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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    126 

 

Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War 

Theory 
 

Michael McKoy 
 

 
 

Love for the enemy is a stated aim of just war. Yet, we rarely consider the conditions that best 

encourage enemy-love. I argue a state’s relationship with the enemy prior to war will shape its love for 

the enemy during war. Specifically, if the just-war state and the targeted enemy had a loving relationship 

prior to war, then the just-war state is more likely to abide by the just war principles in the negotiations 

prior to war and in their actions during war. However, if they previously had a hostile relationship, 

then the just-war state is more likely to ignore just war principles prior to and during war. I demonstrate 

this argument by analyzing the Libyan regime change war in 2011. Christians must take seriously 

Christ’s command to love our enemies, so that we might love well in peace and hopefully avoid the 

devastations of war. 

 

 

A stated aim of just war, dating back to Augustine, 

is to accomplish justice for the enemy aggressor as well 

as for those being threatened or victimized. Augustine 

(1962, 182) states, “Therefore, even in waging war, 

cherish the spirit of a peace-maker, that, by conquering 

those whom you attack, you may lead them back to the 

advantage of peace.” Contemporary just war scholars 

acknowledge that just war requires showing love 

towards the enemy, though they emphasize that love for 

the enemy must not supersede love for the enemy’s 

victims (Bell 2009; Biggar 2013; Miller 2021; Patterson 

2023). Yet, even as love for the enemy is an aim of just 

war, there is often little consideration of how one 

develops and sustains enemy love. Loving the enemy 

means love must endure the grievances, hardships, and 

atrocities that come with war, and it must motivate the 

just state to help the defeated enemy rebuild following 

war. These difficulties should not be underestimated, 

and they place a heavy burden on love. 

The just war tradition largely assumes love for the 

enemy can be generated volitionally, regardless of a 

state’s prior relationship with the enemy or the difficult 

circumstances created by war. In this essay, I seek to 

challenge this assumption. Rather, I assert that love for 

the enemy is far more likely if there is a prior loving, or 

at least amicable, relationship between the two 

belligerents before the escalation to war. A pre-

established love is much more likely to persist through 

war rather than somehow being developed during war, 

and it will likely moderate the belligerents’ behavior 

during war and strengthen their commitment to rebuild 

following war. 

In this essay, I first walk through the principles of 

just war in light of enemy love. I then argue why a prior 

loving relationship is likely critical for accomplishing jus 
post bellum, the establishment of a just peace. I then 

discuss the diverging responses to Libyan leader 

Muammar Qaddafi after he threatened to enact human 

rights abuses on Libyan rebels during the Arab Spring. 

Those countries that had a hostile relationship with 

Libya quickly advocated for war, in violation of the just 

war principle of war as a last resort. Those leaders who 

had a more loving relationship with Qaddafi, most 

notably South African President Jacob Zuma, 

prioritized peaceful negotiations to achieve an inclusive, 

stabilizing exit for Qaddafi. The rush to war by Arab 

and Western countries had devastating effects on Libya, 

from which the country has yet to recover. 

My hope with this essay is to spur us to consider 

more deeply Christ’s command to love our enemy. 

Enemy is a political term, but we rarely think of love in 

either political or collective terms. There is a well-

developed academic literature on communal hatred 

and its political implications (Kaufman 2015), but 

scholars have not given the same attention to love. This 

essay aims to be a first step in more deeply considering 

love’s political importance and implications.  

 

Enemy Love in the Just War Tradition  
The priority of enemy love is reflected in just war 

principles. These principles are traditionally grouped as 



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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    127 

jus ad bellum (justice before war), jus in bellum (justice 

during war), and more recently jus post bellum (justice 

following war). Jus ad bellum principles include just 

cause for war, legitimate authority to decide for war, war 

as a last resort to settling conflict, reasonable confidence 

in the likelihood of success, and the right intent of 

establishing justice for all involved. Jus in bellum 

principles include proportionality in the use of 

necessary force and discrimination regarding the use of 

force against only those who are armed (Bell 2009; 

Bellamy 2006). Just war scholars have more recently 

given attention to jus post bellum and the responsibility 

to establish stable and just governance for the defeated 

country following war (Bass 2004; Patterson 2012). In 

theory, the principle of right intent addresses these 

issues, but the difficulties of postwar stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya 

revealed the neglect of postwar just principles.
1

  

This neglect of postwar justice is particularly 

problematic, because it is during the postwar period 

that enemy love is most positively expressed. When 

escalating to war and when fighting a war, just war 

principles express love through patience and restraint 

rather than through more active means. The principle 

of right intent prior to war expresses enemy love by 

rejecting vengeance as an aim of war. The principle of 

last resort expresses enemy love by requiring that all 

possible resolutions short of war be attempted before 

escalating to war. The principle of discrimination 

expresses enemy love by requiring restraint in the 

execution of war.  

It is only postwar that love is primarily expressed 

positively through right intent and the establishment of 

a just order. The postwar establishment of justice 

requires that the just-war state successfully depose and 

uproot the aggressive or abusive regime, supervise and 

finance (at least partially) the defeated country’s 

reconstruction, establish a just government, and provide 

security and social services in the meantime. These 

demands mark a shift from the negative love of restraint 

to the positive love of just state-building and 

(re)conciliation.  

Just war principles assume that the love necessary 

to fight for just aims and to remain committed to these 

aims long-term occurs through the singular will and 

volition of the state or society engaging in just war. Love 

is treated as a duty rather than a relationship.
2

 But the 

burdens of this assumption become evident when 

                                                        
1

 Eric Patterson (2012, ix) expressed dismay that, in a month-long seminar on just war that he attended in 2004, there 

was no discussion of postwar just principles: “The fact that we could spend a month talking about the morality of going 

to war (jus ad bellum) and the morality of how war is fought (jus in bello) without discussing the morality of conflict 

settlement and postconflict (just post bellum) should be startling to the outside observer.” 
2

 This is akin to the distinction Thomas Aquinas makes between charity and friendship. I thank Peter Campbell for this 

point. 

carrying out the demands of love, and they only become 

heavier as war progresses. The patience of last resort 

may wear thin if it threatens one’s own interests. The 

restraint of discrimination may be compromised if it 

hinders a quick victory or risks the lives of the just state’s 

own soldiers or civilians. The rejection of vengeance 

may succumb to temptation given the stresses, horrors, 

and drudgery of war. The right intent of just, stable 

governance may crumble in the face of reconstruction’s 

high costs, the enemy’s persistent violent resistance, and 

the perceived ingratitude of the people you believe you 

are helping. 

These difficulties are evident in the struggles 

inherent to the United Nations’ Responsibility to 

Protect (R2P) doctrine. The United Nations developed 

this doctrine following the genocidal civil wars in 

Rwanda and Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The R2P 

doctrine states that the international community has a 

responsibility to protect the human rights of a country’s 

citizens when that country’s government is either 

unwilling to or unable to. R2P’s responsibilities are 

often grouped as: the responsibility to prevent human 

rights abuses before they occur, the responsibility to 

react to human rights abuses once they occur, and the 

responsibility to rebuild a state that will respect human 

rights in the future. These responsibilities were 

designed to align with just war principles (Evans 2004). 

R2P is motivated by the just cause of defending human 

rights. The responsibilities to prevent and to react 

ensure that the use of military force is available but as a 

last resort. The responsibility to rebuild is based upon 

the right intent principle of establishing just and stable 

governance following armed conflict. 

However, there has been a consistent disconnect 

between R2P’s honorable aims and its often disastrous 

outcomes in several post-conflict countries. Roland 

Paris (2014) blames this disconnect on what he 

considers the doctrine’s structural problems. These 

include what Paris calls the end-state problem and the 

mixed-motive problem. The end-state problem 

highlights the high costs involved in rebuilding another 

society’s government and infrastructure. This effort 

may also include fighting against insurgent forces who 

oppose foreign occupation. Such fighting only makes 

stabilization efforts more difficult, leading to a vicious 

cycle of fighting and instability without a clear end in 

sight. And these postwar costs of reconstruction come 

on top of the financial, emotional, and psychological 

costs of fighting the prior war itself. 



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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    128 

The mixed-motive problem questions whether a 

state would pay such high costs without expecting 

something substantial in return. While just war and R2P 

principles assume states and leaders will seek justice for 

its own sake, this directly contradicts common 

understandings of state motivations for humanitarian 

action. Rather, state leaders must be able to show their 

supporters that humanitarian action and commitment 

will result in personal gain (Gent 2007). 

These problems together severely undermine the 

just aims of just war. If countries must have selfish aims 

to engage in a just war, how likely is it that these selfish 

aims will be prioritized over the war’s supposed just 

aims? Indeed, how can we know that any professed just 

aims aren’t mere rhetoric to justify more selfish aims? 

And even if just aims are the primary aims, are these 

just aims sufficient for the just-war state to remain 

committed to justice in the face of the extremely high 

costs of occupation and reconstruction? US Secretary 

of State Colin Powell had such high costs in mind when, 

prior to war in Iraq, he warned President George W. 

Bush about the “Pottery Barn rule:” “you break it, you 

bought it” (Woodward 2004, 150). Even if one 

charitably assumes that the Bush administration’s 

motives for war were primarily about bringing justice 

and democracy to Iraq, the administration still failed to 

prepare for the high demands of governing Iraq, 

resulting in catastrophe (Allawi 2007; Gordon and 

Trainor 2006). 

 

Just War and the Impact of Prior Love 
Nevertheless, one could imagine a state taking on 

the high costs for achieving justice for another society if, 

prior to war, the two societies had a loving relationship. 

There has been little research, or even scholarly 

consideration, on love between countries, though there 

is developing research on interstate friendship (Koschut 

and Oelsner 2014), and there are case-study analyses of 

the “special relationships” between Israel and the 

United States (Bar-Siman-Tov 1998) and the United 

Kingdom and the United States (Dumbrell 2006). This 

research provides guidance in considering the nature of 

loving relationships between countries. Politically, love 

develops and is sustained through geopolitical and 

economic ties. Culturally, love develops and is 

sustained through shared racial/ethnic heritage, 

language, religion, or history. Interpersonally, love 

develops and is sustained through relationships 

between leaders, between ruling elites, and through 

people exchanges, such as immigration, tourism, and 

study-abroad programs.  

The existence of a loving relationship helps 

overcome the problems Paris raises about the 

Responsibility to Protect doctrine and, by extension, 

just war. A loving relationship helps overcome the 

mixed-motive problem, because leaders and 

communities in the just-war state are more personally 

invested in the well-being of the defeated enemy. This, 

in turn, helps address the end-state problem, as the just-

war state would be more readily committed to making 

the long-term investments necessary for the defeated 

enemy’s reconstruction. A prior loving relationship 

would also give the just-war state intimate knowledge of 

the targeted society’s culture, norms, and perspectives, 

all of which are critical to sustainably establishing justice 

and order. It would also give the just-war state greater 

credibility with the occupied population and thus could 

deter, or at least mitigate, internal resistance. 

A focus on the relationship between the war 

combatants, however, raises new questions about how 

the two sides escalated to war in the first place. For a 

just war to occur, it may not necessarily be the case that 

the two societies have personal animosity, but rather 

that one of them is persistently committing human 

rights abuses internally or acting aggressively towards 

another country. This, in turn, shifts the focus from the 

last resort of escalation to war to the “first resort” of 

asking why the country committed to justice could not 

convince its abusive ally to stop its aggressive acts. 

Rather than focusing on the decision for war, our 

attention shifts to the negotiations for peace. This has at 

least two notable effects. First, it moves just war 

scholarship closer to current international-relationships 

scholarship, which focuses on why states choose war 

despite the high costs of war (Blattman 2022). Rather 

than simply considering war in pursuit of justice, we 

should consider more broadly strategies in pursuit of 

justice and why these succeed or fail. Second, it 

highlights how prior relationships may affect such 

strategic choices. While a loving relationship will make 

a country more invested in another country’s good, 

such a relationship may also discourage countries from 

holding each other accountable for aggression or 

abuses. Deeper analysis must consider these multiple 

potential effects. 

 

Libyan Regime Change, 2011 
In February 2011, following the downfall of 

authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, protests 

broke out throughout several cities in Libya. Libyan 

leader Muammar Qaddafi’s regime responded by 

brutally suppressing protests in Tripoli and threatening 

even worse violence elsewhere. Qaddafi, specifically 

targeting the rebellious northeastern region centered 

around Benghazi, made the “now infamous threat to go 

‘zanga zanga, dar dar’ or from ‘alley to alley, house to 

house’ to ‘cleanse’ the ‘cockroaches’ and ‘rats’, [which 

to many] carried echoes of the 1994 genocide in 

Rwanda, when the Hutus described the Tutsis in similar 

terms.” In response, Libyan officials who broke with 

Qaddafi formed the National Transitional Council 

(NTC), called for a nationwide uprising against 



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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    129 

Qaddafi, and sought international recognition and 

protection (Noueihed and Warren 2013, 178–179).  

Qaddafi’s long-time dictatorship over Libya meant 

that Libya’s relationship with other countries depended 

almost entirely on Qaddafi’s sentiments and actions. 

Qaddafi had long had turbulent relationships with 

many countries around the world. He understandably 

incurred the hatred of several African and Middle 

Eastern governments by calling for their overthrow and 

supporting revolutionary forces in these countries (de 

Waal 2013, 366; Pargeter 2012, 122–134). He likewise 

incurred the hatred of Western countries by sponsoring 

international terrorism, most notably in the case of the 

Lockerbie bombing in 1988. However, Qaddafi’s 

relations with Western countries significantly improved 

in the early 2000s after he dismantled his weapons of 

mass destruction program and largely desisted from 

sponsoring terrorism (Chorin 2012). Nevertheless, this 

lingering hatred led a coalition of Arab and Western 

countries to propose UN Resolution 1973 in March 

2011, which established a no-fly zone in Libya to 

prevent Qaddafi from using aerial forces to massacre 

the Libyan rebels. The no-fly zone succeeded in 

protecting the rebel forces in Benghazi, but it left 

Qaddafi in power with enough military force to defeat 

the rebels on the ground. Arab and Western countries, 

therefore, recognized the NTC as Libya’s government 

and provided it with the military support necessary to 

defeat Qaddafi (Ibid., 215–232). 

Throughout 2011, South African President Jacob 

Zuma advocated for a less aggressive approach in 

confronting Qaddafi. Unlike with other countries, 

Qaddafi maintained a very warm relationship with the 

leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), 

who led the fight against the South African apartheid 

government and then became South Africa’s dominant 

political party. Qaddafi supported the ANC throughout 

its long struggle against apartheid, even as the Afrikaner 

regime received consistent US support. Nelson 

Mandela never forgot Qaddafi’s steadfast support and 

maintained a close personal relationship with him, even 

while Libya endured international sanctions for its 

terrorism sponsorship. During a press conference with 

US President Bill Clinton, Mandela defended his 

friendship with Qaddafi, stating, “Our moral authority 

dictates that we should not abandon those who helped 

us in the darkest hour of this country. Not only did they 

support us in rhetoric, they gave us the resources for us 

to conduct our struggle.” Mandela went on to say that 

anyone who criticized him for maintaining his 

friendship “can go and throw themselves in the pool” 

(Shogren 1998). 

Mandela’s affection for Qaddafi was matched by a 

broader philosophy that argued peace was best 

achieved through loving dialogue. In the same press 

conference with Clinton, Mandela stated, “The United 

States as the leader of the world should set an example 

to all of us to help eliminate tensions throughout the 

world. And the best way of doing so is to call upon its 

enemies to say, ‘Let’s sit down and talk peace’” (Ibid.). 

Alexander Beresford (2015), in analyzing patterns of 

South African foreign policy, argues that the ANC’s 

strategy for peacemaking mimics its successful strategy 

towards the apartheid regime. This strategy relies on 

patient, quiet diplomacy, which fosters relationships 

between the conflicting parties without shaming or 

embarrassing either side. The ultimate aim is 

establishing a transitional power sharing agreement that 

allows the “losing” side to safely and gracefully 

relinquish power. 

Zuma adopted this strategy towards Qaddafi in 

2011. Very soon after the uprisings against Qaddafi 

broke out, African leaders, including Zuma, met under 

the auspices of the African Union (AU) and quickly 

concluded that Qaddafi would need to step down and 

allow for the formation of an interim inclusive 

government. African leaders were concerned that 

Qaddafi’s sudden overthrow would lead to a power 

vacuum and an expanding civil war that would 

destabilize Libya and create a widening humanitarian 

crisis. Zuma supported UNSCR 1973 authorizing a no-

fly zone in Libya, in the hope that this would give space 

for the AU to negotiate a peaceful settlement. 

Unfortunately, he was stymied both by Qaddafi’s 

intransigence and by Arab and Western impatience. In 

April, Zuma and the presidents of Mali, Mauritania, 

and the Republic of Congo flew to Tripoli and called 

on Qaddafi to negotiate with the NTC and allow for 

free and fair elections, or else be overthrown by foreign 

forces. Qaddafi refused, and Arab and Western 

governments largely ignored AU leaders thereafter (de 

Waal 2013, 370–372; Grovogui 2020).  

Instead, Arab and Western leaders provided the 

rebels with more direct military support, which was in 

direct contravention of UNR 1973, which called for a 

cease-fire. Foreign military support only served to 

escalate the conflict. By ignoring ongoing AU attempts 

at a peaceful settlement, these leaders violated the 

principle of last resort, particularly since they 

themselves made no significant efforts to negotiate 

directly with Qaddafi. Zuma, however, maintained his 

efforts towards a peace settlement, flying again in May 

to Tripoli to try to convince Qaddafi to step down. 

Nevertheless, he was rebuffed once more. When the 

civil war reached a stalemate in June, Zuma called yet 

again for a cease-fire “with the aim of establishing an 

inclusive, consensual interim government, leading to 

democratic elections.” Qaddafi finally expressed some 

interest in negotiating with the NTC, but by then most 

world leaders, including many African leaders, were set 

on overthrowing Qaddafi militarily (de Waal 2013, 

374–375). Zuma was completely marginalized and even 



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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    130 

villainized as sympathetic to a brutal dictator who 

helped pay Zuma’s legal bills when he was facing rape 

charges (Kirchik 2011). 

Sadly, the AU’s concerns about postwar 

humanitarian crises proved prescient. Qaddafi’s forces 

were defeated in autumn 2011, and Qaddafi was 

ultimately executed by rebels who found him hiding in 

a drainage pipe (Chorin 2012, 257). Following 

Qaddafi’s downfall, the NTC was unable to provide the 

stable governance necessary to protect human rights in 

Libya, nor did any of the countries that militarily or 

financially supported regime change. Democratic 

elections initially led to a secular, moderate 

government, but the first prime minister lasted less than 

a month, and no subsequent government was able to 

provide order and unity. Several rebel militias refused 

to disarm, and radical Islamist militias, including al-

Qaeda affiliates, took up arms against the newly 

installed government in Libya and foreign forces 

stationed there. Islamist attacks on foreign embassies—

including the US consulate in Benghazi—caused 

Western countries to flee Libya, abandoning their 

responsibility to rebuild. Libya has since been wracked 

by a civil war between Islamist forces supported by 

Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey, and secular militarists with 

previous ties to the Qaddafi regime supported by Egypt 

and the United Arab Emirates. Rather than human 

rights improving following Qaddafi’s downfall, they 

have significantly worsened (Kuperman 2015).  

Moreover, what happened in Libya did not stay in 

Libya. Radical Islamists, having established a base in 

Libya, launched attacks into Mali, which until then had 

a stable democratic government. This created what the 

Chair of the US Senate Subcommittee on African 

Affairs called “the largest territory controlled by Islamist 

extremists in the world” (Ibid., 73). Ironically, Malian 

President Amadou Toumani Touré was one of the AU 

leaders most committed to negotiating a peaceful, 

incremental transition in Libya. 

The decision-making from the AU leaders and 

Arab-Western coalition corresponds with their 

relationships with Qaddafi. The AU leaders, including 

Zuma and Touré, combined a loving posture towards 

Qaddafi personally with a commitment to a just 

outcome in Libya. In keeping with the principle of last 

resort, they persisted in negotiating with both Qaddafi 

and with the other UN countries to achieve a settlement 

in which Qaddafi stepped down peacefully. This would 

lay the groundwork for inclusive, democratic elections 

and provide consistent stable governance in the 

meantime. Zuma, in particular, went the extra mile to 

appeal to Qaddafi, reflecting the loving relationship 

between Qaddafi and the ANC leadership. 

The Arab-Western coalition, on the other hand, 

had a long hostile relationship with Qaddafi, and as a 

result their pursuit of just war was contaminated by 

mixed motives and a disregard for last resort. The no-

fly zone’s success removed the threat of an imminent 

massacre in Benghazi, so the Arab and Western 

countries had the space to negotiate a more peaceful 

transition. Moreover, the establishment of this no-fly 

zone came at the same time that Saudi forces invaded 

Bahrain to suppress Shi’ite demands for equal rights 

there. This assault sparked little international reaction, 

calling into question the motives of those who targeted 

Qaddafi (Noueihed and Warren 2013, 153–158). This 

does not minimize Qaddafi’s crimes nor invalidate the 

reasons why other countries hated him. Yet, that is why 

just war must include the Christian call to love enemies. 
By definition, the target of just war has committed or 

threatened to commit egregious actions. But when just-

war states refuse to love the enemy they are attacking, 

they will likely fail to uphold the just principles they are 

supposedly promoting.  

 

Conclusion  
Just war doctrine aspires to love the enemy, 

but the way that is accomplished has been under-

theorized. It assumes love can be generated during a 

crisis and expressed through the forbearance of right 

intent and the patience of last resort. If the crisis 

escalates to war, it further assumes love will endure the 

trials and horrors of war and express itself through the 

restraint of discrimination. If the just-war state is 

victorious, it assumes love will take on the heavy 

burdens of reconstruction, security and services 

provision, and statebuilding. It further assumes the just-

war state can and will do this through its own principled 

volition without any subjective care for the enemy itself. 

These are herculean expectations. 

That does not mean, however, that such aims are 

unattainable. These aims are achievable if the just-war 

state has a prior relationship of love with the targeted 

enemy. This relationship provides a foundation and 

motivation by which the loving practices of forbearance, 

patience, restraint, and sacrificial giving are possible. It 

also makes an escalation to war less likely and may 

make a postwar occupation less costly. It also shifts the 

focus from those whose grievance carries a greater 

justification for violence—whether Amharan, Oromo, 

or Tigrayan; Arab or Israeli; Russian or Ukrainian—to 

the recognition that such grievances will either end with 

annihilation or forgiveness (Tutu 1999). It shifts the 

imagination to ideas like those from John Paul 

Lederach (2005), who called for permanent platforms 

of continued dialogue and relationships post-violence. 

This, in turn, requires a shift in our strategic vision from 

one of justice through military victory to justice through 

loving dialogue, as Mandela envisioned. As Martin 

Luther King, Jr. (1962, 48) stated, “[L]ove is the only 

force capable of transforming an enemy into a friend. 



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McKoy, Jus Ante Bellum: Enemy Love and Just War Theory                                                                                    131 

We never get rid of an enemy by meeting hate with 

hate; we get rid of an enemy by getting rid of enmity.” 

 

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Tradition: Christian Foundations and Practices. 
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 

Shogren, Elizabeth. 1998. “Mandela Gives Clinton a 

Lecture on Libya, Cuba.” Los Angeles Times, 
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Tutu, Desmond. 1999. No Future without 
Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday. 

Woodward, Bob. 2004. Plan of Attack. New York: 

Simon & Schuster. 
 

 

Michael McKoy is Chair of the Department of Politics 

and International Relations at Wheaton College (IL). 

His research focuses on the international politics of 

revolutions, and more recently on the international 

political thought of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 

 

Author email: michael.mckoy@wheaton.edu  
 

https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00115
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00115
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00019.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12022
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12022
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0272503700060857
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00609.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00609.x
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/20/by-ignoring-african-leaders-the-west-paved-the-way-for-chaos-in-libya/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/20/by-ignoring-african-leaders-the-west-paved-the-way-for-chaos-in-libya/
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/south-africa-stands-with-qaddafi/244584/
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/south-africa-stands-with-qaddafi/244584/
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483483
https://doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2014.963322
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-mar-28-mn-33490-story.html
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-mar-28-mn-33490-story.html
mailto:michael.mckoy@wheaton.edu

