

# ACRL/RBMS guidelines regarding security and theft in special collections

Approved by the ACRL Board of Directors, September 2009

by the RBMS Security Committee

**T**hese guidelines identify important issues that collection administrators should address in developing adequate security measures and a strategy for responding to thefts. While directed primarily toward special collections in the U.S., many topics are also applicable to general collections and to special collections in other countries. *Special collections* here refers to repositories containing rare books, manuscripts, archives, and other antiquarian and special materials. *Booksellers* refers to those who sell such materials. In the term *library security officer*, *library* is understood to mean any special collections repository.

## Part I: Security measures

**1. Introduction.** Administrators of special collections must ensure that their materials remain intact and secure from theft and damage. The security of collections is now especially important, since administrators' efforts to increase the use and knowledge of collections in their care can result in a greater public awareness of their value and may increase the risk of theft. Security arrangements may vary from one institution to another and are dependent on staffing, physical setting, and use.

Booksellers also must concern themselves with collection security, since thieves may offer stolen materials to them for sale. Administrators should make every effort to familiarize booksellers with the ways institutions attempt to secure and identify their materials and help them use this knowledge to lessen anyone's chances of profiting from theft.

The appointment of a library security officer (LSO) and the development of a written security policy can help ensure that all staff are aware of their legal and procedural responsibilities in applying security measures.

**2. The library security officer.** Each institution concerned with the security of special collections materials should appoint an LSO. The LSO should be appointed by the director, should have primary authority and responsibility to carry out the security program, and should have a thorough knowledge of all repository security needs, particularly those of special collections. The LSO should not necessarily be conceived of as the general security officer, although he or she may also hold that role. The LSO is the person with principal responsibility for planning and administering a security program, which should include a survey of the collections, reviews of the physical layout of the institution, and training of the institution's staff. He or she should develop and maintain active working relationships with colleagues and seek the ad-

### About the guidelines

This version was completed by the RBMS Security Committee in 2008 (and was approved by ACRL in 2009). It replaces the separate "Guidelines for the security of rare books, manuscripts, and other special collections" and "Guidelines regarding thefts in libraries."

vice and assistance of appropriate personnel, such as institutional administrators, corporate counsel, life safety officers, as well as outside consultants from law enforcement agencies and insurance companies.

#### *Suggestions for implementation*

- In some repositories, the LSO and the special collections administrator may be the same person.

- Special collections administrators in institutions without another official for whom the role of LSO would be appropriate are encouraged to take on this role and advocate that the institution recognize the importance of this responsibility.

- Report the name of the current LSO to the LSO-List administrator (see Appendix III).

**3. The security policy.** The LSO should develop a written policy on the security of the collections, in consultation with administrators and staff, legal authorities, and other knowledgeable persons. The policy should include a standard operating procedure on dealing with a theft or other security problems. The security policy should be kept up-to-date with current names and telephone numbers of institutional and law enforcement contacts. The institution should also review the policy periodically to ensure that institutional needs continue to be adequately addressed. The LSO should be involved with the development and implementation of general security measures, as these may affect the security of special collections materials. The LSO should also be involved with emergency and disaster planning.

#### *Suggestions for implementation*

- In large institutions it may be necessary to assemble a security planning group to assist the LSO in identifying problem areas and to recommend solutions. This group, made up of the LSO and other appropriate personnel, will be responsible for developing a security plan to prevent theft and a detailed plan of action to follow when a theft is discovered. The plan may be a part of the institution's disaster plan or constitute a separate plan. The plan should not be a public document (e.g., it should not

be posted on a Web site), but accessible only to appropriate institutional personnel.

- Institutions that lack appropriate staff resources may wish to bring in a security consultant to assist in developing a policy and in determining any major threats to the collection. When engaging a security consultant, the institution or LSO should use caution in evaluating the consultant's competence or ability to perform the work. The institution should investigate the security consultant's background and references thoroughly.

**4. The facility.** The special collections building, unit, or area should have as few access points as possible. Fire and emergency exits, which should be strictly controlled and alarmed, should not be used for regular access. Within the facility itself, the public should have access only to public areas, not to work areas or stack space. Researchers should be received in a separate reception area, where a coatroom and lockers should be provided for researchers' personal belongings and outerwear. A secure reading room where researchers can be continuously monitored by staff trained in surveillance should be identified as the only area in which material may be used. A staff member or security guard should check researchers' personal research materials before they enter the secure area as well as when they depart.

Keys or electronic keycards are especially vulnerable items; therefore, a controlled check-out system for all keys should be maintained. Keys to secure areas should be issued to staff only on an as-needed basis, and master keys should be secured against unauthorized access. Combinations to vaults should have limited distribution and be changed each time a staff member with access leaves his or her position. Strong consideration should be given to installing proprietary keyways (i.e., unique keys and locks available only from a single manufacturer) in locks in the special collections area. Security cameras should be installed that cover reading rooms and any access points that security professionals deem appropriate. All recordings should be retained for as long as possible, preferably permanently.

### *Suggestions for implementation*

- In institutions where it is not possible to hire a security guard, a designated staff member could perform the guard's function. Consideration should be given to installing a video surveillance system.

- As a precautionary policy, keys and locks to secure areas should be changed on a regular basis.

- When an institution plans to remodel, renovate space, or build a new facility for special collections materials, the LSO and the special collections administrator should ensure that all security needs are addressed in the design and planning.

**5. The staff.** An atmosphere of trust and concern for the collections is probably the best guarantee against theft by staff. Nevertheless, close and equitable supervision is essential. The staff, including students and volunteers, should be chosen carefully. Careful personnel management is an ongoing necessity. Disgruntled staff may seek retribution through theft, destruction, or willful mishandling of collections. Consideration should be given to bonding employees who work in special collections. Training the staff in security measures should be a high priority of the LSO. Such training should ensure that staff are aware of their legal and procedural responsibilities in relation to security as well as their own and the researchers' legal rights when handling breaches. Staff should be discouraged from taking personal belongings into secure areas, and such belongings should be subject to inspection by security staff when exiting.

### *Suggestions for implementation*

- The LSO and special collections administrators should ensure that all staff are familiar with these guidelines and the security policies in their institutions and how they may apply specifically to their institution. New staff should receive security training in a timely fashion as part of their orientation process.

- When appropriate or consistent with institutional policies, background checks and bonding of staff members should be considered.

- The LSO and special collections administrators should be familiar with the institution's personnel policies, and advocate security concerns with the institution's human resources staff.

**6. The researchers.** The special collections administrator must carefully balance the responsibility of making materials available to researchers against the responsibility of ensuring the security of the materials. Registration for each researcher who uses special collections materials should be required, including the name, address, legal acknowledgment, and institutional affiliation (if any). Photo identification or some other form of positive identification is necessary to establish physical identity. Records should also be kept of projects researchers are working on and of collections they will be using. These registration records should be retained permanently.

Staff must be able to identify who has used which materials by keeping adequate checkout records, whether paper or electronic. These records should also be retained indefinitely in order to be available to law enforcement authorities if thefts or vandalism later come to light. No matter what their format, the records should unequivocally link a particular researcher to a specific item.

Special collections security plans must take into consideration institutional policies, especially those pertaining to confidentiality, of their parent institution. Access to registration and circulation records should be restricted. Institutional policies and practices, especially in the course of investigating possible thefts, should not violate applicable confidentiality laws. LSOs should be familiar with all applicable laws governing personally identifiable information about users.

Each researcher should be given an orientation to the rules governing the use of the collections. Rules should be prominently posted as well as available on the institution's Web site. Researchers should legally acknowledge compliance with these regulations. Researchers should not be permitted to take extraneous personal materials into the reading areas. These include such items as notebooks, briefcases, outerwear, books, and voluminous papers. Personal computers should be removed from the case before

use in the reading room is permitted. Lockers or some kind of secure space should be provided for any items not permitted in the reading room.

Staff should observe researchers at all times and not allow them to work unobserved behind bookcases, book trucks, stacks of books, or any other obstacles that restrict staff view. Researchers should be limited at any one time to having access only to those books, manuscripts, or other items that are needed to perform the research at hand. Staff should check the condition, content, and completeness of each item before circulating it and when it is returned after use. This checking of materials that are returned is especially important for the use of archival and manuscript collections, which often consist of many loose, unique pieces. Researchers should be required to return all materials before leaving the reading room, even if they plan to return later to continue their research. They should not be allowed to exchange items or to have access to materials brought into the room for use by another researcher.

#### *Suggestions for implementation*

- The LSO or special collections administrator should seek the advice of the institution's legal counsel or other appropriate legal authority when developing researcher policies in order to ensure adequate legal recourse if researchers violate the use agreement.
- The institution should require that all researchers read and legally acknowledge an agreement to abide by institutional policies.

**7. The collections.** Administrators of special collections must be able to identify positively the materials in their collections to establish loss and to substantiate claims to recovered stolen property. This process includes keeping adequate accession records, maintaining detailed cataloging records and lists in finding aids, recording copy-specific information, and keeping condition reports and records. Lists developed to fulfill the requirements of insurance policies should also be kept current. In addition, the materials themselves should be made identifiable by marking them following the Guidelines for Marking (Appendix D), by applying other unique marks, and by keeping

photographic, digital, or microform copies of valuable items.

A recent theft or act of vandalism may give an indication of a building area, subject, or type of material that will be the target of future theft or mutilation. If appropriate, transfer materials related to those already stolen or mutilated to a more secure area. The theft or mutilation of printed books or manuscripts may indicate that other genres of materials containing similar subject matter will become the targets of thieves and vandals.

Many institutions house materials in open stack areas accessible to all users. These open stack areas may contain rare materials that are unidentified and unprotected. Materials in open stacks are most vulnerable to breaches in security. Many thieves search these areas for materials considered rare, rather than attempt to infiltrate special collections or outwit the security measures implemented in monitored reading rooms. Institutions should establish procedures for the routine review of general stacks, using the "ACRL/RBMS Guidelines on the Selection of General Collection Materials for Transfer to Special Collections" to assist in identifying rare materials on the open shelves in need of protection.

#### *Suggestion for implementation*

- Items that are more valuable should be segregated from the collections into higher security areas, with more restricted conditions for staff access and researcher use.

### **8. Record-keeping, description, and cataloging**

A. Catalog all materials as fully as institutional resources and descriptive practices will allow. Stolen materials that have been described in detail are far more easily identified and recovered. Materials that have not been completely cataloged or processed should be made available to researchers only if security is not compromised and additional precautions (such as more stringent supervision of use, a reduction in the number of items dispensed at one time, and marking of items) are taken.

B. In the case of books, use the catalog record to describe copy-specific characteristics

(e.g., binding, marks of previous ownership, defects) and bibliographic information that helps to distinguish among editions, issues, and states. Maintain complete acquisitions records, including antiquarian catalog descriptions. Create machine-readable records for local public access and international bibliographic databases. Participate in bibliographic projects that record detailed bibliographic descriptions.

C. Conduct regular inventories of both cataloged and uncataloged book collections and other collections when possible. This task is most effectively performed by staff members working in teams and should be conducted on a random basis. Proceeding through the collection in a predictable manner is not wise, since it may allow thieves to temporarily replace stolen materials. A simultaneous reconciliation of the shelflist with the collection is also recommended. Inventories conducted even in small stages are valuable, since they may reveal thefts (as well as misshelved books) and serve as a deterrent to any potential in-house thieves.

D. Maintain a shelflist, preferably in paper form for special collections, in a secure area. If the shelflist is electronic, it should be secure from tampering and a backup should be stored off-site. Since the shelflist indicates precisely where each item should be located, and because it contains copy-specific information about special collections materials, its maintenance and security are vital for detecting and recovering thefts.

E. Maintain up-to-date records of unlocated items and periodically recheck them; consider reporting missing items that are still unlocated after several searches to appropriate agencies (see II.3.B. below), noting their status as missing rather than stolen.

F. Cancel marks of ownership when deaccessioning items and keep careful, detailed records of such deaccessions. No attempt to remove ownership marks should be made.

### **9. Legal and procedural responsibilities.**

The administrators of special collections and the LSO must know laws relating to library and archival theft, as well as institutional policies on apprehension of suspects and must convey this information to staff; they must also report

thefts promptly to appropriate law enforcement agencies. Staff members must be aware of their legal rights in stopping thefts without infringing on the rights of suspects.

#### *Suggestion for implementation*

- LSOs and/or special collections administrators should take an active role in raising the awareness of other institutional officials—e.g., institutional legal officers, public safety officers, the director, et al.—regarding the serious nature of materials theft, and urge the institution to resolve security threats and breaches and to seek the strictest punishment possible for those convicted of theft or other security violations.

### **10. Institutional and legislative support**

A. Work with the institutional administration to ensure its support for the prosecution of thieves. This support may range from the collection of evidence to be shared with prosecutors, to direct participation with the prosecution before and during the trial.

B. Work with appropriate institutional, local, and state groups to lobby for strengthening state laws regarding library and archival thefts and for diligent prosecution of such crimes. (See Appendix II: “Draft of Model Legislation: Theft and Mutilation of Library Materials.”)

## **Part II: Responses to theft**

**1. Formulation of action plan.** Like a disaster plan, an institutional plan for dealing with a theft will ensure a quick and well-organized response. The LSO, in concert with appropriate administrators, public relations personnel, security personnel, law enforcement (local, state, and federal, if necessary), and legal counsel should formulate a course of action that includes:

- Establishment of good working relations with law enforcement agencies—institutional, local, state, and/or federal—and determination of which agency has original jurisdiction over the institution (e.g., in-house security, local or state police, etc.) and under which circumstances they should be called. The institution should maintain a list of contacts in each level of law enforcement and discuss the plan of action with each (see Resources Directory). The FBI, as well as U.S.

Customs or Interpol, might become involved if stolen items are suspected of being smuggled into or out of the country;

- notification of appropriate stolen and missing books, databases, and other appropriate networks (see Appendix III);
- notification of local and regional booksellers and appropriate specialist sellers;
- transfer of vulnerable items to a more secure location;
- arrangement of appraisals upon discovery of missing items;
- questioning of staff regarding any suspicious behavior by users or other persons;
- preparation of regular communications to staff about progress in the case, consistent with the investigation's integrity;
- preparation of news releases and responses by authorized institutional representatives to questions posed by the news media; all staff should be instructed to refer inquiries to the authorized spokesperson; and
- maintenance of internal record of actions taken during the case's progress, from its discovery to its final disposition.

**2. Response to a theft in progress.** If suspicions are sufficiently aroused, both a witness and the LSO should immediately be summoned and, if possible, the subject's actions captured on a security camera. After this point, it is necessary to follow institutional policies and applicable state laws concerning the incident. Because of wide vagaries in both those variables, more specific recommendations about potential courses of action in this situation are problematic. Whereas some actions, such as summoning security or the police may seem logical, they may in fact be counter to institutional policies.

- If there is probable cause that a theft has occurred, the appropriate library staff should request that the police officer place the suspect under arrest. (Laws regarding grounds for arrest vary from state to state, and library staff should know the relevant state laws.) If there is evidence of theft, (e.g., materials hidden on the suspect's person), one should not agree to the suspect's release in return for the suspect's assurances that he or she will return to face charges. If the officer

will not make an arrest, attempt to persuade the officer to detain the suspect until the officer can verify his/her identity and place of residence.

At the first opportunity, each person involved should describe in writing the suspect's physical appearance and obtain written accounts of the entire event from witnesses involved. This document may be needed later, especially if the case is prosecuted. Any materials the suspect has already turned back in should be immediately retrieved and inspected for loss or damage.

### **3. Subsequent response**

**A. Gather evidence.** The LSO will notify administrative officers, institutional security personnel, as well as appropriate law enforcement personnel, and will compile a list of missing items. (This does not mean that the entire collection needs to be inventoried.) Other units and local repositories should be alerted. However, after the immediate steps listed below have been taken, it is suggested that works similar to those that have been stolen be inventoried. In consultation with the personnel previously notified, one should gather all available evidence of theft (such as those items listed below), which must not be altered in any way:

- detailed, copy-specific descriptions of missing materials,
- any relevant video files or electronic security system logs,
- chain of custody documentation for missing materials (including call slips or copies of electronic records),
- indications of unauthorized physical access to restricted areas,
- report of any missing cataloging or circulation records and database tampering, and
- report on any indication of systematic patterns of loss of materials.

**B. Report to appropriate organizations and agencies.** The library should inform local booksellers of the institution's collecting areas and establish a procedure for quickly informing them of any theft that has occurred in the repository. Thieves sometimes try to sell stolen property quickly, and sellers with knowledge of the collections can recognize, or at least be

suspicious of, these genres of materials when they are offered.

Thefts or missing items that are believed to have been stolen should be immediately reported to appropriate electronic mailing lists and national stolen and missing book databases (for a complete listing and details see Resources Directory). A search of auction sales records may be advisable if there is reason to believe the stolen material reached the market.

**C. Assist with prosecution.** After the perpetrator is apprehended and brought to trial, the institution should establish lines of communication with the prosecution throughout the process of adjudication. This is particularly important if a plea-bargain and restitution are involved, since the institution may need to submit an account of damages. It is advisable for a representative to be present during the trial and especially during the sentencing phase, at which point the institution may wish to make a statement. This statement should refer to the seriousness of the crime, the damage to the cultural record, and its impact on the institution and its users. Such statements have been known to influence judges to impose harsher punishments.

**D. Arrange for the return of located materials.** Once stolen materials are identified, it is necessary to confirm that they indeed belong to the institution; this process is facilitated by the record-keeping recommendations in Part I, Section 8.

If the stolen materials reached the market and are in the hands of a new owner, recovery may be a difficult and time-consuming process. This is especially true if the materials are in a foreign country, where different legal systems and laws of title regarding the transfer of stolen goods are involved. Law enforcement and legal counsel will be able to provide advice on these issues. If a bookseller or auction house sold the items, its assistance should be enlisted in the recovery effort.

While in some cases authorities may be able to seize stolen items, in many cases this is not possible. Negotiation may be required, and it may prove necessary to compensate the current owner to obtain the timely return of the items. Depending on the circumstances, a bookseller

or auction house should be requested to participate in the compensation, though this cannot be enforced.

Careful records of the stolen and returned items and all other aspects of the theft should be kept in perpetuity.

## APPENDIX I

*Guidelines for marking books, manuscripts, and other special collections materials*

**I. Introduction.** There has been much discussion within the special collections community regarding the appropriateness of permanently marking books, manuscripts, and other special collections materials. Failure to mark compromises security. Cases of theft show that clear identification of stolen material is vital if material, once recovered, is to be returned to its rightful owner. The following guidelines are intended to aid special collections in marking materials, as well as to promote consistency and uniformity.

Even the most conservative marking program results in permanent alteration of materials. Choices concerning marking are likely to depend heavily on one's aesthetic judgment balanced against the need to secure materials from theft and to assist in their identification and recovery. Each repository will have to balance those competing needs. The ACRL/RBMS Security Committee recommends that libraries and other institutions use marking as part of their overall security procedures and that they attempt to strike a balance between the implications for deterrence (visibility, permanence) and the integrity of the documents (both physical and aesthetic).

### II. General recommendations

1. That markings be both:
  - a. readily visible to the casual observer
  - b. hidden and difficult to detect.
2. That readily visible marks be made in an approved form of permanent ink, such as that available from the Library of Congress ([www.loc.gov/preserv/markings.html](http://www.loc.gov/preserv/markings.html)).
3. That marks that are hidden or difficult to detect never be the only or primary types of marking.
4. That visible marks be placed so that they will cause significant damage to the aes-

thetic and commercial value of the item if they are removed.

5. That marks be placed directly on the material itself and not on an associated part from which the material may be separated.

6. That all marks unequivocally and clearly identify the repository.

### **III. Discussion**

1. Readily visible marks are intended to deter potential thieves; hidden marks are intended to assist in the recovery of stolen materials. If only one type of mark is to be used, it should be of the readily visible type.

2. Visible marks should be all but impossible to remove and should never consist of just a bookplate. Although not the only form of a visible mark, ink is perhaps the best medium for this purpose, so long as the ink meets current standards for permanence and conservation. There is still controversy surrounding which inks are best suited for this purpose, so a recommendation cannot go beyond urging those in charge of marking programs to be current on the latest developments in this field.

3. Hidden marks should never be used as the only form of marking, because they are worthless in alerting others, such as booksellers, that material has been stolen. Hidden marks are intended only as supplements to visible marks.

4. Much controversy has surrounded the placement of visible marks. Given the varying nature of special collections materials and the varying nature of beliefs and sentiments concerning what is proper placement for a visible mark, it is probably futile to overly prescribe placement of marks. It is recommended, however, that no position for a mark be rejected outright. Some repositories might, for example, be comfortable stamping the verso of a title page or the image area of a map; others might reject those options. However, regardless of where the visible mark is placed, it should not be in a position that it can be removed without leaving obvious evidence of its former presence.

5. Marks of whatever type must be placed directly on the material itself. Marks placed only on a front pastedown in a book, on a portfolio that holds prints, or on some type of backing

material are rendered useless if that element is separated from the item. Especially in the case of flat items, such as maps and broadsides, it is important that the marks be applied before any backing procedure is done.

6. Marks should not be generic (e.g., "Rare Book Room," "Special Collections," "University Library," etc.) but should rather make plain the repository to which they refer. It is recommended that visible marking consist of the repository's Library of Congress symbol. If a repository lacks such a symbol, the Library of Congress will supply one upon request. If the Library of Congress symbol is not used, then the name of the repository should be used, being careful that no confusion arises among repositories with similar or identical names.

### **IV. Other considerations**

1. Hidden marks do not have to be marks at all. They merely have to provide some positive ownership indication that is extremely difficult if not impossible to detect. Microembossers, for example, provide an extremely cheap and difficult to detect type of nearly invisible mark. Modern technology also provides noninvasive marking techniques, such as microphotography, that do not leave any mark on the item itself yet serve as positive identification. Other technologies, such as microtaggants, may also be appropriate for this purpose. It is vital if such marks are used, however, that the repository keep extremely accurate records of such marks so that they can be readily found for identification purposes, if the need arises to do so. Generic secret marking systems, such as underlining a word on page 13 of every book, should be avoided as the sole means of such marks.

2. Repositories should never attempt to cancel marks, even in the event that the material is deaccessioned. No system has yet been devised for canceling marks that cannot be imitated with relative ease by thieves, and there seems to be no alternative but to assume permanent responsibility for one's mark on a book, manuscript, or other document. Permanent records should be kept of deaccessioned materials, whether marked or unmarked, and the material itself when released should be accompanied by a



document conveying ownership. It is advisable to place stamps or notes in items indicating that they have been deaccessioned, but no attempt should be made to cancel or remove previous ownership marks.

3. Marks should be applied to all items when they are accepted into the collection. It is dangerous to send unmarked items into storage or a cataloging backlog, where they may remain for years with no indication that the repository owns them. Despite the fact that some items may present extremely difficult and complicated decisions about marking, the process should never be deferred. It is strongly recommended that programs also be instituted to mark retrospectively materials already in the collections.

4. Care must be taken to ensure that all discrete or removable parts are marked. It is recommended that each separate plate, map, chart, or other such item in a printed volume be marked individually. Volumes of bound manuscripts and collections of individual manuscripts present a similar problem and each discrete item in such collections should also be marked.

## APPENDIX II

### *Draft of model legislation: Theft and mutilation of library materials*

The draft of proposed legislation presented below may have to be modified in order to conform with federal and state laws regarding search and seizure. Also, the recourse to civil law that is available to a detained suspect may differ from state to state, and the draft legislation may have to be modified in order to meet such potential challenges. However, the wording of definitions should be adhered to; they have been formulated with the assistance of legal counsel. Nationwide conformity to the definition of essential terminology in criminal legislation is desirable.

### **Declaration of purpose**

Because of the rising incidence of library theft and mutilation of library materials, libraries are suffering serious losses of books and other library property. In order to assure that research materials are available for public use, it is the policy of this state to provide libraries and their

employees and agents with legal protection to ensure security for their collections. It is the policy of this state to affirm that local, state, and federal prosecution of crimes affecting books or other library property is executed with the same degree of diligence as is exercised in prosecution of crimes affecting other forms of property. Federal statute pertaining to stolen property is designed not only to implement federal-state cooperation in apprehending and punishing criminals who use, or cause to be used, channels of interstate commerce for transportation of property of which the owner has been wrongfully deprived, but also to deter original theft.

### **Definition of terms**

*Library* means any public library; any library of an educational, benevolent, hereditary, historical, or eleemosynary institution, organization, or society; any museum; any repository of public or institutional records.

*Property* means any book, plate, picture, photograph, print, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any format, magnetic or other tape, catalog card or catalog record, electronic data processing record, artifact; or other documentary, written, or printed materials; or equipment, regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library.

### **Proposed wording**

*Section I.a.* Any person who willfully, maliciously, or wantonly writes upon, injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book, document, or other library property belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library is guilty of a crime.

*Section I.b.* The willful concealment of a book or other library property upon the person or among the belongings of the person or concealed upon the person or among the belongings of another while still on the premises of a library shall be considered *prima facie* evidence of intent to commit larceny thereof.

*Section I.c.* The willful removal of a book or other library property in contravention of library

regulations shall be considered *prima facie* evidence of intent to commit larceny thereof.

*Section I.d.* The willful alteration or destruction of library ownership records, electronic or card catalog records retained apart from or applied directly to a book or other library property shall be considered *prima facie* evidence of intent to commit larceny of a book or other library property.

*Section II.a.* An adult agent or employee of a library or that library's parent institution, whether or not that employee or agent is part of a security force, who has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person committed, was committing, or was attempting to commit the acts described in Section I may detain the suspect. Immediately upon detention, the library employee shall identify himself/herself and state the reason for his/her action. If, after the initial confrontation with the suspect, the adult agent or library employee has reasonable grounds to believe that at the time of detention that the person committed, was committing, or was attempting to commit the crimes set forth in Section I, said employee or agent may detain such a person for a time sufficient to summon a peace officer to the library. Said detention must be accomplished in a reasonable manner without unreasonable restraints or excessive force and may take place only on the premises of the library where the alleged crime occurred. Library premises include the interior of a building, structure, or other enclosure in which a library facility is located; the exterior appurtenances to such building structure or other enclosure; and the land on which such building, structure, or other enclosure, is located. Any person so detained by an employee or agent of a library shall promptly be asked to identify himself/herself by name and address. Once placed under detention, the suspect shall not be required to provide any other information nor shall any written and/or signed statement be elicited from the suspect until a police officer has taken the suspect into custody. The said employee or agent may, however, examine said property which the employee or agent has reasonable grounds to believe was unlawfully taken as set forth

in Section I.b. and/or Section I.c., or injured or destroyed as set forth in Section I.a. and/or Section I.d. Should the detained suspect refuse to surrender the item for examination, a search may be made only of packages, shopping bags, handbags, or other property in the immediate possession of the person detained; no clothing worn by the suspect may be searched.

The activation of an electronic article surveillance device as a result of a person exiting the premises or an area within the premises of a library where an electronic article surveillance device is located shall constitute probable cause for the detention of such person by such library or agent or employee of the library, provided that such person is detained only in a reasonable manner and only for such time as is necessary for an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the activation of the device, and provided that clear and visible notice is posted at each exit and location within the premises where such device is located indicating the presence of an anti-theft device. For purposes of this section, *electronic article surveillance device* means an electronic device designed and operated for the purpose of detecting the removal from the premises or a protected area within such premises, of any specially marked or tagged book or other library property.

*Section II.b.* For the purposes of Section II.a., "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed or injured a book or other library property while on the premises of the library or the inability of the suspect to produce the library material for which there is a document proving that person had used but had not returned said material.

*Section II.c.* In detaining a person who the employee or agent of the library has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, was committing, or was attempting to commit any of the crimes set forth in Section I, the said employee or agent may use a reasonable amount of nondeadly force when and only when such force is necessary to protect the employee or agent or to prevent the escape of the person being detained or the loss of the library's property.

*Section III.* An adult agent or employee of a library who stops, detains, and/or causes the arrest of any person pursuant to Section II shall not be held civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention, assault, battery, defamation of character, malicious prosecution, or invasion of civil rights of the person stopped, detained, and/or arrested, provided that in stopping, detaining, or causing the arrest of the person, the adult agent or employee had at the time of the stopping, detention, or arrest reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was attempting to commit any of the crimes set forth in Section I.

*Section IV.* The fair market value of property affected by crimes set forth in Section I determines the class of offense: value under \$500 constitutes a misdemeanor; \$500-\$5,000 a Class I felony; above \$5,000, a Class II felony.

The aggregate value of all property referred to in a single indictment shall constitute the value thereof.

*Section V.* A copy or abstract of this act shall be posted and prominently displayed in all libraries.

*Section VI.* This act shall take effect upon passage.

## **APPENDIX III**

### **Resources Directory (current as of March 2009)**

The updated directory of resources for this document is located at the RBMS Web site: [www.rbms.info](http://www.rbms.info) Please consult this directory for the latest information on moderators and Web addresses.

#### **I. Publications**

ACRL Code of Ethics for Special Collections Librarians (2003). [www.rbms.info/standards/code\\_of\\_ethics.shtml](http://www.rbms.info/standards/code_of_ethics.shtml).

Association of College and Research Libraries. Guidelines on the Selection and Transfer of Materials from General Collections to Special Collections (2008). [www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/selecttransfer.cfm](http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/selecttransfer.cfm).

Association of College and Research Libraries. Guidelines for the Interlibrary Loan of

Rare and Unique Materials. [www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/rareguidelines.cfm](http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/rareguidelines.cfm).

Association of College and Research Libraries. Guidelines for Borrowing and Lending Special Collections Materials for Exhibition (2005). [www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/borrowguide.cfm](http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlstandards/borrowguide.cfm).

Society of American Archivists. *Libraries and Archives: An Overview of Risk and Loss Prevention* (1994).

Society of American Archivists. *Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Archival Security* (1995).

American Library Association Map and Geography Round Table. Map Collection Security Guidelines Current draft (2007) at [www.ala.org/ala/magert/MapSecurityGuidelines2007.pdf](http://www.ala.org/ala/magert/MapSecurityGuidelines2007.pdf).

Thefts of Early Maps and Books. [www.maphistory.info/thefts.html](http://www.maphistory.info/thefts.html).

#### **II. Other resources**

International Association of Professional Security Consultants. [www.iapsc.org](http://www.iapsc.org). (949) 640-9918; fax: (949) 640-9911. Includes listing of professional security consultants with varying areas of expertise. Members of the organization cannot sell anything or represent any security firm.

Archives and Security Bibliography (draft). [www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/archives-resources/security.html](http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/archives-resources/security.html). This document, dated June 27, 2002, is attributed to Nicole Gordon of the Office of Regional Records Services. The page is contained within the Web site for the Archives Library Information Center ([www.archives.gov/research/alic/](http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/)) and is part of NARA ([www.archives.gov/](http://www.archives.gov/)).

ACRL/RBMS Security Committee. [www.rbms.info/committees/security/index/shtml](http://www.rbms.info/committees/security/index/shtml). Current chair: Richard Oram, [roram@mail.utexas.edu](mailto:roram@mail.utexas.edu)

Exlibris electronic discussion list: [exlibris-l@indiana.edu](mailto:exlibris-l@indiana.edu); subscribe at [listserv@listserv.indiana.edu](mailto:listserv@listserv.indiana.edu). Posting by subscribers only. Extensive Web archives that include security topics available at [palimpsest.stanford.edu/byform/mailling-lists/exlibris/](http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/byform/mailling-lists/exlibris/). For further

information, contact moderator Everett Wilkie at ewilkie@ix.netcom.com.

Archives and Archivists Electronic Discussion list. Often includes discussions about library security. Archives are available at forums.archivists.org/read/?forum=archives (September 2006 to present) and listserv. muohio.edu/archives/archives.html (April 1993 to September 2006). Address for posting is archives@forums.archivists.org. Subscription address is www.archivists.org/listservs/arch\_listserv\_terms.asp.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Art Theft Program. www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/arttheft/arttheft.htm.

Los Angeles Police Dept. Art Theft Detail. www.lapdonline.org/art\_theft\_detail.

Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE). Sponsors occasional conferences on stolen rare books. www.savingantiquities.org.

### III. Secret marking technology

For more information about several of the currently available secret marking technologies, see the following Web sites.

Microembossers, www.microstampusa.com.

Microtaggants, www.microtracesolutions.com/915.htm.

Microdots, www.datadotdna.com.

### IV. Addresses for reporting thefts

Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 20 West 44th St., 4th floor, New York, NY 10035-6604. (212) 944-8291; fax: (212) 944-8293; e-mail: hq@abaa.com. ABAA circulates reports of thefts through its electronic discussion list and maintains a stolen books database with a report form at www.abaa.org/books/abaa/databases/stolen\_search.html.

ACRL/RBMS Security Committee. See contact information provided above.

Art Loss Register. For-profit database with charge for listing and searching entries (unless these are submitted through Interpol). www.artloss.com/.

DeRicci Project: dericci@aol.com (for pre-1600 manuscripts only).

International League of Antiquarian Booksellers (ILAB). Send theft reports and requests

for database searches to: security@ilab-lila.com (reporting and searching limited to members).

International Antiquarian Mapsellers Association "Missing and Stolen Map Database": www.missingmaps.info. This is open to the public, but use of the report form does require site registration.

Interpol. Investigates international thefts of cultural property. Submit reports via Interpol liaison at state or provincial level or via FBI, www.interpol.int/Public/WorkOfArt/Default.asp.

Library Security Officers List. Susan Allen, moderator. Closed nondiscussion electronic list for theft reporting and limited to library security officers only. For information contact the owner at sallen@getty.edu.

Museum Security Network. www.museum-security.org/wordpress/. Reporting address: securma@pop.xs4all.nl. Contact the moderator at: museum-security@museum-security.org.

Professional Autograph Dealers Association. c/o Catherine Barnes, P.O. Box 27782, Philadelphia, PA 19118; e-mail: cb@barnesautographs.com; URL: www.padaweb.org. (215) 247-9240; fax: (215) 247-4645.

Society of American Archivists, 527 S. Wells, Chicago, IL. 60607. (312) 922-0140; fax (312) 347-1452; e-mail: sfox@archivists.org; URL: www.archivists.org. This organization has several books in print on special collections/archives security. It also has a security-related round table and a discussion list at saasecurity-l@cornell.edu. This list is open only to SAA members, however.

### V. Disaster preparedness

Smithsonian Institution Staff Disaster Preparedness Procedures, prepared by Office of Risk Management, October 1992, revised, October 1993. palimpsest.stanford.edu/bytopic/disasters/

Northeast Document Conservation Center. 100 Brickstone Square, Andover, MA 01810-1494. (978) 470-1010; fax: (978) 475-6021. www.nedcc.org/home.php. They maintain a "Disaster Assistance" services page nedcc.org/services/disaster.php. 