id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-1780	Guttentag, Michael D.	On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending	2014	70	.pdf	application/pdf	24739	1037	41	Opponents of the Bebchuk Petition have argued, among other things: (1) that such a requirement is superfluous given existing public company disclosure obligations (see, e.g., Atkins, supra, at 367; Verret, supra, at 464–65); (2) that such a requirement is more likely to harm than benefit public company shareholders (see, e.g., Copland, supra, at 384); and (3) that public company political spending disclosure is not an appropriate topic for SEC consideration (see, e.g., Smith & Dickerson, supra, at 422). requirements.6 The argument that mandatory political spending disclosure is necessary to protect shareholder rights fails to explain why the federal government should grant expressive protection to public company shareholders or to acknowledge the degree to which voluntary disclosures already provide such protection to concerned investors.7 Finally, observing that market failures can distort public company disclosure policies only begins the process of evaluating a topic-specific disclosure proposal.8 To advance the debate about political spending disclosure it is necessary to first answer a more general question: how the efficacy of any topic-specific disclosure requirement should be evaluated.	cache/cblr-1780.pdf	txt/cblr-1780.txt