







































Children and Teenagers 
ISSN 2576-3709 (Print) ISSN 2576-3717 (Online) 

Vol. 3, No. 2, 2020 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ct 

36 
 

Original Paper 

Infant Social Evaluations in Response to Unequal Resource 

Distribution 
Evan M. Jordan1*, David G. Thomas1 & Elisabeth Ponce-Garcia2 

1 Psychology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, USA 
2 Psychology, Southeastern Oklahoma State University, Durant, USA 
* Evan M. Jordan, Psychology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, USA 

 

Received: August 24, 2020     Accepted: August 31, 2020     Online Published: September 10, 2020 

doi:10.22158/ct.v3n2p36                            URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ct.v3n2p36 

 

Abstract 

Healthy emotional development provides a foundation for the development of prosocial motives and 

their subsequent behaviors, especially those emotions specifically related to empathic responding. 

Previous research has demonstrated a preference for individuals who behave prosocially, as opposed to 

antisocially, in infants as young as 3 months of age (Hamlin et al., 2010). It has also been suggested 

that by 18 months of age infants may be evaluating the equitable and inequitable distributive actions of 

others as being either prosocial or antisocial behaviors, respectively (Geraci & Surian, 2011). This 

previous work has focused exclusively on the agents of the distributive actions. The purpose of the 

current study is to focus on the recipients of those actions, i.e., to determine if infants engage in social 

evaluations directed toward the individuals who are on the receiving end of prosocial and antisocial 

distributive behaviors. Specifically, this study assesses infant responses toward receivers that have been 

treated antisocially to determine if infants are displaying an empathically charged response toward 

individuals affected by antisocial actions. 

Keywords 

infant, development, resource distribution, inequity aversion, social evaluation 
 

1. Introduction 

Throughout development, infants and young children will encounter many situations that will require 

them to engage in social evaluation and reasoning, some of it complex. A problem that will arise in 

these developmental periods concerns the fairness of the distribution of resources. Humans, as an 

ultra-social species, must remain in compliance with social norms to maintain a functioning human 

society. Adult humans, as well as other social species such as non-human primates and even dogs, have 



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been found to display negative responses to the unequal distribution of resources, specifically when the 

distribution represents reward allocation (Brosnan, Schiff, & Frans, 2005; Fehr & Rockenback, 2003). 

In humans, this understanding of equitable resource distribution has been found to begin in late infancy 

and strengthen throughout development (Geraci & Surian 2011; Ziv & Sommerville, 2018). 

Previous studies have reported evidence of infants under the age of 2 years forming egalitarian 

expectations regarding the distribution of resources, demonstrating a more positive evaluation of 

egalitarian distributors compared to non-egalitarian distributors. For example, Geraci and Surian (2011) 

showed 12- and 18-month-old infants a series of trials on a computer screen in which a colorful cartoon 

distributor allocated resources to two receivers, with either equal or unequal distributions. In the former 

scenario, the distributor evenly dispersed colorful discs to two receiving agents. The latter scenario 

resulted in the uneven dispersal of discs by the distributor to the two receiving agents, providing one 

receiver with two colorful discs and the other receiver with none. The infants were then shown the two 

distributors. There was no significant difference in how often the younger infants looked at the fair and 

unfair distributors. However, the older infants looked significantly longer at the fair distributor, which 

was assumed to demonstrate infant preference for that distributor. This would indicate that infants 

appear to be able to evaluate the fairness of the behavior of others, though this ability is dependent on 

the age of the participant. 

Research supporting the findings of Geraci and Surian (2011) that infants in their second year can 

indeed make such evaluations was carried out by Schmidt and Sommerville (2011). They found that 

15-month-old infants looked longer at the outcome of an event depicting a distribution of unequal 

resources compared to when the infants observed an event in which resources were distributed equally 

across agents. This longer looking presumably indicated that the infants’ expectations of the event 

outcome had been violated by the distribution of unequal resources. While these looking behaviors may 

seem to conflict with the study by Geraci and Surian that measured infant preferences by longer 

looking times, it should be noted that in preference paradigms, looking time at the distributor is being 

assessed. On the other hand, in violation of expectation paradigms (e.g., Schmidt & Sommerville), 

looking time at the event outcome is measured. Therefore, Geraci and Surian found 18-month-olds to 

look longer—i.e., prefer—distributors who distribute equal amounts, while Schmidt and Sommerville 

found 15-month-olds to look longer at events showing unequal distribution, presumably because such 

events violated the infants’ expectations of equal distribution. These outcomes suggest older infants 

expect equal distribution of resources and prefer distributors who do so. 

Importantly, Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) also found that the previous emergence of spontaneous 

sharing behaviors with caregivers and peers was necessary to consistently elicit a violation of 

expectation of equal distribution in the infants. More specifically, infants that had already demonstrated 

sharing behaviors in a naturalistic setting looked longer at the unfair distributive outcome than infants 



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that had not yet demonstrated sharing behaviors. According to Ziv and Sommerville (2018), infants’ 

understanding of fairness is related to their ability to perform sharing actions, which may influence how 

infants perceive distributive actions and allow for the development of an expectation of fairness. 

Additional work by Meristo and Surian (2013) has provided evidence that 10-month-old infants are 

capable of making social evaluations of fairness based on previous behaviors by the receiving 

individuals. Meristo and Surian (2013) used a paradigm in which two distributing agents treated two 

identical receivers either fairly, by distributing two strawberries equally across the two receivers, or 

unfairly, by distributing both strawberries to one receiver and ignoring the remaining receiver. 

Following this phase, a new agent entered and distributed strawberries to either the unfair or fair 

distributor. Longer looking time in this study was assumed to indicate that the infants’ expectations of 

the event outcome had been violated. Infant looking times were significantly longer when the new 

agent distributed strawberries to the agent that had previously distributed an unequal number of 

strawberries compared to looking times when the new agent distributed these resources to the agent 

that had distributed the resources equally between receivers. Thus, these 10-month-old infants were 

considered to be positively evaluating the fair, equal distributor rather than the unfair, unequal 

distributor and were surprised when the distribution of resources by the new agent favored the latter. 

Similar findings were reported by Surian and Franchin (2017) in their violation of expectation 

paradigm. This study, conducted with 15- and 20-month-old infants, found that by 20 months of age 

infants preferred to see agents of equal merit receive equal distributions and children and agents of 

unequal merit to receive distributions proportional to their relative merit. The 15-month-old infants 

demonstrated a similar pattern of behavior, but the results were not statistically significant. However, 

this indicates that by later in the second year of life infants may be taking merit and deservingness, 

rather than just surface level equity, into account when making evaluations of fairness and instead 

deservingness may trump egalitarian principles in infants’ reasoning.  

To reiterate, in preference paradigms, looking time at the agent(s) is being evaluated, but in violation of 

expectation paradigms, looking time at the event outcome is evaluated. That said, contrasting results 

investigating the socio-moral competence of infants have been found across several studies following 

the violation of expectation paradigm. For example, longer looking times were recorded in a study by 

Sloane, Baillargeon, and Premack (2012) demonstrating events of unequal resource distribution, and 

when unfair agents received rewards rather than fair agents (Meristo & Surian, 2013). While there may 

be plausible explanations for these differences, the interpretation of longer looking times in more than 

one way within either the preference paradigms or the violation of expectation paradigms would lead to 

non-falsifiable hypotheses and therefore, non-scientific measures of preference or aversion. 

Overall, infants have been observed displaying differential responding toward equitable and inequitable 

resource distribution paradigms. While various measures have been used in these paradigms, each has 



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attempted to demonstrate that infants recognize differences in equitable and inequitable resource 

distribution and each has attempted to demonstrate that infants have an aversion toward inequitable 

distribution or a preference for equitable distribution. While it can be theorized that infants are making 

these complex social evaluations based on learned reactions from social interactions, namely cognitive 

and/or affective components of empathy, a greater understanding of infant responding in these 

paradigms is required to more fully understand why infants are indicating a preference for equitable 

distribution and an aversion toward inequitable distribution.  

As the above review demonstrates, research observing the development of inequity aversion and 

preference for resource equality has been conducted across a variety of age groups (Hamlin & Wynn, 

2011; Hamlin et al., 2011; Geraci & Surian, 2011). However, to our knowledge, all of the previous 

research has focused on the responses of infants and toddlers toward the agent actively distributing in 

an equitable or inequitable manner. While this research provides an understanding of early moral and 

social development and its effects on preference for equal resource distribution, little is known about 

infant evaluations of individuals on the receiving end of inequitable resource distribution. 

Additionally, few studies observing reactions to distributive behaviors have included non-social entities 

as either active or passive agents to allow for a behavioral comparison of infant responding to 

inequitable resource distribution directed toward inanimate, non-social (lacking facial features) agents. 

By comparing behavioral differences that occur toward both social and non-social entities, we can gain 

a clearer understanding of the factors that influence infant preferences for one agent over another. 

The purpose of the current study was to determine if infants in their second year of life prefer 

individuals who receive, rather than give, a greater number of resources in an inequitable distribution 

trial, or individuals that have received fewer resources. A preference for the receiver of more resources 

would suggest that infants value prosperity. However, a preference for the receiver of few or no 

resources would suggest a potential empathic emotional response to individuals that are victims of 

unequal resource distribution. This purpose was addressed through the behavioral observation of 

infants that were exposed to a paradigm of resource distribution, consisting of unequal distribution 

trials that used both animate and inanimate receivers. The aforementioned literature can be interpreted 

to mean that infants have the capacity for compassion. Thus, we hypothesized that infants would 

demonstrate a greater preference for receiving agents that are provided with fewer resources compared 

to the alternate receiver due to an affective empathic response by the infant observer. Furthermore, we 

hypothesized that when the receiving agents were inanimate the infant would show a greater preference 

for the receiving object to which was distributed a greater number of resources, thereby indicating that 

infants may be aligning with greater resource amounts when empathy is seemingly removed from the 

situation. 

 



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2. Method 

2.1 Participants 

Twenty-seven full-term, healthy infants (9 males; 18 females) accompanied by their mothers were 

assessed between the ages of 16 and 20 months (M = 79.68 weeks, SD = 4.96). Maternal ages ranged 

between 24 and 48 years (M = 34.35), with the majority of mothers being Caucasian (80%), married 

(68%), and college educated (84%). One female infant did not complete all six trials and the procedure 

was aborted at the request of the caregiver due to excessive distress, and one female infant’s responses 

were unable to be coded due to equipment malfunction. Therefore a final sample of 25 infants was 

analyzed. 

2.2 Materials and Procedures 

2.2.1 Demographic Questionnaire 

Primary caregivers were administered a demographic questionnaire to collect general information 

regarding the infants and the members of their immediate families. Information on income level, 

marital status, number of siblings, birth order, household language, and parental education level was 

gathered. 

2.2.2 Distribution Display 

The distribution paradigm occurred in a custom wooden display (48” L X 34” H X 22” D) that 

emulated a “black box theatre”. Two receiving agents were placed on either side of the stage. The 

resources, which were brightly colored wooden rings approximately three inches in diameter, could be 

placed during the test phase of the procedure on a stationary wooden peg situated in front of each of the 

receiving agents. A cut-out in the rear wall of the display allowed for the distributing agent to enter and 

distribute the resources to the receivers on either side of the stage. 

2.2.3 Agents 

Animate distributing and receiving agents consisted of seven different plush stuffed animals of various 

colors. The inanimate receiving agents consisted of six plush geometric shapes (7 x 7 in) of various 

colors. An animate agent was still used as the distributor in the inanimate conditions, which explains 

the discrepancy between the numbers of animate to inanimate agents. 

2.2.4 Stimuli and Procedure 

Upon arrival at the laboratory the infant and mother engaged in free play until the infant acclimated to 

the laboratory environment. Acclimation was marked by a baseline behavioral state of a 2 or 3 as 

outlined by the AFFEX behavioral scaling system (Izard, Dougherty, & Hembree, 1983), indicating that 

the infant was alert/calm or alert/active, respectively. During free play, the mother was provided one of 

the wooden rings and instructed to become excited, attempt to share the ring with her infant and try to 

elicit excitement in the infant to help establish that it was a desirable resource. Following free play, the 

10-minute test procedure began and the infant was seated on the caregiver’s lap facing away from her 



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and toward the distribution display at which time they watched six distribution trials (3 animate and 3 

inanimate), each followed by a choice phase. Several stimulus and procedural variables were 

counterbalanced and/or randomized, including color, animal type, pairing, and lateral position of 

receiving agents, as well as the order of trial types. The caregiver was instructed to remain neutral and 

not attempt to elicit a choice from the infant or influence the infant in any way. The test phase began 

when the curtain opened to reveal two receiving agents positioned on either side of the display with 

empty wooden pegs in front of each of them. A third agent emerged from the cut out in the back of the 

stage and distributed resources to the receiving agents. Using exaggerated movements, the distributor 

placed the resources on the wooden pegs in a 5:1 distribution ratio. After the distributing agent 

dispersed all six resources to the receiving agents, it disappeared through the cut out in the back of the 

display and the experimenter closed the curtain of the distribution display. Following each of the six 

trials, a second experimenter, blind to the number of resources each agent had received, emerged from 

behind the curtain and administered a forced choice procedure by presenting both of the receiving 

agents at an equal distance from the infant. Infants were prompted (e.g., “which one do you like?” and 

“can you pick one?”) until they reached for one of the agents. If an infant did not attempt to reach for 

an agent for 2 minutes it was counted as “no choice”. Reaching and grasping behavior were measured 

to indicate preference toward the agents, but only when the behavior was preceded by a look toward 

that same agent. Coding for reaches differed from that of grasps. The infant would have to take hold of 

the agent and remove it from the experimenter’s hand to be coded as a grasp and signify the end of the 

trial, whereas reaches were coded across the two minute trial, but reaching behavior alone was not 

sufficient to end the trial. Additionally, the total duration of infant looking toward each of the agents 

was recorded. These behavioral measures were video recorded using a camera worn on the chest of the 

experimenter to be coded offline at a later time. 

 

3. Result 

Observation Oriented Modeling (OOM; Grice, 2011; Grice et al., 2012) was used to analyze the data. 

OOM allows for the comparison of the grasps and looking times made by each infant during each trial 

with expected patterns of outcomes, with results summarized using accuracy indices identifying how 

many infants fit the expected pattern. Depending on the statistical test, traditional null hypothesis 

testing (NHST) relies on a variety of assumptions, such as homogeneity and normality of population 

distributions, whereas OOM utilizes randomization tests that are free of such assumptions. Many of our 

agent preference measures violated NHST assumptions, but because OOM is similar to non-parametric 

methods, we were able to avoid the strict assumptions of NHST and focus attention on the reaches, 

grasps, and looking times for each agent by the individual infants in the study. 

 



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3.1 Hypothesis 1 

An ordinal pattern analysis tested the prediction that infants would indicate a preference for an animate 

agent that had received a smaller number of resources in the distribution paradigm (“animate poor”) 

compared to an agent that had received a larger number of resources (“animate rich”). With regard to 

the number of looks per unit of time toward the animate receivers of resources, the expected ordinal 

pattern for each infant was therefore animate poor > animate rich. Results indicated that 14 of the 25 

infants matched this pattern with respect to the number of looks toward animate agents. This frequency 

can be converted to a percentage (56.00%) which is referred to as the Percent Correctly Classified 

(PCC) in an Ordinal Pattern Analysis. A simple randomization test was then used to assign a probability 

statistic, referred to as the chance value (or c-value), to the PCC. Based on 1000 random trials for 

number of looks per unit of time, the c-value was .14 indicating that a PCC of at least 56% was likely 

to occur by chance 14% of the time for the current data and expected ordinal pattern. 

For the duration of looks per unit of time toward the animate receivers of resources, the overall ordinal 

pattern (animate poor > animate rich) was again examined and results indicated that again 14 of the 25 

infants (PCC = 56.00, c-value = .32) matched the expected pattern and looked more frequently toward 

the animate poor receiver compared to the animate rich receiver. Additionally, an ordinal pattern 

analysis (animate poor > animate rich) of the sum of grasps indicated that only 10 of 25 infants (PCC = 

40.00, c-value = .68) chose the animate poor receiver over the animate rich receiver. Two infants did 

not complete a grasp to either agent. When the infants that did not grasp an agent were removed from 

the analysis 10 of 23 infants (PCC = 43.48, c-value = .65) choose the animate poor receiver over the 

animate rich receiver (see Table 1). 

3.2 Hypothesis 2 

An identical set of Ordinal Pattern Analyses was conducted for the responses to the inanimate receiving 

agent. The expected ordinal pattern outcome for inanimate trials was as follows: inanimate rich > 

inanimate poor. With respect to the total number of looks per unit of time, results indicated that 16 of 

the 25 infants (PCC = 64.00, c-value = .02) matched the ordinal pattern and looked more frequently 

toward the inanimate rich receiver compared to the inanimate poor receiver, which was consistent with 

the original hypothesis for inanimate agent preference. Similarly, 13 of 25 infants (PCC = 52.00, 

c-value = .41) yielded longer durations to the inanimate rich receiver compared to the inanimate poor 

receiver. However, similar to the grasping in the animate trials, only 7 of 25 infants (PCC = 28.00, 

c-value = .81) completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor receiver. Three infants did 

not complete a grasp to either agent. When the infants that did not grasp an agent were removed from 

the analysis this ratio increased to 7 out of 22 (PCC = 31.82, c-value = .81) infants choosing completed 

grasps to the rich compared to the poor receiver (see Table 1). 

 



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Table 1. Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures Agent Preference for Animate and Inanimate 

Trials 

Ordinal Pattern Tested    

Measure n PCC c-value 

Animate: Poor > Rich    

Number of Looks 25 56.00 .14 

Duration of Looks 25 56.00 .32 

Sum of Grasps 25 40.00 .68 

Manual Choosers Only 23 43.48 .65 

Inanimate: Poor < Rich    

Number of Looks 25 64.00 .02 

Duration of Looks 25 52.00 .72 

Sum of Grasps 25 28.00 .81 

Manual Choosers Only 22 31.28 .81 

Note. Manual Choosers row is an additional Sum of Grasps analysis but includes only the participants 

that made a manual choice and includes only 22 infants. 

 

4. Discussion 

4.1 Hypothesis 1 

The primary aim of this study (Hypothesis 1) was to determine if infants showed a preference toward a 

poor recipient of resources compared to a rich recipient of resources, thereby supporting the contention 

that infants have the capacity to make social evaluations toward individuals that are treated unfairly and 

potentially responding empathically toward recipients of fewer resources. While previous research 

(Geraci & Surian, 2011) has found that infants of similar age to our participants engage in social 

evaluation toward an acting distributing agent, the present study focused on the social evaluation of 

passive receiving agents. In the animate trials, only a small majority (56.00%) of the infants followed 

our hypothesized pattern with regard to number and duration of looks. Further, when infants grasped 

one of the two receivers, a greater number of infants chose the rich receiver more often. As these 

findings were weak, relative to those previously discussed that provided a basis for this study, it does 

not provide substantial evidence that infants are being motivated by social evaluation to the poor 

receiver over the rich and rather indicates that evaluating a passive receiving agent may be 

fundamentally different from evaluations of an acting distributing agent. 

Alternatively, there could be components of our methodology that are influencing infant behaviors. The 

research of Meristo and Surian (2013) appears to indicate that when making social evaluations based 

on equity distributions, infants as young as 10 months of age take social contexts such as deservingness 



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and merit into consideration. Further, these expectations are found to increase across infancy as infants 

become capable of more complex cognitive processes (Surian & Franchin, 2017). As the distribution 

paradigm in the present study did not provide any social context that would allow for the appraisal of 

deservingness or merit, it is possible that infant responses were influenced by the lack of social context. 

Similarly, receiving agents remained static during the distribution paradigm, giving no indication that 

the receivers were “excited” or “disappointed” by the number of resources received. A lack of response 

by the receiving agents may have been interpreted by the infants as indifference toward the allocated 

resources, either toward the resources themselves, or toward the inequitable distribution. 

The lack of response by the receivers was a result of a direct methodological choice to reduce bias in 

response differences. For example, in a hill-climbing paradigm used by Hamlin and colleagues (2007) 

focusing on infant preferences for helping behaviors versus hindering behaviors, a protagonist 

“climber” bounced after being helped up the hill by a “helping” agent. The findings were robust in that 

a significant number of infants indicated a preference for a helping agent compared to a hindering agent 

through their looking and grasping behaviors. However, these results were challenged by Scarf and 

colleagues (2012) when they demonstrated that infants chose the helping agent when the protagonist 

bounced after being helped up the hill, but chose the hindering agent when the protagonist bounced 

after being “pushed” down the hill. When the protagonist bounced in both the helping and the hindering 

trials, the infants showed no significant differences in preference and chose both equally. Therefore, 

while the inclusion of an “emotional” response by the receiving agents may have increased clarity of 

how these agents should feel in response to inequitable resource distribution, it may also have 

introduced a confounding perceptual or emotional bias. 

An additional replication of the hill-climbing study was recently conducted and found less than half of 

the infants choose the helping agent compared to the hindering agent (Colaizzi, 2016). Hamlin 

(personal communication, May 25, 2016) attributed this deviation in findings to minor methodological 

differences in the color of the agents being used in the paradigm. Specifically, Hamlin stated that 

infants tend to demonstrate a preference for the color blue (one of the colors of the agents) and that the 

use of a blue agent in the paradigm may have skewed the results in the replication study even though 

the roles of the agents were counterbalanced. 

Another failed replication occurred in an attempt to replicate the findings of Hamlin and Wynn (2011). 

In that study, a protagonist agent attempts to open a box and attain a toy. Similar to the 2007 research, 

one condition showed a helping agent facilitate the protagonist in opening the box and a second 

condition showed a hindering agent inhibit the protagonist in opening the box. Once again, while 

findings from this initial study were robust with a significant number of infants (79%) at both 5 and 8 

months of age preferring the helper over the hinderer, Salvadori et al. (2015) found that only 62% of 

the infants in their replication paradigm demonstrated a preference for the helper compared to the 



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hinderer. Similar to Colaizzi (2016), Salvadori et al. (2015) attributed these differences to minor 

methodological dissimilarities of procedure, materials, or demography. However, the findings of 

Hamlin and Wynn (2011) were robust enough that they should still be evident in the face of only minor 

dissimilarities. One methodological issue that is not addressed with the original 2011 study and then 

again overlooked by Salvadori and colleagues (2015) is the noise that occurs when the box lid is 

slammed shut by the hindering agent. Although not outlined in the publication, in a recording of the 

paradigm (Hewitt & Bloom, 2013) there is a clear, audible noise when the hindering agent slams the lid 

of the box closed. It is plausible that the infants have an aversion to a loud noise that causes them to 

react negatively toward the hindering agent, making it appear as though they are showing a preference 

toward the helping agent. This methodological issue should be addressed in further replications. 

Together these three studies, coupled with the present findings, indicate that the research on social 

evaluations and the conclusions drawn from their findings are not conclusive and remain questionable 

due to mixed results across this area of study. 

4.2 Hypothesis 2 

Hypothesis 2 predicted that behavioral differences in preference toward the receiving agents when 

resources were distributed unevenly between two non-social entities, or inanimate receiving agents. 

Based on basic evolutionary theory and natural selection (Darwin, 1965), humans are motivated to seek 

out the best possible source for resources that aid in survival and reproduction. Therefore, we 

hypothesized that in the absence of social entities (i.e., agents with animate facial features), infants 

would be more likely to demonstrate a preference toward the rich inanimate receiver, thereby indicating 

a preference for aligning with the best possible outcome for survival. Though a greater number of 

infants looked more frequently and longer at the rich receiving agent with more resources to potentially 

“share”, this number was just over half, but yielded a robus c-value of .02, but these preference 

behaviors did not extend to the grasping measure, with a minority of infants choosing the rich over the 

poor receiver. 

Previous research found that infants do not place similar expectations of equitable resource distribution 

on the distributing agent when allocating resources to inanimate agents such that infants look equally 

between the fair and unfair distributor (Sloan et al., 2012). This is further supported by Gredeback, et al. 

(2015) who found that neural responses in the p400 ERP, a component of the brain that has been 

previously linked to empathy and prosocial responding, only occurred when the agents in the paradigm 

were animate (i.e., had eyes), suggesting that when the social valence is removed from the paradigm, 

the action is no longer interpreted by the infant as being goal-related. Again, Sloan et al. (2012) and 

others using similar paradigms are still making claims regarding infant evaluation between fair and 

unfair animate distributing agents that had distributed to inanimate objects, thus, still evaluating the 

social actor. In the present study, the distributing agent is still animate even in the inanimate trials, but 



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the infants are only making social evaluations directed toward the inanimate receiving agents. In other 

words, the direction of their social evaluation in the present paradigm is toward inanimate objects, 

which differs from the previously conducted research. However, a greater number of infants did look 

longer at the inanimate agent with greater resources, which could be an indicator that infants do have 

an interest in a greater number of resources when issues of morality are minimized. 

Once again, the findings of this study were not as robust as those of previous studies using similar 

paradigms (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Hamlin et 

al. (2007) found that infants preferred a prosocial helping agent over an antisocial hindering agent, but 

did not attribute their own attitudes to the protagonist that had been helped or hindered. In other words, 

infants may be capable of evaluating the actions of others before they are capable of evaluating the 

effects of those actions on passive receivers, a process that requires perspective taking, which some 

suggest emerges around 18 months of age (Thompson, 1987), the average age of our sample. If 

perspective taking is just emerging at this time, it would be reasonable to suggest that this cognitive 

skill may not be developed enough to attribute actions to passive receivers that are either lacking facial 

features or lacking previous behavior that would provide a social context for the infant. 

4.3 Implications 

To summarize, this study did not provide robust evidence that infants are evaluating the equitable or 

inequitable distribution of passive receiving agents and it is plausible to suggest that infant’s social 

evaluations of a passive receiving agent differ from their evaluations of an acting distributing agent. 

While they may be engaging in social evaluation toward both parties, the evidence of social evaluations 

toward agents making the choice to distribute evenly or unevenly is much stronger than the evidence 

provided by the current study, though considerations of the multiple failed replication attempts should 

be made before making claims that infants are capable of any of the evaluative and preferential 

responses to which the previous research is alluding. 

Previous research in this area has aided in informing much of what we already know about prosocial 

understanding, inequitable resource distribution, and empathic responses to these behaviors by infants. 

However, in order to gain traction in this area of research and learn more about the developmental 

trajectories of the various forms of social evaluation we must expand on the current research and 

supplement the field with new means for the identification of social evaluation, an area crucial to a 

well-rounded understanding of the socialization process. 

4.4 Limitations and Future Directions 

One way that future research can help to clarify the outcome of this study is to provide an opportunity 

for infants to either distribute or reallocate resources between the rich and poor receivers. Hamlin et al. 

(2011) found that when given the option to either give or take a treat away from prosocial or anti-social 

agents, toddlers in the “give a treat” condition distributed treats more often to the prosocial rather than 



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the anti-social agent. Similarly, toddlers asked to “take a treat” removed the treat from the anti-social 

agent more often than they removed a treat from the prosocial agent. If infants are making social 

evaluations toward receivers similar to their evaluations of distributors, they would likely be inclined to 

reallocate resources evenly if given the opportunity, or to distribute additional resources to the poor 

receiver in an attempt to achieve fairness. 

As mentioned previously, neither the poor nor the rich agent responded upon receiving resources. This 

was purposeful to prevent preference based on any perceptual or emotional biases that agent response 

may have elicited. However, modifying the paradigm to include some indication that the receivers are 

happy or unhappy with their allotted resources may be necessary. If having the protagonist “bounce” 

upon receiving help leads to preference of the agent nearest the bouncing protagonist as it was found to 

do in the study by Scarf and colleagues (2012), then it may be necessary to include a different indicator 

that the agents are interested in the resources. Providing a familiarization trial in which the agents 

interact with the resources and indicate excitement toward the resources may be enough to inform the 

infants that receiving more resources should excite them and receiving fewer resources should 

disappoint them. 

Another modification that could be included in a future study would be the inclusion of a parental 

self-report on the sharing behaviors of their infants in other social situations. Background information 

on the infants understanding of sharing and fairness would be beneficial and could provide some 

insight as to how their environment and their interactions with caregivers and peers influence their 

tendency to make social evaluations regarding unequal resource distribution. 

 

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