id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-2871	Barzuza, Michal	Noise Adopters in Corporate Governance	2014	40	.pdf	application/pdf	13201	642	57	As a result, the motivation of bad firms to imitate good firms by adopting a non-classified board is reduced relative to what it would have been in information-efficient markets. In particular, there are three main (but not unique) equilibria that could produce this setup: (1) a separating equilibrium in which good firms (firms that face significant market discipline) adopt strict governance and bad firms (firms that face weak market discipline) adopt lax governance; (2) a pooling equilibrium in which all firms adopt strict governance; or (3) a pooling equilibrium in which all firms adopt lax governance.	cache/cblr-2871.pdf	txt/cblr-2871.txt