapse against turkey, russia drew two important conclusions. as mentioned earlier, russia was irritated by serbia’s military weakness against the sublime country: public opinion conducted a war apart from the government and without any state organization in a foreign state.” b. h. sumner, russia and the balkans, 1870-1880 (oxford: archon books, 1937), 193, fn. 842. 22 sumner, russia and the balkans, 1870-1880, 185-186. charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 6-7. gorchakov and andrassy met at reichstadt (german for zákupy in the current czech republic) in july 1876 and verbally agreed not to engage in the fighting and to determine territorial settlements upon the conclusion of hostilities. the objective of the agreement was to prevent the formation of a single, unitary south slav state (i.e., bosnia and herzegovina would in no event become one state). far more important than demonstrating the hazards of verbal agreements, the real importance of the reichstadt agreement was that austria-hungary and russia both desired to avoid war in the balkans. 23 sumner, russia and the balkans, 1870-1880, 169-172. pan-slavism never had significant influence in the highest levels of the russian government. it had little appeal for the russian bureaucracy, including statesmen like prince a. m. gorchakov, nor the influential baltic germans. it was advocated by military commanders, educated classes and count nikolai ignatiev. 24 peter k. christoff, an introduction to nineteenth-century russian slavophilism, a study in ideas, vol. 1, a. s. xomjakov (‘s-gravenhage: mounton & co., 1961), 247-259. 25 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 3-4. anderson, 187. charles and barbara jelavich, the establishment of the balkan national states, 1804-1920 (seattle: university of washington press, 1977), 128. telling examples of russia’s earlier preference for serbia can be seen in the peace treaties of the russoturkish wars of 1806-12 and 1828-29. while there was constant fighting on bulgarian soil and bulgarians assisted the russians in fighting, neither treaty contained any provisions concerning the bulgarians. by the same token, there was a marked difference in russian influence among the balkan countries after the crimean war. compared to bulgaria, serbia and the danubian principalities were much less favorably inclined towards russia because of interference in their internal politics. barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 134. 26 anderson, the eastern question, 186. the dreikaiserbund was initially an informal agreement from 1872 but was strengthened in a formal agreement between the three parties in 1879. 27 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 12. 77 porte and started to see bulgaria as the more reliable supporter of its influence in the balkans.28 secondly, russia saw that military action in support of slav inhabitants of the balkans would help stabilize the russian monarchy, which had been threatened by populist movements since the early 1870s.29 “war or disorder at home, that is the dilemma,” wrote a high-ranking russian foreign ministry official in august 1876.30 with the threat of war between some combination of russia, the ottoman empire and austria-hungary increasing, german chancellor otto von bismarck was forced to choose between russia and austria-hungary, and britain worried over the threat to the status quo in turkey. the western powers called for a conference in constantinople at the end of 1876 to devise a series of reforms that would ensure that atrocities against christians in the ottoman empire did not recur.31 however, the ottoman empire had three sultans in 1876 and the ottoman empire had not been in such confusion in seventy years, resulting in the preliminary agreement of the conference becoming meaningless and ending in failure.32 with the failure of the constantinople conference and british public opinion turning strongly against the ottomans, russia felt free to declare war on the ottoman empire, which it did in june 1877.33 the weakened ottomans were quickly defeated and accepted an armistice in january 1878. historian m. s. anderson wrote that the resulting short-lived san stefano settlement “represented the fullest practical expression ever given in russian foreign policy to the pan-slav ideal.”34 the san stefano settlement gave the bulgarians all 28 the central government of the ottoman empire is frequently referred to as the sublime porte or the porte. this figure of speech has its origin from the earliest days of the ottoman empire when the sultan would make announcements from the entrance to his palace. 29 anderson, the eastern question, 187. 30 anderson, the eastern question, 187, citing charles and barbara jelavich, eds., russia in the east, 1876-1880 (leiden: brill, 1959), 20. there were in fact conflicting ulterior motives within russia about a prospective war against turkey. pan-slavist bureaucrats saw a war as strengthening support for the autocracy, while the intelligentsia hoped that war would make more apparent the autocracy’s incompetence. tsar alexander ii was eventually assassinated in march 1881. in any event, celebrations by the russian people over russia’s quick victory over the turks were reinforced by the realistic battlefront paintings of vasily vershchagin and the orchestral tone poem marche slave by pyotr ilyich tchaikovsky with its various renditions of “god save the tsar.” lionel kochan and richard abraham, the making of modern russia, 2nd ed. (new york: st. martin’s press, 1983), 202-203. 31 anderson, the eastern question, 188-190. crampton, bulgaria, 92-3. 32 anderson, the eastern question, 185 and 191-192. the porte initially accepted a compromise imposed upon it by plenipotentiaries from britain and russia. but british ambassador sir henry eliot purposely undermined his government’s official representative and encouraged newly installed sultan abdülhamid ii to proclaim a new constitution, thereby making the preliminary agreement of the western powers meaningless. abdülhamid’s actions were not duplicitous, as was later alleged, but were principally the result of new forces within ottoman society that desired to liberalize ottoman government. 33 anderson, the eastern question, 192-194. within three months of the failed constantinople conference, ignatiev achieved for russia a watered-down pledge of austro-hungarian neutrality in the event of war with turkey. at the same time, public opinion in britain turned so strongly against the ottoman empire that prime minister benjamin disraeli was forced to accept war against turkey. the “price” of austria’s acceptance was receipt of bosnia and herzegovina and russian recognition that serbia fell within austria’s orbit. hupchick, the balkans from constantinople to communism, 264 and 192-194. 34 anderson, the eastern question, 203. the treaty ending the war was signed in san stefano, a village west of constantinople. 78 they could hope for, uniting the three historic regions of bulgaria (moesia, that is eastern rumelia, and thrace and macedonia) into one state and one church. over 23,000 bulgarian people expressed gratitude to russia by signing a petition of thanks to tsar alexander ii.35 unfortunately for the bulgarians, the san stefano settlement brought to the fore longstanding conflicts within the russian government; before ambassador to the porte ignatiev signed the peace agreement, ambassador to the habsburgs, prince a. m. gorchakov had already given britain and austria-hungary effective veto power over it.36 the treaty represented everything that britain and the habsburgs feared: an enlarged center of russian influence, a threat to british routes to the suez and india, and an enlarged slav state that could challenge austria-hungary’s positions in the balkans.37 while britain initially acquiesced to the san stefano settlement, austria protested that an enlarged bulgaria clearly violated the reichstadt and budapest agreements and that the compensation due it with regards to bosnia-herzegovina had been ignored.38 at the same time, gorchakov was also agreeing with austrian foreign minister julius andrassy to convene an international conference in berlin to counteract the san stefano settlement.39 at the 1878 congress of berlin, bulgaria lost its recently added territories, and newly constructed eastern rumelia was created “to diminish russian influence in the balkans by keeping bulgaria small.”40 there was great disagreement among influential elements of the russian public and press about whether or not berlin represented a severe setback for russia; yet, even if it did, the russo-turkish war still helped establish russia’s position in bulgaria.41 russia departed eastern rumelia a year later, but only after it had trained 40,000 men in paramilitary “gymnastic societies.” russian actions thereby gave early impetus to the eventual union of the nation by creating the environment for bulgarian freedom and national independence.42 as historian richard crampton observes, “the april 35 crampton, bulgaria, 91-93. 36 anderson, the eastern question, 205. 37 crampton, bulgaria, 94. barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 128. recognizing the power of pan-slavism, austria did not want to compete with russia for the loyalties of the various balkan slavic states. 38 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 6-7. the budapest convention was an outgrowth of the constantinople conference and was signed in 1877 by emperor franz joseph and russian tsar alexander ii. 39 anderson, the eastern question, 205. typical of the cautious, non-committal bismarck, who rarely wanted to be associated with difficult decisions, bismarck objected to berlin being the site for the conference. he still believed that a partition of the ottoman empire between all interested powers was the best solution to all near east problems. 40 crampton, bulgaria, 94. perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 71. 41 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 1-16. within a few years, russia de facto achieved its goals for bulgaria, but to the detriment of its interests elsewhere in the balkans. serbia was again (after creation of the bulgarian exarchate) faced with its secondary status in russian international relations vis-àvis bulgaria and became a habsburg vassal state. after providing military assistance to russia through territorial access in the russo-turkish war, romania turned from russia and looked to the dual monarchy of austria-hungary for future support. the congress of berlin also exacerbated russian internal concerns. the reforms of tsar alexander ii were being poorly received, the turkish war created a tremendous financial strain on russia, and revolutionary activities were contributing to state insecurity. (alexander was assassinated within three years of the congress of berlin.) 42 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 71. 79 uprising was the beginning of the birth of the modern bulgarian state. the midwife was russia.”43 russia used the russo-turkish war to gain approval among bulgarians, but the war alone does not fully explain the eternal friendship myth. the second part of this article examines other factors that helped establish bulgarian-russian affinity and subsequent resentments and naiveté by both countries in understanding the other’s needs. these include the three important affinities that served to strengthen the bulgarian debt to russia for furthering independence through the russo-turkish war: their common slavic ethnicity, shared orthodox religion, and similar languages. pan-slavism the importance of the slavic ethnicity for russian political decisions in the balkans varied greatly over time and among the various tsars and intellectual, political and military leaders. three major movements of slavic nationalism before 1914 have been identified: “slavophilism” during the reign of tsar nicholas i; “pan-slavism” under tsars alexander ii and iii; and “neo-slavism” from approximately 1908-1914.44 in each case, while russian leaders identified their shared slavic heritage, they also approached other european slavic peoples “as primitive people who needed firm, if friendly, guidance.”45 in the late nineteenth century, russian diplomats came to realize that their support of bulgarian independence transcended pan-slavism and unleashed a fervor for bulgarian nationalism that russia could not control. after centuries of muslim rule, balkan peoples were initially receptive to calls to unite behind the slavic heritage and orthodox religion they shared with russians.46 crampton points out, however, that the nascent bulgarian democrats “had no taste for tsarist autocracy.”47 in fact, the change in bulgarian attitudes towards russia started with the crimean war. after the crimean war, and certainly after the congress of berlin, russia could not promote the idea of independent balkan countries within a framework of conservative domestic policies without stimulating nationalism and political freedom.48 bulgarians were further offended by russian support for ottoman 43 crampton, bulgaria, 91. 44 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 34. a complete exposition of these philosophies is beyond the scope of this study. in brief, “slavophilism” can be idealistically viewed as the embodiment of eighteenthcentury nature as seen by rousseau and johann gottfried herder. it is easily conflated with orthodoxy and often led to virulent attacks on catholic poles. jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 93-94. “pan-slavism” is more closely tied to, but not synonymous with, nationalism and russian domination, and an orientation to orthodoxy. jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 135 and 157. “neo-slavism” originated in austriahungary and had a short life before world war i as a reaction to germanization. it did not attach any importance to religion, but was focused on the balkans and russia, putting each country on an equal basis. jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 208. 45jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 33. as an illustration of disagreement within the russian government, it is instructive to note that only one of the three russian foreign ministers for most of the nineteenth century was both slavic and orthodox (i.e., gorchakov). ironically, gorchakov, tended to side with the western powers over balkan slavic countries. 46 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 3. 47 crampton, bulgaria, 73. 48 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 73. 80 resettlement of circassians in bulgaria after the crimean war and the related settlement of bulgarians in crimea.49 subsequent russian use of force, intimidation, and bribery only led to increased bulgarian rejection of attempted russian domination.50 russian patronization of bulgarians ranged from the comical (e.g., putting sweets on the desks of members of the national assembly) to the consequential (e.g., russians holding all military ranks in the bulgarian army above captain).51 by the 1880s, the saying circulated in sofia that, “russia, though loving bulgaria, did not love the bulgarians.”52 it is easy to over-emphasize the importance of pan-slavism in russian actions. faced with a choice between pan-slavism and its national interests, russia would understandably choose its national interests.53 in fact, pan-slavism did not originate in russia but instead with non-russian western slavs (i.e., czechs and slovaks) in the first half of the nineteenth century, as part of their national awakening. in the second half of the nineteenth century, it became predominantly a russian movement “rooted in a feeling of spiritual and material grandeur and in a consciousness of historical destiny.”54 russian pan-slavism did not draw its strength from the nineteenth-century conservative court and government but from the smaller, educated class of russian radicals newly exposed to western concepts of independence and freedom. as already noted, russia sacrificed both balkan nationalism and pan-slavism in valuing its interests vis-à-vis the straights and bulgaria, thus making it easier for austria to absorb bosnia-herzegovina to the detriment of serbia. serbia was bluntly reminded of russian priorities when it complained about russian positions in the san stefano settlement. russia told the serbian delegation that “the interests of russia came first, then came those of bulgaria, and only after them came serbia’s; but that there were occasions on which bulgarian interests stood on equal footing with the russian.”55 since it appeared to russia that serbia would inevitably fall under the influence of the habsburgs, charles jelavich wrote that it was only “logical” that serbia should not be strengthened and must be 49 crampton, bulgaria, 73 and 38. caroline finkel, osman’s dream: the story of the ottoman empire 13001923 (new york: basic books, 2005), 467. after the crimean war, the ottomans relocated approximately 600,000 circassians from muslim states of the caucasus to bulgaria to strengthen the ottoman northern border. russia supported this relocation. with about one-fourth being agricultural slaves in the caucasus, their integration in bulgaria caused many problems. several bulgarian christians responded by relocating to the crimea, claiming that their villages were no longer safe and their agricultural land had been ruined. 50 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 283. 51 crampton, bulgaria, 111. anderson, the eastern question, 228. 52 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 82-83. 53 hans kohn, pan-slavism: its history and ideology (new york: vintage books, 1960), xv-xvii. 54 kohn, pan-slavism, 121-22. john m. letiche and basil dmytryshyn, “križanić’s memorandum on the mission to moscow, 1641,” the slavonic and east european review 68, no. 1 (1990): 41-68. a much earlier, albeit unsuccessful, advocate of pan-slavism was the croatian catholic missionary juraj križanić (yuri krizhanich). križanić had two goals in his 1641 mission to moscow, reconciliation of eastern orthodoxy with roman catholicism and unification of all slavic peoples under the leadership of russia. 55 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 12-13. 81 abandoned: “russia was making peace not on the basis of balkan nationalism or the ‘slavic idea’ but on that of the balance of power and national interest.”56 any favoritism towards bulgaria or belief in pan-slavism professed by russia, however, was not reciprocated by bulgaria. as bulgarian leaders (as well as those of other slavic countries) became more exposed to western beliefs and ideals, they increasingly sought national self-determination and independence. at the tûrnovo constitutional convention, hot-headed revolutionary stefan stambolov rejected the western-imposed edict of berlin. spurning russia’s efforts, he said, “it would have been better that you [russia] had not come to free us when you were not strong enough to defend your creation, san stefano bulgaria! under the turks, but as one, we had greater hope for a brighter future. but now, cut into five parts, our hopes die.”57 historian hans kohn understood this reaction and generalized that people become “less inclined to sacrifice” their individuality, traditions, and language, as their consciousness of them increases.58 an examination of the life of stefan stambolov illustrates bulgarian leaders’ willingness to use russia to achieve national aspirations, but not to the detriment of efforts towards national independence. stambolov was a bulgarian patriot and pragmatist but also a revolutionary with autocratic tendencies. murdered at age forty-one, his short life was full of contrasts and contradictions illustrating bulgarian attitudes towards russia in the late nineteenth century. stambolov recognized russia’s efforts in gaining independence for bulgaria but in the end was hated by russia, because he could not be “bought, brow-beaten, or persuaded” to do russia’s bidding.59 he played no role in the april 1879 selection of prince alexander of battenberg as the first modern bulgarian monarch, russia’s preferred candidate, but was also “heartsick” when russia forced alexander to abdicate.60 while stambolov was never a russophile, alexander’s removal was the final step toward making him a russophobe.61 he worked hard to convince alexander’s successor, prince ferdinand, to assume the bulgarian throne, over the strong objections of russia; nonetheless, stambolov’s assassination in 1896 was likely related to his involvement in political disagreements between ferdinand and russia.62 neither motivated by slavism nor orthodoxy, stambolov subscribed to realpolitik and neo-machiavellism, with his beliefs 56 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 12-13. 57 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 35-38. in accordance with article iv of the congress of berlin, leaders of the newly formed bulgaria (excluding eastern rumelia) met at (veliko) tûrnovo in a constitutional assembly on february 10/22, 1879. two days before the convention convened, three-fourths of the delegates, along with many foreign diplomats and journalists, attended a meeting to discuss whether to go forward with the convention or to stage some form of protest. in an address that was well received by those in attendance, stambolov attacked both russia in particular and europe in general. 58 kohn, pan-slavism, xvi. 59 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 122 and 145. 60 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 98. 61 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 95. 62 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 124 and 230-231. 82 being called by university of zurich political theorist josette baer “early bulgarian liberalism.”63 common orthodox religion more important than the ethnic ties between russia and many of the balkan peoples was their shared orthodox christianity. charles jelavich calls orthodoxy “the principal agency” through which russia could “reach down to the roots of slavic national feeling and to the individual slavic peasant.”64 by the 1830s, an increasing number of bulgarian priests were being trained in the slav-dominated seminaries of russia, rather than hellenized seminaries in the balkans.65 both seminary groups opposed what they saw as longstanding corruption in the greek-dominated constantinople patriarchate, and from the 1820s, serious agitation against the patriarchate grew to the point that “the bulgarian people no longer wanted greek bishops, good or bad.”66 however, since bulgaria had “always” been orthodox christian, it is easy to forget another cause of concern for russia. in the early 1860s, tsar alexander ii and russian leadership feared bulgarians “going catholic.”67 russia saw a rapidly growing bulgarian uniate movement that would allow bulgarians to keep orthodox rites but recognize papal supremacy (i.e., “going around” the constantinople patriarchate). regardless of how unlikely the development of the bulgarian uniate movement might be, it resulted in russia placing more emphasis upon orthodox unity and less upon pan-slavism.68 russia was inevitably involved in balkan orthodox religious affairs because of the important role granted it by the treaty of kutchuk kainardji. the treaty gave russia the right to intervene diplomatically with constantinople concerning the safeguarding of ottoman christians.69 in response to extending russian diplomatic pressure on the porte, it persuaded the patriarchate to recognize the autonomy initially of the serbian church in 1831, followed by the religious autonomy of the greeks, protestants, armenian catholics, and, finally, the bulgarian church in 1870.70 in the end, russia was able to use the russo 63 josette baer, “the creation of polity in bulgaria, realpolitik or constitutionalism by default,” east central europe 31, no. 1 (2004): 3-8. 64 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 3. 65 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 66. 66 charles jelavich, tsarist russia and balkan nationalism, 64-67. 67 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 113. 68 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 133. bulgarian nationalists employed the fear of catholic missions again in the 1870s. they suggested that bulgarian communities in macedonia “would switch to the still-minuscule bulgarian uniate millet” unless they were allowed to join the exarchate. “indeed, average russians remembered the russo-turkish war of 1877-1878 as a religious conflict rather than as the struggle between the slavs and the turks.” vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 321. 69 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 26 and 74. however, it must be noted that with russia’s defeat in the crimean war, russia relinquished its monopoly claim to protect ottoman christians to the concert of europe in general. 70 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 65-78. 83 turkish war to gain enormous goodwill with bulgarians by supporting demands for a separate bulgarian national church (e.g., exarchy) and canonical law.71 because of the emphasis they placed upon ecclesiastical affairs, in comparison to social grievances and inequalities common with most nationalist movements, bulgarians were late to achieve an independent church, which caused special concerns for the porte, russia, and western powers. the desire for religious autonomy was a crucial component of the bulgarian vǔzrazhdane (national revival).72 bulgarian communities outside of the “bulgarian” lands were hugely important to vǔzrazhdane.73 because of these “outsiders,” bulgarians wanted to reverse the order by which religious affiliation was regulated in the ottoman empire—instead of religious affiliation determining cultural identity, the bulgarians wanted cultural identity to determine religious affiliation. they wanted ethnic bulgarians living in constantinople to be under the religious authority of an exarch living in bulgaria, not the constantinople patriarchate. the patriarchate realized that this demand could soon result in separate bulgarian, romanian, and other ethnically-based orthodox organizations.74 bulgarians recognized that this “ethnicism” would be to their advantage, because, “at the opportune moment,” macedonia could be recognized by the porte as part of the bulgarian millet and become part of greater bulgaria.75 russia feared that orthodox christians leaving the patriarchate would diminish its right to intervene under the kutchuk kainardji treaty. conversely, western powers were concerned that this change would result in increased russian influence. the patriarchate naturally feared that such changes would diminish its influence and income.76 the net result was that bulgarians articulated religious issues to further national political aspirations.77 71 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 82 and 295. bulgaria paid greatly and permanently for its balkan and orthodox disunity. already in the late 1850s, the priest of the russian embassy in athens reported anti-slavic and anti-russian feelings in greece stemming from the bulgarian church question. archimandrite antonin (kapustin) predicted that the bulgarian church would separate from patriarchate control and that there would be continuing hostility between greece and bulgaria in thrace and macedonia. it was not until after the disastrous balkan wars in 1914 that bulgaria was ready for orthodox unity. 72 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 23. 73 vovchenko, containing balkan nationalism, 23-24. 74 veljko vujačić, nationalism, myth, and the state in russia and serbia: antecedents of the dissolution of the soviet union and yugoslavia (new york: cambridge university press, 2015), 126-127. the precedent for an orthodox millet outside of the ottoman empire can be seen as early as the fifteenth century in habsburg domains, and even more obviously after the austro-turkish wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when at least 30,000 serbs were led into habsburg lands by the patriarch of peć, arsenije iii čarnojević (the great migration of 1690). čarnojević was granted wide ecclesiastical and secular powers and essentially an ottoman millet system existed. habsburg authorities used the uniate creed in the opposite manner. they attempted to draw orthodox serbian frontiersmen who had initially come to habsburg lands in the great migration of 1690 into roman catholicism through dissemination of the uniate creed. 75 george g. arnakis, “the role of religion in the development of balkan nationalism,” in the balkans in transition: essays on the development of balkan life and politics since the eighteenth century, eds. charles and barbara jelavich (berkley: university of california press, 1963), 138-139. 76 crampton, bulgaria, 70. 77 crampton, bulgaria, 76-80. the external factors identified by crampton include imperial devolution as an outgrowth of the austro-prussian war, russia slavophiles losing interest in poland and substituting the orthodox balkans where they favored the slavs over the greeks, the serbian michael obrenović promoting a 84 language, culture, modernization, and nationalism the third affinity between bulgaria and russia that barbara jelavich identified is their linguistic proximity.78 while this article identifies several examples of estrangement from russia as bulgarian nationalism developed (the life of stefan stambolov being one), the refinement of the bulgarian language was a reaction against the greek language and orthodox greek clergy; the result brought the bulgarian and russian languages and peoples closer together. reflecting both the similarities in the languages and traditional ties between the two groups, russian became part of the bulgarian gymnasium curriculum in 1878.79 after 1878, russian literature also became more widely read in bulgaria than in other balkan countries, and many bulgarian writers turned to russia for inspiration.80 books published in bulgarian first became available in the nineteenth century. the first bulgarian book was published in 1806 by bishop sofronii vrachanski, kyriakodromion (a book of precepts and sermons for every sunday of the year), followed in 1824 by pet’r beron’s first modern bulgarian schoolbook, and in 1835 by neofit rilski’s bulgarian grammar (bolgarska grammatika).81 furthering the development of bulgarian literature, the ruthenian yuri venelin created great interest in the 1830s in moscow and odessa with his collections of bulgarian folk poetry.82 as was true in other balkan countries, nationalism led to the creation of vernacular literature relating “an awareness of the ethnic group as a historical entity.”83 after being first seen in greece and serbia, a largely religious-based cultural renaissance grew in bulgaria, particularly in the 1860s. however, the foundation for bulgarian pride and nationalism was laid even earlier by the most important of all eighteenth-century bulgarian writers, paisiǐ hilendarski. father paisiǐ finished in 1762 his manuscript slavonic-bulgarian history (slavianob’lgarska istorija), which represented the “landmark…of modern bulgarian literature,” and “the response to a balkan alliance, separate serbian treaties with montenegro, greece, and romania and most importantly an insurrection in crete in 1866. 78 ivan g. iliev, “short history of the cyrillic alphabet,” international journal of russian studies, 2, no. 2 (2013): 221-285. slavs in moravia, pannonia and bulgaria started using the glagolitic script created by st. cyril at the end of the ninth century. the “cyrillic alphabet” originated in the first bulgarian kingdom at the beginning of the tenth century. the commonly accepted belief is that cyrillic began in the tenth century as an enhancement of the bulgarian glagolitic script, with its creation being variously attributed to saint cyril (born constantine), clement of ochrid, or konstantin of preslav. from its origin in bulgaria with 43 letters, letters were changed or eliminated by tsar peter i due to the influence of western european culture and latin script. the first bulgarian official orthography was imposed 1899, and then again under the communist government in 1945, when bulgarian was brought closer to russian by removing two more letters. 79 crampton, bulgaria, 446. 80 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 166-167. 81 albert b. lord, “nationalism and the muses in balkan slavic literature in the modern period,” in the balkans in transition: essays on the development of balkan life and politics since the eighteenth century, eds. charles and barbara jelavich (berkley: university of california press, 1963), 260-261. 82 lord, “nationalism and the muses in balkan slavic literature in the modern period,” 267-268. macdermott, a history of bulgaria,123. venelin reproached russia “for having forgotten the bulgars from whom they had received baptism and the alphabet.” 83 lord, “nationalism and the muses in balkan slavic literature in the modern period,” 258. 85 feeling that a national spirit was needed.”84 paisiǐ’s impact was long-lasting. his book was hand-copied for more than eighty years and only first printed in 1844, with its previously anonymous author finally identified in 1871. while paisiǐ writing in the eighteenth century was focused on greek influences, there can be no doubt, with his urging for a “national spirit” and plea for “greater self-confidence and self-assertion,” that he would have likewise resisted russian influences in nineteenth-century bulgaria.85 despite their linguistic connections, russia was not the major channel through which western culture, ideas, and institutions came to bulgaria and other south slavic countries, nor did russia have much influence over bulgarian efforts to modernize.86 ottoman rulers had undertaken modernizing reforms in their balkan provinces, but these reforms were too limited and too late to capture the imagination of balkan leaders.87 most literate people believed that independence from the ottomans was essential to systematic modernization.88 from the early 1700s, commercial expansion resulted in foreign capital flowing into bulgaria, especially for the textile industry, with a resulting exposure to western ideas.89 businessmen with some knowledge of german and french were traveling to western cities such as paris, vienna, and leipzig, and bulgarian business communities grew in odessa and constantinople.90 the more bulgarians were exposed to western beliefs and ideals, the less interest they had in russian pan-slavism. even traditional ties and russia’s military efforts with respect to independence could not counteract bulgarian interest in an independent nation free of russian interference. western ideals, especially those espoused by french philosophes and encyclopedists, first reached bulgaria through neighboring regions. in the first half of the nineteenth century, this exposure centered on greek schools and translations of western texts into greek, while by the middle of the century, bulgarians who could not afford to go further west were exposed to slavic scholars at schools in belgrade and kragujevac.91 84 lord, “nationalism and the muses in balkan slavic literature in the modern period,” 259. 85 crampton, bulgaria, 31-32. the book had two purposes, the first being “to recall and relate the greatness of the past.” but looking to the future, his second purpose was to “issue a plea for greater self-confidence and self-assertion.” he accused the bulgarian people of “cultural submissiveness and their apparent inferiority complex vis-à-vis the greeks…rather than learning greek, the bulgarian should, he wrote, ‘know your own nation and language and study in your own tongue’ and should ‘keep close to your heart your race and your bulgarian homeland.’” marin v. pundeff, “bulgarian nationalism,” in nationalism in eastern europe, eds. peter f. sugar and ivo j. lederer (seattle: university of washington press, 1969), 99-100. in his interaction with monks from russia and balkan lands in the monastery communities at hilandar and zograf on mount athos, paisiǐ was stung by “the ridicule greek and serbian monks heaped on bulgarians for being backward, ignorant, and lacking a great national past.” he resolved to change their attitude and stated that he had written his work “for the ordinary bulgarian” and for “the benefit of the whole bulgarian nation.” 86 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 162. 87 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 146. 88 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 146. 89 cyril. e. black, the establishment of constitutional government in bulgaria (princeton: princeton university press, 1943), 25. 90 anderson, the eastern question, 162. black, the establishment of constitutional government in bulgaria, 28. 91 black, the establishment of constitutional government in bulgaria, 26-7. 86 however, constantinople was the most important bulgarian center for the dissemination of western ideas, and by the 1880s, its bulgarian population grew to between 30,000 and 40,000 people. initially, the “nationalism” that resulted from an increased awareness of western ideas was not anti-ottoman. some leaders equated an acceptable bulgarian accommodation with the ottoman sultan to the situation in hungary, in which the austrian emperor was also king of hungary. a bulgarian version of this demand was a privileged status for bulgaria that included autonomy, a christian governor subordinate to the sultan, a representative assembly, and the right to use their bulgarian language for official purposes.92 the spread of western thought within bulgaria was hindered by conflicting ideas and their diverse sources (e.g., russian orthodox seminaries, bulgarian businessmen traveling to the west, french philosophes). beginning in 1816, russia wished to educate balkan leaders— first serbian and then bulgarian—by bringing them to russia.93 however, bringing balkan leaders to russia for their education was counterproductive, since they found their contact with non-governmental radicals more relevant to their lives and beliefs than their “education” by russian government officials. leaders such as stefan stambolov were imbued with radicalism in their youth and, later in life, became advocates of (relatively) democratic government, in opposition to russian coercion and force.94 historian cyril black opines that the paradox of nascent bulgarian radicals turning towards democratic inclinations was not simply a case of political moderation developing with age, but that their later political philosophies developed from that early exposure.95 it has also been noted that most of the subsequent revolutionaries were trained either in greek schools, or in foreign institutions, rather than at “official” russian institutions.96 peasants composed the vast majority of the bulgarian population and were consistently portrayed by later nineteenth-century writers as passive, submissive, and far less excitable than most slavs, living a hard subsistence life, and desiring mostly to be left alone to tend their farms.97 to a large extent, peasant passivity was of limited concern to bulgarian leaders. however, when prince alexander, with russian support, attempted to significantly reduce bulgarian representative democracy with a new, less liberal constitution, liberal leaders were chagrined to discover that the majority of the population “remained deeply 92 anderson, the eastern question, 163. 93 crampton, bulgaria, 51. 94 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 17. stambolov was first radicalized as a student at the russian orthodox seminary in odessa, a hotbed of revolutionary ideas. 95 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 171-172. arnakis, “the role of religion in the development of balkan nationalism,” 171-172. the paradox of south slavic writers and politicians being exposed and receptive to western political views of democracy and political freedom simultaneously with increasing ties between their countries and russia, applies equally to stefan stambolov, as described, and serbian prime minister nikola pašić. 96 charles and barbara jelavich, the establishment of the balkan national states, 131. 97 black, “russia and the modernization of the balkans,” 408; dicey, the peasant state, 15; durman, lost illusions, 23; perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 2. the same is true of the balkan peoples in general. through the 1930s, 70-80 percent of the population of all balkan countries, except greece, were peasants. their only involvement in the body politic was through war. 87 devoted to the russians and would not support those with whom the tsar quarrelled [sic].”98 peasant devotion to the tsar also presented a dilemma for prince alexander. he opposed russians sent to aid his government but had to tolerate them because they “served as a subtle assurance to the mass of the population that the tsar was still looking out for bulgaria.”99 contemporary american journalist frederick moore wrote in 1906 that “bulgarians of intelligence and education put little faith in the promises of the present russian government. but russia holds a fast grip on the masses of the people.”100 with a scholarly focus more on diplomacy than “common people,” barbara jelavich discounts russia’s efforts by stating, “neither orthodoxy nor slavdom could provide an effective alternative to rampant nationalism.”101 this conflict between the feelings of the people towards russia and orthodoxy and the views of many bulgarian leaders would play an important role in bulgarian politics through world war ii, and perhaps to the present. bulgaria was originally populated by conservative peasant farmers with modest expectations, and many historians have traditionally “blamed” these peasants for the relatively slow emergence of political and revolutionary activity against the ottomans, after the first stirring of bulgarian national revival vǔzrazhdane in the 1820s.102 however, ottoman tanzimat reforms in the mid-1820s resulted in increased economic security for bulgarian peasants, allowing for greater acceptance of western ideals and eventually resulting in development of an intelligentsia.103 bulgarian historian petǔr mutafchief theorized that slavs were not “natural state formers,” and others have pointed out that the bulgarians developed many of the usual features of a state, such as forming a navy and minting of coins, later than did other groups.104 but richard crampton hypothesizes that geography was the better explanation for bulgaria’s relatively late revolutionary activity. bulgaria was located close to constantinople, and the concentration and wealth of bulgarians who settled in constantinople meant that the heart of the bulgarian national cause was located “precisely where it would be more difficult to make any realistic claim to political devolution.”105 as has already been discussed in regard to efforts for an independent bulgarian church, émigré organizations in belgrade, bucharest, odessa, constantinople, and elsewhere played a large role in both national and religious independence efforts. when it did emerge, bulgarian nationalism “had an unusually weak sense of territorial nationalism,” resulting in its struggles for nationalism being “cultural 98 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 59-60. emphasis added. richard crampton, bulgaria, 1878-1918 (boulder: east european monographs, 1983), 40 and 57. 99 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 61. 100 frederick moore, the balkan trail (new york: macmillan, 1906), 55. 101 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 195. 102 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 2. 103 crampton, bulgaria, 41-44. 104 crampton, bulgaria, 82. 105 crampton, bulgaria, 82-83. 88 rather than political and territorial.”106 there was more a sense of being bulgarian than being from bulgaria. russian autocracy and bulgarian nationalism the lives of bulgaria’s two nineteenth-century monarchs clearly illustrate russian efforts to direct or restrict bulgarian nationalism. prince alexander of battenberg, who assumed the throne as bulgaria’s first monarch of the modern era, was a german by birth and russian tsar alexander ii’s godson and nephew who fought as a russian officer in the russo-turkish war and was the tsar’s preferred candidate to lead bulgaria as prince.107 he was “elected” prince of bulgaria in april 1879, but very quickly developed serious misgivings about both the new bulgarian constitution (tǔrnovo constitution) and russian interference in his government.108 relations between battenberg and russia only worsened during his six-year reign, reaching their lowest point following the assassination of tsar alexander ii, the succession of tsar alexander iii, and the bulgarian monarch’s decision, over the strenuous objections of alexander iii, to accept unification of berlindefined bulgaria and eastern rumelia in 1885.109 while both russian tsars expected bulgaria to be a “russian satellite, a dutiful and servile ‘outpost’ of the russian empire,” the autocratic tsar alexander iii turned on his father’s chosen monarch because battenberg “refused to be a russian stooge.”110 prince alexander abdicated under pressure in 1886.111 in contrast, prince alexander’s successor was violently opposed by alexander iii at first but finally achieved recognition by russia in 1896, nine years after he took the oath of office.112 prince ferdinand saxe-coburg-gotha was an officer in the austrian military with both austrian and french royal lineage and highly intelligent but also with an extravagant personality.113 while ferdinand was generous to his adopted country, his overarching concern was his self-interest.114 surviving several russian-supported assassination attempts, the fervently catholic ferdinand finally achieved recognition by russia (and europe) only after agreeing to his son boris’s conversion to orthodoxy.115 ferdinand was 106 crampton, bulgaria, 83. 107 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 42. 108 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 42, 39, and 44. count egon corti, the downfall of three dynasties, trans. l. marie sieveking and ian d. morrow (freeport: books for libraries press, 1934), 258. in fact, within three weeks of arriving in bulgaria, prince alexander “had come into conflict with all the russian officials in bulgaria” and within the first few months had developed “a violent hatred of all that was russian.” 109 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 185-187. 110 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 234. 111 anderson, the eastern question, 231-233. 112 crampton, bulgaria, 132 and 145. 113 crampton, bulgaria, 131-132. 114 crampton, bulgaria, 149. mateev, dǔrzhavnikǔt stefan stambolov, 214. 115 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 141 and 179. crampton, bulgaria, 134. because russia was traditionally averse to deposing a monarch, his recognition had great significance—if ferdinand were not a legitimate ruler, any action to overthrow him was not revolutionary and thereby acceptable. tsar boris iii ruled bulgaria from 1918 to 1943. barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 167. 89 used as a pawn by various powers for their own purposes: early in his reign, even though turkey was happy with ferdinand, it publicly opposed him to mollify russia; later, austria assisted ferdinand in assuming the title of tsar simply because it would displease russia.116 ferdinand was most likely complicit in the assassination of stambolov in 1896, resulting in him becoming more reliant upon russia for his political survival.117 however, he was a poor strategist who relied increasingly on constitutional absolutism and personal rule.118 he failed to recognize that bulgaria was a small state, barely beginning to develop a modern economy and virtually isolated internationally.119 conclusion this article has focused on repeated attempts by russia to meddle in the internal affairs of bulgaria in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. russia took similar actions in serbia as well, resulting in tangled three-way relationships extending into the first world war, if not beyond.120 all three countries were naïve about the others’ motives. while the russo-turkish war was also the result of russian disillusionment with serbia and russia weakness from the crimean war, it was primarily about geography and the dardanelles straights. balkan nationalism and slavism were secondary to the balance of power and russian national interests. lacking another foreign patron, bulgaria had no choice but to attempt to achieve independence through russia.121 this was the logical choice because of the commonalities between the peoples and polities. however, bulgaria failed to realize that it could not pick and choose the level and form of russian involvement in its affairs. additionally, one could argue that bulgaria also had the misfortune of being “attached” to russia, which failed to develop as quickly as western europe, and was relatively weaker at the end of the nineteenth century than at the beginning. whether or not this belief was justified, bulgaria believed that russia had failed or abandoned it after the san stefano settlement and the congress of berlin. several instances of conflict and working at cross-purposes by russian officials ignatiev and gorchakov served to reinforce bulgarian dissatisfactions. bulgaria further failed to recognize that it was a pawn, not a player, in attempts to solve the “eastern 116 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 131. barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 221. 117 perry, stefan stambolov and the emergence of modern bulgaria, 230-234. ardern george mulme-beaman, twenty years in the near east (london: methuen & co, 1898), 182. 118 crampton, bulgaria, 173. 119 crampton, bulgaria, 153. 120 indeed, one of the many tragedies of the balkan wars was that russia failed to promote fairness and moderation between serbia and bulgaria. as a result, russia lost any position of influence it had among bulgaria’s leaders, and instead became less advantageously bound to serbia and inextricably involved in sarajevo in 1914. as has been mentioned, the three-way slavic relationship first suffered because of the san stefano settlement. but it was irreparably damaged by the fourteen-day serbo-bulgarian war of november 1885, which serbia foolishly started upon austro-hungarian suggestions of support, only to then be saved from serious military defeat by austro-hungarian intervention. this short war resulted in bulgarian and east rumelian unification, de facto independence from the ottoman empire for bulgaria, and serbia being drawn closer to austria-hungary. richard c. hall, the balkan wars 1912-1913: prelude to the first world war (new york: routledge, 2000), 139. 121 barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 159. 90 question,” while the serbian interests became secondary to balance of powers interests of russia vis-à-vis austria. likewise, russia did not recognize that once western liberalism was introduced, bulgaria would no longer be satisfied with being merely a pawn. the “eternal friendship” between bulgaria and russia was largely outweighed by the pride and parochialism of russia and the orthodox church. the myth gave way to resentment, estrangement, and mutual naiveté. bulgarian nationalism replaced orthodoxy and slavism and transcended russian autocracy. while the causes are varied and complex, the final irony of russian adventures in the balkans at the end of the nineteenth century is that within fifteen years, it was bulgaria that allied with austria-hungary in the first world war, while all other south slavs (and non-slavs in the peninsula) allied with russia and against austria.122 122 “thus one of the great russian illusions of the nineteenth century, that liberated national states would provide faithful allies, was effectively shattered.” barbara jelavich, russia’s balkan entanglements, 266. 132 “the most dangerous man in europe” how giuseppe mazzini’s nationalism shaped the italian unification period rachel anderson eastern connecticut state university abstract the italian unification period of the nineteenth century finally saw the fragmented states of italy become one nation as it stands today. this article explores how italian nationalist giuseppe mazzini influenced italy's unification. by using a combination of mazzini's essays and autobiographical notes along with secondary sources on mazzini and nineteenth century italy, this article demonstrates that his writings allowed for the dissemination of nationalist thought throughout italy and europe more broadly. mazzini was often discredited by his contemporaries and early historians as a failure due to his unsuccessful military revolutions, but only looking at his revolutionary actions fails to take into account the fact that mazzini's life's work was educating the italian people on the importance of national unity. article prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the modern state of italy did not exist. instead, the italian peninsula contained a series of duchies, kingdoms, and republics all governed by separate rulers, which were subject to all manner of foreign influence. france and austria were the most involved in the governing of italy, and after several hundred years, the inhabitants of italy began to desire freedom from these foreign nations. in the early nineteenth century, france briefly occupied italy, giving them a glimpse of the benefits of a nation. this occupation planted the seeds of nationalist thought in the hearts and minds of a number of italians, who began to work diligently towards the goal of a politically unified italy. one of these inhabitants was giuseppe mazzini. born in the republic of genoa in 1805, mazzini delved into the world of politics quite early in life. he became involved in the secret societies, preaching political change until he was arrested and exiled for his activities and told not to return to italy under threat of execution. despite his geographical distance from the italian peninsula, his love for his perceived home and his desire to see it unified did not wane. mazzini was a prolific writer and thinker, and while in france he founded his own secret society, young italy (giovine italia). this society became the vehicle for mazzini to express his ideas about the eventual unification of italy. his thoughts were quite specific and often did not align with other italian nationalists of his time. while early italian nationalists envisioned the future of italy as a series of federal states, mazzini envisioned the territory of the italian peninsula as one, unified italian republic. while sometimes 133 criticized for his ideas, it did not deter mazzini, and he worked tirelessly his whole life to pursue the cause of italian unification. as this article explores, he sought to foster nationalism not only through the creation of young italy but also through establishing schools and newspapers, which helped create a sense of community and national identity. educating italians about their shared culture and history helped to strengthen his argument and garner support for the political unification of italy. unification did eventually happen, although not under the circumstances he wanted. mazzini envisioned an italy governed by a democratic republic, but italy became a monarchy instead. nevertheless, while mazzini’s personal attempts at a revolution never succeeded, it is through his writings on politics and nationalism, his educational initiatives, and his creation of young italy that he was able to influence others and help unify italy. unifying italy was an arduous task, thanks to the many republics, duchies, and kingdoms that occupied the italian peninsula. these states had been regarded as the “playground” of foreign powers, primarily france and austria, for at least three hundred years. making italy whole entailed not only combining many separate states into one but also expelling the foreign powers that ruled them.1 as mazzini grew older, he began to understand the impact that france and austria had on italy. france especially tried to encourage agricultural development and create a middle class of landowners in italy, but it only succeeded in causing economic turmoil.2 mazzini observed firsthand how french policies were ineffective and burdensome to the italian people, reinforcing his belief that a nation must be governed by its own people. while mazzini envisioned an italy that was wholly unified under one government, others thought of the future of italy as a series of states or of an italian kingdom featuring the same borders of napoleon’s kingdom of italy.3 other nationalists, such as the secret political society the carbonari, did not conceive of the italian peninsula as being one nation as he did. mazzini’s belief that italy should unify without foreign aid was also revolutionary. the common belief was that italy would never be free from foreign influence without help from france. mazzini, however, was “hostile to the idea of french supremacy in europe.”4 after france, austria was the foreign nation most involved in meddling with italian affairs. in 1831, mazzini wrote a letter to king charles albert of piedmont-sardinia urging him to break ties with austria. the letter was sent to the king and was also published in marseilles, france, where mazzini was in exile, and distributed around italy. in this letter, he wrote that the people “seek the recognition of those rights of humanity which have been withheld from them for ages. they demand laws and liberty, independence and union.”5 he 1 john gooch, the unification of italy (london: routledge, 1986), 1. 2 alexander grab, “from the french revolution to napoleon,” in italy in the nineteenth century, ed. john a. davis (oxford: oxford university press, 2000), 26-37; gooch, the unification of italy, 40-42. 3 maurizio isabella, “mazzini’s internationalism in context: from the cosmopolitan patriotism of the italian carbonari to mazzini’s europe of the nations,” in giuseppe mazzini and the globalization of democratic nationalism, 1830-1920, eds. c. a. bayly and eugenio f. biagini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 46. 4 isabella, “mazzini’s internationalism in context,” 55. 5 giuseppe mazzini, the life and writings of joseph mazzini, vol. i (london: smith, elder, & company, 1864), 59. 134 then pointed out that “the universal dissatisfaction, and the hatred of austria existing in all the states of italy” were detrimental to the cause of italian independence.6 in mazzini’s autobiography, he noted that king charles did receive the letter and that he must have read it, because shortly afterward he was informed that if he ever returned to italy, he would be imprisoned. this was mazzini’s first piece of political writing, according to him, and it certainly made an impression.7 many of mazzini’s writings centered on the idea of nationalism and his vision for the future of the italian nation. he once wrote that “the nation is the sum total of all italians, bound by a fraternal compact and living under a common law.”8 the difficulty lies in defining who constitutes “all italians” and coming to a consensus on this common law. in his 1832 essay “on the superiority of representative government,” mazzini wrote more on his definition of what makes a nation, stating “by nation we mean the entirety of citizens who speak the same language and are associated, under equal enjoyment of civil and political rights, for the common purpose of developing and progressively perfecting all social forces and their activity.”9 whether or not the people of the italian peninsula had a sense of “italian-ness” based on their shared language, they were certainly lacking a common association of political rights. without this most basic foundation of a nation-state, the italian people could never develop these “social forces” that mazzini desired. it is important to note that mazzini’s definition of nationalism is rooted in the romantic ideas popular in europe during the nineteenth century. the romantic movement in relation to nationalism typically involved a sense of a “powerful mystique of the nation,” a desire for a shared history, the “revival of ancient languages; an emphasis on the need for blood sacrifice; a cult of the hero” along with “the personification of the nation.”10 many of these elements were present in mazzini’s ideas, especially the need to educate italians on their shared history and language and the desire to create martyrs that could be turned into national heroes. mazzinian rhetoric was designed to appeal to “history, genealogy, blood, land, and the nation’s honor.”11 mazzini hoped to appeal to italians’ romantic sensibilities by relating it to his nationalist desires. the popularity of romantic art and literature in europe gave mazzini the ability to harness those same themes and apply them to political and nationalist thought in order to reach a broader audience who would be receptive to his ideas. 6 mazzini, life and writings, i.59. 7 mazzini, life and writings, i.57-63. 8 quoted in alberto mario banti “sacrality and the aesthetics of politics: mazzini’s concept of the nation,” in giuseppe mazzini and the globalization of democratic nationalism, eds. c. a. bayly and eugenio f. biagini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 59. 9 giuseppe mazzini, “democracy and the nation,” in a cosmopolitanism of nations: giuseppe mazzini’s writings on democracy, nation building, and international relations, eds. stefano recchia and nadia urbinati (princeton: princeton university press, 2009), 50. 10 michael huggins, “the nation and giuseppe mazzini, 1842-48,” new hibernia review 17, no. 3 (autumn 2013): 15. 11 banti, “sacrality and the aesthetics of politics,” 68. 135 there was also a strong element of religiosity in mazzini’s definition of nationalism. he felt that the nation was “god’s creation” and that god had a hand in shaping the nation and also giving it a specific mission. he once wrote that “[n]ationality is the role assigned by god to a people within the humanitarian travail. it is a people’s mission, their task to accomplish on earth so that god’s thought may be realized in the world. nationality is the work that gives people its right of citizenship within humanity.”12 mazzini believed god as well as the people had a significant role in shaping the nation and gave the nation its strength, although he did not conform to a particular religion. he believed that christianity was too focused on the personal salvation, while he valued the idea of progress for humanity instead.13 essentially, the scope of christianity was too narrow for mazzini’s purposes. while he certainly valued the role of the individual when crafting the nation, he was more interested in how individuals could work together, which played a role in young italy. recent scholars have called young italy a “new political religion.” historian emilio gentile defines the political religion as “a system of myths, symbols, and rituals that subordinate the significance and aim of individual and collective existence to a supreme entity.”14 in mazzini’s case, the supreme entity was the italian nation. in crafting a national community, mazzini helped to create these myths, symbols, and rituals to persuade people to put their faith in the nation. his vision of the struggle for the italian nation also took on a religious tone. the nation could only be forged through the sacrifice of its heroes and martyrs before being resurrected.15 italy needed to unite so that it could become a true nation and fulfill its mission from god. as every nation had its own mission, it was important for italy to achieve this so that it could take its place among the other nations of europe. while mazzini did feel that building a national community of italians was important, it was more critical to him to unite under one political ideal above all. the political ideal that mazzini felt the most drawn to was that of the republic. only a republic could properly represent all the inhabitants of a nation, because “for representation to be truly national, every citizen needs to participate in the election of his deputies through his vote.”16 he felt that everyone should have a voice in electing representatives for their nation, and the idea of a monarchy was anathema to the nation. in fact, “the nation is the only sovereign … the nation alone has the inviolable right to choose its own institutions, to correct them and change them, when they no longer correspond to its needs and no longer contribute to social and intellectual progress.”17 within a monarchy, the monarch is sovereign and is therefore the one in charge of making decisions. 12 quoted in simon levis sullam, “the moses of italian unity: mazzini and nationalism as political religion,” in giuseppe mazzini and the globalization of democratic nationalism, eds. c.a. bayly and eugenio f. biagini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 112-113. 13 roland sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” in italy in the nineteenth century, ed. john a. davis (oxford: oxford university press, 2000), 76. 14 quoted in sullam, “the moses of italian unity,” 109. 15 banti, “sacrality and the aesthetics of politics,” 63-65. 16 giuseppe mazzini, “on the superiority of representative governments,” in a cosmopolitanism of nations: giuseppe mazzini’s writings on democracy, nation building, and international relations, eds. stefano recchia and nadia urbinati (princeton: princeton university press, 2009), 51. 17 mazzini, “on the superiority of representative governments,” 50. emphasis in the original. 136 according to mazzini’s school of thought, it is impossible for one single person to understand and accommodate the needs of an entire nation. only a body of representatives elected through the democratic process could possibly hope to satisfy the needs of the italian nation. moreover, mazzini argued in his “general instructions for the members of young italy” that “our italian tradition is essentially republican; our great memories are republican; the whole history of our national progress is republican; whereas the introduction of monarchy amongst us was coeval with our decay, and consummated our ruin by its constant servility to the foreigner, and antagonism to the people, as well as to the unity of the nation.”18 his ultimate desire was to see italy united under a republic, as that is what he felt was most natural to it. this feeling is most likely connected to the fact that mazzini was born into an italy that was ruled by foreign influence, specifically france. the consequences of living under foreign rule were severe, he feared, and he wrote in his autobiography that it had turned italians into “forgetful slaves, deriving all things from the foreigner.”19 mazzini believed that italians had forgotten how to be italian and believed his purpose was to remind them. he hoped that by educating them on their shared history, culture, and language, the people of the italian states would realize that they were in fact one people in need of unity. to aid him in educating his fellow italians on his beliefs, mazzini founded young italy. originally aimed at recruiting only “young” italians who had not been influenced by existing politics, including previous failed insurrections, mazzini envisioned young italy as more of an educational society than a political society. he also felt that the italian youth were “the bearers of new, romantic spirit and culture” and that only they were capable of the kind of national “resurrection” that mazzini was seeking.20 his goal was to teach its members about his vision for a unified, republican italy and to have them subsequently go out and teach others, “appealing to the true instincts and tendencies of the italian heart, mute at that time, but revealed to us both by history and our own previsions of the future.”21 young italy was certainly not the only organization with revolutionary goals. in fact, mazzini was inspired with the idea for young italy while he was imprisoned in france after being exiled from italy in 1831 for activities associated with another political society, the carbonari. one of the reasons he wanted to found his own society was because he fundamentally disagreed with many of the carbonari principles.22 while he may have disagreed with their principles, mazzini’s involvement in the carbonari launched him into the world of italian politics and helped him establish his own career. the goal of the carbonari was to “conspire and agitate for government reform,” with most members advocating for political representation and fair constitutions. other more radical members argued for things like “anticlericalism, republicanism, and redistribution of property.”23 although many of mazzini’s later ideas aligned with the more radical of the carbonari, it is difficult to say what he believed during his time as a member because he 18 mazzini, life and writings, i.100-101. 19 mazzini, life and writings, i.7. 20 lucy riall, garibaldi: invention of a hero (great britain: tj international, padstow, cornwall, 2007), ebook. 21 mazzini, life and writings, i.65, 34-35. 22 mazzini, life and writings, i.69; sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 82. 23 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 80. 137 was so young, and his opinions may not have fully developed yet.24 later in his life, mazzini had quite a lot to say about the goals and principles of the carbonari and how that influenced his own society. overall, mazzini felt that the carbonari were becoming obsolete due to their outdated political beliefs and their failure to “appreciate the importance of the nation as the foundation of a new political order.”25 upon joining the carbonari in 1827, mazzini wrote: “i reflected with surprise and suspicion that the oath [of allegiance to the society] contained nothing but a formula of obedience and not a word of the purpose … not a syllable which gave a hint as to federalism or unity, as to republic or monarchy. just war against the government, no more.”26 this lack of a clear goal was disturbing to mazzini, and he felt that while the carbonari had many members, they did not know what to do with them.27 his experience with the disorganization of the carbonari inspired him to found young italy, after he was exiled to france for recruiting new members to the carbonari. his time in an italian prison before he was exiled gave him the time to reflect on how he would run his own organization, culminating in the creation of young italy.28 mazzini put members of young italy to work with the goal of educating the italian population about the benefits of republicanism and the existence of their national identity. in the “general instructions for the members of young italy,” which has been reproduced in mazzini’s autobiography, he outlines the goals and expectations for members. he defined young italy as “a brotherhood of italians who believe in a law of progress and duty, and are convinced that italy is destined to become one nation … by the nation we understand the universality of italians bound together by a common pact and governed by the same laws.”29 since his main criticism of the carbonari was their lack of direction, mazzini made sure to clearly define his goals and principles, leaving no room for doubt as to his ultimate goals. the goal of young italy was to cause a revolution, although “its labours will be essentially educational,” and this education would continue even after a successful revolution. this sort of “national education” was very important to mazzini, as he felt that a nation could not rise in ignorance.30 mazzini considered the members of young italy “men of progress” who focused on the future independence of italy and were therefore superior to the men of “old italy.” other men live in ignorance, believing that change can occur without having to accept the consequences or make sacrifices, while young italians had clear goals and principles of liberty and equality.31 it was important to spread the message that “all true sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, the sole progressive and continuous interpreter of the supreme moral law.”32 since young italy was primarily an educational society, mazzini also 24 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 80. 25 isabella, “mazzini’s internationalism in context,” 37. 26 quoted in e.e.y. hayes, mazzini and the secret societies: the making of a myth (london: eyre & spottiswoode, 1956), 41. 27 mazzini, life and writings, i.70-71. 28 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 80. 29 mazzini, life and writings, i.96-97. emphasis in the original. 30 mazzini, life and writings, i.99. 31 mazzini, “on the superiority of representative government,” 44-46. 32 mazzini, life and writings, i.100. 138 published a newspaper, giovine italia, or young italy, and members of the society were expected to publish articles on the principles of republicanism and unity. this newspaper was smuggled from france into italy through genoa and distributed in secret. to avoid detection from the italian government, they would ship ten to twelve barrels at a time packed with newspapers which were then sent to individual towns. according to mazzini, the demand for the newspaper began to exceed their supply, and several secret presses were established within italy to produce more copies of giovine italia.33 young italy’s primary goals, according to mazzini, were education and insurrection. education was expected to take place secretly within italy, as mazzini was still a wanted man, and publicly out of italy, where mazzini and other italian exiles were afforded more freedom for nationalist activities. mazzini himself was much more a man of thought than a man of action, but he still believed that a military insurrection would be necessary for the unification of italy. he wrote in the “manifesto of young italy” that “there is no true war without the masses. the secret of raising the masses lies in the hands of those who show themselves ready to fight and promise to lead the people to victory.”34 moreover, mazzini understood that an insurrection alone would not be enough to create the nation he desired. this insurrection must be accompanied by education, because “bayonets are truly powerful only when they assert or maintain a right.”35 an insurrection would also prove that italy was capable of unifying without foreign help, an important national principle. the goal of young italy was to ensure that the impending revolution of italy would last in the eyes of foreign powers and italians alike. as mazzini had been exiled from italy, the base of operations for young italy was located first in france and later in london. historians estimate that by 1833, membership of young italy was likely around fifty to sixty thousand people.36 moreover, its largely urban membership meant that its network was “close to the seats of power.” the governments of italy and austria feared its power, and conservative austrian diplomat klemens von metternich reportedly referred to mazzini as “the most dangerous man in europe.” france was pressured to expel mazzini, causing him to flee to switzerland briefly before settling in london.37 relocating to england proved fruitful for mazzini, as he was able to make many contacts with influential writers as well as other italian exiles willing to help him in his goal of creating a national, unified italy. it was during mazzini’s time in england that he was able to translate his desire to educate the people into reality. in the 1840s, he founded a free school for italian immigrants in london, where he hoped that education would help to blur class lines. mazzini felt it was the duty of the educated to teach the undereducated, and he was hopeful that this school would create a bond between the working-class students and the middle-class teachers.38 33 mazzini, life and writings, i.105, 187-190; sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 83. 34 giuseppe mazzini, “the manifesto of young italy,” in a cosmopolitanism of nations, eds. stefano recchia and nadia urbinati (princeton: princeton university press, 2009), 36. 35 mazzini, “the manifesto of young italy,” 33. 36 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 83-84. 37 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 83-84. 38 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 89. 139 the school was for both adults and children, and the curriculum consisted of “classes in italian language, italian geography and arithmetic” and lectures on “morality or patriotic history.”39 the focus on italian language was especially important because in italy, the majority of people spoke only regional dialects. these dialects were quite different from each other, making it nearly impossible to communicate with people from other italian states. the national language of italian was spoken only rarely.40 all of the lessons taught in mazzini’s school were designed to help create and support what he hoped would become the italian national community. in mazzini’s mind, education was the most important tool a nationalist could have. he wrote in his 1860 book the duties of man that education “is the great word that encapsulates all our doctrine. the vital question which agitates our century is the question of education … we must find an educational principle … that will guide men toward the best, that will teach them constance in sacrifice.”41 he continued to build on this more in his autobiography, saying that “national education” was vital and that it served to bind people to their “fellow-countrymen,” creating a “social duty by the inculcation and transmission of the national programme.”42 mazzini hoped that by educating italians, they would learn to think of themselves as a people with a shared history and, more importantly, a shared future. the working class was another demographic that mazzini sought to include in his efforts. in addition to giovine italia, he also produced another newspaper titled apostolato popolare (apostleship of the people), which was directed “to italians and especially to italian workers.”43 this newspaper was a part of mazzini’s attempt to create a national community by reaching “as broad an audience as possible.” he published a variety of topics, such as “current affairs reporting, nationalist editorials … biographies of famous italians … and reviews of novels and histories.”44 it was an attempt to create a national culture by making italian workers realize that they had something in common with the famous italians, including novelists and historians. mazzini also used this newspaper to encourage workers to organize and also that they should work together with the upper classes to create a unified society. moreover, he advocated that a national language should be established, because it would help them see themselves as italians rather than as “genoese, piedmontese, or neapolitans” due to their regional dialects.45 he understood that the press was a powerful nationalist tool, and that it could help create an “imagined community,” a term benedict anderson used to describe the formation of a nation and the way that people 39 denis mack smith, mazzini (king’s lynn: biddles ltd., guildford and kings lynn, 1994), ebook. 40 derek beales and eugenio f. biagini, the risgorgimento and the unification of italy (new york: routledge, 2013), 75. 41 quoted in sullam, in “the moses of italian unity,” 122. 42 mazzini, life and writings, i.298-299. 43 quoted in lucy riall, “the politics of italian romanticism: mazzini and the making of a nationalist culture,” in giuseppe mazzini and the globalization of democratic nationalism, 1830-1920, eds. c.a. bayly and eugenio f. biagini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 172. 44 riall, “the politics of italian romanticism,” 172. 45 smith, mazzini, ebook. 140 begin to perceive themselves as part of a larger group.46 more importantly, mazzini used apostolato popolare to speak directly to italian workers, telling them “if the revolution is to succeed, it must be carried out for you and with you, while all the previous revolutions have been attempted not for you and without you.”47 this kind of message helped push mazzini’s republican ideas because it encouraged workers to want representation through a democratic republic. thus, mazzini was attempting to awaken italian workers to the kind of political rights they could have, if they were willing to participate firsthand in the revolution he envisioned. for this reason, nationalism was a means to an end for mazzini. he believed if he could cultivate an italian national identity, the people would see the need for a political revolution that would then achieve national unity. another necessary step for the political revolution was an insurrection. mazzini believed that a national education combined with an insurrection was the perfect formula to achieve italian unification. in many of his essays, mazzini focused on the unity of “thought and action,” meaning that it was impossible to have revolutionary thought without revolutionary action. a true revolution needed to be educational, cultural, and political in order to succeed.48 he attempted several military insurrections, but they almost never succeeded, and if they did, they never lasted long. in 1831, mazzini left france to help a group of italian exiles plan a revolution on the island of corsica, off the coast of italy. he and his companions planned to assist provisional governments in parma, modena, and the papal states with the goal of “bringing the various states of italy closer together.”49 many corsicans were already armed and ready to cross to the mainland, but conflicts among the revolutionary groups caused delays, allowing austria to step in and stop the uprising in its tracks.50 later in 1834, mazzini was involved in an invasion of savoy, which ended almost before it even began. mazzini expected a peasant revolt that never came, and many of his forces defected. he took this loss very hard and reportedly “suffered a mental breakdown and had to be carried off the field unconscious.”51 the failed attempts at a military revolution speak to mazzini’s idealist viewpoint of what the italian unification process would look like. while he was an excellent writer, he did not have the skills to successfully complete an insurrection in the way that he wanted. his ideas did not always translate well into reality, which left him open to criticism from others. for example, a former member of young italy formed a new society called the sons of young italy, because he felt that mazzini did not pay attention “to the material needs of the people.”52 mazzini felt he was called to a particular purpose, but that purpose did not always align with what he could realistically achieve. mazzini had hoped that a small group of revolutionaries would have the power to 46 benedict anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london: verso, 2016), 6. 47 riall, “the politics of italian romanticism,” 172; quoted in sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents," 89. emphasis in the original. 48 riall, garibaldi, 29. 49 smith, mazzini, ebook. 50 smith, mazzini, ebook. 51 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 85. 52 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 88. 141 overthrow the foreign influence of austria as well as the governments of all of the italian states. this was an incredibly idealistic view, and it was proving to be impossible. one particularly painful failure for mazzini occurred in 1844, when he promised his help to the bandiera brothers, who were from venice, which was a part of austria at this time. the bandiera brothers were serving in the austrian navy, had a secret society of their own, and wanted to raid southern italy. after some consideration, however, mazzini tried to dissuade the bandiera brothers from their plan. he was not able to stop them, and the brothers were captured and executed.53 privately, mazzini was devastated by their failure, but in public, he thanked them for their brave sacrifice and treated them like martyrs. in a eulogy he wrote for the brothers, he stated, “it matters little that they have not succeeded. the angel of martyrdom is brother to the angel of victory.”54 with this seemingly harsh statement, mazzini’s motives were made clear. the failed insurrections led to condemnations by many of his supporters, but it allowed him to craft martyred national heroes from the ashes of their failure. as mazzini once wrote, “italy will live when italians shall have learned to die … and for that there is no teaching but by example.”55 these revolutionary attempts were only a small piece of the puzzle in mazzini’s larger nationalist agenda. he was much more successful in pushing his agenda through his writings than through his actions, and his military failures left him vulnerable to criticism from his contemporaries and historians alike. however, one english writer did admit that while the insurrections did fail in their immediate goal, they “produced a hundred proselytes for every martyr who died.”56 despite his failures, mazzini continued to hope for an italian revolution, and in early 1849, he saw his chance. the revolutions of 1848 had swept through europe thanks to a combination of political discontent and nationalism. more specifically, europeans were beginning to desire republicanism and democracy over constitutional monarchies.57 in the aftermath of these revolutions, rome was declared a republic and a constituent assembly was elected, which included mazzini. he described his arrival in rome as an epiphany, stating: “rome was the dream of my youth, the mother of all my ideas, the religion of my soul.”58 thus, the roman republic was established with giuseppe mazzini, carlo armellini, and aurelia saffi elected as a triumvirate to lead it.59 for mazzini, this should have been the foundation of his republic of italy. he hoped to use rome as a base to establish a power structure strong enough to free the rest of italy from foreign influence. it was not to be, however. the roman republic lasted less than five months before it collapsed when it was invaded by french troops in order to restore rome to the pope, who had fled before the republic was declared due to a sharp decline in his popularity. the kingdom of piedmont-sardinia 53 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 91; smith, mazzini, ebook. 54 quoted in riall, “the politics of italian romanticism,” 174. emphasis in the original. 55 quoted in riall, “the politics of italian romanticism,” 175. 56 quoted in smith, mazzini, ebook. 57 johnathan sperber, the european revolutions, 1848-1851 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2005), 56. 58 quoted in sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 94. 59 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 95. 142 never acknowledged the legitimacy of the roman republic, and neither did any other european nation. only the united states of america offered them diplomatic recognition.60 historian eugenio biagini called the republic “a great liberal-democratic experiment,” and there is really no better description.61 the lack of recognition from the rest of the world indicated that no one but mazzini and his followers thought the roman republic had a fighting chance at success. with the history of foreign meddling in italy, it was only a matter of time before either france or austria stepped in to put a stop to the republic. mazzini wanted to fight until the end, saying that “the struggle cannot end until [we] are either victorious or utterly overthrown.” he was overruled, however, and the assembly voted to cease the defense of rome.62 mazzini had maintained high hopes for the roman republic, telling the assembly shortly after his arrival that, “after the rome of the emperors, after the rome of the popes, comes the rome of the peoples.”63 he had anticipated that rome would be able to help tuscany shake the foreign influence of austria, and that other italian states would also fall under roman protection, in order to render “possible a magnificent national movement.”64 mazzini envisioned the roman republic as the first step towards a finally unified italy, with himself as its leader. on the fall of rome, mazzini had much to say about how once again foreign influence had a negative effect on italy. in his 1849 essay “concerning the fall of the roman republic,” mazzini addressed his concerns to a british audience, condemning them for not coming to the defense of rome when the french invaded. he felt very strongly that the balance of power was destroyed and that foreign interference ruined italy’s chance to be unified. it was unfair, he said, that the men of rome chose their own government only to surrender it to the french, who they were trying to distance themselves from.65 it is also possible that mazzini expected more aid from england, as by this time he had lived in england for over a decade, had cultivated many english followers, and had established a community of italian exiles in england. mazzini also wrote directly to the ministers of france, shaming them for destroying “the national revolution” of italy, yet also warning them that they had only delayed italy’s national mission.66 although mazzini was not directly involved in the writing of the roman constitution, it was still the best example of his republican ideal.67 someday, he hoped to see it implemented in a unified italy. after the fall of the roman republic, mazzini’s influence began to decline. in the short term, his time in rome “heightened his stature as a democratic leader,” but in the long term, his 60 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 95. 61 eugenio f. biagini, “mazzini and anticlericalism: the english exile,” in giuseppe mazzini and the globalization of democratic nationalism, 1830-1920, eds. c.a. bayly and eugenio f. biagini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 151. 62 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 94-96; giuseppe mazzini, the life and writings of joseph mazzini, vol. v (london: smith, elder, & company, 1869), 195-210. 63 quoted in sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 94. 64 mazzini, life and writings, v.192-193. 65 giuseppe mazzini, “concerning the fall of rome,” in a cosmopolitanism of nations: giuseppe mazzini’s writings on democracy, nation building, and international relations, eds. stefano recchia and nadia urbinati (princeton: princeton university press, 2009), 208-210. 66 letter to messrs. de toqueville and de falloux in mazzini, life and writings, v.249, 254. 67 sullam, “the moses of italian unity,” 119. 143 movement was dying. this was due in part to count camillo benso di cavour, who was mazzini’s rival in every way. as historian roland sarti observed, “cavour detested republicanism, popular initiatives, and all political agitation that he could not control.”68 his belief in “piedmont’s italian mission” along with other policies drew more moderate nationalists to him and made the movement appear more “respectable,” pulling support away from mazzini. in november 1852, cavour was declared the prime minister of italy, giving him an even larger platform to push his own agenda, which opposed mazzini’s.69 the rise of cavour left mazzini with a shrinking number of followers on the sidelines of the italian nationalist movement. although mazzini was no longer as popular as he once was, he still made efforts towards creating a national, unified italy. he formed the party of action from london in 1853, which was “democratic in principle and autocratic in practice.” he also was involved in several small insurrections, even though they had no hope of succeeding, purely out of his commitment to the nationalist cause.70 mazzini was a true nationalist, who held fast to his beliefs not only in times where he felt he might succeed, but in times where he seemed doomed to fail. he never surrendered his dreams of seeing a unified italy with a thriving national community. in 1859, the chance for a unified italy finally seemed possible, albeit not the way mazzini wanted it. cavour and napoleon iii were goading austria into a war with italy, with the goal of removing austria from lombardy-venetia followed by the creation of four new italian states. giuseppe garibaldi, a famed military general and former follower of mazzini’s, believed that austria could only be overthrown with the aid of the french. mazzini wholeheartedly disagreed but had to acknowledge that garibaldi’s opinion was becoming more popular among the italian people.71 he was afraid that an alliance with france would “surrender the nation to the discretion of the foreigner” and that any chance of a republican revolution would be gone.72 however, when austria declared war in april 1859, mazzini quickly changed stances and lent his support by telling his followers to prepare for insurrections within italy. he secretly hoped that the war would awaken a desire for a popular revolution among his fellow italians.73 mazzini became even more hopeful for a revolution when napoleon iii signed an armistice with austria in july 1859 without consulting cavour. under this armistice, italy would be a “loose confederation” that included austria by way of venice with most of lombardy given to france.74 mazzini took this armistice as evidence that foreign powers were not interested in helping to liberate italy. even when napoleon had promised to work with cavour for the benefit of italy, he still betrayed italy for his own gain. after the disaster that was the war of 1859, mazzini wrote to king victor emmanuel ii, charles albert’s successor, and urged him to reject the 68 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 97. 69 gooch, the unification of italy, 23. 70 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 99. 71 riall, garibaldi, ebook; smith, mazzini, ebook. 72 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 102. 73 smith, mazzini, ebook. 74 smith, mazzini, ebook. 144 armistice and claim the crown of a united italy.75 in this instance, the cause of national unification was greater than the republican cause. mazzini was willing to throw away his dream of a republican italy, because in that instance, he chose to support unity in any form. mazzini then hatched a plan, which required the help of garibaldi. garibaldi and his followers, known as “the thousand,” sailed to sicily where he led a revolution in the name of king victor emmanuel ii. mazzini was still not pleased about unification under a monarch, but he was aware by this time that it was the only way italy would unify at all. he helped garibaldi from the sidelines by sending emissaries to sicily to help prepare for the coming insurrection.76 over the next several months, approximately 20,000 men came to join garibaldi in sicily. in august 1860, garibaldi and his men had successfully captured sicily and turned their eyes to naples on the mainland. upon arrival in naples, one account stated, “the whole of the southern part of the kingdom … has been conquered by garibaldi single-handed and without an army at all … the people rising and the troops falling back or capitulating as he advanced.”77 after the easy victory in naples, garibaldi looked to rome as his next target. cavour, however, had invaded rome first in order to upset garibaldi’s plan and also sought to take over the government in naples. demoralized without the promise of help from piedmont, garibaldi did nothing and chose to wait until the following summer to continue the campaign.78 in october, garibaldi held a public vote where italians overwhelmingly voted to have naples and sicily join “a new and united italy.” garibaldi then surrendered control of both states to king victor emmanuel, who would be “king by will of the people.”79 italy was officially united, apart from venice and rome, albeit under a monarchy rather than a republic, and “few [were] more disappointed than mazzini and garibaldi, the two men who had looked forward to this moment most keenly and who had sacrificed most for its attainment.”80 mazzini’s disappointment is understandable, as italy was not the republic he had dreamed of. yet there is still something to be said for the fact that garibaldi, as a former follower, was still acting under mazzinian influence in the act of unifying italy. while garibaldi may have become a monarchist, he still believed in the idea of national unity that mazzini had always advocated for. the vote taken in naples and sicily showed an overwhelming amount of support for a unified italy, and for that mazzini had the right to be proud, even if the result was not ideal. during the last decade of his life, mazzini continued to advocate for a republican italy. the italian governments continued to see him as a threat, thanks to his attempts to agitate workers into another revolution. it was in 1860 that mazzini wrote his book the duties of man, which he aimed at italian workers, who he wanted to view the government as an enemy so they would feel compelled to take political action.81 in 1861, he was asked to 75 smith, mazzini, ebook. 76 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 104. 77 quoted in riall, garibaldi, ebook. 78 riall, garibaldi, ebook. 79 riall, garibaldi, ebook; smith, mazzini, ebook. 80 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,”104; denis mack smith quoted in riall, garibaldi, ebook. 81 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 106. 145 compile his political papers into several volumes and to write accompanying autobiographical notes. during the process of collecting the papers to be published, mazzini engaged in some self-reflection, writing that “he was in any case a man of heart rather than head, someone whose enthusiasm and sympathies mattered more than his intelligence, and who was interested much less in political theorizing than in transforming society.”82 he continued to advocate for complete unification with venice and rome, and in 1866 a war broke out that resulted in austria surrendering venice. however, austria presented venice to france, and in mazzini’s words, napoleon “tossed [it] to italy as a penny might be thrown to a beggar.”83 finally in september 1870, italy captured rome, completing the unification of italy at long last. mazzini could not celebrate however, as he was in prison after one final insurrection attempt. he had denounced the monarchy several years prior, and after his release from prison he lived the last years of his life in secrecy. 84 he continued to be unhappy with the italian monarchy and had difficulty reconciling the national unity he had always wanted under the monarchist symbol that he hated. in an article published in 1871, mazzini wrote that he regretted that national unification was achieved by “a narrow and privileged elite governing in their own sectional interest” rather than a truly spontaneous act of the italian people. in the last years of his life, mazzini was “only the shadow of his former self,” due not only to illness but also to his grave disappointment in the outcome of his life’s work.85 ultimately, giuseppe mazzini had a very long and tumultuous political career with varying degrees of success. he died on march 10, 1872, in italy under an assumed name, thinking of himself as “the monarchy’s outlaw.”86 while italy was not the republic he desired in his heart, he could rest knowing he had done his part to bring unity to the italian peninsula that he loved so much. historians agree that it is difficult to quantify the exact influence that mazzini had on italian unification, but it is undeniable that he played a large role. throughout his life, he advocated for the creation of a national community within a unified, republican italy. although he was exiled for many years, his devotion to italy never wavered and only increased over time. young italy was arguably mazzini’s greatest achievement. he used the society and its members as a tool to spread his thoughts and ideas throughout italy. through his school for italian immigrants in england and his many publications, he was able to educate his followers on what it meant to be italian and craft a national community with a shared language, culture, and history. his efforts to include the working class were essential to the popularity of his ideas. it showed his good intentions to include everyone in the italian nation, not only the aristocratic population of italy. mazzini’s ideas on republicanism and unity without foreign influence helped the italian people realize that italy could, in fact, stand alone as an independent nation. previous 82 quoted in smith, mazzini, ebook. 83 smith, mazzini, ebook. 84 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 107. 85 smith, mazzini, ebook. 86 sarti, “giuseppe mazzini and his opponents,” 107. 146 italian nationalists had only conceived of italy as a series of federal states, but mazzini was revolutionary in his idea of italy as one, large territory. while his dream of an italian republic failed, the idea behind it succeeded—that italy could be whole and its people should have a voice. nevertheless, mazzini was disappointed in the outcome. the disappointment is understandable, but the hindsight of history demonstrates the far reach of mazzini’s ideas throughout italy. mazzinian nationalism influenced the actions of notable figures like giuseppe garibaldi, but it also influenced the average, everyday italian in small ways that is impossible to quantify. moreover, while his exile from italy meant he was distanced from the material realities of italy, it was that distance that caused him to rely most strongly on his belief in the italian nation and the italian people—and it was this strength of belief that was so powerful in shaping modern italy. 162 guardians of the empire nationalism and the habsburg army benjamin james manuatu victoria university of wellington abstract released by the conquests of napoleon and stoked by the fires of the 1848 revolutions, the age of nationalism took europe by storm in the nineteenth century and lasted well into the twentieth century. for those states that enjoyed a more homogenous population, such as the emerging german empire, nationalism would prove to be a useful tool in mobilizing their citizens and increasing their capabilities for warfare. for the austrian empire, which represented more a polyethnic and multilingual conglomerate than a unified state, nationalism would present itself as an existential threat from which the polity could not recover. this article analyzes the habsburg army and the role it played in maintaining the austrian monarchy in the face of nationalist aggression from the 1848 revolutions to its ultimate end at the climax of the first world war. the army served not only as a physical shield for the empire but also as a symbol for the unity of all ethnic groups under the command of the habsburg emperor and held the potential to be a tool of integration and unity for the multiple ethnic groups. using military and nationalism theories, this article examines the challenges the army was forced to contend with in order to maintain the monarchy and how the language issue plagued combat effectiveness and also served as a hotbed of grievances for the multiple ethnic groups of the empire. article in the difficult times which face the monarchy, one must ask, who and what supports the throne and the dynasty? to this question there is only one answer— the army. the army does not serve only to defend the fatherland against foreign foes; its chief role is the defense and maintenance of the throne and the struggle against the enemies within. — edmund glaise von horstenau1 the military institution of the habsburg monarchy during the nineteenth century served as a mirror that reflected the volatile state of the austrian empire in its twilight century as the wave of nationalism threatened to tear it apart. throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the habsburg state had dramatically changed its 1 edmund glaise von horstenau, franz josephs weggefahrte (vienna: amalthea-verlag, 1930), 474, cited in lohr eugene miller, “politics, the nationality problem, and the habsburg army, 1848-1914 (volumes i and ii)” (phd diss., louisiana state university, 1992), 328. 163 boundaries, system of governance, name, and place on the world stage. in 1848, the austrian empire’s military apparatus was simply referred to as the kaiserlich-königlich armee, imperial-royal army.2 next to the dynasty itself, the habsburg army is often seen as the key bulwark of the state, the common army being the chief guarantor of physical safety and unity of the habsburg state.3 as an institution, the army was one of the most important tools in the habsburg administration for promoting loyalty to the emperor as well as being used as the model for emperor franz joseph’s idealized multination yet ordered and obedient empire. 4 as reflected in the opening quote by austrian military officer edmund glaise von horstenau, the army played a pivotal role in maintaining the state during the nineteenth century, guarding against not only external threats but also internal ones, namely the forces of nationalism.5 topics and terms discussed in this article—including nation, nationalism, nationality, ethnicity, empire, and monarchy—often have multiple, and sometimes contradictory, definitions and could themselves be the subject of a lengthy essay. for the purposes of this article, i use the term monarchy to represent the ruling habsburg government as an entity and not limited to the sitting emperor or empress. similarly, the empire, used alone, refers to the lands directly administrated by the habsburg monarchy. my working definitions of the terms nation, nationalism, and nationality build upon the works of several prominent nationalism theorists. for instance, rupert emerson described the nation as “that of a body of people who feel that they are a nation.”6 ernest gellner defined nationalism, simply, as a shared culture.7 ernest renan acknowledged that a nation could not be defined as simply an ethnographic or linguistic group but is rather based on two things: first, it must have a sense of common history and, second, that people concerned must have a will to live together.8 using these comments we can identify the term nation, and by extension nationality, as that of a group of people who share common characteristics, culture, and who wish to live together. the term nationalism refers to the political and sociological movement to achieve the purported goals of the nation and, ultimately, to unify the nation with the state. a nationalist is an individual who is in pursuit of those goals. ethnicity, 2 lohr eugene miller, “politics, the nationality problem, and the habsburg army, 1848-1914 (volumes i and ii)” (phd diss., louisiana state university, 1992), 1. 3 laurence cole and daniel l. unowsky, “introduction: imperial loyalty and popular allegiances in the late habsburg monarchy,” in the limits of loyalty: imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late habsburg monarchy, eds. laurence cole and daniel l. unowsky (new york: berghahn books, 2009), 5. 4 john e. fahey, “bulwark of empire: imperial and local government in prezmyśl, galacia (1867-1939)” (phd diss., purdue university, may 2017), 62. 5 edmund glaise von horstenau was a member of the austro-hungarian army’s general staff and the head of the press department of the supreme command of the armed forces during the first world war. he became a nazi politician and the last vice-chancellor of austria before the anschluss in 1938. during the second world war, he served a general in the wehrmacht. 6 rupert emerson, empire to nation (cambridge: harvard university press, 1960), 102. 7 ernest gellner, nationalism (new york: new york university press, 1997), 4. 8 eugene kamenka, “political nationalism—the evolution of the idea,” in nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea, ed. eugene kamenka (canberra: australian national university press, 1973), 12. 164 although often confused as a synonym for nationality, is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and often a shared spoken language.9 unlike most of the european states during the nineteenth century, the austrian empire was unique in that it was an imperial organization and not a country. as noted historian a.j.p. taylor observes: “to be austrian was to be free of national feelings—not to possess a nationality.”10 the political entity of the monarchy was simply the unitary state composed of the lands that owed allegiance to the habsburg family.11 distinctively, the austrian state was absent of a single ethnic identity, which on the one hand served to the benefit of their subjects, since it could claim to exist above national or ethnic allegiance, but on the other hand simultaneously failed to evoke strong feelings of unity. many citizens, especially following the ausgleich (compromise) of 1867, often first identified themselves as part of their “nation” and only secondarily as members of the monarchy.12 it was this motely entity, the austrian state, which the army was charged with defending. with the establishment of a standing army by imperial decree, the role of the habsburg monarchy was militarized in formal terms, placing the ruling monarch as the supreme commander.13 in an empire of multiple nationalities, five major religions, and no common political institutions, the army and the imperial bureaucracy served as the only visible bond between the monarchy and its subjects, remaining the sole apparatus to which they could all offer the emperor loyalty in unity.14 the military arm of the habsburgs would undergo a multitude of changes throughout its existence. however its link to the monarchy and its role as the foremost representation of loyalty and unity in the empire never wavered. the view that the institutions of the military are effective instruments for ethnic integration was a prevalent notion in modernization theory during the 1960s and 1970s.15 the army as an institution was often seen not as a separate body of the society but as an extension it. thus an army reflects the social structure, the technological capabilities, and vigor of the state.16 political scholar lucian w. pye observes that the military provides some form of training in citizenship, as “recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self.”17 sven simonsen identifies several traits of facilitating integration and homogeneity, which includes a strict adherence to hierarchy, emphasis on rationality, opportunities for social mobility, and 9 adrian hastings, construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion and nationalism (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997), 3. 10 a. j. p. taylor, the habsburg monarchy, 1809-1918: a history of the austrian empire and austria-hungary, (bristol: western printing services ltd., 1952), 22. 11 kelly mcfall, “ethnicity as a problem for grand strategy: conrad von hoetzendorf, nationalism, and the habsburg imperial army at war, 1914-1916” (phd diss., the ohio state university, 1998), 28-29. 12 mcfall, “ethnicity as a problem for grand strategy,” 30. 13 laurence cole, military culture and popular patriotism in late imperial austria (oxford: oxford university press, 2014), 23. 14 john keegan, world armies, 2nd ed. (london: macmillan, 1983), 30. 15 sven gunnar simonsen, “building ‘national’ armies—building nations?: determinations of success for postintervention integration efforts,” armed forces & society 33, no. 4, (july 2007): 573. 16 correlli barnett, the desert generals (london: pan books edn., 1962), 105. 17 lucian w. pye, “armies in the process of political modernization,” in the role of the miltiary in underdeveloped countries, ed. john j. johnson (princeton: princeton university press, 1962), 69-68. 165 services centered on achieving national aims.18 an officer of the habsburg forces in 1911 attested to the perceived primary function of the military’s training regime: every year in october we conscript men who have, as often as not, undergone a preliminary training in nationalist, anti-austrian atmospheres and have been educated as irredentists or anti-militarists, or who, being illiterate, know less than nothing of the world; and out of such material we have to fashion intelligent responsible individuals and enthusiastic patriotic citizens.19 as reflected in this quote, the primary function of the habsburg army’s training regime was to change potential dissident nationalists who adhered to the needs of their respective nations into citizens who were “patriotic” to their shared monarch. the military can be viewed as one of the—if not the—important factors of integration and homogeneity in a state. for the polyethnic habsburg monarchy, the military had the potential to achieve this aim. as historian n. f. dreisziger notes, the “polyethnic” army could have utilized its ethnic factor in the armed forces to appease certain ethnic groups and promote ethnic integration and unity.20 unfortunately, as we will come to observe, the austrian military was ill-suited to address a task of such gargantuan size. the great force of nationalism that was released in the wake of the devastating napoleonic wars swept the european stage and enveloped it almost entirely by the mid-nineteenth century.21 the austrian monarchy was no exception and became home to a multitude of emerging national movements during this period.22 the national question in austria exploded onto the scene in a violent fashion during the revolutions of 1848, which presented the various nationalist groups in the monarchy the task of condensing their national claims into a political program for the first time.23 the situation for the ethnic germans of austria, however, was unique among the contesting nationalities of the monarchy as they enjoyed a seat of privilege and hegemony. thanks to the efforts of joseph i, building upon the foundations laid by his mother maria theresa, german was the official language of the austrian administration, universalsprache meines reiches, giving the german subjects a distinct social advantage.24 furthermore, the royal family thought of 18 simonsen, “building “national” armies—building nations?,” 573. 19 brosch von aarenau, “am vorabend der sweijahrigen dienstzeit,” danzers arneezetuna, 12 january 1911. 20 n. f. dreisziger, “polyethnicity and armed forces: an introduction,” in ethnic armies: polyethnic armed forces from the time of the habsburgs to the age of the superpowers, ed. n. f. dreisziger (ontario: wilfried laurier university press, 1990), 3. 21 e.h. buschbeck, austria (london: oxford university press, 1949), 92. 22 john deak, forging a multinational state: state making in imperial austria from the enlightenment to the first world war (stanford: stanford university press, 2015), 4. 23 otto bauer, the questions of nationalities and social democracy, trans. joseph o’donnell (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 2000), 219. 24 john w. mason, the dissolution of the austro-hungarian empire 1867-1918 (hong kong: longman group limited, 1985), 10. r. j. w. evans, “language and state building: the case of the habsburg monarchy,” austrian history yearbook 35 (2004): 7. 166 themselves as german, and metternich regarded the monarchy as a german state.25 even the language required for one to enter the diet of hungary was german.26 thus, while the austrian empire was a cauldron of various ethnic groups and languages, its government was consistently german in character. as such, austrian german nationalism held different goals compared to other nationalist groups of the habsburg lands. rather than a call for national liberation, german nationalism was a reaction against the growing nations in the empire’s multiethnic layout that threatened their privileged position. as historian hans kohn wrote, “nationalism centers the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired.”27 the dilemma presented to the austrian germans was that, although the royal family was considered german and the official language of the empire was conducted in german, the ethnic austrian germans did not make up the majority of the habsburg empire, despite being the largest ethnic group.28 the ethnic divide was further exacerbated as the habsburg hereditary lands acquired new territories and subjects; the proportion of privileged german austrians to non-germans dwindled, creating minority elites.29 in many cases, the age of nationalism provided an effective tool for the rulers of europe to ignite a new fervor of loyalty and increase the military power of their respective states;30 the same could not be said for austria. as a polity of different nations, many of whom identified themselves more with their own lands and their monarch than the whole state, nationalism was antithetical to their very existence. 31 as political theorist john plamenatz explains, “nationalism is a reaction of peoples who feel culturally at a disadvantage.”32 for many ethnic groups in the empire, nationalism presented a useful tool to voice their grievances and, for some, to seek their own “liberation” from a foreign master. language, literacy, and technology ernest gellner argues that nationalism emerged from the combination of state and culture. his much quoted phrase—"every man is a clerk”—referred to the spread of education in local languages and economic development during the industrial age, which in turn allowed mass participation in these new nations.33 as gellner observes, “a modern industrial state 25 alan sked, “the nationality problem in the habsburg monarchy and the revolutions of 1848: a reassessment,” in the 1848 revolutions and european political thought, eds. douglas moggach and gareth stedman jones (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2018), 336. 26 c. a. macartney, the house of austria: the later phase 1790-1918 (edinburgh: university of edinburgh press, 1978), 14. 27 hans kohn, “nationalism,” in international encyclopedia of the social sciences, vol. 11, ed. david l. sills (new york: macmillan free press, 1968), 63. 28 robert a. kann, the multinational empire: nationalism and national reform in the habsburg monarchy 1848-1918: volume ii (new york: octagon books inc., 1964), 305. 29 john knickerbocker, “österreich und anschluss: ponderous dilemma of austrian identity (1848-1948)” (ma thesis, university of albany, 2014), i. 30 burak kadercan, “military competition and the emergence of nationalism: putting logic of political survival into historical context,” international studies 14 (2012): 402. 31 miroslav sedivy, “the austrian empire, german nationalism, and the rhine crisis of 1840,” austrian yearbook 47 (2016): 3233. 32 john plamenatz, “two types of nationalism,” in nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea, ed. eugene kamenka (canberra: australian national university press, 1973), 27. 33 ernest gellner, thought and change (london: weidenfeld nicolson, 1964), 159. 167 can only function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population.”34 literacy, the ability to read and write and therefore communicate effectively, facilitated the process of homogenization. eric hobsbawm also postulates the growth of educational institutions, such as schools and universities, mirrors the progress of nationalism.35 with regards to education in austria, the habsburg empire was among the first european states to tackle the literacy question, with empress maria theresa’s policies of encouraging german education during her reign.36 in 1869 the habsburg government made further steps in combating literacy by placing schools under state jurisdiction and mandating eight years of primary school.37 consequentially, the literacy rates climbed from 51 percent in 1870 to 78 percent in 1890.38 as more subjects became educated, the issue of language in a multilingual state became more significant. the general growth in literacy and industry created powerful new impulses and yearnings for linguistic unification.39 language, as peter burke notes, became an instrument for the proverbial “cult of nation.”40 using the foundations laid by his mother maria theresa, joseph centralized the monarchy’s bureaucracy, staffed by the most educated subjects and, in terms of nationality, primarily by those who spoke german.41 the german language consequently became the vehicle for social mobility, in essence promoting the germanization of gellner’s aphorism, “every man is a clerk.”42 the german language’s privileged status simultaneously encouraged resistance of the non-german nationalities and caused other habsburg ethnicities to chaff further under the stewardship of the german-speaking government. the german language became the de facto language of privilege, making german-speaking austrians essentially the leaders in the habsburg monarchy. gellner notes that the industrial age created mass mobility and the uprooting of rural people, which resulted in a new cultural “freak,” the replaceable modular man.43 with the capacity to perform a variety of tasks and duties by obeying the same set of rules and sharing a common idiom with his peers, the modular man can be seen as the end product of 34 ernest gellner, nations and nationalism (oxford: blackwell publisher limited, 1983), 46. 35 eric hobsbawm, the age of revolutions: 1789-1848 (london: weidenfeld & nicolson, 1962), 166. 36 anthony bushell, polemical austria: the rhetorics of national identity from empire to the second republic (cardiff: university of wales press, 2013), 69. 37 branko sustar, “the historical development of the formation of the elite in the south of the habsburg empire. slovens and the schooling of the intellectual class in the late 1800s and early 1900s,” history of education & children’s literature x, no. 1 (2015): 508. 38 harvey j. graff, the legacies of literacy: continuities and contradictions in western culture (indianapolis: indiana university press, 1991), 296. 39 benedict anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london: verso, 2006), 77-78. 40 peter burke, languages and communities in early modern europe (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2004), 160. 41 edward crankshaw, the fall of the house of habsburg (london: jarrold & sons ltd., 1963), 10. 42 andrea komlosy, “imperial cohesion, nation-building, and regional integration in the habsburg monarchy,” in nationalizing empires, eds. stefan berger and alexei miller (new york: central european university press, 2015), 420. 43 ernest gellner, “the importance of being modular,” in civil society: theory, history, and comparison, ed. john a. hall (cambridge: polity press, 1995), 42-43. 168 gellner’s industrialization process, facilitating cultural homogeneity.44 this perspective of industrialization could explain the centralized german character of the austrian administration and bureaucracy, as the bureaucrats, often by origin and always by employment, were urban dwellers, and the urban centers of the austrian empire were all german in character and substance.45 according to k. g. hugelmann’s das nationalitatenrecht des alten österreich (the nationality law of old german), in january 1914, 76 percent of all officials of the empire’s central bureaucracy identified as germans.46 although the imperial government made attempts within the confines of a nonnational state to recognize certain national and linguistic equalities, such as trials being held in ten different languages, the expansion of the bureaucracy meant that more german was heard.47 the germanization of austrian bureaucracy and the consequent elevation of the german people in the habsburg monarchy could be seen as the unintended byproduct of centralization. gellner’s theory of nationalism is concerned with industrialization, but several scholars have noted that gellner does not adequately address the importance of the military in this process. one vocal critic, daniele conversi, argues that gellner failed to relate the homogenization “separatism dynamics” with the rise of the mass army independent of industrialism.48 barry posen contends that any economic argument for the function of literacy and a shared culture, the arbiters of nationalism, can equally be made into a military one.49 gellner draws attention to the importance of technology in the economy, but the conduct and nature of warfare also depended critically upon technology. armies evolved with the changes of technology, communications, and transportation. for instance, the invention of the railroad in particular ushered in the age of mass warfare.50 alongside the evolution of military technology, the utility of a soldier who could read and write became more valuable in ensuring victory.51 states now had a military incentive to promote mass literacy, and the subsequent spread of literacy, in turn, increased the state’s capabilities to train larger armies. brendan o’leary argues that education and cultural standardization of european conscripts preceded that of the general citizenry and that the military elites used protonationalism for military goals exclusive of industrial society.52 in the case of austria, steven beller directly links maria theresa’s modernized bureaucracy to dramatic increases of state revenue, providing the resources to support the expanding 44 daniele conversi, “homogenisation, nationalism and war: should we still read ernest gellner?*,” nations and nationalism 13, no. 3, (2007): 381. 45 taylor, the habsburg monarchy, 1809-1918, 24. 46 quoted in robert a. kann, the multinational empire: nationalism and national reform in the habsburg monarchy 1848-1918: volume ii (new york: octagon books, inc., 1964), 313. 47 miller, “politics, the nationality problem, and the habsburg army, 1848-1914 (volumes i and ii),” 71. 48 conversi, “homogenisation, nationalism and war: should we still read ernest gellner?*,” 373-374. 49 barry r. posen, “nationalism, the mass army, and military power,” in perspectives on nationalism and war, eds. john l. comaroff and paul c. stern (amsterdam: gordon and breach science publishers sa, 1995), 139. 50 massimiliano gaetano onorato, kenneth scheve, and david stasavage, “technology and the era of the mass army,” the journal of economic history 74, no. 2 (june 2014): 450. 51 onorato, scheve, and stasavage, “technology and the era of the mass army,”167. 52 brendan o’leary, “ernest gellner’s diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in ernest gellner’s philosophy of nationalism,” in state of the nation, ed. john a. hall (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998), 66. 169 standing army.53 in response to gellner’s theory, nicos mouzelis observes that, “it is military rather than economic technologies that primarily explain the spectacular development of state bureaucracies and their unprecedented penetration of the societal periphery.”54 both the army and the bureaucracy of the state pursued the goal of homogenization in order to control both the “clerk” and the “conscript.” in regards to the army of austria, there were attempts to educate the common rank and file and establish basic literacy; according to austrian officer fenner von fenneberg, “there [were] scarcely two out of every hundred [men] who could not read or write and answer questions correctly concerning service regulations.”55 as the bellicist, war-centered, approach to state building claims, wars are a great stimulus to centralizing state power and building institutional capacity.56 state-led cultural homogenization, as argued by conversi, ushered in by technological advances, consisted of a “single, distilled purified culture…it did not materialise as a spontaneous and inevitable outgrowth of modernity.”57 military, cohesion, and nationalism nationalism can increase the intensity of the state’s warfare capabilities as well its utility for mass mobilization. as posen notes, in the age of the large-scale armies, states acted purposefully to produce nationalism.58 in a homogeneous state, nationalism can be used effectively to facilitate military cohesion on the primary and secondary level. on the primary level, nationalism can be used to develop an ingrained kinship between fellow soldiers. on the secondary level, nationalism can facilitate trust and kinship in groups bigger than oneself with goals and aspirations of the larger group used as the goals and aspirations of the individual. carlton hayes suggests that “[m]ilitarism exists primarily for the sake of national honor, national rights, and national interests.”59 however, posen’s and hayes’s observations cannot be applied to the habsburg monarchy; on the contrary, nationalism was entirely detrimental to the existence of the state and to maintaining a cohesive army. instead, emperor franz joseph opted to present the army as the highest form of state unity.60 though states such as the emerging prussian-led germany would find nationalism a powerful motive to increase their military effectiveness, the habsburg military needed to be an institution that united the state absent of national identity. to embrace nationalism highlighted the differences of the multiple ethnic groups and gave 53 steven beller, francis joseph: profiles in power (london: longman, 1996), 20. 54 nicos mouzelis, “ernest gellner’s theory of nationalism: some definitional and methodological issues,” in state of the nation, ed. john a. hall (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998), 159. 55 fenner von fenneberg, oesterreich und seine armee (leipzig: keil, 1847), 142-143, in alan sked, the survival of the habsburg empire: redetzky, the imperial army, and the class war, 1848 (london: longman, 1979), 37. 56 cameron thies, “war, rivalry and state building in latin america,” american journal of political science 49, no. 3 (2005): 451. 57 conversi, “homogoneisation, nationalism and war: should we still read ernest gellner?*,” 382. 58 posen, “nationalism, the mass army, and military power,” 136, 139. 59 carlton j. h. hayes, essays on nationalism (new york: russell & russell, 1966), 159. 60 alfred j. reiber, “nationalizing imperial armies: a comparative and transnational study of three empires,” in nationalizing empires, eds. stefan berger and alexei miller (new york: central european university press, 2015), 611. 170 legitimacy to minority grievances. as field marshall conrad von hotzendorf wrote in 1908, “there may be no ruling nation in the army,” for “[o]nly in an army in which each of the nationalities can come to accept that they are viewed as completely equal will a unified spirt and attachment to the greater whole [be able to] endure.”61 commanding the loyalty of a multiethnic army, whilst simultaneously maintaining military cohesion and the quality of the units, was a problem endemic of polyethnic states. imperial policy required an army loyal only to the ruling dynasty; nationalist sentiment was treated with suspicion if not outright as sedition.62 the habsburg army had to contend with nationalist issues that threatened military cohesion more so than any other professional mass army that enjoyed a homogenous state, with the possible exceptions of the concurrent ottoman and british empires. the solution to any polyethnic force was to make the army supranational. the language issue in itself presented a nightmare for the austrian military high command, not only in maintaining the loyalty of multiple ethnic units but, more practically, in the day-to-day operations and military cohesion. cohesion stands at the universal core of all armed groups and to the creation of force.63 success on the battlefield is found in clear communication and bonding within military groups in order to execute orders and tasks vital to victory. effective cohesion between officers and their soldiers generates the trust necessary for teamwork, which in turn leads to a greater group cohesion and identification with the army, producing the professional serviceman.64 the vast majority of officers serving in the habsburg military—78 percent of professional officers and 60.2 percent of reserve officers—were ethnically german.65 the largely german-speaking officer corps was not representative of the units they commanded, which were drawn from the vast ethnically diverse reaches of the empire.66 officially, the habsburg army gave recognition to about ten or eleven languages in their rank and file.67 the average austrian regiment was a proverbial melting pot of different ethnicities, facilitated by a system introduced in 1849, which instituted soldiers of varying ethnic groups in each regiment, lasting up until the ausgleich in 1867.68 this was done with the explicit intention of combatting nationalist influences as the administration distributed troops outside of their ethnic area, and regiments were transferred routinely.69 the 61 conrad von hotzendorf, aus meiner dienstzeit, 1.503, 560, (memorandum dated 19 february 1908), in kelly mcfall, “ethnicity as a problem for grand strategy: conrrad von hoetzendorf, nationalism, and the habsburg imperial army at war, 1914-1916” (phd diss., the ohio state university, 1998), 62-63. 62 rok stergar, “national indifference in the heyday of nationalist mobilization? ljubljana military veterans and the language of command,” austrian history yearbook 43 (2012): 52. 63 ilmari kaihko, “broadening the perspective on military cohesions,” armed forces & society 44, no. 4 (2018): 572-573. 64 guy l. siebold, “the essence of military group cohesion,” armed forces & society 33, no. 2 (january 2007): 287-288. 65 militar-stat. jahrbuch, for 1910, 145, in norman stone, “army and society in the habsburg monarchy, 19001914,” past & present 33 (april 1966): 99. 66 alexander watson, “‘managing an ‘army of peoples’: identity, command and performance in the habsburg officer corps, 1914-1918,” contemporary european history 25, no. 2 (2016): 234. 67 istvan deak, beyond nationalism: a social and political history of the habsburg officer corps, 1848-1918 (oxford: oxford university press, 1990), 99. 68 joseph redlich, emperor francis joseph of austria (new york: the macmillan company, 1929), 197; miller, “politics, the nationality problem, and the habsburg army, 1848-1914,” 82. 69 gunther rothenberg, the army of francis joseph (west lafayette: purdue university press, 1968), 19. 171 linguistic maze, of which the army had to consistently navigate, is an often cited reason for poor performance on the battlefield.70 at first the language issue was treated by military leaders as exclusively a matter of efficiency rather than a political problem; however this would later evolve to become a hotbed for nationalist grievances.71 here, the military apparatus deals with the first and major issue of having a polylinguistic army and that is the challenge of maintain effective communication. to protect the primary group cohesion and to combat the multilingual issues that threatened to break down communication and compromise the chain of command, the habsburg military utilized a complicated language system, designating three linguistic levels. the kommandosprahce (the language of command) was the basic vocabulary between troop units; dienstsprache (the language of service) was the basic intercourse for the officers; and the regimentssprache was the language spoken by the soldiers of the regiment.72 if at least 20 percent of a regiment’s soldiers spoke a native non-german languages, then officers were obligated to speak it.73 this left the members of the army, especially those of higher rank, with the herculean challenge of mastering all three registers in order to deliver effective communication. in order to standardize communication and military cohesion and to promote the fusion of the multiple nationalities, german was to be used as the language of service and the language of command, with the exception of the honvéd (hungarian army), which used hungarian as their language of service.74 for all other regiments in habsburg forces, only around eighty major commands were given in german, such as “halt,” “at ease,” “left,” “right,” and “fire,” with the rest given in the regimentssprache.75 standardizing german as the universal language also had the added benefits of having effective correspondence with the civilian state bureaucracy. german, as the single administrative and command language, was perceived as a symbol of unity by the emperor and the army high command.76 as a commentator in 1862 described, the german language was “a powerful means of uniting the various elements,” insisting that they “are not a german army alone but the great austrian army.”77 by 1914, only 142 regiments were considered to be monolingual, 162 regiments had two languages spoken by their rank and file, 24 were trilingual, and even a handful were 70 john anthony dredger, “offensive spending: tactics and procurement in the habsburg military, 18661918” (phd diss., kansas state university, 2013), xi. 71 scheer, “habsburg languages at war,” 64. 72 irina marin, “k.u.k generals of romanian nationality and their views on the language question,” language diversity in the late habsburg empire, eds. markian prokopvych, carl bethke, and tamara scheer, vol. 9 of central and eastern europe (boston: brill, 2020), 119. 73 reiber, “nationalizing imperial armies,” 611. 74william harrison ainsworth, “the austrian army,” the new monthly magazine 14, no. 414 (jan 1853 – dec. 1881): 128. richard bassett, for god and kaiser: the imperial austrian army, 1616-1918 (london: yale university press, 2015), 367. 75 deak, beyond nationalism, 99. 76 rok stergar, “the evolutions of linguistic policies and practices of the austro-hungarian armed forces in the era of ethnic: nationalisms: the case of ljubljana-laibach,” language diversity in the late habsburg empire, eds. markian prokopvych, carl bethke, and tamara scheer, vol. 9 of central and eastern europe (boston: brill, 2020), 60. 77 d. n., “über die truppensprache unserer armee,” neue militärische zeitschrift 3, no. 2 (1862): 366-368. 172 complex quadrilingual regiments.78 as a consequence, more than 90 percent of the officers were obligated to communicate in one other language than german.79 regarding the language of service and the regimental language, an officer would shout his first order in german and then repeat it in one, two, or three other languages.80 the army mandated its officer cadets to become bilingual in order to maintain unit cohesion.81 military handbooks published the “minority” languages, such as czech, croatian, polish, and slovak, were delivered so that officers were able to more effectively communicate with their troops.82 for the qualifikations-listen (qualifications list), officers had to demonstrate familiarity with the regimental language, or languages, adequate for the needs of service before a commission, before a committee which met within three years after an officer’s entry into his unit.83 if the officer failed, he would be given a second chance a couple years later, upon which if he failed again, his promotion would be set back. typically, after their second failed attempt, officers would either try to obtain a transfer to another regiment that spoke their language or resign from their commission.84 despite the numerous obstacles to communication that confronted the habsburg army, the willingness of the participants and the devotion of military schools to the study of languages yielded moderate results.85 the table below, which displays the percentages of officers’ familiarity with another language besides german, shows that czech, hungarian, polish, and serbo-croatian remained the dominant minority languages. 1870 1904 language italian czech hungarian polish serbo-croatian romanian ruthene slovene slovak percentage 32.76 30.18 19.77 17.62 17.36* 8.95 5.14 5.11 -* language italian czech hungarian polish serbo-croatian romanian ruthene slovene slovak percentage 8.5 47.0 33.6 19.3 15.3 8.8 7.8 7.3 6.9 78 michael wolf, the habsburg monarchy’s many-languaged soul: translating and interpreting, 1848-1918, trans. kate sturge (philadelphia: john benjamins publishing company, 2015), 60. 79 deak, beyond nationalism, 99. 80 wolf, the habsburg monarchy’s many-languaged soul, 60. 81 istvan deak, “the ethnic question in the multinational habsburg army, 1848-1918,” in ethnic armies: polyethnic armed forces from the time of the habsburgs to the age of the superpowers, ed. n. f. dreisziger (ontario: wilfried laurier university press, 1990), 24. 82 livia kardum and bruno korea gajski, “languages as political issue: the case of language of command in the austro-hungarian army,” jezikoslovlje, 13, no. 2 (2012): 359. 83 deak, beyond nationalism, 99. 84 scott warren lackey, “general friedrich beck and the rise of the austro-hungarian general staff: civilmilitary relations and the making of a modern military state” (phd, university of north carolina at chapel hill, 1991), 155. 85 lackey, “general friedrich beck and the rise of the austro-hungarian general staff,”102. 173 table 1: percentage of officers familiar with languages besides german86 *in 1870, serbian and croatian were still listed separately, on the other hand, slovak was not yet a recognized national language. despite these measures, some of the officers’ inability to grasp the languages of the soldiers who served under them threatened the ability to gain their confidence, an issue which reflected the empire’s educational policies.87 though bilingualism was encouraged and promoted among the various national languages, with the exception of military schools, these policies were not implemented among the civilian austro-germans and hungarians whose secondary educational institutions stuck to an almost unilingual practice.88 the lack of bilingualism among the austro-germans weakened their political influence in the empire and proved disastrous for the military apparatus. military cohesion could not be accomplished without clear and precise communication, which in a battlefield situation was vital in achieving war aims. although the monarchy and the military were the pillars that kept the austrian empire aloft, the 1848 revolutions made them inseparable to the unity of the polity. on the verge of being overwhelmed by nationalist fervor, the austrian military rescued the empire from the brink of dissolution, leading one captain—and future lieutenant field marshal—hugo von weckbecker to comment, “now we really say our bayonets are the firmest support of the throne, with our life blood we have cemented the monarchy,” a notion that the young emperor franz joseph never forgot.89 in april of 1849, franz joseph publicly announced his intention to personally oversee the military affairs of the monarchy, elevating the institution to greater heights.90 since the tumultuous uprisings through the 1867 ausgleich and up until his death in 1916, franz joseph chose to elevate the military and the army in order to represent unity of the empire to the exclusion of nationalist sentiments. the emperor constantly displayed the visage of a martial leader, bringing military advisors into his inner circle, insisting on military inspired ceremonies, and adhering to a militaristic discipline in his public life.91 in this regard, the emperor went as far as evaluating his inner entourage on the basis of their “soldierliness” qualities.92 rarely was he seen out of military uniform, even after the turn of the century; according to miklos horthy, who had served as his aide-de-camp, the emperor still prided himself in, “a general’s uniform.”93 the success to franz joseph’s efforts to elevate the prestige of the army was made evident by the 86 militar-statistisches jahrbuch für das jahr 1870, part 1 (vienna, 1872), 222. militar-statistisches jahrbuch für das jahr 1904 (vienna, 1905), 145. 87 scheer, “habsburg languages at war,” 72. 88 peiter h. van der plank, “effects of habsburg educational policies measured by census statistics,” jezikoslovlje 13, no. 2 (2012): 373. 89 quoted in anatol mura, franz joseph i of austria and his empire (new york: twayne publishers, 1968), 66. gunther e. rothenberg, “toward a national hungarian army: the military compromise of 1868 and its consequences,” slavic review 31, no. 4 (december 1972): 806. 90 lackey, “general friedrich beck and the rise of the austro-hungarian general staff,” 31. 91 daniel unowsky, “stating habsburg patriotism: dynastic loyalty and the 1898 imperial jubilee,” in constructing nationalities in east central europe, eds. pieter m. judson and marsha l. rosenblit (oxford: berghahn books, 2009), 147. 92 anatol mura, franz joseph i of austria and his empire (new york: twayne publishers, 1968), 64. 93 admiral miklos horthy, regent of hungary, memoirs (westport: greenwood press publishers, 1979), 44. 174 observers at the time. the austrian writer otto friedlander described the social status and prestige of the austrian military in 1900 as such: “the military is the first estate in the state. it takes precedence at all parades and festivities. the youngest lieutenant goes ahead of the highest civil servant.”94 austrian society absorbed the military culture and integrated it within its daily life. it is a testament to how much importance was placed upon the austrohungarian military by the habsburg government that the german ambassador in 1913 made the following critical observation: “i believe it [the army] to be thoroughly healthy— at the moment it is the only healthy element in the monarchy.”95 the emperor’s love of the military, shown through his public visage and the parades, was an expression of the monarchy’s reliance on the army for its continual existence. franz joseph owed his reign to the army, saving it from the brink of collapse in 1848 and continuing to safeguard him and his throne to his dying day. after the revolutions, while other armies were primarily charged with the defense of a state against external threats, the primary role of the army of austria was to maintain the delicate internal security of the empire. the austrian army had to serve the dual purpose of integrating the various nationalities and ethnicities, unifying them under one proverbial banner, and remain militarily efficient. to achieve this aim, franz joseph made every attempt to ensure that the army’s loyalty was to no nation, no state, no single ethnicity, but to the emperor. according to the final terms of the ausgleich, “matters pertaining to the command, command-system, and internal organization of the common army form exclusive rights of his majesty.”96 this, in short, cemented the importance that the army should remain above nationalism, a notion that both competing halves of the empire recognized as essential to their mutual safety.97 the monarchy existed above any national, ethnic, or familial allegiances, so too must the army. this sentiment can be seen repeated in franz joseph’s army order issued on september 16, 1903 following the divisive debates over the army bill of 1902: my army, whose stout bonds of union are threatened by one-sided aspirations proceeding from misapprehension of the exalted mission the army has to fulfil for the weal of both states of the monarchy. joint and unitary as it shall my army remain, the strong power to defend the austro-hungarian monarchy against every foe. true to its oath, my whole defensive force will continue to tread the path of earnest fulfilment of duty, permeated by that spirt of union and harmony which respects every national characteristic and solve all antagonisms by utilizing the special qualities of each race for the welfare of the great whole.98 94 o. friedlander, letzter glanz der marchenstadt. wien um 1900 (1948; repr. vienna: moden, 2002), 77. 95 die grosse politik der europasichen kabinette 187101914, xxxvm nr. 13370. 96 austrian law 21 december 1867, art v, cited in lohr eugene miller, “politics, the nationality problem, and the habsburg army, 1848-1914 (volumes i and ii)” (phd diss., louisiana state university, 1992), 115. 97 norman stone, “army and society in the habsburg monarchy, 1900-1914,” past & present 33 (april 1966): 97. 98 quoted in henry wickham steed, the habsburg monarchy (london: constable and company ltd., 1919), 66-67. 175 franz joseph had always regarded the armed forces as his personal possession.99 this can be found distinctly in his speeches, constantly referring to the army not as the austrohungarian army or the imperial royal soldiers, but as “my army” or “my soldiers,” as seen in his order. this opinion was shared by other leading figures in the austrian empire. franz joseph’s nephew and heir, franz ferdinand, saw an army that is trustworthy and loyal only to the emperor and blind to nationality as a basic necessity of the empire.100 archduke albrecht, the chief military advisor to franz joseph, shared similar views, proclaiming after the ausgleich: “one oath alone is binding to us all.”101 the common army must remain the bastion of imperial loyalty, its officer corps, and rank and file remaining staunch in the emperor’s favor. world war and dissolution in no other country is unity, uniformity, and dynastic soldierly spirit as all important…because only the dynasty and the army can hold this monarchy together. —archduke albrecht102 it was clear throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the language issue was not the only threat to military cohesion and, therefore by extension, the habsburg monarchy. the nationalist problem was an ever-constant headache that plagued emperor franz joseph and the army command, from the very start of his reign to his dying days. the emperor took great effort to mitigate any fracturing element that emerged, but even some of the measures he took to unify his multiethnic subjects ultimately doomed him. as john breuilly postulates, nationalism is a form of politics that arises out of strained relationships with the modern state.103 in the case of the austrian empire, the state was german in character and german in communication. as a demographic, the ethnic germans, much like their position in the monarchy, was perceived by others to enjoy a position of privilege. in the army, germans only consisted of around 25 percent of the rank and file but made up the majority (70 percent) of the officer corps, and they enjoyed the advantage of having their language as the dientsprache, the kommandosprache, and the universalsprache meines rieches.104 all other ethnic groups were underrepresented in the military hierarchy, especially the minor ethnic groups, like the slovaks, ruthenes, and romanians, who collectively consisted of 18.2 percent of the common army but made up only 1.1 percent of the officer corps.105 of all the ethnic groups under the habsburg dynasty, it was only the germans who had always identified with the entire state and thus 99 valdis baidins, “franz joseph, kaisertreue and loyalty in the late habsburg empire” (phd diss., university of washington, 1999), 63. 100 leopold von chlumecky, erzherzog franz ferdinand wirken und wollen (berlin: verlag für kulturpolitik, 1929), 359. 101 stone, “army and society in the habsburg monarchy, 1900-1914,” 97. 102 rothenberg, “toward a national hungarian army,” 806. 103 john breuilly, nationalism and the state (manchester: manchester university press, 1993), 366. 104 militar-statistiches jahrbuch fur das jahr 1911 (vienna, 1912), 146-147, 196-197. 105 jason lyall, divided armies: inequality and battlefield performance in modern war (boston: princeton university press, 2020), 264-265. 176 were the only ones who never called for “national liberation.”106 the same could not be said for the other prevalent national movements, and the resulting friction led to an overall ethnic mistrust and the suspect of loyalties. the effectiveness of the habsburg army historically had been often regarded by military experts as below the standard of their contemporaries.107 some commentators at the time found praise-worthy elements of the austrian army. for instance, george brinton mcclellan, a united states officer who was attached to the austrian army as a military observer in the 1850s, commented that the austrian system of executing written tactics and adapting them to the battle-ground situation, which required effective and quick communication, was worthy of study and “to, some extent, of imitation.”108 while some commended the austro-hungarian army command for the “military miracle” of having an efficient organization in contention with the maze of multiple languages, the language problem proved to be a multilayered pragmatic disaster for battlefield conditions and army operations via nationalist grievances, especially in the lead up and duration of the first world war.109 as posen has confidently asserted, the army “was nearly the least successful army of the first world war” in stark comparison to the more homogenous armies found on either side of the conflict.110 during the later stages of franz joseph’s reign, nationalist grievances had swelled to the point that the armeoberkommando (army high command, aok) did not even trust a great portion of their own army. in 1906, general franz conrad von hotzendorf had warned of “corrosive nationalist elements” threatening the cohesion of the austro-hungarian military in certain potential theaters of war.111 as one british journalist noted at the time, this was due to the fact that “[t]here is not one potential enemy of austria today, whether it be russia, or italy, or the allied balkan states, that would command the sympathy and active support of some section of this enormous polyglot host.”112 this distrust eventually bled into the officer corps creating a hotbed of contention, leading to the breakdown of the army’s policy of national indifference. the german language, as the official language of command and service, was seen as the language of authority and, by extension, the language of the monarchy. officers equated german with austrian patriotism, and as nationalist tensions became more transparent, the officer corps began to see the use of other languages as an indisputable sign of disloyalty, such as equating slovene with russophilia and favoring german-speaking soldiers over other ethnic groups.113 frank prosek, a czech soldier of the imperial and royal army, wrote, “as a czech, i am subject to 106 fritz fellner, “introduction: the genesis of the austrian republic,” in modern austria, ed. kurt steiner (palo alto: the society for the promotion of science and scholarship inc., 1981), 1-2. 107 “the efficient army of austria,” the washington post, sep 3, 1915, 6. 108 maj. gen. george brinton mcclellan, the armies of europe: comprising descriptions in detail of the military systems of england, france, russia, prussia, austria, and sardinia (philadelphia: j.b. lippincott & co., 1861), 64. 109 henry wickham steed, the habsburg monarchy (london: constable and company ltd., 1919), 65. 110 posen, “nationalism, the mass army, and military power,” 139. 111 lyall, divided armies, 290. 112 o.t.c., “the austrian army,” the westminster review, jan. 1852-jan. 1914, no. 2 (february 1, 1913), 124. 113 stergar, “the evolution of linguistic policies and practices of the austro-hungarian armed forces in the era of ethnic nationalisms,” 69. 177 discrimination and ill treatment. promotions only go to austrians. what chance did i have in this army; my race damns me in the eyes of my superiors.”114 the most significant blow to the army’s ideology was the formation of the national guards, honvéd and landwehr, following the 1867 ausgleich, which ironically was viewed as a solution to placate national grievances.115 the fall out of the ausgleich, as perceived by some officers, would lead to other nationalities seeking connections with foreign slavic powers, sowing more seeds of distrust and disunity.116 in the years before 1914, those loyal to the monarchy came increasingly to feel that the political instability could be cured only through foreign policy rather than internal reform.117 the nationality problem had become too complex, with every attempt to mitigate the issue resulting in the creation of more tears in the delicate fabric which held the army together. while other european statesmen believed that civil war in austriahungary would inevitably set off a greater conflict in the continent, officials in vienna believed that a great conflict in europe was their only alternative to civil war, preventing the “internal fighting which would inevitably result in the disintegration of the polyglot monarchy.”118 a simple solution to a complex problem. however, the subversive and continuous undercurrent of mistrust damaged the army in more ways than one. the systematic suspicion of ethnic minorities crippled habsburg training. wary over the reliability of their own soldiers, the aok curtailed prewar training drastically.119 naturally, an army that had no trust in half its own soldiers had little interest in training them to use initiative or utilize independence.120 certain ethnic groups—notably the czechs, ruthenians, serbs, romanians, and poles— were singled out and restrictions were placed on their military service and training.121 the watered-down training that did take place was more focused on instilling obedience and creating loyal citizen and less on actual combat training. “don’t bother teaching them to fight,” instructed one habsburg general, “they learn that in battle; teach them to obey.”122 the resulting defective training produced unskilled soldiers and vastly depreciated the army’s ability to wage effective warfare. the dilemma faced by the aok was a paradoxical one: to solve the problem of internal threat, an external threat is necessary; however, the army could not hope to succeed without resolving their internal situation, and preparing 114 cited in kevin mcnamara, dreams of a small great nation: the mutinous army that threatened a revolution, destroyed an empire, founded a republic, and remade the map of europe (new york: public affairs, 2016), 52. 115 deak, “the ethnic question in the multinational habsburg army, 1848-1918,” 45-46. 116 john anthony dredger, “offensive spending: tactics and procurement in the habsburg military, 18661918” (phd diss., kansas state university, 2013), 68. 117 norman stone, “hungary and the crisis of july 1914,” journal of contemporary history 1, no.3 (july 1966): 153. 118 stone, “hungary and the crisis of july 1914,” 153. lyall, divided armies, 289-290. 119 lyall, divided armies, 292. 120 norman stone, the eastern front: 1914-1917 (new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1975), 308. 121 lyall, divided armies, 299. 122 geoffrey wawaro, a mad catastrophe: the outbreak of world war i and the collapse of the habsburg empire (new york: penguin, 2014), 354. 178 for a foreign war was useless.123 so concerned was the aok with resolving the monarchy’s internal problem, that it even retained detailed plans to invade hungary in an effort to reunify the dual monarchy, as late as 1914.124 as the minister-president of austria, kasimir badeni, commented: “a country of nationalities cannot wage war without danger to itself.”125 concerns over the reliability of national minorities were intimately bound in the tactics of the aok during the first world war, coupled with the varying qualities of training and the apparent misgivings of certain groups. the aok believed that at least one quarter of its army that went to war in 1914 were politically unwilling to “do their duty to the emperor.”126 the dual monarchy’s army was a haphazard institution yielding mixed battlefield results. due to the crippled training program, many habsburg soldiers could barely fire their weapons, let alone follow instructions to execute complex maneuvers.127 as the war went on, second-rate training also led to an epidemic of indiscipline, especially among the groups that were the targets of official suspicion. in general, only the german, hungarian, and bosnian regiments could be reliably committed to combat on all fronts, and the effectiveness of the other nationalities varied greatly.128 mass desertion was common among the ruthenian-, serb-, and czech-dominated regiments, beginning as early as august 1914.129 the austro-hungarian army suffered particular high rates of desertion during the war, forcing the aok to create a number of ad hoc measures including summary executions for even encouraging desertion.130 so strained had interethnic relations gotten that during the first world war, regiments where officers did not speak the regimental language(s) became fertile grounds for indiscipline and mutinous behavior. even an officer mispronouncing a soldier’s name was enough to generate grievances.131 by the end of the war, nearly 125,000 soldiers—consisting of czechs, poles, serbs, ruthenians, and romanians—defected and took up arms against the habsburgs.132 the first world war proved to be not only a physically devastating conflict but an existential battle for the habsburg army. in a strictly practical sense, the language issue was a proverbial administrative nightmare and pragmatically awkward in battle, but it was not the undoing of the army. interestingly, almost no officer after the war pointed to the language issues as being responsible for the empire losing the war or even any particular operations on the 123 gunther e. rothenberg, “the habsburg army in the first world: 1914-1918,” in the habsburg empire in world war i: essays on intellectual, military, political and economic aspects of the habsburg war effort, eds. robert a. kann, bela k. kirlay, and paula s. fichtner (new york: columbia university press, 1977), 75. 124 cathal nolan, the allure of battle: a history of how wars have been won and lost (oxford: oxford university press, 2017), 333. 125 lyall, divided armies, 253. 126 mark cornwall, the undermining of austria-hungary: the battle for hearts and minds (london: macmillan press, 2000), 31. 127 lyall, divided armies, 292. 128 rothenberg, “the habsburg army in the first world war,” 75. 129 lyall, divided armies, 300. 130 hieke nibergarll-lackner, status and treatment of deserters in international armed conflicts (boston: brill, 2016), 24-25. 131 lyall, divided armies, 301. 132 lyall, divided armies, 302. 179 front.133 ideologically however, it was an entirely different matter. the grievances of the polyethnic empire and the ambitions of the nationalist movements proved too great a task for the army to handle, leading to a crippled military going into one of the most devastating conflicts in history. the results of which were not surprising. though showing, at best, mixed results in actual combat, the habsburg army was an important symbol of diverse unity and was essential to the creation of dynastic loyalty. with nationalism an ever-present danger to that unity, the monarch alone held the potential to unite the army as a symbol of unity. in the case of franz joseph, that relationship was symbiotic. although the army could not prevent the ultimate demise of the monarchy, the collapse would have come a lot sooner if not for the intervention of the loyal habsburg forces during the 1848 revolutions. franz joseph had the army to credit for the longevity of his reign and recognized its significance in keeping him on the throne, as well as its role in maintaining the strained bonds of the interethnic groups. after the revolutions, franz joseph, issued the maxim virbus unitis, “with united forces,” as the official motto of a renovated austrian army and as his personal mantra, bringing to attention the army’s policy of ethnic unity.134 the emperor furthermore took painstaking measures to connect himself to the official army visage as much as possible, considering himself “first soldier of the empire.”135 he and the army, much like the throne and the army, would be inseparable entities. if the emperor counted himself part of the armed forces, referring to the army as “his army,” what did the army think of franz joseph? it would appear the relationship was mutual, as the newspaper, the pester lloyd, stated, “franz joseph is not only the leader of the army in law, but also in fact. he is popular with the army because he is always in uniform, and many regard him as the oldest soldier.”136 the phrases dynastische loyalität (dynastic loyalty) and schwarz-gelb patriotismus (blackand-yellow patriotism, referring to the royal colors of the old imperial flag) were also widely used in expressing feelings of the armed forces.137 the phrases are indicative of the strong ties between the military and the dynasty without referring to any state patriotism, only stressing the loyalty to the dynasty and its symbols. as the nineteenth century progressed, however, the lexicographic revolution created a fierce conviction in europe that languages were the personal property of specific groups, and a particular language was the nucleus to which a nationalist movement formed their group and communities around.138 the dominance of german in the habsburg monarchy, especially in the army, alienated certain groups, and particular questions over the simple means of communication became hotly contested ideological battle grounds. despite all the measures to which franz joseph and the austrian military command took to combat nationalist tendencies, the language issue remained unresolved. 133 scheer, “habsburg languages at war,” 75. 134 ainsworth, “the austrian army,” 138. 135 laurence cole, “military veterans and popular patriotism in imperial austria, 1870-1914,” in the limits of loyalty: imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late habsburg monarchy, eds. laurence cole and daniel l. unowsky (new york: berghahn books, 2009), 37. 136 pester lloyd, 31 may 1908, 3. 137 baidins, “franz joseph, kaisertreue and loyalty in the late habsburg empire,” 71. 138 anderson, imagined communities, 84. 10 the extraordinary efforts of ordinary people in ukraine kristalena herman university of cambridge introduction: background on the ukrainian conflict after russia again invaded ukraine in 2022, the lives of many ukrainians were forever changed. over 10 million ukrainians have been displaced by the invasion, with an article from june stating that the rate of ukrainian casualties are between 600 and 1000 a day.1 the russian invasion of ukraine has created the largest refugee crisis in the world, its scale comparable to that of syria and venezuela, according to the united nations.2 as a result, many ukrainians are reflecting on their skill sets to see what they can do to benefit their country and help their communities. in june, ukrainian civilians raised over $20 million for 2 bayraktar armed drones, with forbes saying that 42.3% of the donations made were less than $3.40.3 musicians are organizing charity concerts to raise money for military and medical equipment, medical professionals provide first aid training, citizens arrange clean ups and local fundraisers, with some even creating non-profits in order to best support their communities. this phenomenon is happening all across ukraine, from lviv to kharkiv, zhytomyr to mykolayiv. to understand the war in ukraine as it stands now, one must first erase the idea that russia and ukraine are—or ever were—“brothers” as many politicians, including french president emmanuel macron, seem to believe.4 during the period of kyivan rus, which began in the ninth century, ukrainians emerged around the center of kyivan rus in kyiv. 1 trevor hughes, “‘we are too tired to be nervous’: some ukrainian refugees return home, despite escalating russian attacks,” usa today, march 23, 2022, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/03/23/ukrainian-refugees-return-despite-russianwar/7128658001/. dan sabbagh, “ukraine’s high casualty rate could bring war to tipping point,” the guardian, june 10, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/ukraine-casualty-rate-russiawar-tipping-point. 2 anna giaritelli, “displaced ukrainians now tie for largest refugee crisis worldwide,” washington examiner, august 31, 2022, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/displaced-ukrainians-now-tie-for-largestrefugee-crisis-worldwide/ar-aa11ktjt. 3 любов петрушко, “майже половину збору «народний байрактар» забезпечили внески до 100 грн. у фонді притули розповіли, як люди скидувались на безпілотники,” forbes, july 5, 2022, https://forbes.ua/news/kozhna-kopiyka-mae-znachennya-mayzhe-polovinu-zboru-narodniy-bayraktarzabespechili-vneski-do-1000-grn-u-fondi-prituli-rozkazali-yak-lyudi-skiduvalis-na-bayraktari-050720226997?fbclid=iwar1msit7uxgvwhy_isgfyk_krnokilssxwz1mdlcx70mchq71_o7kip9cwa. 4 simon bouvier, “macron rejects use of the term ‘genocide’ to describe russian atrocities in ukraine,” cnn, april 13, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-1322/h_e5589f9c279f7e5568fb9aebe5dfdb8e. 11 the state of kyivan rus was broken up by the mongol invasion in thirteenth century.5 the grand duchy of moscow emerged, which would later become russia, while ukraine and kyiv were absorbed by the grand duchy of lithuania. in the sixteenth century, the term ukraine came to refer to the area between poland-lithuania and the growing principality of moscow.6 many ukrainians fled religious persecution and serfdom from poland, and the cossacks led a successful revolution against polish rule in 1648. after breaking from polish-lithuanian rule, a treaty was created with moscow that allowed ukraine a measure of autonomy while still recognizing that moscow was “superior”; however russia did not respect the terms of this treaty and treated ukrainians with contempt.7 after becoming disillusioned by the alliance and the treatment of the ukrainian people, ukraine created a new treaty with poland.8 ukraine did not gain full independence until january 1918, but this was short lived and followed by years of violence and oppression perpetuated by the soviet state. in 1932, josef stalin committed genocide, referred to as the holodomor—an artificial famine that was created by the soviet state. it is estimated that 4 million ukrainians starved to death between 1932 and 1933 (although some scholars estimate that the number may be higher than 7 million).9 in 1991, ukraine gained independence once again from russia, but in 2014, russia invaded again and has since occupied the ukrainian territory of crimea. years of violence and oppression at the hands of the russian state fractures the view of many western countries that the two nations were ever brotherly. 5 “ukraine—history,” encyclopædia britannica, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/ukraine/history, accessed september 4, 2022. 6 “history—the past that shaped present day ukraine,” ukraine.com, https://www.ukraine.com/culture/history-of-ukraine/, accessed september 10, 2022. 7 “ukraine—history,” encyclopædia britannica. 8 “ukraine—history,” encyclopædia britannica. 9 “holodomor,” university of minnesota center for holocaust and genocide studies, 2018, https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor, accessed september 4, 2022. photo of the holodomor museum in kyiv taken in february 2020. https://www.britannica.com/place/ukraine/history https://www.ukraine.com/culture/history-of-ukraine/ https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor 12 with this longer history and the lasting impact of the holodomor in mind, it is easier to understand why ukraine must resist against russian aggression and why so many ukrainians have become involved in this resistance movement. there are hundreds of stories of ordinary ukrainians who have worked hard since the russian invasion to support their country and community. stories emerged of teachers who began projects to raise money and organize the transportation of thousands of ifaks (individual first aid kits) from america to ukraine for the ukrainian military. examples such as anna, who is a ukrainian social media consultant but began working with the charity organization star life after raising money independently to coordinate humanitarian aid for people of poltava and the purchase, transport, and delivery of bullet proof vests and military equipment to military regiments. or even stories like that of yulia tymoshenko, who was an analyst at a consulting company in kyiv prior to the invasion but now works in activist spaces for organizations, such as saint javelin, and raises money to support families who were victims of russian occupation in her hometown of zavorychi—changing the entire trajectory of her career path as a result of russian aggression. even organizations such as schools and hospitals had to pivot dramatically in the face of war and their focus and approach to work has changed dramatically since february 2022. schools in the west converted into refugee centers and schools in the east, such as the school i once worked at in konotop, raise money to support the demining of their area after the russian troops receded or collect funds to help schools in other areas heavier hit like chernihiv. it is impossible to condense each ukrainian’s experiences and incredible stories of strength, resilience, and resistance to russian oppression uniquely into one article. when i asked two ukrainians about their experiences, they described how their perspectives have transformed with the war and the changes they saw in ukrainians in their community. interview with oleksii: working to provide humanitarian aid in mykolayiv oleksii is the owner of concord project ltd. and ceo of a medical facility in mykolayiv, a city that has been bombarded by russia nearly every day since the beginning of the war.10 since february, he has been coordinating not only humanitarian aid but also courses on tactical medicine, raising funds, and acquiring necessary equipment, such as ambulances and trauma kits, and even establishing a water filtration system to give citizens access to clean drinking water. how would you say your mindset and your approach to work has changed since february 24th? once the war began, we started organizing and focusing on how we could provide immediate help—anything we could do to help the community. because of my project management skills, i knew i would be really helpful in organizing within the community. my friends are here, my work is here, and i understood that leaving the country was not realistic or helpful. 10 this interview took place in july. since then, there have been renewed attacks on mykolayiv. 13 as for my approach to work and my profession, business is difficult due to the invasion, so we all shifted to volunteering and helping actively within the community. we started focusing on local problems first. for example, we knew that stores didn’t have any food, so we started working on gathering food for the community. we tried to be responsive and help with any new issues that arose. now that stores have food, we are able to focus on new issues like ambulances and water filtration systems. how has your work changed as the invasion continued? what would you say things looked like in the early weeks compared to now? with volunteers and donations from abroad, i reached out to people i had been interacting with previously about how they can help us. as things continued, mykolayiv was getting bombed every day, so working on architecture would be futile. we have recently started to begin rebuilding mykolayiv. we opened a market, and the clinic began providing humanitarian help free of charge. we also began helping the nearby city of kherson because our situation in mykolayiv is improving. we offered them free medical care and labor. right now, the situation is a little different [and mykolayiv is not being bombed as often], the danger seems more distant. we are doing our jobs and must continue to live and work. we must focus on systematic and economic assistance instead. if we don’t work, if we don’t continue our economic processes, then we will have an issue for the whole nation. what role did other ukrainian civilians play in your war effort? for example, volunteering, fundraising, etc.? we had over 100 ukrainians who assisted as volunteers, but every ukrainian fundraises and works actively to help with the war effort. we had a lot of help in the beginning. in mykolayiv everyone tried to become very actively involved in the war effort. we did not want the russians to move into mykolayiv. in kherson they took longer to organize photo of oleksii's office in mykolayiv after it was bombed on september 15, 2022. 14 themselves and were unable to slow russian forces as a result. our work was to ensure that they would not take mykolayiv and odesa. ukraine is the type of nation that is very united and works hard. we always come together to persevere in difficult situations. interview with zhanna: finding opportunities to help in zhytomyr i also spoke with zhanna, the director of a non-profit in zhytomyr, called the zhytomyr community fund, which was founded in 2012. when the war began, the non-profit which typically focuses on microgrants and supporting local businesses and entrepreneurs turned its attention to community efforts to provide humanitarian aid. can you explain what you did for work prior to the invasion in february? i worked in the nonprofit sector and my main goals were to help and sustain the community and programs focused on business and entrepreneurship. [the zhytomyr community fund] had experience working with internally displaced people (idp) from 2015 to 2019. we partnered with the state’s agency of immigration, and we focused primarily on jobs and things for zhytomyr. working with idps is not new for this organization and on the first day of war, we realized it was necessary to do something. i made the choice for the direction of the program and worked with the organization. i went to city council to raise money with the community fund. i was thinking, “what are my strengths and experiences? what can i do? i don’t know what i will fundraise for or what goals we have, but i need to do it.” i asked the city council what goals we had for our community and what ends we are working towards. the deputy of the city council called on february 25th to ask if i could start the campaign by myself. at first, my colleagues did not want to be a public face for the campaign because of the inherent risks associated with it. since then, we managed to raise over $450,000 over four months as just a small local community foundation, and we received money from all around the world. we managed to help idps, victims of russian soldiers, the military, etc. we are currently working to buy military cars and to support students from lyceum 25, which was destroyed. the war made us professionals in many different fields. we would modify our roles as new people joined the team and remain flexible as some members were evacuated and work remotely while others stayed and worked. everything is very transparent—people from abroad wanted to provide humanitarian aid and now the idps are able to receive that support. everyone was just trying to look for opportunities to help. how would you say your mindset and your approach to work has changed since february 24th? you start to feel professional burn out—it influenced emotional well-being and physical well-being. i realized that it is necessary to find at least one day per week to rest. the work had such an influence on everyone, and we have all aged so much since the invasion. it is impossible to make long-term plans. you must plan only for the short-term. we are looking for different opportunities to help—lyceum 25 buys materials for these students such as desks, chairs, and computers to organize a place for them to study. for the older students, maybe they can study online, but younger students need the structure of in-person classes. 15 right now, we are focusing on uniting people and fundraising for cities beyond zhytomyr to help other children in ukraine. lyceum no. 25 in zhytomyr, ukraine, after being bombed on march 3, 2022. photo from zhytomyr community fund. since the invasion, would you say that there is a stronger sense of identity and community among ukrainian civilians? the ukrainian spirit—people came to realize that they are ukrainians. their identity became stronger, and they united because they found common ground fighting against russian terrorists. people can unite their resources and information. this organization has been working with philanthropy long-term—you can volunteer, provide your expertise, and you can provide information to others as a volunteer. this war made it so that every single ukrainian became a volunteer in some capacity. they give whatever they can—cook food at home and bring it to defense centers, bring information and share, etc. the war relief effort has been extremely unified. everyone realized that they should do something to defend the community, the city, their own family, and themselves. it is really valuable. for the people who are opposed to russia, it is very valuable to be ukrainian. they are giving their lives and are victims of aggression and violence at the hands of russian soldiers. ukraine is the wall between russia and europe. ukrainians are giving their lives to defend not only ukraine, but all of europe and their values. if ukraine were to stand down, they would move on to moldova. what role did other ukrainian civilians play in your war effort? for example, volunteering, fundraising, etc.? a lot of new initiatives and non-profit groups have started in zhytomyr. people started to create charitable organizations and civil society, but they don’t necessarily follow the rules. 16 there are some problems with this because they may be criminal and embezzle money— whether intentionally or due to lack of experience and knowledge. [the zhytomyr community fund] can be an example to these new organizations of how to do things properly. we can also provide support for smaller initiatives that started after the russian invasion, organizations which could give a bad reputation to humanitarian organizations and civil society because of their inability to properly track finances or provide transparency. people realized they could be useful in some way after the invasion, and they noticed another purpose for life. they recognized that they could be helpful to their community, city, and country, even if by only helping one other person. it is something that helps motivate them to keep going. they noticed a reason they can be helpful and become a part of something in a positive way. it is not possible to work with just humanitarian aid for a non-profit. the community foundation is a charitable organization to work on things that we need in the community such as microgrants and financial assistance. how has your work changed as the invasion continued? what would you say things looked like in the early weeks compared to now? we added support of military units and of individual soldiers. before the invasion, we didn’t have that experience—it was only the victims and idps. right now, we are looking for programs to help idps—we made a survey of idps in zhytomyr. it is interesting to me that food is the most important issue; 82% confirmed that food is the first priority. second priority is housing and homes. third category is work and employment. we focus our activities and projects on these priorities and modify our approach based on their feedback. it is necessary to change things because of the war as our ongoing projects were frozen and we had to modify our new plans. we had a project for a civil society organization and were creating plans for education, operations, subgrants, etc. now we’ve signed with many local civil society organizations to conduct activities in their communities within the context of war. we provide information to these new organizations for them to learn about fundraising and project management. what impact do you think the zhytomyr community fund has on the community? how would you describe the relationship of the organization and the community population? we follow the principle that we should understand the needs and respond to these needs. as a civil society organization, we did our best with the resources we had. we became helpful and we assist in any way we can—if we had more human resources, maybe we could be more effective, but always you can be more effective. but with the resources we have, we just did our best. it is truly the results of our whole team and not just of me as a single person. we are responsible for the donations, and it is our responsibility to spend the money in an effective way. our activity could leave an impact as we can show how civil society organizations need to make reports, be transparent, and be an example to others. maybe there is a chance for other organizations to follow this example and show the city and government that civil society can provide support. the government could feel like they have a partner in civil society sphere. i don’t think that we did a lot of things, we just did something, but it is not enough to just stop the war. everything we’ve done and what we will do doesn’t stop the war and it’s hard to see the light at the end of the tunnel. 17 donation boxes to support idps at the zhytomyr community fund's office. photo from zhytomyr community fund. for others outside of ukraine, what would you say is the most important thing for them to know about the work of non-profits like zhytomyr community fund? how can we continue to support ukraine on the ground? it’s important to understand that russia has more resources and money and they abuse the situation with ukraine. it is important to help us by giving ukrainians a voice in your country and uplifting ukrainian experiences and voices whenever possible. it is great support to show that this is not only a war in ukraine, but it is a problem for everyone all over the world. so the first way to help is to help with spreading information and using ukrainian sources to combat disinformation from russia. second, if you have any ability to help us acquire weapons, especially for long distance weapons, this would be really useful. ukraine has only four of these machines to cover hundreds of kilometers on the frontline. third, it is important to provide assistance to the ukrainians who are abroad. it is important to support those in your country. it is impossible to know when this will end, and it is important to continue to support these communities over the long term. the russians have truly destroyed everything, and many refugees don’t have a place to live in ukraine as russians burn the land afterward. fourth, if there is any opportunity to provide assistance and support for ukrainians at the frontline, this would help immensely. you may have the ability to provide anything that can be useful or to give something to support them. 18 concluding thoughts while the war in ukraine is ongoing, it is important to remember the people affected at the center of it. while news sources focus on how russian aggression continues to demolish infrastructure and threaten nuclear power plants, it is important to remember the effect the war continues to have on civilians. ukrainians continue to lose their lives and livelihoods to russian aggression and are often subjected to war crimes in occupied territories.11 it is the tireless work of ordinary ukrainians like oleksii, zhanna, and many others that has made the difference in not only taking back land from russian occupation but holding their position in the east and supporting their communities in the aftermath. ukrainians continue to unite to fight, rebuild, and support one another through countless acts of bravery and resilience. it is imperative to recognize the sacrifice many ukrainians make in their fight against oppression and for freedom and independence in eastern europe. to support zhanna’s organization in zhytomyr, visit фонд громади житомира/zhytomyr community fund for more information, including detailed reports of financial records and spending. to support oleksii and mykolayiv, visit in united force for more information. to learn more about other ways to support ukraine, visit the government’s official webpage at https://war.ukraine.ua/support-ukraine or visit www.defendukraine.org for a list of verified fundraisers and charities. to support refugees, you can look into refugee resettlement programs working in your area. for the us, information can be found at ukrainian assistance resources | the administration for children and families (hhs.gov). 11 russia's war crimes: beyond evil, even during war, ukraine.ua, 2022, https://war.ukraine.ua/russia-warcrimes/, accessed 1 september 2022. http://www.fondgromady.org.ua/en/ http://www.fondgromady.org.ua/en/ https://inunitedforce.com/finansova-dopomoga/ https://war.ukraine.ua/support-ukraine http://www.defendukraine.org/ https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugees/ukrainian-assistance-resources https://war.ukraine.ua/russia-war-crimes/ https://war.ukraine.ua/russia-war-crimes/ 114 encounters with native americans in early colonial georgia the salzburger emigrants and their reports on interactions with indigenous peoples fabia weisser ludwig-maximilians-universität münchen abstract in the 1730s, a group of religiously persecuted salzburgers found refuge in the newly established colony of georgia. two pastors, johann martin boltzius and israel christian gronau, accompanied the men, women, and children on their way to the new world. between 1733 and 1760, the pastors composed letters and diary entries about the challenges in adapting to their new home, which they named ebenezer. a significant portion of the descriptions of their new “heimat” includes encounters with indigenous peoples. the salzburgers and their native american neighbors not only exchanged commodities and gifts but also interacted through acts of kindness and charity. the austrian emigrants’ leader, boltzius, also sought to teach indigenous peoples—whom he frequently portrayed as wild pagans yet intrinsically good people—about christianity. the salzburgers’ accounts of their encounters with native americans, described in a collection of diary entries and letters known as the detailed reports, reveal the many difficulties they faced in cross-cultural interactions, including language barriers and essential cultural and religious differences that elevated a sense of distrust and resentment between both groups. as the political circumstances in america’s southeast changed, so did the descriptions of native americans by the pastors. article in 1731, a small group of lutheran salzburgers from austria were expelled from their home due to religious persecution by catholic bishop leopold anton eleutherius freiherr von firmian and found refuge in the newly established colony of georgia. in the new world, the salzburgers and their spiritual guides, pastors johann martin boltzius and israel christian gronau, were confronted with a foreign and unknown environment as well as a novel group of people. in this new land, the salzburgers established their settlement, which they named ebenezer. the settlers frequently encountered their indigenous neighbors but faced challenges in cross-cultural communication and the establishment of diplomatic relationships. the relationship between colonial and tribal authorities, as well as interactions between the salzburger colonists and their indigenous neighbors, are an essential part of the history of ebenezer. the ebenezer community benefited from diplomatic relationships with authorities in the old world and local indigenous clans. the 115 interactions between the salzburgers and the indigenous community were driven by curiosity and initially had peaceful foundations, which were bolstered by treaties forged between colonial authorities and indigenous chiefs, but cultural misunderstandings contributed to strife between the groups. the detailed reports, a collection of diary entries and letters composed by boltzius and gronau, reveal the many encounters of the ebenezer community with indigenous peoples and provide remarkable insights into the emigrants’ challenges in the new world.1 this article explores two key questions: what was the nature of the encounters between the salzburgers and the local native american peoples? how did boltzius—who composed the vast majority of the detailed reports—depict indigenous peoples? while the conventions between georgia’s founder, james edward oglethorpe, and the yamacraw chief, tomochichi, are important, my work focuses on the nature of boltzius’s reports on interactions with the salzburgers’ native american neighbors, including the yuchee, creek, and cherokee. to explore the nature of the encounters of these groups, i examine the key topics of trade, gift exchanges, and accounts of kindness in the detailed reports but also outline accounts of troublesome behavior. the diary entries and letters speak of friendship and cooperation but also frequently describe the native americans as “others” who were “crude and daring” and “aroused … pity because they [knew] nothing of the great love of god.”2 the encounters were often marked by distrust, and the language barrier between boltzius and the native americans may have been one of the most important reasons for misunderstandings and suspiciousness. religion and the missionary desire also remained an incessant matter, even though a successful conversion of native americans was never recorded in the detailed reports. through a close analysis of the detailed reports, this article reveals how boltzius’s depictions of native americans and his accounts of pity, anger, and fear for the seemingly poor, ungodly souls served to construct and strengthen the salzburgers’ identity as christian and “civilized” settlers. the salzburgers prior to migration in his study of ebenezer, historian james van horn melton observes that there is an imbalance in scholarly analyses of the salzburgers in their “heimat” and in the new georgia settlement, with most existing scholarship focusing on the salzburgers’ lives in british 1 the original, the ausführliche nachricht von den saltzburgischen emigranten, die sich in america niedergelassen haben. worin, nebst einem historischen vorbericht von dem ersten und anderen transport derselben, die reise-diaria des königlichen groß-britannischen commissarii und der beyden salzburgischen prediger/ wie auch eine beschreibung von georgien imgleichen verschiedene hierzu gehörige briefe erhalten (augsburg: francke stiftung halle, 1735), was first published by augsburger pietist samuel urlsperger as an edition of all of boltzius’s and gronau’s letters and diary entries, intended for the german-speaking audience at home. a former professor of german and comparative literature at the university of maryland, george fenwick jones published eighteen volumes of the english edition between 1968 and 1995. the english editions serve as the underlying sources for this research. 2 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1972), 3:220. detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1969), 2:29. 116 america.3 melton’s work on the salzburgers is remarkable for its strong focus on the central european context of the exiles’ journey to the new world. the work of melton has shown the importance of understanding the european context of the salzburgers’ migration especially in regard to religious struggles the exiles had experienced in their alpine home.4 protestantism spread in salzburg and its surrounding territories in the 1520s. according to melton, protestant ideas originally stemmed from gastein miners who were temporarily employed in saxony’s erzgebirge and brought the reformed religion back with them.5 many of the miners kept their protestant beliefs private and outwardly pretended to be catholics.6 with the decline of the miners’ economic importance due to increasing production costs and the decreasing value of precious metals, the rumors about “geheimprotestanten” (secret protestants), which salzburg’s archbishop was aware of, resulted in a strong rise of religious prosecutions in the late seventeenth century until the 1730s.7 yet many continued to practice their religion by singing protestant hymns and reading protestant books for which geschwandel and a group of seventeen other men were arrested for in 1726.8 the driving forces that led to the expulsion were archbishop leopold anton von firmian and his chancellor, hieronimus cristani di rallo, who was appointed in 1731. starting in 1728, firmian asked for the help of jesuit missionaries to combat the secretly protestant believers throughout alpine salzburg and restore the catholic faith.9 in 1731, protestants from pongau addressed their oppression to the corpus evangelicorum in regensburg, citing the archbishop’s violation of the peace of westphalia (1648) and asking for intervention, for the end of prosecutions and the allowance to emigrate.10 such a request was considered a rebellious and potentially dangerous threat to the salzburg government. after the pongau protestants heard of a planned investigation in their territory, they held a famous meeting in schwarzach where they strengthened their shared decisiveness by dipping their fingers into a vessel of salt and then licking it (“salzlecken”).11 the house-searches, specifically for lutheran books, conducted by the jesuits resulted in the spread of arrests and punishments, yet they also strengthened the loyalty of protestants to their faith.12 after the 3 james van horn melton, religion, community, and slavery on the colonial southern frontier (new york: cambridge university press, 2015), 9. melton points to charlotte e. haver, who put a stronger focus on the european context yet also without a thorough analysis of individuals lives prior to their migration. see charlotte e. haver, von salzburger nach amerika. mobilität und kultur einer gruppe religiöser emigranten im 18. jahrhundert (paderborn: verlag ferdinand schöningh, 2011). 4 melton stresses the overlap of three worlds when analyzing the salzburgers’ history: “one was the local alpine world they brought with them, a world still dominated by the confessional struggles of an earlier age. the second was a pietist world, one they entered when boltzius became their pastor … the third, finally was the ‘entangled’ atlantic world of the georgia colony and its british sponsors.” see melton, religion, community, and slavery, 12. 5 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 20. 6 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 22. 7 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 22. 8 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 54. 9 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 61. 10 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 61 and 74. 11 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 75. 12 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 74. 117 announcement of the edict of expulsion of protestants by archbishop firmian in october 1731, more and more protestants left their home to live in exile. those who later found refuge in the new world made their way through central europe towards england. the salzburgers found support in augsburg, which at that time was the center of south german pietism, and specifically from augsburg’s senior lutheran pastor samuel urlsperger, himself an expelled protestant from styria.13 urlsperger represented an important tie between europe and america. he was involved in a network with the society for promoting christian knowledge (spck), an organization that participated in the establishment of the new georgia colony, and august herrmann francke, the leader of the halle pietists. halle pietists devoted themselves to charity and established an orphanage and also had an enormous variety of commercial sectors, such as a manufacturing plant for pharmaceuticals and a printing office.14 both johann martin boltzius and israel christian gronau were halle pietists. not much is known about the two reverends before their migration to georgia. according to melton, the pastors were former teachers at the pietist latin school in halle and were chosen by urlsperger to accompany the salzburgers on their journey to the new world.15 gronau served as boltzius’s assistant.16 to help achieve the collective goal of spreading faith, the spck supplied the ship purrysburg on which the first exiles traveled to the new world.17 the close relations between samuel urlsperger in augsburg, august hermann francke in halle, and the spck also explain potential collective efforts in global missionary work. urlsperger furthermore first published in germany the conditions for emigration to georgia by the trustees, a governing group responsible for the establishment of the georgia colony under king george ii of england.18 these collective efforts aided the salzburger settlers and were instrumental in the establishment of the settlement. language barrier and efforts of conversion johann martin boltzius served as a link between benefactors in the old world and the community of salzburgers in ebenezer. he also acted as a liaison between native peoples and colonial authorities, specifically oglethorpe, the founder of the georgia colony. it is of great importance to analyze the halle pietist background of boltzius and his fellow pastor gronau, who were sent from halle to accompany the salzburgers and met them in rotterdam, since pietist ideas about missionary activity in the eighteenth century were essential to boltzius in regard to potential conversion efforts of native american peoples.19 according to historian hermann wellenreuther, missionaries who were sent to america from halle believed that conversion of non-christians could only be achieved through a long process, involving the acquisition of christian self-awareness, which would then 13 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 99f. 14 melton, religion, community, and slavery, 101. helmut obst, august hermann francke und die franckeschen stiftungen in halle (göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 2002), 57. 15 see james van horn melton, “from alpine miner to low-country yeoman: the transatlantic worlds of a georgia salzburger 1893 – 1761,” past & present, no. 201 (2008): 97–140, here p. 118. 16 see detailed reports, 2:xi. 17 melton, “from alpine miner to low-country yeoman,” 118. 18 haver, von salzburger nach amerika, 66. 19 haver, von salzburger nach amerika, 75. 118 replace pagan beliefs and ideally result in baptism.20 to further this process, the halle clergymen especially focused on instruction in catechism.21 while wellenreuther points to a broader context of halle missionary activities, wolfgang flügel’s work provides a more focused study of ebenezer and similarly argues that the ebenezer pastors very well had missionary intentions and aimed at the conversion of native americans.22 charlotte haver supports flügel’s statement by pointing out that boltzius wished to enlarge the kingdom of god through the conversion of indigenous peoples and the pastors’ many references to the desirous conversion of tribal people.23 boltzius’s diaries suggest that he was interested in spreading christianity among the local peoples. it is, however, reasonable to conclude that the remarks in this regard aimed to distinguish them from the indigenous populations and also were potentially part of the pastors’ efforts to show their loyalty to halle in the reports, as well as expounding the putative problem of native americans as pagans. furthermore, historian julie ann sweet argues that european clergymen often “approached conversion expecting complete submission to every aspect of their society, not just religion.”24 sweet’s argument suggests the conversion to christianity served as a means to assimilate indigenous peoples into european society. despite these myriad motivations, the detailed reports also reveal essential problems regarding the efforts to put conversion of the local indigenous peoples into practice. these factors inevitably include the anticipation of encounters with native americans, which are to be analyzed in more detail later. the language barrier indubitably represented the most dominant obstacle. the difficulty of communication represents the underlying reason for why the detailed reports do not report a single instance of conversion of native americans by the salzburger community. boltzius’s wish to learn the language of the local tribe, the yamacraw, is especially strong in 1734 and 1735, the early years of the salzburgers’ settlement in old ebenezer. the pastor continuously repeats his wish to learn the natives’ language to promote christianity among them; for example, he stated in november 1734: “our ignorance of their language prevents us from showing them the way to eternal life.”25 his efforts were further complicated by the different indigenous languages of the local tribes. scholar sean harvey offers a possible explanation to boltzius’s apparent confusion over the many different languages. long before european contact, native americans used pidgins to ensure inter-tribal communication.26 harvey argues that many europeans expressed confusion over the seemingly constant switching of native americans’ 20 hermann wellenreuther, “pietismus und mission. vom 17. bis zum beginn des 20. jahrhunderts,” in geschichte des pietismus—bd. 4: glaubenswelt und lebenswelten, ed. hartmut lehmann et. al. (göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 2004), 168–195, here, p. 171. 21 wellenreuther, “pietismus und mission.” 22 wolfgang flügel, pastoren aus halle und ihre gemeinden in pennsylvania 1742–1820. deutsche lutheraner zwischen persistenz und assimilation (berlin: walter de gruyter gmbh, 2019), 87. 23 haver, von salzburger nach amerika, 106. 24 julie anne sweet, negotiating for georgia: british-creek relations in the trustees era, 1733-1752 (athens: university of georgia press, 2005), 95–96. 25 detailed reports, 2:19. 26 sean p. harvey, native tongues: colonialism and race from encounter to the reservation (cambridge: harvard university press, 2015), 24. 119 languages, even of people of the same clan.27 given these language difficulties, it is reasonable to assume that in the case of the salzburgers’ encounters with native americans, the frequently observed clash of religious beliefs in north american colonial historiography, which often resulted in syncretism or forced conversions, did not take place in this situation. even if forced conversions and syncretism did not take place, it is possible that different ideologies, specifically judeo-christian beliefs of human superiority over nature and native american mythologies of all life on earth and nature as equipollent, still led to misunderstandings and conflicts.28 in addition to boltzius’s difficulties overcoming the language barrier to convert local native americans, the salzburgers faced troubles of their own. much like other colonies in the new world, the salzburgers were a settlement of religiously persecuted and needy people. as much as the pastor may have wished to teach indigenous peoples about christianity, the salzburgers themselves relied heavily on the support of benefactors in the old world and were greatly occupied with the efforts for the preservation of ebenezer. even though oglethorpe and other british colonists seemed to have encouraged the pastor to convert locals, boltzius notes the difficulty of this task, in january 1737: the english preacher who has been sent here for the conversion of the heathen has requested the help of some of our people to prepare a piece of land which he has been given by the indians. however, everybody is so busy with his own work that it seems impossible to take up work for others. as we have noticed, this preacher is most concerned with learning the language of the indians; it may be said that he has ample time for this, since he has no children other than a single indian boy whom he instructs in his school.29 even though boltzius was preoccupied with more pressing matters, his desire to learn the natives’ language does not seem to vanish throughout the composition of his diary. even in the second to last year of publication of the detailed reports in 1759, when the relationship between both groups became increasingly hostile, boltzius states: “may god in the richness of his mercy show ways and means of bringing poor negroes and indians, of which there are very many in this colony, to a true knowledge of himself and his son … on the side of the indians and negroes, the greatest hindrance … is the deficiency and the inability in understanding their languages and expressing spiritual matters.”30 suggestions related to the accommodation of the indigenous peoples in the latter years mostly stem from those outside the salzburger community and never came from the pastor himself. the diversity of encounters 27 harvey, native tongues, 24. 28 willard hughes rollings, “indians and christianity,” in a companion to native american history, eds. philip j. deloria and neal salisbury (malden, ma: blackwell publishing, 2004), 121–138, here p. 122. detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1976), 4:7. 30 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1993), 17:46. 120 boltzius’s descriptions of native americans in the detailed reports repeatedly portray the indigenous neighbors as “crude and daring.”31 the many different encounters between the salzburgers and the local tribes, however, also depict acts of helpfulness and charity on both sides. this section seeks to shed light on the variety of cross-cultural interactions and the boltzius’s judgements about native americans through analyzing selected instances of various encounters, which are based mostly on claims to personal interactions as well as hearsay. the interactions of the salzburgers and native americans can be categorized by the distinct aims of the many different encounters, such as trade, gift giving, and acts of favors. crosscultural interactions between the salzburgers and their indigenous neighbors oftentimes unavoidably led to misunderstandings and, as can be seen in the later years of the detailed reports, an increasing animosity between both groups. this animosity may have been fostered by the cultural differences between both groups, as well as political restrictions and the influence of alcohol. therefore, the encounters, whether they were of social or economic nature, should not be understood as consistent behavioral patterns that always led to the same reactions, as evidenced by boltzius’s remarks. it is noteworthy that descriptions of trade with native americans in the detailed reports declined from approximately 1740 onwards. there seem to have been increasing animus towards native visitors. boltzius’s mood shifts during this time, and even though in previous reports he often did not speak highly of the local tribal people, by 1740 he complained that “dwelling alone in the woods is unsafe, what with thieves, indians, and other bad folk.”32 the missing volumes of the years 1742 and 1743 make it difficult to provide information about a specific turning point. yet after this time, the apparent aggravation of the relationship between the salzburgers and the local tribes seems more pronounced. many of the pastor’s statements in 1744 point at an increasing enmity towards the yuchi: “[t]he bad-natured uchee indians came to our place,” as well as towards native people in general.33 reports of thievery become more common in these years. for example, a report by boltzius on may 31, 1744, states: “so far they have become entirely lawless and unbridled, and the authorities have no power in their hands to restrict them the least bit in their wickedness and excesses. we hear great complaints about the indians in the country, yet no help can be provided.”34 here, boltzius also describes his helplessness over the seemingly savage behavior he depicts. the decline of amicable descriptions of the closest indigenous neighbors may have been furthered by political changes opposing native american interests. as joshua piker points out, with oglethorpe’s departure to england in 1743 (he never returned to georgia again), complaints by both the 31 detailed reports, 3:220. 32 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1983), 7:172. 33 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1995), 18:23. 34 detailed reports, 18:76. 121 yuchi and the colonists rose when georgia officials stopped their protection for yuchi lands and both groups considered each other intruders.35 how strongly cultural misunderstandings influenced a decline in well-disposed depictions of native americans in the detailed reports becomes evident in boltzius’s description of being presented with scalps. on june 1, 1751, he reported: “one of them brought a bundle of scalps which they are accustomed to pull off along with the hair from the enemies they have shot, into my room to show me. however, because i showed my displeasure at that, another … who seems to be the chief of this party, spoke seriously to him, so he packed up his disgusting wares.”36 although in this passage boltzius claims to have understood native american customs of war, his expression of disgust suggests otherwise. pauline turner strong points out that presentations of scalps were frequently used by native americans to show allied colonists their loyalty to them.37 such descriptions by boltzius served to portray native americans as savage and uncivilized people. as previously mentioned, comparisons like these were common among european settlers, as they served to set clear distinctions between those who considered themselves to be civilized, the colonists, and those who were depicted as seemingly wild peoples.38 commodity trade differences in mores and expectations surrounding trade could also lead to misunderstandings. this section examines the goods traded by the salzburgers and local indigenous peoples. while it is important to point out which products were of specific interest in a cross-cultural exchange, it is also important to analyze what the trade and exchange of goods meant for colonists on the one hand and native americans on the other hand. conventions of gift-giving and trade for economic purpose often stood in conflict. the detailed reports indicate the salzburgers’ repeated confusion over the satisfaction of potential gift expectations of indigenous peoples. the salzburgers were not involved in large-scale trade alliances, nor did they seek to achieve wealth through trade with native americans, as many other settlers attempted to do via the trans-atlantic deerskin trade. this trade, between cherokees, creeks, various other tribes, and colonial powers, was due to an increasing demand of furs in europe from the 1670s onwards and the primary form of exchange between colonists and native americans in the southeast.39 other typical trade items included “metal tools, cotton cloth, 35 joshua piker, “to the backcountry and back again,” in yuchi indina histories before the removal era, eds jason baird jackson (lincoln: university of nebraska press, 2012), 189-213, here p. 200. 36 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1990), 15:770. 37 pauline turner strong, “transforming outsiders: captivity, adoption, and slavery reconsidered,” in a companion to native american history, eds. philip j. deloria and neal salisbury (malden, ma: blackwell publishing, 2004), 339–356, here p. 346. 38 roy h. pearce, savagism and civilization: a study of the indian and the american mind (berkeley: university of california press, 1988), 5. 39 gregory d. smithers, native southerners: indigenous history from origins to removal (norman: university of oklahoma press, 2019), 66. 122 guns, ammunition and liquor.”40 while the detailed reports does not cover all potentially exchanged goods, as the pastors may not always have been informed about all business between tribes and salzburgers, the detailed reports suggest that the natives and salzburgers often traded meat and produce. among the items mentioned in the detailed reports that were traded between the ebenezer community and tribes are honey, rice, gourds, beans, syrup, bread, beer, and meat.41 the role of alcohol, specifically rum, is also repeatedly mentioned in boltzius’s diary entries. in her study of the salzburgers in america, haver suggests that trading encounters with native americans were neutral, meaning they resulted neither in negative nor in positive responses, but in the detailed reports, it becomes evident that boltzius not only mentions the exchange of goods but also draws conclusions based on his personal observations of native americans.42 for example, in his entry on january 20, 1737, he reflects: “we again have a few indian families with us who have brought us fresh meat; but they ask much for it. among them can be found honorable, good, and kind men who are easy and pleasant to get along with.”43 this statement strongly contradicts haver’s argument and rather highlights that many of the encounters, among them trade as an exchange for goods or favors, often provided the basis for judgements of native peoples who also spawned amicable feelings on boltzius’s side. as reflected in the salzburgers’ conclusions about the behavior and nature of indigenous peoples, encounters always led to diverse subjective perceptions of the seemingly savage yet intrinsically good native neighbors. the salzburgers also provided clothing or favors for native americans. for example, on march 4, 1736, boltzius notes that “an indian brought a whole deer to our house … his shirt was torn completely and we provided a new one for him.”44 it is not clear whether the shirt was given in exchange for the meat or out of pity and grace of charity. however, it is of specific interest, since in an entry only two days prior on march 2, 1736, boltzius notes: “[a] few indians came to our place with one of their chiefs and set out the following day for savannah to fetch their gifts. to please them, all the men at our place were called together. they had to perform their exercises in the manner of the ordinary militia in germany for such a long time that it ran over into our prayer hour … in this way mr. vat [jean vat, a swiss commissioner responsible for the transport of the salzburgers to georgia] wanted to show the indians that our people were capable of defending themselves in case of emergency. the following night more men than otherwise usual had to stand watch.”45 this quote suggests that the salzburger community potentially relied on the supply of meat by native americans, since they were skilled hunters, but they nonetheless also feared them as a threat to the ebenezer community. showing off putative capability to defend themselves also served to show off seemingly civilized fighting skills to the indigenous visitors. 40 michael p. morris, the bringing of wonder: trade and the indians of the southeast, 1700–1783 (westport, ct: greenwood press, 1999), 3. 41 see for example: detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1980), 5:177. 42 haver, von salzburger nach amerika, 107. 43 detailed reports, 4:8. 44 detailed reports, 3:67. 45 detailed reports, 3:66. 123 the exchange of goods for money was a rather uncommon practice. in the “short report on georgia and the indians” by baron philipp georg friedrich von reck, printed in the first published volume of the detailed reports, the commissioner states: “money or gold they will not take and it is completely unknown to them.”46 boltzius only once mentions the exchange of goods for money in the detailed reports in his entry on september 4, 1740. however, the pastor indicated that the native american woman who was involved in the trade was not part of the tribes that the salzburgers usually exchanged goods with: “the indians otherwise are not used to trading in money, but these do it, only they take no other money than english or spanish silver.”47 this entry is noteworthy because boltzius describes an argument between a “certain person [who] had dealings with the indians and bought from them colorful material for a skirt” and the above-mentioned native american woman who, as boltzius states, later returned because she regretted the sale and demanded the material back.48 according to boltzius, the salzburger woman “resisted strongly but finally had to acquiesce, because otherwise i would have reported the matter to savannah.”49 the reason for boltzius’s rigorous intervention was the act for maintaining peace with the indians in the province of georgia, which, according to sweet, governor oglethorpe declared on behalf of the trustees after he returned from his trip to england in 1736.50 as sweet details, colonists who sought to participate in trade with native americans first had to purchase a license to do so in savannah for five pounds and extend the permission once per year. furthermore, business was only permitted with native american communities who were at peace with georgia.51 it remains unknown whether the trade between the salzburger and the native woman was considered illegal by boltzius for the sake of business with an antagonistic tribe or simply because the salzburger woman did not possess a license. while it is reasonable to argue that boltzius wished the ebenezer community to follow the laws issued by the trustees, the question arises how the salzburgers still continued to exchange commodities with native americans after oglethorpe declared the need for a costly traders’ license. the detailed reports suggest that boltzius aimed to further distance their interactions with native americans as he increasingly described them as a potential threat to the salzburgers. in his entry on september 11, 1740, only one week after the argument over the purchased cloth, boltzius states: “although the few indians who had been with us for some weeks left a few days ago, today we got all the more of these uninvited guests … the englishman at old ebenezer had to have his corn guarded from these people last night, and hence there is concern here that they will do more harm than the previous ones. this evening i will admonish the congregation not to enter into any trade with these people; for in this way we may be rid of them that much sooner.”52 the 46 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1968), 1:135–148. 47 detailed reports, 7:229. 48 detailed reports, 7:229. 49 detailed reports, 7:229. 50 sweet, negotiating for georgia, 97. 51 sweet, negotiating for georgia, 98. 52 detailed reports, 7:234. 124 increasing caution with which boltzius observed the indigenous visitors may also account for his displeasure with the trade. the fine line between gift exchanges and commercial trade seemed to not always be unambiguous to the pastor. a quote from december 12, 1741, suggests that boltzius sometimes was confused over whether to consider something as a gift or trade item: “today a well-formed and courteous man called on me and offered me a buffalo skin. i do not know whether it is a present or whether i should give him something else for it, because i wish to have no dealings with him in that regard. the lord trustees have forbidden all those who have no licentia … on pain of severe punishment, to trade with the indians … one is rid of them sooner if one has no commercial dealings with them.”53 according to joseph m. hall’s argument in zamumo’s gifts: indian-european exchange in the colonial southeast, gifts, in the context of encounters of colonists with native americans, were frequently offered without an immediate demand for a compensation in return, but consequently indebted the receiver of the gift.54 this would suggest that the buffalo skin was a present; however, boltzius seemed to have felt the obligation to offer something in return. his concern over the lack of a license can therefore be interpreted in two possible ways: a fear of punishment or a lack of understanding of gift-giving customs. while the pastor, according to the passage, was primarily worried about a punishment due to performing illegal acts of trade with native americans, the entry in the detailed reports suggests a general confusion and lack of understanding for when to decode such actions as trade or gift giving. according to jessica stern, “[i]n the southeast there was great overlap between gift goods and commodity goods, despite the fact that people who purchased items had fewer obligations than those who received items as presents.”55 stern’s argument offers an explanation to boltzius’s concern over his indebtedness towards the gift giver and also points at a common confusion over the meaning of offered goods. furthermore, adding to boltzius’s confusion, native americans had different reasons for trade than the colonists. as historian colin calloway states, “trade was a way of cementing alliances, preventing conflict, making and renewing friendships; it was an exchange of gifts hedged around by social and ceremonial considerations.”56 given these different possibilities, boltzius was forced into the position of deciphering each exchange as a trade, a gift, or as some other gesture. gift exchange this section analyzes occurrences of gift exchange between indigenous peoples and the salzburgers as portrayed in the detailed reports. analyzing gift exchanges between native americans and colonists first requires differentiating between commodities and gifts, since these acts of exchanges differed in regard to social and cross-cultural implications. according to stern, commodities were chosen by native americans, who accepted specific 53 detailed reports, 8:528. 54 joseph m. hall jr., zamumo’s gifts: indian-european exchange in the colonial southeast (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2009), 7. 55 jessica yirush stern, the lives in objects: native americans, british colonists, and cultures of labor and exchange in the southeast (chapel hill: the university of north carolina press, 2017), 103. 56 colin g. calloway, new worlds for all: indians, europeans, and the remaking of early america, 2nd edn. (baltimore: the john hopkins university press, 2013), 44. 125 trade items from colonists, which would then enter their community.57 a second difference is that gifts were often more symbolic and often remained in the same physical state after they were given to the recipient, while commodities were frequently used or reconfigured by the recipient for their own purposes.58 furthermore, gifts were used to create social relationships, while at the same time establishing hierarchical structures among groups and individuals.59 it certainly is not always feasible to identify the exchange of goods as gifts. as mentioned in the previous section, boltzius himself seemingly found it difficult to distinguish between gifts and trade.60 however, in the beginning of the detailed reports, boltzius does not predominantly speak of encounters with native americans for the sake of trade. rather, accounts speak of food exchange without the apparent personal commercial gain of either community. the first time boltzius mentions such an interaction is on april 4, 1733: “the indians are coming to see us often because now and then they are given some food and drink. they give us many indian words when we show them the objects which we want to know in their language.”61 according to this entry in the detailed reports, the salzburgers seem to have shared their food, without demanding goods in return, in order to learn more about the natives’ language. stern categorizes gifts of food and clothes as “gifts of hospitality.”62 the attribute of hospitality is what both the salzburgers and the local indigenous population arguably had in common. it is reasonable to assume that boltzius sought to show his peaceful intentions to the native visitors. according to stern, native americans showed hospitality through the offering of food to identify “one party as the outsider and the other as the insider.”63 in an entry from july 26, 1734, boltzius notes: “two of the indians that were here recently came to see me this morning and brought some venison. doubtless this was to be in return for what they enjoyed at my house not too long ago.”64 the passage shows the pastor’s understanding of the venison as a counter-offering for the hospitality he provided, but whether the two indigenous visitors understood the offering of the deer as the return of a gift is uncertain. given boltzius’s difficulty in determining what constituted a gift and what constituted a commodity exchange, one may question whether the intention of the two indigenous visitors was to mark the salzburgers as guests and express a peaceful tolerance of the colonists, rather than a counter-offering for his earlier hospitality. overall, the accounts in the detailed reports that may be classified as gift giving frequently centered around food. the earliest account of gift giving by local native americans to the ebenezer community was reported by the preachers on may 2, 1733: “a few days ago an indian came to the neighborhood of abercorn in a small boat, with his wife and two children. because we had done several things for him, this morning he brought us a whole 57 stern, the lives in objects, 135. 58 stern, the lives in objects, 135. 59 stern, the lives in objects, 94. 60 detailed reports, 8:528. 61 detailed reports, 1:70. 62 stern, the lives in objects, 96. 63 stern, the lives in objects, 97. 64 detailed reports, 2:113. 126 deer so that we could give large pieces to the salzburgers … because we gave him, in return for this gift, some rice, bread, brown sugar, and syrup, he came back in the evening with another half of a deer.”65 this account shows how potential misunderstandings regarding different conceptions of gift exchange led to a domino effect of indebtedness. this backand-forth necessitated repeated exchanges on both sides. stern refers to this account in the detailed reports as a gesture of hospitality by the yuchi and notes how gifts of food by this tribe and by the yamacraw did not necessarily mean that they accepted the salzburgers as permanent residents of the land.66 her work draws attention to the inherent power dynamics of exchange and gift giving. stern argues that english colonists, accustomed to social conventions from the old world, used gifts for two purposes: “individuals declared their superiority over the receiver. but gift giving could also be subversive. by giving a large gift to someone who was considered one’s equal or superior, an individual of lower station could aspire to a new and higher position.”67 stern furthermore argues that, in an attempt to constantly maintain the balance of social hierarchies, colonists were compelled by their own concept of gift giving to offer counter presents to native americans “thereby turning dependent relationships into reciprocal relationships.”68 in the detailed reports , boltzius frequently mentions his anger over seemingly uninvited indigenous guests and their demands for gifts. already in the early years of the salzburgers’ settlement, for example on july 12, 1734, boltzius noted that a group of native americans “asked for and received meat and beans at our place because they had no provisions with them. some of them do not mind asking the people for anything they may see. even in my room an indian was attracted by a number of things.”69 the pastor expressed his apparent indignation over the openly demanding attitude of the visitors. yet the pastor also acceded to the obligation of handing out what the guests asked for, since he seemingly feared them. this becomes evident, for example, in his entry on october 26, 1736, when boltzius is visited by “[t]hree robust young indians” and admits, “[o]ne flatters these savage people greatly to keep them well disposed and friendly; but because of it they become more daring and think that we must treat them as they wish and give them what they demand.”70 this disclosure points at a tense relationship between groups, in which boltzius feels threatened yet tries to keep a peaceful attitude. according to stern, settlers often complained about indigenous peoples asking for what appealed to them or—in the eyes of europeans—crossing boundaries by inviting themselves into someone’s home.71 stern suggests that “[r]ather than being greedy or immoral, as many colonists assumed, it is possible that this behavior signified that southeastern indians were proclaiming these areas as their hûti … [t]he southeastern indian practice of demanding items was a means of claiming space, of affirming solidarity, 65 detailed reports, 1:81. 66 stern, the lives in objects, 98. 67 stern, the lives in objects, 98. 68 stern, the lives in objects, 98. 69 detailed reports, 2:109. 70 detailed reports, 3:233 and 234. 71 stern, the lives in objects, 111. 127 and of establishing political superiority.”72 this would point to the native americans’ attempt to position themselves hierarchically above the salzburgers who were relatively new neighbors. stern’s approach thus suggests one explanation for what boltzius potentially observed as daring and aggressive behavior. furthermore, in his book the bringing of wonder: trade and the indians of the southeast, 1700–1783, michael morris argues that from a native american point of view, the sole ability to distribute gifts placed such individuals in a superior position in indigenous societies.73 hence the detailed reports suggest that the seemingly demanding behavior of the local tribes contributed to a continued feeling of discontent on boltzius’s side instead of the development of an understanding about indigenous practices of trade and gift giving. therefore, even in august 1740, boltzius still expressed his irritation over the seemingly uninvited indigenous guests: “for a week now, a few indians have been with us who are not of the best kind. they go into gardens and fields and take whatever suits their fancy; and the people have to put up with it, because they do not like to get too near them.”74 the increasing animosity towards the local tribes peaks in boltzius’s descriptions of the peoples, as, according to the pastor, “they have become entirely lawless and unbridled … a couple of years ago they robbed our gardens, fields, and huts.”75 in her study of gifts and trade in colonial georgia, clare levenson argues that native american customs demanded gifts from the colonists for every new agreement.76 the continuing exchange of gifts, as levenson points out, was driven by indigenous ideas about the establishment of a reciprocal relationship that was initiated by the first exchanges of gifts between the georgia settlers and the native inhabitants for land.77 on july 25, 1750, boltzius recalled a ceremony of annual gift giving in the detailed reports: “last week, a party of indians had come to savannah in order to get the presents which, by order of the king, they receive each year; clothing, blankets, linen, pretty boxes, woven cloth, rifles, powder, lead, axes, knives, and other household items. instead of showing gratitude to, and affection for, the white people, these indians first behaved disgracefully in savannah; and then, take with them from gardens, fields, and paddocks.”78 even though the salzburgers were not directly involved in this act of gift exchange, this passage by boltzius shows that such occasions, whether the pastor witnessed them himself or only based his reports on hearsay, formed a basis for conclusions regarding native americans and their behavior. these conclusions were subsequently passed on to the audience in the old world. the pastor’s reports of ungratefulness and even thievish behavior evidently points at a conception of indigenous peoples as savages. the increasing skepticism and animosity with which the pastors characterized their indigenous neighbors seemed to have suppressed 72 stern, the lives in objects, 112. 73 morris, the bringing of wonder, 2. 74 detailed reports, 7:223. 75 detailed reports, 18:76. 76 claire s. levenson, “the impact of gifts and trade: georgia colonists and yamacraw indians in the colonial american southeast,” in the political economy of empire in the early modern world, eds. sophus a. reinert and pernille røge (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2013), 147–172, here p. 147. 77 levenson, “the impact of gifts and trade,” 154. 78 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1989), 14:101. 128 reports of acts like gift giving over time. in the 1740s, boltzius hardly ever mentions gift exchanges between salzburgers and native americans; rather, he remarks on the official distributions of presents by the trustees in savannah. the increasingly cool relationship between the ebenezer community and their nearest neighbors, the yuchi, may be explained through oglethorpe’s return to england in 1743 and the georgia officials ending protection for them.79 this likely sparked anger amongst the european colonists, and, according to joshua piker, also led to complaints about unfriendly behaviors of the settlers on the side of the yuchi.80 overall, the detailed reports predominantly noted acts of gift giving in the early years of the salzburgers’ settlement. the increasing skepticism and fear that dominated boltzius’s later descriptions of native american visitors to ebenezer, as well as accounts of the distribution in savannah, may have led to an avoidance of any encounters with indigenous peoples. boltzius might have also decided to stop reporting about gift giving for unknown reasons. accounts of kindness even though the mentioning of gift exchanges between native americans and the ebenezer community declined, favorable accounts can be found throughout the detailed reports. boltzius frequently mentioned his own hospitality towards native americans who visited the ebenezer community, even in the later years when fear and defiance seemed to dominate his depictions of the neighbors. for example, in his entry on june 1, 1751, he writes: “when i came home i was told that a party of uchee indians had come to our place the day before yesterday and gotten very drunk and had made a lot of noise. just as they are usually accustomed to stop at my house as often as they come here, they took the opportunity this time also. we gave them some food and drink … because we lie somewhat apart or remote, they will presumably wish to remain here for a while, but this does not please us.”81 in the later years, boltzius’s acts of generosity and respectful hospitality seemed to be designed to avoid possible threats, as he emphasized his disinclination over the visitors. boltzius’s depiction of native americans as savages was not a new phenomenon in the later years; quite the contrary. in an entry on october 3, 1736, for example, boltzius opined: “these people are very crude and daring, and we are as careful as possible not to come too near them.”82 despite many entries depicting native americans as uncivilized, boltzius also reported multiple accounts of their readiness to help the salzburgers. some noteworthy accounts in which mutual assistance was granted described medical aid. for example, boltzius stated on november 9, 1737: “an indian borrowed a lancet from us to bleed a sick old indian, who has been here for several days.”83 while this passage is the only one that mentions the help provided by the salzburgers to their native neighbors in the form of a medical tool, the descriptions of medical assistance provided by native 79 piker, “to the backcountry and back again,” 200. 80 piker, “to the backcountry and back again,” 200. 81 detailed reports. 15:69–70. 82 detailed reports, 3:220. 83 detailed reports, 4:193. 129 americans to the ebenezer community draw upon more astonishing acts of helpfulness. for example, in the pastor’s entry on april 11, 1739, one of these inspiring actions was detailed: “a woman here has had a lame foot for a year; and, since nothing seems to work, she has shown the foot to an indian who showed by his gestures that he wished to help her. he asked for a glass bottle, which he broke, and then shard to a point as for a lance. he then punctured the skin around both swollen ankles, as is done for bleeding; but, when no blood flowed, he sucked it out by mouth, and this caused her some relief.”84 this account shows reciprocal helpfulness between both groups, as well as astonishment over indigenous medical practices that seemed outlandish to the pastor. a much later entry by boltzius on october 1, 1754, described native american cures for snakebites: “they make an incision into the wound so that the infected blood can be drawn out quickly and as profusely as possible. then they hold a flowing ember or some other red hot object close to the wound so as to extract the poison. in this manner, they cured a young man in old ebenezer about a year ago.”85 bloodletting was a common practice among europeans in the eighteenth century and was believed to cure a variety of diseases.86 as an example given by historian jane merritt suggests, non-christian native communities in pennsylvania adopted bloodletting as medical aid from moravian settlers.87 it is unknown whether the indigenous neighbors of the salzburgers had copied such practices from european settlers or conducted such procedures as part of their own medical care. in addition to providing medical assistance, the native americans also provided physical assistance to the salzburgers, albeit sporadically. one instance, detailed on july 21, 1741, recalls how native americans helped construct the ebenezer church: when i went to the orphanage this evening … i saw, to my great pleasure, three or four young indians contrary to their habits (for they consider work to be a disgrace) helping the construction workers place the timbers on the almost half constructed church, which was a lot of fun for them. i recalled what i had read yesterday about the building of solomon’s temple, namely, that he used not only born jews but also strangers and foreigners, as a prefiguration that during the time of the new testament god would build his holy temple through and among jews and heathens.88 here, boltzius draws a connection between his own christian belief and the native americans’ readiness to help build the church. it is important to note that accounts like 84 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1981), 6:66. 85 detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1991), 16:193-194. 86 see jane t. merritt, “dreaming of the savior’s blood: moravians and the indian great awakening in pennsylvania,” in american encounters: natives and newcomers from european contact to indian removal, 1500 – 1850, 2nd edn., eds. peter c. mancall and james h. merrell (new york: routledge, 2007), 178–200, here p. 194. 87 merritt, “dreaming of the savior’s blood,” 194. detailed reports on the salzburger emigrants who settled in america…edited by samuel urlsperger, ed. and trans. george fenwick jones et al. (athens: university of georgia press, 1985), 8:312. 130 these in the detailed reports should be acknowledged as exceptions rather than regular occurrences. however, these acts of kindness helped foster a community of coexistence between the salzburgers and their indigenous neighbors. boltzius likens the native americans’ help to the strangers in a biblical reference. while he was seemingly pleased about the offer of help, this example also shows that the pastor nonetheless labeled tribal people as distinct and as outsiders who were to be distinguished from the christian community of salzburgers, despite the help they offered. boltzius therefore assigned characteristics of laziness and paganism to native americans. as noted above, boltzius viewed native americans as intrinsically good yet primitive heathens, portraying them as “noble savages.” other examples of favorable encounters suggest that boltzius frequently had a benevolent attitude towards native americans that was based on christian charity rather than amicable pleasure. this is reflected in the many accounts of native americans who stayed over at ebenezer. for example, on june 1, 1751, boltzius’s account states: “just as they are usually accustomed to stop at my house as often as they come here, they took the opportunity this time also … they are in flight from other indians; and, because we lie somewhat apart or remote, they will presumably wish to remain here for a while, but this does not please us.”89 while boltzius expressed his displeasure over the visitors, he let them stay, as his entry one day later suggests: “on this trinity sunday the indians behaved quiet and sober.”90 this shows that the pastors’ discontent was often driven by concerns over bad behavior and drunkenness. it cannot be determined whether boltzius let the visitors stay out of fear or if he extended the invitation to stay out of christian charity. a combination of both may, however, have been possible. conclusion the many challenges in the establishment of the colony of georgia influenced boltzius’s depictions and understandings of native american identity. the constructed image of native americans in the detailed reports was not homogeneous, but boltzius generally described the indigenous peoples as primitive pagans. even when boltzius positively portrayed the actions and behavior of native americans, he often described them as primitive yet intrinsically good people. less generous descriptions of native americans— especially in the later years—labeled them as hostile savages and noted frequent actions of ungodly and troublesome behavior. as shown by the preceding examples, the detailed reports reveal the many difficulties which the salzburgers and native americans faced in cross-cultural interactions. the accounts from ebenezer exhibit a strong contradiction between the christian background of the pastors and the—as depicted by boltzius—savagery of indigenous peoples. furthermore, the language barrier and essential cultural and religious differences posed problematic preconditions for reciprocal understanding. even though both groups worked together and helped each other occasionally, the elevated distrust and resentment over 89 detailed reports, 15:69–70. 90 detailed reports, 15:71. 131 encounters with native americans in the latter year of the detailed reports show an increasing disparity between both groups. ultimately, the language barrier was not overcome. boltzius’s curiosity and efforts at conversions remained secondary to other priorities. as the years progressed and boltzius’s accounts of native americans became increasingly hostile, it became clear that his kindness was borne out of his inclination for christian charity rather than actual friendship. therefore, the tribes were often described as intrinsically uncivilized and savage, leaving boltzius willing yet helpless to change their situation for the supposedly better. the pastor apparently identified good in the native americans, but he repeatedly bemoaned his inability to teach the indigenous neighbors about god. cultural misunderstandings and incomprehension of customs during economic and social exchanges, especially those involving gifts, furthered the chasm between the salzburgers and native americans. 147 a fancy of prince bismarck? bismarck’s strategic aims for the expulsions of 1885 sam hall university of st andrews abstract in 1885, german chancellor otto von bismarck ordered the expulsion of over 30,000 nonnaturalized poles and jews from germany’s prussian provinces. this article explores bismarck’s strategic aims behind his decision to authorize one of the most extreme policies of his career. after examining the current historiographical assertion that the expulsions were a manifestation of antisemitic and anti-polish clamor within german society, this article investigates bismarck’s strategic aims for the expulsions within the context of domestic politics and international relations. this article argues that these policies actually aimed to harm bismarck’s parliamentary critics and foreign powers threatening the reich that he had constructed. article we are told we must leave ̶ ̶ ̶ leave home and every kind of business for a fancy of prince bismarck. it seemed too ridiculous, too mad, too barbarous. but there was no mistake at all. who is to thwart prince bismarck in his pia desiderata? would you believe they have obliged already 35,000 people to leave this province, selling off in a hurry, some larger properties, some their miserable furniture? no one is excepted, neither women nor children. “a friend of poland” to the times, november 18851 this letter to the times reveals the degradation and social upheaval that families were forced to endure as a consequence of otto von bismarck’s order to expel over 30,000 nonnaturalized poles and jews from the prussian provinces in 1885. citizenship in imperial germany was based on the principle of ius sanguinis: a subject held the citizenship of their parents, primarily through their father. if a foreigner had settled in germany but had not been granted legal citizenship by the state, their children and grandchildren were also not guaranteed citizenship, even if they were born in germany. it was left to the state’s 1 anonymous, “the expulsion of the poles from prussia,” the times, november 26, 1885, 18, https://go-galecom.ezproxy.standrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=single tab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898 &doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztmamod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=st and&inps=true, accessed november 26, 2021. https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=41&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=16&docid=gale%7ccs302827898&doctype=letter+to+the+editor&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs302827898&searchid=r2&usergroupname=stand&inps=true 148 discretion who received a “certificate of naturalization.”2 the letter to the times shows how arbitrarily the state appeared to expel people based on this citizenship law. people had to leave their homes for “a fancy of prince bismarck.” many onlookers were equally bewildered as to why bismarck had endorsed this overtly inhumane policy. allgemeine zeitung des judenthums (general newspaper of judaism; azdj), an influential liberal newspaper, described the expulsions as inconsistent with both the interests and legal norms of the state. deputies in the landtag too argued that there was no economic sense behind the expulsions, with migratory russian and austrian workers a crucial part of the junker economy.3 historians have attempted to uncover the rationale behind the expulsions. many who have explored the experiences of minority groups within the reich, such as poles and jews, have concluded that the expulsions were the government’s antisemitic and anti-polish attempt to tackle social and demographic change in prussia. dieter gosewinkel suggests that the expulsions were a way of addressing the state’s problem of integrating non-german speakers into germany, while jack wertheimer argues that they were the state’s response to the influx of russian jews in germany, who had fled the pogroms triggered by the assassination of alexander ii in 1881.4 often historians have studied the expulsions of 1885 as part of a long-term colonial strategy enacted by the state to “germanize” the eastern prussian provinces. robert lewis koehl has argued that they were a planned precursor to the more elaborate royal prussian colonization commission, which sought to settle western germans in the prussian-polish provinces from 1886-1918.5 richard blanke has contested koehl’s view. he has argued that bismarck called for the creation of the colonization commission to spite reichstag deputies because of their fervid reaction against his decision to carry out the expulsions.6 whilst blanke credibly differentiated the expulsions from the colonial policy that followed, like koehl, he primarily focuses on prussian-polish policies post 1885, providing a limited analysis of the expulsions. there has been a lack of recent scholarship in the english language that gives a detailed, standalone account of the expulsions. even less work has attempted to cover bismarck’s rationale for endorsing this provocative policy. the most up-to-date biography of bismarck, 2 anonymous, “law on nationality and citizenship (june 1, 1870),” german history in documents and images, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1830, accessed february 26, 2021. 3 matthew p. fitzpatrick, purging the empire: the mass expulsions in germany, 1871-1914 (oxford: oxford university press, 2015), 104, 136. 4 peter c. caldwell, review of einbürgern und ausschliessen: die nationalisierung der staatsangehörigkeit vom deutschen bund bis zur bundesrepublik deutschland [naturalization and exclusion: the nationalization of citizenship from the german confederation to the federal republic of germany], by dieter gosewinkel. the journal of modern history 75, no. 2 (june 2003): 453; jack wertheimer, unwelcomed strangers: east european jews in imperial germany (oxford: oxford university press, 1991), 42-47. 5 robert lewis koehl, “colonialism inside germany: 1886-1918,” the journal of modern history 25, no. 3 (september 1953): 260. 6 richard blanke, “bismarck and the prussian polish policies of 1886,” the journal of modern history 45, no. 2 (june 1973); 215. http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1830 149 jonathan steinberg’s bismarck: a life, surprisingly does not mention the expulsions.7 matthew fitzpatrick’s more recent purging the empire covers the policy in detail but attributes the main motivation behind the expulsions to provincial pressure, giving a limited exploration of bismarck’s own strategic aims for a decision that brought his reputation into question, both domestically and internationally. 8 this article argues that bismarck had his own strategic aims in ordering the expulsions of 1885. firstly, i show that while bismarck shared german society’s antisemitic and antipolish tendencies of the time, his views were not pronounced; he primarily constructed representations of these groups through a political lens. i then contextualize bismarck’s decision to order the expulsions within the sphere of domestic politics to show that this policy was partly motivated by political expediency. lastly, i build upon recent scholarship that has proven that the expulsions were primarily aimed at poles, as opposed to jews, to explore the gains bismarck made in his foreign policy by ostracizing this ethnic group.9 overall, this article unearths bismarck’s relationship with his reichsfeinde (enemies of the empire), construed in this era as germany’s cultural and ethnic minorities.10 antisemitism, anti-polonism, and bismarck the removal of 20,000 poles and 10,000 jews has led many historians to portray the expulsions as a manifestation of racist and cultural xenophobia within german society.11 edgar feuchtwanger called it an early example of “ethnic cleansing,” while christopher clark has argued that there was a readiness to placate “public opinion” that served as the background for the expulsions.12 fitzpatrick also believed that the expulsions were caused by pressure from below, arguing that provincial authorities called for the government to remove jews and poles who they deemed undesirable.13 yet, it is unclear the extent to which bismarck participated in this racist and cultural hatred of jews and poles and whether his aims for carrying out the expulsions were driven by “public opinion.” the essence of german antisemitism in the second half of the nineteenth century was by no means lucid. shmuel ettinger has argued that its roots derived from the romantic revival of mystical catholicism at the turn of the century, resurrecting medieval christian doctrines that preached a hatred for judaism.14 an antisemitic petition presented to bismarck in april 1881 shows the presence of this “confessional antisemitism” as a force within german society prior to the expulsions. signed by 250,000 citizens, it called for “jews to be excluded from all positions of authority” and the immigration of “alien jews” to be “at least 7 jonathan steinberg, bismarck: a life (oxford: oxford university press, 2011). 8 fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 93-142. 9 fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 123-142. fitzpatrick has refuted the claim made by wertheimer that the expulsions were antisemitic in nature, arguing convincingly that poles were bismarck’s principal target. see also wertheimer, unwelcomed strangers, 42-74. 10 edgar feuchtwanger, bismarck (london: routledge, 2002), 234. 11 feuchtwanger, bismarck, 235. 12 christopher clark, iron kingdom: the rise and downfall of prussia 1600-1947 (london: penguin, 2006), 585. 13 fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 93-122. 14 shmuel ettinger, “the origins of modern anti-semitism,” in the nazi holocaust, part 2: the origins of the holocaust, ed. michael r. marrus (munich: de gruyter, 1989), 220. 150 limited.”15 christian identity was conflated with german identity, arguing that “germanic ideals of honor, loyalty, and genuine piety” were being displaced by a jewish “cosmopolitan pseudoideal.”16 the hohenzollern court chaplain in berlin, adolf stöcker, a notable signatory of the petition, founded the christlich-soziale arbeiterpartei (christian social workers’ party) in 1878.17 his vision of a christian renaissance held no place for judaism within germany.18 stöcker’s well-attended speeches proclaimed that “the reich’s capital city was in danger of being de-christianized and de-germanized” because of berlin’s prevalent jewish population.19 hence, prior to the expulsions, confessional animosity was a powerful component of german antisemitism. by the late 1870s, antisemitism was not limited to this traditional christian judeophobia, as it began to adopt racial undertones. the atheist wilhelm marr founded the antisemitenliga (league of antisemites) in 1879, which explicitly vilified jews based on their culture and race alongside espousing an anti-christian outlook.20 this turn towards a racist and cultural antipathy for jews evolved partly from the literature and academia of the period. a best-selling book, gustav freytag’s soll und haben (debit and credit), contrasted the character of the protagonist anton wohlfahrt, an honest and humble german, with the antihero, a polish jew called geitzel itzig, known for his “highest cunning.”21 similarly, richard wagner’s essay what is german?, published in 1878, argued that german and jewish characteristics were remarkably different, labelling jews as exploitative of german “mind and genius.”22 racial antisemitism was also compounded by the work of ernst haeckel, who made the ideas of social darwinism—the notion of a struggle between humans for existence—popular in germany.23 thus, prior to the expulsions, antisemitism was a potent force in society, consisting of a traditional confessional animosity alongside a growing cultural and racial antipathy for jews. bismarck was not immune to the antisemitic tendencies prevalent in german society. on more than one occasion, the chancellor was overheard employing the term jew in a derogatory manner. he referred to his political rival, the progressive liberal eduard lasker 15 otto pflanze, bismarck and the development of germany, volume iii: the period of fortification, 1880-1898 (princeton: princeton university press, 1990), 49; anonymous, “anti-semites’ petition, 1880-1881,” german history in documents and images, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1801, accessed february 5, 2021. 16 pflanze, bismarck and the development of germany, 49. 17 werner jochmann, “structures and functions of german anti-semitism 1878-1914,” in hostages of modernization, 1: germany—great britain—france, ed. herbert a. strauss (berlin: de gruyter, 1993), 42. 18 d. a. jeremy telman, “adolf stoecker: anti-semite with a christian mission,” jewish history 9, no. 2 (fall 1995): 99-100. 19 adolf stöcker, qtd. in telman, “adolf stoecker,” 97. 20 jochmann, “structures and functions of german anti-semitism 1878-1914,” 43. 21 gustav freytag, qtd. in steinberg, bismarck, 390. 22 richard wagner, “what is german?,” german history in documents and images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2543, accessed february 9, 2021. 23 richard weikart, “the origins of social darwinism in germany, 1859-1895,” journal of the history of ideas 54, no. 3 (july 1993): 475-476. http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1801 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2543 151 as “the little jew” and, on another occasion, described jews as “cosmopolitan nomads.”24 some in the country’s political sphere went as far as to label bismarck as the “father” of antisemitism. in response to a heightened level of antisemitic agitation during the early 1880s—jewish homes, shops, and synagogues were damaged in the cities of thorn, neustettin, and stolp—the liberal landtag deputy eugen richter chastised bismarck for encouraging jewish persecution through his inaction.25 on the 12th of january 1881, richter contended that the antisemites began “to cling to the coat-tails of prince bismarck” and that they “go right on cuddling up to him and call to him as noisy children surround their father.”26 to an extent, richter’s powerful speech was true. prior to the 1881 reichstag elections, bismarck had confided in his son wilhelm that the appointment of stöcker to the chamber was “urgently desirable,” describing the antisemitic flagbearer as “an extraordinary, militant, and useful ally.”27 yet bismarck’s antisemitic views were not as pronounced as those of many of his antisemitic subordinates. his relationship with his jewish personal banker and confidant, gerson von bleichröder, from 1859 to 1893, is testament to this. in 1872, bismarck influenced the kaiser to make bleichröder the first prussian jew to enter the ranks of the nobility, a reflection of bleichröder’s indispensable role in financing the wars of unification and his close relationship with bismarck.28 in the early 1880s, when bismarck was pressured from both sides to show his inclination for antisemitism, bismarck did not abandon his confidant. he reacted furiously in june 1880 when stöcker’s attacked bleichröder for amassing a fortune and cheating christians, and bismarck subsequently never responded to the antisemitic petition presented to him in april 1881.29 hence bismarck did not fully endorse the impassioned antisemitism prevalent in germany prior to the expulsions of 1885. bismarck’s antisemitic views lacked the militancy and the aggressive racial arguments that, by the 1880s, were captivating antisemitic minds. racial hatred for jews was particularly prevalent amongst younger generations; committees formed at most german universities urging students to support the antisemitic petition presented to bismarck in april 1881. the chancellor was out of touch with this generation; steinberg has argued that by the 1880s, bismarck was the “national grandfather,” as he failed to keep pace with german culture, never reading the works of freytag or attending wagner’s operas.30 even stöcker, who subscribed to the traditional christian judeophobia and later endorsed the racial argument against jews to gain support, was twenty years younger than bismarck.31 this 24 otto von bismarck, qtd. in louis l. snyder, “bismarck and the lasker resolution, 1884,” the review of politics 29, no. 1 (january 1967): 44; otto von bismarck, bismarck’s table talk, trans. and ed. charles lowe (london: h. grevel and co., 1895), 199. 25 steinberg, bismarck, 398; pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 51. 26 eugen richter, qtd. in steinberg, bismarck, 398. 27 otto von bismarck, qtd. in pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 51. 28 fritz stern, “gold and iron: the collaboration and friendship of gerson bleichröder and otto von bismarck,” the american historical review 75, no. 1 (october 1969): 37-44. 29 stern, “gold and iron,” 50; anonymous, “anti-semites’ petition, 1880-1881.” 30 steinberg, bismarck, 418-419. 31 telman, “adolf stoecker,” 93-108. 152 suggests that explicitly racist antisemitism was an ideology heralded by a younger generation of which bismarck, seventy years old in 1885, was not part. rather than antisemitism featuring as a primary factor behind bismarck’s conduct as chancellor, his antisemitic views were subordinate to his political expediency. at a family dinner in varzin, bismarck outlined his position in response to heightened antisemitic activity in 1881: nothing can be more unfair. i condemn very decidedly the crusade against the jews, whether on the ground of religion or of race. one might with equal right propose to assail germans of polish or french extraction on the ground that they were not germans. that jews should prefer to follow a commercial pursuit is simply a matter of taste. it may, indeed, be founded on their exclusion from other callings, but it is certainly no justification to make their greater affluence a ground for those inflammatory remarks which i find so very objectionable, because they provoke the envy and malevolence of the masses. i will never agree to jews being denied any of the rights which constitutionally are theirs. the mental organisation of the jews inclines them to criticism, and so one generally finds them in opposition. i make no distinction, however, between christian and jewish opponents to the principles of economic policy which, according to my convictions, i contend for as being useful to my country.32 while it is impossible to determine bismarck’s inner thoughts from his public words, the above speech heard by his immediate confidantes was unlikely to hold an ulterior political motive. bismarck explicitly condemned the “crusade against the jews,” while simultaneously othering the jews as different from the masses by their “commercial pursuit[s]” and “mental organisation.” however, bismarck concluded that his primary outlook towards the jewish population was determined by economic policy and what he determined as “useful” to “his country.”33 notwithstanding that bismarck viewed the term “jew” as a derogatory term and often made comments that can only be deemed as antisemitic, his political decision-making was not driven by a fervid hatred for judaism. during the early 1880s, poles suffered increasing ostracism within german society. freidrich neumann’s germanisierung oder polonisierung? (germanization or polonization?), published in 1883, criticized the demographics of posen, particularly the dominance of the polish language and catholic confession.34 likewise, eduard von hartmann’s der rückgang des deutschtums (the decline of germanness), published in january 1885, urged for the “germanization of the poles” to “eliminate slavdom inside our [german] borders,” to ensure that the “history of cultured nations is not to sink markedly.”35 these sentiments manifested in an anti-polish outlook at the prussian 32 otto von bismarck, bismarck’s table talk, 236. 33 otto von bismarck, bismarck’s table talk, 236. 34 friedrich j. neumann, qtd. in fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 131. 35 eduard von hartmann, qtd. in fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 131-132. 153 provincial level. bismarck was presented with numerous reports in early 1885 from puttkamer and the prussian minister of spiritual, educational, and medical affairs, gustav von goßler, detailing provincial concerns about the heavy burden migrant poles were placing on prussian provinces. goßler informed bismarck of the apparent “catholicizing” of prussian schools and that polish children were being educated at the state’s expense.36 this was more a reflection of the prussian authorities’ distaste for poles than a real demographic concern. the german population of the area was in negligible decline, decreasing from 35.1 percent in 1871 to 33.9 percent in 1890, hardly justifying goßler’s and puttkamer’s anxieties.37 bismarck’s personal views on poles shared a similar vehemence to the views of neumann and hartmann, but as otto pflanze has argued, bismarck’s outlook towards the polish cause was primarily “political rather than racial or cultural.”38 as a deputy in the prussian landtag in 1848, bismarck unveiled his primary concern vis-à-vis the poles as a threat to prussian national security. he warned that the “polish element in posen” had no other goal than the “restoration of an independent polish state,” meaning that the “best sinews of germany would be severed [posen, west prussia, and ermland]” and “millions of germans would fall prey to polish arbitrariness.” bismarck stressed that no matter the compromise made with the poles, they would be “our sworn enemies” until they had “conquered from us the mouth of the vistula.”39 his speech was partly a commentary on the polish uprising in the grand duchy of posen that had followed the wave of revolutionary protests across europe from 1848-1849. though even after the polish liberal-nationalist revolution was extinguished by the prussian monarchy in april 1849, bismarck was consistent in perceiving prussian poles as a security threat to prussia.40 in 1861, he wrote privately to his sister malvina: “[f]lay the poles until they despair of life! i have all sympathy for their position, but if we wish to endure, we can do nothing else but extirpate them.”41 likewise, in his memoirs, published in 1898, he alluded to “polish plots against the king and his state” as a factor in embarking on the kulturkampf (culture struggle).42 bismarck’s perception of the poles as a security threat to the german nation was not entirely unfounded. the poles benefited greatly from napoleon’s occupation of the germanic states, leading to the creation of the duchy of warsaw in 1807, a polish state in all but name. though the duchy followed napoleon’s demise, it left a long-lasting mark on polish imagination. france became identified as a potential ally for the polish nationalist 36 fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 101-102. 37 william w. hagen, germans, poles, and jews: the nationality conflict in the prussian east, 1772-1914 (chicago: university of chicago press, 1980), 138-139. 38 otto pflanze, bismarck and the development of germany, volume i: the period of unification, 1815-1871 (princeton: princeton university press, 1963), 186. 39 otto von bismarck, qtd. in hagen, germans, poles, and jews, 123-124. 40 hagen, germans, poles, and jews, 109-110. 41 otto von bismarck, qtd. in hagen, germans, poles, and jews, 126. 42 otto von bismarck, bismarck, the man and the statesman: being the reflections and reminiscences of otto, prince von bismarck, vol. ii (new york: harper & bros., 1898), 139-141. 154 struggle.43 this was evident during the franco-prussian war (1870-1871). the provincial government of posen received an alarming number of reports detailing polish support for france and attempts to persuade reservists to desert the army. bismarck was fully aware of polish subversion during the war and moved several battalions of silesian militia to stabilize the province.44 bismarck constructed his views of poles and jews upon the immediate political context rather than subscribing to a cultural or racist antipathy. on occasion, the chancellor was prone to making antisemitic slurs, but he did not adopt the racial views of the growing antisemitic movement during the 1880s. he saw the prussian poles as a threat to national security, believing that the coexistence of both a german and a polish state was impossible. therefore, it is apparent that bismarck’s aims for carrying out the expulsions in 1885 were not a manifestation of antisemitic and anti-polish sentiments within “public opinion.” to unearth the strategic aims for enacting the expulsions requires examination of bismarck’s position in the realms of domestic politics and foreign policy. the expulsions and bismarck’s political expediency prior to the expulsions of 1885, bismarck had repeatedly ostracized ethnic minorities for political gain. as part of the kulturkampf in 1871, bismarck had attempted to break up the catholic centre party, the reichstag’s second largest party, by persecuting catholics.45 bismarck followed a similar tack preceding the 1881 reichstag elections. while he reacted furiously when stöcker attacked bleichröder and jews who supported the state, he was apathetic to antisemitic attacks on his political enemies, such as the social democrats.46 in both instances, bismarck had directed his domestic policies based on political opportunism. this precedent calls for the expulsions of 1885 to be assessed with bismarck’s political expediency in mind. bismarck was politically isolated prior to the expulsions of 1885. his power as chancellor and minister president of prussia had been secure with the blessing of kaiser wilhelm i, but aged eighty-seven and deteriorating in 1884, the kaiser was no longer a dependable guarantor of bismarck’s power. this threat was heightened by the imminent accession of the liberal-minded crown prince friedrich wilhelm, who did not see bismarck as indispensable. although friedrich had reassured bismarck in april 1884 that he would retain his services in his reign, the crown prince was also closely associated with bismarck’s political enemies. friedrich had sent a telegram congratulating bismarck’s reichstag rival, the freisinn party (free-thinking party), on its formation in march 1884.47 he was also to some extent influenced by his wife, victoria, who deplored bismarck, 43 piotr s. wandycz, the lands of partitioned poland, 1795-1918, 2nd ed. (seattle: university of washington press, 1984), 64. 44 otto pflanze, bismarck and the development of germany, volume ii: the period of consolidation, 1871-1880 (princeton: princeton university press, 1990), 108. 45 steinberg, bismarck. 315. 46 pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 50-51. 47 patricia kollander, “constitutionalism or staatssreich? bismarck, crown prince frederick william, crown princess victoria and the succession crisis of 1880-1885,” european review of history 8, no. 2 (july 2010): 191, 196. 155 opining in a letter to her mother, queen victoria of britain, “that despotism is the essence of his [bismarck’s] being.”48 the journal reichsfreund (reich friend) captured this schism in the upper echelons of german politics prior to the expulsions of 1885, stating that “the german heir to the throne refuses to be associated in any way with the chancellor’s present policy as a whole.”49 bismarck’s power in the reichstag was also becoming increasingly unstable. the reichstag elections of the 28th of october 1884 resulted in the maintenance of an anti-bismarckian block that had been prominent in the reichstag since 1881. the freisinnige party won sixty-seven seats, becoming the second largest party in the reichstag, only subordinate to the catholic centre party. bismarck’s conservative allies had gained thirty-two more seats than they had managed to achieve in the elections of 1881 but were still forty-two seats short of a majority (397 deputies sat in the reichstag).50 therefore, prior to the expulsions, bismarck occupied a precarious position as chancellor in the german political sphere. bismarck’s first solution to tackle his marginalization in the reichstag was to enforce a series of expulsions, albeit on a small scale. in november 1884, he expelled forty-two russian jews who had illegally voted for the progressive party’s leader heinrich rickert.51 this shows a clear link between bismarck’s political misfortunes and his decision to endorse a policy of expulsions. however, the expulsions that began in march 1885 should not be perceived as bismarck simply targeting the electoral strata that supported the opposition. there is no doubt that poles and jews tended to vote for his opponents (progressive, center, and polish parties). however, the electoral law for the reichstag stipulated that german citizenship was required, making it illegal for foreign poles and jews to vote in elections.52 granted, some foreigners did vote illegally, but it was unlikely that they were in such a number that would have significantly influenced the electoral result. bismarck endorsed a policy of expulsions to create a crisis that would reassert his power and reaffirm his status over the reichstag. feuchtwanger argued that bismarck had little room to maneuver politically at this time, but the “possibility of appealing to german nationalism and directing it against his internal enemies, reichsfeinde [enemies of the empire], remained.”53 on the 26th of march 1885, bismarck ordered the expulsion of all foreign poles from the prussian provinces of east and west prussia, posen, and upper 48 crown princess victoria, “german crown princess victoria criticizes bismarck’s personal regime as dictatorial (1887-89),” german history in documents and images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2842, accessed february 2, 2021. 49 kollander, “constitutionalism or staatssreich?,” 193. 50 anonymous, “elections to the german riechstag (1871-1890): a statistical overview,” german history in documents and images, https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1850, accessed february 2, 2021. 51 eli nathans, the politics of citizenship in germany: ethnicity, utility and nationalism (london: berg publishers, 2004), 119. 52 anonymous, “electoral law for the reichstag of the north german confederation (1869),” german history in document and images, https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=597, accessed february 2, 2021; anonymous, “law on nationality and citizenship.” 53 feuchtwanger, bismarck, 234. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2842 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2842 https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1850 https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=597 156 silesia.54 this policy was met with hostility in the reichstag. in november 1885, a coalition of polish, socialist, centrist, liberalist, alsatian, guelph, and dane deputies demanded an explanation for the expulsions. to reassert his position, bismarck presented an imperial edict signed by the kaiser, the prussian cabinet, and the bundesrat, denying the reichstag the prerogative to interfere in the affairs of the prussian state.55 bismarck, who appeared politically isolated after the 1884 election, had rallied support from the institutions where loyalty was still present to meet his political foes in the reichstag head on. this imperial edict undermined the ostensibly powerful reichstag. the expulsions may have occurred in prussia, but they were provocative enough to be perceived as a policy concerning the entire german empire. this drew the opposition in the reichstag to criticize a policy beyond their jurisdiction. blanke has argued that bismarck was surprised at the hostile reaction his expulsion policy received in the reichstag, but blanke’s analysis does not account for bismarck’s character, as he had united germany by accurately predicting the reactions of others.56 it was more likely that bismarck had expected this reaction and used it to weaken the reichstag. on the 16th of january 1886, the opposition passed a resolution condemning the expulsions, calling them “unjustified,” but this counted for little.57 it was a far cry from the power that bismarck’s opposition had wielded in impeding his social reforms of the early 1880s.58 thus, by presenting the imperial edict, bismarck had exploited both his dual occupation as minister president of prussia and chancellor to diminish the opposition in the reichstag to nothing more than onlookers. bismarck further undermined the reichstag by framing the expulsions as part of “the struggle for existence between the two nations [germany and poland],” which challenged the reichstag’s constitutional authority as “representatives of the entire people.”59 his speech in the landtag on the 28th of january 1886 attacked the reichstag for sympathizing with the polish cause. he asserted that the polish population had made “indubitable progress” at the cost of the german population because of the “support given [to] the poles by the opposition.” the opposing deputies were charged with “not wanting to cooperate in the defence of the state” and therefore “they should withdraw from the state.”60 as blanke has credibly asserted, bismarck made the expulsions a nationalist question, forcing the opposition to either abandon their convictions or face being labelled unpatriotic.61 54 wertheimer, unwelcomed strangers, 48. 55 pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 203-204. 56 s. william halperin, “the origins of the franco-prussian war revisited: bismarck and the hohenzollern candidature for the spanish throne,” the journal of modern history 45, no. 1 (march 1973): 83-91. 57 fitzpatrick, purging the empire, 113. 58 pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 42. 59 otto von bismarck, “speech to the lower house of the prussian parliament, 28th january 1886,” humanities and social sciences online, https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/pages/60770/bismarck-and-polishquestion, , accessed february 5, 2021; anonymous, “the constitution of the german empire (1871),” german history in document and images, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2782, , accessed february 5, 2021. 60 bismarck, “speech to the lower house of the prussian parliament, 28th january 1886.” 61 blanke, “bismarck and the prussian polish policies of 1886,” 220.” https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/pages/60770/bismarck-and-polish-question https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/pages/60770/bismarck-and-polish-question http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2782 157 bismarck’s speech in the landtag was also severely critical of the german constitution. like the opposing deputies, for bismarck the constitution served as an “explanation for the progress of the poles,” as it was being exploited by “polish gentlemen.”62 the chancellor loathed the constitution. he considered a staatssreich (coup against the constitution) as early as 1881, stating to the württemberg envoy baron mittnacht that the “german princes must consider whether the present parliament is still compatible with the welfare of the reich.”63 thus, bismarck’s speech that sought to justify the expulsions of 1885 was a veiled attack under the guise of nationalism against the politicians and institutions that curtailed his power. by framing them as polish sympathizers, while he was styled as a bastion of the german nation by battling “polonization,” bismarck was subscribing to what hugh setonwatson has called “official nationalism.”64 instead of utilizing nationalism for the benefit of the hohenzollern dynasty, however, bismarck cultivated nationalism to elevate his own political position. therefore, the expulsions were partly an act of political expediency. bismarck had contended with political isolation in 1884 and endorsed this policy to reaffirm his status within domestic politics. the imperial edict diminished the power of the reichstag as the opposition had been coaxed to involve themselves in a policy beyond their jurisdiction. this act, alongside framing his enemies as polish sympathizers, reasserted bismarck’s dominance in the german political sphere. while the expulsions had improved bismarck’s position in domestic politics, it is unclear why he chose to ostracize poles more than any other minority. this requires an assessment of where the polish population fit into bismarck’s foreign policy during the 1880s. the expulsions and bismarck’s foreign policy recent historiography has often downplayed the role of foreign policy in bismarck’s decision to carry out the expulsions. blanke has argued that bismarck knew such a provocative policy would antagonize russia and austria-hungary, to the detriment of german national security in central europe.65 this rests on the premise that the maintenance of cordial relations with russia and austria were, in bismarck’s view, the prime conditions for german national security. no doubt this was an objective of bismarck’s foreign policy, but he equally wanted to prevent the outbreak of a war between russia and austria-hungary. the expulsions must be revaluated in this light. prima facie, the political situation in eastern europe was serene prior to the expulsions of 1885. on the 18th of june 1881, the dreikaiserbund (three emperor’s league) had been signed between germany, austro-hungary, and russia. it guaranteed the neutrality of the other two countries if one should find itself embroiled in a war with a fourth power. it also ensured that russia and austria-hungary would remain committed to the terms set out by 62 bismarck, “speech to the lower house of the prussian parliament, 28th january 1886.” 63 pflanze, the period of fortification, 1880-1898, 76-77. 64 bismarck, “speech to the lower house of the prussian parliament, 28th january 1886”; hugh seton-watson, qtd. in benedict anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, 2nd ed. (london: verso, 2006), 86. 65 blanke, “bismarck and the prussian polish policies of 1886,” 211-215. 158 the treaty of berlin (1878).66 under this treaty, austria-hungary occupied bosnia and herzegovina, while bulgaria was partitioned. the southeastern area, known as eastern rumelia, remained a turkish province, and the remainder became a russian satellite state under the authority of the tsar alexander ii’s nephew, alexander von battenburg.67 the renewal of the dreikaiserbund in march 1884 and the meeting of the three emperors— tsar alexander iii, emperor franz joseph and kaiser wilhelm i—at skierniewice in russian poland in september 1884 were further indicators of political harmony.68 the times reported that there “are ample reasons for feeling that their meeting [at skierniewice] brings guarantees of peace to europe.”69 upon closer examination, beneath the harmonious façade of skierniewice, the political situation in eastern europe was extremely volatile. as w. n. medlicott has argued, the dreikaiserbund had not extinguished tensions between russia and austria-hungary over their competing claims for hegemony in the balkans.70 while austria-hungary had committed itself to the dreikaiserbund, it also signed alliances with serbia (june 1881) and romania (october 1883), both of which harbored anti-russian sentiment.71 similarly, the russians had machinations of their own. they attempted to force battenburg to rescind his commitment to build a railway across bulgaria that would connect vienna with constantinople (stipulated by the treaty of berlin) and instead connect the russian railway network to constantinople.72 the growing influence of a pan-slav clique, which dreamt of a federation of balkan-slav nations under russian guardianship, compounded anti-austrian tendencies in the russian court.73 alexander iii’s principal counsellor konstantin pobedonostsev, an ardent pan-slav, was bitterly opposed to the dreikaiserbund. by 1884, he was attempting to incite discontent among austria-hungary’s greek orthodox ruthenians to undermine the habsburg empire.74 thus, the dreikaiserbund was superficial. the russian foreign minister nikolay giers affirmed this at skierniewice, confiding in a german representative that it was unlikely that the dreikaiserbund would 66 anonymous, “three emperors’ treaty between germany, austria-hungary, and russia from june 18, 1881,” german history in documents and images, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1858, accessed february 13, 2021. 67 feuchtwanger, bismarck, 205; george f. kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order: franco-russian relations 1875-1890 (princeton: princeton university press, 1979), 103-104. 68 kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order, 79. 69 anonymous, “london, monday, september 15, 1884,” the times, september 15, 1884, 9, https://go-galecom.ezproxy.standrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=single tab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079& doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztmamod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=st and&inps=true, accessed november 26, 2021. 70 w. n. medlicott, “bismarck and the three emperor’s alliance, 1881-87,” transactions of the royal historical society 27 (1945): 61-83. 71 keith wilson, problems and possibilities: exercises in statesmanship 1814-1918 (stroud: tempus, 2003), 109. 72 kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order, 109. 73 j. d. morison, “katkov and panslavism,” the slavonic and east european review 46, no. 107 (july 1968): 428. 74 melvin c. wren, “pobedonostsev and russian influence in the balkans, 1881-1888,” the journal of modern history 19, no. 2 (june 1947): 132-133. http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1858 https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/ps/retrieve.do?tabid=newspapers&resultlisttype=result_list&searchresultstype=singletab&hitcount=23&searchtype=advancedsearchform&currentposition=5&docid=gale%7ccs151308079&doctype=editorial&sort=pub+date+forward+chron&contentsegment=ztma-mod1&prodid=ttda&pagenum=1&contentset=gale%7ccs151308079&searchid=r3&usergroupname=stand&inps=true 159 prevent a future conflict unfolding in the balkans: “about this one should have no illusions.”75 bismarck was fully aware of this prevalent instability in eastern european affairs and designed his foreign policy to prevent a war breaking out between russia and austriahungary. he did not expect “mutual friendship and love” to come from the dreikaiserbund but was an advocate for the treaty so germany would not be embroiled in a war that would be an “evil like all wars, but without any desirable prize in case of victory.”76 although bismarck believed the balkans were “not worth the healthy bones of a single pomeranian musketeer,” he knew that germany could not stay neutral in a russo-austro-hungarian war; germany would become an enemy for both nations.77 the meeting at skierniewice in september 1884 was an attempt by bismarck to mediate between russia and austriahungary. initially, kaiser wilhelm and bismarck had not been invited to the meeting, but bismarck insisted on their presence as he believed that “kaiser franz joseph attaches to the preservation of peace with russia less importance than we do and might well shape his conduct accordingly.”78 thus, prior to the expulsions, bismarck’s foreign policy was concerned with preventing war between austria-hungary and russia as much as it was focused on the maintenance of cordial relations between germany and these two countries. by 1884, bismarck believed that hostilities between russia and austro-hungary were bound to intensify. his meeting with battenburg in the spring of that year shows that bismarck did not envisage the status quo in eastern europe lasting: “in general, i view the entire future existence of bulgaria as questionable. someday it will become the object of some sort of a deal among the great powers; and sooner or later you will sit peacefully at the fireside and reminisce about the adventures of your stormy youth.”79 thus, prior to the expulsions of 1885, peace in eastern europe was fragile. the dreikaiserbund may have outwardly shown signs of cooperation in the east, but beneath its symbolism, animosity between russia and austria-hungary prevailed. bismarck was fully aware of the precarity of peace, with the prospect of a future war between russia and austria-hungary looming. therefore, bismarck’s aims for the expulsions of 1885 must be evaluated in the context of a likely war in eastern europe. for bismarck, the poles would play a fundamental role in any future war between austriahungary and russia. he argued in his memoirs that austria-hungary’s greatest weapon against russia “is her fostering care of the polish spirit in galicia.”80 bismarck was referring to the favorable patronage that galician poles received under the habsburg empire, in comparison to the discriminatory policies that the prussian and russian states had enforced on their polish minorities.81 as a. j. p. taylor remarked, galician-polish aristocrats 75 nickolay giers, qtd. in kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order, 82. 76 otto von bismarck, qtd. in feuchtwanger, bismarck, 215. 77 otto von bismarck, qtd. in feuchtwanger, bismarck, 198; pflanze, the period of fortification, 225. 78 otto von bismarck, qtd. in kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order, 79. 79 otto von bismarck, qtd. in kennan, the decline of bismarck’s european order, 118-119. 80 bismarck, the man and the statesman, 257. 81 piotr s. wandycz, “the poles in the habsburg monarchy,” austrian history yearbook 3, no. 2 (1967): 278. 160 “remained to the end the most stalwart and reliable supporters of the habsburgs.”82 hence, in the eventuality of a war with russia, the polish nationalist cause would unreservedly support austria-hungary, undermining russian authority in the swathes of polish land under russian control. in comparison, a polish nationalist uprising would have little impact on austro-hungarian security. bismarck was fully aware of this. he argued that the habsburgs could incite a polish revolution in galicia and would “by no means be weakened by its abandonment” as it was an area “loosely connected with the austrian monarchy” and had no natural barrier to protect the remaining habsburg empire.83 thus, bismarck viewed the polish nationalist question as a tool that could be utilized by austria-hungary to the disadvantage of russia. according to bismarck, a “resuscitation of poland” under the auspices of austria-hungary would have disastrous consequences for prussia. the predominantly polish areas of posen and west prussia were not separated from the “old-prussian provinces” by a natural boundary and therefore “their abandonment by prussia would be impossible.”84 with berlin roughly 250 kilometers (155 miles) west of posen, a polish nationalist revolution could undermine german security. bismarck highlighted the extent to which the poles were a fundamental component of german foreign policy, stating “among the preconditions of an offensive alliance between germany and austria the settlement of the future of poland presents a problem of unusual difficulty.”85 the prussian-polish population made germany’s position in foreign affairs untenable. a strategic aim for the expulsions of 1885 was an attempt to diminish germany’s weakness in the outbreak of a likely war between russia and austria-hungary. bismarck could not expel the entire prussian-polish population, as the constitution of 1871 prevented poles with german citizenship from being removed from the state. however, he could work within the legal bounds to expel non-naturalized poles. this would weaken polish nationalist sentiment in prussia, thereby reducing the threat of a “resuscitated poland” at the demand of austria-hungary. as this was a preemptive measure in the eventuality of a war between russia and austria-hungary, bismarck could not admit to this publicly or even privately. the dreikaiserbund had been portrayed as a personal achievement for bismarck. he boasted in january 1885 that “we are surrounded by friends in europe.” 86 to publicize the expulsions as a pre-emptive measure against a looming war between austriahungary and russia would undermine the façade of peace in eastern europe that bismarck had meticulously created. conclusion bismarck did not order the expulsions because he wanted to placate antisemitic and antipolish sentiments within “public opinion.” his views on jews and the prussian-polish population were constructed based on the impact that these minorities held within the 82 a. j. p. taylor, qtd. in wandycz, “the poles in the habsburg monarchy,” 283. 83 bismarck, the man and the statesman, 258. 84 bismarck, the man and the statesman, 258. 85 bismarck, the man and the statesman, 258. 86 feuchtwanger, bismarck, 215; otto von bismarck, qtd. in pflanze, the period of fortification, 218. 161 political realm. bismarck had his own strategic aims for the expulsions, which were janusfaced. internally, bismarck endorsed a policy of expulsions to reassert his power in the german political sphere. prior to ordering the expulsions, he was politically isolated. the imminent accession of friedrich wilhelm threatened bismarck’s future as chancellor and his failure to secure a majority in the reichstag compounded the precarity of his position. bismarck’s order for the expulsions was designed to diminish the power of his enemies and elevate himself out of this quagmire. the presentation of an imperial edict robbed the reichstag of its power to prevent a policy that was considered to affect the whole of germany. he then styled the expulsions as a question of nationalism, slandering the reichstag as supporters of the poles, attacking their authority as an institution for the german nation. moreover, the expulsions were also an opportunity for bismarck to diminish the polish national cause within prussia. war between russia and austriahungary was likely, which would have disastrous consequences for germany. bismarck believed austria-hungary would incite a polish revolution to undermine russia, which would also threaten german security. hence, the expulsions were a preemptive measure to weaken the prussian-polish population by removing those without german citizenship. in this instance, neither poles nor jews were bismarck’s reichsfeinde. they were minorities that could be ostracized for bismarck’s political advantage against his real reichsfeinde— those who curtailed his power in domestic politics and those who posed an external threat to german security. 1 introduction to “the conflict in ukraine: historical and contemporary perspectives” howard louthan university of minnesota the situation in ukraine has riveted the world’s attention since the invasion of russia in february 2022. what many people thought would be a quick victory by putin’s troops has turned into a surprising series of setbacks for the russians as a resilient ukrainian military first ably defended kyiv and then have continued to claw back territory in the east and south of the country. the central europe yearbook has devoted a portion of this issue to the conflict and its impact both in ukraine and beyond. anne stackpole (leiden university), who is based in warsaw, has conducted an interview with a group of ukrainian refugees who recount their harrowing escape from the russians in the days immediately following the invasion. kristalena herman (university of cambridge), a peace corps volunteer in ukraine from 2019 to 2020, considers the experience of men and women who continue to live in ukraine, some very close to the frontlines. she features interviews with a ceo of a medical facility in mykolayiv, a city pummeled by russian artillery, and a director of a non-profit organization offering desperately needed assistance in this conflict. mikołaj dueholm (university of minnesota) explores the situation in poland with a thoughtful interview with justyna janiszewska, the executive director of the fulbright commission in poland. here they discuss the scope and activities of the polish fulbright program, bi-lateral relations with the us, and also the repercussions and echoes of the war both on the program and the country. finally, rusty allison (auburn university) talks with dr. john fahey on his forthcoming book, przemyśl, poland: a multiethnic city before and after a fortress, 1867-1939. in this interview, dr. fahey provides insights into how the history of przemyśl can help us understand the present conflict in ukraine. 19 on the boundary of empire and nation a conversation with dr. john fahey on przemyśl rusty allison auburn university in august 2022, i had the pleasure of interviewing dr. john fahey. in his forthcoming book, dr. fahey examines the history of przemyśl—a polish city near the ukrainian border. when russian invaded ukraine in february 2022, przemyśl became refuge for thousands of ukrainians and found itself, once again, at the crossroads amid broader conflicts. in this interview, dr. fahey provides insights into how the history of przemyśl can help us understand the ongoing conflict in ukraine. he discusses his research and what first drew him to study this complex region. he also reflects on the joys and challenges of doing research and a phd in european history. rusty allison please tell us how you became interested in the poland-ukraine border region. dr. fahey i began as a german historian and participated in a study abroad program. the way things worked out, however, the semester i was able to enroll, instead of traveling to germany, i went to vienna, austria. after spending time in beautiful austria, i fell in love with the 20 habsburgs and the region’s history, then continued my passion for studying this region throughout graduate school. rusty allison how did you become interested in learning about the przemyśl fortress? dr. fahey my father served in the us army, and i grew up on a military installation. as a young teenager, i remember being struck by how much militaries control and influence the physical environment. they can change the landscape and control human traffic patterns via barricades and checkpoints, and i’ve always been fascinated by that. while studying in vienna, i learned the road system was designed and built so the military could suppress rioters and protesters. as it turned out, przemyśl was a great case study for how militaries designed, shaped, and built cities to achieve military and political objectives. also, my military experience serving at the multinational base in a warzone in kandahar, afghanistan, where i deployed two weeks after completing preliminary exams for my phd, contributed to my thinking and curiosity about the complexities of multicultural and multinational regions. the more i thought about it, i was curious if there was a place similar to the base in kandahar in austria-hungary. so, i looked for the biggest, most multinational fort i could find, and that was przemyśl, and i went from there. interestingly, as the fortress was being built beginning in the 1870s, the population of przemyśl increased from approximately 15,000 people to 50,000 in just over thirty years. the austro-hungarian army drove this population increase due to the fort construction. even today, much of the city of przemyśl is left over from the austrian era. the barracks, warehouses, train stations, city hall, and town library remain extant and remind us of the military industrialization of the time. przemyśl allows us to see the mark of the austriahungarian empire. rusty allison how is the przemyśl fortress remembered today? dr. fahey this is a complex question and must be analyzed and considered based on the stages of construction and usage throughout the 1880s-1890s into the world war i period. when we think of local history in the prewar era, the fortress is tied to a massive social-democratic movement spearheaded by workers. eventually, it becomes one of the strong points of socialism in austrian poland, led notably by herman lieberman. another significant aspect of przemyśl’s memorialization today originates from world war i, where it served as a mobilization hub for the austro-hungarian army. in august 1914, the army deployed through przemyśl on their way to fight against the russians, making it a valuable location to support the war effort. 21 the most remembered part of the fortress’s history comes from the siege of november 1914 to march 1915, when approximately 120,000 soldiers and 23,000 civilians were besieged. many perished due to fighting and starvation. today, monuments, statues, and a local museum represent the collective memories and national significance of the siege of przemyśl. what makes przemyśl an important location to study is the fact that it represents a multinational battlefield, with its austrian, hungarian, polish, ukrainian, german, czech, slovene, and jewish combatants’ and non-combatants’ narratives that create a complex history. so, today, przemyśl is an important place to many different groups. even though it is a longstanding polish city, it’s also a long-standing jewish city and a ukrainian city. in addition, people from across the austro-hungarian empire suffered and fought there. to this day you can see ribbons and candles left by hungarians to remember those lost during the przemyśl siege. rusty allison how does your work help us understand the russian invasion of ukraine? dr. fahey what i learned the most in the region is that borders are imaginary, they always have been, but those borders still effect people. przemyśl, like many places, is a victim of empires and nations trying to install and enforce borders. as we study history, people have made ludicrous territorial claims when we look at times of conflict. for example, during world war i, tsar nicholas ii claimed that przemyśl and galicia would be part of russia forevermore. the reality is that the region’s inhabitants wanted nothing to do with russia. at the conclusion of world war i, przemyśl was thought to be critical to both ukrainian and polish nations, and both had legitimate claims to the region. these nationalist claims drove neighbors to take up arms against each other in 1918 and fueled brutal violence throughout the region for the next few decades. putin has tried to justify his war with ukraine through ludicrous historical analysis and examples. this weaponization of history is cynical, but pretty common. he’s not the first to force war in service of a historical narrative. the problem is ukraine, and eastern europe more generally, doesn’t have just one nation, or one historical narrative. forcing conformity on the region is impossible—nazis, soviets, and other nationalists have tried, but failed. the region is littered with monuments to their failure. sadly, many of those monuments are cemeteries. rusty allison what was it like seeing the fortress and visiting the archives? dr. fahey anyone who wants to study central or east central europe should be prepared to go to a lot of places. i spent a summer in vienna and also traveled to l’viv, budapest, warsaw, and 22 cracow archives, and had a year at the archives in przemyśl. being a central european historian is extraordinarily fun because of the rich history and the endless sights you’ll see. also, no matter what you’re studying, get out there and walk around it to get a sense of scale and physical environment. you will see your subject differently, and walking the grounds will significantly impact your research. rusty allison what problems or challenges did you encounter while doing your research? dr. fahey money, time, and language are always challenges. a bit of advice, be nice to people, and you can help yourself overcome some of these logistical issues. archivists and locals are generally happy to help you out, and it’s always good to be polite. work/life balance is also a significant consideration. i got married before i started my phd, and we had two kids before we moved to poland to conduct research. locals treat someone with kids very differently than just some random grad student. poles and austrians were incredibly friendly to me and my family. on the other hand, i also had to balance my family responsibilities with my professional responsibilities while working under pressure to complete my research. if you have kids, the clock is constantly ticking. we also had our third child in a polish hospital, where we learned a lot about a completely different medical system from what we experience in the united states. being a historian is a wonderful profession that is definitely an adventure where you also get a life education. rusty allison what advice do you have for anyone pursuing a history degree? dr. fahey learn a language and practice that language as early and often as possible. there are several programs out there designed to help students learn languages. also, apply for research grants. there are a lot of opportunities to earn a grant, as well as additional avenues such as the state department. no matter the language you choose, commit to learning it, and you’ll create opportunities to conduct exciting research. rusty allison one primary concern we all have is finding a job after graduation. what have you learned about the job market and alternate possibilities in the age of few tenure-track positions? dr. fahey the biggest advice i can give undergraduate and graduate students is to have a purpose behind their degree. having a history degree can lead to very good jobs, but you need to have a plan and a backup plan; whether it be advocacy, the military, federal service, or the private sector, finding a job can be difficult. 23 one thing you can do to improve your marketability is by earning a minor degree in a field that is a growth industry. consider specializing in a field, such as gender or environmental history, or a region that might be less studied. i also think it’s good to gain life experiences, such as spending time in the peace corps, volunteering, community organizing, and military or state department experience. equally important, build your network—who you know matters. put yourself out there, promote your work, and learn from others by talking to people! another key observation is to know your worth and be willing to quit. do not take on more work without extra pay. even though the job market is shaky, do not work for less than you’re worth. be inventive, use your imagination, and put yourself in a position where you can pursue your passion and utilize your strengths. for example, if you are an american political historian, look for jobs in the political arena. rusty allison what’s on the horizon for dr. fahey? would you like to speak about any future projects? dr. fahey with my new position as a historian for the united states navy history and heritage command, i will be working on nineteenth-century naval history. i will also be teaching at george mason and embarking on a few writing projects, notably holocaust stories. rusty allison finally, please tell our readers what you find “fun” about being a historian. dr. fahey in addition to the great travel experiences mentioned earlier, what makes history interesting, fun, and applicable is when you see grand historical themes and ask, “how does it affect these people, this location, and community?” studying and writing history allows us to see how events or phenomena such as war, nationalism, and imperialism washes over a place and leaves a residue that is interesting and invites more questions about the past. dr. john fahey earned a phd in modern european history at purdue university. he has taught history at the united states military academy, georgia military college, and george 24 mason university. his book, przemyśl, poland: a multiethnic city before and after a fortress, 1867-1939, will be published by purdue university press in 2023. dr. fahey is currently a historian working for the united states naval history and heritage command. rusty allison is a phd candidate at auburn university. his research examines interpersonal clashes between scientists and the politburo surrounding the soviet union’s nuclear industry and how these relationships contributed to the 1986 chernobyl tragedy in soviet ukraine. the travels of adam olearius senior sophister essay cover sheet 22 becoming begrudgingly tolerant analyzing the significance of the emergence and development of unitarianism in the transylvanian principality during the midsixteenth century andrew wood-martin trinity college dublin abstract the concept of religious tolerance and toleration has been the subject of much scholarly discussion for centuries. in the wake of the reformation, however, it became a much more practical concept, with europeans living next door to people perceived as heretics. a certain level of tolerance had to be achieved or else the entire continent would fall into a state of mass violence and disarray. religious tolerance as a social practice was tested to its limits in the principality of transylvania during the mid-sixteenth century. the multiconfessional state was home to five competing denominations and somehow managed to establish and maintain a certain level of peace in the region during the age in which religious warfare was rife throughout the continent. this article analyzes the unique emergence of the unitarian, or anti-trinitarian, confession in the transylvanian principality, in order to answer broader questions on the concept of religious tolerance in early modern europe. after initially outlining current thinking on the concept of religious tolerance, it describes the unique emergence of unitarianism in transylvania, aided greatly by political rulers. challenging the idea of transylvania being a haven for religious freedom in this time period, the article addresses contemporary debates surrounding the emergence of unitarianism, namely in the 1567 debrecen reformed synod. it also analyzes legal actions taken to sanction multiconfessionalism in the region, before ultimately situating this study within the broader context of religious tolerance in early modern europe. article introduction amid the so-called age of religious wars, the principality of transylvania, located on the periphery of both the habsburg monarchy and the ottoman empire, appeared to be paving the way towards a more peaceful and civilized europe.1 for years, many historians have championed the region as a haven for religious tolerance, enacting policies of co-habitation among different religions that would arrive in other european nations centuries later.2 1 as well as being located on the periphery of these two great empires, the princes of transylvania also paid annual tribute to the sublime porte. 2 mihály balázs, thomas cooper, and judit gellérd, “tolerant country—misunderstood laws. interpreting sixteenth-century transylvanian legislation concerning religion,” the hungarian historical review 2 (2013): 87. 23 during the mid-sixteenth century, the principality found itself in the unique position of being a multiconfessional state.3 originally dominated by roman catholic and eastern orthodox communities, the reformation saw a profound change in the region’s internal religious loyalties, with the vast majority of the population converting to one form of protestantism or another in just a few short years.4 hence, the myriad of conflicting theologies living in one area could have resulted in widespread violence, but this was not the case. throughout the early modern period, rulers of the region continued to make it possible for the different confessions to coexist, thus leading many local historians to make the case for transylvania as the birthplace of religious tolerance.5 this claim, however, has been challenged with recent thinking around the idea of tolerance and “toleration” in early modern europe. the unitarian church emerged during the mid-sixteenth century and has been at the heart of many arguments for transylvanian tolerance. the confession held to the doctrine of anti-trinitarianism—the belief that god was, in nature, one single entity— and was instantly rejected almost everywhere in early modern europe, with the notable exceptions of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the transylvanian principality, enjoying specific legal status in the latter.6 unitarianism, which was ultimately expelled from the polish-lithuanian commonwealth in 1658, has endured in transylvania to this day.7 this article assesses the significance of the emergence of unitarianism in the transylvanian principality, in order to discuss broader thinking surrounding religious tolerance in early modern europe. it first outlines current thinking around the concept of tolerance and “toleration,” before detailing the emergence of the unitarian church in transylvania during the mid-sixteenth century. the article offers a close study of three reformed synods, which all took place in the latter half of the 1560s, as a way of analyzing the opposition faced by anti-trinitarianism in the principality. these texts are crucial to understanding the context of the time, as there are very few surviving texts that track the emergence of unitarianism in transylvania and the reaction to it. the synods also help provide a deeper understanding of the practical nature of religious freedom and tolerance in early modern transylvania. furthermore, they exemplify that the reformed church was extremely reluctant to be tolerant towards the unitarian church. finally, this article discusses a variety of laws that were enacted in transylvania; some of these laws were key in securing the unitarianism’s status as an official religion in the principality, while others focused on restricting its influence. ultimately, this article serves as an interesting commentary on the nature of transylvania’s alleged tolerance in the mid-sixteenth century, and indeed on the nature of tolerance in early modern europe. 3 most states in early modern europe were loyal to one particular confession, following the legal interpretation of the 1555 peace of augsburg that came to be understood by the tag “cuius regio, eius religio.” 4 earl morse wilbur, a history of unitarianism in transylvania, england, and america (boston: beacon press, 1952), 43. 5 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 87. 6 the denunciation of anti-trinitarianism in the christian tradition dates to the first council of nicaea in 325 ce, where arius’ christology—claiming that the son did not exist in eternity with the father—was condemned as heresy. 7 mihály balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” in a companion to the reformation in central europe, eds. howard louthan and graeme murdock (leiden: brill, 2015), 171. 24 the concept of religious “tolerance” in early modern europe previous thinking around the concept of religious tolerance tied its development to “enlightenment” thinking. it was considered by whig historians as an abstract ideal, developed by the west in order to combat the barbaric “savagery” of post-reformation, pre-enlightenment society.8 religious violence was considered in this interpretation of history as the natural impulse of a primitive mind, which had not yet evolved to a better way of thinking.9 the western narrative of religious tolerance, then, considered it as an emerging phenomenon, judging societies through an evolutionary lens, as they progress from primitivism, which was marked by religious fanaticism and violence, to a more advanced, harmonious way of living. benjamin kaplan has challenged this view in recent years. kaplan confronts the concept of the “rise of tolerance” as an enlightened, western innovation, exposing it as a myth.10 kaplan focuses on de-romanticizing the concept, seeing tolerance less as an ideal of the post-enlightenment elite and more as a gritty compromise practiced by everyday citizens. the legacy of the reformation had left many communities bitterly divided by faith, with millions of europeans forced to live among perceived heretics in their own village. as kaplan describes it, “millions of europeans experienced the divisions in an intensely intimate, local way.”11 societies in early modern europe, particularly multiconfessional ones, needed to respond to the newfound religious pluralism in a pragmatic way, in order to avoid internal rupture and violence. thus, while the concept of “tolerance” was discussed by the scholars of the day, it was a much more mundane, practical experience for many european citizens. this is particularly evident in the region of transylvania, which was under threat from the ottoman empire to the south. it is therefore vital not to project twenty-first century notions of human rights and personal freedom onto sixteenth-century acts of compromise with one’s greatest enemy. as a case study, this article assesses the development of unitarianism in transylvania according to kaplan’s understanding of tolerance and toleration in early modern europe. with this in mind, it will separate the distinctly modern concept of “tolerance” from the early modern social practice of “toleration.” “tolerance,” according to kaplan, denotes the abstract concept of religious freedom. it has been viewed through early modern history as an emerging trend in society, developed from the minds of visionary, forward-thinking intellectuals and rulers who argued for mutual acceptance.12 “toleration,” on the other hand, refers to the social practices of ordinary early modern europeans, begrudgingly adopted in order to achieve a peaceful coexistence with their fellow citizens of different faiths. toleration is not a glamorous ideal conceived by the elite but rather an act of 8 benjamin kaplan, divided by faith: religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern europe (cambridge: harvard university press, 2007), 2. 9 for more criticism on whig interpretations of history and religious tolerance, see the writings of british historian herbert butterfield. herbert butterfield, the whig interpretation of history (new york: norton & co., 1965). 10 kaplan, divided by faith, 4-5. 11 kaplan, divided by faith, 4-5. 12 kaplan, divided by faith, 8. 25 necessity practiced among the general populace of multiconfessional communities: “so defined, religious toleration required no ‘principle of mutual acceptance,’ much less an embrace of diversity for its own sake, as our modern concept of tolerance presumes.”13 origins of unitarianism unitarianism, or anti-trinitarianism, emerged in transylvania in the 1560s, as a product of the impulses of biblicism promoted during the reformation. in this era, public debates were commonplace, with the topic of religion often inspiring lively discourse.14 the doctrine of anti-trinitarianism thus came about following disputes within the reformed community over conflicting understandings of what the bible taught about the trinity. the conviction that god was one single entity and not three persons within one godhead— father, son, and holy spirit—had been considered the utmost form of heresy since the fourth century, as it struck the very center of orthodox christian belief—that of the deity of jesus christ. unitarians initially held the belief that jesus was certainly inspired by god in his moral teachings, but that he was also, ultimately, merely human. it is important to note, though, that within the unitarian church a diverse range of perspectives on jesus’s nature emerged, with certain “adorantist” groups invoking christ in public worship and other “non-adorantist” groups considering this practice heretical. while this doctrine was naturally met with an intense resentment by some, others warmly welcomed it. this caused a sharp divide among the hungarian reformed church, provoking trinitarians to gather at synods to clarify their position on “the great mystery of god.”15 the effectiveness of the emergence of the unitarian church in transylvania can also be linked to the careers of particular individuals. figures such as dr. giorgio biandrata can certainly be regarded as highly influential, as he was crucial in the development and dissemination of anti-trinitarian theology and literature surrounding this theology in transylvania during the mid-sixteenth century. biandrata was an italian physician who spent a year in geneva within the italian-speaking community. he developed an antitrinitarian theology and moved to poland as physician to the dowager queen, bona sforza, of the ruling house of milan. he then moved to transylvania in 1563 as court physician to sforza’s daughter, isabella, and her husband, jános szapolyai. the work of italian theologians lelio and fausto sozzini must also not go unnoticed. uncle and nephew, respectively, the sozzinis were early proponents of anti-trinitarian theology. their theology, known as socinianism, spread throughout the polish-lithuanian commonwealth in the sixteenth century and was also embraced by the transylvanian principality. one cannot understate the impact ferenc dávid and jános zsigmond szapolyai had on the growth of the movement in the principality.16 dávid was the first leader of the unitarian 13 kaplan, divided by faith, 8. along with “toleration,” many scholars choose to use terms like “religious pluralism” in order to distinguish between the two terms. 14 wilbur, a history of unitarianism, 31. 15 graeme murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” in a companion to multiconfessionalism in the early modern world, ed. thomas max safley, (leiden: brill, 2011), 410. 16 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 176-177. sozzini drew his anti-trinitarian convictions from his interpretation of john’s gospel, claiming that the text only referred to jesus as logos in a metaphorical sense, as he was a messenger of god. jesus was therefore, in sozzini’s eyes, not eternal. however, it is important to note that, in 26 church in transylvania. originally opposed to anti-trinitarian theology, the former roman catholic priest, then a crucial figure in the lutheran and reformed churches, ultimately became convinced of the doctrine in the 1560s.17 he agreed upon a christology that was originally developed by sozzini and, over the next few years, published a series of hungarian texts to defend his interpretation of the holy scriptures. like all reformers, dávid believed that a correct interpretation of scripture was at the heart of reform.18 as well as publishing material, the preacher also engaged in lively theological debates with his former trinitarian reformed colleagues.19 his position as the court preacher of jános zsigmond szapolyai, the then ruler of transylvania, was crucial in solidifying the confession’s status in the region. yet, while his involvement was undoubtedly important in the development of the unitarian church, szapolyai’s political influence was paramount to the denomination’s emergence and survival in the early modern period. szapolyai’s role in the development of unitarianism in transylvania in order to discuss how unitarianism was able to grow with such strength and vigor throughout transylvania, it is firstly important to understand the region’s socio-political context in the mid-sixteenth century. szapolyai, the only unitarian ruler of transylvania in the sixteenth century, assumed leadership from his father when the region was in a period of great political uncertainty. with the roman catholic habsburg monarchy to the west and its muslim ottoman neighbors to the south, the prince sought to cement transylvania as an independent state.20 mihály balázs comments on how szapolyai “attempted to identify transylvania as a haven for reform in sharp distinction from his catholic habsburg rivals.”21 thus, in his attempt to secure this autonomy, it was crucial for the prince to introduce a policy of confessional pluralism among his citizens, both to promote his own authority and also because any alternative would surely result in widespread chaos and violence. this image of a region in which, by the 1570s, more than four confessions were legally recognized, does indeed appear to be a great example of religious tolerance in early modern europe. however, szapolyai’s primary motivation was to maintain internal security in the region, in order to establish transylvania as an autonomous state.22 kaplan’s theory would suggest that transylvania was, therefore, similar to many other states in early modern europe, as their chief concern was to maintain political stability and social peace within the region at all costs and were consequently forced to accept some degree of religious toleration. this challenges the claims of many historians throughout the early modern period who praised the region for its tolerance in a progressive, modern-day, ideological context.23 the denomination’s early years of development, there was a consensus among clergy that christ was still to be adored in worship. this would change dramatically by the 1570s, when further division emerged within the unitarian community surrounding their christology. 17 wilbur, a history of unitarianism, 28-33. 18 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 178. 19 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 178. 20 márta fata, “the kingdom of hungary and principality of transylvania,” in a companion to the reformation in central europe, eds. howard louthan and graeme murdock (leiden: brill, 2015), 93. 21 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 182. 22 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 182. 23 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 87. 27 when discussing the emergence of unitarianism in the transylvanian principality, a strong challenge to the region’s alleged embrace of religious tolerance can be seen in the bitter opposition the unitarian denomination faced from other confessions in the region. while the church was offered legal protection by jános zsigmond szapolyai and the transylvanian diet in 1568, this did not indicate any form of widespread support and acceptance from trinitarian communities, as the various reformed synods from the latter half of the decade clearly demonstrate. opposition to anti-trinitarianism at the reformed synods in debrecen (1567), nagyvárad (1568), and szikszó (1569) here is the lord’s command that the things planted, founded and built up by the devil and the antichrist, i.e., false doctrines, opinions, heresies, traditions, and the inventions of men, must be removed and extirpated from the bosom of the church as dung and vile sins.24 the rapid increase in unitarian believers in transylvania, fueled by the charismatic leaders ferenc dávid and giorgio biandrata, provoked a passionate and urgent response from the hungarian reformed church. in a direct response to the emergence of the confession, the reformed church convened synods on numerous occasions and in different locations to discuss the trinity and confirm their own theological convictions.25 upon closer examination of these synods, it becomes undoubtedly clear that the reformed church had no desire to tolerate the emerging unitarian movement and, beyond that, were reluctant that any religious rights be extended to unitarians. the 1567 reformed synod that took place in the hungarian city of debrecen, a key center for calvinist reform, remains one of the most pivotal and longest synods in the history of the reformed church, as the documents that emerged from the synod formed the doctrinal basis of the reformed church in hungary. the synod convened on february 24, 1567, bringing together pastors and clergymen from seventeen archdeaconries of hungary. members of the transylvanian unitarian church were also invited to the synod but did not attend.26 also present was péter melius juhász, a reformed theologian and superintendent in the hungarian church, who engaged in a number of debates with dávid about the trinity.27 24 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” in reformed confessions of the 16th and 17th centuries in english translation, ed. james t. dennison, jr., vol. 3, 1567-1599 (grand rapids, mi: reformation heritage books, 2015), 12. 25 “confession of varadiensis/nagyvárad (1569),” in reformed confessions of the 16th and 17th centuries in english translation, ed. james t. dennison, jr., vol. 3, 1567-1599 (grand rapids, mi: reformation heritage books, 2015), 161. 26 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 1. 27 mihály balázs, early transylvanian antitrinitarianism (1566-1571): from servet to palaeologus (badenbaden: e�ditions v. koerner, 1996), 20. balázs comments further on how these debates between melius and dávid are very important, as they are some of the only surviving documents from the time period that trace dávid’s progression towards anti-trinitarianism in the mid-sixteenth century. 28 doctrinally, the synod is significant as it adopted heinrich bullinger’s second helvetic confession (1566), establishing it as the hungarian reformed church’s official confession.28 throughout the proceedings of the synod, the reformed church, in addition to considering their official doctrine, outlined vehement opposition of anti-trinitarianism. a significant number of the discussions were specifically concerned with the growing influence of unitarian believers in transylvania, who were labelled by members of the reformed community as “idolators.”29 though debrecen was not located within transylvania, it was a bordering town, and as a result, it was directly affected by developments in the region. for the reformed clergy, it was crucial that they intervened in the movement’s early years, in order to avoid the heretical teachings of dávid and biandrata from gaining traction. the texts from the synod can thus be read as a direct response to the internal divide within the reformed community, which resulted in the emergence of anti-trinitarianism in transylvania. members of the synod responded to controversial unitarian claims about reformed doctrine. for example, they asserted their convictions about jesus christ’s deity by denying claims of his inferiority to god the father.30 the synod concluded that sozzini’s “monstrous” anti-trinitarian doctrine was anathema. they condemned his christology, arguing in their response that god was indeed, as confirmed by the bible, three persons within one godhead.31 this language is adopted throughout the text of the synod reveals an intense distaste for the theology of the unitarian church and an urge to expel the perceived heretics and their “insufferable wickedness” from debrecen: “we condemn and repudiate every heresy which, according to the testimony of the apostle, is supported by the devil through his instruments from vain desire for glory, quarrelsomeness, schism, envy, arrogance and verbal battles … namely, those of sabellius and servetus against the true trinity.”32 anti-trinitarianism was certainly a polemical topic at the 1567 synod, and it confirms the depth of antipathy within the reformed church towards their former colleagues who had embraced anti-trinitarianism: “we repudiate those that call the father autotheon and attribute to the son some finite beginning and tear away from the son equal deity and his being one with the father … we resolved to avoid [the anti-trinitarians], their false doctrine, and their society like an infectious disease.”33 ultimately, it is clear that the synod exemplifies the bitter hostility that the unitarian church faced in its early years of development, even as it gained legal recognition in transylvania, and therefore challenges any claims coupling laws about religious rights to attitudes towards religious tolerance in 28 balázs, early transylvanian antitrinitarianism, 20. from then on, the hungarian reformed church officially labelled itself “reformed according to the helvetic confession.” 29 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 2. 30 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 6. “they, however, err wickedly who teach that christ apart from the form of a servant and function of a servant is in some degree inferior to the father, less than him and not his equal.” 31 members of the synod pointed to many passages from the bible to support their claims, for example in the gospel of john: “that you may know and understand that the father is in me, and i am in the father.” (john 10:38, english standard version). 32 balázs, early transylvanian antitrinitarianism, 11. 33 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 5-10. 29 early modern europe. in the next two years, there were two more synods within the reformed church, in szikszó and nagyvárad respectively. in many ways, the sentiments from these two synods are the same as the sentiments at debrecen in 1567. all three synods brought together clergymen from throughout hungary and feature a strong, biblical defense of the reformed faith. at both szikszó and nagyvárad (the latter now oradea in modern-day romania), it is made explicitly clear that the synod convened, at least in part, as a direct response to the continued popularity of unitarianism in transylvania. at both synods, it is also evident that there was no embrace of tolerance towards anti-trinitarianism among the reformed church. the synod at szikszó convened on january 6, 1568, mere weeks before the transylvania diet passed the edict at torda (turda in modern-day romania), which granted rights of conscience and worship to the unitarian church. the synod features a doctrinal statement, which clarifies the reformed church’s position on the sacraments of baptism and communion, as well as their position on polygamy, but most pertinently their understanding of god’s triune nature and character. in total, there are twenty-four statements made rejecting anti-trinitarianism and the affirmation of the trinity became a key marker of identity for the reformed church in this region.34 the full proceedings from the synod are full of avid rejections of the unitarian faith, considered by the trinitarian reformed clergy to have been “recalled afresh from hell.”35 there is a continued reliance on scripture as the basis of the arguments, for example, referring to isaiah 43:10 in order to emphasize the triune god’s unchanging character and the eternal nature of the son: “before me no god was formed, nor shall there be any after me.”36 unitarian theology is addressed on numerous occasions, often referred to as nonsense: “therefore, they who deny the unity and trinity and coeternal nature and deity of the father, son and holy spirit impiously speak nonsense.”37 while the debrecen synod is more detailed and contains more specific calls for action in response to the emergence of unitarianism, it is clear that the clergy at szikszó harbored radical intolerance towards their unitarian neighbors. the synod reconvened in the town of nagyvárad in 1569. once again, a number of hungary clergymen were present, including péter melius juhász. the synod’s opening title reads, “the consensus of the ministers in hungary professing and defending the orthodox faith against franciscus davidis, georgius blandrata and the transylvanian unitarians.”38 it is also interesting to note that the members of the synod did not consider themselves the aggressors, rather expressing the necessity of “defending” the reformed faith against doctrinal innovation. 34 “the synod at szikszó (1568),” in reformed confessions of the 16th and 17th centuries in english translation, ed. james t. dennison, jr., vol. 3, 1567-1599 (grand rapids, mi: reformation heritage books, 2015), 147. 35 “the synod at szikszó (1568),” 148. 36 “the synod at szikszó (1568),” 149. 37 “the synod at szikszó (1568),” 150. 38 “confession of varadiensis/nagyvárad,” 162. 30 the document from the synod features a statement of faith that once again leans heavily on god’s triune nature. it contains six theses, all pertaining to the character of god, and four overtly professing belief in a triune godhead consisting of father, son, and holy spirit.39 the subsequent portion of the synod’s document, entitled “confessions of the pastors,” lays out their particular abhorrence of the “horrendous blasphemy” of the unitarian church, “who deny that god the father is the eternal father of our lord and savior jesus christ.”40 in the final line from the synod’s document, the hungarian pastors write in the name of the father, son, and holy spirit, further emphasizing their trinitarian stance.41 the texts emerging from these synods serve as a reminder of how bitterly antitrinitarianism emerged in transylvania as a the result of a polemic split within the reformed community. the unitarian church defined itself as the only truly reformed religion, solely reliant on scripture, in stark contrast to what they considered the polytheistic and non-biblical reformed and roman catholic confessions. similarly, the synods exemplify how the hungarian reformed church defined themselves within the context of their opposition, claiming that they were the only true, biblical religion. this selfdefinition as a trinitarian church in opposition to the unitarian church is unique to transylvania in this period and polemic rhetoric between all sides accompanied a legal regime that extended rights to different churches. the results of the reformed synods of 1567 to 1569 strongly suggest that many members of the reformed community desired that rights be removed from the unitarian church.42 beyond that, the synods also reflect a severe distaste towards the roman catholic community in transylvania: “[god] commands that we weed out and uproot them, so that no trace of papist defilement remains in the heart and soul of man.”43 hence, the three synods examined in this article provide a challenge to the concept of transylvania as a land where a language or principle of “tolerance” was advocated in any modern-day understanding of the term. despite decrees from the ruling diet, there was clearly resistance to the idea of tolerance and practice of toleration among hungarian speakers, both in transylvania and in hungary. rather than confirm an attitude of tolerance in the region, these synods de-romanticize the time period and remind the reader that there was essentially no embrace of religious tolerance by the hungarian reformed church towards unitarianism. toleration in the sixteenth century was, ultimately, a reluctant compromise practiced among hostile religious factions in the region. however, while the unitarian church endured widespread persecution throughout europe, it was granted specific legal rights that allowed it to grow and develop in the transylvanian principality. the reason for this unique legal status was partly due to the desire to maintain 39 “confession of varadiensis/nagyvárad,” 162-163. 40 “confession of varadiensis/nagyvárad,” 166. 41 “confession of varadiensis/nagyvárad,” 167. 42 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 11-12. 43 “documents of the debrecen synod (1567),” 12. this quote is preceded by an allusion to the first chapter of jeremiah, in which the prophet is commanded to expel heresy from his nation in the name of the lord. this provides the biblical foundation for the reformed church’s argument. 31 social peace and to pursue a policy that bolstered support among the elite of different faiths for transylvania as an autonomous state but also due to the support of the unitarian prince, jános zsigmond szapolyai, whose distinct religious policies allowed the church to flourish in the region. laws concerning anti-trinitarianism in transylvania in the sixteenth century by 1568, transylvania was divided into roman catholic, lutheran, reformed, unitarian, and eastern orthodox communities, as well as being home to other faith communities, most notably jewish, muslim, and roma. naturally, tensions between these groups of believers were high, and when debates surrounding the trinity intensified in the 1560s, so too did questions about the extent to which religious freedom should be sanctioned. this resulted in the edict of torda in 1568, which has been directly linked with the emergence of unitarianism in the region and is also central to the claims of numerous modern historians that transylvania was a “pioneer” of religious tolerance.44 most of the laws passed during jános zsigmond’s reign focused on the challenges of religious pluralism. in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the issue of multiconfessionalism, the diet granted a significant amount of religious liberty to preachers in the region, which was practically unheard of throughout the continent. perhaps the most influential law passed by the prince was the 1568 edict of torda, in which it was announced that ministers in the region were to preach the gospel “according to their understanding of it,” allowing space for a variety of conflicting interpretations of scripture to coexist.45 this edict was one of a number of laws about religious rights passed during the middle decades of the sixteenth century, which in one sense seem to portray the region as uniquely tolerant. later laws, for example, permitted the sharing of church buildings among confessions in order to conduct worship services, while the 1571 diet of marosvásárhely (târgu mures) further solidified confessional pluralism in the region, as it ensured that “no one, neither preacher nor listener, shall come to harm on account of his confession.”46 these laws laid the groundwork for religious pluralism to flourish in the region without any violent disturbance for a number of centuries. one law—the 1570 edict of medgyes (medias)—appears to contradict the prince’s ideology and the edict of torda. it states: “we will carry out your majesty's order concerning the newly emerging heresies and their initiators; that your majesty considers honoring god and respecting his royal dignity of foremost importance, therefore he does not tolerate such blasphemy and heresy in his realm, but rather scrutinizes them and punishes both 44 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 87. see, for example, the writings of earl morse wilbur, who saw transylvanian unitarianism as evidence for religious tolerance in the region. wilbur, a history of unitarianism, 165. dennison, on the other hand, reads these laws as a mere façade concealing dávid’s and szapolyai’s true motivations to push their unitarian agenda. “the synod at szikszó (1568),” 147. 45 szilágyi sándor, ed. erdélyi országgyûlési emlékek. monumenta comitialia regni transsylvaniae (budapest: magyar tudományos akadémia, 1877), 2:343, cited in graeme murdock, “turda, 1568: tolerance transylvanian style,” in a sourcebook of early modern european history: life, death, and everything in between, ed. ute lotz-heumann (new york: routledge, 2019), 236. 46 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 89. 32 their authors and propagators in order to avoid an even greater divine wrath upon us.”47 while some historians attribute this law as a move to prevent anarchy in the region, balázs sees this interpretation as a projection of modern-day concepts of religious tolerance onto a sixteenth-century context. rather, he claims that the law appears to have been put in place to prevent newly emerging groups from gaining influence in the region.48 this reading of the law aligns with szapolyai’s ideology; it de-romanticizes these sixteenthcentury laws, distancing them from any modern concepts of religious tolerance. it is important, then, to note that, by legally recognizing multiple confessions in one region, szapolyai was enforcing the requirement for transylvanians to practice toleration. however, his emphasis at each diet was on the reformation principle of sola scriptura— that the bible was god’s infallible and inerrant word and therefore the sole authority on all matters. this principle is drawn from verses of scripture, such as 2 timothy 3:16-17: “all scripture is given by inspiration of god, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of god may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.”49 it can therefore be concluded that the edict was intentionally excluding non-protestant communities, namely the roman catholic and eastern orthodox churches. this can be determined by the wording of the terms of the edict. the emphasis on reading scripture in the vernacular, as well as the concept of preaching the gospel according to one’s own interpretation, are core protestant beliefs. thus, the edict was indirectly discriminating against the non-protestant communities. the edict also concerned communities of believers and did not grant religious freedom to the individual. given the diverse nature of transylvania in the sixteenth century, as well as the pressure placed on the region from external forces, it is no surprise that cooperation and respect between these primary confessional groups would be at the forefront of jános zsigmond’s religious policy.50 toleration was, at this point, in the best interests of all parties, in order to establish a peaceful coexistence, and therefore it was a practice motivated entirely by self-interest, rather than mutual goodwill and respect, let alone any principled interest in tolerance. by examining these laws, one can see the unique status of the unitarian community in the principality of transylvania. szapolyai’s legal actions granted the church a space to grow and develop in the region unlike anywhere else in europe. the edict of torda gave the church a strong foothold in the region’s internal affairs, as the first unitarian schools were founded within a few years.51 moreover, one must also consider the number of laws introduced by the subsequent catholic rulers, which seemed to limit the status of antitrinitarianism in the region and thereby challenge transylvania’s alleged tolerance. when szapolyai died in 1571, he was succeeded by the catholic noble istván báthory.52 47 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 89-90. 48 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 91. 49 king james version. 50 fata, “the kingdom of hungary and principality of transylvania,” 115. 51 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 411. 52 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 184. in another act of compromise, it can be seen that the protestant elite welcomed báthory in the principality, despite his roman catholic faith, because of his anti 33 báthory’s prejudices against the unitarian church are clearly reflected in the laws passed by the transylvanian diet during his reign. similarly keen to secure political peace and autonomy in the region, however, the prince was unable to reverse the laws enacted by his predecessor. it is also important to note that maintaining peaceful multi-confessionalism in the region helped báthory in the lead up to his election as the king of poland. his successful history of maintaining peace in transylvania encouraged the polish nobility to think he would maintain their own multiconfessional settlement.53 despite this, as balázs explains, “he took every opportunity to act against antitrinitarians.”54 báthory was never subtle in his opposition of the unitarian church. from the early days of his rule, he made it clear that lutheranism was the most acceptable form of protestant worship.55 ferenc dávid, as well as his fellow unitarians, was dismissed from báthory’s court when he came to power, and consequently the preacher’s influence in the region started to diminish. at the 1572 diet of torda, the prince accepted the late jános zsigmond’s decree recognizing the region’s confessional pluralism, but simultaneously introduced a new ban on any further doctrinal innovation: “if found guilty of preaching a different faith from that of the late king, he should be excommunicated or otherwise punished according to his deserts.”56 this law strengthened báthory’s hold on the region’s affairs, while also maintaining multiconfessional peace in the region. as well as this, the catholic prince placed tighter restrictions on the ability of unitarians to print and distribute literature.57 thus, compared to the freedom they enjoyed under szapolyai, one can see that attempts were made to limit any further intellectual development of antitrinitarian ideas within the unitarian church. while it remained an official confession in the region, any further development was deliberately curtailed by laws limiting “doctrinal innovation.” returning to kaplan’s definition of the term, it can be seen that báthory’s treatment of the unitarian church did not come from any abstract ideal of religious liberty, but rather a necessity to maintain peace in the region while conceding the most limited religious rights to unitarians possible. transylvanian tolerance was a grudging affair developed in a very specific political and social context. the aforementioned ban on doctrinal innovation came into effect when ferenc dávid was accused of the crime in 1579, which came about as a result of the splitting of the unitarian church into two factions. the original group continued to adore christ in worship, in accordance with sozzini’s christology, while the other group did not.58 this group defined themselves as non-adorantists, as they held to the conviction that christ was merely mortal and, as such, did not merit any worship or praise. this theological practice was referred to by transylvanian trinitarians as “the very wicked and detestable view that christ should habsburg convictions. once again, this shows a willingness to tolerate (i.e., endure and bear with) the perceived enemy in order to achieve a common goal. 53 on bathory’s career in transylvania and poland, see felicia rosu, elective monarchy in transylvania and poland-lithuania, 1569–1587 (new york: oxford university press, 2017). 54 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 184. 55 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 184. 56 wilbur, a history of unitarianism, 59. 57 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 184. 58 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 412-413. 34 not be adored or invoked,” since it opposed the foundational truths of orthodox christian doctrine.59 ferenc dávid became convinced of non-adorantism, and despite attempted interventions by some of the principality’s most notable unitarian scholars, he would not concede.60 he held strictly to the old testament commandment that no one should be worshipped but god alone and believed that no further command had been given since then.61 sozzini, on the other hand, remained “adorantist” throughout his life, as he claimed that, although it was not necessary, it was not heretical to invoke christ in worship.62 báthory’s law indeed constrained the unitarian superintendent in transylvania to maintain “adorantist anti-trinitarianism” as the core unitarian doctrine, and as a result, dávid’s accusation and trial for doctrinal innovation reveal further inaccuracies in the suggestion that transylvania was a haven for religious tolerance throughout the early modern period. rather, it becomes clear that báthory was doing what was necessary to maintain internal political and social stability in the region, which continued to see angry rhetoric from all sides against the views of rivals, and nothing more. in the following centuries, nonadorantists would continue to be subject to persecution on the basis of these laws passed by báthory in the mid-sixteenth century.63 however, despite their contested place and internal divisions, the unitarian church that emerged from this period has remained in the transylvanian principality to this day and enjoys a unique popularity in many towns and villages throughout the region. by the end of the sixteenth century, unitarianism was no longer a catch-all term. the polemic split that resulted in two main factions—adorantists and non-adorantists, who became known as “sabbatarians”—had led to questions about the nature of the unitarian church in transylvania. every anti-trinitarian could agree theologically that god was a single entity, but beyond that there was no further consensus. at first, arguments arose over whether or not one should worship jesus christ or not; later, divisions arose over whether or not one should share in the sacraments of baptism and communion or not. these intense debates continued for centuries. despite this, it was a beneficiary of the unique multiconfessional laws passed by jános zsigmond szapolyai in mid-sixteenth century. these laws allowed the church to emerge in the principality unlike anywhere else in europe, and while at first glance this appears to portray the region as a tolerant place, upon deeper investigation it can be seen that the laws were primarily adopted in order to allow transylvania to maintain peace within its own borders and to bolster the political authority of the elected nobles who ruled the nascent state with precarious autonomy. 59 wilbur, a history of unitarianism, 39. 60 “biandrata had called for sozzini to come to transylvania to assist him in dealing with the turmoil caused by ferenc dávid’s espousal of non-adorantism … the italian theologian then practically lived together with dávid from november 1578 until april 1579 attempting to persuade dávid to change his position.” balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 189. 61 see, for example, matthew 4:10b: “for it is written, thou shalt worship the lord thy god, and him only shalt thou serve.” king james version. 62 balázs, “antitrinitarianism,” 189. see, for example, john 5:22-23, where sozzini claimed jesus sanctioned adoration of him in worship: “for the father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the son: that all men should honour the son, even as they honour the father. he that honoureth not the son honoureth not the father which hath sent him.” king james version. 63 murdock, “multiconfessionalism,” 415. 35 thus, toleration was in some ways forced upon the transylvanian people from above, through the laws passed by szapolyai and báthory, while also being practiced by the general populace below with state laws that directly forbade any violence towards preachers in legal churches, in order to maintain peace in the region. conclusion this article has shown that transylvania’s famed attitude towards religious tolerance was, in many ways, no different to the attitudes of most other european states. throughout the early modern period, hungarian historiography has portrayed the region as one far more advanced than its neighbors, striving for the ideals of peace and coexistence amid an age of brutality and warfare. beyond this, many scholars have often pointed directly to the emergence and development of the unitarian church in the region to strengthen their nationalist arguments. yet, in analyzing the confession’s emergence in the region from the reformed church, it seems clear that, although the region stood out for its unique acceptance of anti-trinitarianism, religious pluralism in transylvania was not based on any ideological concept. rather, as historian graeme murdock explains, transylvanian multiconfessionalism revealed itself as “a set of pragmatic rather than ideological responses to the changing character of european states and societies after the reformation.”64 this attitude is reflected in the legal developments within the region during the mid-sixteenth century, which forced transylvanian citizens into the social practice of toleration, regardless of their opposition of conflicting doctrine. no single denomination enjoyed a popularity significant enough to dominate the region’s affairs, and so while many transylvanian citizens hoped that confessional pluralism would be a temporary measure, they were willing to do what was necessary and compromise with their enemies, for the sake of internal stability.65 hence, it is erroneous to presume twenty-first-century concepts of individual religious freedom onto the legal and cultural actions of sixteenth-century transylvania.66 it has been shown in the reformed synods of 1567, 1568, and 1569 that there was no embrace of religious tolerance among the reformed community, despite laws passed by the diet. the motivation for practicing toleration in the region was largely governed entirely by selfinterest of the state’s elite of differing faiths. opposing denominations needed to reach a reluctant common ground of biblicism in order to achieve peace while vehemently disagreeing about interpretation of the bible. although various diets and rulers sanctioned religious pluralism during the early modern period, they also found ways to restrict the influence of minorities, as was the case with the unitarian church in transylvania. the growth of the unitarian church is a fascinating case study; its origins, development, and polemical inner division provide key insights into the political and cultural dimensions of toleration in early modern europe. the confession would continue to be the subject of much dispute for centuries, but ultimately it was clear to the citizens of transylvania that maintaining the mundane social practice of confessional pluralism was the best means to 64 murdock, “multiconfessionalism,” 415. 65 murdock, “multiconfessionalism,” 415-416. 66 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 90. 36 achieve peace during the period. rather than any ideological standard, the multiconfessional state of transylvania was built on “grudging and hard-fought compromises.”67 67 murdock, “multiconfessionalism,” 394. introduction the concept of religious “tolerance” in early modern europe szapolyai’s role in the development of unitarianism in transylvania opposition to anti-trinitarianism at the reformed synods in debrecen (1567), nagyvárad (1568), and szikszó (1569) laws concerning anti-trinitarianism in transylvania in the sixteenth century conclusion 25 how global was eastern europe during the cold war? rosie leeming university of cambridge abstract a substantial body of scholarship recognizes the globality of the cold war, evidencing the strategic propositioning of states favorable to the superpower ideologies divided in berlin. however, much of the existing scholarship treats this globality as evidence of superpower strategy: economic partnerships, the provision of weapons, the courting of creatives all understood as self-consciously inseparable from the battle itself. this article argues that the cold war, if understood as a battle fought territorially, ignores the reality of provincial connections. eastern europe, a slippery spatial term, welcomed and visited the spatial certainties that the cold war was based on. the world went to eastern europe throughout the cold war, and eastern europeans went to the world, in numerous and varied forms. these interactions challenge the perception of the cold war as fought according to hermetically sealed spaces, and their legacy challenges the perception that the world can be divided according to historical-ideological-spatial certainties. ultimately, the globality of the cold war reframes how much the context of the cold war contributed to the connectivity and fluidity of spaces. article the globality of the cold war itself is inscribed into the cityscape of lagos. the eko hotel, of nigerian design, constructed by a bulgarian enterprise in 1977, under american supervision, illustrates the global entanglement of the cold war (figure 1). all over west africa and the middle east, according to research by lukasz stanek, there is brutalist evidence of concrete compromises made between socialist satellites and states ideologically and spatially separate from the frameworks seen from washington and moscow. indeed, the cold war was fought according to particular spatial frameworks, namely a “tiered world” divided according to ideological alignment and strategic potential.1 the world was conceptualized into historical-geographical-ideological entities: the “west,” the “east,” the “global south,” and the “far east.” these framings informed how the cold war was understood and how it was fought. eastern europe was likewise spatially 1 timothy barney, “diagnosing the third world: the ‘map doctor’ and the spatialized discourses of disease and development in the cold war,” quarterly journal of speech 100, no. 1 (2014): 2. 26 conceptualized and filtered through cold war geopolitics.2 but spatial framings were never consistent. each had political potential, but each masked provincial priorities. whether propelled by the “instrumental incentives” of financial institutions,3 guided by the realpolitik of “friendly” and “hostile” spaces,4 or incensed by the “common struggle” of “anti-imperialist space,”5 the cold war transformed the idea of hermetic conceptual spaces. figure 1: the eko hotel, lagos.6 eastern europeans were propelled into transnationalism and globalization.7 scholarship increasingly recognizes the geographies of collaboration, and david matless problematizes the “eastern bloc” as a “soviet-dominated whole,” illustrating eastern independence from their soviet straitjacket.8 in his study, he considers the physical movement of geographers, and their international correspondence, as illustrative of the breakdown of cold war spatialities at the academic and vernacular level. despite nominal reliance on state 2 velichka ivanova, “literature in the ‘other’ europe before and after the transition: the work of blaga dimitrova and milan kundera,” debatte: journal of contemporary central and eastern europe 18, no. 2 (2010): 217-219. 3 alexandra gheciu, “security institutions as agents of socialization? nato and the ‘new europe,’” international organization 4 (2005): 976. 4 klaus dodds, “cold war geopolitics,” a companion to political geography, eds. john agnew, katharyne mitchell, and gearóid o� tuathail (oxford: wiley-blackwell, 2003), 210. 5 james mark and quinn slobodian, “eastern europe in the global history of decolonization,” the oxford handbook of the ends of empire, eds. martin thomas and andrew s. thompson (oxford: oxford university press, 2018), 351. 6 image sourced from gloria nwafor, “we are still open for business, says eko hotels,” the guardian, march 24, 2020, https://guardian.ng/business-services/we-are-still-open-for-business-says-eko-hotels/. 7 bruce williams and kledian myfarti, “albania: crossing borders with a new imaginary,” contemporary balkan cinema: transnational exchanges and global circuits, eds. lydia papdimitrious and ana grgic (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 2020), 30-31. 8 david matless, jonathon oldfield, and adam swain, “geographically touring the eastern bloc: british geography, travel cultures and the cold war,” transactions of the institute of british geographers 33, no. 3 (2008): 356. https://guardian.ng/business-services/we-are-still-open-for-business-says-eko-hotels/ 27 regulated agencies, the “other side of the iron curtain” was translated with sympathy and admiration, especially in less academic spaces like the british geographical magazine. essays here, rather than regurgitating official narratives, “globalized” eastern europe as both a real place and subversive space for an international audience. similarly, james mark revises globalization historicizing its cold war context: rather than being the triumph of western capitalism, epitomized by and waiting for the breached berlin wall, globalization was driven by “so-called peripheries,” including eastern europe.9 1989 did not suddenly expose eastern europe to the world; contacts had been maturing for decades. this article draws on matless’s problematization of eastern europe as a non-space and applies it to the conceptualization of all cold war spatialities. conceptual spaces might have their moral dimensions ascribed onto them such that their territorial limits acquire weight, but it was during the cold war that spatial scholar henri lefebvre defined the “worldwide” as a contested category.10 together with scholarship emphasizing changing patterns and perceptions of territorialization, i argue that the cold war saw spatial frameworks undermined by increasing globality.11 i will explore examples of the “west,” the “global south,” and the “far east” affecting eastern europe, and eastern europe affecting these conceptual spaces. as global actors, eastern europeans challenged the conceptual relevance of a monolithic “eastern europe” space. in so doing, they semiconsciously pre-empted the breakdown of borders that advances in cyber, technology, and information has done since the turn of the century. of course, for most eastern europeans, barbed wire rather than brechtian nomadism (bertolt brecht chose both east and west at different times in his career in the theater) was the reality.12 as mikhail german lamented, “one could be fit for military service but not fit for travel abroad.”13 nevertheless, the wall separating east from west was frequently breached. initially about “friendship and unity with the proletariat,” according to josef stalin, physical and material reciprocity became necessary to pacify restless socialist satellites.14 letters from diasporic communities in western europe also forged intimacy, providing evidence that the superiority of socialism was a mere smokescreen. the 9 james mark, “introduction,” alternative globalizations: eastern europe and the postcolonial world, eds. james mark, artemy m kalinovsky, and steffi marung (bloomington: indiana university press, 2020), 2-12. 10 jonathon oldfield, david matless, and adam swain, “the making of a sub-discipline: state initiatives and the production of british geographical studies of the soviet union and eastern europe, 1945-71,” transactions of the institute of british geographers 36, no. 4 (2011): 574-589; lukasz stanek, “socialist worldmaking: architecture and global urbanization in the cold war,” alternative globalizations: eastern europe and the postcolonial world, eds. james mark, artemy m kalinovsky, and steffi marung (bloomington: indiana university press, 2020), 168. 11 d. j. zeigler, “post-communist eastern europe and the cartography of independence,” political geography 21 (2002): 671-686. 12 david caute, the dancer defects: the struggle for cultural supremacy during the cold war (oxford: oxford university press, 2003), 276-296. 13 cited in anne e. gorsuch, all this is your world: soviet tourism at home and abroad after stalin (oxford: oxford university press, 2001), 111. 14 cited in baruch a. hazan, soviet propaganda: a case study of the middle east conflict (jerusalem: keter publishing house, 1976), 34. 28 east/west binary was blurred as real and imagined globality challenged the rhetoric that sealed them. theodora dragostinova understands the cold war as a way for eastern europeans to challenge geopolitical spatialities. this is evidenced by global cultural events with significant eastern european contributions. supposedly “a balkan backwater or soviet satrapy,” bulgaria reimagined itself by celebrating the anniversary of its medieval state in 1981. 1000 years bulgaria was one of 38,854 cultural events on tour between 1977 and 1981. this self-projection as a slavic civilization central to a european community revised geopolitical spatialities, explicitly inserting the bulgarian historical narrative into western exhibition halls. if the 800 artifacts failed to assert bulgaria’s national, rather than “eastern,” relevance, unesco insisted that its members, recognizing bulgaria’s contribution “to the development of world historical processes,” must “mark this anniversary in a suitable manner.”15 reaching new york, new delhi, and mexico city, bulgaria’s cultural program epitomized the sentiment of the late-cold war period. the whole world had been disoriented from the ultimate global entanglement, the 1971 oil shock, but there was an accompanying acceleration of political reconciliation, a détente suggesting collaboration rather than competition. a moment of geopolitical disorientation and international change allowed for smaller states, as dragostinova argues, to insert their agendas into new spaces. by the 1970s there was something of a shared, little-brother sentiment, newly expressible in an increasingly uncertain world order, as articulated in the national herald of new delhi, reviewing the touring company: “small nations know a lot about big nations, but the big nations know very little or almost nothing about the small nations.” similarly aspirational, poland demanded a revision of conceptual spatial frameworks. poland went “west” via their exhibition 1000 years of art in poland, which according to verity clarkson, located poland’s “intrinsic relation to mainstream european culture.” the dialogue surrounding the exhibition hints at efforts to revise poland’s peripherality in western discourse. including bernardo bellotto as a patron of polish art destabilized any idea of an exclusively western european art canon. remembering that copernicus was polish, andrew causey of the illustrated london news captured the confrontation with geopolitical spatialities that the exhibition prompted, recognizing a “home-from-home feeling of warsaw as another of the great european capitals.”16 the cold war context, when cultural flaunting acquired a new primacy, qualified the ideological separation of east and west as the east inserted itself into the visual realm of the western consciousness and the conceptual realm of the western past. as a result, eastern europe as a separate spatiality was challenged.17 15 theodora k. dragostinova, the cold war from the margins: a small socialist state on the global cultural scene (ithaca: cornell university press, 2021), 2-14, 97-114. 16 cited in verity clarkson, “a ‘many-coloured prism’: exhibiting polish national identities in cold war britain,” machineries of persuasion: european soft power and public diplomacy during the cold war, eds. óscar j. martín garcía and rósa magnúsdóttir (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 30. 17 clarkson, “a ‘many-coloured prism,’”30. 29 exhibits not only revisited cold war mental maps. literature has always been a way to “go” without “going.” rival superpowers deliberately translated “the other” to reinforce loyalties, in what sarah davies called the “periodical equivalent of an arms race.”18 magazines were state-sponsored as recognized fodder for propagandistic purposes, softpower strategies to transmit ideas about the “bourgeois prosperity” lacking in the east, according to those behind the us magazine, amerika. residents in kyiv, minsk, and tallinn were all exposed to the messages mediated through glossy colors, connecting eastern europe with the “west.” but travel also happened in consuming subversive media, and the movement of stories hinted at the globality of eastern europe. narratives of “escape” fed a western curiosity that eastern europe was imprisoned. although the actual number of escapees was low, stories like “386 through ulbricht wall with a false passport,” of dietrich jensch’s getaway in 1965, and accounts of the “freedom train,” when czech dissidents hijacked a train crossing the curtain in 1951, were distributed widely.19 that the same image of escapees featured in aftonbladet, expressen, and lektyr illustrates this globality, in what laura saarenmaa calls border-crossing activity. in some ways, these stories reaffirmed superpower spatio-moral tropes, translations that reinforced the east as “voiceless embodiments of victimhood.”20 but it worked both ways, as narratives travelled back depicting the west as a place of exploitation and unemployment, particularly potent in diasporic exchanges. certainly, the exchanges between transylvanian saxon emigres in germany and their compatriots in romania foregrounded the disappointment felt after 1989, when more people travelled west. alienation and discrimination were the frontrunners to the failed integration efforts explored by james koranyi.21 by learning of the proximity of the other (real and imagined), the aesthetic exchange during the cold war undermined the spatial framings that it ultimately depended on. the west was hardly the paradise its patriots promised; when access was liberalized, the spatial separation from the (equally evasive) “east,” which its self-identity depended on, was let down by the actual porosity of both the places and the people that had interacted during the cold war. eastern europeans also went to the “global south,” challenging notions of spatial certainty. scholarship has detailed the interconnectivity of the discourses of soviet internationalism and decolonization. in the wake of mid-century independence struggles, projected solidarity from socialist states appealed to those looking for allies in a globalizing world.22 however, given that international socialism looked very similar to imperial domination of before, eastern europeans were a welcome compromise, sharing a history of quasi 18 sarah davies, “the soft power of anglia: british cold war cultural diplomacy in the ussr,” contemporary british history 27, no. 3 (2013): 317. 19 laura saarenmaa, “operation diplomat and other smuggling stories: east-german trafficking in the swedish popular press 1963–1973,” media history 26, no. 1 (2020): 51-55; tara zahra, the great departure: mass migration from eastern europe and the making of the free world (new york: w. w. norton and company, 2016), 218-221. 20 saarenmaa, “operation diplomat,” 53. 21 james koranyi and ruth wittlinger, “from diaspora to diaspora: the case of transylvanian saxons in romania and germany,” nationalism and ethnic politics, 17, no. 1 (2011): 96-115. 22 sara pugach, “eleven nigerian students in cold war east germany: visions of science, modernity, and decolonisation,” journal of contemporary history 54, no. 3 (2019): 553-555. 30 colonization and proving a path out of it.23 however, eastern europeans were not necessarily moscow’s “scavengers,” to use austin jersild’s term, but individuals, providing industrial equipment, sending planning experts, or selling prefabricated components.24 “east” to “south” exchange complicated their spatially separate imaginings. trade and economic relations between east and south saw spaces created and action conducted outside cold war geopolitics. initially, eastern europeans maintained the soviet system of soft loans rather than exchanges in hard currency, but pressure from western competitors compelled participation in international regulatory institutions, comecon membership gradually superseded by the general agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt).25 for instance, the gdr established a trade agreement with ethiopia in 1977, swapping coffee for weapons, with details like accumulating debt and interest rates to be sorted later on. after mengistu haile mariam’s coup in ethiopia, and the us departure, the gdr stepped in, eager to mediate the bind of fixed-price guarantees that was hurting germany’s economy after the brazilian coffee crop failure in 1975. however, ideology ceded to economics. when ethiopia started trading on the free market, the coffee “reserved” for germany was its poorest quality. the gdr withdrew and diverted its trucks and infrastructure to vietnam, suggesting a global pragmatism with which to mediate the splintering of communist and capitalist space. anne dietrich concludes that side-lining ideology for profitability was a trajectory for most commercial encounters between “east” and “south.”26 anna calori goes further, tracing a “globalist approach” in which to understand the economic disintegration of a cold war world.27 indeed, bilateral relationships were reciprocal, summarized by a mozambiquan official in 1980: “we do not want underdevelopment and we do not want perpetual economic domination…but there is a way to pull all that behind us…let’s do some exchanging.”28 such “aid shopping” also encouraged first and second worlds to meet, as the third world rejected geopolitics in preference for maximizing the skills individual companies, rather than ideological spatialities, offered.29 23 david c. engerman, “the romance of economic development and new histories of the cold war,” diplomatic history 28, no. 1 (2004): 23-54. 24 austin jersild, “the soviet state as imperial scavenger: ‘catch up and surpass’ in the transnational socialist bloc, 1950-1960,” the american historical review 116, no. 1 (2011): 109-132. 25 anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka, eds., between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 9-13. 26 anne dietrich, “bartering within and outside the cmea: the gdr’s import of cuban fruits and ethiopian coffee,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 197-208. 27 anna calori., “introduction,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 19. 28 cited in bodan jacob and iolanda vasile, “agents of decolonization? romanian activities in mozambique’s oil and healthcare sectors, 1976–1984,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 145. 29 david c. engerman, “the second world’s third world,” kritika: explorations in russian and eurasian history 12, no. 1 (2011): 196. 31 in his book, architecture in global socialism, lukasz stanek explores the architectural dialogue between “east” and “west” in the middle east. the collaboration between the polish firm archicentre and the swedish developer skanska was pragmatic as trade rationalized systems into export-oriented markets. returning to the example of the eko hotel, stanek stresses the collaboration that was driven not by hard geopolitical strategy, or at least not only that, but the pragmatism of specialization and profitable economic returns. architects did not necessarily carry ideologies but were motivated by modernity and monumentality. while josip broz tito and nicolae ceauşescu both saw architectural export as strategic, and solidarity with the postcolonial world an advantageous dig at western imperialism, the global south was a new and more neutral space, hosting and enabling multiple worldmaking projects, but self-consciously exploiting their neutrality for the maximum returns. as one kuwaiti diplomat insisted in 1983, cold war spatialities were irrelevant: “kuwait is a completely open market; no political consideration is given.”30 stanek suggests that architectural efforts were experiments in socialist worldmaking.31 but this article challenges his maintenance of geopolitical frameworks. it was not the socialist world that was architecturally reproduced, but the adaptation of architectural practices according to global connections. the cityscapes of the middle east, as well as the cityscapes of eastern european cities where cold war spatial partnerships have subsequently enabled the use of computer-aided design, are a testament to the globality of eastern europe during the cold war. ultimately, in architectural and economic partnerships, eastern and southern engagements undermined cold war spatializations. eastern europeans were active in countries neither explicitly socialist nor adherents to the socialism of soviet specifics. czechoslovakia maintained angolan connections even after the latter renounced marxism-leninism, and the gdr navigated the socialist cosmopolitanism of zanzibar to access its cloves. global actions were a cause and consequence of an increasingly global world.32 the relationship eastern europe had with the “far east” was initially informed by cold war spatializations, but these frameworks were likewise gradually eroded. the soviet union found receptive partnership with its asian comrades, sending eastern europeans to formalize sino-soviet relationships. however, compromises between chinese priorities and socialist states’ ambitions meant eastern europeans in the far east qualified the spatializations they represented, possibly because of the relative novelty of sino-soviet space for eastern european agents, according to liu xiaoyuan.33 for instance, the 1956 30 cited in lukasz stanek, architecture in global socialism: eastern europe, west africa, and the middle east in the cold war (princeton: princeton university press, 2020), 240. 31 stanek, architecture in global socialism, 25-20, 240-280, 305. 32 eric burton, “diverging visions in revolutionary spaces: east german advisers and revolution from above in zanzibar, 1964–1970,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 91-96; and pavel szobii, “czechoslovak economic interests in angola in the 1970s and 1980s,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 161-171. 33 jan zofka, péter vámos, and sören urbansky, “beyond the kremlin’s reach? eastern europe and china in the cold war era,” cold war history 18, no. 3 (2018): 252. 32 hungarian performing arts ensemble’s tour in shenyang projected its own spatial priorities by including their unofficial national anthem, “rákóczi march,” rather than partyoriented works.34 romantic nationalism was a calculated avoidance of stalinist propaganda art, but it was also a strategic insistence of a folkish intimacy between hungary and china that avoided, even discarded, the ussr. playing into the political effervescence of the late 1950s, the ensemble forged a global connection between two socialist, but also two selfconscious, states. it was the cold war context that accelerated this potential partnership. likewise, the twinning project between the chinese and czech villages vinařice and cangzhao “officially” ended in 1961, but local relations survived the sino-soviet split, a testament to the globality of eastern europe and the redundancy of spatial separations of cold war geopolitics. too much emphasis on geopolitical maneuvering, in academia especially, ignores the personal connections that testify to an alternative narrative of cold war connectivity.35 however, it was yugoslavian globality that best demonstrated the futility of geopolitical spatializations. tito conducted a “friendship tour” in 1958 in anticipation of his premiership of the non-aligned movement which jawaharlal nehru hoped “would acquire a wider, universal implementation.” travelling with an “ambition to play a global role,” tito broke down cold war conceptual geographies.36 as a. singham put it, tito “revealed to the afro-asian world the existence of a non-colonial europe which would be sympathetic to their aspirations. by bringing europe into the grouping, yugoslavia helped to create an international movement.”37 the “great friendship” ultimately failed but the legacy of its globality, and that of the czech agriculturalists, surpassed the territoriality of the cold war. eastern europe did not only go to the far east on tito’s flag-ship destroyer, the galeb, to challenge the conceptual distance between spaces. nor was it only a destination for sinosoviet solidarity, as print-media imagined (figure 2). the “far east” was a repository for alternative global aspirations to be rearticulated through media. increasingly, films provided a “mechanism to travel,” which, despite providing tourism “in which virtual travel confirmed the superiorities of home,” also enabled international relations.38 just as the west were showing fincho, a color-film exploring the colonial “gift” of industrialization, to indoctrinate nigerians with british corporatism,39 albania used films to forge solidarities and project its national relevance across socialist, if not soviet, space.40 albania’s leader, enver hoxha, permanently paranoid about his international relevance, forged a version of a 34 józsef böröcz, “performing socialist hungary in china: ‘modern, magyar, european,’” cold war history 18, no. 3 (2018): 263. 35 daniela kolenovska, “sino-czechoslovak cooperation on agricultural cooperatives: the twinning project,” cold war history 18, no. 3 (2018): 294. 36 svetozar rajak, “from regional role to global undertakings: yugoslavia in the early cold war,” the balkans in the cold war, eds. svetozar rajak, konstantina e. botsiou, eirini karamouzi, and evanthis hatzivassiliou (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2017), 66. 37 a. w. singham and shirley hune, non-alignment in an age of alignments (joplin, mo: the college press, 1986), 52. 38 gorsuch, all this is your world, 168, 185. 39 noah tsika, “soft power cinema: corporate sponsorship, visual pedagogy, and the cultural cold war in west africa,” the velvet light trap 73 (2014): 53-54. 40 lynn t. white, “dictators against dependence: albania and korea,” asian politics and policy 10, no. 3 (2018): 493-495. 33 cultural revolution that legitimized claims to a semi-colonial origin myth. emphasizing the national liberation war, the state-sponsored film ngadhnjim mbi vdekjen (essay on death) forged an anti-fascist intimacy between albania and china. this film dealt with female war heroes, caught by nazi germans and tortured for their communist beliefs, a translatable struggle spatially and temporally. the great warrior of albania skanderberg was likewise popular for its demonstration of the technological capacity of socialism.41 the subject of the great warrior was the fifteenth-century national hero george skanderberg, whose legendary legacy of fending off ottoman attack for two decades was transcribed into the propagandistic artillery of albanian socialism. these films were simultaneously part of a nationalizing and globalizing process in albanian international relations. the resistance blueprint, the foundation for most soviet cinema, was a readily communicable allegory for albanian relevance, especially after the sino-soviet split when the socialist world order was being reoriented. global albanian politics, and global albanian films, eroded the conceptual utility of discrete “eastern europe” and “far east” spaces. figure 2: cover of 1959 edition of sino-soviet friendship journal.42 the spatial entity of eastern europe was not only undermined by eastern europeans going global but also by the globe coming to them. “western,” “southern,” and “far eastern” representatives came carrying and rejecting their conceptual identities. if the west represented self-appointed superiority and consumerism, it came as economists and birds 41 elidor mehilli, “globalized socialism, nationalized time: soviet films, albanian subjects, and chinese audiences across the sino-soviet split,” slavic review 77, no. 3 (2018): 623-634. 42 taken from jersild, “the soviet state as imperial scavenger,” 119. 34 eye sweetcorn. the south, supposedly a people and place ripe for manipulation, came as agitated students disillusioned by the cold war binary. the far east came not as noncritical socialist trainees, but with concerns informed by domestic pressures. in every instance, spatializations were overcome in a globalized, dialogic space. western capitalism and eastern communism competed at the domestic level, epitomized by the notorious kitchen debate, which reduced geopolitics to a debate about consumption and convenience. despite every effort made to restrict soviet subjects’ exposure to america’s “endeavor to make [them] dissatisfied,” eastern europe was “visited” by pointed exhibits, according to a us ambassador.43 at poznan’s international trade fair in 1956, the “made in usa” effort offered an abundance of appliances and vending machines full of coca-cola, tapping into the growing dissatisfaction with the scarcity of goods and services in the “sclerotic soviet east,” according to don slater.44 at exhibitions organized with military efficiency and regularity, dwight d. eisenhower and nikita khrushchev were aware of the changing terms of the battle, the east lapped up the west, on display as attractive time-free actresses (figure 3). the riotous excitement when the food was given to a spectator at the end of the exhibition contrasted with the polish bread riots of recent memory. supermarket shows were matched by the economic “arrival” of the west, in the growth of the european economic community (eec). as the profitability of comecon membership floundered, and the west dropped its reluctance to operate outside cold world spatializations, realistic compromises spread continentally. while the ussr held firm against the european family, eastern european satellites were spatially separate and systematically self-conscious about the value of alternative economic models. by 1978, czechoslovakia and hungary had made deals with the eec on steel, and even bulgaria, long the soviet darling, concluded its own the following year. eec overcame aversions to import quotas, and eastern european states ceded the necessity of multilateral negotiations, blurring cold war spatialities. as angela romano argues, by the 1970s, “the cold war order was evidently out-of-date for many governments in europe.”45 so were its spatial frameworks. 43 ambassador cited in greg castillo, cold war on the home front: the soft power of midcentury design (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 2010), vii. 44 don slater, cited in castillo, cold war on the home front, xiv. 45 angela romano, “untying cold war knots: the eec and eastern europe in the long 1970s,” cold war history 14, no. 2 (2014): 168. 35 figure 3: the “kitchen of the future” set, as modelled by students from the university of zagreb.46 the west also came intangibly via smuggled literature, which complicated its separation from the east. prague became a transit zone for translating western literature into eastern languages. translations, according to edmund wnuk-lipinski, were a “window to the west.”47 but in bringing the west closer, the abstract separation of eastern and western spaces was undermined. sometimes, this was explicitly enlisted into the geopolitical agenda. in the late 1970s, students from moscow state university initiated an exchange with the university of michigan, enabling the publication of mikhail bulgakov in western spaces and the translation of american articles in journals including problems of communism and problems of eastern europe. but literature was also apolitical, or ageopolitical, fiction, a forum for universal values rather than capitalist or socialist ones. for instance, appreciating the disillusioned “jumpers” in peter schneider’s der mauerspringer (the wall jumper) in both east and west berlin, according to matthew miller, undermines the idea of divided spaces via a practice of “aesthetic cognitive mapping.” the west and east read each other, and in so doing broke down the “curtainless concrete” separating them.48 ultimately, the more the west visited the east, including on paper, the less the conceptual divide between them made sense. intellectual, pragmatic, and material entanglement, cause and consequence of globalizing forces, attests to the futility of cold war spatialities. the global south also came to eastern europe during the cold war, ostensibly to “learn” socialist modernity. rather than imitating socialist space, this entanglement changed what socialist space meant, again exposing the globality of eastern europe. comecon’s permanent commission for the coordination of technical assistance called for contacts 46 taken from castillo, cold war on the home front, 163. 47 cited in yale richmond, cultural exchange and the cold war: raising the iron curtain (university park: penn state university press, 2003), 200. 48 matthew d. miller, “divided berlin and cold war aesthetics: mediating the wall in literature and film,” seminar: a journal of germanic studies 55, no. 3 (2019): 268. 36 with students from “colonial and developing countries.”49 relations were conducted through the soviet friendly association with the peoples of africa, and students came to universities across eastern europe. the university of 17th november in prague hosted only foreign students between 1961 and 1974, and bratislava specialized in scholarships for angolan students. romania, poland, and east germany all hosted a not insignificant number of african students in the 1960s, offering technical training and socialist solidarity. the south came east, inspired by yuri gagarin’s space flight and enamored by the “second most successful economy in the world.”50 however, the racism that ghanaian students experienced in kyiv not only curtailed east-south connections but also challenged supposedly color-blind marxism.51 similarly, hosting nigerian students demanded a confrontation with socialism, christianity, and race in east germany, a confrontation that was occasionally violent and often discriminatory, as detailed in the semi-autobiographical account written by the student a. ohiaeri, behind the iron curtain.52 soviet-south relations were significantly hampered by incidents of xenophobia, but the experiences of the south in the east continues to encourage eastern european historians to confront global discourses, blurring the binary of geopolitical blocs.53 despite, and because of, the experience of the “south” coming “east,” its legacy informs modern scholarship in ways that demonstrate the globality of eastern europe in the cold war. the dissolution of geopolitical spatializations was also undermined in the intangible arrival of the south. filmic contacts with chile nurtured a commonality across geopolitical framings. during the 1970s, the east german film company, deutsche filmaktiengesellschaft (defa), nurtured increasing intimacy first with bulgarian creatives, but then too with chileans, sharing a sense of displacement in socialist filmmaking itself informed by the broader socio-political climate. in aniko imre’s analysis, eastern europe and latin america were common, self-conscious “imaginary location[s] somewhere between civilization and barbarism.”54 recognizing the potentiality of third world solidarity, visas were granted to more than 1,500 chileans to train in various vocational programs in germany, conditional on their contribution to a broader socialist metanarrative. co-productions saw psychological and territorial likeness inscribed in the radio play trace of the disappeared, the rugged landscape and association with liminality enough to “bridge the distance,” according to the east german press, in a film about the real-life murder of lonquen, “disappeared” for actively resisting fascism. again, this creative and ideological intimacy testifies the fluidity of cold war spatialities: the passage, like trace, depended on bulgarian, german, and chilean collaboration, with national specialization 49 constantin katsakioris, “nkrumah’s elite: ghanaian students in the soviet union in the cold war,” paedagogica historica 57, no. 3 (2021): 260-263. 50 robert c. allen, “the rise and decline of the soviet economy,” the canadian journal of economies 34, no. 4 (2001): 861; szobii, “czechoslovak economies,” between east and south: spaces of interaction in the globalizing economy of the cold war, eds. anna calori, anne-kristin hartmetz, bence kocsev, and jan zofka (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2019), 169-170, 189. 51 katsiakoris, “nkrumah’s elite,” 268. 52 pugach, “eleven nigerian students,” 561-568. 53 sharad chari and katherine verdery, “thinking between the posts: postcolonialism, postsocialism, and ethnography after the cold war,” comparative studies in society and history 51, no. 1 (2009): 9-15. 54 cited in claudia sandberg, “an east german chile in bulgaria: notions of longing and displacement,” studies in eastern european cinema 12, no. 1 (2021): 24. 37 underwrote the universal interest in socialist male heroes. the exilic journey towards argentina is transcribed into eastern european spaces, and claudia sandberg argues that such solidarity could “entertain the idea of proletarian internationalism.”55 but the narratives of individual perseverance amid political turmoil during the cold war “touched everyone,” the german director said. indeed, it touched enough for english, french, and bulgarian contributors to overcome binary spatialities, thereby rejecting the specificity of an eastern europe space at all.56 finally, the far east came to eastern europe, and their exchanges in tangible and intangible ways fractured the spatial frameworks ascribed by cold war geopolitics. the bandung conference of 1955 was an afro-asian dialogue confronting the legacies of colonialism and, in contemporary germany, was understood as “a decision of world importance.”57 unlike the intimacy with vietnam in the gdr in which the conceptual hierarchy of big and little socialist brothers was behind the socialist assistance campaign of training workers as industrialists or the “socialist brotherhood” behind the german-chinese friendship month (figure 4), the coterminous bandung process revised spatial imaginings. afro-asian students arrived with a discourse of postcolonialism that needed accommodating, acknowledged by a public relations campaign: “these students will be the political and intellectual leaders of tomorrow” and their choices “might also determine the future of europe.”58 however, acknowledgement did not precede action, which the gdr failed to take quickly enough for the 500 african students who migrated west. that the gdr failed to shed its binary perspective on world politics was inappropriate neutrality for politicized students of pan-africanism, whose frustration quinn slobodian expands as being “a serious critique of superpower rivalry.”59 the gdr failed to accommodate the “affective proximity” of the east and far east, too distracted by its interplay with its western competitor. when forty east germans protested the tiananmen square massacre in pankow, incensed by (newly permitted) west german television channels, they were issued extortionate fines. this gross misjudgment suggests that china and east germany were entangled not because of socialist solidarity, but by “a shared struggle against [states] that claimed to govern in their names.”60 by 1980, the world was interconnected, spatialities shrunk by global connectivity and universal discourse. 55 sandberg, “an east german chile in bulgaria,” 32. 56 sandberg, “an east german chile in bulgaria,” 27-29. 57 west german journalist herbert von borch, cited in quinn slobodian, “bandung in divided germany: managing non-aligned politics in east and west, 1955–63,” the journal of imperial and commonwealth history 41, no. 4 (2013): 64. 58 cited in slobodian, “bandung in divided germany,” 647. 59 slobodian, “bandung in divided germany,” 657. 60 quinn slobodian, “china is not far! alternative internationalism and the tiananmen square massacre in east germany’s 1989,” alternative globalizations: eastern europe and the postcolonial world, eds. james mark, artemy m. kalinovsky, and steffi marung (bloomington: indiana university press, 2020), 319-322. 38 figure 4: “long live the sino-soviet friendship” painting featured on the poster of the german-chinese friendship month, july 1951.61 spatial frameworks were significantly altered during the twentieth century; technology, trade, and transport connected peoples and places across previously insurmountable geographies in exponentially shortening time. the cold war was predicated on seeing the world according to specific spatialities. however, this article has tried to show that the cold war world was a cold war concept, and its spatial frameworks make little sense when one interrogates the cultural, economic, and material exchanges of the period. representatives of every spatiality interacted in and with eastern europe, but in many instances, by virtue of this interaction, the ideological weight of their spatial homeland was eroded. perhaps nothing better demonstrates that global exchanges eroded the conceptualization of eastern europe than the diasporic experience in and after the cold war. the chilean exiles that arrived in bulgaria and east germany after the 1973 coup changed socialist cinema to a more universally accessible commentary on the disillusionment of socio-political certainty at the end of the cold war. but it was after 1989 when the diasporic experience confirmed the spatial legacy of the cold war. paul magocsi traces the dialogue diasporas had with their homelands after 1989 and suggests that diasporas were unable to influence the geopolitical make-up of post-communist eastern europe.62 this is because diasporic groups carry a nostalgia for an outdated idea of their former homelands, according to mark 61 ivanov, “long live the sino-soviet freindship,” march 1951, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sinosoviet_treaty_of_friendship,_alliance_and_mutual_assistance#/media/file:195103_%e4%b8%ad%e8%8b %8f%e4%b8%a4%e5%9b%bd%e4%ba%ba%e6%b0%91%e5%8f%8b%e8%b0%8a%e4%b8%87%e 5%b2%81_%e4%bc%8a%e4%b8%87%e8%af%ba%e5%a4%ab%e4%bd%9c.png, accessed august 30, 2022. for the poster for the “friendship month,” see quinn slobodian, ed., comrades of color: east germany in the cold war (new york: berghahn books, 2015), 220. 62 paul robert magocsi, “in step or out of step with the times? central europe’s diasporas and their homelands in 1918 and 1989,” austrian history yearbook 36 (2005): 178-184. 39 biondich.63 their failure to have dreams realized hints at the globalized consequences of cold war interconnectivity. they failed to understand the patterns of political organization in a post-1989 context when decades of exchange had shifted spatial priorities. nationstates, long the ambition of slovak, croat, and slovenian diasporas, was an anachronistic ideal, the european union, the ultimate erosion of spatial specificity, was the dominant ideal. petitioning for independent statehood meant, in some ways, eastern european diasporas were the last eastern europeans, but they represented an eastern europe that no longer existed. 63 mark biondich, “some reflections on the south slav diaspora,” austrian history yearbook 36 (2005): 190192. cey 2023 (vol. 5) introduction editorial introduction meyer weinshel university of minnesota i am delighted to introduce the fifth volume of the journal. this current issue continues our mission to promote scholarship of central europe among undergraduate students from across the disciplines. the center for austrian studies and the central europe yearbook editorial team also wish to thank professor elizabeth dillenburg’s leadership over the past five years. as lead editor of the cey, elizabeth oversaw the publication of the journal starting with its founding issue, and devoted significant time and effort to this project even after she had left minnesota for her position at the ohio state university. we are grateful for her commitment to undergraduate scholarship as are the many students who have worked with her on the central europe yearbook. in this volume, we have a superb collection of publications, as well as a digital project, that inevitably draw parallels to other issues of topical importance. natalia bobowiec draws from her research of textbooks in poland published in the last two decades, and how textbooks frame (or elide) the holocaust within polish memory culture. the prevalent binaries that bobowiec uncovers point to the challenges of teaching uncomfortable truths about one’s individual and collective past. jackson bowman dives deeper into the aftermath of reinhard heydrich’s assassination, which resulted in war crimes committed against the towns of lidice and ležáky in 1942. bowman argues that a combination of allied coverage of the crimes in the united states, britain, and the czech government in exile, were crucial in shoring up support for the allied war effort. andrea cuniolo used the past few decades of scholarship on martin heidegger, to expose the ways heidegger’s actions before and after serving as rector of the university of freiburg were in line with antisemitic policies enacted by the nazis. and lastly, emmey harris’ arcgis storymaps project highlights the role of adam olearius’ travels from northern germany through what is today russia, azerbaijan, and iran in the form of his travel accounts. olearius’ writings serve as an important case study for the history of travel and 1 publishing in the seventeenth century. the temporal and topical range of student research published here reflects the breadth and depth of academic research in undergraduate programs across the world today. 2 home search this site embedded files skip to main content skip to navigation home introduction the commission the tapestries in history reading tapestry gallery references   home introduction the commission the tapestries in history reading tapestry gallery references more home introduction the commission the tapestries in history reading tapestry gallery references the jagiellonian genesis tapestries (1553) start tour google sites report abuse page details page updated google sites report abuse 200 das menschliche gesicht der großstadtdämonen wie kulturkritik durch die sprachliche bildlichkeit des expressionismus zum ausdruck gebracht wird romy durda philipps-universität marburg abstract dieses paper zeigt exemplarisch auf, dass expressionistische lyrik als eine zeitgenössische ökologische reflexion und klage über bedingungen des menschlichen daseins gelesen werden kann. gegenstand dieser reflexion ist nicht nur die verfasstheit des individuellen ich, sondern auch seine beziehung zur großstädtischen umwelt: das lyrische ich erkennt seine prekäre situation inmitten der häuserschluchten, die nicht mehr behausung, sondern nur noch bedrohung sind. in close readings verschiedener expressionistischer gedichte stellt sich allerdings heraus, dass dieses leiden unter den bedingungen des modernen großstadtlebens nicht allein – wie in der expressionismusrezeption oft vorgetragen – auf die dämonisch-mystisch metaphorisierte großstadt zurückzuführen ist. vielmehr ergeben sich aus einer textimmanenten auseinandersetzung mit ihren sprachlichen bildern deutliche hinweise auf eine tiefgehende kulturkritik, die in der expressionismusrezeption bislang vernachlässigt wurde. so wurden beispielsweise dämonisierende und dynamisierende metaphern in der auseinandersetzung mit werken von georg heym und alfred lichtenstein vielfach als eine unheilvolle, mystische animierung der umgebung mittels übernatürlicher wesen interpretiert. wie meine analyse verschiedener expressionistischer stadtgedichte zeigen wird, verbirgt sich hinter dieser dämonischen gestalt jedoch ein viel bekannteres, ein allzu menschliches gesicht. eine eingehende untersuchung dieser metaphern macht deutlich, dass den personifizierten großstädten merkmale zugeschrieben werden, die klare gemeinsamkeiten zu menschlichen eigenschaften aufweisen. folglich werden die mit der urbanisierung im zusammenhang stehenden existentiellen leiderfahrungen als konsequenzen des menschlichen schaffens dargestellt und reflektiert. indem die sprachliche gestaltung der analysierten werke auf den wahren urheber großstädtischer leiderfahrungen aufmerksam macht, zeigt sie den menschen als schöpfer dieser zweiten natur, die uns nicht länger lebensdienlich ist. in ihren eindrücklichen metaphern malen österreichische und deutsche dichterinnen ein düsteres bild des großstädtischen lebensraumes, das auch hundert jahre später noch von 201 großer relevanz für uns hier und heute ist: angesichts zunehmender verstädterung und metropolenbildung ist die zeit längst reif für die auseinandersetzung mit der ökologischen und kulturkritischen perspektive expressionistischer großstadtlyrik. this article examines how expressionist poetry gave rise to an ecological reflection on the condition of the self and how it relates to its urban and social environment. based on an analysis of the ambivalent relationship between the self and the emerging big cities, which was of particular significance to german and austrian poets, i argue that ecological implications in expressionist imagery have mostly been overlooked. for example, numerous critics have identified and reaffirmed the significance of “demonizing” and “dynamizing” metaphors in georg heym’s and alfred lichtenstein’s poetry. the dominant reading is to interpret their poetic depictions of the metropolis as supernatural entities imbued with a sinister sense of agency, recklessness, and hostility. through the close readings of various expressionist city poems, i show that there is another, more familiar face behind the demonic mask: a very human one. the big city’s features as well as its characteristics do not only point to demonic entities, but they also draw attention to unmistakably human characteristics. accordingly, expressionist poems illustrate that the existential dread and misery experienced by the self in the metropolis converge into a suffering of our own human making. in my close readings of poems by heym, lichtenstein, lichnowsky, and others, the most “demonic” aspect of the metropolis is the acknowledgement that we as humans have created a second nature that no longer sustains us. this article therefore presents expressionist city poetry as intriguing and insightful meditations on how human ecology responded to the challenges of urbanization and acceleration. in their haunting and emphatic metaphors, austrian and german expressionist poets paint a dark picture of our human dwelling, which is still relevant for us today: as our cities today are ever-expanding and growing into megacities and supercities, it is the perfect time to rediscover—and reconsider—the ecological implications of expressionist city poetry. article in sprachlichen bildern, die eine verfremdete realität zu zeigen scheinen, weil sie nicht der abbildung einer äußeren sondern einer inneren wirklichkeit dienen, offenbart sich die seele expressionistischer dichterinnen und dichter, mit dem ziel ihr leiden an der großstädtischen umgebung zum ausdruck zu bringen. angesichts des überwältigenden chaos’ einer selbstgeschaffenen außenwelt stellen angst und ohnmacht, sowie der verlust von identität und individualität gefühle dar, mit denen sich bereits in der literatur zu beginn des 20. jahrhunderts vermehrt auseinandersetzt wurde. aus dem lateinischen wort für ausdruck (expressio) hervorgehend, bezeichnet der begriff expressionismus eine bewegung in literatur, musik und bildender kunst, welche sich zeitlich in die jahre von 1905 bis 1925 einordnen lässt. mit ihren werken verfolgten die expressionisten das maßgebliche ziel der epoche, die empfindungen der seele zum ausdruck zu bringen und bilder zu erschaffen, die folglich nicht der abbildung einer objektiven realität, sondern der darstellung einer subjektiven gefühlswelt dienen. diese 202 innere wirklichkeit war insbesondere zu beginn des expressionismus geprägt von leiderfahrungen, die mit dem leben in der großstadt in unmittelbarem zusammenhang standen. im vorwort zu seiner anthologie menschheitsdämmerung erklärt kurt pinthus dazu: das chaotische der zeit, das zerbrechen der alten gemeinschaftsformen, verzweiflung und sehnsucht, gierig fanatisches suchen nach neuen möglichkeiten des menschenlebens offenbart sich in der dichtung dieser generation mit gleichem getöse und gleicher wildheit wie in der realität.1 neben dem herannahen des ersten weltkrieges bezieht sich diese „realität“, von welcher bei pinthus die rede ist, vor allem auf den problemkomplex der urbanisierung, der für den expressionismus von prägender bedeutung war. unter dem begriff urbanisierung versteht man sowohl die ausbreitung der städte im geographischen sinne, als auch die veränderungen und anpassungen in persönlichem und sozialem verhalten durch eine „herausbildung und verbreitung der urbanen lebensform.“2 der rasante anstieg des städtewachstums zwischen dem 19. und dem 20. jahrhundert war ursache einer erheblichen beeinträchtigung des lebensgefühls und auslöser seelischer leiden, über die selbst die vielfalt der städtischen vergnügungskultur nicht hinwegtäuschen konnte. zahlreiche technische innovationen und soziale faktoren stellten drastische umstellungen dar, an die sich die menschen in dieser zeit der sich beschleunigenden großstadtentwicklung gewöhnen mussten: die expansion und beschleunigung des verkehrs, die zeitrhythmen der fabrikarbeit, (…) die enge der wohnverhältnisse, die kommerzialisierung von versorgung und dienstleistungen, die anonymität des lebens.3 in seiner ungewohnten schnelllebigkeit wird der städtische alltag zum verursacher existentieller ängste, die kombiniert mit den freuden und vergnügen der metropole eine ambivalente auffassung der großstadt erzeugen. die zerrissenheit des verhältnisses zwischen dem menschen und seinem lebensraum offenbart sich in den expressionistischen werken, wobei insbesondere die lyrik mit ihrer sprachlichen gestaltung auf die kritische haltung gegenüber der selbstgeschaffenen außenwelt verweist. sowohl in den sozialen beziehungen der großstädter untereinander als auch in anbetracht der beziehung der menschen zu ihrer räumlichen außenwelt lassen sich in zeitgenössischen werken hinweise auf deutliche spannungen finden. indem die expressionistische literatur diese verhältnisse zum ausgangspunkt einer auseinandersetzung mit der menschengemachten zweiten natur macht, bringt sie eine 1 kurt pinthus, „vorwort zur menschheitsdämmerung,“ in lyrik des expressionismus, hg. thomas kopfermann (stuttgart: klett, 2007), 121. 2 clemens zimmermann, die zeit der metropolen: urbanisierung und großstadtentwicklung (frankfurt am main: fischer, 1966), 11. 3 tobias becker und johanna niedbalski, „die metropole der tausend freuden: stadt und vergnügungskultur um 1900,“ in die tausend freuden der metropole: vergnügungskultur um 1900, hg. tobias becker, anna littmann, johanna niedbalski (bielefeld: transcript, 2011), 17. 203 kritik zum ausdruck, die sich insbesondere gegen den destruktiven fortschrittsdrang des menschen richtet. die ableitung dieser kulturkritik aus dem außenweltbezug des individuums weist gemeinsamkeiten mit dem wissenschaftlichen ökologiebegriff auf und kann daher auch als ökologische bzw. dem ecocriticism nahestehende perspektive theoretisiert werden. der biologe ernst haeckel definiert die ökologie als „die gesamte wissenschaft von den beziehungen des organismus zur umgebenden aussenwelt, wohin wir im weiteren sinne alle ‚existenz-bedingungen‘ rechnen können. diese sind theils organischer, theils anorganischer natur.“4 indem sie die totalität des außenweltbezuges zu ihrem untersuchungsgegenstand macht, sei die ökologie haeckel zufolge auch die wissenschaft von „den wechselbeziehungen der organismen unter einander.“5 neben dem räumlichen außenweltbezug ist demnach auch der soziale bezug zur außenwelt im blickfeld der ökologie. in seinem streben nach fortschritt schafft sich der mensch eine zweite natur, mit deren schnelllebigkeit seine eigene entwicklung nicht ohne weiteres schritthalten kann. die großstadt wird damit zu einer umgebung, welche insbesondere für die seele ihrer bewohnerinnen keinen schützenden lebensraum mehr darstellt, sondern deren verfassung zu gefährden droht. darauf basierend wird der expressionismus im kontext dieser arbeit als strömung betrachtet, die sich kritisch mit den veränderungen im räumlichen und sozialen außenweltbezug des individuums auseinandersetzt. diese ökologische komponente, die den werken der großstadtlyrik innewohnt, wurde in der bisherigen auseinandersetzung mit dem expressionismus häufig vernachlässigt. tatsächlich handelt es sich bei den als charakteristisch-expressionistisch erkannten stilmitteln der dämonisierenden und dynamisierenden metapher, sowie dem reihungsstil nicht nur um stiltypologische merkmale. sie verweisen ebenso auf die negative beziehung des individuums zu seiner selbstgeschaffenen außenwelt, der zweiten natur, und lassen sich aus einer ökologischen perspektive als ausdruck einer kritik an kultur und fortschritt deuten. die dämonisierende metapher – der urheber großstädtischen unheils in seiner wahren gestalt eines der eindrücklichsten bilder der zeitgenössischen lyrik ist, insbesondere wenn man die stadtgedichte von georg heym betrachtet, die unheilvolle belebung der umgebung, die vor allem mithilfe von dämonisierenden metaphern erfolgt.6 aufgabe der dämonisierenden animierung der großstadt ist es laut kurt mautz, „das rätselhaft unheimliche und die übermächtige, blind wirkende gewalt einer dem menschen entfremdeten gesellschaftlichen wirklichkeit“ zu veranschaulichen.7 das individuum fühlt sich, so geht aus mautz‘ ausführungen hervor, von der bedrängenden fülle und der chaotischen dynamik seiner 4 ernst haeckel, generelle morphologie der organismen: allgemeine grundzüge der organischen formenwissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von charles darwin reformierte deszendenz-theorie. allgemeine entwickelungsgeschichte der organismen (berlin: reimer, 1866), 286. 5 haeckel, morphologie der organismen, 236. 6 vgl. silvio vietta, „erkenntniszweifel im expressionismus,“ in expressionismus: sozialer wandel und künstlerische erfahrung, hg. horst meixner und silvio vietta (münchen: wilhelm fink verlag, 1982), 48. 7 kurt mautz, mythologie und gesellschaft im expressionismus. die dichtung georg heyms (frankfurt am main: athenäum, 1961), 86-87. 204 großstädtischen umgebung unterdrückt und bedroht, so dass ihm diese in seiner subjektiven wahrnehmung als undurchschaubares, lebendiges wesen erscheint und als solches in der lyrik dargestellt wird. die dämonisierung der außenwelt wird hierbei in erster linie über die metaphorischen mittel der personifizierung und beseelung erzeugt, welche zugunsten einer spannungsvollen, bedrohlichen stimmung häufig mit vergrößerungen kombiniert werden.8 jedoch sollte nicht außer acht gelassen werden, dass die expressionistische lyrik die großstadt nicht ausschließlich in der gestalt eines übernatürlichen dämons zum leben erweckt, sondern ihr durch das personifizieren merkmale verleiht, die bei näherer betrachtung deutliche gemeinsamkeiten zu dem erbauer der städte aufweisen und uns als solche weitaus weniger fremd erscheinen sollten. die rede ist hierbei von erkennbaren rückverweisen auf den menschen selbst, der sich mit der erschaffung der städte als urheber des leidens am urbanen lebensraum verantworten muss. das verhältnis des menschen zu der von ihm erschaffenen umgebung wird damit zu einer zentralen thematik der großstadtlyrik. szenen, die die überwältigung der individuen durch personifizierte, übermächtige städte beschreiben, machen deutlich, dass die beziehung zwischen dem menschen und seiner eigenmächtig erbauten außenwelt von angst und zerstörung geprägt ist. exemplarisch lässt sich dies an dem werk „die dämonen der städte,“ aus der feder des autors georg heym, aufzeigen. in dem gedicht „die dämonen der städte“ wird der untergang beziehungsweise die destruktion der stadt und seiner bewohnerinnen in der belebten gestalt von dämonischen wesen zum ausdruck gebracht. bereits zu beginn des gedichtes zeichnet heym mit seinen worten eine eindrücklich unbehagliche szene, indem er insbesondere in den ersten strophen auf die bedrohliche größe der vermeintlichen dämonen aufmerksam macht: wie schifferbärte stehen um ihr kinn die wolken schwarz vom rauch und kohlenruß. ihr langer schatten schwankt im häusermeer […] den einen fuß auf einen platz gestellt, den anderen gekniet auf einen turm, ragen sie auf, wo schwarz der regen fällt9 heyms verse erwecken hier den eindruck, es handle sich um riesige gestalten, deren gewaltige größe die gebäude der städte bis in den himmel überragt. ein genauerer blick auf die beschreibung der bisweilen vorschnell als dämonen identifizierten wesen zeigt allerdings, dass mit dieser feststellung ein wichtiger aspekt vernachlässigt wird. die rede 8 vgl. kurt ludwig schneider, der bildhafte ausdruck in den dichtungen georg heyms, georg trakls und ernst stadlers: studien zum lyrischen sprachstil des deutschen expressionismus (heidelberg: carl winter universitätsverlag, 1954), 78. 9 georg heym, „die dämonen der städte,“ in lyrik des expressionismus, hg. silvio vietta (tübingen: niemeyer, 1990), v. 3-5 und 9-11, 39-41. 205 ist hierbei von dem erkennbaren bezug zum menschen, den heym in seinen metaphern gleichfalls schafft. neben der gigantischen größe der dämonen lassen sich in den genannten versen verweise auf anatomische merkmale finden, die gemeinsamkeiten zum menschlichen körper aufweisen. so ist in heyms gedicht beispielsweise die rede vom „kinn,” „fuß“ und “arm” der dämonen.10 auch gleichen ihre bewegungen denen der menschen: sie „wandern“ und „schwank[en]“, während sie sich „langsam vorwärts [tasten] haus für haus.“11 in die bewegungen und das aussehen der vermeintlichen dämonen ist das menschliche stets eingeschrieben und mitgedacht, sodass heyms verse einen zusammenhang zwischen dem unheil und dem wesen des menschen herstellen und damit dessen (selbst-)zerstörerische macht zum ausdruck bringen. doch nicht nur dem herrschenden elend wird eine beseelte, menschliche gestalt verliehen, auch die großstadt selbst wird durch personifikationen zum leben erweckt. wenn sich die städte in heyms gedicht unter dem fuß der dämonen „ducken“12, wenn in vers 29 „der städte schultern knacken“ oder „durch der städte schoß“13 ein erdbeben donnert, dann tritt erneut die menschliche seite der großstadt hervor, die ihr als ein von menschen geschaffenes werk innewohnt. im gegensatz dazu entsteht in der sechsten strophe eine depersonifikation des menschen. durch das bild, welches in den versen 21 bis 23 erzeugt wird, werden die menschen mit einer gruppe wehrloser tiere assoziiert: sie [die dämonen der städte] lehnen schwer auf einer brückenwand und stecken ihre hände in den schwarm der menschen aus. heym nimmt den menschen in seinem gedicht nicht nur ihre stellung als überlegenes lebewesen, er geht in den versen 23 und 24 sogar noch weiter: wie faune, die am rand der sümpfe bohren in den schlamm den arm indem er die menschen mit “schlamm” vergleicht, werden diese im gedränge der großstadt mit einer leblosen, undifferenzierten masse gleichgesetzt und somit nicht nur ihrer individualität und identität, sondern vor allem ihrer beseeltheit beraubt. wie anhand dieses beispiels beobachtet werden kann, gehen personifikationen und dämonisierende metaphern oft mit einer verdinglichung des menschen einher. laut silvio vietta dient die verbindung dieser beiden stilmittel dem zweck, die „erdrückende 10 heym, „die dämonen der städte,“ v. 3, 9 und 24, 39-41. 11 heym, „die dämonen der städte,“ v. 1, 5 und 8, 39-41. 12 heym, „die dämonen der städte,“ v. 2, 39-41. 13 heym, „die dämonen der städte,“ v. 47, 39-41. 206 eigendynamik der objektwelt literarisch äquivalent zu gestalten.“14 eigendynamik meint mit blick auf heyms gedicht: die vom menschen erbaute städtische umgebung hat sich dessen kontrolle entzogen und wirkt nun mit einer solchen übermacht an fremdheit und aufdringlichkeit auf das individuum ein, dass sie von diesem als dauerhafte bedrohung angesehen wird. von seinen ängsten überwältigt, steht es dem, in seiner wahrnehmung herrschenden schrecken der stadt hilflos und ohnmächtig gegenüber. das eigentlich menschliche individuum wird zum „willenlosen, orientierungslosen objekt,“15 verliert als solches an identität und ist nun, um auf heyms gedicht zurückzukommen, nur noch teil eines menschenschwarms, welcher dem personifizierten, selbstgeschaffenen grauen widerstandslos ausgeliefert ist. dass in der von mautz und schneider beschriebenen dämonisierenden metapher nicht nur eine dämonisierung, sondern vor allem eine vermenschlichung der großstadt erkannt werden kann, ist ein generell zu beobachtendes phänomen und lässt sich in ähnlicher weise an einem werk von armin t. wegner feststellen. das gedicht „der zug der häuser“ thematisiert die ausbreitung der städte, wobei auch hier schnell deutlich wird, dass diese verstädterung mit zerstörung gleichgesetzt wird: wir [die städte] wälzen den plumpen steinernen leib darüber, die dörfer, die felder, die wälder, wir nehmen sie mit!16 ähnlich wie heyms dämonen zeigen sich wegners städte in der personifizierten gestalt eines unaufhaltsamen, erbarmungslosen ungeheuers, dessen äußeres bei näherer betrachtung ähnlichkeiten zum menschen aufweist. die anatomischen gemeinsamkeiten zum menschlichen körper offenbaren sich vornehmlich in den versen 28 bis 31: hinein in der städte pochendes herz. ob lebend, ob tot, wir halten sie fest an unsere steinernden brüste gepreßt. bis unsere stirnen die sterne berühren abgesehen von dem „pochende[n] herz,“ den „brüsten“ und „stirnen“ wird hier auch das verhalten der großstädtischen häuser anthropomorphisiert. wenn sie die menschen nicht loslassen wollen und sie fest an sich drücken, dann stellt dies ein zutiefst menschliches verhalten dar, das schutz bieten und einen drohenden verlust verhindern soll. in dieser beschützenden, menschlichen geste lässt sich noch der lebensdienliche zweck der großstädte erahnen, doch zeigt das gedicht insgesamt, wie das bereits verselbstständigte städtewachstum („bis unsere stirnen die sterne berühren“) in gleichgültiger weise alles leben dem wachstum und der ausbreitung unterordnet. in diesem zerstörerischen 14 silvio vietta, „großstadterfahrung,“ in lyrik des expressionismus, hg. silvio vietta (tübingen: niemeyer, 1990), 31. 15 hermann korte, georg heym (stuttgart: metzler, 1982), 55. 16 armin theophil wegner, „der zug der häuser,“ in deutsche großstadtlyrik vom naturalismus bis zur gegenwart, hg. wolfgang rothe (stuttgart: reclam, 1973), v. 12-13, 135-136. 207 streben spiegeln die städte wiederum den modernen menschen, der dieses verhalten zeigen kann, indem auch er alles leben dem bedingungslosen fortschritt unterwirft. des weiteren verweisen personifizierungen wie „hohläugig glotzen die häuser“ und „alle verschlingt unserer mauern zermalmender mund“ auf das menschliche gesicht der destruktiven, städtischen übermacht.17 die animierung der großstadt zeigt sich jedoch nicht nur in der ihr verliehenen gestalt, sie wird ebenso durch die verwendung der wörtlichen rede in der zweiten und dritten strophe zum ausdruck gebracht. der ausruf „gebt raum! gebt raum / unserm schritt“, betont in den versen 10 bis 11 außerdem die fähigkeit zur selbstständigen fortbewegung, infolge derer sich die großstadt unaufhaltsam bis zum „saume der meere“ und „haupte der berge“ erstreckt.18 der unnachgiebige städtische drang nach wachstum und ausbreitung, der jede zerstörung gleichgültig hinnimmt, steht auch hier kontrastierend zu der aus unterlegenheit resultierenden willenlosigkeit der menschen: und die menschen, aus ihrer qual sich zu retten, […] gebeugte männer, verzweifelte frauen ziehen dahin in schwarzen ketten19 der mensch hat in diesen versen nicht nur an kontrolle und handlungsfähigkeit verloren, die übermächtige großstadt hat ihn zudem seiner freiheit und individualität beraubt. infolge dieser verluste steht er seiner schöpfung als entmenschlichter teil der „schwarzen ketten“ gegenüber und ist angesichts der vermenschlichung seiner umgebung selbst zum objekt geworden. in dieser gegenüberstellung offenbart sich das selbstzerstörerische verhalten des menschen, denn genau wie bei heym, zeigt sich in der menschlichen seite der städte der urheber von urbanem leid. indem das städtische unheil in der gestalt seines schöpfers in erscheinung tritt, wird deutlich, dass die geschaffene lebensfeindlichkeit der umgebung auf den blinden fortschrittsdrang und die destruktive macht des menschen zurückzuführen ist. in anbetracht der tatsache, dass die verantwortung für die errichtung der städte allein in menschlichen händen liegt, verweist das in heyms und wegners gedichten geschilderte städtische unheil auf eine kritische haltung gegenüber dem menschlichen streben nach zivilisation und kultur. der eigentliche zweck von kulturellem fortschritt besteht laut arnold gehlen darin, die unberührte natur, in welcher die überlebensfähigkeit des menschen stark beeinträchtig wäre, zu einer lebensdienlichen umgebung umzugestalten: der mensch ist, um existenzfähig zu sein, auf umschaffung und bewältigung der natur hin gebaut, und deswegen auch auf die möglichkeit der erfahrung der welt hin: er ist handelndes wesen, weil er unspezialisiert ist, und also der natürlich 17 wegner, „der zug der häuser,“ v. 8 und 34, 135-136. 18 wegner, „der zug der häuser,“ v. 35 und 37, 135-136. 19 wegner, „der zug der häuser,“ v. 24 und 26-27, 135-136. 208 angepassten umwelt entbehrt. der inbegriff der von ihm ins lebensdienliche umgearbeiteten natur heißt kultur, und die kulturwelt ist die menschliche welt.20 eben diese lebensdienlichkeit wird nun jedoch mit der thematisierung des destruktiven verhältnisses zwischen mensch und großstadt infrage gestellt. geborgenheit und sicherheit der eigenen großstädtischen behausung sind durch entwicklungen des technischen fortschritts verloren gegangen, so dass sich der mensch nun in einem lebensraum wiederfindet, der ihm nicht länger ein gefühl von schützender zivilisation, sondern von bedrohung und fremdheit vermittelt. seine gefahrvolle eigendynamik entzieht sich dem einwirken der menschlichen hand. der verlust von kontrolle offenbart sich in den werken von georg heym und armin t. wegner mit der gegenüberstellung von großstädtischer, lebendiger übermacht und der verdinglichung des menschen. diese zeigt sich, wenn die menschen in heyms und wegners gedichten als „schwarz[e] ketten“ oder „schlamm“ dargestellt werden. indem dem individuum seine menschlichkeit aberkannt wird, verliert es seine fähigkeiten zur kulturellen anpassung seiner außenwelt und ist dieser schutzlos ausgeliefert. in seiner machtlosigkeit hat es somit einen wendepunkt erreicht, an welchem zivilisation und fortschritt in rückschritt und zerstörung umschlagen. die kritik an dem selbstzerstörerischen charakter von kultur und fortschritt ist in ähnlicher weise in einem der bekanntesten werke der expressionistischen großstadtlyrik auffindbar. in den versen seines gedichtes „der gott der stadt“ verweist autor georg heym erneut auf den menschen als schöpfer des großstädtischen leids. dabei zeichnet er ähnlich wie in „die dämonen der städte“ das bild einer düsteren stadt, in welcher ein vermeintlich dämonischer herrscher sein unwesen treibt. jedoch geben auch hier bereits die äußeren merkmale dieses wesens grund zu der annahme, dass sich hinter dem „gott der stadt“ ein menschliches gesicht verbirgt. die gestalt der unheilvollen kreatur besitzt neben einer „stirn“ und einem „bauch“ auch „haupthaar“ und „augenbrauen“ und zeichnet sich damit optisch durch ihre ähnlichkeit zum menschlichen körper aus.21 weiterhin offenbaren sich diese verweise auf den menschen in den versen 17 bis 20: er streckt ins dunkel seine fleischerfaust. er schüttelt sie. ein meer von feuer jagt durch eine straße. und der glutqualm braust und frißt sie auf, bis spät der morgen tagt. die fähigkeit des menschen, feuer erzeugen und beherrschen zu können, ebnete den weg zum aufbau von zivilisation und kultur. folglich zeigt sich in der letzten strophe, wenn der „gott der stadt“ ein „meer von feuer“ hervorruft, nicht nur die parallele zum menschlichen schaffen von kulturellem fortschritt, sondern auch eine kritik an diesem. das erzeugte feuer wird mit dem vers „der glutqualm braust / und frißt sie auf“ in den kontext von destruktion und bedrohung gesetzt und die macht des menschen dadurch als eine selbstzerstörerische charakterisiert. zudem lässt sich angesichts der verse elf bis zwölf, 20 arnold gehlen, der mensch: seine natur und seine stellung in der welt (frankfurt: klostermann, 2016), 38. 21 heym, „der gott der stadt,“ v. 2, 5 und 16, 112-113. 209 wenn heym „der schlote rauch“ und die „wolken der fabrik“ beschreibt, ein bezug zwischen dem erzeugen von feuer und der im unmittelbaren zusammenhang mit der industrialisierung und urbanisierung stehenden arbeit in den fabriken herstellen. insbesondere in anbetracht dieser verknüpfung verweist die negative verwendung der feuermetaphorik darauf, dass kultur und fortschritt als menschengemachtes unheil angeklagt werden. die dynamisierende metapher: die verhängnisvolle eigendynamik der menschlichen schöpfung häufig treten dämonisierungen in verbindung mit der dynamisierenden metapher auf. diese hat den effekt, gegenständen, die zu einer tatsächlichen bewegung gar nicht fähig wären, handlungen und aktionen zu zuordnen, oder bereits vorhandene bewegungsvorgänge zu intensivieren.22 mithilfe dieser neu übertragenen oder umgedeuteten dynamik werden die auf das individuum einflutenden impressionen der großstadt verdeutlicht. ein ähnlicher effekt dynamisierender metaphorik lässt sich im gedicht „punkt“ alfred lichtensteins erkennen: die wüsten straßen fließen lichterloh durch den erloschenen kopf. und tun mir weh. ich fühle deutlich, daß ich bald vergeh – dornrosen meines fleisches, stecht nicht so. die nacht verschimmelt. giftlaternenschein hat, kriechend, sie mit grünem dreck beschmiert. das herz ist wie ein sack. das blut erfriert. die welt fällt um. die augen stürzen ein.23 das beschriebene geschehen wird metaphorisch schnelllebig, unbeständig und unaufhaltsam gestaltet und gibt damit einblicke in das innere eines großstädtischen menschen, der sich inmitten eines permanent auf ihn einwirkenden chaos‘ gefangen fühlt und glaubt, an diesem zugrunde zu gehen. bereits in den ersten versen des gedichtes wird diese überwältigende ruhelosigkeit der großstadt bildhaft dargestellt. wenn “die wüsten straßen (…) lichterloh / durch den erloschenen kopf [fließen]”, verleiht ihre dynamisierung der umgebung eine zerstörerische eigendynamik. deren bedrohlichkeit wird zudem durch die gegenüberstellung der kontrastierenden begriffe “lichterloh” und “erloschen” hervorgehoben, die den gegensatz zwischen städtischer übermacht und der ohnmacht des lyrischen ichs kennzeichnen. während die straßen der großstadt “lichterloh” erstrahlen, ist der kopf bereits “erloschen”. neben der zum ausdruck gebrachten überwältigung des menschen durch seinen selbstgeschaffenen lebensraum wird mit der hier genutzten feuerbzw. brandmetaphorik die lebensfeindlichkeit der 22 schneider, der bildhafte ausdruck in den dichtungen georg heyms, georg trakls und ernst stadlers, 71. 23 lichtenstein, „punkt,“ 35. 210 stadt betont.24 zu beginn der zweiten strophe zeigt sich der verlust von kontrolle über die eigene schöpfung erneut: die nacht verschimmelt. giftlaternenschein hat, kriechend, sie mit grünem dreck beschmiert. genau wie bei den fließenden straßen, lässt sich auch an der dynamisierung des kriechenden giftlaternenscheins beobachten, wie dem geschehen mithilfe der dynamisierenden metapher eine selbstständigkeit zugeschrieben wird, die sich über den menschlichen willen hinwegsetzt. indem sich die künstlich erbaute umgebung dem einfluss ihres schöpfers entzieht und diesem schaden zufügt, folgt der großstädtische lebensraum in lichtensteins gedicht nicht länger dem zweck des lebensdienlichen. aus der eigenmächtigen beschleunigung geht eine lebensfeindlichkeit der umgebung hervor, in deren folge kultureller fortschritt seinen eigentlichen sinn verliert und in zerstörung umschlägt. verweise auf diese rückkehr zu einem dem menschen feindlichen lebensraum können in lichtensteins werk in der wiederholten verwendung von naturassoziationen gefunden werden. wenn lichtenstein im vierten vers von den “dornrosen meines fleisches” schreibt und in den versen fünf bis sechs die nacht durch den “grünen dreck” des giftlaternenscheins wie verschimmelt aussieht, kommen mit „dornrosen“ und „nacht“ naturphänomene zum vorschein, die gleichfalls in den kontext von unabwendbarem leid gestellt werden. der verselbstständigung der großstadt unterlegen, findet sich der mensch inmitten eines ungebändigten lebensraumes wieder, in dem er der bedrohung seiner existenz entgegensehen muss. “ich fühle deutlich, daß ich bald vergeh”, klagt das lyrische ich und betont damit das destruktive verhältnis des individuums zu seiner selbstgeschaffenen umgebung. noch eindrücklicher wird der verfall menschlichen lebens infolge der städtischen lebensfeindlichkeit in den letzten versen geschildert, in denen „das blut erfriert,“ „die welt [um]fällt“ und die „augen [ein]stürzen“. die zerstörerische beziehung zwischen dem menschen und der großstadt findet ihren abschließenden höhepunkt hier in einem gänzlichen zusammensturz, von dem ein handlungsunfähiges lyrisches ich mitgerissen wird. eine konträre darstellung von menschlicher ohnmacht und städtischer übermacht wird auf ähnliche weise von dem dichter ernst wilhelm lotz mithilfe der dynamisierenden metapher geschaffen. „die nächte explodieren in den städten“25 schreibt lotz in einem gleichnamigen gedicht, um die ungestüme gewaltsamkeit der sinneseindrücke innerhalb der großstadt, hier insbesondere im hinblick auf das lebhafte städtische nachtleben, zum ausdruck zu bringen. der ruhelosigkeit des stadtgeschehens wird mittels dieser dynamisierung ein bedrohlicher, zerstörerischer charakter verliehen, dessen wirkung im 24 dass großstadt und feuer dergestalt metaphorisch miteinander verbunden werden, lässt sich mit blick auf ihre in ähnlicher weise ambivalenten rollen für die zivilisatorische entwicklung des menschen erklären. während sie einerseits das zivilisatorische fortkommen befördern, bedrohen sie es andererseits durch die möglichkeit ihres umschlagens in leid und zerstörung. dieser dialektische zusammenhang wurde nicht zuletzt von herbert marcuse anhand des feuerbringenden menschenfreundes und kulturstifters prometheus demonstriert (eros and civilisation: a philosophical inquiry into freud [boston: beacon, 1955], 81). 25 ernst wilhelm lotz, „die nächte explodieren in den städten,“ in lyrik des expressionismus, hg. silvio vietta (tübingen: niemeyer, 2010), v. 1, 36. 211 zweiten vers “wir sind zerfetzt vom wilden, heißen licht” noch verstärkt wird. in ihrer vehemenz bestätigt diese metaphorik erneut das bild einer überwältigenden, eigenmächtigen umgebung, der das lyrische ich unterlegen ist. verdeutlicht wird diese unterlegenheit durch die gegenüberstellung des wilden, einnehmenden stadtgeschehens und der dazu im kontrast stehenden zurückhaltung des lyrischen ichs, die sich in den versen sieben bis acht zeigt: wir flammten schon. und suchen leise zu verglimmen, weil wir noch furchtsam sind vor eigner glut. das individuum ist der neuen, herausfordernden macht seiner umgebung noch nicht gewachsen und kann mit deren schnelllebigkeit nicht mithalten: und unsre nerven flattern, irre fäden im pflasterwind, der aus den rädern bricht. in kaffeehäusern brannten jähe stimmen auf unsre stirn und heizten jung das blut26 das lyrische ich macht hier deutlich, dass die beziehung zu seinem städtischen lebensraum von nervosität und aufregung geprägt ist. sein inneres wird, äquivalent zu dem chaos seiner äußeren umgebung, von einer unruhe geleitet, die ihm selbst unbehagen und furcht bereitet. bezwungen von seiner außenwelt, hat der mensch seine machtposition gegenüber der eigenen schöpfung verloren. er ist nicht länger herrscher und gestalter der großstadt, sondern wird von dieser beherrscht. des weiteren äußert sich dieses fehlen von kontrolle in dem verlust von agens: wir haben uns dem tage übergeben und treiben arglos spielend vor dem wind27 die hier dargestellte passivität des lyrischen ichs lässt sich als ausdruck einer machtlosigkeit, die angesichts des übermächtigen stadtgeschehens empfunden wird, deuten. verstärkt wird dieser eindruck noch durch die polysemie des wortes „treiben,“ da es die menschliche betriebsamkeit („treiben“ als „etwas tun“) mit passivität und ausgeliefertheit an den wind kontrastiert („treiben“ als „fortbewegt werden“). die dynamische gewalt der außenwelt bereitet dem lyrischen ich, wie exemplarisch an den gedichten von lotz und lichtenstein gezeigt wurde, gefühle von furcht und ohnmacht. karl ludwig schneider bezeichnet die charakteristische metaphorik expressionistischer lyrik daher als „gefühlsmetaphern,“ welche „auf eine innere verfassung schließen [lassen], die durch fieberhafte unruhe, aktionsdrang, durch einen nicht mehr einzudämmenden andrang von angstgefühlen gekennzeichnet ist.“28 unter betrachtung des verlustes von agens und handlungsfähigkeit, der sich anhand des lyrischen ichs in „die nächte 26 lotz, „die nächte explodieren in den städten,“ v. 3-6, 36. 27 lotz, „die nächte explodieren in den städten,“ v. 13-14, 36. 28 schneider, der bildhafte ausdruck in den dichtungen georg heyms, georg trakls und ernst stadlers, 78. 212 explodieren in den städten“ zeigt, lässt sich der von schneider beschriebene aktionsdrang als erscheinung deuten, die kompensatorisch zu der empfundenen machtlosigkeit auftritt. darüber hinaus lässt sich die angst vor der außenwelt und ihrer bedrohlichen dynamik wie bereits bei der von mautz und anderen beschriebenen „dämonisierenden“ metapher um eine weitere ebene der deutung erweitern. wenn in lotz‘ gedicht die „nächte explodieren“ und wenn lichtenstein die „wüsten straßen fließen“ lässt, dann intensivieren sich bedrohliche bewegungen und vorgänge nicht zuletzt durch die umfassende verselbstständigung der großstadt. die angst kann hier nicht nur in einen zusammenhang mit dem überfluss an reizen gestellt werden; sie muss gleichfalls im verbund mit der gesteigerten eigendynamik der stadt betrachtet werden, die in den lyrischen texten deutlich wird. in lichtensteins und lotz‘ metaphern wird der großstadt eine eigene dynamik zugeschrieben, die von menschlichem agens und menschlichen zwecken entkoppelt ist. sie verselbstständigt sich dergestalt, dass sie plötzlich – im unterschied zur „dämonisierenden“ metapher – nicht mehr die zeichen und eigenschaften ihrer menschlichen erschaffer trägt. indem die dynamisierende metapher auf das entfremdete verhältnis zwischen dem menschen und der großstadt verweist, enthält sie abermals kritik an dem blinden, zerstörerischen streben nach technischem fortschritt. der mensch selbst ist es, der der natur ihren stetigen lauf nimmt und die außenwelt zugunsten von zivilisation und fortschritt beschleunigt. ohne sich der konsequenzen seines handelns bewusst zu sein, läuft er dabei jedoch gefahr, durch die künstlich intensivierte beschleunigung seiner umgebung die eigenen lebensbedingungen zu verschlechtern. die vom menschen vorangetriebene schnelllebigkeit der außenwelt wirkt sich damit rückschrittlich auf die beziehung des menschen zu seinem lebensraum aus. in seiner eigendynamik kann die urbane behausung ihren bewohnern nicht länger schutz bieten. der fortschritt verfehlt somit seinen zweck, dem menschlichen leben zu dienen und wird von diesem stattdessen mit unbehagen empfangen. motivgeschichtlich und topologisch knüpft die großstadtlyrik des expressionismus damit an einen zusammenhang an, der auch goethes “zauberlehrling” prägt: der mensch verliert die kontrolle über seine schöpfung und anstelle ihrer dienlichkeit zeigt sich ab diesem moment des umschlagens, wie sie ihm zum verhängnis wird. der simultanstil – die fragmentarische wahrnehmung einer zersplitterten außenwelt die erdrückende impressionsflut der großstädtischen eigendynamik spiegelt sich häufig nicht nur im inhalt zeitgenössischer gedichte, sondern auch in deren form wider. um der “dissoziierenden vielfalt der eindrücke in der großstadt einen formal äquivalenten ausdruck zu verleihen“ wird häufig das stilmittel der simultantechnik, auch bekannt als reihungsstil, verwendet.29 hierbei erfolgt eine aneinanderreihung verschiedener sinneseindrücke, welche meist durch bildliche darstellungen veranschaulicht werden, jedoch in keinem direkten bezug zueinander stehen. 29 thomas anz, literatur der existenz. literarische psychopathographie und ihre soziale bedeutung im frühexpressionismus (stuttgart: metzler, 1977), 75. 213 die großstädtische reizüberflutung, welche georg simmel als „rasche zusammendrängung wechselnder bilder, de[n] schroffe[n] abstand innerhalb dessen, was man mit einem blick umfaßt, die unerwartetheit sich aufdrängender impressionen“ beschreibt,30 dient dieser technik als vorbild. als einer der gründungstexte der großstadtsoziologie macht simmels aufsatz die großstädte und das geistesleben auf die besondere problematik des großstädtischen alltags aufmerksam und erklärt, diese beginne mit der seelischen belastung, die die aufregung der stadt mit sich bringt: das leben in der großstadt führe laut simmel zu einer erheblichen beanspruchung der nerven, was sowohl das unaufhörliche intermittieren äußerer reize als auch die darauf erfolgenden inneren reaktionen einschließt.31 in seiner eigendynamik hat sich der großstädtische lebensraum der kontrolle durch den menschen entzogen und ist zu einem ort geworden, der seinem erschaffer so fremd und unvorhersehbar erscheint, dass er von diesem nicht mehr in seiner kohärenz erfasst werden kann. wahrnehmbar bleiben folglich nur noch myriaden von bruchstücken einer bis zur unkenntlichkeit zersplitterten außenwelt. die unmöglichkeit, die großstadt sinnlich als ein ganzes wahrzunehmen, findet im reihungsbzw. simultanstil seinen poetologischen ausdruck. der simultanstil weist somit zwar auf eine sinnesphysiologische überforderung hin, deutet allerdings auch über sie hinaus. bezogen auf das verhältnis des menschen zu seiner selbstgeschaffenen zweiten natur drückt sich in diesem stil ein kohärenzverlust aus. nichts hält die großstadt mehr zusammen: sie ist in den untersuchten lyrischen texten weder ein einheitlicher entwurf noch ist in ihr ein vereinheitlichender zweck der lebensdienlichkeit zu erkennen, den gehlen der menschlichen zweiten natur zuschreibt.32 in der bloßen aufzählung und nennung der dinge zeigt sich der abbruch eines existentiellen außenweltbezugs. anstatt seine großstädtische behausung in den aneinandergereihten dingen zu erkennen, platzieren die untersuchten gedichte den menschen inmitten einer zusammenhanglosen und fragmentarischen umgebung. selbst der ästhetisierende prozess des dichtens bietet keine aussicht, die dinge zum ganzen zusammenzufügen und zu ordnen. diese zusammenhänge lassen sich beispielsweise konkret in dem gedicht „weltende“ von jakob van hoddis nachvollziehen. wie der titel des gedichtes bereits vorwegnimmt, wird in diesem der untergang der welt thematisiert. ereignisse, die mit dieser katastrophe einhergehen, werden aneinandergereiht geschildert und erzeugen dadurch die wirkung, dass es sich bei den geschehnissen um einzelne fragmente eines chaotischen elends handelt, dessen vollständiges ausmaß nicht umfassend zu überblicken ist und dessen zusammenhänge nicht mehr erkannt werden können: 30 georg simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ in georg simmel: aufsätze und abhandlungen 19011908 bd. 1, hg. rüdiger kramme und angela rammstedt (berlin: suhrkamp, 1903), 117. 31 simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 116. 32 vgl. gehlen, der mensch, 38. 214 dem bürger fliegt vom spitzen kopf der hut, in allen lüften hallt es wie geschrei. dachdecker stürzen ab und gehn entzwei und an den küsten – liest man – steigt die flut33 aufgrund ihrer reihung und der möglichkeit ihrer gleichzeitigkeit können diese ereignisse weder in einen kausalen noch in einen chronologischen zusammenhang gebracht werden. auch eine angemessene reaktion auf diese unverbundenen und wechselhaften impressionen ist nicht ersichtlich. denn wie bereits diese erste strophe zu erkennen gibt, werden desaströse ereignisse wie überschwemmungen in einer ihrer dramatik unangemessenen neutralität und lakonischen distanziertheit geschildert und in eine reihe mit banalitäten wie dem wegfliegenden hut gestellt. ein erneuter blick auf simmels ausführungen zu der großstädtischen überreizung bietet eine mögliche deutung, welche ursache hinter dieser distanzierten wiedergabe der katastrophen stecken könnte. gemeint ist hiermit, dass die vermeintliche gleichgültigkeit in jakob van hoddis‘ gedicht ebenso wie das von simmel beschriebene versagen der reaktionsfähigkeit als folge der unablässigen belastung der nerven interpretiert werden kann. indem das großstadtleben mit seinem überfluss an eindrücken unnachgiebig auf das individuum einwirkt, nimmt es ihm die fähigkeit, „auf neue reize mit der ihnen angemessenen energie zu reagieren“34 und die einzelnen und disparaten teile zu einem weltganzen oder wenigstens zu einem kohärenten ausschnitt der welt zusammenzufügen.35 nicht nur van hoddis‘ „weltende“ gibt einen eindruck davon, wie typisch der verlust von kohärenz im außenweltbezug des lyrischen ich ist. dieser kohärenzverlust zeigt sich ebenfalls in dem gedicht „berliner abend,“ wenn paul boldt schreibt: der asphalt dunkelt und das gas schmeißt sein licht auf ihn. aus asphalt und licht wird elfenbein. (…) autos, eine herde von blitzen, schrein36 die bloße wiedergabe des visuell und auditiv wahrgenommenen macht deutlich, dass das reflektieren aufgenommener reize aufgrund deren vielzahl nicht länger möglich ist. das erschlagende gewicht dieser geschilderten eindrücke nimmt dem individuum damit nicht nur die fähigkeit das zusammenhängende ganze der außenwelt zu überblicken, sondern beeinträchtigt das verhältnis zwischen individuum und umgebung auch insofern, als dieses keine emotionale verbindung zum geschehen seiner außenwelt mehr herstellen kann. das individuum nimmt seine außenwelt nüchtern, lakonisch und distanziert zur kenntnis. seine ausdrückliche unbetroffenheit führt uns nicht nur die unempfänglichkeit für die einzelnen dinge der außenwelt vor augen, sie zeigt uns gerade in form des 33 jakob van hoddis, „weltende,“ in lyrik des expressionismus, hg. silvio vietta (tübingen: niemeyer, 1990), v. 1-4, 93. 34 simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 121. 35 vgl. simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 121. 36 paul boldt, „berliner abend“, in deutsche großstadtlyrik vom naturalismus bis zur gegenwart, hg. wolfgang rothe (stuttgart: reclam, 1973), v. 2-3 und 5, 175-176. 215 reihungsstils, dass in der außenwelt auch keine einheit mehr vernommen werden kann, in der die einzelnen dinge behütet sind. in dem verlust der sensibilität für die individuellen besonderheiten der umgebung erkennt georg simmel eine wesentliche eigenschaft des städtischen lebensstils, die dem zweck dient, die gewalt der wechselnden impressionen abzuschwächen und den prozess ihrer verarbeitung weniger kräftezehrend zu gestalten. diese seelische anpassungserscheinung wird von georg simmel als blasiertheit bezeichnet: er beschreibt die blasiertheit als eine indifferente disposition, die aus der apathie gegenüber der ungleichheit und vielfalt von dingen hervorgeht.37 indem unterschiede zwar wahrgenommen, ihr jeweiliger wert jedoch als unwesentlich angesehen wird, kommt es zu einem bedeutungsverlust von individualität, der keine möglichkeit für angepasste reaktionen bietet. in weltende wird dieses verhalten vornehmlich durch die neutrale aneinanderreihung von banalitäten und katastrophen zum ausdruck gebracht: die meisten menschen haben einen schnupfen. die eisenbahnen fallen von den brücken.38 hoddis’ verse verdeutlichen somit, dass den einzelnen impressionen der außenwelt keine individuelle bedeutung mehr beigemessen werden kann. an diesem punkt zeigt sich das eigentümliche verhältnis, in dem das ich und seine großstädtische außenwelt nun zueinander stehen: in der seelischen und sinnlichen entbehrung der blasiertheit sucht das ich schutz gegen eine städtische außenwelt, die durch die überwältigende vielfalt an reizen weder als kohärent noch als schutz bietende behausung wahrgenommen wird. zunehmend wird die großstadt durch ihre gewaltvolle wirkung auf das lyrische ich (wie in gedicht punkt von lichtenstein gezeigt wurde) sogar als feindlich wahrgenommen. um sich vor der beschriebenen gewalteinwirkung der außenwelt zu schützen, richtet das ich gewalt gegen sich selbst, indem es einen teil seiner selbst von der außenwelt abscheidet. in seelischer und sinnlicher hinsicht ist der neue, an die großstädtische umgebung angepasste außenweltbezug demnach nichts anderes als ein beziehungsabbruch, der erahnen lässt, dass die großstädtische behausung in einen modernen locus terribilis umschlägt. genau dieses kippmoment im verhältnis des ichs zur großstadt, das von großer bedeutung für die expressionistische lyrik war, eröffnet deutungsmöglichkeiten, die den theoretischen perspektiven der kulturkritik und ökologie verwandt sind. wie seelische anpassungen an das großstadtleben die beziehung zwischen individuum und sozialer außenwelt beeinträchtigen die emotionale indifferenz in der wahrnehmung äußerer eindrücke sowie die damit verbundene entwertung ihrer spezifischen eigenschaften beziehen sich nicht ausschließlich auf die städtische objektwelt, sondern zeigen sich auch in anbetracht des sozialen umgangs der großstädterinnen. ähnlich wie die reizüberflutung durch eine 37 vgl. simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 122-123. 38 van hoddis, „weltende,“ v. 7-8, 93. 216 vielzahl von sinneseindrücken, beansprucht auch der kontakt mit anderen menschen ein hohes maß an nervenkraft. die fülle an täglichen, kurzweiligen begegnungen ist einerseits der hohen bevölkerungsdichte geschuldet und andererseits eine folge der schnelllebigkeit des großstädtischen alltags, in welchem man schon beim verlassen des hauses, sowohl auf der straße als auch in öffentlichen verkehrsmitteln, mit stetig wechselnden gesichtern konfrontiert wird. im vergleich mit dem leben auf dem land oder in der kleinstadt, wo meist alle miteinander vertraut sind und es durch häufigere, längere aufeinandertreffen viel einfacher ist, sich ein bild von der anderen person zu machen, wird deutlich, dass die großstadt, aufgrund ihrer dimensionen, eine höhere soziale verschlossenheit nicht nur gegenüber der außenwelt im allgemeinen, sondern auch gegenüber den mitmenschen erfordert.39 da der versuch einer individuellen beurteilung und ein abwägen nach sympathie bei der menge an neuen eindrücken laut simmel zu einer unerträglichen reizüberflutung führen würde, nivellieren sie die impressionen der eigentlich vielfältigen, jedoch unzählbaren begegnungen und wählen für alle dasselbe kräftesparende verhalten der reserviertheit. die veränderungen im verhältnis zur unmittelbaren großstädtischen außenwelt, die oben anhand verschiedener expressionistischer großstadtgedichte beschrieben wurden, betreffen simmel zufolge demnach auch das verhältnis zu mitmenschen. die konsequenzen, die sich aus dem großstädtischen blasierten verhalten und der daraus resultierenden distanz zur belebten und unbelebten außenwelt ergeben, scheinen auf den ersten blick nicht ausschließlich negativ zu sein, denn obwohl die großstadt dem individuum durch seelische anstrengung und beschwerlichkeiten unbehagen bereitet, öffnet sie ihm auch eine grenze, welche in weniger weitläufigen dimensionen unüberschreitbar bleiben würde. die rede ist hier von der erweiterung der möglichkeiten zur persönlichen entfaltung. um zu verdeutlichen, wie das leben in den großstädten einfluss auf diese steigerung der freiheit nimmt, zieht georg simmel einen vergleich zu einer kleineren, in sich abgeschlossenen gemeinschaft, deren zusammenhalt und resistenz eine starke anpassung und eingliederung der mitglieder nötig macht und wenig platz für das ausleben individueller bedürfnisse bietet.40 da in der großstadt allerdings jeder in gewisser weise auf sich selbst gestellt ist und somit nicht länger dazu genötigt wird, sich als das passende teil einer gruppe zu definieren, offenbart sich den großstädterinnen die gelegenheit, die schranken, die ihnen zuvor die individualität versagten, hinter sich zu lassen. doch wie bereits angedeutet, hat auch dieser vermeintliche vorteil der großstadt seine schattenseiten. in anbetracht der zeitgenössischen werke des expressionismus fällt auf, dass dem individuum in der großstadt zwar die option zur entfaltung der eigenen individualität gewährt wird, diese auslebung jedoch auch hier nicht klaglos möglich ist: 39 vgl. simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 122-123. 40 vgl. simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 124. 217 wir sind, die im freien einzeln, dunkel stehen. warum klagen wir, die wir im freien stehen? an den lampen scheint es hell und lebt sich hart41 das von dichterin mechthilde lichnowsky verfasste werk außensteher 1 weist in seinen versen bereits daraufhin, dass die persönliche freiheit, die aus der entrücktheit von der außenwelt resultiert, von den damaligen künstlerinnen keineswegs als erleichterung des großstädtischen lebens angesehen wurde: zwar stehen sie „im freien,“ doch mischt sich in den pathetischen ton der selbstbehauptung eines kollektiven „wir“ auch der trübe klang des „dunkel,“ durch den die selbstbehauptung in eine klage umschlägt, die selbst dem kollektiven „wir“ noch rätselhaft ist („warum klagen wir“). um tatsächlich, wie es lichnowskys gedicht beschreibt, „im freien“ zu stehen und der eigenen individualität freiraum zu verschaffen, ist wenigstens teilweise eine loslösung von gesellschaftlichen normen erforderlich, was zugleich in einem unweigerlichen zusammenhang mit der abwendung von dem leben in einer gemeinschaft steht. dies führt dazu, dass man sich laut simmel im tausch für seine unabhängigkeit „unter umständen nirgends so einsam und verlassen fühlt, als eben in dem großstädtischen gewühl.“42 hier zeigt sich bereits, dass mit den neuen möglichkeiten zur auslebung der eigenen individualität gleichzeitig auch die angst vor der entfremdung von der gesellschaft einhergeht. dass eine entscheidung zugunsten der persönlichen entfaltung nicht ohne soziale folgen bleibt, wird vornehmlich deutlich, wenn lichnowsky in der ersten strophe schreibt: tore sind und breite treppen uns verschlossen, spät nach mitternacht bewegt uns unverdrossen menschenscheu rasch unser letzter gang über straßenleere, die man frisch begossen, an den vollen häusern dieser stadt entlang.43 die treppen und tore lassen sich als bildhafte darstellung der integration in ein soziales umfeld deuten. sie bieten zugang zu dem leben in einer gemeinschaft, hier mit den “vollen häusern dieser stadt” zum ausdruck gebracht. der zutritt zu diesen bleibt dem lyrischen ich jedoch verwehrt. in seinem streben nach der auslebung seiner individuellen freiheit kann es den preis der angepasstheit, den die integration in ein soziales umfeld fordert, nicht aufbringen. “menschenscheu” wandelt es über “straßenleere” und muss infolge seines individualitätsdranges zusehen, wie es die berechtigung zur teilnahme an einem gemeinschaftlichen leben verliert. als konsequenzen der uneingeschränkten selbstentfaltung lassen sich somit die gefahren der gesellschaftlichen isolation, sowie die fortschreitende entfremdung von der großstädtischen gesellschaft feststellen. die 41 mechthilde lichnowsky, „außensteher 1,“ in in roten schuhen tanzt die sonne sich zu tod: lyrik expressionistischer dichterinnen, hg. hartmut vollmer (hamburg: igel, 2014), v. 21-23, 90-92. 42 simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 126. 43 lichnowsky, „außensteher 1,“ v.1-5, 90-92. 218 nachfolgenden verse betonen jedoch, dass das leiden an der einschränkung des eigenen selbst zugunsten gesellschaftlicher akzeptanz für das lyrische ich eine weitaus größere bedrohung darstellt. “einer stadt wie dieser sieht es niemand an, / daß die häuser grüfte sind mit folterkammern”44, klagt es zu beginn der zweiten strophe. hier wird deutlich, dass die mit dem betreten der “vollen häuser” einhergehende beengung durch gesellschaftliche normen und zwänge von dem lyrischen ich als qualvolle unterdrückung der persönlichkeit angesehen und mit dem tod der individualität gleichgesetzt wird. lichnowskys verse bringen eine aversion gegenüber der großstädtischen gesellschaft zum ausdruck, die auf das angespannte verhältnis des individuums zu seinen mitmenschen verweist und so zu erkennen gibt, dass nicht nur die räumliche außenwelt der großstadt, sondern ebenso die soziale als bedrohung empfunden wird. es zeigt sich demnach, dass die häufig thematisierten gefühle der einengungsund entfremdungsangst sowohl die beziehung zum selbsterschaffenen lebensraum als auch den zwischenmenschlichen umgang der großstädterinnen prägen. unter betrachtung des kapitels entfremdung als erfahrung und denkform im expressionismus, welches der literaturwissenschaftler thomas anz in seinem werk literatur der existenz veröffentlichte, wird der zusammenhang zwischen der entfaltungsthematik und der leiderfahrung von fremdheit und einsamkeit noch präziser thematisiert. anz erklärt, dass gesellschaftliche integration und die vollständige bewahrung der eigenen unangepassten persönlichkeit dem individuum unvereinbar erscheinen, so dass es sich vor die wahl gestellt sieht, zwischen zwei miteinander kollidierenden „existenzformen“ entscheiden zu müssen.45 eine entscheidung zugunsten der bürgerlichen existenz und die damit verbundene anpassung an die gesellschaft, würde sich einschränkend auf die entfaltungsfreiheit des individuums auswirken und den „drohenden verlust der individuation“ bedeuten.46 neben den auswirkungen, die die blasiertheit der großstädterinnen auf das soziale verhalten hat, macht thomas anz das streben nach individualität und souveränität und die damit verbundene angst, sein eigenes wesen in der übermächtigen bevölkerung zu verlieren, dafür verantwortlich, dass es dem individuum in der großstadt kaum möglich ist, vertrauen und bindungen zu seiner sozialen außenwelt aufzubauen.47 die daraus resultierende einsamkeit bleibt nicht das einzige problem, mit dem die sozial isolierten großstädterinnen infolge der desintegration zu kämpfen haben, denn laut anz hat die entscheidung zugunsten der persönlichen entfaltung negative auswirkungen auf die art und weise wie mitmenschen innerhalb flüchtiger begegnungen wahrgenommen werden, „sie bilden einen dem ich in seiner andersartigkeit fremden oder gar feindlichen bereich, in dem es sich selbst als fremdling sieht.“48 es zeigt sich somit abermals, dass es nicht nur die räumliche umwelt ist, die dem menschen in der großstadt durch überreizung 44 lichnowsky, „außensteher 1,“ v. 6-7, 90-92. 45 vgl. anz, literatur der existenz, 116. 46 anz, literatur der existenz, 90. 47 vgl. anz, literatur der existenz, 91. 48 anz, literatur der existenz, 85. 219 und schnelllebigkeit fremd und unheimlich erscheint, sondern auch die soziale. sowohl der gesellschaft als auch der objektwelt misstrauisch und verloren gegenüberstehend, findet sich das individuum in der rolle des ausgestoßenen wieder. diese position existentieller verlorenheit zwingt es zu einem gefühl kontinuierlicher fremdheit, welches sich durch seine allgegenwärtigkeit zwangsweise irgendwann auf die eigene identität überträgt und infolgedessen bewirkt, dass sich die großstädterinnen selbst als „fragwürdig, unerklärlich, undurchschaubar, chaotisch und fremd“ wahrnehmen.49 verstärkt wird das leid dieser selbstentfremdung zudem durch das blasierte verhalten, das nicht nur der umgebung, sondern auch der eigenen persönlichkeit entgegengebracht wird und diese dadurch „unvermeidlich in ein gefühl gleicher entwertung hinab zieht.“50 die abstumpfung gegenüber äußeren reizen und der daraus resultierende mangel an empfindungen weiten sich auf die selbstwahrnehmung aus und sind ursachen einer inneren taubheit, die dem tod des innenlebens gleichkommt. ein teil des eigenen wesens ist für das individuum lautlos und dadurch rätselhaft geworden und führt aufgrund seiner unverständlichkeit zur entfremdung beziehungsweise zur gespaltenheit des eigenen ichs. verstärkt wird diese unfähigkeit der wahrnehmung des individuellen selbst außerdem durch den einströmenden lärm einer ruhelosen städtischen umgebung, wie sich in gerrit engelkes gedicht „seele!“ erkennen lässt: straßenbahnschienen klirren, hundert sensen umschwirren, fabriken umrauchen dich, im ohre gellt dir: messerstich51 wie sich angesichts dieses titels vermuten lässt, handelt es sich bei dem hier angesprochenen lyrischen du um die eigene seele, die innerhalb des gedränges der großstadt an hörbarkeit verliert. als ursache dieses seelischen leidens lässt sich das nervenfordernde einströmen städtischer impressionen ausmachen, welches mithilfe des reihungsstils dargestellt wird. in der aufzählung diverser sinneseindrücke zeigt sich die überbeanspruchung der sensuellen wahrnehmung, wobei insbesondere in den versen 4 und 5 auffällt, dass die aufnahme einzelner auditiver reize noch möglich ist, ihr zusammenhang jedoch nicht erfasst werden kann: im ohre gellt dir: -messerstich, geschäft, diebstahl, geld, brand von der intensität seiner außenwelt überwältigt, fehlt es dem individuum an sensibilität gegenüber dem eigenen inneren. dass sich diese beeinträchtigte wahrnehmung des selbst negativ auf den zustand der seele auswirkt, wird deutlich, wenn engelke schreibt: 49 anz, literatur der existenz, 106. 50 simmel, „die großstädte und das geistesleben,“ 122. 51 gerrit engelke, „seele!,“ in deutsche großstadtlyrik vom naturalismus bis zur gegenwart, hg. wolfgang rothe (stuttgart: reclam, 1973), v. 1-4, 187-188. 220 die wände stürzen über dir ein: du verkümmerst, wirst klein und gemein52 indem die gefahr einer seelischen verkümmerung als folge der großstädtischen impressionsflut thematisiert wird, zeigt sich, dass das angespannte verhältnis des menschen zu seinem lebensraum ebenso die beziehung zum eigenen innenleben gefährdet. fazit wie unter eingehender betrachtung der sprachlichen bildlichkeit des expressionismus festgestellt werden kann, nimmt die kritische haltung gegenüber kultur und fortschritt eine zentrale thematik in den werken der großstadtlyrik ein. diese expressionistische kulturkritik ist auf eine ökologische perspektive zurückzuführen und wird vor allem durch metaphern zum ausdruck gebracht, die auf das angespannte verhältnis zwischen dem menschen und seiner selbstgeschaffenen großstädtischen umgebung verweisen. die relevanz der expressionistischen kulturkritik kann insbesondere durch eine weitergehende untersuchung der dämonisierenden metapher erkannt werden. ausschlaggebend hierfür war die erkenntnis, dass die darin enthaltene bildliche darstellung der großstädte nicht nur, wie häufig angenommen, auf eine verbindung zum dämonischen und mythischen, sondern auch auf einen bezug zum menschlichen zurückzuführen ist, der bisher oft übersehen oder vernachlässigt wurde. ein wichtiger hinweis auf diese zweite deutungsebene der expressionistischen metaphorik ergibt sich aus der exemplarischen analyse von georg heyms gedicht die dämonen der städte. neben anatomischen gemeinsamkeiten zwischen heyms vermeintlichen dämonen und dem menschlichen körper lässt sich auch anhand ihrer bewegungen und ihres verhaltens erkennen, dass das zerstörerische unheil der großstädte mit ihren menschlichen erschaffern in beziehung gesetzt wird. indem der mensch als urheber von leid und elend in der expressionistischen bildlichkeit erkannt wird, eröffnet sich eine neue deutungsebene, auf welcher sich die kritik am menschlichen fortschrittsdrang offenbart. von dieser neuen ebene der deutung aus betrachtet, zeigt sich auch in der nachfolgend analysierten dynamisierenden metapher sowie in der untersuchung des simultanstils das prekäre verhältnis des menschen zum eigenmächtig erbauten urbanen lebensraum. metaphorisch bringen die untersuchten expressionistischen gedichte zum ausdruck, wie sich die großstadt, beschleunigt durch die hand des menschen, verselbstständigt und sich in ihrer gesteigerten eigendynamik der kontrolle ihres schöpfers entzieht. dabei wird beispielsweise in lichtensteins punkt, wenn das lyrische ich die schnelllebigkeit seiner städtischen außenwelt und den verfall des eigenen ichs beklagt, deutlich, dass geborgenheit und schutz – mit gehlen ließe sich hier von der „lebensdienlichkeit“ der zweiten natur sprechen – dem fortschritt zum opfer gefallen sind und der eigentliche nutzen der kultur somit in die beeinträchtigung, beschädigung und bedrohung des lebens umschlägt. 52 engelke, „seele!,“ v. 6-7, 187-188. 221 dieses unbehagen an der großstadt wird im expressionismus auch häufig im reihungs bzw. simultanstil ausgedrückt: der nervenfordernde überfluss an reizen wirkt sich auf die wahrnehmung und reaktionsfähigkeit des individuums aus und hat zur folge, dass sinnstiftende zwecke der großstadt ebenso wenig erfasst werden können wie die zusammenhänge der großstädtischen außenwelt insgesamt. indem die impressionen der großstadt im reihungsbzw. simultanstil aneinandergereiht und unter auslassung von reflexionen geschildert werden, spiegelt sich in dieser technik die wechselhaftigkeit städtischer eindrücke sowie der daraus resultierende verlust von kohärenz und reaktionen. neben der beeinträchtigten beziehung zu der räumlichen umgebung offenbart sich in der expressionistischen lyrik zudem eine aversion gegenüber der sozialen außenwelt. wobei insbesondere in anbetracht des werkes außensteher 1 von dichterin mechthilde lichnowsky deutlich wird, dass die großstädtische gesellschaft als bedrohung der individualität und identität wahrgenommen wird. das soziale verhalten der großstädterinnen, das in den lyrischen reflexionen erkannt werden kann, erweitert das angespannte verhältnis zum eigenen lebensraum somit um einen weiteren aspekt. anhand der vier gesetzten schwerpunkte wird deutlich, dass die expressionismusrezeption besonders im hinblick auf großstadtlyrik noch blinde flecken hat: jenseits der ausgetretenen pfade stiltypologischer interpretationen zeigt sich hier, welch eigentümlich-komplexer außenweltbezug sich in den (deutschen und österreichischen) großstädten entwickelte. dieser außenweltbezug, der vielfach von angst, machtlosigkeit und zerstörung geprägt ist, eröffnet eine bis hierhin vernachlässigte deutungsebene, die als ökologisch erfasst werden kann und durch die die expressionistischen dichterinnen auch zu uns hier und heute noch sprechen: denn nicht zuletzt angesichts wachsender megaregionen und megacitys im 21. jahrhundert wird ihr unbehagen an der selbstgeschaffenen zweiten natur der großstadt auch in unserer gegenwart und zukunft noch von großer bedeutung sein. das menschliche gesicht der großstadtdämonen die dämonisierende metapher – der urheber großstädtischen unheils in seiner wahren gestalt wie schifferbärte stehen um ihr kinn die wolken schwarz vom rauch und kohlenruß. ihr langer schatten schwankt im häusermeer […] den einen fuß auf einen platz gestellt, den anderen gekniet auf einen turm, ragen sie auf, wo schwarz der regen fällt8f sie [die dämonen der städte] lehnen schwer auf einer brückenwand und stecken ihre hände in den schwarm der menschen aus. wie faune, die am rand der sümpfe bohren in den schlamm den arm wir [die städte] wälzen den plumpen steinernen leib darüber, hinein in der städte pochendes herz. ob lebend, ob tot, wir halten sie fest an unsere steinernden brüste gepreßt. bis unsere stirnen die sterne berühren und die menschen, aus ihrer qual sich zu retten, […] gebeugte männer, verzweifelte frauen ziehen dahin in schwarzen ketten18f er streckt ins dunkel seine fleischerfaust. er schüttelt sie. ein meer von feuer jagt durch eine straße. und der glutqualm braust und frißt sie auf, bis spät der morgen tagt. die dynamisierende metapher: die verhängnisvolle eigendynamik der menschlichen schöpfung die wüsten straßen fließen lichterloh durch den erloschenen kopf. und tun mir weh. ich fühle deutlich, daß ich bald vergeh – dornrosen meines fleisches, stecht nicht so. die wüsten straßen fließen lichterloh durch den erloschenen kopf. und tun mir weh. ich fühle deutlich, daß ich bald vergeh – dornrosen meines fleisches, stecht nicht so. die nacht verschimmelt. giftlaternenschein hat, kriechend, sie mit grünem dreck beschmiert. das herz ist wie ein sack. das blut erfriert. die welt fällt um. die augen stürzen ein.22f die nacht verschimmelt. giftlaternenschein hat, kriechend, sie mit grünem dreck beschmiert. wir flammten schon. und suchen leise zu verglimmen, weil wir noch furchtsam sind vor eigner glut. und unsre nerven flattern, irre fäden im pflasterwind, der aus den rädern bricht. in kaffeehäusern brannten jähe stimmen auf unsre stirn und heizten jung das blut25f wir haben uns dem tage übergeben und treiben arglos spielend vor dem wind26f der simultanstil – die fragmentarische wahrnehmung einer zersplitterten außenwelt dem bürger fliegt vom spitzen kopf der hut, in allen lüften hallt es wie geschrei. dachdecker stürzen ab und gehn entzwei und an den küsten – liest man – steigt die flut32f der asphalt dunkelt und das gas schmeißt sein licht auf ihn. aus asphalt und licht wird elfenbein. (…) autos, eine herde von blitzen, schrein35f die meisten menschen haben einen schnupfen. die eisenbahnen fallen von den brücken.37f wie seelische anpassungen an das großstadtleben die beziehung zwischen individuum und sozialer außenwelt beeinträchtigen wir sind, die im freien einzeln, dunkel stehen. warum klagen wir, die wir im freien stehen? an den lampen scheint es hell und lebt sich hart40f tore sind und breite treppen uns verschlossen, spät nach mitternacht bewegt uns unverdrossen menschenscheu rasch unser letzter gang über straßenleere, die man frisch begossen, an den vollen häusern dieser stadt entlang.42f straßenbahnschienen klirren, hundert sensen umschwirren, fabriken umrauchen dich, im ohre gellt dir: messerstich50f im ohre gellt dir: -messerstich, geschäft, diebstahl, geld, brand die wände stürzen über dir ein: du verkümmerst, wirst klein und gemein51f fazit 3 a historian’s path an interview with professor mary lindemann, former president of the american historical association and german studies association nash christian central college i had the honor of talking virtually with professor mary lindemann in may 2021. professor lindemann is a professor of early modern history, german history, and history of medicine at the university of miami as well as the former president of the american historical association (2020) and the german studies association (2019). we discussed a variety of topics, including how her passion for history has driven her studies and career and pandemics in history. this interview has been edited for length and clarity. nash i'd love to start out by just hearing a bit more about yourself. what is your background? what got you interested in history in the first place? professor lindemann well, i'll start with a little background, not that it's particularly interesting or exciting. i am the first person in my family to go to college and certainly the first person in my family to get a phd or an academic job. i think that’s “historically” accurate, although i won't swear to this on a stack of anything. i am also, i believe, the first person in my family to graduate high school. people often ask me the question, “how did you first get interested in history?” 4 or “what motivated you to study history?” i've often thought about that question, and i feel that i don’t really have a good answer. everybody says it was a good teacher or reading particular books. i had those good teachers and i certainly consumed a lot of books, especially novels. but i think that the basis for my interest in history goes even further back than that. and i think i have to blame my grandfather. my grandfather used to read both history stories and mythology to me. i like them both equally. at one time, i actually thought of becoming a classicist and the world book encyclopedia played a central role in my early “education.” the world book encyclopedia was something like the encyclopedia britannica, although it was also more pedagogical in tone and content, and it was a bit more directed toward self-education and selfimprovement. besides the regular definitions of what crystalline substances were or who john i of england was, it also had stories. there were stories from greek mythology. there were stories from norse mythology. there were stories about the napoleonic wars. i don't mean just narratives but stories, like excerpts from war and peace written at a level that made sense in the context of what the world book encyclopedia wanted to achieve. our house was overrun with books. my mother and my grandmother were especially voracious readers of historical fiction, and i can remember my grandmother slowly wending her way several times through the entire multi-volume d’artagnan histories of alexander dumas. so i was introduced to all of that world at a young age. although professional historians often sneer at historical fiction, it's not a bad way to start. i can remember a medievalist friend of mine who just loved tolkien and all mythologies. so, to some extent, the process of reading and the facility with which i very quickly learned to read made it rather easy for me to become a historian. nash i read that you had originally planned on majoring in pre-med or something medical, and during your undergraduate time, you decided to switch. why? was it just you loved history that much, or was it something else? professor lindemann again, it's one of those things that when you go back and you try to reconstruct it, you can't find that “aha” moment. i think a couple of things came into play. i had a terrible time learning calculus. i was just dreadful at it. organic chemistry just bored me to tears, absolutely to tears. i had a pretty good organic chemistry teacher, i think, but it just was so painful. of course, i had to take it if i wanted to get into med school. these were the days when you had distribution requirements. you had to take a certain history course and english course. my history teachers were good. some of them were a little weird as we all tend to be, but many were excellent. the decision to pursue history was not sudden; i just decided that i really didn't want to do organic chemistry and then analytical chemistry and then biology and biochemistry and then whatever else was necessary to get into med school. the other thing that happened was that, in college, i got very interested in the history of medicine. if you've seen my publications, you know that i've written quite extensively on history of medicine. the university of cincinnati, which is my alma mater, had a very good 5 historian of medicine, who was quite famous with both a national and international reputation. he was weird, but he was interesting, so that allowed me to shift painlessly from medicine to the history of medicine. i think that a lot of people have very clear moments when everything changed. they experience something like a mental earthquake, and they decided, “i want to do this.” i don't think that was what happened to me. i dabbled a lot, but dabbling a lot isn’t a bad thing pedagogically. i took languages. i read a lot of english literature. i did some philosophy. i did some social psychology. i thought that i would use social psychology in studying history but decided that it was too reductionist. i can't even say in college that i was a particularly great student. i was a good student in many things and an okay student in other things. but the fact that i did read a lot of literature, i think, made an enormous difference in my life and in my career. nash you originally were focusing more on pre-med, but then you decided to pursue medical history. what drove you to make a focus on history into your career? professor lindemann i wrote an honors thesis in my senior year, then went to graduate school, and i think that process, almost by osmosis, made me into a historian. i wish i could give you some really good intellectual reasons for my choices, but what i can say is that i was always curious about people and why they acted and thought as they did. history for me is about people, individuals not structures, decisions not trends. with the kind of broad basis, if also somewhat eclectic, liberal arts education i had, i could have done something else. i could probably have done literature. i maybe could have done philosophy. (i doubt it.) becoming a historian also gave me opportunities that i never had when i was young. i was born in cincinnati, ohio, and i rarely had been out of ohio until my late twenties. graduate school gave me the opportunity to go to germany, which was just wonderful. i spent a lot of years of my life in germany. i love it! i love going back! my first real scholarly experience there was when i went to do my dissertation research; i almost didn't come back. i seriously considered staying in germany and making my career there. now i return to germany as frequently as possible. i'm not sure i'd always admit this, but i think there's a lifestyle involved in academia as well. i don't mean a lifestyle like you see in lifestyle magazines, but rather a sense of how you want to spend your time and how you want to do your work. in the life of a professional historian, there's a lot of time you spend alone, staring at a computer screen, or in an archive freezing to death because nobody's turned the heat on. if you're not good at that, if you're not good at self-correcting, it's probably not a good life-choice. however, i'm pretty good at all those things. i remember one of my early professors said, “i like to file.” i thought “oh god,” what happened to this poor guy to make filing the light of his life. then i suddenly discovered that i, too, actually like to file, or at least like doing the organization necessary to write a good book, for example. and, as weird as this sounds, i find it a creative not a mechanical activity. i like to move things around and rearrange them into new patterns. of course, i do it now on a computer screen. nash 6 you mentioned studying and doing research in germany. what drove you to germany to do your research? professor lindemann that choice actually was an intellectual one. thus far, i feel like i have sounded very little like a “real intellectual” or scholar. i became very interested in germany when i was in graduate school in the 1970s. social history was, of course, the end all and be all at that time. that’s not so true anymore, but at the time (the late 60s and 70s), it dominated the discipline. there was a lot of interest in doing good and in writing history that would help change the world. i am less sure of any of that now; however, it did make a difference at the time. thus, i became interested in the history of poverty and poor relief. i found out that one of the first great municipal poor reliefs was created in hamburg. it started at the beginning of the eighteenth century and then crystallized towards the end of the century. i thought, “ah, nobody's worked on this yet.” thus, i combined an interest in going somewhere like hamburg, where i'd never been, with the thrill of looking at original sources that not that many people had worked on. that was my first book. that is one reason i went to germany. invariably, every german scholar, every german professor with a german name or family background is asked, “did you want to study germany because of your german roots?” no, not really. “well, don't you want to look up your relatives?” no, not really. nash i'd like to dig a bit deeper on the subject of archives and the physical manuscripts that they hold. over the past few decades, we have seen a pretty steady transition to more digital databases, websites, collections, etc. now, you can just look up sources on your computer screen and not have to go to a physical location. what do we lose with that transition? do you think it's positive or negative? professor lindemann the germans have a great word for this. it's called “jein.” it's a combination of “ja” and “nein,” yes and no. look, there is no denying that in many respects, the digitization of sources has made research possible for people who could not do it before. it is particularly important and useful for people who are at small universities and colleges that do not have the resources and the superb library facilities of a princeton, harvard, berkeley, or other premier institution. it makes it feasible for those people to do primary research. even better, it makes it possible for students to do primary research in ways they never would have been able to do before these sources became so readily available. it also makes it very possible for people who have other obligations to do original research. people get married. they have children, buy a dog, acquire a house, or they don't have the money to go off for six months or a year to snuggle down in an archive. they can now do things in sources that they never could do before. however, there are disadvantages, too. i think some of the disadvantages are inherent in the way things are digitized, while some are misperceptions by the people who use digital sources. remember that somebody (or several somebodies) has to make the decision about what gets digitized and what doesn't. there are many, many things left out of digital 7 sources. for example, you might digitize all the parish records for a small town. that’s great, convenient, and useful. digitized serial records like notary records are wonderful because you can continually go back and check things. and then you have the complete archive (or a huge chunk of it) literally at the click of your mouse. for example, i've worked extensively in the notary archives in the amsterdam archive, which are now digitized. it's very easy. i can just go back to those any time and play around with new ideas. little is missing even though it is never “all there.” however, for the vast majority of archives, when you consider the incredible volume of resources that we're talking about here, you can only digitize a certain amount, often a very small sliver. people pick and choose what they put into a digital archive. now, let's not be silly about this. archivists have always picked and chosen what is going to be preserved and not preserved. what's in the archive building or the archive collection is also a subsection and “someone’s” choice. however, people who work in archives go there and sit down and order up the documents and get the dust on their fingers. i think some students and graduate students make the mistake of thinking that digitized sources are “an archive.” it's not the archive; it's part of an archive and a collection of some sources. it can be a very important, of course. the other thing that has happened, which i felt is also sometimes pernicious, is the business of using a camera to take digital pictures of documents. there's nothing essentially wrong with spending your archive time going “click, click, click,” although it is crushingly boring. taking a digital picture of a document that is very important allows you want to go back to it when you need to do so. often, however, one of two things happen to graduate students who take lots of pictures in the archives. one, they don't have what they really need, but they lack the time and the money to return. two, they don't use what they've acquired as pictures and have, therefore, wasted a great deal of time. i think that taking pictures works best for people who already know what they're doing and specifically what they need. when i left the archive in potsdam in the summer of 2018, there were some sources i needed to look at. i knew it was a vast collection, but i knew what i needed because i'd already done a great deal of work in other critical holdings. i sat there for a week and scanned things that i knew i wanted to evaluate. it wasn't just scanning every document that i thought i might use; i was scanning what i knew i needed. and, in fact, i’m probably not going to use every one of those documents or maybe not even a quarter of them. i also think it is very important for historians to go to archives. if you're working in someplace besides the united states, or even if you're working in the united states, it's important to be in the society in which these documents were created and preserved. i am working with some peculiar documents right now that are very fragmentary and that are written in the most horrible german imaginable. terrible spelling. i don't think i would be able to do that now had i not gained, over many years, a facility with the language coming from speaking to people, not just reading documents. you thus learn a lot about the society and that's also important. the other reason is that you often read something in an archival document, and you think “that's interesting; i’d like to know more.” if you're staring at a computer screen in houston, boise, chapel hill, sacramento, or iowa city, what are you going to do? you can't follow that idea up without going back to the sources, that is, back to the archive. but sitting there in the archives, i can go pull out the inventory and pursue the lead right then and there. this has happened to me many times and often totally reshaped 8 my project, and for the better. i stumble over something, then follow it up and the thread, the skinny little thread that i thought might just make for an interesting footnote, turns out to be a chapter or even an entire book. there’s another advantage to “doing time” in the archives. to make your time in the archives productive, you have to understand how it's been put together. you acquire that knowledge being there. digital screen is digital screen. it all looks alike. not that i don't use digitized records. i use them all the time. i spend half my life on the internet. i just think there's pros and cons and there is no single right way. the other thing all people who've worked in the archives have experienced is the first week of archival humiliation where you know nothing. i've worked in a lot of archives, so i sort of know how to “get around.” yet every time i go into one, i screw something up. i've ordered something incorrectly; i've sat in the wrong seat; or i've sneezed in the wrong direction. each archive has its own rules and etiquette, even its own quirks and foibles. some staff person invariably swoops down on me and says, “you can't do that,” like i knew. once you get past that, you kind of become an insider, and you enjoy having gained a little expertise. it's fun, if it is also at times frustrating, cold, and uncomfortable. if you are unlucky, you have somebody sitting at your table who needed the bath about a week ago. archivists run the gamut from extremely helpful and extremely knowledgeable to being pains in the posterior portions. nash this summer i'm interning at an archive in a museum in wisconsin called the hoard dairyman museum. it deals a lot with agriculture, specifically dairy farming, but it's also a historical society for our local region. i would love to ask, what do you recommend are some of the things i should try and take away from working at an archive? professor lindemann well, you'll certainly learn a little bit about the ins and outs of how archives function. now, a small specialized archive is not the same as a big national archive, but that’s fine. that’s what it's supposed be, and you will still learn how archivists think and think about how to organize materials. the other thing you'll learn to do is how to find things. finding things in archives is not always easy. if you start at a little one, it becomes clearer more rapidly. the bigger ones work about the same way. german archives are still organized by the prussian system, and once you've cracked that, you kind of get it. get the people who work there to show you how things are organized and how they make choices about what to save and what not to save. that makes you a better researcher and will really give you a lot of insight that will be very valuable to you, if you ever go on to do this more professionally. i'm interested that it's a dairyman/historical society and archive. agricultural history is one of the most neglected and important histories that people just don't work on enough. it's tremendously important. cows are important. pigs are important. i don't just mean writing about how to feed pigs. for example, one of the best books i've read recently on medieval history and is titled legions of pigs, which demonstrates how absolutely critical swine were, not only to the food chain in the medieval world, but to the whole conception of how their world worked. it is fascinating. who would ever think that someone could write a 400-page history of pigs that's absolutely riveting? 9 nash that is great advice and insight. i'd like to discuss your time as president of the aha (american historical association). what has being the president of the aha meant to you both personally and professionally? professor lindemann i remember when i was contacted by the nominating committee. i was in germany at the time. they called me and they said, “we'd like to nominate you for president elect,” and i said, “do you have the wrong number?” then it slowly sunk in. being picked by a nominating committee of people who are not just german historians or historians of medicine was a great honor. being president of the aha also gave me the chance to meet many people that i normally wouldn’t meet. i have connections with a lot of europeanists and german historians. i meet a lot of early modernists. however, i don't normally encounter a lot of non-western historians. i don't interact with people who work on native and indigenous people. it's not because i'm dismissive of them. it's that our paths rarely cross. as president, you also become extremely aware of various intellectual currents as well as the various political currents within the profession. it is a bit of an education at times; suddenly you think, “whoops, i didn't understand that at all.” but that’s how you learn. you also see how the profession works. the aha plays a great role in fostering scholarship and teaching, but it also is involved in advocacy. we have done a great deal of advocacy at both the national and international levels over the last two years. we worked to avoid history departments being closed and tenured faculty being fired. we also protested the harassment of historians and even imprisonment of historians throughout the world. we published a statement on black lives matter, for example. that's the kind of advocacy work in which i, as a non-american historian, am normally less involved. i learned a lot about how the american government works. i was, of course, called upon for information on how the polish government or the german government worked and how to address officials there. i got to know a lot of really wonderful people with incredible talents. that was another great benefit. the other thing is i met a lot of people whose ideas under normal circumstances i would think were really stupid, but who actually were not quite so stupid when you talked to them. i didn't necessarily agree with them in the end, but their positions were actually interesting and certainly worth thinking about. this came from both left and right. i also appreciated the chance to help people throughout their careers in history. i like helping not only beginners but also people at all levels in their career and encouraging them to think of things that would work for them and would make their lives easier and enrich their intellectual experiences. i learned all about the difficulties that independent scholars faced and the equally great difficulties scholars who are marginally employed deal with daily. in short, i gained a much broader sense of historians and historical scholarship that i had before becoming president. 10 nash i would like to transition into talking about working with undergraduate students. in a world where academic subjects, such as stem, have taken the forefront for a lot of schools, can you talk a bit about teaching the importance of history to the younger generations? professor lindemann i can start with what will seem a very ivory tower intellectual statement. a college education is not about acquiring skills; it's about getting an education. the sense of the value of a liberal education, in case you're unaware of this and i am sure you are not, has really shrunk. stem is important. science is important, math is important, engineering is important; all of those things are important as is, for that matter, acquiring skills. i'm not saying they're not, but they often impart a skill set, rather than a broad education. i'm a great advocate of a broad education. however, i can also make other arguments, and i'm sure you've heard some of these. one of the things we know is that people who come out of college with a ba in history get just as good jobs as people who come out with a degree in business. critical thinking is something that the study of history teaches and that employers seek. i'd like to point out another good argument to use, not against stem, but in discussions with stem advocates. stem is seen by many as the way that we're going to save the world? climate change, increased production of goods and services, artificial intelligence, medicine, you name it, stem is going to do it, right? however, if you think about this, you realize that the world's problems are not going to be solved only by technical measures. they’re going to be solved by convincing people to do certain things, and you're not going to do it just by science alone. now, we just lived, and are still living, through covid. there’s a lot of science out there. i love fauci. however, he is not standing up there with a diagram of a virus. he's appealing to people’s social and human concerns. he's talking about how public health works. he's talking about how we all bear responsibility for others and not only for ourselves and our families. it’s better to get vaccinated with any one of the vaccines out there than not to if you don't want to get covid. to convince those who argue that it is their “right to choose” to get vaccinated or not, you have to make arguments that appeal to them as human beings. as we have seen over the past months, it is not enough to say, “look, science says...” we need to make stronger arguments about what's good for the community, what's good for your elderly parents, and what's good for your kids. forced vaccinations have never worked very well, but in the current pandemic situation, there may indeed be a good reason to use stronger measures to persuade people to get vaccinated, such as needing a vaccination to go to work, see a movie, eat in a restaurant, go to school. you have to convince people that this is what they want, that it's good for them, for their kids, for their families, and for the society of which they are apart. that's not stem. that's a humanist’s argument. nash you mentioned “forced vaccinations” and how over history that has not been very successful. what other patterns or trends throughout history that can help us deal with covid? 11 professor lindemann i wrote a column in perspectives on history, the aha’s magazine. i said, “let's not write the history of covid now.” we don't know enough; we need more distance. i think that’s very important. i think humanists know, or at least they should know, not to belittle other people's ideas. there's often a lot of misapprehensions of how people in the past behaved. if you understand how those misapprehensions of behavior in the past developed, you might have a little bit more sympathy and understanding of how to change things and how to move things in one direction or another. i can give you a very good example. in the eighteenth century, instead of smallpox vaccination, smallpox inoculation was the method used to combat the disease. in inoculation, you give somebody a real case of smallpox. there was a lot of opposition to this, although it seemed very clear that people who are inoculated had a much better chance of survival than people who weren't inoculated. there's all sorts of biological reasons for why inoculation is less dangerous, but people who looked at this skeptically said, “yes, but people who are inoculated with smallpox get a real case of smallpox, which means they can spread it.” that argument was not illogical nor was it wrong. we hear about religious objections. well, sometimes those objections are not religious at all but are based on knowledge and good thinking about a problem. being a historian of medicine, i see this all the time. we look back at what people did in medicine before the mid-twentieth century and go, “oh my god, the dark ages.” the kind of agony, the kind of inability they had to do anything for anybody except provide simple nursing care was just horrible. people think those people were stupid. i mean, who could believe that leprosy was caused by eating raw meat? who could believe something so stupid like that? but they weren’t stupid. you need to understand why they believed these things. i think that's what history of medicine, well, history in general, can teach us. nash this is a timely lesson. most arguments that are going on around the world right now are worsened by hyper-partisanship and in-fighting. it's just the inability of people to understand that there are those who believe in different things, and it's for certain reasons. professor lindemann this is where history and humanistic study can make a real difference. you look at what kind of information you're getting and where it’s coming from. everybody can have their own opinion, but not everybody can have their own facts. there's so much information out there (and this is one of the real dangers of the internet), and too much of it is misleading or simply wrong. wrong information is dangerous. that's where having a broad humanistic education helps people discern what is good information and what is not and how to separate one from the other. i'm not necessarily saying history allows you to say, “we've seen this before.” historians are terrible at prediction, but we can better understand how it works. nash 12 you had mentioned earlier the distance we should have before we start writing the history of covid. when we begin to write that story/history, what do you think that might look like? professor lindemann there is a lot of histories of covid out there now. unfortunately, nobody knows enough yet to write a history of covid because there's not enough distance from it to allow for a historical perspective. we're right inside the epidemic. it's a good thing to write something about covid as a current event, but not a good time to write a history of it. the history of covid needs to be anchored carefully set within a larger historical framework, and people need to refrain from making facile comparisons with other epidemics and other disasters. i heard a good historian say “covid is like hurricanes hitting 100 american cities at once.” i thought, “no, that's not right.” it's a complete false comparison. when a hurricane hits a city, not many people die, but a lot of buildings fall down. there is huge and expensive damage to the infrastructure then it goes away. we don't know what the life span of covid is going to be. we know it's related to sars, but even if you look over the period of the past year or so, there's been a lot of change in our understanding of covid. scientists know a lot more about the virus. we all know a lot more about how it spreads. for a long time, we were all told to wear masks outdoors, and people said, “oh, it's so confusing. it's so confusing because they say wear a mask, then they say don't wear a mask,” but the problem is that until you have enough information about it, you have to make decisions on the best knowledge you have at the time and that knowledge may be incomplete. that is what the public health authorities do. they make decisions and suggest ways of dealing with disease based on the best information they have. mask wearing is a very interesting subject in light of the 1918-1919 flu that killed 675,000 americans. we have in the us now passed that number. if you look at pictures of cities during the flu of the early twentieth century, everybody's wearing a mask. we don't know what it looked like in rural communities, but what we have seen is that large numbers of people in cities anyway wore masks. they did it for a year and a half, so it is not so weird and bizarre, but rather prudent and useful. nash covid has really highlighted the role that disease really plays in history. can talk a bit about role of disease in history, and how we should understand and teach that? professor lindemann the ways are so many ways and they are as complex as they are fascinating. it's hard to pull all of the strings together and select one thing that says, “this is the importance of disease in world history.” we know that epidemic and infectious diseases were the greatest killers until the end of the nineteenth century, then mortality patterns changed. now we're seeing a resurgence in such diseases, but infectious diseases, as a whole, still don’t affect mortality as they did two centuries ago. covid has killed nowhere near as many people as cancer, for example. there are a lot of books that have addressed just that issue. in the history of medicine, there is no subject that has generated more interest and nurtured more books than epidemics. none. the reason is twofold. one is because a lot of people die, and epidemics cause a great deal of social and cultural, as well as political, disruption. two, 13 it's the perfect laboratory for the historian, and not only the medical historian. that moment of disruption shows how our society works or doesn't work. for a long time, people looked at epidemics and said: “epidemics disrupt society, society collapses, people don't do what they're supposed to do, people run away.” this was a very standard story in the history of medicine until fairly recently. now, however, we're beginning to see that's not what actually happened or happens. most societies pulled themselves together, continued to function, and created mechanisms for dealing with diseases; those mechanisms eventually became what we know as public health that is now considered a normal part of government. william mcneill, in his influential book on plagues and people, talks about how important the thirteenth-century mongol migration westward was for carrying plague out of its homeland somewhere in wuhan, china. the plague transformed all sorts of societies that were impacted by it. then there's john mcneill’s mosquito empires that analyzes how the empires in the caribbean were transformed by epidemics. during wars of empire, epidemics were weaponized by non-infected or less susceptible people. they knew that almost all newcomers to the tropics died of yellow fever and malaria. malaria is still a tremendous problem in the world today, but it's a social problem. it's a problem that is generated by changes in agriculture, cutting down forests, different forms of husbandry, and the presence of lots of animals, because cows and horses are also reservoirs for malaria and many malaria-transmitting mosquitoes. many anopheles mosquitoes prefer cows and horses and only bite humans when cows and horses die off. such diseases present the historian and the epidemiologist with complex problems. i think the history of medicine and the history of epidemics go a long way to helping us understand the complexities of any given society. it's not simply that an epidemic killed a lot of people. studying epidemics helps us understand how a society is put together and how society either continued to function or broke down. climate changes, such as those we are experiencing now, also greatly affect how epidemics spread, and therefore environmental history and medical history often address many of the same issues. as it got colder in certain parts of the world with the advent of the little ice age, malaria disappeared. i live in florida, and with global warming, the mosquitoes are striking back. we have zika in florida and west nile virus, which never bothered us before. malaria is next. i think those are the ways in which the history of medicine has become an important part of the historical mainstream, especially for the early modern period. early modernists cannot ignore the history of medicine. modern historians, who are not principally medical or environmental historians, often still do, although i think covid is going to have a real impact there. people are going to pay more attention to it. nash awesome! it has been super interesting and fun to talk with you. thank you for your time! 40 bourbon ceremony in the former habsburg territory maria amalia and ferdinand’s wedding in parma (1769) mike zhou university of alberta abstract this article examines descriptions of the wedding ceremony of habsburg archduchess maria amalia and duke ferdinand of parma in 1769 and specifically analyzes the decisionmaking behind her marriage and the symbolism replete in her wedding ceremony. while scholarship on this habsburg archduchess is extremely scarce and predominantly focuses on her later life as a ruling duchess in parma, this article sheds light on an important moment in her life and one that had widespread political implications. situating the marriage in the historical and political context of the eighteenth century, this article contends that maria amalia and ferdinand’s alliance was made by habsburgs as a part of mid-eighteenth-century “diplomatic revolution,” which aimed at repairing the relationship with bourbons after the war of austrian succession. hosted in the duchy of parma, a region which had been ceded to bourbons from the habsburgs in 1748, the wedding ceremony was marked by the high-profile and laudatory celebrations of the bourbons, which contrasted with the humble and censored presence of the habsburgs. this contrast reflected the larger political situation: defeated by bourbons in the war of austrian succession, habsburgs’ prestige had plummeted dramatically since the mid-eighteenth century. they were not allowed to present themselves politically in their former territory. hence what welcomed the habsburg bride in parma was a ceremony with strong militaristic features and full of bourbon propaganda. article introduction among the various children of empress maria theresa and emperor francis stephen, archduchess maria amalia had the worst relationship with her mother. historians commonly believe that this antagonism stemmed from maria amalia’s marriage to ferdinand of parma, a bourbon-parman duke, in 1769. the empress made this decision against maria amalia’s will.1 with perfect beauty and talents, maria amalia was raised as an ideal partner for suitable royalty and a precious asset for the habsburg dynasty. while 1 barbara stollberg-rilinger, maria theresa: the habsburg empress in her time (princeton: princeton university press, 2021), 579. 41 maria amalia expected to marry prince charles ii of zweibrücken, a distant cousin whom she had fallen in love with, her mother mapped out a different course. why did the empress insist on maria amalia marrying ferdinand, despite her daughter’s wishes to the contrary? what significance did the marriage have? this article investigates these questions by analyzing the surviving descriptions of the marriage ceremony between maria amalia and ferdinand. i argue that maria amalia’s marriage was a dynastic sacrifice, a theme that emerges repeatedly in the history of habsburg women. i also contend that this wedding, with its strong bourbon influence and modest habsburg presence, was a reflection of the broader political situations: bourbons seized this wedding as a great opportunity to demonstrate their powers and dominance; habsburgs’ influence had plummeted dramatically during the mid-eighteenth century and their position and prestige was intentionally minimized from this wedding held in parma, a duchy which had been occupied by them just over two decades before the wedding. dynastic sacrifice the 1740s was a period of crisis for the habsburgs. when charles vi died in 1740, he left no son, and despite his efforts to secure the succession of his daughter, maria theresa, before his death, her status as heir was frequently challenged, leading to prolonged disputes over the inheritance of the habsburg imperial title. the habsburgs held the title of holy roman empire for hundreds of years, but this came to an end in 1742, when charles albert, from the wittelsbach family, was elected as the new holy roman emperor.2 the habsburgs’ neighbors seized upon this instability and used the occasion to encroach upon habsburg territories. most notably, the hohenzollerns occupied silesia in 1740.3 facing all these issues, young matriarch maria theresa and her habsburg family were pushed into the war of austrian succession (1740-1748) to defend the family’s territories and status. it was amid this intense situation that a daughter arrived. on february 26, 1746, maria amalia was born in vienna, the eighth child of holy roman empress maria theresa and emperor francis stephen.4 the war of austrian succession ended two years after maria amalia’s birth, with the habsburgs losing silesia, part of the netherlands, and almost its entire holdings in the apennine peninsula.5 stumbling through this crisis with huge losses of influence in western and southern europe, the dynasty started a long path to regrouping and a new understanding of their place on the european stage. this context determined the fates of maria amalia and many of her sisters: born amid the crisis, they were destined to fix the crisis. in the wake of these struggles following charles vi’s death, the mid-eighteenth-century habsburg dynasty readjusted its foreign policy, a shift coined the “diplomatic revolution” by historians. habsburgs abandoned their traditional alliance with britain and instead 2 barbara stollberg-rilinger, the holy roman empire: a short history (princeton: princeton university press, 2018), 123. 3 andrew wheatcroft, the habsburgs (london: penguin books, 1996), 219. 4 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresa, 240. 5 m.s. anderson, the war of austrian succession 1740-1748 (new york: taylor & francis, 2013), 96. 42 turned toward the bourbons, and in doing so, they aimed to regain lost territories and deter the hohenzollerns from further invasions.6 to make peace with the bourbons, whom the habsburgs had rivaled against for most of the eighteenth century, a series of marriages were sealed between the young generation of habsburgs and their bourbon counterparts. leopold ii married bourbon princess maria luisa in 1764. his younger sister archduchess maria josepha had been set to marry ferdinand of two sicilies, a descendant of spanish bourbons, but it failed when she died of smallpox in 1767; maria josepha was swiftly substituted by maria carolina, who married ferdinand in 1768.7 when maria amalia expressed the inclination of marrying charles of zweibrücken, empress maria theresa firmly turned down the idea. maria amalia was instead arranged to marry ferdinand of parma, a descendant of spanish and french bourbons with more status and prestige.8 in his essay, historian joseph patrouch compared habsburg women to the greek hero protesilaus, who departed from home and loved ones to fight against the trojans, arguing that the austrian daughters’ faraway departures from their parents and siblings, sometimes forcible, had contributed tremendously to the prosperity of the house and those who remained at home.9 from giovanna of austria, who despite the failure in relationship, consistently demonstrated the pious image of austria in the duchy of tuscany till her death, to empress maria leopodina of brazil, who was shipped across the ocean to hold office in a different continent, habsburg women’s marriages were constantly marked by personal sacrifices.10 when we observe the destiny of maria theresa’s daughters, particularly those who were born in the war of austrian succession, it is clear that they were shouldering the responsibility of repairing the diplomatic damages caused by that warfare. given that maria amalia was coerced into a marriage when she desired someone else, her wedlock was a sacrifice of no less tragic proportion. the martial demonstration maria amalia’s carriage entered the city of parma in july 1769, accompanied by her older brother joseph, the future emperor of the habsburg empire. a grand wedding was held in the ducal palace of parma on july 19th, where the marriage between twenty-three-year-old maria amalia and eighteen-year-old duke ferdinand of parma, was celebrated. the surviving sources indicate that amalia and ferdinand’s wedding celebrations consisted of several gatherings and performances. the details of parman-organized events were written in descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma (description of the festivals celebrated in parma, abbreviated as descrizione), a pamphlet printed in italian and french with rich texts 6 jeremy black, “essay and reflection: on the ‘old system’ and the ‘diplomatic revolution’ of the eighteenth century,” in the international history review 12, no. 2 (1990): 302, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40106181. 7 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresa, 370. 8 stollberg-rilinger, maria theresa, 579. 9 joseph patrouch, “‘bella gerant alii.’ laodamia’s sisters, habsburg brides: leaving home for the sake of the house,” in early modern habsburg women: transnational contexts, cultural conflicts, dynastic continuities, eds. anne j. cruz and maria galli stampino (new york: routledge, 2013), 25. 10 alice e. sanger, art, gender and religious devotion in grand ducal tuscany (new york: routledge, 2016), 37; lilia moritz schwarcz, “portraits: empress maria leopoldina of brazil,” in the brazil reader: history, culture, politics, eds. james n. green, victoria langland, and lilia moritz schwarcz (durham: duke university press, 2019), 158-161. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40106181 43 and illustrations and issued by the royal printing house of parma in 1769. according to this pamphlet, a series of gatherings and performances were hosted and celebrated in duke ferdinand’s court. the pamphlet is composed of five parts: description (description), which narrates the performative contest and military parade which took place in the ducal palace; description des habits (description of clothes), which exhibits the images of participants of the said contest and parade in their garments; noms des personnes nobles (names of noble people), which lists the nobles who participated in the contest and the parade; les bergeres d’arcadia (the shepherdesses of arcadia), which narrates the arcadia party, the second event in maria amalia and ferdinand’s wedding ceremony; and lastly, la foire chinoise (the chinese fair), the last event of their wedding ceremony. run by the bourbon statesman guillaume du tillot, the parman court had been infused with strong french influence since the mid-eighteenth century. this clue is key to help us understand the strong bourbon narratives existing in these celebratory gatherings.11 while the wedding primarily featured events presented by the groom’s family, the one exception was an opera festival named le feste d'apollo (the festival of apollo), which was composed by bohemian playwright christoph willibald gluck. a playwright who spent his career in multiple european states, gluck had a close relationship with habsburgs throughout lifetime.12 before composing le feste d'apollo, he had participated in the production of various works for the habsburgs, including a serenata for archduke joseph and isabella of parma’s wedding in 1760.13 in the year 1769, gluck traveled to parma to supervise his opera’s performance in maria amalia and ferdinand’s wedding.14 given gluck’s close relationship with the habsburgs, the le feste d'apollo might be considered the only habsburg presence, and as i shall discuss later, it was a modest and muted one in this habsburg-bourbon wedding. the first noteworthy element in this wedding is the heavy military features. among three performances which were recorded in the wedding pamphlet descrizione, the military tournament has the most detailed description. local parman noblemen participated in the event and were divided into nine quadrilles. each quadrille was composed of a knight and his pages and assigned a color. a coliseum was constructed in the ducal palace for the performance and viewing of this event (figure 1).15 according to descrizione, maria amalia 11 on the cultural transition of parma under bourbon occupation, see gregory hanlon, early modern italy, 1550-1800 (new york: st. martin’s press, 2000), 350-352. halon argues that the bourbon reform had been taking place in parma since the 1750s under guillaume du tillot’s guidance, and it had deeply changed the cultural sphere of parman court. 12 gluck was living in vienna from 1752 to 1760, but his relationship with the habsburgs lasted much longer. not only did he produce the opera for maria amalia’s wedding in 1769, he was also patronized by maria antoinette during his later years in paris. see bruce alan brown and julian rushton, “gluck, christoph willibald, ritter von,” oxford music online (january 2001): 39. 13 it is noteworthy that joseph is maria amalia’s older brother, and isabella of parma is a sister of ferdinand. predating maria amalia and ferdinand’s wedding, their marriage was also sealed to repair the relationship between habsburgs and bourbons. see brown and rushton, “gluck, christoph willibald,” 12. 14 brown and rushton, “gluck, christoph willibald,” 21. 15 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma l’anno mdcclxix. per le auguste nozze di sua altezza reale l’infante don ferdinando colla reale arciduchessa maria amalia. (parma: nella stamperia reale, 1769), 5. 44 and her husband were sitting in the most visible place in the coliseum. the judges of the tournament sat one floor below the royal couple. figure 1: an illustration of the coliseum from descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma. the military tournament itself was composed of duels, races, and parades, which all took place inside the coliseum. the participants entered the coliseum, bowing deeply in front of the grand box, where maria amalia and her husband were seated, and started dueling against each other with different weapons. although these duels were performed as a sort of entertainment, their seriousness was not reduced, as several knights did not quit fighting until they broke several spears.16 these fights were followed by foot racing and horse racing. eventually, all the participants were assembled in quadrilles, marching inside the coliseum in a martial parade fashion. as descrizione recorded, the military tournament was ended with the public pledge of allegiance: “the judges of arms asked the knights for the names of the ladies whom they had fought for. they responded that the names were written on their handlebars; the pages advanced forward towards the grand box, displaying the handlebars before the eyes of the princes. all had fought for the same lady: the handlebars showed the same name, that one of marie amalia. the lady of the tournament, so worthy to boost their courage, honored them with her praise, and took them all as her knights.”17 16 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 13. 17 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 14. this translation and all the following ones are by the author from the original french. 45 figure 2: an illustration from the descrizione, showing cherubs holding different weapons. figure 3: the illustration of military items found in the descrizione. 46 the detailed narration of this military tournament is quite conspicuous in this official description of the wedding. over a hundred pages of the descrizione is related to the military tournament, and only thirty pages were left to describe the other two events: the arcadia party and the chinese fair. in addition to its disproportionate focus on the military tournament, strong martial features are found almost everywhere in this pamphlet, including on the title page where the coat of arms of bourbon parma was decorated with cannon, spears, and arrows. the majority of other illustrations in the pamphlet also feature different military items. some images depict cherubs holding a large spear, others simply put random military items together (see figures 2 and 3). this evidence indicates that militancy was a major theme of the wedding celebration. moreover, since the events narrated in this pamphlet were prepared by parman court, which had been tightly controlled by bourbons since the 1750s, we can also understand maria amalia’s wedding ceremony as a martial demonstration designed by bourbons. while the strong militaristic presence may seem unfitting in a wedding, the intention behind this antique-fashion military performance must be appreciated in the historical context. eighteenth-century europe had witnessed several large-scale wars, including the war of spanish succession (1701-1714), war of polish succession (1733-1735), and war of austrian succession. such a highly hostile context made a demonstration of military might necessary, and maria amalia’s wedding provided a great opportunity for such a demonstration. while the strong militaristic features did not necessarily relate to maria amalia and ferdinand’s alliance, the chivalric, heroic tournament was designed to echo the contemporary environment on the continent. moreover, given that the control of parma had switched between several families during the early and mid-eighteenth century, a topic which i will go into detail in the next section, it is reasonable for bourbons to present a tournament performed by local parman nobilities as a demonstration of harmony between them and their parman subjects. the attention generated by royal weddings provides great occasions for the hosts to advertise their political images. from the public spectacle of giovanna of austria’s entry in 1565 to maria louise and napoleon’s grand wedding procession in 1810, several habsburg women’s weddings had been utilized by the groom’s families to disseminate their ideologies, and it seems like in the year 1769, the bourbonparman court had similar arrangement for amalia and ferdinand’s wedding, as they hosted a militaristic one to propagandize the bourbon hegemony.18 the unequal presence it is pivotal to our understanding of this wedding that, although parma was occupied by bourbons in 1769, it had been part of the habsburg’s holdings not that long ago. situated at the northern tip of the apennine peninsula, the duchy of parma had been ruled by the farnese family from 1545 to 1731.19 while nominally independent, parma was inevitably swept into the vortex of enormous polities’ rivalries, specifically between habsburgs and bourbons. the lack of male heirs within the house of farnese provided an ample opportunity for both powers to exert influence, and the bourbons seized it, when philip v 18 sanger, art, gender and religious devotion, 37; imbert de saint-amand, the memoirs of the empress marie louise (london: remington & co, 1886), 208-216. 19 hanlon, early modern italy, 351. 47 of spain married elizabeth farnese, the female heir of parma in 1714. when the duke, antonio farnese, died in 1731, his status was inherited by charles, the son of philip v and elizabeth farnese.20 this inheritance soon affected the rivalry between habsburgs and bourbons, as the two houses were pitted against each other in the war of polish succession. when the conflict ceased in 1738, bourbons handed over the duchy of parma to the habsburgs in exchange for naples and sicily.21 this led to a ten-year habsburg occupation of parma until their defeat against bourbons in the war of austrian succession. the habsburg empire lost a huge amount of its holdings, including the duchy of parma and various other regions in the apennine peninsula. when we look into the sources related to this wedding, it is evident that the habsburgs were politically censored and even implicitly blamed for the previous conflicts between the two houses. the parman-issued wedding pamphlet started with the narration of bourbonhabsburg relationships. it referred to the bride’s mother, maria theresa, as “a virtuous princess,” who “has reunited the dispersed parts of the heritage of her ancestors with effort … designed the project to devote her power to the happiness of mankind.”22 however it referred to the groom’s grandfather louis xv with even more complimentary terms, glamorizing him as a prince who “had been conquering only to be a peacemaker… whose equity and moderation had been tested by the fortune.”23 the introduction of this pamphlet was highly complementary to both families, their leaders, and their members. while nobody was directly blamed in this section, it is noteworthy that these lines referred to habsburg ancestors’ heritage as “dispersed.” it foreshadows the following contents, and as we shall see, the habsburgs would be criticized and disdained for the “dispersed heritage,” which they had tough time bringing together after their loss in the habsburg-bourbon conflict. the pejorative narrative against habsburgs gradually comes to the surface in the following part of this pamphlet. following the military tournament, descrizione recounts the second part of the wedding celebration: the arcadia party, the theme of which was derived from virgil’s classic literature. this party was held in the royal garden, where noble men and women dressed up in costumes, played music, sang poems, and danced in a classic fashion. in descrizione, the narration of this event implicitly attacks the habsburgs: “the ladies thought that no law prevents the pastoral land (of arcadia) from being established in our countryside, to convene themselves an assembly in such a happy occasion; and that they must revenge on the rigid leaders who never called them to their sessions.”24 given that the habsburgs were ruling parma until the end of the war of austrian succession and the farnese family’s occupation was quite distant from 1769, these lines were clearly poking fun at the period of habsburg occupation of parma from 1738 to 1748. in general, this 20 hanlon, early modern italy, 351. 21 hanlon, early modern italy, 351. 22 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 2. 23 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 2. 24 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 66. 48 section depicted a peaceful and harmonious gathering between parman nobilities and their bourbon sovereign. the mention of parman nobilities’ participation in the party and their complaints against habsburgs portrayed bourbons as well-loved in parma and the previous habsburg occupation of parma as fatuous.25 according to descrizione, maria amalia and ferdinand’s wedding celebration ended with the chinese fair, a festival organized by local parman merchants. the narration of this event once again derogatorily referred to the previous habsburg occupation: “the merchants of parma were also eager to report their joy and their deep gratitude. imbued with what the august father of the infante has done in their favor, everyday they reap new fruits from the kindness and wisdom of the prince. protection, encouragement and aid multiplied.”26 these lines could be considered as the most explicit attack, for they mentioned “the august father of the infante.” this refers to the groom’s father, philip, duke of parma, to whom the bride’s father, francis stephen, ceded parma in 1748. the “aid multiplied” referred to the ten-year habsburg occupation of parma as austere and uncaring. figure 4: the illustration that presents wedding families’ coats of arms in descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma. not only were habsburgs defamed by bourbons multiple times in this pamphlet, their dynastic symbols were also suppressed and erased during the wedding. among the various illustrations portrayed in the descrizione, the habsburg symbol only vaguely appears once. 25 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 66. 26 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 73. 49 it is in an illustration of angels holding two coats of arms, the habsburg emperor francis stephen’s coat of arms is relegated to the back, overshadowed by the bourbon-parman coat of arms, which takes center stage (figure 4).27 francis’s coat of arms is supposed to include a double-headed eagle with the sword, the orb, and the scepter in its claws, but it appears to be intentionally altered—neither the orb nor the scepter appears in the eagle’s claw. both items are strong symbols of power and sovereignty, and the alteration of this habsburg coat of arms was clearly done to erase any symbols that could potentially evoke the memory of previously habsburg sovereignty on this bourbon-controlled territory. figure 5: the title page illustration of a bourbon coat of arms, with a golden fleece necklace hanging down at the bottom, from descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma. the scepter and the orb are not the only things that got erased; the golden fleece necklace was also stripped from the habsburg eagle’s neck. it instead appears in the title page illustration, hanging down from the bourbon coat of arms (figure 5). this leads to a very interesting issue: the disputable claim regarding the order of golden fleece. founded by philip the good, duke of burgundy, in 1430, the order of golden fleece was one of the most renowned christian chevalier orders in early modern europe. after maximilian i married philip’s granddaughter, mary of burgundy, maximilian claimed the ownership of the order. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the order was headed by charles ii of spain, a habsburg descendant who held power in iberia. following his death in 1700, as the head of the habsburg family, charles vi claimed to be the legitimate heir of the order, but his claim 27 descrizione delle feste celebrate in parma, 14. 50 was countered by philip v, the bourbon king of spain. the order then split into two branches.28 it is noteworthy that charles vi and philip v are respectively the bride’s and groom’s maternal grandfathers. by placing the necklace under their coat of arms, the narrative once again favored bourbons and diminished habsburgs’ prestige. the placement of the necklace reflects the wide rift between the two houses, which had been created since the early eighteenth century. finally, the two houses’ unequal presence in the wedding ceremony is conspicuous when we compare the bourbon repertoire to that of the habsburg one. organized by bohemian playwright christoph willibald gluck, le feste d'apollo might be the only section of amalia’s wedding celebration that was prepared by the habsburgs. performed in parman court theater under gluck’s supervision, this opera is composed of four scenes, each adapted from virgil or ovid’s classic writings. what reflects the bourbon censorship this time is not any alteration or deletion but instead the opera itself. composed of classic love stories, this habsburg-directed opera’s apolitical nature contrasted dramatically with the bourbon parts of the wedding, which—as discussed above—was highly militaristic and political. the habsburgs’ more muted presence must be understood in its broader context. having lost the war against bourbons twenty years ago, it would be illogical for bourbons to allow habsburgs to have a strong political presence in the territory that they had ruled from 1738 to 1748. together with the derogatory reference and altered coat of arms, these clues strongly suggest that the two houses were not equally presented in the wedding ceremony. while bourbon hegemony was advertised and praised, habsburg symbols were filtered and removed. conclusion from the arrangement of marriage to the wedding ceremony itself, there are various conclusions we can make about maria amalia’s marriage. in the dynastic context, the almost-coerced wedlock between maria amalia and ferdinand was sealed as part of habsburgs’ diplomatic revolution in the mid-eighteenth century, which aimed at securing the bourbons as an ally in the precarious postwar environment of the continental europe. like many of her female predecessors and peers in the history of the habsburg dynasty, maria amalia’s marriage was sacrificed for a dynastic cause. celebrated in parma, a bourbon-controlled duchy that had been previously occupied by the habsburgs, the wedding celebration was by large a martial demonstration and a propaganda event, which intended to demonstrate bourbons’ military might and the harmony between them and their parman subjects. furthermore, it is not a wedding with an equal presence from both families. the imbalance is indicated by the predominant bourbon narratives and the censored habsburg culture in the ceremonies can be explained by two factors: first, the bourbons were the ones who triumphed in the previous conflicts, most significantly in the war of austrian succession. second, the political presence of habsburgs in parma was a very sensitive issue. given that the habsburgs ceded this duchy to bourbons in 1748, any form of habsburg presence would evoke the local parmans’ memories of their previous occupiers, which simply could not be tolerated by bourbons. thus during this habsburg 28 j. balfour paul, “the order of the golden fleece,” the scottish historical review 5, no. 20 (july 1908): 410. 51 bourbon marriage ceremony, the house of habsburg was subtly defamed and marginalized. in general, maria amalia’s wedding ceremony epitomizes the habsburg dynasty in the eighteenth-century political context. stumbling out of the crisis of inheritance, the austrian royal house’s prestige plummeted. they no longer held absolute advantages against multiple continental rivalries, and they sought to stabilize their already weakened sovereignty, particularly in the western flank of the empire, by repairing diplomatic relationships with bourbons. maria amalia, along with many of her sisters who were married to bourbons, were sacrificed for such a dynastic cause. 54 augustin calmet and the construction of the eighteenth-century vampire ciaran craig trinity college dublin abstract this article examines the role played by augustin calmet, a benedictine, in the construction of the vampire. in the eighteenth century, calmet embarked upon a thorough examination of the evidence for the existence of reported vampires in the lands of hungary, moravia, serbia, and romania. in order to complete this task, calmet would investigate numerous incidents of apparent vampirism as well as the particular qualities that define these claims. however, calmet’s emphasis and focus upon these features of “vampirism” would assist in the creation of an archetypal vampire, which would endure for the next three centuries. article during the middle decades of the eighteenth century, the intellectual and medical elite of western europe became captivated by reports emerging from the territories lying between habsburg austria and the ottoman empire that spoke of a spreading supernatural epidemic known as “vampirism.”1 amid swathes of apparently reliable testimony from local civil and military authorities, the “vampire debate” became entangled in the “enlightenment” discussion of science and religion and elite knowledge and popular belief. the former sought to understand what was labelled as superstition, while the later, spearheaded by ecclesiastical philosophes, sought to use this supernatural “other” to exemplify their understanding of truth. the most important writer within this contest spoke to both sides of the debate. dom augustin calmet (1672-1757) was a french benedictine monk, antiquarian, and counter-reformation apologist who wrote extensively about the many “mysteries” and other unexplainable phenomena found throughout the bible. while largely advocating for a literal interpretation of the bible, calmet argued that belief in one miracle necessitates belief in the plausibility of all miracles.2 since highly unlikely events, such as the 1 during the eighteenth century, no collective identification of these territories on the periphery of europe as “eastern europe” existed. instead, this terminology emerged later as a creation of the “western gaze” and the writings of western travelers. see larry wolff, inventing eastern europe (stanford: stanford university press, 1994). however, by lumping these territories together as the location of these superstitions, calmet assisted in the creation of later western conceptions of this region (although not called eastern europe yet) as a zone of superstition. 2 bertram eugene schwarzbach, “reason and the bible in the so-called age of reason,” huntington library quarterly 74, no. 3 (2011): 460-461. 55 immaculate conception, lay at the heart of christian religion, he argued we cannot dismiss any apparently impossible phenomenon.3 in these instances, calmet believed that it was appropriate to forgo a literal, rationalistic reading of the text. these views placed calmet outside the mainstream of intellectual “enlightenment” thought. the growing scientific revolution of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had asserted the regularity of nature and the superiority of reason over dogma.4 as a result, everything that deviated from the laws of nature must be summarily rejected. however, calmet, alongside many of his fellow “enlightenment” ecclesiastical scholars, had been educated before the natural sciences had permeated french university education.5 consequently, calmet stood alongside several other “enlightenment” figures, such as jean meslier (1664–1729), who remained “intellectually remote from the scientific revolution” and free to engage in discussion about the supernatural.6 in fact, calmet even asserted the value of scientific interpretation, so long as it did not contradict or conflict with christian teaching. ultimately, these philosophical views would have great consequences for calmet. during the early eighteenth century, habsburg officials stationed in vienna began to receive reports from local civil and military authorities in hungary, serbia, and moravia concerning strange local disturbances. these reports claimed that local communities had been menaced by the undead spirits of recently deceased individuals. it was claimed that upon exhumation the suspected culprits, who had been buried for several months or years, were found with their “blood in a liquid state, the flesh entire, the complexion fine and florid, the limbs flexible and pliable.”7 these persons, known locally as ouipres , arose from their graves at night to drink the blood of the living before returning to their slumber before sunrise. in calmet’s view, investigating the veracity of these incredulous claims emerging from hungary, moravia, and transylvania about vampires was within the interests of both science and religion. unlike witchcraft, which had been a long-standing phenomenon in western europe, vampirism was totally new to western intellectuals and, therefore, suspect.8 during this time of profound challenge to the catholic church, the church increasingly attempted to re-establish the boundaries of truth to determine what resided within and outside christian society. however, the sudden explosion of supernatural claims, particularly vampirism, threatened this agenda. considering this issue, calmet believed that if vampirism was illusory, it was “of consequence to the interests of religion to undeceive those who believe in its truth and destroy an error which may produce dangerous effects.”9 moreover, regarding science, if these claims are proved true, then greater knowledge about the processes of life can be unlocked. therefore, for these reasons and to maintain his intellectual integrity, calmet felt compelled to provide an answer to these reports. 3 schwarzbach, “reason and the bible in the so-called age of reason,” 460-461. 4 schwarzbach, “reason and the bible in the so-called age of reason,” 462. 5 schwarzbach, “reason and the bible in the so-called age of reason,” 461. 6 schwarzbach, “reason and the bible in the so-called age of reason,” 464. 7augustin calmet, the phantom world or, the philosophy of spirits, apparitions, &c, &c., trans. henry christmas (philadelphia: a. hart, late cary & hart, 1850), 250. 8 kathryn morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” preternature: critical and historical studies on the preternatural 4, no. 2 (2015): 182-183. 9 calmet, the phantom world, p. 247. 56 through his investigation, calmet would amass a vast collection of western european knowledge regarding vampires, the undead, and other supernatural phenomena. by doing this, calmet would attempt to determine what a vampire was, what it looked like, what it did, and how it could be destroyed. this enterprise would result in the publication of the dissertations sur les apparitions des anges, des démons et des esprits, et sur les revenants et vampires de hongrie, de bohême, de moravie et de silésie (essays on apparitions of angels, demons, and spirits, and on ghosts and vampires from hungary, bohemia, moravia, and silesia; 1746).10 aside from examining a variety of supernatural topics, such as spiritual apparitions, magic, and witchcraft, calmet’s objective was to provide a rational, scientific, and philosophical answer to the vampire reports from hungary, bohemia, silesia, and moravia. by doing so, calmet hoped to erode the foundation of popular superstition in these regions. however, rather than dispelling superstition, calmet would give a distinct name and character to the vampire of the eighteenth century, which fueled its popularity. furthermore, calmet’s reliance upon letters, personal testimonies, military reports, popular gazettes, and earlier texts about vampirism meant that he only reported what western intellectuals already “knew,” often mistakenly interpreted, about these remote and largely non-urbanized regions. therefore, rather than contributing to western understanding about these regions, calmet would only perpetuate popular prejudices and mistaken intellectual assertions. ultimately, calmet unintentionally assisted in the construction of an enduring popular conception of “eastern europe,” which would commonly associate this region with superstition and mysticism. this article examines the major features of vampirism investigated by calmet in the dissertations. by doing this, the role played by calmet in the creation of the “archetypal vampire” becomes clear. finally, the article demonstrates how this construction would create a stereotyped image of “eastern europe” that would endure into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. the origins of the vampire during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, various regions of eastern europe became the focus of greater intellectual attention in western europe. as western travelers, usually elite intellectuals, increasingly explored these territories, they were confronted with societies and cultures completely alien to them. these largely rural regions had remained relatively sheltered from the political centralization of western europe and the re-christianization efforts of the catholic church. consequently, belief in various pagan concepts, superstitious practices, and supernatural entities remained widespread amongst the ordinary population. one of the most prevalent local slavic superstitions encountered by western travelers was belief in the existence of evil, undead revenants that fed upon the flesh of the living. these 10 no english translation of calmet’s work, which was produced in french, existed during the eighteenth century. therefore, this article will make use of an english translation produced by reverend henry christmas (1811-1868) during the middle of the nineteenth century. rev. christmas was the editor of several english periodicals, including the church of england quarterly review, the literary gazette, the british churchman, and the churchman. also, rev. christmas was a fellow of the society of antiquaries of london and a professor of english history and archaeology. this background likely gave rev. christmas interest in calmet’s subject matter. 57 creatures possessed various local names and features, such as the serbian mullo (one who is dead), which preyed upon livestock, and the bulgarian obour that, like the turkish ghoul, fed on carcasses. furthermore, among the greeks, it was commonly accepted that those who died under excommunication would return as vengeful, undead creatures known as vrykolakas (vampires). these creatures were formed from the “bodies of criminal and malevolent men” which they use “to frighten mortals, and cause their death.”11 while these beliefs originated in the medieval period, by the time of calmet’s publication in the mideighteenth century, belief in these superstitions was so extensive that, according to calmet, “anyone who thought otherwise would be regarded almost as a heretic.”12 in transylvania, slavic folklore spoke of undead revenants that arise from their graves to drink the blood of their relatives. these creatures rest in their graves “perfectly putrefied” and can only be destroyed by driving “a stake through the dead body, from whence … blood flows as if the person were alive.”13 these revenants were known locally as strigoi or upir. in fact, upir is the root verb for the various local variations in russia, serbia, poland, and bulgaria.14 in their attempt to make sense of what they saw and heard, western travelers created an image of this region of primitiveness, superstition, and backwardness that prevailed for almost three centuries. however, this construction, which calmet would reinforce within the dissertations, would only serve to strengthen popular and elite misconceptions about eastern europe. alongside the belief in undead revenants arose a multitude of apotropaic practices to protect the local community from these creatures. these practices informed participants about the characteristics and capabilities of the undead revenant, which would become key aspects of later vampire beliefs. since it was believed that strigoi escaped their graves to prey upon the living, potential strigoi were buried face down to prevent them from rising.15 these individuals were usually those who had existed on the margins of the community or whose death had attracted stigma, such as the unmarried, criminals, and those who had died by suicide, plague, or murder.16 from the ninth century, numerous romanian and hungarian graves contain iron sickles, either buried in the heart or resting around the neck so that the strigoi’s neck would be severed if they rose from the grave.17 additionally, numerous serbian and romanian burials have been found with iron rods or needles driven through the roof of the deceased’s mouth. it was not unusual for particularly dangerous individuals to be disposed of in bodies of water. these “vulnerable” corpses, like plague victims, were quarantined from other burials outside consecrated ground and far from any habitation, commonly along boundaries or at crossroads.18 while the english historian william of newbury reported tales of vengeful revenants in the twelfth century, neither 11 calmet, the phantom world, 302. 12 calmet, the phantom world, 376. 13 samuel johnson and william oldys, the harleian miscellany: a collection of scarce, curious, and entertaining pamphlets and tracts, as well in manuscript as in print, vol. 11 (london: robert dutton, 1808), 232. 14 katharina m. wilson, “the history of the word ‘vampire,’” journal of the history of ideas 46 (1985): 577583. 15 paul barber, vampires, burial, and death: folklore and reality (new haven: yale university press, 2010), 47. 16 paul barber, “forensic pathology and the european vampire,” journal of folklore research 24 (1987): 5. 17 barber, vampires, burial, and death, 50. 18 barber, vampires, burial, and death, 55-56. 58 these nor similar apparitions, like the scandinavian draugrs (corporeal revenants), were known to drink the blood of the living. therefore, the multitude of apotropaic practices found within slavic and other cultures emphasizes the danger associated with strigoi. consequently, as reports of strigoi began to spread into western europe, these superstitions presented a significant threat to the survival of the entire christian community. thus, these reports became the focus of intense intellectual and popular attention as western european intellectuals sought to uncover the truth of these claims. in the face of reports emerging from eastern europe concerning the undead, the intellectual and ecclesiastical elite of western europe began to categorize these loose sets of beliefs into a single concept—vampirism. one of the first appearances of the strigoi in western intellectual circles was in the present state of the greek and armenian churches (1679) by the british diplomat, paul rycaut (1629-1700). in this piece, rycaut attributed the overuse of excommunication by orthodox officials in giving rise to “a pretended demon, said to delight in sucking human blood, and to animate the bodies of dead persons, which when dug up, are said to be found florid and full of blood.”19 however, rycaut never used the word “vampire.” nonetheless, as reports began to emerge about an apparent “vampirism epidemic” in serbia from 1725 to 1732, the “vampire” slowly began to enter the popular vernacular of western europe.20 in the subsequent process of identification and categorization by elites, the strigoi, with its unique thirst for human blood, would become the archetypal vampire.21 an early application of this new terminology can be witnessed in the english travelogue, the travels of the three english brothers (1610), which detailed a romanticized version of the adventures of the shirley brothers as they journeyed to persia. 22 while initially published as a pamphlet, the popularity of this travelogue meant that it was adapted into a stage play less than six weeks after its publication. among many other things, this travelogue spoke of “vampyres, which come out of the graves in the night-time, rush upon people sleeping in their beds, suck out all their blood and destroy them.”23 however, within the vampire’s purported homelands, the term was little used. in fact, it was over a century after its emergence within the vocabulary of western europe that it appeared in eastern europe.24 this terminology indeed never became widely used in the region. instead, these creatures continued to be referred to by their traditional names. in this way, the “vampire” essentially became a linguistic creation of western intellectuals to describe a set of complicated and diverse local superstitious beliefs, which they sought to categorize and to discredit. by doing so, they sought to destroy, whether for religious or intellectual reasons, the last vestiges of paganism and superstition residing upon the frontiers of “civilized” europe. 19 wilson, “the history of the word ‘vampire,’” 580. 20 wilson, “the history of the word ‘vampire,’” 583. 21 g. david keyworth, “was the vampire of the eighteenth century a unique type of undead-corpse?,” folklore 117 (2006): 256. 22 this text can be found within the harleian miscellany—a collection of material from the library of the earl of oxford and earl mortimer—which was collated and edited by samuel johnson and william oldys and published by thomas osborne in 1753. the text cited within this essay belongs to a reprinted edition in 1808 by robert dutton. 23 johnson and oldys, the harleian miscellany, 232. 24 wilson, “the history of the word ‘vampire,’” 582. 59 a restless slumber throughout the reports and incidents investigated by calmet, the most recognizable feature of the vampire that he identified was the ability of the deceased to rise from the grave. calmet informed his readers that these reports are “so singular, so detailed, and invested with such probable circumstances … that one can hardly refuse to credit the belief, which is held in those countries, that these revenants come out of their tombs and produce those effects which are proclaimed of them.”25 to uncover the truth of these occurrences, calmet sought answers within the writings of antiquity and medieval christendom. firstly, calmet explained that according to ancient writers, such as pliny and origen, the body serves as a vessel, which a spirit can inhabit and reanimate. in discussing the destruction of the soul of hermotimes of lazomene, pliny stated that his enemies destroyed his body, which deprived “the soul of the means of returning to lodge in its envelope.”26 furthermore, calmet suggested that among the pagans, it was commonly “believed that the bodies of the dead rested not, neither were they safe from magical evocations, so long as they remained unconsumed by fire, or undecayed underground.”27 calmet also explained how william of newbridge had reported in the twelfth century how a deceased man “appeared bodily, as when alive, three succeeding nights to his wife, and after that to his nearest relatives.” in william’s view, these claims would have appeared doubtful “if several instances had not occurred in his time, and if they did not know several persons who believed in them.”28 at a church council held at limoges in 1031, the bishop of cahors relayed the story of a cavalier who died under excommunication but was interred by his comrades without the bishop’s permission. subsequently, “the next morning his body was found out of the ground and thrown naked far from the spot; his grave remaining entire, and without any sign of having been touched.” following reinterment, the corpse was again found “outside the tomb, without its appearing that anyone had worked at it.”29 after establishing the precedent of reanimation within ancient and medieval cultures, calmet turned his attention to the vampires of hungary and moravia who apparently shared these traits. in each incident as recounted by calmet, the vampire is stated to “come out of his grave … to embrace and hug violently his near relations or his friends.”30 when this task is complete, the vampires “return to their graves without anyone seeing how they re-enter them.”31 while this pattern of behavior is, according to calmet, grounded in reliable testimony, the reader is informed of “how the vampires come out of their graves to haunt the living, and how they return to them again … without informing us either of the way or the circumstances.” as a result, calmet found it absurd that a “body covered with four or five feet of earth, having no room to move about and disengage itself … can make its way out … and how after that it returns to its former state, and re-enters underground, 25 calmet, the phantom world, 244. 26 calmet, the phantom world, 357. 27 calmet, the phantom world, 284. 28 calmet, the phantom world, 283. 29 calmet, the phantom world, 292. 30 calmet, the phantom world, 276. 31 calmet, the phantom world, 250. 60 where it is found sound … and in the same condition as a living body.”32 according to calmet, it has been suggested that these vampires are those that “had been interred alive, and returned naturally to themselves, and came out of their tombs.”33 however, not only are some of these individuals interred for months before disturbances, but also calmet found no reason why a victim of premature burial would return to the grave from which they just escaped. moreover, since the earth is left undisturbed, it must be assumed that the vampire can pass through the ground “like the water and vapours which enter into the earth.”34 while calmet was skeptical of the idea that vampires arise physically from the earth, he does not totally reject these claims. instead, calmet suggested other possibilities that could account for these reports. according to some philosophers, calmet found that the soul does not immediately abandon the body upon death “until after the entire dissolution of their body.”35 during this time, the body can be reanimated by the deceased’s soul or other spiritual entities, which could manifest as a spiritual apparition. consequently, calmet wrote that some people have come to believe that god “permits or commands them to come back to earth, and resume for a time their own body.” however, calmet wondered why god would allow the deceased to return to do harm to their relations. as a result, calmet contemplated if it is a “demon who causes these revenants to appear, and by their means does all the harm he occasions both men and animals.”36 yet, how can a spiritual being inhabit a material body “without destroying the configuration of its parts … and render this body incapable of appearing, showing itself, acting and speaking.” furthermore, as far as we understand, god has not given the devil the power of reanimation. despite this, while the possession of vampires by demons “is a thing asserted without proof or likelihood,” god has never fully revealed the power given to demons so that “we must then keep silence on this article.”37 in the end, calmet’s views upon this issue are not entirely clear. to conclude, calmet opted to cite the opinions of the author of the lettres juives, or jewish letters (1738), on the issue.38 while acknowledging that “the return of vampires is neither impossible nor incredible” to the ancients, the author firmly believes that vampirism is “chimerical and beyond all likelihood … whatever may be the number and quality of those who have believed it,” since the return of vampires to the earth is something “unmaintainable and impracticable.”39 nevertheless, the quantity of testimonies championing these ideas throughout this work serve to solidify this concept within the reader’s mind. the living dead 32 calmet, the phantom world, 357. 33 calmet, the phantom world, 248-250. 34 calmet, the phantom world, 357. 35 calmet, the phantom world, 356. 36 calmet, the phantom world, 248. 37 calmet, the phantom world, 358-359. 38 the lettres juives was an epistolary novel written by jean-baptiste de boyer, marquise d’argens. this text contained over two hundred letters purportedly written by five rabbis residing in different regions of europe. these letters provided an overview and discussion of their respective regions. 39 calmet, the phantom world, 269. 61 aside from its power of reanimation, the appearance of the deceased was, according to calmet, the most reliable indicator of a dormant vampire. most notably, it was the apparent absence of decomposition that contributed to the identification of the recently deceased as vampires. throughout the reports examined by calmet, the bodies of vampires are said to maintain the “mobility and suppleness of the limbs, the fluidity of the blood, and the flesh remaining uncorrupted.”40 among the local populations who reported the presence of vampires, it is believed that those who perish from “plague, poison, hydrophobia, drunkenness, and any epidemical malady, are more apt to return, apparently because their blood coagulates with more difficulty.”41 furthermore, the beard, hair, and nails of the deceased were found to have grown anew. these “vampires” can be found “entire, their blood vermilion and fluid, and their limbs supple and pliable.”42 to demonstrate this pattern, calmet examined the well-known vampirism case of peter plogojovitz (blagojević). the details of this incident are provided by the lutheran pastor and historian michael ranft (1700-1774), who was well-known for his writings of vampirism. in his work entitled de masticatione mortuorum in tumulis (on the chewing of the dead in their tombs; 1728), ranft brought the details of this incident to western audiences. according to calmet, ranft reported that blagojević, who had died in 1725 and killed nine persons in the village of kisilova in lands gained in 1718 by the habsburgs from the ottomans (likely the modern village of kisiljevo in serbia), appeared “as when alive … that his hair and beard had grown, and instead of his nails, which had fallen off, new ones had come.”43 moreover, blagojević was found “not at all putrid, no ill smell about him, save the mustiness of his grave clothes, his joints limber and flexible, as those that are alive.”44 these criteria were presented as key to judging cases of vampirism. the apparent bloating of the corpse was particularly important to local authorities, since it suggested that the deceased had fed recently, thus confirming its affliction. according to calmet, when the deceased was discovered by local people with these features and “without worms or decay,” they are immediately “given up to the executioner, who burns them.”45 for example, within the village of kisilova, two officers from the tribunal of belgrade arrived to investigate reports of further supernatural disturbances within the community. following their arrival, the two officers, alongside an executioner, opened the graves of all those who had died within the timeframe of the disturbances. consequently, they discovered the corpse of an old man “with his eyes open, having a fine colour, with natural respiration … whence they concluded that he was most evidently a vampire.”46 after this discovery, the corpse was destroyed after which the disturbances ceased. these details were relayed by an imperial officer who served as an ocular witness to the events and were contained within the lettres juives, which calmet paraphrased. 40 calmet, the phantom world, 262. 41 calmet, the phantom world, 343. 42 calmet, the phantom world, 248. 43 calmet, the phantom world, 342. 44 david keyworth, “was the vampire of the eighteenth century a unique type of undead-corpse?,” 252. 45 calmet, the phantom world, p. 262. 46 calmet, the phantom world, 264. 62 following his discussion of blagojević, calmet turned his attention to the famous case of arnold paule who lived in the village of medveđa in modern serbia. as with the case of blagojević, paule lived in lands only recently brought under habsburg control. the version of the story known to calmet came from an austrian army surgeon, johann flückinger, who was sent to investigate the stories about paule and compiled a formal report on the case as a visum et repertum (seen and discovered) in 1732. following local reports that the recently deceased paule was terrorizing the community, flückinger had led a formal military investigation into the incident. during the investigation, the local inhabitants, as well as local military officers, were interviewed about apparent disturbances. furthermore, flückinger had paule disinterred, who was found “quite complete and undecayed, and that fresh blood had flowed from his eyes, nose, mouth, and ears; that the shirt, the covering, and the coffin were completely bloody.” moreover, the “old nails on his hands and feet, along with the skin had fallen off, and that new ones had grown.”47 following the presentation of flückinger’s report to the council of war in vienna, the details of flückinger’s findings quickly became widely known. in response, a wave of intellectual treatises on the subject followed as elite writers with the seeming implausibility of the incident.48 within calmet’s dissertations, flückinger’s report was heavily used to provide an archetypal example of vampirism. however, in flückinger’s original report, he never refers to vampirism. nevertheless, calmet utilized this terminology frequently when recounting paule’s previous experiences with a “turkish vampire” and the role of the justice of the village “who was skilled in vampirism.” in fact, after vividly describing the apparent appearance of paule’s corpse, calmet concluded that the investigators found all the signs of “an arch-vampire.” these key features for identifying a “vampire” were at the core of calmet’s discussion of the subject. conditional upon the veracity of these reports, calmet admitted that “the ghosts of hungary, moravia, and poland are not really dead … the blood, which is found in them being fine and red, the flexibility of their limbs … all prove that they still exist.”49 despite his consideration of numerous incidents of corpses remaining absent from decomposition as well as conceding to the possibility that these creatures exist, calmet remained highly skeptical of these claims. instead, calmet believed that the “suppleness of these vampires” can be attributed to “the vegetation of the human body,” which “may produce all these effects.”50 firstly, he argued that advances in science have taught physicians that “those who die without malady and a sudden death; or of certain maladies” can appear fluid and subtle for a time after death. furthermore, there remains “a certain slow and imperceptible circulation of the humors, which causes this growth of the nails and hair.”51 in fact, modern medicine has sided with calmet’s naturalistic explanations. since it was not unusual for corpses to be buried face-down, this would have resulted in the coagulation of the blood in the face and extremities. as a result, the deceased would appear to possess a ruddy and lively appearance. furthermore, since “dangerous corpses” were 47 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 182. 48 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 182. 49 calmet, the phantom world, 267. 50 calmet, the phantom world, 357. 51 calmet, the phantom world, 377. 63 disposed of with far greater urgency, these graves would likely have been much shallower. such was the haste with which some corpses were buried that “sometimes some are buried who are not quite dead … from fear of the infection they would cause.”52 consequently, there was a greater likelihood that the community would encounter the complex processes of decomposition, which they misinterpreted as vampirism.53 since vampires are only native to eastern europe, calmet suggested that perhaps its cold winters and soil allow the temporary preservation of the deceased in the earth. similar to those birds and fish who become frozen within lakes and rivers yet maintain vitality, calmet speculated that once the exhumed “vampire” is exposed to the sun or “laid in a room of temperate heat … they are seen to revive, and perform their ordinary functions, which had been suspended by the cold.”54 consequently, the deceased, who is mistaken for a vampire, would be given the appearance of vitality with the resumption of blood flow within the veins. therefore, the suspicions of the community about their affliction would appear to be confirmed. moreover, calmet asserted that there are “certain kinds of earth which will preserve dead bodies perfectly fresh” and allow “some augmentation in those parts which do not demand a vital spirit” like the hair and nails.55 to support this statement, calmet cited a contemporary french journal, the glaneur historique (historical gleaner; 1731-1732), which stated that certain particles within the soil can enter the blood and cause decoagulation when heated.56 in calmet’s opinion, these factors produced the apparent lifelike appearance of the would-be vampire. additionally, calmet addressed the assertion by orthodox christians that it was excommunication that prevented decomposition and eventually allowed for the reanimation of the deceased as a vrykolaka. calmet completely dismissed this idea (with some religious polemic) since the church schism would mean that “all the greeks towards the latins, and the latins towards the greeks, would be undecayed, which is not the case.” therefore, “we cannot maintain that all those who die in a state of excommunication, are incorruptible.” as a result, such claims are “very frivolous, and nothing can be concluded from it” and “the instances cited by the greeks either prove nothing, or prove too much.”57 in fact, calmet greatly mistrusted such stories, stating that “if well examined, many of them would doubtless be found to be false.”58 a thirst for blood after establishing the appearance and abilities of vampires, calmet turned to an examination of their behavior. according to local testimony and written letters from moravia and the hungarian lands in serbia, certain “persons who were dead … have been 52 calmet, the phantom world, 343. 53 barber, “forensic pathology and the european vampire,” 8. 54 calmet, the phantom world, 356. 55 calmet, the phantom world, 271-272. 56 this popular french journal can be found in publications de l'institut d'etudes françaises et occitanes de l'université d'utrecht [publications of the institute of french and occitan studies of the university of utrecht] 6 (1971). 57 calmet, the phantom world, 377-378. 58 calmet, the phantom world, 378. 64 seen to return … and torment men and animals, suck their blood, and cause their death.”59 once attacked, victims quickly develop anemia, eventually dying within a few days. although there existed “in the twelfth century in england and denmark, some revenants similar to those of hungary,” calmet found that within “no history do we read anything so usual or so pronounced, as what is related to us of the vampires of poland, hungary, and moravia.”60 through his research upon transylvania and moravia, calmet discovered that the peoples of these regions “believe that certain dead persons, whom they call vampires, suck all the blood from the living.”61 as a result, calmet would align his conception of a vampire with the features of the slavic strigoi. by doing this, calmet would assist in transforming the strigoi of slavic folklore into the vampire of the eighteenth century. while this theme runs throughout the incidents cited by calmet, it is best illustrated by the case of arnold paule. in the words of calmet, paule’s affliction first began after he was attacked by a “turkish vampire” upon the frontiers of serbia. consequently, paule succumbed to the same illness. soon afterwards, paule claimed several victims in the local community. while vampirism was not initially suspected, upon examination, it was found that these individuals had died “in the same manner in which according to the tradition of the country, those who die are molested by vampires.” although paule’s corpse was disinterred and destroyed, five years later, seventeen people within the community suddenly “died of vampirism.” upon these corpses the authorities reportedly found “the most evident signs of vampirism”—bite marks.62 although the arnold paule case was the most typical example of vampirism, calmet included in the dissertations numerous incidents where vampires reportedly sucked upon the blood of the living. these incidents, from which calmet built his investigation, were largely reported second-hand by western pamphlet literature and periodicals. one of the most important pamphlets was the mercure galent (mercury galant; 1693), which concerned stories of vampirism in poland and russia. 63 according to this text, which calmet reproduced, the revenant “goes by night to embrace and hug violently his near relations or his friends, and sucks their blood so much as to weaken and attenuate them, and at last cause their death.”64 following the attack, “a person finds himself attacked with languor, loses his appetite, grows visibly thinner and at the end of eight or ten days, sometimes a fortnight, dies, without fever, or any other symptom than thinness and drying of the blood.”65 calmet also provided a letter written to him that recounts the details of a lengthy military investigation into a hungarian count who, despite being deceased for thirty years, returned and “sucked the blood and caused the death of two of his sons.”66 furthermore, according to calmet, within a work entitled philosophical and christian 59 calmet, the phantom world, 252. 60 calmet, the phantom world, 244. 61 calmet, the phantom world, 265. 62 calmet, the phantom world, 265-266. 63 the mercure galent was a french gazette and magazine operating from the early seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries. it informed readers about fashion, luxury goods, and intellectual and artistic debates. 64 calmet, the phantom world, 273. 65 calmet, the phantom world, 276. 66 calmet, the phantom world, 263. 65 thoughts upon vampires, by john christopher herenberg (1733), it is stated that the people of slavonia believe vampires “to be the authors of the death of those whose blood they were said to suck.”67 additionally, calmet cited karl ferdinand von schertz’s magia posthuma (magic posthuma; 1704) for evidence of similar revenants in moravia who harmed the living.68 the discussion upon blood-sucking vampires is revealing of calmet’s methodology. calmet’s examination was based upon the study of contemporary journals, written reports, intellectual treatises, and periodicals on vampire superstitions, which he pieces together into a single compendium. far from being a “quack researcher,” calmet presented an empirical observation of the vampire phenomenon using the scientific and natural philosophical principles of his time. since calmet had to rely totally upon external testimony, he stated that he approached the subject “as a historian.” as a result, calmet evaluated each reported case on both internal evidence, such as witness testimony, and external evidence, which entailed the attempted reconciliation of incredulous claims with existing knowledge.69 the latter was particularly important in the eyes of “enlightenment” thinkers who were becoming increasingly critical of events that lay outside the accepted course of nature.70 nevertheless, calmet gave far greater weight to the value of testimonial evidence than was usual. consequently, after carefully considering all these various accounts of vampire attacks, calmet arrived at the conclusion that these attacks were the result of “epidemical fanaticism.”71 he wrote that when a man finds himself afflicted with “the least illness, he fancies that he is seized with the epidemical disease.” ultimately, this fear brings about the death of the individual rather than the affliction. in calmet’s view, a similar process was underway in relation to cases of vampirism. as stories spread within communities about apparent attacks and visitations, an internal revolution was brought about whereby people imagine themselves attacked by a vampire. once these pretended apparitions have occurred, they allow the “mind to be more vividly struck by them.”72 consequently, belief in vengeful vampires stalking the community spreads like an epidemic. one of calmet’s principal sources, known as the glaneur de hollande (dutch gleaner, 1733), espoused similar ideas, which basically mirror calmet’s conclusions.73 the glaneur de hollande compared vampirism to “the bite of a mad dog, which communicates its venom to the person who is bitten; thus, those who are infected by vampirism communicate this dangerous poison to those with whom they associate.” as a result, this disease produces “the wakefulness, dreams, and pretended apparitions of vampires.”74 since these creatures 67 calmet, the phantom world, 267. 68 this work is believed to be one of the earliest works upon vampire superstitions. however, the preservation of this work is not entirely clear. in most cases, when writers cited this work, they cited calmet’s quotations. 69 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 187. 70 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 187. 71 calmet, the phantom world, 270. 72 calmet, the phantom world, 271. 73 the glaneur de hollande was a franco-dutch newspaper that operated during the eighteenth century. this newspaper published many apparent cases of vampirism, including a translation of johann flückinger’s report. 74 calmet, the phantom world, 273. 66 were only known to hungary and moravia “where the people, being badly fed, are subject to certain disorders … and augmented by prejudice, fancy, and fright,” calmet concluded that these beliefs have their “foundation only in ridiculous prepossessions of the mind.”75 in this way, superstitious beliefs, represented by the “vampire epidemic,” were associated with the social conditions of eastern europe. within these territories, relatively isolated from the control of “civilized” western governments and church leadership, these superstitions were free to spread among the population, who were clearly seen as ignorant and simple, like a virulent disease. despite calmet’s dismissal of the phenomenon, he continued to include a vast array of evidence and testimony in its favor so that his precise views on the issue may well have escaped the attention of many readers. following his support of the arguments of the glaneur de hollande, calmet suddenly stated that “this phenomenon is too well averred for it to be doubted.”76 to illustrate this point, calmet included two letters that were communicated to him on the subject. in the first letter, the writer, who was the aide-decamp to prince alexander of württemberg, stated that he was part of a formal deputation sent by charles vi that investigated incidents of vampirism in serbia. to begin, the writer stated that “concerning vampires … nothing is more true or more certain than what he will doubtless have read about it in the deeds or attestations which have been made public and printed in all the gazettes in europe.”77 following this, the writer recounted their examination of local victims of vampirism, the bodies of suspected culprits, and the discovery and the destruction of the vampire. in relation to the vampire’s thirst for blood, the writer informed calmet that “at the place where these persons are sucked a very blue spot is formed.” in fact, this is “a notorious fact, attested by the most authentic documents, and passed or executed in sight of more than 1,300 persons, all worthy of belief.”78 in the second letter, an officer stationed in wallachia told calmet that he cannot be too circumspect on this issue, since “there are certain facts so well attested that one cannot help believing them.”79 during his deployment within those territories recently acquired from the treaty of passarowitz, the officer related numerous incidents where his troops were drained of life by undead spirits. these calamities were only ended after a corporal performed a series of local rituals. while several natural explanations could explain the experiences of catholic hungarian soldiers in these regions, whose culture and beliefs were totally alien to them, by the time these reports reached western audiences of gazettes and periodicals, we see how moravia, hungary, serbia, and romania are all part of some composite region of superstition to the western mind. to slay a demon as calmet examined the various cases of vampirism presented in the dissertations, a consensus among the local populations of these territories about how to destroy these revenants became visible. within popular folklore, it is apparently believed that only “by 75 calmet, the phantom world, 344. 76 calmet, the phantom world, 284. 77 calmet, the phantom world, 274. 78 calmet, the phantom world, 275. 79 calmet, the phantom world, 276. 67 exhuming them, impaling them, cutting off their heads, tearing out the heart, or burning them” can the visitations of a vampire be ended.80 consequently, when a corpse is found possessing the features of vampirism, “the people of those countries impale them, cut off their heads, burn them, to deprive their spirit of all hope of animating them again, and of making use of them to molest the living.”81 once these actions are taken, they “appear no more.”82 however, one must approach calmet’s assertion about what was “commonly believed” with great caution. ultimately, calmet had no personal experience of these cultures or local disturbances, which were highly sporadic and mostly occurred in remote rural areas or along borderlands. instead, calmet relied upon western periodicals and reports and letters from elite doctors and military officials to support his investigation. these regions were viewed by western travelers through the lens of western intellectualism, which shaped their perception of what they encountered. these perceptions were then reproduced for popular consumption by gazettes and periodicals in the west. as a result, calmet’s knowledge about local beliefs and practices only extended as far as the understanding of western travelers and reporters who witnessed them. in this way, calmet would assist in the creation and propagation of popular western ideas about the territories on the periphery of western europe. despite his reliance upon the opinions of western observers, calmet repeatedly raised examples of the process whereby vampires are destroyed by local communities. in particular, the work of the german author michael ranft, de masticatione mortuorum, mentioned previously, which dealt with incidents of vampirism in hungary and germany, was central to calmet’s efforts. ranft provided the details of the famous case of peter plogojovitz (blagojević) in the serbian lands, which has been discussed previously. ranft noted that upon the exhumation of blagojević’s corpse and the identification of various features of vampirism, the local officer “persuaded that he was the true cause of the death of their compatriots, ran directly for a sharp-pointed stake, which they thrust into his breast.” when this was done “the peasants placed the body on a pile of wood and saw it reduced to ashes.”83 additionally, calmet cited karl ferdinand von schertz’s magia posthuma, which stated that “the only remedy for these apparitions is to cut off the heads and burn the bodies of those who come back to haunt people.” furthermore, according to von schertz, witnesses were called before the law, their arguments were examined, and the body inspected for “any of the usual marks which lead them to conjecture that they are the parties who molest the living.”84 in the course of his investigation, calmet found that these practices first began among the “ancient northern nations” as those people “knew no remedy so proper to put a stop to this kind of apparition as to cut off the head of the dead person, or to impale him, or pierce him through the body with a stake, or to burn it.” subsequently, these practices spread so that they are “now practiced to this day in hungary and moravia with regard to vampires.”85 in the end, the emphasis placed upon the 80 calmet, the phantom world, 244. 81 calmet, the phantom world, 356. 82 calmet, the phantom world, 250. 83 calmet, the phantom world, 342. 84 calmet, the phantom world, 262. 85 calmet, the phantom world, 198. 68 destruction of the vampire’s body allows calmet to conclude that it is “very true and very real, that they appear in their own bodies.”86 the existence of vampires upon the culmination of his investigation, calmet concluded that vampires were “morally impossible.” firstly, existing theological and philosophical methods cannot be “rationally applied to the matter of apparitions or of vampires.” so long as we are not being duped, there can be other ways to “act on this question than to absolutely deny the return of these vampires.”87 furthermore, after consulting various letters sent to him and official documents received from vienna, including verbal acts drawn upon by the emperor regarding several incidents in moravia, calmet has “not found in them the shadow of truth, nor even of probability, in what is advanced.”88 consequently, where incidents of vampirism cannot be reconciled with existing knowledge, it must be concluded that they are the result of “stricken imaginations.” however, since “moral implausibility” was not absolute as we cannot fully understand creation, calmet allowed a slim possibility for the existence of vampires.89 the vast swathe of vampire reports emerging from eastern europe could not be dismissed as a collective delusion, since they were “made juridically, in proper form, and attested by several officers who were garrisoned in the country, by the chief surgeons of the regiments, and by the principal inhabitants of the place.” these certificates of authority give “a plain demonstration of the reality of the most absurd story.”90 therefore, it was only through thorough analysis that truth could be separated from superstition. the reception prior to undertaking the dissertations, calmet was acutely aware that such a task was likely to open himself up to criticism from both sides of the debate. on the one hand, those who believed in the existence of vampires “will accuse me of rashness and presumption, for having raised a doubt on the subject, or even of having denied their existence and reality.” on the other hand, intellectuals “will blame me for having employed my time in discussing this matter which is considered as frivolous and useless by many sensible people.”91 in fact, the contradictory and uncertain nature of the subject almost made calmet abandon the work.92 nonetheless, calmet believed that this was an important task, since superstitions can hold both falsities and truths.93 through intense examination, dubious beliefs could be shown to be true, false, or equivocal.94 therefore, the process of examination cannot be avoided, since it risks overlooking potential elements of god’s majesty. furthermore, it allows writers to dispel the dangers of superstition. 86 calmet, the phantom world, 253. 87 calmet, the phantom world, 361. 88 calmet, the phantom world, 377. 89 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 191. 90 calmet, the phantom world, 266-267. 91 calmet, the phantom world, 245. 92 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 183. 93 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 192-193. 94 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 192. 69 the intellectual response to calmet’s dissertations would be emblematic of the growing divide within the european intellectual tradition during the eighteenth-century “enlightenment.” while some intellectuals like jean-jacques rousseau, noting the tension between obvious implausibility and reliable testimony, would side with calmet’s conclusions, this work would come under scathing criticism from voltaire. while calmet believed that superstition should be understood, voltaire maintained that science should dismiss superstition without consideration.95 in this way, voltaire was among those who rejected the existence of vampirism as “chimerical, and as an effect of the prepossession and ignorance of the people of those countries, where they are said to come back or return.”96 in the eyes of this strain of “enlightenment” thinkers, only science could determine the boundaries of reality, not religion. anything that lay outside the limits of science resided in the domain of fantasy and error.97 furthermore, any testimony that spoke in favor of these fabulous beliefs should be rejected out of hand since they only encouraged superstition. to voltaire, calmet treated a subject seriously that did not belong as a matter of proper inquiry in the present age, concerned perhaps that reason appeared largely ineffectual in preventing the malicious spread of superstition. as a result, by reporting upon vampires so heavily, voltaire believed that calmet was helping to spread this superstitious disease.98 voltaire viewed calmet as having been duped by superstition. conclusion despite scathing criticism from the likes of voltaire, calmet’s dissertations proved to be a massive popular success in western europe.99 it did not take long for the dissertations to completely sell out.100 furthermore, calmet’s publication of the dissertations would result in him being inundated with countless letters, personal testimonies, military reports, and other treatises detailing different experiences with vampirism. due to the huge quantity of new material sent to him, calmet published a greatly expanded edition of the dissertations three years later. the second edition of the dissertations would include many of the letters, reports, and other writings sent to calmet. in many instances, these testimonies, in contrast to calmet’s intentions, spoke in favor of the existence of vampires. as a result, the intellectual consequences of this text were far from what calmet had intended. calmet’s extensive analysis and publicization of the characteristics of vampirism, which were placed within the context of reliable military and medical reports, had assisted in their solidification in the popular imagination. moreover, calmet’s attempts to create a singular, uniform entity out of a series of vastly different local beliefs helped to assist the believability of this phenomenon. consequently, calmet would assist in transforming the strigoi of slavic folklore into the archetypal vampire of the eighteenth century. therefore, 95 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 183. 96 calmet, the phantom world, 247. 97 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 196. 98 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 195. 99 an analysis of the immense popularity of the dissertations and its importance to late eighteenthand early nineteenth-century vampire literature can be found in marie-helène huet, “deadly fears: dom augustin’s vampires and the rule over death,” eighteenth-century life 21 (1997): 222–232. 100 huet, “deadly fears,” 222. 70 perhaps voltaire was correct when he condemned calmet’s discussion of the topic for spreading a disease while failing to offer any cure.101 the most significant consequence of calmet’s dissertations was its association of vampire superstitions with the regions of modern-day eastern europe, such as hungary, moravia, serbia, and romania. by focusing the existence of vampires on the european periphery, calmet contributed to the psychological alienation and barbarization of these territories. aside from its depiction as a rural and uncivilized expanse, the people of these regions were depicted as ignorant, uneducated, poorly nourished, and prone to ridiculous fancies. for these reasons, these peoples, who remained isolated from the catholic church, were shown to be easily duped by the most outrageous superstitions. the presentation of the experiences of western military officers and medical professionals in these territories further illustrated the psychological remoteness of this region. consequently, calmet’s investigation of the vampire phenomenon would assist in the creation of a popular perception of “eastern europe” as a realm of illusion and superstition. the territory of transylvania, which would become synonymous with superstitions about vampires and the supernatural, would suffer most from this fallout. one must only browse the contents of late nineteenth and twentieth century travel writings in transylvania to see these consequences.102 101 morris, “superstition, testimony, and the eighteenth-century vampire debates,” 196. 102 for a sample of nineteenthand early twentieth-century travel writers, see emily gerard, “transylvanian superstitions,” the nineteenth century 18 (1885): 130-150; and patrick leigh fermor, between the woods and the water: on foot to constantinople from the hook of holland: the middle danube to the iron gates (london: penguin, 1986). 91 die inszenierung des todes das funeralzeremoniell kaiser leopolds i. in vergleichender perspektive lennart katzenbach rheinische friedrich-wilhelms-universität bonn abstract dem funeralzeremoniell kaiser leopolds i. (†1705) wurde in der forschung bislang nur wenig aufmerksamkeit zuteil. dies nimmt die vorliegende untersuchung zum anlass, begräbnis und begängnis des kaisers ausführlich zu beschreiben und zu analysieren. dabei werden sterbeverhalten, der umgang mit dem leichnam und dessen bestattung, sowie die exequienfeiern mit ihrer ephemeren trauerarchitektur und der damit einhergehenden funeralpublizistik betrachtet. zuletzt erfolgt ein schlaglichtartiger vergleich des kaiserlichen sterbeund trauerzeremoniells mit seinem kurfürstlichen pendant für den ‘großen kurfürsten’ friedrich wilhelm von brandenburg (†1688). the funeral ceremonies of emperor leopold i (†1705) have received scant attention from scholars. the article offers a close description and analysis of the emperor's funeral and burial. special attention is paid to the final hours of the dying emperor, the handling of his body and burial, as well as the funeral ceremonies with its ephemeral architecture and accompanying funeral publications. finally, it compares the imperial funeral with its counterpart for the “great elector” frederick william of brandenburg (†1688). article der blick in frühneuzeitliche zeremonialkompendien zeigt, dass den begräbnissen und begängnissen1 der herrscher im alten reich große bedeutung beikam.2 entgegen der von den zeitgenossen offenbar empfundenen bedeutung dieser zeremoniellen großereignisse, hat die historische forschung sich dem bisher kaum gewidmet.3 eine besondere lücke dieser aufsatz beruht auf meiner bachelorarbeit “inszenierungen des todes: eine vergleichende untersuchung zu kurfürst friedrich wilhelm von brandenburg und kaiser leopold i.”, die ich im wintersemester 2020/21 an der rheinischen friedrich-wilhelms-universität bonn eingereicht habe. 1 das begriffspaar begräbnis und begängnis bezeichnet die bestattung und die darauffolgenden leichenfeierlichkeiten, wenn bestattung und leichenfeier voneinander getrennt stattfinden. in den quellen werden die begriffe aber oft synonym gebraucht. 2 vgl. beispielswiese friedrich carl von moser, teutsches hof-recht, vol. 1 (frankfurt/leipzig: verlag der knochund eßlingerischen buchhandlung, 1761), 377-496; julius bernhard von rohr, einleitung zur ceremoniel-wissenschafft der großen herren… (berlin: johann andreas rüdiger, 1733), 272-338. 3 so auch linda brüggemann, herrschaft und tod in der frühen neuzeit: das sterbeund begräbniszeremoniell preußischer herrscher vom großen kurfürsten bis zu friedrich wilhelm ii. (1688-1797) (münchen: utz, 2015). konkrete untersuchungen liegen bisher vor allem zu kleineren höfen vor, beispielsweise jill bepler, “das trauerzeremoniell an den höfen hessens und thüringens in der ersten hälfte des 17. jahrhunderts,” in frühneuzeitliche hofkultur in hessen und thüringen, eds. jörg jochen berns and detlef ignasiak (erlangen: 92 stellt dabei der habsburgische kaiser leopold i. (†1705) dar. in den wenigen werken, die über ihn vorliegen, werden sterben und tod nicht genauer betrachtet, publikationen über habsburgische begräbnisse handeln ihn meist mit wenigen sätzen ab, da eine ausführliche untersuchung dessen bislang schlichtweg fehlt.4 darüber hinaus sind vor allem ungedruckte quellen bislang nur in einzelfällen herangezogen worden. eine nähere untersuchung des funeralzeremoniells leopolds i. wird zusätzlich durch die insgesamt lückenhafte forschungsund literaturlage zum wiener hof zu seiner zeit erschwert.5 die wichtigste quelle zu begräbnis und begängnis leopolds i. ist der ausführliche bericht in einer kurz nach seinem tod erschienen biographie von eucharius gottlieb rink.6 dieser text stellt auch in der literatur die grundlage der betrachtung des funeralzeremoniells dar, jedoch in der von johann christian lünig fast textgleich übernommenen fassung.7 da die version rinks älter ist, wird sie hier verwendet. woher dieser seine informationen bezog ist bisher unklar, textliche vorläufer sind aber zu vermuten. bevor es um die begräbnisund begängnisfeierlichkeiten leopolds geht, folgt eine kurze einführung in die historischen grundlagen der dortigen zeremonien, um dann das potential einer vergleichenden betrachtung hochfürstlichen funeralzeremoniells im alten reich anhand eines beispiels zu erörtern. die sterbeund begräbniskultur katholischer herrscher bis zum beginn des 18. jahrhunderts das katholische sterbeverhalten zu beginn des 18. jahrhunderts stand noch ganz im zeichen der bereits im mittelalter entstandenen und etablierten ideale der ars moriendi, die als vorstellungen eines ‘guten todes’ oder ‘guten sterbens’ bereits im 15. jahrhundert einen gipfel der ausdifferenzierung erreichten.8 neben dem durch verhaltensnormen geregelten individuellen verhalten des sterbenden, gestand die katholische lehre im zeichen des ‘fegefeuers’, einer temporären, postmortalen bestrafungsinstanz, auch allen anderen glaubensgenossinnen und -genossen wirkmacht auf das ergehen des moribunden palm & enke, 1993), 249-265; helga czerny, der tod der bayerischen herzöge im spätmittelalter und in der frühen neuzeit 1347-1579: vorbereitungen – sterben – trauerfeierlichkeiten – grablegen – memoria (münchen: beck, 2005). 4 magdalena hawlik-van de water hat zwar einige arbeiten zu begräbnis und begängnis der habsburger in der frühen neuzeit, besonders leopolds i., vorgelegt, diese bedürfen jedoch dringend methodischer wie inhaltlicher aktualisierung. vgl. v.a. magdalena hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod: zeremonialstrukturen des wiener hofes bei tod und begräbnis zwischen 1640 und 1740 (wien: herder, 1989). 5 die feststellung stefan sienelles aus dem jahre 2001, wonach der wiener hof in seinen inneren verhältnissen besonders schlecht erforscht ist, muss sicherlich mittlerweile relativiert werden, hat aber im hinblick auf den tod leopolds bis heute gültigkeit, vgl. stefan sienell, “die wiener hofstaate zur zeit leopolds i.,” in hofgesellschaft und höflinge an europäischen fürstenhöfen in der frühen neuzeit (15.-18. jh.), ed. klaus malettke (münster: lit, 2001), 89. 6 eucharius gottlieb rink, leopolds des grossen/ röm. käysers/ wunderwürdiges leben und thaten, aus geheimen nachrichten eröffnet…, vol. 4 [leipzig: 1709], http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12bsb10047720-0 (6.10.2020). 7 johann christian lünig, theatrum ceremoniale historico-politicum, oder historischund politischer schauplatz aller ceremonien…, vol. 2 (leipzig: moritz georg weidmann, 1720), http://mdz-nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10869245-8 (18.10.2020). 8 peter dinzelbacher, “mittelalter,” in europäische mentalitätsgeschichte: hauptthemen in einzeldarstellungen, ed. peter dinzelbacher (stuttgart: kröner, 1993), 245. 93 zu. an die stelle der definitiven optionen ‘himmel’ und ‘hölle’ trat damit eine dritte, in ihrer dauer von sterbenden und begleitenden beeinflussbare option hinzu. so erklären sich die zahlreichen liturgischen handlungen und symbole im direkten und indirekten umfeld, das heißt im ganzen herrschaftsgebiet des sterbenden kaisers, die seine aufnahme ins ewige leben nach christlichem glauben erwirken wollten.9 für das herrscherliche sterben, das gleichzeitig vor dem höfischen publikum am ort selbst und, durch die verbreitung textlicher und bildlicher beschreibungen, in einer überzeitlichen und vergleichenden öffentlichkeit stattfand, war die normkonformität des todes ein zu erbringender beweis für die gottgefälligkeit des herrschers, die eine wesentliche grundlage der legitimität seiner herrschaft darstellte. ein bruch der sterbenormen wäre also einer legitimitätskrise der herrschaft als ganze gleichgekommen.10 da die sterbeideale und diesbezüglichen verhaltensnormen über soziale schichten hinweg galten und praktiziert wurden, setzten sich herrscher durch besonders exzellentes sterben, die einbeziehung besonders hoher geistlicher und weltlicher amtsträger und – speziell im falle des kaisers – durch die präsenz einzigartiger reliquien ab.11 angesichts des herrschenden normdrucks weisen die berichte von herrscherlichem sterben über lange zeit hinweg nur eine geringe varianz auf. dadurch drängt sich einerseits die vermutung auf, dass die berichte entlang des idealverlaufs des sterbevorgangs gewebt wurden, um die normkonformität – ob vorhanden oder nicht – nachträglich zu bescheinigen, andererseits liegt aber auch nahe: “wer wußte, wie man sterben sollte, bemühte sich, so zu sterben”.12 dass die sicherlich oft ausgeschmückten berichte im kern zutreffen, ist demnach nicht unwahrscheinlich. die abstrakten ideale des sterbens kamen bei fürstlichen todesfällen mit einem konkreten bedürfnis nach weltlicher repräsentation zusammen, das auf dem totenbett keineswegs endete. so kristallisierten sich an einzelnen höfen spezifische zeremonielle formen des umgangs mit dem tod eines herrschers heraus, die eigene traditionen formten. der englische königshof pflegte bereits im 12. jahrhundert ein charakteristisches 9 vgl. zur bedeutung des ‘fegefeuers’ cornell babendererde, sterben, tod, begräbnis und liturgisches gedächtnis bei weltlichen reichsfürsten des spätmittelalters (ostfildern: thorbecke, 2006), 9-10. 10 günther schulz-bourmer, “repräsentation und präsenz des todes an der schwelle vom mittelalter zur frühen neuzeit,” in der tod des mächtigen. kult und kultur des todes spätmittelalterlicher herrscher, ed. lothar kolmer (paderborn et. al.: schöningh, 1997), 363. 11 hans martin schaller, “der kaiser stirbt,” in tod im mittelalter, 2nd ed., ed. arno borst, (konstanz: universitäts-verlag, 1995), 60-61. lünig, theatrum ceremoniale, 552 beschreibt das problem der prinzipiellen gleichheit vor dem tod und den umgang der herrscher damit: “so grosse mühe sich die hohen in der welt geben, ihre freude und vergnügen über die geburth der ihrigen der gantzen welt und sonderlich ihren unterthanen durch eclatante merkmahle bekannt zu machen, mit eben so viel fleiß und emsigkeit suchen sie auch ihr betrübnis über den tod und verlust der ihrigen auszudrücken, und dadurch ihre hochachtung gegen dieselbe an den tag zu legen, auch sie im tode, den sie anderen menschen gemein haben, von denselben zu distinguiren”. 12 werner friedrich kümmel, “der sanfte und selige tod: verklärung und wirklichkeit des sterbens im spiegel lutherischer leichenpredigten des 16. bis 18. jahrhunderts,” in leichenpredigten als quelle historischer wissenschaften, vol. 3, ed. rudolf lenz (stuttgart: steiner, 1984), 201. 94 funeralzeremoniell.13 in frankreich fand ein kult um das effigie, das abbild des toten königs, statt, der diesen stellvertreter fast wie eine lebende person behandelte.14 im alten reich des spätmittelalters dagegen entwickelte sich ein zielgerichteter, nach organisatorischen kriterien funktionierender umgang mit dem tod und den toten, in welchem die körper verstorbener herrscher lediglich nach zeremonieller notwendigkeit konserviert wurden.15 praktiken, die mit dem französischen effigiekult vergleichbar wären, etablierten sich hier nicht. auch deutsche fürstenhöfe blickten am ende des mittelalters vielfach schon auf eine lange tradition eigener sepulkralkultur zurück.16 den römischdeutschen königen und kaisern ermöglichte erst das ende des wanderkönig beziehungsweise -kaisertums die ausdifferenzierung eines sich lokal entfaltenden trauerzeremoniells. darin liegt ein spezifischer unterschied zwischen den meist habsburgischen kaisern der frühen neuzeit und anderen, besonders den älteren reichsfürsten. wie schon die geistlichen ideale des zeremoniellen sterbens, bildeten sich auch dessen weltlich-repräsentative komponenten größtenteils bereits im mittelalter heraus. die aufbahrung, der erste höhepunkt im leichenzeremoniell, wurde schon im 12. jahrhundert zu einem öffentlichen anlass.17 der zeremonielle fixpunkt mit entsprechender möglichkeit zur repräsentativen ausgestaltung war das paradebett.18 wie im leben, spiegelte sich der status des verstorbenen auch nach seinem tod in seiner kleidung wider. durch besonders prachtvolle totenkleider konnten symbolisches und finanzielles kapital demonstriert werden.19 einfache kleidung dagegen drückte demut und frömmigkeit aus – im hinblick auf die christliche vormoderne nicht zu unterschätzende werte. schon am ende des mittelalters begann eine konzentration des funeralzeremoniells auf diese beiden pole: einerseits demutsbekundung bis hin zur geißelung des leichnams, andererseits höchste prachtentfaltung in zeremonien und grabmonumenten.20 möglich wurde die voneinander getrennte zurschaustellung mehrerer facetten des toten körpers durch repräsentationsobjekte wie effigies oder scheinsärge. der leichnam konnte schon bestattet, der tote in den späteren leichenfeiern aber noch symbolisch präsent sein, auch an mehreren orten gleichzeitig. so auch bei den zeremoniellen höhepunkten katholischer fürstenbegräbnisse, den exequienmessen, die, wie bei leopold, nicht praesente cadavere, sondern nach der 13 wolfgang brückner, bildnis und brauch: studien zur bildfunktion der effigies (berlin: schmidt, 1966), 37. 14 ralph e. giesey, the royal funeral ceremony in renaissance france (geneva: droz, 1960), 5-6. 15 babendererde, sterben, tod, begräbnis, 103-104. 16 vgl. dazu exemplarisch die umfangreiche arbeit von helga czerny, der tod der bayerischen herzöge. 17 gabriele woll, “pompe funèbre – machtrepräsentation im leichenzeremoniell,” in tod und gesellschaft – tod im wandel, eds. christoph daxelmüller and ines amann (regensburg: schnell und steiner, 1996), 59. 18 brückner, bildnis und brauch, 40. 19 beatrix bastl, “die bekleidung der lebenden und der toten: memoria, soziale identität und aristokratischer habitus im frühneuzeitlichen habsburgerreich,” wiener geschichtsblätter 55, no. 3 (2000): 114. 20 ein beispiel hierfür ist maximilian i., der sich nach seinem tod die zähne herausbrechen und den körper geißeln, andererseits aber in innsbruck ein monumentales grabdenkmal errichten ließ, vgl. schulz-bourmer, “repräsentation und präsenz,” 366. 95 bestattung stattfanden. diese meist dreitägigen begängnisfeiern fanden erst einige zeit nach dem tod statt, boten also ausreichend vorbereitungszeit um den im vergleich zu den kurz nach dem tod stattfindenden bestattung deutlich erhöhten zeremoniellen aufwand zu bewerkstelligen. die trennung des solennen leichenbegängnisses von der bestattung ermöglichte es, den herrscherlichen leichnam in einem dezidiert trauernden modus beizusetzen, während die darauffolgenden exequienfeiern ganz der verherrlichung der herrscherlichen maiesteas dienten.21 bei der beschreibung dieses sachverhalts schwingt in der forschung oft direkt oder indirekt die theorie der “zwei körper des königs” von ernst kantorowicz mit. sie widmet sich der frage, wie eine mittelalterliche gemeinschaft mit dem tod ihres “haupts” umging. ausgangspunkt der hier relevanten überlegung ist die figur des “rex qui nunquam moritur, eines königs, der »nie stirbt«”.22 dessen “perpetuität” bestehe durch die ununterbrochene dynastische nachfolge auf seiten des individuums und den fortbestand des beherrschten kollektivs.23 davon ausgehend kann ein leichenzeremoniell in rituale und zeremonien für den natürlichen körper des verstorbenen herrschers und solche für die herrschaft selbst unterteilt werden. kantorowiczs überlegungen gehen von “fiktionen” aus,24 die zum beispiel im französischen umgang mit den königlichen effigies zu handlungen führten, die ohne ein bewusstsein für die dahinterstehenden “fiktionen” nicht zu verstehen seien. solche extremen symbolhandlungen kennt das wiener funeralzeremoniell nicht. die unterscheidung zwischen einem natürlichen körper des herrschers und dessen politischer komponente ist nichtsdestoweniger besonders für die untersuchung des wiener zeremoniells wichtig. es ist aber zielführender, dabei von der “herrschaft” oder “maiestas” des kaisers in abgrenzung zu dessen sterblichen überresten zu sprechen. diese weniger strikten bezeichnungen lassen raum für historische abweichungen. gerade im bereich des “politischen körpers” läuft der bezug auf kantorowicz gefahr, beliebig zu werden. klar ist, dass es auch im hier behandelten fall um einen toten körper geht, dessen herrscherliche würde intakt auf seinen nachfolger zu übertragen war, doch von einer spezifischen “fiktion”, welche die “kontinuität des ganzen »politischen körpers«”25 hätte sichern müssen, kann am ende des 17. jahrhunderts schlicht keine rede mehr sein. vielmehr ging die aufgabe der kontinuitätsdemonstration auf das zeremoniell über. ein weiterer, vor allem katholischer brauch war die mehrfachbestattung. aus der notwendigkeit, bei den kreuzzügen des mittelalters die sterblichen überreste der kreuzfahrer transportfähig und verwesungsbeständig zu machen, entwickelte sich im europäischen hochadel die tradition der mehrfachbestattung als ehrenzeichen.26 trotz eines verbots der mehrfachbestattung durch papst bonifaz viii. 1299/1300 ließ sich der europäische adel während der kreuzzüge und darüber hinaus nicht mehr von dieser sitte 21 michael brix, “trauergerüste für die habsburger in wien,” wiener jahrbuch für kunstgeschichte 26 (1973): 219. 22 ernst h. kantorowicz, die zwei körper des königs: eine studie zur politischen theologie des mittelalters, trans. walter theimer and brigitte hellmann (münchen: deutscher taschenbuch verlag, 1990), 319. 23 kantorowicz, die zwei körper, 381. 24 kantorowicz, die zwei körper, 317. 25 kantorowicz, die zwei körper, 338. 26 hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 81-82. 96 abbringen.27 die verbreitetste form der mehrfachbestattung, die im 17. jahrhundert zu einem üblichen brauch katholischer regenten wurde, war die herzbestattung. deren exponenten im reich waren, neben den wittelsbachern, die habsburger.28 begräbnis und begängnis kaiser leopolds i. die vorbereitung auf den tod des kaisers als kaiser leopold i. am 5. mai 1705 in der wiener hofburg starb, lag eine außergewöhnlich lange und bewegte regierungszeit hinter ihm. ferdinand bonaventura von harrach, der kaiserliche oberst-hofmeister, hielt in seinen aufzeichnungen die letzten tage leopolds fest.29 am 17. april 1705 begann sich der zustand des kaisers sichtlich zu verschlechtern.30 die aktiven vorbereitungen, und damit wohl auch die klarheit über das baldige ableben des monarchen, fielen jedoch erst in die letzte aprilwoche. am 24. april fand eine konferenz statt, um das testament des kaisers zu besprechen, welches er am 26. april in seiner letztgültigen fassung unterschrieb.31 in der vorhergehenden nacht litt leopold unter kurzatmigkeit, befürchtete gar zu ersticken. spätestens damit setzten die spezifischen liturgischen ritualhandlungen ein, mit der die gemeinde und ihre vorsteher den sterbenden, in ihrem verständnis, vom leben in den tod begleiteten. beispielsweise wurden geistliche angewiesen, ihre gemeinden zum gebet für den kaiser aufzufordern.32 als der kaiser immer schwächer wurde, übergab er am 28. april die regierungsgeschäfte an seinen sohn josef.33 zu diesem zeitpunkt fanden schon überall im reich bittgottesdienste für den sterbenden statt.34 das schlafzimmer des herrschers wurde sukzessive in ein sterbezimmer umgewandelt, auf dem altar des zimmers wurden kostbare reliquien positioniert: blut christi, ein dorn aus dessen krone, ein kreuznagel, und andere, nicht explizit genannte.35 der 5. mai, der todestag leopolds, war geprägt von abschiednahme und letzten liturgischen ritualen. angesichts des nahenden todes habe er sich von der welt abgewandt 27 brückner, bildnis und brauch, 29. 28 walter michel, “herzbestattungen und herzkult des 17. jahrhunderts,” archiv für mittelrheinische kirchengeschichte 23 (1971): 121. 29 der bericht von harrachs ist auszugsweise abgedruckt bei ferdinand menčik, “die letzten tage kaiser leopolds i.,” mitteilungen des instituts für österreichische geschichtsforschung 19, no. 3 (1898): 518-520. 30 aufzeichnungen von harrachs, as cited in menčik, “die letzten tage,” 518. 31 john p. spielman, leopold i.: zur macht nicht geboren, trans. gerald and uta szyszkowitz (graz, vienna and cologne: styria, 1981), 185. das testament ist abgedruckt bei ferdinand fournier, “zur entstehung der pragmatischen sanktion kaiser karls vi.,” historische zeitschrift 38 (1877): 16-47. 32 “undt ware die forcht so gross, das man in alle kanczlen geschükt, umb vor i. k. m. zu betten”, aufzeichnungen von harrachs, as cited in menčik, “die letzten tage,” 519. der bischof von wien beispielsweise hielt ein vierzigstündiges gebet in st. stephan ab, der stadtrat ordnete feste gebetsstunden an, denen bürgerschaft und zünfte beizuwohnen verpflichtet waren, vgl. rink, leopolds des grossen, 1581-1583. 33 johann adam schenckhel, vollständiges lebens-diarium deß allerdurchleüchtigsten großmächtigst… (vienna: anna rosina sischowitz, 1702), 39. 34 hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 49. 35 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1593. bei rouven pons, „wo der gekrönte löw seinen kayser-sitz“: herrschaftsrepräsentation am wiener kaiserhof zur zeit leopolds i. (egelsbach: hänsel-hohenhausen, 2001), 138, abweichend ein kreuzpartikel statt einem nagel. 97 und sein schicksal ostensiv in die hand gottes gegeben.36 im zimmer wurden stetig messen gelesen, auch verabschiedete sich der kaiser mehrfach von seiner frau, kaiserin eleonore magdalena, und seinen kindern, besonders seinem nachfolger josef, mit dem er eine längere und geheime unterredung, vermutlich politischen inhalts, führte.37 er segnete seine kinder und enkelkinder, den abwesenden karl iii. von spanien, später kaiser karl vi., mittels eines portraits.38 als eleonore magdalena, die am bett des kaisers wachte, unregelmäßigkeiten im atem ihres gemahls feststellte, rief sie dessen leibarzt, der wiederum nach dem beichtvater schickte. dominicus du bois, kanonikus an st. stephan und ältester hofkaplan des kaisers, gab die letzte ölung.39 die darauffolgende beschreibung bei rink steht ganz im zeichen der ars moriendi: wobey der käyser alles, was man sonsten bey administrirung dieses sacraments [der letzten ölung] dem betenden priester zu antworten pflegt/ gantz deutlich/ und mit höchster andacht/ zu iedermänniglicher verwunderung/ massen dieselbe auch/ biß zu selbigster auslassung dero geheiligten seele/ bey höchster vernunfft geblieben/ selbsten nachgebetet.40 die vernunft des kaisers, dessen aufmerksamkeit bis zum letzten, lobt rink explizit, und beschreibt ihn als – zur allgemeinen verwunderung – herausragend selbst im tod. hier zeigt sich, was lünig meint, wenn er vom versuch der “hohen in der welt” berichtet, sich trotz der prinzipiell nivellierenden wirkung des todes abzuheben.41 die frage des beichtvaters, ob leopold ihn verstehe, habe dieser eindeutig bejaht: “intelligitne vestra majestas quae dico?”, “ita, mi pater”. auch dieser geradezu sinnbildliche wortwechsel muss vor dem hintergrund des ideals des sterbens bei klarem verstand gesehen werden. unter den worten des beichtvaters, “in manus tuas domine, commendo spiritum meum”, “in deine hände herr, gebe ich meinen geist,” und “moriatur anima mea morte justorum”, “meine seele sterbe den tod des gerechten,” starb der kaiser um 15:45 uhr.42 eingeleitet mit “man hat angemercket”, überliefern rink und lünig in textlicher übereinstimmung einige weitere fragmentarische berichte aus dem sterbezimmer des monarchen. die letzten worte des kaisers hätten “domine memento mei […] und consumatum est”, “der herr gedenke meiner”, in anlehnung an die worte eines der mit 36 “sich in den willen des allerhöchsten völlig ergeben/ seine gedancken und gemüth von diesen vergänglichen welt-sachen gäntzlich ab/ und zu gott mit inbrünstigem hertzen und vertrauen gewendet”, rink, leopolds des grossen, 1584. 37 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1585. 38 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1591. 39 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1587 und lünig, theatrum ceremoniale, 663 merken wortgleich an, dass antonius sances, “ceremoniarius und hof-pfarrherr”, “unpäßlich war”. ob dieser hinweis als entschuldigung für sances‘ von den zeitgenossen festgestellte abwesenheit diente, oder als dezenter hinweis auf eine im restlichen bericht seltene ungereimtheit zu verstehen ist, bleibt offen. 40 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1587. 41 vgl. anm. 11. 42 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1588. 98 jesu gekreuzigten (luk 23,42), und “es ist vollbracht”, die letzten worte jesu nach dem johannesevangelium (joh 19,30), gelautet. beides sind eindeutige bezüge auf den tod jesu. außerdem habe er das kreuz in händen gehabt, das zum bedrängten ferdinand ii. gesprochen haben soll “ferdinande non te deseram”, “ferdinand, fürchte dich nicht.”43 diese erzählung, zusätzlich zu den reliquien und den überlieferten letzten worten, setzt ihn in eine tradition habsburgischer gottesnähe und -gefälligkeit. immer wieder habe der sterbende kaiser gesagt: “a te sceptrum & coronam accepi, ad tuos pedes ea hodie iterum depono”, “von dir [herr] habe ich zepter und krone erhalten, zu deinen füßen lege ich sie heute wiederum.”44 gewissermaßen als letzte devotionsgeste vor seinem gott, dem entgegenzutreten er ja unmittelbar erwartete, habe leopold in seiner letzten, auf latein abgehaltenen beichte nicht mehr als majestät angesprochen werden wollen.45 derlei demuts-, frömmigkeitsund gerechtigkeitsbezeugungen folgen noch einige in den berichten. bezogen auf die ideale des ‘guten sterbens’ in der frühen neuzeit starb der kaiser den sprichwörtlichen ‘tod des gerechten’. welche der bei rink beschriebenen geschehnisse tatsächlich so stattfanden ist nicht mehr zu klären – so viel kann der sterbenskranke kaiser kaum auf einmal getan, gesagt und bezeugt haben. inwieweit sie überhaupt der wahrheit entsprechen, ist fraglich. bewusstlosigkeit oder verwirrung hätten die erinnerung an leopold jedenfalls mit einem schweren makel versehen. indem dieser ideale bericht einstimmig der überlieferung übergeben wurde, dienten alle beteiligten der memoria des toten kaisers, die auch ihnen, als beteiligte, statusgewinn versprach. vor diesem hintergrund wäre es von großem interesse zu wissen, woher die von rink überlieferten informationen stammen. die parade und die vorbereitung von trauer und begräbnis nach dem tod seines vaters empfing der neue kaiser zuerst seine mutter, die ihn bei dieser gelegenheit mit dem prädikat “majestät” ansprach. damit wurde er erstmals innerhalb der familie als deren oberhaupt bezeichnet. um die anstehende bestattung zu planen, damit sie angemessen vonstattengehe, ward geheimer rath darüber gehalten/ in welchem noch des höchst seeligen käysers obrist-hoffmeister/ der graff von harrach präsidirte/ weil dieses eine sache/ so gleichsam noch das vorige governo betraff/ wie dann auch hierauff alles nach gewöhnlicher oestereichischen etiquette veranstaltet wurde.46 43 vgl. zum kreuz ferdinands ii. hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 48. 44 diese anekdote nimmt frank huss, der wiener kaiserhof: eine kulturgeschichte von leopold i. bis leopold ii. (gernsbach: katz, 2008), 42 offenbar wörtlich, wenn er schreibt, der kaiser habe kurz vor seinem tod zepter und krone einem kruzifix zu füßen gelegt. 45 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1589-1590. 46 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1592. lünig, theatrum ceremoniale, 664 übernimmt den text so, bis auf den zusatz “oestereichischen”, den er ohne erkennbaren grund auslässt. auch “geheimer rath” ist in der bedeutung unklar. eine sitzung der geheimen konferenz leopolds, die der hinweis auf die zugehörigkeit dieser besprechung zur alten regierung nahelegt, ist für stefan sienell, die geheime konferenz unter kaiser leopold i.: personelle strukturen und methoden zur politischen entscheidungsfindung am wiener hof (frankfurt am main et al.: lang, 2001), 360 nicht nachweisbar. 99 offenbar begreift rink die “beerdigung dieser hohen leiche”47 als eine angelegenheit der vorherigen regierung. das ist eine erstaunliche, aber in ihrer bedeutung schwer einzuordnende feststellung. die formulierung lässt die möglichkeit offen, dass nur das begräbnis gemeint ist, nicht das begängnis. insgesamt hatte der nachfolger einen eher geringen einfluss auf das bereits nach kurzer zeit stattfindende begräbnis. er wurde nur einbezogen, wenn fragen auftaten, deren beantwortung vom herkommen nicht abgedeckt waren.48 die genauen zuständigkeiten sind von der forschung bislang nicht geklärt. bald danach begannen die umbauarbeiten in der hofburg um die trauer vorzubereiten. dazu gehörte nicht nur die rückführung der ins sterbezimmer gebrachten reliquien in die schatzkammer, sondern auch die sammlung und sicherung aller schriftstücke und wertgegenstände aus den zimmern des kaisers, um sie in truhen einzuschließen. auch die zimmer selbst wurden verschlossen. die tapeten in der ritterstube und den anderen kaiserlichen und königlichen zimmern wurden schwarz verhangen. außerdem wurde eine wachordnung für den leichnam festgelegt. tag und nacht umgaben ihn vier augustinerbarfüßer und lasen totenmessen, zwei kammerherren, ein kammerdiener und zwei hofkapläne wachten stets neben dem toten.49 am nächsten morgen, dem 6. mai, wurde die benachrichtigung der europäischen höfe über den tod des kaisers und die einleitung der trauer angeordnet.50 am nachmittag dieses tages wurde der leichnam des kaisers im beisein einiger hofadliger von sechs leibärzten und drei “leib-barbieren”, hier gleichbedeutend mit chirurgen,51 geöffnet. nach feststellung der todesursache und entnahme der organe wurde der körper einfach konserviert,52 angekleidet und in die ritterstube getragen. begleitet wurde der kleine trauerzug vom kaiserlichen oberst-kämmerer, einigen hofkaplänen und vier augustinerbarfüßern, die liturgische handlungen vollzogen.53 dort angekommen wurde der leichnam auf einer dreistufigen, von brennenden wachskerzen umgebenen bühne, die mit kostbaren stoffen überzogen und mit einem schwarzen baldachin überdacht war, zur parade hergerichtet.54 er trug ein schwarzseidenes spanisches mantelkleid mit hut und perücke, wie schon seine vorgänger ferdinand iii. und ferdinand iv.55 vor den füßen stand ein silbernes kreuz neben einem kleinen behältnis mit weihwasser. zur rechten lagen auf einem goldenen kissen die kaiserkrone, der reichsapfel, das zepter und der orden zum goldenen vlies. linker hand lagen, ebenfalls auf einem goldenen kissen, die böhmische und die ungarische krone.56 (fig. 1) an den vier altären in der ritterstube 47 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1592. 48 zu dieser einschätzung kommt hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 60. 49 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1592-1593. 50 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1596. 51 vgl. zur genese der berufsbezeichnungen sabine sander, “bader,” in enzyklopädie der neuzeit online, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_com_243636 (05.12.2020). 52 magdalena hawlik-van de water, “das einbalsamieren und die herzbestattung,” in triumph des todes?, ed. gerda mraz (eisenstadt: museum österreichischer kultur, 1992), 135. 53 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1596-1597. 54 wiennerisches diarium 184 (1705). 55 hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 92, vgl. auch wiennerisches diarium 184 (1705), das zusätzlich von einem degen berichtet. 56 dabei handelte es sich höchstwahrscheinlich um funeralinsignien, also materiell wertlose repliken zur symbolischen repräsentation der würden für die die insignien standen. die bei leopold verwendeten 100 hielten die höchsten geistlichen der stadt vom frühen morgen bis zum mittag messen ab. zwischen 10 und 11 uhr morgens und von 6 bis 7 uhr abends sangen die kaiserlichen hofmusiker choraliter den psalm miserere mei deus (ps 51). all diese liturgische nachsorge diente der sicheren ankunft des verstorbenen in der gnade gottes. die wache während der dreitätigen parade hielten sowohl hofadlige als auch kleriker, allerdings ergänzt durch militärische wachposten in und vor der ritterstube, schließlich war das paradezimmer öffentlich zugänglich.57 fig. 1: johann christian marchand, vorstellung der höchst selig-verblichenen majestät des aller durchleuchtigsten röm. kaysers leopold i…, nürnberg 1705, herzog august bibliothek wolfenbüttel, portr. iii 408.12, http://portraits.hab.de/werk/28579/ (02.08.2021), ausschnitt. funeralinsignien sind vermutlich nicht erhalten, vgl. hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 128-129. für gewöhnlich lagen die ranghöchsten insignien bei fürstlichen leichenparaden zu kopfe des leichnams und zur rechten, verhältnismäßig rangniederere insignien lagen zur linken und zu füßen, vgl. moser, teutsches hofrecht, 413. bei leopold gilt aber eher der hinweis von rohr, einleitung zur ceremoniel-wissenschafft, 282: “die fürstlichen insignia […] liegen nach den regeln der kunst nicht weit davon auf eine solche weise, wie es am besten in die augen fällt, und die größte parade macht.” dadurch entsteht wiederum aus kreuz und insignien ein ensemble, das dem topos der rückgabe der von gott empfangenen würden an ebendiesen entspricht. 57 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1598-1599. wer genau zugang hatte ist nicht bekannt. http://portraits.hab.de/werk/28579/ 101 die bestattungen und der prunksarkophag samstag, der 9. mai 1705 wurde als tag für die bestattung festgesetzt. gegen 13 uhr wurde der leichnam mitsamt hut, degen und kleinem toison um den hals in einen mit rotem samt ausgekleideten sarg gelegt. dann verschloss der ober-kammerfourier den sarg mit zwei vorhängeschlössern und übergab die schlüssel dem oberst-kämmerer. schließlich wurde der mit schwarzem samt überzogene sarg mit einem von den karmeliterbarfüßerinnen ausgeliehenen, nur dafür verwendeten bahrtuch bedeckt. mittig auf den sarg wurde ein kreuz gestellt, am kopfende die kaiserliche krone, das zepter und der reichsapfel positioniert und zu füßen die ungarische und die böhmische krone gelegt. am abend des 9. mai wurden herz und zunge in einem vergoldeten silberbecher in der loretokapelle beigesetzt.58 der kessel mit dem intestina wurde erst am abend des 10. mai an seinen letztlichen bestimmungsort in st. stephan überführt.59 auffällig ist der verhältnismäßig niedrige stand der teilnehmer des kleinen trauerzugs zu st. stephan. nicht kammerherren trugen den kessel, sondern kammerdiener. sicherlich waren die intestina das element der mehrfachbestattung, dem die geringste reputation anhaftete – es waren jedoch sterbliche überreste des kaisers. als am abend die bestellten trauergäste ihren platz eingenommen hatten und die stadtgarde auf dem neuen markt mit umgedrehten fahnen und gewehren sowie schwarz verhüllten trommeln stellung bezogen hatte, begab sich die kaiserliche familie in die ritterstube. dort nahm der ober-kammerfourier nach der segnung der leiche durch den bischof von wien die funeralinsignien und das bahrtuch vom sarg ab, um ihn transportfähig zu machen. zwölf kaiserliche kammerherren trugen den sarg zuerst in die hofkirche, wo er wieder mit bahrtuch und insignien versehen wurde. von dort aus trugen 24 kammerherren den sarg unter dem geläut aller glocken in und vor der stadt von der hofkapelle in die kapuzinerkirche.60 rink gibt die ordnung des trauerzugs detailliert wieder.61 an der spitze des zuges liefen soldaten aus dem spital am schottentor, zusammen mit armen männern, frauen und kindern aus dem kaiserlichen hofspital und dem armenhaus als beweis der milde des verstorbenen herrschers. darauf folgte eine große gruppe ordensgeistlicher und anderer kleriker, die den großteil des zuges ausmachte. abordnungen von territorien des herrschers waren nur in geringem maße vertreten, als geschlossene gruppe erschienen lediglich die landstände niederösterreichs. auf den bischof von wien folgte der kaiserliche leichnam, begleitet von 58 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1599-1601. 59 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1614-1615. 60 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1603-1605. 61 auflistung bei rink, leopolds des grossen, 1606-1611. die gesamtteilnehmerzahl ist schwer einzuschätzen, pons, herrschaftsrepräsentation, 141 geht von mehr als 1.400 personen im trauergeleit aus, also von etwas mehr als der summe der angegebenen größen der gruppen. folgt man allerdings der schätzung von michaela kneidinger and philipp dittinger, “hoftrauer am kaiserhof, 1652 bis 1800,” in der wiener hof im spiegel der zeremonialprotokolle (1652–1800): eine annäherung, eds. irmgard pangeln, martin scheutz and thomas winkelbauer (innbruck: studien-verlag, 2007), 539, nach der am trauerkondukt für die kaiserin-witwe eleonore magdalena (†1720) 2.200 personen teilnahmen, ist damit zu rechnen, dass der kondukt für leopold deutlich mehr als 1.400 personen umfasste. 102 kammerdienern und edelknaben, mit fackeln beleuchtet. neben ihnen gingen die vier dekane und der rektor der wiener universität mit ornat und zepter. direkt am sarg gingen außerdem die hauptleute der kaiserlichen trabanten und hartschiere mit den vier höchsten hofbeamten, oberst-stallmeister, oberst-hofmarschall, oberst-kämmerer und oberst-hofmeister. es folgten kardinal kollonitsch, den roten kardinalshut mit schwarzem flor überzogen, begleitet vom venezianischen botschafter. darauf folgte das neue kaiserpaar mit seinen drei töchtern. die verwitwete kaiserin war mit ihrem beichtvater in der hofburg geblieben.62 beschlossen wurde der kondukt von der stadtgarde. im inneren der kapuzinerkirche waren wände und bänke mit schwarzem stoff überzogen. sie war reich mit den kaiserlichen insignien und zahlreichen wappen dekoriert, vermutlich inklusive wappen der territorien, auf die nur noch ein formaler anspruch erhoben wurde, zum beispiel spanien. die ganze szenerie wurde von kerzen hell erleuchtet. in der kirche angekommen, wurden vom sarg die insignien und das bahrtuch abgenommen. nachdem der bischof von wien den sarg nochmals gesegnet und die hofmusik das libera me, ein teil des totenoffiziums, gesungen hatte, trugen sechs kapuziner den sarg in die gruft. dorthin begaben sich mit dem sarg und seinen trägern der bischof von wien und einige weitere geistliche. die minister leopolds waren durch den oberst-hofmeister, den oberstkämmerer, und den ober-kammerfourier vertreten. der sarg wurde auf einem katafalk vor dem altar der gruft abgestellt. nachdem sich der pater guardian des kapuzinerklosters der identität des verstorbenen im sarg versichert hatte, verschloss der oberkammerfourier den sarg endgültig. einen schlüssel erhielt der pater guardian zur verwahrung, der andere ging zurück in die hofburg, wo auch die schlüssel zu den anderen särgen der kaiserlichen familie aufbewahrt wurden. nach der abgeschlossenen zeremonie verließ die kaiserliche familie die kirche und fuhr in ihren wagen zurück in die hofburg, begleitet von den ministern. der bericht zieht ein positives fazit: die zeremonie sei trotz der großen ansammlung von schaulustigen ohne zwischenfälle vonstattengegangen.63 der aus zinn gefertigte punksarkophag leopolds war ein stilistisches novum in der kapuzinergruft, weil er ganz in dienst der herrscherlichen repraesentatio maiestatis, der repräsentation seiner herrscherlichen würde, gestellt wurde. darauf finden sich kaum sterblichkeitssymbole, sondern der sarkophag zeigt szenen aus dem leben des verstorbenen und die insignien seiner herrschaft.64 der sarkophag wird von vier adlern getragen, die inschriften adressieren mit der gerechtigkeit des herrschers, der kontinuität der monarchie und der frommen zuversicht auf den tod gängige topoi, die auch an vielen anderen stellen des funeralzeremoniells präsent waren.65 62 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1614. pons, herrschaftsrepräsentation, 141 zitiert eine akte, nach der eleonore magdalena nicht an der beisetzung teilnahm, weil bei der bestattung kaiser ferdinands iii. dessen gemahlin auch nicht teilgenommen habe, womit ein präzedenzfall entstanden sei. 63 rink, leopolds des grossen, 1611-1614. 64 hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 29. 65 die inschriften sind abgedruckt bei hawlik-van de water, die kapuzinergruft, 117-118. 103 wann der zinnsarkophag fertig war und wann der holzsarg, in dem der kaiserliche leichnam aus der ritterstube getragen wurde, in den prunksarkophag eingelassen werden konnte, wird in der literatur nicht erwähnt, geht aber vermutlich aus den hofakten hervor. es ist anzunehmen, dass der leichnam nach fertigstellung des zinnsarkophags, von hofbeamten und geistlichen zeremoniell begleitet, hineingelassen wurde. dass die fertigstellung lange auf sich warten ließ, war in wien nicht ungewöhnlich.66 laut der entsprechenden akte aus dem hofkammerarchiv war der sarkophag für leopold nicht vor dem 2. mai 1707 fertig. aus den hofzahlamtsbüchern gehen die enormen kosten hervor, die der hof für den sarkophag bestritt.67 angesichts dieses, nicht nur finanziellen, sondern auch institutionellen aufwands verwundert es, dass der punksarkophag nicht besonders rezipiert wurde. weder rink noch lünig gehen darauf ein, obwohl ihnen der sarg hätte bekannt sein können. auch zeitgenössische gedruckte abbildungen sind nicht bekannt. das feierliche leichenbegängnis in den exequienfeiern und die ephemere trauerarchitektur die erste exequienfeier für leopold i. fand vom 8. bis zum 10. juni 1705 in der augustinerhofkirche statt.68 die dreitätige messe dort war die trauerfeier mit den höchsten gästen. unter vollem geläut innerhalb und vor der stadt nahm daran auch das neue kaiserpaar mit seinen kindern teil.69 neben weiteren feiern in wien fanden auch außerhalb wiens gedächtnismessen für den verstorbenen kaiser statt. bekannt sind beispielsweise gleich mehrere exequienfeiern aus regensburg, sowohl aus katholischen als auch evangelischen kirchen.70 aus ljubljana, berichtet das wiennerische diarium von dreitätigen exequien vor einem castrum doloris.71 über den einfluss des hofs auf die unzähligen feiern in ganz europa ist sehr wenig bekannt. klar ist, dass die feier in der augustinerhofkirche auf direkte weisung des neuen kaisers erfolgte, die frage jedoch, wie und ob überhaupt andere kirchen und ausrichter mit dem hof rücksprache hielten, hat die forschung bislang nicht beantwortet. ephemere trauerarchitektur bezieht sich hier vor allem auf die zahlreichen castra doloris, welche verschiedene auftraggeber für die von ihnen veranstalteten exequienfeiern errichten ließen. neben den fünf wiener trauergerüsten gab es auch in anderen städten ganz europas trauerarchitektur für den verstorbenen herrscher. eine vollständige auflistung aller castra doloris für leopold liegt nicht vor, doch zahlreiche beispiele sind 66 hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 76. 67 vgl. die aktenauszüge bei hawlik-van de water, der schöne tod, 31-34. 68 brix, “trauergerüste,” 257. 69 vgl. insg. wiennerisches diarium 194 (1705). 70 sebastian roser and armin ruhland, “trauerfeierlichkeiten,” in feste in regensburg: von der reformation bis in die gegenwart, ed. karl möseneder (regensburg: mittelbayrische druckereiund verlags-gesellschaft, 1986), 64-66. 71 wiennerisches diarium 199 (1705). 104 überliefert. exemplarisch seien regensburg,72 würzburg73 und düsseldorf74 genannt, auch aus rom75 und sogar konstantinopel76 sind trauergerüste überliefert. drei der wiener trauergerüste werden mit ihren jeweiligen schwerpunkten im folgenden exemplarisch betrachtet. das einzige vom hof in auftrag gegebene trauergerüst wurde von johann lucas von hildebrandt in der augustinerhofkirche gestaltet. (fig. 2) im zentrum dieser theatralen inszenierung stand unter einer übergroßen hauskrone der habsburger die apotheose des verstorbenen herrschers. der titan chronos wird gestürzt, das ihm entrissene medaillonportrait des kaisers übergibt ein adler einer personifikation der unsterblichkeit, die bereits mit einer hand gen himmel deutet. der unterbau des ziboriums preist die würden, titel und tugenden des herrschers. die monumentalen dekorationssäulen neben dem ziborium stellen die siege leopolds über frankreich und das osmanische reich dar.77 hildebrandt verließ aber nicht nur mit den dekorationssäulen das eigentliche castrum, sondern inszenierte den gesamten kirchenraum mit seinen wänden und kapellen, die er mit schauwänden, gemälden und wappenschmuck zur verherrlichung des verstorbenen und seines hauses versah. eine solche inszenierung der ganzen kirche blieb in wien einmalig.78 die jesuiten am hof konzentrierten sich in ihrem castrum doloris auf die pietas der habsburger als fundament ihrer herrschaft. der kaiser wird als frommer christ gezeigt, dem sein glaube den weg ins paradies ebnet.79 (fig. 3) das trauergerüst korrespondiert direkt mit der dort gehaltenen leichenpredigt,80 indem der aufbau des gerüsts in drei stufen die predigten der dreitägigen exequien abbildet. auf dem dach des ziboriums wird der herrscher unter einem mit dem orden zum goldenen vlies geschmücktem ölbaum von der personifizierten göttlichen sanftmut empfangen. auf einem blatt in seiner hand steht “memento, domine, david et omnis mansuetudinis eius”, “gedenke, herr, davids und all 72 roser and ruhland, “trauerfeierlichkeiten,” 65 und roser, “die trauerfeierlichkeiten für kaiser leopold i. 1705,” in feste in regensburg: von der reformation bis in die gegenwart, ed. karl möseneder (regensburg: mittelbayrische druckereiund verlags-gesellschaft, 1986), 275-279. 73 sabine doering-manteuffel, “‚da sehet ihr, welchen der herr erwählet hat!‘: religionspolitik im spiegel von dankund trauerpredigten über das haus habsburg,” in religionspolitik in deutschland: von der frühen neuzeit bis zur gegenwart, eds. anselm doering-manteuffel and kurt nowak (stuttgart: kohlhammer, 1999), 85. 74 anja buschow, “castra doloris: fürstliche leidensfeierlichkeiten als beispiele architektonischer inszenierung im bereich des ephemeren,” in festarchitektur: der architekt als inszenierungskünstler, eds. werner oechslin and anja buschow (stuttgart: hatje, 1984), 135. 75 pons, herrschaftsrepräsentation, 147 nennt ein trauergerüst in der deutschen nationalkirche santa maria dell’anima. 76 liselotte popelka, castrum doloris oder „trauriger schauplatz“: untersuchungen zu entstehung und wesen ephemerer architektur (wien: verlag der österreichischen akademie der wissenschaften, 1994), 126. 77 brix, “trauergerüste,” 224. 78 brix, “trauergerüste,” 231. 79 brix, “trauergerüste,” 224. 80 thomas winter, drey-mahl-seelige sanfftmuth/ ihro römischen/ kayserlichen/ auch zu hungarn/ und böhmen/ königl. majestät/ etc. etc. leopodi i. deß grossen/ mild-seeligst-und glorwürdigster gedächtnuß… ([1705]), http://data.onb.ac.at/rep/1033df4b (6.10.2020), dort auch eine großformatige abbildung des trauergerüsts. 105 seiner sanftmut”. er vergleicht leopold mit dem biblischen könig david und dessen sanftmut, “mansuetudo”, nach der die gesamte predigt benannt ist. das trauergerüst präsentiert leopold nicht primär als großen herrscher oder eroberer, sondern vor allem als frommen gläubigen.81 fig. 2: benjamin kenckel, “castrum doloris kaysers leopoldi i. aufgerichtet in der augustiner hoff-kirchen bey der loretten capell in wien den 7 juny 1705,” [falttafel in johann lucas von hildebrandt, aquilae in felici leopoldi i. gloriosissimae memoriae romanorum imperatoris…, wien [1705],] österreichische galerie belvedere, inv.-nr. pe 122, https://sammlung.belvedere.at/objects/16873/trauergerust-fur-kaiser-leopold-i-inder-augustinerkirche-i (02.08.2021). 81 brix, “trauergerüste,” 233-234. https://sammlung.belvedere.at/objects/16873/trauergerust-fur-kaiser-leopold-i-in-der-augustinerkirche-i https://sammlung.belvedere.at/objects/16873/trauergerust-fur-kaiser-leopold-i-in-der-augustinerkirche-i 106 fig. 3: in franz ambros dietel, [“trauergerüst für kaiser leopold i. in der kirche am hof,”] falttafel in thomas winter, drey-mahl-seelige sanfftmuth, ihro römischen, kayserlichen, auch zu hungarn, vnd böhmen, königl. majestät, … leopoldi i…, wien 1705, österreichische nationalbibliothek, mf 4680 neu mik, http://data.onb.ac.at/rep/1033df4b (02.08.2021). der trauerapparat in der jesuitenkirche fällt nicht durch seine form, sondern das gewählte medium völlig aus dem rahmen der anderen trauergerüste heraus: andrea pozzo malte das trauergerüst als riesiges illusionistisches gemälde.82 (fig. 4) pozzo gelang ein fließender übergang vom gemälde in die restliche architektur des gebäudes, so fügte er der kirche in seinem gemälde ein querhaus und eine helle kuppel hinzu. auf der spitze des trauerapparats ringen personifikationen des “österreichischen glücks” und der “beständigen herrschaft” mit der figur des todes um den buchstaben l. dieser zerbricht, und übrig bleibt ein i, die initiale des nachfolgers iosephus, josef. die “beständige 82 “auff besondere neue arth sehr künstlich erfundenen todten-gerüst”, heißt es anerkennend im wiennerisches diarium 214 (1705). http://data.onb.ac.at/rep/1033df4b 107 herrschaft” befestigt das i auf dem gipfel des trauergerüsts unter einer kaiserkrone. ein spruchband erklärt um das gekrönte i herum, dass leopold in josef fortlebt. das reiterstandbild unterhalb dieser szenerie stellt leopold als kapitolinischen marc aurel dar, umgeben von den antiken römischen und römisch-deutschen kaisern konstantin, theodosius, karl dem großen und otto dem großen.83 dieser trauerapparat steht gänzlich im dienste der dynastischen und kaiserlichen tradition leopolds, die gleichzeitig legitimitätsstiftend für josef eingesetzt wird. fig. 4: christian engelbrecht and johann andreas pfeffel, “cenotaphium augustissimo imperatore leopoldo i…,” in veneratio posthuma collegii caesareo-academici societatis jesu…, wien 1705, wienbibliothek im rathaus https://www.digital.wienbibliothek.at/wbrobv/content/pageview/1876323 (02.08.2021). 83 die darstellungen werden im exequienbuch [anonymus], veneratio posthuma collegii caesareo-academici societatis jesu…, (wien: 1705), http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb11348064-1 (23.10.2020) erläutert. https://www.digital.wienbibliothek.at/wbrobv/content/pageview/1876323 108 die beispiele zeigen, wie die trauergerüste zwar alle der memoria des herrschers dienten, aber jeweils eigene schwerpunkte setzten. so kann der fokus der jesuiten am hof auf die frömmigkeit des kaisers ebenso als klassisches herrscherlob in einem religiösen register, wie auch als demonstration der eigenen herrschernähe als geistliche institution gedeutet werden. hof und auftraggeber der funeralarchitektur gingen eine symbiose ein, die beiden seiten prestigegewinn versprach und vor allem den ausrichtern die möglichkeit bot, eigene akzente und botschaften zu artikulieren und über den weg der funeralpublizistik zu verbreiten. die funeralpublizistik das für die castra doloris bereits beschriebene konzept symbiotischer zusammenarbeit verschiedener (medialer) akteure funktionierte genauso in bezug auf funeralpublizistik.84 die verschiedenen funeraldrucke entstanden so gut wie nie im auftrag oder im direkten umfeld des hofes, dessen rolle dabei bislang weitgehend unerforscht ist. die funeraldrucke übernahmen verschiedene funktionen, die in unterschiedlichem maße mit dem eigentlichen zeremoniell in verbindung standen. neben leichenpredigtdrucken entstanden auch einblattdrucke, meist von castra doloris, aber auch mit abbildungen der leichenparade leopolds. der einzige druck, der sich gänzlich mit einer trauerdekoration beschäftigt, ist die beschreibung des castrum doloris hildebrandts in der augustinerhofkirche.85 andere erhaltene abbildungen von castra doloris entstanden für ganz unabhängige gelegenheiten, zum beispiel in form von nachstichen, die im theatrum europaeum erschienen.86 der größte teil der funeraldrucke 1705 entfällt aber auf die zahlreichen predigtdrucke aus ganz europa, die zum tode leopolds erschienen. ihre bibliographische erfassung verbessert sich zwar stetig, in ihrer dabei zutage tretenden fülle sind sie jedoch nicht ansatzweise untersucht.87 festzuhalten ist an dieser stelle, dass keine vom hof angestrengte zusammenhängende festbeschreibung in form eines bebilderten prachtfolianten entstand, daher liegen keine darstellungen einzelner zeremonieller elemente der trauerfeiern vor, unbelebte abbildungen von dekorationen dominieren die erhaltenen drucke. 84 jutta schumann, die andere sonne: kaiserbild und medienstrategien im zeitalter leopolds i. (berlin: akademie verlag, 2003), 36-38 bezeichnet diese vorgehensweise als “multiplizierende imagepflege”, die schon zu leopolds lebzeiten dessen mediale repräsentation maßgeblich geprägt habe. 85 johann lucas von hildebrandt, aquilae in felici leopoldi i. gloriosissimae memoriae romanorum imperatoris… (wien: andreas heyinger, [1705]). 86 theatrum europaeum 17 (1704-1706), teil 2, tafeln 17 und 18. 87 birgit boge and ralf georg bogner, oratio funebris: die katholische leichenpredigt in der frühen neuzeit (amsterdam and new york: rodopi, 1999), 336 erfassen elf gedruckte leichenpredigten auf leopold i. eine abfrage im gesa (gesamtkatalog deutschsprachiger leichenpredigten, http://www.personalschriften.de/ datenbanken/gesa.html) ergibt 92 treffer mit predigtdrucken auf “leopold i. (gest. 1705)”, die bei weitem nicht nur im reich erschienen, sondern auch westlich und vor allem östlich davon. diese diskrepanz offenbart die mit zunehmender erschließung der erhaltenen predigtdrucke immer weiter aufreißende kluft zwischen dem stand der forschung und den möglichkeiten, die dazu bereitstehen. 109 das kaiserbegräbnis in vergleichender perspektive der nächste schritt der untersuchung fürstlicher begräbnisse in der frühen neuzeit geht zum vergleich, denn nur so können die erkenntnisse aus der untersuchung einzelner höfischer funeralkulturen einen weiterführenden mehrwert für das verständnis der höfischen gesellschaft des alten reichs bieten. ein mögliches vergleichsbeispiel für den hier behandelten leopold i. ist das begräbnis des ‘großen kurfürsten’ friedrich wilhelm von brandenburg 1688.88 kaiser und kurfürst waren jeweils exponierte repräsentanten ihrer konfession und standen sich auch politisch zeitweise diametral entgegen.89 indizien für das zeitgenössische verständnis beider zeremonieller großereignisse zu finden erscheint hier besonders vielversprechend, da brandenburg-preußen 1688 kurz vor einer gravierenden rangerhöhung stand, im zuge derer die kurfürsten von brandenburg zu königen in preußen wurden. nun stellt sich die frage, ob schon das begräbnis friedrich wilhelms, das unter der ägide des späteren königs in preußen, damals noch kurfürst friedrich iii., stand, als teil des “planvoll betriebenen aufstiegs in den kreis der souveräne”90 betrachtet werden kann, wie linda brüggemann es in ihrer ausführlichen untersuchung der preußischen herrscherbegräbnisse ab dem ‘großen kurfürsten’ andeutet,91 und ob ein vergleich ermöglicht, dies aus dem überlieferten zeremoniell herauszulesen. um diese frage zu beantworten, liegt ein vergleich mit dem kaiserlichen begräbnis leopolds i. nahe, da zu erwarten wäre, dass leopolds begräbnis seine position an der spitze des reiches widerspiegelt. um sein begräbnis einzuordnen und vergleichspunkte mit dem begräbnis friedrich wilhelms zu umreißen, werden folgend einige charakteristika des jeweiligen zeremoniells näher betrachtet. ein erster wesentlicher unterschied liegt im zeitpunkt der bestattung. während leopold bereits kurz nach seinem tod bestattet wurde, und die leichenbegängnisse später ohne den leichnam stattfanden, wurde friedrich wilhelm nach seinem tod am 9. mai 168892 zwar obduziert und präpariert, danach allerdings nicht gleich bestattet. noch an seinem todesort in potsdam wurde der leichnam 88 linda brüggemann hat das begräbnis friedrich wilhelms in ihrer dissertation herrschaft und tod ausführlich untersucht, vgl. zusammenfassend linda brüggemann, “‚ich habe einen guten kampf gekämpft, ich habe den lauf vollendet‘. sterben, tod und feierliches leichenbegängnis des ‚großen kurfürsten‘ 1688,” in machtmensch – familienmensch. kurfürst friedrich wilhelm von brandenburg (1620-1688), eds. michael kaiser, jürgen luh and michael rohrschneider (münster: aschendorff, 2020), 205-219. 89 vgl. dazu ausführlich michael rohrschneider and stefan sienell, “hohenzollern kontra habsburg? zu den kurbrandenburgisch-kaiserlichen beziehungen in der zweiten hälfte des 17. jahrhunderts,” forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen geschichte nf 13 (2003): 61-81, die einem “grundsätzlichen antagonismus”, wie er von der älteren historischen forschung lange propagiert wurde, widersprechen. vielmehr seien die beziehungen von einem “wechselhaften und nie unproblematischen mitund gegeneinander geprägt” gewesen. 90 barbara stollberg-rilinger, “höfische öffentlichkeit: zur zeremoniellen selbstdarstellung des brandenburgischen hofes vor dem europäischen publikum,” forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen geschichte nf 7 (1997): 148. 91 brüggemann, herrschaft und tod, 49. 92 alle daten werden im folgenden im gregorianischen kalender angegeben. 110 in den kurfürstlichen ornat gekleidet und in einen sarg gelegt. dort verweilte er bis zur überführung nach berlin,93 die am darauffolgenden sonntag, den 16. mai, stattfand.94 in der residenz angekommen, wurde der tote körper kostbar eingekleidet und mit den insignien seiner herrschaft geschmückt.95 diese befanden sich, anders als bei der parade leopolds, nicht am fußende des paradebetts, sondern so positioniert “wie selbige im leben gebraucht worden”.96 (fig. 5) am 22. mai, nach dem ende der parade im schloss, wurde der tote kurfürst in die schwarz verhängte schlosskapelle getragen, wo er für die nächsten vier monate bis zur bestattung verblieb.97 fig. 5: [constantin friedrich blesendorf?,] [“aufbahrung kurfürst friedrich wilhelms im berliner schloss,”] in christian cochius, davids des königs [prachtausgabe], cölln an der spree [1688], staatsbibliothek zu berlin – pk, abteilung historische drucke, signatur: gr.2" st 9556 : r, http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/sbb0001040c00000179 (02.08.2021). 93 friedrich wilhelm von winterfeld, teutsche und ceremonial-politica, an sich haltend die ceremonien und gebräuche/ so bey politischen und anderen sachen vorzugehen pflegen…, vol. 2 (frankfurt am main and leipzig: carl christian neuenhahn, 1700), 610. 94 christian cochius, davids des königs in israel heilige fürbereitung zum tode/ und kräfftige ansprach an seinen sohn und nachfolger salomo/ betrachtet bey dem höchstbetrübten todes-fall/ des weyland durchlauchtigsten/ großmächtigsten fürsten und herrn/ herrn friderich wilhelmen… (cölln an der spree: ulrich liebpert, [1688]), https://doi.org/10.17192/eb2010.0415 (30.6.2020), [144]. die beschreibung des trauerzeremoniells in cochius‘ funeralwerk ist nicht paginiert, der besseren nachvollziehbarkeit halber wird sie hier fortgesetzt und in eckigen klammern angegeben. hier wird die schlichtere, unbebilderte ausgabe des bandes zitiert. 95 cochius, davids des königs, [144-145]. 96 diese beschreibung formuliert moser, teutsches hof-recht, 413 als übliches prinzip der anordnung der funeralinsignien, das vorgehen bei leopold war demnach die weniger übliche variante. 97 cochius, davids des königs, [145], vgl. auch brüggemann, herrschaft und tod, 82. http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/sbb0001040c00000179 111 die trennung von begräbnis und begängnis sowie die mehrfachbestattung bei leopold gingen auf die tradition seiner familie zurück. das begräbnis friedrich wilhelms dagegen war in vielerlei hinsicht ein novum. die brandenburgischen hohenzollern konnten insgesamt auf keine lange tradition zurückblicken. das haus hohenzollern wurde 1415 mit der markgrafschaft brandenburg belehnt. erst 1499 ließ kurfürst johann cicero die grabstätte seines hauses vom stammsitz in heilsbronn ins kloster lehnin verlegen. damit knüpfte er an die askanier, die mittelalterlichen herrscher der mark brandenburg, an, die sich dort lange begraben ließen. 1545 etablierte kurfürst johann ii. bestattungen in cölln an der spree, ein prestigeträchtigerer ort mit großer öffentlichkeit, nahe dem neuen residenzschloss.98 dass die brandenburgischen hohenzollern die trennung von körper und eingeweiden 1713 gänzlich einstellten,99 beweist die dort im gegensatz zu den habsburgischen begräbnissen geringe bedeutung dieses schritts. ein weiterer großer unterschied liegt in den repräsentativen mitteln und ihrer gewichtung. an protestantischen höfen war die dekoration der kirchen genauso schlicht wie die gottesdienste, was wenig spielraum für repräsentativen pomp gab,100 wie ihn die wiener exequienfeiern für leopold entfalteten. zum protestantischen beziehungsweise reformierten gegenstück wurden die trauerzüge. sie wurden dramaturgisch inszeniert und galten als besonderer ehrbeweis.101 um diese einmaligen höhepunkte über ort und zeit hinaus wirken zu lassen, entstanden funeralpublikationen, sogenannte funeralwerke, die als festbeschreibungen unter europäischen höfen zirkulierten. an protestantischen höfen konzentrierten sie sich auf das weltliche zeremoniell, vor allem den trauerzug.102 für friedrich wilhelm entstand in berlin ein prachtband, der neben der leichenpredigt des hofpredigers christian cochius, einer kurzen biographie des verstorbenen und einer ausführlichen beschreibung des trauerzugs auch detaillierte abbildungen des trauerzugs mit einem großteil der teilnehmer enthält.103 eine vergleichbare publikation entstand in wien nicht. betrachtet man das gesamtbild der beiden zeremoniellen ereignisse, fällt auf, dass die von kirchlichen feiern unabhängige herrscherliche repräsentation in berlin deutlich ausgeprägter und aufwändiger war als in wien, wo begräbnis und die begängnisfeiern religiös strukturiert waren und zu einem großen teil von klerikern durchgeführt wurden. lässt sich nun angesichts dieser divergenzen ein rangunterschied zwischen den begräbnissen leopolds und friedrich wilhelms entsprechend des amtes der verstorbenen ausmachen? diese frage muss nicht nur verneint werden, sondern auf den ersten blick entsteht sogar ein gegenteiliger eindruck. anachronistisch formuliert, wirkt das begräbnis leopolds in der rückschau wie ein kirchliches fest, das mit blick auf nachfolgende 98 achim beyer, die kurbrandenburgische residenzlandschaft im „langen 16. jahrhundert“ (berlin: berliner wissenschafts-verlag, 2001), 73-74. 99 brüggemann, herrschaft und tod, 79. 100 bepler, “das trauerzeremoniell,” 250. 101 craig m. koslofsky, the reformation of the dead: death and ritual in early modern germany, 1450-1700 (basingstoke: macmillan, 2000), 152. 102 bepler, “das trauerzeremoniell,” 250-251. 103 cochius, davids des königs, [prachtausgabe], http://resolver.staatsbibliothekberlin.de/sbb0001040c00000000 (3.11.2020). 112 begräbnisse als auslaufmodell erscheint. das begräbnis friedrich wilhelms dagegen hatte bereits große ähnlichkeiten mit dem heutigen verständnis eines staatsbegräbnisses. fig. 6: constantin friedrich blesendorf, [“ehrenpforte für kurfürst friedrich wilhelm in berlin,”] in cochius, davids des königs [prachtausgabe], cölln an der spree [1688], staatsbibliothek zu berlin – pk, abteilung historische drucke, signatur: gr.2" st 9556 : r, http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/sbb0001040c00000253 (02.08.2021). außerdem waren die nachwirkungen des berliner begräbnisses viel ausgeprägter als in wien. die ehrenpforte, die der trauerzug für friedrich wilhelm auf der breitestraße durchschritt, (fig. 6) erlebte noch eine zweite verwendung: sie wurde entgegen ihrer bestimmung als ephemere festarchitektur nach potsdam überführt, wo sie in der nähe des potsdamer schlosses wieder aufgestellt wurde.104 der totenhelm, der im rahmen des begräbnisses den ritterlichen stand des kurfürsten anzeigte, wurde von 1688 bis 1918 als “reichshelm” bei begräbnissen männlicher hohenzollern mitgeführt und bei den kroninsignien aufbewahrt.105 hier zeigt sich, wie das begräbnis friedrich wilhelms zu einem ausgangspunkt der traditionsbildung des entstehenden brandenburgischpreußischen staates wurde. vergleichbares gab es in wien nicht, das begräbnis leopolds erzeugte keine langfristigen bezugspunkte. schon von der fertigstellung des 104 thomas h. von der dunk, “vom fürstenkultbild zum untertanendenkmal: öffentliche monumente in brandenburg-preußen im 17. und 18. jahrhundert,” forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen geschichte nf 7 (1997): 190-191. 105 brüggemann, herrschaft und tod, 94. http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/sbb0001040c00000253 113 prunksarkophags für leopold, einige jahre nach dessen tod, sind uns keine prägnanten zeugnisse überliefert beziehungsweise bekannt. warum die von seinen zeitgenossen durchaus anerkannte “größe” leopolds sich in der erinnerung an ihn nicht recht festsetzen konnte, bleibt auch in bezug auf sein begräbnis zu klären.106 die vorangegangenen, schlaglichtartigen vergleiche zeigen, dass das begräbnis leopolds von der bisherigen historischen forschung noch kaum in all seinen dimensionen erfasst wurde, weder als isoliertes ereignis, noch im vergleich mit anderen begräbnissen im alten reich. langfristig erstrebenswert wäre, eine art von nomenklatur der funeralriten zu identifizieren, sofern es eine solche gab. das ziel sollte sein, einen überblickt über die verschiedenen formen in zeitlicher und geographischer perspektive zu erhalten, um dann durch das daraus erwachsende verständnis für konkrete funeralzeremonien rückschlüsse auf den ausrichtenden hof und beteiligte personen ziehen zu können. die vergleichsbeispiele zeigen jedoch auch, wie heterogen die tradition und funktion einzelner aspekte sind, was eine systematisierung erschwert. für solche weiterführenden untersuchungen bedarf es jedoch, das beweist nicht zuletzt die lückenhafte forschungslage zum begräbnis leopolds i., weiterer grundlegender forschung zum herrscherlichen funeralzeremoniells im alten reich. 106 vgl. zu leopolds titel “der große” stefan benz, “vergessene größe: kaiser leopolds i. epitheton ‚magnus‘,” in friedrich und die historische größe, eds. michael kaiser and jürgen luh (2009), https://perspectivia.net/publikationen/friedrich300-colloquien/friedrich-groesse/benz_groesse (2.10.2020) der allerdings die begängnisfeiern und ihre nachwirkungen nicht in seine untersuchung einbezieht. die sterbeund begräbniskultur katholischer herrscher bis zum beginn des 18. jahrhunderts begräbnis und begängnis kaiser leopolds i. die vorbereitung auf den tod des kaisers die parade und die vorbereitung von trauer und begräbnis die bestattungen und der prunksarkophag das feierliche leichenbegängnis in den exequienfeiern und die ephemere trauerarchitektur die funeralpublizistik das kaiserbegräbnis in vergleichender perspektive 52 jan hus a connection between belief and national identity yutsil hernandez salem college abstract jan hus was a bohemian preacher who was burned at the stake at the council of constance in 1415. however, hus’s legacy well outlived his death, and six centuries later, he continues to be considered a symbol of czech identity today. using his letters written in exile and while awaiting trial at constance, this article explores key aspects of hus’s theology and how they gave momentum to the movement that arose after his death and has experienced an unparalleled longevity. hus’s pursuit of truth, his frustrations with the practices of the church at the time, and his allegiance to czech-speaking people resonated beyond the religious realm and paved the way for an early form of protonationalism. article what turns a believer into a martyr? further, how does one’s legacy become a symbol of national identity that goes beyond the walls of the church for centuries thereafter? the answer to these questions lies in a perfect cocktail of societal and religious volatility fueled by unwavering belief. in the fourteenth century, the church found itself in a crisis of authority and power that also plagued broader society. there was turmoil in the kingdom of bohemia, as it experienced several shifts in centers of power. in 1378, the catholic church had two popes: one residing in avignon and the other in rome. the papal schism had several important implications: the church was no longer speaking on behalf of all in western europe, and in bohemia, there was no longer one christian people held together by a homogenous and indivisible church. these divisions gave way for new social and religious movements to gain momentum. one of the most notable figures of this era was jan hus, a bohemian preacher who was burned at the stake as a heretic for his beliefs at the council of constance in 1415. jan hus rose to popularity in bohemia for his teachings and criticisms of the catholic church but became beloved by many czech people for his advocacy of translating the bible into the vernacular, making the bible accessible to all czech people. his beliefs were considered heretical, and he was excommunicated and spent two years living in exile while awaiting trial at constance. during this time, he wrote roughly eighty letters that were addressed to a variety of audiences: religious leaders, political leaders, and his beloved praguers. hus’s letters in exile and while awaiting trial at constance reflect his emphasis on the importance of truth, his frustrations with the church and its practices, and the importance of teaching in the vernacular. this is significant as it helps us see the possible connections between his theology and politics that allowed a number of people to see him as symbolic of various 53 forms of czech national identity that were a catalyst to events like the hussite wars, the thirty years’ war, and nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalist movements. situating the emergence of hus: political and religious upheavals in late medieval bohemia understanding the political context in the kingdom of bohemia leading up to the time of hus is important. in bohemia, the luxemburg dynasty ruled from 1310 to 1437. the first ruler of this dynasty, john of luxemburg (1310-1346), was the son of the holy roman emperor, henry vii, and his placement on the bohemian throne can be attributed to the prominence of bohemia and its integration in european affairs.1 john was well known throughout europe in military and political spheres, and while his reign was not particularly notable, upon his death, it was said by his contemporaries that the kingdom of bohemia was on its way to becoming a powerful state in central europe.2 his reign was followed by charles, whose rule would solidify the kingdom of bohemia’s prominent status in europe. the kingdom would expand both in size and influence; several small principalities, duchies, and territories would become part of the kingdom of bohemia. charles would select prague as the seat of power and, ultimately, of the holy roman empire. additionally, prague was made the seat of an archbishopric in the 1340s.3 in 1348, charles university was established in prague as the first institution of higher learning in central europe, and it would have a prominent role in the bohemian reformation.4 charles sought to make prague the cultural center of central europe and his reign was marked by relative peace and prosperity and contributed to bohemia’s “golden age.” although a charismatic ruler who promoted the czech language throughout the empire, many of his contributions to bohemia would not survive him. following his reign, václav iv came to power, and the underlying issues that charles perhaps covered up with his charisma came to the surface with václav’s reign. one of these issues was his failure to permanently strengthen the royal house against a nobility hungry for power. socioeconomic problems were also coming to light during this time; as much as half of the population of prague in the fourteenth century lived on the cusp of poverty. further, other factors such as the fluctuation of wages, which impacted immigration into bohemia, and the subsequent disruption that the epidemic of the black death caused in bohemia has been speculated to heighten tensions between ethnic groups during economic crises. while these cannot be taken as definite conclusions or correlations, it is important to consider these volatile factors and how they may have had immediate ramifications and also impacted the future hussite revolution.5 all of this, in addition to the papal schism that coincided with václav’s reign, further complicated matters as he did not wield the same authority that charles did. external threats came forth when leaders from hungary, austria, and moravia signed a treaty against václav, and he was arrested. sigismund, king 1 thomas a. fudge, the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia, st. andrews studies in reformation history (aldershot: ashgate, 1998), 5. 2 fudge, the magnificent ride, 7. 3 thomas a. fudge, jan hus: religious reform and social revolution in bohemia, international library of historical studies 73 (london: i.b. tauris, 2010), 19. 4 fudge, the magnificent ride, 8. 5 fudge, jan hus, 21. 54 of hungary, would seek to install himself as ruler in bohemia during this time, as well as muffle any support for václav in the kingdom. these events led to distrust and suspicion amongst the public, and it is these political instabilities that created opportunities for figures to become symbolic of a people. whereas the church previously had been a uniting and consolidated force in society, in this time, it found itself at the height of the papal schism and instead the source of division and antagonism. naturally, when a longstanding institution such as the catholic church experienced such levels of internal dissent that it threatened their authority, any external dissent needed to be silenced. it is important to note that within prague, the church had a wealth of power; it was home to numerous churches and related institutions. parallel to avignon, prague evolved into a city of clerics, with thousands studying at charles university and thousands in service.6 another dynamic that added to this volatile environment was the growing association that the church had with materialism in light of such influence and power. in the totality of the bohemian kingdom, the percentages of land owned by the church ranges from 25 to over 50 percent. while these figures are debated, they are important to note as this correlation between the church and ownership of property would be a pillar of not only hus’s personal theology but also the hussite movement. records exist of clergy who engaged in illicit behaviors or who had no desire to work among the people in their parish, which hus strongly opposed.7 in november of 1412, jan hus wrote a letter to his beloved praguers while in exile. hus writes to them about how he heard that the catholic church was trying to prevent services where their “iniquities [were being] denounced” and that the more “they wish to conceal their wickedness, the more they reveal it.”8 the entirety of this letter reads like the product of an unstable environment, which hus certainly was experiencing. the theology of jan hus in this letter “to the praguers,” hus acknowledges their desire for god and the truth and prays for them to not be led astray despite the “wiles of the antichrist.” this letter encourages the praguers to “not be dismayed, nor let fear trouble [them].”9 hus also asks them to pray for him, so that he may defend the truth, for he knows that nothing is lacking in god’s word to the praguers. this letter is arguably one of the best examples we have of the sum of his theology and its devoted connection to the people of prague. furthermore, it is evident that hus’s theology was committed to truth above all else—which, although he never explicitly defined it, was a central theme in his writings. hus’s definition of “truth” and his moral and ethical compass is evident in another letter, “to the lords gathered at the supreme court of the kingdom of bohemia.” the letter contains statements such as “in continuing to preach the word of god and in truth as i see 6 fudge, jan hus, 22. 7 fudge, the magnificent ride, 15-16. 8 jan hus, “john hus to the praguers c. november 1412,” in the letters of john hus, trans. matthew spinka (manchester: manchester university press, 1972), 81. 9 “john hus to the praguers c. november 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 79. 55 it.”10 his commitment to truth is also evident in his belief of adhering to the law of christ, even if it meant defying one’s superior, yet being equally prepared to submit to authority should one be proven wrong. however, for hus, being proven wrong was only considered truth if it was done with the bible as the sole and final authority and not papal authority. this assertion, while bold in nature, is necessary in the eyes of hus given the turmoil the catholic church was experiencing during this time. while the church was in a volatile state, hus turned to other sources to help make sense of his personal beliefs. he relied heavily on augustine for the development of his stances on doctrines such as predestination, the concept of the church, and clerical wickedness. speaking to the latter of these, in a letter he addressed to a nobleman, he speaks of the ways in which the clergy is at fault for “filling their purses with deceit…thus speaks st. augustine.”11 in hus’s treatise de ecclesia (the church), augustine is mentioned over one hundred times. in many ways, it is evident that hus held augustine in high regard, but it must be noted that he likely did not have access to his works and knew his writings from the theologian peter lombard’s libri quattuor sententiarum (four books of sentences). derivative scholarship in the middle ages was a relatively common practice.12 in hus’s letters, references to augustine are scattered consistently throughout, with hus often deferring to him as an authoritative figure. another external influence that hus arguably drew from was john wyclif. wyclif was a professor of theology and philosophy at oxford and considered the forerunner of the reformation for his stances on biblical authority and his subsequent translation of the bible into the vernacular, his challenges to the doctrine of transubstantiation (the belief that the elements of communion became the broken body of christ), and his opposition to the sale of indulgences (certificates that you could purchase for the forgiveness of sins for yourself or deceased relatives). hus’s teachings reflected agreeance with these teachings, and in addition to these commonalities, wyclif and hus shared similar approaches to matters such as papal authority and their ownership of property, and it is perhaps these parallels that drew accusations of wyclifism to hus.13 hus’s letters provide some insight into his views on wyclif’s teachings, which bring forth some of the ambiguities surrounding the extent of the influence of wyclif’s teachings on hus. in his letter “to master christian of prachatice or john cardinal,” he states: “[štěpán z] páleč (a former supporter of hus turned opponent) calls us wyclifites, as if we have deviated from the entire faith of christendom.”14 this statement could be interpreted as hus condemning wyclif’s teachings all together, perhaps calling them heretical. on the contrary, hus wrote a response to the forty-five articles that had been drawn from wyclif’s writings, saying that they had been taken out of context and did not represent their true meaning.15 at the council of 10 “john hus to the lords gathered at the supreme court of the kingdom of bohemia before 14 december 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 90. 11 “john hus to a nobleman concerning the death duties,” in the letters of john hus, 17. 12 fudge, jan hus, 30. 13 fudge, magnificent ride, 43-44. 14 “john hus to master christian of prachatice or john cardinal of rejnšten c. june 1413,” in the letters of john hus, 102. 15 matthew spinka, john hus: a biography (princeton: princeton university press, 1968), 65. 56 constance, hus condemned wyclif’s teachings yet openly admitted that he found his teachings attractive due to wyclif’s genuine efforts to convert people to the law of christ. hus’s theology did at times focus on doctrine, but his doctrine was predominantly centered on moral reform. while wyclif’s influence on hus is evident, hus always made sure to adopt the parts of wyclif’s doctrines that would be perceived as palatable to the orthodoxy.16 therefore, the connection between wyclif and hus exists, but perhaps in more abstract and indirect ways than is commonly believed. further speaking to the volatile state of the church, those who opposed hus accused him of adopting a sola scriptura stance, but this accusation does not necessarily stand. hus’s approach to theology was both traditional and innovative, evident in his adherence to biblical authority that simultaneously did not seek to exclude tradition. his acknowledgement of creeds and other patristic authorities back this claim.17 in one of his letters written pertaining to his upcoming trial in constance, hus claims: “consider, dear lords, even if i were fully guilty, whether they should restrain the people of god from the praise of the lord god and grieve them by such excommunication and cessations of the divine services. they do not have the warrant in the holy scriptures to stop them whenever they please!”18 this passage points to several pillars of hus’s theology. he asserts, in passing, that the bible is superior to papal authority and that he himself recognizes that there is a possibility he could be wrong, but that it should not stop him, or other people, from worshiping. hus’s critiques of the church at the council of constance, hus’s concept of the church came under assault. the council of constance was called by emperor sigismund in 1414 to end the papal schism as well as to examine the teachings of wyclif and hus and thus reform the church. in the context of his time, hus’s concept of the true church was considered heretical for several reasons. a charge that was at the forefront of the accusations was his claim that the church was limited to the predestinate. this stance was considered heretical because it implied hus’s denial of the validity of the church militant, which consists of both the predestinate and the foreknown and was considered to be the “true” church.19 in his letter “to master of christian of prachatice,” hus writes: “also in this i stand: if the pope is of the predestinate and performs the pastoral office, following christ in morals, then he is the head of as much of the church militant as he rules.”20 hus’s writings affirm his stance on predestination. however, outside of this context and aligning with his respect for authority, his concept of the church is thoroughly pauline and augustinian, the evidence of the latter is evident in the similarities of language and principles found between hus’s writings and those of augustine. at constance, his stance on predestination was never explicitly condemned as heretical, but hus’s concept of the church was a central theme of his trial at constance 16 howard kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution (berkeley: university of california press, 1967), 35. 17 fudge, jan hus, 40. 18 “john hus to the lords gathered at the supreme court of the kingdom of bohemia before 14 december 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 90. 19 matthew spinka, john hus' concept of the church (princeton: princeton university press, 1966), 255-257. 20 “john hus to master christian of prachatice prior to 25 april 1413,” in the letters of john hus, 99. 57 because it was perceived as a threat, and it was believed that his theology would lead to a revolution, of which the ramifications had potential to be catastrophic.21 within the church, hus’s view of the church had potential ramifications, but his stances that spoke against indulgences, simony (the selling of church offices), and papal authority were also most likely to have ramifications in society and beyond. in his letter, “to the polish king, władisław,” hus exhorts the ruler to rid his dominion of the practice of simony, yet he acknowledges the difficulties of doing so, given how widespread and entrenched the practice was: “but how could i expect its extermination when it has diffused its poison so widely that hardly anywhere priesthood and people can be found who are not stricken by the heresy of simony?”22 hus’s personal and complex journey with indulgences must be highlighted to understand the significance of his writings. first, hus’s personal decision to make a career in the church is rather unremarkable. at the time, the church was one of the major employers and provided opportunities for advancement and assurances of salvation. hus himself said, “whoever wishes to live well should enter the monk’s cell.”23 he would later repudiate his own statements, which put carnal desire above heavenly things. while a student at charles university, hus was exposed to a practice that would later cause him to protest against the church: he heard a preacher teach vehemently about indulgences, a practice upon which the late medieval church depended for economic stability.24 hus was not always opposed to indulgences. while at charles university, hus once used his last coins to purchase an indulgence after being moved by powerful rhetoric, ready to live a penniless life so long as he had the assurance of forgiveness of sins. however, this stance began to change for him when the sale of indulgences turned violent in prague. seeing the negative effects in his beloved prague, he took a staunch position against indulgences but also against the subsequent greed it created among church leadership. in a bold letter addressed to pope john xxiii, hus claims his innocence since he was accused “that indulgences are naught.”25 considering how heavily the catholic church relied on this practice for both pious and financial purposes, hus’s claims against them to the pope himself are bold in their time. in his letters, hus also spoke out about the greed of such practices among church leadership. in his letter “to an unnamed monk,” he discusses the rules for clerics concerning property ownership and how they should not claim anything as their own and further that their money perishes with them.26 likewise, in his letter “to the polish king władisław,” he says that “once the priesthood was like gold heated with love…now it has become earthly and darkened.”27 in this same letter, he also expresses his frustration regarding how this same group of clergy who are “pompous, luxurious, and unrestrained” are the ones accusing him of heresy and, should he keep silent on this double standard, 21 fudge, jan hus, 34. 22 “john hus to the polish king, władisław on 11 june 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 73-74. 23 fudge, jan hus, 11. 24 fudge, jan hus, 11. 25 “john hus to pope john xxiii, 1 september 1411,” in the letters of john hus, 54. 26 “john hus to an unnamed monk, 28 february 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 69. 27 “john hus to the polish king władisław,” in the letters of john hus, 74. 58 then it would “make [him] a participant in their guilt and hell.”28 he even goes as far as to liken it to prostitution, as written in his letter “to christian of prachatice, rector of the university.”29 in hus’s view, the papacy was not the sole authority over him or the church. in light of the ways in which he had seen the greed for material things grow within the clergy, he had reasons to protest in his letters. beyond his letters, hus preached against the abuses of simony in bethlehem chapel in prague and urged those in attendance not to pay for these privileges.30 in addition to his personal grievances with the practice, his vocal opposition of this reinforces his care for people and shows how much hus did not want a corrupt clergy to abuse their power over the people. hus’s commitment to the czech people and their access to faith is evident throughout his letters. in his letter “to the people of plzen,” hus repudiates a letter he received that stated that priests should forbid the reading of scripture in the czech or german vernacular.31 he also argues that the authors of the gospels wrote in the language of the people they were addressing and could not understand how in light of this how priests could deny this to the czech and german peoples. in another letter written in exile addressed “to king sigismund,” hus writes of how, in preparation for his trial at constance, he posted notices in both latin and in czech so that perhaps king sigismund would grant him the grace to publicly profess the faith that he held.32 theology aside, in another letter addressed to the praguers that he wrote while in exile, hus’s love for the praguers is evident. in this letter, he writes: “albeit i am now separated from you so far that it perhaps is not fitting that i preach much to you, nevertheless, the love i have for you urges me that i say at least a few brief words to your love.”33 this affection, which is evident through this letter, is reciprocated. this factor arguably contributed to hus’s eventual centrality in czech memory and history. hus’s time in the countryside also sheds light on why preaching in the vernacular was of such importance to him. in prague, it was expected that clergy should have an acceptable command of latin. however, when hus moved to the countryside, he found that many priests there did not have an extensive command of latin, thus hindering their abilities to draw from latin handbooks and anthologies. making matters even more serious, hus also encountered some who were even illiterate. given the situation, hus was compelled to teach and began spreading religious knowledge in the vernacular. his goals were clear: to produce a systematic and accessible instruction on doctrine for commoners and to elevate czech as a language of theology. this is a feat that he could not achieve alone, and with the fervent support of priests who were devoted to him and his czech treatises that were published, his vision to bring an internal and personal christianity to life began to gain momentum. this would lead him to arguably his most important contribution to czech 28 “john hus to the polish king władisław,” in the letters of john hus, 74. 29 “john hus to christian of prachatice, rector of the university, toward the end of 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 89. 30 fudge, jan hus, 63. 31 “john hus to the people of plzen, c. october 1411,” in the letters of john hus, 59-61. 32 “john hus to king sigismund, 1 september 1414,” in the letters of john hus, 119. 33 “john hus to the praguers, 25 december 1413,” in the letters of john hus, 111. 59 believers at this time: his participation in the translation of parts of the bible to the vernacular.34 hus’s afterlives hus’s willingness to speak out against these abuses of power and his refusal to recant on his theological stances eventually cost him his life. on july 6, 1415, he was burned at the stake as a heretic after his trial at the council of constance. this event would have ramifications not only within the church, but for many, it would also elevate hus as a champion of the czech people, the effects of which we still see today. the commemoration of hus’s death as a martyr in the context of the early bohemian reformation became a cemented practice. his death at constance affirmed his message: his writings in czech were perceived by his followers in the way they were intended to be—as a call to reform within the church and as a tool that utilized the vernacular to empower czech people. almost immediately after his death, his letters written while in exile and in prison became liturgical texts and part of czech popular piety, and his teachings in the vernacular gained the status of a saint’s teaching. the following of a new saint is often, perhaps always, political in nature, and these words fueled a movement that would turn revolutionary in nature.35 additionally, a concept of the czech nation as god’s chosen people gained a different meaning after his death, and this was one of the most important motives for the hussite resistance against external forces.36 hus’s life before his trial and death affirm that he sought to be a teacher and a preacher above all and that his principal purpose was not only to defend the truth, which he believed in vehemently, but also to make it accessible to his people, so they too could know the truth for themselves and perhaps not be subjected to unnecessary abuses by religious authorities that sought to gatekeep and control people. hus’s public life was a period that covered roughly two decades. however, hus is one of those rare figures who gets to live twice, in the sense that his “afterlife” spans six centuries. when considering the potential longevity or impact of phenomena, an important factor to examine is the initial success it experienced—or lack thereof. to answer the question of how hus, a religious figure, became a symbol of national identity that has survived six centuries and several regime changes, one must look at broader contexts. hus’s life and death was certainly impactful in religious spheres, but his legacy was cemented as a result of the social and political discontent in bohemia at the time.37 exploring how it is that hus’s influence transcended from religious martyr to national figure is an interesting path. in order to understand how this path unfolded, it is important to explore the theological and ideological roots of the immediate product of hus’s life and death: the hussite movement. originating as a reform movement in prague, it turned into a nationalist movement and 34františek šmahel, “instead of conclusion: jan hus as writer and author,” in a companion to jan hus. eds. ota pavlı́ček and františek šmahel, brill's companions to the christian tradition 54 (boston: brill, 2014), 399405. 35 phillip n. haberkern, patron saint and prophet: jan hus in the bohemian and german reformations, oxford studies in international history (new york: oxford university press, 2016), 25. 36 františek šmahel, “the national idea, secular power, and social issues in the political theology of jan hus,” in a companion to jan hus, eds. ota pavlı́ček and františek šmahel, brill's companions to the christian tradition 54 (boston: brill, 2014), 215-217. 37 steven ozment, the age of reform (new haven: yale university press, 1981), 165-167. 60 contributed to the construction of hus’s memory. the hussite movement was complex in nature—it was both a revolution and a reformation. no other religious movement had gained the momentum that the hussites in bohemia did prior to the protestant reformation. understanding the role it played is imperative to comprehend fully the beginnings of the influence that hus’s legacy had. the hussite movement and revolutions did not necessarily have hus as the figure who questioned church practices yet was willing to submit to papal authority at the center of the movement. the movement, which unfolded in 1414 and for a decade after it, emerged amid more radical subscribers of hus the martyr but less so hus the theologian. this is evident in the hussite belief of utraquism. at the council of constance, utraquism, or the practice of the laity partaking in communion in both bread and wine form, was condemned. although this doctrine of utraquism became part of hus’s legacy, he did not author it. this doctrine was birthed from the more radical wing of the religiously awakened laity at the time but became central to the hussite movement and subsequently the utraquist church.38 after hus’s death at the council of constance, the utraquist church would keep hus’s memory alive and lay the foundation of a pronationalist movement. shortly after hus’s death, he was represented on altars within the utraquist church alongside czech patron saints, further establishing the connotation in the minds of the public that made hus a symbol of national identity.39 this hussite movement appealed to a demographic that desired sociopolitical freedom as well as religious reform in several facets.40 one of these was their desire for truth as they knew it. in addition to their defiance of the roman catholic church via advocating for utraquism, hus’s movement held on to the belief that the church was made up of the elect, which was derived from hus’s wyclifism.41 hus’s predestination beliefs would be carried forward in the hussite movement. his teachings on predestination were perceived as a threat to the church and state polity, since, at its core, it argues that the church does not have authority over man. while hus had no interest in applying this defiance to his secular jurisdiction, his followers did. this is evident in the “four articles of prague” that were written shortly before the roman catholic church launched the first crusade against the hussites in 1420, which led to a series of conflicts known as the hussite wars. these articles were written by hussites who wanted free preaching throughout the kingdom of bohemia, communion in both kinds for all faithful christians, the divesting of church wealth, and the punishment of all mortal sins that went against the law of god.42 hus and eventually his movement would cling to this belief that the roman catholic church did not have authority over them, which would fuel the movement. aligning with hus’s discontentment with the church during his time, the hussites also heavily criticized the ways in which the church exerted and abused their authority. one of the pillars of hus’s life and legacy was his desire to make scripture and teachings available in the vernacular. 38 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution, 5. 39 pavel soukup, jan hus: the life and death of a preacher, central european studies (west lafayette: purdue university press, 2020), 8. 40 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution, 6-8. 41 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution, 38. 42 fudge, the magnificent ride, 98. 61 fellow prominent reformers, like jacob of mies (1372-1429), also known as master jakoubek, carried on this important pillar of hus’s legacy, approving the mass and church songs in czech.43 to further understand how the hussite movement would eventually become a protonationalist movement, it is important to understand how it radicalized exponentially right before and after hus’s death. for example, two weeks prior to hus’s death at constance, two preachers were burned for preaching “hus’s errors.”44 the hussites labeled these preachers defenders of their gentis, or race, on the basis of their czech nationality. strengthening the hussite movement and its path towards a protonationalist movement were two factors: their counterparts, german catholics, and their proximity to the nobility. german catholics were utilized as the “other” during this period, as the hussite movement continued to pair truth and czech nationality as a virtuous message and german catholics as a threat. the pairing of the hussite church to the nobility would increase this sense of national identity. following hus’s death, fifty-eight hussite barons and nobles protested hus’s death at constance and eventually sent a formal letter of protest to a later pope to appeal the actions of the council of constance. the hussite barons and nobles who wrote this would go on to form a hussite league, whose main purpose was to support the next pope as long as he followed god’s law. here, hussitism began to take on more political dimensions. furthermore, considering the increasing prominence that the kingdom of bohemia had in europe, this protonationalist movement, paired with a state that had significant military power, was a mark of success internally, while also a cause for concern from foreign observers. after hus’s death, the czech people experienced a series of drastic changes, making hus and his movement central to the living history of the czech nation. though the czechs won a series of religious privileges in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these freedoms were curtailed in the seventeenth century and hus remained a “heretic” in the eyes of orthodox catholic believers. some habsburg rulers, such as emperors maximilian ii (1527-1576) and rudolf ii (1552-1612), were sympathetic to protestants for different reasons.45 during this time, religious issues contributed to a revolt against the habsburgs that resulted in the defenestration, or throwing out of a window, of two officials and a chancery secretary.46 this event would spark the thirty years’ war (1618-1648), which was a catastrophic conflict for europe overall. during this period, the catholic minority in bohemia that had been living in the shadows of the hussites would begin to try to reclaim their power. within bohemia, this series of events—the defenestration of prague in 1618 and the decision to depose the kingdom’s elected sovereign and replace him with a protestant—led to the battle of white mountain in 1620. this clash on a hill would lead to an aggressive campaign to re-catholicize bohemia with a full-blown counter-reformation.47 43 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution, 183. 44 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution, 141. 45 howard louthan, converting bohemia: force and persuasion in the catholic reformation, new studies in european history (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2011), 9. 46 louthan, converting bohemia, 16. 47 louthan, converting bohemia, 4-5. 62 there were times where hus was seen as a symbol of national identity first and a religious figure second. for instance, catholic author václav hájek wrote in his czech chronicle in 1541 that hus was someone he respected for his virtuous life, even though he could not approve of his heretical stances, thus recognizing hus as someone who lived and died advocating for the czech people, despite ideological differences.48 there were instances where hus’s status as a national symbol was contested by those within the church. in the baroque era, catholic authors were searching for figures in czech history who could redeem the reputation of the nation and used john of nepomuk (1345-1393) as their champion. john of nepomuk was considered a martyr for his refusal to divulge the secrets of the confessional and used by catholics to erase hus from church history.49 this effort, however, would not have lasting success. during the czech national revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, hus’s label of “heretic” was traded for that of champion for the freedom of belief. his legacy, which until then had been centered around his religious contributions, acquired two new components in the nineteenth century. first, hus and the subsequent hussite movement were considered a prototype for social justice efforts by western european socialists. second, hus became the center of national efforts for emancipation of the czech nation from habsburg rule. as a national figure of this kind, he continued to be a part of the history of the czech nation during and after the creation of an independent czechoslovak republic in 1918. hus was seen as the bearer of the national idea during this time.50 in modern religious spheres, churches in the czech republic commemorate hus in their liturgies, even if they do not entirely adhere to the principles of the bohemian reformation. established in 1920, shortly after the formation of the nation-state, the czechoslovak church captured the spirit of their newly acquired independence and nationalism. it was not until 1971 that it adopted the “hussite” part to its name thus becoming the “czechoslovak hussite church.” in this church, hus is commemorated in the provisions made for the reading of hus’s letters dated between 10 and 26 june 1415 which were addressed “to all faithful czechs.”51 additionally, the offertory sentence and the prayer after communion are extracted from hus’s works. the effect of this within this church is powerful, as it evokes historic events and places the liturgical assembly as if it were in the presence of hus, either as those he addressed in his writings or as witnesses in his trial and execution. these elements have had their share of polemic, but it is important to understand that these practices emerged as a product of an infant church and nation that had regained their political and religious freedom and sought to shake off the chains of three centuries of habsburg rule. the czechoslovak church at its beginning saw itself as a 48 soukup, jan hus, 9. 49 louthan, converting bohemia, 279-280. 50 františek šmahel “introduction: a companion to jan hus,” in a companion to jan hus, eds. ota pavlı́ček and františek šmahel, brill's companions to the christian tradition 54 (boston: brill, 2014), 1-2, 7. 51 david holeton and hannah vlhova-woner, “the second life of jan hus: liturgy, commemoration, and music,” in a companion to jan hus, eds. ota pavlı́ček and františek šmahel, brill's companions to the christian tradition 54 (boston: brill, 2014), 316. 63 part of the liberation from foreign rule, inspired by hus’s life and example that called upon ecclesial and national reform.52 if you visit prague today, there is a statue commemorating hus in the old town square thanks to nationalists who had raised the funds for this statue over a period spanning twenty-five years. it was unveiled by civic leaders in the middle of world war i to mark the 500th anniversary of his death. this choice to make hus a national icon was not universal or without protest. while popular sentiment reflected hus’s overwhelming popularity among the majority of the czech people, it is important within this historical context also to highlight the dissent that existed as a result of these actions. political conflicts between czechs and germans heightened between 1890 and world war i, and the choice to erect a monument to hus took a quarter century, since it was embroiled in the peak of nationalistic competition and change in bohemia.53 one cannot ignore how germans who lived in bohemian lands viewed hussites as both anti-german and anti-habsburg, and in the late nineteenth century, several protests broke out over the erection of this statue. during this time, many catholics in bohemia felt alienated by the pro-hus nationalist movement and opposed it by aligning with catholic austria for as long as they could. however, once their defeat became inevitable, they reconciled with the dominant discourse that supported this nationalist notion.54 “hus” in czech means “goose.” in his letter “to the praguers,” hus says that a goose has been caught by a net, but since a goose is a lazy, domestic bird, their net would inevitably tear, like “many other birds who fly high to god by their writings, and their lives will tear their nets,” since hus says that the truth they wanted to suppress is such that the more they tried to suppress it, the brighter it shone.55 he was right. while he was alive, hus accomplished what he set out to do: make the teaching of the word accessible to common people, fueled by his deep commitment to truth above all else. one could argue that this dedication to his beliefs and to the czech people certainly merited the response that his death received. his path from martyr to national icon is perhaps a romanticized one, but for many czech people, his living and his dying was a statement of identity above all else, which they have held onto in the face of a tumultuous history. six hundred years later, hus’s life and death are still impactful because there is much that we can learn from him, such as the virtues of holding steadfast principles and the unrelenting pursuit of truth, and the quiet confidence one has when our convictions align with our actions. 52 holeton and vlhova-woner, “the second life of jan hus,” 315-317. 53 gary b. cohen, the politics of ethnic survival: germans in prague, 1861-1914, 2nd ed., central european studies (west lafayette: purdue university press, 2006), 172-176. 54 cynthia j. paces, “‘the czech nation must be catholic!’: an alternative version of czech nationalism during the first republic," nationalities papers 27, no. 3 (1999): 407-428. 55 “john hus to the praguers, c. november 1412,” in the letters of john hus, 82. 180 a consciously un-revolutionary revolution salzburg 1918 cole ashkenazy mcgill university abstract as the habsburg monarchy ended in fall 1918, the salzburg social democratic workers’ party almost never mentioned the word revolution in association with austria or salzburg. yet in later years it would organize celebratory demonstrations for the anniversary of the revolution. this article examines this change in attitude and addresses the idea of a revolution in salzburg. in addition to the specific austrian, regional, and local salzburg contexts, the article confronts the central power of the word revolution: its ability to both legitimize and delegitimize political and social change. the research is based primarily upon three salzburg newspapers, which each corresponded to a major political party of the time, as well as the stenographic protocols of the local government. article as the habsburg monarchy ended, the decision to use, or not use, the word revolution to describe unfolding events mattered greatly. the kommunistische partei österreichs (communist party of austria; kpö) offered one example of why revolution mattered to it in a fictional tragikomödie (tragicomedy) in which an austrian soldier returning home from russia in mid-september 1918 meets with the leader of the austrian social democrats. the soldier comments that a revolution is inevitable in austria, but the leader cuts him off to say “wir in oesterreich brauchen solche dummen sachen nicht. wir brauchen keine revolution” (we don’t need such stupid things in austria. we don’t need a revolution), before finishing the conversation with a request that the soldier keep their discussion a secret. the tragikomödie skips ahead to october 1919 where the socialist leader is giving a speech before a massive crowd and proclaims to rousing applause that “in wenigen tagen fährt sich der tag unserer glorreichen revolution” (in a few days it will be the day of our glorious revolution). the leader goes on to take credit for the revolution and accidently reveals that a coalition government, not the revolution, was his desire.1 the accusations the kpö levels at the socialist leader, of celebrating revolution after not supporting it, appear well-suited to the sozialdemokratische arbeiterpartei (social democratic party; sdap) in salzburg. through communist eyes, the sdap appears to hate 1 die rote fahne, 2 november 1919. when english follows german, all translations are my own. 181 the idea of revolution in 1918, but in little more than a year, the socialists are disingenuously commemorating the “glorious revolution” for political gain, without believing in what it stands for. salzburg and revolution in the fall of 1918, the socialist newspaper salzburger wacht (salzburg watch) almost never mentioned the word revolution in association with austria, while in later years it would advertise and support demonstrations for the anniversary of the revolution. what explains this change in attitude? the communist view of a cynical, self-serving sdap does not entirely match the evidence in the case of salzburg. to explore why this change occurred, it is necessary to establish an understanding of how socialists, and others in salzburg, used the word revolution and thought of the idea of revolution. the kpö’s short scene, while unfair to the sdap, highlights an important feature of the perception of revolution which carries over into salzburg. revolution was polarizing; it was either “stupid” or “glorious,” with little middle ground. often there was awareness that both these views existed, which is why the socialist leader in the tragikomödie asks the returnee to keep quiet about their talk: the socialist leader would lose support if it came out that he opposed revolution. for those in salzburg in 1918, the decision to use the term revolution was not purely based on whether a situation fit a definition but also whether the baggage connected to revolution should be invoked. this baggage, which comprised the various people, ideas, events, and feelings associated with revolution, as well as the power and influence of those who supported the view, could and did change over time. in 1918 salzburg, multiple revolutions dating back to the french in 1789 were connected to the term revolution, but the most prominent were the recent 1917 russian revolutions. recalling the tragikomödie’s socialist leader who began celebrating revolution when it suited him, if one can invoke revolution to reap the benefits associated with the word and idea, can one conversely choose not to invoke revolution and distance oneself from the concept to avoid any of the negative associations? in other words, how much are the “good” and “bad” associations of revolution tied to revolution as a label, versus the actual events and processes which earn the title? in the salzburg sdap’s case both physical and temporal distance from revolutionary events proved to be the keys to their willingness to invoke revolution. the decision to use, or not use, the word revolution mattered greatly in salzburg in 1918. the present subject, the use of the term revolution in salzburg and its change over time, emerged from the question: was there a revolution in salzburg in 1918? the diversity of definitions and conceptions of revolution on offer made answering this question feel both inadequate and unsatisfying. applying the works on revolution of various scholars and theorists, including austro-marxists, francis carsten, and charles tilly to salzburg, highlighted a factor that distanced the topic from the question of whether there was a revolution, to how revolution was portrayed and seen. an overview of these works and how they relate to salzburg will follow in the next section, but a commonality is that they all deal with institutions and structures more than people. as important as studying institutions and structures is, the people who create, inhabit, and interact with them must not be ignored. the sources on which this paper is based, primarily newspapers, do not 182 provide a grassroots perspective of what people thought and experienced in the revolution; however, they do present how political parties portrayed revolution to the majority of the population. in salzburg the newspapers were an intersection between the political parties and the people; they were meant for public consumption, and while they influenced people, the people also influenced them. i do not know how people responded to these newspapers, but newspapers at least present how groups of writers, editors, and politicians thought about and described revolution. in this article, the question of whether there was a revolution in salzburg is subsidiary to whether salzburgers believed there was a revolution. the specific context of salzburg also allows for the question which follows naturally from looking at how revolution was used: did how actors at the time, or others afterwards, portray revolution, affect whether there was indeed a revolution? salzburg is an excellent place to consider the portrayal of revolution for three main reasons. first, there is little written about salzburg specifically on the topic of revolution, and no dedicated works in english focus on salzburg in this period.2 second, salzburg has an excellent and easily accessible source base for the question of portrayal because there were three politically distinct newspapers, as well as the full stenographic protocols of the local salzburg government.3 finally, the evidence in salzburg not only points to different uses and views of revolution, but also a change over time in certain groups’ and peoples’ usage of revolution. before exploring this evidence, a few notes about language. firstly, salzburg refers to both the land of salzburg, salzburg as a province or state, and the city proper, which when in need of distinction shall be referred to as stadt salzburg. secondly, socialists refers to the sdap and its members, not just anyone who held socialist beliefs. with these clarifications in mind, the first section of this paper focuses on whether there was a revolution in salzburg. following this is an examination of how the revolution in salzburg was portrayed in the fall of 1918. the third section focuses on how the revolution was remembered, assessed mainly through its portrayal during periods of commemoration from 1919 to 1928. the subsequent section proposes various possible explanations for why salzburgers did, or did not, use revolution the way they did. the conclusion then explains how the salzburg socialists were consciously un-revolutionary in 1918. was there a revolution in salzburg? many different theories of or works on revolution could be used to answer this question, but here i only address three: austro-marxist theory, francis carsten’s study of the 1918 revolutions in austria and germany, and charles tilly’s study of european revolutions. it is natural to apply austro-marxist thought to salzburg in 1918, because as an intellectual 2 for good examples addressing salzburg in the period, but not addressing the question of revolution, see ingrid bauer, von der alten solidarität zur neuen sozialen frage. ein salzburger bilderlesebuch (vienna: europaverlag, 1988); and ernst hanisch, “die sozialdemokratische fraktion im salzburger landtag, 19181934,” in bewegung und klasse. studien zur österreichischen arbeitergeschichte, eds. gerhard botz, hans hautmann, helmut konrad, and josef weidenholzer (vienna: europaverlag, 1978), 247-268. 3 stenographische protokolle contain transcripts as well as reports and appendices. 183 orientation, it was not only native to the habsburg monarchy and austria, but it was also a school of thought contemporary to the revolution. prominent socialists, mostly in vienna, such as otto bauer, karl renner, and max adler, developed austro-marxist theory, which informed many of the sdap’s actions. slightly before the first world war, an american socialist created the label of “austro-marxism” to describe the school of thought. austromarxism can be thought of as a middle ground between marxist-leninist communism and more reform-oriented social democratic parties.4 that is to say that austro-marxists were supporters of revolution, but one that was more gradual. in 1919, otto bauer wrote that if the workers were to “suddenly take possession of the factories by force, [and] expel the capitalists” it would result in “a bloody civil war.” the solution? to “construct socialist society gradually”—but bauer notes that this is not reformism because it is a mistake to believe that socialism can be made without a revolution. the austro-marxist revolution was thus a two-part revolution: a gradual social revolution that required the proletariat seizing political power “and the proletariat could and can seize power only by revolutionary means.”5 max adler explains that the first, political revolution means the “destruction and dissolution” of the established power.6 the idea of a more gradual revolution was present prior to the fall of 1918; for example, the socialist linken program of january 1918 stated that “unter der sozialen revolution verstehen wir einen jahre, vielleicht jahrzehnte dauernden prozeß” (by social revolution, we understand a process which will last for a year, maybe decades).7 the austro-marxist view of revolution recognizes the difficulty of quickly and utterly transforming society. applying this theory to 1918 austria, a political revolution took place where a republic replaced the established monarchy. this replacement also took place in salzburg, with local leaders organizing independently and supporting the republic. the theory would not apply to austria or salzburg if one considered that the old order was not entirely destroyed with the republic. many politicians and bureaucrats in salzburg and throughout austria maintained their positions and power from the monarchy in the republic. francis carsten embraces this critique and offers a view contrary to the austro-marxists: that the political and social revolutions needed to have happened together. carsten describes defeated revolutions in both austria and germany in 1918/19.8 in the austrian case, failure is ascribed to, but blame not attributed to, the soldiers’ and workers’ councils not doing enough to secure radical change and easily relinquishing their power. in the same vein, the sdap is criticized for not fully supporting these new places of democracy and organization. while he does not offer an explicit definition or theory, it is clear that carsten places democratizing political and social institutional changes as central to 4 tom bottomore and patrick goode, eds. and trans., austro-marxism (oxford: clarendon press, 1978), 1. 5 otto bauer, der weg zum sozialismus (1919), in austro-marxism, eds. and trans. tom bottomore and patrick goode (oxford: clarendon press, 1978), 149-150. 6 max adler, “zur soziologie der revolution,” der kampf 12 (1928), in austro-marxism, eds. and trans. tom bottomore and patrick goode (oxford: clarendon press, 1978), 146. adler is quoting karl marx here. 7 “das nationalitätenprogramm der linken” (1918), in österreichische parteiprogramme, 1868-1966, ed. klaus berchtold (vienna: verlag für geschichte und politik, 1967), 160. 8 francis l. carsten, revolution in central europe, 1918-1919 (berkeley: university of california press, 1972), esp. pp. 325-335. 184 revolution.9 salzburg fits the broader austrian case, where in getting rid of the monarchy, revolution managed limited democratizing change, but the councils and socialists, wishing to maintain order, did not push back against the old social forces that had never been driven out. there was a revolution in salzburg, but it was a failure. charles tilly’s conception of revolution also allows for failure to be taken into account. tilly’s flexible framework of revolution draws a distinction between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes.10 applying his three proximate conditions for revolutionary situations to 1918 salzburg shows that there was indeed a revolutionary situation. there were multiple contenders for control of the state (i), with both monarchists and republicans who were supported by large numbers (ii), and the ruling habsburgs were unable to suppress the republicans (iii). in salzburg, the sdap and many german nationalists openly supported a republic at the end of october, almost two weeks prior to the declaration of the republic. there was also a revolutionary outcome in 1918 salzburg. the mass desertions of the army and the establishment of soldiers’ councils fulfill two of the conditions: neutralizing the regime’s army and revolutionaries in control of an armed force. the councils proved to be very peaceful, and some might consider this to mean that they were not revolutionary. but the councils were initially independent organic structures separate from the state and possessed the possibility of using armed force. another condition which occurred in salzburg was the defection of polity members. many politicians who served under the habsburgs began to organize in november, independent of orders from the monarch, and also quickly transitioned to serving the republic. the final condition, “control of the state apparatus by members of a revolutionary coalition,” also fits salzburg if one considers supporting the republic to be revolutionary. in 1918, austria and salzburg both had a revolutionary situation and outcome, making it a fully fledged revolution based on tilly’s framework. the answers that salzburgers themselves gave in 1918 and later in memory also varied. prior to the creation of the republic, none of the salzburg newspapers or politicians in the assembly used the word revolution to describe what was occurring locally at the time. some groups were openly hostile to the idea of revolution, others were more ambivalent, and others were supportive of it abroad and, in all but name, at home. in the 1920s the socialists moved to openly celebrating a revolution and the republic together, explicitly referring to 1918. greater details and examples will be given in the following two sections, but it is clear that different groups perceived revolution differently and that, within a group, their views changed over time. in an earlier iteration of this article, my own case for why revolution is an appropriate label for salzburg would also have then been made. however, this changed when the focus of the paper shifted from “was there a revolution” to the use of the term revolution in salzburg. the decision to use revolution and thus invoke its baggage not only varies between people and places and over time but also changes depending on someone’s purpose. using a rigid 9 carsten, revolution in central europe, 335. 10 charles tilly, european revolutions, 1492-1992 (oxford: blackwell, 1993), esp. pp. 49-50. 185 definition or even adaptable theory like tilly’s is not how most people decide whether or not something is a revolution. the decision to call, or not to call, the events in 1918 salzburg a revolution is a moral choice.11 the decision in this article to use revolution, as opposed to transition of power or another term, depended on how and what i gathered from the evidence, how i conceived of revolution, what i associated with revolution, and what i wanted to project about the events in salzburg and the idea of revolution more generally. the sdap and other salzburgers also naturally had their own reasons behind their decisions to use or not use revolution. on this note, let us now see what occurred and how revolution was used in 1918 salzburg. the reasons why salzburgers used, or did not use, revolution—why they made the moral choices they did—will follow later. revolution in salzburg in salzburg the three major political groups were all associated with one of the local newspapers. the christian socialist party had the salzburger chronik (salzburg chronicle), the salzburger volksblatt (salzburg people’s journal) was the domain of the various german nationalist parties, and the socialists had the salzburger wacht. the wacht was directly the organ of the salzburg sdap, and robert preußler was both the paper’s editorin-chief and the leader of salzburg’s socialists. each of these papers had a clear target audience: those in salzburg who fit into their respective political camp. salzburg was a small, mountainous, and practically ethnically homogenous, which is to say germanspeaking, state. these three newspapers will be followed from mid-october to the end of december 1918. the period was not selected because the revolution ended nicely on the final day of the year, but because these weeks encapsulate a period of great change and potential, including the ends of the war and monarchy and establishment of the republic. the rest of november and december following the declaration of the republic are included because the survival of the republic was not guaranteed. the focus of this section is how the three newspapers used revolution and depicted the events in 1918. throughout this section, the arbeiter zeitung, a socialist newspaper from vienna, will be used as a comparison. there were differences between salzburg and vienna, including that the capital had a greater sdap presence than salzburg.12 a great deal of context could be provided with respect to austria and salzburg in the days, months, and years leading up to the revolution. instead, a single episode of september 19th, 1918, is enough to set the stage. the people of salzburg were hungry. years of warfare and blockade had taken their toll. on september 19th, a demonstrationstreik (demonstration strike) for more food occurred in stadt salzburg. thousands of people participated, but the orderly demonstration broke into looting and ausschreitungen (riots). in response, the government forbade assemblies in the 11 james krapfl, revolution with a human face: politics, culture, and community in czechoslovakia, 1989-1992 (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 2013), ch. 2, esp. p. 34. the moral choice here is regarding which plot people, in this case czechoslovaks, chose to employ to narrate the history of the 1989 revolution. 12 vienna receives a dominant amount of attention in scholarship not only on the topic of revolution in 1918, but for interwar austria as a whole. the comparison here is to present a situation which is typically seen as more revolutionary than that of salzburg, because in vienna, there were more crowds in the street, and it was the seat of the national government. 186 streets and squares, heavily censored newspapers from telling the whole story, and called hungarian soldiers into the city to keep order. responses in the press varied; the german nationalist volksblatt appeared sympathetic to the strike but was thoroughly in support of the reestablishment of order, even encouraging people to report to the police if they knew any details about rioters. the christian socialist chronik largely agreed with the volksblatt but was less sympathetic—this could have been censored—and more heavily emphasized the looting. the socialist wacht considered the demonstrations to be completely reasonable and supported them. after the riots, the sdap stated it would work with vienna to improve food supplies. additionally, while there is reference to “anarchie” (anarchy), the wacht also points out the negative side of having hungarian troops in the city as well as that at least fifty people were arrested.13 the fact the demonstration dissolved into disorder is something to keep in mind when reading of salzburgers’ reactions and actions in late october and early november. after september 19th, it is not surprising that looting was a major concern of salzburgers who experienced a demonstration turning into a riot. the last days of october had newspaper headlines dominated with war, peace, ceasefire, and the end of the monarchy. there was no consensus in salzburg over what qualified as a revolution in 1918, as we can see the chronik refer to an “umsturz” (takeover) in hungary, and the volksblatt call it a “revolution” on the 31st.14 all three newspapers used the word revolution to refer to a foreign event at least once, but none ever used it in relation to german-austria. revolution was in their vocabulary and was an option to describe events. despite revolution not being explicitly invoked, the end of the monarchy and desire for a republic was a popular topic in late october. “genug der worter!” (enough words!) the wacht was clear on the 31st with this headline referring to the option of a republic; it wanted a democracy for german-austria. the czechs and south slavs establishing their own states had shown the wacht that “das alte stirbt!” (the old dies!), which meant an opportunity for the new.15 already on the 25th, workers in salzburg began organizing themselves, including with advertisements in the wacht.16 the german nationalist volksblatt agreed with the socialists—at least in the case of wanting democracy; on the 29th, they declared that “jezt sind wir frei!” (now we are free!), referring both to freedom from monarchy as a form of government but also its multi-ethnic character.17 in vienna, the sdap called for a republic on october 21st in the new national council, and later the prominent socialist max adler would support a revolution to achieve democracy.18 not all were pleased with the call for a republic. a demonstration for an austrian republic in vienna earned the ire of the christian socialist salzburger chronik. not only was it a “putschversuch” (an attempted putsch), but to rush the declaration of a republic was to “spiel mit feuer” (play with fire).19 the worry here is that order would be upset. another 13 see the salzburger chronik (sch); salzburger volksblatt (svb); and salzburger wacht (sbw) for 19-24 september 1918. 14 sch, 31 october 1918, 1; and svb, 31 october 1918, 1. 15 sbw, 31 october 1918, 1. 16 sbw, 25 october 1918, 4. 17 svb, 29 october 1918, 1. they also mentioned the czechoslovaks and south slavs as an example. 18 arbeiter zeitung (az), 29 october 1918, 2-3. 19 sch, 31 october 1918, 1. 187 theme of these early days in salzburg was the idea of maintaining order, specifically in the phrase “ruhe und ordnung” (peace and order).20 in the first days of november, prior to the official declaration of a republic on the 12th, peace and order were a common topic in salzburg. for example, a volksblatt headline read “ruhe, ordnung, und selbstzucht” (peace, order, and self-discipline).21 the power behind the idea of peace and order was not only that it promised relief from the current crises but also that these crises had been going on for many years of warfare and hardship. on the 7th, the provisional salzburg government, made up of all three parties with each having a position in the three-man presidency, met for the first time. these presidents echoed the message of peace and order with calls to stop looting and robbery. they also emphasized that this austria was a new state and focused their immediate objectives on security and feeding the people.22 it is notable that the former salzburg governor, eduard rambousek, was arrested for embezzling and using his position to sell food during the war. none of the newspapers used this as an opportunity to bring up the september 19th demonstration/riots. perhaps the risk of the chaos recurring was seen as too great.23 the old army was also gone; in its place were the salzburg volkswehr (literally peoples’ guard), the new armed force of austria, and soldiers’ councils. a pattern throughout the fall was these groups emphasizing that they were apolitical. this is likely because of how concerned the non-socialists were of these organizations becoming dominated by socialists.24 the salzburg soldiers’ councils promoting peace and order, instead of attempting to radically alter society, recalls francis carsten’s criticism of the austrian soldiers’ and workers’ councils not establishing a strong enough power base separate from the republicans.25 the volkswehr and soldiers’ councils both stated that they would maintain order and then acted accordingly. for example, the wacht had a volkswehr advertisement for many days emphasizing that the volkswehr were able to secure “demokratie, zum schutze der familien und unserer heimat, aufrechterhaltung der ruhe und ordnung” (democracy, defend families and our homeland, maintain peace and order).26 this was also in response to an actual need, for salzburg was in some ways occupied. there were approximately 10,000 foreign soldiers in the province, mostly returning to their native lands from the front, and looting was a major concern.27 in this period, none of the newspapers used the word revolution to refer to austria, but other countries were a different matter. the chronik and volksblatt used revolution to describe events in germany, but while very 20 svb, 31 october 1918, 3. 21 svb, 2 november 1918, 1. 22 verhandlungen der provisorischen salzburger landesversammlungen, vom 7. november 1918 bis 18. märz 1919 (salzburg: zaunrith’schen buchdruckerei, 1919), 7-13. 23 az, 8 november 1918, 3. 24 charlie jeffery, social democracy in the austrian provinces, 1918-1934: beyond red vienna (leicester: leicester university press, 1995), 24. the svb and sch are concerned about this; for an example, see sch, 8 november 1918; and sch, 9 november 1918. 25 carsten, revolution in central europe, 325-335. 26 sbw, 5-9 november 1918. 27 bauer, von der alten solidarität, 84. 188 supportive of the republic in germany, the wacht did not yet use the word revolution. the arbeiter zeitung also used revolution to describe germany.28 a short article from the november 8th arbeiter zeitung reveals that there was talk of revolution regarding austria in vienna. prior to the “revolutionswoche” (revolution week), vienna was meant to have two sections of the ringstraße renamed after the kaiser and his wife. the replacement of the signs never occurred because revolution broke out. the article ends with a joke that perhaps the street signs were “das einzig alte, das die revolution verteidigt” (the only old things the revolution defends).29 to joke about revolution as it is happening is far from the silence seen in salzburg. the arbeiter zeitung also used revolution heavily in its coverage of the november 12th declaration of a republic. they considered the german-austrian revolution not only to have been “unblutige” (not bloody), but also that it was not over: “der weltkriege ist beendet. die soziale revolution hat begonnen” (the world war is over. the social revolution has begun).30 the word revolution, used in relation to austria, was absent from the media in salzburg on november 12th. the volksblatt and chronik both published an announcement from the three presidents calling for the unity of farmers, workers, and city-dwellers, and for “ruhe und ordnung.” the end of the monarchy and the creation of a republic was the major story in all three salzburg newspapers, but the wacht also emphasized something else. the socialists stated that they desired austrian unity with germany; in the same sentence the wacht also congratulated germany on the “siegreiche deutsche revolution” (victorious german revolution).31 more so than even calling for a republic, this was the closest the sdap in salzburg got to using the word revolution in association with austria. the wacht noted that on the 14th there was a spontaneous demonstration in salzburg to celebrate the republic, with robert preußler and many soldiers in attendance, some of whom waved red flags.32 prior to the republic, and even after, there is no sign of the sdap organizing any mass events, unlike what it would go on to do in later years. following the proclamation of the republic and until the end of the year, old patterns continued, but new ones also emerged. the provisional government continued to emphasize security, “ruhe und ordnung,” and feeding the population.33 the fears of socialist domination of the volkswehr also continued. the sdap was aware of these fears and tried to quell them, with preußler declaring that the soldiers should read all three local newspapers.34 a threat which seemed newly invigorated was the fear of communism, because of the attempted red guard coup in vienna on november 12th. the chronik and volksblatt both attacked communism—they wanted austria to avoid russian “chaos”—but 28 sch, 11 november 1918,1; svb, 9 november 1918, 1; sbw, 10 november 1918, 1; az, 9 november 1918, 1. the sbw also refers to a revolution in bavaria. 29 az, 5 november 1918, 8. 30 az, 12 november 1918, 4. 31 sch; svb; and sbw, 12 november 1918, 1. 32 sbw, 15 november 1918, 3. 33 verhandlungen, see the 20 november 1918 session, esp. p. 73. 34 svb, 18 december 1918, 2-3. 189 the chronik went further and attacked revolution. a long article in the chronik described the dangers that existed so long as the “rote flagge der revolution” (red flag of revolution) existed and that it was irresponsible to be constantly talking about the revolution.35 the chronik and volksblatt were also united in how pleased they were when foreign journalists observed that there were no troubles in the area, one even referring to “revolution” in quotation marks, and another observing that the vienna revolution was not at all red.36 the word revolution was also used in the wacht more often than before. on november 20th, an article about the danger of reactionaries in austria referred to the “ereignissen der revolution” (events of the revolution).37 following this, when the wacht used the term revolution in reference to austria, it was most often qualified in some way. the most common qualifier was to emphasize that the revolution was already over. in general, the socialists used the term revolution in positive contexts, such as to share what the sdap had done to help women before the revolution.38 already in 1918, a divide existed between the chronik and the wacht in how they used the word revolution, and in the following years it would become starker. remembering the revolution the pattern with which each political group remembered the events of fall 1918 in the years from 1919 to 1928 will be addressed separately. from 1919 to 1924, the chronik does not indicate the existence of any christian socialist celebration to commemorate any of the events of 1918. there were occasionally articles on november 12th, marking the anniversary of the republic, such as in 1919 and 1922.39 most often, the fall was an opportunity to attack the sdap and the idea of revolution. in 1919, the chronik declared that “die treuen katholiken haben die revolution nicht gemacht” (true catholics had not made revolution), and in 1921, they described how the christian worker had outlasted both the war and the revolution.40 revolution was also associated directly with the sdap, and a particularly antisemitic example from 1920 is found in the chronik’s report of the sdap celebration the previous day: the sdap not only celebrated the staatsfeiertag (state holiday) as a day of revolution, but it was also interesting that the chronik considered the attendance of a vienna jew to be particularly noteworthy.41 in the chronik’s view, many negative associations were being made, between the sdap, revolution, jews, and vienna. this same pattern of sporadic recognition and attacks against the sdap carried over from 1925 to 1928. the notable difference of this period was that in 1925 and 1928, there were military parades in salzburg for 12th. the general sentiment from 1925 was that it was a show of strength for the vaterland (fatherland), but in 1928 it was mainly portrayed as a show of strength against the sdap and its own demonstration.42 this opposition to the sdap demonstration fits a broader austrian pattern of non-socialists finding the sdap 35 svb, 13 november 1918, 1-4; and sch, 10 december 1918, 1. 36 the articles are found in each the svb and sch on 25 and 26 november 1918. 37 sbw, 20 november 1918, 2. 38 sbw, 5 december 1918, 1. 39 sch, 12 november 1919, 1; and 12 november 1922, 1. 40 sch, 29 october 1919, 1; and 22 october 1922, 1. 41 sch, 14 november 1920, 2. 42 sch, 13 november 1925, 3; and 10 november 1928, 7. 190 celebrations of may 1st and november 12th intimidating.43 before turning to the sdap, the volksblatt will be addressed briefly. as with the chronik, the volksblatt noted the anniversary of the republic only sporadically and rarely reported on public celebrations. when the “nationalfeiertag” or any anniversary was noted, the word revolution was often not used. the nationalists also sporadically attacked the sdap. while it is difficult to discern a pattern or trend, prior to 1923 more positivity was associated with fall 1918, such as comments on the end of the monarchy or lack of a rätediktatur (council dictatorship) like in hungary.44 starting around 1924, ideas of revanchism or unhappiness became more common.45 an interesting case is a national socialist ad in 1927, which stated: “zum neunten male jährt sich der tag der revolution. was hat sie uns gebracht?” (it’s been nine years since the day of revolution. what has it brought us?).46 while the nazis were not (yet) representative of the volksblatt, this sentiment of “what has revolution brought us” was repeated, though not extensively.47 the lack of commemoration on the part of the volksblatt and chronik is manifest when compared to the wacht. the sdap in salzburg regularly celebrated the revolution and the republic together. while i do not have access to the wacht from fall 1919, from 1920 onward, the revolution was remembered every year, and from 1921 on, it was celebrated with special events. the sdap explicitly and repeatedly used the word revolution to refer to fall 1918. a phrase consistently used during these years was the “errungenschaften der revolution” (achievements of the revolution). some typical achievements that were celebrated, included the end of the monarchy, the avoidance of bolshevism, and the republic itself. a typical example of a wacht issue from this period is that of november 11th, 1922.48 an image of a worker holding a large flag, emblazoned with the name of the sdap, stands before a massive crowd around the parliament in vienna. this image creates an association between the party, revolution, workers, and republic. the picture is also noteworthy because images at this time in the wacht were extremely rare; there might be political cartoons, but larger pieces of art were saved for special occasions. art was used to celebrate the revolution multiple times in the decade following 1918. the accompanying article is also typical, because it associates the revolution and republic with then current events and struggles, in this case criticizing the power of the “faszisten [sic]” (fascist) heimwehr (literally home guard), which was a fascist paramilitary group. the same pattern of associating revolution and republic, of large celebrations, of artwork, and of connecting the revolution to current struggles is seen in the arbeiter zeitung in vienna.49 is it possible that salzburg was taking the lead from vienna? absolutely, though the wacht’s 43 jeffery, social democracy, 26, 67. 44 svb, 7 november 1921, 1; and 29 october 1919, 1. 45 for an example of revanchism see svb, 12 november 1924. 46 svb, 11 november 1927, 13. 47 svb, 31 october 1927, 2. 48 sbw, 11 november 1922. the run of the sbw that was not available digitally goes from march 31 to december 31, 1919. 49 a typical issue is az, 11 november 1922. 191 articles and pieces of art differed. additionally, the salzburg sdap already cautiously began using the word revolution in 1918, and there is no evidence that it received a message from vienna to do so. given that vienna was largest bastion of socialism in austria, the salzburg socialists would have naturally looked to vienna for inspiration, but the salzburg sdap recognized that its circumstances were different from vienna’s and that what might work in the capital would not work there.50 the most striking aspect of the sdap’s memory of 1918 was not what it shared with the vienna socialists, it was the extreme difference from the salzburg socialists’ own silence on the topic of revolution in austria in early november 1918. why not call a revolution a revolution? this question is directed specifically to the salzburg sdap in 1918, as it called for an end to the monarchy and supported a republic and yet only referred to this change as a revolution after the fact. an immediate concern with using the word revolution was the russian revolution. for most austrians in the fall of 1918, the february revolution alone would not have been a great cause of fear; after all many austrians wanted an end to their own monarchy. the fear was with the bolshevik october revolution, which had become a major association with revolution and seemed like it could repeat in austria. for example, in november 1918, the volksblatt expressed concern over the risk of a second “russiches chaos” (russian chaos) in salzburg.51 even though there was no bolshevik revolution in austria or salzburg, this fear was not unfounded because there were multiple parallels between the revolutionary periods in russia and austria. a few similarities include a hungry population, mass desertions, the formation of soldiers’ and workers’ councils, the desire to end the monarchy, and the challenges of creating a functional government, yet as francis carsten has outlined, there were major differences between russia and austria.52 while the sdap proved to be radical enough that communists did not have any real strength in austria, the term revolution still risked summoning images of bolsheviks and violence. already in november 1917, readers of the wacht learned that “die revolution der bolshewiki sei ein unglück für die revolution [und] die russische republik” (the revolution of the bolsheviks is a disaster for the revolution [and] the russian republic).53 a bolshevik revolution advocated for all power to the soviets and was against the republic, thus one could take revolution and connect it to anti-republicanism. the communists cemented that 50 jeffery, social democracy, 45-46 51 svb, 13 november 1918, 4. 52 francis carsten identifies four crucial differences between 1917 russia and 1918 austria. first, in russia, the peasant masses were actively revolutionary and sought to expropriate land, while the peasants in austria were and did not. second, soldiers’ and workers’ councils maintained actual power and had better direction in russia compared to austria. third, the first world war was still ongoing during the russian revolution, which provided the bolsheviks with a popular tool: the promise of peace. peace was also popular in austria, but there were no significant factions who wanted to keep fighting. fourth and most general was that the russian revolution had a radical phase, but austria never had such a phase. carsten, revolution in central europe, 332-333. 53 sbw, 20 november 1917, 2. 192 the word revolution did not merely encompass a political change but also a social one.54 even though the sdap still believed in a different, pro-republic form of revolution, the associations between the word revolution and the bolsheviks were too great for the sdap to risk using in the fall of 1918 when an austrian republic was in sight. many salzburg socialists would also have been opposed to bolshevism on an austro-marxist basis. another partial explanation for why the sdap did not use the word revolution in 1918 can be found in the austro-marxist school of thought. the austro-marxist idea of a staged revolution between changing political power and socializing the economy and society is adaptable to the context of austria in 1918. the pressure from the entente not to spiral towards communism, as well as the power of the peasants in the countryside, made it so that a revolution aiming for a dictatorship of the proletariat would have been “suicide.”55 a brief political revolution in which the monarchy was ended was, however, possible. in the end, austro-marxists were more willing to compromise and cooperate with other parties than communists, but they also went beyond reformists to demand the destruction of the old system. the historian charles gulick believes that the austro-marxists did not abandon the word revolution, despite their willingness to compromise and view that social and economic change would take a long time, because of “political convenience.”56 this idea will be revisited later, but for now it is worth noting the potential conflict between the idea of revolution and the process of gradual and systematic change. if a revolution will take years, then it makes sense that compromises would be made along the way, just as the sdap did in 1918. this was the ideological atmosphere of the sdap, and in salzburg, robert preußler embraced the ability to compromise. as we have seen, he worked closely with the other parties and called for moderation, such as that the volkswehr should be apolitical. thus, a possible reason why the wacht and preußler left the term revolution unused was that it could upset the entente or their coalition partners, which would then jeopardize the victory of the political revolution. however, this does not explain why the socialist arbeiter zeitung in vienna used the word revolution prior to, and on, november 12th, 1918. was the political, and thus the eventual social, revolution at risk or not? to understand this, we must turn to the different contexts of salzburg and vienna. in late october and early november 1918, compromise and cooperation were the norm in salzburg. the other major political groups in salzburg, the christian socialists and german nationalists, were willing to work together and with the sdap. the desire to work together is characterized by the idea that “wir sitzen alle in einem boot” (we are all in the same boat).57 in salzburg the consensus was that any danger, particularly the risk of starvation and bolshevism, would hurt everyone in the small, mountainous state; neither the farmers, 54 the beginning of the shift for revolution meaning both political and social change dates back to during the 1789 french revolution; see ilan rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word into western political discourse (lanham, md: university press of america, 1999), 244. 55 otto bauer, die österreichische revolution (1923), in austro-marxism, eds. and trans. tom bottomore and patrick goode (oxford: clarendon press, 1978), 158-162. 56 gulick, austria from habsburg to hitler (berkley: university of california press, 1949), 49. 57 hanisch, “die sozialdemokratische fraktion,” 249. 193 city-dwellers, nor workers would be spared.58 an act of compromise was the selection of the 1911 mandate to determine the division of the provisional state council so no group was given an absolute majority. a sign of consensus and avoiding unnecessary conflict is seen in early november 1918 when the parties did not attack each other viciously in the press, as they later would.59 additionally, the discussions in the provisional council were not hostile and point to the different parties genuinely wanting to find common solutions. the three presidents’ individual speeches all point to a common goal of peace and order— though only max ott directly stated “ruhe und ordnung.”60 in vienna, we also see the socialists and other parties working together, but with less ease than in salzburg, in part because of attempting to deal with federal issues as well. the historian c. a. macartney described the government as walking on “a very slender tight-rope along which they had to dance, very high in the air and very insecurely fixed.”61 and walk along it they did, but we also see the sdap in vienna refer to revolution in austria in early and mid-november 1918, while in salzburg, the socialists did not. a simple explanation for the difference between these cities is the relative strengths of the sdap in vienna compared to salzburg. the 1919 local election in vienna resulted in the sdap receiving 54 percent of the vote, which translated to 100 of the 165 city council seats.62 in salzburg, the socialists had a respectable showing in the 1919 state elections, with 29.66 percent of the vote and twelve of the forty seats, with the christian socialists winning nineteen seats by comparison.63 additionally, in salzburg, many sdap voters were highly concentrated, such as in the working-class hallein and bischofshofen districts. while concentration helped community strength, it was also isolating to have non-socialists surround the community.64 with these differences in mind, it made sense for the vienna socialists to be less concerned about rocking the boat—they were the most numerous political group in the city.65 in salzburg, the socialists were not the most powerful party but were in a situation where parties had to work together and cooperate, with no single party having an absolute majority. having established various reasons why compromise and consensus occurred in salzburg, a question that remains is: why would using the term revolution to refer to the situation in 58 hanisch, “die sozialdemokratische fraktion,” 249, 257-259. 59 a milder attack can already be seen in the sbw, 15 december 1918. the election of 1919 made it clear that the gloves were off, and an example of this combative spirit is an ad in the svb, 14 february 1919, which calls for people to not vote for the “bolshevik” socialists or the “monarchist” christian socialists. 60 preußler and winkler both spoke of peace and the need to stop looting. another example of consensus is that many proposals are adopted without anyone electing to speak against them; verhandlungen, 7 november 1918, 10-13, 17-19. compare this to how karl renner was heckled repeatedly in vienna; stenographische protokolle, 30 october 1918, 47-48. 61 c. a. macartney, the social revolution in austria (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1926), 123. 62 eve blau, the architecture of red vienna, 1919-1934 (cambridge, ma.: mit press, 1999), 33. 63 hanisch, “die sozialdemokratische fraktion,” 253-354. 64 jeffery, social democracy, 62. 65 the rhetoric of austro-marxism was also likely stronger in vienna, given the concentration of key austromarxists. for examples, see az, 11 december 1918; and az, 12 november 1918. however, theory was not absent from salzburg, such as talk of “der revolution dem politischen leben” (the revolution of political life), sbw, 5 december 1918. 194 austria have jeopardized so much? already the general fear of bolshevism, which naturally had an association with revolution, has been touched on; however, listing all the associations with the term revolution is not constructive. instead, revolution has at its core two main categories of association. we encountered them in a bastardized format in the kpö’s tragikomödie: “stupid” and “glorious.” stupid is a more vulgar stand in for chaos. how are revolution and chaos associated? the chronik’s two-part report on the ten-year anniversary of the russian revolution began with the headline “das grabe der menschheit” (the grave of mankind). the revolution caused the “auflösung der ordnung” (dissolution of order) and, referring to the bolsheviks in october, destroyed the last remnant of democracy. the revolution brought “terror,” “gewalttaten” (acts of violence), “morden” (murder), “hungersnot” (famine), “bürgerkrieg” (civil war), and “chaos.”66 in some ways, austro-marxism can be interpreted as a direct response to the association between revolution and chaos because it favored incremental change involving cooperation—a decidedly unchaotic plan. and yet the austro-marxists still called for a forceful political revolution and used the word revolution to describe their plan of gradual social and economic change. recall charles gulick’s accusation that the austro-marxists used the word revolution for political gain. he believed that the socialist leaders continued to use the word just because it was “dear to large masses of their adherents.”67 gulick is pointing out that many people were attracted to the term revolution. while he may be wrong about the sdap using the term purely pragmatically, without any actual belief, this still points to the other main association with revolution that can be invoked by the word: glorious. glorious, while an excellent descriptor for a revolution—as the english can attest to—is not an adequate explanation as to why the otherwise practical austro-marxists would stick to using the term, and while some support revolution for glory, it is rather patronizing to suggest that everyone does. at its core, revolution is about legitimacy. in november 1926, when robert preßler declared that “die republik ist aus der revolution geboren” (the republic was born from the revolution), he was drawing on revolution’s power to legitimize.68 it is worth pointing out that these two associations, chaos and legitimacy, can be seen on one spectrum from delegitimizing to legitimizing. the associations of legitimacy and chaos with revolution are not isolated to salzburg, and it is worth briefly looking at two other cases. revolution and legitimacy is not a concept unique to salzburg; these ideas have a place in existing scholarship. the historian ilan rachum traced the change in the use and meaning of the word revolution from renaissance italy to the american revolution. he suggests looking at revolution as “a word employed rhetorically to magnify the importance of a given or desired change.”69 in other words, it is a word used to legitimize. in the case of the american revolution, the meaning of revolution shifted away from meaning a violent and chaotic change of government to instead mean a move towards “a worthier” form of government, which would help legitimize the new country.70 rachum is not the only 66 sch, 4 and 5 november 1927, beginning on covers. 67 gulick, austria from habsburg, 49. 68 sbw, 13 november 1926, 1. 69 rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word, 3. 70 rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word, 209-210. 195 scholar to make the connection between revolution and legitimacy. in a study on the 1989 revolution in czechoslovakia, the historian james krapfl also establishes that, at its core, revolution is about legitimacy. using narrative theory, he shows how the story of the 1989 revolution can be told in multiple very different ways, such as in the form of a satire, which might be that the secret police orchestrated the “revolution” in a conspiracy. even if the definition of revolution changes between different narratives, all the storytellers are either legitimizing or, such as with the conspiratorial satire, delegitimizing the revolution. 71 the battle over the word revolution, while changing in particulars, took place in both eighteenth-century america and twentieth-century czechoslovakia and austria. historical actors were often aware of revolution’s power to praise and condemn. before continuing to look at revolution and legitimacy in salzburg, we will expand on the topic of foreign revolutions and compare two of them, the american and 1917 russian, with salzburg, and specifically how the idea of revolution was portrayed at the times of occurrence. the immediate similarity between salzburg’s and america’s revolutions is that revolution was not used in either case to describe the events as they unfolded. only in 1783, after the fact, did references to the american revolution really begin, and only around 1785 was the term established as a “standard label.”72 for the colonial revolutionaries the word revolution was not used because it maintained a negative connotation from the seventeenth-century english context, and only after it shifted to mean not merely a political change but a change to a “worthier” political system, did “american revolution” see widespread adoption.73 this is very similar to how salzburgers in 1918 avoided the word because of its connotations with a specifically bolshevik revolution, and the sdap only used the term when the association with communism was weaker. another similarity is that even though the term was not used in either case as the revolutions unfolded, many ideas that deserved the term were expressed. for example, in salzburg we saw calls for the end of the monarchy and simultaneous support for the revolution in germany and for unification with germany. in the american case, ilan rachum uses thomas paine’s common sense as an example of “revolutionary fervor” without using the word, because paine not only wanted independence but also to go beyond that to forge a new world.74 an interesting difference between america and salzburg is that the pursuit of independence acted as the descriptive shorthand for events in america for much of the time, but in austria it was mostly other groups declaring independence from austria (or rather the habsburg monarchy). in 1918, none of the parties in salzburg had a consistent term that captured both what was occurring and their beliefs, other than the unifying “peace and order.” unlike salzburgers and americans, many russians were openly aware that they were in a revolution as it occurred. the russian revolution provides an interesting contrast to salzburg in 1918 because the russian revolution is a standard example of what a revolution looks like. unlike in salzburg, during the russian revolution, people actively invoked the 1789 french 71 krapfl, revolution with a human face, chapter 2, esp. pp. 32-34. 72 rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word, 208. 73 rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word, 201 and 209. 74 rachum, “revolution”: the entrance of a new word, 200. 196 revolution. for example, the marseillaise was a very popular song, groups were called—or called themselves—jacobins and girondins, and many labels, such as “committee of public safety,” were copied.75 this might add another reason to why austrians in 1918 would have associated revolution first and foremost with russia: the russian revolution had appropriated and absorbed many of the french revolution’s symbols, including any which had legitimizing potential. a central theme of orlando figes and boris kolonitskii’s study of the symbols and language of the russian revolution is that whoever mastered and controlled the symbols of revolution or their meanings possessed the possibility of controlling the revolution or an aspect of it.76 this can be seen in how different groups struggled not only politically or physically but also over revolutionary symbols. in salzburg we do not see any symbolic battles similar to that between the marseillaise and the internationale, but the point about controlling the meaning of symbols does still apply. as we have seen, the battle over the meaning of revolution was already lost—or at the very least would have looked like a losing battle—in 1918 salzburg, because the word was already associated with chaos. figes and kolonitskii also describe the importance of creating enemies and defining them symbolically during the revolution. in 1917 russia, many people experienced the revolution as it was defined in relation to their enemy, which is to say as the struggle of the revolution against something. these “dark forces” could include tsarists, the bourgeoisie, jews, and more, but the definitions varied. a commonality was that there was little space to compromise with these enemies and that these images of the revolution’s foes took on a life of their own. figes and kolonitskii conclude that this deeply encoded “us versus them” mentality contributed to the violence of the revolution.77 in salzburg, the “enemies of the revolution” discourse did not evolve like in russia. instead, all three political factions united behind the republic and “peace and order” to push back against the common enemy of “chaos.” if a common code of communication allowed the russians to create symbolic enemies of the revolution, then salzburgers had a different code, one which established symbolic “enemies of peace.” three of these enemies included bolsheviks, roaming foreign soldiers, and the word revolution. in 1918 salzburg, it was safe to mention revolution at a distance. all three salzburg newspapers used the word revolution to refer to events in foreign places. all three agreed that there was a revolution in holland, but when locations were closer to home, such as bavaria, we see divergence. the difference was that holland was far enough away that any potential (de)legitimatizing power of using revolution would not backfire on the writers— chaos was unlikely to spread to austria from the netherlands. this was not the case for bavaria in the christian socialist view, where there was an “umsturz” (takeover), not a revolution. the chronik article is matter of fact and not fear-mongering. given that munich is closer to salzburg than vienna, there was the real possibility of danger spreading over the border, a danger that was not worth legitimatizing with the term revolution. as for the wacht, it used the word revolution only once in its article about bavaria, but they were very 75 orlando figes and boris kolonitskii, interpreting the russian revolution: the language and symbols of 1917 (new haven: yale university press, 1999), 30, 40, and 188. 76 figes and kolonitskii, interpreting the russian revolution, 1. 77 figes and kolonitskii, interpreting the russian revolution, ch. 6 and 188-190. 197 supportive and also called for democracy in austria.78 the potential negative associations of revolution were deemed acceptable because bavaria was still not austria, the focus on democracy mitigated the risk, and there was the benefit that if what bavaria had was legitimate, then an austrian republic could be, too. one could ask why the salzburg sdap did not refer to a revolution in vienna, but there is a logical explanation. vienna was still politically closer to salzburg than munich. a revolution in vienna could upset salzburg’s boat because salzburg elected to stay united with an austrian state in 1918. geographic and political were not the only distances to affect the decision to use the word revolution. temporal distance can explain why the sdap referred to a revolution after the fact. in retrospect, the risks of revolution’s chaotic associations had passed. in celebrating the revolution on the anniversary every year, the salzburg sdap used its legitimizing potential. the sdap made a connection between the revolution and themselves, the republic, and the working class. recall the cover page image of the sdap flag bearer standing before a crowd in vienna, depicting the revolution. for the sdap, the legitimacy of revolution came from its association with democracy, both as it connected to the republic and as a form of democracy in the streets, where the masses taking action (with the help of the sdap) established a democracy. the republic as something “unchaotic” supports revolution, and the revolution helps the republic with a sense of progress or radicalness. the idea of temporal distance also explains why the sdap was able to start using revolution a few days after the republic was declared. with the republic established, the volkswehr maintaining order, and no major new signs of danger, the legitimizing potential of revolution rose. still, the wacht often referred to a revolution that was completed and/or peaceful. in the 1920s, those opposed to revolution also used the word in relation to austria now that imminent danger had passed, though with the intention to delegitimize. in a christmas eve 1918 article about the status of austria, the chronik referred to a “revolution” in quotation marks and associated revolution with violence and obstructing peace.79 the clearest example of time affecting what salzburgers called a revolution is present in the november 8, 1928 wacht. a cover story about salzburg ten years previously opens with a description of the september 19th demonstration and subsequent looting, before turning to an overview of later october and early november, focusing on how order was maintained, quoting preußler’s speech in the november 7, 1918 provisional state council. the piece ends with a call to resist bourgeois threats: “wir fürchten uns vor keiner drohung, denn die revolution ist für uns” (we are afraid of no threats because the revolution is for us).80 a legitimate demonstration that devolved into riots was a perfect encapsulation of why calling for revolution in 1918 seemed so unwise to the sdap, and yet in its memory, it was part of the larger story of the revolution. this story continued into 1928, when the sdap used the idea of revolution to inspire socialist action. thus, just as there were many reasons for the sdap not to call a revolution a revolution, there would later be many reasons to use the word. all of this evidence points to the sdap possessing revolutionary consciousness. 78 for holland see svb and sbw on 14 november 1918, 1; and sch, 15 november 1918, 2. for bavaria, see sch, 9 november 1918, 1-2, and sbw 10 november 1918, 1. 79 sch, 24 december 1918, 1. 80 sbw, 8 november 1928, 1-2. 198 conclusion revolutionary consciousness is a topic curiously missing from literature on revolutions. certainly, a marxist view of revolutionary consciousness as related to class consciousness exists, but aside from that, i have not encountered any theories of revolutionary consciousness. the explanation i offer for this lacuna is rather simple: revolutionary consciousness is actually often examined in works on revolution, but it is merely unnamed. it is unnamed because revolutionary consciousness, at its core, is how people thought about revolution. thus, one does not need to possess a specific idea of revolution to have revolutionary consciousness; every time revolution is thought about, there is revolutionary consciousness. revolutionary consciousness being centered on people’s thoughts also means that someone opposed to revolution can be just as revolutionarily conscious as the ideal proletarian. additionally, this broad definition includes the act of placing a revolution on the (de)legitimization spectrum. the socialists of salzburg were aware that sometimes revolution was its own worst enemy. in late october and early november 1918, they chose to work with other parties to call for “peace and order” and class cooperation. at a time after four and half years of exhausting war, many risks and dangers existed or appeared to exist: starvation, looting, foreign occupation, and bolshevik revolution. only a year earlier in russia, the bolshevik revolution began transitioning a burgeoning democratic state—caught in a battle between council and republican power—into a soviet state and civil war. for many salzburgers, it looked like chaos. in addition, there were opportunities to establish a republic, to join with germany, and to make peace. in this context, the sdap in salzburg made the decision not to use the term revolution in reference to austria. all the while, they called for an austrian republic and recognized and celebrated revolutions abroad, especially in neighboring germany. revolution’s association with chaos and violence outweighed its possible legitimizing power in salzburg at this time, and the sdap knew this. to call for peace and order was to call for precisely the opposite of the chaos with which many associated with revolution. the sdap in salzburg was consciously un-revolutionary. in some ways the kpö was correct; the socialists used revolution when it suited them. however, the sdap appeared to do what it thought was right and not act cynically. i am not claiming to know exactly what they were thinking, or that they broke revolution down into chaos and legitimacy as i have, or that the salzburg socialists operated under the austromarxist view that establishing a republic constituted a political revolution. what i am arguing is that the socialists’ actions indicate that they were unwilling to jeopardize the possibility of a republic and that they knew using the word revolution would not help their case—on some level they were conscious of the advantages and disadvantages to using the term revolution. before the declaration of the republic and for a few days afterward, they did not use revolution, and then when they started using the term, they qualified it to dissociate it from potentially delegitimizing associations. with time, the republic and revolution were celebrated together, often with mentions of the sdap and the working class. with the risks of fall 1918 gone, the sdap was free to tap into the legitimizing potential of revolution and did not avoid that rhetoric. of course, its rival parties also used revolution in how they remembered events, but they focused on its ability to delegitimize. 199 there is the potential to look at the consciously unrevolutionary salzburg sdap and label it as having conducted a self-limiting revolution. at the very least the sdap self-limited revolution as a word in their speeches and newspapers. given the high level of compromise and calls for order, as well as significant limits on what the revolution changed, the label is suitable. however, before calling the revolution in salzburg a self-limiting one, we must ask why we want to give it that label? returning to the tragikomödie, will the addition of “selflimiting” make the revolution less “stupid” because it sounds more planned and orderly? or will “self-limiting” take too much away from the revolution’s “gloriousness”? perhaps, it is easier to follow the sdap’s lead and drop the label altogether because sometimes a revolution is best without revolution. deciding to not use the word revolution is an answer in itself. 71 with fire and sword military factors in the disintegration of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth mikołaj dueholm university of minnesota abstract this article discusses seventeenthand eighteenth-century circumstances that adversely affected the armed forces of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth. it identifies lack of a professional army, overreliance on cavalry, failed attempts at reform, funding problems, and unrestricted power of the magnates as the primary military factors leading to the eventual partition of the commonwealth. these factors have been relatively unexplored in previous literature and serve to highlight the importance of synthesizing diverse perspectives and experiences in understanding the fraught history of eastern europe. article introduction the year 1569 is one of the most critical dates in polish and lithuanian history. this year marks the union of lublin, a constitutional settlement that brought the kingdom of poland and the grand duchy of lithuania together into a loose confederation known as the rzeczpospolita obojga narodów, or the commonwealth of both nations, the largest polity in latin-christian europe.1 this state occupied the eastern edge of europe and was distinctive from its western neighbors in a number of important ways. the polishlithuanian commonwealth covered a much greater land area, stretching from the black sea to the baltic and encompassing much of what is today poland, ukraine, belarus, and the baltic states (see figure 1). this unique geographic position contributed to a cosmopolitan blend of east and west visible in everything from language to dress, combining a largely feudal economic and military system with relative religious toleration and political freedoms, at least for the aristocracy. this nobility, known as the szlachta, was a social class particular to the commonwealth, comprising a higher share of the population than in any other european nation and enjoying an unprecedented array of rights and privileges.2 1 satoshi koyama, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth as a political space: its unity and complexity,” regions in central and eastern europe: past and present, eds. tadayuki hayashi and hiroshi fukuda (sapporo: slavic research center, hokkaido university, 2007), 137-153, doi: srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no15_ses/08_koyama.pdf. 2 norman davies, god's playground: a history of poland in two volumes (new york: columbia university press, 2005), 202. for more discussion of the szlachta and their unique nature, see for instance: anna grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty the concept of freedom in the polish-lithuanian commonwealth, trans. daniel sax (leiden: brill, 2012). for comparative analysis of other european aristocracies, see jonathan dewald, the european nobility, 1400-1800 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1996). https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no15_ses/08_koyama.pdf https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no15_ses/08_koyama.pdf 72 similarly unique was the religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the commonwealth. its vast territory incorporated catholics, jews, muslims, orthodox christians, and protestants. it also included trader communities from as far afield as armenia and persia. these people used a variety of languages, including latin, polish, ruthenian, german and yiddish, and maintained a high standard of literacy and education, even among women and the nonaristocracy.3 figure 1: map of polish-lithuanian commonwealth in 16484 polish-lithuanian commonwealth in 1648 the commonwealth’s political system was also distinctive. as norman davies aptly observed, “its laws and practices were inspired by deeply rooted beliefs in individual freedom and civil liberty which, for the period, were exceptional.”5 the szlachta considered themselves citizens rather than subjects and, despite wide disparities in wealth and power, were legally equal. a common phrase captured this sentiment well: “a nobleman on his garden patch was any wojewoda’s [administrator’s] match.”6 this equality extended all the way up to the throne, as the commonwealth’s government was predicated on the concept of joint rule between the szlachta and the king. therefore, unlike the more absolutist monarchies emerging in france and spain, the commonwealth maintained a weak central 3 koyama, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth as a political space,” 139. 4 mathias rex, “polish-lithuanian commonwealth in 1648,” wikipedia, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:polish-lithuanian_commonwealth_in_1648.png, accessed november 6, 2021. 5 davies, god’s playground, 321. 6 benedict wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good: the politics of virtue in early modern polandlithuania (oxford: oxford university press, 2015), 75. see also p. 1. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:polish-lithuanian_commonwealth_in_1648.png 73 authority and functioned essentially as a republic. within this unique arrangement, local decisions were left to the sejmiki, or dietines, which then nominated delegates to the sejm, or diet, in order to represent the commonwealth as a whole. the king governed alongside the sejm, which held the exclusive power to make laws, wage war, levy taxes, and determine foreign policy. since decisions of the sejm had to be unanimous, this put a strong emphasis on agreement through consensus-building.7 it also resulted in a climate where, “the nobility constantly suspected the ruler of machinations to extend his powers.”8 these potentially competing dynamics of consensus and suspicion were a hallmark of the commonwealth’s political system and set it apart from its neighbors. together, these unique geographical, social, and political factors made the commonwealth perhaps europe's strangest state. nevertheless, it operated as an important player on the european stage and earned the admiration of both foreign and domestic observers.9 despite enjoying general peace and prosperity for approximately the first eighty years of its existence, the commonwealth was soon beset by a variety of threats, both foreign and domestic. consequently, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw poland and lithuania’s gradual decline, as the central government was unable to defend its borders and the political system was co-opted by powerful magnates and foreign powers for their own agendas. though the commonwealth eventually produced europe’s first written constitution and conducted a series of important reforms in its final years, it was partitioned three times between 1772 and 1795 at the hands of austria, prussia, and russia, ceasing to exist as an independent nation until its rebirth in 1918. many historians studying what exactly caused this fall from an influential european power to a casualty of rising nation-states have made a connection to the concept of the golden liberty. this rather nebulous term was used both to encapsulate the impressive array of rights and privileges guaranteed to the szlachta and to define the political system of the commonwealth. these included freedom from taxation and arbitrary arrest, as well as religious toleration and restrictions on the power of the monarch to raise troops, levy taxes, or declare war without the consent of the nobility. the golden liberty also ensured the right of rokosz, or insurrection, in response to perceived infringement of these rights. finally, there was the liberum veto, or ability for any single delegate to veto the decisions of a particular sejm, which was seen as the capstone of the golden liberty. the foundational privileges of the golden liberty in many cases predated the establishment of the commonwealth itself and tended to expand in scope over time. for example, the privilege of koszyce in 1374 virtually exempted the polish szlachta from taxation.10 consequently, the szlachta generally opposed efforts to levy taxes of any sort on 7 jerzy lukowski, “‘machines of government’: replacing the liberum veto in the eighteenth-century polishlithuanian commonwealth,” the slavonic and east european review 90, no. 1 (2012): 66, doi:10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.90.1.0065. 8 lukowski, “machines of government,” 66. 9 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 2. 10 these concessions also made the szlachta exempt from building and repairing castles, towns, and bridges, as well as paying for the travel of the royal court, while also guaranteeing the gentry compensation for military service and restricting foreigners’ access to certain royal offices. 74 their estate, even for the purpose of national defense. similarly, statutes in 1430 and 1433 ensured the szlachta’s freedom from arbitrary arrest. religious toleration had also enjoyed a long tradition in poland and lithuania, but it was not a formal guarantee until the 1573 confederation of warsaw. fears of religious persecution had been validated by events elsewhere in europe, specifically the 1572 saint bartholomew’s day massacre and the strife of the thirty years' war abroad. consequently, many considered toleration essential to preserving liberty. since the golden liberty extended many rights to the nobility, it also necessarily prevented the monarchy from infringing on those privileges. the nihil novi act of 1505 ensured that the king could not pass laws without the consent of the gentry, cementing the power of the szlachta in the political system. this prerogative was jealously guarded; members of the 1702 sejm asserted that king august ii’s (1670-1733) waging of war without a declaration of the sejm trampled upon their freedom. the nobility opposed countless military reforms, tax proposals, and other attempts to centralize power on behalf of the king on the grounds that they limited the power of the gentry and thus endangered their liberty. in addition to these formidable shackles on the king’s authority, the szlachta still had at their disposal a mechanism to protect their liberty by force. the rokosz, which was essentially an armed lobby formed in protest to perceived infringements on noble rights, was perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the commonwealth’s political system. it was also regularly exercised to protect perceived attacks on the golden liberty; the orchestrators of both the zebrzydowski and lubomirski rokosz in 1606 and 1666-1667 respectively saw themselves not as rebels or rival claimants to the throne but as protectors of the szlachta’s freedom from absolutism. while all of these noble privileges were key components of freedom in the commonwealth, its culmination was the liberum veto, or the right of a single member of a sejm or sejmik to veto a piece of legislation by exclaiming, “nie pozwalam!” (“i do not allow it!”). the implications of such a tool are not difficult to realize; as the commonwealth entered its twilight years, the liberum veto began to loom large. previously, it had been used to raise objections to individual pieces of legislation that were quickly resolved, but it began to disrupt entire sejms, blocking not only the legislation directly vetoed but everything else that had been previously decided. although finally abolished by the constitution of the 3rd of may in 1791, it was far too late at that juncture. historians are largely in agreement that the legislative paralysis induced by the use of the liberum veto and jealous preservation of privileges had a detrimental impact on the commonwealth and contributed to its fall.11 more generally, they have identified the golden liberty as a source of weakness if not an outright catalyst for the decline of the polish-lithuanian state. according to this narrative, the golden liberty fostered a system of government unable to reform itself in response to societal and political challenges, vulnerable to interference by foreign powers and powerful domestic interests. this in turn 11 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 4. this perspective was posited by władysław konopczyński and members of the nineteenth-century “kraków school.” 75 resulted in an environment of competition between different organs of government and denied the monarchy the authority necessary to function as an effective european state. consequently, it is well-supported that the golden liberty exerted a significant impact on the fall of the commonwealth, and modern evaluations of this decline have thus focused on the influence of the golden liberty on political factors within poland and lithuania. however, the impact of the armed forces on the disintegration of the commonwealth has received less attention. this is an important topic for discussion, as the last century and a half of the commonwealth’s history saw it involved in a series of exhausting conflicts that weakened it considerably. consequently, this article considers how military factors, specifically lack of a professional army, overreliance on cavalry, failed attempts at reform, funding problems, and unrestricted power of the magnates contributed to the commonwealth’s fall. in order to chart the commonwealth’s military decline, i rely on a variety of primary sources in both polish and english, most notably jan chryzostom pasek’s memoirs of the polish baroque and stanisław żołkiewski’s the beginning and progress of the muscovy war. both are diaries of politically and militarily active seventeenth-century polish nobles. these works provide first-hand accounts not only of perceptions of the golden liberty but also its influence on military developments. these will be supplemented by primary texts on political and military reform, including the writings of andrzej fredro and stanisław karwicki, which provide different perspectives on the political system and reforms within the commonwealth. i will also draw on secondary sources, including norman davies’s god’s playground, for historical context. my analysis will also build on the work of previous researchers, such as robert frost and benedict wagner-rundell, who explore the military state of the commonwealth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. the period of decline and eventual fall of the commonwealth coincided with a series of unsuccessful wars against muscovy, sweden, and the crimean tatars. additionally, during this same period, the cossacks in what is today ukraine led a series of revolts against the commonwealth. these setbacks on the battlefield contributed in their own way to the collapse of poland-lithuania. the factors that contributed to military failure were both causes and symptoms of the broader malaise affecting the state. this article examines five of these variables: the lack of standing troops, the predominance of cavalry, unsuccessful attempts at military reform, chronic underfunding, and the outsized autonomy of magnates. a close examination of these issues helps us understand the commonwealth’s military failings specifically but, more generally, offers important insights into its most glaring weaknesses leading to its ultimate dismemberment in the eighteenth century. absence of a standing army one of the overarching themes in the history of the commonwealth’s military are efforts to create a large, permanent army. although its forces consisted primarily of a variety of levies and private military units, the elected monarchs of the commonwealth realized the need for a standing professional army to protect their borders and enact their will. this standing army was important in light of changes happening in the rest of europe, as the military revolution of the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries brought about a series of 76 profound changes in organization and structure of the armed forces. gone were the days of feudal levies and small cores of heavily armored knights. instead, the fledgling nationstates of europe began fielding successively larger standing armies of predominantly pike and musket-armed infantry. for example, louis xiv modernized the french army and turned it into a professional force, growing it from 70,000 men to approximately 400,000 men by 1700, making it the largest army in europe.12 similarly, the spanish army swelled from 20,000 in 1470 to approximately 300,000 in the 1630s.13 while conflicts as late as the thirty years’ war were fought primarily by mercenaries, rulers quickly realized that a standing domestic army strengthened the power of monarchs. kings would no longer have to rely on hiring expensive foreign soldiers who would pillage both friend and foe or slow and unreliable feudal levies of peasants and knights. instead, professional standing armies were directly loyal to the crown and always available, meaning rulers had substantially more freedom to pursue their goals, safe in the knowledge that their troops could bring both foreign and domestic opposition to heel. this swelling of royal power precipitated the growth of nation-states in france, spain, england, and elsewhere and fostered loyalties to a state and ruler rather than to a family or region.14 though the aristocracy may have resented this vast accumulation of power by the monarch, they were happy to no longer see their lands looted by mercenary companies. additionally, the new army provided myriad opportunities for advancement based on merit.15 while other european powers were busy raising these professional armies, the commonwealth largely stuck to its older military structure, relying on general levies, small standing forces, and cobbled-together support from private and mercenary units. the permanent forces known as the wojsko kwarciane and its successor, the wojsko komputowe, were often ill-paid and small, something which would plague the commonwealth, particularly after 1648. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the wojsko komputowe numbered only 24,000 men, which paled in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of troops the soon-to-be partitioning powers of prussia, austria, and russia could bring to bear.16 some have argued that this failure to modernize the military stemmed from a close-minded resistance to reform among the nobility.17 while this perspective does not necessarily make an explicit connection to ideals of the golden liberty, many members of the szlachta felt the commonwealth had reached its zenith in terms of freedom and prosperity and bitterly opposed any changes to the status quo.18 others argue for a more nuanced 12 john a. lynn, "recalculating french army growth during the grand siècle, 1610-1715," french historical studies 18, no. 4 (1994): 881-906, doi:10.2307/286722. rene chartrand, louis xiv’s army, men-at-arms series 203 (oxford: osprey publishing, 1988), 8. 13 m.s. anderson, war and society in europe of the old regime 1618-1789 (london: fontana press, 1988), 17. 14 robert ian frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” in poland and europe: historical dimensions: selected essays from the fiftieth anniversary international congress of the polish institute of arts and sciences of america vol 1, eds. james pula and marian biskupski, east european monographs 390 (new york: columbia university press, 1994), 37. 15 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 38. 16 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 24. 17 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 23. 18 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 56. 77 perspective, positing that the failure to expand the standing army did not represent simple opposition to military reforms per se, but a conscious rejection of the power such innovations would give the monarchy.19 historians cite many examples of innovations the commonwealth was willing to make without having to modify its political structure, for instance the establishment of weapon foundries and penning of influential treatises on siege craft.20 essentially, the nobility was happy to adopt certain aspects of the military revolution as long as they did not change the political status quo. regardless of the motivation behind the szlachta’s rejection of a large standing army, the impact was essentially the same. robert frost has rightly noted, “for it was the failure of the noble citizens of the commonwealth to cross this psychological watershed [establishment of a permanent army] which doomed it to a decline which was by no means inevitable.”21 the nobility perceived a standing army as a fundamental threat to their liberty, since it would allow the monarch to bypass the diet, which was normally required to levy and pay troops as well as declare war. as a result, the gentry were generally opposed to efforts to enlarge the military and remained more concerned about the threat of absolutist monarchy than foreign invasion.22 this was rationalized by the military successes of poland and lithuania at the end of the sixteenth and in the first half of the seventeenth century, which prevented many nobles from recognizing the threat posed by their neighbors.23 unfortunately, this myopic perspective would have disastrous consequences when the outdated, underpaid, and untrained military of the commonwealth—far from being able to serve as a tool of monarchical oppression—was unable to defend the nation against foreign invasion. the history of what has become known as the cossack register is an excellent example highlighting the impact of the szlachta’s reluctance to enlarge the army. established in 1572, the register was a list of names of cossacks, a people inhabiting ukraine. the register integrated these individuals into the army of the commonwealth, granting them special privileges and wages in an attempt to discourage raiding and turn them into a regular fighting force.24 this was conceptually an excellent solution; it converted the cossacks from a potential threat into highly loyal and fierce troops able to defend the commonwealth from tatar and muscovite incursions. in practice, it was significantly less effective, as the crown was not able to pay the cossacks consistently, who continued raiding and plundering with little regard for whether they were part of the register or not.25 additionally, local diets tended to be resentful of the rights granted to the cossacks and consistently tried to shrink or abolish the register. this hostility is typified by one polish noble in the sejm, who quipped, “you [cossacks] say that you are like all others, members of the commonwealth and thus demand the rights of the nobility. verily, you are 19 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 24. 20 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 25. 21 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 38. 22 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 36. 23 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 36. 24 linda gordon, cossack rebellions: social turmoil in the sixteenth-century ukraine (albany: state university of new york press, 1983), 90. 25 gordon, cossack rebellions, 95. 78 indeed members of this commonwealth, but like fingernails, meaning you must from time to time be trimmed.”26 figure 2: ilya repin, reply of the zaporozhian cossacks to sultan mehmed iv of the ottoman empire, 189127 this arrogance belied a fear that the king would use the register in order to limit the szlachta’s freedoms.28 not only would the register provide the monarch with a larger standing army, but it would eliminate the cossack’s dependence on the local szlachta, since their wages and privileges would come directly from the king. this concern that the cossacks could not be controlled by the magnate regime was typified by ilya repin’s painting, reply of the zaporozhian cossacks to sultan mehmed iv of the ottoman empire (see figure 2). it portrays the writing of a defiant and profanity-ridden letter the cossacks allegedly sent in response to the ottoman sultan’s request for submission. while the story is largely a legend, it demonstrates the perception of the cossacks as free-spirited and fiercely independent, unwilling to submit to the yoke of foreign control, much less the power of magnates. these fears about royal power and cossack autonomy may have been exaggerated, however, since despite nominally being part of the royal standing army, the register cossacks reported to local magnates, who deployed them in conjunction with their own private troops without having to pay for their upkeep.29 nevertheless, families such as the wiśniowiecki or kalinowski saw a large, organized force of cossacks as a threat to their interests. consequently, the szlachta and powerful magnates tried to limit the size of the 26 zbigniew wójcik, dzikie pola w ogniu; o kozaczyźnie w dawnej rzeczypospolitej (warsaw: wiedza powszechna, 1968), 110. author’s translation. as cited in davies, god’s playground, 446. 27 ilya repin, reply of the zaporozhian cossacks to sultan mehmed iv of the ottoman empire, 1891, oil on canvas, state russian museum, st. petersburg, http://en.rusmuseum.ru/collections/painting-of-the-secondhalf-of-the-xix-century-beginning-of-xxi-century/artworks/zaporozhye-cossacks/?sphrase_id=259736, accessed november 6, 2021. 28 gordon, cossack rebellions, 94. 29 gordon, cossack rebellions, 94. 79 register once any immediate threat had passed, while the cossacks, who maintained their loyalty to the throne and instead saw the local nobility as oppressors, tried to permanently enlarge the size of the register.30 since the king generally strove to increase cossack recruitment and the cossacks lacked direct representation in the sejm, the political struggle over the register primarily pitted the szlachta against the monarchy. in the rare instance that the interests of the magnates and monarch concerning the number of troops coincided, the former were known to oppose efforts to expand the army on the grounds that they were illegal. this occurred most notably in 1646, when king władysław iv (1595-1648) attempted to recruit cossacks for a war against the ottomans and tatars without approval of the diet. despite saying that he supported the king’s policy, great chancellor jerzy ossoliński (1595-1650) and other magnates refused to sign off on the recruitment on the grounds that it was not legal.31 legalism was a common feature of szlachta political thought, and respect for the laws was seen as the duty of every noble.32 thus, both personal interest and a concern with preserving “the rule of law” could put the magnates at odds with increasing the register. these various tensions came to a head with the khmelnytsky uprising in 1648. poor relations between the polish catholic nobility and their orthodox ukrainian subjects prompted the ukrainian peasantry to ally themselves with the cossacks and revolt. the leader and namesake of the revolt was bohdan khmelnytsky, a minor noble who had significant ties to the cossacks. his forces won a series of victories, plunging ukraine into chaos and permanently damaging commonwealth-cossack relations. as a result of this conflict, the register essentially ceased to function after 1648, leaving behind a void that was never successfully filled. the cossack’s absence would be felt when sweden invaded in 1655, and the beleaguered commonwealth, beset by threats from muscovy, sweden, transylvania, and the ottoman empire, began to cede territory to its rivals. soon, poland and lithuania had to face internal threats in the form of the lubomirski uprising, a response to attempts at reform from king jan kazimierz (1609-1672) that saw much of the army revolt against the king. these costly conflicts slowly sapped poland-lithuania’s strength, leading to the eventual partitions starting in 1772. one cannot but wonder if the enlargement or preservation of the cossack register may have served to delay or even prevent the collapse of the commonwealth, especially considering that in the aftermath of the khmelnytsky uprising, many of the disillusioned cossacks switched their allegiance to russia, one of the eventual partitioning powers. the controversy surrounding the cossack register and the subsequent khmelnytsky uprising deprived the commonwealth of a large force of excellent infantry that would be sorely missed in the coming years. additionally, it resulted in the loss of lands used for extensive taxation and recruitment.33 this crippling blow to poland-lithuania became apparent during the swedish invasion of 1655. though the tide was eventually turned, this 30 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 41. 31 koyama, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth as a political space,” 147-148. 32 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 43. 33 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 41. 80 was in part due to foreign pressure, as the commonwealth desperately cast about for allies willing to contribute much-needed infantry and artillery required to reduce swedish garrisons and actually drive out the invaders. in previous conflicts, these forces had been supplied by the cossacks, giving the commonwealth’s armies the vital ability to take and hold ground.34 predominance of cavalry this lack of infantry and preponderance of cavalry was itself a factor leading to the commonwealth’s decline. both polish and lithuanian forces included a much higher ratio of cavalry and significantly fewer pikemen than their european neighbors. this was because the great european plain along much of the commonwealth’s southern and eastern borders offered little in the way of natural barriers, and there were few fortresses that would require infantry or artillery to attack or defend. additionally, opponents such as the tatars fought as light cavalry, meaning a highly mobile, decentralized force of cavalry was required for defense.35 however, this preference for horsemen was more than tactical; it represented the conscious reflection of cultural and philosophical ideas into the military sphere. traditionally, the szlachta believed that they had received the rights and privileges of the golden liberty in return for their military service to the crown.36 thus, allowing foreign mercenaries or non-nobles (such as the cossacks) to fight in the army potentially jeopardized the nobles’ liberty. consequently, warfare, like many other things in the commonwealth, was seen as the prerogative of the gentry, who almost exclusively fought mounted. in fact, andrzej fredro (1620-1679), a notable supporter of the golden liberty, talked about horsemen being soldiers of a free republic, while infantry were a tool of autocracy.37 this penchant for mounted warfare was also supported by cultural traditions among the nobility. well-bred horses were both plentiful and highly prized, and horsemanship was learned from a young age. similarly, fencing both on foot and horseback was taught to young nobles by experienced veterans, ensuring that the commonwealth was known far and wide for its excellent swordsmen.38 this, coupled with a lack of formal military academies, meant that szlachta culture bred independent and accomplished horsemen and fencers rather than the trained and disciplined members of an officer corps or infantry formation. considering all these factors, it is hardly surprising that the commonwealth armies tended to consist primarily of horse. despite the varying reasons for the dominance of cavalry, commonwealth military reformers and leaders recognized the need for more and better infantry, particularly in response to facing more “westernized” militaries such as sweden’s. though fredro had 34 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 38. 35 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 27. 36 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 2. 37 andrzej maksymilian fredro, militarium, ad harmoniam togae accommodatorum (amsterdam, 1668), 180181. 38 bartosz sieniawski, "from szabla to saber: the polish saber, its history, and impact on swords east and west" (online event, university of minnesota center for early modern history and the oakeshott institute, march 26, 2021). mailto:bartosz.sieniawski@gmail.com 81 been an ideological supporter of cavalry, he authored a 1670 treatise that seemed to largely reverse his stance from two years prior. he advocated for greater use of infantry and encouraged the gentry to fight on foot, referencing the effectiveness of an all-noble infantry regiment during the 1581 campaign against muscovy.39 the notable reformer stanisław karwicki (c. 1640-c. 1725) was also a great proponent of infantry, arguing that it should constitute a higher ratio of the commonwealth’s armies. he stated that more infantry was necessary to compete with more westernized armies because they were better suited to siege warfare and more dependable.40 he also criticized the commonwealth’s noble cavalry: “but in the cavalry of our army, a soldier is known as towarzysz [comrade], inflated with his own opinion and even more with his property, considers himself equal to his officers, even the hetmans [military commanders], and coolly tolerates commands of his superiors. infantry in regiments, by contrast, much more diligently applies itself to the orders of its superiors.”41 the term towarzysz was used throughout the commonwealth’s military, regardless of rank, and was intended to represent equality among the nobility.42 in addition to this preoccupation with equality, karwicki also accused the gentry of campaigning with lavish baggage trains and being more interested in taking part in sejmiks as opposed to fighting for the fatherland.43 all these critiques imply that the nobility’s priorities were political influence and social standing as opposed to warfare. it was not just karwicki who harped on these vices. fredro likewise spent much of his overview of the military discussing methods for improving discipline and training, demonstrating that the poor behavior of the army and cavalry in particular was common knowledge.44 these calls for change did not fall completely on deaf ears. infantry played an increasingly prominent role in the armed forces, acquitting themselves particularly well in the swedish wars, but the commonwealth struggled to deploy and pay substantial and well-trained infantry units.45 in his memoirs, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej (beginning and progress of the muscovite war), hetman stanisław żółkiewski (1547-1620) recounts how the siege of smolensk in 1609 was delayed because of a lack of infantry and artillery. crucially, it was the arrival of allied cossacks that finally allowed the commonwealth to make headway.46 a similar problem would face żółkiewski’s forces a year later during the battle of kłuszyn (see figure 3), when polish winged hussars were forced to break through picket fences and charge dug-in russian infantry, a task normally reserved for infantry.47 39 andrzej maksymilian fredro, o porządku wojennym i o pospolitem ruszeniu małym (sanok: kazimierz józef turowski, 1856), 42. 40 stanisław dunin karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku (kraków: wydawnictwo polskiej akademii nauk, 1992), 139. author’s translation. 41 karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku, 140. author’s translation. 42 davies, god’s playground, 239. 43 karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku, 158. 44 fredro, o porządku wojennym i o pospolitem ruszeniu małym, 5. even contemporary authors were themselves guilty of occasional rabble-rousing: jan chryzostom pasek (1636 1701), a noble and important diarist who also took part in many military campaigns, recounts many armed altercations he had, frequently over matters of honor. these invariably left behind substantial casualties. 45 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 30. 46 stanisław z� ółkiewski, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 2nd ed. (kraków: nakładem. krakowskiej spółki wydawniczej, 1925), 26. 47 z� ółkiewski, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 42. 82 this deficiency in foot soldiers was further on display in 1656, when a polish force attacked brandenburg in an effort to induce it to sever its alliance with sweden. however, the invasion force consisted primarily of cavalry and was unable to capture any cities. as a result, it contented itself with raiding and failed to put any significant pressure on brandenburg to desert the swedish cause.48 these examples serve to illustrate problems facing the commonwealth’s military operations owing to its lack of infantry. overall, the increased cost of cavalry and its inability to compete with modernized armies made largely mounted forces just another symptom of the decline of the commonwealth. figure 3: szymon boguszowicz, battle of kłuszyn, 165049 attempts at reform while there were many forces opposing changes to the military status quo, there were also attempts at reform. the reigns of jan kazimierz (1648-1668) and august ii (1697-1706, 1709-1733) represent two concerted efforts at structural reform of the commonwealth’s military. they also highlight the dynamics that made reform so difficult in the commonwealth. jan kazimierz was very popular with the army and proved himself a canny general, leading royal troops to a resounding victory over the cossacks at the battle of beresteczko in 1651.50 however, like most of the commonwealth’s elected monarchs, he chafed at the power of the diet and tried to use the army in order to bypass its authority. to this end, he attempted a variety of military reforms, designating many army units as “royal” 48 robert ian frost, after the deluge: poland-lithuania and the second northern war, 1655-1660 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1993), 98. 49 szymon boguszowicz, battle of kłuszyn, 1650, oil on canvas, borys voznytsky lviv national art gallery, https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/hetman-battle-of-klushino-szymonboguszowicz/8gg2nok9awtwva?hl=en, accessed november 6, 2021. 50 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 43. https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/hetman-battle-of-klushino-szymon-boguszowicz/8gg2nok9awtwva?hl=en https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/hetman-battle-of-klushino-szymon-boguszowicz/8gg2nok9awtwva?hl=en 83 and making sure they were paid by and directly loyal to the monarch.51 he also tried to enlarge the wojsko komputowe directly and through an increase in the size of the cossack register. he also attempted to centralize military power in his own person by not nominating new hetmans, or military commanders.52 these military reforms were also coupled with a variety of plans surrounding the impending royal election. nevertheless, his reforms met resistance. this controversy eventually led to the lubomirski rokosz of 1665-1666, which left the commonwealth unable to successfully execute the ongoing war with muscovy. jan chryzostom pasek (1636-1701)—a noble, soldier, and diarist who experienced the revolt firsthand—described it as uniquely calamitous: “our villages are shuddering, our poor are weeping, our bishops and senators are urging the king to take pity on the country, seeing that we are plainly displeasing to god if luck is not with us.”53 while the material damages caused by the lubomirski rokosz were significant, perhaps even more important was the fact that jan kazimierz’s efforts forever tainted plans to enlarge the military in the eyes of the nobility, largely condemning future desultory efforts to increase the size of the army. according to frost, “the greatest danger to polish liberties, it seemed, was the polish monarchy and its alleged wish to introduce absolutum dominium by force of arms; it was therefore vital to prevent it building up the sort of military powerbase which jan kazimierz had attempted to construct.”54 consequently, his reign represented perhaps the last real opportunity to modernize and reform the military of the commonwealth.55 the reign of august ii also saw the thwarting of efforts to enlarge the standing army. the sejm of 1712-1713 proposed a variety of reforms, including a permanent force of 36,000 troops and the necessary permanent taxes to pay them.56 interestingly, this proposal seems to have met little opposition, as the szlachta resented the increasing presence of swedish, russian, and saxon armies in the commonwealth, which were known for exacting “contributions'' from the local populace. consequently, august ii’s supporters were quick to represent this new force and the associated funding as a way to protect the everimportant golden liberty from foreign encroachment. however, many envoys to the sejm saw the main problem to be not the lack of appropriate military funding but the damage to szlachta property from marauding armies.57 these excesses were pinned on the hetmans for not maintaining better behavior among their troops, echoing concerns held by fredro surrounding discipline and likely influencing karwicki’s proposals to limit their power.58 as a result, the focus of the sejm shifted from military reforms to curbing the power of the hetmans and restricting licentious and immoral behavior. this shows that even when the 51 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 43. 52 frost, after the deluge, 32. 53 jan chryzostom pasek, memoirs of the polish baroque: the writings of jan chryzostom pasek, a squire of the commonwealth of poland and lithuania (berkeley: university of california press, 1976), 187. 54 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 44. 55 frost, after the deluge, 179. 56 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 80. 57 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 85. 58 fredro, o porządku wojennym i o pospolitem ruszeniu małym, 15. karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku, 161. 84 gentry were willing to enlarge and modernize the army, it was seen as tangential to the preservation of property rights. commissions to address property damages and the culpability of the hetmans were proposed, but negotiations quickly bogged down. eventually, supporters of one of the hetmans exercised the liberum veto, breaking the sejm and dooming the entire package of legislation, including the increase to the size of the army.59 the nobility were primarily concerned with the threat to their private property rather than the threat of foreign encroachment. as a result, they seized on immorality and the power of the hetmans as the fundamental issue, rather than the need to strengthen the army. thus, it is evident that both the gentry and the monarch were engaged in a zero-sum battle for power with the military as a key institution affecting the struggle. even militarily successful kings such as zygmunt iii (1566-1632) or jan sobieski (1629-1696) were perceived by the gentry as a threat, since their attempts at expanding the commonwealth were seen as warmongering and a dangerous step towards absolutism.60 by keeping the wojsko komputowe small, the nobility ensured that the monarch was dependent on the senate and diets, giving the szlachta power and thus by extension liberty. though both jan kazimierz and august ii sought to introduce serious reforms to the military, they were unable to garner sufficient support for their efforts. in the end, the reforms failed for political rather than military reasons. underfunding of the military while the calls to enlarge and modernize the army were constant, the commonwealth’s military was frequently unable to pay the soldiers it already had, leaving commanders with only emotional appeals to secure their troops’ continued cooperation. the memoir of hetman stanisław z� ółkiewski routinely deals with chronic problems of underfunding during the commonwealth’s invasion of russia in 1609. originally, z� ółkiewski advised king zygmunt iii against the campaign, as few troops had arrived and those that had were unpaid.61 since the king personally assured the hetman that he would gather the necessary funds, it can be inferred that zygmunt iii was independently funding the army through his own channels, given that the slow-moving sejm had yet to authorize the war and thus the requisite fiduciary resources. this situation was far from unique; not only did the diet have to approve funds to pay troops, but the next diet had to ratify the resolution. according to fredro, this whole process of debating, approving, and gathering taxes took at least five months.62 even when a monarch was able to secure the necessary funding from the diet, the local dietines lacked the political infrastructure to actually enforce collection of taxes it decided on, meaning that the troops still frequently went unpaid. this was compounded by the nobility's refusal to agree to a survey of land, which made tax rates hard to enforce.63 all this meant that money to pay troops was extremely hard to secure, a factor that would continuously hamper the military efforts of the commonwealth. 59 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 94. 60 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 70. 61 z� ółkiewski, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 15. 62 fredro, o porządku wojennym i o pospolitem ruszeniu małym, 58. 63 frost, after the deluge, 23. 85 these financial problems continued well into z� ółkiewski’s campaign. after winning a great victory at the battle of kłuszyn and leading his forces to the gates of moscow, z� ółkiewski began negotiating with prominent boyars. he tried to convince his soldiers to continue to serve during the negotiations without pay: “because with such perseverance, one could with god’s help induce this nation [muscovy] to offer more advantageous conditions for the commonwealth.”64 however, the troops demanded their wages (which the shrewd muscovites offered to pay in exchange for peace) and an end to the conflict, forcing z� ółkiewski to broker a suboptimal peace for the commonwealth. any potential gains from this campaign were soon reversed as the polish garrison in the kremlin was forced to surrender in 1612.65 this lack of funding continued to plague the reign of zygmunt iii. since the diet was unwilling to approve the taxes necessary to continue paying the army, he was forced to surrender livonia to sweden as part of the peace of altmark in 1629, another “disadvantageous” outcome for the commonwealth.66 these problems would resurface during the reign of jan kazimierz thirty years later. despite military successes in 1660-1661, the diets responsible for voting and collecting taxes to pay the army were broken. this left the military, much as it had been during the 1609 campaign, unpaid and unwilling to press its advantage by attacking muscovy and regaining lost territory. jan chryzostom pasek documented the formation of a union by unpaid troops in 1661. though pasek was sympathetic to the cause of the union, he wrote, “our division opposed it, seeing therein great detrimentum to our country.”67 consequently, his memoirs include a speech he gave to discourage his fellow soldiers from joining the union and exhorting them to exhibit public virtue. public virtue, or the sacrificing of private interest for the sake of the public good, was a central value in szlachta culture, and similar appeals to pasek’s were made by reformers in the mid eighteenth century.68 the speech highlights one of the responses to the ills facing the commonwealth: a call for moral reform, either in addition to or even instead of institutional reform. thus pasek began by urging patriotic self-sacrifice: “i know not how any man could call himself a son of this fatherland, who could wholly forget its public interests for the sake of his private ones.”69 he then continued by urging an attack on muscovy in order to press the commonwealth’s advantage: “let us consider how these deceitful people [the muscovites] plundered threequarters of our fatherland with fire and sword. let us consider how many outrages against god they committed in his churches. let us show them that we too are capable of finding our food abroad in the country which robbed us of so much of it.”70 calls for crusade against the muslim ottomans were a frequent tool in attempts to reignite the martial virtue of the nobility through religious warfare, and pasek appealed to a similar sentiment by mentioning desecration of presumably catholic churches by the orthodox muscovites.71 64 z� ółkiewski. początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 54. 65 davies, god’ playground, 346. 66 frost, after the deluge, 23. 67 pasek, memoirs of the polish baroque, 95. 68 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 1 and 34. 69 pasek, memoirs of the polish baroque, 97. 70 pasek, memoirs of the polish baroque, 97. 71 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 39. 86 the exhortation to fight strove to unite the fractious gentry against a common foe and alleviate financial strain on the commonwealth, since its troops would sustain themselves by looting in foreign lands. additionally, since the szlachta saw their privileges as a reward their ancestors had received from a grateful monarch for military services, it made sense to engage in warfare in order to return the commonwealth to its golden age and reignite the patriotic virtue of the nobility.72 within pasek’s speech, we see a call to moral reform through a renewal of public virtue and religious warfare. despite pasek’s impassioned speech, the paralysis induced by the lack of funding led to the signing of the treaty of andrusovo in 1667, which made significant territorial concessions to muscovy in exchange for token sums of money.73 this continued the pattern of the treaties of moscow in 1610 and altmark in 1629, with the commonwealth gaining a military advantage only to sign unfavorable treaties when the military was starved for money. it is important to note, however, that poland and lithuania were hardly the only countries struggling to pay their armies. especially in the first half of the seventeenth century, even countries undertaking the so-called “military revolution” still relied heavily on mercenary forces and the pillaging of enemy territory, as they had not developed the sophisticated bureaucracies necessary to finance their growing armies.74 however, this problem was more acute in the commonwealth, since it never developed the mechanisms necessary to consistently pay its troops. furthermore, attacking foreign territory and living off the land was also not possible, since the szlachta were inherently suspicious that foreign wars were a way for their monarchs to increase their power at the expense of noble liberties.75 polish reformers were hardly blind to these financial problems. stanisław karwicki advocated for a smaller army but with regular wages, rather than pay requiring ratification by the sejm, noting, “thus we would avoid so many discomforts, which have during our time grievously afflicted the commonwealth due to the halt in wages. the nation’s jewels are dispersed, cities and provinces appropriated, in the end the very free election for the price of what is to be paid to the soldiery as wages, extended for sale.”76 karwicki and other reformers were acutely aware that the necessity of the sejm’s approval for wages led to an ineffective military that was unable to defend the commonwealth. however, the szlachta feared that an army that did not require approval of the sejm for its wages would be too independent and could easily be used by a monarch to fight wars or enforce his will without consent of the nobility, trampling on their liberties and leading to the dreaded absolutum dominium. as a result, reformers such as fredro were eager to suggest improvements in discipline and training, identifying license and insubordination as the true problems plaguing the armed forces and effectively ignoring funding issues in favor of calls for moral reform.77 even those such as karwicki who advocated financial reform were unsuccessful. this was because the lack of a comprehensive land survey and the 72 wagner-rundell, common wealth, common good, 2. 73 frost, after the deluge, 170. 74 frost, “the polish-lithuanian commonwealth and the ‘military revolution,” 37. 75 grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 70. 76 karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku, 138. author’s translation. 77 fredro, o porządku wojennym i o pospolitem ruszeniu małym, 10. grześkowiak-krwawicz, queen liberty, 83. 87 requirement for diet approval and dietine execution of the new tax levy made collection of wages time-consuming and inconsistent. this fostered an incredibly fragile system of military funding that made it nearly impossible for the army to maintain the initiative. consequently, the commonwealth’s leaders were left appealing to their soldiers’ patriotism. unfortunately, this was no substitute for regular pay, and efforts at reviving public virtue fell largely on deaf ears. ultimately, the szlachta’s unwillingness to relinquish political control over the armies’ purse-strings would be ruthlessly exploited by the partitioning powers, as the commonwealth’s languishing military proved ineffective at protecting its borders. power of magnates while the royal army’s effectiveness was hampered by lack of funding, the private armies of magnates had no such troubles. this was because the political system of the commonwealth gave a significant amount of power to the magnates, which in large part contributed to the khmelnytsky uprising and the disastrous settlements of the seventeenth century, most notably the treaty of kiejdany. while subsequent claims that in its latter years the commonwealth was a magnate oligarchy are to some extent reductionist, it is undeniable that families such as the potocki, radziwiłł, sapieha, lubomirski, and czartoryski wielded a tremendous military and political power in poland and lithuania. their power in large part stemmed from the royal court’s difficulty in securing funding from the diet. this meant that the crown was heavily dependent on loans from wealthy magnates. in return, the powerful clans were leased royal lands and the associated revenue.78 while the 1567 diet established that a quarter of the revenue from these lands would go towards national defense, the lack of an effective bureaucracy and land survey meant that monarchs were able to collect substantially less in practice.79 this compounded the issue of magnate power, as they became even wealthier and the monarchy lost access to regular revenue from crown lands. additionally, while the royal bureaucracy was often unable to even collect the taxes from its own lands effectively, the magnates developed efficient systems for collecting taxes and labor, enslaving the peasants and provoking anger and resentment.80 in fact, the khmelnytsky uprising was at least partially due to exploitation of the peasants and cossacks by regional magnates and szlachta.81 this situation was bemoaned by many within the commonwealth, and karwicki proposed the return of all leased lands to the crown upon the renter’s death. this would give the monarchy a solid base of revenue from which to collect the funds necessary to pay the army.82 however, this was never put into practice, and the vast revenue from appropriated crown lands gave many magnate families the ability to establish private armies to defend their vast domains all over poland and lithuania. immediately after the khmelnytsky uprising, the entire royal army numbered 5,400 men, while the palatine of ruthenia jeremi wiśniowiecki (1612-1651) could muster up to 12,000 men to defend his lands in the 78 frost, after the deluge, 142. 79 frost, after the deluge, 20. a quarter, known as a kwarta, provides the linguistic root for the wojsko kwarciane, theoretically paid with a quarter of the revenue from royal lands. 80 gordon, cossack rebellions, 41. 81 davies, god’ playground, 446. 82 karwicki, dzieła polityczne z początku xviii wieku, 145. 88 southeast.83 similarly, the “alban band” of prince karol stanisław radziwiłł (1734-1790) consisted of 6,000 retainers lavishly dressed in snow white.84 these troops were frequently used to further the interests of the magnates. for example, the early response to the khmelnytsky uprising was almost exclusively from the private army of jeremi wiśniowiecki, who possessed substantial land holdings in the regions affected by the revolt.85 this type of private military intervention naturally did little to soothe the existing tensions between the cossacks and peasants and their magnate overlords, whose power was so extensive that they, not the king, were perceived by khmelnytsky’s followers as the enemy. during the beginning of the revolt, khmelnytsky maintained his loyalty to the king, insisting that his quarrel was with the magnates and not the crown.86 this conceptual disconnect of the king from the de facto rulers of the southeast of the commonwealth illustrates the extent of magnate power and independence. unfortunately, this freedom would be a significant catalyst for the woes befalling the commonwealth after 1648. while contributing to tensions with the cossacks and peasantry, the power of the magnates also allowed them to conduct their own foreign policy and diplomacy, which often pitted rival families against each other. for instance, stanisław z� ółkiewski was a lifelong enemy of the powerful potocki family on account of their support for the austrian faction at court. he went so far as to lay the blame for the deterioration of the commonwealth’s position after the 1610 russian campaign at their feet. he accused them of convincing king władysław iv to violate the treaty with muscovy so that z� ółkiewski would not get all the glory for brokering the peace.87 z� ółkiewski also criticized the king for acting in bad faith and being amenable to arguments of the potocki’s, since “facile creditur quod desideratur” (it is easy to believe what you desire [to believe]).88 the fact that z� ółkiewski would be bold enough to include such an insult in his account illustrates hostility vis-à-vis not only other magnate clans but also the monarch himself. these tensions and even military dangers stemming from magnate influence were perhaps best illustrated by the period from 1648 to 1660. this era represented a time of unique crisis for the commonwealth as it conducted a war against muscovy before being invaded by sweden in 1655. lithuania in particular had been devastated by the muscovites, and the local nobility felt abandoned by the poles as the diet refused to approve the necessary funding for its military defense.89 these ill feelings were exacerbated by anti-protestant sentiment targeted against janusz radziwiłł (1612-1655), one of the premier magnates in lithuania and also a calvinist (see figure 4).90 not surprisingly, the troops sent to face sweden had extremely low morale and capitulated at ujście after a brief struggle. this, coupled with a resumed muscovite offensive, convinced radziwiłł that the grand duchy needed to beg for swedish protection in order to preserve the liberties of its gentry. consequently, he signed a treaty at kiejdany in 1655, which 83 frost, after the deluge, 17-18. 84 davies, god’s playground, 226. 85 frost, after the deluge, 18. 86 davies, god’s playground, 446. 87 z� ółkiewski, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 66. 88 z� ółkiewski, początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, 67. author’s translation of polish translation of latin phrase. 89 frost, after the deluge, 44. 90 frost, after the deluge, 44. 89 effectively abolished the polish-lithuanian union and established lithuania as essentially a swedish vassal. figure 4: daniel schultz, portrait of janusz radziwiłł (1612-1655), 165491 the surrender at ujście and the subsequent treaty of kiejdany set off a chain reaction of military disasters, leading to the occupation of most of poland by sweden. the polish szlachta were reluctant to contribute their own funds to the war effort in lithuania, and radziwiłł subsequently allied himself with sweden in order to protect his own interests and those of the local nobility. while there were a variety of factors leading up to the khmelnytsky uprising and the treaty of kiejdany, the power and influence of prominent magnate families can be seen as a major contributor to these disastrous events. both saw the military effectiveness of the commonwealth severely hampered by the independent 91 daniel schultz, portrait of janusz radziwiłł (1612-1655), 1654, oil on canvas, national art museum of belorussian republik, minsk, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:janusz_radziwi%c5%82%c5%82_by_daniel_schultz.png, accessed november 6, 2021. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:janusz_radziwi%c5%82%c5%82_by_daniel_schultz.png 90 actions taken by these magnates acting in their own self-interest or in the interests of some subgroup within the commonwealth. conclusion a variety of military factors contributed to the partitions of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth. these included suboptimal composition of the armed forces, underfunding, and power of the magnates, which all served to stymie attempts at reform and restrict the commonwealth’s ability to establish a strong standing army. this failure to create such a force was caused in part by the controversy and eventual dissolution of the cossack register, which would permanently cripple the ability of poland and lithuania to wage war. similarly damaging was the commonwealth’s reliance on cavalry, which would prove ineffective against more westernized armies, especially sweden’s. while there were concerted efforts at reform during the reigns of jan kazimierz and august ii, they were doomed by political controversy. all these challenges left an army that was not only antiquated and small but also underpaid, as inefficient bureaucracy and competing interests confounded efforts to regularly pay the commonwealth’s soldiers. consequently, commanders in the field such as hetman stanisław z� ółkiewski and jan chrysostom pasek were forced to appeal unsuccessfully to sentiments of patriotism and self-sacrifice in order to induce their soldiers to fight. finally, the outsized power of magnates allowed them a degree of autonomy that precipitated the catastrophic khmelnytsky uprising and the treaty of kiejdany. all of these factors made a significant but perhaps understudied contribution to the partitions of the commonwealth. cuniolo_finalforpublication.docx heidegger’s support for antisemitic measures as rector of the university of freiburg, 1933-19341 andrea cuniolo university of st. andrews abstract the relationship between martin heidegger and jewish colleagues has long been controversial. although heidegger always denied being an antisemite, he also undertook significant action against jews during his time as the rector at freiburg university, promoting antisemitic policies such as the aryanization of university staff and students and the destruction of jewish authors’ books. there were some exceptions to these policies, but even these exceptions did not completely go against the political will of the nazi party, thus showing heidegger’s ultimate support of the nazi regime. 1 i would like to thank dr. tomasz kamusella for having been my supervisor and having given me advice on my work and dr. claudia kreklau for having been my second marker and encouraging me to publish my work. i would also like to thank prof. howard louthan, prof. meyer weinshel and the entire editorial board of central europe yearbook for allowing me the opportunity to publish my undergraduate dissertation and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. 39 introduction martin heidegger was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, but he was also a member of the nazi party between 1933 and 1945, the entire duration of nazi rule.2 heidegger served as rector of the university of freiburg between april 21st, 1933, and april 23rd, 1934, during the first year of the nazi era. evaluating heidegger’s relationship with jews during his period as rector of the university of freiburg is extremely important for two reasons. the first: the persecution of jews was swift and immediate following the nazis’ seizure of power in 1933 with the law for the restoration of the professional civil service (gesetz zur wiederherstellung des berufsbeamtentums, henceforth in this article known as gwb). the second: this was the moment when heidegger was most active in politics. although heidegger would never again have such great political power (although he retained the ability to influence policies and measures as an eminence grise). it was, however, during his rectorate that heidegger had administrative authority that directly affected jews at the university.3 in april 1933, the academic senate of freiburg elected wilhelm von möllendorf, a doctor and a member of the spd, as rector of the university. however, möllendorf “resigned” after a few days because of his unwillingness to cooperate with nazi authorities and his refusal to implement antisemitic measures. möllendorf refused to dismiss jewish members of the university staff, to remove non-aryan books from the library, and to allow the circulation of antisemitic propaganda throughout the university.4 in a 1966 interview, heidegger reported that he was pressured by two previous rectors, joseph sauer and von möllendorf himself, to take the rectorship for the sake of the university: on the very day he was removed, von möllendorf came to me and said: "heidegger, now you must take over the rectorship," i said that i lacked experience in administration. the vice-rector at that time, prof. sauer (theology), likewise urged me to become a candidate for the rectorship. for otherwise the danger would be that a party functionary would be named rector. the younger faculty, with whom i had been discussing the structure of the university for many years, besieged me to take over the rectorship. for a long time i hesitated. finally i said that i was ready to take over the office in the interest of the university, but only if i could be certain of the unanimous agreement of the plenum.5 however, this is far from the truth. ott argues that prof. wolfgang schadewaldt, a committed nazi and a professor of classics, proposed heidegger as a new rector and planned the 5 martin heidegger, ‘now only a god can save us: der spiegel’s interview (september 23, 1966)’, martin heidegger: philosophical and political writings, ed. manfred stassen, trans. maria p. alter and john d. caputo (london: routledge, 2003), 25. 4 ott, martin heidegger, 141. 3 by the 1930’s, the university of freiburg had become one of germany’s most prestigious universities (not to mention, one of its oldest). prominent scholars of the time included edmund husserl, who was at the time the most important german philosopher.# husserl was of course not the only prestigious academic in the humanities at freiburg in the first half of the twentieth century, but heidegger himself arrived at the university to serve as husserl’s assistant in 1928.# another preeminent scholar in freiburg during this time was eugen fink.# in addition, edith stein, one of the most important phenomenological philosophers, studied there for her phd with husserl as her advisor.# freiburg's excellence was also not limited to the humanities. freiburg also had a prestigious medical clinic and university hospital.# among the illustrious members of the faculty of sciences were georg von hevesy and hermann staudinger, who both won the nobel prize for chemistry in 1943 and 1953, respectively. 2 rundiger safranski, heidegger e il suo tempo (milan: garzanti, 2008), 302-321. 40 removal of von möllendorf to facilitate the gleichschaltung process.6 moreover, knowles reported that shortly before his election as rector, heidegger was already in contact with the nazi ministry of education and enjoyed its full confidence in pursuing all the policies that his predecessor refused.7 therefore, heidegger’s defence is not true. many scholars, both in history and philosophy, would agree that heidegger was pivotal in the implementation of antisemitic measures. for instance, wolin, knowles, ott, faye, and farìas8 have portrayed heidegger as an extremist in politics or as the stereotypical nazi bureaucrat who only sought to obey orders from above. however, there are a few dissenting views. among heidegger’s defenders are karl moheling and heidegger’s son hermann. hermann heidegger frequently tried to rehabilitate his father: as the editor of a volume about his father’s life and actions, he underlined many times that martin heidegger tried to distance himself from the government and to keep some jewish colleagues of his at the university.9 similarly, moheling presents heidegger’s rectorate as an act of opposition to nazism.10 moheling considers one sign of heidegger’s opposition to antisemitic policies to be his resistance to the publication of antisemitic posters.11 this article will argue that as rector, heidegger implemented nazi policies at their very best and supported ideologically and culturally antisemitic policies via the “against the un-german spirit” campaign, regarded as the natural continuation of the gwb.12 even when he attempted to protect some jewish colleagues, heidegger's position should not be interpreted as opposition to the antisemitic measures: he either sought to defend the university's prestige or to apply the exceptions provided by the gwb. the aryanization of the university under heidegger heidegger implemented antisemitic policies at freiburg university during his rectorate, despite his postwar claims that he became rector to prevent the politicization of the university.13 at his trial in 1945 and in der spiegel’s interview of 1966, he tried to present himself as an opponent of nazism and its antisemitic policies. in fact, in the interview and his deposition, he claimed that he accepted the rectorate under pressure from his predecessor, von möllendorf. this was to prevent a bureaucrat, as opposed to a scholar, from occupying the leading position in the university, which would destroy the university’s independence.14 but it is the opposite which is true: heidegger worked together with the ministry of baden to implement the gwb and other antisemitic policies aimed at limiting the presence of jews at 14 ibid. 13 martin heidegger, ‘the rectorate 1933/34: facts and thoughts’, the review of metaphysics 38: 3 (march 1985), 483; heidegger, ‘now only a god can save us’, 27. 12 guillaume payen, martin heidegger : catholicisme, révolution, nazisme (paris, éditions perrin, 2016), 397. 11 ibid. 10 karl a. moheling, ‘heidegger and the nazis’, heidegger: the man and the thinker, ed. thomas sheehan (chicago: precedent publishing, 1981), 35. 9 hermann heidegger, ‘preface’, the review of metaphysics 38: 3 (march 1985), 468-469 8 ott, martin heidegger, 133-262; adam knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s nazi conscience’, probing the limits of categorization, ed. christina morina and krijn thijs (oxford: oxford university press, 2018), 168-183; richard wolin, heidegger’s children (princeton: princeton university press, 2001), pp. 36-37; emmanuel faye, heidegger: the introduction of nazism into philosophy (new haven, ct: yale university press, 2009), 39-58; victor farìas, heidegger and nazism (philadelphia, pa: temple university press, 1987), 79-177. 7 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s nazi conscience’, 183. 6 ott, martin heidegger, 143. 41 the university. most importantly, the gwb aimed to expel all jewish public servants from their roles, including university staff.15 knowles suggests that heidegger implemented the gwb with great enthusiasm and zeal,16 and there is material proof that this affirmation is correct. on april 28th, 1933, just a few days after his election, heidegger sent a letter to all faculty deans, urging them to expel jewish instructors from the university.17 he even failed to support edmund husserl, a close friend who had jewish parents and had converted to lutheranism. this episode indicates how much heidegger was willing to sacrifice for the implementation of the new law; it had mainly been thanks to husserl’s recommendations that heidegger had won a place at the university of freiburg as a tenured professor.18 additionally, husserl’s and heidegger’s families were close, almost inseparable before hitler’s rise to power.19 despite this, heidegger did not reciprocate in this moment of need. husserl received his letter of dismissal on april 14th, 1933, and was bitterly disturbed by it, calling it “the greatest affront of my life.”20 however, heidegger did not return the favour to his former mentor and confirmed the order of dismissal.21 further episodes indicate that heidegger desired the full implementation of the gwb. on june 7th, 1933, heidegger sent to the minister of baden a dossier on prof. liefmann, a jewish member of the freiburg law school.22 the dossier included the results of three examinations commission on prof. liefmann’s war wounds.23 although not explicitly specified, the purpose was clearly to demonstrate liefmann’s eligibility to remain at freiburg university as a former frontline soldier, based on the frontkämpferprivileg (section 2 of article 3 of the gwb).24 commissioning not just one but three exams suggests that heidegger was extremely scrupulous in granting one of the few gwb exceptions and wanted to implement it at its very best. additionally, this episode proves that heidegger was in close contact with the minister, with whom he had to work for the application of the gwb. overall, heidegger supported the aryanization of the university and filled the gaps left by dismissed jewish staff with aryan professors. the gwb applied “if only one parent or grandparent is of non-aryan descent,”25 but heidegger's half-jewish assistant, dr. werner brock, remained until august 1933 to “rearrange the seminar library.”26 heidegger did not protest his ultimate dismissal.27 on march 18th, 1934, heidegger simply communicated to the minister of culture and education of baden that brock, his former student, had been 27 faye, heidegger, 43. 26 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s’, 188. 25 ‘first regulation for administration of the law for the restoration of the professional civil service, 11 april 1933’, the nazi germany sourcebook, 151-152. 24 ‘law’, 151. 23 ibid. 22 martin heidegger, ‘richiesta di benevolo esame per il prof. liefmann’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 114. 21 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s’, 168. 20 ibid. 19 yvonne sherratt, hitler’s philosophers (yale: yale university press, 2013), 75. 18 tom rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism and philosophy (berkeley: university of california press, 1992), 25. 17 ibid., 173. 16 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s nazi conscience’, 179. 15 ‘law for the restoration of the professional civil service, 7th april 1933’, the nazi germany sourcebook, ed. roderick stackelberg and sally a. winkler (london, routledge 2002), 150-151. 42 replaced as his assistant by dr. brocker, a non-jewish philosopher, 28 and to whom he granted a status equal to the ordinary assistant.29 hence, it can be argued that heidegger was working towards the overall aryanization of the university staff, just as the nazis programmed. indeed, the ministry of baden was satisfied by heidegger’s actions in the process of aryanization, deeming them “exemplary.”30 additionally, brocker was nominated as heidegger’s new assistant because he showed “camaraderie and spiritual superiority,”31 meaning that brocker was a committed nazi. this promotion furthered gwb objectives to build a new class of civil servants aligned with nazi ideology.32 heidegger’s support of the gwb was so strong that he was willing to sidestep faculty members and ignore all complaints about the feasibility of the policy. some faculty deans requested more explanations on how to classify those who (after 1935 with the passage of the nuremberg laws) be considered mischlinge, or jews who had converted to christianity.33 others were not ready to fire the most skilled technicians in their laboratory or the best paediatricians in the clinic.34 however, heidegger did not respond to these complaints and ordered the full implementation of the gwb with a letter to all faculty deans on april 28th, 1933.35 heidegger’s order for the full dismissal of all jewish university staff members, even if this went against more practical concerns, demonstrates his enthusiastic support of this measure and strong adherence to the principles of duty as rector. heidegger persecuted not only jewish staff members but jewish students as well, supporting the implementation of the law for the overcrowding of schools and universities issued on april 25th, 1933. on may 3rd, heidegger wrote to faculty deans that jewish students could make up a maximum of only 1.5% of the new class of students and 5% of returning students.36 heidegger’s implementation of the law against overcrowding immediately after the gwb follows the logic of “cumulative radicalization” typical of the nazi regime.37 this policy drastically reduced the number of jewish students at freiburg, meaning that the university was even more aryanized. moreover, on may 6th, 1933, heidegger sent faculty deans a circular from minister eugen fehrle: following an order by the ministry of education of baden, scholarships would not be available to marxists or jews, while members of the sa and ss would receive priority.38 in an article in the freiburger studentenzeitung, heidegger stated further that the scholarship ban applied to any student who was not pure aryan (including half-jews), with the only exception being “students of non-aryan stock who themselves fought on the front line or whose fathers died during the first world war.”39 this policy exceeded what was originally 39 ibid. 38 ibid., 344. 37 ibid., 345. 36 guillaume payen, martin heidegger's changing destinies: catholicism, revolution, nazism (yale: yale university press, 2023), 344. 35 ibid. 34 ibid. 33 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s’, 173. 32 saul friedlander, nazi germany and the jews: the years of persecution, 1933-1939 (london: w&n, 2007), 27. 31 heidegger, ‘equiparazione’, 248. 30 adam knowles, martin heidegger’s fascist affinities: a politics of silence (stanford, stanford university press, 2019), 5. 29 ibid. 28 martin heidegger, ‘equiparazione agli assistenti ordinari’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 248. 43 demanded by the minister40 and is thus another example of the value heidegger placed on racist policy.41 heidegger was fully complicit in the cumulative radicalization of antisemitic policies coming from above. in a 1929 letter to victor schworer, heidegger declared that “the judaization of germany’s spiritual life must be stopped”42 and that a restoration of the german spirit could be achieved with “indigenous forces and educators.”43 with all these actions, heidegger was trying to accomplish goals that he had already made clear. this letter reinforces that heidegger’s support for the gwb was not only dictated by political opportunism, nor was it a simple, isolated event in his life. instead, it supported a project that he had deeply desired for a very long time. for this reason, it is impossible to think of heidegger’s actions as a “compromise” or casual mistakes, as he defined them in his interview with der spiegel.44 these actions were intentional. heidegger willingly supported the new measures included in the gwb and the law against overcrowding of public schools. for this reason, heidegger was a crucial element in building a politicized university, just as the nazis intended. indeed, the very scope of the expulsion of jewish teachers and students was a form of nazification of the university. the objective of the gwb was to build a university that expelled all politically unreliable civil servants and kept only aryans.45 in substance, heidegger did not behave any differently from the other nazi rectors who actively persecuted jews and acted as “race experts.”46 as rector, he obeyed orders from the ministry and sometimes radicalized them even further. for this reason, karl moehling’s thesis that heidegger’s rectorate should be read as an act of resistance to nazism and its programme is false.47 the ideological antisemitic policies: against the un-german spirit even before heidegger was elected rector, the ministry of baden put pressure on von möllendorf to implement cultural policies aimed at expelling jewish and un-german influence from the university. among these were the publication of the “twelve theses against the un-german spirit” and the exclusion of books by non-aryan authors from the library.48 it is important to highlight heidegger’s role in these policies, not merely because heidegger’s predecessor refused to implement them.49 book burnings were normally seen as the natural continuation of previous policies like the gwb.50 indeed, if the gwb restored public offices, book burnings were thought of by the nazis as a restoration of culture.51 cultural control had always been in the nazi’s plans, and they had long advocated for a 51 ibid. 50 payen, martin heidegger’s changing destinies, 353. 49 ibid. 48 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 25; heidegger, ‘the rectorate’, 491-492. 47 moheling, ‘heidegger and the nazis’, 31-43. 46 bela bodo, ‘the role of antisemitism in the expulsion of non-aryan students’, yad vashem studies, 30 (2002), 228. 45 friedlander, nazi germany and the jews, 27. 44 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 28. 43 ibid. 42 martin heidegger, ‘the jewish contamination of german spiritual life: letter to victor schower (1929)’, martin heidegger: philosophical and political writings, trans and ed. manfred stassen (london: continuum, 2003), 1. 41 ibid. 40 ibid. 44 german press that excluded any jewish influence.52 the 24th section of the nazi party programme stated explicitly that “the party fights the judeo-materialistic spirit.”53 at universities, the destruction of “un-german” books naturally followed the expulsion of non-aryan teachers.54 the overall aim was to create a university environment in which there could be no corruption of young minds.55 heidegger said in his interview with der spiegel and a brief titled “the rectorate” that he forbade the publication of an antisemitic poster called “against the un-german spirit,” implying that he was hostile to the campaign from the very beginning.56 these posters identified measures that had to be taken to preserve the german language and culture from jewish contamination.57 joseph goebbels himself ordered this type of placard to be published in german universities.58 freiburg’s previous rector, von möllendorf, was hostile to the publication of these posters.59 this point is particularly dear to heidegger’s defenders like moheling and hermann heidegger, who found evidence of heidegger’s disagreement with nazi racial policies in this incident.60 heidegger described the episode as follows: on the second day after i had assumed office, the "student leader" with two companions visited me as rector and demanded again the posting of the jewish proclamation. i declined. the three students left remarking that the prohibition would be reported to the national student leadership. after a few days, a telephone call came from the office of higher education [sa hochschulamt], in the highest sa echelons, from the sa leader dr. baumann. he demanded the posting of the so-called proclamation since it had already been posted in other universities. if i refused i would have to reckon with removal, if not, indeed, with the closing of the university. i attempted to win the support of the badish minister of culture for my prohibition. the latter explained that he could do nothing in opposition to the sa. nevertheless, i did not retract my prohibition.61 this account was thought to be true even by scholars who have taken an extremely critical stance against heidegger, like ott, rockmore and safranski.62 nonetheless, there is material evidence that this prohibition may not have occurred, suggesting that in fact, heidegger supported this piece of antisemitic policy. krebs reports in his autobiography that these posters were distributed all over freiburg and even published in the freiburger studentenzeitung, a student newspaper, on may 2, 1933.63 although heidegger had not yet given his inaugural speech (“the self-affirmation of the german university,” read on the 27th of may), he was already in charge and had the power to prohibit 63 hans krebs, reminiscences and reflections (oxford: claredon press, 1981), 72 [n.b. krebs reports the “twelve theses” fully in his autobiography, adding that “[m]uch of the fanatic, mystic, weird, and hysterical quality of the german text is softened by translation”]. 62 ott, martin heidegger, 188; rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism, 78, 98, 112; safranski, heidegger, 310. 61 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 26; heidegger, ‘the rectorate’, 491-492. 60 moheling, ‘heidegger and the nazis’, 35; hermann heidegger, ‘preface’, 468-469. 59 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 25. 58 hermann heidegger, ‘preface’, 469. 57 krebs, reminiscences, 68-69. 56 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 25-26; krebs, reminiscences, 70. 55 ibid, 352. 54 ibid. 53 ibid. 52 ibid. 45 the publication altogether. krebs, a credible witness since he was present at freiburg at the time this happened, put blame especially on heidegger, saying that contrary to his predecessor, heidegger approved the publication of the posters.64 this evidence suggests that heidegger lied in his der spiegel interview about his resistance to antisemitic initiatives. this episode reveals one of the most important mistakes made by those defending heidegger’s position, such as his son or moheling. both had simply accepted as fact that heidegger prohibited the publication of the anti-jewish decrees or the book burning at the university, without analysing whether this claim was true.65 there is also evidence that heidegger supported the destruction of non-aryan books. in his der spiegel interview, heidegger argued that his resistance to nazi racial policies can also be found in his prohibition of the book burning in front of the university’s main building.66 these book burnings were scheduled to take place on may 10th 1933 across germany as the culmination of the campaign “against the un-german spirit”.67 hermann heidegger mentioned this point as a sign that his father always tried to distance himself from the nazi regime, using his power as rector to counter this policy.68 nevertheless, there is material proof that this supposed prohibition by heidegger never took place: italian philosopher ernesto grassi and other eyewitnesses saw a book burning in freiburg on may 10, in front of the university library.69 moreover, heidegger supported the eradication of liberalism at the university, which was seen as a jewish disease. thesis 10 of the ‘jew notice’ called for “the determination and ability to overcome jewish intellectualism and the threat it contains: the decay of the spirit of the german people through liberalism.”70 when writing to the university of munich about the jewish philosopher hönigswald, heidegger highlighted hönigswald’s liberalism as a threat leading inevitably “to a generic logic and mundane conscience.”71 this decadent “mundane conscience” is in sharp contrast with the “german spiritual life.”72 heidegger also claims that hönigswald’s liberalism “deviates the attention from man in his historical rooting and the popular tradition of his origin in blood and soil.”73 this was not the only time that heidegger wrote something like this. in his black notebooks, heidegger defines the jew as someone incapable of having a relationship with the soil.74 heidegger further strengthens his attack against hönigswald’s philosophy, saying it is “insidious” and “has already deceived and deviated many young people.”75 an emphasis on deception is also found in thesis 5 of the poster “against the un-german spirit”: if a jew “writes in german, he lies.”76 hence, it can be argued that heidegger was trying to defend the university from the liberal corruption that the nazis despised so much in a battle against the un-german spirit. indeed, the main 76 krebs, reminiscences, 69. 75 ibid. 74 donatella di cesare, heidegger e gli ebrei: i “quaderni neri” (turin: bollati boringhieri, 2014), 171-172. 73 ibid. 72 heidegger, the jewish contamination’, 1. 71 heidegger, ‘hönigswald’, 248. 70 krebs, reminiscences, 69. 69 ott, martin heidegger, 189. 68 hermann heidegger, ‘preface’, 468. 67 ott, martin heidegger, 189. 66 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 29. 65 moheling, ‘heidegger and the nazis’, 35; hermann heidegger ‘preface’, 468-469. 64 ibid. 46 concern of heidegger was not allowing hönigswald to corrupt young people.77 the expulsion of hönigswald then was also part of a nazi cultural policy. heidegger expressed similar thoughts even in private, thus demonstrating his commitment to the cause and that he did not support this campaign out of mere political opportunism. further evidence of heidegger’s deep support for this kind of policy can be found in his letter to schworer, in which he expressed concern about tutelage of the “german spiritual life”78 and stopping its growing judaization “in a larger and a narrower sense.”79 the destruction of jewish works was a way to stop the process of judaization. in sum, heidegger’s claims that he resisted antisemitic cultural policies are false. instead, it seems that heidegger supported them, thus deepening his commitment to national socialism and antisemitism. arguably, heidegger supported almost the epuration of jewish influence at the university. this means that the historian should be very sceptical when treating heidegger’s der spiegel interview and his brief “the rectorate: facts and thoughts” as reliable sources when it comes to the implementation of antisemitic policies at freiburg university. the exceptions to the policies: what value do they have? the evidence here reported proves that heidegger was a useful instrument in the hands of the nazis and implemented antisemitic policies. nonetheless, on some occasions, heidegger resisted some antisemitic measures: these episodes are important pieces of his defence of his actions as rector in his interview with der spiegel. there were cases in which heidegger attempted to retain some jewish staff members at the university. in his interview with der spiegel, heidegger strongly emphasized that he tried to resist the firing of professor george von hevesy.80 there is proof that heidegger tried to keep him at freiburg, and hermann heidegger used this episode as evidence that his father was not a committed nazi.81 indeed, on july 12, 1933, heidegger wrote to the minister of culture of baden that dismissing von hevesy from his role would be detrimental to the international reputation of the university.82 nonetheless, this should not be seen as a defence of jews at the university, but rather as a defence of the prestige of the university. a close reading of the letter reveals that heidegger was much more concerned with avoiding the possible decline of the international reputation of the university. heidegger writes that “a permanent dismissal would cause the german science and particularly to our university near the border [with france] a great damage that may not be repaired in the long run.”83 heidegger also states that he is writing this letter “with full consciousness of the necessary and indispensable actuation of the law for the restoration of the professional civil service,”84 meaning that he did not think of his action as an act of rebellion. additionally, it must be mentioned that von hevesy had recently won a considerable amount of money from the rockefeller foundation, which 84 ibid. 83 ibid., 132. 82 martin heidegger, ‘parere sul congedo von hevesy e frankel’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 132-133. 81 hermann heidegger, ‘preface’, 468. 80 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 31. 79 heidegger, ‘the jewish contamination’, 1. 78 ibid. 77 payen, martin heidegger’s changing, 356. 47 he was going to use to fully renovate the department of physical chemistry at freiburg.85 losing von hevesy would have meant losing the money. the fact that heidegger was more concerned with defending the prestige of the university rather than von hevesy as an individual is proven if we compare his case that of hans krebs, a fellow chemist who was dismissed. von hevesy had already made extremely important contributions to the literature in radiochemistry. he had discovered the element of hafnium in 1922 and was an authority in his field by 1933.86 additionally, it was at freiburg that von hevesy had begun his research on the isotopes that would win him the nobel prize for chemistry in 1943.87 in contrast, krebs was still quite young and not internationally recognized. by december 1932, he was only admitted as a privatdozent of internal medicine.88 krebs had done important work on the cycle of urea synthesis, but this was the only important discovery he had made so far.89 he would not discover the citric acid cycle (today is known as the krebs’ cycle) until 1937, four years after his dismissal from freiburg.90 for this research, krebs received the nobel prize for medicine in 1953.91 it seems that heidegger tried to keep at freiburg only people who were famous, while he did not care much for the unknown. hence, it is impossible to think of heidegger’s actions as a defence of the jews, as he presented them in his interview with der spiegel.92 it is also worth noting that the exceptions to the gwb, namely those listed in section 2 of article 3, were overall quite vague and left a lot of room for interpretation on the part of the rector.93 heidegger displayed this on july 17, 1933, when he tried to retain eduard frankel, a classical scholar. heidegger again made it clear that his main concern was maintaining the international reputation of the university. indeed, heidegger wrote to the minister that frankel was an excellent scholar and considered “among the best of german science on the antiquity in italy, the netherlands, sweden, england and the united states.” he remarks that the university’s reputation would be tarnished if frankel were fired.94 heidegger opens the letter by claiming that frankel’s name does not appear in the list of those who fought at the front because of an ailment in his left arm and hand.95 heidegger tried instead to keep frankel based on his service at the thesaurus linguae of munich.96 in this case, heidegger is trying to apply article 3, section 2 of the gwb, which protected non-aryan civil servants who had been in charge before 1914 from dismissal.97 this means that heidegger’s request should not be seen as an action against the law; it was instead an attempt to apply the law fully. 97 ibid., 137; ‘law’, 151. 96 ibid. 95 ‘law’, 151. 94 martin heidegger, ‘parere sul professor dr. eduard frankel’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 136. 93 ott, heidegger, 207-208. 92 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 31. 91 ibid., 165-179. 90 ibid., 105-118. 89 ibid., 51-60. 88 krebs, reminiscences, 50. 87 ibid., 134-135. 86 john d. cockfort, ‘george de hevesy 1885-1966’, biographical memoirs of fellows of the royal society, 13: 13 (november 1967), 137. 85 ott, martin heidegger, 207. 48 however, the ministry believed heidegger’s justifications were insufficient, so frankel was dismissed and moved to oxford.98 despite this rejection, heidegger did not resign in protest, nor did he pressure the government to withdraw its decision—he simply obeyed.99 frankel’s failed defence reveals the difference between heidegger and his predecessor, professor von möllendorf. when von möllendorf was urged to dismiss the jewish members of staff by the minister, he simply refused and resigned in protest; heidegger did not show any sign of protest or disapproval for frankel’s dismissal and continued his position as rector until april 1934. this characterizes heidegger as an obedient nazi worker, who faithfully submitted to the minister. nonetheless, these actions also demonstrate, as payen argued, that heidegger’s support for the gwb was not absolute. the cases of von hevesy and frankel show that whenever antisemitic policies clashed with the university’s prestige, they would be less welcome.100 heidegger tried to keep some jewish professors at freiburg by appealing to the gwb’s two exceptions. for example, heidegger defended his colleague prof. fritz pringsheim, a jurist, from dismissal. pringsheim had been a frontline soldier during the first world war and was very proud of his military service.101 for this reason, he could remain at freiburg under section 2 of article 3 of the gwb.102 heidegger sent pringsheim’s certificate of war to the ministry of karlsruhe and told him that he did not have to fear for his position.103 here we have an example of heidegger using his position as an intermediary between the university and the ministry to allow a jewish professor to stay. hermann heidegger reported that his father confessed he wanted pringsheim to stay at freiburg. heidegger’s request was granted.104 the ministry allowed pringsheim to stay until 1935, when he was dismissed because of the nuremberg laws.105 heidegger was not responsible for this final dismissal because he had resigned in 1934, one year before the nuremberg laws came into effect. nonetheless, this episode should not be read as an act of opposition to nazi racial policies. indeed, the strategy employed in pringsheim’s case was a mere application of a comma of the law (paragraph 2). hence, much more than a “protection,” heidegger’s actions constituted a full application of the law. heidegger also points out in the der spiegel interview that he defended prof. siegfried joseph thannhauser, a jewish professor of internal medicine.106 thannhauser should have been dismissed from the university, but heidegger claims that in a meeting, he persuaded the minister of baden to retain thannhauser at freiburg.107 hermann heidegger used the defence of thannhauser several times to show that his father was not a full-blooded nazi.108 however, it must be noted that thannhauser had been a front-line soldier in the first world war, so he 108 rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism, 78; hermann heidegger, ‘introduction’, 468. 107 ibid. 106 heidegger, ‘now only a god’, 31. 105 hermann heidegger, ‘notes to “chiaro segnale per karlsruhe”’, 144; honoré, ‘fritz pringsheim’, 218. 104 hermann heidegger, ‘notes to “chiaro segnale per karlsruhe”’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 701. 103 martin heidegger, ‘chiaro segnale per karlsruhe’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 257. 102 ‘law’, 151. 101 tony honoré, ‘fritz pringsheim (1882-1967)’, jurists uprooted: german-speaking lawyers émigré in twentieth-century britain, ed. jack beatson and reinhard zimmermann (oxford: oxford university press, 2004), 210-211. 100 payen, martin heidegger’s changing destinies, 344. 99 ott, martin heidegger, 208. 98 hermann heidegger ‘notes to “parere sul professor dr. eduard frankel”’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 701. 49 was exempt from dismissal under section 2 of the same law.109 thus, this should again not be seen as an opposition to the gwb. the two examples of pringsheim and thannhauser disprove farìas’ argument that heidegger was an extremist who persecuted jewish teachers protected by the law.110 heidegger applied the gwb fully, including its three exceptions. of course, this does not mean that heidegger was less guilty of having executed antisemitic laws. instead, it indicates that he always operated within the legal frameworks the nazis gave him, without excessive or fanatic persecution as farìas argued. another means by which heidegger tried to avoid antisemitic legislation was recommending his former jewish students for positions abroad. this point was often remarked on by those who wanted to minimize the extent of heidegger’s support for antisemitic policies. for example, karl jaspers reported to the freiburg denazification committee that heidegger’s support of some of his former jewish students abroad mitigated his support for nazi racial policies.111 for example, historian of philosophy paul kristeller lost his job at freiburg because of the civil service law.112 heidegger recommended him for a position at the university of basel in switzerland. the case of kristeller is rather peculiar, since a petition to the minister for his maintenance at the university of freiburg would have impossible under the gwb. kristeller was born in 1905 to a jewish family and did not serve as a frontline soldier, nor was he employed in the civil service before 1914.113 in addition, kristeller had completed his ph.d. only in 1928 and did not have the same international reputation as von hevesy or frankel.114 he was too young to be renowned in academia. for these reasons, heidegger tried to sustain his former student by recommending him to prof. haberlin at basel for a position there. in his letter, dated 30th april 1933, heidegger praises kristeller’s work and highlights his influential works on ficino and renaissance philosophy.115 also, it is interesting to note that heidegger opens this letter by saying, “kristeller asked me to write to you.”116 this line is important because it shows that in some cases, heidegger still kept in contact with and replied to some of his jewish students and was willing to help them. a case analogous to kristeller’s was that of dr. werner brock, another of heidegger’s jewish students whom he also recommended to prof. haberlin at the university of basel. on 11 august 1933, heidegger wrote a letter stating that brock was an excellent scholar and deserved absolute precedence before every candidate for the habilitation (second ph.d.).117 heidegger writes that “if an oral declaration from me is necessary, i will be available to come to basel in september.”118 heidegger cared about brock’s well-being to a great extent and demonstrated this with the great support that he offered him. hermann heidegger also 118 ibid. 117 martin heidegger, ‘il dr. brock medita di cambiare abilitazione’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 144. 116 ibid. 115 martin heidegger, ‘raccomandazione per il dr kristeller’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, 82. 114 ibid., 6. 113 ibid., 3. 112 paul oskar kristeller, ‘a life of learning’, acls occasional paper 12 (april 1990), 7. 111 karl jaspers, ‘letter to the freiburg university denazification committee, december 22nd, 1945’, in richard wolin (ed.), the heidegger controversy: a critical reader, (cambridge, ma: the mit press, 1992), 148. 110 farìas, heidegger and nazism, 161. 109 anonymous, ‘siegfried’. 50 reported that in 1934, thanks to heidegger’s help, brock obtained a scholarship to cambridge.119 philosopher karl lowith, one of heidegger’s philosophy students in marburg, is a further case that is very similar to those of kristeller and brock.120 heidegger supported him and advised him when he emigrated to italy after the gwb came into effect and he was dismissed from the university of marburg.121 overall, the cases of brock, kristeller and lowith suggest that while heidegger’s support for antisemitic measures was strong within germany, he was still well-disposed towards his former students abroad. however, it is important to note that these actions were not taken against the nazi government. in fact, by recommending jewish students abroad, heidegger did not violate any piece of antisemitic legislation and fully respected the goal of the aryanization of the german university. as already mentioned, brock was replaced by brocker, an aryan philosopher.122 heidegger was, however, less supportive of other antisemitic cultural policies on some occasions. for example, the seventh thesis of the ‘twelve theses,’ which heidegger (falsely) claimed he had banned across freiburg, prescribed that works by jewish authors should appear in hebrew and, if in german, should be labelled as translations.123 heidegger did not comply with this rule, arguing that it was too extreme and that “everyone is making a fool of himself as best as he can.”124 however, this singular act of defiance does not negate the overall support heidegger gave to the battle “against the un-german spirit” required of him by the party. the significance of this episode is thus questionable. in summary, some antisemitic policies related to the university were not well-received by heidegger. indeed, heidegger did try to keep some jewish members of staff at the university of freiburg, although this action should not be interpreted as a defence of the jews as moheling or hermann heidegger claim. indeed, these actions were either a defence of the prestige of the university or a thorough application of the gwb. the image of heidegger that emerges is not a fanatic as faye125 tries to argue, but neither is it a great defender of the jews as hermann heidegger suggests. instead, heidegger was much more likely a cold executor of orders from above when it came to applying exceptions of the civil service law, and a calculator when it came to defending the prestige of the university. this means that heidegger never really tried to do much against such antisemitic policies. conclusion in summary, evidence shows that heidegger, in his capacity as rector, did participate in the persecution of the jews via the implementation of antisemitic regulations at the university of freiburg. he duly obeyed the minister when it came to implementing the law for the 125 faye, heidegger, 151-173. 124 ibid. 123 payen, martin heidegger’s changing destiny, 354. 122 heidegger, ‘equiparazione’, 251. 121 ibid., 82. 120 karl lowith, my life in germany before and after 1933: a report, trans. elizabeth king (chicago: university of illinois press, 1994) 45-47. 119 hermann heidegger, ‘notes to “il dr. brock medita di cambiare abilitazione”’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze, 144. 51 restoration of the professional civil service. additionally, he adhered to other antisemitic policies such as the law against overcrowding of schools and universities and the campaign against the un-german spirit. in other words, heidegger supported both the physical expulsion of the jews and the attempted erasure of their intellectual work. moreover, in cases where he defended a colleague against dismissal, he never went against the rules of the civil service law and duly submitted to the will of the ministry of baden. considering these factors, it is very difficult to excuse heidegger from the charges of having participated in the nazi government. his defence in the der spiegel interview and in “the rectorate” is far from reality. hence, there is no way in which heidegger can be redeemed or excused, as some scholars, such as moheling and heidegger’s son hermann, have tried to do. heidegger was indeed an obedient nazi. it is not possible to think of heidegger as ‘neither an uncritical fellow traveller nor an active party member,’ as his son hermann described him.126 instead, as knowles argues, heidegger was an active perpetrator.127 nevertheless, the extremist painting of heidegger given by faye is not correct. indeed, there were some cases in which heidegger preferred to defend the university’s prestige rather than following the minister’s requests immediately. for this reason, the stances taken by faye and knowles are too extreme. the scholar closest to the truth is wolin, who argues that while it is undeniable that heidegger was a nazi, this does not mean he was a “dyed-in-the-wool nazi.”128 indeed, there were occasions on which his fanaticism did not comply with the nazis’ demands, like in the cases of kristeller and brock. nevertheless, there are no signs that heidegger opposed antisemitic policies. moreover, the evidence found in private letters and the black notebooks suggests that heidegger was deeply convinced that what he was doing was right. this makes it impossible to think of heidegger as anything but antisemite, and a supporter of nazi racial policies. but what type of guilt does heidegger incur for his implementation of these policies? it may be possible to recur to karl jaspers’ fourfold understanding of german guilt. jaspers explains that criminal guilt arises when someone breaks a particular law.129 in this case, heidegger is not culpable since he did not technically break any law.130 then there is political guilt: “this, involving the deeds of statesmen and the citizenry of a state, results in my having to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs me and under whose order i live. everybody is co-responsible for the way he is governed.”131 heidegger is guilty of having voluntarily submitted to nazism and its delirious racial policies.132 moreover, there is moral guilt, which jaspers describes as follows: “i, who cannot act otherwise than as an individual, am morally responsible for all my deeds, including the execution of political and military orders. it is never simply true that ‘orders are orders.’”133 heidegger was responsible for a type of moral guilt from his actions as rector, his persecution of the jews, and his despicable behaviour toward many such as husserl.134 most importantly, there is metaphysical guilt, about which jaspers states, “there exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the 134 rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism, 295. 133 jaspers, the question, 25-26. 132 rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism, 295. 131 jaspers, the question, 25. 130 rockmore, on heidegger’s nazism, 295. 129 karl jaspers, the question of german guilt (new york: fordham university press, 2000), 25. 128 wolin, heidegger’s children, 180. 127 knowles, ‘martin heidegger’s nazi conscience’, 183. 126 hermann heidegger, ‘introduction’, 468-469. 52 world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. if i fail to do whatever i can to prevent them, i too am guilty.” 135 both heidegger and his defenders who excuse or deny his affiliation to nazism must accept that they have metaphysical guilt, since if someone endorses a movement like nazism, he necessarily preaches the superiority of one “race” over all others.136 in summary, there is enough evidence to prove that heidegger was an active supporter of nazism as rector of freiburg university. heidegger did not try to oppose antisemitic policies and in fact supported them vigorously. thus, he was a committed nazi and a persecutor of the jews in his capacity as rector. bibliography primary sources heidegger, elfriede ‘sincera e immutata gratitudine’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 81. heidegger, martin, ‘the jewish contamination of german spiritual life: letter to victor schower (1929), martin heidegger: philosophical and political writings, trans. and ed. manfred stassen (london: bloomsbury, 2003), 1. heidegger, martin, ‘now only a god can save us: der spiegel’s interview (september 23, 1966)’, martin heidegger: philosophical and political writings, trans. maria p. alter and john d. caputo, ed. manfred stassen (london: bloomsbury, 2003), 24-48. heidegger, martin, ‘raccomandazione per il dr kristeller’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 82. heidegger, martin, ‘richiesta di benevolo esame per il prof. liefmann’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 114. heidegger, martin, ‘solstizio d’estate 1933’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 123. heidegger, martin, ‘hönigswald, dalla scuola neo-kantiana’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 124. heidegger, martin, ‘parere sul congedo dei colleghi v. hevesy e frankel’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 132-133. heidegger, martin, ‘parere sul professor dr. eduard frankel’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 136-137. heidegger, martin, ‘il dr. brock medita di cambiare abilitazione’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 144. heidegger, martin, ‘spiccate doti filosofico sistematiche’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 203. heidegger, martin, ‘equiparazione agli assistenti ordinari’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 248. 136 ibid. 135 jaspers. the question, 26. 53 heidegger, martin, ‘chiaro segnale per karlsruhe’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 257. heidegger, martin, ‘the rectorate 1933/34: facts and thoughts’, in the review of metaphysics 38: 3 (march 1985), 481-502. jaspers, karl ‘letter to the freiburg university denazification committee, december 22nd, 1945’, in 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cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genova: il melangolo, 2005), 579. heidegger, hermann, ‘notes to “chiaro segnale per karlsruhe”’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 701. heidegger ‘notes to “parere sul professor dr. eduard frankel”’, discorsi ed altre testimonianze del cammino di una vita, ed. hermann heidegger (genoa: il melangolo, 2005), 701 honoré, tony, ‘fritz pringsheim (1882-1967)’, jurists uprooted: german-speaking lawyers émigré in twentieth-century britain, eds. jack beatson and reinhard zimmermann (oxford: oxford university press, 2004), 206-232. 54 knowles, adam, ‘martin heidegger’s nazi conscience’, probing the limits of categorization, eds. christina morina and krijn thijs (oxford: oxford university press, 2018), 168-186. knowles, adam, martin heidegger’s fascist affinities: a politics of silence (stanford: stanford university press, 2019). lewy, gunter, harmful and undesirable: book censorship in nazi germany (oxford: oxford university press, 2016). mohanthy, j. l., edmund husserl’s freiburg years. (new haven, yale university press, 2011). ott, hugo, martin heidegger: a political life (new york: breghan books, 1993). moheling, karl a., ‘heidegger and the nazis’, heidegger: the man and the thinker, ed. thomas sheehan (chicago: precedent publishing, 1981), 31-43. payen, guillaume, martin heidegger: catholicisme, révolution, nazisme (paris: editions perrin, 2016). payen, guillaume, martin heidegger's changing destinies: catholicism, revolution, nazism (yale: yale university press, 2023). quesada martìn, julio, “martin heidegger: anti-semitism and metaphysics in the schwärze hefte (1939-1941). the attack (angriff) on husserl”, philosophy international journal 3: 2 (june 2020), 1-7. rockmore, tom, on heidegger’s nazism and philosophy (berkeley: university of california press, 1992). rockmore, tom ‘philosophy or weltanschauung? heidegger on hönigswald’, history of philosophy quarterly 16: 1 (january 1999), 97-115. safranski, rundiger, heidegger e il suo tempo (milan: garzanti, 2008). sherratt, yvonne, hitler’s philosophers (yale: yale university press, 2013). wolin, richard, heidegger’s children (princeton: princeton university press, 2001). 55 37 the unwanted yet unavoidable implementation of religious tolerance in early modern transylvania koloman marschik trinity college dublin abstract while most of early modern europe was plunged into confessional strife, the central european principality of transylvania managed to survive the period with no inter-confessional warfare. rather, the state recognized multiple confessions and allegedly advocated tolerance between them. drawing from differing theories on the rise of toleration and on the context of early modern transylvanian history, this article argues that this regime of tolerance arose not due to any enlightened thinking about toleration but out of immediate political necessity. more precisely, the motivation of the transylvanian elite lay in protecting their nascent state’s existence in a dangerous international environment. article introduction in order to assess how and why the emerging central european principality of transylvania implemented religious tolerance even as most other countries descended into interconfessional conflict, one must first define what “tolerant” means in the context of the period. this subject has a rich and developing historiography. henry kamen provided an assessment of the emergence of tolerance across europe in the sixteenth century as a “new and more liberal attitude to religion.”1 states, so kamen suggested, were initially wary to adopt tolerance as a policy. however, they were convinced of the merits of this new liberal attitude through campaigning by proponents of this philosophy of tolerance.2 these campaigns paved the way for tolerance to be accepted among states’ inhabitants, creating tolerant societies. one perspective on the laws that created the legal space for alleged tolerance in transylvania might seem to support this motive. the transylvanian diet, responsible for creating legislation, met at the town of torda (today turda) in january 1568 and enacted an edict that proclaimed “ministers should everywhere preach and proclaim the gospel according to their understanding of it,” and that “no one should harm any superintendent or minister, nor abuse anyone on account of their religion … and no 1 henry kamen, the rise of toleration (london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 1967), 8. 2 jeffrey r. collins, “redeeming the enlightenment: new histories of religious toleration,” the journal of modern history 81, no. 3 (2009): 629. 38 one is permitted to threaten to imprison or deprive anyone of their position because of their teaching.”3 this appears at first sight to be a statement that might support kamen’s view of the emergence of tolerance on the basis of a more liberal attitude towards religion. yet in the same text, one also reads in a statement addressed to the ruler of transylvania, jános zsigmond szapolyai: “there are many in your majesty's country who disobey the wallachian bishop, who was appointed to this position by your grace; they prefer to follow the former priests and their heresies, and prevent the bishop from properly fulfilling his duties; therefore we beg your majesty to graciously grant the advancement of the gospel according to your majesty's earlier decree concerning the country, and to punish those who dare oppose it.”4 kamen’s view of an emerging philosophy of religious liberalism (however this might be understood in the context of the sixteenth century) that preceded the emergence of tolerance suddenly seems misplaced. the 1568 diet of torda rather seems to offer support for religious tolerance, while simultaneously expressing a desire to persecute on religious grounds. another motivation for tolerance must be at play. returning to the developing historiography on the question of tolerance in early modern europe, we can find discussion by a broad range of scholars from herbert butterfield to benjamin kaplan. in his widely cited 2007 study on the practice of toleration in early modern europe, kaplan saw tolerance not as “an embrace of diversity for its own sake,” but as a “pragmatic move, a grudging acceptance of unpleasant realities, not a positive virtue.”5 such ideas about tolerance were not new. some thirty years prior, butterfield put the case in starker tones: “it [tolerance] was not so much an ideal, a positive end that people wanted to establish for its own sake; but, rather, a pis aller, a retreat to the next best thing, a last resort for those who often still hated one another, but found it impossible to go on fighting any more.”6 such motivation might offer some explanation for the seemingly opposing decisions declared at torda. butterfield went so far as to call into question whether tolerance can be called an “idea” at all: “it was hardly even an ‘idea’ for the most part—just a happening—the sort of thing that happens when no choice is left and there is no hope of further struggle being worthwhile.”7 this language about the history of tolerance as a pragmatic legal regime and everyday social practice from butterfield to kaplan now seems more convincing than kamen’s idealistic argument. in the following assessment, we will come to see that this pragmatism in transylvania was undertaken by those who had the means to enact change in transylvanian society—the nobility, the burghers, and the princes of transylvania—in 3 sándor szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek. monumenta comitialia regni transsylvaniae [records of the transylvanian diet], 21 vols. (budapest: magyar tudomános akadémia, 1875-1898), 2.343, trans. graeme murdock, qtd. in graeme murdock, “turda, 1568: tolerance transylvanian style,” in a sourcebook of early modern european history life, death and everything in between, ed. ute lotz-heuman (london: routledge, 2019), 234-236. 4 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in mihály balázs, judit gellérd, and thomas cooper, “tolerant country—misunderstood laws. interpreting sixteenth-century transylvanian legislation concerning religion,” the hungarian historical review 2 (2013): 5. 5 benjamin j. kaplan, divided by faith: religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern europe (london: belknap, 2007), 8. 6 herbert butterfield, “toleration in early modern times,” journal of the history of ideas 38, no. 4 (1977): 573. 7 butterfield, “toleration in early modern times,” 573. 39 order to further their own spiritual, political, and material interests. these elite actors primarily focused on the protection and advancement of their own confessional and material interests, but also included foreign policy considerations and, perhaps to some degree, pressures driven by the complex social context of urban and rural communities in their decision-making processes. it was the nature of the pragmatic self-interests of its elite that led transylvania to become “tolerant.” first, however, some historical context is required to frame the decisions reached by the transylvanian diet. historical background the political entity that came to be known as the principality of transylvania, which existed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in central europe, had emerged from the partition of the medieval kingdom of hungary, following its defeat at the hands of the ottoman empire at the battle of mohács in 1526.8 before its defeat, transylvania had been a province of the medieval hungarian kingdom, ruled by a governor chosen by the hungarian monarch. pre-mohács, this man would have held the title of vovoide. in the wake of the battle of mohács, hungary was de facto partitioned. the ottoman army had dealt a deathblow to the hungarian army: most of the hungarian nobility, as well as the man who would become known as the last king of medieval hungary, king louis ii, were killed at the battle. in its aftermath, ottoman armies advanced deep into the hungarian heartland, taking its capital buda. but they did not finish the conquest of all of the hungarian crown lands.9 lands to the west, north, and east remained out of ottoman hands. upon the death of the king, decision makers in these territories readied the kingdom’s constitutional contingency plans. the medieval hungarian kingdom was an elective monarchy. the king was voted into office by the members of the hungarian diet, made up mostly of hungarian nobles. and even though many had died at mohács, enough remained to commence proceedings. representatives of the northern and western estates of the kingdom, which had eluded ottoman control, elected ferdinand habsburg, archduke of neighboring austria and brother to the holy roman emperor.10 after the defeat at mohács, however, the easternmost provinces of the kingdom were almost cut off from the western part of the kingdom. yet in order to retain political continuity, these provinces also called a diet to elect a monarch. the province of transylvania had its own provincial diet within the medieval hungarian kingdom, and given the circumstances, representatives of the noble estates of the other eastern counties that had not come under ottoman control joined it. they elected as king of hungary the native transylvanian magnate, jános szapolyai.11 szapolyai ruled from transylvania but laid claim to all of the medieval kingdom’s territory. as did ferdinand habsburg. 8 paula sutter fichtner, terror and toleration: the habsburg empire confronts islam, 1526-1850 (london: reaktion, 2008), 31-32. 9 paula sutter fichtner, the habsburg empire: from dynasticism to multinationalism (malabar: krieger, 1997), 7-9. 10 fichtner, the habsburg empire, 7-9. 11 graeme murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” in a companion to multiconfessionalism in the early modern world, ed. thomas max safley (boston: extenza turpin, 2011), 396-397. 40 for the following decades, transylvania thus not only had the ottoman empire to its south looking to it as a target of territorial expansion, it also had the most powerful european dynasty to the west with a claim to its territory.12 both of these powers would make incursions into transylvania over the following decades. indeed, the entire territory of the medieval hungarian kingdom was to become a near constant theatre of war for much of the middle and latter decades of the 1500s.13 figure 1: borders of the principality of transylvania as outlined by the 1570 treaty of speyer. the partium is shown in dark beige.14 the title of prince of transylvania, and the identification of the territory as the principality of transylvania, was itself a slow product of this geopolitical conflict: a means to formalize de jure what had until then remained a de facto political reality. in the 1570 treaty of speyer, the habsburgs and the realm now ruled by janos szapolyai’s son, janos zsigmond szapolyai, agreed on a legal framework to coexist without laying claim to each other’s territory. ferdinand would recognize szapolyai as ruler of transylvania, in return for which szapolyai renounced his claim to the hungarian throne and guaranteed that, having no children, he would name ferdinand’s son as his successor. the nascent transylvanian state encompassed the transylvanian province formerly ruled by a vovoide, as well as the surrounding eastern hungarian counties, which had joined the transylvanian diet, known as the partium (see figure 1). however, on the death of the childless szapolyai, the 12 graeme murdock, “transylvanian tolerance? religious accommodation on the frontier of christian europe,” in religious conflict and accommodation in the early modern world, eds. marguerite ragnow and william d. philips, jr. (minneapolis: university of minnesota libraries, 2011), 106-107. 13 fichtner, the habsburg empire, 9-10. 14 fz22, “partium 1570,” wikimedia commons, december 23, 2006, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:partium1570.png, accessed november 25, 2021. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:partium1570.png 41 transylvanian diet instead elected istván báthory as their new ruler who pursued continued political independence of the emerging principality from the habsburgs.15 the decades following transylvania’s birth into political existence saw it perched in a precarious geopolitical position. survival depended on balancing the relations and intentions of the two superpowers at its borders. transylvania’s rulers needed to side with the ottomans (and paid annual tribute to the sultans) when the habsburgs looked poised to gain the upper hand in the region and turned to the habsburgs if the ottomans seemed ready to incorporate the principality under their direct control.16 path to tolerance if the rise of tolerance in transylvania was the result of the promotion of political selfinterests in pursuit of the stability of the state, the fact that a coalition of what might be inaccurately described as “protestants” were able to preserve their self-interests stems from the fact that they dominated the elite and held sway in the political decision-making processes of the principality. the fact that the emerging principality of transylvania was an elective monarchy meant its central political institution was to be its diet. it was made up of representatives of the three “nations” of transylvania: hungarian nobles, szekler lords, and the german towns. the elected sovereigns of transylvania oversaw the diet’s meetings and could also invite officials of their administrations to attend sessions. it was this body that was not only tasked with voting on laws, determining the privileges of the estates, and providing decisions on military as well as religious matters but also with electing the state’s sovereign.17 both transylvania’s rulers and the estates in the diet had the power to initiate legislation, and measures required the consent of the prince and of all three “nations.” in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, the reformation spread rapidly through transylvania’s communities. lutheranism quickly became popular in german-speaking saxon towns. calvinism or reformed religion later spread widely among hungarianspeaking nobles in hungarianand mixed germanand hungarian-speaking towns, and antitrinitarianism or unitarianism found a foothold among both hungarian and szekler communities in the 1560s.18 this spread of different ideas about reform was reflected among the elite, the large majority of which had abandoned catholicism for lutheranism, calvinism, or unitarianism by the mid-1560s.19 since the passing of legislation on religious rights required the consent of the prince and all three “nations” in the diet (now divided in different ways by religious loyalty), retaining earlier legislation against either lutheran, reformed, or unitarian churches through the diet became impossible from the mid-1560s, not least considering the shifting and uncertain religious views of then-sovereign jános zsigmond szapolyai. 15 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 396-397. 16 for an overview of the important dates, figures, and religious settlements, see the chronological table in appendix a at the end of this article. 17 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 107. 18 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 107-108. 19 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 110. 42 what followed was legislation that provided rival confessions with practical freedoms to worship. this legislation did not make reference to kamen’s high-minded liberal ideals. rather the diet understood its decisions in kaplan’s and butterfield’s pragmatic sense. when legal provisions for religious tolerance were put in place, they came piecemeal and begrudgingly. when the diet made provisions for lutheranism to be recognized as a church in 1558, this followed failed attempts by the state to seek unity between lutheran and catholic clergy. in 1557 it had ordered a synod to be held for the clergy of the two churches to reconcile their views.20 rather unsurprisingly this failed, but interestingly it was in the interim of this decision, the time between the ordering of the synod and its failure, that the first measures of tolerance can first be observed. the diet had allowed that both religious doctrines could be practiced until its synod had reached an agreement.21 officially speaking, tolerance came into being when lutheranism was granted recognition the following year, but the practice of allowing two religious communities that self-identified as being distinct from one another to cohabitate in transylvania is first observed in the diet’s decision of 1557. this path that tolerance took echoes butterfield’s analysis of how tolerance first came about. a set of polices was enacted out of expediency when all other options had been exhausted. the diet also first made use of tolerance as a means to an end, while perhaps still hoping that religious unity might be restored. when this failed, the diet simply continued and enshrined in law the practices it had used in the interim. however, unlike what butterfield predicted, the diet acted without prior bloodshed to propel the elite towards accepting the need to compromise. this suggests that in the transylvanian case study something additional was at play. kaplan’s and butterfield’s argument is nevertheless bolstered by the fact that this practice of begrudging and limited action to offer religious rights and legal recognition to a new church was repeated. by the mid-1560s calvinism had spread from the german-speaking world to transylvania and was gaining ground there. the diet’s strategy of recourse was again to order a reconciliation of doctrinal differences. in 1564 it ordered lutheranism and calvinism to reconcile their theological differences by means of debate. again, equally unsurprisingly, these efforts failed. again, it was only after the failure of these efforts that the state granted legal recognition to both lutheran and reformed churches in june of the same year.22 when it put this decision in writing, the diet provided a justification for its actions. it saw them as a means to preserve “the peace of the realm,” not as a declaration of tolerance.23 tolerance is expressed once more as a pragmatic move resorted to after preferable measures could not be taken. but again, the decision was taken before violence erupted, not after. this intention of the diet—to preserve and advance the self-interests of its “nations” as well as those of the sovereign, rather than an aspiration to a tolerant society—also explains the oppressive measures taken by the diet against a number of religious groups in the same 20 graeme murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 21 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 22 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 23 szilágyi, ed., erdelyi orszaggyulesi emlekek, 2.226-227, 231-232, trans. murdock, qtd. in murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 43 period. these measures reflected the desire of the diet to act only to offer religious rights when politics demanded they do so and to maintain the status quo (that is, protect their own confessional interests), or to advance the spread of their own confession in the principality. tolerance then reflected the confessional fragmentation of the political elite rather than their unification behind an interest in universal toleration.24 this conservative, status-quo minded conception of tolerance is as old as the practice of tolerance in transylvanian legislation. shortly after its 1558 edict that allowed lutheranism, the diet sought to prevent any further doctrinal innovation and outlawed a sect it called “sacramentarians”—by which it meant none other than the reformed preachers who would receive its legal protection only six years later.25 catholicism was also a target of the diet. this was because support for catholicism had lost so much ground within the state by the 1560s; the diet, consisting overwhelmingly of lutherans, calvinists, and unitarians, was decidedly anti-catholic.26 even though the direction of the state’s ire changed, the principle of self-interest held firm. the members of the diet were still acting to advance their confessional interests. the only thing that had changed was their confessional affiliation. in 1566 the diet expelled all catholic clergy from the country, issuing the order that “all priests who insist upon the papal teachings and upon what was made up by humans, and refuse to convert, should be ousted.”27 this anticatholic measure was also evident in the diet’s 1568 edict from torda. in a passage that asked the prince to persecute a christian sect, as quoted in the introduction above, a reference to the gospel was included that reflected this sentiment against churches deemed not to promote gospel teaching: “they prefer to follow the former priests and their heresies, and prevent the bishop from properly fulfilling his duties; therefore we beg your majesty to graciously grant the advancement of the gospel according to your majesty's earlier decree concerning the country, and to punish those who dare oppose it.”28 support for religious tolerance based on a freedom of reading and teaching the vernacular gospel provided a shared language around which lutherans, reformed, and antitrinitarians could agree as a reasonable basis of their own rights. all three religions promoted the idea that individuals (or at least clergy) should read the gospel themselves and come to their conclusions from this experience, even though they disagreed about the proper conclusions that would be derived from this engagement. catholicism and orthodoxy did not agree with the idea of individual engagement with gospel; neither endorsed vernacular translations of the bible. rather, they preferred official interpretations of the latin and greek editions, respectively. this shared language of advancement of the gospel thus provided lutherans, reformed, and antitrinitarians a mechanism with which they could protect their doctrinal 24 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 25 szilágyi, ed., erdelyi orszaggyulesi emlekek, 2.226-227, 231-232, trans. murdock, qtd. in murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 401. 26 szilágyi, ed., erdelyi orszaggyulesi emlekek, 2.226-227, 231-232, trans. murdock, qtd. in murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 402. 27 szilágyi, ed., erdelyi orszaggyulesi emlekek, 2.302-303, qtd. in balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 9. 28 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 5. 44 interests, while simultaneously keeping the peace with each other and persecuting the two religions, which by that point held no sway in transylvanian political decision-making.29 the number of catholics in transylvania at the time had decreased drastically, and those who were left lived primarily on the estates of remaining catholic nobles and in the szekler lands to the east.30 this is in line with the conception of transylvanian tolerance as the guarding of self-interests: on their lands, catholic nobles might in practice be allowed to choose priests for their churches. this privilege, the ius patronatus (right of patronage), dated back to the middle ages and was used during the reformation by the nobility to further the confession of their choice in their lands.31 thus while catholic clergymen faced persecution in most parts of transylvania and could find safe haven on the lands of sympathetic catholic nobles, the legal mechanism that allowed for it remained unchanged. lutheran and calvinist nobles acted on the same privilege they shared with the catholic nobility of having control over the selection of churchmen on their lands. in this, nobles oversaw the removal of traditional objects of worship from the churches on their estates, and there is evidence of clergymen from multiple churches being forced to flee from the lands of nobles unsympathetic to their confession. 32 despite the radical and uneven nature of these disturbances, they all took place within the established legal framework of the transylvanian principality. the fate of catholicism in transylvania provides a case study for how self-interest informed the creation of space for religious practice in particular (rather than freedom of conscience) and proselytizing. in 1571 a catholic was elected to rule transylvania in the person of istván báthory. báthory was respectful of the existing legal framework on religious rights and the context of the overwhelming support for lutheran, reformed, and unitarian churches across the principality. he chose a lutheran as his court preacher and saw himself as the patron of all his subjects on religious affairs.33 but despite this recognition, báthory also tried to advance his own religion in the country by settling jesuits in the principality. bathory, who from 1576 was also ruler of the polish-lithuanian commonwealth, had to impose his decision on the transylvanian diet, which only accepted the jesuits if they limited their activities to particular villages and founding specified schools and colleges.34 the jesuits sought to convert the local inhabitants but were only given the opportunity to do so in the surroundings of the monasteries given to them and on the lands of catholic 29 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 5. 30 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 11. 31 maria crăciun, “traditional practices: catholic missionaries and protestant religious practice in transylvania,” in religion and superstition in reformation europe, eds. helen parish and william g. naphy (manchester: manchester university press, 2002), 80. 32 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 118. 33 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 18; for further information on bathory’s career, see felicia roşu, “free from obedience: constitutional expressions of the right of resistance in early modern transylvania and poland-lithuania,” european history quarterly 47, no. 1 (2017): 14-16. 34 crăciun, “traditional practices,” 75. 45 nobles.35 in non-catholic lands, the jesuits were prevented from preaching by the local elites. since the diet had made clear its opposition to jesuit proselytizing, the jesuits refrained from undertaking actions that they knew could get them expelled from the principality altogether.36 their survival depended upon the support of a catholic prince, for without such protection, the nobility and burghers that made up the diet would quickly move against them. in fact, the diet openly discussed their removal from 1581, and after istván báthory’s death in 1586, it gave the order a three-week ultimatum to leave the country.37 istván báthory was succeeded upon his death by his nephew zsigmond. zsigmond was still a minor at the time, and the diet made zsigmond’s election to the transylvanian throne conditional upon his removing the jesuit order from the country. zsigmond accepted only to renege on this commitment in 1593, when he forced the diet to resettle them.38 when catholicism finally became one of the “received religions” of the principality in 1595, it was only done so through rather brutish negotiating tactics: prince zsigmond held the diet at his royal palace surrounded by his army.39 it took hard negotiations and bitter compromise to widen transylvanian “tolerance” to include catholicism, as would be expected of grudging, and deeply anti-catholic, pragmatists. however, religious loyalties were not the only factor in the diet’s anti-catholic stance. the transylvanian nobility had a vested interest in maintaining only minimal catholic influence in the region. after the initial catholic collapse in the 1550s and 1560s, the estates had appropriated lands formerly held by the church. as part of the standoff initiated when zsigmond báthory began inviting jesuit missionaries back into the principality in 1588, the diet passed a resolution reminding prince zsigmond that the monastic property that had been taken from the church was confiscated in perpetuity.40 the fears of the diet appear obvious; if catholic orders regained authority in the principality, it stood to reason that they would make claims on the lands that they had been driven from and which had since been incorporated into the domains of the transylvanian nobility. the same nobility that was present in person at the diet lobbied to keep jesuit influence in their principality at a minimum. in this instance, it appears as if members of the transylvanian diet acknowledged that material self-interest played a role. while it is difficult to ascribe any single intention to the members of the diet, it seems that religious solidarity was not the only motivating factor involved in the creation of the balance of power of transylvanian tolerance, at least in this instance. the anti-catholic bias of the diet could of course also be interpreted as some sort of protestant solidarity. however, this does not mean that protestants within transylvania were allied or even respectful of each other. the early modern period saw widespread persecution and attempted proselytization between protestant groups. antitrinitarianism 35 crăciun, “traditional practices,” 80-81. 36 crăciun, “traditional practices,” 80-81. 37 crăciun, “traditional practices,” 76. 38 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 19-20. 39 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 19-20. 40 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 114. 46 rejected the notion of the holy trinity, and for some antitrinitarians in transylvania, this also implied a rejection of worshipping jesus as god. this concept was known as nonadorantism. the antitrinitarian movement had grown out of calvinism in the 1560s and was subject to repeated oppression throughout its early existence.41 after 1568 lutheranism, calvinism, and antitrinitarianism were the only received religions in the principality, but the transylvanian diet later passed numerous laws that served to constrict antitrinitarianism, especially acting to prevent what they called doctrinal innovation, which targeted non-adorantist antitrinitarianism in particular.42 these laws laid out explicitly the purpose of this persecution; they were to prevent any fundamental changes in the confessional landscape of transylvania. in a 1571 decree that promoted tolerance, the diet simultaneously warned of “criminal excess” in matters of religious freedom.43 the punishment for practitioners found to be in excess was to be severe— expulsion from their offices and from the principality altogether. in the following years, church superintendents were empowered to investigate and excommunicate “innovators” who advocated “distinct and new things in their confession.”44 if church superintendents would not intervene, the prince was not only given the right to execute capital punishment on the innovators themselves but also invested with the power to reprimand towns or noblemen who were found to support these preachers. the diet’s use of the word “innovators” perhaps most succinctly underlines their conception of tolerance as a conservative force. even though the members of the diet hailed from different confessional backgrounds, they all found common ground in maintaining the status quo in which their churches alone were granted legitimacy in the principality. in 1576 the antitrinitarian church was warned by the diet not to introduce any doctrinal changes and the places in which they could hold synods were restricted to two towns. a year later, the right of antitrinitarian clergy to visit parishes was limited, and the calvinist church’s superintendent was allowed to warn members of not just his own but all other churches of such visits, as long as force was not used.45 despite instructions not to become violent, the goal of these decrees was clearly to limit the spread of antitrinitarianism, despite its legal status and related concern for the emerging theological opinions of some antitrinitarian clergy whose views were seen as beyond the pale of what was acceptable among the recognized churches. in this, another familiar strain in reformation thought emerges: the fear that the existence of heresy in the community could endanger its wellbeing through divine punishment.46 while lutheranism, calvinism, and unitarianism had considerable doctrinal and theological disagreements, they were also all churches that claimed as authority their distinct interpretations of the same scripture (a problem neatly side-stepped by the terms of the 1568 law). the antitrinitarian movement seemed to have ventured beyond a tenet 41 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 19-20. 42 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 43 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 44 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 45 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 46 natalie zemon davis, “the rites of violence: religious riot in sixteenth century france,” past and present 59 (1973): 59. 47 fundamental to all three received religions to the point where the diet openly referred to it as dangerous. already in 1570 the diet had moved against the antitrinitarian church on the grounds of having to punish heresies that could inspire divine wrath upon the principality.47 in the decade that followed the diet’s decision, it would reference “heresies” in its warnings about what it called “blasphemous innovations.”48 this oppressive effort was directed against those antitrinitarians who rejected the adoration of jesus and culminated in the imprisonment of the antitrinitarian superintendent ferenc dávid for breaking the law prohibiting doctrinal innovation.49 if they believed the survival of their community was at stake, transylvanians did not hesitate to dismiss the strategy of tolerance in favor of oppression, as would be expected of those embracing tolerance only for pragmatic reasons. the sabbatarians, a group of non-adorantist antitrinitarians that emerged from the unitarian church but also adopted some jewish ritual practices, are a case study for how the transylvanian confessional establishment reacted when it perceived that the line of what had been permitted by the 1568 law had been crossed. sabbatarianism in transylvania was founded by andrás eőssy, a wealthy szekler nobleman. the faith held that jesus, while indeed the messiah, was not divine and had not set out to create a new covenant between man and god. they adopted some jewish texts into their tradition.50 sabbatarianism started to gain ground at the end of the sixteenth century and officially split from the unitarian church in 1618. in this case, the diet went so far as to outright ban the church.51 sabbatarians were forced to go underground and worshipped in secret on the lands of supportive nobles. in response to the continued existence of the church, the heads of the other protestant churches in transylvania jointly complained to the prince to condemn sabbatarianism. in doing so they used language that clearly showed their view on the competing theology, saying of it that it “spreads like the plague.”52 again, members of the established faiths in transylvania were intolerant to novel denominations of worship, which further undermines the idea that tolerance emerged as an end in itself rather than as a coping mechanism for the complex political and confessional conditions of the 1560s. the different protestant churches thus did not get along harmoniously with one another. but if their persecution of one another shows anything, it is that the rival confessions did not put up fences and try to ignore each other. persecution served the purpose of proselytization. in this the protestants were not alone. throughout the early modern period, all churches in transylvania tried to win over members of the others’ congregations to their own belief. the degree to which the rival churches were still intent on following 47 davis, “the rites of violence,” 59. 48 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 49 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 50 gábor győrffy, “back to the origins: the tragic history of the szekler sabbatarians,” east european politics and societies 32, no. 3 (2017): 569-573. 51 gyorffy, “back to the origins,” 569-573. 52 samuel kohn, a szombatosok: történetük, dogmatikájuk és irodalmuk, különös tekintettel péchi simon fökanczellár életére és munkáira [the sabbatarians: their history, dogmas, and literature, with a special reference to the life and works of chancellor simon péchi] (budapest, 1889), 86-97, qtd. in gyorffy, “back to the origins,” 572. 48 their proselytizing missions is best exemplified by the case of the calvinist attempt to reform the orthodox romanian church in the seventeenth century. anti-orthodox attitudes had been present in the diet’s decisions from the start of the reformation—the “former priests and their heresies” referred to at torda in 1568, as mentioned above, were none other than the romanian-speaking orthodox clergy.53 but the proselytizing effort of the calvinist church is not worth study because of its success—it only resulted in the creation of a small community of romanian-speaking calvinists. rather, it is exemplary of how the rival churches in transylvania made use of all means at their disposal to further their interests. the effort was backed not just by the full force of the calvinist clergy in the state but also by the then-calvinist princes of the principality.54 in order to receive their backing, the calvinist clergy actively tried to convince these calvinist princes to put their weight behind the effort. the orthodox church was protected by princely privileges rather than enjoying rights equivalent to those offered to the lutheran, reformed, unitarian, and, from 1595, catholic churches. istván geleji katona, the calvinist superintendent in transylvania who had led efforts to curb the practice of sabbatarianism, pleaded with then prince györgy rákóczi to push reform on the romanian-speaking orthodox community by telling him that “romanians, although they are stupid, are still human beings and your highness, as a christian prince, has a duty to care for their souls.”55 proselytizing intent can be clearly seen in the clergyman’s words, in addition to the clear contempt for what he sees as adherents of a false religion. katona and his co-confessionalists succeeded in gaining the support of the prince, which led to the creation from the 1640s of the aforementioned small romanian-speaking reformed community in and around some towns of southwestern transylvania in particular.56 this effort by calvinist princes to support this campaign of the reformed church is most enlightening when contrasted with the work of the jesuit missionaries fought over by then prince zsigmond báthory and the diet decades earlier. just like the calvinist missionaries, the jesuits used all means at their disposal to execute their proselytizing mission. the only difference is the nature of the rights and resources at their disposal; while the calvinist clergy enjoyed the backing of the state, the jesuits found themselves constricted by the state apparatus, even in spite of their being backed by the then prince. what stays the same is the intent of all religious communities to pursue their universal proselytizing missions. tolerance as espoused by the state was an obstacle to this, and the individuals pursuing these proselytizing missions constantly sought to lobby key state actors to grant them greater leeway to execute their proselytizing efforts. in all of these examples, transylvanian nobles, urban elites, and leading clergymen acted to further their own confessional or material self-interest, not to make the state a welcoming home for all. 53 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, qtd. in balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 5. 54 maria crăciun, “building a romanian reformed community in seventeenth-century transylvania,” in confessional identity in east-central europe, eds. maria crăciun, ovidiu ghitta, and graeme murdock (aldershot: ashgate, 2002), 99-100. 55 letter by geleji published in új magyar múzeum [new hungarian museum] 1 (1859), pp. 203-204, qtd. in crăciun, “building a romanian reformed community,” 102. 56 crăciun, “building a romanian reformed community,” 99-120. 49 motives for tolerance if the preceding examples may be seen as an argument that transylvanians became tolerant out of pragmatic reasons and an explanation for how this worked, it begs the question why transylvanians chose this path. it clearly was not their preferred course of action. the following section lays out an explanation for what motivated transylvanians to become accepting of religious diversity. here one must not look inside the principality, but outside. it was their international position that led transylvanians to pragmatically accept tolerance. recall the geopolitical position of the principality, already outlined above: two superpowers, surrounding its borders, both with territorial claims or designs on its territory and with ongoing conflict between the two sides. an ever-shifting web of alliances. a need to play the two superpowers against each other to keep the principality politically independent from either. 57 this precarious international position lent a powerful incentive to local transylvanian leaders to resolve peacefully their internal political situation. any civil conflict, but especially one rooted in religious divisions, would be detrimental to the state’s security by drastically weakening its ability to defend itself from external attack.58 this foreign policy calculation further incentivized the transylvanian elite to pursue domestic peace due to the confessional nature of their geopolitical opponents. the habsburg monarchy remained a bulwark of catholicism, while transylvania had become a majority non-catholic state by the middle of the sixteenth century.59 the danger of a catholic monarchy seizing control of transylvania was especially present for the nobility, usually granted more safety due to their social status. starting towards the end of the sixteenth century, the habsburgs encouraged the aristocracy in the parts of hungary under their control to choose to convert to catholicism—or face marginalization in the political affairs of the hungarian kingdom and across the habsburg monarchy.60 over the course of the following decades, this would lead to waves of conversions among the hungarian nobility. if the habsburgs were to gain control of the transylvanian principality, it stood to reason that the protestant nobles who wielded considerable amounts of political influence from their seats in the diet would be faced with the same fate. when sovereignty over a political entity had changed hands in the past, the members of the region’s nobility had not necessarily seen change for themselves. after the battle of mohács, it was the same hungarian noble families who had served on the hungarian diet who elected ferdinand habsburg and jános szapolyai to the throne of hungary. the confessional question posed a direct threat to the continuity in authority the members of the transylvanian diet would otherwise have expected. the majority-protestant diet thus had a large impetus to do whatever necessary to retain its independence as the multi-religious legal settlement became embedded in the political and social character of the principality. 57 murdock, “multiconfessionalism in transylvania,” 396-397. 58 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 106-107. 59 fichtner, terror and toleration, 31-32. 60 gabriella erdélyi, “confessional identity and models of aristocratic conversion in seventeenthand eighteenth-century hungary,” social history (2015): 3. 50 curiously, this rationale explains the election of a catholic to the transylvanian throne in the middle of the sixteenth century by a majority-protestant diet, istván báthory. as already mentioned, báthory retained an ambiguous relationship towards protestantism. on the one hand, he committed to view himself as patron over all the received religions in the principality and even took a lutheran as his court preacher. on the other hand, he appears to have shown personal disdain for protestantism and initiated laws against religious innovation.61 it was due to considerations of its international position that the diet overlooked these issues. despite his catholicism, báthory was no friend of the habsburgs. he was favored by the diet precisely because of his dedication to an anti-habsburg political movement—he was once even imprisoned in vienna during a diplomatic visit. báthory’s election in poland was also a product of his platform as the best anti-habsburg candidate available. báthory let these international circumstances dictate the course of action of his catholic agenda within transylvania. when he invited the jesuit order to return to transylvania, he took care to ensure that those dispatched to the principality would hail from the order’s polish province, of which he had control given his position as king of poland, rather than from its austrian chapter, which would have been under the influence of the habsburgs.62 the ottoman empire constituted a similar confessional threat. the ottoman interpretation of islam allowed for the enslavement of infidels and the confiscation of their property, giving transylvanians a stark reminder of a possible future for themselves personally should the empire conquer their land. transylvanian nobles were also well aware of the restrictions faced by their co-religionists under ottoman rule in southern hungary.63 finally, the answer to the last question remaining about butterfield’s hypothesis comes to our attention. transylvanian decision-makers adopted tolerance out of expediency before violence erupted because they knew that if violence did erupt, the decision on the religious orientation of the principality and its inhabitants would be taken out of their hands, and most definitely be decided to their disadvantage. but in a landscape where the boundary between the political and confessional was ambiguous at best, foreign policy considerations could also factor into decisions on religious toleration. elias gezmidele was one of the many travelling preachers who entered the principality in the early modern period. gezmidele was exiled by a city’s church court— in this case cluj (kolozsvár)—for his teachings. gezmidele had been preaching communitarianism and pacifism.64 while contemporary clergymen would have taken issue first and foremost with gezmidele’s apparent anabaptist leanings, he also conveyed a pacifist interpretation of luther’s thoughts on the ottoman empire. gezmidele advocated pacifism in the face of the turks.65 the ideas that he was spreading were thus conceived of as dangerous not only in a religious sense but also in a political sense: if the concept of 61 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 18. 62 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 18-19. 63 fichtner, terror and toleration, 27. 64 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 7-8. 65 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 7-8. 51 inaction in the face of outside aggression were to gain a foothold in the principality, the ability of cluj’s church court to do as it saw fit may well soon have been greatly inhibited. as posited previously, transylvanian tolerance found its boundaries when those in positions of power saw their own interests threatened. indeed, in the precarious political circumstances of transylvania pacifism was an unwelcome philosophy. zsigmond báthory, as part of his struggle with the estates to bolster the position of catholicism in transylvania, ordered the execution of several notable representatives of his opposing political camp. among them were protestants and catholics alike, as well as humanist scholars from outside transylvania. at the next meeting of the diet, the one held in 1595 at his royal estate surrounded by his army at which catholicism would become a received religion, báthory had the diet thank him for disposing of these pacifist philosophers.66 whether this description was accurate is of less importance than the fact that it was used. to legitimate the murder of political opponents, one simply had to label them as pacifists. the fear that transylvanians had of both these empires is best encapsulated in a prayer overheard in a lutheran church in a southern transylvanian village near kronstadt (now braşov) by jesuit priest pierre lescalopier in 1574. at the end of the service, the congregation prayed “for the destruction of papal and turkish tyranny.”67 clearly, the transylvanian lutheran citizenry was aware of the danger that the existence of these two powerful empires of different confessions posed. they provided a stark reminder for transylvanians that if religious affairs got out of control internally, their arguments about which religion they should adhere to might end up being forced upon them by an outside power. the unknown throughout this article, emphasis has been placed on the role played by elite actors within transylvania in establishing the principality’s framework of legal toleration and extension of rights of worship to a number of confessions. the omission of analysis of the role played by the common laity, those who made up the bulk of the preachers’ congregations, is not due to a verifiable lack of initiative on their part. rather it reflects a problem in source material of the period. not enough primary sources survive, or are known to scholars, for anyone to claim to be able to reconstruct the role of commoners in the construction (or reception) of transylvanian tolerance.68 written records come in the form of legal documents drafted by powerful institutions or personal testimony of those capable of writing—a skill learned by only a select few at the time. to gauge the role of the lay folk in transylvania in establishing the regime that allowed for confessional coexistence, one is left with the uneasy task of inferring through other 66 balázs, cooper, and gellérd, “tolerant country,” 20. 67 maria holban, ed., călători străini despre tările române [foreign travelers in the romanian lands], 8 vols. (bucharest: editura științifică, 1968-1983), 2:430 (lescalopier), qtd. in maria crăciun, “traditional practices,” 82. 68 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 117. 52 sources. for example, recurrent emphasis in transylvanian legal documents on prohibiting religious violence may lead one to suggest that these laws must have been created out of necessity. that is, that tensions almost certainly could arise at a local level. the 1568 diet of torda stating that no one should “abuse anyone on account of their religion” presupposes that instances of violent language or behavior had either happened or were immanently feared to happen.69 one does not create laws without impetus. similar examples abound in laws decreed throughout this period about the diet’s concern to maintain social peace through legal regulation of competing religious rights. ascribing commoners too active a role in perpetuating religious upheaval, however, runs afoul of what does survive in the historical record. recall the ius patronatus that gave the transylvanian nobility the power to select the preachers of their choice to promote their faith on their lands. instances of persecution and expulsion of clergymen opposed to their lord’s confession have also been attested to.70 the nobility clearly had control over the practice of religion on their property. recall as well the laws implemented throughout the 1570s against religious innovation that gave the sovereign of the principality the authority to reprimand not only religious innovators but also the towns and noblemen who sheltered them.71 these historical realities greatly constricted the agency of those on the lower rungs of the feudal social ladder in deciding on matters of religious life at the level of government. what the historical record can attest to is that the local population was conscious of the differences between the rival confessions and had opinions on them. recall of course the prayer heard by pierre lescalopier in 1574, as taught to a village’s lutheran congregation against catholicism and the ottoman empire. another example is provided by the reception that jesuit missionaries received when they insisted on clerical celibacy during one their proselytizing missions. many protestant clergymen had married, and when jesuits spoke out against this, popular opinion condemned them and sided with the protestant churchmen.72 differences in religious practice and doctrine were capable of enjoying deep-seated popular support. whether those not born into privilege had much agency in deciding the religious policy of their state cannot be attested to, although one may infer that it was limited. conclusion early modern transylvania did not become such a tolerant country because its citizenry was imbued with a liberal zeal of acceptance of diversity. those who had the power to make decisions (the nobility and burghers represented at its diet as well as its prince) adopted it out of necessity to avoid internal conflict. such conflict was extremely dangerous due to transylvania’s position caught between two imperial powers with designs on its territory. transylvanians therefore acted before confessional violence flared up and created a legal framework that was meant to prevent such internal conflict that would 69 szilágyi, ed., erdélyi országgyülési emlékek, 2.343, trans. murdock, qtd. in graeme murdock, “turda, 1568,” 234-236. 70 crăciun, “traditional practices,” 80. 71 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 112-113. 72 murdock, “transylvanian tolerance?,” 84. 53 weaken it against external attack, all the while still doing everything to advance their own confessional and material self-interests within the framework they had created. appendix a: chronological table year event ruling monarch 1526 battle of mohács: defeat and de facto partition of medieval hungarian kingdom, coronation in transylvania of janos szapolyai as king of hungary janos szapolyai 1540 janos szapolyai dies, succeeded by his son janos zsigmond szapolyai 1556 roman catholic church property seized by diet 1558 lutheranism recognized as received religion by transylvanian diet janos zsigmond szapolyai (king of hungary) 1564 calvinism/reformed recognized as received religion by transylvanian diet 1566 all catholic clergy exiled from the state by transylvanian diet 1568 diet of torda: lutheranism, calvinism, and antitrinitarianism are recognized as received religions 1570 treaty of speyer: state now officially recognized as the principality of transylvania. szapolyai gives up claim to hungarian throne janos zsigmond szapolyai (prince of transylvania) 1571 death of janos zsigmond szapolyai; istvan báthory elected prince istvan báthory 1586 istvan bathory dies; zsigmond báthory elected prince zsigmond báthory 1595 catholicism recognized as received religion by diet (which was held at báthory’s estate surrounded by his army) bowman+final (1).docx turning a war crime into a weapon how the razing of lidice and ležáky aided the allied powers’ war effort jackson bowman auburn university abstract on may 27th, 1942, nazi german ss general reinhard heydrich was assassinated in an infamous event called operation anthropoid. the nazis responded to this assassination by razing two czechoslovakian towns: lidice and ležáky. while there are many books and writings about operation anthropoid and the german reprisals, there are very few that explicitly discuss how the allied powers used this tragedy to demonize the nazi government and garner public support for the war effort. providing a comparative study of the responses by britain, america, and the czechoslovakian government-in-exile, this article analyzes how various methods of propaganda were employed to galvanize respective civilian populations against nazi germany. article on may 27, 1942, czechoslovakian special operations unit members executed an assassination mission targeted at nazi ss (schutzstaffel, or protection squadron) general reinhard heydrich. slovak soldier josef gabčík and czech soldier jan kubiš wounded the general seriously enough that he eventually died, although that was unclear at the time of the operation. even though it would take heydrich over a week to succumb to his injuries, the nazi government immediately began a harsh series of retaliations. on may 29, the british newspaper the times reported that the “reprisals begun in prague.”1 the german retributions led to the deaths and forced relocation of thousands of innocent czechoslovak civilians. at the time this article was released, no government knew what the nazi german government would do for its reprisals against the czechoslovak people. no government knew the towns of lidice and ležáky would be razed with all men of those towns executed, women deported to labor camps, and children forced into adoption. all that was known was that one of the most feared and notorious nazi leaders had been attacked. all that was universally understood was the nazi government would retaliate and do so harshly. the assassination of heydrich—which was code named operation anthropoid—was a monumental event in the course of the war that had multiple immediate effects on germany. these effects included adolf hitler losing one of his favorite and most reliable generals. another effect was the seeming partial lapse of control over the provinces of bohemia and moravia, which the nazis had firmly controlled for roughly two years. finally, 1 “reprisals begun in prague,” the times, may 29, 1942, 4. 20 there was an economic impact due to the fact that the controlled provinces were industrial powerhouses and were paramount to the success of the nazi war effort. the germans thus felt the immediate effects of operation anthropoid on their war effort, but how did the assassination of ss general reinhard heydrich and, more significantly, the draconian german reprisals affect the allied powers’ war effort? this article argues that the allied powers used the destruction of the two towns of lidice and ležáky as propaganda to garner public support by further demonizing nazi germany in the eyes of the civilian populations. to prove this point, this article analyzes and compares the responses of the british population, the american population, and the czechoslovakian government-in-exile through a study of multiple primary and scholarly secondary sources. these three major players are discussed in this article in chronological order by the swiftness of their respective responses with the swiftest being the united kingdom, then the united states, and finally the czechoslovakian government-in-exile. analyzing a range of propaganda campaigns involving a variety of media, from posters and speeches to radio addresses and film, this article covers, in-depth, an aspect often overlooked in other sources, specifically how the allied powers used these events to evoke the emotions of their populations to gain support for the war effort on the home front. how it all began the events that led to operation anthropoid can be traced back to 1938 with the austrian anschluss. immediately following the successful annexation of germany’s neighbor, hitler turned his attention towards the invasion of the czechoslovakian border region called the sudetenland. secretly, he planned on invading the czechoslovak regions of bohemia and moravia as well. the provinces of the sudetenland, bohemia, and moravia consisted of the northwestern half of czechoslovakia, while the province of slovakia consisted of the southern half. in accordance with hitler’s wishes, the german high command prepared for the full invasion of the northern three czechoslovakian regions.2 before hitler could launch an invasion, british prime minister neville chamberlain requested a diplomatic meeting. that meeting resulted in the infamous deal that came to be called the munich agreement. that agreement ceded the sudetenland to germany. on october 1, 1938, the sudetenland was officially annexed into the third reich.3 on march 14, 1939, the southern half of czechoslovakia was turned into the german client state named the slovak republic.4 and two days later, the german military invaded the other two czechoslovak provinces of bohemia and moravia turning them into a protectorate.5 5 moses moskowitz, “three years of the protectorate of bohemia and moravia,” political science quarterly 57, no. 3 (1942): 353. 4 bradley adams, “the politics of retribution: the trial of jozef tiso in the czechoslovak environment,” in the politics of retribution in europe: world war ii and its aftermath, eds. istván deák, jan t. gross, and tony judt (princeton: princeton university press, 2000), 252. 3 neville chamberlain, edouard daladier, adolf hitler, and benito mussolini, “the munich pact,” september 29, 1938, available at the avalon project, yale law school lillian goldman law library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp, accessed may 30, 2023. 2 friedrich hossbach, hossbach memorandum, conference in reich chancellery, november 5, 1937, available at the avalon project, yale law school lillian goldman law library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/hossbach.asp, accessed may 30, 2023. 21 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/hossbach.asp with the invasion and occupation of those provinces, hitler and the third reich dismantled the nation of czechoslovakia. within a six-month period, germany made the sudetenland part of germany proper, the region of slovakia a client state, and the provinces of bohemia and moravia a german protectorate. the german government let the former president of czechoslovakia, emil hácha, retain his position in the new protectorate.6 even though hácha remained president, germany immediately appointed former foreign minister of germany, baron konstantin hermann karl freiherr von neurath, as the reich-protector of bohemia and moravia. as reich-protector, neurath would have true power over the region. even though he enacted many of the policies of the third reich, hitler believed he was not strict enough towards the czechoslovak people. on september 27, 1941, hitler made the decision to send the man whom he described as “a man with an iron heart,” general reinhard heydrich of the ss, the nazi paramilitary organization.7 ss general reinhard heydrich was a member of the nazi elite. he had been with the nazi party since 1931, and in 1934, he was appointed as the head of the nazi secret police, the gestapo, by heinrich himmler. he was “in control of the master list” for the night of long knives and “was entrusted with the preparation of the final solution in europe.”8 at the beginning of world war ii, heydrich was put in charge of forming the nazi special units called the einsatzgruppen (task forces). these units followed the wehrmacht into lands the german military occupied. their job was to arrest and execute anyone who was deemed a threat to the reich. the units heydrich created were responsible for the executions of 33,771 people over a two-day period outside of kiev in 1941.9 he earned his reputation through the actions in which his units took part and his career accolades. when he was transferred to prague, heydrich brought his reputation with him and continued to carry out acts similar to those he had previously done. in his mind, he had one primary goal and that was to “germanize about half of the czech population.”10 his official title was deputy protector of bohemia and moravia, but heydrich was the de facto leader who made and enforced the laws and decrees throughout the region. immediately upon his appointment as deputy reich-protector, he announced martial law throughout the region. at the end of this period, he gave a speech to the german officials in prague in which he stated “that the number of sentences [of death] by courts-martial is approximately 400 to 500, while the number of arrests was and it is between 4,000 and 5,000.”11 throughout his roughly yearlong reign, hundreds of people were executed, and thousands of people were 11 vojtěch šír, “první stanné právo v protektorátu” [the first martial law in protectorate], fronta, april 3, 2011, https://www.fronta.cz/dotaz/prvni-stanne-pravo-v-protektoratu, accessed may 30, 2023. 10 paul bookbinder, “hitler reconsidered: a new construct by peter longerich and his contemporaries,” german studies review 43, no. 3 (2020): 593-603. 9 ronald headland, messages of murder: a study of the reports of the einsatzgruppen of the security police and the security service, 1941-1943 (madison: fairleigh dickinson university press, 1992), 100. 8 paul maracin, night of the long knives: forty-eight hours that changed the history of the world (lanham: rowman & littlefield, 2007), 114. richard breitman, “plans for the final solution in early 1941,” german studies review 17, no. 3 (1994): 491. 7 mario r. dederichs, heydrich: the face of evil (barnsley: greenhill books, 2016), 16. 6 george frost kennan, from prague after munich: diplomatic papers, 1938-1940 (princeton: princeton university press, 2015), 98. 22 https://www.fronta.cz/dotaz/prvni-stanne-pravo-v-protektoratu forcibly relocated.12 these numbers and policies enacted earned him the nickname “the butcher of prague.” the inception of operation anthropoid with the german invasion of poland in 1939, great britain was plunged into its second war with germany in twenty years. after the german invasion and occupation of france in late spring of 1940, great britain was the last fully free nation in western europe, but it was under intense pressure from the german bombardments. with the situation as dire as it was, the british began looking for new ways to conduct unconventional warfare that would aid their conventional military strategies. one method that was chosen was to combine intelligence services section d and mi(r), into a consolidated agency called the british special operations executive (soe).13 on july 22, 1940, the war cabinet appointed the minister of economic warfare, hugh dalton, to head the new organization. with his appointment, dalton recalled prime minister winston churchill saying to him, “and now, go and set europe ablaze.”14 with their mission firmly understood, they began planning ideas on how to conduct these operations against nazi germany and the axis powers. the soe found a partner for their ideas with the czechoslovakian government-in-exile. at the time of the german invasion, the members of the czechoslovakian government who chose not to capitulate to the germans fled and created a government-in-exile with its headquarters in great britain. that government-in-exile was led by dr. edvard beneš, who was the czechoslovakian president preceding emile hácha. from the german invasion in 1939 until 1942, beneš’s government fought for recognition by the western powers, but it was an uphill battle. there were two major obstacles they had to face. first, they had to demonstrate their relevance and authority to the world. during the period following the german invasion and occupation of bohemia and moravia, president beneš “had not so far been able to secure unity among czechs and slovaks abroad, and his influence in the protectorate [of bohemia and moravia] and slovakia was uncertain.”15 second, upon the proving of their relevance and authority, they had to show the world that they were unequivocally loyal to the allied powers not the axis. the government-in-exile had a small intelligence agency as well as a small army of soldiers who fled the nation in 1939. the intelligence agency acted independently, while the czechoslovakian soldiers were enveloped in the larger military of the united kingdom. each branch was fighting those two obstacles. it took until july 21, 1940, for the czechoslovakian government-in-exile to be recognized by the british as the provisional government.16 it took until the winter of 1941 16 jírí musil, the end of czechoslovakia (budapest: central european university press, 2000), 186. 15 stefan talmon, “who is a legitimate government in exile? towards normative criteria for governmental legitimacy in international law,” in the reality of international law. essays in honour of ian brownlie, eds. guy s. goodwin-gill and stefan talmon (new york: oxford university press, 1999), 515. 14 hugh dalton, the second world war diary of hugh dalton 1940–45 (london: jonathan cape, 1986), 62. 13 aaron r. b. linderman, rediscovering irregular warfare: colin gubbins and the origins of britain's special operations executive (norman: university of oklahoma press, 2016), 119. 12 milan l. hauner, “terrorism and heroism: the assassination of reinhard heydrich,” world policy journal 24, no. 2 (summer 2007): 87, doi:10.1162/wopj.2007.24.2.85. hauner is a czech author who was born in 1940, so he heard first-hand the experiences of people who lived through the occupation and were old enough to comprehend it. 23 https://archive.org/details/secondworldwardi0000dalt/page/62 for the soviet union and the united states to recognize beneš’s government. they only did so because slovakia joined germany in its war against the soviet union on july 22, 1941 and formally declared war on the united states and the united kingdom on december 12, 1941.17 by 1942, beneš’s government-in-exile in london and slovakia had been officially recognized and both had chosen their side in the war. prior to the government-in-exile being deemed a legitimate government, the interests of the british soe and the government-in-exile complemented each other, which led to the december 1940 meeting between british soe representatives and the czechoslovakian intelligence led by colonel františek moravec.18 that meeting formed the foundation for the mission to assassinate deputy reich-protector ss general reinhard heydrich. the mission would be codenamed operation anthropoid.19 immediately following that meeting and the secret agreement to work together, men of czech and slovak descent were handpicked from the czechoslovakian units and put through a selection process. that selection process would be for the mission in czechoslovakia and run by men of czech and slovak descent, but it would be supervised and equipped by british soe agents.20 after the intense selection process, josef gabčík and jan kubiš were the men who were selected to lead the operation.21 the planning and preparation for this mission took place in secret. regardless of who knew about the mission prior to its execution, without the soe, operation anthropoid would never have gotten off the ground nor would it have ever been successful. there is no apparent connection between the british government’s recognition of beneš’s government-in-exile and the soe’s approval of operation anthropoid because the planning for the mission began roughly six months prior to formal recognition. operation anthropoid and the german reprisals throughout the winter and spring of 1942, there were multiple undercover operations being planned and prepared, but the two that would be successful were the silver a and anthropoid missions.22 they had separate missions but were dropped into the german protectorate of bohemia and moravia simultaneously on december 28, 1941.23 silver a’s mission was to aid the domestic resistance groups with communication to the allied powers. the anthropoid group’s mission was to assassinate deputy reich-protector ss general reinhard heydrich. once these groups landed in czechoslovakia, they received “absolute and unconditional support from the sokol resistance movement.”24 this movement made it possible for the anthropoid paratroopers to remain in the protectorate, undetected, from their initial landing in december until their mission in late may. 24 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 25. 23 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 29. 22 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 29. 21 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 19. 20 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 19. 19 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 23. 18 zdenek spitalnk, petr bjacek, and col. michal burian, anthropoid: the silent witnesses (prague: ministry of defense-mhi, 2018), 19. 17 musil, the end of czechoslovakia, 186. 24 five months after their initial landing in the protectorate, anthropoid paratroopers jan kubiš and josef gabčík stood at the bend of vychovatelna in prague-liben when heydrich drove by in his open roofed car.25 as his car slowed down, gabčík attempted to open fire with his sten m ii submachine gun while kubiš lobbed a bomb at the car. gabčík’s submachine gun jammed and kubiš’s bomb did not go into the car, but gabčík was still able to wound heydrich’s bodyguard with his pistol, and most importantly, kubiš’s bomb went off close enough to the car to send shrapnel into heydrich.26 the infection from the shrapnel wounds eventually killed him. on may 29, 1942, the global reporting began describing initial reprisals taken by the new deputy reich-protector kurt daluege. these reprisals were nothing out of the ordinary for the germans as occupiers. compared to the “400 shot to avenge two germans” in konvo as reported on the previous day, daluege and berlin were quite tame compared to hitler’s immediate request.27 after heydrich was assassinated, hitler requested the “murder of up to 10,000 czechs” as a reprisal, but reich-protector karl hermann frank dissuaded him.28 since hitler could not kill 10,000 people, the secondary reaction was to create a curfew between the times of 9:00 p.m. the 27th and 6:00 a.m. the 28th, closing all civilian amenities like bars, cinemas, and restaurants, and the arrest and execution of those who aided the anthropoid paratroopers.29 on june 9, 1942, however, the germans committed the harshest and most surprising act of their reprisals. the mining town of lidice was found to have aided the anthropoid paratroopers avoid detection.30 hitler ordered the police to raze the town. all the male population were executed, and the female and children population were forcibly relocated to concentration camps. nothing in the town was spared—not the livestock, agriculture, buildings, or even the dead.31 everything and everyone from that town was brutally destroyed and defamed. fifteen days later the same fate fell upon the town of ležáky. ležáky was razed because gestapo agents found a radio transmitter that belonged to the silver a group that landed with the anthropoid group. since the germans did not know about the separate missions of these two groups, they believed that they were working together. the razing of those two towns shocked the world, but not because it was the first time the germans had razed towns. the primary reason it shocked the world, according to alan gerrard of the website “lidice lives,” was because the nazis filmed it.32 not only did the rest of the world read about the 32 ian willoughby, “a true act of solidarity: how barnett stross and the miners of stoke-on-trent helped rebuild lidice,” radio prague international, april 8, 2021, 31 jan kaplan and krystyna nosarzewska, prague: the turbulent century (new york: koneman, 1997), 241. 30 carmen t. illichmann, “lidice: remembering the women and children,” uw-l journal of undergraduate research 8 (2005): 1. 29 “state of emergency,” the times, may 28, 1942, 4. 28 united states holocaust memorial museum, “lidice: the annihilation of a czech town,” holocaust encyclopedia, june 9, 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/lidice, accessed may 30, 2023. 27 “reprisals begun in prague,” the times, may 29, 1942, 4. 26 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 31. 25 spitalnk, bjacek, and burian, anthropoid, 31. 25 https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/lidice destruction of the villages, but they got to see it as well. up until lidice, the germans had tried to cover up and hide their apparent atrocities, with the exception of heydrich’s well-known nickname “the hangman.” he had earned this nickname from his actions prior to his appointment to the protectorate. while they could chalk heydrich’s harsh actions up to the war, they could not hide the fact that their actions at lidice would be universally denounced as evil. instead of attempting to hide lidice, they promoted it. through filming it and transmitting it on the radio, the germans sought to make lidice a symbol and a lesson for the rest of the world. the message transcribed on the poster read: “all the male adults of the village have been shot. the women have been sent to a concentration camp. the children have been handed over to the appropriate authorities. the buildings of the locality have been leveled to the ground and the name of the community has been obliterated.”33 the german destruction of lidice was an attempt to erase the town and its people from the earth, but instead, the allied powers immortalized lidice through news stories, films, and monuments. from june 1942 until the end of the war, lidice became a powerful weapon of propaganda against the germans. the british response immediately following the events of may 27, 1942, the british newspaper the times reported that “in berlin last night that heydrich, chief of gestapo for the occupied countries, was wounded when an attempt was made on his life in prague yesterday.”34 the newspaper reported six stories that day regarding heydrich. “attack on heydrich” was the headline for that day’s section.35 at this time, most of the times reporting was heydrich’s biographical information, recent travel information, and standard reporting on the events of that day. for the next two days the papers would discuss different aspects of the mission. on may 29, 1942, the times described the immediate response to the assassination attempt by saying “the whole population of bohemia and moravia over the age of 15 have been told to register with police by midnight tonight.”36 furthermore, it added that anyone “without a registration card” or “those who hide any unregistered person” will be arrested and executed.37 the first executions to take place during the manhunt were reported on may 30, 1942, with the german-controlled radio “last night broadcast the names of 12 more persons, including four women, sentenced to death” and “two families in the small town of rokiban, bohemia has been shot.”38 the first section of reporting by the times offered very little in regard to gauging the feelings of the british people, but the future articles begin giving a snapshot. 38 “12 more czechs shot,” the times, may 30, 1942, 4. 37 “attaché case found,” 4. 36 “attaché case found,” the times, may 29, 1942, 4. 35 “attack on heydrich,” 4. 34 “attack on heydrich,” the times, may 28, 1942, 4. 33 humphrey jennings, dir., the silent village (london: crown film group, 1943). https://english.radio.cz/a-true-act-solidarity-how-barnett-stross-and-miners-stoke-trent-helped-rebuild-819 0520, accessed may 30, 2023. “lidice lives” is the modern and continued version of the original “lidice shall live” campaign and has an archival collection that discusses the “lidice shall live” campaign from its inception to its postwar actions. 26 https://english.radio.cz/a-true-act-solidarity-how-barnett-stross-and-miners-stoke-trent-helped-rebuild-8190520 https://english.radio.cz/a-true-act-solidarity-how-barnett-stross-and-miners-stoke-trent-helped-rebuild-8190520 what those articles lacked in emotion, the next two make up for. after the first three articles written regarding heydrich and the assassination attempt, there was an eleven-day break between articles. the next article written about heydrich discusses his death and his memory. the article gives a short history of heydrich’s time as deputy reich-protector and, most poignantly, gives a short history of the people who suffered under him. the section titled “the victims” recalled that “from september 26 to and including october 1,120 persons were shot or hanged.”39 it further goes on to recall what heinrich himmler said about heydrich at his funeral. phrases that were used were “purest of character,” “deep sense of justice,” and “charity.”40 the editors of the times made sure those descriptions of heydrich were overshadowed, both on the paper and in importance, by the accounts of the victims of heydrich’s government. oddly enough, the times did not explicitly report on lidice or ležáky until june 26. the june 10 article discussed heydrich instead of the razing of lidice, which happened on that same day. on june 26, “the second czech town … razed to the ground” was too much to ignore.41 on that day, the headline was “czech village wiped out.”42 this article about lidice and ležáky, along with contemporary reporting from around the world, created an opportunity for the allied powers to use german evil for their own good. in a war that consisted of an exorbitant amount of propaganda, the allied powers were able to turn those stories into a weapon. the weapon was wielded by a campaign, called “lidice shall live,” which started in the small british mining town of stoke-on-trent. “lidice shall live” was an international campaign that began on september 6, 1942, by sir barnett stross in an attempt to raise awareness of the atrocity and raise money to rebuild the destroyed town.43 stross was a polish immigrant of jewish descent who was then a british politician whose constituents included the residents of stoke-on-trent.44 in defense of starting a campaign during the war, he argued that “[t]he miner’s lamp” of lidice could “send a ray of light across the sea to those who struggle in darkness.”45 the campaign was started in a small mining village, but the launching ceremony was a large event. the president of the czechoslovak government-in-exile, edvard beneš, and his wife were in attendance to see the ceremony in person. alongside him were other people of high rank from the government-in-exile, british politicians, members of the mining union, and other international leaders, such as the soviet ambassador to great britain.46 in his speech to the gathered crowd, president beneš made sure to include the fact that lidice was not an isolated event but that towns throughout eastern europe had met the same fate.47 throughout the war, people of stoke-on-trent and around the world would bring donations. these donations would often be “up to a week’s worth of wages despite the hardships of 47 lidice shall live. 46 lidice shall live (london: movietone news, 1942). 45 jessica rapson, “mobilising lidice: cosmopolitan memory between theory and practice,” culture, theory and critique 53, no. 2 (2012): 129-145. 44 gerrard, “launching lidice shall live.” 43 alan gerrard, “launching lidice shall live—an account,” lidice lives, september 21, 2022, https://lidicelives.org/2022/09/07/launching-lidice-shall-live-an-account/, accessed may 30, 2023. 42 “reprisals begun in prague,” the times, june 26, 1942, 4. 41 “czech village wiped out,” the times, june 26, 1942, 4. 40 “himmler’s eulogy of heydrich,” the times, june 10, 1942, 4. 39 “the victims,” the times, june 10, 1942, 4. 27 https://lidicelives.org/2022/09/07/launching-lidice-shall-live-an-account/ the time.”48 after the war, the “lidice shall live” campaign was so successful that it would be able to rebuild “new lidice … overlooking the site of the old village.”49 during the war, the “lidice shall live” campaign did much more than just take donations for the rebuilding of the town. the campaign, after its spectacular launch, swiftly began further raising awareness by commissioning documentaries, posters, and speeches. one of the documentaries made about lidice was the film the silent village. the film was released on august 9, 1943, and tells the story of lidice with an original and intentional twist.50 stoke-on-trent is 900 miles away from lidice, so british film director humphrey jennings recreated the story as if it happened to the welsh mining village of cwmgiedd.51 jennings received help with the production by the czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs, the british ministry of information, and the villagers that resided in cwmgiedd.52 the film’s intention was to make a story that happened across the continent seem as if it happened at home. it was made to pull on the heartstrings of the british people. the film used many different techniques to add an emotional aspect. from the portrayed innocence of the townspeople going about their day to the children playing and, most impactfully, the journey of a family portrait, the film was acclaimed as a propaganda masterpiece.53 the movie schindler’s list used a similar strategy to evoke an emotional response from its viewers. in schindler’s list, one girl in red is followed throughout the entire movie until her demise, which is made to show the evils of the nazis. in the silent village, a family portrait played the same role. in multiple scenes it is shown hanging on the wall of a family house, but at the end of the movie, it appears cracked and burned on a pile of rubble that is alluded to as the remains of that family’s house. this film became one of the many renowned propaganda films to come out of world war ii and eventually gained international recognition. two of the posters that commemorate lidice say, “lidice shall live” (figure 1) and “this is nazi brutality” (figure 2), with the former being followed by a transcript of the german radio transmission quoted above. much like the american “we can do it!” poster, those two posters were mass-produced and distributed throughout great britain in an effort to further demonize the nazi german government. the first poster (figure 1), created by the czechoslovak british friendship club around 1942, showed what appears to be a british soldier holding an enfield rifle overlooking the former skyline of lidice. the soldier is red, with flames protruding from under him, alluding to the fact that they must avenge the town. 53 adrian danks, “the silent village,” senses of cinema, june 4, 2014, https://www.sensesofcinema.com/2006/cteq/silent-village/, accessed may 30, 2023. 52 the silent village, imdb. 51 the silent village. 50 the silent village, imdb, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0139612/, accessed may 17, 2023. 49 zeina elcheikh, “remembering 10 june,” visual history, june 9, 2020, 3, available at https://visual-history.de/en/2020/06/09/remembering-10-june/, accessed may 30, 2023. 48 jackie reynolds, janet hetherington, ann o’sullivan, kelvin clayton, and john holmes, “cultural value: the story of lidice and stoke-on-trent: towards deeper understanding of the role of arts and culture,” report of the staffordshire university arts and humanities research council, march 12, 2014, 2, available at store—staffordshire online repository, http://eprints.staffs.ac.uk/5444/, accessed may 30, 2023. 28 https://www.sensesofcinema.com/2006/cteq/silent-village/ https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0139612/ https://visual-history.de/en/2020/06/09/remembering-10-june/ http://eprints.staffs.ac.uk/5444/ figure 1: "lidice shall live" propaganda poster, c. 1942.54 the second poster (figure 2), created by lithuanian-american artist ben shahn in 1942, portrays a civilian with a bag over his head about to be executed. while the first poster told its story primarily through the picture, the second told its story primarily through words. the german radio transmission that was quoted on the poster is meant to evoke the feeling of disgust and hatred towards the nazi government as well as validate that the story is true. the addition of the german radio transmission adds proof to the story of lidice. it shows the british population that it was not a made-up story or false narrative intended as propaganda. instead the events portrayed in this poster actually happened and should be avenged. 54 “lidice shall live,” poster, 1942, available at wikimedia commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/lidice_shall_live.jpg, accessed may 29, 2023. 29 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/lidice_shall_live.jpg figure 2: “this is nazi brutality" propaganda poster, 1942.55 through the previous two years of conflict between great britain and nazi germany, there were many accounts of war crimes and stories that made the british population hate the germans, like the blitz. the razing of lidice and ležáky was very similar to the previous british claims of the 1914 “rape of belgium,” in which the british military reported mass war crimes committed by the german army. those war crimes consisted of massacring innocent civilians, the stripping and raping of nuns, and the crucifixion of a canadian soldier with german bayonets.56 these reports led to a similar wave of anti-german 56 “alleged german ‘war crimes,’” the uk national archives, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/alleged.htm, accessed may 30, 2023. 55 ben shahn, “this is nazi brutality,” poster, 1942, us government printing office, available at franklin delano roosevelt presidential library and museum, https://fdr.artifacts.archives.gov/objects/14690/this-is-nazi-brutality?ctx=4dff9b92ff771b85206d7bf82bc5e 2e9a90c5dc0&idx=3, accessed may 29, 2023. 30 https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/alleged.htm https://fdr.artifacts.archives.gov/objects/14690/this-is-nazi-brutality?ctx=4dff9b92ff771b85206d7bf82bc5e2e9a90c5dc0&idx=3 https://fdr.artifacts.archives.gov/objects/14690/this-is-nazi-brutality?ctx=4dff9b92ff771b85206d7bf82bc5e2e9a90c5dc0&idx=3 propaganda featuring the slogan “hang the kaiser.”57 after the war though, it was proven that many of the reported war crimes were made up for the sole purpose of propaganda. the razing of lidice and ležáky was vastly different from the “rape of belgium” because it was videoed in its entirety by the german forces for their own use as propaganda. because of that, there was no denying that those reported atrocities actually happened. within the past two decades, the british government has unclassified documents that show the newspapers were not the only entity discussing the war crimes of the germans in czechoslovakia. in the parliament’s war cabinet minutes for june 15, 1942, minute two on page seventy-five records how the cabinet discussed how and if they were to retaliate against the german atrocities. the proposal was that the british royal air force “should destroy a number of german villages by air attack,” but it was rejected on the grounds that it would take too many resources and be too risky for the bomber crews.58 from the british newspaper’s immediate response to the creation of the “lidice shall live” campaign and the public speeches to the creation of the movie the silent village and the joint production and global distribution of propaganda posters to the secret war cabinet records of major british leaders, it was obvious that the british government and newspaper editors saw the stories of those two towns as a way to aid the war effort by galvanizing the british population against nazi germany. the american response on june 10, 1942, the new york times broke the news of the razing of lidice to the united states. the headlines of the new york times were considerably more poignant than those of the british times. the headline that americans read was “nazis blot out czech village; kill all men, disperse others.”59 the american newspaper got straight to the point with the first sentence of that article stating, “all men in the czechoslovak town of lidice have been shot.”60 the body of that article contained quotes from the infamous german radio transmission in which they recounted what happened to the town of lidice. an additional aspect of that article that should not be overlooked was its placement in the paper. that article was on page one. it was one of the first articles the reader would see, and that was done purposefully. the next day, the new york times published an article entitled “worst act ‘since dark ages.’”61 that article had very little content, but the content it did have spoken loudly. it chose to publish the part of the czechoslovakian government-in-exile’s statement that the razing of lidice was “the most dastardly german act since the dark ages.”62 after recounting what the paper viewed as the most important part of the czechoslovakian government-in-exile’s response, they use the word “slaughter.”63 the word 63 “worst act ‘since dark ages,’” 6. 62 “worst act ‘since dark ages,’” 6. 61 “worst act ‘since dark ages,’” the new york times, june 12, 1942, 6. 60 “nazis blot out czech village,” 1. 59 “nazis blot out czech village; kill all men, disperse others: germans blot out bohemian village,” the new york times, june 11, 1942, 1. 58 war cabinet 74th conclusions, june 15, 1942, p. 75, the uk national archives http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/large/cab-65-26.pdf, accessed june 10, 2023. 57 the poster is available at “we're going to hang the kaiser under the linden tree,” library of congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/ihas.200199230.0/?sp=1, accessed may 30, 2023. 31 http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/large/cab-65-26.pdf https://www.loc.gov/resource/ihas.200199230.0/?sp=1 choice for the single sentence published regarding lidice that day was meant to pack an emotional punch. what the american newspaper chose to publish speaks volumes about what emotions and reactions they were trying to evoke from their readers immediately after the incident occurred. while the british newspaper had titles and articles that were aimed more at objectively recounting the news, the new york times immediately added emotion to its reporting. this is a stark difference between the methods of reporting of the two newspapers, but the feelings of anger, hatred, and disgust are the same for both populations. much like great britain, the american newspapers were not the only american entities to decry the nazi atrocities. there was a wave of politicians and statesmen who released public statements that resembled what the newspapers were already printing out. on june 12, 1942, secretary of state cordell hull issued a statement that described the nazi’s acts as “butchery” and added “his [hitler’s] act is in thorough keeping with all he represents.”64 his words were published by multiple major american newspapers with the ability to reach millions of readers. in august of the same year, president franklin d. roosevelt issued a warning to the leaders of the axis nations and a promise to the leaders of the allied nations that the former would stand trial for their military’s “practice of executing scores of innocent hostages.”65 this was at the behest of the three exiled governments of the netherlands, yugoslavia, and luxemburg. those nations were afraid that a similar situation as lidice and ležáky would happen to them at the hands of the nazi occupiers.66 president roosevelt’s announcement came with no surprise to the american population or allied nations; instead, it was an expectation. but at the casablanca conference in 1943, president roosevelt told the world that the allied powers would only accept unconditional surrender from the axis powers so that they could not “escape the consequence of their crimes.”67 though the atrocities in bohemia and moravia were not explicitly stated in roosevelt’s address, they were still fresh in the minds of the allied powers’ populations and politicians and furthermore affected the talks and decisions made at the casablanca conference. while both nations had powerful reports and official statements issued by national leaders that would define the course of the war, the most influential aspect of both nations’ responses was the actions their respective general populations took. the actions both nations’ general populations took looked vastly different but were equally as effective. the british population started the “lidice shall live” fundraising campaign, while the american population most notably renamed an illinois town in lidice’s honor. on july 12, 1942, the illinois town of stern park gardens announced that it would rename itself 67 franklin d. roosevelt, casablanca conference (radio address), feb. 12, 1943, the public papers of f. d. roosevelt, vol. 12, 71, available at ibiblio, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/1943-02-12a.html, accessed may 30, 2023. 66 lawrence, “president warns atrocities of axis will be avenged,” 1. 65 w.h. lawrence, “president warns atrocities of axis will be avenged,” the new york times, august 22, 1942, 4. 64 “hull denounces slaughter,” the new york times, june 13, 1942, 5. 32 http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/1943-02-12a.html “lidice” to commemorate the czechoslovakian village.68 the new york times reported that there were 10,000 people who attended the renaming ceremony.69 one of the headline speakers was 1940 republican presidential candidate wendell willkie. willkie was one of the few republicans who supported military aid to the allied powers and was openly supportive of president roosevelt’s different aid initiatives. while at the ceremony, willkie gave a speech entitled “eulogy of lidice.” the primary message of his speech, and the ceremony as a whole, was encapsulated in his last line: “let us here highly resolve that the memory of this little village of bohemia, now resurrected by the people of a little village in illinois, will fire us, now and until the battle is over, with the iron resolution that the madness of tyrants must perish from the earth, so that the earth may return to the people to whom it belongs, and be their village, their home, forever.”70 alongside willkie and a myriad of other speakers that denounced the nazi german government, president roosevelt “hailed the community as a world shrine of freedom.”71 even president beneš heard about and commented on the renaming ceremony. he applauded the “detestation of the inhuman behavior of the nazi criminals” and furthermore argues that those nazi behaviors are what brought together the allied powers.72 the large ceremony and the transformation of the town into a memorial was part of a larger effort to make sure that the name of lidice was never forgotten and was never truly blotted out from the earth. alongside renaming the town, the new illinois town of lidice also erected a monument called the “light of liberty” to further memorialize the martyred residents.73 the monument was destroyed in 1995, but it was quickly replaced with the memorial that stands today. regardless of the memorial’s future destruction, at the time it was a very outward expression of support for the czechoslovakian town and no doubt evoked emotions of hatred of germans in the united states. another famous monument erected to commemorate the lidice massacre was the “lidice memorial” in sokol park in phillips, wisconsin. this monument was erected in 1944 by sculptor vaclav hajny, and it was built on the land owned by the sokol of the area.74 according to the wisconsin historical society, “the tall round-topped red stone column represents the united nations, the three iron rods represent the czechs, slovaks, and moravians leaning on the united nations for support. an evergreen frond symbolizes eternal life for the people of lidice and the nation of czechoslovakia. the three-quarter circle represents the rising sun of lidice and czechoslovakia.”75 75 “sokol park,” wisconsin historical society. 74 images and information about the lidice memorial can be found at “sokol park,” wisconsin historical society, https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/records/property/hi19157, accessed may 30, 2023. 73 see an image of the memorial at “12th july 1942, stern park gardens—lidice illinois.” 72 “willkie speaks,” the daily chronicle, july 13, 1942, 1. 71 “lidice hailed as a shrine of freedom,” mattoon illinois journal gazette, july 13, 1942, 1. 70 wendell willkie, “eulogy of lidice,” stern park gardens, il, july 12, 1942, available at speech vault, http://www.speeches-usa.com/transcripts/wendell_wilkie-eulogy.html, accessed may 30, 2023. 69 “lidice, in illinois,” the new york times, july 14, 1942, 18. 68 alan gerrard, “12th july 1942, stern park gardens—lidice illinois,” lidice lives, july 11, 2022, https://lidicelives.org/2022/07/11/12th-july-1942-stern-park-gardens-lidice-illinois/, accessed may 30, 2023. 33 https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/records/property/hi19157 http://www.speeches-usa.com/transcripts/wendell_wilkie-eulogy.html https://lidicelives.org/2022/07/11/12th-july-1942-stern-park-gardens-lidice-illinois/ the united states and great britain often shared propaganda especially when it concerned the germans. the two aforementioned propaganda posters directly referring to lidice made it over to the united states, while the people of great britain heard about the renaming of the illinois town. an aspect of this propaganda push by the united states that is not applicable to great britain is the fact that the united states had only declared war on germany six months prior. lidice and the propaganda campaigns, like the posters, documentaries, and renaming of towns, were some of the first anti-german propaganda to hit mainstream america. the razing of lidice was one of the first events the united states could use as propaganda to turn the population against the germans. while the british already had an excess of events and stories they could use as propaganda against germany, on account of the three years of armed conflict, it should not be understated that this was one of the first major pieces of propaganda to hit the american newspapers after america officially joined the allied powers’ war effort. while it was one of the first major pieces of propaganda to hit american newspapers, it was also an acceptable kind of propaganda for the time. as stated earlier in the article, the towns of lidice and ležáky were blue-collar mining towns. at the time, the democratic party was the party of the blue-collar working man.76 there was a section entitled “industry and the worker” in the 1940 democratic party platform.77 that section concluded with the pledge that “we shall continue to emphasize the human element in industry and strive toward increasingly wholehearted cooperation between labor and industrial management.”78 since lidice and ležáky were both blue-collar towns that revolved around mining, it struck a chord with the democratic party and, more importantly, its voter base. like the workers in stoke-on-trent who felt a connection with the miners in lidice and ležáky, the american blue-collar workers also felt a connection with them, and the democratic party was obliged to listen to its voter base. another, more nefarious, reason why the razing of lidice and ležáky was an acceptable kind of propaganda was because neither town had a significant jewish population; instead, they were people of slavic descent. that was a distinction that cannot be overlooked because, at the time, america had powerful figures and groups who were vocal antisemites and held fascist beliefs. among these figures were popular radio show host and catholic priest fr. charles coughlin, architect philip johnson, and fritz kuhn, who was the leader of the german american bund.79 the german american bund was an american-based fascist group that modeled itself on hitler’s third reich. at its height, its membership reached approximately 25,000. many americans without allegiance to fascist groups or overtly antisemitic groups held antisemitic beliefs as well. as historian katherine archibald recalls, “time and again i have heard the statement that, whatever crimes hitler had committed, his 79 united states holocaust memorial museum, “german american bund,” holocaust encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/german-american-bund, accessed march 6, 2023. 78 “1940 democratic party platform.” 77 “1940 democratic party platform.” 76 “1940 democratic party platform,” july 15, 1940, democratic party platforms online by gerhard peters and john t. woolley, the american presidency project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273219, accessed may 30, 2023. 34 https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/german-american-bund https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273219 ruthless pursuit of the jewish evil was praiseworthy.”80 antisemitism was blatantly exemplified, if not through quotes, through the lack of coverage and the lack of government support for the german’s systemic murdering of jewish people. as early as 1942, there were articles in newspapers discussing the german murder of hundreds of thousands of jewish people.81 it must be noted that in 1942 the united states department of state confirmed and condemned the war on the jewish people, but it would take until the creation of the war refugee board in 1944 for the united states government would take any meaningful action to aid the european jewish population.82 one specific question that was posed by a professor at auburn university following the presentation of this article in class was, “why did the razing of lidice and ležáky quickly blow up in popularity in the united states, while the mass murder of jewish people took so long to gain traction?” while one cannot state with certainty why lidice and ležáky were immediately influential while the murdering of millions of jewish people took more time, the answer may stem from two key factors. first, there was a sizable number of immigrants who claim czechoslovakian heritage in the united states at that time. that was evident by the different sokols all over america having ceremonies of remembrance and honoring the people of lidice and ležáky. sokols were czechoslovakian gymnastics groups that would end up serving the dual purpose of building strength and infusing czechoslovakian nationalism in their communities, even when overseas. the razing of lidice and ležáky was a time in which sokols throughout the world joined to remember and honor their fallen people. in the united states, one of the most famous moments was when the sokol from phillips, wisconsin, erected a monument for lidice.83 the second reason is uglier than the first. as discussed in the previous paragraph, an aspect of american history that is often overlooked is how antisemitism and fascism were popular beliefs in the pre-world war ii era. the newspaper companies and the united states government thus may have viewed the western slavic people as a group who would attract more empathy than the jewish people enduring the same fate. from the immediate emotionally charged articles and the production and global distribution of propaganda posters to the renaming of the illinois town to the political and religious views of the american people, the razing of lidice and ležáky affected and was shaped by american society in the early periods of the war. the two towns’ stories were expertly used to galvanize the already appalled american people against the nazi empire by evoking the emotions of hatred, fear, and disgust. 83 an image is available at “lidice memorial philips wisconsin,” wikimedia commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:lidice_memorial_phillips_wisconsin.jpg, accessed may 30, 2023. images are also available on “sokol park,” wisconsin historical society. 82 united states holocaust memorial museum, “the united states and the holocaust 1942-1945,” holocaust encyclopedia, june 9, 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-united-states-and-the-holocaust-1942-45, accessed may 30, 2023 . 81 joseph w. grigg, “200,000 jews are killed by germans,” the amarillo globe-times, june 1, 1942, 5. 80 katherine archibald, wartime shipyard: a study in social disunity (chicago: university of illinois press, 2006), 109. 35 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:lidice_memorial_phillips_wisconsin.jpg https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-united-states-and-the-holocaust-1942-45 the czechoslovakian government-in-exile’s response after the initial meeting between the british soe representatives and colonel moravec that provided the foundation for operation anthropoid, president beneš was eager to make the plan a reality. moravec and other members of the government-in-exile had fears of nazi reprisals, which were universally understood to be inevitable if the mission was carried out. beneš understood the threat of nazi reprisals, but he justified it by saying “where national salvation was at stake, even great sacrifices would be worth it.”84 he justified the potential catastrophic loss of life because he saw that the assassination of heydrich was a major step in the direction of regaining czechoslovakian sovereignty. he believed that the assassination would reignite patriotic and nationalistic feeling in the citizens within the protectorate and that would help show the allied powers that the people of bohemia and moravia are firmly on the side of them.85 the reprisals that the germans induced post-anthropoid were on a much greater scale than any of the planners expected. after the success of operation anthropoid until his death, president beneš did not clearly admit that he was the person who gave the order to execute the mission.86 he was proud of those who executed the mission, but his immediate response was to say that the czechoslovak resistance acted independently and conducted this mission without any outside help.87 one of the primary reasons beneš did not take credit for planning and ordering the mission was that he wanted the domestic resistance groups to be ignited by the assassination.88 he also wanted them to receive international acclaim for the mission. as noted earlier in the article, ever since czechoslovakia was divided and the government became a government-in-exile, beneš struggled to unify the dislocated czechs and slovaks and prove his authority and relevance. operation anthropoid was a way to unify the people by showing them that they were able to stand up and resist the nazi occupiers. if the dislocated and occupied czech and slovak people saw that they could stand up and resist the nazis, it would unify the people with national pride and they would support their “true” president, president beneš. a more sanguine and alternative interpretation would be that the german retribution was expected by beneš, and he wanted to use the german punishments as a wake-up call for those who had grown comfortable with the german occupation. he wanted to use the germans as a tool to shock the lackadaisical citizens into a ferocious nationwide resistance movement. regardless of the true reasoning, beneš refused to publicly take credit for ordering the assassination. in a roundabout way, by assigning credit to the domestic resistance groups, beneš was able to partially address both of the aforementioned problems.89 he was able to begin unifying the czech and slovak people and that gave him relevance and authority, most importantly, in the eyes of the western allied powers. 89 leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid.” 88 leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid.” 87 leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid.” 86 leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid.” 85 leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid.” 84 adam leong kok wey, “operation anthropoid: the assassination of reinhard heydrich and the fate of a nation,” the rusi journal 157, no. 2 (2012), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2012.675808. 36 while the czechoslovakian government-in-exile did not have the same means of production or distribution as the united states or great britain did, they did have one thing the other powers did not. beneš and his government had the ability to call themselves czechoslovakians and be the propaganda itself. instead of mass-producing propaganda posters and movies, beneš commonly used himself as the vessel of propaganda. he employed his first-hand experiences, knowledge of the situation in the protectorate, and his bottom-line up-front style of public speaking to appeal to people’s emotions. by giving speeches denouncing the nazi oppression and having his quotes in newspapers, he was able to reach every nation in the allied powers. he would commonly give speeches during major public events and dedications. for example, beneš was at the launch of the “lidice shall live” campaign in stoke-on-trent and was also at the dedication of the renamed town of lidice, illinois, and he would give televised addresses. at the launch of the “lidice shall live” campaign, beneš called the germans “barbarous.”90 while in illinois, he was able to be seen by the 10,000 americans in attendance while acting as an ambassador for czechoslovakia. and on his first recorded television response to the razing of lidice, he informed the audience that he had “seen the eyes of the czecho-slovak soldiers and airmen blaze with anger.”91 he then went on to say that “justice, believe me, will come” in regard to the nazi reprisals.92 beneš and his government were able to be living propaganda. everywhere they traveled, they were raising awareness for czechoslovakians and the nazi atrocities. conclusion while there are many books and writings about operation anthropoid and the german reprisals, there are very few that explicitly discuss how the allied powers used this tragedy to further demonize the german government. the importance of support on the home front of a war cannot be overstated. look no further than the vietnam conflict's failures to fully appreciate this argument. when the home front does not support a war, that war becomes extremely hard to wage. previous historians have been fascinated with the events surrounding the assassination of heydrich, but very similar to robert mcnamara’s system of judging success in the vietnam war strictly by body count, they leave out the aspect of civilians’ emotions. one of the most substantial ways great britain retained and the united states gained the emotional support of their civilian populations on the home front was through the story and subsequent propaganda campaigns centered around the atrocities of lidice and ležáky. this article adds the emotional analysis of the home front that other historians have left out. the greater “lidice shall live” campaign and all the international fundraising efforts raised the modern equivalent of roughly one million pounds. after the war, the campaign fulfilled 92 beneš, “lidice statement.” 91 edvard beneš, “lidice statement,” british movietone news, june 29, 1942, available at https://youtu.be/qfmjyhjnmeq, accessed may 30, 2023. information about the speech, including a transcript of it, can be found at alan gerrard, “president beneš statement on lidice,” lidice lives, june 27, 2022, https://lidicelives.org/2022/06/27/president-benes-statement-on-lidice/, accessed may 30, 2023. 90 edvard beneš, “speech at ‘lidice shall live’ dedication,” british movietone news, september 6, 1942. the video can be found at gerrard, “launching lidice shall live,” https://lidicelives.org/2022/09/07/launching-lidice-shall-live-an-account/, accessed june 10, 2023. 37 https://youtu.be/qfmjyhjnmeq https://lidicelives.org/2022/06/27/president-benes-statement-on-lidice/ https://lidicelives.org/2022/09/07/launching-lidice-shall-live-an-account/ its promise and rebuilt the town of lidice and brought back as many of the original residents as possible. the horrific story of lidice galvanized the entire world, shown by the campaign’s global donor support. it gave the allied powers stories to demonize the germans, and through the “lidice shall live” campaign, posters, documentaries, and various memorials of lidice, they did. the british propaganda posters were used to give a snapshot of the story to evoke emotions of anger quickly, while humphrey jennings’s documentary and the renaming of the illinois town were used to commemorate the town. president edvard beneš used his public speaking prowess when traveling to the western allied powers in order to make it feel real for the civilians who were hundreds and thousands of miles away. through the use of propaganda, the allied powers turned a war crime into a powerful weapon used to galvanize their populations against germany. 38 cey. vol.6.sessums.revised+historiographic+essay+submission.docx russification and russianization in modern historiography: recent developments and future directions nicholas w. sessums abstract as the soviet historical archives became accessible to western scholars beginning in the 1980s, renewed scrutiny was placed on the imperial-colonial policies of the russian empire toward its borderlands. these scholars began to interrogate the policies of the imperial administration toward ethnic and national groups in the borderlands from the imperial administrative perspective. in this essay, i geographically circumnavigate the borderlands of the russian empire through secondary studies published since the 1980s to understand how scholars have reinterpreted these policies since gaining access to the imperial administrative perspective. i find that they began to challenge the notion that the empire had cohesive and consistently applied policies to russify its subjects. instead, scholars now generally argue that policies were applied on a more ad hoc basis depending on the ethnic and national contexts of individual borderlands. consequently, the concept of ‘russification’ (obrusenie in russian) became opaque, difficult to define, and inadequate in capturing the range of imperial policies toward the peoples of the borderlands. therefore, the application of the term ‘russianization’ is now more popular among scholars in describing non-assimilatory policies. further distinction between the two concepts, however, is required in order to understand the full range of policies enacted toward imperial ethnicities and nationalities. therefore, i also argue in favor of two promising new frameworks in the historiography, namely, the shifting usage of the term inorodtsy (aliens) by imperial administrators over time, and the concept of national indifference. study of the former, i contend, would highlight the “othering” of non-dominant ethnic and national minorities. the latter permits an understanding of the limits of national constructions, thereby enabling a greater understanding of processes of national construction and, therefore, imperial responses to those constructions. both would ultimately further clarify the historiographic distinction between russification and russianization. introduction the challenges and questions of the present often inform historical scholarship. following this principle, scholars of imperial russia’s borderland territories will likely 42 initiate new studies in the coming years due to vladimir putin’s invasion of neighboring ukraine. indeed, putinism bears many of the hallmarks of nineteenth and early-twentieth-century imperialism in the russian empire, a reality that is inspiring renewed scholarly interest in the region. this resharpened focus on russian imperial-colonial policies in its historical borderlands invites a look back at the recent scholarship on this subject. prior to the dissolution of the soviet union, studies of nationality within these borderlands generally fell into two distinct historiographical schools. the first mainly comprised of authors from the modern nation-states that emerged out of the borderland territories following the first world war. this scholarship tended to focus on nineteenth-century ethno-national movements and their responses to imperial policies rather than the imperial administration itself. studies of this type are numerous in the historiography of each individual borderland territory, due in part to the focus on nation-states in the twentieth century, and also due to the dearth of russian archival sources during this period. in many ways, then, the scholars working in this vein acted as representatives of local ethnonational traditions, and their respective histories tended to highlight the development and spread of local national character despite imperial rule. on the other hand, western historical studies and those originating from within russia itself did not focus much on imperial nationality policies. instead, these scholars concerned themselves with russian narratives about the empire and its borderlands rather than the ethnonationalities on the empire’s fringes, thus contributing to popular contemporary perceptions of the imperial state as a despotic russian monolith. as access to russian state archives in the lead-up to and following the dissolution of the soviet union gradually increased, however, these frames of interpretation started to shift. beginning in the first half of the 1980s, nationality within the russian empire gained greater prominence in western scholarship as the prospect of independence for these ethnonationalities grew. local, western, and russian historians began to study imperial policies, thereby developing several new historiographical themes and currents in the process.1 in this essay, i trace the convergence of these two historiographical schools following renewed access to the archives beginning in the 1980s. i identify similarities and differences in how scholars depict the construction of national and imperial identities throughout the borderlands after 1863-1864 when an uprising in the polish territories supercharged imperial nationality policies in peripheral regions. through the works chosen, i seek to geographically circumnavigate the major borderlands of the russian empire, specifically through studies of the northern borderlands (finland), the northwestern borderlands (lithuania and belarus), the central asian borderlands (uzbekistan), the southwestern borderlands (ukraine and poland), and the far eastern borderlands (siberia and the amur region). i pay particularly close attention to scholars’ 1 the late mark von hagen’s discussion on whether ukraine has one definite historical narrative upon which to base its national identity provides a good example of the historiographical shift toward studying local national movements in imperial contexts and an overview of how scholars began to approach nationalism in eastern and central europe from new perspectives after the fall of the soviet union. see mark von hagen, “does ukraine have a history?” slavic review 54, no. 3 (1995): 658–73. 43 conclusions about processes of imperial identity construction despite studying different borderlands, their insights about the goals and policies of imperial administrators throughout the borderlands as well as the frameworks and methodologies scholars use in their analyses. i find that, over time, scholars identified two distinct processes for the construction of imperial identities: russification, which can be understood in general terms as the assimilation of a non-dominant ethnic group, and russianization, which can be understood as the acculturation and or/integration of a non-dominant ethnic group. finally, considering the renewed relevance of these historical questions given recent events in ukraine and the impending possibility of further russian expansion into other imperial borderlands, i also consider promising new directions and frameworks for the future study of these questions with the hope that they may contribute fresh insights into the past and present russian empire. russification or russianization? a substantial difficulty faced by western historians of the russian empire before 1991 (and now again after february 2022) was the general inaccessibility of russian archival material, particularly before the implementation of glasnost by mikhail gorbachev in the latter half of the 1980s. in his discussion on the impact of the archives on contemporary scholarship, historian donald raleigh noted that he was only able to gain access to the central state archive of the october revolution and socialist construction (tsgaor, today garf) in 1986.2 even when he gained access, raleigh remarked, “the terms of admission imposed from above also put me on edge. for one thing, i was shown—and then only after frustrating delays—a mere twenty archival files (dela). i could not consult archival inventories (opisi) or catalogs, discuss my research with archivists willing to help, or inspect files in the same building in which our soviet colleagues conducted their research.”3 clearly, soviet archival authorities were highly protective of their materials and conscious of the potential impacts that western use of them could have. the publication of tuomo polvinen’s imperial borderland, one of the first monographs written outside of the soviet union to make extensive use of the heavily guarded archives and analyze imperial policy from the russian perspective rather than from the perspective of local sources, thus marked the first step in a new historiographic direction. first published in finnish in 1984 and then translated to english in 1995 by steven huxley, the author could access and use documents in the archives of moscow, leningrad, and st. petersburg years before raleigh’s visit. archival research in the soviet union was an essential undertaking in the author’s goal to “clarify russia’s policy on finland” because it is the main source type missing from the russian general and historian m.m. borodkin’s 1905 history of finland under governor-general n.i. bobrikov. borodkin’s work was clearly a major source of inspiration for polvinen’s project, given that no other work had been centered on the perspective of bobrikov, who, as governor-general, was 3 ibid. 2 donald raleigh, “doing soviet history: the impact of the archival revolution,” the russian review (stanford) 61, no. 1 (2002), 16. 44 responsible for implementing tsarist policies that sought to suppress finnish autonomy.4 the influence of the imperial policies themselves on this historiography is emphasized by the fact that, despite writing roughly 80 years apart, both borodkin and polvinen choose to interrogate them from the point of view of the man most responsible for their implementation. indeed, polvinen making bobrikov his main character was an excellent choice expressly because he had access to the archives. this combination of structure and evidence allowed for a much more nuanced understanding of imperial policy toward the finnish people than previously conceived. though this work only became accessible to non-finnish speakers once translated to english after the fall of the soviet union and the opening of its archives to the world, polvinen’s intervention nonetheless marks an important step forward. indeed, the english translation of the book was an important factor in the development of this historiography (a testament to the necessity of translational work in the field of historical research) as several western historians had begun to ponder these same questions in the decade prior without access to polvinen’s work. thus, imperial borderland highlights the importance of archival material as the way that historians craft narratives of the past. as a result, virtually no monograph on imperial russia written in the modern day can be considered complete without access to russian archival material. one would not be wrong to wonder if and how these narratives may change in the context of present events. in addition to being one of the first authors of the russian borderlands to combine the state archives with the policy-focused approach and the lens of the top imperial authorities, polvinen taps into several important historiographical discussions upon which numerous authors would seize in the decades after. perhaps the most broadly conceptual of these debates is over the pandora’s box that is russification. the term is notoriously difficult to define and characterize within historiographic circles, though one might understand it (in highly general terms) as a process through which non-russians become russians via assimilation. the concept of russification acts almost as a boogeyman to many scholars of the late russian empire because it was never defined or standardized by the imperial authorities and was often carried out on an ad hoc basis in different borderlands. darius staliūnas, for example, largely sidesteps the debate of russification as a term in his 2007 book making russians, stating that “an analysis of russian national discourse, especially the semantics of the terminology, is important, but the results of such analysis can give only very limited information about the aims of such policy.”5 even more extremely, stephen velychenko avoids both the debate and the term itself entirely in his 1992 book national history as a cultural process despite tracing “ukraine’s past in survey histories of poland, russia, and ukraine.”6 indeed, scholarly dialogue about russification has become so 6 stephen velychenko, national history as cultural process: a survey of the interpretations of ukraine’s past in polish, russian, and ukrainian historical writing from the earliest times to 1914 (edmonton: canadian institute of ukrainian studies press, 1992), xiv. 5 darius staliūnas, making russians: meaning and practice of russification in lithuania and belarus after 1863 (amsterdam: rodopi, 2007), 21. 4 tuomo polvinen, imperial borderland: bobrikov and the attempted russification of finland, 1898-1904 (durham: duke university press, 1995), viii. italics included in original. 45 focused and nuanced that it can fall out of the scope of studies that are not wholly dedicated to its discussion. often, then, substantive discourse on russification can only be found within tertiary sources. raymond pearson, for example, was one of the first western historians of the era to comment directly on the issue in his 1989 paper “privileges, rights, and russification.” reflecting on the historiography prior to the late 1980s, pearson alludes to the ongoing historiographical debate in which some historians used the terms “russification” and “russianization” interchangeably whereas others draw the distinction between “russification” as a process requiring the erasure of ethnic identity through assimilation and “russianization” as a process perpetuating the dominance of russian language, culture, and institutions without the total erasure of local identity. pearson concludes that “what has in the past generally been dubbed ‘russification’ would be better named ‘russianization,’ especially in the light of the strengthening view that the tsarist state possessed neither the totalitarian ambition nor the modern resources to undertake the ethnic assimilation of its minorities (other than perhaps the ukrainians and belorussians).”7 indeed, modern historiographical interpretations of imperial policy towards national minorities in the russian empire’s disparate borderlands can largely be broken down along the lines of efforts to russify populations (assimilation or forced integration) and efforts to russianize populations (acculturation or unforced integration). edward thaden also wrote extensively about conceptions of russification in the historiography. in his 1990 essay his essay “russification in tsarist russia,” for example, he finds that the term was first developed in the 1860s by german and polish intellectuals, “who attributed to the russian government the goal of forcibly making russians out of non-russians.”8 thaden understood this as a definition selectively used by those opposed to tsarist rule. he, therefore, saw the need to differentiate between three types of russification in the historiography: unplanned (suggesting the voluntary acceptance of russian identity by imperial subjects), administrative (suggesting russification of language, laws, and institutions), and cultural (which sought to supplant borderland culture with russian language and culture).9 thaden, however, does not differentiate between russification and russianization on the basis of assimilation or non-assimilation as pearson does. in pearson’s logic, administrative and cultural russification on their own would imply russianization since they do not by themselves result in the erasure of the non-russian identity. this conceptual misalignment and the resulting historiographic tensions have powered historical conversations about russification and russianization into the present day. the conversation around the contours of russification also led to the debate surrounding how imperial authorities applied policies across the borderlands, a debate which polvinen’s work provided commentary on in the finnish context. this debate was 9 ibid, 211, 213. 8 edward thaden, “russification in tsarist russia,” in interpreting history: collective essays on russia’s relations with europe, ed. marianna forster thaden and edward thaden (new york: columbia university press, 1990), 211. 7 raymond pearson, “privileges, rights, and russification,” in civil rights in imperial russia, ed. olga crisp and linda edmondson (oxford: clarendon press, 1989), 89-90. 46 sparked largely by an oversight on the part of previous generations of historians, who, according to pearson, focused myopically upon a few highly visible minority nationalities who seized and then monopolized international attention, and made sweeping generalizations from this limited sample… to attempt to generalize about the one hundred or more national minorities within the empire on the basis of just three patently unrepresentative nationalities must be indefensible for any professional historian.10 while pearson referenced finns as one of the overly studied minorities, he is specifically talking about the historiographic family that focuses on finnish responses to russification rather than policies from the imperial perspective. from this imperial perspective, in which polvinen is a pioneer in the finnish historiography, it is notable that leading up to bobrikov’s appointment as governor-general, “the special status of the grand duchy of finland had gradually become firmly established… even during the reign of alexander iii.”11 they were allowed “their own police force, their own currency, their own postage stamps, their own railway system and, most obvious to russians, the finns spoke their own local languages of finnish and swedish.”12 certainly, the tsarist government had been attentive to the challenges of national minorities in the borderlands for decades before polvinen’s period of study and had, at times, acted to crush those movements. imperial bureaucrats were evidently not as lenient with ukrainian nationalists in the empire’s southwest borderlands, polish nationalists in the west, relatively neglected central asian and siberian subjects, or jews confined to the pale of settlement, each having their own unique experiences with imperial policy. in this light, polvinen’s findings contribute to the thesis that imperial authorities applied policies toward nationalities in an imbalanced manner across the borderlands. from a historiographical perspective, if imperial authorities unequally applied policies across borderlands, then through which methodologies could these inequalities be analyzed? could the distinctions between russification and russianization be further refined? indeed, polvinen himself weighed in by understanding russian policy in finland as initially focused on integrating finns into russian culture and society before fully assimilating them. he points out that “in 1881… finland’s newly appointed governor-general, the former chief of the russian general staff count fedor logginovich heiden, outlined far reaching integration measures in a memorandum to the tsar… integration policy was to be implemented step by step” but “in 1891… in a memorandum concerning the ‘finnish provinces’ he now refused altogether to recognise finland’s status as an autonomous state.”13 here, polvinen suggests that russification and russianization policies were not mutually exclusive and inflexible but could complement one another depending on the situation in a given borderland. 13 polvinen, imperial borderland, 22. 12 peter waldron, “imperial borderland: bobrikov and the attempted russification of finland [review],” europe-asia studies 48, no. 7 (1996), 1244. 11 polvinen, imperial borderland, 21-22. 10 ibid, 87. 47 yuri slezkine was another early contributor to these debates. though only dedicating a few chapters to the imperial period after 1864, slezkine’s geographically and temporally expansive study of russia’s northern borderlands in his 1994 monograph arctic mirrors: russia and the small peoples of the north supports polvinen’s implications and makes its own novel contributions. most interestingly, slezkine highlights the “conflicting rationalist and romantic impulses” of imperial administrators in applying russifying and russianizing policies (though slezkine equates the two in his book through the exclusive use of the term russification).14 these conflicting impulses are evident in imperial administrators adopting the term inorodtsy (aliens) during the nineteenth century. the term was used for subjects who “were different from others in ways that were legally recognized but had no legal justification. by the early nineteenth century ‘foreigners’ (inozemtsy—people from a different land) had become ‘aliens’ (inorodtsy— people of a different birth).”15 this change in terminology implies that imperial authorities considered inorodtsy, such as the peoples of the north, the central asian steppe, and the russian far east, among other groups, to be geographically part of the russian empire, but not necessarily so in the social, cultural, economic, or political sense. slezkine, therefore, demonstrates that the language and attitudes of imperial bureaucrats toward borderlanders can be used to reveal the former’s policy priorities at different times and in different places. the combined reemergence of russian archival sources in the 1980s and 1990s and renewed scholarly interest in how imperial russian authorities managed their heterogeneous empire fundamentally reshaped the historiography of the russian empire. historians began to take a closer look at assumptions that had governed their work for decades, finding that many needed to be reconsidered. in particular, the idea that russification was a coherent, desired, and consistently applied policy to turn the empire’s non-russian subjects into russians warranted further investigation. was it true that russian authorities did not necessarily want an all-russian empire? did imperial authorities seek less intrusive means to hold the empire together in the form of russianization? if russianization was its own process separate from russification, then how was it different in practice? these questions were central in the minds of russian borderland scholars at the turn of the twenty-first century. twenty-first century development in the 2000s, the ideas that emerged around russification and russianization in the 1980s and 1990s were further developed and taken in interesting new directions. seizing on the work done in the two decades prior, particularly that of pearson and thaden, benjamin nathans developed the differentiation between russification and russianization based on assimilation vs. non-assimilation more sharply in his 2002 book beyond the pale, stating, 15 ibid, 53. 14 yuri slezkine, arctic mirrors: russia and the small peoples of the north (ithaca: cornell university press, 1994), 389. 48 assimilation should be understood as a process culminating in the disappearance of a given group as a recognizably distinct element within a larger society. by contrast, acculturation signifies a form of adaptation to the surrounding society that alters rather than erases the criteria of difference, especially in the realm of culture and identity. integration is the counterpart of acculturation (though the two do not necessarily go hand in hand) in the social realm—whether institutional (e.g., schooling), geographic (patterns of residential settlement), or economic (occupational profile).16 in nathans’ view, as in pearson’s, the criterion for assimilation is the erasure of a unique socio-cultural identity. acculturation is defined by an adaption or alteration to a unique cultural identity rather than erasure, and integration is cast as the social “counterpart of acculturation” because it is also defined by adaption rather than erasure, but to a social identity rather than a cultural one. it is also noteworthy that, though supporting pearson’s assertion that russification and russianization were different processes based on assimilation, nathans also adopted thaden’s three-type framework wherein non-dominant group cultures and/or institutions could be made more russian/russianized, or these non-dominant groups could be fully assimilated and russified. thus, by using thaden’s framework to support pearson’s assertions, nathans took a significant step toward resolving the core historiographic tension established by pearson and thaden. darius staliūnas added further nuance to nathans’ thoughts five years later in his book making russians. the author suggests that, we would even broaden the concept of integration and also regard the measures by which the imperial authorities sought to turn people of other nationalities into loyal subjects as integration. thus, making russians does not necessarily mean russian policy sought to assimilate people of other nationalities. acculturation or integration also shows the authorities’ aim to turn people of other nationalities into russians in the political, rather than the ethno-cultural sense. acculturation or integration policy could also use methods of “divide and rule.” the aim of such policy was to support those non-dominant national groups, which, in the opinion of imperial officials, were loyal to the empire and would thereby serve as a counterweight to a disloyal nation, which was the authorities’ main opponent in a given region.17 staliūnas posits multiple new ideas here. first, he believes that if one focuses on policies of integration and acculturation, they demonstrate that the imperial russian 17 staliūnas, making russians, 2. italics included in original. 16 benjamin nathans, beyond the pale: the jewish encounter with late imperial russia (berkeley, los angeles: university of california press, 2002), 11. 49 bureaucracy was not solely focused on assimilating nationalities into the empire and was not necessarily focused exclusively on ethnonational identities. second, he posits that attempts to acculturate and integrate borderland populations made use of strategies distinct from strategies of assimilation. in cases where imperial authorities attempted to acculturate and/or integrate, one may find strategies that can be described as “divide and rule,” an approach that he defines as supporting non-dominant groups loyal to the empire in opposition to national groups that were not.18 jeff sahadeo’s 2007 monograph russian colonial society in tashkent, 1865-1923 represents another work that asked these novel questions and implemented these new methodologies as well as one that strongly supports staliūnas’ assertions. sahadeo places his focus on the tsarist administration in imperial tashkent, a leading city in the empire’s central asian borderlands, asking whether imperial policy toward central asian minorities could be classified as russification or russianization and what means were used for these ends. indeed, sahadeo’s choice of geographical and cultural focus brings much to the discussion. imperial administrators tended to view their central asian colonies as “oriental,” a term that edward said has noted “connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century european colonialism.”19 much like the subjects in slezkine’s study, the conception of russia’s central asian borderlands as uncivilized, oriental, and non-national by imperial administrators is likely a major reason for the region’s underrepresentation within the historiography of nationalism in the borderlands. sahadeo’s monograph plugged this gap. he found that “tsarist administrators needed the cooperation of important sections of the central asian population to rule the region in a cost-efficient manner. native notables in tashkent pledged outward allegiance to the tsar in exchange for assurances of political and cultural autonomy.”20 despite being unaware of staliūnas’ discussions and findings since the two authors published in the same year, sahadeo’s work provided strong evidence for the idea that “divide and rule” was utilized as a strategy by imperial administrators in the borderlands. this suggests that imperial policy was focused on acculturation and/or integration and, therefore, represents russianization rather than russification. these conclusions further prove that russification and russianization were distinct processes and should not be conflated in the broader historiographical conversations. six years after staliūnas and sahadeo took this step, faith hillis applied many of their ideas for the first time to the context of imperial russian ukraine in her 2013 work children of rus’. hillis too finds that imperial administrators clearly applied “divide and rule” strategies to this borderland by allying with apparently loyal “little russian” 20 jeff sahadeo, russian colonial society in tashkent, 1865-1923 (bloomington: indiana university press, 2007), 230. 19 edward said, orientalism, first vintage books edition. (new york: first vintage books, 1979). unfortunately, this online edition of the book does not include page numbers. 18 staliūnas has since further discussed and clarified the nuances of defining this approach and its applications in the northwest and western borderlands of the late empire. see darius staliūnas, “affirmative action in the western borderlands of the late russian empire?,” slavic review 77, no. 4 (2018): 978–97. 50 intellectuals, whom she defines as “activists who saw local traditions as compatible with imperial rule” against seemingly disloyal ukrainians, whom she defines as “activists who questioned the unity of the east slavs and the authority of the imperial state.”21 hillis’ work also adds to a recent and relevant historiographic subtheme that focuses on the role of modernization and urbanization in perpetuating russification and russianization.22 the development of right-bank ukraine’s (the portion of the country west of the dnipro river) infrastructure and urban spaces during the nineteenth century and the increase in the urban population that occurred as a result meant, in part, that intellectual circles flourished. it was within these circles that imperial authorities found the little russian intellectuals with whom they sought to develop an orthodox east slavic identity that could unify the empire, and also within these circles that they found ukrainian intellectuals who needed to be undermined. however, citing making russians and other texts in an oblique reference to the russification vs. russianization debate, hillis semantically adopts “a set of policies that some referred to as ‘russification’”23 for the policies in right-bank ukraine rather than russianization. given the conceptual development of russification and russianization prior to her work, a more meaningful engagement with and application of the terminology may have enhanced scholarly understanding of the “little russians” that hillis studies. while russification was an affectual force in contemporary right-bank ukraine, it was primarily within policies directed toward ukrainian activists. russianization, on the other hand, seems to be the more appropriate way to categorize policies directed toward the little russians. the author herself states, “by the early twentieth century, official tolerance for nationalist agitation on the right bank permitted activists to create a socially variegated and mass-oriented russian nationalist movement, which soon became the preeminent political force in the region.”24 therefore, while this work supports the distinction between russification and russianization conceptually, it also shows that this distinction is not yet fully deployed linguistically within recent historiography. malte rolf’s imperial russian rule in the kingdom of poland, first released in german in 2014 and subsequently translated into english in 2021, applied the term “russification” more thoughtfully. his work offers a refreshing perspective on a borderland that is well represented in the historiography, from which imperial administrators’ first real experience with an agitated national group came in 1831 and again in 1863-1864. in characterizing the kingdom of poland as “a test ground where the imperial government devised and developed ways to secure power and to force integration,” rolf adopts the conceptual language of russification to support this characterization.25 his extensive citation of both thaden and staliūnas further alludes to the fact that a secondary objective of rolf’s work 25 malte rolf, imperial russian rule in the kingdom of poland, 1864-1915 (pittsburgh: university of pittsburgh press, 2021), 5. 24 ibid, 2. 23 hillis, children of rus’, 4. 22 staliūnas, sahadeo, and rolf also fit into this trend. 21 faith hillis, children of rus’: right-bank ukraine and the invention of a russian nation (cornell university press, 2013)., xiii. 51 was to develop the contours of russification as a concept, thereby making the book one of the field’s most up-to-date works. the implications of this decades-long discourse now appear to be spreading into neighboring historiographical fields. in his book beyond the amur, published as part of the university of british columbia press’ contemporary chinese studies series, victor zatsepine’s primary goal is “to describe and analyze the emergence of the amur frontier society and how the region was claimed and divided by two states [imperial russia and qing china] despite difficult natural conditions.”26 in approaching the claims of imperial russian bureaucrats over a borderland from an adjacent historiographical perspective, zatsepine highlights the core of the field’s recent debates and broadly summarizes their findings without needing to engage with them directly. the author accomplishes this by concluding that “russia engaged in a variety of initiatives to expand its influence in the region,” that “one persistent feature of this frontier was inconsistent and insufficient support from central governments,” and that “this frontier region came to symbolize the ambiguity of imperial attitudes, which ranged from high expectations to neglect.”27 zatsepine identifies both a primary motivator for these historiographical conversations (the ambiguity of imperial attitudes) and the consensus that has resulted (a variety of attitudes and policies that represented high expectations for a region and its peoples and/or relative neglect). indirectly, and from a historiographic outsider’s perspective, the author supports the notions that imperial authorities applied policies inconsistently across time and space, that they depended highly on the perceptions and attitudes of contemporary actors, and that they employed particular strategies depending on these attitudes and goals of said actors. by interrogating and refining the initial historiographic thoughts from the 1980s and 1990s, the authors of the twenty-first century have made great progress in defining what russification and russianization mean, how they are different, and how their different policies were applied in the empire. the recent scholarship highlighted here strongly supports the idea that imperial administrators adopted different policies depending on the contexts of different borderlands at different times. indeed, russification and russianization now seem to be generally accepted as different processes involving different policies with different goals. in cases of russification, historians tend to agree that policies were oriented toward assimilation. in cases of russianization, however, policies were oriented toward acculturation and/or integration through strategies like “divide and rule.” simultaneously, however, authors like hillis illustrate the fact that the distinction between “russification” and “russianization” is either not fully accepted or fully deployed as of the 2010s. while the overall development of this historiography has done much to clarify the differences between the two, a definitive comparative analysis of these processes throughout the empire remains extremely challenging given the necessity of understanding the diverse cultures and languages of the empire’s many non-dominant groups and how imperial authorities treated each one. nonetheless, historians must continue to understand 27 ibid, 6, 160, 162-163. 26 victor zatsepine, beyond the amur: frontier encounters between china and russia, 1850-1930 (vancouver: ubc press, 2017), 16. 52 russification and russianization more deeply, given that both are being implemented in the russian empire’s borderlands today. this reality raises important questions. must historians again innovate to generate new insights? if so, how? what new analytical tools are available, and how can they help us make further progress? in fact, one does not have to look far to find promising possibilities. historiographic frontiers i advocate for two potential new frameworks that could be of use in analyzing russification and russianization. both lenses proposed here have precedent within the current historiography, though to different degrees. the first potential new lens for understanding russification and russianization within imperial policies is through the concept of inorodtsy. as highlighted by slezkine in arctic mirrors, the term technically refers to a legal category used administratively throughout the empire (generally translated into english as “aliens”). however, john slocum points out that it “was used, often in a pejorative sense, to refer to all of the empire's non-russian inhabitants,” and that historians have “remarked on the shift in usage whereby, in the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, the formal sense of the term gradually gave way to the informal one.”28 given the scholarly focus in the historiography on the relationships between imperial authorities and local peoples, it would reasonably follow that most works would at least include a mention and discussion of inorodtsy in the context of their respective borderlands. curiously, however, there does not appear to be a deep focus on inorodtsy in the literature. while staliūnas uses the term throughout his work and slezkine and hillis define its significance in theirs, it is absent from polvinen’s, sahadeo’s, rolf’s, and zatsepine’s monographs. how might this be explained? staliūnas positions this inconsistency as “the problem of what kind of general term could be used to describe the ‘objects’ of nationality policy.”29 he correctly identifies inorodtsy as the term used for “aliens” or “when national groups were differentiated from russians,” but states that separate analytical categories are required to analyze the relationship between “russians” and “inorodtsy.”30 why can the concept of inorodtsy not be used as a category of analysis in and of itself? indeed, slocum’s essay suggests that it can and perhaps should be. he highlights the fact that “the changing usages of the term inorodtsy are bound up with changing conceptions of ‘russianness’ and the russian nation, and evolution in the concepts of nationality and nationhood… the evidence presented here relates to broader questions concerning changing conceptions of identity, difference, and “otherness” in russian history.”31 it seems, then, that the development and usage of the term inorodtsy in the empire over time can be used as an analytical framework through which to interrogate identity in the empire as well as strategies of control, but this has not happened for one reason or another as far as i am aware. 31 slocum, “who, and when, were the inorodtsy?” 175. 30 ibid. 29 staliūnas, making russians, 22. 28 john slocum, “who, and when, were the inorodtsy? the evolution of the category of ‘aliens’ in imperial russia,” the russian review (stanford) 57, no. 2 (1998), 173. 53 another potential new lens within the historiography of the russian empire’s borderlands is “national indifference.” none of the monographs analyzed in this essay use this analytical lens, and the only mention of it is found in hillis’ introduction.32 national indifference was most cohesively hypothesized as an analytical category in a 2010 work published in the slavic review by tara zahra.33 it should also be emphasized that by 2010, multiple works analyzing national indifference as an influential force in constructing national identities in various european regions had already been released, including one by zahra herself.34 zahra’s essay, however, made two novel and critical points relevant to the historiography of nationalism and imperial russia. first, “while national indifference has long been an obsession of nationalist activists in east central europe, it has only recently become a subject of historical research.”35 indeed, while the concept of national indifference is as old as the concept of nationalism, it has received scant scholarly attention within the historiography. second, “making indifference visible… enables historians to better understand the limits of nationalization and thereby challenges the nationalist narratives, categories, and frameworks that have traditionally dominated the historiography of eastern europe.”36 understanding national constructions in the empire and how imperial administrators responded to them enables historians to interrogate distinctions between “russification” and “russianization.” at the same time, understanding national constructions also necessarily means understanding their limits, and so works that fail to do so might be considered incomplete analyses. while the lack of analysis of national indifference and its nonuse as an analytical lens is understandable in polvinen’s, staliūnas’, and sahadeo’s monographs given when zahra’s article was released and in zatsepine’s given that nationalism is not a central focus, the oversight of both hillis and rolf to incorporate this novel framework into their studies appears to be a missed opportunity.37 to her credit, hillis does explicitly point out that, “scholars of national awakenings have generally taken for granted the transformative power of nationalism—a tendency recently challenged by historians who argue that the traditional focus on nation-building has obscured the fact that popular indifference and even hostility toward national ideas persisted well into the modern period.”38 however, she continues on by stating, “rather than focusing on expressions of consciousness or 38 hillis, children of rus’, 11. 37 sahadeo’s work, in particular, would benefit from the utilization of national indifference as an analytical lens because attempts to nationalize the peoples of the central asian steppe were so weak, as the author points out. 36 ibid, 94. 35 zahra, “imagined noncommunities,” 93. 34 see james bjork, neither german nor pole: catholicism and national indifference in a central european borderland (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2008). jeremy king, budweisers into czechs and germans: a local history of bohemian politics, 1848-1948 (princeton: princeton university press, 2002). pieter judson, guardians of the nation: activists on the language frontiers of imperial austria (cambridge: harvard university press, 2006). tara zahra, kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the bohemian lands, 1900-1948 (ithaca: cornell university press, 2008). 33 see tara zahra, “imagined noncommunities: national indifference as a category of analysis,” slavic review 69, no. 1 (2010), 93–119. 32 hillis, children of rus’, 11. 54 indifference, this book analyzes how nationalist agendas evolved through time and across space, often in convoluted and nonlinear ways.”39 while hillis does not reject the concept of national indifference as an analytical framework, her choice not to incorporate it seems to in some capacity limit the overall historiographical impact of the book. understanding indifference and hostility toward national ideas in the right-bank is an important component in understanding the development of national movements, imperial responses to those movements, and categorizations of those responses because indifferent or hostile people represented a problem for spreading nationalist agendas. given the failure of tsarist officials to implement official nationality40 in right-bank ukraine and throughout the rest of the empire, its absence seems a disappointing choice when considering zahra’s point about interrogating the limits of nationalization. the disappointment of this choice is further felt through hillis’ nonuse of the term “russianization,” an important aspect in the evolution of nationalist agendas in the southwestern borderlands. in rolf’s case, this omission seems particularly egregious given that james bjork’s monograph on national indifference in the polish-german borderlands was released more than a decade prior.41 both hillis and rolf could have placed their work into a novel and rapidly evolving historiographic framework, thereby giving it greater meaning and relevance without detracting from their overall points and goals. for hillis, this is perhaps not as pressing today, considering the tragic relevance of her work to contemporary events in ukraine. a focus on national indifference in rolf’s monograph, however, would have added strong evidence to a work premised on the belief that “giving a dense description of the particular weave of interaction found [in the monograph’s region and period] is the best way to demonstrate the complexities, inconsistencies, and formative dimensions of the imperial context.”42 certainly, the inclusion of national indifference as a category of analysis should feature more heavily in the historiography of nationalism in the russian empire’s borderlands going forward. i would argue that this need is even more pressing in the historiography of the russian empire’s borderlands given the ad hoc nature of the empire’s construction, its geographical vastness, and the heterogeneous composition of its population.43 considering the relevance of these two lenses to current historiographical debates, one would hope to see more extensive use of them by scholars in the near future. studying 43 brian boeck’s case study of the don cossack host in the russian empire touches on all these points. see brian boeck, imperial boundaries: cossack communities and empire-building in the age of peter the great (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009). additionally, for a more direct focus on ad hoc imperial policies through different periods of russian history, see kees boterbloem, russia as empire: past and present (london: reaktion books, 2020). 42 rolf, imperial russian rule in the kingdom of poland, 5. 41 bjork, neither german nor pole. 40 official nationality was an ideology developed by tsar nicholas i and count sergei uvarov for the cohesion of the russian empire. it espoused three interdependent concepts: religious orthodoxy, political autocracy, and imperial nationality. for a translation of uvarov’s original phrasing, see a parting of ways: government and the educated public in russia, 1801-1855, trans. nicholas riasanovsky (oxford: carendon press, 1976), 108. in terms of secondary discussions on official nationality, extensive scholarship exists. for an up-to-date example, see valerie a. kivelson and ronald grigor suny, “imperial russia in the moment of the nation, 1801-1855” (new york, ny: [oxford university press], 2017). 39 ibid. 55 the use of the term inorodtsy over time in different borderlands would allow historians to understand how imperial administrators and russians in general “othered” non-dominant national minorities. this understanding, in turn, would enable more in-depth analysis of whether tsarist officials used strategies of “russification” or “russianization” to control these groups, potentially adding to the further understanding of “russification” and “russianization” within the historiography. national indifference also offers a promising new analytical framework. through an understanding of the limits of national constructions, the lens would enable scholars to better investigate the processes and results of these constructions. this, in turn, would facilitate a greater understanding of imperial responses to those constructions, thereby further clarifying the line between “russification” and “russianization.” conclusion the reemergence of russian archival documents after the brezhnev era was revolutionary for non-russian scholars of the russian empire. westerners studying the region’s history through the lens of the cold war generally tended not to differentiate between tsarist and soviet imperialism, thereby creating historiographical blind spots. although access remained somewhat limited to western academics until the fall of the soviet union, historians from countries that fostered warmer political relationships with the soviet union made extensive use of state archives, reshaping the subsequent historiography in their wake. polvinen’s 1984 publication is a prime example of this phenomenon. part of a new wave of archivally-informed scholarship, polvinen’s work was at the forefront of finnish historiography on the period of imperial rule and the vanguard of western historiography on the russian empire. part of this is attributable to his commentary on the concept of russification. russification has long been an opaque concept to historians. the shifting intentions and inconsistent applications of russifying policy by imperial authorities mean that a clear definition or universal criteria for identifying the process remains elusive. since the opening of the russian archives, however, the concept has come to be more generally understood as a process that results in the assimilation of a non-dominant group through the erasure of its unique ethnic identity. pearson was among the first to suggest that processes of russification should be viewed as distinct from processes of russianization on the basis that russification necessitates the erasure of local identity, whereas russianization does not. though thaden did not necessarily adopt pearson’s ideas initially, he did provide a three-type framework for assessing imperial policy in the form of unplanned, administrative, and cultural russification. nathans resolved some of this tension by combining pearson’s ideas and thaden’s framework to posit that assimilation generally acts as a means toward the ends of russification whereas acculturation and integration generally act as the means toward russianization. furthering the idea that russification and russianization were separate policies, staliūnas found that processes of acculturation and integration deployed their own unique strategies, such as “divide and rule.” importantly, slezkine provided a framework of analysis for understanding why imperial authorities applied certain policies at different times and in different places through the language and attitudes of the imperial administrators applying them. 56 these findings imply that policies were applied piecemeal and unequally in different borderlands, often on a haphazard basis. this oversight on the part of previous generations of scholars of the russian empire is generally attributed to a combination of the inaccessibility of the archives as well as the fact that their focus was on a very limited sample of highly prominent national minorities in the borderland. from this limited sample, scholars attempted to justify overgeneralized conclusions. staliūnas and sahadeo’s monographs represent a historiographical school that is changing these conceptions. they both contribute evidence to new hypotheses suggesting russification and russianization were separate processes based on unequal policy applications in the borderlands which are evidenced by the presence of “divide and rule” strategies. still, not all authors of recent works have been completely in tune with these new hypotheses. while hillis’ work does support the hypothesis of unequal policy applications in the borderland and the idea of “divide and rule,” her choice not to differentiate between russification and russianization in her work despite her awareness of staliūnas’ framework somewhat softens its impact, though the work remains valuable to other historiographic conversations. it seems, perhaps, that more time is needed for the concepts to fully penetrate the language of scholars when discussing nationality policies in the imperial borderlands. malte rolf, on the other hand, demonstrates that the nuance of this historiographical debate is being picked up in some areas of recent scholarship. citing many relevant works and adopting the appropriate language, rolf’s represents the most up-to-date scholarship on the russian empire’s imperial borderlands. demonstrating the overall importance of these historiographic conversations and trends to adjacent historiographic fields, victor zatsepine indirectly incorporates and supports many of the aforementioned findings into his own study from an outsider historiographic perspective. as is always the case with historiographic developments, new questions are arising, and new analytical tools are being utilized to generate new narratives. one potentially promising route to further understanding russification and russianization is to analyze it through conceptions around inorodtsy populations over time. slezkine’s work has long implied the potential of this concept for understanding the opaque attitudes and policies of imperial administrators toward different borderlands. nonetheless, this framework is contested within the historiography, and little appears to have been done in terms of exploring it since the publication of arctic mirrors. the framework of national indifference, on the other hand, is much more developed in terms of theoretical background. unfortunately, it has not been widely deployed for analyzing imperial nationality policies in the russian empire’s borderlands despite allowing historians to interrogate where national constructions failed or were underdeveloped.44 there is no time to waste asking and answering these important historical questions. ongoing efforts to russify and russianize borderland populations today will not wait for historians to understand them, and the prospect of accessing russian archives is the most uncertain it has been in nearly fifty years. though it is certain that historians will continue finding new ways to understand the russian empire’s imperial borderlands in the future, the time to start is now. 44 it has, however, been relatively extensively deployed in the study of soviet nationality policies. 57 bibliography bjork, james. neither german nor pole: catholicism and national indifference in a central european borderland. ann arbor: university of michigan press, 2008. boeck, brian j., author. imperial boundaries: cossack communities and empire-building in the age of peter the great. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009. boterbloem, kees. russia as empire: past and present. london: reaktion books, 2020. cusco, andrei. “russians, romanians, or neither? mobilization of ethnicity and ‘national indifference’ in early 20th-century bessarabia.” kritika 20, no. 1 (2019): 7–38. hagen, mark von. “does ukraine have a history?” slavic review 54, no. 3 (1995): 658–73. hillis, faith. children of rus’: right-bank ukraine and the invention of a russian nation. cornell university press, 2013. judson, pieter. guardians of the nation: activists on the language frontiers of imperial austria. edited by american council of learned societies. cambridge: harvard university press, 2006. king, jeremy. budweisers into czechs and germans: a local history of bohemian politics, 1848-1948. princeton: princeton university press, 2002. kivelson, valerie a., and ronald grigor suny. “imperial russia in the moment of the nation, 1801-1855.” new york, ny: [oxford university press], 2017. nathans, benjamin. beyond the pale: the jewish encounter with late imperial russia. 1st ed. vol. 45. studies on the history of society and culture. berkeley: university of california press, 2002. pearson, raymond. “privileges, rights, and russification.” in civil rights in imperial russia, edited by olga crisp and linda edmondson, 85–102. oxford: clarendon press, 1989. polvinen, tuomo. imperial borderland: bobrikov and the attempted russification of finland, 1898-1904. durham: duke university press, 1995. raleigh, donald. “doing soviet history: the impact of the archival revolution.” the russian review (stanford) 61, no. 1 (2002): 16–24. rolf, malte. imperial russian rule in the kingdom of poland, 1864-1915. pittsburgh: university of pittsburgh press, 2021. sahadeo, jeff. russian colonial society in tashkent, 1865-1923. bloomington: indiana university press, 2007. 58 said, edward. orientalism. first vintage books edition. new york: first vintage books, 1979. slezkine, yuri. arctic mirrors: russia and the small peoples of the north. ithaca: cornell university press, 1994. slocum, john “who, and when, were the inorodtsy? the evolution of the category of ‘aliens’ in imperial russia.” the russian review (stanford) 57, no. 2 (1998): 173–190. staliūnas, darius. “affirmative action in the western borderlands of the late russian empire?” slavic review 77, no. 4 (2018): 978–97. staliūnas, darius. making russians: meaning and practice of russification in lithuania and belarus after 1863. amsterdam: rodopi, 2007. thaden, edward. “russification in tsarist russia.” in interpreting history: collective essays on russia’s relations with europe, edited by marianna forster thaden and edward thaden. new york: columbia university press, 1990. velychenko, stephen. national history as cultural process: a survey of the interpretations of ukraine’s past in polish, russian, and ukrainian historical writing from the earliest times to 1914. edmonton: canadian institute of ukrainian studies press, 1992. waldron, peter. “imperial borderland: bobrikov and the attempted russification of finland [review].” europe-asia studies 48, no. 7 (1996): 1244. zahra, tara. “imagined noncommunities: national indifference as a category of analysis.” slavic review 69, no. 1 (2010): 93–119. zahra, tara. kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the bohemian lands, 1900-1948. edited by american council of learned societies. ithaca: cornell university press, 2008. zatsepine, victor. beyond the amur: frontier encounters between china and russia, 1850-1930. vancouver: ubc press, 2017. 59 cey.weinshel.introduction editorial introduction meyer weinshel university of minnesota before i highlight the articles in this year’s edition of the central europe yearbook, i am reminded of the complex publishing apparatus that makes our work at the journal possible. a publication such as this one requires not only a team of reviewers, but also a dedicated team of libraries and publishing professionals as well as in-house editorial staff to see articles through to publication. not to mention, faculty mentors also play a central role in this process; they often encourage their talented undergraduates to submit their work to the journal in the first place, and without whom we would not be able to highlight this important subset of scholarly work. our capacity to publish new articles also reflects recent developments at the center for austrian studies that took place over the course of the past year. i am indebted to the extraordinary work of the newly-appointed assistant editor, elijah (eli) wallace. eli is completing his ph.d. in the university of minnesota’s department of history, and began working for the center in the fall of 2025. we at the center also employ several undergraduate staff members at any given time. since becoming senior editor of the cey in 2023, one of my goals was to better integrate the center for austrian studies student staff into the journal’s operations. the reasons for doing this were both professional and structural. undergraduate students acquire relevant skills and experience with publishing prior to graduation, and their involvement in the journal’s publication also mirrors staffing structures at other undergraduate-focused journals in north america. my sincere gratitude to both briana heidkamp-vu (umn history, 2025) and colby miller (umn history, 2026) for their outstanding and collaborative work while this volume was under production. last but not least: we have five extraordinary articles to share with you in this current volume. as in years past, they reflect the current diversity of scholarship within the many fields comprising central european studies. chloe hooker examines the long-term legacies of the hussite wars in the 15th century within the larger history of religion in central and eastern europe. nicholas tsui uses kan youwei’s writings on habsburg austria in the late 19th century to paint a larger picture of china’s own modernization at the time, and how perceptions of europe shaped chinese politics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. sylvia rutherford convincingly argues that following the assassination of 1 empress elisabeth (sisi), the public image she had worked hard to cultivate for herself quickly transformed into a more iconographically romanticized depiction that continues to shape her legacy today. sorcha deheer examines children’s writings of the holocaust in yugoslavia, which have generally been omitted from the historical record. and finally, rafi escoto provides us with an analysis of the film, green border (2023; directed by agnieszka holland), which grapples with the film’s depiction of the 2021 humanitarian crisis that unfolded at the polish-belarusian border. we at the center for austrian studies hope you enjoy this issue of the cey, and we are always grateful for your continued support and interest in the journal. 2 cey vol. 6 introduction editorial introduction meyer weinshel university of minnesota as has been the case for the past five years, the cey continues to publish outstanding undergraduate research from the many disciplines within central european studies. with the appearance of the cey’s sixth volume, i am excited to share another excellent collection of articles that showcase the breadth and depth of undergraduate research today. eight articles appear in this issue, which is an astounding number considering the challenges we and our students faced only a few years ago during the pandemic. my editorial team and i are grateful for this volume’s authors and readers, and for their continued interest in the central europe yearbook. as we continue to broaden the scope of the journal, i am also pleased to highlight scholarship in not only the field of history, but also in other fields such as german and russian studies. we hope this will encourage undergraduates and recent graduates from a variety of fields to submit their work for review, whether it be an article-length paper, historiographical essay, translation, or multimedia project. when perusing the titles of this volume, and upon a closer reading of the articles, it is undeniable that many of these scholars and their work are in dialogue with one another. there are resonances to our current moment, and sometimes frighteningly so. two of this year’s articles appear in german, a friendly reminder that the cey also publishes in other languages besides english. harper crosson addresses an important chapter in viennese history, particularly for red vienna, when socialists influenced by julius deutsch sought to meld working-class and mass politics with sport, albeit with mixed results. arushi nair, the issue’s other german-language author, combines personal experiences and their own scholarly interventions to discuss the supposedly egalitarian and radical spaces of berlin’s night club scene. both papers address different temporal moments in two distinct cultural capitals in central europe, but both address how utopian politics often fail to reach imagined outcomes. the editors of this journal are especially grateful for their willingness to publish their work in german. 1 several of the articles ask vital questions regarding historiography, while others probe questions of nationalism and mass politics at the turn of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. nicholas sessums addresses the current moment for russian and ukrainian studies scholarship, particularly for the study of the ukrainian-russian borderlands that have faced the brunt of the russian invasion. larger, structural questions regarding disciplinarity also shape sessums’ article, as slavic studies in general faces both external and internal challenges in today’s academy. arushi nair, in addition to their article on berlin’s club scene, has contributed a second essay to this volume based on a research project completed for the mellon-mays fellowship. nair introduces scholars to foundational texts for the study of romani and sinti culture in germany, and the challenges researchers will face due to the marginalization and discrimination roma and sinti writers and artists have experienced before and after the nazi holocaust. both sessums and nair highlight the continued role of memory in their respective fields. similarly, other articles in this volume address questions of memory, and how they shape collective and scholarly understanding of our past and present. libby edwards examines the politics of naming a wissenschaftskolleg in greifswald after alfried krupp, who was tried for war crimes for his use of slave labor. greifswald, a city with a long, storied history of its own stretching back to the hanseatic league, has since the unification of east and west germany seen an uptick in antisemitic acts and neonazi activity. as editor, i stress to readers that these terrifying political trends are sadly not new, and have been part of modern german politics for over 150 years. flora warshaw traces the links between post-1871 german nationalism (and nationalist parties) and antisemitism, both of which fueled right-wing populism following the wars of german unification. paula krajnik also addresses 19th century politics, notably in the parts of historic silesia that remained under habsburg rule, and sought greater autonomy within austria-hungary. as these nationalist conflicts increased across central europe, it is thus important to understand how the politics of assimilation affected central european jews in 19th-century germany. josephine porter conducted important research on jewish women’s identities in 19th-century central europe in the aftermath of the enlightenment. porter specifically focuses on the life and work of rahel varnhagen, whose life and work gained renewed interest thanks to hannah arendt. arendt, a german-jewish philosopher and one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, continues to shape our understanding of totalitarianism today. 2 in conclusion, we at the cey and the center for austrian studies are excited to publish this terrific set of essays, written by talented undergraduates and recent graduates from around the world. 3 nair.revised.roma and sinti culture as modern german studies.docx roma & sinti culture as modern german and austrian studies: a guide for researchers arushi nair abstract the history and culture of roma and sinti, especially within germany, has faced repeated attempts of erasure and suppression. although the roma and sinti form an integral part of german society today and comprise important periods of germany’s long history, this is a culture and history deliberately kept from the public. i began my project investigating the existing literature and canon of historical works on the roma and sinti to better understand their origins and culture for myself, but also to see the landscape of the work and better understand the figures behind it. i found overwhelmingly that these works were outdated by today’s standards, with little scholarship having emerged in recent decades. this came with a whole host of problems: the labels used to refer to roma and sinti, the lack of consent in ethnographic interviews, and large generalizations or assumptions about roma across europe. secondary sources two books stood out in their ability to highlight the shortcomings of previous scholarship: isabel fonseca’s anthropological work bury me standing: the gypsies and their journey and klaus-michael bogdal’s historiographic work europa erfindet die zigeuner: eine geschichte von faszination und verachtung. fonseca, an anthropologist, conducted interviews with roma families with whom she stayed across central and eastern europe throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. the book often retells of extremely intimate and vulnerable stories that her interview subjects shared. fonseca also added her own commentary. while this style of writing was engaging and conjured vivid images of roma life and folklore, it ultimately bridged into a realm of fiction, solidifying preconceived negative stereotypes about the roma and sinti into an unforgiving public consciousness. fonseca’s retelling of false stereotypes and mass generalizations about the roma and sinti, such as the tendency for women and girls to marry young and thus be kept out of educational institutions, do more harm to their autonomy and existence than help to 60 educate on their plight. while fonseca’s intentions cannot truly be determined, it is not unlikely that she, like many authors working within this area of study at the time, plays with a personal fascination to achieve literary success at the expense of the roma. this is a concept klaus-michael bogdal closely investigates in his work. a trained historian, bogdal explores the idea that europeans have been fascinated with the roma and their culture for centuries yet have deliberately taken efforts to ensure their suppression. he retells many important historical moments involving or revolving around the roma and sinti, including their banishment from the south asian subcontinent in the 11th century, their arrival in the european continent between the 14th and 15th centuries, and recountments of their discrimination from these early periods leading into the second world war.1 one notable example of early discrimination and stereotyping that bogdal elaborates on is carmen, the operatic work by george bizet. though this departs from the german regional example, it serves a larger point; europeans have often taken from the marginalized what they deem of cultural value for themselves and discarded the rest. in spain, this was flamenco; in other countries, like germany and romania, it has been the outsourcing of cheap and undesirable labor, explicit exclusion from educational institutions through geographic isolation, and even antiquated laws that permitted and encouraged the hunting of roma people. bogdal responds to previous scholarship, like the work of fonseca, stating: “die ethnographie verfremdet, indem sie vorrangig kollektive in den blick nimmt und nicht individuen. ihr interesse gilt dem, was alle menschen eines volkes miteinander teilen und ausüben, also jenen erscheinungen, die über eine lange dauer bestehen und sich in ritualen wiederholen.”2 bogdal attempts to offer a comprehensive history without doing the roma and sinti injustice, and while he rightly establishes a more objective and critical perspective on the roma and sinti, his work still lacks an authentic voice and room for autonomy from the roma themselves.3 this reveals that the state of scholarship on roma and sinti in germany remains largely unexplored, perhaps because the previous scholarship has created a strong narrative that many are uninterested in reinvestigating or critically analyzing. the work of fonseca is just one of numerous examples in the scholarship about roma and sinti, which has solidified their image in the public consciousness as a crime-ridden, uneducated, and impoverished while also granting a strange fascination for or seduction of the roma woman. this potent combination has been a cornerstone for the white male-dominated european culture because it both preserves a sacred hierarchy and creates a convenient scapegoat for societal and economic issues that cyclically recur. memoirs this realization led me to investigate new avenues of approach, still searching for this voice but hard-pressed to find it. i learned that emerging from the horrors of the holocaust were the first memoirs and published writings by roma. in the past, the roma identity of authors or artists was deliberately hidden, or non-roma authors outright stole 3 bogdal, europa erfindet die zigeuner, 478. 2 bogdal, europa erfindet die zigeuner, 279. 1 bogdal, europa erfindet die zigeuner. 61 their pieces. but then there was philomena franz, one of the first german roma authors and one of the first female holocaust survivors to be published. rather than reduce her work through a simple summary, i offer a quote from the beginning pages: ich wünsche mir von ganzem herzen, daß dieses kleine buch dazu beiträgt, die wiederholung von geschehnissen zu verhindern, die man bei uns in deutschland ‘vergangenheit’ nennt. die wahrheit ist schmerzlich, aber nur mit ihr können wir unser glück aufbauen. die liebe ist vollkommenheit. sie gibt uns freude, sie ist weisheit und wahrheit, denn sie kommt von gottes güte und gerechtigkeit, liebe fördert immer wieder zum verzeihen heraus. wenn wir liebe nicht haben, zerstört die menschheit sich selbst, sind wir menschen verloren.4 in her retelling of her life story and the traumas she survived, franz adopts a framework of love and forgiveness towards hatred, something deeply rooted in her upbringing in a multigenerational roma family. at the time of its discovery during my path of research, this was a revelation. it was the first time i was hearing from a roma person themselves about their culture and life experiences without worry of its authenticity. i learned a lot from this account. as i read more memoirs and enquired more about survivors like philomena franz, i discovered that writing accounts like these took a heavy toll, often leaving their writers in shambles, having to relive their trauma during the writing process while simultaneously having to reckon with ongoing discrimination against roma and sinti. while the holocaust memoirs offer some of the first authentic recountings of roma and sinti experience and expression, they are limited in that they only speak to the experiences of the generation of holocaust survivors, with only anecdotes about the ancestors (whose voices and stories we have little hope of recovering) and the successors of this now dying generation. these memoirs tend to unintentionally center the horrors of genocide and the role of the nazis and their collaborators. memory politics was something that bogdal also warned about extensively throughout his book because the aftermath of the holocaust, in many ways, forgot non-jewish survivors. lgbtq+ survivors, disabled survivors, and roma and sinti survivors have often been relegated as “the others,” and have been treated as such in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. while lgbtq+ survivors remained imprisoned as other survivors were liberated, disabled individuals did not receive proper and necessary medical care, and roma and sinti were not publicly acknowledged in germany as survivors worthy of reparation until the 1980s, after mass-mobilization efforts. additionally, holocaust memoirs have a limited scope; they take on a victim perspective of what has happened to an individual, which, while the acknowledgment is important and necessary, can often be insufficient in the larger goal of gaining autonomy. in the story-telling of roma experience, i wanted to see what roma did, and this was the push from memoirs into poetry. poetry revealed itself in this context to be a medium uniquely suited to allowing writers to express themselves without the same limitations that a 4 franz, zwischen liebe und haß, 9. 62 memoir or other mediums might require, additionally expanding the scope of experiences beyond the atrocities of the holocaust with an emerging image of a rich and colorful history and culture. so, the question emerged: how can we spotlight the voices and experiences of second-generation roma and sinti in the german-speaking world? this second generation, as i am using the term, refers to the children of holocaust survivors. this generation offers a new perspective and addresses the existing gaps in scholarly research, shifting the narrative on roma and sinti towards one rooted more closely in authentic experiences and accounts. the road of memoirs led me to a woman named dotschy reinhardt – a sinti woman born in ravensburg, germany on november 10th, 1975. she belongs to a long lineage of sinti musicians, including the famous django reinhardt, and was born into a generation removed from world war two. in her own memoir, gypsy: die geschichte einer große sinti familie, reinhardt addresses her experiences living in an intergenerational family, the distinctions of roma versus sinti identity, and the role that mediums of poetry and music have played in processing identity struggles and generational trauma. i became increasingly interested in her work as a musician and poet, which she only referenced in her memoir. poetry reinhardt authored the foreword to a book entitled die morgendämmerung der worte: moderner poesie-atlas der roma und sinti, a poetry anthology of collected works of sinti and roma poets and artists from across the world and translated into german. in the quote below, reinhardt captures the importance of poetry and anthologies like this one, when she details the ways in which survivors otherwise struggle to express their traumatic experiences in traditional literary formats: “oft standen die überlebenden vor dem problem, dass die extreme traumatisierung nicht in die sprache einer lebensgeschichtlichen erzählung gefasst werden konnte. die lyrik, die musik und die bildende kunst war für viele sinti und roma ein dankbares medium, mit dem sie ihr unausgesprochenes leid zu artikulieren und zu vermitteln vermochten.”5 in naming the additional trauma that is incurred by recounting generational trauma for the explicit consumption of others, reinhardt leaves readers with a deeper understanding that only mediums like poetry can offer a safe haven and a way for survivors to articulate their unspoken pain and to share their stories how they choose to and potentially find means of healing. audre lorde famously speaks to the value of poetry in her essay “poetry is not a luxury” and writes: this is poetry as illumination, for it is through poetry that we give name to those ideas which are until the poem nameless and formless, about to be birthed, but already felt. that distillation of experience from which true poetry springs births thought as dream births concept, as feeling births idea, as knowledge births (precedes) understanding.6 6 lorde, sister outsider, 36. 5 reinhardt, die morgendämmerung der worte, 20. 63 again, lorde reiterates the idea that poetry is a necessary medium for those in need of free expression and liberation, where it cannot otherwise be found in their everyday lives. furthermore, lorde states: for women, then, poetry is not a luxury. it is a vital necessity of our existence. it forms the quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action. poetry is the way we help give name to the nameless so it can be thought. the farthest horizons of our hopes and fears are cobbled by our poems, carved from the rock experiences of our daily lives.7 as a format without binding rules or structure, poetry allows individuals to work through their pain and trauma with a unique opportunity to confront complications with their identity freely. lorde’s personal experiences studying and writing in germany, coupled with her ability to draw connections back to the generations of trauma survivors in the united states, further demonstrates the irreplaceable role of poetry in academic discourse and especially in the pursuit of under-researched (or poorly researched) topics. she inspired grassroots activism among the afro-deutsch community and mentored black feminists like may ayim. this movement and lorde’s invaluable contributions to the decolonization of german culture are imperative to this research project and any project that aims to broaden the horizons of german studies.8 die morgendämmerung der worte: moderner poesie-atlas der roma und sinti also features one of dotschy reinhardt’s poems “chaplins geheimnis,” or chaplin’s secret. in this poem, she references a letter uncovered by charlie chaplin’s daughter in which it is revealed by the sender that chaplin has ethnic ties to the roma. the anthology features a german translation of reinhardt’s song with the same title, originally written in english: mitunter frage ich mich selbst warum ich mich verstecke vor der wahrheit meine ethnische herkunft leugne und dann höre ich mich sagen es ist einfacher für mich so zu verfahren mein geheimnis sehr tief in mir zu verstecken tief in mir tagtäglich deine gedanken sind ohne vorbehalte, deine liebe ist schlicht rein 8 plaum, “audre lorde.” 7 lorde, sister outsider, 37. 64 ich wünschte ich könnte sein wie du gelobt sind immer diejenigen die immer noch glauben es gäbe menschenrechte für alle du ermutigst mich damit aufzuhören mich weiterhin zu verstecken weiterhin mein geheimnis sehr tief in meinem innern zu bewahren tief in mir tagtäglich aber es gibt viel mehr als nur schwarz und weiß nun sehe ich endlich sie sind nicht im recht und nur kulturelle vielfalt die wahrheit offenbart und liebe alle mauern des hasses einstürzen lässt ich werde nicht mehr verleugnen mich, nicht mehr und ich werde mein geheimnis nicht mehr verbergen in mir niemals mehr nie mehr, nie9 the “ich” in the poem addresses chaplin directly, trying to understand why he would spend his life hiding his roma background. she recognizes her secrecy in his secret, which brings many questions and conflicting emotions to the surface. charlie chaplin might have concealed his identity in pursuit of a successful career. the message in four lines are particularly striking: du ermutigst mich damit aufzuhören mich weiterhin zu verstecken weiterhin mein geheimnis sehr tief in meinem innern zu bewahren10 reinhardt uses the “ich” speaker in the poem to indicate a sense of motivation to embrace one’s ethnic identity as roma, elicited by the shame that chaplin held for his own identity. and yet, she acknowledges the complexity of this choice, knowing that an outspoken embracing of a marginalized identity may come at a severe cost, namely to one’s social status. roma and sinti history is a cyclical one of people who have been killed for their mere existence, and the trauma and fear to proudly represent that identity is passed down through generations. in a culture that values the wisdom of its elders and respects the knowledge within the family unit, this is a cycle that cannot be broken easily and has only emerged in recent generations, empowered through a rise in social movements to embrace and recognize diverse cultural heritages in germany. through the “ich” in the poem, reinhardt grapples with her own dilemma of this cost, a 10 reinhardt, die morgendämmerung der worte, 42. 9 reinhardt, die morgendämmerung der worte, 42 65 seemingly common motif among second-generation roma and sinti artists and writers. in choosing to stray from chaplin’s path of secrecy and hiding, reinhardt is also less overtly exemplifying generational differences that perhaps chaplin, or others from this older generation of roma, could not choose to be proud and outspoken about their identity, for the fears of discrimination that undoubtedly faced them. we begin to see that agency in the second/younger generation takes shape in the necessity to choose to be outspoken and to be able to choose in the first place. a refusal to compromise between your identity, community, career, and success is the essence of the emerging voice within the second generation, which researchers and advocates must continue to foreground. this piece also addresses issues that many historians, especially in relation to the holocaust, are continuing to grapple with: memory politics. the memories of events that have induced extensive trauma in communities have become increasingly politicized because of how those traumas are measured against other communities that suffered under the same powers of oppression. additionally, the ways in which communities have been treated and been able to recover from these traumas has a significant impact on the way their traumas are remembered across generations. in the case of the roma and sinti, memories around the holocaust and periods of discrimination before that are certainly remembered and still felt deeply in succeeding generations, arguably because they were acknowledged as victims several decades after the end of the holocaust and continue to face harsh discrimination to this day. often, roma and sinti struggle and treatment is overlooked because it is compared to that of other marginalized groups who were targeted during the holocaust. as a researcher, i found it important to distinguish these groups, in order to preserve, honor and respect their memories. archival research during the following summer, a continued effort to find a means of centering roma voices and experiences took me to maryland for a visit to the us holocaust memorial museum (ushmm) archives. while access to archives and their material are few and far between, especially within this area of study, it was important for my research to uncover what dimension an archive might add, if any. searching broadly for terms like “roma and sinti” often delivers results in the thousands or more, which require some introspection and refining on behalf of the researcher. given my background as an undergraduate researcher comfortably housed in the humanities, i was most interested in materials pertaining to the cultural study of roma and sinti within the time frame after the holocaust. each researcher has a different focus and can use this to guide their selection of materials within the archive. my own project focused on uncovering any original material written by roma people or similar projects that might reveal the former, eliminating any objects or artifacts that the archive might hold, as they were not explicitly the focus of my project. this narrowed the options significantly and revealed a number of sources with which i could spend my time analyzing and collecting data for my project. the two most significant findings from this visit were the mary costanza living witness collection, which documented an art exhibition and a scholarly text, jewish and romani 66 families in the holocaust and its aftermath edited by eliyana r. adler and kateřina čapková. the scholarly volume jewish and romani families in the holocaust and its aftermath was fruitful because it provided detail on the transitional phase of post-holocaust survival and readjustment, which i had not yet considered in my timeline. the book is an anthology comprising chapters by different authors and the three most salient ones were: “the romani family before and during the holocaust: how much do we know? an ethnographic-historical study in the belarusian-lithuanian border region” by volha bartash, “return to normality?: the struggle of sinti and roma survivors to rebuild life in postwar germany” by anja reuss; and “the postwar migration of romani families from slovakia to the bohemian lands: a complex legacy of war and genocide in czechoslovakia” by helena sádilkóva. the book adopts a framework of family and critical familial studies, a theme that i found in my own research to be particularly important in conversation about and with roma and sinti. throughout many of the scholarly texts and in works pursued by roma and sinti authors or artists, the family unit recurs as an element central to the roma culture and experience. for example, the idea that knowledge is passed from elder family members down to younger members (a point deemed higher in value than traditional education systems), ostracization from larger society meaning family members were often the only people to be relied on, and the intercultural pressure for women and girls to marry young which has long been a cornerstone of roma and sinti culture because it preserves the sacred unit of family and thereby longevity and survival of a culture and its people. family has often been used throughout works by roma and sinti artists or authors to demonstrate continuous survival and perseverance through multi-layered discrimination, a point my own research has tried to expand upon, but truthfully survival is a key element to roma and sinti existence across history. while the first and the third chapters of jewish and romani families in the holocaust and its aftermath depart from my own focus, the second chapter, authored by anja reuss, hits on the unspoken dialogue between the generations of philomena franz and dotschy reinhardt respectively. she discusses the politics of roma and sinti survivors left to fight the german government for acknowledgment of their persecution during the holocaust, financial reparations, and recognition as displaced persons (dps). many of these efforts were ultimately shot down or unequally implemented due to existing prejudice and stereotyping of roma and sinti that remained in the aftermath of the holocaust. she also looks at the minimal scholarship on survivors, often executed by non-roma authors, and does a similar critical analysis of the victim narrative that strips autonomy over roma and sinti cultural expression and experience. in her work, she draws attention to the designation of sinti and roma as second-class citizens, quite literally only ever included in the margins of history and politics. she notes how the lack of aid and support for roma and sinti survivors in post-war germany renewed a distrust among roma and sinti communities of state authority and only further ostracized them. this isolation led to the reproduction of many social inequalities that roma and sinti have faced for centuries and continue to fight for. 67 the second discovery during my visit to the archive was the work of mary costanza, an american artist born in 1927, who, in her late years, decided to pursue a research project with the ultimate goal of curating a museum exhibit on the art of holocaust survivors. she had a specific interest and focus on art produced within concentration camps, and also worked with a group of 6 artists whose art she worked to recover and make known throughout her project. the ushmm archive gave me access to her meticulous and extensive notes that aided in her project’s research and curation phase, all compiled and donated by her husband. i was particularly interested in her research methods and process—how she discovered these artists, the notes of her interviews with them, and her selection process on who to include or exclude from the final book and exhibit. ultimately, she chose not to include works from non-jewish survivors, due to a personal liking and kinship to the jewish artists she worked with and for the sake of having a more cohesive narrative. while reviewing these materials was informative to my own research process and larger goals for my project, i saw that the curation of materials in archives is largely incomplete. i anticipated the resources and information on non-jewish holocaust survivors to be more extensive. i would advise researchers to be weary and critical of the offerings from archival collections and to look more deeply into the digital archive collections.11 my conclusion on this project is that i hope to see a similar one on roma artists pursued in the future, with the same dedication and commitment to amplifying their art and stories of survival and resilience.12 conclusion in summary, this resource guide aims to highlight the primary and secondary sources available to researchers and call attention to the work being done to uplift roma and sinti voices and enrich the curricula of german studies. while not exhaustive, this guide uses my own research to aid others pursuing similar projects of an understudied nature to encourage ethical, holistic, and even unexpected pathways of research and discovery. the ambition behind my research was to center the voices of the roma and sinti through a compilation of materials and works that successively led me closer to this goal. i hope to have demonstrated throughout the course of this guide how integral roma and sinti are to german studies and the work that still needs to be done to include their experiences and history into the discipline. acknowledgements: 12i was recently informed of a similar project that recently debuted in austria centering roma artist and holocaust survivor ceija stojka. this body of 90 paintings and drawings captures life pre-war, the family unit, and experience within concentration camps and under nazi rule. this historic exhibition demonstrates concrete movement in a direction where roma and sinti people have autonomy in the narratives of their lives and experiences. 11i found the most useful aspect of visiting an archive in person was the access to incredibly knowledgeable and helpful archival librarians. for new researchers and old, these librarians tend to hold years of knowledge and experience working in the specific subject area of the archive. likely, they will be the people pulling and requesting the materials not housed in the archive itself, which you request prior to your arrival. additionally, they assist you in digitizing different materials and navigating their digital archive selections. 68 this project was made possible due to the guidance and support of my professors and mentors at macalester college. i want to express my gratitude to professors david martyn, sonita sarker and karín vélez for their encouragement and needed pushback throughout the course of my research. additionally, i would like to thank and acknowledge the mellon mays undergraduate fellowship, without which i would not have been able to pursue this project. bibliography: adler, eliyana r., and kateřina čapková. jewish and romani families in the holocaust and its aftermath. rutgers university press, 2021. bogdal, klaus-michael. europa erfindet die zigeuner: eine geschichte von faszination und verachtung. berlin: suhrkamp. 2011. costanza, s. mary. the living witnesses: art in the concentration camps and ghettos. thefree press: new york. 1982. franz, philomena. zwischen liebe und haß: ein zigeunerleben. freiburg im breisgau: herder, 1985. french, lorely, catrina kurta, and stephanie buhmann. “what should i be afraid of? roma artist ceija stojka.” austrian cultural forum new york, september 28, 2023. https://acfny.org/exhibition/what-should-i-be-afraid-of-roma-artist-ceija-stoika/. janetzki, ulrich and ihrig, wilfried editors. die morgendämmerung der worte : moderner poesie-atlas der roma und sinti. die andere bibliothek: berlin. 2018. lorde, audre. sister outsider: essays and speeches. the crossing press feminist series. trumansburg, ny: crossing press. 1984. plaum, alexander. “how audre lorde made black and feminist history in germany and beyond.” europeana, october 26, 2022. https://www.europeana.eu/en/stories/how-audre-lorde-made-black-and-feministhistory-in-germany-and-beyond. reinhardt, dotschy. gypsy: die geschichte einer großen sinti-familie. scherz, s. fischer verlag: frankfurt am main. 2008. romero, angel. “dotschy reinhardt’s jazz and sinti heritage.” world music central: durham, nc. 2019. 69 cey.vol6.nair.entzauberung der berliner clubszene 2. version.docx entzauberung der berliner clubszene arushi nair abstract die berliner techno-szene ist seit 2024 offiziell unesco kulturerbe1. es ist für einige menschen erstaunlich, wie die techno-szene in berlin es soweit geschafft hat, für die meisten ursprünglichen und heutigen teilnehmern der szene ist es jedoch gar kein wunder, denn techno gehört schon lange zur berliner identität. die techno-szene ist ohne zweifel ein wichtiges phänomen.was aber oft übersehen wird, sind die vielen unterliegenden spannungen, die ein mythisches vorbild für freiheit unterstützen. ich hatte selber viele erfahrungen in dieser szene, die meine faszination im dementsprechenden phänomen inspirierte, worüber ich in dieser arbeit erzählen werde und mit akademischen quellen auch entzaubern möchte. 1 der spiegel, “berliner techno.” 21 inhaltsverzeichnis i. abstract a. ein persönlicher überblick der szene ii. geschichte und ursprünge der berliner technoszene a. der weimarer republik b. berlin im kalten krieg c. stil iii. das erlebnis a. die räumlichkeit 1. die türsteher 2. der raum 3. die sexuelle freiheit iv. weitere kritik: hinter die fassade schauen a. das fördern von elitismus durch kulturellen produktion b. das ignorierte bipoc erlebnis v. schlussbemerkungen vi. die literaturverzeichnis 22 einleitung: ein persönlicher überblick der szene2 als ich vor einem jahr in berlin lebte, war ich von dieser kultur selbst besessen und fasziniert. ich wusste gar nichts außer, was mir von den anderen auslandsstudenten erzählt wurde : “keine weiße schuhe, keine blaue jeans und auf gar kein fall englisch reden. ach ja, hast du bargeld? gut. dann los geht’s, und in der schlange nicht auf dem handy sein oder zu betrunken aussehen, sonst haben wir keine chance.” so führten mich zwei kumpels um viertel vor 5 uhr morgens an irgendeinem sonntag in dasberühmte “berghain”. es dauerte ewig, bis wir überhaupt an dem club ankamen und als wir vor ort standen, konnte ich nicht fassen, dass das berghain in so einer verlassenen lagerhalle 30 minuten von der innenstadt entfernt ist. die äußere fassade ist stark industriell und vermittelt ein bedrohliches gefühl es sieht auf den ersten blick eher wie ein gefängnis als wie ein techno-club aus. in dem moment, wo wir vor dem türsteher standen, habe ich gar keine regeln nachgefragt und einfach versucht, alles richtig zu machen: handy fest in der tasche und nicht in der hand. wir haben uns von unserer freundesgruppe getrennt und es nur zu dritt versucht (weil große gruppen “touristen” bedeuten). außerdem verhielten wir uns sehr ernst, wir trauten uns nicht mal miteinander zu sprechen. ich habe als vertreter der gruppe alle fragen der türsteher auf deutsch beantwortet. wir versuchten etwas mysteriös auszusehen, mit schwarzen doc martens stiefeln, zerrissenen hosen und lederjacken. wir taten weniger besoffen, als wir waren, und die nerven zu bewahren, als ob wir schon tausend mal in berghain waren. niemand war mehr überrascht als ich, als der türsteher einfach mit dem kopf genickt und uns die ausweise zurückgegeben hat, damit wir weiter zur sicherheitskontrolle kommen, den schock durfte ich aber natürlich nicht auf dem gesicht zeigen. wir wurden sehr ausführlich kontrolliert, alle taschen und die socken auch. die handy-kameras wurden mit starken stickern abgeklebt und in berghain gelten nur armbänder, keine stempel auf der hand. 25 euro habe ich noch nie so schnell ausgegeben und dann waren wir drin. erstmal habe ich geatmet und noch mal geprüft, ob ich nicht räumen, sondern wirklich alles echt ist. wir gaben unsere mäntel an der garderobe ab und sind direkt zur tanzfläche gegangen. es ist wirklich schwer zu beschreiben, was es alles zu beobachten gab. es gab drei verschiedene räume, und in der nacht wurde auf der hauptfläche harter techno und im nebenraum eine mischung von house und techno gespielt. menschen tanzten überall, alle trugen tatsächlich schwarz und leder, einige sogar bdsm-masken. lichter im neon grün und weiß flackerten im gleichen tempo der musik und wurden durch den rauch im raum magisch erleuchtet. es gab um jede ecke eine bar und trotzdem waren die barkeeper immer beschäftigt. obwohl sie alle möglichen getränke (zu übertriebenen hohen preise natürlich) servierten, haben 2 eine gegenerklärung: in dieser arbeit wird oft über erlebnisse generalisiert. mir ist sehr klar, dass es kein einziges club-erlebnis gibt (dieser punkt wird in späteren textstellen weiter erklärt), sondern eine vielfalt von erlebnisse. alle verschiedenen erlebnisse sind relevant und wichtig, auch für diese arbeit und werden deshalb anerkannt. eine entschuldigung wird angeboten, wenn die generalisierungen, die erlebnisse von anderen übersät, da es nicht mit absicht gemacht wird. ich ziehe am meisten von meinen persönlichen erfahrungen, denn sie inspirierten diese arbeit überhaupt. meine erfahrungen repräsentieren nicht die erfahrungen von allen, sondern werden benutzt, um kontext zu geben und ein kritisches argument zu bilden. 23 wir uns sofort wodka-redbull bestellt, denn wir brauchten energie und stimmung, um dieses erlebnis richtig zu genießen. der geruch in jedem club ist am schwierigsten zu beschreiben, aber es besteht immer aus einer mischung aus schweiß, zigarettenrauch und alkohol. berghain war in diesem fall keine ausnahme. aber die menschen drin waren gefühlt ernster als in anderen clubs. sie verhielten sich , als ob techno ihr leben wäre. es sollte dort richtig genossen und gefeiert werden. und das taten wir. im hauptraum haben wir stunden lang getanzt, geraucht und getrunken, bis wir es körperlich nicht mehr aushalten konnten. irgendwann verliert man auch die kontrolle und wahrnehmung von anderen im raum, einige menschen sind offensichtlich seit mehreren tagen im club geblieben und haben ihr zeitbewusstsein komplett verloren. ich fühlte mich in diesem raum frei, aber nicht unbedingt sicher. es gab einen starken rausch, aber eben auch eine vielfalt an regeln und einschränkungen. die clubs versprachen safe-spaces zu sein, aber man merkte schon, wie die sozialen ungerechtigkeiten reproduziert wurden. welche art von freiheit gab es nur in den clubs zu finden? bieten solche orte echte freiheit für alle? diese fragen und “das große phänomen” müssen noch kritisch untersucht werden. die berliner clubs waren in den achtziger und neunziger jahren orte, in denen man mit sicherheit man selbst sein konnte, als es zu der zeit nicht immer in der öffentlichkeit erlaubt war. heute ist es anders. die berliner clubs bewerben sich immer noch als safe-spaces, aber elemente wie die kontrolle der menschen an der tür und das verhalten innerhalb des clubs stellt diesen anspruch in frage. der schwerpunkt dieser arbeit möchte die wahrheit und soziale auswirkungen der berliner clubszene durch eine kritische auseinandersetzung mit dem mythos dieser szene beleuchten. ich musste mich fragen: wie typisch waren meine erfahrungen in der technoszene? diese frage wird mit einer historischen hintergrund der berliner clubszene und mit theoretischen konzepte geführt und unterstützt. das ist der kern dieser arbeit. theoretische konzepte der arbeit ich arbeite mit interdisziplinären ansätzen in dieser arbeit. ein anthropologischer blick wird auf meine eigenen erfahrungen geworfen. ein cultural studies blick wird auf das konzept der räumlichkeit verwendet. auch wird diese perspektive angewandt, um ein verständnis der berliner technoszene als ein nexus der subkultur, sowohl heute als auch in der vergangenheit, herzustellen. ich bediene zwar mehrere theoretische perspektiven, beschäftige mich aber hauptsächlich mit timo korens3 und diane delaveaus4 bedeutungen von räumen und räumlichkeit des clubs als orte, in dem menschen sichere räume konstruieren oder nicht und welche sozialen und kulturellen normen/regeln dadurch gebaut werden. die techno clubs waren ursprünglich große urbane orte, die während des unsicheren aufbaus des neuen, wiedervereinigten berlins, als besondere orte die sicherheit der subkulturen versorgten. ich verwende auch sarah thorntons verständnis von subkulturellem kapital5 und kevin hetheringtons definitionen von 5 thornton, “club cultures”. 4 delaveau, “how are spaces.” 3 koren, “beyond door policies.” 24 spaces6 im laufe des arbeits, denn zusammen schaffen beide autoren eine fundamentale grundlage für die technoszene. man versteht durch diese werke, dass die berliner subkultur (und eventuell technoszene) nur im “underground” aufgebaut werden konnte und solche orte häufiger von geographischer interpretation als spaces für kulturelle erfindung gesehen werden. die sozialen theorien der beiden autoren zeigen einen trend in clubkulturen um die welt, dass menschen in clubs fahren, um mit ihren identitäten zu experimentieren, frei von den augen einer beurteilenden/diskriminierenden gesellschaft7. thornton und hetherington legen viel wert auf der geografischen standort und zeitpunkt des aufbaus einer clubkultur8, der in der berliner technoszene auch essentiell ist. clubs sind laut thornton und hetherington symbolische orte, in denen menschen mit ihre identitäten experimentieren können. jedoch: durch die vermehrten im club kann diese identität nur unter bestimmten umständen experimentiert werden, die häufig gegen soziale minderheiten diskriminieren. die berliner clubs (und auch die nachtlokale der weimarer republik9) galten mit sicherheit als eine art safe space, die ihre besucher von bedrohungen geschützt haben und eine atmosphäre von freiheit und sicherheit schaffen. die berliner clubs heute stellen eine andere geschichte dar. warum suchen menschen solche orte immer noch aus? weil sie sich die gleiche freiheit bei der experimentierung versprechen, und weil es sonst solche spaces, sogenannte safe spaces, nicht gibt. subkulturelles und finanzielles kapital sind entscheidende erfolgsfaktoren, wenn man in berliner techno clubs reinkommen will und den versprochene freiheit bei der identität experimentierung erleben möchte. trotzdem gibt es keine garantie, dass man dieses erlebnis im club wegen des anstiegs von tourismus noch findet, der spezifisch auf techno clubs ausgerichtet wird. im allgemeinen versucht dieses projekt verschiedene schemata und muster der heutigen clubszene aufzudecken. mit anderen worten, wird der echte zwang und die scharfe realität, der im hintergrund dieser szene steckt, zum vordergrund gerückt, um zu zeigen, wie die clubszene hinter einer fassade eines grenzenlosen raums steckt, tatsächlich jedoch die kultureller elitismus und materialistische zwecke oft genau dort besonders in erscheinung treten. der ursprung der berliner technoszene die weimarer republik es ist nicht überraschend, dass berlin die club-hauptstadt europas geworden ist, war sie doch schon seit der weimarer republik die revolutionäre musikund tanzhauptstadt europas. einige historiker behaupten, dass die heutige clubszene nicht ohne die kultur des nachtlebens inder weimarer republik existieren könnte. schon zu dieser zeit fand man hunderte kabaretts, cafés und tanzlokale, in denen man nach dem ersten weltkrieg allerdings die sexuelle freiheit entdecken konnte. 170 clubs und kneipen davon waren exklusiv für homosexuelle. in vielen kabaretts wurden zum beispiel 9 von thörne, “nachtleben der zwanziger jahre." 8 thornton, “club cultures” & hetherington, “expressions of identity.” 7 thornton, “club cultures” & hetherington, “expressions of identity.” 6 hetherington, “expressions of identity.” 25 doppel-drag shows geführt, in cafés haben sich schwule männer und lesbische frauen getroffen und frei geliebt, währenddessen in tanzlokalen neue formen des ausdrucks in form von tanz und musik experimentiert wurden.10 berlin war in den frühen zwanziger jahren ökonomisch aufgrund der hyperinflation schwer getroffen ein resultat der kriegswirtschaft), weshalb das lebenim vergleich zu den usa und europa sehr günstig war. menschen sind nach berlin gereist um dort billig leben zu können und die besondere queer-freundlich szene zu erleben. berlin in der weimarer republik war in der dokumentierten geschichte einer der “ersten orte, die das nachtleben mit einem emanzipatorischen anspruch verband”.11 das nachtleben der weimarer republik war die grundlage der techno clubszene, die in den achtziger jahren wiederaufgetauchte. berlin im kalten krieg die elektronische musikund tanzszene, die heute als techno anerkannt ist, ist am ende der zeit der berliner mauer entstanden, während ostund west-berlin noch getrennt waren, aber bald wieder vereinigt wurden (ungefähr zwischen 1987 und 1990). auf einer seite der mauer in der ddr haben die strengen verbote “westlicher” musik und tanz die freiheit der jugend in ost-berlin zum “underground” geführt. wegen tiefgreifender überwachung und repression in der ddr war die politische freiheit nur teil der vorstellungskraft. es gab aber gleichzeitig ein wachsendes interesse an neuer musik, großen freiheiten und den verlust von kontrolle auf der anderen seite der mauer, in west-berlin. nach dem fall der mauer und den neuen sozialen, politischen und kulturellen spannungen wegen der wiedervereinigung, haben die menschen angefangen, eine neue identität zu konstruieren, die weder mit der ddr noch der brd verbunden war. weniger wichtig war die neue deutsche identität, die die politiker beschäftigte, sondern der subkulturelle radikale underground-identität hervorzuheben. mit dieser neuen identität wurde experimentiert und der techno-musik-stil zeigt genau das. es ist unter experten noch umstritten, wann und wo genau der berliner techno clubszene erstmalig aufgetaucht ist, da meistens an geheimen orten oder im “underground” experimentiert wurde und nicht unter der auge der öffentlichkeit(und noch wichtiger, der polizei). die musikalischen wurzeln dieser szene liegen in der dj-kultur, die in den 70er jahren entstand, als musiker begannen, mit synthetischen klängen zu experimentieren und die tanzund rave-kultur immer beliebter wurde. manuel göttsching ist für viele deutsche als “techno gottvater"12 bekannt, da er einer der vorreiter dieses genres war. in 1984 ist sein album “e2-e4”13 herausgekommen, einige erkennen dieses als startpunkt, als “jahr-null” des elektronischen minimalismus. göttsching war gelernter gitarrist und hörte in seiner jugend sehr viel oper und klassische musik. trotzdem wollte er sehr minimalistisch mit akkorden experimentieren, indem er “riffs” wiederholte und dann elektronisch manipulierte, um, laut göttsching, einen "freien raum"14 zu schaffen. obwohl sein werk “e2-e4” wegen der 14 coney, “manuel, göttsching.” 13 göttsching, “e2-e4.” 12 tco bln, “techno geschichte allgemein.” 11 schneider, “queer nightlife”, 108. 10 von thörne, “nachtleben der zwanziger jahre." 26 wiederholungshäufigkeit nicht von vielen ernst genommen wurde, haben die techno-pioniere aus new york und detroit diese platte sehr häufig gespielt. die techno bewegung wurde stark von künstlern in den usa inspiriert, am stärksten von detroit15. die ost-berliner künstler und die kreativen menschen aus der ddr erhielten kaum zugang zu diesen neuen musikformen und begannen erst nach der wende mit den ehemaligen west-berlinern, innovationen zu entwickeln und ihren eigenen unverwechselbaren deutschen (bzw. berliner) stil der techno musik zu beschaffen.16 die frühen technologischen entwicklungen in west-berlin, als die mauer noch stand, spielten eine starke rolle, denn der klang des berliner techno war synthetischer und rauer als in den usa und großbritannien.17 techno-fans aus dieser zeit erinnern sich an die evolution von punk zu house bis zum techno. der techno nach der wende ist geblieben, teilweise weil er nicht gegen west oder ost diskriminierte, nachdem er einen einzigartigen “wiedervereinten” berliner stil annahm. in diesem stil geht es um eine art musikalischen minimalismus. das heißt: weniger ist besser und am wichtigsten ist der bass. jeder song hat ein variiertes tempo, aber die meisten songs laufen mit 120 bpm (beats pro minute). in dieser offenen form sind die assoziationen im kopf freier, das denken, tanzen und fühlen lassen sich viel offener interpretieren. beim techno konnte man die identität während der politisch und sozial aufgeregten zeit zurücklassen und einfach in der musik verloren sein. er hatte eine vereinigende macht im “nexus der subkultur”, wie andere musikgenres bis dahin nicht hatten.18 in dem jahr zwischen dem mauerfall undder wiedervereinigung, als die zukunft des landes nicht klar war und viele ddr-bürger:innen in den westen gingen, begannen jugendliche, verlassene orte wie bunker, keller und lagerhäuser in tanzund musikräume zu transformieren. die räume funktionierten damals als orte, in denen man mit sicherheit ohne augen der anderen man selbst sein und quasi machen konnte, was man wollte, und zwar mit menschen, die dasselbe erlebnis suchten. diese verlassenen räume waren physische orte, wo die sicherheit der communities existierte, als die sicherheit der gesellschaft und politik noch unsicher war. deswegen war die freiheit im club der achtziger wahr, weil es etwas den menschen gab, was keine andere person oder system versprechen konnte. in dem buch no photos on the dance floor!: berlin 1989-today, wird eine visuelle geschichte der berliner clubszene dargestellt, was auch die bedeutung der freiheit in den clubs unterstreicht. diese darstellung ist kraftvoll und beleuchtet die geschichte dieser szene, indem man in die welt mittels visueller galerie hineingezogen wird. der titel dieses buchs spielt mit einem der berühmtesten elemente berliner clubs und technokultur: keine fotos dürfen innerhalb des clubs gemacht werden. in manchen clubs heute werden die kameras mit einem sticker abgeklebt, die beim ausgang wieder geprüft werden, in anderen clubs werden die handys in schließfächer eingeschlossen, bis man den club wieder verlässt. man soll sich in den tänzen und der musik selbst verlieren 18 opitz, “capital b folge .” 17 opitz, “capital b folge 1”, 14:37-15. 16 tco-bln, “techno geschichte allgemein." 15 wasacz, “berlin, detroit and reinvention.” 27 und nicht auf dem handy sein. außerdem sollte man die privatsphäre der anderen schützen, denn die clubs sind deswegen entstanden. sie sollen der einzige ort sein, in dem man keine angst haben muss, von anderen beund verurteilt zu werden. man konnte in dem raum man selbst sein, die kontrolle verlieren und die atmosphäre völlig genießen. so war die berliner-clubszene gemeint. in dem vorwort des selben buches schreibt redakteur heiko hoffmann folgendes: “während an anderen orten und in anderen musikalischen kontexten das fotografieren der anderen sowie das dokumentieren der eigenen teilnahme fester bestandteil der ausgehkultur ist, hat das nichtfotografieren hier vor allem zwei gründe: ‘die tradition des gemeinsamen feierns in einem raum, in dem man sich nicht nur in der musik verliert, lost in the music, sondern in dem man sich frei und aufgehoben fühlen kann. frei von überwachung. frei von konsequenzen und dem urteil der welt da draußen.’”19 frei von überwachung das ist das ursprüngliche ziel von techno. ich hatte auch bei meiner ersten techno nacht ähnliche gefühle von schock und kompletter freiheit, die ich in der art sonst nie erlebt hatte. das fotoverbot funktioniert tatsächlich als eine art schutzmittel, in dem man entspannt machen und anziehen kann, wie man will, ohne angst haben zu müssen, dass es dokumentiert wird. man ist wirklich, im vergleich zur “außenwelt”, im clubraum frei, man selbst zu sein und sich grenzenlos auszudrücken. hoffmann beschreibt aber zwei wichtige elemente des innenraums: die freiheit von überwachung und das gefühl, wenn man in die musik eintaucht. techno, als musikund tanzform ist keine überraschende wahl, um diesen grenzenlose freiheit zu erfüllen, denn es hat eine bestimmte unregelheit und unberechenbarkeit, was andere musikformen vielleicht nicht haben. der wiederholungshäufigkeit, kein text und elektronische pulse ziehen die körperbewegung und gedanken rein, ohne kontrolle. das erlebnis heute weil jeder mensch verschiedene erwartungen hat, ist es schwer, ein typisches erlebnis zu beschreiben. die stereotypischen elemente können in fast jedem club erwartet werden, es gibt aber auch einige elemente, an denen nicht jede person teilnehmen darf. es gibt viele menschen, die argumentieren, dass die clubs als sogenannte “safe space” bezeichnet werden können. laut der rise jugendkultur organisation, ist unter “safe space” folgendes zu verstehen: “safe spaces (deutsch: sichere räume, auch freiräume genannt) sind analoge und digitale räume, in die sich menschen mit ähnlichen diskriminierungsund marginalisierungserfahrungen zurückziehen können, um sich über ihre erfahrungen auszutauschen, sich zu organisieren und gegenseitig zu empowern. es wird jedoch häufig zu recht darauf hingewiesen, dass auch safe spaces nicht frei von machtstrukturen innerhalb der diskriminierten gruppe sind. alternativ wird die bezeichnung safer spaces (sicherere räume) 19 hoffman, “no photos”, 12. 28 eingeführt, um zu betonen, dass dies nur räume sind, die sicherer als öffentliche räume sind”.20 man argumentiert zum beispiel, dass clubs unter dem begriff safe space eingeordnet sein können, aber je öfter man in die clubs fährt, desto klarer wird es, dass etwa das abkleben durch kamera-sticker und das einschließen von handys einschließenperformativer natur sind. einigen clubs ist es doch wichtig, die freiheit der club-gehenden zu schützen (z.b. schwuz), aber bei anderen fördert die “no photos on the dancefloor” die exklusivität. wenn man zum beispiel wissen will, wie es ist, in kitkatclub zu sein, muss man selbst hinfahren sich ein eigenes bild machen. die "keine fotos machen” regeln fördert die wirtschaftlichen zwecke eines clubs und macht aus dem erlebnis ein geschäftsmodell. die berliner clubs waren also am anfang doch ein wahrer safe space, aber mit der zeit werden sie eher als mittel für tourismus und profit ausgenutzt. einige clubs versuchen absichtlich sichere räume für queere und trans-menschen, die meisten clubs jedoch suchen menschen in der schlange mit kulturellen oder finanziellen kapital, die oft gegen marginalisierte identitäten funktionieren und dieselben sozialen ungleichheiten reproduzieren. für die clubs werden nur diejenigen, die etwas “anzubieten haben” als “nützlich” gesehen, in dem sie entweder die atmosphäre kulturell verstärken oder zum profit beisteuern. oft sind touristen dafürideal, da sie beide aspekte mitsichbringen. die menschen in der schlange, die das geschäft unterstützen, werden zuerst reingelassen, dann aber erst die menschen, die einen safe space suchen. das ist problematisch und komplett konträr zu den ursprünglichen zielen der berliner clubszene und muss daher genauer untersucht werden, etwa durch eine analyse der räumlichkeit. die räumlichkeit zwei weitere aspekte des club erlebnis sind der raum und die räumlichkeit. in einem club geht es um verschiedene räume und den ganzen club als einen raum selbst. der raum ist wichtig, weil er einen ort darstellt, in den menschen gehen, um miteinander zu sein und sich sicher zu fühlen. das muss jedoch in frage gestellt werden, denn die äußere grenze dieses raums wird stark betont und schließt so ganz grundsätzlich schon einige menschen aus dem raum raus. das reinkommen, der einlass, oder eben die abweisung, sind mit die wichtigsten elemente des cluberlebnis. wer wird hereingelassen und wer nicht. diane delaveau unterstreicht die wesentliche rolle des raums in ihrer untersuchung von club-szenen als orte für die community. sie sagt, dass clubkulturen im sozialen umfeld einem teil der gesellschaft gehören, deshalb werden soziale/gesellschaftliche strukturen und individuelle/kulturelle ausdrücke während des aufbaus der nightlife-szene integriert. diese szene ist in berlin nicht zufällig in verlassenen gebäuden gegründet worden (wie dieser arbeit schon demonstriert hat) und die integration von den subkulturen im club war ein teil der aufbau dieser szene, nicht eine nachwirkung.21 clubs existieren als orte, in denen menschen die identität nicht nur 21 delaveau, “how are spaces.” 20 rise, “safe space.” 29 mit freiheit ausdrücken können, sondern sogar neu schaffen können. sie sind aber auch orte, in denen kulturelle bedeutung und kapital auch konstruiert werden. delaveau argumentiert in ihrer arbeit, dass räume soziokulturelle erfindungen der menschen sind und deshalb auch politische bedeutung haben. menschen entscheiden, wofür ein raum sei, wer im raum sein darf und was im raum passiert: das geschehen im alltag wird in dem club direkt widerspiegelt. solche entscheidungen sind fundamental politisch, weil sie eine identität schaffen, das gehalt voraussetzt und ein machtverhältnis darstellt. die räume gelten eher als symbole der sicherheit für menschen, die am rand der gesellschaft stehen, die außerhalb des raums diskriminiert werden. der räumlichkeit eines clubs enthält viele verschiedene elemente, deutungen und widersprüche, aber daran, dass sie alle konstruktionen sind, liegt das problem. wie ein bestimmte (bzw. sichere) räumlichkeit von clubs hergestellt wird, wird durch eine auseinandersetzung mit drei wesentliche elementen des cluberlebnis genauer untersucht. für einige clubgehenden fängt das erlebnis an der tür an, wenn entschieden wird, ob man den club “erleben” darf oder nicht. die tür ist ein entscheidender punkt für die entscheidung über inklusivität oder exklusivität. der türsteher ist eine person, angeheuert von dem club, der vor der tür des clubs steht und die aufgabe hat, menschen hereinzulassen oder abzuweisen. der türsteher nimmt für die club-gehenden dann die rolle einer autoritäts-figur ein und die club-gehenden werden zu “ungeordneten”, die bestimmte regeln erfüllen müssen, um akzeptiert zu werden. das konzept eines “safe spaces” wird in frage gestellt, denn um im freien raum zu sein, muss man sich an abstrakten vorschriften halten , die oft als diskriminierungsmittel verwendet werden. dieses phänomen wird genauer durch eine analyse von türsteher sven marquardts autobiografie untersucht. der türsteher als beispiel sven marquardt sven marquardt ist in der popkultur sehr bekannt für sein aussehen und sein verhalten als berghain türsteher. er spielt bei dieser arbeit eine sehr kritische rolle, weil er ein stellvertreter vieler türsteher berliner clubs ist, aber auch weil er selbst in seiner jugend teilnehmer der clubkultur war und auch (immer noch) in die subkultur tief integriert ist. ein starker fokus wird auf marquardt gesetzt, weil er sich selbst mit der rolle des türstehers kritisch auseinandersetzt. in der späten achtziger jahren war marquardt ein jugendlicher im ehemaligen ost-berlin und ein “untypisches” ddr-kind. er war sehr tief in die punkszene eingetaucht und wollte mit der “regelmäßigkeit” der ddr brechen, weil er schon in seiner jugend wusste, dass er nicht zur norm-kultur gehörte. das hat er beispielsweise mit seinen haaren, tätowierungen und piercings bewiesen. als künstler, punk und schwuler man wusste marquardt, dass er seine eigene gemeinschaft finden musste, die nicht in der öffentlichkeit zu finden waren. er brauchte in der ddr orte, in denen er für seinen lebensstil akzeptiert wurde, und in denen er sich ausdrücken konnte. wie kam es also, dass er türsteher werden würde? in seiner autobiografie spricht er die gegenüberstellung vonüberwachungbzw. autoritätsfifigur und auf der einen seite, und 30 jene des “genießers” freier, sicherer räume auf der anderen seite an. er hatte recht einfach erkannt, dass , er geld brauchte und als fotograf nicht genug verdiente, als türsteher jedoch war er ebenso qualifiziert und brachte auch das passende aussehen it. darüber schreibt er folgendes: “als ich auf oliver treffe, fragt er mich, ob ich nicht lust hätte, den türsteher für den geplanten schuhladen-club zu machen. an drei wochenenden hintereinander. er weiß, dass ich geld brauche. ich bin verdutzt über das angebot, aber später denke ich: warum eigentlich nicht? warum soll ich in der szene, in der ich selbst gerne feiere. nicht auch ein paar mark verdienen? … am besagten abend gehe ich hin und lege einfach los. lasse hinein, von denen ich mir vorstellen kann, dass ich selbst gern neben und mit ihnen tanzen würde. … eine absage an der tür erteile ich leuten, die aussehen, als hätten sie sich von der oranienburger zu uns verlaufen. ich sage ihnen, dass hier nicht ihre musik spielt, und verweise sie auf umliegende nachtbarn ”.22 man lernt, dass marquardt seinen ersten (und dann weitere) türsteherjobs zufällig bekommen hat. er wollte von dieser szene profitieren und die arbeit war ihm nicht schwergefallen. er musste nur abstrakte regeln einsetzen, die er mit unverschämten vorurteilen durchsetzte. er war in dieser rolle gleichseitig schützer dieser subkultur und schaute darauf, dass weder touristen noch eliten auf die tanzfläche der ersten techno-sets kammen zumindest meint er das mit “einer absage an der tür erteile ich leuten, die aussehen, als hätten sie sich von der oranienburger zu uns verlaufen”.23 gleichzeitig hat marquardt aber ein elitäres netzwerk gefördert und nur diejenigen reingelassen, die nach seiner meinung an die kultur passen. der arbeit eines türstehers muss von ihrer natur aus gegen menschen diskriminieren, marquardt jedoch ist ein besonderes beispiel, in dem er für das wohlergehen des clubs (oder für dessen kulturelles kapital) diskriminiert und nicht gegen finanzielles kapital, rasse, ethnizität, sprache, geschlecht oder sexualität. man kann nicht mit sicherheit wissen, mit welchen motiven andere türsteher ihre arbeit erledigen, aber die perspektive von marquardt ist einzigartig und darf nicht in dieser arbeit fehlen, weil er ein teilnehmer der technoszene war und die intimität der szene versteht. marquardt zeigt auch, wie türstehers oft den mythos dieser szene gleichzeitig unterstützen und untergraben. die frage ist nicht, ob türsteher nicht existieren sollten, sondern welchen zweck sie im im sinne des schützens von räumen, der herstellung von “safe spaces”, sie erfüllen.. wenn sie ihre autorität missbrauchen, um nur menschen mit finanziellem und kulturellem kapital hereinzulassen, weil sie mit der räumlichkeit des clubs gut zusammenpassen, dann ist die rolle des türstehers falsch und diskriminierend. ein türsteher soll den raum schützen, um sicherheit herzustellen für diejenigen, die es brauchen. 23 marquardt, “die nacht ist leben”, 180. 22 marquardt, “die nacht ist leben”, 179-180. 31 nun ist der türsteher nur ein teil des ganzen systems. einige soziologen, wie timo koren, behaupten, dass sie nur mittelständler sind, die die regeln durchsetzen, aus arbeitsgründen und nicht unbedingt aus persönlichen vorurteilen. die echte diskriminierung fängt, laut koren, noch viel weitervor der tür an und ist wesentlich unsichtbarer.24 dieses thema wird später in der arbeit genauer untersucht. der raum tresor, ufo und die love parade als beispiele im jahr 1989 sind zwei fundamentale ereignisse für die berliner technoszene geschehen: der club ufo wurde in west-berlin von achim kohlenberger, dimitri hegemann und carola stoiber eröffnet. die erste love parade fand ebenfalls dort statt. die love parade war gleichzeitig ein großes elektronisches musikfestival und eine “technoparade”, organisiert von matthias roeingh und seinem partner danielle de picciotto. die parade gilt bis heute als ein politisches fest für frieden sowie internationale verständigung durch liebe und musik. das motto lautete "friede, freude, eierkuchen" oder abrüstung, musik und essen für alle. sie fing mit nur 150 teilnehmer:innen an und wuchs bis 2010, dem letzten stattfinden der love parade, auf 1,4 millionen.25 die erste parade wurde danach bei ufo an ihrer eröffnungsnacht gefeiert.26 der club war noch illegal in dem sinne, dass die erfinder keine schanklizenz oder sonstige offiziellen genehmigungen hatten. der club wurde zwei jahre später wegen seiner beliebtheit und kenntnisnahme der polizei geschlossen. dann kam tresor. tresor wird unter vielen historiker:innen und technofans als “heiliger ort” angesehen. dieselben gründer des “ufo” haben 1991 auch den “tresor” eröffnet. locations existierten zuvor schon im “underground” als informelle orten, wo partys mit lauter harter techno-musik, tanz und illegalen drogen-/alkoholkonsum stattfanden. tresor liegt an der köpenicker straße in einer unscheinbaren umgebung der ehemaligen ost-berlin zone. in der nähe gibt es verschiedene industriegebäude, fabriken, werkstätten, einen dönerladen und noch einen sehr bekannten club ansonsten ist der stadtteil ist nicht weiter besonders auffällig. genau das ist aber der punkt, wenn man die bekanntesten clubs anschaut erkennt man sehr schnell, dass fast alle ziemlich weit von der hauptstadt, von schulen, der polizei und sehr weit von den reichen nachbarn der finanziellen eliten entfernt sind. “tresor” ist wie ein verlies gebaut. die tür befindet sich zwar imerdgeschoss, aber sofort, wenn man hineinkommt, führt der weg herunter. es wird dunkler, stickiger, heißer und rauchiger. man sieht die farbigen lichtstrahlen durch dicken rauch in der luft (wie in vielen berliner bars und clubs, darf man hier noch drin rauchen), der technostil ist hart und ernst. von allen wänden vibriert es. der stein aller vier wände sieht original und veraltet aus, es gibt stahlstäbe, die überall herausragen,in der masse von menschen fühlt man sich klein. ich fand tresor persönlich schrecklich und zu erstickend. meine trommelfelle sind fast geplatzt aufgrund der lautstärke der musik. die menschen sind so nah aneinander, dass ich sogar von der zigarette von jemandem 26 die letze love parade fand 2013 statt, weil menschen im publikum von “crowd crush” gestorben sind, “wikipedia: love parade”. 25 “wikipedia: love parade”. 24 koren, “beyond door policies.” 32 verbrannt wurde. jetzt verstehe ich aber, warum “tresor” wichtig und beliebt ist, denn “tresor” ist einer der einzige unverändert gebliebenen, originalen teile der ursprünglichen technokultur berlins. dazu ist es beeindruckend, wie die clubbesitzer diese stimmung festgehalten haben, besonders im laufe des steigenden technotourismus und d druck, um ihren club zu modernisieren. tresor bietet für menschen wie mich keinen safe space, viel eher einen “gefährlichen raum”, aber trotzdem repräsentiert dieser club den ursprünglichen safe space für jugendliche in berlin in den achtziger und neunziger jahre. dieses verlies war in der wendezeit ein sicherer ort frei von den augen von polizei, eltern und verurteilten. die sexuelle freiheit weil die clubs als einer “nexus der subkultur” entstanden sind, waren sie auch ein ort für sexuelle emanzipation und queere menschen. das gehört immer noch zur clubkultur und zum erlebnis, dieser ruf ist jedoch eher übertrieben. in einigen clubs wird die sexuelle freiheit “verkauft”. der kitkatclub ist ein primäres beispiel dafür, da es einer des berühmtesten fetish-clubs berlins ist, der nur 15 meter von tresor entfernt ist. die dort betriebene art von türpolitik habe ich bei keinem anderen club erfahren. es war mitten im januar, bitterer winter und wir trugen natürlich alle lange hosen und jacken, einige auch mützen und handschuhe. trotzdem wurde man an die tür direkt gefragt: “du ziehst die jacken aus, oder? man kommt nur mit wenigen klamotten an rein, ne.” wir nickten alle und fingen an, die jacken auszuziehen (man trägt doch im club sowieso keine jacke). bei der garderobe wurde auch nach handys gebeten, die in einem beutel eingeschlossen und erst beim ausgang wieder abgegeben wurden. hier reichten die kleber über den handykameras nicht aus, um die privatsphäre zu schützen. dann fuhr man im “hauptraum” ein und was man zunächst sah, kann schwer in worte gefasst werden. die vielfalt von sexuellen aktivitäten und handlungen auf einmal, direkt auf der tanzfläche und neben der bar, waren im ersten moment ein schock. ich wurde doch gewarnt, aber noch nie hatte ich sowas erlebt. sex ist aber im kitkat kein tabu, sondern die regel. die lichter im club sind überall rot, als wäre man im rotlicht-viertel. überall wurden entweder drogen oder alkohol ohne zögern konsumiert und großzügig an fremde ausgegeben (auch im austausch gegen sexuelle handlungen). die menschen waren allgemein freundlich, ich hatte aber das gefühl, dass es für frauen und besonders queere frauen nicht unbedingt ein sicherer ort war. ich wurde oft als mann verwechselt oder offen nach sex oder geld gefragt. wenn es keine grenzen im raum gibt, dann werden manchmal auch persönliche grenzen übertreten. ortefür marginalisierte und bipoc-menschen sind notwendig, weil sie von der veränderten club-szene entweder nicht akzeptiert oder übersexualisiert werden. nicolaus schmidt führte ein projekt namens gayhane, ursprünglich ein club in der nähe vom tempelhofer feld. er beschreibt das erlebnis in seinem gleichnamigenbuch“gayhane war immer für lesben, transgender, schwule und deren freundinnen und freunde konzipiert. wie freuten uns über die ersten grüppchen von türkischen mädchen und frauen die unserem raum ebenfalls als einen freiraum für sich 33 entdeckten fernab von den üblichen, türkischen diskotheken und der damit verbundenen stumpfen anmache von heteromachos, die bei ablehnung zu sitten wächtern zu mutieren imstande sind.”27 es war am anfang an als safespace geplant und die tür sollte für alle, die diese community gehören oder es unterstützen, offen bleiben. die tür, in diesem fall reguliert. die kontrolle weist möglicherweise bedrohlichen oder gefährlich wirkenden figuren schon außen ab, um den innenraum vor sozialen unterdrückung zu schützen. einige expert:innen argumentieren auch, dass bei queeren clubs den strengste regelung stattfindet, weil sie das gefühl von einen sicheren community und “special fantasy” im raum fördern.28 “allies” werden sehr oft von stereotypen wie alter, geschlecht und klasse bestimmt, was natürlich auch problematisch ist. schmidt erzählt weiter wie gayhane mit diesem problem umging: “um dieser situation spielerisch entgegenzuwirken, entwickelten wir die idee, bei einer party buttons am einlass zu verteilen mit dem aufdruck ,ben ibneyim’ (ich bin ein schwuchtel) oder ‘ben lezoyum’ (ich bin eine lesbe) -, die jede/r unserer gäste, die das nicht taten, mussten am tresen 1,dm mehr pro getränk bezahlen. dieser versuch, unserer selbstverständnis klarzumachen, wurde ignoriert. weitere aufrufe und erklärungen folgten wir mussten immer wieder klarstellen, dass es sich bei gayhane um einen lesbisch-schwulen raum handelt und dass dor unsere spielregeln gelten.”29 laut schmidt und den organisator:innen ist das gayhane ein freier raum, wenngleich ein stark kontrollierter ram. das ist ein widerspruch, der von marginalisierten menschen im club erlebt werden muss, um sich sicher bei der feier zu fühlen es gibt keine andere wahl. im kontext von queeren und trans-clubs geht es weniger um die kapitalistischen ziele eines geschäfts oder darum, kulturelles kapital im club zu gewinnen, sondern eher um die ursprüngliche freiheit in einem “nexus der subkultur” zu füllen. diese clubs benutzen techno als genre, um einen sicheren raum zu bauen, in dem man von gesellschaftlichen meinungen oder verund beurteilungen frei sein kann. natürlich gibt es immer noch materialistische ziele von queeren clubs, aber es geht dabei eher ihre arbeiter und künstler (bzw. djs) gut zu bezahlen. eine party wie gayhane versucht nicht nur, einen sicheren raum für menschen der lgbt community zu errichten, sondern auch für menschen aus ethnischen minderheiten. gayhane gehört als club zu der minderheit, denn die meisten techno clubs reproduzieren ähnliche soziale ungerechtigkeiten laut hautfarbe, sexualität, ethnizität usw. überhaupt ist die heutige szene von homosexuellen männern dominiert mit weniger platz für lesben, transpersonen und queers ethnischer minderheit. für manche mitglieder der lgbtq+ community wird der mythos der freiheit verkauft, aber wenig ausgelebt oder verwirklicht. 29 schmidt, “kosmos-gayhane”, 6. 28 koren, “beyond door policies.” 27 schmidt, “kosmos gayhane”, 4. 34 weitere kritik: hinter die fassade schauen obwohl diese szene damals ein ort für freien selbstausdruck war, hat es sich bis heute sehr verändert. einerseits existieren diese orte noch als safe space für einige menschen, aber andererseits fördern sie das gegenteil: elitismus und exklusivität. eine erklärung dafür kann sein, dass die clubs hauptsächlich als geschäfte funktionieren und man das erlebnis eines sicheren raums kaufen muss. um die frage zu beantworten, ob der clubraum politisch ist oder sein kann, muss gesagt werden, dass die antwort kompliziert ist. clubgehende suchen die räume eines clubs, um vor der politik zu flüchten und an einem ort zu sein, wo die realität der gesellschaftlichen strukturen weniger zu bemerken, bzw. zu erleben ist. jedoch: als man ihren eigenen raum schaffen will und nicht an der politik der “außenwelt” teilnehmen will ist eine form des widerstands, die identitäten der clubgehenden werden auch im clubraum betont und von machtverhältnisse der außenwelt auch hier widergespiegelt. das fördern von elitismus durch kulturellen produktion die türpolitik entsteht aus zwei formen von regelung: staatliche regelung und club geführte regelung. der staat regelt einen club durch lizenzierung, gesetze um begrenzung und die gentrifizierung in nachtlebenvierteln.30 ein club befolgt seine eigenen regeln an der tür, um einen problemlose tanzfläche zu schaffen und um geld in das geschäft zu bringen. es kommt bei jedem club darauf an, aber meistens spielen stand/klasse, rasse/ethnizität und geschlecht die größten rollen. die clubszene scheint “betrügerisch” zu sein, sie gaukelt einen mythos vor. der club ist vor allem ein geschäft. er war am anfang ein ort, an dem die menschen mehr freiheit finden konnten, die im alltag sonst fehlte. jetzt ist die clubszene aber meistens von profit motiviert. die exklusivität der türpolitik und die erfahrung innerhalb des raums sind alle sehr bewusst konstruiert, um geld zu verdienen. anstatt dem verhältnis zwischen “freiem raum und freien menschen” sind es nunmehr geschäft und kunden. somit stellt sich die zentrale frage: warum fahren so viele menschen in die clubs, trotz der klaren kapitalistischen ausnutzung? was genau ist an dem club erlebnis so wertvoll und lohnend? diese fragen werden in diesem nächsten teil genauer untersucht. das ignorierte bipoc31 erlebnis die berliner clubs fördern einen raum, in dem soziale ausgrenzung ein wichtiger teil der kultivierung eines bestimmten bild von “subkultur” ist. in den frühen neunzigern waren alle drei faktoren bei der exklusivität berliner clubs sehr präsent. da die kultur in den achtziger jahren meistens im underground stattfand, gehörten die meisten teilnehmer:innen zu einem bereit sexistierenden netzwerk, einer bestehenden community, 31 bipoc wird im englisch benutzt und steht für black, indigenous and people of color (schwarz, einheimisch, und “farbige menschen”) als kategorie für rasse und ethnizität. dieser begriff wird für ihre einfachheit und inklusivität verwendet, anstatt eine deutsch alternative. 30 koren, “beyond door policies.” 35 in denen die informationen und neuigkeiten mit blick auf clubs und partys geteilt werden32. dieser aspekt hat sich bis heute behalten, nun hat sich durch den aufbau von internet und sozialen medien die verteilungsmethode von informationen drastisch verändert. dadurch ist das engere netzwerk weniger exklusiv, trotzdem gibt es spezifische netzwerke und kommunikationsmittel, in denen der underground noch lebt. dieses netzwerk bestand damals meistens aus menschen sehr ähnlich wie marquardt punks, künstler:innen, queere menschen und alle, die sonst ein teil der subkultur waren und oft zusammen in einem viertel von berlin gewohnt haben. heute sind angehörige der subkultur immer noch ein grundsätzlicher teil des undergrounds, die menschen selbst sind aber heutzutage weniger geographisch verbunden. menschen kommen von überall aus der welt um die berline cliubszene zu besuchen es ist nicht mehr eine “authentische berliner erfahrung” für und von berliner:innen gestaltet. in diesem sinne ist der berliner techno heute offener und für mehrere menschen konzipiert. zweitens war techno am anfang und heute immer noch ein sehr spezifisches musikalisches tanz-genre, das nicht immer allen für geschmäckern beliebt. dass dieses genre menschen ausschließt oder exkludiert kann zwar argumentiert werden, eher ist es ein teil der berliner geschichte. techno stellt eine zeit der unterdrückung und aufteilung dar, verbunden mit einer erkämpften revolution, wegen der dringenden sehnsucht nach freiem ausdruck. diese erkenntnis ist zeitlos und wird immer ein teil der underground-kultur sein. ein letzter aspekt ist der aufbau von "mystique", die einige clubs, wie das berghain, tresor oder kitkat als einzigartige erlebnisse verkaufen. solche entwicklungen der berliner technoszene unterstützen die einführung von diskriminierenden praktiken, die unter dem mythos einer szene voller feiern und freiheit stecken. heute benutzen die clubvertreter die marke und geschichte ihrer clubs, um menschen eine freie erfahrung anzubieten. dies widerspricht dem ursprünglichen ziel von clubs. bipoc menschen werden von der reproduktion von sozialen ungleichheiten in der berliner clubszene am stärksten getroffen, was immer weiter gegen bekämpft werden soll. wenn clubs ein safespace sein sollen, dann müssen historisch marginalisierte menschen auch einen platz im club haben. obwohl bipoc menschen ein wichtiger teil der aufbau vieler subkulturen waren, besonders in der nachtleben-szene, werden sie immer noch ausgegrenzt. timo koren versteht dieses phänomen als nebenprodukt der türpolitik, weil die soziale ausgrenzung viel früher als an der tür anfängt. er stellt fest, dass “because nightclubs are concerned with attracting the ‘right’ audience, cultural production practices also regulate nightlife spaces and thereby reinforce social inequalities in audience participation. while racist and classist profiling at the door remains a direct form of racism and is a powerful example of how exclusion becomes lived experience (buford may and chaplin, 2008), i argue door policies are only the tip of the iceberg in an analysis of nightlife, exclusion and social inequalities.”33 er argumentiert, dass es andere methoden der kulturellen produktion sind, die bis zur sozialen ausgrenzung führen: erstens, die existierenden informationen netzwerke, die arbeiten, um die tanzfläche zu füllen. zweitens, clubs konzipieren ihre events um genres und spezifische interpretationen dieser genres um ein bestimmtes (bzw. gewolltes) publikum anzuziehen und das “ungewollte” 33 koren, “beyond door policies”, 48. 32 marquardt, “die nacht ist leben.” 36 publikum fernzuhalten. drittens, der ort eines clubs/partys macht den kulturellen status eines veranstaltungsortes einzigartig und schafft einen geheimnisvollen nimbus im gegensatz zu anderen clubs. ohne zweifel existieren alle drei faktoren in der berliner clubszene, von ihrem aufbau bis heute. schlußbemerkungen abschließend lässt sich sagen, dass die berliner clubszene voll von verschiedenen motivationen und begehrlichkeiten ist. einerseits gibt es ein offensichtliches geschäftssystem, das die clubgehenden materialistisch ausnutzt, aber ebenfalls von denselben menschen ausgesucht wird, um eine bestimmte freiheit zu erleben. andererseits existieren diese räume immer noch als safespaces für einige menschen und dort wird diese einzigartige freiheit gesucht und manchmal auch gefunden. diese tatsache ist gleichzeitig ein “wunder” dieser szene. trotz einiger unterdrückender elemente die sich in der heutige szene entwickelt haben wie der materialistische ausnutzung, abstrakten regeln und kontrollen an der tür (autoritätsformen und überwachung) und der reproduktion sozialer ungerechtigkeiten werden berliner techno clubs immer beliebter. echter harter techno besteht aus purem elektronischen rhytmus, der so tief eindringt ist, dass das denken vergeht und man nur alles oder nichts fühlen kann. das rhythmisches schlagen kann manchmal robotisches natur sein, was man öfter an der berliner technoszene beobachten kann. viele wollen diesen aspekt als eine form von unterwerfung, die die komplizierte geschichte von unterordnung zur machtkraft darstellt, was eine falsche interpretation wäre. in der realität ist techno eine "neo expression" der inneren gefühle und identität, weil dieses genre das einzige ist, das ihre teilnehmer:innen chancengleichheit ermöglicht. keine einzige person kann besser beim techno tanzen oder genießen als eine andere: es ist pure subjektivität. diese befreit jede:n einzelne:n, um zu verführen und fühlen, was für sie oder ihn am authentischsten ist. die individualität von techno bietet beides, die selbstständigkeit jedes menschen, des selbstausdruckes, und deren interpretation der umgebung.während dieser auflösung lässt sich in der szene einen platz für community und verbindung bilden. dieser konzept von techno mit seiner fähigkeit brücken zu bauen und safespaces für die individualität zu schaffen ist an dieser tanzund musiksform einzigartig. nicht nur einzigartig, sondern auch vom aussterben bedroht. tourismus, rücksichtsloser drogenkonsum, exklusivität und fokus auf sozialem/finanziellem kapital tragen alle dazu bei. sie ändern den kern dieser szene und ihren ursprünglichen ziele von purer freiheit. diese faktoren haben unersetzlichen schaden an einer kunstform, die den berliner kultur inspiriert hat und die heute noch von vielen geschätzt und gesucht wird, verursacht. die evolution dieses genres seit seinem aufbau bietet eine interessante perspektive darauf, dass die exklusivität dieser szene bleibt, um die spaces für uneingeschränkten selbstausdruck und freiheit aufrechterhalten. auf der anderen seite aber argumentiert diese entwicklung auch für die zerstörung aller barrieren, um absolute zugang an alle zu lassen, für die inklusivität und einheit der menschen. das sind letztendlich die prinzipien, unter denen die berliner technoszene erfunden wurde. dieses komplizierte dilemma ist 37 aus einer doppelseitigen sicht der szene entstanden, dass sie sich als eine sache darstellt, aber in der tat was anderes anbietet. die anerkennung der berliner techno-szene als unesco weltkulturerbe, erkennt die interessante und komplexen ursprung dieser szene und auch die abhängige kraft dieser szene für die unbegrenzte ausdrück und freiheit. der mythos ist genau das, was das kulturerbe nur oberflächlich anerkennt , denn hinter der fassade ist ein ganzes wirtschaftssystem mit profit motivationen reich mit dikriminierung. der heutige clubkultur priorisiert diejenigen mit finanziellem kapital, bzw. die eliten und nutzt menschen mit kulturellem kapital als bewerber ihrer szene aus, weil das kulturelle kapital menschen reinzieht und einen brand für die clubs kreiert. aber nicht jede person sucht einen safespace im club und deshalb soll jede:r für sich selbst entscheiden, was die berliner techno clubs einem mensch hinzufügen. diese unstimmigkeit von einer mystischen fassade und die wahrheit der szene muss weiter diskutiert werden mit einem fokus darauf, wie die clubszene sich von ihrem anfang bis zur heute verändert hat. wie können die clubs besser an den ursprünglichen ziel um einen safe space von den unterdrückenden gesellschaft und regierung zu schaffen kommen, ohne die reproduktion von diskriminierung? diese frage muss weiter bearbeitet werden, und zwar gemeinsam mit techno-fans aller identitäten, türsteher, club-besitzer und ursprünglichen techno-club-gehenden. die clubs müssen für alle, die es suchen, als safe space gelten, besonders für diejenigen, die immer noch in der öffentlichkeit diskriminiert werden. vielleicht ist die wichtigste frage, ob menschen in den clubs gehen, um zu feiern oder zu flüchten? 38 literaturverzeichnis bücher und artikeln: ℅ berlin foundation. “no photos on the dance floor!: berlin 1989-today”. edited by heiko hoffmann and felix hoffmann. 1. auflage = first ed., prestel, 2019. delaveau, diana. “how are spaces a significant impact within club cultures?: a case study of fabric london” birmingham city university press. april 2017. dorst, hade. “electronic music scenes: a comparison of the diverging spatial contexts of the electronic dance music scenes of berlin and amsterdam.” journal of urban cultural studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2015, pp. 57–74, https://doi.org/10.1386/jucs.2.1-2.57_1. hetherington, kevin. “expressions of identity: space, performance, politics”, sage, 1998. koren, timo. “beyond door policies: cultural production as a form of spatial regulation in amsterdam nightclubs.” european journal of cultural studies, vol. 27, no. 1, 1 may 2023, pp. 36–51, https://doi.org/10.1177/13675494231165923. kühn, jan-michael. “arbeiten in der berliner techno-szene: skizze der theorie einer szenewirtschaft elektronischer tanzmusik.” journal der jugendkulturen, vol. 17, 24 june 2011, pp. 109–278, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13660-4_3. marquardt, sven et al. “die nacht ist leben : autobiographie”. 1. auflage ed., ullstein, 2019. schmidt, nicolaus, et al. “kosmos gayhane-nicolaus schmidt”. translated by barbara uppenkamp and lindsay jane munro, art in flow i verlag für zeitgenössische kunst, 2021. schneider, thilo. “queer nightlife.” prestel verlag. 13.sept. 2019. s.108-111. thornton, sarah. “club cultures: music, media and subcultural capital”. polity press. 1995. weiss, felix et al., "schatzkammer des techno: der club tresor im keller einer alten bank" wurde als 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videos: göttsching, manuel. “e2-e4.” youtube, 1984, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vq-kovir2be opitz, florian. “capital b – wem gehört berlin?” rundfunk berlin brandenburg, 3. okt. 40 http://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn%3acontentitem%3a65xt-vt81-f066-f2bh-00000-00&context=1516831 http://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn%3acontentitem%3a65xt-vt81-f066-f2bh-00000-00&context=1516831 http://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn%3acontentitem%3a65xt-vt81-f066-f2bh-00000-00&context=1516831 https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/musik/unesco-kommission-berliner-technokultur-ist-jetzt-kulturerbe-a-4dc9662a-4f59-40c9-92e8-b91b6543308f https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/musik/unesco-kommission-berliner-technokultur-ist-jetzt-kulturerbe-a-4dc9662a-4f59-40c9-92e8-b91b6543308f https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/musik/unesco-kommission-berliner-technokultur-ist-jetzt-kulturerbe-a-4dc9662a-4f59-40c9-92e8-b91b6543308f http://www.facebook.com/gayhane/ 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https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/berlin-zwischen-exzess-und-exitus-4542094.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/love_parade https://www.modeldmedia.com/features/dimitrihegemannqanda052014.aspx https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vq-kovir2be 2023, https://www.rbb-online.de/doku/c-d/capital-b-wem-gehoert-berlin/doku-fuenftei ler-capital-b.ht ml 41 https://www.rbb-online.de/doku/c-d/capital-b-wem-gehoert-berlin/doku-fuenfteiler-capital-b.html https://www.rbb-online.de/doku/c-d/capital-b-wem-gehoert-berlin/doku-fuenfteiler-capital-b.html 2 eyewitness accounts of the war in ukraine anne stackpole leiden university inna is a young wife and mother of two from odesa, currently living as a refugee with her family in warsaw. her husband is an engineer of fighter planes, now working for the ukrainian army. on may 12, inna spent several hours with me sharing her story of survival during the war. i began by asking her about the initial days of the invasion and how she escaped to poland. we knew that soldiers and tanks were amassing in occupied crimea and that people there anticipated a war. we also knew that the russian army was gathering on the border with belarus. people were talking openly about an invasion. because of the nearby threat from crimea, many people in odesa believed that they should evacuate and move to a safer part of the country. something bad was brewing. on february 23, terrible panic started, but i did not want to leave the city. i have two young children, and i truly did not believe that russia would invade us. i thought, in this day and age, it’s unheard of. however, i packed an emergency bag, in case we would have to evacuate quickly. on the morning of february 24, we started to hear the bombs and rockets. some of the first targets were soviet-era arms factories that were now being used for workshops and businesses. the russians were using old maps that still listed those buildings as operational factories. early that morning, the whole city started to escape. everyone was packing their things and ran to their cars and the train station. at that point, i decided to get my family packed, but i wasn’t sure where to go. i have family in vinnytsia (a city approximately 250 kilometers southwest of kyiv), which i thought might be a safer place, but the road would be dangerous. we knew that they were bombing along highways and in towns we would have to pass. there had also been reports of shooting in vinnytsia. in the end, i decided to go to stay with my sister and her three children, who also lived in odesa. at least my sister had safer places to hide the children. we risked the drive through the city and had to pass an old chemical plant that now housed thousands of people’s workshops. we saw it explode when a rocket hit. thankfully, it was before the start of the work day, so no one was inside. everyone on the road was panicking, driving chaotically, trying to get out as quickly as possible. there were ambulances everywhere. at this point, my main concern was to keep 3 my kids safe and calm. i hoped that they wouldn’t ask too many questions, because i didn’t know what i could tell them. when we reached my sister’s house, we saw that the aftershock from the explosion of the nearby chemical plant had shattered the windows of neighboring houses. thankfully, my sister had had the front and back door open at that moment and that had absorbed some of the shock for the house. nothing was damaged. my sister and i hid the children in the bathroom, because it had compact walls and no windows. i remembered the safety tips i had learned in case of earthquakes, and i applied the same logic to the threat of another explosion. the smallest child slept in the bathtub, and the rest on benches along the walls. my husband obtained a gun, and we made molotov cocktails. the city was encouraging everyone to get any weapons they could find ready to defend themselves. at this point, the grocery stores were still stocked with food, but we started baking our own bread in case of shortages. we could hear the shooting the whole time, and we learned how to differentiate the sounds of russian and ukrainian shooting. we could tell where it was coming from and what kind of weapons they were using. even the children started getting used to the sound and calmed down when they recognized the sound of ukrainian fire. they knew that our soldiers were defending the city. inna’s children hiding in her sister’s house in odesa 4 my mother and other sister live in warsaw, and they were calling us frequently to convince us to come to poland. however, none of us had international passports, and in the early days of the war, there was no way to cross the ukrainian border without passports. as soon as the border control lifted the passport requirement, we bought tickets for the train from odesa to przemyśl (southern poland). the train was our only option. it was the only international train out of the city. the roads were too dangerous because of the constant random shelling, and the train route went through safer towns. i had to go to the train station to buy the tickets in person, since we had no internet. they weren’t even selling tickets with assigned seats; the tickets were standing room only. i saw the pandemonium on the platform. the only way out of the city was to get into the four-car train, and thousands of people were trying to board every day. moreover, the train departed after the city-wide curfew started at 6 pm. if you didn’t make it on the train, you might not be able to make it back home safely. we tried to get on the train for three days. we got to the station before 6 pm, and the platforms were already packed, mostly with women and children. everyone was pushing their way through, and i was scared that the children would get trampled in the crowd. i tried to ask the station master if there was any chance to board with my children, but he just threw his hands in the air. the staff were not able to control the situation anymore. on the third day, we finally managed to board the train. i got onto one end of the car with my children, and my sister and her children got onto the other end. people were jumping onto the train as it started to move. as we left the station, all the city lights turned off, so that the russians could not see the train leaving the station. it would have been an easy target. it was a forty-hour journey. the windows and shutters had to remain closed, to hide the fact that the train was carrying civilians. we knew that even if we wrote “children” on the train, that they would shoot. in fact, we had heard that the russians were specifically targeting vehicles and buildings marked as hiding places for children. people were sitting on their suitcases, lining the narrow corridors. there was no way to get to the toilet or to move around. in each compartment, at least ten people squished themselves into two bunks and on the floor. in our compartment, we had four children on the top bunk and three mothers with small children on the bottom bunk. at each station, volunteers gave us water bottles and sweets for the children, as we didn’t have any provisions on the train. we were all dehydrated and starving, and it was hot and stuffy. there were five hundred people in our car, and we couldn’t get out to get some fresh air. a lot of people got sick with fevers and coughs, and many people fainted from the lack of oxygen. ambulances waited for us at each station. the train staff were very kind and helpful and tried to do whatever they could. even though they couldn’t get through the wagons, they would pass out cups of tea from volunteers through the crowd. we stopped for ten hours at the polish border, but at least we could get out and stretch our legs. i was shocked by how organized the local volunteers were. the entire village on the 5 polish side of the border seemed to have been transformed into a humanitarian aid center. as we left the train, we walked down a corridor of stalls run by villagers, who offered us hot meals, water, medications, clothes, baby strollers, medical attention, a bed for the night, whatever we needed. they gave sweets and toys to the children; mine still keep their stuffed animals with them as good luck charms. afterward, everyone had to load back into the train for the rest of the journey. my sister’s husband picked us up in przemyśl. they had been waiting for a whole day in the car, as it was nearly impossible at that time to predict when the trains from ukraine would arrive. looking back now, i can’t believe that my family and i made it through such a horrible journey. i never want to ride a train again for as long as i live. my daughter is so traumatized by the ordeal that she refuses to even get into a city tram. soon after we arrived in warsaw, i took my daughter to our local church. she prayed that russia would leave her country alone, that their soldiers would stop fighting us, and that her dad would be safe and healthy. i am especially concerned about the impact of this war on young children, both in russia and in ukraine. from such a young age, they are desensitized to images of war. they will not remember a time when bloodshed was not a daily norm. the notion of a war like this will not be as shocking to them as they grow up, and they may be more likely to join one in the future. i see it in my own children: my son can recognize and name different missiles, which never interested him before. when a rocket hit the playground of my children’s preschool back home, i couldn’t fathom how to explain it to them. they asked me, “why would the soldiers want to fight kids?” …. inna’s husband is still working in odesa, and many of her friends and family members have chosen to remain in ukraine. i asked inna about the current situation in her hometown and in other cities across the country. back home, the citizens of odesa have gotten used to the war. many people have remained in the city, and most people are working as normal. it’s important that people are unafraid to go to their jobs, keep the economy afloat, and produce supplies for the army and the home front. at this point, whoever hasn’t evacuated is likely going to see it through to the end. civilians in odesa are helping the army by organizing their own volunteer brigades which defend the city’s borders and set up blockades. this is happening in cities and towns across the country. the attacks come in waves, but it was particularly bad over easter weekend (april 15-17). we saw on the news that a mother and three-month-old baby had been killed in the shelling of an apartment building. they are definitely targeting civilian infrastructure: homes, student dorms, churches, and the most populated workplaces. they are using crimea to export all that they have stolen back to russia, from wheat to toilet seats. they 6 take whatever they can carry. there is no gas at all in the city, but there is water and electricity, which we are also supplying to mykolaiv [the region directly east of odesa] as it defends us from the russian army’s land advances. my husband is still working at the aviation facility to produce parts for ukrainian fighter planes. the russians bombed the airport and his workplace twice. miraculously, he was not in the building both times. he is still living in our home, but he sleeps in the front hallway, fully clothed, with his gun at his side. from our balcony, you can see the russian war ships just off the coastline, periodically shooting rockets at the city. there are estimated to be around fifty ships and three submarines. when i talk to my husband, he is never able to give any concrete information about the war in the city. the government has asked civilians not to spread information about the locations of hit targets, or to share photos or videos, as the enemy can use them to strategize further attacks. i have many friends who are fighting for our freedom, and morale is high. the people believe in victory and are unafraid to sacrifice everything for it. for example, i could tell you about my husband’s close friend ivan, a pilot in the air force, who was captured after his plane was shot down on march 8. everyone else on the plane was killed, and ivan was seriously wounded. the russians took him to their prison and called his wife, telling her that her husband was a pow and could be released for ransom. they said they would contact her soon with details, but that she was to tell no one about the situation. meanwhile, they sent a video of ivan lying on a stretcher, clearly in critical condition, having suffered serious burns, a head injury, and a broken leg. he read off a script to the camera, saying that he was safe and being treated very well. his wife heard nothing else for two weeks, when ivan finally called her from a pow camp in russia. he told her not to send any money. it was a common scam that soldiers were using to make some extra cash. he would wait for an upcoming prisoner exchange. ivan first had the opportunity to be exchanged for a russian pilot who was notorious for shooting at apartment buildings and killing many civilians. ivan refused, as he did not want such a war criminal to be released on his account. eventually, he agreed to be exchanged for a pilot who had only been involved in military skirmishes, and he was taken to kyiv for complex surgeries. when ivan was finally reunited with his wife, he told her, “the war is not hell. the pow camp is hell.” the russians filmed themselves torturing prisoners and posted the videos on social media. they took turns jumping on ivan’s broken leg. they starved them and kept them in squalor. when i heard about ivan’s experience, it was a breaking point for me. i no longer knew about war crimes just from stories on the news but from a close friend’s personal experience. i had to come face to face with the inhumanity of the russian army. there can be no forgiveness for this war. human beings cannot do this to one another. somehow, the ukrainian soldiers are able to treat their pows according to international conventions and even give them compensation for throwing down their weapons. war is hell, but there is a way for an army to maintain some standard of humanity in combat. 7 ivan and a fellow pow following their release from the pow camp in russia i could also tell you about my cousin from donbas, who has lived in a war since 2014. a month before the invasion, he fled to mariupol. after the war started, he was stuck in mariupol for a long time, but he managed to escape to zaporizhia in a humanitarian bus. he finds himself in an awful predicament. he wants to join the ukrainian army, but his family is in occupied donbas, in which men are being drafted into the russian army, forced to fight their own people. if my cousin were sent to the front, he could very well end up fighting against his own father. my aunt and uncle live in borodyanka [50 kilometers northwest of kyiv], one of the cities which was under heavy attack. first, the invaders killed all the local men with military experience or connections. then, they killed anyone they found. my family lived in their basement for weeks, terrified to leave the house, as people were being shot at random in the streets and houses were being looted. they had to live on whatever they had in the pantry, and their only source of water was their well. they were lucky to have a well; many people in the city died of thirst, because there was no running water in the city. their neighbors cut their daughters’ hair short and dressed them up like boys, so that they would be less likely to be raped if soldiers found them. because phone connection was disrupted, their son couldn’t contact his parents for weeks during the occupation. he had no idea whether they were alive or dead. my uncle had a heart attack because of all the stress. 8 there are thousands of stories like ours, and we are the lucky ones. millions are no longer able to share their stories. …. joining us for the interview was inna’s friend tatiana, a young woman from lviv who has been living in warsaw for several years, and who has been organizing humanitarian aid and activism since the start of the war. her brother and his family live in kyiv. his wife and children fled to poland but have since returned to the city. her brother stayed behind and is among the soldiers defending kyiv’s borders. tatiana shared the story of her family’s escape and of her friend currently fighting in donbas. my sister-in-law and her teenage children lived in an underground parking garage for two weeks. the air raid sirens went off so frequently that there was no point going back and forth to the eleventh floor of their building. they would just run upstairs from time to time to get food and water. it was impossible to evacuate the city for some time. like in odesa, trains were the only somewhat safe option, and the platforms were packed to the brim every day. my sister tried several times, but she saw the chaos, and she saw how many mothers with babies and people in wheelchairs were trying to get on the train. she felt that she could not take the place of those who were even more at risk than her and her children. finally, she got a call from a priest who was organizing a transport to lviv by van. they knew how dangerous it was to take the roads, but the attack on kyiv was intensifying, and they decided to risk it. they hid in the van with other families. the windows were blacked out so that no one could see that it was transporting people. thankfully, they made it to lviv safely, and then crossed the border to poland. many of my friends from university are fighting in the ukrainian army. i have daily contact with one of them who is on the front lines in donbas. his mother begged him not to join the army, but he told her that he could not possibly hide at home while others are dying for their country and even coming back home from abroad to enlist. a few days ago, a rocket hit their base, and they had to flee in the middle of the night. all of their weapons and supplies were destroyed. they didn’t even have bulletproof vests or boots. they were helpless and hiding for a couple of days, but an emergency transport from lviv reached them, and they were able to re-equip their unit. it is amazing how quickly civilians across the country are able to mobilize and save countless lives. …. at the end of our interview, i was curious to know what inna thought of the ukrainian government’s reaction to the invasion, and especially of president volodymyr zelensky’s leadership. i also asked her about the response from other countries. 9 i voted for zelensky in the last elections, and i agree with all of his decisions as our leader. i think he is very wise not to accept putin’s alleged terms for a ceasefire, as it would mean surrendering the occupied territories. we are not talking about some peaceful, democratic referendum, but brutal colonization. the inhabitants of these regions have made their choice very clear. they do not want to be annexed by russia, and they are willing to pay for that choice with their lives. they are already suffering unimaginable horrors or being deported en masse to labor camps in russia, so i do not even want to think of what would await them if they were officially handed over to russia. we’ve seen what has happened in crimea. zelensky is well aware of this. as for the reaction of the west, i believe that poland deserves particular praise for all that they have done for our refugees, army, and government. were it not for poland, we would have been wiped off the map long ago. in closing, i want to push back on the absurd notion that russian civilians are not aware of the realities of the war. this notion plays exactly into the kremlin’s hands. by framing the invasion as “putin’s war” alone, it exculpates the majority of russians, soldiers and civilians alike. ivan’s story is prime evidence against this lie. the soldiers are in constant contact with their girlfriends, wives, and mothers and post public updates on russian social media. our army is constantly intercepting their communications, and we see that they tell their families everything. it seems that it is especially popular for soldiers to send videos of war crimes to their loved ones. for example, there were the films of the young man raping and killing a baby, and of some soldiers gangraping several women and then running over their bodies with a tank, laughing the whole time. i myself have seen how my russian family and friends have completely cut off contact with us since the start of the war, because they are convinced that ukraine must be “denazified” and that the ends justify their army’s means. even children in preschools are now being indoctrinated about this “heroic” war against the “nationalist terrorists.” believing in the ignorance of the russian public at large is simply believing kremlin propaganda. russia knows what is going on. the responsibility is on individuals to actively oppose the war. i want to stress that the ukrainian army is not the aggressor in this conflict. they are defending their country from annihilation and defending women and children who are constantly being targeted. it is absolutely imperative for the west to support ukraine militarily, and for neighboring countries to prepare their own defenses. putin’s plan was never to stop with ukraine. if ukraine falls, then he will move on to the next, and the next, and the next. to find out more about how to support ukraine through donations, volunteering, or activism, visit the government’s official webpage at https://war.ukraine.ua/support-ukraine, or visit www.defendukraine.org for a list of verified fundraisers and charities. https://war.ukraine.ua/support-ukraine http://www.defendukraine.org/ cey.4escoto.everythingisnewagain everything old is new again borders, ritual, and the return of history in europe rafi escoto emory university abstract this paper argues that green border (2023), directed by agnieszka holland, transforms the polish-belarusian border into a site of moral ritual, where sacred violence replaces humanitarian law. using durkheim’s theories, eastern european memory studies, and analyses of populism and asylum policy, the paper interprets the film as a historical recurrence rather than a modern crisis. drawing on scholars like törnquist-plewa, exeler, and krastev, the analysis reveals how europe’s border politics ritualize exclusion and revive authoritarian patterns under democratic guise. methods include close film analysis and engagement with secondary literature on eu identity, populism, and the symbolic politics of migration. 80 article in the autumn of 2021, a strip of dense forest between poland and belarus—long peripheral in the european imagination—abruptly became the epicenter of a manufactured humanitarian crisis. the belarusian regime, seeking to retaliate against eu sanctions, engineered a migrant corridor by issuing visas to syrians, iraqis, afghans, and congolese and transporting them to the edge of europe.1 poland responded with a state of emergency, the construction of an exclusion zone, and the legalization of summary pushbacks. journalists and aid workers were barred; asylum procedures were suspended; and hundreds of people were trapped in a militarized limbo between two states intent on denying responsibility. what unfolded was not a border malfunction, but the deliberate creation of a political theater in which human bodies became instruments of geopolitical signaling.2 to see this frontier only as a site of strategic confrontation, however, is to miss the deeper historical structure that gives it meaning. borders in europe have long been stages upon which states perform belonging, exclusion, and sovereignty. migration specialists—from hein de haas to michelle lynn kahn—remind us that mobility is not an aberration of later modernity but a constitutive feature of european history: cyclical, patterned, and profoundly ordinary. yet the political class continues to describe migration as an existential rupture, a crisis to be managed rather than an ongoing human condition.3 in this discursive alchemy, migrants become impurities threatening the moral coherence of the nation, and the border becomes a sacred line whose defense justifies exceptional measures. it is within this longer historical and sociological frame that agnieszka holland’s green border (2023) functions not as the center of analysis, but as a revealing fictionalized primary source—a cinematic document of a border transformed into ritual terrain. shot in black and white, the film intentionally disorients temporality, echoing what asli yakali and zahide erdogan describe as a “cinematic history of the present.”4 its aesthetic choices evoke earlier european catastrophes: zones of filtration, exclusion, and bureaucratic cruelty that 4 asli yakali and zahide erdoğan, “green border: cinematic storytelling as history of the present,” cinej cinema journal 12, no.2 (2024): 247. 3 hein de haas, how migration really works: the facts about the most divisive issue in politics (london: penguin press, 2023), which argues that migration is structural, cyclical, and a normal feature of human societies; michelle lynn kahn, foreign in two homelands: racism, return migration, and turkish-german history (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2024), which demonstrates the centrality of circular and return migration to european history via turkish guest-workers in the federal republic of germany. 2 human rights watch, “die here or go to poland”: belarus and poland’s shared responsibility for border abuses (new york: human rights watch, 2021); republic of poland, decree of the president no. 171/2021 declaring a state of emergency in parts of podlaskie and lubelskie voivodeships, september 2, 2021; helsinki foundation for human rights, the lawless zone: human rights violations in the area of the state of emergency (warsaw: hfhr, 2021); aida (asylum information database), country report: poland—2021 update (brussels: european council on refugees and exiles, 2022); grupa granica, report on the situation of people at the poland-belarus border, october-december 2021. 1 european commission, statement by president von der leyen on the instrumentalisation of migrants by the belarus regime, november 8, 2021; amnesty international, poland/belarus: caught in a political game (london: amnesty international, 2021). 81 recur whenever states construct an “impure” category to be expelled. the soldiers and guards in the film do not behave spontaneously; they perform rehearsed gestures of exclusion that closely reflect the documented practices of poland’s border services and the testimonies collected by grupa granica, human rights watch, and the helsinki foundation for human rights. durkheim’s theory of ritual offers a powerful lens through which to understand this convergence between cinematic representation and documented practice. for durkheim, rituals reaffirm the moral community by distinguishing the sacred from the profane and by expelling the impure.5 at the poland-belarus border, the migrant is rendered not merely as an administrative problem but as a symbolic pollutant whose presence destabilizes national order. the violence that follows—pushbacks, exposure, abandonment—functions less as a security policy than as a purification rite. once the border is sacralized in this way, its maintenance becomes a moral obligation immune to legal constraints, humanitarian norms, or empirical evidence about migration’s ordinariness. this essay argues that the poland-belarus frontier should be understood as precisely such a durkheimian ritual site: a space where violence is performed to reaffirm the imagined integrity of the european community. by reading green border alongside legal documents, ngo reports, and contemporary scholarship on migration, populism, and memory politics, i show that europe’s so-called postwar humanitarian order has not collapsed but has reverted to older patterns of sacralized exclusion. the border has become an altar on which liberal ideals are sacrificed, populist narratives sanctified, and human beings rendered symbolic offerings in a ritual of sovereignty. though grounded in the specificities of belarus and poland, this paper speaks to europe as a whole, for the dynamics that converge in the forests of podlasie—ritualized security, selective compassion, and the moralization of borders—echo throughout the continent. methodologically, this analysis does not rely on personal testimony or oral history; rather it draws on legal texts, policy decisions, civil-society documentation, and established historiography to illuminate how structures of power express themselves through language, bureaucracy, and space. in synthesizing these sources, i offer not a partisan argument but an applied historical commentary—one that seeks to interpret, rather than indict, and situate the present within a larger continuum of european political and moral practice. ultimately, this is a study of how history moves through us: how what is old becomes new again, how inherited patterns reassert themselves in moments of crisis, and how the border, far from being a peripheral line, becomes a site where europe’s deepest anxieties—and aspirations—are revealed. sacred boundaries: eu memory politics and the making of a ritualized frontier the sacralization of the eu’s eastern frontier is not a rupture in europe’s postwar trajectory but a revealing continuation of its unresolved moral architecture. as ian kershaw 5 émile durkheim, the elementary forms of religious life, trans. karen e. fields (new york: free press, 1995), pp. 38-39. 82 argues in the global age, the postwar european project emerged from a dual inheritance: a cosmopolitan ideal grounded in the memory of catastrophe, and a persistent pattern of selective remembrance that allowed national mythologies to endure beneath the veneer of integration.6 this duality deepened after the 2004 enlargement, when the european union absorbed states whose memory culture diverged sharply from western norms. as barbara törnquist-plewa demonstrates, western europe had cultivated a “negative founding myth” centered on holocaust remembrance and self-critique, whereas many eastern european states retained narratives of national martyrdom that resisted cosmopolitanizing pressures.7 this mnemonic divide is not merely symbolic; it has real policy consequences. poland’s conduct at the belarus border—framed as the defense of “european civilization” yet executed through illegal pushbacks, emergency decrees, and obstruction of asylum procedures—embodies the tension between human rights as europe’s universalist promise and sovereignty as its practiced theology. this contradiction becomes most visible in the legal and bureaucratic structures that govern europe’s periphery. maciej grześkowiak’s analysis of the 2021 crisis shows that the european commission, long styled as the “guardian of the treaties,” failed to enforce eu asylum standards when confronted with member states operating under the logic of exception.8 on paper, the common european asylum system (ceas) guarantees access to procedure, non-refoulement, and individual assessment. but as documented in aida’s 2021-22 country report: poland, these rights evaporated at the border zone, where poland’s october 2021 amendment to the act on foreigners enabled summary expulsions and effectively neutralized asylum claims.9 grupa granica’s field reports corroborate this legal landscape, describing a cycle in which migrants were repeatedly pushed back and forth between polish and belarusian forces—“ping-pong” expulsions that left families stranded for days in freezing forests without food, shelter, or medical care.10 the “paper rights” of ceas thus reveal their fragility; bureaucratic humanitarianism becomes a ritual of self-legitimation rather than a functional system of protection. the performative power of border enforcement is not uniquely european, but part of a broader pattern in which contemporary states use borders as stages for projecting sovereignty. comparative migration historians such as leo lucassen and tara zahra remind us that public narratives of crisis often diverge sharply from empirical realities of mobility. migration, they argue, has always been a normal and recurring feature of modern societies, yet governments repeatedly transform it into a symbolic battleground on which national identity is defended.11 this helps explain why states across ideological contexts—european, 11 leo lucassen, “peeling an onion: the ‘refugee crisis’ from a historical perspective,” ethnic and racial studies 41, no. 3 (2018): 383-410; tara zahra, against the world: anti-globalism and mass politics between the world wars (new york: w.w. norton, 2023). 10 grupa granica, report on the situation of people at the poland–belarus border, october–december 2021 (warsaw: grupa granica, 2021), 30. 9 aida (asylum information database), country report: poland—2021 update (brussels: european council on refugees and exiles, 2022). 8 maciej grześkowiak, “the ‘guardian of the treaties’ is no more? the european commission and the 2021 humanitarian crisis on the poland–belarus border,” refugee survey quarterly 42, no. 1 (2023): 83-84. 7 barbara törnquist-plewa, “after all these years, still divided by memories? the european union and eastern europe,” east european politics and societies 38, no. 4 (2024): 1080. 6 ian kershaw, the global age: europe, 1950-2017 (new york: viking, 2020). 83 american, or otherwise—invest borders with outsized political meaning. when the united states expanded detention facilities at its southern frontier or debated offshore processing arrangements, these were less policies of material necessity than gestures aimed at reassuring an anxious nation that the border still “holds.” the point is not that the american and polish contexts are equivalent—each is historically distinct—but that both reflect a broader logic in which states ritualize control by transforming vulnerable migrants into embodiments of disorder. recognizing this pattern requires acknowledging the explanatory limits of both anti-migrant populism and uncritical pro-migrant idealism. as hein de haas argues, migration is neither the solution to all socioeconomic problems nor the existential threat portrayed by its opponents; it is a structural feature of human societies shaped by development, demographic change, and global inequality.12 michelle kahn’s work on turkish guest-workers and their return migration similarly disrupts simplified narratives by showing how migration flows are often circular, reversible, and deeply intertwined with national histories.13 migrants are not invading forces nor passive victims but actors embedded in long-standing global patterns. by situating the poland-belarus crisis within this broader scholarly landscape, the historical question becomes not whether migration is “good” or “bad,” but how and why states transform ordinary mobility into a site of moral panic and ritualized violence. seen through this wider lens, the poland-belarus border emerges as a microcosm of europe’s unresolved struggle to reconcile universal rights with national belonging. the exclusionary practices documented by human rights watch and the helsinki foundation for human rights—pushbacks, denial of aid, and obstruction of asylum access—are not aberrations but logical outcomes of a system that sacralizes territorial integrity while delegating humanitarian responsibility outward.14 green border captures this with eerie accuracy: its monochrome palette mirrors the stark moral binaries imposed by the state, while its depiction of border guards performing routine expulsions aligns with both legal records and ngo testimonies. the ritualization of violence at the frontier thus reflects not only poland’s illiberal turn but a deeper european ambivalence about the very foundations of its postwar identity—an identity suspended between cosmopolitan aspiration and the enduring power of the border as a sacred line. filtration, frontiers, and the return of history the bureaucratized violence unfolding on the poland-belarus border resonates with a much older repertoire of governance in eastern europe: the selective sorting, disciplining, and abandonment of human beings under the guise of security. as stephen kotkin observes 14 human rights watch, “die here or go to poland”: belarus and poland’s shared responsibility for border abuses (new york: human rights watch, 2021); helsinki foundation for human rights, the lawless zone: human rights violations in the area of the state of emergency (warsaw: hfhr, 2021). 13 michelle lynn kahn, foreign in two homelands: racism, return migration, and turkish-german history (cambridge: cambridge university, 2024). 12 hein de haas, how migration really works: the facts about the most divisive issue in politics (london: penguin press, 2023). 84 of stalinist rule, citizens “were compelled to endure enervating bureaucratic indifference and arbitrary repression” despite the state’s frequent rationalizations for their policies and practices.15 this paradox continues to echo in contemporary border regimes. franziska exceler’s recent study of russian filtration camps during the invasion of ukraine reveals a chilling continuity with their soviet predecessors. the camps, she writes, are used “to register, screen, and detain ukrainian civilians in areas that have come under russian occupation.” moreover, she notes that “structural similarities exist between the different filtration camp systems (soviet and russian), above all in terms of the administrative design of the filtration process.”16 taken together, these continuities show that filtration is not merely a neutral procedure of screening, but an administrative technology that decides whose lives are to be monitored, constrained, or removed. the same logic—innocuous administrative language masking state violence—structures the poland-belarus frontier today. poland’s 2021 emergency zone decree invoked “public order” and “state security,” while its october 2021 pushback amendment legalized summary expulsions of migrants deemed to lack “legitimate grounds” for entry.17 bureaucratic euphemism once again enables human disposability. the forested borderlands between belarus, poland, and ukraine have borne these experiments in statecraft for more than a century, making the present crisis not an anomaly but a reactivation of an older logic. kate brown’s a biography of no place demonstrates how these lands were repeatedly transformed by imperial projects that sought to refashion diverse populations into idealized national subjects; in these efforts, states reorganized people with the same zeal with which they reorganized territory. crucially, brown insists that in borderlands, ideology always lands hardest on the bodies of ordinary people, who become the medium through which states assert control.18 this insight illuminates the human cost of the poland-belarus standoff. belarusian officials funnelling migrants to the eu frontier as instruments of geopolitical leverage; polish authorities responding with pushbacks, exclusion zones, and legal fictions of “non-entry”; and caught between these competing sovereignties were the stateless, the undocumented, and the unprotected—those upon whose bodies the border’s power is enacted. the geography itself retains the memory of these violences. timothy snyder’s account of the borderlands captures the region’s long history of state interventions that reorder populations by identifying and eliminating categories of unwanted people.19 green border’s monochrome cinematography captures this moral geography: the forest appears as a space where law, sovereignty, and abandonment overlap. granica documented cases in 19 timothy snyder, bloodlands: europe between hitler and stalin (new york: basic books, 2010), vii-xix. 18 kate brown, a biography of no place: from ethnic borderland to soviet heartland (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2004), 1-17. 17 republic of poland, decree of the president no. 171/2021 declaring a state of emergency in parts of podlaskie and lubelskie voivodeships, september 2, 2021; act of 14 october 2021 amending the act on foreigners, journal of laws 2021, item 1918. 16 franziska, exeler, “filtration camps, past and present, and russia’s war against ukraine,” journal of genocide research 25, nos. 2-3 (2023): 426, 444. 15 stephen kotkin, magnetic mountain: stalinism as a civilization (berkeley: university of california press, 1995), 389. 85 which migrants were forced back and forth for days, left between the border lines without food or shelter, trapped in a no-man’s land where both states denied responsibility.20 the forest becomes an archive of unacknowledged lives—a place where europe’s humanitarian vocabulary dissolves into the logistical management of suffering. the russo-ukrainian war intensified this moral geography by revealing striking asymmetries in europe’s politics of compassion. in 2022, while russian forces resurrected filtration tactics designed to intimidate, monitor, and detain ukrainian civilians, the european union activated the temporary protection directive and opened its borders to millions of ukrainians. as exeler notes, russian filtration operated as tools for surveillance and intimidation, not merely processing.21 yet at the poland-belarus frontier, syrians, afghans, yemenis, and congolese were denied the very protections extended to ukrainians. this divergence exposes what didier fassin calls the “moral economy, centered on humanitarianism,” where compassion is selectively allocated according to geopolitical narrative rather than universal principles.22 a 35-year-old congolese man, interviewed by human rights watch, distilled this double standard succinctly: [they said], ‘there’s no asylum, there’s nothing [here], go back to where you came from!’ they [took us by vans] and made us go back to belarus, to the neutral zone.23 green border echoes this sentiment powerfully as its characters confront the silence surrounding non-european refugees—a silence that speaks louder than any declaration of values. yet this asymmetry cannot be explained solely through compassion; it is rooted in competing visions of belonging that divide europe internally. as paul kubicek has argued, the rise of illiberal nationalism in poland and hungary reflects a backlash against cosmopolitan liberalism, which is framed by populist leaders as elitist, foreign, and corrosive to national cohesion.24 ivan krastev similarly observes that the 2015 refugee crisis produced the return of the east-west divide, as eastern european governments rejected brussels’ universalism in favor of narratives of cultural defense.25 holland displays this dynamic on screen through the suspicion directed at those who aid migrants—acitivists, psychologists, even border guards who show empathy. they become transgressors of the moral order, punished not for illegality but for violating the ritual boundaries of national solidarity. 25 ivan krastev, “the refugee crisis and the return of the east-west divide in europe,” slavic review 76, no. 2 (2017): 292. 24 paul kubicek, “illiberal nationalism and the backlash against liberal cosmopolitanism in post-communist europe,” nationalism and ethnic politics 28, no. 3 (2022): 331–49. 23 human rights watch, “die here or go to poland”: belarus and poland’s shared responsibility for border abuses (new york: human rights watch, 2021). 22 didier fassin, humanitarian reason: a moral history of the present (berkeley: university of california press, 2012), 7. 21 exeler, “filtration camps,” 429. 20 grupa granica, report on the situation of people at the poland–belarus border, october–december 2021 (warsaw: grupa granica, 2021), 8. 86 green border also indicts western europe, refusing a simplistic binary in which east equals cruelty and west equals universalism. törnquist-plewa notes that while western europe foregrounds holocaust memory as its negative founding myth, it often deploys that memory selectively, instrumentalizing it to avoid confronting other historical traumas, especially those concerning colonial violence or the expulsions and displacements that reshaped eastern europe after 1945.26 refugees at the poland-belarus border thus experience a double erasure: they are unwanted within eastern nationalist mythologies and inconvenient to western humanitarian self-presentation. the film’s searing line—“no one is coming”—captures this structural abandonment. it is not merely a narrative device; it reflects a political reality in which europe’s commitments fracture at the border and the ideals proclaimed in brussels evaporate among the birch trees of podlasie. taken together, the crisis at the poland-belarus frontier represents not a break with europe’s past but its resurgence: a return of the border as a tool of moral sorting, bureaucratic domination, and selective compassion. in this sense, the contemporary border does not replicate the stalinist camp or the soviet filtration point, but it draws from the same repertoire of statecraft—one in which administrative categories organize human worth, and where frontier spaces become the experimental ground for political visions enacted upon vulnerable bodies. history, here, does not repeat itself. but as exeler’s work, brown’s borderlands scholarship, and holland’s film collectively reveal, it returns with new instruments and with devastating clarity. populism, moral community, and the politics of purification if the border is a durkheimian stage on which europe enacts the boundaries of moral community, populism provides the language through which the drama is narrated. case mudde famously defines populism as a thin-centered ideology built on a single manichean division between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a worldview too narrow to stand alone but powerful enough to reshape whatever ideology it attaches itself to.27 this vision presupposes a unified and homogenous people whose supposed general will is both singular and morally infallible.28 yet real societies are heterogeneous. to preserve the illusion of unity, populist movements must identify elements that threaten the imagined coherence of “the people.” in contemporary europe, migrants—stateless, racialized, and symbolically malleable—have filled this role. they become the impurity whose expulsion affirms the purity of the national body . the migrant thus becomes indispensable to the populist narrative: not a person so much as a symbolic instrument that sustains the moral dichotomy populism requires. jan-werner müller emphasizes that populists claim exclusive representation of the people; anyone who disagrees, whether migrant or citizen, becomes morally suspect.29 this explains why the poland-belarus border, although involving a relatively small number of 29 jan-werner müller, what is populism? (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2016), 9. 28 cas mudde and cristóbal rovira kaltwasser, populism: a very short introduction (oxford: oxford university press, 2017), 6–9. 27 cas mudde, populist radical right parties in europe (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007), 23–24. 26 törnquist-plewa, “after all these years,” 1086. 87 asylum seekers, became a symbolic flashpoint. stephen gross notes that right-wing populism in europe is rooted not simply in xenophobia but in a sense of cultural disruption, demographic anxiety, and disillusionment with neoliberal cosmopolitanism.30 the migrant therefore serves as a dual function: he or she personifies elite failure and provides the necessary scapegoat for populism’s moral universe. the border becomes the ritual site where the community purifies itself, enacting the durkheimian expulsion of symbolic disorder. yet populism is not simply a politics of exclusion; it is a politics born from genuine anxieties about belonging, representation, and the perceived failure of liberal-democratic governance. populist movements flourish, mudde and rovira kaltwasser argue, when mainstream elites appear distant, technocratic, or unresponsive to the social and cultural concerns of their constituents.31 the crisis at the poland-belarus frontier capitalizes on precisely these sentiments. polish leaders frame their actions as defending sovereignty against a hostile autocrat in belarus and an indifferent bureaucracy in brussels. their rhetoric resonates with citizens who feel marginalized by globalization and skeptical of cosmopolitan ideals—sentiments shared across european electorates from the mediterranean to the north sea.32 such grievances cannot be dismissed as irrational. they reflect what müller sees as “democratic disappointment,” the widening gap between formal democratic rights and the lived sense of political agency.33 populist leaders step into this gap by transforming complex structural problems—economic precarity, uneven development, post-communist uncertainty—into moral arguments about corruption, betrayal, and national decline. migration becomes the visible proxy for broader fears. the border thus becomes the physical and symbolic terrain upon which this struggle for meaning is fought. poland’s emergency-zone decree and 2021 pushback legislation were not merely administrative tools; they were performative gestures signalling the state’s capacity to protect the community.34 their effects, as have been documented by granica and the helsinki foundation for human rights, demonstrate how populist narratives translate into human consequences: migrants forced back and forth between state forces, denied food, shelter, and medical care, rendered invisible by legal fiction and political necessity.35 the ritual of sovereignty is enacted through the suffering of those who fall outside the imagined community. 35 grupa granica, report on the situation of people at the poland–belarus border, october–december 2021 (warsaw: grupa granica, 2021), 7–11; helsinki foundation for human rights, the lawless zone (warsaw: hfhr, 2021). 34 republic of poland, decree of the president no. 171/2021 declaring a state of emergency in parts of podlaskie and lubelskie voivodeships, september 2, 2021; act of 14 october 2021 amending the act on foreigners, journal of laws 2021, item 1918. 33 müller, what is populism?, 45–62. 32 larry m. bartels, “the populist phantom: threats to democracy start at the top,” foreign affairs 102, no. 3 (2023): 1–9. 31 mudde and rovira kaltwasser, populism, 13–21. 30 stephen g. gross, “understanding europe’s populist right: the state of the field,” contemporary european history 32 (2023): 489–497. 88 but populism’s treatment of migrants cannot be understood in isolation from europe’s own liberal contradictions. the warmth extended to ukrainian refugees after the 2022 invasion—justified and necessary as it was—exposed a selective humanitarianism conditioned by racial, cultural, and geopolitical affinities. fassin’s concept of the moral economy of humanitarianism illuminates this asymmetry once more: not all suffering is recognized equally, and compassion is shaped by political narratives rather than universalist ethics.36 the contrast between europe’s embrace of ukrainians and its abandonment of syrians, afghans, and yemenis in the forests of podlasie underscores this tension. populism exploits such inconsistencies, framing them as evidence of elite hypocrisy. liberal democracy, in turn, struggles to reconcile its universalist aspirations with its uneven practices. in holland’s green border, this tension is rendered in miniature. the film’s final moments—small acts of refusal by individuals within the state apparatus and quiet gestures of humanity from activists—reveal the fragility of the populist narrative. these ruptures echo exeler’s observation that systems of domination, whether soviet or contemporary, rely on compliance and silence; moments of hesitation expose their contingency.37 green border does not romanticize these acts, but it does suggest the border’s violence is not inevitable. it is constructed, maintained, and therefore capable of being unmade. populism, in this sense, is neither an aberration nor a totalizing force. it is a symptom of unresolved tensions within european democracy and a warning about the fragility of pluralism. it challenges europe to confront not only the dangers of majoritarianism but also the limits of its own cosmopolitan project. and at the poland-belarus frontier, where sovereignty, memory, and fear converge, populism reveals its deepest truth: that the battle for the border is always a battle over who counts as part of the moral community. conclusion what unfolds at the poland-belarus border is not simply a regional dispute, nor the failure of a single asylum system, nor the cruelty of one illiberal government. it is a revelation of something older, deeper, and far more difficult to confront: the persistence of europe’s unresolved moral architecture and the way borders continue to function as laboratories for political imagination. in this forested frontier—where migrants shiver between two unyielding states, where law dissolves into exception, and where compassion competes with fear—we see how history refuses to recede into the past. it returns, not as repetition, but as rhyme: familiar structures of domination, familiar rituals of exclusion, and familiar justifications dressed in new bureaucratic language. yet history’s return is never merely magic. it is diagnostic. it exposes the fault lines of the present. the many scholars whose work has guided this analysis have illuminated how borders become mirrors: reflecting our anxieties, our myths, our hopes, and our 37 exeler, “filtration camps,” 432. 36 fassin, humanitarian reason, 1-17. 89 failures. but historiography has its own silences. for decades, migration scholarship wrestled with numbers, systems, and institutions, often missing the symbolic and ritual dimensions that give borders their emotional power. conversely, moral and theoretical studies sometimes flattened the lived experiences of those who move through these spaces. only by holding the empirical and the symbolic in tension—by reading legal decrees alongside cinematic testimony, ngo reports alongside durkheimian theory—can we see the border not just as a line, but as a stage where the human condition is laid bare. migration itself, as hein de haas and michelle kahn remind us, is not a crisis. it is a constitutive element of what it means to be human: movement, uncertainty, search for opportunity, escape from danger, and the hope for a life that might be lived differently. that fundamental truth is as old as civilization. what is newer—and perhaps more perilous—is the way politics increasingly distorts the truth, transforming ordinary movement into existential threat, turning fellow human beings into moral symbols, and converting borders into arenas of purification and fear. populism feeds on that distortion, but it did not invent it. liberalism struggles with it, but has not resolved it. europe’s postwar project gestures toward universalism but falters at its frontiers. so the question that remains is not only political, but profoundly historical: what kind of community does europe imagine itself to be, and at what cost? for if borders continue to serve as sites where solidarity ends, then the european project, like so many before it, risks becoming another chapter in the long history of civilizations unable to reconcile their ideals with their fears. if historians have any lesson to offer, it is that such contradictions do not remain abstract. they take shape in forests, in camps, in courtrooms, and in bodies. green border makes this visible—not as allegory, but as lived reality. its silences, ruptures, and small acts of refusal reminds us that history is not an observer; it is a participant. it judges us by how we respond to the vulnerable, by what we choose to see, and by what we allow to be hidden. the past is not a distant archive but an active force, pressing against the present with the quiet insistence of memory. those who claim indifference to history—whether populists or technocrats, citizens or elites—forget that history is never indifferent to them. it shapes borders, policies, identities, and the moral choices available to us. everything old is indeed new again. but that is not a prophecy of inevitability. it is a call to clarity. europe, and all who study it, must decide whether history’s return will be met with repetition or with recognition. whether borders will continue to sanctify exclusion or become spaces of shared responsibility. whether migration will remain a battleground of political theater or be understood, finally, as the universal human story it has always been. and whether we—scholars, citizens, policymakers—will confront the rituals of violence we inherit, or retreat behind the comforting fiction that history’s lessons belong to someone else. in the end, the forest between poland and belarus is not merely a site of suffering. it is a mirror. it reflects who we have been, who we are, and who we might yet become—if only we dare to look. 90 bibliography primary sources aida (asylum information database). country report: poland—2021 update. brussels: european council on refugees and exiles, 2022. grupa granica. report on the situation of people at the poland–belarus border, october–december 2021. warsaw: grupa granica, 2021. helsinki foundation for human rights. the lawless zone: human rights violations in the area of the state of emergency. warsaw: hfhr, 2021. holland, agnieszka, dir. green border. 2023. film. republic of poland. act of 14 october 2021 amending the act on foreigners. journal of laws 2021, item 1918. human rights watch. “die here or go to poland”: belarus and poland’s shared responsibility for border abuses. new york: human rights watch, 2021. republic of poland. decree of the president no. 171/2021 declaring a state of emergency in parts of podlaskie and lubelskie voivodeships. september 2, 2021. secondary sources bartels, larry m. “the populist phantom: threats to democracy start at the top.” foreign affairs 102, no. 3 (2023): 1–9. brown, kate. a biography of no place: from ethnic borderland to soviet heartland. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2004. de haas, hein. how migration really works: the facts about the most divisive issue in politics. london: penguin press, 2023. durkheim, émile. the elementary forms of religious life. translated by karen e. fields. new york: free press, 1995. exeler, franziska. “filtration camps, past and present, and russia’s war against ukraine.” journal of genocide research 25, nos. 3–4 (2023): 426–438. fassin, didier. humanitarian reason: a moral history of the present. berkeley: university of california press, 2012. gross, stephen g. “understanding europe’s populist right: the state of the field.” contemporary european history 32 (2023): 486–499. 91 grześkowiak, maciej. “the ‘guardian of the treaties’ is no more? the european commission and the 2021 humanitarian crisis on the poland–belarus border.” refugee survey quarterly 42, no. 1 (2023): 81–102. kahn, michelle lynn. foreign in two homelands: racism, return migration, and turkish-german history. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2024. kershaw, ian. the global age: europe, 1950–2017. new york: viking, 2020. kotkin, stephen. magnetic mountain: stalinism as a civilization. berkeley: university of california press, 1995. krastev, ivan. “the refugee crisis and the return of the east–west divide in europe.” slavic review 76, no. 2 (2017): 292–296. kubicek, paul. “illiberal nationalism and the backlash against liberal cosmopolitanism in post-communist europe.” nationalism and ethnic politics 28, no. 3 (2022): 331–349. lucassen, leo. “peeling an onion: the ‘refugee crisis’ from a historical perspective.” ethnic and racial studies 41, no. 3 (2018): 383–410. mudde, cas. populist radical right parties in europe. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007. mudde, cas, and cristóbal rovira kaltwasser. populism: a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press, 2017. müller, jan-werner. what is populism? philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2016. snyder, timothy. bloodlands: europe between hitler and stalin. new york: basic books, 2010. törnquist-plewa, barbara. after all these years, still divided by memories? the european union and eastern europe. east european politics and societies 38, no. 4 (2024): 1080–1092. yakalı, aslı, and zahide erdoğan. “green border: cinematic storytelling as history of the present.” cinej cinema journal 12, no. 2 (2024): 245–260. zahra, tara. against the world: anti-globalism and mass politics between the world wars. new york: w. w. norton, 2023. 92 cey.4.tsui.lessonsfromaustriahungary lessons from austria-hungary kang youwei’s vision for china’s reform in the early 20th century nicholas tsui university of alberta abstract this article analyzes how kang youwei (1858–1927), a reformer and intellectual in china, used examples from austria-hungary to support his plan to reform china. by using textual analysis of three articles kang wrote in 1906, 1908, and 1912 about austria-hungary, which are collected in kang youwei quanji, and by comparing them with modern studies, this article shows how kang linked religion, politics, and the economy in austria-hungary to his political beliefs in monarchism, a centralized government, and his role as a confucian reformer. it also argues that kang used selected or exaggerated facts about austria-hungary to advocate for his political beliefs. 22 article introduction the history of austrian-chinese communication can be traced back to the early 14th century. odoric of pordenone (1285/6–1331),1 born in pordenone, present-day italy, visited china and stayed in beijing for three years.2 the british east india company acting in agreement with king george iii’s government, decided to send an embassy to china led by lord george macartney (1737–1806), a politically well-connected peer from northern ireland.3 however, the entire venture had cost the east india company a small fortune, for which the company had received no return.4 while most european countries’ impression of china worsened after lord george macartney led the first official british diplomatic mission to china, the people in habsburg austria remained a favorable opinion of china, especially on chinese art. while people in habsburg austria had great interest in china, elites and leaders of the chinese empire did not have much interest in foreign nations, including austria. the europeans had limited access to china in the late 18th century. until 1842, canton (guangzhou) was the sole port of call for western traders, a system known as the canton system.5 however, the first chinese person who lived in habsburg austria was recorded in 1780, and was likely a sailor.6 the official connection between austria and china came roughly a century later. in 1869, china established diplomatic relations with habsburg austria-hungary. however, the chinese ambassador in austria was based at berlin, in what was then the german empire, until 1902.7 austro-hungarian representation in east asia followed a similar pattern. in 1883, the seat of austria-hungary’s diplomatic mission in east asia was moved from shanghai to tokyo “to stress the importance that japan had acquired in international relations in east asia.”8 in 1896, the austro-hungarian government finally decided to establish a legation in beijing and split the representation for china and japan.9 by the late 19th century, the chinese ambassador to austria was based in berlin, and the austro-hungarian representation in east asia was in tokyo. both sides chose a more influential country in the region as the base for their diplomatic presence. although the official connection between china and habsburg austria was limited, some chinese intellectuals still visited europe, including austria, to seek inspiration for 9 ibid., 32. 8 michael s. falser, habsburg going global: the austro-hungarian concession in tientsin/tianjin in china (1901-1917). (verlag der österreichischen akademie der wissenschaften, 2022), 27. 7 ibid., 91. 6 kaminski, österreich und china im bild 1624-2016, 76. 5 john d. wong, “introduction,” in global trade in the nineteenth century: the house of houqua and the canton system, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2016.), 2. 4 ibid., 121. 3 jonathan d. spence, the search for modern china. 3rd ed. (new york: w.w. norton, 2012), 120. 2 gerd kaminski, österreich und china im bild 1624-2016 中奥关系史图解 [austro-chinese relationship in charts]. (bacopa verlag, 2016), 23. 1 a. c. moule, “a life of odoric of pordenone,” t’oung pao 20, no. 3/4 (1920): 288, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4526615. 23 modernization, particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. this was a period of crisis for china, marked by significant military defeats and internal instability. having been defeated by britain twice in the opium wars (1842 and 1860),10 chinese leaders and intellectuals were concerned about the country’s future. as a result, the qing government11 made two major attempts to modernize china. the first attempt was the self-strengthening movement, which took place from roughly 1861 to 1895. there were three phases in the self-strengthening movement. the first phase took place from 1861 to 1872, characterized by the idea of “use western methods to defeat western powers.”12 during this time, the focus was on setting up translation offices, modern schools, and sending students abroad to learn about western technology, as well as training people in technology and foreign affairs.13 the second phase was from 1872 to 1885. although national defense industries were still the main focus, more attention was also given to profit-making businesses such as shipping, railways, mining, and telegraphs.14 the third phase was from 1885 to 1895. the focus on building the navy continued. at the same time, the idea of developing light industries to make the country richer became more accepted.15 in 1894, the first sino-japanese war broke out. the chinese beiyang fleet, which was established during the self-strengthening movement, was defeated. in 1895, the treaty of shimonoseki was signed.16 the defeat in the first sino-japanese war marked the failure of the self-strengthening movement, as the beiyang fleet was defeated by the japanese. the qing government’s second attempt at modernization was the hundred days’ reform, led by emperor guangxu (1871–1908) in the summer of 1898. influenced by kang youwei (1858–1927) and his supporters, emperor guangxu issued edicts calling for political and economic reforms. he ordered changes to china’s examination system, the upgrading of peking college, and the opening of several modern schools. emperor guangxu also made economic reforms, such as ordering local officials to coordinate reforms in commerce, industry, and agriculture, and to increase the production of tea and silk for export.17 several reformist thinkers, including kang youwei, were appointed as secretaries in the grand council so they could take part in important discussions and memorialize the emperor through their superiors.18 this reform effort failed due to empress dowager cixi’s intervention.19 she was disturbed by some of the proposed changes that threatened to weaken the qing ruling house, and was worried that the faction supporting guangxu seemed influenced by both the british and the french. on september 21, 1898, empress dowager cixi issued an edict claiming that the emperor had asked her to resume power, and she put guangxu under palace detention.20 20 ibid., 221. 19 ibid., glossary a61. 18 ibid., 221. 17 spence, the search for modern china, 220-221. 16 ibid., 348. 15 ibid., 284. 14 ibid., 282. 13 ibid., 280. 12 the term “use western methods to defeat western powers.” is called 師夷長技以制夷 in chinese. see immanuel hsu, 徐中約. zhongguo jindai shi 中國近代史 [the rise of modern china], vol. 1. translated from english. (hong kong: the chinese university of hong kong press, 2001), 280. 11 the qing dynasty was the ruling chinese dynasty before the republican revolution in 1911. 10 spence, the search for modern china, glossary a67. 24 the intervention of empress dowager cixi not only led to the failure of the hundred days' reform but also forced kang youwei into exile. kang was born in guangdong in 1858. he passed the imperial examination and became an imperial scholar (jinshi進士) in 1885.21 he was a key figure during the hundred days’ reform in 1898. he was one of the reformist thinkers who was appointed as a secretary to the grand council by emperor guangxu. kang tried to organize several reforms, including the proposal to reframe confucianism as china’s version of a state religion.22 after the failure of the reform in 1898, he fled to hong kong with the help of the british consulate in shanghai.23 soon after he arrived in hong kong, he moved to japan with the permission of the japanese prime minister ōkuma shigenobu (大隈重信).24 however, ōkuma shigenobu soon resigned as prime minister and the new japanese government led by yamagata aritomo (山縣有朋) decided to change its diplomatic policy towards the qing government,25 kang was forced to leave japan and moved to british columbia, canada in 1899.26 during his exile, he wrote the book of the great unity (datong shu 大同書) in 1901, chow finds that there are resonances between kang’s thought of the great unity and the progressive theory of history found in british liberalism.27 kang traveled to many countries during his exile, including the austro-hungarian empire in 1904 and 1908.28 in 1911, a revolution occurred in china, leading to the overthrow of the great qing empire by republican revolutionaries. a new government, the republic of china, was established in 1912.29 kang spent 15 years overseas and eventually returned to china in 1913 after the revolution.30 the collection of kang youwei is the main primary source for this essay. this book is a compilation of articles and letters written by kang youwei. among kang youwei’s writings, this essay will analyze articles about his tour of austria-hungary. many of the historical facts mentioned in kang’s articles reflect the situation in austria-hungary, including austrian history, politics, and more. kang also studied austrian historical events, such as the thirty years’ war, austro-hungarian compromise of 1867 and political issues such as the parliamentary conflict, the succession crisis, and pan-germanism. this paper will connect kang’s work with the situation in austria-hungary and argue that kang used the historical facts in austria-hungary selectively to advocate his political beliefs towards china. kang’s articles are significant because they provide an outsider’s perspective, that of an intellectual from east asia, on the austro-hungarian empire, and examine how he connects the issues in austria-hungary to china. i analyze kang’s views on the austro-hungarian empire, including the empire’s religious issues, 30 wu, kang youwei nianpu, 2: 559. 29 spence, the search for modern china, 261. 28 youwei kang 康有为, kang youwei quanji 康有为全集 [collection of kang youwei]. vols 8-9. ed. yihua jiang and ronghua zhang, (beijing: zhongguo remin daxue chuban she, 2007), 9: 291. 27 chow, "making the twain meet," 31. 26 ibid., 1: 268. 25 ibid., 1: 269. 24 ibid., 1:252. 23 wu, kang youwei nianpu, 1: 251. 22 kathy chow, "making the twain meet: the invention of confucian religion and kang youwei’s political theology." political theology 23 (2022): 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/1462317x.2021.2014625. 21 tianren wu 吳天任, kang youwei nianpu 康有為年譜 [chronological biography of kang youwei], (guangzhou: guangdong renmin chuban she, 2018), 1: 113. 25 political conflicts, issues of loyalty, and economy, especially how kang selectively or mistakenly chose historical facts about the austro-hungarian empire to support his political beliefs. this paper mainly examines three articles written by kang. the first article is “inspection on the evolution of the germanic states and austria-hungary” (1906),31 primarily looks at the history of germany and austria-hungary from kang’s perspective. the second article “complementary record of the austrian trip” (1908),32 mainly discusses his trip to austria and his thoughts on the austrian monarchy, history, politics, and economy. the third article is “inspection of austrian political parties” (1912),33 written just after the 1911 republican revolution. this article examines austria-hungary's politics, particularly party politics in the early 20th century.34 religious conflict and austrian catholicism religion and religious conflicts play a large role in kang youwei’s descriptions of austrian history. he describes conflicts between “popes and emperors, popes and princes, old religion (catholicism) and new religion (protestant)”35 in the holy roman empire, stating, “[those] conflicts are all resolved by arms, with killings filling cities and blood flowing like rivers, displaying brutality.”36 he also highlighted the brutality of the popes, arguing that the popes’ brutality led to the religious conflicts.37 kang’s description of religious conflict in the holy roman empire does reflect the historical reality of significant population loss during the thirty years’ war. for instance, under swedish occupation, the city of mainz lost 40% of its population.38 however, kang highlighted the casualties in the thirty years’ war not just to point out the facts, but to make a comparison with the religious conflicts in china and advocate his political ideas. after describing the religious conflicts in the holy roman empire, he then turns to religious conflicts in ancient china, saying, the disputes within confucianism and buddhism are confined to debates of words and ideas, conducted with tolerance and gentleness in teaching, which is why they seem weak [compared to the conflicts in the holy roman empire]. and now, philosophy is growing every day, and science is becoming clearer. even though people [in china] are still not very educated, and religion is still needed to teach them, we can no longer treat people as foolish. and a hundred years from now, as conflicts between nations gradually subside, the ideals of confucius concerning universal harmony and great unity, and the buddhist spirit of transcending birth and death, may resonate even more deeply into human hearts.39 39 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 253. 38 geoffrey parker, the thirty years' war. (oxford: taylor & francis group, 1997), 147. 37 ibid. 36 ibid. 35 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 253. 34 kang’s articles were originally written and published in chinese. i have translated the passages into english myself. 33 the original title in chinese is “奧政黨考.” see kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 291. 32 the original title in chinese is “補奧遊記.” see kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 384. 31 the original title in chinese is “日耳曼沿革考 奧大利匈牙利沿革附.” see kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 235. 26 he made this specific comparison due to his preference for confucianism. by comparing the brutal and violent religious conflicts in the holy roman empire to the peaceful religious disputes in china and expressing his prediction for the future of the world, he aims to emphasize that the harmonious ideals in confucianism and certain buddhist ideas will dominate the future peaceful world. however, his description of religious disputes in china is not entirely correct, as the religious conflicts in ancient china were not always peaceful. for example, the tang emperor wuzong (r. 840–846), as one of china's most enthusiastic taoist rulers, ordered the huichang persecution of buddhism.40 kang did not view the empire’s close relationship with catholicism positively: “the greatest harm to austria lies in the union of religion and politics. the roman catholic church keeps its people ignorant, and the roman authority in austria remains as strong as ever. the government follows the [roman] church’s command, to the extent that even if a newspaper publishes slight criticism of the church, it will be shut down immediately.”41 to kang, the close relationship between the empire and catholicism was one of the reasons that made austria’s strength “difficult to restore.”42 he also emphasized the power that religious figures in austria wielded compared to prussia, stating that the catholic church prevented the empire from reforming.43 catholicism was not a religion that could help the country reform; instead, it weakened the nation. one reason he had a negative view of the empire’s close relationship with catholicism is that this connection weakened the emperor’s power, and he had a preference for a more powerful monarch. he argued: “when the austrian emperor wanted to reform, the church leaders would stop him. the people listen to the priests and hate the emperor. the emperor feels unsafe and do not dare to act.”44 to kang, the catholic church in austria was too powerful, and he preferred the emperor to hold more power. kang’s preference for protestantism is also a reason, as chow states, kang’s proposed reforms in 1898 illustrated his attempt to “fit confucianism into a protestant understanding of religion.”45 in other words, protestantism was the model for kang’s reform of confucianism, and he naturally favored protestantism over catholicism. thus, his favourable opinion of protestantism led him to share a more critical attitude towards catholicism in austria. although kang did not have a positive view of catholicism, he favorably described the catholic practice of the veneration of virgin mary.46 kang expressed his opinion that christians venerating virgin mary’s statue were no different from chinese people worshipping guanyin,47 concluding that chinese traditional customs were not necessarily bad.48 he argued that “people today want to give up the light [of the east] and learn from the darkness of the west. they do not know what is right or wrong, but only try to please 48 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 398. 47 guanyin is a buddhist bodhisattva. originally called avalokiteśvara in india, guanyin was introduced to china and became popular in east asia. 46 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 398. 45 chow,"making the twain meet," 31. 44 ibid. 43 ibid. 42 ibid. 41 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9:294. 40 timothy h. barrett, “the madness of emperor wuzong,” cahiers d’extrême-asie 14 (2004): 173, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44160395. 27 foreigners.”49 his statement is connected to the specific historical background of the early 20th century, when, starting from the hundred days’ reform, confucian moral rules based on “ritual” were seriously challenged by western trends and reform thinkers.50 kang, as a supporter of confucianism, mentioned religious practices in austria because he wanted to use the veneration of virgin mary in austria to justify that it was acceptable for chinese society to maintain ties with its own religions, such as confucianism and buddhism. from his perspective, austria, as part of european society, accepted the veneration of the virgin mary, and therefore, it was acceptable for chinese people to keep their old customs. although he criticized catholicism in austria, he still used catholic practice in austria to justify his argument. in other words, he selectively used the historical facts and situation in austria selectively when it suited him. political diversity in the empire ethnicity within the empire was especially important in kang’s essay. the topic of his chapter pointed out that, “austria’s lack of strength compared to prussia (german empire) is due to its lack of linguistic unity.”51 kang analyzed the different ethnic groups within the empire and compared austria to germany, two states with similar cultures. he explained: the current territory of austria consists of fourteen nations... each region maintains its own language and script, making it impossible to unify. thus, there are fourteen languages and ten writing systems, which interrupt governance and progress, leaving no viable solutions. if [the government] wishes to enforce unity through political and legal measures, the current trend of civil liberties prevents it. the austrian monarch fears the people and dares not impose it forcibly... on the other hand, in germany, the monarchy holds substantial power, allows the enforcement of linguistic unification. all of germany only has four languages, and now everyone is gradually proficient in prussian language (german). austria had monarchical authority but dares not exercise it, marking a significant difference from germany... nevertheless, the harm caused by linguistic differences and lack of mutual understanding is also severe [in austria].52 kang identified two reasons why austria was weaker than prussia (german empire): the power of the monarch and linguistic diversity. historian bálint varga argues that “the national and the imperial were not necessarily incompatible, but could mutually reinforce each other.”53 kang obviously didn’t agree with varga’s point. instead, he agreed with a 53 bálint varga, “writing imperial history in the age of high nationalism: imperial historians on the fringes of the habsburg monarchy,” european review of history: revue européenne d’histoire 24, no. 1 (2016): 91. doi:10.1080/13507486.2016.1217402. 52 ibid. 51 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 256. 50 duan, lian 段煉. "qingmo minchu de daode jiaolv ji yingdui zhi ce" 清末民初的道德焦慮及應對之策 [moral anxiety and coping strategies in the late qing and early republican period]. ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀, no. 130 (2012): 53, https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c130-200907054.pdf. 49 ibid. 28 more traditional idea that the late habsburg monarchy was in permanent crisis, its state unity eroded at the expense of rising nationalist movements.54 he argued that the diversity of languages threw the empire into disorder, caused chaos in its military, and explained how prussia defeated austria in the austro-prussian war.55 kang then turned to discuss the problem of ethnicity in china. he emphasized the linguistic diversity in the chinese military, and suggested that “soldiers from fujian and guangdong should all be taught standard pronunciation within their camps, as well as the soldiers from manchu, mongol, hui, and tibetan regions.”56 he particularly focused on ethnic and linguistic issues within austria-hungary because china faced a similar situation. china was also a country with significant ethnic and linguistic diversity. ethnicities like han chinese as well as mongols lived in the manchu qing empire. even among han chinese, different languages or dialects were used in different areas. another similarity he saw was a record of military failure. austria was defeated in the austro-prussian war in 1866 while china was defeated in the first sino-japanese war in 1895. kang naturally connected these similarities together. kang wanted to ensure that china would not repeat austria’s “mistake” and instead should work to unify its language. from kang youwei’s point of view, countries with unified ethnicity and language were stronger than those with significant diversity. however, it is important to note that there were more important reasons that led to austria’s defeat in the austro-prussian war, as beller argues. one reason was diplomatic: the problem was austria’s isolation on the international great power level.57 the second reason was military innovation: “the superior tactics and training of the prussian forces, especially the ultra-effective use of breech-loading rifles by the infantry.”58 another reason was that it was “under the emperor’s jealously guarded prerogative of control of the military that the necessary reforms had failed to occur.”59 this is a significant point, as kang argues that it was the lack of power of the monarch that led to the weakness of austria. however, according to beller, the emperor was one of the reasons that led to the failure of military reforms before the austro-prussian war. moreover, none of beller’s points argue that austria’s defeat was related to linguistic or ethnic issues in the military. the austro-hungarian empire was established due to the new constitution sanctioned in 1867, in which hungary was allowed to have great autonomy under the crown, “with very different constitutions, different administrative and judicial systems, and even different qualifications for citizenship.”60 kang provided his opinion on austro-hungarian relationships, although the hungarians acknowledge the austrian emperor as their king, hungary maintains its own national structure, which is far from being a vassal 60 pieter m. judson, the habsburg empire: a new history. (harvard university press, 2016), 262, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjsf5rq. 59 ibid. 58 ibid., 117. 57 steven beller, the habsburg monarchy 1815–1918. of new approaches to european history. (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2018), 116. 56 ibid., 8: 258. 55 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8:257. 54 varga, “writing imperial history in the age of high nationalism: imperial historians on the fringes of the habsburg monarchy,” 80. 29 state. the system [of austria-hungary] is similar to how australia and canada relate to britain, except that australia and canada have british-appointed governors, while hungary is governed entirely by hungarians. apart from the austrian emperor, not a single austrian interferes in hungary's internal affairs. even the emperor, holding a nominal title as king, cannot intervene in its internal governance. the only areas in which austria exercises authority over hungary are foreign affairs, military matters, and finance... this arrangement is nearly no difference from that of an alliance, with the austrian emperor serving as the alliance's leader… if other major powers benefit from austria's weakening... then hungary and austria could be separated in a single day.61 in this passage, kang expressed his negative view of the system established after the austro-hungarian compromise of 1867. from his description, the great autonomy of hungary within the empire would eventually lead to separation if other great powers desired it. kang highlighted the austria-hungary relationship within the empire to support his broader argument. kang’s observation of austria-hungary is correct in some ways, as he realized that under the compromise, “austria and hungary integrated in only three competencies, run by three joint ministries that were responsible for foreign affairs; for the armed forces; and for funding these joint activities.”62 still, he exaggerated the degree of autonomy in hungary. although kang claimed that the union between austria and hungary had “no difference from that of an alliance.”63 in fact, austria and hungary experienced a deeper integration than a simple personal union because of the compromise.64 furthermore, at the legal level, the austrian legislation does not say a word about the possible negative conflicts of the competences in relation to the ministry of the common affairs, which allows its intervention into hungarian political life.65 from kang’s description, he was not a supporter of the idea of regional autonomy. to him, austria-hungary was not a successful state. he connected these two elements together to support his claim for a more centralized government. kang concluded that europeans did not understand the “method of unification,”66 that “even after they take over another land, they still keep its name and government, and just make themselves the king”67. he argued that the lack of understanding of the “method of unification” was the reason europeans kept fighting for a thousand years.68 kang aimed to support his idea of a unified china by using the hungarian example to illustrate to his readers that autonomy could lead to potential chaos. he wished to underline that china needed unification to avoid wars and conflicts. his claim is reasonable in the case of austria-hungary, but other european states had different strategies for consolidating 68 ibid. 67 ibid. 66 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 394. 65 ibid., 825. 64 ibid., 835. 63 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 394. 62 mate paksy, “toward a better understanding of peripheral nation-building strategies: a critical comparison of the austro-hungarian ausgleich and the canadian british north america act (1867),” international journal for the semiotics of law 33 (2020): 834, https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1007/s11196-020-09736-3. 61 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 394. 30 power. for instance, the civilizing mission (mission civilisatrice) is an important concept for the french.69 in other words, “assimilation” was actively practiced in french governance. kang’s claim is an oversimplification, and he only emphasizes what he wants. his racial idea also provides an explanation for his idea of “unification.” in his book of the great unity, he separated people into “white,” “yellow,” “brown,” and “black” races.70 in this article, kang used austrians to represent the “white” race, while using chinese people to represent the “yellow” race. as he separated people too simply, he did not realize the diversity within the “race.” although kang argued the greatest difference between european states and china was that europeans do not understand the “method of unification” while china does. in fact, china also experienced relatively long periods of division, bringing this claim into question. according to zhou, the total number of years that china was under unification is 950—only 45% of the time from 221 bce to 1911 ce.71 in other words, the remaining 55% was spent in periods of division. kang also wrote about party politics in the austro-hungarian empire. kang argued that austria was not strong domestically and pointed out the reason: “austria is skilled in maintaining harmony in foreign affairs, but its domestic governance is ineffective because there are too many political parties in parliament, debates are too scattered, and the government lacks fairness and justice.”72 kang further explained that austria had the most political parties at that time, making compromise in parliament difficult due to the empire’s ethnic diversity. according to kang, the austro-hungarian parliament was in chaos, “the leaders of the german and bohemian parties are all aggressive and domineering, holding the highest power.73 some grab the prime minister by the throat, while others brandish swords to attack... this is no different from the chaos of the mobs during the french revolution.”74 he then compared party politics in austria-hungary with those in other countries, such as britain and the usa, and concluded that strong countries usually had fewer political parties.75 kang also worried about china: “if china were to establish a constitution with political parties, i wonder how many parties there would be?”76 kang further explained the diversity in china and concluded that “given china’s vast size… [and] those who discuss politics and law often lack experience and simply follow the crowd, repeating ‘political parties,’ i cannot predict how much future danger, chaos, weakness, and decline this will bring to china.”77 kang mentioned the various parties in austria-hungary to argue that such a system was not suitable for china. to kang, countries with fewer political parties were stronger. he highlighted the disorder in the austro-hungarian parliament to illustrate that china would also become weak if it adopted a similar multi-party system. kang’s observation that the parliament in austria-hungary was chaotic 77 ibid., 9: 291 76 ibid. 75 ibid. 74 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 293 73 the “german party” here is referring to alldeutsche vereinigung. 72 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 292 71 haiwen zhou, "unification and division: a theory of institutional choices in imperial china," annals of economics and finance 24, no. 1 (2023): 13, http://aeconf.com/articles/may2023/aef240102.pdf. 70 chow, "making the twain meet," 37. 69 krishan kumar, “the french empire: ‘imperial nation-state,’” in visions of empire: how five imperial regimes shaped the world. (princeton university press, 2017), 429. 31 was correct in some ways. as bader-zaar pointed out, government agents were involved in election conflicts that resulted in fraud and sometimes violent clashes ending in bloodshed.78 while it is true that the austro-hungarian parliamentary system was chaotic in some aspects, it is questionable whether the parliamentary system led to austria’s weakness. roháč argues that the collapse of the austro-hungarian empire occurred particularly as a result of the removal of the possibility of bargaining through standard political processes, when the reichsrat (imperial council) and the national diets were suspended during the first world war.79 witt states that having a voice in the government convinced minorities that they were participating in the destiny of the state.80 in other words, the existence of the parliament allowed ethnic minorities to solve their problems within the imperial system, which actually benefited the empire. furthermore, witt also points out that “parliament’s ineffectiveness did not matter so much in this case; the importance was the equal value of all citizens to the monarchy.”81 kang clearly didn’t pay attention to this aspect; he focused more on the effectiveness of the concentration of government power. the timing of kang’s article “inspection of austrian political parties” suggests his growing concerns about china’s future following the republican revolution. although his last visit to austria was in 1908, he wrote this article in 1912 as a response to the republican revolution.82 before 1910, the qing government restricted and controlled political parties in china. it was only in 1910 that the manchu court agreed that a fully elected parliament should be convened in 1913.83 from kang’s perspective, political parties had not been a significant issue before the revolution. the revolution made the formation of various political parties much easier. the number of political parties grew rapidly after the 1911 revolution. from february to october 1912, there were 85 political parties and groups officially registered with the ministry of civil affairs. there were many more that were not registered or were registered later.84 kang was worried about this growing factionalism and expressed his idea of “merging political parties like britain and the us”85 in china, through his observations of austrian politics in 1908. kang observed the diversity within the empire, including the compromise between austria and hungary, the ethnic diversity within the empire, as well as the diversity in parliament in the austro-hungarian empire. kang was clearly not a supporter of these forms of diversity; he selectively and even mistakenly chose the facts in the empire to justify his political idea of a more centralized and homogeneous government. 85 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 291 84 yu-fa chang 張玉法, "minchu zhengdang de diaocha yu fenxi" 民初政黨的調查與分析 [a study and analysis of political parties in the early republican period]. jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 近代史研究所集刊, no. 5 (1976): 121-122 83 spence, the search for modern china, 263 82 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 291 81 ibid. 80 katrina witt, “the politics of managing pluralism: austria-hungary 1867-1918,” constellations 1, no. 1 (2009): 86, https://doi.org/10.29173/cons6899. 79 dalibor roháč, “why did the austro-hungarian empire collapse? a public choice perspective,” const polit econ 20, (2009): 174, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9058-0. 78 birgitta bader-zaar, “democratization and the practices of voting in habsburg austria, 1896–1914: new directions in research,” austrian history yearbook 53 (2022): 120, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0067237822000042. 32 monarchical power and imperial loyalty the austro-hungarian empire was built upon loyalty to the habsburg monarchy. kang youwei highlighted the habsburg monarch, particularly on the popularity of emperor franz joseph: “what austria can still preserve today is due to emperor franz joseph’s long reign. by granting freedom to the people, he has earned their gratitude, making them reluctant to rebel against him.”86 he also pointed out the succession crisis in austria-hungary: “however, if the emperor leaves no successor, a major upheaval may occur.”87 kang then mentioned the death of the emperor’s brother, maximilian, who was emperor of mexico. he also discussed the possible heir to the throne, otto,88 who had married the daughter of an earl. kang viewed him as the only person who could save the empire.89 although some of the names and facts he referenced were inaccurate, kang accurately recognized that emperor franz joseph enjoyed “unprecedented popularity,”90 as well as the reality of a succession crisis in the empire and the potential chaos it could bring. as discussed in the “political diversity in the empire” section, kang emphasized the weakness of the monarch’s power in the empire. he also stated: “the austrian emperor’s authority, originally inherited from a unified tradition, was once immense. however, after significant conflicts between the monarch and civilians,91 the emperor has power but dares not use it.”92 although kang claimed that after the 1848 revolutions, the emperor dared not use his power, his claim is incorrect. the sylvesterpatent (new year's eve patent) in 1851 overthrew the march constitution and returned austria to absolutism.93 austria entered emperor franz joseph’s neo-absolutist era. according to beller, it was in the areas where franz joseph had reserved to himself the most influence, in foreign policy and the military, that austria’s performance was to prove calamitous.94 first, after the 1848 revolutions, emperor franz joseph dared to use his power in foreign policy and the military. second, as discussed in the “political diversity in the empire” section, kang argued that the austrian monarch’s lack of power led to its weakness. however, beller told a different story: it was the areas where the emperor had the most influence, diplomacy and the military, that broke the neo-absolutist system. kang compared austria to germany and emphasized the supreme power held by the german emperor. he noted that freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, as promised in the constitution of germany, were merely symbolic and not actually shared by the people.95 he further explained his ideal system: “the monarch and the people govern together, benefiting one another…this system is truly appropriate. germany, now the 95 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 293 94 ibid. 93 beller, the habsburg monarchy 1815–1918. of new approaches to european history, 86 92 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 396 91 kang is referring to the 1848 revolutions. 90 judson, the habsburg empire: a new history, 341 89 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 294 88 kang is mistaken, the heir to the throne was archduke francis ferdinand (1863-1914). 87 ibid. 86 ibid., 9: 294 33 world's foremost rising power, serves as proof of this.”96 in other words, kang advocated for a system similar to germany’s, where the people held limited judicial and legislative power while the monarch retained greater authority, particularly in executive power. kang’s opinion on germany reflects german influence in china. from 1870 to 1895, germany and china had close cooperation, and the two countries developed strong economic and trade relations.97 starting from 1870, germany became china’s first choice as a partner for cooperation in reform plans during the self-strengthening movement.98 according to yu, there are three reasons why china chose germany. first, germany had strong military technology. second, at that time, germany did not have imperial ambitions in china. third, after the victory in the franco-prussian war (1870–1871), china had a new image of germany, which gave china a new model to follow for its own reforms.99 among these three reasons, two of them are related to the military strength of germany. the military strength of germany left a deep impression on the reformers in china, which extended to kang. kang’s german preference also reflects german influence on the japanese system. kang saw japan as a country that shared the same language and customs with china;100 he argued that reform should be fully based on japan’s meiji restoration.101 meanwhile, the japanese political system had great influence from germany, the meiji constitution (constitution of the empire of japan) promulgated in 1889 was modeled on the german-prussian constitution.102 kang’s view of japan, as well as the fact that japan modeled germany, resulted in kang’s advocacy of the german model. kang discussed georg ritter von schönerer, the leader of the austrian pan-germans.103 they advocated the dissolution of the austro-hungarian empire and the unification of all german people with the prussian-dominated german empire.104 after 1901, schönerer lost much of his influence and in 1907 failed to win re-election to the diet.105 kang, however, exaggerated his influence, saying that schönerer had a strong party.106 historian andrew whiteside argues that the reason for the ultimate failure of pan-germanism to achieve its goals was schönerer’s violent methods and inability to capture and hold the support of the young and workers.107 kang didn’t see this, arguing that 107 morris, “reviewed work: the socialism of fools: georg ritter von schönerer and austrian pan-germanism by 106 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9:291 105 ibid. 104 ibid. 103 wanen b. morris, “reviewed work: the socialism of fools: georg ritter von schönerer and austrian pan-germanism by andrew whiteside,” social science quarterly 57, no. 4 (1977): 936, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42859733. 102 bernd martin and peter wetzler, “the german role in the modernization of japan — the pitfall of blind acculturation.” oriens extremus 33, no. 1 (1990): 77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24048466. 101 ibid., 190 100 huijun lin 林慧君, "kang youwei wuxu bianfa shiqi de riben guan—yi riben bianzheng kao wei kaocha zhongxin" 康有為戊戌變法時期的日本觀－以《日本變政考》為考察中心 [kang youwei’s view of japan during the hundred days’ reform: a study centered on a study of japan's political reform]. chang geng keji xuekan 長庚 科技學刊, no. 7 (2007): 187, https://doi.org/10.6192/cgust.2007.12.7.13. 99 ibid., 166 98 ibid. 97 yu, hefang 虞和芳. "zhong-de guanxi fazhan de lishi yanjiu: 1861–1917" 中德關係發展的歷史研究：1861–1917 [a historical study of sino-german relations: 1861–1917]. ouzhou guoji pinglun 歐洲國際評論, no. 10 (2014): 165 96 ibid. 34 “[the unification] is what the people desire and what the situation demands.”108 in fact, by the time kang visited austria-hungary in 1906 and 1908, schönerer and his party had already lost much of their influence. his exaggeration of the influence of schönerer reflected his preference for the german system and showed that he was deeply influenced by ethnic ideas and nationalism. thirty years after kang’s visit, austria was “incorporated” into germany under the nazis, which caused tragic results. after the second world war, austria became independent again, and was no longer a part of germany. although kang repeatedly emphasized crises in austria-hungary and supported the german model, when he described schönerer’s act of praising emperor wilhelm ii in the parliament, he described it as “arrogance.”109 this reaction can be attributed to kang’s strong monarchist beliefs. in the chinese context, kang still supported the qing monarchy even after the republic of china was proclaimed. according to spence, general zhang xun led his army into beijing in 1917 and declared the restoration of the abdicated qing emperor puyi, while kang youwei hurried to the forbidden city in official robes to serve the new emperor.110 kang’s enthusiasm for the qing emperor extended to austria-hungary, where he expected austro-hungarian subjects to remain loyal and respectful to their emperor. economic development and moral contradictions kang youwei discussed austria-hungary’s economy using charts and statistics to analyze and compare it with other great powers in the early 20th century. his analysis included the amount of farmland, income across various sectors, and industrial output. kang also compared the empire’s economy with other great powers, focusing on banking, ports, and maritime affairs.111 after this analysis, kang concluded that austria-hungary’s industry was not powerful enough, and its mining sector was also underproductive. he believed this was why austria-hungary was not as wealthy as france or germany.112 although austria-hungary’s economy did not leave a strong impression on kang, he still connected austria’s weak economy to the “simplicity and honesty” of austrian farmers.113 to support his argument, he contrasted this with america, which he identified as having the world’s strongest economy but whose people also “steal, cheat, [and] fake” the most.114 kang suggested that economic growth could lead to moral decline, arguing that as a nation’s economy improves, its people’s character may worsen. kang’s argument is connected to the situation in china. in the early 20th century, china struggled with its economy and sought modernization. kang’s connection between austria’s economy and the kindness of its people intended to show that, despite its weak economy, china could still have virtuous citizens. despite criticizing american people as those who “steal, cheat, [and] fake” the 114 ibid. 113 ibid. 112 ibid., 8: 407 111 kang, kang youwei quanji, 8: 403-6 110 spence, the search for modern china, 272-3 109 ibid., 9: 291 108 kang, kang youwei quanji, 9: 294 andrew whiteside,” 936 35 most,115 he still argued that “if we follow this trend, then the world will become like the united states, moving quickly toward a peaceful and united future…even if there are some problems along the way.”116 this reflects his contradictory idea towards modernization: worrying about the risk of moral decline accompanying modernization, but also viewing modernization as the only path to national strength. conclusion although kang youwei accurately observed certain historical facts about austria-hungary, he sought to validate his political ideas by using examples selectively or even inaccurately. kang mostly emphasized the negative aspects of the empire. he compared the thirty years’ war to religious disputes in ancient china, which he described inaccurately. he argued that the ideals of harmony in confucianism, along with certain buddhist principles, would dominate a future peaceful world. he criticized the empire’s connection to the catholic church because of his preference for a powerful monarch as well as his favourable opinion towards protestantism. kang highlighted the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the austro-hungarian empire because of the similarities between china and austria-hungary. he incorrectly blamed the empire’s defeat in the austro-prussian war on linguistic and ethnic issues. he also exaggerated the degree of autonomy in hungary. this all shows his preference for a more centralized government. kang highlighted the chaos in the parliament, but in fact, the parliament allowed ethnic minorities to solve their problems within the imperial system, which was beneficial to the empire’s stability. kang’s comments on the parliament expressed his disapproval of the multi-party system, as well as his concern about the 1911 republican revolution. kang also incorrectly described the neo-absolutist period, when it was through diplomacy and the military that the emperor’s influence most contributed to austria’s weakness. by comparing the austrian system to the german system, he expressed his preference for the german system, which reflects german influence in china as well as in japan. he exaggerated the influence of pan-germanism in austria, which shows that he was influenced by ethnic ideas and nationalism. kang had complex feelings towards austria-hungary due to his different political beliefs. although he expressed his disapproval of catholic influence, he also justified his confucian belief by describing the veneration of the virgin mary. although he did not have an optimistic opinion of austria’s future, he showed his disapproval of the praise for emperor wilhelm ii in the austrian parliament. he was not impressed by the austrian economy, but he highlighted the simplicity and honesty of austrian farmers. kang’s opinion of austria-hungary reflects his varied political beliefs. he was a monarchist figure, a confucian reformer, and a supporter of a government with concentrated and centralized power. although he did not have a strong influence on china after the republican revolution, looking at it today, china’s development largely followed what he had hoped. although a monarchy did not return to china, two major political parties dominated china in the 20th century: the nationalist party during the republic of china (1912–1949) and the communist party during the people’s republic of china 116 ibid. 115 ibid. 36 (1949–), both following a pattern of party-state system.117 the chinese government in recent years has also spread its international influence through confucianism, such as through the confucius institute. 117 i use dr. yu miin-ling’s definition of party-state system (黨國體制) here. according to dr. yu miin-ling, party-state system means that in a country, “a single dominant political party seeks, or in reality manages to control the entire country’s resources and institutions. and it aims to extend the party’s will and authority into every government institution and even into every corner of the society.” see miin-ling yu 余敏玲, “tong zhong you yi de liangan dangguo tizhi” 同中有異的兩岸黨國體制 [similar yet different: the party-state systems across the taiwan strait]. dianzi qikan jiyi 電子期刊記憶 (2013): 2. 37 bibliography bader-zaar, birgitta. “democratization and the practices of voting in habsburg austria, 1896–1914: new directions in research.” austrian history yearbook 53 (2022): 107–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0067237822000042. beller, steven. the habsburg monarchy 1815–1918. of new approaches to european history. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2018. barrett, timothy h. “the madness of emperor wuzong.” cahiers d’extrême-asie 14 (2004): 173–86. 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"zhong-de guanxi fazhan de lishi yanjiu: 1861–1917" 中德關係發展的歷 史研究：1861–1917 [a historical study of sino-german relations: 1861–1917]. ouzhou guoji pinglun 歐洲國際評論, no. 10 (2014): 147–179. yu, miin-ling 余敏玲. “tong zhong you yi de liangan dangguo tizhi” 同中有異的兩岸黨國體 制 [similar yet different: the party-state systems across the taiwan strait]. dianzi 39 https://doi.org/10.6192/cgust.2007.12.7.13 http://www.jstor.org/stable/24048466 qikan jiyi 電子期刊記憶 (2013): 2–21. zhou, haiwen. "unification and division: a theory of institutional choices in imperial china." annals of economics and finance 24, no. 1 (2023): 13–37. http://aeconf.com/articles/may2023/aef240102.pdf. 40 http://aeconf.com/articles/may2023/aef240102.pdf edwards.cey.vol6.final genocidaire alfried krupp: the implications of memorializing a criminal against humanity elizabeth edwards abstract this research paper explores the implications of naming institutions after convicted criminals against humanity, as seen through the case of the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald in germany. it highlights the vital importance of incorporating survivor testimonials to direct the narrative and reveal the true nature of (in this case) alfried krupp's crimes, while questioning the acceptance of krupp's name as a desirable brand for the wissenschaftskolleg in greifswald. furthermore, the paper delves into the larger political failures in addressing these implications effectively and aims to initiate a discussion on the role of businesses in remedying the holocaust's horrors and ensuring the appropriate recognition of nazi crimes. through historical discourse and survivor accounts, this paper seeks to foster a deeper understanding of the suffering caused by alfried krupp and the implications of continuing to honour his name. the methodology involves an examination of the historical context, survivor testimonials, and the wider societal implications of perpetuating the recognition of nazi crimes through institutional nomenclature 70 introduction in the early 1990s, the united states holocaust memorial museum was working tirelessly to collect testimonies, gather evidence, store memoirs, and deliberate on how one can appropriately represent the victims of the nazi holocaust. deborah lipstadt, a renowned jewish-american scholar who was elected to consult the museum, recalls a meeting with the content committee; the agenda was to create an exhibition of hair that the nazis had “harvested” from jewish women at auschwitz and sent to factories to produce blankets and military uniforms.1 scholars, psychologists, and rabbis were present to offer a wide-ranging perspective. historians such as raul hilberg argued that the display of the hair would demonstrate the “final solution’s ultimate rationality”: that the nazis considered a body part as a saleable commodity and an “industrial object.”2 psychologists suggested that the hair would add another layer of disconcertion and horror, thus ensuring that “all humankind stares this evil in the face” and prevents future atrocities.3 even the leading orthodox rabbis determined that the exhibition wouldn’t be a desecration of the dead.4 but then a committee member rose from her seat, a survivor of the genocide herself, and presented a perspective that only she could. she said, “that could have been my mother’s hair. she never gave you permission to display it.” as she sat down, she murmured, “it could have been my hair.”5 that was the end of the conversation; no vote was needed. the hair still sits in a storehouse outside of washington to this day.6 this anecdotal example speaks to the power of survivor testimony within larger debates around representing the crimes committed in the holocaust. this testimony is particularly valuable as it shows the importance of hearing from the victim; no other professional or religious leader in the room was able to provide or represent the opinion of a holocaust survivor and yet all those in the room unanimously respected the woman’s suggestion. however, in a small town in north-eastern germany, a university stands proud bearing the name of a convicted criminal against humanity, alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach. the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald (alfried krupp institute for advanced study) bears the name of an individual whose personal decisions resulted in the death of over 100,000 concentration camp inmates, and thousands more who were subjected to forced labor in nazi germany.7 this research paper argues that the acceptance of the name of a criminal against humanity such as alfried krupp as a seemingly legitimate and desirable brand for industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as scholarly, educational, or medical institutions, amounts to an acceptance of krupp’s crimes and, 7 trials of war criminals before the nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no.10, nuernberg october 1946-april 1949, (vol 9: the krupp case). united states government printing office, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_law/pdf/nt_war-criminals_vol-ix.pdf> . 6 ibid., p. xii. 5 ibid. 4 lipstadt, the eichmann trial. 3 ronald reagan’s remarks at the site of the future united states holocaust museum, october 5th, 1988. the ronald reagan presidential library & museum. 2024. “remarks at the site of the future holocaust memorial museum.” the ronald reagan presidential library & museum. 2024. https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-site-future-holocaust-memorial-museum. 2 ibid. 1 lipstadt, deborah e. 2011. the eichmann trial. schocken. 71 https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_law/pdf/nt_war-criminals_vol-ix.pdf ultimately, the active denial surrounding the scale of the suffering caused by the holocaust to its victims. the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald is an example of the flaws in german memory culture, as institutions such as these are still deeply engrained in the industrial history of the krupp legacy and have failed to divorce themselves from krupp’s crimes.8 facing these testimonies on a deeper level could ultimately result in institutions such as the college changing their namesake or at least facilitating the dissemination of krupp’s crimes. in the case of alfried krupp, survivors’ voices have not rung loud enough as the name “krupp” remains an outsized figure when his victims have been forgotten. this research paper intends to allow the accounts of those who directly witnessed the horrors of the nazi genocide of european jewry to reveal the true nature of alfried krupp’s crimes. this paper refers to testimonies of both the victims of the crimes and those complicit in orchestrating those crimes, as both groups supply invaluable information, albeit for different reasons. once these crimes have been established, one can explore the implications of naming institutions after a convicted criminal against humanity and, furthermore, the larger political failures to address these implications effectively. the use of social history and business history facilitates this research in navigating a particularly contested area of historiography, as it reveals the human aspect of nazi germany’s inhumane industry and labor policies. historical discourse regarding the responsibility of big businesses and industry in bringing the nsdap into power and the complicity of businesses in the genocide of european jewry has increased significantly since the 1990s.9 nevertheless, the discussion on the role of businesses in remedying and compensating for the crimes of the holocaust post-1945, and their position in ensuring the continued appropriate recognition of nazi crimes, is less prominent. this paper explores the accounts of the friedrich krupp ag company’s survivors to allow the historian to achieve as close to an understanding of the degree of the suffering caused by alfried krupp as possible. first, this paper will explore terminology relevant to the discussion (most notably, terms that emerged from the genocide convention of 1984). secondly, a focus is given on the voluntarism versus coercion debate regarding alfried krupp, alongside a comparison to his contemporary industrialists, to establish krupp’s intention to contribute to the holocaust and its horrors. next, secondary literature permits the understanding of the context in which to place alfried krupp; to understand the commercial, economic, and industrial conditions in nazi germany and post-1945. the following section is dedicated to giving space to the voices of the victims; this section hears of krupp’s crimes in first-hand detail and cross-references them to the previous chapters to 9 for wiesen, s. jonathan. 1996. “overcoming nazism: big business, public relations, and the politics of memory, 1945–50.” central european history 29 (2): 201–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900013017.; nicosia, francis r, and jonathan huener. 2004. business and industry in nazi germany. new york: berghahn books. 8 it is worth noting that the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg is not the sole example of a flaw in german memory culture, a fascinating article in jewish currents, “bad memory,” labels germany’s “culture of contrition” as a “narcissistic enterprise.” emily dische-becker et al., “bad memory,” jewish currents (jewish currents, 2023), https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2. 72 https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2 demonstrate krupp’s genocidal intentions. finally, an examination of the institution in question, the alfried krupp wissenshaftskolleg greifswald and other such institutions that represent the krupp name, facilitates a longer-term perspective of the larger political failures to take concrete measures to prevent holocaust evasion, and indeed denial, in contemporary business in germany. terminology and methodology jean-paul satre wrote, “the fact of genocide is as old as humanity.”10 the legal web designed to condemn genocidaires and prevent further genocide is significantly younger, however. the united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (cppcg) was proposed for ratification by the general assembly in 1948 and came into effect three years later.11 since the genocide convention (1948), the definitions of “genocide” and “genocidaire” have been debated and their limits tested by scholars and lawyers worldwide. as defined by the united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (cppcg) in article ii, and thus for the purposes of this essay, genocide is defined by five accounts: (a) killing; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm; (c) deliberate infliction on the conditions of life calculated to bring destruction; (d) imposition of measures to prevent births; (e) forcible transition of children.12 these acts must be committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group in order for them to be deemed genocidal.13 krupp’s actions and decisions within friedrich krupp ag can be found and proven with evidence to sustain genocidal activity on at least the first three defined counts. the difficulty, however, in applying such terms to alfried krupp can be found in the word “intent.” the mental element (mens rea) of the crime must be present for the international criminal court (icc) to try for genocidal activity.14 nonetheless, article 30 of the rome statute of the icc states that “a person shall be held criminally responsible and liable for punishment… if the material elements are committed with intent or knowledge.”15 it is this fundamental difference between purpose-based and knowledge-based mentality of the crime which brings krupp within the realm of criminality. whilst krupp was not the key perpetrator nor instigator of the holocaust, the maltreatment of the forced laborers in his factories and his close personal 15 united nations, rome statute of the international criminal court, treaty series vol. 2187, no. 38544, (rome, 1998), p. 15. 14 schabas highlights this with the example of the bosnian genocide as several indictments for the former yugoslavia have invoked article ii(c) of the convention with respect to conditions in detention camps. whilst sufficient evidence that conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction can be found to have been inflicted upon bosnian muslim and bosnian croat detainees, the trial chamber reported that “the evidence presented has not enabled the court to find that those acts were accompanied by specific intent (dolus specialis).” 13 ibid. 12 schabas, william a. 2009. genocide in international law. cambridge university press. p. 290. 11 united nations office of the high commissioner, “convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide,” ohchr, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx> 10 jean-paul satre, “on genocide,” in eds., richard a. falk, gabriel kolko and robert jay lifton, crimes of war, (new york, 1971), p. 534. 73 https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx ties with the nsdap mandate that krupp was an aider and abettor to the genocide.16 for the purposes of this research question, i argue that not only did krupp know the nsdap’s racial policies and was thus complicit, but that he had an active role in participating with them. for the duration of this research, the term “forced laborers” will be used when referring to the victims “employed” to work in krupp’s factories. often, the term “slave laborers” is used in literature (and indeed in krupp’s trial), as “forced laborers” is inclusive of all such workers recruited by krupp during the war in a broader sense: concentration camp inmates, citizens of occupied territories, and those who were considered “asozial” (translates from german to “anti-social”) such as homosexual people, the roma people, sex workers and more. alfried krupp: coercion and voluntarism in german industrial institutions the krupp family represented much more than a cog in the nsdap’s industrial machine (and arguably still does to this day). they were a prominent german dynasty that had played various roles in german industry for over four centuries, including steel, artillery, and ammunition production. at the beginning of the twentieth century, friedrich krupp ag was the largest company in europe and the premier weapons provider for germany (as it had been since the thirty years’ war).17 the reputation of the krupp family was ultimately tainted by its position in the third reich; their relationship with the nsdap, however, has represented a point of conflict amongst historians.18 scholars such as manchester insist that the krupps were instrumental in bringing the nsdap to power, whilst the likes of james maintain that the krupps were more opportunistic than they were antisemitic.19 this debate falls within a larger discussion on voluntarism within a totalitarian state and the scope of “free will” for industrial leaders. this is a debate that was not uncommon (especially in the west) during the cold war, in a context of rising political tensions between east and west europe and increasing economic hardship, to rehabilitate former nazi functionaries and war criminals under the binary of voluntarism versus coercion. the united states military tribunal found that “the accused supported and approved the aims and programs of the third reich and the nsdap and placed at their service the productive resources of krupp.”20 it is believed that as krupp was the largest builder of u-boats and warships and the second largest product of iron and coal in germany, he contributed substantially to the third reich’s abilities.21 the prosecutors at krupp’s trial presented the argument that krupp had not only served the third reich out of duty, but he 21 ibid. 20 trials of war criminals: the krupp trial, 1950, p. 72. 19 ibid. and james, harold. 2012. krupp a history of the legendary german firm. princeton university press. 18 see wiesen, s. jonathan. 1996. “overcoming nazism: big business, public relations, and the politics of memory, 1945–50.” central european history 29 (2): 201–26; stone, dan. 2006. the historiography of the holocaust. houndmills, basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. 17 manchester, william. 1970. the arms of krupp, 1587-1968,. toronto, new york, bantam books. 16 for example, in the case of elizaphan ntakirutimana, a pastor and convicted aider and abettor of the rwandan genocide, the appeals chamber took the view that “he knew of the genocidal intent of the attackers… and, therefore, that he possessed the requisite mens rea for that crime.”15 74 had believed it an honor to do so.22 the trial found that krupp had “altered and greatly expanded” its production capacity, systematically circumventing and violating the restrictions that the versailles treaty had placed upon any rearmament in germany.23 the ambitions of the nsdap coincided with those of the krupp firm: to establish a powerful germany with krupp at its industrial center.24 this perspective was largely popular in post-war historiographical scholarship, such as in manchester’s 1968 monograph on the krupp dynasty. manchester reminds readers that krupp had told hitler that “he could see no reason why [jews, foreign citizens of occupied territories, roma, and other ‘anti-social’ citizens] should have to contribute something to the fatherland.”25 manchester maintains that krupp reiterated foundational nazi ideology that non-aryans were not part of the german “volk” and could not contribute to the german state, which in turn contributed to the nazi rationale to deny human rights and later target populations for forced labor. this is evidence that krupp was not simply acting as an effective business leader but was rather adherent to the nazi ideology. evidence of alfried krupp’s willingness to contribute to the third reich’s “final solution” continues to be presented, as seen in a more recent monograph written by the esteemed benjamin ferencz.26 ferencz, a prosecutor at the nuremberg trials and scholar on the holocaust, presents a series of events that included krupp officials and the schutzstaffel (ss), in which krupp’s eagerness to gain a rapport with the party is evident. in early 1942, a member of krupp’s council of directors showed hitler their new anti-tank gun and advised hitler that “krupp is also interested in manufacturing automatic weapons in connection with a concentration camp in the sudetengau.”27 it was agreed that the factory would be re-erected in auschwitz, the ss would lease the workshops to krupp, and the company would provide the machines and the management. they predicted that 50 to 60 of krupp’s workers would be instructed to travel from essen to train and supervise the anticipated 600 prisoners.28 when army ordnance urged a senior member of krupp’s staff, an engineer named weinhold, to try to use german workers in the early stages, weinhold reported, “i pointed out that the main purpose of evacuating the plant to auschwitz had been to employ the people there.”29 the case study presented shows indisputable evidence of krupp’s intent to employ forced laborers in the pursuit of increased armaments production and complete knowledge of the nature of the source of these “free laborers.” krupp expressed a personal motive to incorporate the ss-led concentration camps into his labor policies. the judges presiding over the trial of friedrich flick (another industrialist and contemporary of krupp) largely accepted the defense’s argument that the business was subject to compulsion.30 contrastingly, in the krupp trial, it was accepted that the company 30 james, krupp, p. 176. 29 ni-3754, trials of war criminals: the krupp trial, (1950), pp. 722. 28 ni-2868, trials of war criminals: the krupp trial, (1950), pp. 708-711. 27 annual report of krupp’s war material dept. for 1941-42, nik-11504, trials of war criminals: the krupp trial, (1950), p. 684-685. 26 ferencz, benjamin b. 2002. less than slaves. indiana university press. 25 manchester, arms of krupp, p. 489. 24 ibid. 23 ibid. 22 ibid. 75 had more room to maneuver. at nuremberg, krupp’s attorneys argued that if their client had not accepted the nazi’s policies of using forced laborers or failed to meet the required quotas of munitions, he would have been punished.31 however, the prosecution offered a rebuttal in the form of testimony from karl otto saur, the former chief of albert speer’s ministry’s technical office.32 saur, who was granted immunity in exchange for his cooperation, insisted that krupp was close with hitler and swore under oath that “[krupp’s] intervention with hitler was directly responsible for krupp’s use of jewish forced laborers at auschwitz.”33 based on the evidence presented at the trial, it is inaccurate to say that krupp, who (as of 1938) had been a member of the nazi party and was part of one of the most prominent industrialist families, used forced labor out of compulsion. the economic context for alfried krupp the weimar republic had seen a challenging period for heavy industries, with the steel industry in particular being heavily plagued with overcapacity following the first world war, as well as the industries that krupp was involved in being heavily sanctioned following the versailles treaty.34 with the near memory of standing on the precipice of bankruptcy in the 1920s, businesses in germany were wary of falling into a similar trap when faced with hitler’s plans to violate the treaty and rearm germany. not to mention, the central rhetoric of goebbel’s propaganda was centered on vilifying capitalism as the nsdap’s core foundation was socialism.35 nonetheless, krupp’s production of armaments in the fiscal year 1933-4 (hitler’s entry to office) was almost double that of the previous year.36 production of “km” (war materiel) was 8.1% of krupp’s gussstahlfabrik in 1932-33 and 16.1% in 1933-4.37 this stark rise in the production of armaments in hitler’s first year in office was no coincidence. this is indisputable evidence of krupp’s eagerness to provide and advance the nsdap’s economic and military strength. barkai’s revisionist interpretation in nazi economics: ideology, theory, and policy refashioned the way historians viewed the role of businesses in the third reich. before 1977, scholars believed that the nazis had no theoretical or practical economic program. however, barkai reminded his readers that the nazi’s had, in fact, railed against big businesses at the beginning of their campaign, and their overall aim was to restructure companies and commercial attitudes.38 the nazi party used antisemitic propaganda to critique “capitalists,” using a populist ploy to appeal to the economic struggles germany was facing brought on by the 1923 recession as well as the 1929 global depression following the wall street crash. ultimately, barkai argued german industrial leaders became “sleeping partners” of the new nazi state; they appeared to be not nearly as 38 christopher kobrak and andrea h. schneider, “big business and the third reich: an appraisal of the historical arguments” in ed d. stone, historiography of the holocaust, (london, 2004), pp. 146. 37 ibid. 36 ibid. p. 180. 35 ibid. 34 james, krupp, p. 176. 33 stanley goldman, 2016, ‘a fuhrer of industry: krupp before, during, and after nuremberg’, loyola of los angeles international and comparative law review. los angeles. p. 195. 32 manchester, arms of krupp, p. 486. 31 trials of war criminals: the krupp trial, (1950), p. 256. 76 opposed to extended government intervention as businesses in other nations may be.39 however, krupp’s personal correspondence with the nsdap and active role in instigating a program of forced labor in his factories suggests that krupp did not demonstrate the inertia of a “sleeping partner.” peter hayes’ paradigmatic perspective that business leaders were neither “manipulating the nazi thugs nor innocent victims” provides a more useful form of analysis in the krupp case. in ig farben’s case, their transition from an internationally revered, managerial independent and even a firm that had been accused as “jewish” by the nazis to a trusted partner of the nsdap is explained through an understanding of the party’s “carrot and stick” methods. one ought to make allowances for personal ideologies and interests, economic culture and context, managerial style and motive when considering the degree of voluntarism and coercion in nazi german industry. contrary to ig farben, it is apparent that krupp felt no such coercion under the nazi regime to be subservient to their goals, but rather he played an active role in ensuring his maintained in hitler’s good graces and that the krupp name may become an instrumental figure within the third reich. his personal membership to the national socialist party and his eagerness to construct a factory adjacent to auschwitz concentration camp can provide evidence as such. an examination of oral testimonies of alfried krupp’s victims an unfortunate aspect of the cppcg and the groundbreaking level of international legislation that came with it is that it came into force in the exact month and year that alfried krupp was released from prison (january 1951), thus rendering it ineffective in krupp’s trial. therefore, the examination of krupp’s genocidal crimes in this research is to be conducted for the purpose of academic insight and with the benefit of historical hindsight. a survey of the evidence of conditions and welfare for the forced laborers at krupps factories can be found to provide ample justification to comprehend the extent of krupp’s crimes. there were 500 women in the transport, almost all of them from łódź but there were also some german jews… the trip took three days and three nights. there was nothing to eat on the way and only little water to drink… a pail served as our toilet… i was sent to work for krupp.40 above, a survivor describes in harrowing detail the conditions she suffered on her journey from auschwitz concentration camp to neukölln, where she would be employed in forced labor at an ammunition factory owned by alfried krupp. after losing her daughters, aged seven and ten, and later her husband, this survivor recalls working in the “galvanizing section, dipping hot irons into cold water. the sparks flew into my eyes and burned my hands… i can hardly believe that i’m still alive today.”41 the suffering inflicted on this victim 41 ibid. 40 affidavit of trudi g, dated sept 15, 1959. seen in ferencz, less than slaves, p. 93. 39 avraham barkai, nazi economics: ideology, theory and policy, (connecticut, 1990). 77 is incomprehensible to anyone who has not witnessed it first-hand. whilst krupp’s trial had more than 250 witnesses and over 3000 documents were presented, to fathom the pain felt by krupp’s victims and thus provide justice would be a tall task.42 conditions were greatly overcrowded… the diet was extremely inadequate… only bad meat, such as horse meat or meat that had been rejected by veterinarians as infected with tuberculosis germs, was passed out in these camps. clothing, too, was altogether inadequate…43 this account, given by a senior krupp doctor who had visited several of the fenced-in compounds run by his employer, describes the treatment and conditions endured by laborers at krupp’s factories. it is one of many examples of evidence incriminating krupp further of crimes against humanity. krupp not only endeavored to secure “free labor” via correspondence with the nsdap and pushed for the construction of an artillery factory adjacent to auschwitz concentration camp, but he held little regard for the concentration camp inmates’ health and safety once they were placed under his care. the very nature of the conditions for forced laborers in krupp’s factories was against reason, denying a productive and effective environment to maximize production and thus profits for the business. by 1942, germany had lost a significant amount of its workforce, skilled and unskilled, to the war and the ostracization and genocide of its jewish citizens. by 1945, the millions of prisoners of war and forced laborers conscripted in the eastern occupied territories (poland, czechoslovakia, etc.) accounted for over 25 percent of the total german workforce.44 what purpose would there be in creating unhygienic and lethal living conditions for the few laborers available? this would be counterproductive to the aims of a business. such a question has been explored by a number of historians, ensuing a debate on a proposed new method of genocide: “extermination through labor.”45 when one considers the treatment of the laborers within krupp’s factories and the abundance of evidence proving a specific discrimination against the jewish concentration camp inmates, it becomes evident that there is intent to widen the scope of the genocide and massacre via extreme labor. stanley goldman maintains that the plan for the party and leading industrialists was to have two groups of forced laborers: one group included civilians of occupied territories and prisoners of war who were compelled to labor under inhumane conditions but would be allowed to live; the other group consisted prisoners taken from concentration camps, whose lives would not be protected under the motives of genocide.46 for the latter group, the ultimate aim was to fulfill the nsdap’s racial prerogative of the “final solution”; these individuals lived under the constant threat of being murdered at any moment. goldman’s interpretation is synonymous with the argument put forward by michael thad allen in his theory of the “business of genocide.”47 allen concludes that the ss 47 allen, the business of genocide, p. 81. 46 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 190. 45 marc buggeln, slave labor in the nazi concentration camps, 1941-45, (oxford, 2014). 44 michael thad allen, the business of genocide: the ss, slave labour, and the concentration camps, (north carolina, 2002), p. 61. 43 manchester, arms of krupp, p. 453. 42 ferencz, less than slaves, p. 71. 78 administration of slave labor was intrinsically linked to the holocaust, employing, and destroying workers in the service of the state and its racist visions for european domination.48 in the case of krupp, goldman’s interpretation is accurate when one considers krupp’s “bertha works,” a munitions factory in breslau named after krupp’s mother.49 a czech survivor described that, at bertha works, “the jews received the worst beatings… people were beaten to death or even thrown alive into the concrete which was used for new constructions.”50 testimonies such as this highlight the paramount importance of considering survivor accounts when recounting a history of genocide, as this testimony demonstrates a first-hand perspective that few others can offer. further confirmation of krupp’s intention to facilitate the nazi genocide can be found in his instruction to send all forced laborers at his factories back to the concentration camps as the end of the war became apparent. a defense witness at nuremberg testified that “camp commandant rieck had made it understood that it was his strictest orders not to let [inmates] fall into the hands of the american army under any circumstances.”51 at the factory in essen, despite the logistical difficulties, krupp’s workman began to send the remaining inmates from essen back to buchenwald concentration camp.52 at bertha works, workers were sent to auschwitz to be murdered.53 rather than leave the inmates to be recovered by the allies or open the gates and set them free, krupp ensured that the nsdap’s wishes were met up until the final bell. this final decision to send all remaining inmates to be exterminated in the concentration camps is indisputable evidence of not only krupp’s complicity but active participation in the holocaust. larger political failures to engage with national socialist past often germany has been celebrated for its successful acknowledgment of the destruction caused by national socialism and their appropriate responses to the nazi holocaust of the jewish people.54 for the atlantic’s december 2022 cover story, the author travels to germany to assess the country’s atonement process and commends germany as a good role model for acknowledging one’s past, one which the u.s. could follow to digest its one racist history.55 similarly, silverstein reports that spain has been noted to follow the german example in its public memory culture, adopting the german practice of “stolperstein,” or remembrance stones at the homes of murdered jews, to launch its 55 clint smith, “monuments to the unthinkable,” the atlantic, november 14, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/holocaust-remembrance-lessons-america/671893/. 54 greg rienzi, “other nations could learn from germany’s efforts to reconcile after wwii,” john hopkins university, (2015), <https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/> 53 ibid. 52 trials of war criminals: the krupp trial (1950) pp. 812-815. 51 ferencz, less than slaves, p. 95. 50 translation of document no. nik-8487, affidavit of josef aubrecht, office of chief of counsel for war crimes, (5 february 1948) <https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/d24-nik-9209.pdf> 49 affidavit of karl hupe, korschan defense book v, pp. 3-6. <https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/construction%20of%20bertha%20works.pdf>. 48 ibid. 79 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/holocaust-remembrance-lessons-america/671893/ https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/ https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/d24-nik-9209.pdf https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/construction%20of%20bertha%20works.pdf reckoning of the violence under franco’s fascist dictatorship.56 it is known that students in germany today are encouraged to visit the memorial sites and preserved concentration camps to promote an understanding of the horrors in the past. meanwhile, vergangenheitsbewältigung remains an eminent element of scholarship.57 however, the concepts of soft-core denial and secondary antisemitism remind us that history is not linear. this section considers the gaps and flaws in germany’s memory culture and argues that the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg is a prime example the lack of effort to acknowledge one’s past wholly. with the deplorable living conditions at krupp’s factories and his evident ambition to aid the nsdap in their “final solution” in mind, one begins to see the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald in a different light. holocaust survivor testimonies and accounts of witnesses have confirmed that alfried krupp inflicted inhumane conditions against his workers and actively sought out forced labor. a study into the legality of convicting a criminal against humanity (or, indeed, a genocidaire by today’s terms) has revealed that krupp can be found accountable for breaching several of the cppcg’s articles. a synoptic overview of business and industry historiography gave insight into the perspectives held by historians and allowed the conclusion that krupp was neither compelled nor coerced into committing crimes against humanity in the national socialist autocracy. yet, a respected institution for higher education in germany proudly bears the krupp name. how has the name of a convicted criminal against humanity become celebrated and revered in the public sphere in contemporary germany? unfortunately, the denial of the holocaust has been present within historiography for the past seventy years. after 1945, nazis and their sympathizers immediately attempted to deny or reduce the severity of their crimes committed against the european jewry.58 today, perhaps the most famous example of holocaust deniers can be seen in british historian david irving’s writing, as he attempts to argue that hitler was “probably the biggest friend the jews had in the third reich… he was the one who was doing everything he could to prevent nasty things happening to them.”59 irving’s monograph hitler’s war argued that hitler was against the execution of eastern european jews and even claimed that hitler had ordered a stop to their extermination in november of 1941.60 historians of the second world war are (thankfully) quick to denounce irving’s work. for example, trevor-roper didn’t hesitate to identify irving’s blatant self-contradiction in hitler’s war with his earlier claim that hitler was ignorant of what was happening to the jews in the east.61 despite the abundance of evidence in the forms of survivor testimonies, testimonies 61 evans, “david irving, hitler and holocaust denial,” holocaust denial on trial, (2018) <https://www.hdot.org/evans/#> 60 david irving, hitler’s war, (london, 1977) 59 richard j. evans, telling lies about hitler: the holocaust, history, and the david irving trial, (london, 2002), p. 51. 58 clemens heni, “secondary anti-semitism: from hard-core to soft-core denial of the shoah,” jewish political studies review, vol. 20, no. 3-4, (2008), p. 74 57 jeffrey herf, divided memory: the nazi past in the two germanys, (cambridge, 1997). 56 emily dische-becker et al., “bad memory,” jewish currents (jewish currents, 2023), https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2. 80 https://www.hdot.org/evans/ https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2 of leading nsdap members at the nuremberg trials, and physical evidence found in concentration camps, a supposedly educated man can still leap to the defense of hitler and accuse the jews of fabricating their own genocide—the most documented genocide in history. whilst this may be an extreme example, a link can be found between irving and this research paper’s focus: the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald. the writings and warnings of deborah lipstadt have opened scholarship to an extremely frightening but nevertheless crucial area of holocaust denial. lipstadt proposes a new branch of holocaust form in the shape of “soft-core denial.”62 this form of holocaust denial is becoming increasingly relevant when considering antisemitism and historical memory in contemporary europe, particularly in germany. unlike the negation of the fact of the holocaust as demonstrated by irving, soft-core denial is more subtle. it threatens the distortion of facts within public and historical memory, a universalization of the shoah, and the relativization or trivialization of the suffering endured by jewish victims.63 an evident example of this phenomena in recent years is the controversy which followed a statement released by president trump’s administration on international holocaust memorial day, which failed to specifically mention the jews as the principal victims of the holocaust or of antisemitism at any point.64 lipstadt labels this as “classic soft-core denial”; the de-judaization of the holocaust seen here does not deny the facts, but it minimizes and de-personalizes them and, in doing so, dishonors its victims. clemens heni’s concept of “secondary anti-semitism” contributes to our understanding of lipstadt’s “soft-core denial.” “secondary anti-semitism” is a relatively unknown concept used for the analysis of antisemitism, but it is used to refer to antisemitism after auschwitz.65 the core principle of secondary antisemitism is the “refusal or rejection of remembrance” of the nazi holocaust, and it often manifests as an anti-zionist and geo-political policy focused on criticizing israel.66 heni uses friedrich flick, one of germany’s richest and most influential industrialists in the twentieth century, as a prime example of secondary antisemitism and soft-core denial. he argues, “the flick phenomenon is a specific expression of a new german lack of inhibition, and the shamelessness of the berlin republic.”67 similar to krupp, flick was the “employer” of some fifty thousand forced laborers, ten thousand of whom are believed to have perished.68 at the demise of national socialism in 1945, flick was the wealthiest man in germany. like krupp, he was condemned at the nuremberg trials and sentenced to seven years in prison; he was acquitted soon after and in 1963, received the bundesverdienstkreuz (the federal service cross of the republic of germany).69 heni proposes that a very specific dimension of secondary antisemitism can be seen in germany as a result of the country’s unique political 69 ibid. 68 ibid. p. 76. 67 ibid. p. 77. 66 ibid. 65 heni, “secondary anti-semitism,” p. 74. 64 peter beaumont, “historian deborah lipstadt accuses trump advisers of ‘soft holocaust denial,’” the guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaustdenial> 63 heni, ‘“secondary anti-semitism,” p. 74. 62 deborah lipstadt, denying the holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory, (new york, 1993). 81 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaust-denial https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaust-denial culture. flick, for example, planned to cleanse his family’s tarnished name from the very beginning and did so in the form of an art museum boasting his family’s collection.70 adenauer’s newfound federal republic of germany was only too accommodating to such an influential figure who promised wealth and prosperity for germany. lipstadt and heni’s insightful approaches broaden one’s understanding of post-war germany; they quash the stereotypes that had riddled historiography and modern-day preconceptions. the case of alfried krupp, like that of friedrich flick, is a prime example of how the victims of the holocaust and their suffering have not been afforded the appropriate public memory in contemporary germany. this ignorance can be demonstrated via the exploration of alfried krupp’s acquittal in 1951 and the political failure to appropriately punish krupp for his crimes. former war criminals were dealt with differently in various regions (east germany, west germany, poland, etc.), but it was not uncommon for west germany to rehabilitate war criminals and former nazis for the sake of its own economy. in addition, the ordeal of reparations for holocaust survivors in post-war germany gives an insight into an inherent failure to compensate victims judiciously. finally, the formation of scholarly, medical, and other institutions of public interest such as alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald in alfried krupp’s name can be seen as an example of the failure to maintain accurate public memory and contributes to the active forgetting about the holocaust and its victims. this is not unique to germany but rather is reflective of larger structural injustices facing many people who fall victim to war crimes and genocide, a topic too large to fall into the remit of this essay. alfried krupp’s acquittal and release from confinement in 1951 was accompanied by negotiations conducted between the high commission and the krupp family lawyers. the result was that alfried krupp would dispose of his holdings in the steel and coal industries, estimated to be at £30 million, over a period of five to seven years, depending on whether krupp would be able to find a “suitable buyer.”71 krupp was to retain possession of the remainder of the krupp complex, which included locomotive works, shipyards, hotels, light industries, and more.72 the allied intention was that the new federal german government would guarantee krupp’s compliance and a signed document agreeing to the undertaking. however, a guardian article published in 1953 reveals that “it seems certain that this will not now be done.” the german government’s legal advisers defended krupp under the provision that the federal constitution guarantees the right for every german citizen “freely to choose his own trade or profession.” not to mention, the final negotiation allowed for a loophole; should krupp not want to dispose of some of his acquisitions in heavy industry, and should his holdings not be sold for “reasonable prices,” krupp may be able to retain ownership of them.73 the procedure of krupp’s acquittal can, therefore, be understood as being riddled with political failures to place concrete measures in preventing the success and reverence of a criminal against humanity and genocidaire. this is a clear 73 ibid. 72 ibid. 71 the guardian, “agreement on krupps: but bonn finds legal snag,” the guardian, manchester, 10 february 1953, p. 1. 70 ibid. p. 78. 82 demonstration of german memory culture not going far enough to accurately acknowledge the extent of the holocaust. i believed then and i believe now that political expediency dictated [t]his decision [of pardoning alfried krupp in 1951]. the russian blockade and berlin air lift had been on. east germany was in communist hands. czechoslovakia had been overrun. and the wall was being built in berlin.74 krupp tribunal judge william j. wilkins, 1981. it ought to be noted that krupp’s acquittal coincided with a dramatic change in allied policy in germany. the 1950s marked a time of post-war positivity, with optimism being promoted by western governments’ efforts to align public opinion with what they branded as a “new world order.”75 judge wilkin’s statement above aptly surmises the environment in which krupp’s acquittal was approved by the american high commissioner, john j. mccloy. in 1948, the russians had walked out of the allied control council, and as highlighted by wilkins, eastern europe (including eastern germany) had fallen stiffly in the hands of an ideology that triggered fear amongst the west.76 a strong west germany, ideologically and economically, was deemed vital if allied powers were to confront the soviets and solidify the “iron curtain” that had torn europe in two. having received several petitions on behalf of the landsberg prisoners and with the sentiment of a strong american-german relationship, mccloy established the “advisory board on clemency for war criminals.”77 the very title of this initiative suggested that the board had been created with the motive of clemency. mccloy asked the group of highly respected lawyers to consider any disparities found among the prisoners’ sentences, the family and health situation of the inmates, and any inclinations that the sentencing had been too harsh.78 thirteen of the prisoners under consideration had been defendants in the einsatzgruppen trial and guilty of murdering over one million people. the board considered individuals such as oswald pohl, who had been the head of the main economic office of the ss and key administrator of concentration camps.79 ferencz famously states, “krupp and his board must have appeared like lambs among the lions to mccloy.”80 nonetheless, without once consulting any of the nuremberg prosecutors, mccloy and his advisors concluded that “the concentration camp inmates allocated to [krupp] were under the strict control of the gestapo.”81 in fact, they believed that krupp had been a victim of discrimination because property forfeiture had not been invoked on any other industrialist.82 mccloy and his clemency board represent a political intervention in the nuremberg process, a process that represented the ultimate moral defeat of an extremist, 82 ibid. 81 ibid., p. 74. 80 ibid., p. 73. 79 ibid. 78 ibid. 77 ibid., p. 93. 76 ferencz, less than slaves, p. 72. 75 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 196. 74 william j wilkins, the sword and the gavel: an autobiography, (seattle, 1981). 83 racist, and genocidal regime. the political board game of the cold war allowed for a slip in european morality and ultimately signified that antisemitism had not been eradicated from the continent. the politics of memory is once again at play here, as bringing the criminals of the holocaust to justice is tempered by the contemporary political-economic environment. german jewish sociologist bodemann’s focus on the politics of memory coins the phrase “theater of memory,” meant to describe a narrative that is less about making amends to victims of genocide than about redeeming perpetrators and their descendants.83 it shows an element of narcissism in the german memory culture, as they endeavor to publicly atone for their past but politically protect their economy. krupp’s acquittal was the first failure to take concrete measures to eliminate soft-core denial in contemporary germany. the second failure can be considered the ordeal krupp’s victims faced to receive compensation. in the late 1950s, a legal brief entitled “the forced labor of jewish concentration camp inmates within the krupp combine” authored by the conference of jewish war claims arrived on krupp’s lawyers’ desks.84 the initial applications for compensation were granted an initial fund of dm 3,000 with the promise that more would follow.85 nonetheless, once the number of approved claims exceeded two thousand, the payments came to an immediate halt.86 in the last months of the war, krupp’s company had dispatched boxcar after boxcar of jewish workers back to concentration camps.87 thus, krupp had felt confident that a dedicated fund of dm 10 million would cover the predicted 1,200 survivor claimants. ferencz argues that krupp believed many of his victims would not have outlived their captivity in his factories, the death sentence of those sent to camps in 1945, and the post-war trauma.88 krupp was mistaken. due to the death camps not being fully functioning by the end of the war, over 7,000 claimants applied for the funds.89 krupp’s general manager, berthold beitz, faced a dilemma, as they were not willing to provide beyond the dm 10 million budgeted. he wrote to the claims conference president just five days before christmas 1963, expressing his sympathies but explaining that krupp was, as a matter of principle, not in a position to increase the amount that had been agreed upon.90 to make matters more challenging, many of those who had filed for claims could not prove that they had, in fact, worked in krupp’s factories due to the destruction of documents on krupp’s behalf and the frequency at which prisoners had been transported amongst companies in the third reich.91 despite the net worth of the krupp holdings being reported to be nearly one billion euros, beitz wrote to goldmann claiming that: 91 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 204. 90 ibid., p. 98. 89 ferencz, less than slaves, p. 96. 88 ibid., p. 204. 87 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 203. 86 ibid. 85 ferencz, less than slaves, pp. 97-98. 84 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 199. 83 y. michal bodemann, jews, germans, memory: reconstructions of jewish life in germany (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 1996). 84 despite all understanding of the difficult condition of the former concentration camp prisoners, which we solely for moral reasons expressed through our voluntary indemnification, we do not see ourselves in the position to make further sums available. i therefore do not consider even a discussion of this matter appropriate.92 if krupp believed himself to bear no responsibility, having spent the 1950s proving his innocence, it begs the question of why he paid the reparations. krupp’s representatives continued to claim that the payments had been a “voluntary sacrifice” made in the hopes of healing old wounds.93 krupp’s claim that he held no guilt nor responsibility for the treatment of forced laborers was not just inaccurate in legal terms, but it defied all logic. his release from landsberg prison in 1951 had not absolved him of any criminal convictions involving the use of slave labor and the treatment of slaves.94 the abuse and exploitation of laborers, including but not exclusive to whipping, execution, and starvation, had been proven at trial. krupp had admitted in affidavits to having, on several occasions, personally inspected the forced laborers.95 for all intents and purposes, krupp was still a criminal against humanity. yet not only was he reinstated with all his previous wealth, including the “blood money” he had earned from the efforts of the forced laborers, but he was not compelled to provide restitution to his victims and their families. ernest landau, a holocaust survivor, gives a glimpse into how his victims received this: “my god, look at how [alfried] krupp was allowed to start all over again and given back his millions of dollars when his slave workers were still dying in hospitals!”96 an evident failure to implicate concrete measures to ensure that the victims of the holocaust were honored and their suffering was in some way compensated can be seen in krupp’s inability to provide monetary reparations to all claimants. krupp was able to retrieve his wealth, deny his guilt (despite a criminal conviction), and refuse his victims any form of compensation beyond the symbolic “voluntary indemnification.” one could consider the reallocation of money the most transparent method of illustrating krupp’s crimes; the profit procured from the crimes is allocated back to the victims of them. the failure to do so amounts to the soft-core denial of the suffering caused by the holocaust and an example of secondary antisemitism. the lack of a system of governance or international intervention to ensure that this reallocation of funds took place also embodies a political failure to appropriately face the reality of the holocaust and its victims. in a debate in the british parliament’s house of commons in 1952, the leader of the liberal party clement davies raised the question, “in as much as this man was found guilty of using slave labor and of taking other people's property, it is not possible to divert some of this wealth to those people who have 96 leo katcher, post-mortem: the jews in germany today. (new york, 1968), p. 76. 95 trials of war criminals: the krupp trial (1950). 94 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 201. 93 manchester, the arms of krupp, p. 791. 92 ferencz, less than slaves, p. 98. 85 suffered…?”97 the foreign secretary, mr. eden, advised the commons that this was beyond british jurisdiction, given herr krupp was arrested, tried, and acquitted under american law.98 it was also argued that the responsibility for this should rest “fairly and squarely” on the last government. the general election of 1951 had resulted in a conservative victory over atlee’s labour government.99 it becomes abundantly clear that national politics, and indeed wider allied politics, played a key role in inhibiting the ability to appropriately respond to the short and long-term effects of the nazi holocaust. a member of the labour party likened krupp to “a rascal [who] got away with murder and is now getting away with swag.”100 whilst some members of parliament recognized the injustice in krupp’s reacquisition of wealth and influence, the british government made no effort to get involved. fear of a steady relationship with america and a harmonious allied occupation in germany, not to mention the internal conservative-labor politics, ultimately resulted in british inertia to protect the rights and the memory of holocaust victims. the passivity demonstrated by the british government here, and fundamentally other nations who failed to safeguard holocaust victims, amounts to the soft-core denial of the reality of the victims’ suffering. the acquittal of alfried krupp in 1951 and the restoration of his wealth, alongside the inability to establish an encompassing compensation program for his victims, contributed to the preliminary infrastructure of a post-war german society that conceded to soft-core holocaust denial and secondary antisemitism. it is within this unique societal make-up that the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg came to exist. the successor company of friedrich krupp ag, thyssenkrupp, is the result of a merger of thyssen ag and krupp in 1999. on alfried krupp’s death in 1967, the entirety of the krupp family holdings was transferred into an honorary foundation, the alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach foundation, which was to become thyssenkrupp’s largest stakeholder accounting for 20.9% of equities.101 the foundation would also strive to engage in other “philanthropic” activities, which included the creation of the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg in 2000. on thyssenkrupp’s website, it is possible to find details about the company’s history and relationship with national socialism. however, no research on krupp and his involvement with national socialism had been conducted until a research endeavor was launched in 2023 by the alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach foundation.102 in this paper, dr. conze explores “the person of alfried krupp and his relationship to national socialism 102 eckart conze, “alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach und der nationalsozialismus,” ed. jens brüggemann, ergebnisse des rechercheprojekts, july 16, 2023, 1–70, https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/app/uploads/2023/08/rechercheprojekt-_alfried-krupp-und-der-ns_-ergebnisse.pdf. 101 market screener, thyssenkrupp ag (tka), https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/thyssenkrupp-ag-436698/company/ . 100 goldman, “fuhrer of industry,” p. 203. 99 ibid. 98 ibid. 97 hansard, house of commons debate 15 october 1952, vol 5005 cc195-201, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1952/oct/15/herr-krupp-compensation> 86 https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/app/uploads/2023/08/rechercheprojekt-_alfried-krupp-und-der-ns_-ergebnisse.pdf https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/thyssenkrupp-ag-436698/company/ https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1952/oct/15/herr-krupp-compensation through source research.”103 unfortunately, the paper was published in german, rendering it inaccessible to non-german speakers. however, their website does state “there has not yet been a comprehensive study of his relationship to national socialism” and calls for further research, suggesting that conze’s study did not provide a conclusive interpretation of krupp’s crimes under nazi germany.104 the “foundation history” section of the university’s website offers no insight into the criminal background of their namesake, alfried krupp. rather, it boasts an image of the bust of alfried krupp which can be found in the kolleg’s foyer, and the website reads: “the alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach foundation contributed a significant portion of the foundation’s equity.”105 the university chooses to publicize that they were primarily funded by a foundation that inherited krupp’s money without once admitting to the frightful reality that this money had derived from the toil and suffering of forced laborers of the national socialist genocide. through my personal correspondence with the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald (which was initiated in the pursuit of this research), i received an extremely impersonal reply; its response to my request for further information regarding how the university addresses its national socialist past was a simple hyperlink to the aforementioned website alongside benign pleasantries. the alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg represents the pinnacle of lipstadt’s “soft-core denial.” whilst the leadership of the university makes no attempt to deny the holocaust outright nor the reality of krupp’s involvement with the genocide, they offer no assistance to the education and continued upholding of honor towards the victims of the holocaust. conclusion the survivor accounts mentioned in this research paper describe the horrifying conditions they were subjected to in the name of national socialism. the outcome of this research endeavor begs the question: does the naming of an educational institution such as the wissenschaftskolleg after a man responsible for such grave crimes against humanity satisfy this request given by holocaust survivors? as seen in the example of the council meeting for the ushmm, one cannot (and indeed ought not) deny the reality of a victim’s suffering when conducting a narrative for the holocaust and educating it to younger generations. an understanding of history itself is critical if we are to learn its lessons and honor its victims. once the legality of trying and convicting a criminal against humanity of krupp’s stead in international law is outlined, and the understanding of krupp’s economic and social context is achieved, one can begin to explore the damage caused by any ignorance of krupp’s crimes. the synthesis of historiographical studies in coercion and voluntarism in a totalitarian state with a specific eye to the third reich revealed that krupp’s criminality can be ascertained yet further. the evidence presented at the united states military tribunals 105 alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald, “the alfried krupp kolleg greifswald foundation,” https://www.wiko-greifswald.de/en/foundation/alfried-krupp-kolleg-greifswald-foundation/foundation-history/. 104 ibid. 103 alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach foundation, “alfried krupp alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach-stiftung,” alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach-stiftung, december 10, 2024, https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/alfried-krupp/. 87 https://www.wiko-greifswald.de/en/foundation/alfried-krupp-kolleg-greifswald-foundation/foundation-history/ https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/alfried-krupp/ in nuremberg revealed private correspondence between krupp and nsdap verifying that the krupp company was eager to establish a liaison of labor between their factories and the concentration camps. most significantly however, holocaust survivor testimonies and accounts of krupp’s victims not only humanize but allow one to sympathize with the severity of the consequences of krupp’s actions. lipstadt’s coinage of “soft-core denial” facilitates the scholar in a deeper comprehension of holocaust denial and its threats. in the case of alfried krupp and his employment of forced labor during the second world war, such soft-core denial is seen primarily in commissioner mccloy’s decision to release krupp from imprisonment and acquit him of his crimes. the wider context of the cold war and the newfound american motive for an amiable alliance with germany created the conditions necessary for krupp’s release. mccloy’s decision to not only release krupp from prison, but also reinstate him with his former wealth and assets that had been earnt at the toil of forced labor, ultimately was the result of a lack of regard for the suffering of thousands in krupp’s factories. holocaust survivor ernest landau perfectly summates the frustration that this inflicted upon krupp’s victims. as a scholar with the benefit of hindsight and contextual distance, a fear may ensue that justice could be carried out so ineptly. the politics of memory culture in germany is ultimately reflected as a nation that has been revered for its ability to acknowledge and come to terms with its past by other nations (and even acted as a role model for post-franco spain). yet, flaws are demonstrated in this essay by krupp’s release from prison, acquittal for his crimes, regaining his wealth and, ultimately, being used as a proud namesake for a higher education institution. the endeavor endured by krupp’s victims in attempting to retrieve some form of compensation further amounts to a form of “soft-core denial.” one may argue that it is not of huge significance nor surprise that krupp failed to compensate his victims in the full sum expected by the conference of jewish war claims. nonetheless, the contextual circumstances once again allowed for a failure on a european scale to ensure the reallocation of krupp’s wealth appropriately. some members of the british parliament recognized a disparity between krupp’s reinstatement as head of friedrich krupp ag and the lack of compensation, and yet the political setting disallowed intervention. not to mention, non-governmental organizations such as the conference for jewish war claims were not given the clout to be taken seriously. reallocation of monetary funds and public acceptance of responsibility may both be considered concrete measures to prevent holocaust denial and yet neither was achieved. the closing sentiments of deborah lipstadt’s monograph, the eichmann trial, reads: “i had heard it many times before from holocaust survivors: ‘les générations futures, ceux qui n’étaient pas là, doivent se souvenir. et nous qui étions là, doivent leur dire.’”106 future generations, those who were not there, must remember. and we who were there, must tell them. the next generation cannot possibly be aware of the full extent of the destruction caused by genocide if they are being educated in a university named after a genocidaire. 106 lipstadt, eichmann trial, p. 203 88 bibliography primary sources affidavit of karl hupe, korschan 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(new york, 1968). lipstadt, deborah, denying the holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory, (new york, 1993). lipstadt, deborah, the eichmann trial, (new york, 2011). manchester, william, the arms of krupp: 1587-1968, (boston, 1968). market screener, thyssenkrupp ag (tka), https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/thyssenkrupp-ag-436698/comp any/ nicosia, francis r., and jonathan huener, business and industry in nazi germany, (vermont, 2002). oxford reference, ‘totalitarianism’, oxford reference, <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105035 796>, rienzi, greg, ‘other nations could learn from germany’s efforts to reconcile after wwii’, john hopkins university, (2015), <https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/> schabas, william, genocide in international law, (2nd ed., cambridge, 2009). smith, clint. “monuments to the unthinkable.” the atlantic, november 14, 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/holocaust-remembrance -lessons-america/671893/. snyder, timothy, black earth: the holocaust as history and warning, (london, 2015). 92 https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/thyssenkrupp-ag-436698/company/ https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/thyssenkrupp-ag-436698/company/ https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105035796 https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105035796 https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/ stone, dan (ed.), the historiography of the holocaust, (london, 2004). kobrak, christopher, and andrea h. schneider, 'big business and the third reich: an appraisal of the historical arguments', pp. 141-172. lobont, florin, ‘antisemitism and holocaust denial in post-communist eastern europe’, pp. 440-498. stone, dan, ‘memory, memorial and museums’, pp. 508-532. team, pluswerk. “about alfried krupp von bohlen und halbach alfried krupp wissenschaftskolleg greifswald.” wiko-greifswald.de, 2022. https://www.wiko-greifswald.de/en/foundation/alfried-krupp-kolleg-greifswald-fo undation/about-alfried-krupp-von-bohlen-und-halbach/. tedxskoll, lecture by deborah lipstadt, ‘behind the lies of holocaust denial’, (april 2017), < https://www.ted.com/talks/deborah_lipstadt_behind_the_lies_of_holocaust_denial/ up-next?language=en>. trevor-roper, hugh, (ed.), hitler's table talk, (london, 1953). vidal-naquet, pierre, assassins of memory, (new york, 1992). villa, dana (ed.), the cambridge companion to hannah arendt, (cambridge, 2000). wiesen, s. jonathan, ‘overcoming nazism: big business, public relations, and the politics of memory, 1945-50’, central european history, vol. 29, no. 2, (1996). wiesen, s. jonathan, 'reconstruction and recollection: west german industry and the challenge of the nazi past, 1945-55', thesis, university of brown, (1992). wilkins, william j, the sword and the gavel: an autobiography, (seattle, 1981). y michal bodemann. jews, germans, memory: reconstructions of jewish life in germany. ann arbor: university of michigan press, 1996. 93 genocidaire alfried krupp: the implications of memorializing a criminal against humanity introduction terminology and methodology alfried krupp: coercion and voluntarism in german industrial institutions the economic context for alfried krupp an examination of oral testimonies of alfried krupp’s victims larger political failures to engage with national socialist past bibliography cey bobowiec challenges to preservation of holocaust memory in poland natalia bobowiec university of minnesota abstract holocaust memory in poland has faced various challenges in its development and preservation in the last twenty years. notably, widespread antisemitism and the political atmosphere has caused memory to form differently in poland than in its surrounding nations. holocaust memory is dynamic and fragile, meaning it is constantly being influenced by polish politics, media, and institutions. previously, historians commonly defended one of two main perspectives: that poles were heroes or helpless bystanders, or that poles were active perpetrators in crimes against jews. this original binary thinking ignores additional nuances such as the prevalence of nationalism in polish history, as well as generational suffering following the holocaust. building upon a third perspective introduced by jolanta ambrosewicz-jacobs, this paper discusses poles as both victims and perpetrators taking into account these additional nuances and further examining societal attitudes, poland's educational systems, and the attitudes of young people in poland today. article introduction on october 5th, 2021, auschwitz-birkenau was vandalized with antisemitic and holocaust denying phrases.1 while antisemitic desecration of the place where millions of jews were murdered during world war ii may be especially shocking, these hateful attitudes expressed by the vandals have been growing in poland. the institute of national remembrance, established in 1998, once played a pivotal role in clarifying holocaust memory by investigating the role of poles in pogroms and other historical crimes against jews occurring between november, 1917 and july, 1990.2 however, in 2003, when the institute of national remembrance exposed ethnic poles as the sole perpetrators of the jedwabne pogrom of 1941, in which they trapped a large group of jews inside a barn and burned it down, there was a dramatic increase in discussions surrounding holocaust 2 institute of national remembrance, “mission,” institute of national remembrance, august 14, 2006, https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-institute/mission/2,institute-of-national-remembrance-commission-for-th e-prosecution-of-crimes-again.html. 1 jaclyn peiser, “nine barracks at auschwitz death camp were vandalized with antisemitic, holocaustdenying phrases,” the washington post, october 6, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/20 21/10/06/auschwitz-birkenau-vandalized-holocaust/. 3 https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-institute/mission/2,institute-of-national-remembrance-commission-for-the-prosecution-of-crimes-again.html https://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-institute/mission/2,institute-of-national-remembrance-commission-for-the-prosecution-of-crimes-again.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/10/06/auschwitz-birkenau-vandalized-holocaust/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/10/06/auschwitz-birkenau-vandalized-holocaust/ memory in poland.3 suddenly, analyses like jan t. gross’s neighbors: tthe ddestruction of the jewish ccommunity in jedwabne, poland, which had been published in 2000, received backlash for being “anti-polish” and misrepresenting catholic poles during the holocaust.4 the book’s publishing publication triggered the initial investigation, causing many to blame gross for reintroducing this discussion to the public sphere. the institute of national remembrance is now heavily influenced by the currently ruling political party: prawo i sprawiedliwość (pis or law and justice party) in poland whose nationalistic goals thwart hinder discussions of poles as perpetrators of holocaust crimes. additionally, pis began to pass legislation that has stifled historical research surrounding jewish-polish relations and history. these events are signals that holocaust memory and discussion in poland have developed to be an atypically contested topic compared to surrounding european nations. because polish legislation has reflected and reinforced broader polish attitudes and history education has been historically traditionally utilized as a medium for nationalism, holocaust memory has developed differently in poland than other nations, especially which is particularly evident in the resistanceing towards discussions of poles as perpetrators and focusing the focus on the victimization of poles. in 2018, the controversial “holocaust law” criminalized accusing poles of being perpetrators of war crimes. if found guilty, accusers could be sentenced for up to three years in prison. after backlash from influential allies like israel and the united states, the sejm (polish parliament) amended this law so that imprisonment was no longer a potential consequence.5 regardless, this law still holds influence today and has been referenced in recent court cases. in february 2021, a district court in warsaw found jan grabowski and barbara engleking, the authors of dalej jest noc: losy żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej polski (night without end: the fates of jews in selected counties of occupied poland), published in 2018, guilty of “violating the honor” of a polish man who was the mayor of a small village in nazi-occupied poland.6 the plaintiff in this case wais the niece of the man discussed in the book, and the court ordered the historians to issue a public apology. furthermore, as of 2007, the ministry of national education reviews textbooks and only allows those that coincide with the ministry’s new core curriculum to be used in schools.7 this educational reform severely limits what textbooks teachers are allowed to utilize in their classrooms, and the texts they are allowed to choose from all have a strikingly similar tables of contents. most recently in august of 2021, pis passed yet another law that prevents former property owners in poland, including holocaust survivors and their descendants, from recovering property seized by the nation’s communist regime following 7 krzysztof jaskułowski, piotr majewski, and adrianna surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism: school history education in poland (new york: routledge, 2021). 6 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 5 adam easton, “poland holocaust law: government u-turn on jail threat,” bbc news, june 27, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44627129. 4 mikhal dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history,” boston review, november 18, 2021, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/polands-current-memorypolitics-are-rewriting-history/. 3 jan tomasz gross, neighbors: the destruction of the jewish community in jedwabne, poland (princeton: princeton university press, 2001). 4 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44627129 https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/polands-current-memory-politics-are-rewriting-history/ world war ii, once again reflecting the nation’s political climate and efforts to suppress holocaust discussion.8 the predominant perspective of polish public opinion seems to accept that some poles did in fact commit crimes during the holocaust, but this past should not be discussed deeplyin depth. polish citizens and historians vary on how much blame should be placed on poles for their crimes, although generally polish people do acknowledge ethnic poles to be perpetrators of holocaust crimes in some capacity.9 nevertheless, nationalism is widespread in polish society resulting in many poles being protective of their nation’s history, prioritizing honoring those who were heroes and avoiding discussing the shameful history that may taint the polish image. since the fall of the communist regime in poland, nationalism has been deeply rooted in polish values and history education. it is increasingly difficult to acknowledge the truth when one’s entire education solely focuses on the narrative of the heroes without acknowledging any of the perpetrators.10 as a result of major legislation and discussion in mainstream media, historians have taken one of two main positions: that poles were either heroes or helpless bystanders, or that poles were active perpetrators in crimes against jews.11 in “politics of innocence: holocaust memory in poland,” kornelia konczal reports on the historical arguments that put forward thise claim that poles were either heroes or helpless bystanders.12 this claim is founded on the idea that helping jews put poles’ lives at risk and that reluctantly giving them up to the nazis would allow poles to save themselves.13 to oppose this perspective, jan grabowski and barabara engleking in their book dalej jest noc, provide countless examples of polish people who committed crimes against jews during the second world war, in addition to the massacre at jedwabne.14 other historical examples include individuals who had willingly sold wood to the german authorities to build concentration camps.15 this binary thinking that has dominated the historiography fails to take into account the complexity of circumstances and human actions. an additional factor that most historiography fails to consider is the delicate nuances of generational trauma as a potential reason for poles defending themselves and their actions. nevertheless there are two 15 beth holmgren, “holocaust history and jewish heritage preservation: scholars and stewards working in pis-ruled poland,” shofar: an interdisciplinary journal of jewish studies 37, no. 1 (spring 2019): 96–107, doi:10.1353/sho.2019.0004. 14 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 13 konczal, “politics of innocence.” 12 konczal, “politics of innocence.” 11 kornelia konczal, “politics of innocence: holocaust memory in poland,” journal of genocide research 24, no. 2 (2022): 250–63. 10 wojciech kalwat, piotr szlanta, and andrzej zawistowski. historia 8: podręcznik: szkoła podstawowa [history 8: textbook: primary school] (warszawa: wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne spółka akcyjna, 2020). 9 adam szostkiewicz, “bulwersujący wyrok ws. autorów książki „dalej jest noc’” [“shocking verdict vs. authors of book “„night without end’”], polityka.pl., february 9, 2021. https://www.polityka.pl/tygod nikpolityka/kraj/2103329,1,bulwersujacy-wyrok-ws-autorow-ksiazki -dalej-jest-noc.read. 8 vanessa gera, “poland passes law that would cut off property claims,” ap news, august 11, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-poland-laws-aff8252937db7f5b8e3653f 71e7726bb. 5 https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2103329,1,bulwersujacy-wyrok-ws-autorow-ksiazki-dalej-jest-noc.read https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2103329,1,bulwersujacy-wyrok-ws-autorow-ksiazki-dalej-jest-noc.read https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-poland-laws-aff8252937db7f5b8e3653f71e7726bb historians who do acknowledge not only poles’ nationalism, but also generational trauma, when discussing the roles of poles as victims and perpetrators in the holocaust. jolanta ambrosewicz-jacobs and jan gross have contributed to holocaust memory historiography by introducing a third viewpoint: poles were both victims of nazism and perpetrators during the holocaust. many poles had collaborated with nazis and committed crimes against jewish poles. moreover, many non-jewish polish people also suffered during the holocaust and in concentration camps. gross emphasizes that “when reflecting upon this epoch, we must not assign collective responsibility. we must be clear headed enough to remember that for each killing only a specific murderer or group of murderers is responsible.”16 likewise, those who lived in poland throughout the course of the second world war experienced a war-torn nation that had collapsed and fallen to the nazis overnight. this collective trauma of living through a gruesome war is a contributing factor to conflicts over historical memory as many poles see themselves as victims of the nazis. although polish trauma is considerably different from jewish trauma in the grand scheme of the holocaust, it is a contributing factor to conflicts over historical memory. non-jewish poles had a different lived experience than jewish poles and jews in general, but they experienced a gruesome war nonetheless. additionally, as mentioned, nationalism is a core polish value that needs to be taken into consideration when discussing polish education and holocaust memory. when discussion of the holocaust assigns blame to groups of poles for holocaust crimes, many poles become defensive in protecting their country’s honor. despite the amount of time that has passed since world war ii, polish nationalism is deeply rooted in polish history, and education has been consistently used as a medium for further instilling polish patriotism in youth. the recent legislation created by the pis is significant in shaping attitudes about the wartime experience, but it is not the direct reason why holocaust education and discussion is difficult. rather, the new laws are contributing factors, since the rising power of the pis and their recent holocaustrelated laws are in turn a reflection of the preexisting attitudes of many polish people. focusing on these nuances of generational collective trauma, history education as a medium for nationalism, political legislation as a reflection of broader polish attitudes, and an overall lack of nuance in understandings about the holocaust, this article will investigate how holocaust memory has developed differently in poland than other nations and explore potential reasons for why it has developed this way. memory memory is a concept that is difficult to define as it can be applied in a variety of contexts. memory as a phenomenon can be defined as the way that individuals persistently learn over time through storing and retrieving information.17 memory can also be trained to become a process, but the preservation of memory “has the character of a material object” as it has become a part of the present that is actively being shaped, uncovered, and clarified.18 in the context of history, memory is what is remembered about a certain event, 18 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 27. 17 jolanta ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory: the landscape of the (non)memory of the holocaust in polish education between 1989-2015, first edition (kraków: jagiellonian university press, 2020). 16 gross, neighbors, 134. 6 time period, or group of people in history. this includes the sentiments surrounding the events and individuals involved. most importantly, historical memory also involves what is not remembered, or is intentionally erased from history. memory holds many meanings and functions for the present and the future, as memory allows humans to learn from the past and also plays a role in the development of “contemporary political culture, its norms, values, rules and attitudes through the choice of what our societies should remember.”19 holocaust memory, like historical memories more generally, are particularly fragile, susceptible to influence, and emotionally charged. the collective memories of holocaust survivors and their loved ones “are loaded with strong emotions and evaluations of facts and personalities” that allow individuals to reevaluate them.20 not only does holocaust memory consist of the experiences of individual people, but also groups of people and their collective personal, social, and political experiences.21 in this way it is constructed like a complicated puzzle, but depending on who, or which group, is building the puzzle, the portrait does not quite turn out the same. there are also circles of society from which memories diffuse. for example, while knowledge regarding the pogroms in poland was known in academic circles among scholars, this information had not become part of the collective consciousness until popular media began to scrutinize the findings of the institute of national remembrance. the preservation of historical memory has a physical property, meaning that it is kept in textbooks, historical artifacts, news articles, and more. it is also important to note that textbooks and written articles are made by people. this holocaust memory lives within real people who experienced the event themselves or learned about the event. there are tangible objects and people that hold holocaust memory meaning it is particularly susceptible to change, whether that is intentional or not. memory is affected by culture and institutions, including schools, media, and churches as they influence perspectives.22 all current events further shift perspectives and ideas of the past and current politics can resemble or relate to historical events and figures.23 because perspectives are changing, historical memory inevitably changes over time. similarly, memory can be intentionally altered by institutions that want to highlight a certain perspective, for example, to maintain a certain identity, support a present political situation or figure, and more. recent contestations over historical memory in poland poland was previously thought to be doing groundbreaking work in terms of holocaust studies. monica rice claimed in 2018 that “polish scholars have been at the cutting edge of holocaust research” with its focus on polish-jewish relations.24 in the previous twenty years of research prior to the 2018 holocaust law and recent controversy, polish scholarly “memory of its jewish past has demonstrated an impressive commitment to coming to 24 monika rice, “with anti-semitism on the rise, can poland come to terms with its past?,” america 219, no. 11 (2018): 28. 23 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 29. 22 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 29. 21 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 30. 20 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 28. 19 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 27. 7 terms with its history,” especially compared to other nations such as ukraine and lithuania who have yet to face their transgressions of world war ii.25 beth holmgren believes that it was during the initial twenty-five years following the fall of the soviet union where jewish studies became “well established at several major polish universities” and “professional relationships among polish, israeli, and american educators and activists increased.”26 there was controversy among politicians and academics in 2003 with the discovery by the institute of national remembrance about the jedwabne pogrom and in 2008 with the educational reform, but it was not until the 2018 “holocaust law” that the controversy infiltrated popular consciousness. this resulted in the greatest amount of mainstream backlash, with the debate regarding holocaust memory becoming a hot topic on news outlets, blogs, and social media. furthermore, the rise of prawo i sprawiedliwośćpis in poland resulted in setbacks in holocaust historiography. as a result, the suppression of historians’ crucial work in recent years is particularly unfortunate. in the present day, polish historians and writers are fearful of writing about holocaust memory, as those who do so are “bombarded by ‘a barrage of hate mail.’”27 the authors of dalej jest noc were just one example of historians that fell victim to the public eye when they were accused and sued for “violating” a pole’s honor. grabowski’s father, who is a holocaust survivor himself, believes that the current national atmosphere and general attitudes of poles resemble those of the 1930s.28 jan grabowski’s ttwitter (now x) feed has been filled with hateful messages and negativity to the extent that his mother fears being attacked when walking the streets of warsaw with her son. even those who comment on grabowski and engleking’s text become targets of polish resentment. in the new yorker, masha gessen wrote about the authors’ trial and discussed poland’s attempt to exonerate itself and its people of the death of three million jews.29 this commentary resulted in a flood of backlash that included death threats and other hate mail being sent to gessen. when a new york times article reviewed mikal dekhel’s book, tehran children: a holocaust refugee odyssey, it discussed poles who “equate polish and jewish suffering” to create “a vision of ‘shared’ history.”30 unsurprisingly, angry poles came to dekhel’s ttwitter page to voice their disapproval. this public response to holocaust memory discussion in poland stifles scholarships and deters historians from publishing works on this topic. those that are brave enough to do so expect to suffer the consequence of polish retaliation. historians are not the only ones receiving hate mail as these popular attitudes have also infiltrated educational spaces in poland, greatly influencing the attitudes of both teachers and students, altering the learning environment. these opinions become concrete barriers when parents and community members send hate mail to teachers and historians. magdalena gross studied a group of non-jewish teachers who decided to implement a new 30 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 29 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 28 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 27 dekel, “poland's current memory politics are rewriting history.” 26 holmgren, “holocaust history and jewish heritage preservation.” 25 rice, “with anti-semitism on the rise, can poland come to terms with its past?,” 30. 8 curriculum and increase their own knowledge of the holocaust in poland.31 her interviews with the educators revealed considerable backlash from parents as multiple teachers had received hate mail at their homes that included rhetoric such as “no more jewing up the curriculum” and “how are your jews today?”32 this fearless display of antisemitism by parents illustrates blatant opposition for teaching polish-jewish history. considering the hate mail as a potential reflection of parental attitudes suggests that youth may be learning from their parents to push back against education about the holocaust. this idea will be crucial later, as learner attitudes are also important in the efficacy of comprehensive holocaust education. the parents who send these messages to educators are likely also expressing these ideas at home, discouraging their children from further investigating holocaust history. teachers are therefore constantly being discouraged from teaching about jewish as holocaust history as they may be putting themselves and their safety at risk if they choose to do so. in addition to these parental attitudes, widespread and increasing xenophobia and antisemitism among polish politicians and poles in general poses a major hindrance to holocaust education. the centre for research on prejudice at the university of warsaw conducted a study in 2013 where 69 percent of respondents revealed that they do not want non-white people living in poland.33 this highlights that an overwhelming majority of poles not only hold, but admit to holding, xenophobic attitudes. similarly, jolanta ambrosewicz-jacobs recreated her own 1998 study as closely as she could in 2008 to investigate how these attitudes towards foreigners and minorities have developed over the past decade. the minorities discussed in this setting included jews, germans, ukrainians, roma, and russians. in the 1998 study, about one third of the national sample believed that some of the minorities living within poland could harm poles and the polish nation.34 in 2008, this number shifted to every fifth individual in the national sample believing that poland and the poles could be harmed by minorities living in poland.35 despite xenophobia and antisemitism presumably decreasing since 1998, as of 2008 roughly 20 percent of the nation still openly expresses fear of minorities, illustrating that xenophobia persists among the polish population. this particular study does not differentiate between which specific minorities produce the most fear or hate from poles, but the foundation for the preservation of jewish heritage investigated this further asking participants questions about specific minority groups and their attitudes towards them. participants were asked about being in romantic relationships with, sitting in class next to, or attending the same school as the presented ethnic group. this study concluded that roma and jews were among the minorities least welcomed in poland across these presented social situations indicating the steadfastness of antisemitism in addition to xenophobia as poles continue to consider jewish people to be one of the most unfavorable minorities in poland.36 36 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 217. 35 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 213. 34 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 215. 33 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 214. 32 gross, “no longer estranged,” 131. 31 magdalena h. gross, “no longer estranged: learning to teach the holocaust in poland,” holocaust studies, 24, no. 2 (2018), 131-49, doi: 10.1080/17504902.2017.1380922. 9 poles’ relative willingness to admit to their xenophobic and antisemitic beliefs speaks to the sociopolitical atmosphere in poland and what ideas, beliefs, and speech are tolerated. in addition to the legislation that bans discussion of poles as perpetrators in the holocaust, current politicians in poland that have come to power throughout the reign of the pis party have used their platforms to spread antisemitism and xenophobia, creating an atmosphere conducive to hostility. jarosław kaczyński, who is the leader of the pis party and arguably the most powerful politician in poland, warned poles about the “parasites transmitted by the refugees.”37 this is imperative because when individuals see their politicians publicly and fearlessly declaring foreigners to carry “parasites,” it further cultivates an environment where this type of speech is accepted and supported.38 kaczyński made this statement ahead of the last parliamentary election and nevertheless, succeeded in holding his seat. another pis politician, zbigniew girżyński, made a similar detrimental comment about islam being a “violent religion” and that even “muslim children are a deadly threat” to the polish nation.39 later, jarosław gowin, who once served as the polish minister of justice and was nominated as politician of the year, stated that his main role as a “polish politician is to prevent anyone from ever blowing up a polish newborn.”40 he has since been dismissed from serving in the sejm and the polish government entirely due to homophobic comments. but the former two politicians, kaczyński and girżyński, continue to hold prominent positions within the government. the comments of these powerful men reflect that polish society may have a larger threshold for xenophobic, islamophobic, and antisemitic comments as it takes many offensive remarks for a politician to lose support. although not all hate speech is tolerated in poland, there seems to be a greater intolerance to foreigners. in fact, once politicians began openly expressing xenophobic ideologies, these attitudes became more and more present in mainstream, popular culture. for example, in polish hip-hop music songs warn “against the islamisation of poland,” which may explain why politicians who make hateful anti-refugee statements are not removed from power.41 this rhetoric has successfully infiltrated polish society and is no longer restricted to the right, as some liberal poles have been drawing on islamophobic imagery as well.42 this phenomenon allows for prejudice and bigotry to become a larger component of polish society. as a result, politicians that take advantage of these ideas and choose to advocate against immigration continue to be reelected. this phenomenon creates an echo chamber where once people begin to broadcast their hateful ideas, their behavior is reinforced and more people continue to spread hatred. this xenophobia may exist because poland is one of the most homogeneous nations in europe in terms of ethnicity and religion, but politicians continue to fuel this hatred.43 therefore a combination of these factors create an environment in which open xenophobia, antisemitism, and contempt can grow in multiple 43 “world directory of minorities & indigenous peoples: poland,” minority rights group international, july 2018, https://minorityrights.org/country/poland/. 42 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 41 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 40 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 39 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 38 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 37 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, celebrating nationalism, iix. 10 https://minorityrights.org/country/poland/ realms of society, including education, which is now full of obstacles to discussion of comprehensive holocaust history. to examine why the sociopolitical environment may have formed to be conducive to xenophobia and antisemitism, it is important to return to the concept of trauma and emotional stress as it has a deep influence on memory. traumas, as defined by psychoanalysts, refers to “overwhelming events not processed at the time of their occurrence.” the memories associated with the emotional distress of displaying cowardice or potential complicity in crime is particularly strong as these feelings can create intense guilt and shame.44 according to ambrosewicz-jacobs, there are also a variety of different ways to deal with this type of emotional suffering. for example there is “working through” trauma and “acting out” trauma.45 the former involves recognizing the source of one’s emotional distress and assists in avoiding projecting anxieties onto scapegoats, while the ladder refers to the repetition of one’s emotional stressors or the original event.46 this repetition is often called transference, particularly when the stressor is generational. the emotional distress of the holocaust in poland has been transmitted across multiple generations. generations referring to varying age groups of individuals who had an experience with the holocaust. the original generation refers to those who were adults during the time of the holocaust, but there are other age groups of individuals who were emotionally affected such as those who were very young during the holocaust, those who were born to parents that endured the holocaust, and those who have grandparents and great-grandparents that were alive during the astrocity. survivors are still living in poland today, but more prevalently are the polish kin of survivors, victims, and perpetrators. dealing with unprocessed emotional suffering, or not doing so at all by blocking memories, results in “values, myths, and behaviors” being “transmitted from generation to generation providing vicarious experience.”47 because narratives of family members as perpetrators during the holocaust are typically neglected, children and grandchildren are likely raised hearing alternative oral stories focusing on what their loved ones had to endure, many of whom they may have been unable to meet while they were still alive. many families are holding onto these oral histories along with photos, journal entries, and other important artifacts that are pieces of their family history from the second world war. to the families, all of the relatives' lives lost are heroes and to think of them that way brings them peace. therefore discussion of poles as perpetrators tends to feel like an attack on poles because that is not the way they know and understand their family history. transmission of family knowledge along these generations has created an established holocaust history for each family. discovering an alternative truth may be especially emotionally difficult since the original story came from their family that they loved and trusted, and was accepted by other family members. collectively, families share this history therefore it is distressing when a historian makes the claim that many poles were in fact, 47 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 32. 46 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 34. 45 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 34. 44 zygmunt bauman, postmodern ethics (cambridge: blackwell publishers, 1993). 11 not the people that present poles thought they were. even for historians, holocaust memory is difficult to digest. following his research of the jedwabne pogrom, historian jan gross held onto his knowledge for four years before he could bring himself to articulate the history and write neighbors. ultimately, this element of emotional stress puts poles in a position where they are unsure of where to place themselves and their family in history. it is difficult to think of a loved one as a perpetrator when they were originally believed to be a victim. this complicates polish historical memory because one cannot reasonably claim that all poles were perpetrators or all poles were victims. the lack of nuances in understanding holocaust narratives, although it may not be unique to poland, plays a large role in this nation’s difficulty in discussing holocaust memory. the traumatic event itself will always have the greatest effect on the victim, but “it also affects everyone who comes in contact with it: perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders, resisters, those born later.”48 sigmund freud commented on this idea of screen memories. in terms of psychic splitting, this means that historians, victims, perpetrators, or outsiders of the trauma simply split perpetration and victimhood without acknowledging more complex scenarios such as those in which individuals can be both victims and perpetrators, but also in which victims can become the perpetrators.49 the role of teachers and education as many poles and their families have deep, interpersonal, and emotional ties to the holocaust, discussion of it inevitably influences all members of the population in some capacity, including teachers. subsequently, educators’ and educational administrators’ attitudes towards history education and the holocaust impacts what youth are taught in schools. while there are educators who choose to teach jewish history and comprehensive world war ii history despite the backlash from parents, many teachers hold antisemitic views themselves and consciously choose not to discuss jewish holocaust history in their classrooms. in 2010, in response to magdalena gross’s survey, one teacher named tomek stated that the greatest challenge for those who sought to teach holocaust history is other teachers. he told the story of a colleague who recently quit working in the middle school of a small town near warsaw, as her coworkers chanted “none of those jews today! żadnych żydów dzisiaj!” as she entered the school building each day.50 this anecdote illustrates that especially in smaller towns, teachers who seek to teach the holocaust have a lack of support. these daily comments from colleagues, like the hate mail from parents, is incredibly discouraging and hinders teachers’ ability and desire to continue teaching about the holocaust. the offensive chants from the colleagues mentioned implies that they themselves do not teach and actively oppose teaching comprehensive holocaust education. this creates a cycle where the educators who do believe in teaching adequate holocaust history are intimidated and tormented by those who fiercely oppose it and, like the teacher who quit working at the middle school near warsaw, will eventually choose not to implement it in their classrooms. 50 gross, “no longer estranged,” 138. 49 gabriele schwab, haunting legacies: violent histories and transgenerational trauma (new york: columbia university press, 2010). 48 dominick lacapra and mazal holocaust collection, history and memory after auschwitz (ithaca: cornell university press, 2018), 9. 12 despite varying teacher attitudes towards jews, the polish curriculum for history education itself is designed to promote nationalism and a nationalistic version of polish history. the polish history curriculum has consistently played an important role in promoting and maintaining polish honor. although it started before then, it was strengthened in the communist period following world war ii where the centralized education system had one “party-approved” textbook for each grade.51 this meant that educators at each grade level were provided with a textbook that they were required to teach. they were not able to choose their own textbook or teach content outside of the book. after the fall of the communist regime, educational reforms introduced a new core curriculum that focused on contradicting communist teaching portraying communism as a cataclysm rather than the peak of poland’s success. in 2008, an additional educational reform kept primary school history the same, covering ancient history to modern history, but lower secondary schools (parallel to american middle schools) only learned history from ancient times to 1914. then, students’ history schooling depended on what they wanted to study in upper secondary school (similar to american high schools). in their first year of secondary school, pupils learn an overview of history from 1914 to the present. students who choose history as a major subject in secondary school would continue to learn broad periods of history in greater detail, but those that choose other subjects are mandated to take “history and society.” this course is an alternative that focuses on various historical time periods and issues.52 the 2008 reform initially frightened right-wing journalists and politicians as they feared that not knowing enough about “poland’s past” would “erode their national identity.”53 this was viewed as a catastrophe that would threaten “the existence of the polish nation,” highlighting how a potential change from a nationalist model of historical education was undesirable for many.54 despite their worries, the reform reinforced nationalism and continued to focus on primarily polish history. although the primary school curriculum contains discussions of “civic participation, social sensitivity, tolerance, and ties with groups of different scales,” the core curriculum for history education in poland continued to focus on teaching primarily the history of the polish nation.55 conversations about social issues and tolerance are reserved as minor, insignificant topics that may or may not be discussed in the classroom depending on the teacher. in the example of the primary school curriculum, the subject of “history and society” is divided into thematic blocks. there are a total of 17 thematic blocks and 12 of those “concern exclusively polish history and the remaining 5 are devoted to general history, but they also contain polish themes.”56 similarly, an overwhelming 80 percent of history for youth in the first grade of primary school is political history, “with a prevalence of national history content” and “a strong synchronization of polish history with european and world history.”57 this is the wording used in the official commentary of the curriculum 57 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 56 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 55 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 54 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 18. 53 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 18. 52 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, ix. 51 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, ix. 13 as approved by the ministry of national education, highlighting that history education continues to focus on poland and promoting nationalist ideology. in the core curriculum, the polish nation is constantly emphasized as the “main object of loyalty.”58 the ministry further explains this, by saying that the goal of history education is to “instill values associated with tradition, especially homeland tradition.”59 educators are able to choose their own textbooks, albeit they must choose books from a list approved by the ministry. because reviewers are appointed to evaluate the books based on their “compatibility with the core curriculum,” many of the books have similar, if not identical, tables of contents.60 additionally, educators are given the illusion of choice, but all polish history textbooks are published by one of three publishers that have monopolized the market.61 according to the ministry of national education, the textbooks used in schools should be “deeply rooted in the polish tradition of teaching history” and absolutely should not “discuss controversial issues such as the scale of poles’ participation in the holocaust.” this accentuates the idea that there is a connection between protecting polish honor, and abstaining from discussing comprehensive holocaust history.62 this can be seen in practice in historia 8, an eighth year history textbook developed by wojciech kalwat, piotr szlanta, and andrzej zawistowski where the holocaust takes up a total of 6 of the 235 pages. the headers in this section include: dwa oblicza niemieckiej okupacji (two faces of the german occupation), terror, różne postawy wobec okupanta (different attitudes towards the occupier), zbrodnia jakiej nie widział świat (a crime unlike what the world has seen), powstanie w getcie warszawskim (uprising in the warsaw ghetto,) and polacy wobec holokaustu (poles in the holocaust).63 in the section różne postawy wobec okupanta (different attitudes towards the occupier), the textbook features one sentence to state that some people living in nazi occupied land collaborated with the occupiers. immediately afterwards, the section takes several sentences to say that many poles were particularly resistant to nazi occupation and participated in various diversion tactics and sabotage.64 additionally, polacy wobec holokaustu (poles in the holocaust) stresses the consequences of being caught helping jews in the holocaust and tells the heroic stories of irena sendlerowa and the ulmów family.65 irena sendlerowa helped around 2,500 jewish children by creating false documents that would allow them to escape the warsaw ghetto and, when that was no longer an option, organized places for them to hide with families.66 the ulmów family hid two jewish families, and when discovered, the parents and six children were shot and killed.67 the textbook does not make any mention of poles as perpetrators, only one sentence says some were collaborators. there was also no 67 kalwat, szlanta, and zawistowski, historia 8, 23. 66 kalwat, szlanta, and zawistowski, historia 8, 23. 65 kalwat, szlanta, and zawistowski, historia 8, 23. 64 kalwat, szlanta, and zawistowski, historia 8, 23. 63 kalwat, szlanta, and zawistowski, historia 8, 22. 62 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 61 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 20. 60 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 20. 59 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 58 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak, teaching history, 19. 14 mention of holocaust memory, or comment on any explicit polish crimes. historia 8 reflects the requirements of the ministry of national education and entirely omits the nuances of polish involvement in the holocaust. these brief six pages do not adequately encompass all the essential components of the holocaust in poland and instead emphasize polish heroism illustrating how holocaust memory has developed in poland. conspicuously, this results in students solely believing poles to be heroes during the holocaust and creates a foundation for nationalist ideology. if poles were to be confronted with knowledge that contradicts this belief, it would be easy not to believe it. not only because of potential family ties to the event, but also because their education specifically taught them that polish individuals had helped jews during the holocaust and that poland led the strongest resistance to nazi rule. this intentional curriculum makes it difficult for poles to learn new information that contradicts this narrative throughout their education. unless a student chooses to study history at the university level where most comprehensive holocaust discussion and scholarship occurs, they may never be exposed to a narrative that strays from the polish core curriculum. even well-intentioned educators that attempt to fight the core curriculum have often internalized these nationalistic ideas themselves. even if they are not antisemitic or intentionally avoiding holocaust memory, they avoid discussion of poles as perpetrators either because they believe this narrative tarnishes polish honor or because it is undoubtedly uncomfortable. it is not that these educators are particularly susceptible to internalization, but rather that nationalism is exceptionally closely tied to polish identity. magdalena gross writes of a holocaust education program designed for teachers that took place at a university in poland in 2010. in this six day program, sixty teachers from all over the country participated in workshops administered by historians from israel, the united states, and poland.68 the first survey question asked educators: “what does being polish mean to you? what does identity mean?”69 most teachers expressed a national identity by attributing a character such as traditions, cultural leaders, language, and land to the polish nation, demonstrating that “being polish” is both an ethnic and a civil identity. a teacher in the program responded saying that the “bottom line” for being polish is “protecting the national symbols and national memory of our great ancestors” and “a feeling of collectiveness with one of the greatest histories in the world” further exhibiting the importance of the polish national identity.70 even though this program about holocaust education for educators is voluntary and participants are relatively well-intentioned, this quote highlights how polish nationalism, either consciously or subconsciously, is ingrained in poles. following the survey, educators were asked to respond to a scenario in which a student comes to class and says: “you cannot be polish and jewish at the same time.”71 many educators immediately sought to introduce the students to examples of individuals who 71 gross, “no longer estranged,” 135. 70 gross, “no longer estranged,” 134. 69 gross, “no longer estranged,” 134. 68 gross, “no longer estranged,” 133. 15 were jewish poles. the wording they used suggested that polish and jewish identities were independent of one another. educators expressed trying to find examples of “‘a pole who felt jewish,’ ‘a pole who was also jewish,’ or ‘a jew who was a pole.’”72 providing examples that students can understand makes sense, as youth tend to learn new material best when given discernable examples, but then the educators provided names of what poles refer to as, “polonized jews.” “polonized jews” are jewish poles who were artists or cultural figures where “polonized” refers to a type of cultural assimilation, where a population that is considered to be non-polish takes on polish characteristics. it is essential to note that polish identity and roman catholicism are heavily intertwined. as a result, jewish poles who create art or make major contributions displaying their loyalty to polish society may then be considered polish, but are considered polonized. teachers’ depiction of jewish poles as providing an artistic service to poland illustrates the educators’ positive intentions of providing their students with great examples of jewish poles, but highlights educators’ prioritization of jews’ contributions to the polish nation in order to call them polish. educators further explained that “one can love two fatherlands at the same time, their cultures and nations, and identity with them,” but the implication of this idea is that “one can feel both jewish and polish, that the two can coexist but not commingle.”73 this exposes the reality that poles, no matter how well-intentioned they may be, often see jewish and polish identities as disassociated, making it difficult to teach tolerance and adequate history since jewish history is seen as separate from the history of the polish nation. the educators in the program later experienced struggles in regards to incorporating “jewish experience into the polish curriculum as ‘normal history’” and sought to present jews as “normal people” when jewish history should be presented as a part of polish history.74 for these educators, what is “normal" is equivalent to what is polish. this issue further develops this idea that one can feel jewish and one can feel polish, but these identities are separate. this creates issues as it continuously separates the two ideas, suggesting that they are somewhat antithetical. this contributes to the idea of jewish poles as the “other" in poland and that they are a threat to poland, rather than a part of the country and its rich, and at times disappointing, past. the history of polish nationalism stems from before the communist regime, with nationalist ideas peaking around the 1930s. at that time, polish nationalists focused on assimilating slavic minorities and enacted many discriminatory policies like limiting the number of jews that could attend a given university.75 communist rule actually strengthened homogeneity in poland as the communists intentionally adopted nationalist politics in order to increase their legitimacy among poles. throughout the communist regime, nationalism grew because the nationalistic movement was the rebellious movement against the communists. as a result, nationalism is an essential part of polish history that has consistently governed 75 jaskułowski, majewski, and surmiak. teaching history, 21. 74 gross, “no longer estranged,” 139. 73 gross, “no longer estranged,” 139. 72 gross, “no longer estranged,” 135. 16 most of its politics for the last ninety years. because nationalism is deeply rooted in society, discussions of the holocaust and poles as perpetrators is uncomfortable and confusing for poles as it conflicts with their polish identity. as a result, the event of the holocaust presents “a confusing rupture in polish history and tradition” as it presents a “sudden challenge to the polish national narrative.”76 this may play a role in why memories of the holocaust are suppressed and why the narrative of polish heroism is emphasized instead. for poles that seek to learn more and expand their knowledge about the holocaust, what they encounter does not “fit with the overarching meta-narrative of national progress or resurrection,” forcing poles to question not only the education they have received, but their entire identity.77 when considering that many poles have family histories that are intricately intertwined with the holocaust and world war ii, it is unsurprising that many poles are distraught upon discovering the appalling actions of many poles during the holocaust. it causes one to wonder whether their family could have been involved in something so horrendous. because polish identity is developed as a collective national identity, poles will defend polish honor as if they are indeed defending their own close family relatives. this highlights how discussion of the holocaust has become so taboo in society and how nationalism is the preeminent value in society, so that discussion of poles as perpetrators feels like an attack on poles and the poland nation. young people: the future of holocaust memory in poland focusing on young people in poland that are immersed in this nationalist environment, it has become evident that there is a lack of knowledge regarding jewish history and jewish-polish relations. teachers in magdalena gross’s study expressed concerns that polish youth come to school full of stereotypes about jews which they believe to be rooted in ignorance and a general lack of knowledge of jewish history and culture.78 in addition to the survey questions about negotiating polish-jewish identities, gross surveyed teachers regarding their understanding of youth attitudes, asking “what ideas do students bring to class about the jews and why?”79 an overwhelming 60 percent of educators responded saying that students brought stereotypes and negative attitudes, while the other 40 percent of respondents gave specific examples of negative attitudes such as “students are negative about jews because they don’t know them.”80 educators also shared experiences where students had repeated antisemitic slurs, saying that students were doing so “without any knowledge of jewish culture or the polish-jewish past.”81 educators cite this rhetoric and offensive language to be one of the largest barriers in teaching holocaust memory, as any conversation about jewish culture induces slurs in the classroom. teachers speculated on where they believe these beliefs come from, many believing the home to be a major source of information for students. 81 gross, “no longer estranged,” 132. 80 gross, “no longer estranged,” 137. 79 gross, “no longer estranged,” 137. 78 gross, “no longer estranged,” 137. 77 gross, “no longer estranged,” 135. 76 gross, “no longer estranged,” 140. 17 ambrosewicz-jacobs sought answers from the young people themselves, asking participants aged 16 to 17 where they obtained their knowledge of jewish people and culture. in her 2008 study, 74 percent of students listed the media such as television, film, or radio as their source of information, 52 percent named books, newspapers, and journals, and 28 percent said family and conversations with family members.82 22 percent of respondents had also cited the church as a source of knowledge, but without additional clarifying survey questions, it is unclear what kind of information was being transmitted and whether it was positive or negative.83 in similar studies done by historians ireneusz krzemiński and michał bilewicz, arkadiusz tomaszewski, and adrian wójcik, large percentages of students had cited schools to be one of the main sources of holocaust and jewish knowledge. in general, school was a prominent source of information according to 46 percent of young people in krzemiński’s study (2004) and 79 percent in bilewicz et al. (2008).84 krzemiński’s study had focused on indicators of antisemitism, and bilewicz, tomaszewski, and wócik focused on knowledge and opinions about jews in poland. seeking more information regarding this component of education, ambrosewicz-jacobs had added questions in her 2008 study, asking students to identify a specific “school factor” that contributes to their jewish education.85 almost half of students listed religious education lessons, 49 percent said lessons at school, and only 3 percent indicated extracurriculars conducted by teachers, illustrating the massive influence of religious education on polish youth.86 despite there being an overall lack of knowledge, polish young people have formulated negative attitudes towards jews and minorities, entering the classroom with preconceived notions and beliefs. because polish youth must unlearn many of their ideas that they hold about other groups of people because of their attitudes, there is an immediate barrier that must be broken in order to teach comprehensive holocaust education. in 2013, the center for research on prejudice of the university of warsaw implemented a poll with the assistance of the homo homini polling institution, right before the 70th anniversary of the warsaw ghetto uprising. this survey contains responses from twenty technical schools and high schools in warsaw, where 61 percent of youth said they “would not have been happy to discover their partner is jewish.”87 similarly, 45 percent would have also been unhappy to discover that there is jewish origins in their family, 44 percent would not want to have jewish neighbors, and 40 percent would not want to have jewish peers and classmates in school.88 the attitudes of young people displayed here reflects the overall lack of effectiveness of holocaust education and the strong influence of popular media and politics. antisemitism is so strong among youth that almost one in three of respondents in ambrosewicz-jacob’s survey thought that it was preferable that there are fewer jewish people in poland now 88 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 217. 87 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 217. 86 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 223. 85 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 223. 84 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 223. 83 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 223. 82 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 222. 18 than before world war ii. when asked why this was the case, just under half of participants said this because of “conflicts from the past” highlighting the belief that the historical relationship between poles and jews is “conflictive rather than cooperative.”89 conclusion the attitudes of young people illustrate how embedded these beliefs are in polish society, and it may take several generations for these ideas to change entirely. young people are commonly referred to as the future, and if that is the case then it appears the future may look regrettably similar to the present. the evolution of holocaust discussion over the last twenty-five years frames how polish society has created an atmosphere that has been fostering discriminatory ideas among youth. this sociopolitical environment has become well established and may require an equivalent length of time, if not longer, to unravel. it will require conscious effort, especially on the part of learners and young people to open up and want to learn about holocaust memory. this change will need to be intentional and with present attitudes, this change may take some time. the emotional stress transmitted across generations will dissipate as the amount of time since the event increases, but it is clear that many young people currently attending primary and secondary school in poland are still experiencing some degree of distress transmitted by the previous generations. hopefully more time will provide room for the trauma to be properly processed, and for holocaust memory to be repaired. but as time increases and generational trauma begins to resolve, other issues arise. memory is already full of lapses and tricks, and as survivors who directly remember the holocaust pass away, there are fewer individuals on earth that are able to discuss their lived experiences. afterwards we must rely on these transmitted stories. historical memory must be preserved intentionally and carefully or it will fail to exist. historian dominick lacapra emphasized that there cannot be a single narrative of the holocaust, and that a variety of perspectives are essential in preventing a single, fixed meaning of the holocaust from forming.90 therefore it is essential that the upcoming generation of young people in poland is able to dismantle the suffocating echo chamber created by politicians, mainstream media, and the generations before, to allow holocaust discourse to continue freely. 90 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 32. 89 ambrosewicz-jacobs, islands of memory, 220. 19 cey. vol 6. crosson.die+askö+und+die+arbeitersportbewegung+der+zwischenkriegszeit.docx die askö und die arbeitersportbewegung der zwischenkriegszeit: ein vergleich radikaler rahmung und verwirklichung des programms harper crosson abstrakt die wiener sozialdemokrat:innen der zwischenkriegszeit wollten einen neuen sozialistischen menschen ohne revolution entwickeln. dieses ziel erforderte einzigartige und kreative mittel, die in der privatsphäre der arbeiter:innen tätig waren. ein instrument, das die sozialdemokratische arbeiterpartei österreichs (sdapö) zu diesen zwecken nutzte, war der arbeitersport: eine einmalige und faszinierende mischung aus sozialistischen werten und einer florierenden internationalen leistungssportverrücktheit. diese analyse konzentriert sich zum teil auf die veröffentlichungen von julius deutsch, dem leiter der österreichischen arbeitersportbewegung. deutschs beschriebene ziele und radikale visionen werden dann mit der tatsächlichen manifestation des programms verglichen. es wird gezeigt, dass die proklamierte radikalität der bewegung oft hohl war. diese erkenntnisse werden dann in die größere geschichte der sdapö eingeordnet. 4 überblick und geschichte des arbeitersports: für den modernen leser sind dinge wie wettbewerb und nationale rivalitäten dem sport inhärent. für manche stellen die enorm profitablen modernen profisportindustrien sogar eine karikatur der werte des kapitalismus dar. daher scheinen die weit verbreiteten bemühungen der zwischenkriegszeit, eine art sozialistischen arbeitersport zu kultivieren, der in direktem gegensatz zu diesen kapitalistischen werten stand, vielleicht schwer fassbar zu sein. die anfängliche idealisierte vision für den sozialistischen sport umfasste variationen von kollektiver demonstration von gymnastik, tanz und kraft, die den wettbewerb minimierte, und den die seele, den körper und das image der arbeiterklasse stärkte.1 die heute spürbare starke dissonanz zwischen kollektivistischen oder sozialistischen werten und unserer vorstellung von sport, war in der zwischenkriegszeit sicherlich vorhanden. es war dieser widerspruch, der die faszinierende, aber letztendlich zum scheitern verurteilte arbeitersport agenda der arbeitsgemeinschaft für sport und körperkultur in österreich (askö) prägte. der moderne sport war sicherlich ein produkt neuer politischer, sozialer und wirtschaftlicher strukturen, ebenso wie das konzept der arbeitsfreien zeit, in denen sport betrieben wurde. mit dem industriekapitalismus kam es zu einer deutlichen trennung zwischen arbeit und erholung. nur durch diese unterscheidung konnte sich der sport, wie er heute existiert, entwickeln.2 aufgrund seines status als freizeitbeschäftigung wurde und wird sein politischer charakter jedoch oft in den hintergrund gedrängt. die askö, eine organisation der sozialdemokratische arbeiterpartei österreichs (sdapö) in wien, und insbesondere ihres leiters julius deutsch, lehnte die möglichkeit ab, dass eine sportorganisation, ein sport, oder die teilnahme eines athleten unpolitisch sein könnte.3 in einem pamphlet von 1931 behauptet deutsch, dass der bürgerliche sport (alle nicht-arbeitersportarten) immer in einer weise getrieben wird, die mit kapitalistischem denken und fühlen einhergeht.4 deutsch beanstandete den unpolitischen charakter des sports und wollte in seiner utopischen vision sportarten schaffen, die kollektivismus und solidarität förderten, und vor allem, für arbeiter:innen eine gesunde umgebung gewährleisteten, die zur schaffung einer einzigartigen arbeiterkultur beitrugen.5 die geschichte des österreichischen arbeitersportes existiert in einem internationalen kontext. die arbeitersportbewegung war in der zwischenkriegszeit eine weltweite bewegung, deren größte teile jedoch in mitteleuropa angesiedelt waren, insbesondere in 5 wheeler, “organized sport,” 196. 4 julius deutsch, “unter rote fahnen! vom rekord-zum massensport,” in antifaschismus! proletarische wehrhaftigkeit im kampfe gegen den faschismus, ed. and transalted by gabriel kuhn (oakland ca: pm press, 2017), 73. 3 georg spitaler, “18. sport und körperkultur”, in das rote wien: schlüsseltexte der zweiten wiener moderne 1919–1934 edited by rob mcfarland, georg spitaler and ingo zechner, (berlin: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2020), 352. 2 wheeler, “organized sport,“ 191-192. 1 robert f. wheeler, “organized sport and organized labour: the workers’ sports movement,” journal of contemporary history 13, no. 2 (1978): 196-197. alle übersetzungen vom englischen ins deutsch sind meine eigenen. 5 den deutschsprachigen gebieten.6 international entstand 1913 die arbeitersportbewegung in belgien, aber löste sich im ersten weltkrieg auf. 1920 wurde sie wieder zum leben erweckt und später 1926 in sozialistische arbeitersport internationale (sasi) umbenannt.7 auf dem höhepunkt der mitgliederzahl und stärke hatte die sasi über zwei millionen mitglieder aus zwanzig ländern. in wien begann die geschichte des organisierten arbeitersports im jahr 1891, als der erste arbeiterturnverein gegründet wurde. die askö war dann das ergebnis eines zusammenschlusses im jahre 1919 von vielen bereits bestehenden arbeitersportorganisationen.8 auf ihrem höhepunkt zählte der askö 300.000 mitglieder, was ihn zum weltweit größten nationalen arbeitersportverband im verhältnis zur größe der bevölkerung des landes machte.9 die hier vorliegende arbeit wird sich auf die schriften des sozialdemokraten und leiter der askö, julius deutsch, konzentrieren, aber auch kritische analysen des österreichischen arbeitersports miteinbeziehen. die analyse ist in drei kategorien unterteilt: militarismus, wettbewerb und nationalismus, und körperideale. in diesen drei bereichen hatten deutsch und die askö die schärfste kritik am bürgerlichen sport. es wird gezeigt, wie deutsch diese kritik genutzt hat, um den arbeitersport gegen den bürgerlichen sport zu schildern – als dichotom – und als vollkommen gegensätzlich. innerhalb jeder dieser drei kategorien wird argumentiert, dass die radikale ausrichtung des arbeitersports als antithese zum traditionellen sport immer wieder schrumpfte und sich veränderte, bis er nicht mehr sehr von seinen verhassten bürgerlichen gegenstücken zu unterscheiden war. fig. 1: der eröffnungsmarsch der arbeiterolympiade 1931 in wien. unbekannter fotograf:in.10 10 wikipedia commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:opening_march_1931_vienna.jpg 9 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 26. 8 wheeler, “organized sport and organized labour,” 198 7 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 87. 6 gabriel kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety: forging a militant working-class culture, (oakland ca: pm press, 2017), 25. 6 militarismus: man kann konkret sagen, dass pazifistische und antimilitaristische gefühle einen großteil der austromarxistischen ideologie untermauert haben.11 als jedoch bereits mitte der 1920er-jahre politische spannungen zunahmen, haben viele austromarxist:innen wie otto bauer und julius deutsch begonnen, die notwendigkeit des bewaffneten widerstands und des proletarischen militarismus zu befürworten.12 trotz dieser veränderten äußeren einstellung, als die askö offen begonnen hat, das potenzial des sports als beitrag zu ihrem militär anzuerkennen, beharrte die leiterschaft weiterhin darauf, dass die militärpolitik und die wachsende militärische struktur der askö grundlegend anders und tatsächlich das genaue gegenteil des traditionellen militarismus war. diese betonung auf militarisierung wird durch schriften deutschs und weiteren parteipublikationen der sdapö deutlich aufgezeigt. danach tritt es eine analyse der darstellung des militarismus innerhalb der askö als gegensätzlich zum traditionellen militär ein. die unwahrheiten dieser behauptung werden hervorgehoben. das parteiprogramm von 1926, das bei der linzer parteikonferenz entworfen wurde, ist ein klarer beweis dafür, dass die partei bereits 1926 offiziell und offen den potenziellen bedarf an militärischer entwicklung anerkannte. das linzer programm wurde von otto bauer, einem prominenten mitglied der sdapö, verfasst: wenn sich aber die bourgeoisie gegen die gesellschaftliche umwälzung, die die aufgabe der staatsmacht der arbeiterklasse sein wird, durch planmäßige unterbindung des wirtschaftslebens, durch gewaltsame auflehnung, durch verschwörung mit ausländischen gegenrevolutionären mächten widersetzen sollte, dann wäre die arbeiterklasse gezwungen, den widerstand der bourgeoisie mit den mitteln der diktatur zu brechen.13 dieses gefühl der notwendigkeit, sich militärisch auf die faschistische bedrohung vorzubereiten, wuchs verständlicherweise noch weiter.14 zudem sagte julius deutsch 1931: heute ist das ausüben von sport zu einem mittel geworden, um das proletariat zu stärken, ein mittel, um seine kampffähigkeit und kampflust zu steigern. deswegen müssen die arbeiter sportvereine und die proletarischen 14 spitaler, “18. sport und körperkultur,” 352. 13 otto bauer et al., programm der sozialdemocratischen arbeiterpartei duestchösterreichs: beschlossen vom parteitag zu linz am 3. november 1926, (wein: europa verlag wien, 1926). 12 öhner, „austromarxismus,” 34/35. und julius deutsch, “klassenkampf, diziplin und alkohol,” in antifaschismus! proletarische wehrhaftigkeit im kampfe gegen den faschismus, ed. and transalted by gabriel kuhn (oakland ca: pm press, 2017), 97-99. 11 vrääth öhner, „austromarxismus. die ideologie der einheit der österreichischen arbeiterbewegung,“ in: das rote wien 1919-1934: ideen, debatten, praxis, ed. schwarz, werner michael, spitaler, and elke wikidal. (birkhäuser, 2019), 35. 7 verteidigungseinheiten so eng wie möglich miteinander verbunden werden.15 als organisation begann der arbeitersport die ansichten jener austromarxist:innen zu verkörpern, die an die notwendigkeit eines bewaffneten proletariats glaubten. sport wurde zum vehikel für diese aufrüstung und militarisierung. deutsch argumentierte, dass es einfach sei „in modernen ländern waffen zu bekommen,“ was allerdings schwierig sei, wäre der aufbau effektiver, strukturierter und disziplinierter militäreinheiten.16 diese könnten aber durch sport gefördert werden. deutsch erkannte auch, dass die zahl der menschen mit militärischer erfahrung aus „dem krieg“ verschwinden werde, und sport ein mittel war, um junge menschen militärisch auszubilden.17 als die politischen spannungen zunahmen, wurde sport immer mehr als mittel gesehen, das proletariat auf bewaffnete konflikte vorzubereiten. um das ausmaß der militarisierung des arbeitersports bis in die 1930er jahre zu verstehen, und um die begründung daher später zu kontextualisieren, ist eine beschreibung des „wehrsports“ und eine kurze geschichte seines platzes in der askö erforderlich. wehrsport war im wesentlichen militärisches training: wehrsport war als mittel zugedacht, um junge arbeiter:innen der verteidigung auszubilden und ihnen beizubringen, sich in geschlossenen formationen zu bewegen, lange märsche zu ertragen, hindernisse zu überwinden, mit schusswaffen umzugehen, und sich in anderen kampfformen beteiligen.18 niemand würde dies als modernen sport bezeichnen das war einfach militärische ausbildung. natürlich muss dies als reaktion und antwort auf die zunehmende flut des faschismus verstanden werden, aber die einzelheiten und merkmale dieses übergangs zum militarismus müssen noch kritisch hinterfragt werden. die anerkennung der bedeutung des sports für den aufbau leistungsfähiger militäreinheiten existierte schon vor 1927, und wurde ab 1926 ausdrücklich (offiziell) eingegliedert.19 es überrascht nicht, dass deutsch auch die paramilitärische organisation der sdapö (den schutzbund) anführte.20 die tragischen ereignisse des 15. juli 1927 haben die verbindung zwischen sozialistischem sport und militär schließlich endgültig vereinheitlicht. am 15. juli 1927 gab es eine massendemonstration, die durch den freispruch von drei nationalistischen 20 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, vi. 19 helmut gruber, red vienna: experiment in working class culture, (new york: oxford university press, 1991), 105. 18 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 83. 17 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 66. 16 julius deutsch, “organisation des selbstschutzes,” in antifaschismus! proletarische wehrhaftigkeit im kampfe gegen den faschismus, ed. and transalted by gabriel kuhn (oakland ca: pm press, 2017), 62. 15 “internationaler sozialistischer verband für arbeitersport und körperkultur (isvak),“ in bericht über den iv. kongress zu helsingfors, 5-8 august 1927 (leipzig: arbeiter-turnverlag) 57-58. 8 heimwehr-angehörigen eingeleitet wurde, die zuvor zwei leute bei einer sozialdemokratischen veranstaltung ermordet hatten.21 es kam zu gewalt, der justizpalast wurde in brand gesetzt und die heimwehr hat fast 100 demonstranten getötet.22 vor 1927 war der wehrsport bereits ein großer teil des askö-programms. nach dem 15. juli 1927 waren praktisch alle mitgliedsverbände der askö verpflichtet, sich der ausübung des „wehrsports“ mindestens teilzeit zu widmen.23 militäreinheiten (der schutzbund) und sportvereine existierten zu diesem zeitpunkt nicht mehr unter einem organisatorischen dach, sondern wurden strukturell vereint. angesichts des politischen kontexts ist es keine überraschung, dass die sozialdemokrat:innen sich auf den kampf gegen die faschistische bedrohung vorbereitet haben. es kann nicht stark kritisiert werden, dass der pazifismus, der dem austromarxismus untermauert hat, in vielen fällen aufgegeben wurde. jedoch kann eine differenziertere und kritischere analyse der unterschiede zwischen den proklamierten zielen der askö und ihrer verwirklichung in der begründung und der rahmung, die für die militarisierung des sports angeführt wurden, erfolgen. die vorsitzenden der askö stellten sich und ihre agenda weiterhin im gegensatz zu ihren bürgerlichen gegenstücken dar. deutsch verurteilte „die bürgerlichen sportvereine, [weil sie] die leidenschaft der jugend für den militarismus geweckt haben.“24 deutsch definiert aber den militarismus eng als „die maschinerie der unterdrückung“ und „das wichtigste element des machtapparates, das von der herrschenden klasse des staates eingesetzt wird.“ er behauptet dann: „in diesem sinne ist es klar, dass die organisation des proletarischen selbstschutzes nichts mit militarismus zu tun hat.“25 deutsch trennt militarismus und „militärische[...] strukturen“ und glaubt dann, dass „es keinen besonderen grund gibt, warum das proletariat keine militärischen strukturen nutzen sollte.“26 jenseits von deutschs paradoxer konstruktion der dichotomie zwischen „militarismus“ und „militärischen strukturen,“ ist eine viel substanziellere und auch bedrohliche falsche dichotomie, die deutsch versuchte, zwischen der hierarchie und struktur seiner militärischen organisation und einem bürgerlichen militär zu ziehen. völlig im gegensatz zu der „maschinerie der unterdrückung“ wurden der arbeitersport und die militärischen strukturen, die ihn umfassten, als manifestationen proletarischer macht dargestellt. in einer veröffentlichung von 1926 behauptete deutsch: der innere kern des militarismus ist fremd und feindlich zu dem volk. die proletarischen verteidigungseinheiten [des schutzbundes] sind ganz anders. sie gehören zum fleisch und blut des proletariats. wenn sie nicht von dem proletariat getragen würden, wären sie nur bleiche 26 deutsch “organisation des selbstschutzes,” 59/60. 25 deutsch “organisation des selbstschutzes,” 59. 24 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 88. 23 gruber, red vienna, 105/6. 22 william p. barnett and michael woywode, “from red vienna to the anschluss: ideological competition among viennese newspapers during the rise of national socialism,” american journal of sociology 109, (2004) 1467. 21 kristie a. foell, “july 15, 1927: the vienna palace of justice is burned in a mass uprising of viennese workers, a central experience in the life and work of elias canetti,” in yale companion to jewish writing and thought in german culture, 1096-1996, ed. sander l. gilman and jack zipes, 464–70. (yale university press, 1997), 1098. 9 und leblose gespenster.27 deutsch hat dramatisch die ansicht vertreten, dass diese militärischen strukturen ein mittel zum ausdruck der macht des proletariats waren. die kontrolle kam ausschließlich von und durch die mitgliederbasis. die militärischen strukturen der askö waren angeblich eine antithese der, von-oben-nach-unten strukturen der heimwehr und traditionellen militäreinsätze des ersten weltkrieges. diese radikale und idealisierte darstellung der machtstrukturen innerhalb der militarisierung des askö greift zu kurz. ein hindernis auf dem weg zur verwirklichung dieser radikalen militärischen struktur war der hintergrund deutschs in der k.u.k. armee. die ungarische revolutionärin ilona duczynska, die zur zeit des bürgerkriegs in wien lebte, übte nach der niederlage der sozialisten im jahre 1934 im österreichischen bürgerkrieg viel kritik an dem schutzbund und an den proletarischen militärstrukturen. duczynska kritisiert deutsch und seine leitung, und behauptet allgemein, dass er „streng konventionelle formen militärischer aktivitäten gefördert hat, die für den straßenkampf gegen das reguläre militär völlig ungeeignet sind.“28 die implikationen dieser militärstruktur auf den konflikt von 1934 sind weniger wichtig für das argument hier als die tatsache, dass autor:innen der damaligen zeit den irrtum von deutschs vorgeschlagener radikaler struktur des schutzbundes sah, und die konventionalität der methode und hierarchie darin erkannten. moderne wissenschaftler:innen stimmen duczynska zu. kristie foell gruppiert die wiener „politische rechte“ mit „eher konservativen sozialdemokrat:innen“ zusammen, indem sie beide die ereignisse vom 15. juli 1927 als „verbrechen der horde“ betrachteten.29 interessanterweise stimmen sowohl die konservativen sozialdemokrat:innen als auch die rechte im allgemeinen zu, dass an erster stelle der verbrechen die zerstörung von eigentum war. foell behauptet dann, dass beide gruppen diese „zerstörung“ auf „das versäumnis der sozialdemokrat:innen, ihre anhänger:innen in angemessener parteidisziplin zu erziehen, zurückführten...[und] einige der sozialdemokratischen leiter [nämlich deutsch] gaben dies zu.“30 sicherlich wollten die sozialdemokraten, auch der konservative flügelfähig sein, gegen den faschismus zu kämpfen. dahingegen, insbesondere im lichte von foells analyse, scheint es, dass einige konservative sozialdemokrat:innen wie deutsch diese militarisierung als eine möglichkeit betrachteten, ein weiteres ereignis zu vermeiden, bei dem arbeiter:innen außerhalb der kontrolle und des diktats der sdapö handelten und demonstrieren würden. bezugnehmend auf den schutzbund, meint historiker helmut gruber kurz zusammengefasst, dass „strenge disziplin, ein geschworener eid, ein führerkult [mit julius deutsch als führerfigur] und das verbot aller politischen diskussionen (...) das 30 foell, “july 15, 1927”, 464/465. 29 foell, “july 15, 1927: the vienna palace of justice is burned in a mass uprising of viennese workers, a central experience in the life and work of elias canetti,” 464. 28 radomir luza, review of workers in arms: the austrian schutzbund and the civil war of 1934, by ilona duczynska. the journal of modern history 51, no. 3 (1979): 604 27 deutsch, “organisation des selbstschutzes,” 59/60. 10 ende der ursprünglichen ziele der sdapö“ markierten.31 die radikalen ausgerichteten militärischen strukturen der askö spiegelten so die bürgerlichen und faschistischen militärs wider, denen sie in form angeblich entgegengesetzt waren. der soziale und politische kontext, in dem sich die austromarxist:innen und die askö befanden, machte es unmöglich, ihre mission und ursprünglichen ideale zu verwirklichen . die geschichte des arbeitersports und seiner militarisierung spiegelt die umfassendere geschichte einer partei wider, die unter der wachsenden faschistischen macht zum scheitern verurteilt war. in diesem licht meint historiker gabriel kuhn: „die positiven folgen des schutzbundes dürfen im frust über verpasste chancen und eventuelle niederlagen nicht übersehen werden.“32 diese meinung wird aber von manchen modernen und damaligen wissenschafter:innen widerlegt, die der meinung sind, dass die militäraspekte der askö, natürlich inklusive des schutzbunds, „die eigeninitiative den arbeiter:innen untergrub. diese widersprach den kulturellen idealen des austromarxismus und machte die organisation zu einer polizeitruppe der arbeiter:innen anstatt zu einer kampftruppe gegen die bourgeoisie.“33 mit dem gleichen ton sprach karl haas „von einer bewaffneten arbeiterklasse, und einer proletarischen miliz, die parteisoldatenschaft unter ernannten führern war alles, was übrigblieb.“34 dies entspricht der kritik von foell und duczynska. diese widersprüchlichen meinungen vertreten eine optimistische und auch ziemliche pessimistische wahrnehmung der askö. klar ist jedoch, dass ein teil der begründung für die vollständige militarisierung der askö der versuch war, die arbeiter:innen zu kontrollieren, und keineswegs eine manifestation der proletarischen macht von unten nach oben, wie deutsch zu argumentieren versuchte. die strenge hierarchie, struktur und militärischen praktiken der askö spiegelten die bürgerlichen militärs, die sie anfangs offen ablehnten, und gegen die sie sich als gegensätze positionierten, wider. körperkultur und massenästhetik: die besessenheit von muskulösen, fähigen, kräftigen männlichen körpern, die wir in der faschistischen propaganda dieser zeit sehen, war nicht nur auf nationalsozialistische kreise beschränkt. dies war ein phänomen, das über parteigrenzen hinausging. das gleiche gilt für die betonung von massenästhetiken, die mit der körperkultur verbunden waren. in diesem abschnitt wird zunächst die diskussion über die militarisierung des sports fortgesetzt, wobei der schwerpunkt auf der massenästhetik innerhalb der askö und dem performativen charakter der askö liegt. es wird eine fallstudie vorgestellt, die diesen allgemeinen wahnsinn um körperideale veranschaulicht. in bezug auf körperideale und massenästhetik wird das muster der radikalen formulierung der askö, die letztlich zu kurz kommt und die dominante bürgerliche kultur widerspiegelt, fortgeführt. 34 karl haas, “die wehr politik der sozialdemocratie,” vortrag gehalten beim symposium österreich, 1927-1938, zitiert von ilona duczynska, workers in arms, (new york : monthly review press, 1978), 59. 33 gruber, red vienna, 56. 32 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 42. 31 gruber, red vienna, 105. 11 deutsch kritisiert den bürgerlichen sport, indem nur „spitzenleistungen" geschätzt wurden. er argumentierte, dass dies nicht die beste funktion des sports sei, insbesondere für arbeiter:innen. deutsch sagte, dass „sport alle teile des körpers harmonisch entwickeln sollte“ und es nicht um beeindruckende leistungen gehen sollte.35 er weist darauf hin, dass beeindruckende sportliche leistungen,„spitzenleistungen" und das erreichen von perfektion für menschen, die einen großteil ihrer zeit arbeiteten, nicht möglich wäre. deswegen geht es beim arbeitersport darum, einfach eine gesündere arbeiterklasse zu schaffen, und nicht meistersportler oder extreme stärke zu entwickeln.36 in gewisser weise wird in den programmen von der askö ein mangel an betonung auf extreme kraft oder körperperfektion gelegt. gabriel kuhn beschreibt, wie die laufwettkämpfe der bürgerlichen sportvereine durch wandertouren im grünen ersetzt wurden, und schwimmwettkämpfe durch rettungskurse und wassergymnastik. beides deutet auf eine vermeintliche verminderte betonung des wettbewerbs hin, die diskutiert werden wird, aber es zeigt auch einen mangel an betonung auf die kultivierung extremer stärke. die geschwindigkeit und die offensichtliche kraft, die für erfolg bei einem sprintrennen erforderlich sind, wurden angeblich zugunsten der allgemeinen gesundheit und atmosphäre verworfen, die durch aktivitäten wie gruppenwanderungen geschaffen wurden.37 diese behauptungen über die werte der aksö wurden allerdings nicht verwirklicht. um die körperideale innerhalb der askö zu analysieren, ist ein verständnis der extremen kulturellen besessenheit von männlicher stärke und körperlicher perfektion im allgemeinen zu dieser zeit erforderlich. dies wird durch die bizarre fallstudie von breitbarts besuch in österreich illustriert. siegmund breitbart war ein russischer bodybuilder, der eine tournee durch europa unternahm. breitbarts beabsichtigter einmonatiger aufenthalt in wien wurde auf drei verlängert, da die stadt von ihm besessen war.38 seine nächtlichen auftritte fanden vor ausverkauften mengen von 1500 leuten statt.39 die illustrierte kronen-zeitung berichtete, dass kinder jeden alters von breitbarts stärke wussten.40 ein reporter des neuigkeits-weltblatt hat einen café-besitzer interviewt, der sich über breitbarts auftritt in wien beschwerte, weil seine kunden bei kraftwettkämpfen löcher in wände geschlagen, die gardinenstangen verbogen und mit bloßen händen nägel in die tische genagelt hatten, als sie versuchten, breitbarts auftritte zu replizieren.41 einmal hat breitbart mit seinen zähnen durch eine metallkette gebissen und ein reporter beschrieb die folgenden ereignisse als „schwer zu beschreiben...frauen stürmten auf die bühne, um ihn zu küssen.“42 breitbarts „wohl proportionierter und ausgewogener körper repräsentierte das zeitgenössische ideal der körperkulturbewegung, 42 „hie breitbart, hie martha farra,” illustrierte wiener extra blatt, februar 3, 1923 s. 41 "der breitbart-rummel in wien," neuigkeits-weltblatt, jan. 31, 1923, 5. 40 „breitbart zeigt wieder etwas neues, “illustrierte kronenzeitung, feb. 3, 1923, p. 4. 39 gillerman, „samson in vienna,” 69. 38 sharon gillerman, “samson in vienna: the theatrics of jewish masculinity,” jewish social studies 9, no. 2 (2003): 70. 37 wheeler, “organized sport,” 196. 36 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 74. 35 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 74. 12 kraft und schönheit.“43 diese wahnsinnige besessenheit und begeisterung, die breitbart in wien auslöste, spiegelt das unglaublich hohe maß wider, in dem männliche stärke und männliche körperliche schönheit idealisiert und angestrebt wurde. trotz der angeblichen konzeption und ziele des askö-sports konnte sich die darin formulierte körperkultur dem breitbart-esken konzept maskuliner perfektion nicht entziehen. ganzheitliche und allgemeine gesundheit waren nicht das einzige ziel in bezug auf die körper der arbeiter:innen. die massenausstellung von athlet:innen war nicht nur eine demonstration der parteistärke und der potenziellen kampfkraft der arbeiter:innen, sondern die einzelnen arbeiterkörperschaften wurden als beweis für den erfolg des arbeitersports und der kultur der arbeiterklasse angesehen. die sdap wollte den „neuen menschen“ schaffen: ein neues, aufgeklärtes mitglied des proletariats und akteur des sozialistischen wandels. wie bereits erwähnt, war sport eine der wichtigsten methoden, um die kultur der arbeiterklasse zu schaffen, die notwendig ist, um diese „neuen menschen“ hervorzubringen. die kulturlandschaft mit breitbart und der mit dem nationalsozialismus verbundenen körperkultur ragte jedoch groß heraus. die körperideale der askö und der nationalsozialisten sind in bezug auf umfang, ausmaß und schaden nicht vergleichbar. wir können jedoch die vorherrschende kultur anerkennen, die beide tief beeinflusst hat. ein großer teil der konzeption des „neuen menschen“ und des idealen sozialistischen arbeitersportlers beinhaltete „die verherrlichung der (männlichen) körperliche kraft und verbundenen ideale von schönheit und gesundheit.“44 die askö formulierte sich gegen offene zurschaustellung von körperlicher kraft und athletischer perfektion, die körperkultur, mit der dieser jedoch durchdrungen war, spiegelte immer noch die bürgerliche gesellschaft wider, in der sie existierte. die körperkultur der askö spiegelt die bürgerliche gesellschaft spezifischer und differenzierter wider als nur die allgemeine verherrlichung männlicher kraft und muskulatur. die nüchternheit und alkoholabsitnenz der arbeiter:innen waren wichtigere teile der arbeitersportbewegung und ein großer teil von deutschs mission mit der askö. deutsch glaubte, wie viele andere, dass alkohol den klassenkampf behinderte. weiterhin glaubte er, dass sport das wirksamste mittel zur steigerung der nüchternheit der arbeiter:innen war.45 die art und weise, wie deutsch diese funktion des sports beschrieb, ähnelt jedoch auf unheimliche weise der klassischen christlichen rhetorik, die er und andere sozialdemokraten verpönten. die spezifische sprache der folgenden veröffentlichung von deutsch ist hier sehr aufschlussreich: der arbeitersportler braucht hauptsächlich die innere stärke, die nötig ist, um in den schwierigen kämpfen unserer zeit bestehen zu können. klarheit und nüchternheit, disziplin und besonnenheit, heiliger enthusiasmus und opferwille: das sind die eigenschaften, die den sozialistischen kampf ausmachen.46 46 deutsch, “sportler, meidet den alkohol,“ 1. 45 julius deutsch, “sportler, meidet den alkohol!”, der weckruf. zeitschrift des arbeiter-abstinentenbundes in der tschechslowakischen republik no. 3 (june 1936): 1. und deutsch, “klassenkampf, diziplin und alkohol,“ 98-100. 44 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 44. 43 gillerman, “samson in vienna,” 90. 13 die ähnlichkeit zwischen dem begriff „innere stärke“, der sich hier auf das widerstehen von versuchungen bezieht, und religiösen, puritanischen botschaften ist unbestreitbar. auch die verwendung des begriffs „heilig“ ist nicht zufällig, noch ist die zutiefst christliche vorstellung von der wichtigkeit des opfers. die verbindung von sport, körperlicher betätigung, und körperkultur mit moralvorstellungen wurde 1931 von deutsch ausdrücklich betont: „körperliche bildung ist für den moralischen fortschritt des proletariats unerlässlich.“47 moralische botschaft in bezug auf sport war überall. eine anzeige für einen arbeiter-jiu-jitsu-club lautete: „der sport entfaltet jene körperlichen, moralischen und geistigen kräfte, die die arbeiterklasse zu ihrem wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen aufstieg braucht.”48 dieser religiöse ton eine große abschreckung für viele arbeiter:innen und nach ansicht einiger wissenschaftler:innen ein hindernis für die arbeitersportbewegung dar.49 die moralische rhetorik ist ein weiteres beispiel für den arbeitersport und die ähnlichkeit der askö mit jenen bürgerlichen institutionen, die sie kritisierte, in diesem fall die kirche. es macht sinn, dass jede große mäßigkeitsbewegung, selbst wenn sie sozialistisch wäre, einen ähnlichen ton anschlagen und eine gewisse rhetorik mit der vorherrschenden quelle der mäßigkeitsrhetorik teilen würde: der katholischen kirche. wir sehen immer wieder, dass es unmöglich ist, der vorherrschenden kultur zu entkommen. ebenso wäre es beeindruckend gewesen, wenn die askö der körperkultur, die breitbarts ruhm umgibt, widerstanden hätte, ganz zu schweigen dem allgegenwärtigen kulturellen einfluss der kirche. breitbart illustriert eine stadt, die von einer vision männlicher stärke und körperperfektion besessen war. es ist keine überraschung, dass die askös in vieler hinsichten diesem körperwahn folgten. es ist auch nicht neu oder seltsam, dass bei den arbeiterolympiaden die zurschaustellung von körpern und massendemonstrationen sportlicher stärke dazu benutzt wurden, die stärke der arbeiterbewegung als ganzes zu reflektieren. 50 die körperideale und betonung der massenästhetik und körperliche perfektion innerhalb der askö sind an schaden und umfang nicht mit denen der nationalsozialisten gleichzusetzen. in ähnlicher weise gab es einzigartige sozialistische untertöne in den vorstellungen von moral und körperlicher reinheit, die den direkten vergleich mit christlicher rhetorik erschweren. diese verwandten merkmale offenbaren jedoch die konvergenz und überschneidung der askö mit bürgerlichen institutionen; der fehlschluss ihrer radikalen abkehr davon ist bewiesen. wettbewerb und nationalismus: 50 es ist üblich, dass nationen die athlet:innen, die sie zu modernen olympischen spielen schickten, insbesondere im kontext des kalten krieges, als ausdruck des erfolgs der politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen initiativen ihres landes betrachteten. bei den arbeiterolympiaden war das anders, weil nationale grenzen weniger betont wurden, aber das zugrundeliegende konzept war das gleiche. 49 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 44. und gruber, red vienna, 142-144. 48 kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 32. 47 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 87. 14 sport ohne wettkampf ist schwer vorzustellen, aber für viele befürworter des roten wien war dies eine möglichkeit. sie behaupteten, dass wettbewerb, der sich natürlich an kapitalistischen werten ausrichtete, kein wesentlicher bestandteil des sports sei. viel mehr war wettbewerb im sport für sie eine wirkung kapitalistischer rahmenordnungen, die den bürgerlichen sport beeinflussten: „in dem maße als die entwicklung des kapitalismus fortschreitet, färbt sie mußestunden der bourgeoisie ihre merkmale auf.“51 das beharren auf wettbewerb und die „jagd nach rekorden“ wurde als bürgerlich-kapitalistisches phänomen bezeichnet, von dem der arbeitersport vermutlich abwich. mit einem sehr kritischen ton sagte deutsch „um den individuellen erfolg zu messen, sind aufzeichnungen erforderlich. im bürgerlichen sport wird das aufstellen neuer rekorde zum obersten ziel.“52 die natürliche verbindung zwischen anti-individualismus und anti-wettbewerb wird hier deutlich erkennbar. deutsch und andere befürworter des arbeitersports waren der meinung, dass die besessenheit, rekorde zu schaffen, und die individualistische überhöhung von "gewinnern", die exklusivität des sports erhöht hat, für arbeiter:innen eine unerreichbare aussicht war und eine ablenkung des potenzials des sports für arbeiter:innen war. der arbeitersport folgt dieser rekordbesessenheit angeblich nicht und hat sich „im kern“ von den bürgerlichen sportarten unterschieden: „während der bürgerliche sport einzelleistung und rekorde verfechtet, verfechtet der arbeitersport leistungen der massen und solidarität. "53 die arbeiterzeitung legte dar, dass es im sport nicht um „die vernichtung des gegners” geht, sondern um „die gemeinsame ertüchtigung beider teile.”54es ist klar, dass in der arbeitersportbewegung kritik am wettbewerb, und des damit verbundenen individualismus und der rekordjagd, die im bürgerlichen sport waren, weit verbreitet war; ebenso war das beharren darauf, dass der arbeitersport in direktem gegensatz zu diesem wettbewerb steht. die angeblich antinationalistischen tendenzen des arbeitersports waren eng mit dieser antiwettbewerbsauffassung verbunden, weil der wettbewerb “nation gegen nation” im sport den nationalismus fördert. 1931 deklarierte deutsch „die bürgerlichen sportverbände gehören seit jeher zu den stärksten trägern von chauvinismus und nationalismus.“55 deutsch behauptete vehement, dass der bürgerliche sport das „rückgrat der nationalistischen bewegung“ ist. gleichweise, im handbuch der frankfurter arbeiterolympiade von 1925 wird folgendes festgehalten: die bürgerlichen olympischen spiele werden immer von dem ungeist des nationalismus geschädigt... [aber] wir [die arbeiterolympiade] verleihen nationen keine lorbeerkränze, und wir hissen nicht ihre flagge. stattdessen kommen wir zusammen als brüder und schwestern unter der flagge des sozialismus.56 diese haltung und vorgetragene vision für den arbeitersport wird von der askö und insbesondere von deutsch eingenommen. wie üblich wird der arbeitersport als radikale 56 handbuch für die arbeiterolympiade in frankfurt am main 1925, zitiert in kuhn, antifascism, sport, sobriety, 29. 55 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 88. 54 dr. j hannas, „sport und faschismus,“ arbeiter zeitung, 15. marz 1924, 7. 53 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 77. 52 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 73. 51 „sport und arbeiter klasse,“ arbeiter zeitung, juli 4. 1926, 3. 15 abkehr von diesen schädlichen nationalistischen tendenzen des bürgerlichen sports und damit der bürgerlichen gesellschaft dargestellt, die dieser sport repräsentiert. ein vernichtendes stück widersprüchlicher beweise gegen die obige erzählung stammt aus der veröffentlichung der arbeiterzeitung vom 27. august 1931, die direkt nach der arbeiterolympiade von 1931 in wien veröffentlicht wurde. eine schlagzeile auf der titelseite lautete „österreichs siege bei der olympiade.“57nationalstolz und konkurrenz auf einen schlag. alle idealistischen und radikalen einstellungen zum wettbewerb als auch nationalismus werden sofort in frage gestellt. mit dieser wird dem beharren auf die vermeidung des wettbewerbs zugunsten von solidarität widersprochen und diese schlagzeile steht im offensichtlichen konflikt mit den aussagen des askö und ihrer ablehnung nationaler konkurrenz und rivalität. in bezug auf wettbewerb und nationalismus wird hier die arbeiterolympiade und der österreichische arbeitersport als nachahmer für bürgerlichen sport und olympiaden gesehen. der sport war in der zwischenkriegszeit ein internationales phänomen, das sich weitaus schneller ausbreitete als in jeder anderen periode der geschichte. es scheint eine unmögliche aufgabe zu sein, der kultur des „ausdehnenden nexus des globalen sportlichen wettkampfs in den 1920er und 1930er jahren“ zu entkommen und gleichzeitig die mitgliedschaft aufrechtzuerhalten.58 wien wurde „vom sportwahn der zwischenkriegszeit erfasst“, was bürgerlichen, organisierten, wettbewerbsorientierten, individualistischen und nationalistischen sport bedeutet.59„die sozialdemokratie musste gegen den boom des kommerziellen sports antreten“,spektakel und wettbewerb waren ein weg, dies zu tun.60 tatsächlich war diese „entscheidung, den mannschaftssport und damit den wettbewerb zu verstärken, offenbar eine reaktion auf den druck der arbeiter:innen von der basis.“61 es muss daran erinnert werden, dass für deutsch eine der hauptfunktionen des arbeitersports die rekrutierung neuer parteimitglieder:innen und später auch militärpersonal war. um zu rekrutieren, musste der arbeitersport versuchen, den kulturellen wünschen wiens anzusprechen. unleugbar ist auch, dass in der wiener bevölkerung, auf die die askö besonders abzielte, nationalstolz und nationalismus stetig wuchsen. insofern kann der appell daran als ausdruck nationalistischer ideologie innerhalb der parteiführung gewertet werden, aber auch als versuch, bevölkerungsschichten anzusprechen, für die nationalstolz immer wichtiger wurde, oder beides. genau wie bei körperkultur und aspekten des militarismus, war dieser trend in vielen facetten des arbeitersports sichtbar: die askö konnte sich den einflüssen des größeren kulturellen kontextes, in dem sie existierte, nicht entziehen. deutsch hat beispielhaft behauptet, „die begriffe bürgerlicher sport und arbeitersport bezeichnen nicht nur politische gegensätze, sie weisen auch auf tiefe sachliche 61 wheeler, „organized sport,” 197. 60 spitaler, "18. sport und körperkultur,” 351. 59 bowman, „hakoah vienna and the international nature of interwar austrian sports,” 646. 58 william d. bowman, „hakoah vienna and the international nature of interwar austrian sports.” central european history 44, no. 4 (2011): 667. 57 „österreichs siege bei der olympiade,“ arbeiter zeitung, 27. august 1931, 1. 16 unterschiede hin. ihr innerstes wesen ist anders.“62 wir haben viele beispiele dafür, dass dies falsch ist. die askö hat nicht nur wettbewerb, nationalismus und militarismus kritisiert, sondern sie haben sich und den arbeitersport in völlige opposition zu diesen kräften dargestellt. im laufe der zeit wuchsen jedoch alle drei und prägten die struktur und organisation der programmierung der askö. dasselbe gilt für die körperkultur innerhalb der askö. obwohl die sozialdemokratische führung weiterhin akribisch bürgerliche körperideale im sport, und allgemein, anprangerte, richtete sich das innige wertsystem mit der zeit immer mehr an bürgerlichen und sogar faschistischen körperidealen aus. dieses argument zielt nicht darauf ab, den schaden und die reichweite des militarismus, nationalismus oder der körperideale den damaligen faschismus mit denen innerhalb der askö oder sdapö gleichzusetzen. vielmehr soll gezeigt werden, dass die askö sich in allen aspekten, die sich selbst als radikale abkehr vom bürgerlichen sport bezeichnet hat, in struktur, form und oft auch inhalt an ein etabliertes bürgerliches muster angepasst hat. die bedeutung dieser analyse ist nicht auf den bereich des sports beschränkt. eine analyse von alys george, der die „festivalkultur“ im österreich der zwischenkriegszeit untersucht, liefert beim vergleich der katholisch konservativen salzburger festspiele und dem von den sozialdemokrat:innen betriebenen massenfestival ein bemerkenswert ähnliches argument. georg argumentiert, dass das massenfestspiel eine „symbolische kompensation für den relativen mangel an konkreten veränderungen“ war. george weist nicht nur auf den relativen mangel an radikalität oder aktion der sdap hin, sie argumentiert weiter, dass trotz der unterschiedlichen ideologischen tonfälle, beide festivals in einem sehr messbaren sinne gestaltet waren... obwohl organisatoren beider lager [konservativ und sozialistisch] die übereinstimmung der festivals weitgehend ablehnten, mobilisierten sie, zu verschiedene zielen, überraschend ähnliche strategien, um maximale wirkung und reichweite zu erreichen.“63 so wie die askö von religiösen und bürgerlichen werten definiert wurde, während deutsch solche werte denunziert, argumentiert george, dass „obwohl der inhalt der festivalaufführung [des massenfestspiel] offensichtlich die religion verteufelte...basierte seine form dennoch auf einer klerikalen vorlage.“64 auf festivals und im theater, aber auch im sport und in der körperkultur, die sozialdemokrat:innen predigten narrative der radikalität, in denen sie gegenüber dem bürgerlichen mainstream dichotom waren, aber der kern ihrer programmierung beruhte auf unglaublich ähnlichen kulturellen systemen, symbolen, rahmenwerken und werkzeugen. in diesem sinne kann diese analyse der askö als eine fortsetzung von georgs analyse angesehen werden, die ihre these über den vergleich von festivals hinaus erweitert und allgemeiner in den bereich aller aufwändigen kulturprogramme der sozialdemokrat:innen des roten wiens hineinreicht. abschluss 64 george, everyman and the new man, 221. 63 alys x. george. “everyman and the new man: festival culture in interwar austria.” austrian studies 25 (2017): 198–214. 62 deutsch, “unter rote fahnen!“ 77. 17 der arbeitersport hinkte dem bürgerlichen sport immer hinterher und hatte nur den wettbewerbsorientierten, individualistischen, militaristischen bürgersport zum vorbild. die askö ist vielleicht die anschaulichste organisation der sdapö, die ihren wunsch widerspiegelt, tief in die privatsphäre der arbeiterklasse einzudringen, um den „neuen menschen“ ohne revolution zu kultivieren. um ihr hohes ziel zu erreichen, musste der kulturelle appetit der zeit gesättigt werden und die sdapö musste alle ihr stehenden überzeugungsinstrumente nutzen. parteien, gruppen und bewegungen werden wie einzelpersonen in der zeit sozialisiert, in der sie sich bilden, und wie einzelpersonen ist es schwierig, die überwältigenden sozialpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen institutionen abzulehnen, die ihre epochen bestimmen. mit dieser einstellung, weil die askö seinen wichtigsten zielen und werten nicht gerecht wurde, bedeutet das nicht, dass sie als organisation nutzlos oder insgesamt schädlich war. der staat hat räume und einrichtungen finanziert, die den arbeiter:innen ihre freizeit gesund zu verbringen ermöglichten. ein askö-mitglied und freiwilliger gab im jahr 1930 allein mehr als 10.000 menschen kostenlosen schwimmunterricht.65 der arbeitersport insgesamt und die teilnahme der askö an internationalen veranstaltungen hatten tatsächlich komponenten der angestrebten internationalen arbeitersolidarität erreicht. anders als bei den bürgerlichen olympischen spielen zum beispiel, wohnten die arbeitersportler:innen bei den arbeiterolympiaden mit anderen arbeitergastfamilien.66 die arbeiterolympiade hat den aufbau internationaler verbindungen zwischen arbeiter:innen und die kultivierung internationaler arbeitersolidarität massiv erleichtert und unterstützt. das praterstadion wurde für die arbeiterolympiade 1931 errichtet, die mehr menschen angezogen hat als die olympischen spiele in los angeles im darauffolgenden jahr.67 die atmosphäre, die der arbeitersport geschaffen hat, insbesondere die arbeiterolympiade, kann ebenfalls nicht ignoriert werden. ein amerikanischer gewerkschaftsorganisator bemerkte nach der olympiade 1931 „ich konnte es nicht aus meinem kopf bekommen – die stimmung, die es erzeugte, von einheit und hoffnung, die freundschaft, die es aufbaute.“ dieses einzigartige experiment enthielt viele leere narrative von völliger radikalität aber enthielt sicherlich auch erfolge für die wiener arbeiter:innen. 67 gabriel kuhn, “julius deutsch, an anti-fascist who organized workers on the sports field,” interviewed by david broder, the jacobin, july 23, 2021, 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"18. sport und körperkultur" in das rote wien: schlüsseltexte der zweiten wiener moderne 1919–1934 edited by rob mcfarland, georg spitaler and ingo zechner, 447-470. berlin, boston: de gruyter oldenbourg, 2020. wheeler, robert f. „organized sport and organized labour: the workers’ sports 20 porter.revised.jewish+women+and+identity+-+the+german-speaking+enlightenment+around+1800.docx jewish women, identity, and the aufklärung: the german-speaking enlightenment around 1800 josephine porter university of st andrews abstract this paper poses the question, “how enlightened was german-speaking central europe around 1800?” the initial idea was to explore how marginalized groups accessed the german enlightenment. during the process of writing, it developed into a wider exploration of female jewish identity. this revised and lengthened paper, therefore, has become a critical analysis of civil society’s perception of jewish female participants and their unique identity in nineteenth-century germany.1 1 i would like to thank dr. claudia kreklau for always encouraging me to develop my ideas and for suggesting i submit my work to the yearbook. i would also like to thank professor meyer weinshel and the entirety of the central european yearbook for giving me the opportunity to publish my work and be a part of this journal. and i would like to thank tom and my parents for supporting me in everything i do. 133 introduction rahel levin varnhagen, a salonnière of the german-speaking enlightenment, often contemplated her female jewish identity and questioned her place in society. how did someone who was both jewish and female, and thereby doubly marginalized, internally remedy these contrasting components of identity? jay geller deciphers this comingling of identities, presenting the “jewess,” a separate identity projected onto female jews.2 this unique character allowed jewish women to hold specific roles in the german-speaking enlightenment. the nineteenth-century enlightenment was inherently paradoxical, professing freedom and liberty for humanity while simultaneously excluding large swathes of the population. people of color, women, lower classes, and other marginalized groups had no access to the position white male philosophers held. yet, some groups could access these higher echelons of society – as long as they conformed to specific conditions. this paper explores one marginalized group’s role in the enlightenment. german-speaking jewish women had active roles in the german-speaking enlightenment. however, these parts did not evolve into the utopian, egalitarian society that scholars such as brian vick and hannah ardent would like to purport.3 the teleological assumption that marginalized groups were working for some larger historical development conflicts with the actions of those marginalized individuals who successfully entered and participated in civil society. there is little to no evidence to suggest, for example, that salonnières were ardent feminists in the way twenty-first-century activists may imagine. the german-speaking enlightenment, then, was a place that involved more diversity than one may expect, but by no means was it a utopia fostering diverse, egalitarian thought. so, how exactly did german-speaking jewish women participate in the berlin aufklärung, and how could they do so through both their gender and religious identities? jewish identity is a complex concept to deal with. geller, for instance, chooses to use the term “identification” rather than “identity” when examining the jewish question. “identification” instead alludes to a process that an agent undertakes rather than the complex concept of “identity.” he argues that “no single conventional criterion is sufficient for determining an individual’s jewishness,” so the process of “identification” aptly reflects this multiplicity.4 weir further complicates this by identifying the myriad of “jewish questions” to deal with; there is not one singular issue concerning jewish identity, but rather a plethora of questions and issues that have existed throughout history.5 “identity” is always a difficult concept to grapple with, but especially so when dealing with jewish identity. this paper takes “identity” (specifically in relation to upper-class jews) as their role and participation in the civil sphere. while “identification” may be a more accurate and less abstract term, this paper uses both terms for ease in order to discuss the unique position of jewish women. 5 todd h. weir, “the specter of ‘godless jewry’: secularism and the ‘jewish question’ in late nineteenth-century germany,” central european history 46 (2014), 815–849. 4 geller, jay, the other jewish question: identifying the jew and making sense of modernity (fordham university, 2011). 3 brian vick, the congress of vienna (cambridge university press, 2014), 152; hannah arendt, the origins of totalitarianism (schocken books, 1951), 77. 2 geller, jay, “circumcision and jewish women’s identity: rahel levin varnhagen’s failed assimilation,” in judaism since gender, eds. miriam peskowitz and laura levitt (routledge, 1997). 134 the question of jewish women’s unique status within enlightened germany immediately raises a query: what was the enlightenment? such a simple, four-word question has stumped scholars for centuries. the enlightenment was such a vast movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that it surely cannot be reduced to a single definition. lester crocker addresses this first problem. he discusses how definitions “impose a restrictive order on phenomena,” forcing authors to live within their prescriptive interpretations. instead, he pulls on the concept of “descriptions,” which can interpret phenomena more broadly. describing not what something is but what it did displays the phenomena and accepts its wide-reaching nature.6 what did the enlightenment do, then, and how can we describe it? crocker presents it as so: a diverse intellectual movement whose general direction was to use free, critical reason, untrammeled… by authority and tradition, in order to understand the universe, man’s place in it, human nature and interaction, to improve the economic and political institutions of society.7 crocker’s definition is simultaneously valuable and limiting. his open-ended definition allows an unrestricted interpretation of the enlightenment, but it also leaves us wondering where the enlightenment began and ended and who it involved. perhaps the enlightenment was not something that had a beginning nor end. we cannot point to a date and declare it the beginning of modern thinking. it, like so many other things in history, emerged slowly until, all at once, it was there. to simplify crocker’s idea, we can infer that the enlightenment was an extensive concept primarily characterized by critical thinking and the advancement of society. it was a diverse movement throughout europe, with a plethora of intellectual thinkers, all theorizing about human existence, knowledge, logic, reason, and so much more. this diversity meant that the enlightenment manifested differently in various regions. the most common connotations of the enlightenment period stir up ideas of france, equality, fraternity, and liberty. these images, while characterizing the french enlightenment – and others such as america – cannot be said to characterize every region’s movement. german history has been presented in historiography as “peculiar” and “exceptional” compared to the main trends of western european history.8 this is also said of germany’s enlightenment (aufklärung), which has been presented highly differently throughout historiography to that of britain and france. the aufklärung has been illustrated as tedious, timid, unoriginal, and overall “little there to compare with the best of contemporary writing in france and britain.”9 marx, following this line of thought, argued that a failed bourgeoisie was to blame, who “had sunk to the level of a type of estate, as clea§rly marked off from the people as from the crown.”10 they supposedly didn’t have the same urgency in their actions or demands, seeing the state as a partner in enlightened thinking.11 to be sure, the aufklärung differed from france and britain, but these differences weren’t necessarily disadvantages. following crocker’s idea of descriptive rather than prescriptive interpretations of the enlightenment, we can argue that the movement was not monolithic, 11 christopher clark, iron kingdom: the rise and downfall of prussia, 1600-1947 (allen lane, 2006). 10 karl marx, the revolutions of 1848, (allen lane, 1973), 192-4. 9 h.b. nisbet, “‘was ist aufklärung?’: the concept of enlightenment in eighteenth-century germany,” european studies, xii (1982), 77; isabel hull, sexuality, state, and civil society in germany, 1700-1815 (cornell university press, 1996). 8 david blackbourn and geoff eley, the peculiarities of german history: bourgeois society and politics in nineteenth-century germany (oxford university press, 1984). 7 ibid, 341. 6 lester g. crocker, “the enlightenment: what and who?,” studies in eighteenth-century culture 17, no. 1 (1988): 336. 135 “dull,” or “tedious.” both understudied and unfairly presented, the german-speaking enlightenment was rife with discussions, debates, and social events. one of the busiest arenas of the aufklärung were the sitting rooms of the berlin elite. these spaces, called salons, welcomed a range of people, including women and jews, allowing them to contribute to the aufklärung effectively. there is, however, no exhaustive description of the aufklärung, as recent trends in scholarship show; hull, blackbourn and eley, nisbet, and others have revised this portrayal of german history. germany’s aufklärung may not fit the model of france and britain’s, but that does not mean it was a failure nor any less “enlightened.”12 to write another paper looking deeply into the nuances of german enlightened thinking – or comparing germany to france and britain – would be iterative and formulaic. as historiographic trends have shown, germany’s differences should not be minimized nor derogated.13 as such, this essay accepts germany’s differences and moves to ascertain how enlightened it was through the scope of the movement. this brings us to our second query. how does one measure the enlightenment? historical studies are not a scientific discipline; try as we may, we cannot give a scale on which to objectively mark enlightened thinking. a concept as abstract as the enlightenment can, however, be measured in a plethora of abstract ways, using print media, legislation, civil society groups and clubs, or even the presence of a revolution. this paper uses different foci, such as gender and religion, to demonstrate how active the aufkläung was, and how large the scope of the movement was. using these foci, we can examine how far enlightened thinking permeated into german-speaking society. looking at the gendered and religious aspect of jewish women’s participation in the aufklärung, we can ask not only what the enlightenment did but also whose it was. jewish women were practitioners of civil society but were marginalised on two counts – for their gender and their religion. “civil society” here refers to the people and community that engaged in enlightened thinking – usually the public sphere but also incorporated into the private. using this term, and hull’s idea of “practitioners of civil society,” this paper will revise and reinterpret an old-school question, giving it a modern-day twist. primarily focusing on prussia and berlin around the turn of the century, circa 1800, we will look more closely at how jewish women were active and involved in the aufklärung. these women were far more involved in civil society than one would first believe, yet they were still markedly different from the principal practitioners and philosophers. this essay will first examine how jewish women entered the civil sphere as women, particularly in their gendered roles as salonnières. secondly, we will turn to religion and how women as jews, and the jewish community more broadly, participated in the aufklärung through the haskalah. finally, this paper will present the concept of the “jewess” where jewish women’s gender and religion coalesced into a unique identification. this study uses excerpts of letters and biographies from jewish women who contemplated and examined their identities. letters, at this time, were a literary form deemed acceptable for women, so the ones still in existence offer a window into jewish women’s emotions, ideas, and reflections at the time. 14 from this, i posit that german-speaking central europe was a society moving towards an enlightened age, incorporating large swathes of society in its movement; however, its scope was still sorely limited by gender, religion, and class conditions. indeed, this civil society was a 14 liliane weissberg, “writing on the wall: letters of rahel varnhagen,” new german critique, no. 36 (1985), 157-173. 13 blackbourn and eley, the peculiarities of german history. 12 hull, sexuality, state, and civil society in germany. 136 “developing” one, where enlightened thought and liberation benefited only the upper-classes of both christians and jews alike. this essay focuses on upper-class jewish women who experienced the inner circles of the aufklärung. “berlin landmarks”: jewish women using a gendered lens, we can find that jewish women, as women, were able to access civil society despite their role in the inferior sex. fanny lewald commented on the legacy of these women’s contribution to the aufklärung in the 1830s. it seemed to me as if i found myself at king arthur’s round table when i looked at these old, weathered faces… once they had all been at the forefront of the movement. these frail women had overcome the barriers of the caste spirit with their bildung, and they had conquered the violence of prejudice in berlin by means of their own powers.15 fanny lewald, a young salonnière, had lunch with henriette herz and sara levy – two famous salonnières in their seventies. she admired and revered their legacy, likening them to knights, even calling them “berlin landmarks.” while this conveys them as having overcome the discrimination and prejudice in berlin to become part of civil society, it suggests there was still a marked difference between them and the practitioners of civil society – they had prejudice to overcome in the first place that their male counterparts did not. salons were a critical space for civil society at this time. practitioners of civil society gathered in the living rooms of berlin elites to share and discuss ideas. despite salons’ fundamental role in the aufklärung, there is no concrete, steadfast definition for them. indeed, such a term was emerging during this period – hahn, in fact, describes “salons” as a word for “what we do not know about social life around 1800.”16 rather, the term provides an umbrella definition of female-led activities around 1800, an emerging and gendered term in german-speaking europe. these salons were held in the homes of berlin notables and invited a diverse group of people to join in discussion and conversation: men, women, christians, jews, middle classes, nobility, professors, poets, and others. the female hosts, known as salonnières, were wealthy elites with education in the humanities – often jewish too. through salons, jewish women were active in the aufklärung; they facilitated discussions and were educated in enlightened thinking. their roles as women were fundamental to the character of salons; their marginalized social statuses meant they could promote these meetings full of diverse people. hannah arendt, a twentieth-century philosopher and jewish woman, wrote an autobiography about her predecessor, rahel levin varnhagen – a nineteenth-century forerunner of jewish, female philosophy.17 she illustrates salons as a utopian, transformative space: “the charm of the early berlin salons was that nothing really mattered but personality and the uniqueness of character, talent, and expression.”18 from both lewald’s and ardent’s depictions, it’s clear these women were important parts of the aufklärung, even years later. 18 hannah arendt, the origins of totalitarianism, 77. 17 hannah ardent, rahel varnhagen: the life of a jewess (institute, 1957). 16 b. hahn, “die salons der rahel levin varnhagen,” in berliner romantik, orte, spuren und begegnungen, ed. h. gärtner and a. purfürst (berlin: trescher verlag, 1992), 106. 15 fanny lewald, meine lebensgeschichte, volume 3 of gesammelte werke (berlin: verlag von otto janke, 1871); 116–17, 123–24. 137 henriette herz, in her later years, also described how transcending gendered barriers in salons had its difficulties. even when mixing socially in these interstitial spaces, women were not on equal footing. however, she does admit that these differences in status were somewhat overcome: the relationships changed within our circles soon enough. the mind is a powerful equalizer, and love, which now and then does not refrain from meddling, often entirely changes pride into humility.19 herz’s experience exemplifies that women could be accepted into the salon community as equals, but not without a struggle. she posits the mind as an “equalizer,” an organ capable of overcoming gendered barriers. her intellectual contribution to enlightened thought and discussion allowed her to transcend this barrier. this comment reveals a very vulnerable and human thought from herz in relation to her challenges in life. to find a woman of this time so openly commenting on the power of intellect to overcome gendered hurdles is powerful to read. this egalitarian utopia illustrated by ardent, lewald, and herz, however, was not all it seemed. jewish women, while having these facilitatory roles, were not fully incorporated into civil society. the salons provided them with a space they could enter to participate in the aufklärung, but this space was not wholly within the public civil society. as vick argues, “salons bridged the boundary between private and public.”20 during this time, the dichotomy existing in a society where women inhabited the private, domestic sphere meant they struggled to access the masculine, public sphere. as carol pateman argues, “women are incorporated into a sphere that both is and is not in civil society. the private sphere is part of civil society but is separated from the ‘civil’ sphere.”21 this is an apt illustration of how women slotted into civil society during the aufklärung; the salons allowed them to participate in civil society and enlightened thinking but were not able to fully permeate the boundaries. as hedwig staegemann – jewish daughter of a prussian official and a salonniére, despaired: o, truly, women are not suited to these times! they are suited, but they are made unsuited. …the soft education of the female sex makes their spirit as undecided, wavering, and weak as their body. … my heart rises up against this. it hammers and pounds forcefully and wants to fly boldly out of this petty sphere.22 she describes how women have been weakened by society, which forces them into a specific sphere, limiting and controlling their education. brian vick argues women were able to participate more publicly and politically than historiography would have you believe.23 but from hedwig’s description, the middling sphere created by salons was as similarly imprisoning as the private one, tying this confinement to her sex. while they could engage publicly and politically, they were expected to limit and soften their interests and engagement with society. it was thought that women did not understand politics and to become too politically active in their endeavors was unseemly. the austrian statesman 23 vick, the congress of vienna, 125. 22 hedwig staegemann, quoted in vick, the congress of vienna, 126. 21 carole pateman, the sexual contract (cambridge university press, 1988), 11. 20 vick, the congress of vienna, 149. 19 emily bilski and emily braun, the power of conversation: jewish women and their salons (yale university press, 2005), 27. 138 metternich is recorded to have told his wife, the duchess of sagan, that he “would love [her] a little less still if [she] were political.” the duchess, thereafter, subdued her political interests with humor and apologies to suit her husband.24 men were open to female political participation, “with certain limits.” they could not be wholly political, needing to soften their opinions for the men around them. it is interesting to view metternich’s censorship of his wife’s politics in the context of his censorship in austria more broadly. his regulations in 1810 set out guidelines for censors to restrict and redact media and texts, guidelines which divided texts into academic scholarship and popular entertainment – the latter of which was susceptible to more rigorous censorship.25 texts, then, intended for the masses and lower orders were more heavily restricted by the state. when looking at metternich’s censorship of his wife, we can see a mirroring of similar restrictions of lower orders. men in scholarship and science who made new discoveries spoke more freely and could access more texts. texts that were mildly censored were available only to scientists and academics, while women and the lower orders were censored and restricted from accessing them. tamara kamatović describes how these censorship regulations were paternally justified,26 implemented to protect the wellbeing of the emperor’s subjects, stating that his majesty was: fully conscious of his foremost duties as ruler and father, which encompass the intellectual and moral education [of his subjects], as well as their physical well-being, and which no more allows that the subjects’ spirits or hearts be corrupted than that their bodies be corrupted.27 austria’s censorship regime under metternich, while not prussia, demonstrates the role of germanic states in the proliferation of printed enlightenment thought. the paternal hierarchy of state censorship is mirrored in metternich’s approach to his wife’s participation in political thought and discussion. in encouraging her to soften her political tendencies, he is censoring her role as a practitioner of civil society, just as he similarly censored the literature of the masses. in salons, however, women were able to participate in enlightened discussions, although their politicization was still curbed. here, discussions were seen to be calmer and more civil due to the presence of women;28 in fact, salons were one of the only places women could participate in civil society. spaces like coffee houses were seen to be too impolite, public, or consequential to let women participate in. salons, then, were shaped by women to keep civil society civil. jewish women were certainly practitioners of civil society, but not in the same manner as men. they were fragmented from the main movement, allowed only to participate in certain settings or with certain conditions. the enlightenment was theirs – but only in specified circumstances were they allowed to be active participants in it. ‘the foreskin of your heart:’ jewish women as jews 28 vick, the congress of vienna, 129. 27 marschke, ben (trans.) “guidelines for administering censorship and for the conduct of censors” (1810), published in german history in documents and images. available at: https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567. (accessed 15/11/2024). 26 tamara kamatović, “metternich’s censors at work: philosophy and practices of censorship in the early nineteenth century,” romanic review 109, no. 1-4 (2018), 103-26. 25 marschke, ben (trans), “guidelines for administering censorship and for the conduct of censors” (1810), published in german history in documents and images. available at: https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567. (accessed 15/11/2024). 24 metternich, quoted in vick, the congress of vienna, 130. 139 https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567 https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567 jewish women, and jews more broadly, were similarly able to access the civil sphere. the jewish elite of berlin learned enlightenment thinking just like that of christian berlin intellectuals, and salons allowed the comingling of all religions and classes – jews were part of civil society in this way.29 but they also had their own enlightenment movement – the haskalah. they read and debated new enlightenment philosophy in their own communities and critiqued orthodox jewish teachings – all fostered by the jewish tradition of learning – from there, the berlin haskalah, a movement specific to the jewish elites of berlin – “was born and thrived.”30 for jews, the haskalah meant questioning orthodox practices and the religious elite, reinterpreting judaism through enlightened thought.31 clark discusses the haskalah and argues its presence demonstrates the distinctive nature of the aufklärung; it marked an important moment for german and jewish-german sociability. further than this, civil society provided an “interstitial sphere of enlightened trans-confessional conviviality.”32 similarly to salons for women, the civil society provided a space for jews to participate in the public sphere alongside christians. and jewish women were a large part of this, as salonnières they were able to further bring together a mixed group of people. however, jews were still fragmented from the center of civil society, being perceived as markedly different from their christian counterparts due to contemporary legislation. in 1750, frederick ii issued a general code dividing prussian jews into six classes. wealthy berlin jews sat in the upper class – generally privileged. but still, people of this class were rarely granted full citizenship, and citizenship itself was not instituted for jews until 1812. the majority of prussian jews were modest people living under restrictive laws in berlin.33 additionally, weissberg describes how jews were markedly different from the rest of berlin through their homelessness. the concept of heimatlos comes from the german word heimat – an indefinable term with no english equivalent. it loosely equates to the german homeland or ancestral lands, and during the enlightenment period, it was utilized by practitioners as a regional identity, a concept used in the midst of german states lacking territorial and political cohesion. minsky finds that heimat became a central discourse “about place and belonging” in these spaces.34 heimatlos was utilized conceptually to reference the topos of the “wandering jew.” woolf describes this motif as so: he is, to a degree, the ultimate cosmopolitan: restrained by no borders and, often, able to speak all languages. he resides within time and beyond it, belongs nowhere and everywhere. he is human but condemned to live forever until the second coming of christ releases him.35 as a group suffering from heimatlos, jews were constructed as cosmopolitan beings who drifted from city to city, borders not restricting their movement. the motif of the 35 michael woolf, “the wandering jew,” frontiers: the interdisciplinary journal of study abroad 30, no. 1 (2018), 21. 34 amir minsky, “home is where the heart is: the rise of emotional spaces in german late enlightenment,” eighteenth-century life 45, no. 3 (2021), 106. 33 ibid, 257-269. 32 clark, the iron kingdom, 263. 31 ulrike wagner, “on dialogical writing, self-forming, and salon culture: rahel varnhagen, henriette herz, and fanny lewald,” hegel bulletin 43, no. 3 (2022), 441. the berlin haskalah was highly characterized by moses mendelssohn, a jewish scholar whose writings and use of hebrew in the public sphere were widely admired. 30 liliane weissberg, ‘literary culture and jewish space around 1800: the berlin salons revisited,’ in modern jewish literatures: intersections and boundaries, eds. shelia jelen, michael kramer, and scott lerner (university of pennsylvania press, 2011), 29. 29 geller, “circumcision and jewish women’s identity.” 140 “wandering jew” was utilized antisemitically, pursuing the narrative that jews had no home, residing across europe unattached to specific nations. this unattached status was seen to be a part of a larger jewish conspiracy where jews were aiming for world dominance.36 in the context of berlin’s civil sphere, jewish homelessness (heimatlos) marked jews with a distinct status. expelled from their homeland, they were visitors in german-speaking central europe, with no native land, nor any civic rights or citizenship to take advantage of. they were granted the privilege to live in berlin, rather than the right their christian counterparts enjoyed. they were seen as homeless in both a philosophical and legal sense, pushed to the edges of society due to their historical status.37 their distinct status was also evident in salons. salons were not solely secular places for reasoned debate and discussion; they acted as places for religious sociability also.38 the jewish salonnières who, being socially marginalized themselves, were able to “suspend boundaries” and allow the intermingling of multiple faiths.39 after hosting in their homes, however, jewish women could not expect invitations in return from their christian visitors. while salons allowed the mixing and mingling of so many people in civil society, it still conserved markedly different statuses. the salon meant more privileged visitors – christians with civic rights – could keep their homes off-limits to jews, while still socializing and interacting with them in the civil sphere.40 jewish women, and jews more broadly, were participants in civil society, but degrees of separation had to be maintained – such as preserving christian homes as jewish-free spaces. salons, while centers of enlightened thinking and discussion, acted like halfway homes for the heimatlos jews of berlin, providing an interstitial sphere but still stifling women and jews’ full involvement in the public civil sphere. even without the restrictive legal impositions, jews felt symbolic differences between themselves and christians. rahel levin varnhagen expresses the conflict she endured over her jewish identity; she articulated her jewish identity through “figures of circumcision,” referring to the removal of the foreskin that physically marked jews from non-jews. varnhagen, as a woman, was not circumcised but she talked of her phantasmal circumcision that, while not real, still left her feeling physically marked and removed from society. the bildung that elite jews were educated in was supposed to transcend this difference, but varnhagen argued her (imagined) circumcision “could not be removed.”41 even hebrew scripture argues circumcision is not a physical condition but a fundamental difference jews are born with. deuteronomy 10:16 comments that one should “circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart,”42 finding that jewish observation required an internal alteration, demarcating jews from christians and therefore removing them from the center of civil society – and larger society as well. jews were a part of enlightened thinking and civil society but were denied full and central involvement due to their lesser statuses. ‘eroticised and exoticized beauties:’ jewish women as the ‘jewess’ the jewish salonnières, such as henriette herz, fanny lewald, rahel levin varnhagen, hedwig staegemann, and sara levy, held their gender and religion as two intermingling 42 deuteronomy 10:16, hebrew old testament. 41 geller, “circumcision and jewish women’s identity,” 175-178. 40 ibid, 32. 39 clark, the iron kingdom, 264. 38 vick, the congress of vienna, 113. 37 weissberg, “literary culture and jewish space around 1800,” 27. 36 ibid. 141 parts of their identities. not isolated attributes, these qualities mutually shaped each other. this is the definition of intersectionality according to collins and bilge who present it as categories of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, and others, all “mutually shaping one another.”43 gender and religion are two such entities intersecting within people’s identities. the berlin salonnières experienced the intersectionality of their gender and religion in prussia during the aufklärung. they were agents of civil society and enlightened thinking that brought together feminine and jewish aspects. these women were still a part of the enlightenment, but these intersecting entities affected jewish women’s place and involvement within it in a unique manner. in her letters and autobiography, varnhagen discusses being a “jewess.” the term “jew” is a gender-neutral category, but varnhagen interpreted her jewish identity as gendered. she was not born jewish but as a “jewess.”44 as we have seen, jewish women had a uniquely different experience from their male and female counterparts in the enlightenment. they were not able to participate in the haskalah which was reserved for jewish men who had been brought up with an intellectual education. while elite jewish women had also been educated, it was not learning in the traditional jewish way, but a flawed and defective form of jewish bildung. jewish women, therefore, could not access the haskalah in the same way as their male counterparts.45 the jewish women’s experience differed from christian women’s also; as jewish women, society projected a sense of being foreign and exotic onto them, viewing them as “eroticised and exoticised feminine [beauties].”46 this perception of the “jewess” objectified jewish women; their gender and religion were merged into an exotic form of beauty and morbid curiosity. this was, however, dependent on these women being objectively “beautiful.” varnhagen had expressed that being an “ugly” woman made their lives and efforts that much harder.47 varnhagen was described by her visitors as a plain, middle-class girl – a contrast to the great beauty of henriette herz. she was, however, praised for her intelligence, wit, and friendship – qualities that were seen to compensate for her lack of wealth and beauty. these jewish women, then, had to make up for their deficiencies as women and jews with some impressive outstanding quality, whether that would be beauty, wit, or charm. they were not, however, allowed to exist as women in their own right. the topos of the “beautiful jewess,” or as a charming and witty acquaintance, allowed female jews to enter the civil society as objects of curiosity and desire. 47 wagner, “on dialogical writing, self-forming, and salon culture,” 450. 46 marjanne goozé, “posing for posterity: the representations and portrayals of henriette herz as ‘beautiful jewess’,” in body dialectics in the age of goethe, ed. marianna henn and holger a. pausch (leiden; brill, 2003), 80. 45 weissberg, “literary culture and jewish space around 1800.” 44 geller, “circumcision and jewish women’s identity,” 175. 43 patricia collins and sirma bilge, intersectionality (cambridge university press, 2020), 1. 142 the salonniére henriette herz was renowned for her great beauty and she defined herself through this beauty. in later years she reminisced, explaining that “guests spoke a great deal with me since they assumed i was intelligent because i was pretty.”48 in fact, her looks determined her place in society from a young age. as marjanne goozé describes, she was painted as the goddess hebe at fourteen years of age, a common style for the upper class of eighteenth-century europe.49 despite being fourteen, she is sexualized; with her gown half off her shoulder revealing a hint of an areola, her small smile, and straight-on stare, she is displayed in a sexual manner. perhaps this speaks more widely to the archetype of the “jewess.” this sexualization could speak to jewish women’s experience of eroticization from a young age, not just within the civil sphere but society at large. despite this, herz herself admitted that her perceived beauty made her an object of interest at salons, aiding her role as a jewish salonnière. jewish women had specific experiences that were unlike those of christian women or jewish men. not just because of their gender and religion but because of the way these entities mutually shaped and entangled with each other, creating unique identities. but these individuals – jewish men, women, jewish women – were all tied together by their challenges to entering civil society. jay geller ties jewish identification to the body, specifically beschneiden (circumcision). he finds that beshneidung was an act “performed on objects that already served, respectively, as iconic and indexical markers of difference,” such 49 goozé, “posing for posterity,” 71. 48 bilski and braun, the power of conversation, 26. 143 as the penis marking gender and sexuality.50 women’s genitals were doubly marked as the inferior gender, lacking circumcision which was said to be what made a jew a jew. philosopher johann gottlieb fichte made a remark to this effect in 1811, commenting that if one is not circumcised, then “one is not a jew.”51 women, jews, and jewish women, however, did not share a cohesive experience as one and it is important not to over-romanticize this. as wagner argues, social endeavors at this time “were not tied to specific ends that we can either admiringly endorse or expose as failures.”52 their individual involvements in enlightened thinking were not smaller parts of a larger jewish emancipation movement or feminist campaign. these people had prejudices to overcome, which they did – but not to any full extent. neither were their intentions to form a part of an overarching jewish movement. on the contrary, these “jewesses” made up a privileged group of the berlin jewish elite, an elite group not solely concerned with furthering jewish civic equality, but with their own penetration into the berlin upper class. as geller asserts, they “considered themselves different from their poorer, more traditional brothers and sisters.”53 the consequence of this was a middling group. jews who were not entirely accepted into the christian upper class but were distinguished from the everyday jew in berlin. it is important, then, to remember that the enlightenment was an upper-class possession, a movement the general, unprivileged jews and christians alike could not claim to belong to. it is easy to draw up a narrative of a great campaign forming at this time, especially if we look to sources written by the likes of lewald who presents salonnières as unsung heroes of the aufklärung. these women may have held some greater, societal value in their assimilation into the berlin elite, but ultimately, they participated in civil society for their own interests and ambitions. but who can blame them? these women were scaling the glass ceiling and smashing it open for themselves. the enlightenment was accessible to them, and it was their movement too, despite their differences and disadvantages. however, they were markedly different from the other enlightened thinkers of the time. they were fragmented from the main sphere, on the edge looking in. geller epitomizes this paradox well: because she is a jewess, she can never be accepted fully as such an individual. being a jewess is not just a birth defect. rather, the birth defect recalls the biblical circumcision of the heart.54 conclusion there was a great diversity in enlightened thinking across europe. this is true not only transnationally, but within borders too; the aufklärung and enlightened thinkers in german-speaking central europe varied greatly themselves. women and jewish enlightenment thinkers, while involved in the movement, were fragmented from the main sphere. the famous berlin salons of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries bridged between both the private and public spheres, creating a space for women to participate and even lead enlightened thinking. similarly, the haskalah was an abstract place allowing jewish participation in the enlightenment. gender and religion entangled with 54 ibid, 179. 53 geller, “circumcision and jewish women’s identity,” 176. 52 wagner, “on dialogical writing, self-forming, and salon culture,” 438. 51 ibid, cited in geller, 15. 50 geller, the jewish question, 7. 144 each other in a dynamic manner within jewish women, forming unique identities in the form of jewesses. this paper has, while proving jews and women had access to the german-speaking civil society of the later 18th and early 19th centuries, revealed how christian men shaped and molded this sphere to their liking. there was an implicit contract in place for these suburban citizens of civil society that placed conditions on their existence in the aufklärung, regulating how they participated within it. women were allowed to partake in enlightenment discussion while in the salons and correctly presenting themselves as polite and appeaseable beings, avoiding offending the traditional traits expected from women. likewise, jews, while being afforded certain privileges in the upper classes, were not recognized as citizens (just as women weren’t) and, in fact, were often perceived as foreigners. they could not access bildung or education in the same manner, nor be guests in christian homes as christians were guests in their homes. the main condition of enlightened contribution was class. most women and jews would never have the chance to access civil society; debate and enlightened discussion was a privilege for the elite that the bulk of society would never have an opportunity to access. being of high class was the key to them accessing the higher tiers of society while being tied to disempowered identities. these marginalizations of women and jews led into the combined identity of the “jewess.” these jewish women experienced civil society uniquely, sitting in a “painful chasm between social power and racial prejudice.”55 they endured the enlightenment movement under dual non-citizenship, marginalized on two counts, which coalesced into their identity as a jewess. jewish women, while not physically circumcised, experienced the phantasmal, biblical circumcision described by rahel levin varnhagen that doubly marked them as outsiders of the enlightened world. these physical and anatomical differences covertly manifested in social marginalization in civil society and salons. a marginalization that could only be overcome by class. for jewish women, class was enough to just get through the door. to truly participate in the aufklärung and prove their worth they had to compensate for their jewish identity through beauty or intellectual prowess. women were expected to conform to feminine norms, jews remained outside of christian society, and jewish women were to be objects of curiosity for others to marvel at. this study begs the question, can a society excluding large portions of the population be enlightened? this is anachronistic to consider, but the question at hand provokes anachronistic thinking. women and jews were markedly different at this time. this was the natural hierarchy of eighteenth-century society; women and jews were not invited into the public sphere. the enlightenment principally belonged to christian men. rather than a time of civil society, this period could perhaps be termed civilising society; the enlightenment was a process for all areas, different for each place and person, developing in fragments in germany. these fragments were connected, involving many types of people in society, but some people were on the edges, marked as different and separate from the center. as kant argued, this was an age of enlightenment, but not an enlightened age.56 this is illustrated by moggach and stedman-jones, who describe the 1848 revolutions as a “slow unfolding of freedom and reason,” a historical process more than anything.57 elite jewish women 57 douglas moggach and gareth stedman-jones, eds. the 1848 revolutions and european political thought (cambridge university press, 2018), 1. 56 immanuel kant, “what is enlightenment?” (1784), 3. 55 bilski and braun, the power of conversation, 4. 145 experienced this slow unfolding of freedom through the meeting of conditions set out by civil society. a combination of their class, looks, wit, and hostess skills coalesced to combat their existence as jewish women – a class that was set apart from any other in nineteenth-century berlin. 146 bibliography arendt, hannah, the origins of totalitarianism (schocken books, 1951). ardent, hannah, rahel varnhagen: the life of a jewess (institute, 1957). bilski, emily, and braun, emily, the power of conversation: jewish women and their salons (yale university press, 2005). clark, christopher, iron kingdom: the rise and downfall of prussia, 1600-1947 (allen lane, 2006). collins, patricia, and bilge, sirma, intersectionality (cambridge university press, 2020). crocker, lester g, “the enlightenment: what and who?,” studies in eighteenth-century culture 17, no. 1 (1988), 335-347. blackbourn, david and eley, geoff, the peculiarities of german history: bourgeois society and politics in nineteenth-century germany (oxford university press, 1984). geller, jay, ‘circumcision and jewish women’s identity: rahel levin varnhagen’s failed assimilation,’ in judaism since gender, eds. miriam peskowitz and laura levitt (new york, 1997). geller, jay, the other jewish question: identifying the jew and making sense of modernity, (fordham university, 2011). goozé, marjanne, “posing for posterity: the representations and portrayals of henriette herz as ‘beautiful jewess’,” in body dialectics in the age of goethe, ed. marianna henn and holger a. pausch (brill, 2003), 67-95. hahn, b. “die salons der rahel levin varnhagen,” in berliner romantik, orte, spuren und begegnungen, ed. h. gärtner and a. purfürst (trescher verlag, 1992). hull, isabel, sexuality, state, and civil society in germany, 1700-1815 (cornell university press, 1996). kamatović, tamara, “metternich’s censors at work: philosophy and practices of censorship in the early nineteenth century,” romanic review 109, no. 1-4 (2018), 103-26. kant, immanuel, “what is enlightenment?” (1784). lewald, fanny, meine lebensgeschichte, volume 3 of gesammelte werke (verlag von otto janke, 1871). marschke, ben (trans.), “guidelines for administering censorship and for the conduct of censors” (1810), published in german history in documents and images. available at: https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:docum ent-3567. (accessed 15/11/2024). 147 https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567 https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/the-holy-roman-empire-1648-1815/ghdi:document-3567 marx, karl, the revolutions of 1848, (allen lane, 1973). minsky, amir, “home is where the heart is: the rise of emotional spaces in german late enlightenment,” eighteenth-century life 45, no. 3 (2021), 88-115. moggach, douglas, and stedman-jones, gareth, eds. the 1848 revolutions and european political thought (cambridge university press, 2018). nisbet, hb, “’was ist aufklärung?’: the concept of enlightenment in eighteenth-century germany,” european studies xii (1982), 77-95. pateman, carole, the sexual contract (cambridge university press, 1988). vick, brian, the congress of vienna (cambridge university press, 2014). wagner, ulrike, “on dialogical writing, self-forming, and salon culture: rahel varnhagen, henriette herz, and fanny lewald,” hegel bulletin 43, no. 3 (2022), 438-466. weissberg, liliane, “writing on the wall: letters of rahel varnhagen,” new german critique, no. 36 (1985), 157-173. weissberg, liliane, “literary culture and jewish space around 1800: the berlin salons revisited,” in eds. shelia jelen, michael kramer, and scott lerner, modern jewish literatures: intersections and boundaries (university of pennsylvania press, 2011). todd h. weir, “the specter of ‘godless jewry’: secularism and the ‘jewish question’ in late nineteenth-century germany,” central european history 46 (2014), 815-849. woolf, michael, “the wandering jew,” frontiers: the interdisciplinary journal of study abroad 30, no. 1 (2018), 20-32. 148 cey.4.deheer.actsofsurvival acts of survival children’s writings during the holocaust sorcha deheer university of alberta abstract an analysis of children’s writings during the holocaust in former yugoslavia reveals that children are active participants in the formation of the social world and retain a sense of agency in spaces that afford them little. through their diaries, letters, and memoirs, young people produced works of radical nonconformity that aided in their individual and social survival. this paper aims to understand how children and youth aid in the survival of their social environment amid periods of severe systemic oppression by problematizing children as an ideological concept. conventional perceptions of childhood consign children to passive roles as victims and symbols. as scholarship on the holocaust and genocide progresses, children’s contributions shouldn't be overlooked. 65 article introduction the late júlia szilágyi (2020), a hungarian holocaust survivor from north transylvania and renowned professor, wrote in her memoir that “whoever wants to eradicate a culture, in another or in himself, must erase the memories. not the textbooks. not the legends that have become a treasure trove. no. the most personal, the memories of children....”1 szilágyi poignantly illustrated children's importance in transmitting and sustaining culture. when children are viewed as passive actors whose contributions to culture are limited to their capacity to mature, it is easy to diminish their contributions.2 by challenging this narrative, it is possible to understand how children aid in the survival of their social environment (sometimes referred to as social worlds), even if they do not live to adulthood. the construction of the social world is an endlessly fluid process made up of individual behaviours. these actions impact the accepted social representations—the values, beliefs, practices, and ideas shared among a group of people that form the basis for their collective identity. social worlds are intersectional, so a person may be simultaneously present in more than one. for the purposes of this paper, the social world refers both to the individual communities of people that share a physical space with children in camps, ghettos, and neighbourhoods as well as the wider european jewish community, which is connected through shared beliefs, practices, and histories. in essence, the social environment encompasses the interpersonal and cultural milieu that shapes their attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviour. conventional perceptions of childhood position them as passive participants who exist within history but do not shape it. by problematizing children as an ideological concept, this paper aims to understand how children and youth retain a sense of agency and aid in the survival of their social environment amid periods of severe systemic oppression. through their diaries, letters, and memoirs, young people produced works of radical nonconformity that aided in their individual and social survival. the authors demonstrate that they are active, knowing subjects who are capable of critically evaluating and impacting their social world. alexandra zapruder discusses the legacy of anne frank’s diary. it is seen not just as a testimony of the events that occurred during the war but as “rescuing her generation; and by its seemingly dominant theme of hope for humanity, rescuing all of us in the process.”3 by recording and sharing their authentic experiences, children challenged nazi propaganda, providing proof of the events that occurred and instilling hope and resilience in their communities. any close examination of children and youth as historical subjects necessitates a thorough understanding of how they are viewed—socially and culturally—in the time and space they occupy. as with any other social actor, their actions and worldviews are 3 alexandra zapruder, “introduction,” in salvaged pages, ed. alexandra zapruder (yale university press, 2002), 7. 2 children are regarded as important to the transmission of culture in the sense that they will grow up to carry on the traditions, but not as a child in and of themselves. 1 júlia szilágyi, álmatlan könyv (kolozsvár: korunk, 2014), 32, quoted in louise o. vasvári, “culinary nostalgia and post-traumatic stress disorder: addenda to kinga király's az újrakezdés receptjei (2019) / recipes for a new beginning (2020),” hungarian cultural studies 14, no.1 (2021): 196. 66 determined, in part, by social climate. understanding how society viewed and treated children is easier, however, than uncovering the lived experiences of the children themselves. holocaust studies has grown into a significant discipline, but children and youth continue to occupy a small space. some barriers are demographic. the aging population of survivors dwindles and the availability of source material in archives and personal collections is inconsistent. although numerous sources are available in other languages, english is the primary language of publishing for this subject. for academics who are not writing in english, this restricts the resources that are available to them as well as their publishing options. some are based on research, including the ones covered in further depth below. scholarship on children and youth employs a wide variety of age ranges, making the research inconsistent. when sources survive, they can be subjected to omission and doctoring, as was the case with anne frank’s diary. when research is conducted, children are often constrained by age-related ideologies. as i will discuss, this leads to an incomplete and potentially misleading analysis of children’s experiences. similarly, sources directly from children themselves can be limited, so scholars rely on the memories and reflections of adults. while this can be valuable in its own right, it is not a replacement. finally, the interruption to education as a result of german policies, trauma, and displacement serves as a barrier to effective communication. challenges faced by children’s historians patricia herberer rice challenges historians to “represent these experiences in a meaningful and authentic way.”4 reproducing the world as it was seen by children in the past is difficult because the nature of childhood itself is fluid and a social construction defined by adult expectations.5 there are legal, cultural, religious and biological definitions of childhood and all of them would situate historical actors in a different way. even if we were to choose a single definition, there are additional factors to consider. if a time and place have surviving legal definitions of childhood, how do we situate that in a culture that may or may not consider this definition in their everyday lives? does a 16-year-old girl remain a child because she is under the age of majority and not done growing, or an adult because she has surpassed puberty and is married with children? to put this into perspective, we can look at the various ways that youth were treated during world war ii. the hitlerjugend, also known as the hitler youth, consisted of boys ages 14-18 years old. as members, they were prepared for war but did not participate directly in it until 1943.6 the organization defined what it means to be a youth legally, but in practice, the line blurred. a defensive militia known as volkssturm was set up in the last few months of the war and consisted of boys as young as 16. in this case, the need for soldiers trumped the legal definition of childhood. the dilemma facing historians is 6 “hitler youth,” united states holocaust memorial museum, accessed may 1, 2025, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hitler-youth-2#fn_ref-1. 5 mischa honeck and james marten, “introduction,” in war and childhood in the era of the two world wars, ed. mischa honeck and james marten (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2019), 4-6. 4 patricia herberer rice, “in their own words” children in the world of the holocaust,” in war and childhood in the era of the two world wars, ed. mischa honeck and james marten (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2019), 231. 67 https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hitler-youth-2#fn_ref-1 whether to use legal or social definitions to determine when their subjects are considered adults. hidden children pose a similar challenge to the definition of childhood. assuming persons in their late teens and early twenties were sent abroad by their parents at the beginning of the war it can be assumed that they were considered children, to some extent, by their parents and communities. again, the social perspective is more important than the legal one. mischa honeck and james marten focus on the industrialization of actual and ideological childhood, a process that frequently placed children at the forefront of war and violence. they place fewer limitations on who they consider children for research purposes, including adolescents and older. the same is true for jefferey blutinger, who classifies anyone under the age of twenty-five as being a child. most historians will go up to a maximum age of twenty-five, although it can be as low as sixteen.7 in line with blutinger, this paper situates children and youth (used interchangeably) as any persons under the age of 25 because this is the approximate age when social conventions around childhood appear to stop. after defining what a child is, based on social conventions, it is critical to assess how scholarship positions them as a historical subject. conventional discourse constrains children and youth by situating them as passive actors, both within their own lives and their larger social networks. as historical subjects, they occupy a submissive role, experiencing the world around them but not actively participating as sovereign agents. when looking at the literature surrounding the hitlerjugend (hitler youth), children and youth are depicted as tools of the state, with little regard for the role they are playing in the war. we have often questioned how children are utilized to further political ends, but less so how those children understood and responded to the regime's puppeteering. further challenges occur when we explore children as perpetrators. jessica k. taft argues for a critical approach to child and youth studies that treats young people as “knowing subjects who can offer their own theoretical insights into the social world.”8 the challenge then is to reconcile our perception of children as innocent with their capacity to critically assess their social position. children and youth as submissive historical subjects is a discursively constructed narrative with potential implications on age-related ideologies. if children are viewed as inherently passive, we risk overlooking a significant part of history. the sources left behind by children of the past embody childhood as it is understood by those who are living through it, rather than a narrative that has been reconstructed through the lens of maturity. this does not mean that there is no place for post-war memoirs, interviews, or similar. the reflections of adults on their childhoods provide greater depth to the study of memory. it is important to consider how the experiences of a child are interpreted and valued years later. there is a wealth of sources examining children’s experiences from the perspective of their older selves. many holocaust survivors documented and archived their experiences soon after the war, while others waited until 8 jessica k. taft, “is it okay to critique youth activists? notes on the power and danger of complexity,” in children and youth as subjects, objects, agents: innovative approaches across time and space, ed. deborah levinson, mary jo maynes, and frances vavrus (palgrave macmillan, 2021), 194. 7 jeffery blutinger, "children and the holocaust," in plight and fate of children during and following genocide, ed. samuel totten (routledge, 2014), 85-86. 68 old age. both cases reflect the belief that memory is valuable and worthy of preservation. in a uniquely reflective article, historian elena jackson albarrán challenges her perceptions of scholarship and childhood. jackson submits her childhood diary for historical scrutiny by herself and a class of undergraduate students. through this process, two interesting things emerge. the assumptions made by the undergraduate students were at times wildly incorrect, especially when only given a fraction of the diary to work from. secondly, jackson was faced with questions about her diary that she did not have answers for or had not considered, even as an adult. jackson writes that the experience “prompted me to take a second, more objectively distanced, look at a childhood i thought i understood” in response to observations that her parents worked more than average.9 the experiment points to the challenge that historians and subjects face when remembering the past. the affective practices of the child and the adult are different as they situate themselves uniquely within the social environment. when written sources from children do exist, they may be subject to partial omission or doctoring, as in the case of anne frank’s diary. this leaves scholars to rely on the interpretations and manipulations of powerful adults.10 omission is also seen in a different but equally important way in cases of hidden children. throughout the war, children were being transported across borders in an attempt to save them from the horrors occurring at home. children, especially those rehomed through private means, were not always returned to their biological families after the war. in many cases, these children did not know they were hidden children until much later in life. blutinger points to this phenomenon as a key reason for a lack of documentation from child survivors.11 in both instances of omission, the history and agency of the children are removed from themselves and the historical record. the last issue faced by historians is simply the lack of evidence to begin with. many individuals would have been too young to write, and many experienced interruptions to their education. in 1933, the national government instituted a quota on the number of non-aryan students admitted to german schools, and the tenth supplementary decree to the reich citizenship law in 1935 disbanded jewish educational institutions and jewish teacher-training centers. while there were regional differences in legislation, by 1938, jewish students were banned from all public schools throughout germany and austria.12 many students continued to attend segregated schools, however their education was likely interrupted by the trauma of current events. others faced interruption when their families fled their country of origin. felicitas and thomas gumpel’s letter is an example of this interruption. the siblings were among hundreds of jewish children who fled germany for unoccupied france. along with their mother, gertrud gumpel, the siblings were caught during roundups in vichy and transported to the drancy transit camp near paris. felicitas 12 karl a. scleunes, ed., legislating the holocaust: the bernhard loesener memoirs and supporting documents, trans. carol scherer (routledge, 2018). 11 blutinger, "children and the holocaust," 93. 10 mona gleason and tamara myers, eds., bringing children and youth into canadian history: the difference kids make (ontario: oxford university press, 2017), 2. 9 elena jackson albarrán, ““so how’s your childhood going?” a historian of childhood confronts her own archive,” in children and youth as subjects, objects, agents: innovative approaches across time and space, ed. deborah levinson, mary jo maynes, and frances vavrus (palgrave macmillan, 2021), 21. 69 and thomas wrote to their grandmother after their mother and older brother were deported to auschwitz. the imperfect german reflects the limited education they received before the war.13 excerpt 1: a letter written by felicitas gumpel and thomas gumpel from the drancy transit camp to their grandmother, 1942. translated from german by patricia herberer rice. july 14, 1942 dear grandma, now don’t be shocked about the newest thing that i have to tell you: this morning mama and kurt were taken away with others to work. but they are staying in france, they are still in tours in order that they will be examined [by a doctor]. those that are sick will come back here. we children all remained here and are in good hands; they are taking good care of us. we have good things to eat, better than normal anyway: cookies, bread with butter, etc. we even sleep at night with a family that mama had befriended before; they are very kind to us. at nine-thirty we must all assemble again in our barracks, and then we will get to hear news; i hope good news. just don’t excite yourself too much; this is all only for the time being. share this letter with the entire family, because i cannot write to everyone. it is very sad in the camp because only the old men and women are here. they each have a suitcase a piece and 200 francs and a comforter, a thick one from us. this evening we haven’t heard any more [news]. i must close for today. many, many greetings and kisses, your fee dear grandma, with this news i think i have cried as never before, but this i show it is, so [many] fathers done from their children, mothers done from their children. i write these lines with tears in my eyes. many greetings and kisses, your tommy14 felicitas and thomas were able to communicate with distant relatives, but many children had not learned the skills necessary to do so after being separated from their parents. even with these skills, many children did not survive long enough to author letters and diaries. in many ways, children were at a disadvantage due to their age, limited education, and poor health. however, in some cases, like that of felicitas and thomas, their ages—thirteen and eleven, respectively—allowed them to communicate at least once with their family. prior to 14 letter for felicitas and thomas gumpel, july 14, 1942, in reiner lehberger and ursula randt, eds., “aus kindern werden briefe”: dokumente zum schicksal judischer kinder und jugendlicher in der ns-zeit (hamburg: freie und hansestadt hamburd behorde fur schule, jegend und berfufsbildung, 1999), 52-53 (translated from the german), quoted in patricia herberer, children during the holocaust (lanham: altamira press in association with the united states holocaust memorial museum, 2011), 97. 13 patricia herberer, children during the holocaust (lanham: altamira press in association with the united states holocaust memorial museum, 2011), 96-97. 70 1942, policy in france largely forbade juveniles from being deported to concentration camps. this policy spared the lives of the siblings until september 23, 1942, when the two were transported to auschwitz.15 despite their circumstances, their letter conveys hope and resilience. they aim to reassure their loved ones and share their experiences with a wider community. the writing is nuanced and emotional. the goal of the nazi regime was not to instill hope in jewish children but rather the opposite. whether intentional or not, felicitas’ letter serves as an example of radical nonconformity. felicitas saw the events happening around her as something of importance that needed to be shared. she did not write exclusively about her family but about all the mothers and fathers who were separated from their children. their record of the events that took place subverts the nazi’s attempt to control and erase jewish history. children’s writings from the sajmište concentration camp and vilna ghetto on the bank of the sana river stands an exhibition centre built in the 1930s known as sajmište. in 1941, the site was converted by the german army into a concentration camp for serbian jewish women and children. the conditions in the camp were especially heinous, with buildings that were broken and leaking in the middle of winter. food rations were so poor that the ss medical officer, dr. jung, attempted to intervene. his plea was denied by the administration, and many died well before the gas vans arrived in 1942.16 sajmište was a relatively small camp with very few survivors, making it particularly remarkable that sources were produced and survived. unlike drancy, prisoners in sajmište were not permitted to communicate with the outside world. the stories of đura rajs and hilda dajč provide a glimpse into the lives of children during severe systemic oppression. the diary of đura rajs was written by an eleven-year-old boy during his internment in the sajmište concentration camp. đura was among the approximately 7,500 jewish women and children from the banat region of modern-day serbia to be forcibly transported to belgrade in 1941. along with descriptions of his experiences, đura filled the pages with drawings of the things and places he saw. taken together, it is possible to inquire into the everyday life of a child in the sajmište camp, but also what children value and the experiences that they find worthy of recording at a time when resources are scarce. written on grid-lined paper, đura has dated and titled the work, given it a dedication, and signed it. the diary’s author pays great attention to detail. the image shows black smoke billowing from the engines of double-masted ships; the pen drawings give substance through the use of wavy lines and cross-hatching. đura’s work likely served as a way to externalize the trauma and rapid changes faced by him and his family. while many children were forced to or chose to take on forced labour jobs in camps and ghettos, đura and other children “were able to play to our heart's content all day long.”17 play does not feature in the 17 đura rajs, diary of đura rajs, august 11, 1941, us holocaust memorial museum, last accessed april 7, 2023, https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs. 16 menachem shelach, “sajmište — an extermination camp in serbia,” holocaust and genocide studies 2, no. 2 (1987): 243-260, https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/2.2.243. 15 herberer, children during the holocaust, 97. 71 https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/2.2.243 short diary; rather, đura takes the time to assure the reader that his accounts are real, lived experiences. he is intent on recording the harsh realities of life in the camp, both for himself and the adults. the work is dedicated to the lager, a word that the author makes a note of translating. meaning camp in german, đura makes it clear that he is aware of the situation he is in. the introduction, written in sajmište, sets a scene wrought with disease and sadness. his otherwise pragmatic retelling is interrupted briefly, expressing remorse that, at the age of eleven, he cannot produce a work of fiction. rather than playing with his peers, đura spends time drawing meticulous maps and diagrams. he details the living conditions and harsh realities of those around him in an attempt to show the reader how he “sees and imagines” the camp.18 đura’s attention to detail mirrors the literary writings of children across nazi-occupied europe. in the vilna and łódź ghettos, young people poured hours into learning, documenting, and creating. vilna-born yitskhok rudashevskin was 14 years old when he was transported to the vilna ghetto along with his parents and maternal grandmother. yitskhok kept a diary that documented his experiences over the two years he was interned. the vilna ghetto boasted two youth organizations that served as spaces where fragments of childhood could be preserved. along with his peers, yitskhok compiled a history of the ghetto.19 in response to a folklore project, yitskhok wrote: “in the ghetto dozens of sayings, ghetto curses, and ghetto blessings are created before our eyes…[t]he ghetto folklore…. must be collected and cherished as a treasure for the future.”20 he relayed a sense of responsibility for future generations and an understanding that resistance is located in the survival of culture. at ages when interest in make-believe is quickly fading, children such as đura and yitskhok transcend the restraints placed upon them through biographical pursuits. much like children’s play mimics the social environment, the diaries of camp and ghetto children reproduce the experiences of those around them. a sense of purpose and agency is sustained through these endeavours, contributing to their emotional survival. yitskhok writes in his diary that “…if we did not go to school, to the club, did not read books. we would die of dejection inside the ghetto walls.”21 the individual survival of youth in the ghetto relied not only on food and shelter but the creation and transmission of culture, to which these children were essential. the two boys are not passively experiencing history but creating it. in addition to their individual survival, the sources subvert attempts to modify and erase history. 21 yitskhok rudashevskin, diary entry, october 17, 1942, in salvaged pages, ed. alexandra zapruder (yale university press, 2002), 208. 20 yitskhok rudashevskin, diary entry, october 17, 1942, in salvaged pages, ed. alexandra zapruder (yale university press, 2002), 192. 19 herberer rice, “in their own words,” 231-232. 18 đura rajs, diary of đura rajs, august 11, 1941, us holocaust memorial museum, last accessed april 7, 2023, https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs. 72 https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs excerpt 3: excerpt from a diary written by đura rajs during his time in the sajmište concentration camp (1941). translation from serbo-croatian by the united states holocaust memorial museum. introduction i have dedicated this book to the "lager." readers will be surprised and will wonder what a "lager" is, and what kind of word that is. it's a german word, which, translated into serbo-croatian, means camp. all jews of petrovgrad were resettled into that camp. earlier the camp was an army barracks, which had been totally neglected and thus full of lice and bedbugs. before the jews were moved into the barracks, it was a breeding place for infectious diseases. the courtyard was full of various military things which the retreating yugoslav army left in great disorder. in the rooms, soldiers unloaded their things from suitcases, trunks, etc. bedbugs promenaded among those things just like people taking an evening stroll in town. in a word, there was a big mess in this building, and the only inhabitants were lice and bedbugs. we, the children, still lived relatively well because we were together, and we were able to play to our hearts' content all day long. but the adults could not boast anything like that. they worked and sweated very hard, and when they returned, the commissar would harass them. and so it went. this book cannot be written in the form of a novel, because it wouldn't have any content, and therefore i am writing in the form of short stories. the stories in this book are not fabrications but rather the plain truth which i lived through. readers will see how a young boy of 11 feels and imagines the lager. because i am writing this book when i am only 11 years old. so, let's begin…22 hilda dajč was born in 1922 in belgrade, where she studied architecture before the invasion of yugoslavia in 1941. hilda chose to volunteer as a nurse after her studies were interrupted, a venture that she would continue throughout her internment in the sajmište concentration camp. hilda's father, emil dajč, took on the role of vice president of the representative body of the jewish community in belgrade. emil’s position granted him and his family leniency under antisemitic legislation, notably during orders for deportation. despite this protection and her family's misgivings, in december of 1941, hilda volunteered to join a group of jews destined for sajmište to “put [herself] wholly at the service of others.”23 her experiences in sajmište were recorded in a series of smuggled letters written to her friend, mirjana. the need to retain a sense of agency and control over her destiny is evident in hilda’s letters. her experience challenges the myth that young people passively absorb 23 hilda dajč to nada novak, december 7, 1941, in “semlin judenlager: in serbian public memory,” the letters of hilda dajč, last accessed april 9, 2023, http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php. 22 đura rajs, diary of đura rajs, august 11, 1941, us holocaust memorial museum, last accessed april 7, 2023, https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs. 73 http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/diary-of-dura-rajs history. hilda’s letters were smuggled out by medical staff travelling between sajmište and belgrade. these pieces of paper stitched together the reality faced by inmates, but they provide something more. throughout her four short letters, hilda chronicles her changing mental and emotional state. even in her most sombre letter, hilda reveals that her writing gives her hope and strength. her survival in the camp hinges on her connection through writing and her work as a nurse. both were radical acts of agency that subverted the goals of the nazi regime. she influenced her social world by creating a record of the events she witnessed, humanizing a tragedy despite attempts by the regime to control the dominant narrative. her immediate social environment is impacted through her work; caring for her community in a place meant to break it apart. the date and manner of hilda’s death are not recorded, but it is assumed that she perished along with 6,000 other jewish inmates in mobile gas vans in march of 1942.24 excerpt 4: excerpt of a letter from hilda dajč to mirjana petrović on december 9, 1941. my dear mirjana, …dear mirjana, there are now 2,000 women and children here, including nearly a hundred babies for whom we can't boil any milk as there's no fuel and you can imagine what the temperature is towards the top of the pavilion with the kosheva wind blowing as hard as it does. i'm reading heine and that does me good, even though the latrine is half a kilometre away and fifteen of us go at the same time, and even though by four o'clock we've only been given a bit of cabbage which has obviously been boiled in water, and even though i have only a little straw to lie on, and there are children everywhere and the light is on all night, and even though they shout 'idiotische saubande' [stupid bunch of pigs] and so on all the time, and even though they keep on having roll calls and anyone missing these is 'severely punished'. there are walls everywhere. today i started to work in the surgery, which consists of a table with a few bottles and some gauze, behind which there is just one doctor, one pharmacist and me. there's a lot to do, believe me with women fainting and goodness knows what else. but in most cases, they put up with it all more than heroically…25 excerpts of a letter written by hilda dajč to mirjana petrović in february 1942. my dear, i could never have imagined that our meeting, even though i was expecting it, would arouse in me such a flurry of emotion and create even more unrest in my already frenzied soul which simply won't calm down… that reality is unsurpassable, our immense misery; every phrase describing the strength of the soul is dispersed by tears of hunger and cold; all hope of leaving here soon disappears before the monotonous 25 “the letter of hilda dajč,” semlin judenlager: in serbian public memory, accessed april 9, 2023, http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php. 24 “the letter of hilda dajč,” semlin judenlager: in serbian public memory, accessed april 9, 2023, http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php. 74 http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php perspective of passive existence which, whatever you compare it with, bears no resemblance to life… … we're all becoming cynical and count everyone else's mouthfuls everyone is desperate but in spite of this, no one kills anyone because we're all just a bunch of animals that i despise. i hate every single one of us because we've all fallen as low as we can go…. …it's the people that get on my nerves. not the hunger that makes you weep, not the cold that freezes the water in your glass and the blood in your veins, nor the stench of the latrines, nor the kosheva wind nothing is so repulsive as the crowd of people who deserve to be pitied, but who you are unable to help and can do nothing else than put yourself above them and despise them…. ... mirjana, my dear, we are imprisoned slaves, in fact even lower than that we're not so much wretched as a despised and starving horde, and when from this position one sees a little of life meaning you then one senses so many of life's juices that flow through it. only yes that eternal only to wrench oneself away from that life afterwards is so painful and bitter that not even the sea of tears that one sheds can express it. i cry and they all start laughing: how can you, who conducts yourself like a man, allow yourself to cry like a sentimental teenager?! but what can i do when in the depths of my heart everything is so horrible. that's the refrain i repeat to myself all night. i know there's no hope of our getting out soon, and outside are you and nada, all that binds me to belgrade which, by some incomprehensible contradiction, i deeply hate and deeply love at one and the same time. you don't know, just as i didn't know, what it's like to be here. i hope you will never find out. way back when i was a child, i was afraid they would bury me alive. and now this is some sort of vision of death. will there be some sort of resurrection? i've never thought so much about the two of you as i do now. i continually talk with you and yearn to see you, because to me you are that 'paradise lost'.26 through their production and transmission of culture, as well as the optimism and resilience they instilled in people around them, children like đura, yitskhok, and hilda had an impact on the environment in which they lived. through acts of nonconformity, “yesterday's agent becomes through her actions a part of tomorrow's structure.”27 children’s writings aid in a more democratic understanding of the past, building an imagined social world by documenting its history. without this history, there is little identity from which to build a culture or community. genocide seeks to break the ties between the present and the imagined social world by destroying embodiments of social representations, the people, the land, the art, and the texts. yitskhok’s collection of ghetto 27 daniel little, “the social world,” understanding society (blog), april 26, 2014. https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-social-world.html. 26 “the letter of hilda dajč,” semlin judenlager: in serbian public memory, accessed april 9, 2023, http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/semlin/en/letters.php. 75 https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-social-world.html folklore shows that culture and language continued to evolve and sustain even in spaces where it was meant to wither. the tragedy of the holocaust is brought to relief through the lives of children. their experiences contrast more effectively against oppression because of their perceived innocence. đura’s drawings are not viewed as simple childhood doodles but evoke an emotional reaction to the situations in which a young person was subjected. although each of these situations has been examined separately, taken as a whole, they also have special significance. the variety of sources detailing the loss of jewish life is proof of the extent of the genocide. conclusion children, youth, and adolescents remain on the fringes of holocaust writing. the discipline has archival and internalized constraints that have downplayed children’s contributions to the ongoing social survival of their communities. children turned to writing and archiving as a feasible alternative to imaginative play when it became impossible for them to cope with their devastating realities. these records, which at first served as a means of personal survival, affected the imagined social world, subverting the mechanisms that aimed to control them. in their short letter, felicitas and thomas gumpel reflected on the conditions that they and their peers were facing. they had lost their parents, but so had many other children. the effects of genocide are magnified in their letter through their emotions. the impact of a child explaining that their family was ripped away from them is greater than if it were described from an outside perspective. the evidence of their experiences and the hope they attempted to instill in their family had an impact on social survival. đura and yitskhok retained a sense of agency through their biographical endeavours. while nonconformity is not difficult under a system that makes most aspects of life illegal, both boys made active and deliberate choices to record the genocide that was occurring. đura described the sorrow he felt at not being able to write fiction, an effort that shows a loss of childhood innocence and feelings of responsibility for the survival of the culture. yitskhok similarly undertook significant endeavours in recording culture as it existed around him. this act of individual agency contributed to his everyday, individual survival. reporting and writing were important outlets that allowed him to cope with life in the ghetto, but it was also an act of rebellion. he strived to ensure that the lives of the people around him were not erased. hilda’s experience was uncommon in that she chose to go to sajmište as a nurse. in a world where people’s lives and choices were rapidly being stripped away, hilda strived to make a difference in whatever way she could. this allowed her to retain a sense of agency and control while attempting to support her community. her letters are the best description of a camp with very few survivors. children, youth, and adolescents remain on the fringes of holocaust writing, but when we situate them as active participants, it becomes clear that they make a significant impact on the world around them. the discipline has archival and internalized constraints that have downplayed children’s contributions to the ongoing social survival of their communities. ideological perceptions of children as passive do not allow for a holistic and nuanced understanding of their impact. children turned to writing and archiving as a 76 feasible alternative to imaginative play when it became impossible for them to cope with their devastating realities. they sought to record the culture and experiences of those around them despite their suffering, which have become invaluable sources for historians and scholars. these records, which at first served as a means of personal survival, affected the imagined social world, subverting the 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https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/anti-jewish-legislation-in-prewar-germany https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/anti-jewish-legislation-in-prewar-germany https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hitler-youth-2#fn_ref-1 https://perspectives.ushmm.org/collection/the-holocaust-in-yugoslavia krajnik.revised_negotiating+national+equality+in+the+austrian+silesian+diet+1905-1914.docx negotiating national equality in the austrian silesian diet 1905-1914 paula krajnik abstract at the turn of the twentieth century, nationalized conflicts affected all levels of politics in the habsburg monarchy. since the 1890s, polish and czech members of the austrian silesian provincial diet demanded equality with austria’s german-speaking citizens, granting them the basic law as two of the crownlands’ recognized nationalities. with the moravian compromise of 1905, which attempted to solve the national conflict between czechs and germans and ensured national equality on a provincial level, czechs and poles of silesia called for electoral and language law reforms of a similar model. despite many years of attempts, the silesian diet found no national compromise. this article will provide an overview of the struggle for national equality and attempts at a national compromise in silesia from the moravian compromise in 1905 until the closure of the provincial diet in 1914. by analyzing the stenographic minutes of the silesian provincial diet, this article traces the attempts at national equalization and pacification, how members of the provincial parliament debated national equalization and pacification, and aims to identify the reasons for their failure of these attempts. reforms of the administrative language laws and school politics to resolve national conflicts never concretized, although national conflicts heavily characterized these topics. the viennese central government rejected two electoral reform drafts for their lack of measures to solve the national conflicts; further drafts never materialized. a silesian compromise never became realized in part due to the unwillingness and lack of interest to find a compromise on the side of the diet’s german majority, which was easily able to outvote its slavic minority and refused many of their demands out of fear of losing their hegemony. 115 introduction the name silesia is primarily connected with the historically prussian or present-day polish province, not with the region of silesia that became part of the present-day czech republic. until 1918, this small region was part of the habsburg monarchy and was an autonomous region in bohemian crownlands. the bohemian crown acquired the whole region of silesia in 1331, and as such, the region came under habsburg rule in 1526.1 when emperor charles vi of the holy roman empire died in 1740, leaving the throne to his daughter maria theresa, frederick ii of prussia issued an ultimatum demanding silesia in exchange for his approval of the austrian succession. when austria declined the ultimatum, prussian troops invaded silesia, starting a series of three wars during the years from 1740 to 1763. eventually, the majority of silesia became prussian; only the duchy of teschen (cieszyn/tešín), parts of the duchies of troppau (opava) and jägerndorf (krnov), and part of the principality of neiße (nysa) remained in the habsburg monarchy.2 these were districts of the margravate of moravia until 1850 when austrian silesia became a crownland of its own: the duchy of upper and lower silesia.3 silesia was the smallest crownland in the monarchy and one of its most densely populated. with industrialization came a decline in agriculture and an increase in coal mining.4 the population of austrian silesia was diverse, consisting mainly of german, polish, and czech-speaking peoples.5 the national awakening and industrialization of the nineteenth century led to full national movements building their own networks and programs with their respective demands. those demands differed within every national movement, but at their cores were similar interests: more autonomy for their nations or at least national and linguistic 5 while eastern silesia was dominated by poles and the west by germans, the central region was dominated by czechs except for the provincial capital troppau. the austrian census from 1900 shows that of the 663.470 people living in silesia, 47 percent were german-speaking, 30 percent polish-speaking and 22 percent czech-speaking. hence, the proportion of the slavic-speaking population was slightly higher than 50 percent. this quota increased by three percent in the 1910 census. these numbers do not reflect personal national affiliation or heritage but the language of daily use, equated in austrian censuses with nationality. the language of daily use indicated national assertiveness or hegemony rather than the population’s actual national composition. therefore, these categories remain contested as accurate representations of nationality. see jiří kořalka, tschechen im habsburgerreich und in europa 1815-1914: sozialgeschichtliche zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen nationsbildung und der nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen ländern, schriftenreihe des österreichischen ostund südosteuropa-instituts, bd. 18 (wien: münchen: verlag für geschichte und politik; r. oldenbourg, 1991), 126-30 and emil brix, die umgangssprachen in altösterreich zwischen agitation und assimilation: die sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen volkszählungen, 1880 bis 1910, veröffentlichungen der kommission für neuere geschichte österreichs, bd. 72 (wien: böhlau, 1982), 401-3. 4 great britain foreign office, ed., austrian silesia, vol. 4, handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the foreign office (london: h. m. stationery office, 1920), 6, 26-32. 3 dan gawrecki, “der schlesische landtag,” in die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. band vii/2. verfassung und parlamentarismus. die regionalen repräsentativkörperschaften., ed. adam wandruszka, peter urbanitsch, and österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, vol. vii/2, die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 (wien: österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, 2000), 2105-7. 2 brigitte mazohl, “vom tod karls vi. bis zum wiener kongress,” in geschichte österreichs, ed. thomas winkelbauer (stuttgart: reclam, 2015), 293-305. 1 great britain foreign office, ed., austrian silesia, vol. 4, handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the foreign office (london: h. m. stationery office, 1920), 1-15. 116 equality. many germans6 of the habsburg monarchy simultaneously feared losing their rights to other nations and advocated for a centralist unitarian state.7 the contradiction of interests led to conflicts mainly carried out on a political level, but also in cultural and even everyday life, especially the conflicts of language, as many people could not communicate with the authorities in their native language or send their children to schools according to their language.8 national conflicts could manifest themselves in actions such as obstruction in the parliament, protests, boycotts, and even the destruction of schools.9 to comply with hungarian demands for more independence, the austrian monarchy took a drastic measure, the ausgleich (compromise), by administratively dividing the country in two parts along the leitha river in 1867 into two states. to the east, hungary was now its own part of the monarchy, with its own parliament and authorities. the part west of the leitha never received an official name; austria and cisleithania became commonly used synonyms, and it remained a multinational state under german hegemony.10 while this compromise offered a solution or at least appeasement to the conflicts with hungary, it created an even bigger demand in other national movements for similar compromises. because article 19 of the basic law on the general rights of citizens from 1867 proclaimed the equality of all peoples of cisleithania, national movements demanded that the law be fulfilled. national conflicts were primarily a struggle for equality in a german-dominated multinational state.11 in 1905, an attempt to grant the czech population of the margravate moravia more equality and accurate political representation on a provincial level succeeded. the solution was a national compromise providing personal autonomy to all people of moravia since that autonomy could not be fixed territorially. the compromise worked through reforms in electoral laws and new language laws concerning schools and authorities. the new electoral laws drastically changed the national make-up of the moravian diet. by separating the electorates by nationality (except for the curia of landowners who considered themselves nationally indifferent), the electoral laws attempted to represent the national proportions of 11 gerald stourzh, die gleichberechtigung der nationalitäten in der verfassung und verwaltung österreichs, 1848-1918 (wien: verlag der österreichischen akademie der wissenschaften, 1985), 53-60. 10 börries kuzmany, “habsburg austria: experiments in non-territorial autonomy,” ethnopolitics 15, no. 1 (january 2016): 43-44, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1101838. 9 pieter m. judson, habsburg: geschichte eines imperiums: 1740 1918, trans. michael müller, 3., durchgesehene auflage (münchen: c.h. beck, 2019), 347–53. 8 bruckmüller, österreichische geschichte, 420-39. 7 ernst bruckmüller, österreichische geschichte: von der urgeschichte bis zur gegenwart (wien köln weimar: böhlau verlag, 2019), 418–21; gerald stourzh, die gleichberechtigung der nationalitäten in der verfassung und verwaltung österreichs, 1848-1918 (wien: verlag der österreichischen akademie der wissenschaften, 1985), 1–3. 6 in the habsburg monarchy, “german” meant, first and foremost, german-speaking. as german was the hegemonial language of the monarchy, many spoke and assimilated to german. the jewish population poses as a prominent example; the jewish population was acknowledged as a religious group but could not declare a jewish native language or nationality and, therefore, was mostly identified and counted as part of the german population. the original german movement of the habsburg monarchy was historically founded and not ethnically. with the emergence and success of other ethnic national movements, the german movement became mostly defensive, fearing being disadvantaged by the equalization of other nationals. a growing part of the german movement started to found itself on german ethnicity only, excluding other groups such as the jewish population. see brix, die umgangssprachen in altösterreich zwischen agitation und assimilation, 403-408 and jeremy king, “who is who? national classification in imperial austria, 1867–1914,” the journal of modern history 96, no. 2 (june 1, 2024): 295–98, https://doi.org/10.1086/730026 and ernst bruckmüller, österreichische geschichte: von der urgeschichte bis zur gegenwart (wien köln weimar: böhlau verlag, 2019), 436-437. 117 the crownland. the electoral laws determined the distribution of seats by nationality.12 czech and german became both official languages of the margravate; local authorities that could not provide their services in both languages now had a translation bureau at the provincial executive committee (provincial government) available free of charge. children were to frequent schools according to their native language; thus, czech children had to attend only czech and german children only german schools.13 the goal in all sectors was pacification through personal separation. this did not mean a territorial redistribution and separation of population, but rather the separation of institutions and administration such as school boards or the electorates of the provincial diets by nationality. to separate the electorates, local authorities compiled national cadasters (registries) based on their perception of which nation a voter belonged to. these claims could be challenged by the person in question but also by third parties. nationalists set out to get as many people as possible on their respective registries. further, nationalists tried to remove people they perceived as not belonging to their nationality and national ambivalent people from their registries. to achieve that, nationalists objected to those people being on their registries. in case of an objection, the authorities had to assess the nationality of the person in question by interrogation. if not satisfied with the authorities’ assessments, people could challenge it up to the imperial court of justice, which happened regularly and was solved through a combination of self-declaration and objectivized criteria, so the declarations were never determined only externally.14 although those measures seem to complicate the situation even more at first glance, the moravian compromise eased the national conflict in the crownland and provided more equality to the czech population.15 silesia was no exception to the national conflicts, as it contained at least three nationalities with even more different national and regional movements. the polish and czech national movements highly influenced and supported their respective counterparts in silesia. the silesian polish and czech national movements expanded and cooperated in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. though, in more diverse parts of eastern silesia, they competed, especially as czech agitation increased there. the german movement was liberal and moderately nationalist but started to radicalize as the other movements in the province grew.16 with silesia split between the german empire and austria-hungary, both national and regional movements targeted the population. in eastern silesia, which was (as already stated) more diverse in part due to immigration from neighboring galicia, the group of so-called slunzaks formed, who identified neither as czech nor as polish, and spoke their 16 tomasz kamusella, silesia and central european nationalisms: the emergence of national and ethnic groups in silesia, 1848-1918, central european studies (west lafayette, ind: purdue university press, 2007), 213-23. 15 the success of the moravian compromise posed as an example for other crownlands. in 1909, the diet of the crownland of bukovina achieved a national compromise. a similar electoral law was established in bosnia in 1910. however, the defining criteria for the electoral cadasters was not nationality but rather religion, with separate orthodox, muslim, catholic, and jewish electorates. a galician compromise between poles and ukrainians was signed in 1914, though it never came to fruition because of the breakout of world war i. see kuzmany, “habsburg austria,” 59-61. 14 börries kuzmany, “objectivising national identity: the introduction of national registers in the late habsburg empire,” nations and nationalism 29, no. 3 (july 2023): 978–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12950. 13 glassl, der mährische ausgleich, 217-26. 12 horst glassl, der mährische ausgleich (münchen: fides-verl.ges, 1967), 211-15; kuzmany, “habsburg austria,” 47-50. 118 own slavic idiom.17 especially from the perspective of local politics, it is hard to tell on which scale the national conflicts affected the population and to which extent people were leaning into national indifference. internal conflicts of national movements, regionalist movements, national indifference, or other perspectives of nationality did not really come up for discussion in the silesian provincial diet. however, the three “main nationalities” (germans, poles, czechs) were represented in the diet, and their conflicts were also carried out there. mainly, the diet’s underrepresented slavic minority, consisting of polish and czech deputies, struggled for their representation in attempted electoral reforms that should have become the cornerstone for a national compromise in silesia. attempted reforms of electoral laws the provincial diets of the cisleithanian crownlands were established in 1861 as a means of self-government in the sectors of agriculture, schools, infrastructure, and the provincial economy.18 the diets were organized in electoral classes (curias): at least one curia representing the great landowners, one for towns and the chambers of commerce, and one curia for the rural municipalities. further, the diets held ex officio seats for provincial dignitaries like the rector of the university and the archbishops and bishops of the crownland. from 1902 on, many crownlands established a general curia that included all men who did not meet the minimum taxation rate (steuerleistung) required to obtain suffrage in the other curias. however, silesia never implemented a general curia. the ratio of people represented was uneven to their representatives. while one-third of the members represented a minority of landowners, the chambers of commerce, and the clergy, the other two-thirds represented the majority of the province’s population. the total number of members depended on the size of the crownland. by law, suffrage was not restricted to men, as women from the curia of great landowners were allowed to vote. furthermore, the right to vote depended on a minimum taxation rate that voters had to meet.19 to settle national conflicts in elections, many crownlands reassigned communal borders to achieve more linguistically homogeneous voting districts. however, ethnic or national belonging did not necessarily coincide with physical borders. therefore, granting personal autonomy everywhere through separated electorates and more realistic representation of national proportions became one of the main objectives of national compromises negotiated in the provincial diets.20 silesia’s provincial diet met once or twice each year for sessions of varying durations. it consisted of 31 members, 17 of which were representatives of the towns and the rural population. due to the rigid curia system, the deputies of those two classes were not very 20 melik, “zusammensetzung und wahlrecht der cisleithanischen landtage,” 1334-36. 19 vasilij melik, “zusammensetzung und wahlrecht der cisleithanischen landtage,” in die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. band vii/2. verfassung und parlamentarismus. die regionalen repräsentativkörperschaften., ed. adam wandruszka, peter urbanitsch, and österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, vol. vii/2, die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 (wien: österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, 2000), 1313-31. 18 jana osterkamp, “vielfalt ordnen: das föderale europa der habsburgermonarchie (vormärz bis 1918),” veröffentlichungen des collegium carolinum 141 (göttingen, vandenhoeck et ruprecht, 2020), 193-203. 17 kamusella, silesia and central european nationalisms, 119-21. 119 socially diverse and consisted mainly of lawyers, teachers, engineers, medical doctors, or journalists.21 until 1890, when three polish and three czech representatives were elected, the diet had almost no slavic members. those six slavic seats remained unchanged until 1914 and represented more than 50 percent of the population according to the national proportion.22 for these reasons, slavic demands often failed, as they had few supporters, while the majority did not depend on slavic votes. the main source for analyzing the attempts and negotiations of a reform of silesian electoral laws are the minutes of the forty-second to the forty-fifth legislative periods of the silesian diet from october 1905 to march 1914. in this time span, the diet debated and sanctioned two reform drafts that never took effect, as the central government in vienna did not approve of both drafts. the diet negotiated and prepared a third draft of a new electoral law, which never materialized before the outbreak of world war i in july 1914. creating a new electoral law was already on the silesian diet’s agenda for the forty-second legislative period in the autumn of 1905. right from the start, slavic members criticized their underrepresentation in the parliamentary electoral reform commission, but their objections were not heard except for assigning one german and one slavic substitute for the commission.23 during the following session, the reform plans were elaborated by the electoral commission and were not discussed in the provincial parliament. municipalities handed petitions to the commission requesting a “change of the electoral law reform,” mainly by slavic deputies; only one was handed in by a german, pleading for a separate curia of industries.24 those petitions are a revealing source to evaluate national activists’ interest in electoral reforms. with every attempt almost exclusively slavic diet members handed over countless petitions for the “change of the electoral law reform” or the “quick execution of the electoral law reform.” these petitions imply the interest of municipalities, people, and the slavic deputies’ efforts to show their prioritization of electoral reforms.25 throughout all negotiations, the main arguments on both sides remained similar. the slavic deputies referred to article 19 of the basic law, demanding equal rights as it proclaimed. the slavic deputy johann michejda insisted that their equalization could no longer be prevented26: “gentlemen, do you believe that these people, once their national idea has awakened, will allow themselves to be held back in any state – least of all in the state of austria, where equal rights are at least still on paper in the basic law?”27 meanwhile, german petitioners had other interests. german members were mostly defensive, indicating their fears of losing their privileges. the main argument was based on the status quo. silesia flourished under german hegemony culturally and economically; 27 smsd, 42d period (1905), 519. this translation and all the following ones are by the author from the original german. 26 smsd, 42d period (1905), 515-520. 25 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 654-655. 24 smsd, 42d period (1905), 49; 42d period (1905), 28-30; 42d period (1905) 8081; 42d period (1905), 113; 42d period (1905), 467. 23 stenographic minutes of the silesian diet (further cited as smsd) 42d legislative period (1905), 6-8; 42d period (1905), 28-30. 22 kořalka, tschechen im habsburgerreich und in europa 1815-1914, 164-65. 21 gawrecki, “der schlesische landtag,” 2107-14. 120 hence, nothing should be changed in the current state of affairs.28 german deputies also argued silesia’s financial success under german hegemony and claimed that the german population contributed more taxes, thus justifying their privilege.29 german diet members rated slavic requests for consideration of their concerns or persistence on the legally granted equality as attempts to impose their will on the diet’s majority. generally, many german deputies claimed quite paternalistically that the diet’s majority always included its slavic minority and that they acted on their behalf as well. simultaneously, many german deputies depicted slavic protests and complaints as ungrateful and impertinent.30 in november 1905, the provincial diet negotiated the final draft of the new electoral law. the slavic deputies contested the draft because it contained no measures against national inequality. to guarantee realistic national proportions in the provincial diet, slavic deputies proposed an electoral law similar to the moravian one or even demanded the introduction of universal suffrage in the crownland.31 slavic diet members saw general, direct, and equal suffrage introduced in 1907 for the imperial council, the central parliament in vienna, as a solution to all national and social conflicts in silesia. however, the negotiations over the reforms never even approached such a drastic change. many slavic deputies saw the struggles for national and social equality as closely intertwined and thus advocated such matters.32 this viewpoint is visible in their acceptance of the 1908 draft, which did not include national measures. however, all slavic members supported this draft because it would have at least introduced suffrage for a larger social group.33 slavic deputies also criticized two planned new seats in eastern silesian districts, fearing they would become two more german seats. the diet’s german majority refused the request from the slavic minority to nationally regulate those seats. although all slavic deputies voted against the 1905 draft of the electoral law and requested its revision before the next legislative period, the concerns of a minority of six representatives were easily outvoted by a majority of 22 votes, and the draft passed.34 the viennese central government did not sanction the reform and disclosed that new laws should ameliorate the crownland’s national conflicts based on an agreement of all national parties.35 the next reform of electoral law was proposed in 1908 after the failure of the previous one. likewise, the new draft did not attempt any national compromise. this new attempt at reform sought to expand the silesian diet to fifty seats, rename the curia of rural municipalities to include new industrial towns, and introduce compulsory voting.36 despite criticism, the diet accepted this draft of the new electoral law unanimously. the slavic deputies acknowledged, again showing their concern for social issues, that additional seats would represent people who had not been represented up to that point. both sides were not really satisfied with this reform and perceived it as a temporary agreement to appease 36 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1337-1341. 35 gawrecki, “der schlesische landtag,” 2110. 34 smsd, 42d period (1905), 537-557. 33 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1354-1356; 44th period (1909-1910), 6. 32 smsd, 42d period (1905), 514-519. 31 smsd, 42d period (1905), 514-520. 30 smsd, 42d period (1905), 525-530; 45th period (1912), 808-815. 29 smsd, 42d period (1905), 525-533; 44th period (1909-1910), 131-132. 28 smsd, 42d period (1905), 525-530. 121 conflicts in the crownland that should be solved later by the next reform.37 again, the central government rejected the new electoral law, anticipating an extensive compromise in silesia.38 in 1909, a new silesian diet was elected based on the old electoral law; this, its national structure remained similar. this diet negotiated a new electoral law reform between 1909 and 1914, reaching an agreement to prepare a draft of the new law only in 1913. debates around the electoral reform became even harsher and more polemic than before, as slavic deputies pressed for their equality while the german majority again wanted to maintain the status quo. the slavic side accused the germans of not being interested in any compromise and of intentionally delaying the electoral reform. the legislative period already started with dispute when the diet’s slavic minority requested the election of a parliamentary electoral reform commission, unaware or uninformed that the german majority already submitted such a request. the german deputies perceived the slavic request and its justification as allegations of disinterest toward the german side. in the twenty-second session, a polish member of the electoral reform commission claimed that he was not invited to a meeting of the electoral reform commission. instances like these indicate that miscommunication between the majority and minority exacerbated the conflicts around the reform.39 the german deputy karl ott proposed a new approach: national electoral cadasters should be established, but their power should depend on the amount of taxes contributed by each electorate. thus, the nationality contributing the most in taxes should have the most power. this idea was especially well received by german members, who claimed that only with such a system would they not be disadvantaged. both sides agreed on further surveys on the tax output (steuerleistung) of each silesian national group by the provincial government.40 for the following years, slavic deputies listed those surveys as the reason for delay in electoral reform. inquiries about the long duration and the database of the surveys sparked new conflict.41 the slavic side criticized the data the surveys were based on; the two previous censuses (1900, 1910) defined nationality by a person’s proclaimed language of daily use.42 as mentioned before, this category was hardly congruent with personal national affiliation, especially since silesia’s slavic population was commonly bilingual, switching between languages constantly as needed, rendering the category of the “language of daily use” inapplicable,43 or as the slavic deputy rudolf gudrich put it simply: “i speak two languages, but one a little weaker.”44 slavic diet members criticized exactly this issue and questioned the entire concept of tax-bound representation for this reason. slavic requests for new surveys determining 44 smsd, 44th period (1910), 858. 43 brix, die umgangssprachen in altösterreich zwischen agitation und assimilation, 336-52. 42 smsd, 45th period (1912), 1019-1022. 41 smsd, 44th period (1910), 834-835; 45th period (1911-1912), 242-243; 45th period (1912), 808-815. 40 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 131-132. 39 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 5-8; 44th period (1909-1910), 653-657. 38 kořalka, tschechen im habsburgerreich und in europa 1815-1914, 164-65. 37 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1341-1356. 122 nationality by other criteria (preferably self-identification) and a permanent parliamentary commission to conduct the surveys were denied. german deputies defended using census data for nationality purposes, claiming that if the central government saw the language of daily use as an adequate criterion to assess nationality, it had to be reliable. in 1912, the diet’s majority refused slavic requests to abort the ongoing surveys and elect a new electoral commission to accelerate the reform.45 at the same time, slavic deputies handed over dozens of municipalities’ petitions, urging for a rapid completion of the electoral reform.46 both sides accused each other of being responsible for delaying the electoral reform. the slavic side argued that the majority would use the surveys to slow down the reform. meanwhile, the german side denied their responsibility for causing the delays, depicting the implementation of the tax cadaster as their reaction to slavic provocation: it would have been very easy for you to prevent this! if you had stopped complaining that the german majority is putting the slavic population at a disadvantage and not treating them fairly with regard to their various claims, it would never have occurred to us to try to exonerate ourselves from this accusation and it would never have been necessary to exonerate us.47 in 1913, the german side suddenly prioritized electoral reform and accepted all requests to that effect. the diet’s unanimous resolution declared the preparation of the reform draft up to the start of the next legislative period.48 in march 1914, the diet elected a parliamentary commission to create those drafts.49 with the outbreak of the war in july 1914, all cisleithanian provincial diets were shut down and never reopened, impeding any remaining efforts for a national compromise.50 putting both parties’ claims aside, the number of requests indicates the different prioritizations of the electoral reform. slightly more than 80 percent of requests or inquiries between 1905 and 1914 regarding the reform came from the slavic side. petitions for electoral reform, its swift execution, or the consideration of certain groups in the reform drafts were almost exclusively initiated by slavic municipalities and submitted by slavic deputies. through the years, various slavic deputies insisted not only on a national compromise akin to the moravian compromise but on universal equal suffrage as a comprehensive solution for national and social inequality, implying universal equal suffrage would represent all national proportions accurately without further measures.51 such a position went beyond the moravian compromise or any attempted compromise. it was also 51 smsd, 42d period (1905), 514-520; 43d period (1907), 494-495; 45th period (1912), 777-779; 45th period (1912), 1022. 50 smsd, 45th period (1914), 1897-1899. 49 smsd, 45th period (1914), 1367-1368. 48 smsd, 45th period (1913), 1038; 45th period (1913), 1129-1133. 47 smsd, 44th period (1910), 857-864. 46 smsd, 45th period (1912), 777-780; 45th period (1912), 833; 45th period (1912), 854. 45 smsd, 45th period (1912), 1019-1022. 123 not supported by the viennese government, which aimed for a national compromise in silesia but not for universal equal suffrage in provincial elections.52 one of the few active inputs from the diet’s german side to achieve a national compromise through a new electoral law was requests for a tax-bound national representation. on both sides, the height of taxes contributed by different nationalities had always been a recurring theme in the debates, though the german side especially insisted on their higher contributions to the provincial budget, claiming the majority by contributed taxes should be decisive, not the majority by population numbers.53 with their request to create a tax cadaster, the german deputies agreed to nationally divided electoral cadasters, but only if the electorates’ power was determined by their tax output.54 the surveys to compile those tax-bound cadasters were a major factor in the constant delay of the reform. in particular, the majority pressed for implementing a tax cadaster, while the minority pleaded to abort the surveys to accelerate and complete the reform.55 german efforts to accelerate the reform never appear in the diet’s minutes and seem evanescent in contrast to the slavic requests. this is particularly evident from 1910 to 1912, when a high number of requests and inquiries were submitted. while those numbers alone do not prove that the german majority intentionally delayed the reforms as slavic deputies accused them in 1912,56 they imply a lower prioritization of electoral reform on the german side or at least a lack of interest in changing the existing conditions. language politics another important issue in the negotiations to find a national compromise was questions of language usage in administration and schooling. while slavic national activists demanded equalization of their native languages in public administration and accessible schooling for every child, german nationalists feared these equalizing measures. by law, cisleithania never had an official language or any regulations concerning the use of languages, and article 19 only proclaimed their equality. further attempts to regulate the official language(s) failed. german, however, remained the dominating language in administration, courts, and parliaments out of the empire’s unwritten national and linguistic hierarchies.57 in 1897, a reform by austrian minister-president kasimir badeni obligated all civil servants in bohemia to be proficient in the crownland’s two languages within two years, which applied primarily to german civil servants as most czech civil servants were proficient in german already. the reform failed as protests in prague and vienna escalated violently; badeni had to resign, the reform was put on the shelf, and the population seemed even more divided.58 the moravian compromise intended to solve this problem by granting every citizen the possibility to communicate in their native languages 58 bruckmüller, österreichische geschichte, 428-29. 57 stourzh, die gleichberechtigung der nationalitäten in der verfassung und verwaltung österreichs, 1848-1918, 88-90. 56 smsd, 45th period (1912), 1019-1022. 55 smsd, 44th period (1910), 834-835; 45th period (1911-1912), 162; 45th period (1911-1912), 242-243; 45th period (1912), 808-815; 45th period (1912), 1019-1022. 54 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 131-132. 53 smsd, 42d period (1905), 529. 52 smsd, 43d period (1907), 615-617. 124 with the authorities either locally or through translation services provided by the provincial government.59 silesia’s official language was german, though polish and czech were acknowledged as languages customary to the crownland. unlike all other multinational provinces in cisleithania, the silesian diet kept german as its only language of negotiation and the stenographic minutes.60 as the minutes prove, all slavic deputies were fluent in german. however, they protested the inequal treatment of their native languages in the diet. with the start of every new legislative period, slavic members challenged the fact that even greetings and opening speeches were held only in german. the majority’s response was constant stressing, that german is the diet’s official language, and therefore the welcoming speech must only be in german. the majority ignored requests to change the status quo of the diet’s language. considering these arguments from the german side, the opening of the new legislative period in december 1909 seems especially striking. after the slavic deputies’ protests, the provincial governor reminded them that only german was the diet’s language. when all deputies took their oath just minutes later, the slavic deputies were allowed to take theirs in czech or polish, pointing out the inconsistencies of the majority’s statement.61 a debate concerning the language of correspondence between municipalities and the provincial government escalated, and the debate had to be stopped by the provincial governor when national polemics got too agitated. slavic deputies criticized the provincial governments’ decisions to use languages at their own discretion, thus foremost german. the slavic deputies argued that while the government had the means to correspond in all languages, municipalities did not have them in all cases. further, they claimed that the public civil service in silesia was thoroughly germanized. to solve those issues, they proposed to draft a language law (akin to the moravian compromise’s language law) that would equalize all languages and establish translation services. they claimed that such a regulation would be even easier in silesia than in moravia because here the distribution of nationalities followed stronger territorial patterns. the german majority rejected the slavic minority’s request to grant the execution of article 19, which the slavic side considered transgressed regarding the crownland’s languages. on the other side of the debate, german deputies claimed that the main requests to communicate in slavic languages came from highly organized municipalities able to correspond multilingually and drew comparison to the united states where all people would agree on one language, which then escalated to a german member agitating against the czech population using hostile stereotypes, depicting czechs as either vagrant musicians or thieves. subsequently, the diet dismissed the slavic request while accepting the executive committee’s request, allowing the committee to use languages discretionarily and, thus, to respond to letters exclusively in german.62 however, in 1908, the imperial court of justice ruled this practice violated of article 19, confirming the slavic deputies’ previous claims that municipalities had the right to communicate with the provincial government in languages other than german.63 63 stourzh, die gleichberechtigung der nationalitäten in der verfassung und verwaltung österreichs, 1848-1918, 123-24. 62 smsd, 42d period (1905), 496-514. 61 smsd, 42d period (1905), 4; 43d period (1906-1907), 4-5; 44th period (1909-1910), 3-5. 60 gawrecki, “der schlesische landtag,” 2114-15. 59 kuzmany, “habsburg austria,” 51. 125 a parliamentary inquiry by two slavic deputies shows a more practical example of the effects of the language conflict. a matter of concern was the german-only inscriptions on train station signs and tickets along many silesian railway lines, which they claimed should have been at least bilingual because the lines and stations were located in bilingual or non-german regions of silesia. what slavic deputies took issue with was met with laughter by their german counterparts.64 this seemingly minor inquiry again shows two sides of the conflict: the highly different perception of equality and the indifference on the german side towards the concerns of the slavic population. a main topic of the diet’s debates about language politics was school politics. schools became one of the nationalist movements’ most important battlegrounds to “gain” children for their nation, powered by the fear of “losing” them to another nation. by founding national school associations, schooling in native languages became available in theory.65 as those schools were only funded by public money if they had enough students, they enforced the fears of “losing” children. losing students could lead to losing an entire school.66 the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century enforced monolingualism in their insistence on teaching children in their native language, as they no longer saw bilingualism as worthwhile. language became a national asset; therefore, children had to be taught only in their native language to flourish under national education. also, the later acquisition of the second language(s) of the own home province was no longer enforced or encouraged, and the right to native language schooling granted.67 many children still frequented german schools by necessity or their parents’ choice. parents chose to send their children to german schools for diverse reasons. many parents preferred german schools, which were more prestigious, hoping to improve their children’s opportunities.68 some parents were urged to send their children to schools according to their employer’s or landlord’s will. their decision was often determined by additional benefits that schools provided, such as food, shoes, clothing, and presents. sending children to a specific school was thus less related to the question of nationality and native language but rather to necessity, advantages, and benefits.69 the moravian compromise also tried to solve the issue of children not being sent to schools according to their nationality. it divided the local school boards between nationalities so both groups could develop unhindered.70 this separation gave every national school board the autonomy to choose their own staff and teaching materials, thus providing their national education. to attend a school, children had to be proficient in the language of instruction. the school boards also had the power to claim children from other schools if they seemed to be in a school not in line with their father’s proclaimed national affiliation.71 71 kuzmany, “habsburg austria,” 51. 70 burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, 191. 69 zahra, kidnapped souls, 27-31. 68 burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, 193-94. 67 hannelore burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, studien zur geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen monarchie 26 (wien: verl. d. österr. akad. d. wiss, 1995), 25-31. 66 pieter m. judson, habsburg: geschichte eines imperiums: 1740 1918, trans. michael müller, 3., durchgesehene auflage (münchen: c.h. beck, 2019), 388-92. 65 tara zahra, kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the bohemian lands, 1900-1948 (ithaca, n.y., bristol: cornell university press: university presses marketing [distributor], 2011), 16–19. 64 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 687-688. 126 in the silesian diet, debates about school politics expressed concern about national education, indoctrination, and the quality of instruction and supplies. yet the diet never planned major school reforms as they did with the electoral reforms. attempts to divide the silesian school boards nationally in multilingual municipalities most closely resembled measures of the moravian compromise. although the diet’s majority avoided a division, in 1913 slavic deputies could implement that the provincial committee of national minority schools had to nominate teachers whose nationality was in line with the language of the school in question.72 1908 saw the most requests concerning schools due to a ministerial inquiry of secondary schools in addition to school reforms taking place.73 two parliamentary inquiries in the diet in november 1908 concerning polish schools show an interest in instructional supplies and perceived pressure from german authorities. the first inquiry challenged the currently used elementary school readers, accusing them of being outdated, and demanded both an updated version as well as textbooks teaching german as a foreign language. the second inquiry criticized that the administrative forms for polish teachers were only in german and that the school headmasters and inspectors pressured polish speakers to use those; the inquiry underscored that teachers could not cultivate the polish language to their students if they were obligated to use german forms. in addition, a third inquiry denounced the “utraquization” (bilingualization) of slavic schools as attempted germanization.74 utraquist schools were schools with two languages of instruction.75 this form of bilingual instruction had been mandatory in silesia since 1873; only in slavic schools, however, not german ones. the inquiry accused german nationalist headmasters, teachers, and agitators of increasingly replacing the czech or polish lessons with german instruction with the purpose of turning the respective schools into german schools and to indoctrinating polish and czech children, rating this as a violation of article 19. at the same time, slavic deputies claimed that german agitation would only nurture resentment against everything german in the children, thus destroying any ambitions to learn the german language properly. while the german diet members calmly accepted the first two inquiries, they denounced the third as a lie and fraudulent.76 only two days later, german deputies submitted an inquiry by several eastern silesian german and polish teachers organizations that included several letters. they described situations in schools and made accusations from the opposing perspective. the letters heavily condemned the “foreign” (i.e., imported and influenced from neighboring galicia) polish nationalism that impacted silesian schools, alleging nationalist teachers were trying to replace german in utraquist schools, introducing the polish textbooks into the curriculum and pressuring teachers to conform to polish nationalist wishes. the enclosed letters were clearly pro-german and loyal to the monarchy and appealed to regional silesian patriotism. one of the letters’ authors, josef kożdon,77 was a known activist, agitating for eastern silesian (slunzak) regionalism in the habsburg monarchy and against any 77 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1535-1546. 76 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1440-1443. 75 burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, 29. 74 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1440. 73 burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, 222-23. 72 gawrecki, “der schlesische landtag,” 2126. 127 nationalism but clearly sympathizing with germandom as he was elected to the diet through german support in 1907.78 in this rare instance, silesian regionalism is visible in the diet and siding with the german majority. considering these debates about germanization or slavicization through utraquist schools, the negotiations on the following day concerning a proposed law on language classes proceeded in a surprisingly concordant and peaceful fashion. this law would have obliged pupils of secondary schools to learn at least one other of the crownland’s languages.79 the idea was also well received on the german side, acknowledging that language was a root of but also a solution to national conflicts: the knowledge of a country's second language is an absolute necessity for all of us, in fact i firmly maintain that the fact that our parliamentary conditions are so unfavorable is primarily due to the fact that a large part of the population does not know the country's second language. […] it is my firm belief that not we, but perhaps our children and grandchildren, will have national peace when people will know more languages.80 the diet accepted this proposal, but similar to the last electoral reform attempt, the draft of the law was not finalized soon enough.81 a discourse among german nationalist teachers in the bohemian lands that unfolded in the following years put german approval in a different light. they surmised that they could no longer sustain their position without knowledge of the province’s other language(s). thus, they had to learn the “opponent’s” language to compete against them. their acquiescence to learn the second language was also motivated by economic competition and the fear of being replaced by bilingual czech civil servants in public administration.82 national questions and conflicts manifested in peoples’ everyday life primarily through language. the silesian diet’s debates concerning language topics illustrate those conflicts and show the different interests. however, the diet never discussed major language reforms. the number of slavic requests concerning language is higher than that of german requests, and a large part of the slavic requests concerned equalization of the parliamentary or administrative languages. meanwhile, the german majority showed no interest in such measures, claiming that german linguistic dominance functioned well enough in the past. the requests about school politics are more evenly balanced by nationality, indicating the priority of schooling on both sides of the national conflict and fears of “losing” their children. even though debates about language politics would, in some instances, inspire fierce national polemics in the silesian diet, they also showed in other instances, such as both sides agreeing on instruction in a second language of the crownland, that reconciliation was possible. 82 burger, sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918, 225-27. 81 smsd, 44th period (1909-1910), 646; 45th period (1911-1912), 682. 80 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1492. 79 smsd, 43d period (1908), 1491-1493. 78 kamusella, silesia and central european nationalisms, 234-35. 128 conclusions between 1905 and 1914, the crownland of silesia saw several attempts at electoral reform that sought to solve (or at least pacify) national conflicts. this resulted in two drafts of electoral laws that only proposed marginal changes and not a solution to the national conflicts; the viennese central government did not sanction those drafts, as the central government aimed for a national compromise in silesia. a further electoral reform that attempted to establish tax-bound national cadasters as a means of national compromise was subject to many delays and could not be presented before the closure of the silesian diet in july 1914. while slavic deputies of the silesian diet advocated for equalization through universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, the german majority promoted tax-bound equalization through national cadasters, which sought to base the right to representation and participation on each national population’s tax output (steuerleistung). the equality of nationalities would, therefore, still not have been a fundamental right, but one dependent on the amount of taxes paid by each nationality. during this period, the silesian parliament repeatedly discussed language issues, but reforms akin to the language reforms of the moravian compromise never materialized. measures in this vein were especially considered and demanded by slavic diet members. official use of slavic languages continued to be rejected. german remained the only language of parliamentary proceedings and the language of correspondence of the provincial government, even as the imperial court of justice ruled the latter as a violation of article 19. the german side only received laws on the compulsory teaching of a second national language in schools positively. school politics reflected the fears both sides of the national conflict voiced of “losing” children to the other nation. the reasons why the silesian diet did not achieve a national compromise are a combination of many diverse factors and circumstances. different priorities, strong slavic under-representation in parliament, and fears of slavicization and germanization were decisive factors, although not the only ones. the different priorities of a national compromise are visible through the processes in parliament. although both sides considered a national compromise necessary, the efforts to achieve it differed immensely. while the slavic members prioritized electoral reforms more strongly and constantly addressed them through interpellations, requests, and petitions, the german majority remained more reactive. this is reflected both in the numbers and the content of interventions and debates. in addition to the lack of interest on the german side, jiří kořalka considers the absence of mediation between the two sides as the decisive factor for the failure to achieve a silesian compromise; moravian great landowners spurred the moravian compromise, but the great landowners of silesia did not take the initiative.83 despite years of discussions and preparations, an equalizing electoral and language reform could never be implemented. judging by its timeline, it appears that the silesian diet was shut down right on the verge of a promising draft of a new electoral law. whether this 83 kořalka, tschechen im habsburgerreich und in europa 1815-1914, 165. 129 reform really would have been a breakthrough to a silesian compromise or another discarded draft remains an open question. 130 bibliography brix, emil. die umgangssprachen in altösterreich zwischen agitation und assimilation: die sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen volkszählungen, 1880 bis 1910. veröffentlichungen der kommission für neuere geschichte österreichs, bd. 72. wien: böhlau, 1982. bruckmüller, ernst. österreichische geschichte: von der urgeschichte bis zur gegenwart. wien köln weimar: böhlau verlag, 2019. burger, hannelore. sprachenrecht und sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen unterrichtswesen 1867-1918. studien zur geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen monarchie 26. wien: verl. d. österr. akad. d. wiss, 1995. gawrecki, dan. “der schlesische landtag.” in die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. band vii/2. verfassung und parlamentarismus. die regionalen repräsentativkörperschaften., edited by adam wandruszka, peter urbanitsch, and österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, vii/2:2105–30. die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. wien: österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, 2000. glassl, horst. der mährische ausgleich. münchen: fides-verl.ges, 1967. great britain foreign office, ed. austrian silesia. vol. 4. handbooks prepared under the direction of the historical section of the foreign office. london: h. m. stationery office, 1920. judson, pieter m. habsburg: geschichte eines imperiums: 1740 1918. translated by michael müller. 3., durchgesehene auflage. münchen: c.h. beck, 2019. kamusella, tomasz. silesia and central european nationalisms: the emergence of national and ethnic groups in silesia, 1848-1918. central european studies. west lafayette, ind: purdue university press, 2007. king, jeremy. “who is who? national classification in imperial austria, 1867–1914.” the journal of modern history 96, no. 2 (june 1, 2024): 291–331. https://doi.org/10.1086/730026. kořalka, jiří. tschechen im habsburgerreich und in europa 1815-1914: sozialgeschichtliche zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen nationsbildung und der nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen ländern. schriftenreihe des österreichischen ostund südosteuropa-instituts, bd. 18. wien : münchen: verlag für geschichte und politik ; r. oldenbourg, 1991. kuzmany, börries. “habsburg austria: experiments in non-territorial autonomy.” ethnopolitics 15, no. 1 (january 2016): 43–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1101838. 131 ———. “objectivising national identity: the introduction of national registers in the late habsburg empire.” nations and nationalism 29, no. 3 (july 2023): 975–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12950. mazohl, brigitte. “vom tod karls vi. bis zum wiener kongress.” in geschichte österreichs, edited by thomas winkelbauer, 290–321. stuttgart: reclam, 2015. melik, vasilij. “zusammensetzung und wahlrecht der cisleithanischen landtage.” in die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. band vii/2. verfassung und parlamentarismus. die regionalen repräsentativkörperschaften., edited by adam wandruszka, peter urbanitsch, and österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, vii/2:1311–52. die habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. wien: österreichische akademie der wissenschaften, 2000. osterkamp, jana. “vielfalt ordnen: das föderale europa der habsburgermonarchie (vormärz bis 1918).” veröffentlichungen des collegium carolinum 141. vandenhoeck et ruprecht, 2020. stourzh, gerald. die gleichberechtigung der nationalitäten in der verfassung und verwaltung österreichs, 1848-1918. wien: verlag der österreichischen akademie der wissenschaften, 1985. zahra, tara. kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the bohemian lands, 1900-1948. ithaca, n.y., bristol: cornell university press : university presses marketing [distributor], 2011. 132 negotiating national equality in the austrian silesian diet 1905-1914 abstract introduction attempted reforms of electoral laws language politics conclusions bibliography cey.rutherford.fromselfrefashioningtostatesymbol from self-fashioning to state symbol empress elisabeth’s aesthetic agency, posthumous cult, and national appropriation in austria sylvia rutherford university of st andrews abstract this thesis interrogates the life and posthumous transformation of empress elisabeth of austria (1837-1898), challenging prevailing historiographical constructions that cast her as a passive consort constrained by the rigid formalities of the habsburg court. through an analysis of visual culture, gendered self-representation, and the processes of cultural mythologisation that followed her death, elisabeth emerges as a figure who strategically cultivated a public persona that exercised aesthetic and performative agency in subversion of the symbolic constraints of her imperial role. after her assassination, however, this carefully constructed image was appropriated and reconfigured within austrian cultural memory, as her acts of self-fashioning were systematically effaced and supplanted by a romanticised iconography that functioned as an ideological projection screen for the reconstruction of national identity in twentieth century austria. 41 article introduction elisabeth, empress of austria and queen of hungary, occupies a paradoxical position in austrian cultural memory: resolutely elusive in life, yet inescapably omnipresent in death. born into the bavarian wittelsbach dynasty, she married emperor franz joseph i in 1854 and ascended to the ceremonial apex of the habsburg monarchy.1 her imperial career is widely perceived as defined by withdrawal, aesthetic extremity, and personal tragedy – most notably the suicide of her only son, crown prince rudolf.2 yet this perception, shaped less by her imperial career than her posthumous image, obscures the complexity of her historical presence. following her 1898 assassination, elisabeth became an object of obsessive cultural fascination, centred on her mythologised beauty. appropriated by mass media and popular culture, she was transfigured into an icon of romantic tragedy and abstracted into a symbol of idealised femininity.3 this thesis intervenes in such narratives by reasserting elisabeth as an agent of aesthetic self-fashioning who resisted the constraints of dynastic femininity. tracing the processes of her posthumous mythologisation, it exposes how gendered iconography overwrote her self-fashioned image, effacing her agency and recasting her as a passive emblem of imperial femininity. the historiographical scope of this study is defined by its engagement with english-language scholarship, facilitating an interrogation of elisabeth’s legacy within anglophone discourse. central to this discourse is the image of elisabeth as a tragic figure constrained by the ceremonial strictures of habsburg identity – an image rooted in biographical accounts published posthumously. marguerite cunliffe-owen inaugurated this tradition in 1899, portraying elisabeth as “tormented by the oppressive sense of injustice which made her life a long martyrdom.”4 the same year, alborough de burgh entrenched this portrayal, framing the death of her son as the rupture that transformed elisabeth into a spectral presence, “haunted…seeking in vain for rest.”5 clara tschudi’s 1900 biography advanced the “sorrowing mother” motif, casting elisabeth as the tragic embodiment of the irreconcilable tensions between dynastic obligation and desire for independence.6 these early works established the “mater dolorosa” paradigm that shaped elisabeth’s cultural reception. egon corti’s 1936 biography attempted a historiographical correction, denouncing the tradition of “romantic embellishment” and seeking to reclaim elisabeth “from the realms of legend.”7 yet, nostalgic undertones and corti’s neglect of her contemporary reputation limited this endeavour. 7 egon corti, elizabeth: empress of austria, trans. catherine alison phillips (yale university press, 1936), v-vi. 6 clara tschudi, elisabeth: empress of austria and queen of hungary, trans. e. m. cope (e. p. dutton & co., 1901), 253. 5 alborough de burgh, elizabeth empress of austria: a memoir (hutchinson & co., 1899), 16-17. 4 marguerite cunliffe-owen, the martyrdom of an empress (harper & brothers, 1899), 4. 3 matteo tuveri, “elisabeth of austria: a beauvoirian perspective,” simone de beauvoir studies 24, no. 1 (2008): 5, https://doi.org/10.1163/25897616-02401004. 2 katrin unterreiner, sisi: myth and truth, trans. neil radford (verlag christian brandstätter, 2005), 85. 1 dagmar c. g. lorenz, “gender, imperialism, and the encounter with islam: ruth beckermann’s film a fleeting passage to the orient,” in visual culture in twentieth-century germany: text as spectacle, ed. gail finner (indiana university press, 2006), 191. 42 https://doi.org/10.1163/25897616-02401004 a decisive shift occurred in 1981 with brigitte hamman’s landmark study. enduring as the most comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated biography to date, hamann reinterpreted elisabeth as an ideologically-engaged figure who actively resisted the performative expectations of her role. hamman’s assertion that the true “tragedy of her life” stemmed from the fact that “self-realisation did not make her happy” challenged the prevailing perception of the empress as a passive victim.8 in hamann’s wake, a wave of scholarship sought to recover elisabeth from the margins of habsburg history. the resultant body of work foregrounded her political influence, particularly her role in the austro-hungarian compromise of 1867.9 her affinity for hungary inspired extensive study on her symbolic significance within that context. comparatively, studies examining elisabeth’s cult within austria remain largely absent. this lacuna is striking given the dramatic revaluation of her image that followed her assassination. regarded with marked ambivalence during her lifetime, elisabeth was recast postmortem as a figure of national veneration. that an empress of bavarian origin, who articulated limited identification with austria, would be reconfigured as a symbolic locus of national identity demands further scrutiny. this historiographical imbalance is redressed through a gendered perspective, first substantively treated in maura hametz and heidi schlipphacke’s 2018 edited volume. reframing elisabeth’s transcultural resonance, they argue that successive reincarnations of her image constitute not an enduring historical legacy but a mutable cultural artefact, whose feminine appeal is repeatedly repurposed to legitimise the cultural imaginaries of the present.10 the work of olivia gruber florek offers a particularly significant contribution. through engagement with visual analysis, florek broadened the scope to recognise elisabeth’s cultural function, arguing for the centrality of visual culture in the production of femininity. her 2022 monograph, the first concentrated study of elisabeth’s portraiture, uncovered the extent of elisabeth’s curatorial control.11 while florek focuses on elisabeth’s influence on modern female portraiture, her analysis critically illuminates elisabeth’s assertion of agency within a representational realm typically inaccessible to women.12 this thesis takes florek’s methodology as a point of departure, shifting the analytic focus to the posthumous reframing of elisabeth within austrian cultural memory. traditional scholarly treatment of the visual culture surrounding elisabeth, which constitutes the primary source base of this study, has interpreted these materials within the reductive framework of her posthumous mythology, thereby obscuring her agency in self-representation. repositioned within the context of their creation, these sources reveal elisabeth’s strategic negotiation of the visual codes of imperial femininity. the framework underpinning this analysis is informed by judith butler’s theory of gender as performative, constituted through the “contingent construction of meaning.”13 butler’s model provides a critical lens for interpreting visual enactments of imperial 13 judith butler, gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity, 2nd ed. (routledge, 2007), 190. 12 ibid., 7. 11 olivia gruber florek, the celebrity monarch: empress elisabeth and the modern female portrait (university of delaware press, 2022), 13. 10 maura e. hametz and heidi schlipphacke, “‘sissi’: the convergence of memory and myth,” in sissi’s world, ed. maura e. hametz and heidi schlipphacke (bloomsbury publishing, 2018), 5. 9 unterreiner, sisi, 48. 8 brigitte hamann, the reluctant empress: a biography of empress elisabeth of austria, trans. ruth hein (faber and faber ltd, 2010), vii. 43 majesty as articulations of dynastic legitimacy. to examine elisabeth’s performance of this role, this study engages pamela robertson’s “feminist camp” theory – an aesthetic defined by “oppositional modes of performance and reception” – which elucidates how stylised femininity could be reappropriated as resistance to hegemonic gender norms.14 within this framework, elisabeth’s mobilisation of visual codes of femininity emerges as a considered subversion of monarchical gendered performance. this interdisciplinary methodology, fusing visual analysis with gender theory, is anchored throughout by reference to hamann’s biography. this thesis proceeds in three sections. the first explores elisabeth’s self-representation during her lifetime, arguing that she strategically employed aesthetic and performative tactics to subvert monarchical expectations. the second traces the posthumous transformation of this image, as it was reshaped to align with gender ideals in twentieth-century austria. the final section examines the instrumentalization of elisabeth’s image within austria’s second republic, interrogating its role in the reconstruction of national identity. through a gendered analysis of visual culture and cultural memory, this study reveals how elisabeth was appropriated as a symbolic projection screen for the configuration of austria’s cultural and political identity. self-fashioning in the visual economy of nineteenth-century monarchy, image operated as a crucial medium through which authority, legitimacy, and identity were constructed and conveyed. female consorts were bound by an unwritten but immutable script of dynastic performance, in which fertility functioned as a fundamental aspect of visible governance, anchored in the production of a male heir.15 a long-standing tradition of habsburg imagery celebrating imperial motherhood inscribed this ideal. elisabeth, however, appeared in only a single photograph with her children during her reign.16 moreover, she refused to sit for photographs beyond the age of thirty.17 while her retreat from the public eye has traditionally been read as evidence of her victimhood, closer analysis of her visual statements reveals her awareness of female consort imagery as a codified performance grounded in gendered expectations – one she actively worked to control.18 drawing on butler’s model of gender as an “intentional and performative” act, elisabeth’s use of feminine aesthetics emerges as a self-conscious performance, preserved through her calculated withdrawal.19 this performance sees elisabeth engage in what robertson terms “feminist camp practices.”20 by reappropriating aesthetic codes of femininity, elisabeth reclaimed aestheticism as a means to dictate her public 20 robertson, guilty pleasures, 9. 19 butler, gender trouble, 190. 18 beth muellner, “the empress elisabeth of austria and her ‘untidy’ collection,” women’s studies 39, no. 6 (2010): 551, https://doi.org/10.1080/00497878.2010.490734. 17 sylvia schraut, “sissi: popular representations of an empress,” in popular historiographies in the 19th and 20th centuries: cultural meanings, social practices, ed. sylvia paletschek (berghahn books, 2010), 158. 16 florek, celebrity monarch, 14. 15 joseph roach, “private and public stages,” in enlightened princesses: caroline augusta, charlotte, and the shaping of the modern world, ed. joanna marschner et al. (yale university press, 2017), 166. 14 pamela robertson, guilty pleasures: feminist camp from mae west to madonna (duke university press, 1996), 9. 44 identity.21 as such, she emerges as a conscious agent of self-fashioning who manipulated the representational schema of imperial femininity. the image elisabeth intended to preserve is encapsulated in a trio of portraits by franz xaver winterhalter, the last officially commissioned portrayals of the empress.22 winterhalter, celebrated for his success in conveying the archetype of female monarchical representation, began his residency at the viennese court in autumn 1864.23 the resultant portraits, however, refuse to conform to the dominant canon of consort imagery. the most overt example is the formal portrait (figure 1) that served as elisabeth’s official image, to complement winterhalter’s portrait of the emperor.24 the dissemination of these portraits intended to glorify the emperor through visual splendour and, importantly, reinforce his patriarchal authority.25 as mary sheriff has observed, the symbolic power of the female consort lay in her subordinate relationship to the emperor, precipitating the forfeiture of control over her body and its representation.26 in light of this, it is striking that elisabeth appears without the heraldry typical of imperial portraiture. her white tulle gown, by parisian couturier charles worth, evokes the image of a “queen of the ball” rather than a habsburg empress.27 worth’s renowned creations drew on elements of theatrical costume that ran counter to traditional aristocratic silhouettes.28 in a further appeal to theatrical representation, elisabeth’s hair is adorned with diamond stars reminiscent of viennese costume jewellery. by substituting imperial regalia for emblems of modern glamour, elisabeth distanced herself from the responsibilities of her ceremonial role. such distinct iconographic departures signal an unusual degree of intersubjectivity in the portrait’s production.29 her appeal to theatrical portraiture enabled her to circumvent stylistic conventions and assert an individuality traditionally denied to female consorts. 29 florek, celebrity monarch, 7. 28 abigail joseph, “‘a wizard of skills and tulle’: charles worth and the queer origins of culture,” victorian studies 56, no. 2 (2014): 257, https://doi.org/10.2979/victorianstudies.56.2.251. 27 juliane vogel, “the double skin: imperial fashion in the nineteenth century,” in the body of the queen: gender and rule in the courtly world, 1500-2000, ed. regina schulte (berghahn books, 2006), 227. 26 mary d. sheriff, the exceptional woman: elisabeth vigée-lebrun and the cultural politics of art (university of chicago, 1996), 154. 25 olivia gruber florek, “empress elisabeth and the painting of modern life,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 137. 24 richard ormond and carol blackett-ord, eds., franz xaver winterhalter and the courts of europe 1830-70 (national portrait gallery publications, 1987), 217. 23 florek, celebrity monarch, 32. 22 titia hensel, “‘secret pictures’? staging privacy in franz xaver winterhalter’s portraits of female monarchs,” in empresses and queens in the courtly public sphere from the 17th to the 20th century, ed. marion romberg (brill 2021), 206. 21 ibid., 34. 45 the individuality elisabeth achieved through unconventional aesthetic expression is enhanced when her portrait is viewed in tandem with that of franz joseph. in contrast to elisabeth, the emperor employs the typical imperial accoutrement that affirm his status.30 despite this, elisabeth’s commanding presence, emphasised by the expanse of her gown, dominates the composition. the emperor’s gaze mirrors, and encourages, a visual trajectory leading to the body of the empress. while franz joseph looks at elisabeth, she stares directly at the viewer.31 her posture obstructs the emperor’s view of her figure, denying him access to her body and, thus, undermining its prescribed function as a vessel for the future dynasty. the paradoxical subjectivity of elisabeth’s expression is telling: while her eye contact reveals awareness of the viewer’s gaze, the barriers to her body and her implied movement into the recessional landscape convey control over her objectification.32 her image is thus preserved in a moment of evanescent presence that destabilises the authority of the emperor.33 viewed through the framework of gender performativity, elisabeth’s refusal to conform to iconographic 33 vogel, “double skin,” 227. 32 florek, “elisabeth,” 148-9. 31 ibid., 34. 30 ibid., 32-4. 46 tradition demonstrates her awareness of the power inherent in subverting conventional tropes of female consort portraiture. by transcending reliance on the symbolic capital of her status, elisabeth enacted a vision of authoritative femininity detached from the representational role demanded of an empress. winterhalter’s two additional portraits depict the empress in a strikingly informal setting. the first of these is an oval-shaped canvas (figure 2) that captures elisabeth in an apparent moment of intimacy.34 commissioned personally by franz joseph, it has traditionally been relegated to the private sphere. this classification, however, obscures the portrait’s public function through its display in the emperor’s hofburg office.35 demonstrating that the image was well-known to contemporaries, franz joseph’s 1898 biographer noted, “when the emperor raises his gaze, he looks straight ahead into the wonderful face of the empress, whose famous portrait by winterhalter stands on an easel.”36 as such, the portrait’s visibility invites analysis of its utility as a tool through which elisabeth constructed her public image. 36 max herzig, viribus unitis: das buch vom kaiser (verlag von max herzig, 1898): 10, qtd. in titia hensel, “secret pictures,” 208. 35 hensel, “secret pictures,” 208-9. 34 florek, celebrity monarch, 71. 47 here, her modes of self-representation discard the elaborate costuming of the state portrait and she appears authentically unadorned. although such compositions were not without precedent in winterhalter’s repertoire – in 1843 he produced a portrait of queen victoria with unbound hair as a gift for prince albert – elisabeth’s differs markedly in affect.37 whereas victoria gazes passively away from the viewer, elisabeth maintains direct eye contact and the scale of her hair dominates the scene.38 interlaced at her chest, her ostensibly un-styled hair obscures access to the sexual elements of her body; her neck, her breasts, and her figure are usurped by her hair.39 as a result, elisabeth evades the passivity of contemporary female portraiture and wields her hair as a barrier to her body. this is achieved through deployment of the “female masquerade,” which, as advanced by robertson, deliberately reproduces cultural stereotypes, simulating femininity based on an awareness of “the activity of gendering as an enactment.”40 for elisabeth, the masquerade is deployed as a strategy of opposition to patriarchal patterns of representation. in this example, she appeals to the convention of hair as a symbol of naturalized femininity yet implements it in such a way that she retains authority over her sexual body. biographical evidence for elisabeth’s hair rituals informs the argument for her authority in positioning her hair as the dominant visual motif. it is well-documented that elisabeth developed rigid beauty routines, and hamann details that “the daily regimen of hair care could not be accomplished in much less than three hours.”41 elisabeth’s greek instructor, konstantin christomanos, describes this regimen as a “sacred ritual.”42 the value elisabeth placed on preserving the beauty of her hair extended to almost all aspects of her appearance and her devotion to this so-called “cult of beauty” is traditionally interpreted as a manifestation of vanity. karen owens embodies this in attributing elisabeth’s “obsessive concentration on her beauty” to her persistent attempt to gain recognition as “the most beautiful woman in the world.”43 her subversive use of aesthetics in the winterhalter portraits, however, complicates such a reductive reading of these practices. as she manipulated her femininity as a currency of power, elisabeth demonstrated her engagement with beauty as a tool to renegotiate gendered frameworks of representation. thus, her commitment to preserving this beauty emerges as an effort to withstand the co-option of her body by her role as empress. elisabeth’s construction of her public identity emerges as an articulation of her private identity, or sense of self, revealed through her collection of carte-de-visite albums. in the nineteenth century, women across europe engaged in album production, a practice that intensified after a. e. disderi patented the carte-de-visite in 1854. as anne higonnet has illuminated, assembling these albums offered women “a means both 43 karen owens, franz joseph and elisabeth: the last great monarchs of austria-hungary (mcfarland & co., 2014), 112-5. 42 konstantin christomanos, tagebuchblätter (mortiz perles, 1899): 58., qtd. in hamann, reluctant empress, 136. 41 hamann, reluctant empress, 133. 40 robertson, guilty pleasures, 12. 39 florek, “slave to my hair,” 9. 38 florek, celebrity monarch, 76. 37 olivia gruber florek, “‘i am a slave to my hair’: empress elisabeth of austria, fetishism, and nineteenth-century austrian sexuality,” modern austrian literature 42, no. 2 (2009): 7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24649766. 48 to learn and perform an identity.”44 shaped by individual understandings of femininity, the nature of album curation uncovers “women’s definition of themselves as it was structured by gender conventions.”45 evidence for elisabeth’s engagement in this trend exists in the form of eighteen albums personally assembled by the empress.46 three of these, known as the ‘albums of beauty’, exclusively contain images of women and stand out as representational of elisabeth’s disengagement from the methods of collecting adhered to by her contemporaries.47 the traditional approach to these albums focuses on the individual photographs and, consequently, overlooks the complexity that emerges through addressing their place in the wider collection. this method obscures elisabeth’s curatorial role and endorses the popular perception of her albums as evidence for her superficial obsession with beauty. to appreciate them as a site for elisabeth’s construction of identity, it is essential to heed higonnet’s reminder that “each individual picture works toward the meaning of the album as a whole.”48 through the albums of beauty, compiled in the years preceding winterhalter’s residence, elisabeth’s collecting is illuminated as an act through which she developed her sense of self that was then publicly disseminated through portraiture. elisabeth’s album curation aligned with her absence from the viennese court in the early 1860s. it was from venice, in march 1862, that she penned her request to her brother-in-law, archduke ludwig viktor, for photographs, “only of women.”49 this request was then extended to foreign diplomats and elisabeth’s only criteria was “pretty faces,” irrespective of social status.50 in disregarding delineations of social class and selecting women who occupied the public sphere, elisabeth utilised her albums to construct a vision of femininity that operated outside the realm of domesticity.51 in one instance, elisabeth placed an image of empress eugénie amongst erotic photographs of parisian performers that would have been regarded as pornographic by contemporaries.52 hamann concludes that the parisian consulate’s submission of these “scandalous” photographs was intended as a gesture of “mockery.”53 elisabeth, however, juxtaposed these images with the french empress to dissolve the established hierarchy between the worlds of monarchy and theatre.54 further, the sexuality of both these subject categories was inherent in the role they were expected to perform. while the sexuality of the parisian dancers was available, and intended, for public consumption, that of eugénie manifested in her dynastic reproductive obligation. by grouping these images together, elisabeth symbolised the tension between the presumed modesty of imperial consorts and the public expectation of reproduction.55 55 ibid., 47. 54 florek, celebrity monarch, 43. 53 hamann, reluctant empress, 130. 52 ibid., 47. 51 florek, celebrity monarch, 42. 50 ibid. 49 corti, elizabeth, 104. 48 higonnet, “secluded visions,” 177. 47 florek, celebrity monarch, 42. 46 uwe schögle. “‘now i am collecting photographs’: miriam szwast in conversation with katrin unterreiner about elisabeth of austria’s carte-de-visite collection,” photoresearcher 36 (2021): 5, eshph. 45 ibid., 171. 44 anne higonnet, “secluded visions: images of feminine experience in nineteenth-century europe,” in the expanding discourse: feminism and art history, ed. norma broude (routledge, 1992), 179. 49 this awareness of the performative nature of her role extended to representations of “normative” models of beauty. she included, for example, a photograph of archduchess sophie posing with an album beside a photograph of an anonymous bourgeois woman, smiling while viewing an album. while sophie looks anxiously towards the camera, the unidentified woman is absorbed in the album, conveying a sense of ease and confidence.56 in this self-reflexive compilation, elisabeth explores the act of spectatorship. while her duties as empress posited her as an object of public spectacle, she was also an astute spectator and demonstrably aware of the art of self-staging in the performance of her monarchical image.57 through the visual language of these albums, elisabeth interrogated the role of women in the public realm and fashioned her individual identity against gender conventions before embracing this identity to fashion a public image detached from her role as imperial wife and mother. the ‘sissi’ myth elisabeth’s intellectual agency in shaping her self-representation has been largely occluded by the mythologising narratives generated through posthumous reappropriations of her image. these reconstructions diverged markedly from the discourse perpetuated within austria during her lifetime, where her failure to fulfil the prescribed public role of empress provoked disillusion and resentment.58 citing health concerns as justification for her absence, elisabeth elicited little sympathy amongst the viennese aristocracy. in the early 1860s, archduchess therese remarked, “i feel infinitely sorry for [francis joseph] for having a wife who prefers to leave her husband and her children for six months instead of leading a quiet life in vienna.”59 within the viennese court, elisabeth was regarded as a consummate failure in both her imperial duties and her duties as a wife and mother. among the wider population, elisabeth became a veritable stranger over the course of her life.60 given that strict habsburg censorship suppressed overtly critical voices, the empress was virtually ignored by the press, especially in her later years. on her fiftieth birthday in 1887, die neue freie presse devoted a mere seven lines to the occasion and, a decade later, mention of her sixtieth birthday was limited to the observation that she spent it in paris.61 the subsequent transformation of public opinion appeared to forget not only the criticism of her character but her active defiance of habsburg expectations.62 the tragedy of elisabeth’s death provided fertile ground for the reconstruction of her image in line with established gender ideals. her violent assassination instigated her dramatic return to the public stage and proved a pivotal moment in the construction of her posthumous myth.63 austrian media coverage ubiquitously emphasised her outstanding beauty, compounded with the tragedy of her death, to style the empress as a 63 kendler, “sisi,” 163. 62 unterreiner, sisi, 106. 61 susanne hochreiter, “sissi: a double reflection on a ‘queer icon’,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 160. 60 kendler, ‘sisi,” 162. 59 papers of archduke albrecht, hungarian state archives, budapest, quoted from the microfilm in haus-, hof und staatsarchiv, vienna, november 4, 1860, reel 32, qtd. in brigitte hamann, reluctant empress, 100. 58 maria kendler, “sisi: a figure of multiple projections,” in cultural complexes in europe, ed. jörg rasche and thomas singer (routledge, 2025), 162. 57 ibid., 550. 56 muellner, “elisabeth,” 549. 50 “mater dolorosa.”64 the trope of motherliness as a system of reference in memory politic provided a tool to implant women into memory culture by assigning them national and social importance.65 elisabeth’s unjust death as an act of self-sacrifice enhanced the symbolic power of this image. in an appeal to the familiar figure of the virgin mary, elisabeth came to allegorise the beautiful, suffering mother.66 this sentimental reimagining offered the public a figure of ideal femininity and motherhood as a site of collective identification.67 in death, therefore, elisabeth emerged as an idolized figure whose image was appropriated to reaffirm defined notions of feminine beauty in austrian cultural discourse.68 her loss of agency over her portrayal facilitated the projection of a romanticised image that suffused the narrative of her reign in line with the habsburg court’s desire to enforce a positive association between the empress and the empire. as a symbolic surrogate, the empress now fulfilled her dynastic function as the allegorical representation of hegemonic imperial power.69 in crafting a commemorative narrative that “obfuscated elisabeth’s problematic behaviour,” the monarchy effectively replaced the provocative empress with a “compliant duplicate.”70 immediately after her death, elisabeth’s body was assimilated into the ritual of iconographic public ceremony that she had avoided during her lifetime. upon its arrival in vienna on september 15, her coffin was placed on display in the hofburg’s palace chapel until the funeral procession on september 17 delivered the empress to the church for burial.71 these public displays invoked expressions of collective mourning and re-focused the empress as a symbol of state unity.72 media coverage reinforced the visual language, as in an excerpt from new freie presse that reads, “we are one people and one family…in this widespread and ethnically rich monarchy, hardly a heart beats now that is not in accord, in grief and compassion, with the so terribly stricken monarch.”73 focusing on nationalistic loss, personified by the suffering of the emperor, memorial passages espoused the image of elisabeth as landesmutter.74 this narrative aligned with the paternalistic interpretations of habsburg rule that had long acted as a centrifugal force for the image of the dynasty.75 coinciding with franz joseph’s golden jubilee, the ceremony surrounding elisabeth’s death was conducive to creating a 75 scott o. moore, “vaterland, heimat, and the family of nations: education and identity formation in late habsburg austria,” nationalities papers, special issue (2015): 9, https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2024.100. 74 nighswander, “seeing sisi,” 8-9. 73 neues wiener tagblatt (vienna), september 11, 1898, qtd. in nighswander, “seeing sisi,” 8. 72 ibid., 207. 71 daniel louis unowsky, “the pomp and politics of patriotism: imperial celebrations in habsburg austria, 1848-1916” (phd thesis, columbia university, 2000), 208. 70 olivia gruber florek, “the absent empress: photomontage, monarchy, and celebrity in the nineteenth century,” in representing the habsburg-lorraine dynasty in music, visual media, and architecture, 1618-1918, ed. werner telesko (böhlau verlag, 2017), 92. 69 hochreiter, “sissi,” 261. 68 anita mcchesney, “imagining austria: myths of ‘sisi’ and national identity in lilian faschinger’s wiener passion,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 284. 67 regina schulte, “the queen – a middle class tragedy: the writing of history and the creation of myths in nineteenth-century france and germany,” gender & history 14, no. 2 (2002): 284, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00266. 66 elisabeth bronfen, over her dead body: death, femininity and the aesthetic (manchester university press, 1992), 67. 65 sylvia paletschek and sylvia schraut, “introduction: gender and memory culture in europe – female representations in historical perspective,” in the gender of memory: cultures of remembrance in nineteenth and twentieth-century europe, ed. sylvia paletschek (campus verlag, 2008), 24. 64 lena nighswander, “seeing sisi: contemporary portrayals of empress elisabeth of austria on page and screen” (ma thesis, bowling green state university, 2004), 12. 51 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00266 genuine feeling of identification with the emperor and, therefore, the intensification of dynastic unity.76 alongside the image of elisabeth as landesmutter, franz joseph embodied the loving father who would serve as a palliative for the suffering of the austrian people.77 after her death, therefore, elisabeth as the virtuous empress served as an integrating symbol, inserted into the paternalistic narrative of habsburg rule to bolster affinity with the monarchy in austrian national consciousness. the legend attached to the image of elisabeth inaugurated by the rhetorical interventions of the habsburg court gained renewed vitality in the 1950s with the release of the sensationally successful sissi film trilogy. directed by ernst marischka and produced by vienna-based erma-film, the series charted elisabeth’s life up to the 1860s.78 caitlin gura has credited the trilogy with igniting a european-wide “sissi phenomenon,” driven by their romanticised portrayal of the “fairy tale” empress.79 this cinematic rendition of elisabeth, as sissi, is inseparable from the cultural context of postwar austria, specifically the crisis of traditional gender order. the period between 1945, when austria suffered political and military defeat with the fall of the third reich, and 1955, when austria regained national independence, proved formative for the reconstruction of gender roles.80 an atmosphere of masculine insecurity accompanied economic and social shifts post-1945 that saw many men experience a loss of social status, while women had comparatively enhanced their position.81 the need to provide stability through positive gender role models based on distinctly austrian ideals thus grappled with the destabilisation of traditional gender order. popular cinema provided an avenue to promote a revived image of masculinity while simultaneously reinforcing traditional gender relations.82 within this context, the character of sissi acted as a foil for the reconstruction of gender relations in austrian society. the audience is introduced to sissi in the bavarian countryside at possenhofen, her family home, when she enters the frame riding a horse.83 this idyllic portrayal situates sissi as the embodiment of innocence and natural virtue that persists throughout the narrative. these values are established as key moral stabilisers in the initial dialogue, when sissi’s father advises her, “whenever sorrow and trouble enter your life, open your eyes and take a walk…and every flower will remind you of the 83 heidi schlipphacke, “melancholy empress: queering empire in ernst marischka’s sissi films,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 224 82 ibid., 86. 81 ibid., 87. 80 maria fritsche, “austrian men ‘do everything with feeling!’: representations of masculinity in post-war austrian cinema (1946-1955),” in continued violence and troublesome pasts: post-war europe between the victors after the second world war, ed. ville kivimäki and petri karonen (finnish literature society, 2017), 86. 79 caitlin gura, “the austrian aschenputtel: empress elisabeth of austria as an icon of austrian national identity,” trinity college digital repository, trinity papers (2013): 7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.38593922. 78 erica carter, “sissi the terrible: melodrama, victimhood, and imperial nostalgia in the sissi trilogy,” in screening war: perspectives on german suffering, ed. paul cooke and marc silberman (boydell and brewer, 2010), 81. 77 christian wolf, “representing constitutional monarchy in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century britain, germany, and austria,” in the limits of loyalty: imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late habsburg monarchy, ed. laurence cole and daniel l. unowsky (berghahn books, 2007), 213. 76 james shedel, “emperor, church, and people: religion and dynastic loyalty during the golden jubilee of franz joseph,” the catholic historical review 76, no. 1 (1990): 129, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25023203. 52 https://www.jstor.org/stable/25023203 almighty power of god, and you will find solace and strength.”84 sissi repeats this homily verbatim in her initial romantic encounter with franz. the relationship between franz and sissi is set up as a highly romanticised love story, beginning with a chance encounter at bad ischl, where sissi has travelled for the intended betrothal of her sister and the emperor. not recognising sissi, franz is enraptured by the beauty of this “ordinary” girl.85 set against the backdrop of nature, the circumstance of their meeting serves to authenticate their love in contrast to the matchmaking orchestrated by their mothers.86 subsequently, franz declares his love for sissi during a private conversation. responding to her initial rebuttal of his proposal, franz laments the burdens of his position and confides that “i don’t know if it is a joy to be married to me.”87 this admission marks the last occasion where franz readily admits weakness.88 with sissi on his side, franz’s masculinity is revitalised and he is empowered to firmly rebuke his mother in the following scene.89 the moral influence of sissi, therefore, is a rejuvenating force that inspires the emperor’s victory over the undue influence of the archduchess.90 in this narrative sissi actuates the remodelling of franz’s masculinity that, while grounded in traditional patriarchal relations, is tempered by the gentle authenticity associated with femininity that sissi exhibits. the conflict between sissi and the archduchess frames the central narrative of the second instalment, sissi: the young empress. following the birth of sissi’s first child, a protracted power struggle ensues when the archduchess insists on taking charge of the infant.91 sissi, positioned as the protective mother, engages in a furious defence of the mother-child dynamic and reacts against the domineering authority of the archduchess by fleeing to possenhofen.92 at her parental home, extended scenes of familial intimacy recast sissi’s rebellious “masculine” nature in the feminine form as a longing for mother-child symbiosis.93 sissi’s ultimate return to vienna, and her reconciliation with the imperial court, facilitates the mediation of political tensions between the austrian monarchy and hungarian nationalists through her charm and empathetic disposition, positioned as redemptive forces. the film thus concludes with the coronation of sissi and franz as king and queen of hungary.94 the resolution of this dual conflict, both personal and political, is achieved not through statecraft, but through sissi’s feminine virtues of motherliness and affective sincerity.95 this message is strongly reaffirmed in the culminating sequence of the final film, which unfolds in the politically volatile atmosphere of venice.96 in the face of the italians’ burgeoning nationalist rebellion, franz calls on his wife for succour and sissi, debilitated 96 schlipphacke, “melancholy empress,” 218. 95 schraut, “sissi,” 167. 94 schlipphacke, “melancholy empress,” 218. 93 ibid. 92 carter, “sissi,” 97. 91 schlipphacke, “melancholy empress,” 218. 90 ibid., 80. 89 ibid. 88 ibid. 87 maria fritsche, homemade men in postwar austrian cinema: nationhood, genre and masculinity (berghahn books, 2013), 83. 86 sabine müller, “‘finally a human being in this palace’: how ‘sissi’ deals with the past,” new readings 9 (2008): 5, https://doi.org/10.18573/newreadings.63. 85 schlipphacke, “melancholy empress,” 231. 84 carter, “sissi,” 84. 53 by illness, joins her husband for the imperial procession.97 a pivotal moment occurs when sissi is reunited with her daughter, forgoing etiquette and embracing her in her arms. the previously hostile crowd erupts in a cheer of “viva la mamma!” at this display of maternal sentiment.98 here, sissi’s maternal appeal, rather than her imperial status, becomes the conduit through which dissent is neutralised and the imperial image rehabilitated.99 the films’ consistent recourse to the domestic sphere as the site of resolution has important connotations for austrian gender relations in the postwar period. the influence of sissi’s naturalness and authenticity, imbued with symbolic maternal power, effectively dissolves the energy of rumbling political rebellion against the imperial regime.100 yet, these reconciliations are contingent upon sissi’s acceptance of her roles as empress and wife; thus, personal and political harmony is only achieved through the re-inscription of patriarchal gender codes.101 in this configuration, elisabeth’s cinematic representation mobilises her image to stabilise postwar austrian identity through a nostalgic invocation of hegemonic gender norms. these portrayals stand in direct contradiction to the image elisabeth actively cultivated and worked to preserve during her lifetime, underscoring the extent to which her posthumous legacy was shaped by external ideological imperatives rather than her own self-fashioned identity. state symbol the figure of elisabeth in the sissi trilogy performed a critical ideological function in the construction of austrian national identity in the wake of world war ii. the war’s denouement precipitated a crisis of national identity when, as franz mathis has identified, “austria experienced something which seems so vital for the creation of national identity, but which the country had never experienced before: the liberation from a suppressive regime that it had finally learned to hate.”102 austria faced the task of conceptualising itself as a modern nation with an identity distinct from that of germany. intimately connected with the quest for a new national identity on political grounds was the quest for a unique cultural identity.103 this ideological project derived significant rhetorical impetus from the allies’ 1943 moscow declaration.104 the declaration defined austria as “the first free country to fall a victim to hitlerite aggression.”105 selective appropriation of its wording propagated the so-called “victim-doctrine,” which became the hegemonic narrative in the construction of a collective austrian identity.106 returning to full sovereignty as a neutral republic with the signing of the state treaty in 106 martin tschiggerl, “significant otherness nation-building and identity in postwar austria,” nations and nationalism 27 (2021): 783, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12677. 105 “the moscow conference; october 1943,” the avalon project: documents in law, history and diplomacy, yale law school, accessed april 25, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20230402080630/https:/avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp#expand. 104 christian karner, “the ‘habsburg dilemma’ today: competing discourses of national identity in contemporary austria,” national identities 7, no. 4 (2005): 417, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940500334382. 103 margarete lamb-faffelberger, “beyond ‘the sound of music’: the quest for cultural identity in modern austria,” the german quarterly 76, no. 3 (2003): 289, https://doi.org/10.2307/3252083. 102 franz mathis, “1000 years of austria and austrian identity: founding myths,” in austrian history memory & national identity, ed. günter bischof and anton pelinka (routledge, 1997), 23. 101 müller, “finally a human being,” 10. 100 cater, “sissi,” 99. 99 ibid. 98 schraut, “sissi,” 167. 97 carter, “sissi,” 97. 54 https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12677 https://web.archive.org/web/20230402080630/https:/avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp#expand 1955, austria sought to evade association with the controversial legacy of its immediate past by invoking a unique, non-german, cultural patrimony.107 consequently, the second republic was symbolically, and ideologically, configured as the successor of the habsburg neo-absolutist monarchy.108 in reactivating this imperial legacy, austria’s film industry came to the fore. austrian cinema’s most efficacious genre in the 1950s was the kaiserfilm, an austrian variant of the german heimatfilm tradition. the ideologically charged kaiserfilm emphasised austria’s historical grandeur through the prism of habsburg imperial splendour, projecting a vision of a culturally coherent austria rooted in a glorified imperial past. marischka’s sissi trilogy, released in the same year as the signing of the state treaty, is often heralded as the apotheosis of this genre.109 sissi combines the opulence of habsburg austria with bucolic alpine landscapes, allowing audiences to vicariously inhabit the benevolent word of a bygone austrian utopia.110 through charting the story of elisabeth as the bavarian princess and young empress, marischka succeeded in constructing a “fairy tale.”111 however, the explanatory notion of “nostalgic escapism” risks obscuring the trilogy’s ideological function in shaping postwar austrian identity.112 throughout, sissi provides a reference for a modern austria anchored in traditional cultural values.113 her simplicity and affinity with nature are staged as humane and democratic traits, implicitly contrasting with the ossified habsburg court.114 establishing the ideological binary, the first film intercuts scenes of sissi in the bavarian alps with viennese court scenes depicting franz joseph burdened by responsibility. in one such scene, when asked to approve death sentences for young prague dissidents, the emperor replies, “you cannot expect me to make a snap decision on the lives of eight young people.”115 establishing visual association with the pastoral world of the benevolent sissi signals that the emperor will decide in favour of leniency.116 because of sissi’s influence, the generational conflict with the authoritarian archduchess is repeatedly resolved in favour of the young protagonists. in a pivotal confrontation between sissi and her future mother-in-law, sissi declares: “i have no intention of changing my way of living. i want to life free, without constraint.”117 here, sissi espouses the tenets of the new republic of austria as her character is equated with truth, freedom, and democracy. it is the advent of these ideals that is expressed in the visual organisation of the finale, when sissi makes her journey down the danube to marry franz joseph.118 initially, sissi is framed from behind, aligning the audience with her view of the castles and churches lining the riverbanks. alternating shots reverse this 118 ibid. 117 wauchope, “sissi,” 175. 116 ibid. 115 cater, “sissi,” 85. 114 ibid., 175. 113 wauchope, “sissi,” 173. 112 müller, “finally a human being,” 2-3. 111 mike peters et al. “empire and romance: movie-induced tourism and the case of the sissi movies,” tourism recreation research 36 no. 2 (2011):170, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508281.2011.11081317. 110 mary wauchope, “sissi revisited,” in literature, film, and the culture industry in contemporary austria, ed. margarete lamb-faffelberger (peter lang, 2002), 173. 109 gura, “aschenputtel,” 9. 108 tschiggerl, “otherness,” 790. 107 robert von dassanowsky, austrian cinema: a history (mcfarland & co., 2005), 158. 55 https://doi.org/10.1080/02508281.2011.11081317 perspective to offer the gaze of the cheering austrian populace. this visual interplay constructs a dialogic rapport that fuses the iconography of habsburg grandeur with the democratic ethos of postwar renewal, and sissi is framed as the rightful representative of the austrian people.119 as a symbol of leadership and authenticity, sissi embodies a renewed image of austria that provides the means to generate a new notion of national identity. marischka’s use of masquerade scenes in the following films empowers the fashioning of sissi as a figure of identification for the postwar generation of austrians. the overemphasised splendour of the imperial court is simplified in comparison to panoramic scenes of the countryside, which praise the beauty of nature as the paradise that sissi longs for. this is exemplified in the second film, when franz travels to possenhofen to retrieve sissi after she has fled the hofburg. rather than returning directly to vienna, the imperial couple detours through southern austria. while hiking through the mountains of tyrol, an impending storm sees the couple seek refuge in a local chalet. masquerading as ordinary austrians, franz struggles to decipher the dialect of their host, prompting sissi to tease him for “not understanding his own people.”120 sissi’s confidence and comfort in this simple, rural environment is reinforced when she expresses her wish that they were “no longer the emperor and empress, but people of the mountains.”121 in such instances, the pageantry of habsburg royalty is backgrounded, and sissi and franz are positively reduced to the status of ordinary austrians.122 the fantasy of this pastoral idyll functions as a defence against traces of turmoil and loss in the austrian imagination, such that the temporal space of the pure rural community could be imagined as a potential future.123 sissi becomes the ideal historical figure to articulate this postwar iteration of national identity, and, as a result, the cinematic character emerges as a cultural icon, transforming the empress into a contemporary heroine – an austrian aschenputtel.124 in an image divorced from historical reality, elisabeth was thus co-opted as an allegory for 1950s austria who did not merely reflect but actively contributed to shaping the identity of the new austrian republic. the conflation of elisabeth with austrian identity that began in the decade following the second world war was reanimated in the 1990s. the catalyst for this resurgence was the so-called “waldheim affair,” which coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the anschluss and sparked political debate over austria’s level of involvement in the third reich, challenging austria’s “victim status.”125 in 1986, kurt waldheim, former un secretary general and austrian president, was accused of personal involvement in the nazi occupation of the balkans.126 contemporary commentators alleged that walheim’s historical “amnesia” was paradigmatic of wider austrian reluctance to confront its past, which engendered a heated transnational debate concerning austrian complicity in the pan-european aggression of hitler’s 126 ibid., 908. 125 lutz musner, “vienna – urban memories and the reification of culture,” human affairs 12, no. 2 (2002): 122, https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2002-120203. 124 ibid. 123 carter, “sissi,” 90. 122 ibid., 12. 121 ibid. 120 gura, “aschenputtel,” 11. 119 müller, “finally a human being,” 10. 56 regime.127 austria’s carefully constructed modern identity was thus destabilised, forcing austria to mediate between determining its role in the european community while confronting its third reich past.128 once again, the figure of elisabeth provided a means to resurrect the image of austria as a neutral state with a rich history.129 in its revived form, the idealised image of sissi as a cultural icon was sensationalised to construct the image of elisabeth as a royal celebrity. austrian cultural and tourist institutions commercialised this renewed image of elisabeth to promote a popular and unproblematic vision of austria for domestic and international audiences.130 it should not be overlooked that the proliferation of the empress’s image in tourism campaigns performed an important function as discursive terrain for the negotiation of issues of austrian identity.131 in vienna, in particular, elisabeth was intimately tied to habsburg landmarks, encouraging tourists to engage nostalgically with the habsburg past through the romantic figure of the empress.132 indeed, the “sissi ticket” offered a package for tourists to experience vienna exclusively through exhibits centred on the empress. as well as viscerally experiencing elisabeth’s life through a shared location, tourists could purchase her image on innumerable souvenir objects.133 the immortalised image of elisabeth on such objects as plates, fans, and bells, ascribed a domesticity unto the empress that misrepresented her reality to serve the needs of contemporary society.134 heidi schlipphacke identifies viennese marketing of “habsburg nostalgia” as constituting more than a reactionary retreat into the past. rather, it generates “nostalgic affective responses that are radically displaced from the location and time of habsburg vienna,” enabling the empress to become a pliable signifier of cultural stability.135 as in the 1950s, the sensationalised figure of elisabeth was mobilised to connect an irrecoverable imperial past with the cultural present, while deflecting contemporary issues of austrian identity.136 the centenary of elisabeth’s death in 1998, officially commemorated as the “sissi year”, marked a climax in this promotional campaign, generating an estimated equivalent of fifty-million german marks in tourist and consumer expenditure.137 numerous features and facilities were launched in her honour, such as the “walking tours of the empress” that enabled participants to retrace her footsteps to baden and the vienna forest.138 the winterhalter portraits, encountered at the beginning of this study, were ubiquitously reproduced on banners and postcards, amongst other forms of 138 oliver haid, “‘eternally will austria stand…’: imperial tourism in austria between timeless predisposition and political statement,” in royal tourism: excursions around monarchy, ed. philip long and nicola j. palmer (multilingual matters & channel view publications, 2008), 117. 137 wauchope, “sisi,” 179. 136 ibid. 135 heidi schlipphacke, “the temporalities of habsburg nostalgia,” journal of austrian studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 14, https://doi.org/10.1353/oas.2014.0023. 134 beth muellner, “the remains of the stay: the corporeal archive of empress elisabeth in the hofburg,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 75. 133 ibid., 358 132 susanne kelley, “sisi in the museum: exhibits in vienna and the us,” in sissi’s world, ed. hametz and schlipphacke, 357. 131 gundolf graml, revisiting austria: tourism, space, and national identity, 1945 to the present (berghahn books, 2020), 2. 130 ibid., 178. 129 ibid. 128 wauchope, “sissi,” 177. 127 karner, “‘habsburg dilemma’,” 414. 57 https://doi.org/10.1353/oas.2014.0023 visual media, often accompanied by the caption “eternal beauty.”139 in this context, her state portrait projected the former opulence of the habsburg monarchy, while the informal portrait provided evidence of elisabeth’s status as the epitome of timeless feminine beauty.140 it is precisely this dissemination of her image, stripped of its historical specificity, that occludes elisabeth’s agency in constructing her self-image through the processes of commodification and nostalgia. thus, the image of elisabeth emerged as a palimpsestic memory site within austrian cultural imagination, one whose symbolism consistently overrode historical veracity. idealised in the 1950s through the sissi trilogy as the youthful embodiment of a rehabilitated austrian republic, and later reimagined in the 1990s through sensationalist mythmaking, her image functioned not as an index of lived history but as a symbolic vehicle for the negotiation of national identity and commodified nostalgia. conclusion the paradox at the heart of empress elisabeth’s cultural legacy lies in the disjunction between her strategic manipulation of her image in life and the ideological instrumentalization of that image after her death. in defiance of the dynastic codes that prescribed imperial femininity as maternal visibility and ceremonial compliance, elisabeth fashioned an aesthetic persona that eluded such prescriptions. her visual self-fashioning, rooted in calculated absence, aesthetic extremity, and the mobilisation of beauty, exploited and subverted the very codes it inhabited. refusing to be reduced to a reproductive cipher within the visual economy of monarchy, she enacted a form of feminine resistance that was at once deeply embedded in and critically distanced from the imperial stage. yet in death, elisabeth transformed into a cultural palimpsest: a figure retroactively inscribed with qualities that reinforced conservative gender ideals and national mythologies. the habsburg imaginary reconfigured her into an icon of serene maternity and imperial loyalty, an ideological construct at odds with the historical record. through the twentieth century, the qualities projected onto elisabeth were repeatedly mapped onto austria itself, as her image became a symbolic linchpin in the mythologisation of imperial nostalgia. in her reimagined form, elisabeth no longer resisted the visual regime – she became its posthumous muse. 140 florek, “elisabeth,” 131. 139 jeffrey l. sammons, “previewing sisi: a congratulatory album on the marriage of emperor joseph and elisabeth of bavaria,” the yale university library gazette 74, no. 3/4 (2000): 135, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40859233. 58 https://www.jstor.org/stable/40859233 bibliography illustrations figure 1. 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https://doi.org/10.1353/oas.2014.0023 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00266 https://www.jstor.org/stable/25023203 https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12677 https://doi.org/10.1163/25897616-02401004 wauchope, mary. “sissi revisited.” in literature, film, and the culture industry in contemporary austria, edited by margarete lamb-faffelberger. peter lang, 2002. wolf, christian. “representing constitutional monarchy in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century britain, germany, and austria.” in the limits of loyalty: imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late habsburg monarchy, edited by laurence cole and daniel l. unowsky. berghahn books, 2007. 64 cey.4.hooker.“warriors+of+god”+and+their+perceptions+during+the+hussite+wars_+october+2025.docx_ “warriors of god” and their perceptions during the hussite wars chloe hooker salem college/independent scholar abstract about a century before martin luther challenged catholic church doctrine and catalyzed the protestant reformation, jan hus was burned at the stake for heresy due to his beliefs that countered traditional church ideas. hus, a czech preacher, gained many supporters during and after his death, and his execution sparked a fifteen-year-long military conflict between his followers, the hussites, and the catholic church and holy roman emperor. this paper proposes a distinctive perspective by emphasizing how perceptions can motivate actions and shape impacts. both sentiments, either as heretical from the catholic church and emperor’s perspective, or as “warriors of god” from the hussites’ perspective, affected the actions of the hussites, and ultimately the outcome of the wars. 3 article the protestant reformation posed one of the most significant challenges in the history of christianity. it significantly created a european-wide split that still has implications today. however, reformers began to challenge the catholic church centuries before martin luther nailed his ninety-five theses on a church door in 1517 in wittenberg. advocating for a transformation of the catholic church, leaders such as john wycliffe, peter payne, and jan hus challenged the catholic religious and social order. in bohemia, jan hus argued against many church doctrines and practices. after jan hus was executed for his revolutionary ideas, he gained a large following known as the hussites. because of threats looming from the king of hungary, king sigismund, the devout catholic king who had ordered hus’s execution, hussites felt compelled to take up arms and defend themselves and their beliefs. sigismund, now holy roman emperor, and pope martin v called five crusades against the hussites from july 1419 to may 1434, known as the hussite wars. the hussites were victorious in five military conflicts, and their actions in the wars directly impacted how others perceived them. when the council of basel met in 1431 to solve what was perceived as a problem with the hussites, the hussites had already begun to split into two groups: the taborites and the utraquists. the central works used for primary sources are thomas fudge’s translated compilation of texts, the crusade against the heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, as well as letters, speeches, and sermons given by prominent hussite figures, such as jan hus, jan želivský, and jan žižka. thomas fudge, martin pjecha, howard kaminsky, matthew spinka, craig atwood, and other scholars have significantly analyzed and written secondary works about the hussite wars,1 but this paper proposes a distinctive perspective by emphasizing how perceptions can motivate actions and shape impacts. although the hussites were deemed heretical by their opponents, the hussites thought themselves to be “warriors of god,”2 a name they had given themselves during a battle around 1420, and the impacts of the hussite wars transformed central european society, both militarily and religiously. social order was challenged, new military tactics were introduced, and the catholic church was forced to compromise with the hussites on certain doctrines. the environment of late medieval central europe should be discussed to understand the hussite movement. figures from the luxembourg dynasty of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ruled bohemia and lands beyond and shaped central european history, culture, and religion long before the reformation movement ultimately divided europe over catholic-protestant issues. furthermore, events like the papal schism and dynastic rivalries 2 attributed to jan čapek (c. 1420) doc. no. 31 “battle song of the hussites.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents, ed. fudge, 66-67. 1 thomas a. fudge, the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437 : sources and documents for the hussite crusades. (aldershot: ashgate, 2002); martin pjecha, theo-politics of the hussite movement: from reform to revolution. (leiden: brill, 2024); howard kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution. (berkeley: university of california press, 1967); jan hus, the letters of john hus. translated by matthew spinka. (manchester. manchester university press; rowman and littlefield, 1972); craig d. atwood, the theology of the czech brethren from hus to comenius. (university park, pa.: pennsylvania state university press, 2009). 4 contributed to the creation of a central europe that was already plagued by turmoil decades before jan hus came onto the scene of conflict. the luxembourg dynasty lasted from 1310 to 1437 and wore the “crown of saint wenceslaus” for those one-hundred and twenty-seven years, ruling the kingdom of bohemia.3 established by john of luxembourg (r. 1310-1346), the son of holy roman emperor henry vii, the luxembourg dynasty shaped bohemian history in several ways. after john of luxembourg ruled, his son, charles, ascended to the throne. charles i (1316-1378) of bohemia established bohemian lands within europe, which included bohemia, moravia, the duchy of silesia, and other small principalities.4 in 1346, charles was crowned king charles i of bohemia and holy roman emperor charles iv. he controlled the crownlands of bohemia and the broader holy roman empire, typically described as modern-day germany and austria, as well as some areas beyond, such as bohemia. he was incredibly influential in bohemian history, not only for instituting borders but also for scholarship and politics. in 1348, charles iv established the university of prague, making it the oldest university in eastern europe. this made prague a famous imperial city and the capital of the holy roman empire from 1355 to charles’s death in 1378. because of this, the “golden age of bohemia” peaked under him.5 also under charles iv was the creation of the golden bull of 1356. the golden bull served similar to a constitution for the holy roman empire and set boundaries for clerical authority. it solidified a firm election process for the holy roman emperor, wherein seven electors met to choose a holy roman emperor. these seven electors consisted of three ecclesiastical figures: the archbishops of mainz, trier, and cologne, and four secular figures: the count palatine, king of bohemia, margrave of brandenburg, and duke of saxony.6 the papal schism (1378-1415) was a period when the two popes in rome and avignon excommunicated each other. it created distrust and disrespect from catholics, and many regarded the papacy as flippant, confused, and corrupt. because of this, the church was already facing difficulties before hus. at the same time as the papal schism, the half-brother of king sigismund of hungary, wenceslaus iv (václav iv), rose to power in bohemia upon their father’s death. however, sigismund had wenceslaus arrested and imprisoned him and his supporters in bratislava in march 1402. from there, wenceslaus could do nothing to keep his half-brother out of bohemia. sigismund became king of bohemia upon wenceslaus’s death in 1419, and his seizure of the bohemian throne created multiple concerns for bohemians, especially on the eve of the hussite revolution.7 jan hus was born in husinec, a small village in southern bohemia, in 1372/73. his parents were poor, but his mother vowed a life of priesthood for her son. he moved to prague in 1386 to attend the university of prague, where he studied theology, graduated in three years with a b.a., and spent three more years getting an m.a. in 1398, he became a faculty 7 fudge, the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia. 9-11. 6 selected historical documents of the middle ages, translated and edited by ernest f. henderson, (london/new york 1892, 220-261): the golden bull of the emperor charles iv, 1356 a.d. 5 fudge, the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia. 7. 4 fudge, the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia. 7. 3 thomas a. fudge, the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia. (aldershot: ashgate, 1998): 5. 5 member and the dean of the college for the winter semester from 1401 to 1402. in june 1400, he was ordained into the clergy and appointed a priest at bethlehem chapel in prague on march 14, 1402. hus was a popular preacher who preached in czech and advocated for more czech positions at the german-dominated university of prague. because of his radical religious views that will be discussed, hus was called to the council of constance by emperor sigismund, found guilty of heresy, and burned at the stake on july 6, 1415.8 before jan hus challenged the clergy and promoted a czech translation of the bible, john wycliffe (c.1330-1384) spoke out against the immorality of the church in england. he criticized the papacy, argued the bible had more authority than the clergy, rejected sales of indulgences on commission, and worked to translate the bible into the vernacular; for him, it was english. these were pillars of the catholic faith, and wycliffe ran a significant risk of arguing against them. wycliffe’s ideas circulated into bohemia, mainly thanks to peter payne, an english scholar and follower of wycliffe, and influenced jan hus’s argument.9 like wycliffe, hus vehemently disagreed with the practice of indulgences because they took advantage of impoverished christians. he argued that christ was the head of the church, not any clergyman or pope in rome.10 hus also believed the bible and god had more authority than the church, as he wrote,“...the faithful ought not to believe in the church, for she is not god, but the house of god.”11 therefore, he worked toward translating the bible into his vernacular, czech, so that all czech speakers could read and interpret the bible for themselves. like wycliffe, hus also criticized the clergy, as he protested, “i cannot, however, engage in controversy as to [who between the two popes deserves] the greater praise, for the savior prohibited it to his disciples in luke 12.”12 hus observed clerical abuses in his work about the church, de ecclesia, writing that “many priests abandon the imitation of christ” and “but whatever calls for the imitation of christ, as poverty, gentleness, humility, endurance, chastity, toil or patience — these passages they suppress or gloss over at their pleasure or expressly set aside as not about salvation.”13 emperor sigismund called the council of constance (1414-1418) to settle the issue of the papal schism. both popes in rome and in avignon were deposed and replaced with martin v, an italian who permanently resided in rome. also present at the council of constance were sigismund’s concerns about hus, and sigismund invited him to the council, offering a safe passage for hus. however, sigismund’s terms of a safe passage only applied if hus did not preach on his way to constance. hus preached to the public anyway; therefore, he was arrested and sent to prison.14 14 hus, “public notice displayed by hus during the journey to constance,” “to his friends in bohemia.” the letters of john hus. 124-125. 13 hus, “the abuse of scripture in the interest of clerical power.” de ecclesia, the church. 111-112. 12 jan hus, “to a nobleman concerning the death duties.” the letters of john hus. 14. 11 hus, “the unity of the church,” de ecclesia, the church. 6-7. 10 jan hus. “all christians are not members of the church,” “the pope not the head of the church but christ’s vicar,” de ecclesia, the church. translated by david s. schaff. (new york: c. scribner’s sons, 1915): 18-19, 125. 9 william r. cook, “john wyclif and hussite theology 1415-1436.” church history 42, no. 3 (1973): 335. https://doi.org/10.2307/3164390. 8 matthew spinka, john hus: concept of the church. (princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 1966): 7-8. 6 https://doi.org/10.2307/3164390 while hus was in prison, he described in letters that god continued to visit him and assured hus he would be saved.15 at the council though, hus and the hussites, and wycliffe and his followers, the lollards, were deemed heretical by emperor sigismund and pope martin v. they were to be “apprehended…and burned to death”.16 jan hus was sentenced to death and burned at the stake on july 6, 1415, for heresy. however, hus’s beliefs did not die out, as the hussite movement was incipient. the hussites’ worries grew once wenceslaus iv of bohemia died and sigismund of hungary took his title of king of bohemia in 1419. the man who had just sentenced their leader to death was now contesting for rule over them. reports that sigismund intended to suppress heretics spread rapidly throughout czech lands.17 because jan hus was a theologian, not a militant man, he never referred to his followers as warriors. rather, they began to call themselves that during the hussite wars. because of sigismund’s aggression, the hussites had no choice but to militarize and defend themselves. they saw themselves as not only protecting themselves, but also god’s word. in 1404, jan hus wrote to a silesian german, “you declared recently that wyclif is a heretic, for the reason he had written heresy in his books. that does not seem to be a sufficient reason…”18 in another letter, “to his friends in bohemia,” hus called on his supporters to “remember that they burned the prophecies of saint jeremiah, which god had commanded to be written….” 19 these affirmations gave his followers hope and confidence that their beliefs were to be stood by and they were right. because of these beliefs and attitudes from hus, it is doubtful that the hussites ever viewed themselves as heretics. instead, they called themselves “warriors of god,” which eventually was popularized in a hussite battle song during the second crusade: “you who are warriors of god/and the law of god/pray that god will help you/believe in god/and with god you shall ever triumph.”20 the hussites created several songs and poems that emphasized the glorification of fighting for god. the hussites engaged in five crusades from 1419 to 1434 to defend “the truth of the gospel.”21 even though the hussites saw themselves as god’s warriors, they indeed were not perceived this way by others. as aforementioned, sigismund declared the hussites as heretics and ordered that they be “exterminate[d].”22 czech author karel brušák writes that because hus had challenged so much of sigismund and his supporters’ authority, “...the rejection of sigismund was triggered rather by hatred of a particular person than by 22 (may 18, 1421) doc. no. 61“crusade commander orders death to all heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 114-115. 21 prokop holý (february 2, 1430) doc. no. 147 “prokop replies to german town requesting peace.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 281-282. 20 attributed to jan čapek (c. 1420) doc. no. 31 “battle song of the hussites.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents, ed. fudge, 66-67. 19 hus, the letters of john hus. translated by matthew spinka. 188. 18 hus, the letters of john hus. translated by matthew spinka. 3. 17 (april 22, 1418) doc. no. 5 “report that sigismund intends to suppress heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades, ed. thomas fudge, 20. 16 (april 22, 1418) doc. no. 5 “report that sigismund intends to suppress heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades, ed. thomas fudge, 20. 15 hus, “to the faithful friends in bohemia,” “to his friends in constance.” the letters of john hus. 143, 152. 7 wyclif ’s ideas on rulers.”23 this makes one wonder if the hussite wars were declared over doctrinal differences or merely a personal disdain for hus. aeneas sylvius, later pope pius ii, thought of the hussites as the “legions of hell unleashed upon the earth.”24 he also described them to have “eyes…like those of an eagle, their hair wild and stood on end, their beards long and their stature prodigiously tall. their bodies were hairy and their skin so hard that it appeared able to resist iron as though it were a piece of armour.”25 aeneas sylvius’s illustration provided an understanding of why the hussites’ opponents often fled, allowing them to continue successful attacks. however, the hussites did gain multiple opponents, including the archbishops of mainz, trier, and cologne. these three figures, arguably some of the most powerful in europe at the time, served as three out of seven electors for the holy roman empire. in april 1421, the three archbishops, along with the count palatine, a fourth elector, organized a union and issued a statement declaring their disdain for the hussites. their statement read: “...all four of us electors of the holy roman empire, declare and publicly announce with this letter to all those who learn of its content…that, with regard to the matter of heresy and infidelity, which unfortunately have arisen in the kingdom of bohemia, and with regard to which it has to be feared that if we do not counteract them in good time, that they will also occur in other lands…”26 due to sigismund’s frequent absence in the reichstag, or the imperial diet, the bishops often took over crusading powers. thus, they further called for an end to hussite activity in a strategy outline for anti-heresy: first, we shall and will resist such infidelity and destroy it wherever it may develop or arise, and we shall also firmly help and support each other against all those who deliberately support or help the same infidels, with our knights, cities, castles, lands and people and with our subjects and with all our might without any reservations. furthermore, we shall and will in each and every one of our cities, castles, markets, villages, lands, and areas earnestly and strongly decree to our officials, servants, and our people…where one becomes aware of such heretics and infidels or if such persons who are suspected of this, be it men or women, clerics or secular persons, that one shall stop and apprehend them and hand them over to us or a senior official…27 jan hus gained a large following after his death. figures such as peter payne, jerome of prague, jan želivský, and jan žižka spread the hussite cause and movement. peter payne, an english lollard from oxford, traveled to bohemia in 1415 and became a leading figure in 27 (april 23, 1421) doc. no. 55 “bishops outline anti-hersey strategy” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades, ed. fudge, 106-107. 26 (april 23, 1421) doc. no. 54 “union of german bishops” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades, ed. fudge, 105-106. 25 doc. no. 111 “description of hussite warriors.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades, ed. fudge, 195. 24 thomas a. fudge, “žižka’s drum: the political uses of popular religion.” central european history 36, no. 4 (2003): 555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353. 23 karel brušák, “reflections of heresy in czech fourteenthand fifteenth-century rhymed compositions.” the slavonic and east european review 76, no. 2 (1998): 246. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622. 8 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622 the hussite movement as he spread wycliffe’s and hus’s teachings in bohemia.28 another ardent supporter of jan hus was jerome of prague. however, jerome of prague was not just a supporter of hus; the two shared an “intellectual relationship,”29 and he is considered a leader of the hussite movement due to his contributions to spreading wycliffe’s ideas and arguing for church reform. like hus, jerome of prague was present at the council of constance to defend his friend. once he arrived in constance, however, he was arrested, imprisoned, questioned, found guilty of heresy, and forced to recant his beliefs. he affirmed his views and rejected the clergymen who abused their power. on may 30, 1416, jerome of prague met the same fate as hus, being burnt at the stake. his narrative, as thomas fudge writes, is not studied as intensively as hus’s due to the lack of translated material from czech.30 still, his influence remains vital to the hussite story. perhaps the two most significant hussites for ushering in the hussite revolution were jan želivský and jan žižka, the two military leaders of the hussite factions. on july 30, 1419, czech priest jan želivský led an insurrection in the town hall of prague. author martin pjecha suggests that želivský’s “charisma must have been impressive,” noting that “in the face of continual persecution, he was able to not only mobilize popular defiance and open protests against authorities, but even inspire civil upheaval.”31 želivský and other hussite radicals were protesting king wenceslaus iv and his officials for taking “anti-hussite action” by ordering “all of prague’s parish churches restored to their legitimate catholic priests.”32 jan žižka (the “one-eyed”) was a czech general during the hussite wars. his radical views led him to spread the four articles of prague, which laid out what reforms žižka and other hussites desired.33 these four articles helped establish hussite doctrine and theology. žižka essentially called for god’s word to be preached, the communion in both kinds, to weaken the power of the clergy, and for all sin to be driven out. žižka declared in 1420, first, that god’s word be preached everywhere throughout christendom …second,that the true body and holy blood of our lord be given to all authentic christians, both young and old. third, that the power of priests from the highest level, even the papacy, to the lowest not be tolerated. neither may they own estates or collect tithes…fourth, that all clear sin be 33 brušák, “reflections of heresy in czech fourteenthand fifteenth-century rhymed compositions.” 246. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622. 32 howard kaminsky, “the prague insurrection of 30 july, 1419” mediaevalia et humanistica 17. (1966): 108-111. 31 pjecha, theo-politics of the hussite movement: from reform to revolution.196. 30 fudge, jerome of prague and the foundations of the hussite movement. 172-213, 234-253. 29 thomas fudge, jerome of prague and the foundations of the hussite movement. (oxford: oxford university press, 2016): 8-9. 28 luigi campi, “determinism between oxford and prague: the late wyclif’s retractions and their defense ascribed to peter payne.” in europe after wyclif, edited by j. patrick hornbeck and michael van dussen, 121-122. (fordham university press, 2017). http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.8. 9 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622 http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.8 driven out whether by kings or lords, squires or priests, or ecclesiastical or secular people. 34 the offering of communion in both kinds to the laity, or nonclergy members, became the main goal for the hussites, as they felt it necessary to decentralize clerical power and make christ available to all christians. these four articles were the crux of hussite doctrine. the main issue hussites focused on was communion in both kinds, meaning the laity had access to bread and wine. on october 28, 1414, czech priest jakoubek of stříbro allowed the laity to drink from the chalice for the first time.35 as author craig atwood argues, this event could be considered the beginning of the hussite revolution. from there, the chalice became the symbol of the hussites, as it appeared on their flags during the wars. the hussites were split into two main factions: the taborites and the utraquists. the taborites, with a settlement in tabor founded by žižka, were more radical in their beliefs and, therefore, more feared. they embraced the four articles of prague and rejected many churches, taxes, and private land ownership. at the end of the hussite wars, the taborites faded out due to a lack of support from the utraquists. the utraquists, led by želivský, held more in common with the catholic church. they upheld communion in both kinds to be given to infants, but they still believed in purgatory and agreed that images could be kept in churches.36 because of this, they were welcomed back into the church after the council of basel (1431-1449) ended the hussite wars. the hussite wars had many long-term causes, including the papal schism, aggressions from sigismund, and the expansion of wycliffe’s and hus’s teachings. the immediate cause, however, other than the executions of jerome of prague and jan hus, was the storming of the town hall in prague and the defenestration of the kings’ officials, in an event known as the first defenestration of prague. in july 1419, jan želivský gave a speech in the church of our lady of the snows in prague that encouraged a violent insurrection. this example of “radical hussite preaching during the crusade period, ” as fudge describes it, later led to opponents calling a crusade against the hussites.37 soon after, jan želivský proclaimed, “ oh, if only the city of prague would now, in this time, become an example for all the faithful, not only in moravia, but also in hungary, poland, austria, and elsewhere. and that the word of god would be spread to the entire world!”38 in response to the defenestration, a surprise attack in živohošť in central bohemia led by lord petr of šternberk against žižka and the hussites ensued, making it the first military engagement of the hussite wars.39 the utraquists appealed to catholic forces and proposed a truce; however, sigismund persuaded pope martin v to call a crusade against the hussites. on 39 doc. no. 9 “first military action: surprise attack at živohošť.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 29-32. 38 pjecha, theo-politics of the hussite movement: from reform to revolution. 197. 37 jan želivský (july 30, 1419) doc. no. 6 “sermon of priest želivský.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 21-25. 36 atwood, the theology of the czech brethren from hus to comenius. 84-87. 35 atwood, the theology of the czech brethren from hus to comenius. 76-84. 34 (november 25, 1420) doc. no. 47 “žižka and táborite leaders address czech people.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 99-100. 10 february 22, 1418, martin v issued an anti-hussite bull, calling for all supporters of the catholic faith to “rise up firmly and with courage against such heretics and their goods…”40 as author howard kaminsky contends, “sigismund himself well understood the danger of such a crusade for the independence and integrity of the realm, and it is hard to imagine how he could have possibly persuaded himself that his new policy was the right one.”41 issuing a crusade meant a definite reunification of the hussites, one that sigismund and pope martin v severely underestimated. on the eve of war in 1419, the city council of kutná hora “offered rewards to anyone who turned hussites in…” and “these people of kutná hora, who were german, cruelly persecuted the czechs, especially those who loved the teaching of christ.”42 it is clear that the hussites continued to be viewed as heretics even after jan hus’s death. the first battle fought was the battle of sudoměř on march 25, 1420, with about four hundred hussites fighting against over two thousand catholic crusaders. hussite leaders published the hussite manifesto in prague and encouraged their followers with these words: “dearest and faithful friends in the kingdom of bohemia, we appeal to your wisdom and consistent defense of our language, with love and justice that you might be prepared to stand up to resist all of our enemies and we admonish you and encourage you with our whole heart…” 43 the hussites also gained support from the bohemian nobility, including čeněk of vartenberk, the lord high burgrave, who separated himself from sigismund’s crusading policies, and oldřich rožmberk, a czech baron from southern bohemia.44 by the end of april 1420, perhaps hundreds of barons and knights in bohemia had announced their support for the hussites. čeněk of vartenberk, in particular, along with other nobles gathered and issued a proclamation in defense of the hussites: “therefore, dear friends, you must under from this, therefore, that his majesty has no other intention but to shamefully and brutally wreak destruction upon, and cruelly exterminate, the czech kingdom and crown as well as and particularly the bohemian language.”45 these nobles also publicly supported the four articles of prague, as they stated, …furthermore, we wish for you to know that we stand for nothing other than these articles which follow. first, that the common people might receive the body properly and freely proclaimed. second, that the word of god might be properly and freely proclaimed. third, the priests might live lives of 45 fudge, “bohemian nobility side with the heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 60-61. 44 john klassen, the nobility and the making of the hussite revolution. (new york: columbia university press, 1978): 128-129. 43 (april 3, 1420) doc. no. 26 “hussite manifesto from prague.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 58-60. 42 doc. no. 15 “pre-crusade suppression of hussite heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 40-41. 41 howard kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution. berkeley: (university of california press, 1967): 365. 40 martin v (february 22, 1418) doc. no. 18 “the anti-hussite bull ‘inter cunctus’ of martin v;” (march 1, 1420) doc. no. 19 “proclamation of the crusading bull,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 45-52. 11 exemplary conduct in the manner which our lord christ commanded along with the apostles and in the institutions of the holy father thereafter. fourth, that the czech language and kingdom be cleansed from all harmful rumors and slander for the common benefits of our kingdom and language of bohemia…46 additionally, women fought alongside men during the first crusade at the battle of týn horšův in 1422. a letter from the duke of bavaria to the margrave of meißen reveals that some hussite warriors who were captured as prisoners by hungarian soldiers were “women who had fixed their hair like men and had girded themselves with swords, with stones in their hands, wearing boots. among these were some high-born.” 47 other noblewomen, such as agnes štíné, who stayed in prague and defended hussite teachings, and queen sophie of bavaria, the wife of wenceslaus iv, who was an “enthusiastic reader of czech literature,” aided in protecting the hussite movement.48 on july 14, 1420, the battle of víkov hill was won by jan žižka and the taborites, and the hill was renamed “žižka’s hill,” where they celebrated with songs of triumph and victory.49 the second crusade was fought in žatec in 1421. in february of 1421, the taborites established a “new tábor” in the region around the lower morava river, spreading hussite influence further, while the utraquists remained in prague.50 armies on both sides continued to grow, with bishops and other clerical members supporting one another. also, the hussites developed new warfare tactics in the second crusading phase. žižka’s innovation of the wagenburg, or wagon fort, involved a “quadrangle or circle” tied “wheel to wheel” to form a defense. between the wagons was space for artillery to fire out from the inside of the encircled wagons.51 the wagenburg allowed the hussites to gain another success at the end of the second crusade.52 also during the second crusade was the “strongest point of anti-hussite sentiment in the country.”53 in attempts to combat this sentiment, žižka and other hussites gave a manifesto in defense of their values and their belief that they were gaining assistance from god. žižka declared, “we…true czech people bringing hope in god, warn all of you by the death of our lord, specially you knights and squires, both people in the cities and peasants belong to the plzeň landfríd to cease opposing the lord god and god’s holy law as well as the worthy four articles. it is for these 53 (february 1421) doc. no. 49 “manifesto to the plzeň alliance,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 100-101. 52 doc. no. 74 “crusade armies thwarted again at žatec.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 129-132. 51 szymon górski and ewelina wilczynska. “jan žižka’s wagons of war: how the hussite wars changed the medieval battlefield.” medieval warfare 2, no. 3 (2012): 27–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48578020. 50 doc. no. 51 “a moravian tábor” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 102-103. 49 kaminsky, a history of the hussite revolution. 375. 48 thomas alfred, anne’s bohemia: czech literature and society, 1310-1420. (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1998): 45-46. 47 doc. no. 34 “women among hussite armies.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 73. 46 fudge, “bohemian nobility side with the heretics.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 60-63. 12 https://www.jstor.org/stable/48578020 matters that we fight with the help of god.”54 furthermore, žižka counter-criticized anyone who did not support the hussite cause, as he accused hussite enemies of being heretical: “you wish that we would not destroy your land and burn your houses down. why have you not given liberty to god’s word and to the worthy four articles noted above when you were among the first to hear them? is it not true that you told us you were willing to grant freedom to these articles and agreed that this was right and proper? but you were speaking lies to us and in the face of god.”55 the third crusade from kutná hora to sázava lasted from 1421 to 1422. žižka and his warriors arrived in kutná hora on december 9, 1421, with sigismund and his catholic forces arriving a few weeks later. the battle of kutná hora was fought for just two days, from december 21 to 22, 1421. an account from the battle discusses the hussites with admiration: “...god always provides support and never lets his warriors down but granted to all who fought for the truth and bravery. being fearless of the strength of the armies they [hussites] entered the battlefield and enclosed themselves within the wagons on all sides.”56 although the hussites, using the wagenburg, were able to secure victory once more, they were beginning to run low on supplies, and the winter temperatures continued to worsen.57 on the other hand, sigismund and his army were severely defeated and ready to give up. thus, he fled and did not set foot in bohemia for another fourteen years. however, pope martin v wrote to sigismund, the king of poland, the grand duke of lithuania, the grand master of the teutonic knights, the duke of austria, and many more, pressing for more military action to suppress the hussites. pope martin v claimed, “we wish to encourage you by letting you know through this letter that this matter is most urgent in our hearts. to be sure, we are convinced that if you, together with the faithful princes and german people who this heresy threatens with grievous injury as well as god and the church, take this matter into consideration and provide a remedy this summer by coordinating an army to enter bohemia it would be easy to put down and exterminate the heretics, these rebels against yourself and god.”58 more soldiers and supporters joined both sides, and more battles ensued. on september 14, 1424, žižka gave a speech in prague to his “warriors of god” before they entered into war. shortly after this speech was given, žižka died on october 11 of that year after contracting a sickness on his way to battle in moravia. his followers took up the name “orphans” as they felt they had lost their own father, and žižka was buried in the church of the holy ghost in hradec králové. a story circulated that žižka requested his “body flayed 58 doc. no. 82 “crusade failures in the winter of 1421-2,” martin v (before july 1422) doc. no. 87 “pope martin v presses for military solution.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 145, 151-153. 57 (december 1421) doc. no. 78 “battle for kuntá hora,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 137-141. 56 (december 1421) doc. no. 78 “battle for kuntá hora,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 140. 55 (february 1421) doc. no. 49 “manifesto to the plzeň alliance,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 100-101. 54 (february 1421) doc. no. 49 “manifesto to the plzeň alliance,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 100-101. 13 and his skin stretched onto a drum.”59 the “žižka’s drum” fictitious tale was fabricated and told mainly by catholic “temporal and ecclesiastical authorities [as] a standard response to the perceived threat of the ‘other’ in late medieval europe”60 in order to spread propaganda about the hussites and demonize žižka. it is no surprise that catholic enemies spread this story; žižka was half-blind (and fully blind toward the end of his life), ruthless, led terrorizing armies, burned his enemies, attacked innocent cities, never lost a single battle as a commander, and was one of the greatest military strategists and leaders in history. his image easily allowed others to associate him and the hussites with evil.61 in 1427, a priest and an “intimate friend”62 of žižka, prokop holý, emerged to fill the power vacuum žižka left behind. although he was documented to fight in only the battle of lipany in may 1432, prokop strengthened bohemian borders by commanding the invasion of neighboring countries hostile to the hussite czechs. prokop successfully adopted žižka’s battle tactics and led the taborites until his death in 1434 as the fourth crusade of the hussite wars amplified.63 a fourth crusade was called against the heretics in july 1427. catholic crusaders, supplied with spies, had attempted to utilize the wagenburg at battles at stříbro and tachov, but fled when the hussites approached.64 pope martin v issued his disdain at the crusading armies as the hussites began to threaten lands beyond central europe. he wrote to henry beaufort, the papal legate for germany, hungary, and bohemia, in 1427: “the pope has with grief” lamented “the disgraceful flight of the army of the faithful in bohemia from the siege of stříbro and tachov.”65 he also condemned the archbishops of mainz, trier, and cologne, criticizing, “for if they had joined those in bohemia as they ought, and as had been arranged, the army would not have retreated with such disgrace.”66 at a meeting in bratislava in 1429, a provocative speech from prokop and peter payne compelled sigismund to call a fifth and final crusade against the hussites, as the hussites continued to “perpetuate more trouble and calamity on a daily basis…”67 on april 18, 1429, sigismund called for the crusade, urging bavarian, silesian, and hungarian lords 67 sigismund i (april 10, 1429) doc. no. 139 “the empire strikes again,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 262-263. 66 martin v (october 2, 1427) doc. no. 128 “pope martin v expresses disgust at crusade failures,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 243. 65 martin v (october 2, 1427) doc. no. 128 “pope martin v expresses disgust at crusade failures;” (october 9, 1428) doc. no. 134 “hussite heresy threatens distant lands.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 243, 250-251. 64 (july, 1427) doc. no. 124 “crusaders and heretics clash at stříbro and tachov,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 230. 63 doc. no. 112 “emergence of prokop holý,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 195-196. 62 doc. no. 112 “emergence of prokop holý,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 196. 61 fudge, “žižka’s drum: the political uses of popular religion.” 546-555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353. 60 fudge, “žižka’s drum: the political uses of popular religion.” 554. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353. 59 (1424) docs. no. 105-106 “death of žižka,” “žižka’s drum.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 182-183. 14 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353 to send more troops. 68 sigismund gained english aid, and perhaps even support from joan of arc,69 but it was still not enough as hussites attacked silesia, austria, and lusatia between 1427 and 1434.70 in february 1430, prokop wrote to german lords to “agree with the truths of the gospel” if they wished to save their lives.71 on february 20, 1431, pope martin v died. exactly one month later, the fifth crusade was announced and began on july 23 of that year in domažlice.72 a hussite account from the crusade proclaims, “...the lord god who does not burden his faithful ones…is a ready and faithful helper to those who call upon him in need,” and the hussites defeated the catholic crusaders in august 1431.73 prokop stated during this crusade that the hussites would cease fighting if their opponents agreed with their beliefs. he wrote, the will of the aforementioned armies and lords [the táborites and orphans] is that you return to the truth of the gospel. for these truths they have been leading a daily struggle up until the present time. if you agree to this, then the plunders will cease immediately and they will under no circumstances extort money from you…however, if you do not decide to agree to the truths of the gospel for which our forces contend…you may be assured that the will of the aforementioned armies and all of the lords who are of the kingdom of bohemia is this: if you desire to save your lives and your goods you are to provide them with a certain amount of money…74 these perspectives demonstrate how the hussites believed themselves to be chosen by god for a victory against the crusaders, and therefore motivated them to continue defending their beliefs and prove successful in battle. sigismund called for the council of basel in march 1431 to find a solution to the hussite problem. however, only one prelate appeared on the day it was set for due to more minor wars that made crossing the alps into basel difficult. therefore, it was moved to july 74 prokop holý (february 2, 1430) doc. no. 147 “prokop replies to german town requesting peace.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 281-282. 73 (august 15, 1431) doc. no. 167 “hussite perspective on the campaign;” (august 17, 1431) doc. no. 169 “admission of crusader defeat and disaster,” “hussite song of victory at domažlice,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 318-321. 72 (june 26, 1431) doc. no. 154 “ceremonies for the fifth crusade;” (1431) doc. no. 165 “account of the fifth crusade fought at domažlice” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 300, 314. 71 attributed to prokop holý (february 2, 1430) doc. no. 147 “prokop replies to german town requesting peace.” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 281-282. 70 henry beaufort (1431) doc. no. 143 “england backs crusade against czech heretics;”(1430) doc. no. 145 “counter crusades;”(1430) doc. no. 146 “hussite invasion of lusatia;” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 277-285. 69 howard kaminsky cautions that the authenticity of the letter from joan of arc threatening the hussites has always been disputed. it may have been real, but also could have been forged by catholics as an attempt to intimidate the hussites. either way, it demonstrated the lengths catholics would endure to put an end to the hussites. it is worth noting, kaminsky writes, that henry beafort, the papal legate for the fourth crusade, was also one of joan’s jailers; attributed to joan of arc (march 23, 1430) doc. no. 149 “joan of arc threatens the hussites” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 284. 68 (april 18, 1429) doc. no. 141 “a call for renewed crusade,” found in the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437, ed. fudge, 266-267. 15 23.75 the council of basel followed expectations of conciliarism set by the previous generation of clergymen at the council of constance. the conciliar movement, as historian matthew spinka argues, was one of the “most significant eras in the history of christianity” because it gave more power to church councils, rather than the pope holding too much influence.76 the four hussite leaders attending the council of basel and defending their movement were john of rokycany, ulric of znojmo, nicholas of pelhřimov, and peter payne. these men urged the council to accept the four articles of prague and especially to allow the laity to participate fully in communion.77 the council of basel ended in 1449, with the two hussite groups officially split. the taborites phased out over time as the utraquists were accepted back into the catholic church with the hope that the utraquists’ beliefs would also fade. on the other hand, the utraquists hoped to influence other catholics further. furthermore, they accepted king sigismund as the king of bohemia before he died in 1437. in return for papal recognition, the utraquists were promised communion in both kinds.78 the effects of the hussite wars were present throughout europe and later the transatlantic world. the wars further decentralized the papacy and weakened the catholic church. jan hus also helped to facilitate the rise of czech proto-nationalism in bohemian lands, and he is still revered today. wycliffe and hus are known to be the forerunners of the protestant reformation. in october of 1527, reformer martin luther nailed his ninety-five theses on the door of all saints’ church in wittenberg, calling for many of the same changes wycliffe and hus did. the protestant reformation led to the creation of lutheranism, calvinism, zwinglianism, anabaptism, anglicanism, and many more branches of the protestant church. in turn, however, the catholic church also sought reform as evident with the council of trent from 1545 to 1563 that instituted a reform of the clergy, indulgences, and the catholic church. this also led to the counter-reformation, a movement specifically targeted to suppress protestants. further wars, such as the schmalkaldic wars (1537-1555) and the thirty years’ war (1618-1648), ensued. as for the hussites, the utraquist faction was absorbed into the catholic church following the council of basel and would later be reformed to the unitas fratrum, also known as the unity of the brethren, or the bohemian brethren. the unity of the brethren follows many of hus’s ideas and is primarily known as the moravian church in north america today. one prominent figure from hussite and moravian history is jan amos komensky (comenius, 1592-1670). comenius was another follower of hus, who would later be prominent for his role in promoting education. comenius was a czech philosopher born in moravia and a bishop among the bohemian brethren. during the thirty years’ war (1618-1648), comenius was exiled due to his protestant views that challenged holy roman emperor ferdinand ii’s attempts to re-establish catholicism back into bohemia. while 78 decaluwe, michiel, thomas m. izbicki, and gerald christianson, eds. a companion to the council of basel. 280. 77 otakar odlozilik, “from revolution to restoration,” the hussite king: bohemia in european affairs, 1440-1471. (new brunswick: rutgers university press, 1965): 4-18. 76 petr z mladenovic,“the conciliar movement and the council of constance,” john hus at the council of constance. translated by matthew spinka. (new york: columbia university press, 1966): 3-22. 75 michiel decaluwe, thomas m. izbicki, and gerald christianson, eds. a companion to the council of basel. (leiden: brill, 2017): 12-13. 16 living in exile in polish leszno after 1648, comenius was able to gain international support throughout europe. he and other members of the brethren successfully advocated for financial support from leaders in poland-lithuania, the swiss confederation, and the dutch church in london, for students, elderly persons, and others living without a substantial income.79 comenius promoted universal education and is known as the “father of modern education.”80 comenius is known as the “father of modern education” as he argued that education should be accessible and enjoyable to many people, including women. as a result, the bohemian brethren, later known as the moravians, established schools for girls in the colonies of pennsylvania and north carolina in the mid-eighteenth century. the moravians have also held missions around the world, where they continue to spread hus’s teachings. moravians, as an ethnic group, still live in prague and parts of south czechia, formerly bohemia. the czechoslovak hussite church in czechia was refounded in 1920, after world war i, and is still in practice today. it “professes to the old christian tradition, cyril and methodius tradition, follows the teachings of master john huss, the reform efforts, the legacy of jan amos comenius, the modernist movement and the spiritual.”81 the “warriors of god” shaped bohemian and christian history in several ways that can still be demonstrated worldwide today. the protestant reformation and the contrasting forms of protestantism that resulted from it were significantly influenced by the hussite wars and their aftermath. hussites were feared, hated, respected, and revered by many christians, czech and beyond, from the lower to upper classes, and these perceptions about them influenced the actions of the hussites and their opponents during the hussite wars. the hussite wars challenged society, introduced new military tactics, powerfully challenged catholic authority, and facilitated new religious movements. 81 “czechoslovak hussite church reminds 100th anniversary of its birth | communion of protestant churches in europe cpce.” (2020). https://www.leuenberg.eu/czechoslovak-hussite-church-reminds-100th-anniversary-of-its-birth/. 80 atwood, the theology of the czech brethren from hus to comenius. 366-376. 79 vladimír urbánek, “comenius, the unity of brethren, and correspondence networks.” journal of moravian history 14, no. 1 (2014): 30–50. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jmorahist.14.1.0030. 17 https://www.leuenberg.eu/czechoslovak-hussite-church-reminds-100th-anniversary-of-its-birth/ https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jmorahist.14.1.0030 18 bibliography primary sources charles iv, holy roman emperor, the golden bull of the emperor charles iv, 1356 a.d, found in selected historical documents of the middle ages, translated and edited by ernest f. henderson london/new york 1892. fudge, thomas a. the crusade against heretics in bohemia, 1418-1437: sources and documents for the hussite crusades. aldershot: ashgate, 2002. henderson, ernest f., ed. the golden bull of the emperor charles iv, 1356 a.d. selected historical documents of the middle ages hus, jan. de ecclesia, the church. translated by david s. schaff. new york: c. scribner’s sons, 1915. hus, jan. the letters of john hus. translated by matthew spinka. manchester university press; rowman and littlefield, 1972. petr z mladenovic. john hus at the council of constance. translated by matthew spinka. new york: columbia university press, 1966. secondary sources alfred, thomas. anne’s bohemia: czech literature and society, 1310-1420. minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1998. atwood, craig d. 2009. the theology of the czech brethren from hus to comenius. penn state press. brušák, karal. “reflections of heresy in czech fourteenthand fifteenth-century rhymed compositions.” the slavonic and east european review 76, no. 2 (1998): 241–65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622. campi, luigi. “determinism between oxford and prague: the late wyclif ’s retractions and their defense ascribed to peter payne.” in europe after wyclif, edited by j. patrick hornbeck and michael van dussen. 121-122. fordham university press, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.8. communion of protestant churches in europe. “czechoslovak hussite church reminds 100th anniversary of its birth | communion of protestant churches in europe cpce.” (2020). https://www.leuenberg.eu/czechoslovak-hussite-church-reminds-100th-anniversar y-of-its-birth/. cook, william r. “john wyclif and hussite theology 1415-1436.” church history 42, no. 3 (1973): 335–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/3164390. 19 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212622 http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.8 https://www.leuenberg.eu/czechoslovak-hussite-church-reminds-100th-anniversary-of-its-birth/ https://www.leuenberg.eu/czechoslovak-hussite-church-reminds-100th-anniversary-of-its-birth/ https://doi.org/10.2307/3164390 decaluwe, michiel, thomas m. izbicki, and gerald christianson, eds. a companion to the council of basel. leiden: brill, 2017. fudge, thomas. jerome of prague and the foundations of the hussite movement. oxford: oxford university press, 2016. fudge, thomas a. the magnificent ride: the first reformation in hussite bohemia. aldershot, hants: ashgate, 1998. fudge, thomas a. “the state of hussite historiography.” mediaevistik 7 (1994): 93–117. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42584176. fudge, thomas a. the trial of jan hus: medieval heresy and criminal procedure. new york: oxford university press, 2013 fudge, thomas a. “žižka’s drum: the political uses of popular religion.” central european history 36, no. 4 (2003): 546–69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353. górski, szymon, and ewelina wilczynska. “jan žižka’s wagons of war: how the hussite wars changed the medieval battlefield.” medieval warfare 2, no. 3 (2012): 27–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48578020. housley, norman. religious warfare in europe, 1400-1536. oxford: oxford university press, 2002. kaminsky, howard. a history of the hussite revolution. berkeley: university of california press, 1967. kaminsky, howard. “the prague insurrection of 30 july, 1419” mediaevalia et humanistica 17. 1966. klassen, john. the nobility and the making of the hussite revolution. new york: columbia university press, 1978. klassen, john. “women and religious reform in late medieval bohemia.” renaissance and reformation / renaissance et réforme 5, no. 4 (1981): 203–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43465024. lahey, stephen e. the hussites. leeds: arc humanities press, 2019. odlozilik, otakar. the hussite king: bohemia in european affairs, 1440-1471. new brunswick: rutgers university press, 1965. pjecha, martin. theo-politics of the hussite movement: from reform to revolution. leiden: brill, 2024. perett, marcela klicova. preachers, partisans, and rebellious religion: vernacular writings and the hussite movement. philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2018. 20 http://www.jstor.org/stable/42584176 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4547353 https://www.jstor.org/stable/48578020 http://www.jstor.org/stable/43465024 soukup, pavel. “the waning of the ‘wycliffites’: giving names to the hussite heresy.” in europe after wyclif, edited by j. patrick hornbeck and michael van dussen, 196–226. fordham university press, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.11. spinka, matthew. john hus and the czech reform. chicago, ill.: the university of chicago press, 1941. spinka, matthew. john hus: concept of the church. princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 1966. urbánek, vladimír. “comenius, the unity of brethren, and correspondence networks.” journal of moravian history 14, no. 1 (2014): 30–50. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jmorahist.14.1.0030. van dussen, michael and pavel soukup, eds. a companion to the hussites. leiden: brill, 2020. zeman, j. k. “restitution and dissent in the late medieval renewal movements: the waldensians, the hussites and the bohemian brethren.” journal of the american academy of religion 44, no. 1 (1976): 7–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1462099. 21 http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1f114xz.11 https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jmorahist.14.1.0030 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1462099 warshaw.central+european+yearbook+entry+.docx how german nationalism between 1871 and 1890 restructured and fueled antisemitism. flora warshaw abstract: this essay seeks to explain through textual analysis of speeches and writings of key antisemitic figures of the time, how german nationalists used antisemitism as a unifying force for citizens, who were disappointed with the lack of german cultural homogeneity in the wake of german unification in 1871. taking a distinct turn from the religious prejudice suffered by many jews in what became the german empire, a new form of racialized antisemitism emerged and created a legacy of racialized hatred that was most commonly associated with the third reich. 94 introduction the 1870s witnessed a different and new kind of antisemitism, one that was racialized in its nature and took a distinct turn from the religious prejudice under which jews had suffered so far in the german empire.1 modern antisemitism had, according to hannah arendt, “emerged with the birth of the modern nation-state.”2 indeed, as klaus holz wrote, “modern antisemitism constituted itself more than anything else through its association with nationalism.”3 nationalism is a very contested idea, and its meanings and interpretations have varied over time. as eric hobsbawm summarizes it, nationalism is an idea that stresses the convergence of the state, the nation, and society.4 for ernest gellner, nationalism stresses the idea of a culturally unified state.5 this idea is seen most evidently in the evolution of german nationalism within germany in the late 19th century. german nationalism evolved from a predominantly liberal movement into a xenophobic ideal after the failed 1848 revolutions.6 it is important to note, however, that the rise of nationalism in the late 19th century was not unique to bismarck’s unified germany. as julie thorpe highlights, german unification spurred greater debates about pan-german nationalism outside bismarck’s borders, such as in austria-hungary.7 yet for the purposes of this essay, the german nationalistic goal, within the borders of an 1871 germany, became one based on identity. even after unification in 1871, germans felt they lacked an identity and sought to construct one based on ethnic exclusion.8 this idea of ethnic exclusion and its relationship to nationalism is the subject of this essay; more specifically, the exclusion of the german jews through the new form of antisemitism that was created. the term “antisemitism” today is simply a synonym for “jew-hatred.”9 however, this essay will showcase its original meaning and why “antisemitism” is so specific in its racialized nature and how the german nationalist movement helped motivate it. whilst many associate racial antisemitism with the third 9 shulamit volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code: reflections on the history and historiography of antisemitism in imperial germany,” leo baeck institute yearbook 23, no.1 (january 1978): 39, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/23.1.25. 8 marcel stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews: liberalism and the antisemitism dispute in bismarck's germany (lincoln: university of nebraska press, 2008), 286. 7 julie thorpe, pan-germanism and the austrofascist state, 1933-38 (manchester: manchester university press, 2011). 6 peter pulszer, “third thoughts on german and austrian antisemitism,” journal of modern jewish studies 4, no.2 (july 2005):154, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725880500133293. david j. wertheim, “german jewry and the development of the jewish question in the nineteenth century,” in oxford history of modern german theology, volume 1: 1781-1848, eds. grant kaplan and kevin m. sander schel (oxford: oxford university press, 2023), 691, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845768.003.0036. 5 ernest gellner, nations and nationalism. 2nd ed. (ithaca: cornell university press, [1983] 2008), 132. 4 eric hobsbawm, “mass-producing traditions: europe, 1870-1914,” in the invention of tradition, eds. eric hobsbawm and terence ranger (cambridge: cambridge university press, [1983] 2012), 265, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107295636. 3 klaus holz, nationaler antisemitismus: wissenssoziologie einer weltanschauung (hamburg: hamburger edition, 2001), 12, quoted in peter pulszer, “third thoughts on german and austrian antisemitism,” journal of modern jewish studies 4, no.2 (july 2005):155, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725880500133293. 2 hannah arendt, the burden of our time (london: secker & warburg, 1951), 8, quoted in shulamit volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code: reflections on the history and historiography of antisemitism in imperial germany,” leo baeck institute yearbook 23, no.1 (january 1978): 25, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/23.1.25. 1 fritz stern, gold and iron: bismarck, bleichröder, and the building of the german empire (london: allen and unwin, 1977), 498. 95 reich, the foundations for such beliefs were created within imperial germany.10 this essay will look at the socio-economic conditions, specifically the economic crash of 1873, and subsequently argue that the ensuing german identity crisis laid the groundwork for this new form of antisemitism.11 this context fueled new secular, racialized ideas that declared that jewish germans constituted a separate race, as opposed to a religion. due to the secular nature of this antisemitism, this essay will go on to analyze the religious antisemitism that had persisted and now accompanied this new racial antisemitic movement. however, as will be evidenced, even this religious antisemitism became racialized in its movement. through an analysis of the key antisemitic figures of this period and their writings and speeches, we can understand how the two ideologies of nationalism and antisemitism converged and mutually reinforced each other to create a unifying factor for germans who craved an identity and a true nation-state. the relationship between the 1873 economic crash and the german jewry despite the physical unification of germany in 1871, many germans still felt a lack of unity.12 nationalism within germany thus far had often been a local movement due to the reality of the german confederation prior to unification in 1871.13 furthermore, due to the success of many of these individual german states, “regional patriotism” continued even after german unification.14 as yehuda cohen summarizes, “unification was more structural, the machinery of governance, than unification on a psychological or cultural level.”15 yet, as paul de lagarde, an infamous german antisemite and scholar, said, when people talk of the unity of germany, they almost always think of the unity of political leadership; i contend that unity has to be understood as the unity of the governed. the former without the latter would be mere force; to demand the former when the latter prevails would be unnecessary, for it would come about by itself.16 16 stern, the politics of cultural despair, 53. 15 yehuda cohen, the germans: absent nationality and the holocaust (eastbourne: sussex academic press, 2010), 29. 14 nancy r. reagin, “recent work on german national identity: regional? imperial? gendered? imaginary?” review of nation of provincials: the german idea of heimat, by celia applegate, review of music and german national identity, by celia applegate and pamela potter, review of the nation as local metaphor: württemberg, imperial germany, and national memory, 1871-1918, by alon confino, review of körper der nation: habitusformierung und die politik des turnens, 1860-1890, by svenja goltermann, review of fatherlands: state-building and nationhood in nineteenth century germany, by abigail green, review of staging philanthropy: patriotic women and the national imagination in dynastic germany, 1813-1916, by jean quataert, review of denkmal im sozialen raum: nationale symbole in deutschland und frankreich im 19. jahrhundert, by charlotte tacke, review of political poetry in periodicals and the shaping of german national consciousness, by lorie a. vanchena, central european history 37, no.2 (2004): 281. 13 christian jansen, “the formation of german nationalism, 1740–1850,” in the oxford handbook of modern german history, ed. helmut walser smith (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 235, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199237395.002.0003. 12 saul k. padover, “treitschke: forerunner of hitlerism,” pacific historical review 4, no.2 (june 1935):161, https://doi.org/10.2307/3633727. 11 harold james, a german identity: 1770 to the present day. 2nd ed. (london: phoenix, [1989] 1994), 103. 10 yfaat weiss, “identity and essentialism: race, racism, and the jews at the fin de siècle,” in german history from the margins, eds. neil gregor, nils roemer, and mark roseman (bloomington, in: indiana university press, 2006), 52. 96 importantly, he said later in 1888 that despite german unification, “our life is more joyless than anyone can imagine.”17 germans were evidently disappointed by bismarck’s unification and felt a lack of cultural homogeneity, defined in this essay as a shared sense of identity. it was a “national and cultural crisis of identity,” according to reinhard rürup.18 whilst this essay only covers the period from 1871-1890, it is important to note that even hitler, decades later, “found it necessary to boast that his greatest achievement was the creation of a united-totalitarianreich.”19 it is clear how important it was for germans to have a strong sense of unity. marcel stoetzler summarizes these ideas well by arguing that germany was founded before developing “a strong national consciousness.”20 it makes sense then that many german nationalists then sought to discover it. this disappointment in german unity was also compounded by the fact that germany was dealing with a dramatic societal shift as a result of industrialization and urbanization, with many germans yearning for a “pre-industrial past.”21 this meant many germans began seeking a societal change in the 1870s, which was compounded in the 1890s, summarized by shulamit volkov who writes, the unique german culture emerging in the 1890s was expressed in the “german ideology”; in a radical anti-modern mentality, rejecting liberalism, capitalism, socialism; in a nostalgic passion for a long-lost world. it implied a series of political views including an opposition to democracy and a call for the reestablishment of a national community of harmony and justice.22 these ideas showcase a contradictory group of germans who sought a new culturally unified germany while simultaneously yearning for germany’s pre-industrialized past that had existed prior to unification. 22 volkov,“antisemitism as a cultural code,” 31. 21 stern, gold and iron, 498. fritz stern, the politics of cultural despair: a study in the rise of the germanic ideology (berkeley, ca: university of california press, [1961] 1974), https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.5972996. norman cohn, warrant for genocide: the myth of the jewish world-conspiracy and the protocols of the elders of zion (london: serif, 1967), 164-179, quoted in shulamit volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code: reflections on the history and historiography of antisemitism in imperial germany,” leo baeck institute yearbook 23, no.1 (january 1978): 30, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/23.1.25. 20 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 288. peter pulzer, jews and the german state (detroit, michigan: wayne state university press, [1992] 2003), 30. 19 padover, “treitschke,” 161. 18 reinhard rürup, emanzipation und antisemitismus: studien zur “judenfrage” in der bürgerlichen gesellschaft (göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 1975), 123, quoted in peter pulzer, “third thoughts on german and austrian antisemitism,” journal of modern jewish studies 4, no.2 (july 2005):154, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725880500133293. 17 anna de lagarde, paul de lagarde. erinnerungen aus seinem leben für die freunde zusammengestellt (göttingen: w. f. kaestner, 1894), 163, quoted in fritz stern, the politics of cultural despair: a study in the rise of the germanic ideology (berkeley, ca: university of california press, [1961] 1974), 32, https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.5972996. 97 antisemitism and pogroms were rife in times of economic uncertainty in germany prior to 1871.23 therefore, when germany experienced the stock market crash in 1873, due to the prevalence of german jews within the financial industry, many sought to blame the disaster of the crash and the subsequent collapse of the german economy on them.24 indeed, the jews “were widely portrayed as an excessive powerful minority that had financial control over the german host society.”25 the issue was that the modern jew was now a “symbol of the modern world,” as norman cohn wrote.26 german jews gained full emancipatory rights in 1871, and they took the opportunities associated with assimilation and emancipation more than any other minority group, becoming “disproportionately active” in industries and professions that provided an income and societal standing higher than the average german.27 as peter gay writes, jews “stationed themselves across the social, political, and stylistic map.”28 ironically, this was probably due to the jewish assumption that the more a jew acculturated to german society, the more likely they were to be accepted. yet, as rürup highlights, the more assimilated german jews became, the more aggrieved german society was as a result.29 for those who strove to turn against modernity and the supposed evils that accompanied it, the jews were the easiest target. this can be seen most evidently with the antisemitism associated with bismarck’s banker bleichröder, a key target of this new virulent strain of antisemitism as he “embodied all that the socially aggrieved came to detest.”30 these ideas were summarized well by harold james who described this new emergence of antisemitism as resulting from, “an intellectual uncertainty in national identity; an increase in uncertainty when there are powerful fluctuations on housing, farming, money or stock markets; and a definition of national identity against an “enemy” associated with market operations.”31 the “enemy,” and reason for this uncertainty was found in german jewry.32 the relationship between german jewry and nationalism one of the most prominent figures in the german antisemitic and nationalist movement, who sought to relate the question of the german jews to the question of nationalism and cultural unity, was heinrich von treitschke.33 as a university professor, 33 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 42. 32 ibid.,101 31 james, a german identity, 103. 30 stern, gold and iron, 495. 29 rürup, emanzipation und antisemitismus, 82-84, quoted in pulszer, “third thoughts on german and austrian antisemitism,” 100. 28peter gay, “encounter with modernism: german jews in german culture, 1888-1914,” midstream 21, no.2 (february 1975): 41 27 geoffrey g. field, review of the downfall of the anti-semitic parties in imperial germany, by richard s. levy, journal of social history 11, no.1 (autumn 1977): 99. stern, gold and iron, 499. 26 cohn, warrant for genocide, 23–24, quoted in volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 30. 25 alexander jacob, “introduction,” in political ideas, eds. houston stewart chamberlain and alexander jacob (lanham, maryland: university press of america, [1915] 2005), 6. 24 ibid. matthew lange, antisemitic elements in the critique of capitalism in german culture, 1850-1933 (oxford: peter lang, 2007), 122. 23 james, a german identity, 101. 98 treitschke had the social and “intellectual stature” required to formulate and popularize a new form of nationalism based on exclusionary, anti-jewish factors.34 furthermore, for those seeking a “respectable argument” for antisemitism, treitschke’s standing provided the intellectual validation they sought.35 for treitschke, the overwhelming success of jews within germany showcased a “lack of nationalism,” whereby germany lacked its own culture, which in turn had allowed for the success of jews.36 in his infamous piece “our views,” published in the prussian yearbook in 1879, he declared, the jews in france and england have become a harmless and in many ways beneficial, element of civil society. that is in the last analysis the result of the energy and national pride of these two ancient culture-bearing peoples. our culture is a young one. our being still lacks a national style, an instinctive pride, a thoroughly imprinted character. that is why for so long we stood defenseless against alien essences. now, however, we are at the point of acquiring those goods. we can only wish that our jews recognize in time the transformation that is the logical consequence of the rise of the german state.37 treitschke here is pointing to the idea that germany was “behind” its european counterparts in terms of nation-state building, thus it needed to “catch-up.”38 it is clear from this writing that in treitschke’s mind, france and england could accommodate the jewish minority as they already possessed a strong sense of national culture and pride. yet, germany clearly did not. german jews purportedly shared the unity and commonality that the germans could not possess, whilst simultaneously subverting germany’s attempt to gain it.39 the jews supposedly sapped the culture of those who surrounded them, seen most evidently in the work and writings of richard wagner who declared that jews “have no authentic culture of their own.”40 lagarde, meanwhile, said that the jews were “the carriers of decay and pollute every national culture.”41 in the eyes of german nationalists in the new german state, it was clear the state could not thrive with such a parasitic presence within its society. therefore, the german nation-state was to be constructed by process of “othering,” defining minorities such as jews as not real germans.42 as has already been established, germany desired cultural homogeneity, which invariably requires a degree 42 reagin, “recent work on german national identity: regional? imperial? gendered? imaginary?,” 286. 41 paul de lagarde, deutsche schriften (mainz: dieterich, 1892),41, quoted in fritz stern, the politics of cultural despair: a study in the rise of the germanic ideology (berkeley, ca: university of california press, [1961] 1974), 61, https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.5972996. 40 james loeffler, “richard wagner’s “jewish music”: antisemitism and aesthetics in modern jewish culture,” jewish social studies 15, no.2 (winter 2009): 2, https://doi.org/10.2979/jss.2009.15.2.2. 39 stern, the politics, 61. 38 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 55. 37 heinrich von treitschke, “unsere aussichten,” in antisemitism in the modern world: an anthology of texts, trans. richard s. levy (lexington, mass. and toronto: d.c. heath canada, 1991), 73. 36 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 47. 35 james, a german identity, 101. 34 ibid. michael a. meyer, “great debate on antisemitism: jewish reaction to new hostility in germany 1879-1881,” the leo baeck institute yearbook 11, no.1 (january 1966):143, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/11.1.137. 99 of exclusion unless a minority is willing to wholly assimilate.43 treitschke, for example, demanded the complete assimilation of jews into germany—which would in turn “strengthen national unity”—writing in “our views,” “[the jews] they should become germans. they should feel themselves, modestly and properly, germans… for we do not want to see millennia of germanic morality followed by an era of german-jewish hybrid culture.”44 as donald l. niewyk describes, “at the heart” of most of the early antisemitic attacks by the likes of wagner, treitschke, and lagarde was the idea that the jews had failed to “live up to their part of the bargain” of emancipation by amalgamating to german culture fully.45 yet, as has been mentioned, many jews had already assimilated. indeed, marion kaplan’s work “refining judaism in imperial germany” highlights how modern judaism was reformed to better suit germanic society, more specifically the german middle class.46 she writes, “measured in lagging synagogue attendance or in rising rates of intermarriage or conversion, “judaism” as a practice declined, especially in the cities.”47 the cultural changes jews attempted to make within this period, alongside their success within germanic society, shows that jews did assimilate, or at least showed an attempt to which, according to german nationalists, led to the conclusion that the german jew was to be despised if they were rich or poor, working or middle class.48 hence, whilst this demand for complete assimilation that many antisemites put forward may not have appeared “extreme,” it was an impossible task for german jewry.49 therefore, the “racist position” many antisemites began to take was that jews were physically “unable to assimilate.”50 thus, for the jews that had technically assimilated, especially into the middle class, germans had to find a new way to distinguish, as jonathan judaken refers to it, the now “evermore-indistinguishable jewish other.”51 this could only be achieved with a new construction of anti-jewish hatred based on racism.52 racializing antisemitism racial antisemitism of this period was very specific because the idea of racial difference itself was not dangerous; rather, racial difference denoted a “shorthand to differences of cultural, religious, moral, and economic behavior.”53 this was everything the new germanic state did not want, and was, in turn, what the german jew had been accused of by german nationalists. racial antisemitism was not a wholly new concept. there were many examples of scholars who wrote about jewish racial theories in the latter half of the 19th century, such as theodore fritsch in 1881, who described theories that revolved around the idea that jesus was an “aryan.”54 however, racial theory had, in 54 cohen, the germans, 19. 53 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 303. 52 ibid. 51 jonathan judaken, “antisemitism and the jewish question,” in the cambridge history of judaism: volume 8: the modern world, 1815-2000, eds. mitchell b. hart and tony michels (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2017), 561, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139019828.021. 50 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 286. 49 meyer, “great debate on antisemitism,” 145. 48 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 37. 47 ibid., 9. 46 marion kaplan, “redefining judaism in imperial germany: practices, mentalities, and community,” jewish social studies 9, no.1 (autumn 2002): 1–33. 45 donald l. niewyk, “solving the “jewish problem”: continuity and change in german antisemitism, 1871–1945,” the leo baeck institute year book 35, no.1 (january 1990): 338. 44 von treitschke, “unsere aussichten,” 71. 43 stoetzler, the state, the nation, and the jews, 286. 100 fact, appeared throughout the first half of the 19th century, with works such as count arthur de gobineau’s essay that cited the “supremacy of the nordic-aryan race.”55 indeed, as early as 1835, the königsberg historian friedrich schubert, in his criticism of jewish emancipation, declared that a jew could never be a true “member of the german nation” because the jews were “an asiatic tribe.”56 the coining and proliferation of the term “antisemitism” was itself a direct product of the racialization of jews in europe. the man most associated with popularizing this term was wilhelm marr.57 marr, a german journalist, was another figure frustrated with the state of germany in the 1870s.58 the term “antisemitism” had been coined by the austrian-jewish scholar moritz steinschneider in 1860.59 however, it was marr that revolutionized the anti-jewish movement by popularizing the term “antisemitismus,” whereby it “far exceed[ed] its direct communicative value.”60 indeed, as richard levy writes, “over the next fifteen years, variants of anti-semitism, anti-semite, and anti-semitic, made their way out of the german-speaking world into nearly every european language.”61 “antisemitism” was more than a word. even the very construction of the wordusing “ismus”meant it was viewed within the same discourse as words such as “liberalism” (liberalismismus) or “conservatism” (konservatismus), added more power, weight, and respect to the term.62 the most important thing to note about this new term is that it did not denote being anti-jewish, a religious idea. instead, it denoted an opposition to a race, the semites.63 as judaken writes, in this new era, the discourse of race replaced the earlier theological and then social distinctions between christians and jews with new scientific-sounding criteria based on blood and descent that could be easily welded onto an exclusionary nationalist, ethno-racial vision of “the people.” the language of race was secular, scientific, and positivist. the invention of “semite” as a category suggested objectivity and science, making jewish qualities fixed and unchanging, from which neither conversion nor assimilation was possible.64 64 judaken, “antisemitism and the jewish question,” 568. 63 ibid., 38. 62 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 39 61 richard s. levy, “political antisemitism in germany and austria, 1848-1914,” in antisemitism: a history, eds. albert s. lindemann and richard s. levy (oxford: oxford university press, 2010), 123. 60 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 38. 59 armin lange, “jew-hatred in antiquity: cultural, legal, and physical forms of antisemitic persecution,” in volume 3 confronting antisemitism through the ages: a historical perspective, eds. armin lange, kerstin mayerhofer, dina porat, and lawrence h. schiffman (berlin: de greuter, 2021), 44, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110671995. 58 mosche zimmerman, wilhelm marr: the patriarch of antisemitism (new york: oxford university press, 1986), 75. 57 pulzer, the rise of political anti-semitism, 49. 56 friedrich schubert, handbuch der allgemeinen staatskunde in europa (königsberg: bornträger, 1835), 161-62, quoted in till van rahden, “germans of the jewish stamm: visions of community between nationalism and particularism, 1850-1933,” in german history from the margins, eds. neil gregor, nils roemer, and mark roseman (bloomington, in: indiana university press, 2006), 29. 55 peter pulzer, the rise of political anti-semitism in germany and austria (new york: john wiley and sons, 1964), 49. 101 marr wanted to make it very clear that his jewish hatred was not religious in its nature, even writing “how nonsensical the religious aspect of this [jewish] hatred was” in his infamous work “the victory of judaism over germanism” in 1879.65 he goes on to say that “from the very beginning it was not a religious war, it was a battle for survival against the foreign rule of judaism, of whose character we only now have become clearly aware.”66 marr successfully connected the idea of racial difference to anti-jewish hatred despite the clear similarities between this new racial hatred and the older theological anti-jewish ideals.67 as volkov writes, “semitism provided sufficient, though indirect indication of marr’s real target, but it was also conveniently inaccurate, enabling him to infuse it with a meaning that transcended hatred of jews yet elegantly became identical with it.”68 marr, who had three jewish ex-wives, once believed in the concept of assimilation, albeit through intermarriage.69 however, by the time of his published work in 1879, he had concluded that assimilation was impossible as jews were “impelled to dominate others.”70 for marr, jewishness was “an irreversible matter of heredity,” and in his eyes, a jew could never win his favor.71 therefore, “antisemitism” meant that no matter what, the jew, on account of their inherent racial difference, would forever be a societal outcast. furthermore, marr’s antisemitic writing highlights the idea that in order for germany to become a strong nation, it must rid itself of the parasitic presence of the jews, writing that “germanism did not possess sufficient spiritual endurance to protect itself from judaization.”72 this idea alludes to tretischke’s work, which talked of jewish culture prevailing as a result of germany’s lack of cultural unity. another figure to which we can attribute the success of racial antisemitism is otto glagau. another german journalist, glagau also sought to blame the economic crash on the german jews.73 in 1879, in a published pamphlet, he wrote against the dominance of “a foreign race,” writing “die soziale frage its die judenfrage,” translating to “the social question is the jewish question.”74 whilst marr supplied the name of “antisemitism,” glagau provided the perfect slogan to accompany it, successfully distributing it through mass media and in turn, “permanently linking a specific view of social reality and a particular method in attempting to improve it with open and virulent opposition to jews.”75 thus, antisemitism became, as volkov calls it, a unifying “cultural code,” that signified one’s cultural identity and was “a way of communicating an acceptance of a particular set of ideas.”76 “antisemitism” became such a powerful statement that even the 76 ibid., 34-35. 75 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 40. 74 otto glagau, deutsches handwerk und historisches bürgertum (osnabrück: verlag von bernhard wehberg, 1879), quoted in shulamit volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code: reflections on the history and historiography of antisemitism in imperial germany,” leo baeck institute yearbook 23, no.1 (january 1978): 40, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/23.1.25. 73 pulzer, the rise of political anti-semitism, 89. 72 marr, the victory of judaism over germanism, 14. 71 meyer, “great debate on antisemitism,” 143. 70 ibid. 69 niewyk, “solving the “jewish problem,” 351. 68 ibid. 67 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 39 66 ibid., 27. 65 wilhelm marr, the victory of judaism over germanism, trans. and ed. by gerhard rohringer. 8th ed (bern: rudolph costenoble, 2009), 9. 102 word “jewish” seemingly lost all religious connotations.77 steven aschheim talks of the “jewification” of german society that many spoke of in this period, whereby the term “jewish” just denoted something believed to be a degenerative force.78 this new virulent racist antisemitism found its way into the speeches of many other prominent germans of the time. otto böckel, a german politician, successfully “became the first antisemite in 1887 to win a seat in a reichstag.”79 he also declared the jewish question to be racial, as opposed to a religious issue.80 böckel described the german jews as “a tenacious, ancient race that is remote from our own and that cannot be disposed of through baptism or mixed marriages.”81 böckel saw jews and germans as two mutually exclusive nations that couldn’t exist alongside one another.82 once again, this points to the concept of an alien or parasitic presence of the jews within german society and showcases the idea that assimilation was no longer a viable option. whilst antisemitism was not necessarily a winning idea for many politicians at the time, böckel’s success shows how these new racial ideas were not left to the fringes of society; they penetrated all areas of life. antisemitism had transformed the age-old religious anti-jewish hatred into a “symbolic” and respectable movement that sought to unify germans.83 religious antisemitism in volkov’s study on the lineage of antisemitism, she is keen to separate this new racial antisemitism from the more religious anti-jewish hatred of germany’s past, emphasizing the secular nature of this new racial variant of antisemitism. 84 this makes sense considering the work of marr; yet, despite the existence of this new racial antisemitism, there still existed an anti-jewish nationalist movement that was more religious in nature.85 therefore, the debate within the historiography surrounds whether or not this religious anti-jewish hatred was a distinct entity or if it was also influenced by these racial ideas. indeed, peter pulzer, according to jeremy telman, either “categorise[s] antisemites as either christian-conservative or racialist.”86 uriel tal, in agreement with puzler, argues that the christian anti-jewish movement “pervaded german intellectual circles until the late 1880s and helped prepare the way for the more virulent racial 86 jeremy telman, “adolf stoecker: anti-semite with a christian mission,” jewish history 9, no.2 (september 1995): 94. 85 todd h. weir, “the specter of "godless jewry": secularism and the "jewish question" in late nineteenth-century germany,” central european history, 46, no. 4 (december 2013), 823. 84 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code.” 83 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 39. 82 niewyk, “solving the “jewish problem,” 354. 81 otto böckel, die juden die könige unserer zeit. 7th ed. (berlin: böckel, 1887),7, quoted in donald l. niewyk, “solving the “jewish problem”: continuity and change in german antisemitism, 1871–1945,” the leo baeck institute year book, 35, no.1 (january 1990): 354, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/35.1.335. 80 ibid., 122. 79 lange, antisemitic elements, 139. 78 steven e. aschheim, culture and catastrophe: german and jewish confrontations with national socialism and other crises (london: macmillan press, 1996), 66. 77 david j. wertheim, “german jewry and the development of the jewish question in the nineteenth century,” 696. 103 strains which appeared in the next decade.”87 whilst these positions emphasize the continuing existence of a religious anti-jewish hatred, they fail to connect the racial aspect to these movements. indeed, as telman argues, these positions are “misleading” as they create a “false teleology” of the creation of this new form of antisemitism.88 this “racial variant of antisemitism” also found its way into the religious side of the antisemitic movement.89 in short, each antisemitic movement of this period, even the religious, was racial in its nature. the religious and anti-religious antisemitic movements were distinct. however, they both helped to unite disparate groups of germans with a common negative view of the german jew. these concurrently religious and racial ideas can be found in the work of treitschke, who wrote, “[christianity was] tightly interwoven… with all fibers of the german people.”90 he goes on to say in the same publication that the “jewish question [would not subside] until our israelite citizens learn through our stance that we are and want to remain a christian people.”91 jews were viewed as secular and atheist, thus ruining the protestant nature of germany. this religious anti-jewish movement placed more emphasis on the christian nature of germany, as opposed to the religious differences found in judaism.92 this inadvertently stresses the racial nature of the religious movement. in answer to those who questioned the role of catholics within this idealized (protestant) german state, treitschke determined that there was far more difference between a jew and a christian than there was between a catholic and a protestant.93 this just highlights how there were a plethora of excuses for german nationalists like treitschke as to why german jews were outsiders. the most important figure to study, however, in order to analyze the religious movement and its relationship to the new racial antisemitism and nationalism is adolf stoecker.94 the founder of the christian-social party in 1878 and the court chaplain to kaiser wilhelm i, stoecker is a key figure in the german antisemitic movement, considering that the “jewish question” was a large factor in his political thoughts and speeches.95 for stoecker, protestantism formed part of the foundation of the german state and supposedly was “the basis of its greatness.”96 thus, stoecker believed that germany could only truly unify once it had accepted its christian nature.97 there is still 97 kater, “either mammon or the messiah?” 33. 96 john c. fout, “adolf stoecker’s rationale for anti-semitism,” journal of church and state 17, no.1 (january 1975): 51. 95 ibid., 27. 94 lodewijk kater, “either mammon or the messiah? the christian-social tradition in the netherlands and germany on the jewish question, 1875-1914,” trajecta 28, no.1 (may 2019): 33. 93 meyer, “great debate on antisemitism,” 148. 92 weir, “the specter of "godless jewry," 825-826. 91 ibid. 90 heinrich von treitschke, “noch einige bemerkungen zur judenfrage,” in der berliner antisemitismusstreit. trans and ed. walter boehlich (frankfurt am main: insel, 1965), 88, quoted in todd h. weir, “the specter of "godless jewry": secularism and the "jewish question" in late nineteenth-century germany,” central european history 46, no.4 (december 2013): 827, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938913001295. 89 ibid. 88 telman, “adolf stoecker,” 94 87 uriel tal, christians and jews in germany: religion, politics, and ideology in the second reich, 1870-1914. translated by noah j. jacobs (ithaca, n.y.: cornell university press, 1975), 280, 300, quoted in michael r. marrus. “european jewry and the politics of assimilation: assessment and reassessment.” the journal of modern history 49, no.1 (march 1977): 104, https://doi.org/10.1086/241541. 104 discourse within historiography pertaining to stoecker’s racial nature, and fout’s work on stoecker even seeks to remove him from the racial antisemitic discourse, by claiming that stoecker’s “position was somewhat set apart from the majority of his contemporaries who were far more violent in their attacks and their solutions.”98 nevertheless, through an analysis of stoecker’s writing, we can clearly see how this religious movement also racialized (and in turn was racist against) jewish difference.99 a consistent idea that reappears throughout stoecker’s work and speeches is the idea of “reform” and “orthodox” judaism, whereby he affirms that he has no issue with orthodox jews, just the new modern jews that have no religious basis.100 in his infamous speech “our demands on modern jewry” from 1879, he declares, in fact, i see modern jewry as a great danger to german national life. [by “modern jewry”] i do not mean the religion of the orthodox or the enlightenment of the reformers…they hold no attraction for the children of the nineteenth century and pose no dangers. in its deepest core it is a dead religious form, a lower stage of revelation, a spirit that has outlived itself and, although still worthy of honour, has been invalidated by christianity. it has no more truth for the present. reform judaism has even less religious significance. it is neither judaism nor christianity but a shabby little survival of the age of enlightenment.101 this distinction adds a subtle racialized element to his words, emphasizing the non-religious aspect of the reformed modern jewry. it is also interesting to note that in the same speech, stoecker calls on the jews to be “more modest,” calling on them to “live on the same economic level as their countrymen.”102 this not only highlights the fact that antisemitism and anti-capitalism are “inextricably intertwined” but that all these anti-jewish nationalist movements, the socio-economic, racist, and religious, are intertwined.103 one does not have to look too far to find more of stoecker’s outwardly racialized speeches, where it is clear that his religious ideas have been influenced by the new racist antisemitic movement. in one speech, stoecker declared, race is…an important element in the jewish question. the semitic-punic type is, in all areas… so different from germanic morals and philosophy of life, that reconciliation or amalgamation is impossible, unless it take the form of a sincere rebirth from the depths of the consciences of upright israelites.104 104 adolf stoecker, reden und aufsätze, ed. reinhold seeberg (leipzig: a.deichertsche verlag, 1913), 143-144, quoted in jeremy telman, “adolf stoecker: anti-semite with a christian mission,” jewish history 9, no. 2 (september 1995): 96, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01668991. 103 stern, gold and iron, 523. 102 telman, “adolf stoecker,”102. 101adolf stoecker, “unsere forderungen an das modern judentum,” in antisemitism in the modern world: an anthology of texts, ed. richard s. levy (lexington, mass. and toronto: d.c. heath canada, 1991), 60. 100 fout, “adolf stoecker’s rationale,” 52. 99 telman, “adolf stoecker,” 94. 98 fout, “adolf stoecker’s rationale,” 60-61. 105 it is clear that whilst stoecker was determined to unite germans through the christian faith, this could only be done through the exclusion of the “other”: the german jews. within this speech, stoecker says that “the jewish question is not solely a racial question” according to telman.105 nevertheless, stoecker’s work is vital to emphasize the linkage between the racial antisemitic movement and the religious movement, and how even this religious movement was racialized in its nature. conclusion one cannot analyze the antisemitism of this period without, as telman puts it, having “an eye to its similarities to and differences from the antisemitism of the third reich.”106 the nazi ideas of race and biology clearly have their similarities to the ideas founded in the late 19th century germany.107 some historians see a direct linkage, such as pulzer, paul massing, and lars fischer who claimed that the holocaust was only possible because these antisemitic ideas had already “saturated” wilhelmine society.108 despite being successful within society during this period in time, antisemitism did not truly enter the political sphere, as after 1890, many of the antisemitic parties that had seen success in the reichstag dwindled in power, and even prior to this, their success was “limited.”109 yet, many parties, such as the conservative party, began to adopt an antisemitic rhetoric.110 therefore, antisemitism had been made, by the likes of marr, stoecker, and treitschke, “respectable” and even “fashionable,” even if it never truly entered mass party politics within this period.111 it is clear that there are linkages between the antisemitism of imperial germany and the third reich, but it is also important to treat this movement as “an autonomous topic” that is “present in the context of its time.”112 according to german nationalists, antisemitism was the answer to the disunity following german unification. looking at the context that was a distressed and flailing germanic society that had never truly felt unified, in combination with economic hardships that had brought out an older, more well-known hatred for jews, we can see how antisemitism thrived in this period. as james writes, “the 1870s were the first instance in which this matrix of forces and calculations operated.” 113these factors, in combination with prominent, intellectual figures who were willing to put a name and answer to german’s misery and disappointment, meant it came to be that if one believed 113 james, a german identity, 103. 112 pulzer, “third thoughts,” 167. 111 niewyk, “solving the “jewish problem,” 369. 110 pulzer, the rise of political anti-semitism, 126. michael r. marrus, “european jewry and the politics of assimilation: assessment and reassessment,” the journal of modern history 49, no.1 (march 1977): 103. 109 oded heilbronner, “from antisemitic peripheries to antisemitic centres: the place of antisemitism in modern german history,” journal of contemporary history 35, no. 4 (october 2000): 569. 108 paul massing, rehearsal for destruction: a study of political anti-semitism in imperial germany (new york: harpers & brothers, 1949), https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.177835/page/n5/mode/2up. pulzer, the rise of political anti-semitism. lars fischer, the socialist response to antisemitism in imperial germany (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007), xi. 107 varshizky, “the metaphysics of race,” 255. 106 ibid.,93. 105 telman, “adolf stoecker,” 109. 106 in german nationalism, they also believed in antisemitism.114 a hatred for the jews was finally the powerful force that could unite germany. thus, whilst it is still debatable how much we can link this movement to nazi germany, the movement was a powerful force in and of itself. part of germany’s nationalist identity was built on a foundation of racialized hatred. 114 volkov, “antisemitism as a cultural code,” 45. 107 primary sources böckel, otto. die juden die könige unserer zeit. 7th ed. berlin: böckel, 1887, quoted in donald l. niewyk. “solving the “jewish problem”: continuity and change in german antisemitism, 1871–1945.” the leo baeck institute year book, 35, no.1 (january 1990): 335-370. https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/35.1.335. de lagarde, anna. paul de lagarde. erinnerungen aus seinem leben für die freunde zusammengestellt. göttingen: w. f. kaestner, 1894, quoted in fritz stern. the politics of cultural despair: a study in the rise of the germanic ideology. berkeley, ca: university of california press, 1961. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.5972996. de lagarde, paul. deutsche schriften. mainz: dieterich, 1892, quoted in fritz stern. the politics of cultural despair: a 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