id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cblr-5121	Hayes, William	Insider Interest, Not Industry Influence: The Practice of Federal Reserve Bank Presidential Appointments	2019	49	.pdf	application/pdf	16545	813	45	As outlined above, challenges to the constitutionality of the appointments procedure for Federal Reserve Bank Presidents were decided without any constitutional resolution, creating a “judicial hedge around Fed independence.”154 After the financial crisis, some pointed to the insularity of the Federal Reserve as a potentially exacerbating cause.186 Looking beyond the regulatory sphere, the lack of dissenting votes on the FOMC may further indicate homogeneity within the System.187 To the extent that the politically insulated process for appointing Federal Reserve Bank Presidents further entrenches this trend, the practical effects on regulation may be undesirable.	cache/cblr-5121.pdf	txt/cblr-5121.txt