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Research on Authentication Technology of Agriculture 
Products Traceability System Based on RFID 

Bin W anga, Jian Zhanga, Xiaohua Sunb, Na W angc, Yan Zhao*d, Fushun W angd 
a College of Information Science and Technology, Agricultural University of Hebei, Baoding, China, 
b Department of Digital Media, Hebei Software Institute, Baoding, China, 
c Department Economics and Management, Baoding Vocational and Technical College, Baoding, China,  
d College of Information Science and Technology, Agricultural University of Hebei, Baoding, China. 
wb900@126.com 

A secure mutual authentication protocol named DRHSAP (Dynamic Refresh ID and Hash -based the Security 
authentication protocol) is presented. It can guarantee that the agriculture products in the process of 
productivity and circulation are not counterfeit. Based on the deficiencies of the low cost RFID (Radio 
Frequency Identification) system, the DRHSAP protocol has kept the last and present identities of each label 
on server to effectively solve the synchronization issue between the server and the label, thus further 
enhances the overall safety of the system. After using BAN logic and several comparative analysis of the 
authentication protocol, it can prove that the DRHSAP can effectively ensure the security and privacy issues 
faced by RFID technology and achieve higher security in RFID system. 

1. Introduction 

The current agriculture products quality security incident sometimes occurs; the agriculture products security 
problem is day by day serious and is prominent. Modern technologies are being incorporated to cope with the 
increasing complexity, and such innovations cost substantial amounts of money. Radio frequency 
identification (RFID) technology is a type of wireless, contactless auto identification technology. Its core is 
EPC and electronic tag. The techniques have been applied to various products traceabil ity systems. However, 
the RFID system faces with traditional security threats such as forgery, eavesdropping, replay attacks, 
tampering with information in tags, and the ability of tracking targets is more likely to cause serious privacy 
problems which was confirmed (Martin Feldhofer, et al. (2004); Dirk Henrici, et al. (2004); Sarmas. E, et al. 
(2003); S.K. Kwok, et al. (2010); Chen H Y, et al. (2007); Ha J, et al. (2007)). The current systems based on 
RFID have security shortcomings which was confirmed (Avoine G, et al. (2005); Thompson, et al. (2006); Kfir, 
Z, et al. (2005); Sarma, et al. (2003); Chien-Chang Hsu, et al. (2011); Myung, J.H, et al. (2006)). Aiming at this 
problem, a large number of studies have been launched and a set of assumptions has been put forward about 
security authentication protocol which was confirmed (Oh, R, et al. (2008); Gu, H, et al. (2009); Chen, S.C, et 
al. (2008); C. Berbain, et al. (2009)). But there are more weaknesses with these present protocols. The 
research of efficient, safe and practical security problem of RFID hasn't formed its unified concept and 
theoretical system so far which was confirmed Oscar Ortiz.et al. (2013); Sen A, et al. (2013); Chaudhry, et al. 
(2009); BEIER S, et al. (2006)).. In the paper aiming at the demand of privacy protection and practical 
security, a mutual authentication protocol named DRHSAP is presented based on unilateral hashing function, 
pseudo-random number generator and dynamic update RFID. By Using BAN logic, the objective and the 
security of this protocol are proved by formal analysis process. 

2. DRHSAP protocol 

Aimed to the deficiencies of security authentication protocol, a new authentication protocol named DRHSAP 
(dynamic refresh ID and hash-based security authentication protocol) is proposed. The RFID information is 
stored in back server database of the protocol. A Pseudo Random Number Generator is fixed in read-write 
device. By the pseudo random number generator, the RFID label can deal with the hash function algorithm 

 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONS  
 

 VOL. 46, 2015 

A publication of 

 

The Italian Association 
of Chemical Engineering 
Online at www.aidic.it/cet 

Guest Editors: Peiyu Ren, Yancang Li, Huiping Song  
Copyright © 2015, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l., 

ISBN 978-88-95608-37-2; ISSN 2283-9216  

                               
 
 

 

 
   

                                                  
DOI: 10.3303/CET1546227

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Please cite this article as: Wang B., Zhang J., Sun X.H., Wang N., Zhao Y., Wang F.S., 2015, Research on authentication technology of 
agriculture products traceability system based on rfid, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 46, 1357-1362  DOI:10.3303/CET1546227

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and logic operation, and has certain storage capacity. Suppose that there is wired connectio ns between the 
reader and back-end database, and the communication security can be guaranteed. 
The implementation process of the protocol is illustrated on fig.1.Here is the explanation of some symbols of 
parameters about DRHSAP. 
Query: the authentication request from read-write device to the RFID label. 
Dr: the 18bit all states pseudo-random sequence produced by read-write device. 
Dt: the 12bit all states pseudo-random sequence produced by the RFID label. 
SIGNi: the 60 bit binary sequence allocated by severity is unique identifier of each label. 
TSIGNi: the hash value of SIGNi, Ti is the pseudonym of a label. 
Last SIGNi: a prescribed value of SIGNi in the previous authentication. 
Last TSIGNi: a prescribed value of TSIGNi in the previous authentication. 
Present SIGNi: a prescribed value of SIGNi in the current authentication. 
Present TSIGNi: a prescribed value of TSIGNi in the current authentication. 
hk: an one-way hash function for hash arithmetic with the secret key k and message x.  
⊕: a boolean operator for xor operation. 
==: to test whether or not the two are equal.  
The authentication protocol is described in detail in fig 1. 
 

 

Figure 1: DRHSAP protocol operation procedure 

(1) Initial condition 
The information of each label is stored to back-end database. The information includes:  
[ , , , ]

i i i i
lastSIGN lastTSIGN presentSIGN presentTSIGN . 

The value of parameters last SIGNi and last TSIGNi in the initialization condition is distributed. And present 
SIGNi and present TSIGNi are both of null value. They share a secret key with each legitimacy label. 

( )
i k i

TSIGN h SIGN  
is stored in label Ti(Tag), and it can be used for a pseudonym of the label. 

 (2) Authentication process 
The reader creates a random number Dr and sends request to Ti for query. 
When receiving the query request from reader, Ti generates a binary random number Dt. Then it calculates 
the 

1
( )

k t d i
M h D D TSIGN    and sends the value of M1 and Dt to R. 

M1, Dt and Dr are sent to back-end database by R. 
last TSIGNi is selected by database from [last SIGNi,last TSIGNi,present SIGNi, present TSIGNi],and 

' ( )
k t d i

M h D D lastTSIGN    is calculated. 
Then judge whether

1
'M M . 

If they are accurately equal, identify and authenticate Ti.If there is no accordant object, select present TSIGNi 
from storage space and calculate " ( )

k t d i
M h D D presentTSIGN   . Judge whether 

1
'M M  again. If they 

are accurately equal, identify and authenticate Ti and go to the next step. If the two are not equal, send 
authentication failure information to R and terminate the sessions. 
Calculate the 

2 i t
M lastSIGN D   or 

2 i t
M presentSIGN D  . Then the success information and relevant 

information about the label is sent to reader. At the same time, M2 is sent to Reader by R. 
Then last SIGNi and last TSIGNi are covered by present SIGNi and present TSIGNi which are successfully 
authenticated. 
And 

i i t
lastSIGN lastTSIGN D   is calculated and present SIGNi is covered by it. 

k i
h presentSIGN  is calculated 

and present TSIGNi is covered by it. 
Ti is sent to M2 by the Reader. The logical exclusion or operation is executed with M 2 and Dt, and SIGNi’ is 
obtained. Then judge whether ( ' )

k i i
h SIGN TSIGN . If they are equal, the identification has been completed 

 

 

database 

 

 

reader 

 

 

tag 
3 

Success,4 

1 

2 

5 

Hk,Dt,TSIGNi,Dt,Dr 
Query,Dr 

Hk,Dt,Dr,TSIGNi,Dt, 

 

M2,lastSIGNi,Dt,presentSIGNi,Dt 

 

M2,lastSIGNi,Dt,presentSIGNi,Dt 

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and TSIGNi is covered by ( '
k t

h SIGN TSIGN D  . If they are not equal, the identification is failure and the 
TSIGNi remains the same value. 

3. BAN logical analysis 

In order to verify the security of DRHSAP protocol, a formal method is used with the BAN logical analysis 
about goals, assumptions, and message delivery. BAN logical analysis is given to  prove that DRHSAP 
protocol can achieve the predetermined target from assumption. There are three kinds of treatment object in 
BAN logical analysis which is called as subject, key and formula. The formula is also known as proposition or 
statement. The main variable is represented as P and Q. The common theme is represented as A and B. The 
shared secret variable is represented as S. The temporary value is represented as Na and Nb.  
The logical expression of BAN is described as:  

|P X : P regarded X as a true value. 

P X : P has received the message of X. 

|P X : P has sent information about X at some moment. 

|P X : P has the jurisdiction to X. 

#( )X : X is a new object. 

s

P Q  : P and Q are sharing a secret about S. 

{ }
s

X : X is encrypted by the key S. 

A total of 19 logic rules are managed by BAN. The rules used here are listed below. 
(1) Message meaning rule:

  
| , { }

| |

s

s
P P Q P X

P Q X

  

   

(2) Random number verification rule: 

| # , | |

| |

P X P Q X

P Q X

  

   

(3) Jurisdiction rule: 

| | , | |

|

P Q X P Q X

P X

   

  

(4) Message fresh rule: 

| #

| #( , )

P X

P X Y



  

In the basic model, the label is regarded as subject A, the reader and backend server are regarded as B. In 
the DRHSAP protocol, the unique identifier of each label is SIGNi. Therefore, in the DRHSAP authentication 
system, TSIGNi is regarded as an Identity authentication of subject A and similarly, SIGN i is regarded as an 
Identity authentication of subject B. 
When executing formally BAN, the process of key generation and identity authentication are omitted. Only the 
logical part directly related to the security problems are conserved. The definite formalization of the protocol is: 
Message1:  

: , ,{ , , }
a b a b i k

A B N N N N TSIGN . 

Message2:  

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:{ , }
a i k

B A N SIGN . 

The security goals are: 
(1) |

i
B TSIGN  

(2) |
i

A SIGN  
The initial hypotheses are: 

1: |
k

P B A B   

2 : |
k

P A A B   
3: | #( )

b
P B N  

4 : | #( )
a

P A N  
5 : | |

i
P B A TSIGN   

6 : | |
i

P A B SIGN   
The pragmatic logical reasoning of BAN about DRHSAP protocol is: 
When , ,{ , , }

a b a b i k
B N N N N TSIGN  

are met, according to the initial hypothesis P1 and message meaning rule, 

It is deduced that | , { }
| |

s

s
P P Q P X

P Q X

  

 

. From this, | |
i

B A TSIGN  . 

According to the initial hypothesis P3, with | #( )
b

B N  and the message fresh rule | #
| #( , )

P X

P X Y





. It is deduced 

that | #( )
i

B TSIGN . 

According to the random number verification rule | #( ), | |
| |

P X P Q X

P Q X

  

 

. It is deduced that | | #( )
i

B A TSIGN  . 

According to the Initial hypothesis | |
i

B A TSIGN   and jurisdiction rule | | , | |
|

P Q X P Q X

P X

   



, It is deduced 

that |B TSIGN
i

 . In the same sense, when { , }
a i k

A N SIGN  It is deduced that |
i

A TSIGN . 

Through the content above about the DRHSAP based on BAN, the security goals can be deduced. 
The results show that the present DRHSAP protocol is reliable. It can effectively realize the target of two-way 
legal identity security authentication. 
The traceability system based on RFID will receive security threat in many ways, including spoofing, replay 
attacks, tracking attack, tampering with data and repudiation, QOS and blocking attack, system attack and 
virus. The method presents by this paper is contrasted with the common protocols about countering the 
security threats above. As shown in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Table 1: Security agreement 

 hash hash-chain reverse--chain random--chain DRHSAP 

spoofing √ √ √ √ √ 

replay √ √ √ √ √ 

tracking √ √ √ × √ 

blocking\qos × × × - √ 

system\ virus × × × × √ 

tampering\ × √ √ √ √ 

 
Therefore, the proposed DRHSAP is well suitable for security communication of the low cost traceability 
system of agriculture products. 

4. Conclusions 

It is very import to establish farm product traceability system for ensuring safety of farm product. As the 
popularization of Internet of thing and RFID technologies, through RFID technology combined with the existing 
information security technologies, realization of supply chain security and traceability of goods, low cost, and 
high-tech features, that can ensure the safety of goods in circulation. It is concluded that the application of 
RFID technology to agricultural products is quite critical to the foodstuff safety of our country, and will plays 
important role in the agricultural development and 21st century society stability. 

Acknowledgments 

This work is supported by rural informatization engineering technology research center of Hebei province, 
2014 annual plan for scientific research and development of Baoding support project (Grant No.14ZS004) and 
2015 annual plan for scientific research and development of Baoding support project (Project: Agricultural 
products traceability management system based on IOT) and 2013 annual Science and Engineering 
Foundation of Hebei Agricultural University, China. (Grant No. LG201308). 

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