



























Edwards.CEY.Vol6.FINAL


Genocidaire Alfried Krupp: The 
Implications of Memorializing a 
Criminal Against Humanity 

 
 
Elizabeth Edwards 
 
Abstract 
 
This research paper explores the implications of naming institutions after convicted 
criminals against humanity, as seen through the case of the Alfried Krupp 
Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald in Germany. It highlights the vital importance of 
incorporating survivor testimonials to direct the narrative and reveal the true nature of (in 
this case) Alfried Krupp's crimes, while questioning the acceptance of Krupp's name as a 
desirable brand for the Wissenschaftskolleg in Greifswald. Furthermore, the paper delves 
into the larger political failures in addressing these implications effectively and aims to 
initiate a discussion on the role of businesses in remedying the Holocaust's horrors and 
ensuring the appropriate recognition of Nazi crimes. Through historical discourse and 
survivor accounts, this paper seeks to foster a deeper understanding of the suffering caused 
by Alfried Krupp and the implications of continuing to honour his name. The methodology 
involves an examination of the historical context, survivor testimonials, and the wider 
societal implications of perpetuating the recognition of Nazi crimes through institutional 
nomenclature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Introduction 
 

In the early 1990s, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum was working 
tirelessly to collect testimonies, gather evidence, store memoirs, and deliberate on how one 
can appropriately represent the victims of the Nazi Holocaust. Deborah Lipstadt, a 
renowned Jewish-American scholar who was elected to consult the Museum, recalls a 
meeting with the Content Committee; the agenda was to create an exhibition of hair that 
the Nazis had “harvested” from Jewish women at Auschwitz and sent to factories to 
produce blankets and military uniforms.1 Scholars, psychologists, and rabbis were present 
to offer a wide-ranging perspective. Historians such as Raul Hilberg argued that the display 
of the hair would demonstrate the “Final Solution’s ultimate rationality”: that the Nazis 
considered a body part as a saleable commodity and an “industrial object.”2 Psychologists 
suggested that the hair would add another layer of disconcertion and horror, thus ensuring 
that “all humankind stares this evil in the face” and prevents future atrocities.3 Even the 
leading Orthodox rabbis determined that the exhibition wouldn’t be a desecration of the 
dead.4 But then a committee member rose from her seat, a survivor of the genocide herself, 
and presented a perspective that only she could. She said, “That could have been my 
mother’s hair. She never gave you permission to display it.” As she sat down, she murmured, 
“it could have been my hair.”5 That was the end of the conversation; no vote was needed. 
The hair still sits in a storehouse outside of Washington to this day.6  

 
This anecdotal example speaks to the power of survivor testimony within larger 

debates around representing the crimes committed in the Holocaust. This testimony is 
particularly valuable as it shows the importance of hearing from the victim; no other 
professional or religious leader in the room was able to provide or represent the opinion of 
a Holocaust survivor and yet all those in the room unanimously respected the woman’s 
suggestion. However, in a small town in north-eastern Germany, a university stands proud 
bearing the name of a convicted criminal against humanity, Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach. The Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald (Alfried Krupp Institute for 
Advanced Study) bears the name of an individual whose personal decisions resulted in the 
death of over 100,000 concentration camp inmates, and thousands more who were 
subjected to forced labor in Nazi Germany.7 This research paper argues that the acceptance 
of the name of a criminal against humanity such as Alfried Krupp as a seemingly legitimate 
and desirable brand for industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as scholarly, 
educational, or medical institutions, amounts to an acceptance of Krupp’s crimes and, 

7 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10, Nuernberg 
October 1946-April 1949, (Vol 9: The Krupp Case). United States Government Printing Office, 
<https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf> . 

6 Ibid., p. xii. 
5 Ibid. 
4 Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial. 

3 Ronald Reagan’s remarks at the site of the future United States Holocaust Museum, October 5th, 1988. The Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library & Museum. 2024. “Remarks at the Site of the Future Holocaust Memorial 
Museum.” The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum. 2024. 
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-site-future-holocaust-memorial-museum. 

2 Ibid. 
1 Lipstadt, Deborah E. 2011. The Eichmann Trial. Schocken. 

71 

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf


ultimately, the active denial surrounding the scale of the suffering caused by the Holocaust 
to its victims. The Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald is an example of the flaws in 
German memory culture, as institutions such as these are still deeply engrained in the 
industrial history of the Krupp legacy and have failed to divorce themselves from Krupp’s 
crimes.8 Facing these testimonies on a deeper level could ultimately result in institutions 
such as the college changing their namesake or at least facilitating the dissemination of 
Krupp’s crimes. 

 
In the case of Alfried Krupp, survivors’ voices have not rung loud enough as the 

name “Krupp” remains an outsized figure when his victims have been forgotten. This 
research paper intends to allow the accounts of those who directly witnessed the horrors of 
the Nazi genocide of European Jewry to reveal the true nature of Alfried Krupp’s crimes. 
This paper refers to testimonies of both the victims of the crimes and those complicit in 
orchestrating those crimes, as both groups supply invaluable information, albeit for 
different reasons. Once these crimes have been established, one can explore the 
implications of naming institutions after a convicted criminal against humanity and, 
furthermore, the larger political failures to address these implications effectively. The use of 
social history and business history facilitates this research in navigating a particularly 
contested area of historiography, as it reveals the human aspect of Nazi Germany’s 
inhumane industry and labor policies. Historical discourse regarding the responsibility of 
big businesses and industry in bringing the NSDAP into power and the complicity of 
businesses in the genocide of European Jewry has increased significantly since the 1990s.9 
Nevertheless, the discussion on the role of businesses in remedying and compensating for 
the crimes of the Holocaust post-1945, and their position in ensuring the continued 
appropriate recognition of Nazi crimes, is less prominent.  

 
This paper explores the accounts of the Friedrich Krupp AG company’s survivors to 

allow the historian to achieve as close to an understanding of the degree of the suffering 
caused by Alfried Krupp as possible. First, this paper will explore terminology relevant to 
the discussion (most notably, terms that emerged from the Genocide Convention of 1984). 
Secondly, a focus is given on the voluntarism versus coercion debate regarding Alfried 
Krupp, alongside a comparison to his contemporary industrialists, to establish Krupp’s 
intention to contribute to the Holocaust and its horrors. Next, secondary literature permits 
the understanding of the context in which to place Alfried Krupp; to understand the 
commercial, economic, and industrial conditions in Nazi Germany and post-1945. The 
following section is dedicated to giving space to the voices of the victims; this section hears 
of Krupp’s crimes in first-hand detail and cross-references them to the previous chapters to 

9 For Wiesen, S. Jonathan. 1996. “Overcoming Nazism: Big Business, Public Relations, and the Politics of Memory, 
1945–50.” Central European History 29 (2): 201–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900013017.; 
Nicosia, Francis R, and Jonathan Huener. 2004. Business and Industry in Nazi Germany. New York: 
Berghahn Books. 

 

8 It is worth noting that the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg is not the sole example of a flaw in German memory 
culture, a fascinating article in Jewish Currents, “Bad Memory,” labels Germany’s “culture of contrition” as a 
“narcissistic enterprise.” Emily Dische-Becker et al., “Bad Memory,” Jewish Currents (Jewish Currents, 2023), 
https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2. 

72 

https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2


demonstrate Krupp’s genocidal intentions. Finally, an examination of the institution in 
question, the Alfried Krupp Wissenshaftskolleg Greifswald and other such institutions that 
represent the Krupp name, facilitates a longer-term perspective of the larger political 
failures to take concrete measures to prevent Holocaust evasion, and indeed denial, in 
contemporary business in Germany.  

 
Terminology and Methodology 
 

 Jean-Paul Satre wrote, “the fact of genocide is as old as humanity.”10 The legal web 
designed to condemn genocidaires and prevent further genocide is significantly younger, 
however. The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (CPPCG) was proposed for ratification by the General Assembly in 1948 and came 
into effect three years later.11 Since the Genocide Convention (1948), the definitions of 
“genocide” and “genocidaire” have been debated and their limits tested by scholars and 
lawyers worldwide. As defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) in Article II, and thus for the purposes of this 
essay, genocide is defined by five accounts: (a) killing; (b) causing serious bodily or mental 
harm; (c) deliberate infliction on the conditions of life calculated to bring destruction; (d) 
imposition of measures to prevent births; (e) forcible transition of children.12 These acts 
must be committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group in order for them to be deemed genocidal.13 Krupp’s actions and 
decisions within Friedrich Krupp AG can be found and proven with evidence to sustain 
genocidal activity on at least the first three defined counts. The difficulty, however, in 
applying such terms to Alfried Krupp can be found in the word “intent.” The mental element 
(mens rea) of the crime must be present for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try for 
genocidal activity.14  

 
Nonetheless, Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC states that “a person shall be 

held criminally responsible and liable for punishment… if the material elements are 
committed with intent or knowledge.”15 It is this fundamental difference between 
purpose-based and knowledge-based mentality of the crime which brings Krupp within the 
realm of criminality. Whilst Krupp was not the key perpetrator nor instigator of the 
Holocaust, the maltreatment of the forced laborers in his factories and his close personal 

15 United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Treaty Series vol. 2187, no. 38544, (Rome, 
1998), p. 15.  

14 Schabas highlights this with the example of the Bosnian Genocide as several indictments for the former 
Yugoslavia have invoked Article II(c) of the Convention with respect to conditions in detention camps. Whilst 
sufficient evidence that conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction can be found to have been inflicted 
upon Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees, the Trial Chamber reported that “the evidence presented has not 
enabled the Court to find that those acts were accompanied by specific intent (dolus specialis).” 

13 Ibid. 
12 Schabas, William A. 2009. Genocide in International Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 290. 

11 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,” OHCHR, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx>  

10 Jean-Paul Satre, “On Genocide,” in eds., Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko and Robert Jay Lifton, Crimes of War, 
(New York, 1971), p. 534. 

73 

https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx


ties with the NSDAP mandate that Krupp was an aider and abettor to the genocide.16 For the 
purposes of this research question, I argue that not only did Krupp know the NSDAP’s racial 
policies and was thus complicit, but that he had an active role in participating with them. 
For the duration of this research, the term “forced laborers” will be used when referring to 
the victims “employed” to work in Krupp’s factories. Often, the term “slave laborers” is used 
in literature (and indeed in Krupp’s trial), as “forced laborers” is inclusive of all such 
workers recruited by Krupp during the war in a broader sense: concentration camp 
inmates, citizens of occupied territories, and those who were considered “asozial” 
(translates from German to “anti-social”) such as homosexual people, the Roma people, sex 
workers and more. 
 
Alfried Krupp: Coercion and Voluntarism in German Industrial Institutions 
 

The Krupp family represented much more than a cog in the NSDAP’s industrial 
machine (and arguably still does to this day). They were a prominent German dynasty that 
had played various roles in German industry for over four centuries, including steel, 
artillery, and ammunition production. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Friedrich 
Krupp AG was the largest company in Europe and the premier weapons provider for 
Germany (as it had been since the Thirty Years’ War).17 The reputation of the Krupp family 
was ultimately tainted by its position in the Third Reich; their relationship with the NSDAP, 
however, has represented a point of conflict amongst historians.18 Scholars such as 
Manchester insist that the Krupps were instrumental in bringing the NSDAP to power, 
whilst the likes of James maintain that the Krupps were more opportunistic than they were 
antisemitic.19 This debate falls within a larger discussion on voluntarism within a 
totalitarian state and the scope of “free will” for industrial leaders. This is a debate that was 
not uncommon (especially in the West) during the Cold War, in a context of rising political 
tensions between East and West Europe and increasing economic hardship, to rehabilitate 
former Nazi functionaries and war criminals under the binary of voluntarism versus 
coercion.  

 
The United States Military Tribunal found that “the accused supported and approved 

the aims and programs of the Third Reich and the NSDAP and placed at their service the 
productive resources of Krupp.”20 It is believed that as Krupp was the largest builder of 
U-boats and warships and the second largest product of iron and coal in Germany, he 
contributed substantially to the Third Reich’s abilities.21 The prosecutors at Krupp’s trial 
presented the argument that Krupp had not only served the Third Reich out of duty, but he 

21 Ibid. 
20 Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial, 1950, p. 72. 

19 Ibid. and James, Harold. 2012. Krupp a History of the Legendary German Firm. Princeton University Press. 

18 See Wiesen, S. Jonathan. 1996. “Overcoming Nazism: Big Business, Public Relations, and the Politics of 
Memory, 1945–50.” Central European History 29 (2): 201–26; Stone, Dan. 2006. The Historiography of 
the Holocaust. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 

17 Manchester, William. 1970. The Arms of Krupp, 1587-1968,. Toronto, New York, Bantam Books. 

16 For example, in the case of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a pastor and convicted aider and abettor of the Rwandan 
Genocide, the Appeals Chamber took the view that “he knew of the genocidal intent of the attackers… and, 
therefore, that he possessed the requisite mens rea for that crime.”15 

74 



had believed it an honor to do so.22 The trial found that Krupp had “altered and greatly 
expanded” its production capacity, systematically circumventing and violating the 
restrictions that the Versailles Treaty had placed upon any rearmament in Germany.23 The 
ambitions of the NSDAP coincided with those of the Krupp firm: to establish a powerful 
Germany with Krupp at its industrial center.24 This perspective was largely popular in 
post-war historiographical scholarship, such as in Manchester’s 1968 monograph on the 
Krupp dynasty. Manchester reminds readers that Krupp had told Hitler that “he could see 
no reason why [Jews, foreign citizens of occupied territories, Roma, and other ‘anti-social’ 
citizens] should have to contribute something to the Fatherland.”25 Manchester maintains 
that Krupp reiterated foundational Nazi ideology that non-Aryans were not part of the 
German “Volk” and could not contribute to the German state, which in turn contributed to 
the Nazi rationale to deny human rights and later target populations for forced labor. This is 
evidence that Krupp was not simply acting as an effective business leader but was rather 
adherent to the Nazi ideology. 

 
Evidence of Alfried Krupp’s willingness to contribute to the Third Reich’s “Final 

Solution” continues to be presented, as seen in a more recent monograph written by the 
esteemed Benjamin Ferencz.26 Ferencz, a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials and scholar on 
the Holocaust, presents a series of events that included  Krupp officials and the Schutzstaffel 
(SS), in which Krupp’s eagerness to gain a rapport with the Party is evident. In early 1942, a 
member of Krupp’s council of directors showed Hitler their new anti-tank gun and advised 
Hitler that “Krupp is also interested in manufacturing automatic weapons in connection 
with a concentration camp in the Sudetengau.”27 It was agreed that the factory would be 
re-erected in Auschwitz, the SS would lease the workshops to Krupp, and the company 
would provide the machines and the management. They predicted that 50 to 60 of Krupp’s 
workers would be instructed to travel from Essen to train and supervise the anticipated 
600 prisoners.28 When Army Ordnance urged a senior member of Krupp’s staff, an engineer 
named Weinhold, to try to use German workers in the early stages, Weinhold reported, “I 
pointed out that the main purpose of evacuating the plant to Auschwitz had been to employ 
the people there.”29 The case study presented shows indisputable evidence of Krupp’s 
intent to employ forced laborers in the pursuit of increased armaments production and 
complete knowledge of the nature of the source of these “free laborers.” Krupp expressed a 
personal motive to incorporate the SS-led concentration camps into his labor policies. 

 
The judges presiding over the trial of Friedrich Flick (another industrialist and 

contemporary of Krupp) largely accepted the defense’s argument that the business was 
subject to compulsion.30 Contrastingly, in the Krupp trial, it was accepted that the company 

30 James, Krupp, p. 176. 
29 NI-3754, Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial, (1950), pp. 722. 
28 NI-2868, Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial, (1950), pp. 708-711.  

27 Annual Report of Krupp’s War Material Dept. for 1941-42, NIK-11504, Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial, 
(1950), p. 684-685. 

26 Ferencz, Benjamin B. 2002. Less than Slaves. Indiana University Press. 
25 Manchester, Arms of Krupp, p. 489. 
24 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 

75 



had more room to maneuver. At Nuremberg, Krupp’s attorneys argued that if their client 
had not accepted the Nazi’s policies of using forced laborers or failed to meet the required 
quotas of munitions, he would have been punished.31 However, the prosecution offered a 
rebuttal in the form of testimony from Karl Otto Saur, the former chief of Albert Speer’s 
ministry’s technical office.32 Saur, who was granted immunity in exchange for his 
cooperation, insisted that Krupp was close with Hitler and swore under oath that 
“[Krupp’s] intervention with Hitler was directly responsible for Krupp’s use of Jewish 
forced laborers at Auschwitz.”33 Based on the evidence presented at the trial, it is inaccurate 
to say that Krupp, who (as of 1938) had been a member of the Nazi Party and was part of 
one of the most prominent industrialist families, used forced labor out of compulsion. 
 
The Economic Context for Alfried Krupp 
 

The Weimar Republic had seen a challenging period for heavy industries, with the 
steel industry in particular being heavily plagued with overcapacity following the First 
World War, as well as the industries that Krupp was involved in being heavily sanctioned 
following the Versailles Treaty.34 With the near memory of standing on the precipice of 
bankruptcy in the 1920s, businesses in Germany were wary of falling into a similar trap 
when faced with Hitler’s plans to violate the Treaty and rearm Germany. Not to mention, the 
central rhetoric of Goebbel’s propaganda was centered on vilifying capitalism as the 
NSDAP’s core foundation was socialism.35 Nonetheless, Krupp’s production of armaments in 
the fiscal year 1933-4 (Hitler’s entry to office) was almost double that of the previous 
year.36 Production of “KM” (war materiel) was 8.1% of Krupp’s Gussstahlfabrik in 1932-33 
and 16.1% in 1933-4.37 This stark rise in the production of armaments in Hitler’s first year 
in office was no coincidence. This is indisputable evidence of Krupp’s eagerness to provide 
and advance the NSDAP’s economic and military strength.  

 
Barkai’s revisionist interpretation in Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy 

refashioned the way historians viewed the role of businesses in the Third Reich. Before 
1977, scholars believed that the Nazis had no theoretical or practical economic program. 
However, Barkai reminded his readers that the Nazi’s had, in fact, railed against big 
businesses at the beginning of their campaign, and their overall aim was to restructure 
companies and commercial attitudes.38 The Nazi party used antisemitic propaganda to 
critique “Capitalists,” using a populist ploy to appeal to the economic struggles Germany 
was facing brought on by the 1923 recession as well as the 1929 global depression 
following the Wall Street Crash. Ultimately, Barkai argued German industrial leaders 
became “sleeping partners” of the new Nazi state; they appeared to be not nearly as 

38 Christopher Kobrak and Andrea H. Schneider, “Big Business and the Third Reich: An Appraisal of the Historical 
Arguments” in ed D. Stone, Historiography of the Holocaust, (London, 2004), pp. 146. 

37 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. p. 180. 
35 Ibid. 
34 James, Krupp, p. 176. 

33 Stanley Goldman, 2016, ‘A Fuhrer of Industry: Krupp Before, During, and After Nuremberg’, Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review. Los Angeles. p. 195. 

32 Manchester, Arms of Krupp, p. 486. 
31 Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial, (1950), p. 256. 

76 



opposed to extended government intervention as businesses in other nations may be.39 
However, Krupp’s personal correspondence with the NSDAP and active role in instigating a 
program of forced labor in his factories suggests that Krupp did not demonstrate the inertia 
of a “sleeping partner.” Peter Hayes’ paradigmatic perspective that business leaders were 
neither “manipulating the Nazi thugs nor innocent victims” provides a more useful form of 
analysis in the Krupp case. In IG Farben’s case, their transition from an internationally 
revered, managerial independent and even a firm that had been accused as “Jewish” by the 
Nazis to a trusted partner of the NSDAP is explained through an understanding of the 
Party’s “carrot and stick” methods. 

 
One ought to make allowances for personal ideologies and interests, economic 

culture and context, managerial style and motive when considering the degree of 
voluntarism and coercion in Nazi German industry. Contrary to IG Farben, it is apparent 
that Krupp felt no such coercion under the Nazi regime to be subservient to their goals, but 
rather he played an active role in ensuring his maintained in Hitler’s good graces and that 
the Krupp name may become an instrumental figure within the Third Reich. His personal 
membership to the National Socialist party and his eagerness to construct a factory 
adjacent to Auschwitz concentration camp can provide evidence as such.  

 
An Examination of Oral Testimonies of Alfried Krupp’s Victims 
 

An unfortunate aspect of the CPPCG and the groundbreaking level of international 
legislation that came with it is that it came into force in the exact month and year that 
Alfried Krupp was released from prison (January 1951), thus rendering it ineffective in 
Krupp’s trial. Therefore, the examination of Krupp’s genocidal crimes in this research is to 
be conducted for the purpose of academic insight and with the benefit of historical 
hindsight. A survey of the evidence of conditions and welfare for the forced laborers at 
Krupps factories can be found to provide ample justification to comprehend the extent of 
Krupp’s crimes.  

There were 500 women in the transport, almost all of them from Łódź but 
there were also some German Jews… the trip took three days and three 
nights. There was nothing to eat on the way and only little water to 
drink… a pail served as our toilet… I was sent to work for Krupp.40 

 

Above, a survivor describes in harrowing detail the conditions she suffered on her journey 
from Auschwitz concentration camp to Neukölln, where she would be employed in forced 
labor at an ammunition factory owned by Alfried Krupp. After losing her daughters, aged 
seven and ten, and later her husband, this survivor recalls working in the “galvanizing 
section, dipping hot irons into cold water. The sparks flew into my eyes and burned my 
hands… I can hardly believe that I’m still alive today.”41 The suffering inflicted on this victim 

41 Ibid. 
40 Affidavit of Trudi G, dated Sept 15, 1959. Seen in Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 93. 
39 Avraham Barkai, Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory and Policy, (Connecticut, 1990). 

77 



is incomprehensible to anyone who has not witnessed it first-hand. Whilst Krupp’s trial had 
more than 250 witnesses and over 3000 documents were presented, to fathom the pain felt 
by Krupp’s victims and thus provide justice would be a tall task.42  

Conditions were greatly overcrowded… The diet was extremely 
inadequate… Only bad meat, such as horse meat or meat that had been 
rejected by veterinarians as infected with tuberculosis germs, was passed 
out in these camps. Clothing, too, was altogether inadequate…43 

This account, given by a senior Krupp doctor who had visited several of the 
fenced-in compounds run by his employer, describes the treatment and conditions endured 
by laborers at Krupp’s factories. It is one of many examples of evidence incriminating 
Krupp further of crimes against humanity. Krupp not only endeavored to secure “free labor” 
via correspondence with the NSDAP and pushed for the construction of an artillery factory 
adjacent to Auschwitz concentration camp, but he held little regard for the concentration 
camp inmates’ health and safety once they were placed under his care. The very nature of 
the conditions for forced laborers in Krupp’s factories was against reason, denying a 
productive and effective environment to maximize production and thus profits for the 
business. By 1942, Germany had lost a significant amount of its workforce, skilled and 
unskilled, to the war and the ostracization and genocide of its Jewish citizens. By 1945, the 
millions of prisoners of war and forced laborers conscripted in the eastern occupied 
territories (Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) accounted for over 25 percent of the total German 
workforce.44 What purpose would there be in creating unhygienic and lethal living 
conditions for the few laborers available? This would be counterproductive to the aims of a 
business. 

 
Such a question has been explored by a number of historians, ensuing a debate on a 

proposed new method of genocide: “extermination through labor.”45 When one considers 
the treatment of the laborers within Krupp’s factories and the abundance of evidence 
proving a specific discrimination against the Jewish concentration camp inmates, it 
becomes evident that there is intent to widen the scope of the genocide and massacre via 
extreme labor. Stanley Goldman maintains that the plan for the Party and leading 
industrialists was to have two groups of forced laborers: one group included civilians of 
occupied territories and prisoners of war who were compelled to labor under inhumane 
conditions but would be allowed to live; the other group consisted prisoners taken from 
concentration camps, whose lives would not be protected under the motives of genocide.46 
For the latter group, the ultimate aim was to fulfill the NSDAP’s racial prerogative of the 
“Final Solution”; these individuals lived under the constant threat of being murdered at any 
moment. Goldman’s interpretation is synonymous with the argument put forward by 
Michael Thad Allen in his theory of the “business of genocide.”47 Allen concludes that the SS 

47 Allen, The Business of Genocide, p. 81. 
46 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 190. 
45 Marc Buggeln, Slave Labor in the Nazi Concentration Camps, 1941-45, (Oxford, 2014). 

44 Michael Thad Allen, The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labour, and the Concentration Camps, (North 
Carolina, 2002), p. 61. 

43 Manchester, Arms of Krupp, p. 453. 
42 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 71. 

78 



administration of slave labor was intrinsically linked to the Holocaust, employing, and 
destroying workers in the service of the state and its racist visions for European 
domination.48 In the case of Krupp, Goldman’s interpretation is accurate when one 
considers Krupp’s “Bertha Works,” a munitions factory in Breslau named after Krupp’s 
mother.49 A Czech survivor described that, at Bertha Works, “the Jews received the worst 
beatings… people were beaten to death or even thrown alive into the concrete which was 
used for new constructions.”50 Testimonies such as this highlight the paramount importance 
of considering survivor accounts when recounting a history of genocide, as this testimony 
demonstrates a first-hand perspective that few others can offer. 

 
Further confirmation of Krupp’s intention to facilitate the Nazi genocide can be 

found in his instruction to send all forced laborers at his factories back to the concentration 
camps as the end of the war became apparent. A defense witness at Nuremberg testified 
that “Camp Commandant Rieck had made it understood that it was his strictest orders not 
to let [inmates] fall into the hands of the American Army under any circumstances.”51 At the 
factory in Essen, despite the logistical difficulties, Krupp’s workman began to send the 
remaining inmates from Essen back to Buchenwald concentration camp.52 At Bertha Works, 
workers were sent to Auschwitz to be murdered.53 Rather than leave the inmates to be 
recovered by the Allies or open the gates and set them free, Krupp ensured that the 
NSDAP’s wishes were met up until the final bell. This final decision to send all remaining 
inmates to be exterminated in the concentration camps is indisputable evidence of not only 
Krupp’s complicity but active participation in the Holocaust. 

 
Larger Political Failures to Engage with National Socialist Past 
 

Often Germany has been celebrated for its successful acknowledgment of the 
destruction caused by National Socialism and their appropriate responses to the Nazi 
Holocaust of the Jewish people.54 For The Atlantic’s December 2022 cover story, the author 
travels to Germany to assess the country’s atonement process and commends Germany as a 
good role model for acknowledging one’s past, one which the U.S. could follow to digest its 
one racist history.55 Similarly, Silverstein reports that Spain has been noted to follow the 
German example in its public memory culture, adopting the German practice of 
“Stolperstein,” or remembrance stones at the homes of murdered Jews, to launch its 

55 Clint Smith, “Monuments to the Unthinkable,” The Atlantic, November 14, 2022, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/holocaust-remembrance-lessons-america/671893/. 

54 Greg Rienzi, “Other Nations Could Learn From Germany’s Efforts to Reconcile after WWII,” John Hopkins 
University, (2015), <https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/>  

53 Ibid. 
52 Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial (1950) pp. 812-815. 
51 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 95.  

50 Translation of Document No. NIK-8487, Affidavit of Josef Aubrecht, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, 
(5 February 1948) <https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/D24-NIK-9209.pdf>  

49 Affidavit of Karl Hupe, Korschan Defense Book V, pp. 3-6. 
<https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/Construction%20of%20Bertha%20Works.pdf>. 

48 Ibid.  

79 

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/holocaust-remembrance-lessons-america/671893/
https://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2015/summer/germany-japan-reconciliation/
https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/D24-NIK-9209.pdf
https://krupp.library.vanderbilt.edu/sites/default/files/Construction%20of%20Bertha%20Works.pdf


reckoning of the violence under Franco’s Fascist dictatorship.56 It is known that students in 
Germany today are encouraged to visit the memorial sites and preserved concentration 
camps to promote an understanding of the horrors in the past. Meanwhile, 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung remains an eminent element of scholarship.57 However, the 
concepts of soft-core denial and secondary antisemitism remind us that history is not 
linear. This section considers the gaps and flaws in Germany’s memory culture and argues 
that the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg is a prime example the lack of effort to 
acknowledge one’s past wholly.  

 
With the deplorable living conditions at Krupp’s factories and his evident ambition 

to aid the NSDAP in their “Final Solution” in mind, one begins to see the Alfried Krupp 
Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald in a different light. Holocaust survivor testimonies and 
accounts of witnesses have confirmed that Alfried Krupp inflicted inhumane conditions 
against his workers and actively sought out forced labor. A study into the legality of 
convicting a criminal against humanity (or, indeed, a genocidaire by today’s terms) has 
revealed that Krupp can be found accountable for breaching several of the CPPCG’s articles. 
A synoptic overview of business and industry historiography gave insight into the 
perspectives held by historians and allowed the conclusion that Krupp was neither 
compelled nor coerced into committing crimes against humanity in the National Socialist 
autocracy. Yet, a respected institution for higher education in Germany proudly bears the 
Krupp name. How has the name of a convicted criminal against humanity become 
celebrated and revered in the public sphere in contemporary Germany?  

 
Unfortunately, the denial of the Holocaust has been present within historiography 

for the past seventy years. After 1945, Nazis and their sympathizers immediately attempted 
to deny or reduce the severity of their crimes committed against the European Jewry.58 
Today, perhaps the most famous example of Holocaust deniers can be seen in British 
historian David Irving’s writing, as he attempts to argue that Hitler was “probably the 
biggest friend the Jews had in the Third Reich…  He was the one who was doing everything 
he could to prevent nasty things happening to them.”59 Irving’s monograph Hitler’s War 
argued that Hitler was against the execution of Eastern European Jews and even claimed 
that Hitler had ordered a stop to their extermination in November of 1941.60 Historians of 
the Second World War are (thankfully) quick to denounce Irving’s work. For example, 
Trevor-Roper didn’t hesitate to identify Irving’s blatant self-contradiction in Hitler’s War 
with his earlier claim that Hitler was ignorant of what was happening to the Jews in the 
East.61 Despite the abundance of evidence in the forms of survivor testimonies, testimonies 

61 Evans, “David Irving, Hitler and Holocaust Denial,” Holocaust Denial on Trial, (2018) 
<https://www.hdot.org/evans/#>  

60 David Irving, Hitler’s War, (London, 1977) 

59 Richard J. Evans, Telling Lies About Hitler: The Holocaust, History, and the David Irving Trial, (London, 2002), 
p. 51. 

58 Clemens Heni, “Secondary Anti-Semitism: From Hard-Core to Soft-Core Denial of the Shoah,” Jewish Political 
Studies Review, vol. 20, no. 3-4, (2008), p. 74 

57 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys, (Cambridge, 1997). 
 

56 Emily Dische-Becker et al., “Bad Memory,” Jewish Currents (Jewish Currents, 2023), 
https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2. 

80 

https://www.hdot.org/evans/
https://jewishcurrents.org/bad-memory-2


of leading NSDAP members at the Nuremberg Trials, and physical evidence found in 
concentration camps, a supposedly educated man can still leap to the defense of Hitler and 
accuse the Jews of fabricating their own genocide—the most documented genocide in 
history. Whilst this may be an extreme example, a link can be found between Irving and this 
research paper’s focus: the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald.  

 
The writings and warnings of Deborah Lipstadt have opened scholarship to an 

extremely frightening but nevertheless crucial area of Holocaust denial. Lipstadt proposes a 
new branch of Holocaust form in the shape of “soft-core denial.”62 This form of Holocaust 
denial is becoming increasingly relevant when considering antisemitism and historical 
memory in contemporary Europe, particularly in Germany. Unlike the negation of the fact of 
the Holocaust as demonstrated by Irving, soft-core denial is more subtle. It threatens the 
distortion of facts within public and historical memory, a universalization of the Shoah, and 
the relativization or trivialization of the suffering endured by Jewish victims.63 An evident 
example of this phenomena in recent years is the controversy which followed a statement 
released by President Trump’s administration on International Holocaust Memorial Day, 
which failed to specifically mention the Jews as the principal victims of the Holocaust or of 
antisemitism at any point.64 Lipstadt labels this as “classic soft-core denial”; the 
de-Judaization of the Holocaust seen here does not deny the facts, but it minimizes and 
de-personalizes them and, in doing so, dishonors its victims.  

 
Clemens Heni’s concept of “secondary anti-Semitism” contributes to our 

understanding of Lipstadt’s “soft-core denial.” “Secondary anti-Semitism” is a relatively 
unknown concept used for the analysis of antisemitism, but it is used to refer to 
antisemitism after Auschwitz.65 The core principle of secondary antisemitism is the “refusal 
or rejection of remembrance” of the Nazi Holocaust, and it often manifests as an 
anti-Zionist and geo-political policy focused on criticizing Israel.66 Heni uses Friedrich Flick, 
one of Germany’s richest and most influential industrialists in the twentieth century, as a 
prime example of secondary antisemitism and soft-core denial. He argues, “the Flick 
phenomenon is a specific expression of a new German lack of inhibition, and the 
shamelessness of the Berlin Republic.”67 Similar to Krupp, Flick was the “employer” of some 
fifty thousand forced laborers, ten thousand of whom are believed to have perished.68 At the 
demise of National Socialism in 1945, Flick was the wealthiest man in Germany. Like Krupp, 
he was condemned at the Nuremberg Trials and sentenced to seven years in prison; he was 
acquitted soon after and in 1963, received the Bundesverdienstkreuz (the Federal Service 
Cross of the Republic of Germany).69 Heni proposes that a very specific dimension of 
secondary antisemitism can be seen in Germany as a result of the country’s unique political 

69 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. p. 76. 
67 Ibid. p. 77. 
66 Ibid.  
65 Heni, “Secondary Anti-Semitism,” p. 74. 

64 Peter Beaumont, “Historian Deborah Lipstadt accuses Trump advisers of ‘soft Holocaust denial,’” The Guardian, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaust-
denial>  

63 Heni, ‘“Secondary Anti-Semitism,” p. 74. 
62 Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, (New York, 1993).  

81 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaust-denial
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/deborah-lipstadt-historian-donald-trump-advisers-soft-holocaust-denial


culture. Flick, for example, planned to cleanse his family’s tarnished name from the very 
beginning and did so in the form of an art museum boasting his family’s collection.70 
Adenauer’s newfound Federal Republic of Germany was only too accommodating to such an 
influential figure who promised wealth and prosperity for Germany. Lipstadt and Heni’s 
insightful approaches broaden one’s understanding of post-war Germany; they quash the 
stereotypes that had riddled historiography and modern-day preconceptions. 

 
The case of Alfried Krupp, like that of Friedrich Flick, is a prime example of how the 

victims of the Holocaust and their suffering have not been afforded the appropriate public 
memory in contemporary Germany. This ignorance can be demonstrated via the 
exploration of Alfried Krupp’s acquittal in 1951 and the political failure to appropriately 
punish Krupp for his crimes. Former war criminals were dealt with differently in various 
regions (East Germany, West Germany, Poland, etc.), but it was not uncommon for West 
Germany to rehabilitate war criminals and former Nazis for the sake of its own economy. In 
addition, the ordeal of reparations for Holocaust survivors in post-war Germany gives an 
insight into an inherent failure to compensate victims judiciously. Finally, the formation of 
scholarly, medical, and other institutions of public interest such as Alfried Krupp 
Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald in Alfried Krupp’s name can be seen as an example of the 
failure to maintain accurate public memory and contributes to the active forgetting about 
the Holocaust and its victims. This is not unique to Germany but rather is reflective of larger 
structural injustices facing many people who fall victim to war crimes and genocide, a topic 
too large to fall into the remit of this essay. 

 
Alfried Krupp’s acquittal and release from confinement in 1951 was accompanied by 

negotiations conducted between the High Commission and the Krupp family lawyers. The 
result was that Alfried Krupp would dispose of his holdings in the steel and coal industries, 
estimated to be at £30 million, over a period of five to seven years, depending on whether 
Krupp would be able to find a “suitable buyer.”71 Krupp was to retain possession of the 
remainder of the Krupp complex, which included locomotive works, shipyards, hotels, light 
industries, and more.72 The Allied intention was that the new Federal German Government 
would guarantee Krupp’s compliance and a signed document agreeing to the undertaking. 
However, a Guardian article published in 1953 reveals that “it seems certain that this will 
not now be done.” The German Government’s legal advisers defended Krupp under the 
provision that the Federal Constitution guarantees the right for every German citizen 
“freely to choose his own trade or profession.” Not to mention, the final negotiation allowed 
for a loophole; should Krupp not want to dispose of some of his acquisitions in heavy 
industry, and should his holdings not be sold for “reasonable prices,” Krupp may be able to 
retain ownership of them.73 The procedure of Krupp’s acquittal can, therefore, be 
understood as being riddled with political failures to place concrete measures in preventing 
the success and reverence of a criminal against humanity and genocidaire. This is a clear 

73 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 

71 The Guardian, “Agreement on Krupps: But Bonn Finds Legal Snag,” The Guardian, Manchester, 10 February 
1953, p. 1. 

70 Ibid. p. 78. 

82 



demonstration of German memory culture not going far enough to accurately acknowledge 
the extent of the Holocaust.   

I believed then and I believe now that political expediency dictated [t]his 
decision [of pardoning Alfried Krupp in 1951]. The Russian blockade and 
Berlin air lift had been on. East Germany was in Communist hands. 
Czechoslovakia had been overrun. And the wall was being built in Berlin.74  

   Krupp Tribunal Judge William J. Wilkins, 1981.  
 
It ought to be noted that Krupp’s acquittal coincided with a dramatic change in 

Allied policy in Germany. The 1950s marked a time of post-war positivity, with optimism 
being promoted by Western governments’ efforts to align public opinion with what they 
branded as a “new world order.”75 Judge Wilkin’s statement above aptly surmises the 
environment in which Krupp’s acquittal was approved by the American High Commissioner, 
John J. McCloy. In 1948, the Russians had walked out of the Allied Control Council, and as 
highlighted by Wilkins, Eastern Europe (including Eastern Germany) had fallen stiffly in the 
hands of an ideology that triggered fear amongst the West.76 A strong West Germany, 
ideologically and economically, was deemed vital if Allied powers were to confront the 
Soviets and solidify the “Iron Curtain” that had torn Europe in two.  

 
Having received several petitions on behalf of the Landsberg prisoners and with the 

sentiment of a strong American-German relationship, McCloy established the “Advisory 
Board on Clemency for War Criminals.”77 The very title of this initiative suggested that the 
Board had been created with the motive of clemency. McCloy asked the group of highly 
respected lawyers to consider any disparities found among the prisoners’ sentences, the 
family and health situation of the inmates, and any inclinations that the sentencing had 
been too harsh.78 Thirteen of the prisoners under consideration had been defendants in the 
Einsatzgruppen Trial and guilty of murdering over one million people. The Board 
considered individuals such as Oswald Pohl, who had been the Head of the Main Economic 
Office of the SS and key administrator of concentration camps.79 Ferencz famously states, 
“Krupp and his board must have appeared like lambs among the lions to McCloy.”80 
Nonetheless, without once consulting any of the Nuremberg prosecutors, McCloy and his 
advisors concluded that “the concentration camp inmates allocated to [Krupp] were under 
the strict control of the Gestapo.”81 In fact, they believed that Krupp had been a victim of 
discrimination because property forfeiture had not been invoked on any other 
industrialist.82 McCloy and his Clemency Board represent a political intervention in the 
Nuremberg process, a process that represented the ultimate moral defeat of an extremist, 

82 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., p. 74. 
80 Ibid., p. 73. 
79 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p. 93. 
76 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 72. 
75 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 196. 
74 William J Wilkins, The Sword and the Gavel: An Autobiography, (Seattle, 1981). 

83 



racist, and genocidal regime. The political board game of the Cold War allowed for a slip in 
European morality and ultimately signified that antisemitism had not been eradicated from 
the continent. The politics of memory is once again at play here, as bringing the criminals of 
the Holocaust to justice is tempered by the contemporary political-economic environment. 
German Jewish sociologist Bodemann’s focus on the politics of memory coins the phrase 
“Theater of Memory,” meant to describe a narrative that is less about making amends to 
victims of genocide than about redeeming perpetrators and their descendants.83 It shows 
an element of narcissism in the German memory culture, as they endeavor to publicly atone 
for their past but politically protect their economy. Krupp’s acquittal was the first failure to 
take concrete measures to eliminate soft-core denial in contemporary Germany.  

 
The second failure can be considered the ordeal Krupp’s victims faced to receive 

compensation. In the late 1950s, a legal brief entitled “The Forced Labor of Jewish 
Concentration Camp Inmates within the Krupp Combine” authored by the Conference of 
Jewish War Claims arrived on Krupp’s lawyers’ desks.84 The initial applications for 
compensation were granted an initial fund of DM 3,000 with the promise that more would 
follow.85 Nonetheless, once the number of approved claims exceeded two thousand, the 
payments came to an immediate halt.86 In the last months of the war, Krupp’s company had 
dispatched boxcar after boxcar of Jewish workers back to concentration camps.87 Thus, 
Krupp had felt confident that a dedicated fund of DM 10 million would cover the predicted 
1,200 survivor claimants. Ferencz argues that Krupp believed many of his victims would 
not have outlived their captivity in his factories, the death sentence of those sent to camps 
in 1945, and the post-war trauma.88 Krupp was mistaken. Due to the death camps not being 
fully functioning by the end of the war, over 7,000 claimants applied for the funds.89  

 
Krupp’s general manager, Berthold Beitz, faced a dilemma, as they were not willing 

to provide beyond the DM 10 million budgeted. He wrote to the Claims Conference 
president just five days before Christmas 1963, expressing his sympathies but explaining 
that Krupp was, as a matter of principle, not in a position to increase the amount that had 
been agreed upon.90 To make matters more challenging, many of those who had filed for 
claims could not prove that they had, in fact, worked in Krupp’s factories due to the 
destruction of documents on Krupp’s behalf and the frequency at which prisoners had been 
transported amongst companies in the Third Reich.91 Despite the net worth of the Krupp 
holdings being reported to be nearly one billion euros, Beitz wrote to Goldmann claiming 
that: 

91 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 204. 
90 Ibid., p. 98. 
89 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 96. 
88 Ibid., p. 204. 
87 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 203. 
86 Ibid. 
85 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, pp. 97-98. 
84 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 199. 

83 Y. Michal Bodemann, Jews, Germans, Memory: Reconstructions of Jewish Life in Germany (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996). 

84 



Despite all understanding of the difficult condition of the former 
concentration camp prisoners, which we solely for moral reasons 
expressed through our voluntary indemnification, we do not see ourselves 
in the position to make further sums available. I therefore do not consider 
even a discussion of this matter appropriate.92 

If Krupp believed himself to bear no responsibility, having spent the 1950s proving his 
innocence, it begs the question of why he paid the reparations. Krupp’s representatives 
continued to claim that the payments had been a “voluntary sacrifice” made in the hopes of 
healing old wounds.93  
 

Krupp’s claim that he held no guilt nor responsibility for the treatment of forced 
laborers was not just inaccurate in legal terms, but it defied all logic. His release from 
Landsberg Prison in 1951 had not absolved him of any criminal convictions involving the 
use of slave labor and the treatment of slaves.94 The abuse and exploitation of laborers, 
including but not exclusive to whipping, execution, and starvation, had been proven at trial. 
Krupp had admitted in affidavits to having, on several occasions, personally inspected the 
forced laborers.95 For all intents and purposes, Krupp was still a criminal against humanity. 
Yet not only was he reinstated with all his previous wealth, including the “blood money” he 
had earned from the efforts of the forced laborers, but he was not compelled to provide 
restitution to his victims and their families. Ernest Landau, a Holocaust survivor, gives a 
glimpse into how his victims received this: “My God, look at how [Alfried] Krupp was 
allowed to start all over again and given back his millions of dollars when his slave workers 
were still dying in hospitals!”96 An evident failure to implicate concrete measures to ensure 
that the victims of the Holocaust were honored and their suffering was in some way 
compensated can be seen in Krupp’s inability to provide monetary reparations to all 
claimants. Krupp was able to retrieve his wealth, deny his guilt (despite a criminal 
conviction), and refuse his victims any form of compensation beyond the symbolic 
“voluntary indemnification.” One could consider the reallocation of money the most 
transparent method of illustrating Krupp’s crimes; the profit procured from the crimes is 
allocated back to the victims of them. The failure to do so amounts to the soft-core denial of 
the suffering caused by the Holocaust and an example of secondary antisemitism. 

 
The lack of a system of governance or international intervention to ensure that this 

reallocation of funds took place also embodies a political failure to appropriately face the 
reality of the Holocaust and its victims. In a debate in the British Parliament’s House of 
Commons in 1952, the Leader of the Liberal Party Clement Davies raised the question, “In 
as much as this man was found guilty of using slave labor and of taking other people's 
property, it is not possible to divert some of this wealth to those people who have 

96 Leo Katcher, Post-Mortem: The Jews in Germany Today. (New York, 1968), p. 76. 
95 Trials of War Criminals: The Krupp Trial (1950). 
94 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 201. 
93 Manchester, The Arms of Krupp, p. 791. 
92 Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 98. 

85 



suffered…?”97 The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, advised the Commons that this was beyond 
British jurisdiction, given Herr Krupp was arrested, tried, and acquitted under American 
law.98 It was also argued that the responsibility for this should rest “fairly and squarely” on 
the last Government. The general election of 1951 had resulted in a Conservative victory 
over Atlee’s Labour Government.99 It becomes abundantly clear that national politics, and 
indeed wider Allied politics, played a key role in inhibiting the ability to appropriately 
respond to the short and long-term effects of the Nazi Holocaust. A member of the Labour 
Party likened Krupp to “a rascal [who] got away with murder and is now getting away with 
swag.”100 Whilst some members of parliament recognized the injustice in Krupp’s 
reacquisition of wealth and influence, the British Government made no effort to get 
involved. Fear of a steady relationship with America and a harmonious Allied occupation in 
Germany, not to mention the internal Conservative-Labor politics, ultimately resulted in 
British inertia to protect the rights and the memory of Holocaust victims. The passivity 
demonstrated by the British Government here, and fundamentally other nations who failed 
to safeguard Holocaust victims, amounts to the soft-core denial of the reality of the victims’ 
suffering. 

 
The acquittal of Alfried Krupp in 1951 and the restoration of his wealth, alongside 

the inability to establish an encompassing compensation program for his victims, 
contributed to the preliminary infrastructure of a post-war German society that conceded 
to soft-core Holocaust denial and secondary antisemitism. It is within this unique societal 
make-up that the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg came to exist. The successor company 
of Friedrich Krupp AG, ThyssenKrupp, is the result of a merger of Thyssen AG and Krupp in 
1999. On Alfried Krupp’s death in 1967, the entirety of the Krupp family holdings was 
transferred into an honorary foundation, the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 
Foundation, which was to become ThyssenKrupp’s largest stakeholder accounting for 
20.9% of equities.101 The Foundation would also strive to engage in other “philanthropic” 
activities, which included the creation of the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg in 2000. 

 
On ThyssenKrupp’s website, it is possible to find details about the company’s history 

and relationship with National Socialism. However, no research on Krupp and his 
involvement with National Socialism had been conducted until a research endeavor was 
launched in 2023 by the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation.102 In this paper, 
Dr. Conze explores “the person of Alfried Krupp and his relationship to National Socialism 

102 Eckart Conze, “Alfried Krupp von Bohlen Und Halbach Und Der Nationalsozialismus,” ed. Jens Brüggemann, 
Ergebnisse Des Rechercheprojekts, July 16, 2023, 1–70, 
https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/app/uploads/2023/08/Rechercheprojekt-_Alfried-Krupp-und-der-NS_-Ergebnisse.pdf. 

101 Market Screener, ThyssenKrupp AG (TKA), 
https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/THYSSENKRUPP-AG-436698/company/ . 

100 Goldman, “Fuhrer of Industry,” p. 203. 
99 Ibid. 
98 Ibid.  

97 Hansard, House of Commons Debate 15 October 1952, vol 5005 cc195-201, 
<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1952/oct/15/herr-krupp-compensation>  

86 

https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/app/uploads/2023/08/Rechercheprojekt-_Alfried-Krupp-und-der-NS_-Ergebnisse.pdf
https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/THYSSENKRUPP-AG-436698/company/
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1952/oct/15/herr-krupp-compensation


through source research.”103 Unfortunately, the paper was published in German, rendering it 
inaccessible to non-German speakers. However, their website does state “there has not yet 
been a comprehensive study of his relationship to National Socialism” and calls for further 
research, suggesting that Conze’s study did not provide a conclusive interpretation of 
Krupp’s crimes under Nazi Germany.104 The “Foundation History” section of the university’s 
website offers no insight into the criminal background of their namesake, Alfried Krupp. 
Rather, it boasts an image of the bust of Alfried Krupp which can be found in the Kolleg’s 
foyer, and the website reads: “The Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation 
contributed a significant portion of the foundation’s equity.”105 The university chooses to 
publicize that they were primarily funded by a foundation that inherited Krupp’s money 
without once admitting to the frightful reality that this money had derived from the toil and 
suffering of forced laborers of the National Socialist genocide.  

 
     Through my personal correspondence with the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg 

Greifswald (which was initiated in the pursuit of this research), I received an extremely 
impersonal reply; its response to my request for further information regarding how the 
university addresses its National Socialist past was a simple hyperlink to the 
aforementioned website alongside benign pleasantries. The Alfried Krupp 
Wissenschaftskolleg represents the pinnacle of Lipstadt’s “soft-core denial.” Whilst the 
leadership of the university makes no attempt to deny the Holocaust outright nor the 
reality of Krupp’s involvement with the genocide, they offer no assistance to the education 
and continued upholding of honor towards the victims of the Holocaust.  

 
Conclusion 

The survivor accounts mentioned in this research paper describe the horrifying 
conditions they were subjected to in the name of National Socialism. The outcome of this 
research endeavor begs the question: does the naming of an educational institution such as 
the Wissenschaftskolleg after a man responsible for such grave crimes against humanity 
satisfy this request given by Holocaust survivors? As seen in the example of the council 
meeting for the USHMM, one cannot (and indeed ought not) deny the reality of a victim’s 
suffering when conducting a narrative for the Holocaust and educating it to younger 
generations. An understanding of history itself is critical if we are to learn its lessons and 
honor its victims.  

 
Once the legality of trying and convicting a criminal against humanity of Krupp’s 

stead in international law is outlined, and the understanding of Krupp’s economic and 
social context is achieved, one can begin to explore the damage caused by any ignorance of 
Krupp’s crimes. The synthesis of historiographical studies in coercion and voluntarism in a 
totalitarian state with a specific eye to the Third Reich revealed that Krupp’s criminality can 
be ascertained yet further. The evidence presented at the United States Military Tribunals 

105 Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald, “The Alfried Krupp Kolleg Greifswald Foundation,” 
https://www.wiko-greifswald.de/en/foundation/alfried-krupp-kolleg-greifswald-foundation/foundation-history/. 

104 Ibid. 

103 Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation, “Alfried Krupp - Alfried Krupp von Bohlen Und 
Halbach-Stiftung,” Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, December 10, 2024, 
https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/alfried-krupp/. 

87 

https://www.wiko-greifswald.de/en/foundation/alfried-krupp-kolleg-greifswald-foundation/foundation-history/
https://www.krupp-stiftung.de/alfried-krupp/


in Nuremberg revealed private correspondence between Krupp and NSDAP verifying that 
the Krupp company was eager to establish a liaison of labor between their factories and the 
concentration camps. Most significantly however, Holocaust survivor testimonies and 
accounts of Krupp’s victims not only humanize but allow one to sympathize with the 
severity of the consequences of Krupp’s actions.    
 

Lipstadt’s coinage of “soft-core denial” facilitates the scholar in a deeper 
comprehension of Holocaust denial and its threats. In the case of Alfried Krupp and his 
employment of forced labor during the Second World War, such soft-core denial is seen 
primarily in Commissioner McCloy’s decision to release Krupp from imprisonment and 
acquit him of his crimes. The wider context of the Cold War and the newfound American 
motive for an amiable alliance with Germany created the conditions necessary for Krupp’s 
release. McCloy’s decision to not only release Krupp from prison, but also reinstate him 
with his former wealth and assets that had been earnt at the toil of forced labor, ultimately 
was the result of a lack of regard for the suffering of thousands in Krupp’s factories. 
Holocaust survivor Ernest Landau perfectly summates the frustration that this inflicted 
upon Krupp’s victims. As a scholar with the benefit of hindsight and contextual distance, a 
fear may ensue that justice could be carried out so ineptly. The politics of memory culture 
in Germany is ultimately reflected as a nation that has been revered for its ability to 
acknowledge and come to terms with its past by other nations (and even acted as a role 
model for post-Franco Spain). Yet, flaws are demonstrated in this essay by Krupp’s release 
from prison, acquittal for his crimes, regaining his wealth and, ultimately, being used as a 
proud namesake for a higher education institution. 

 
The endeavor endured by Krupp’s victims in attempting to retrieve some form of 

compensation further amounts to a form of “soft-core denial.” One may argue that it is not 
of huge significance nor surprise that Krupp failed to compensate his victims in the full sum 
expected by the Conference of Jewish War Claims. Nonetheless, the contextual 
circumstances once again allowed for a failure on a European scale to ensure the 
reallocation of Krupp’s wealth appropriately. Some members of the British Parliament 
recognized a disparity between Krupp’s reinstatement as head of Friedrich Krupp AG and 
the lack of compensation, and yet the political setting disallowed intervention. Not to 
mention, non-governmental organizations such as the Conference for Jewish War Claims 
were not given the clout to be taken seriously. Reallocation of monetary funds and public 
acceptance of responsibility may both be considered concrete measures to prevent 
Holocaust denial and yet neither was achieved.  

 
 The closing sentiments of Deborah Lipstadt’s monograph, The Eichmann Trial, reads: 
“I had heard it many times before from Holocaust survivors: ‘les générations futures, ceux 
qui n’étaient pas là, doivent se souvenir. Et nous qui étions là, doivent leur dire.’”106 Future 
generations, those who were not there, must remember. And we who were there, must tell 
them. The next generation cannot possibly be aware of the full extent of the destruction 
caused by genocide if they are being educated in a university named after a genocidaire.  
 

106 Lipstadt, Eichmann Trial, p. 203 

88 



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93 


	Genocidaire Alfried Krupp: The Implications of Memorializing a Criminal Against Humanity 
	Introduction 
	Terminology and Methodology 
	 
	Alfried Krupp: Coercion and Voluntarism in German Industrial Institutions 
	 
	The Economic Context for Alfried Krupp 
	An Examination of Oral Testimonies of Alfried Krupp’s Victims 
	Larger Political Failures to Engage with National Socialist Past 
	Bibliography 


