id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-1719	Lin, Yu-Hsin	Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control	2017	58	.pdf	application/pdf	19137	837	50	Using cross-country data, both La Porta et al. and Claessens et al. find that the cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders are positively correlated with shareholder value, which is consistent with the incentive effect of cash-flow ownership under agency theory.85 With regard to the effect of the wedge on firm value, the results are somewhat mixed. Instead, IPO charters commonly include a staggered board, which is a takeover defense that is considered to be value-decreasing.121 From an agency theory perspective, one-share one-vote is an efficient allocation of corporate control because shareholders are the only group of corporate stakeholders who bear the risks of bad decisions and have the right incentives to make discretionary decisions.122 Mechanisms that create deviations from the one-share one-vote rule would result in greater entrenchment agency costs by insulating managers from the market for corporate control.123 Controlling-minority shareholders not only have the incentive, but also the ability, to extract private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders.124 From a contractarian theorist’s point of view, mechanisms that offer shareholders leveraged control are not desirable in IPO charters.	cache/cblr-1719.pdf	txt/cblr-1719.txt