id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-1801	Mhatre, Miheer	Parallel or Paralyzed? Sklena, Rule 804(b)(1), and the Costly Implications for Interagency Law Enforcement Efforts	2013	3	.pdf	application/pdf	1507	49	48	I. INTRODUCTION On April 2, 2004, floor traders David Sklena and Edward Sarvey arrived at work in the five- year Treasury note futures pit at the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”).1 Sklena and Sarvey had no idea that April 2––which, in Sklena’s opinion, became “the busiest day in the history of the [CBOT]”––would generate a rapid flurry of transactions that would form the basis of a criminal prosecution against them.2 On that day, the price of the five-year note futures fluctuated wildly––so wildly, in fact, that the aforementioned transactions transpired over a period of only seven minutes.3 The Seventh Circuit recounted the precise details in its decision: * J.D. Candidate 2014, Columbia Law School; A.B. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 2011, Princeton University. This was when, according to the government, Sklena and Sarvey conspired to sell Sarvey’s customers’ contracts non- competitively.4 At approximately 7:37 AM, the other traders noticed that Sklena and Sarvey were engaged in a private conversation as chaos reigned within the pit.5 Shortly thereafter, Sarvey sold 2,274 contracts to Sklena at a price of 111.065 each, and Sklena immediately resold 485 of those contracts back to Sarvey at 111.070.6 Both of these prices were well below the customary market price, positioning the two traders for a massive payday.7 Scarcely seven minutes later, Sklena sold his remaining 1,789 contracts and “netted . . .	cache/cblr-1801.pdf	txt/cblr-1801.txt