id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-5120	Greene, Kyle L.	Standard Essential Patents and Antitrust Law: Balancing Innovation and Competition	2019	39	.pdf	application/pdf	14169	530	46	ANTITRUST LIABILITY: WHEN SEP HOLDERS REFUSE TO DEAL A. Reasons for a Presumption of Antitrust Liability The affirmative case for a presumption of antitrust liability when a SEP holder refuses to deal with a prospective standard implementer in violation of its FRAND commitments proceeds, from the above discussion, as follows: (1) the standard setting process is of vital importance for many industries and technologies, but confers incredible and abusable power to SEP holders,141 (2) despite Trinko, the Supreme Court has not ruled out either the essential facilities doctrine or an intent-based inquiry for a Sherman Act Section 2 refusal to deal case,142 and (3) the leading circuit court decisions that consider refusals to deal by patent holders in general do not offer policy or legal objections which support an argument against presuming antitrust liability when the patent holder owns a standard essential patent.143 As a result, a refusal to deal by an SEP holder is dangerously anticompetitive conduct that is—on its face—exactly the sort of conduct which has been, and should be, condemned by the antitrust laws. Although the following cases do not directly address the situation of a refusal to deal by a standard essential patent holder, a set of important circuit court decisions establish a spectrum of approaches to refusals to deal by patent holders in general.95 As standard essential patent holders are a subset of this larger group, it is obvious that this set of cases structures the litigation landscape for SEP holders and their potential antitrust liability.	cache/cblr-5120.pdf	txt/cblr-5120.txt