id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-1750	Davis, Alicia J.	The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate Governance”	2015	120	.pdf	application/pdf	44376	2067	62	Very little is known about what works in corporate governance, and the empirical evidence on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms is mixed, at best. He argues that Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and the highly influential proxy advisory firms who promulgate commercial ratings promote internal governance mechanisms, which have not proven effective, while Congress, state legislatures, and courts not only fail to promote a robust market for corporate control, but also impede its effectiveness by sanctioning both the implementation of antitakeover mechanisms and their maintenance in the face of a hostile bid.14 There have been thousands of law review articles written about corporate governance in the past ten	cache/cblr-1750.pdf	txt/cblr-1750.txt