Microsoft Word - Brogdon Note 6.11.12 NEED PAGE NUMBERS.docx   263   A  New  Horizon?:    The  Need  for  Improved   Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   Lauren  Hunt  Brogdon*   Introduction  ................................................................................................  264   I.    The  Deepwater  Horizon  Spill  and  Its  Causes  ............................  267   A.    Background  .......................................................................................  268   B.    Causes  ..................................................................................................  272   1.    The  Blowout  Preventer  and  Other  Technical     Failures  .............................................................................................  272   2.    The  Failures  of  MMS  and  Lack  of  Oversight  ....................  275   C.    Inadequacies  in  Proposed  and  Existing  Legislation  ........  282   II.    Existing  Regulations  and  Laws  Must  Be  Improved  to   Prevent  Spills  of  Disastrous  Magnitudes  from  Occurring  in   the  Future  .................................................................................................  291   A.    NEPA  and  OPA  Should  Be  Reexamined  to  Require  a   Detailed  EIS  for  Major  Oil-­‐Related  Developments  and   Greater  Consistency  Among  Response  Plans  .......................  291   B.    An  Independent  Board  Should  Be  Established  to  Monitor   and  Approve  Developing  Technologies  Before   Implementation  .................................................................................  294   C.    Industry  Should  Rely  Less  on  Human  Triggers  of  Last   Resort  Protective  Technologies  .................................................  297   III.    Conclusion  ...........................................................................................  301   264   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   INTRODUCTION   On  April   20,   2010,   the  Deepwater  Horizon   offshore   oil   rig   caught   fire   and   exploded   fifty-­‐two  miles   off   the   coast   of   Louisiana.1     Soon   after,   the   rig   platform   sank   into   the   Gulf   of   Mexico,   and   the   uncompleted   Macondo   exploratory   well   began   releasing   crude   oil   into  Gulf  waters  at  a  rate  of  5000  barrels—or  200,000  gallons—per   day.2     When   the   Macondo   well   was   finally   closed   off   on   August   6,   2010—106  days  after  the  initial  explosion—it  had  released  a  total  of   4.9   million   barrels   of   crude   oil   into   the   Gulf,3   devastating   the   environment  and  disrupting  the  local  economy  to  such  a  great  extent   that   the   full   long-­‐term   impacts   of   the   damage   have   yet   to   be   fully   realized.4   In   the   weeks   and  months   following   the   spill,   government   actors   began  to  clean  up  the  oil  and  allocate  liability  for  the  environmental   and   economic   damage.5     In   the   midst   of   these   efforts   came   the   ubiquitous   call   to   ensure   that   a   disaster   of   such  magnitude   would   never   occur   again.6     Responding   to   this   call,   the   government     * J.D.   2012,   Columbia   Law   School.     The   author   would   like   to   thank   Professors   Michael   Gerrard   and   Robert   Ferguson   for   their   advice   and   suggestions,   as  well   as   Devin  McDougall,   Michael  Panfil,  Blake  Brogdon,  and  the  members  of  the  Columbia  Journal  of  Environmental  Law   for  their  comments  and  editorial  work.   1. U.S.   DEP’T   OF   THE   INTERIOR,   INCREASED   SAFETY  MEASURES   FOR   ENERGY  DEVELOPMENT   ON   THE   OUTER   CONTINENTAL   SHELF   1   (2010),   available   at   http://www.doi.gov/   deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598.   2. U.S.  ENERGY  INFO.  ADMIN.,  COUNTRY  ANALYSIS  BRIEFS:    CURRENT  MONTHLY  ENERGY  CHRONOLOGY   1  (2010)  (on  file  with  author).     3. Id.     4. See,   e.g.,   How   Does   the   BP   Oil   Spill   Impact  Wildlife   and   Habitat?,   NAT’L  WILDLIFE   FED’N,   http://www.nwf.org/oil-­‐spill/effects-­‐on-­‐wildlife.aspx   (last   visited   Apr.   19,   2012)   (“We   likely   will  not  see  the  full  extent  of  impacts  for  many  years,  which  makes  creating  and  implementing   successful  restoration  plans  a  serious  challenge.”).   5. See,   e.g.,   Press   Release,  White   House   Office   of   the   Press   Sec’y,   Fact   Sheet:     Deepwater   Horizon   Oil   Spill   Legislative   Package   (May   12,   2010),   available   at   http://www.white   house.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/fact-­‐sheet-­‐deepwater-­‐horizon-­‐oil-­‐spill-­‐legislative-­‐package   (“[T]he   President  today  sent  Congress  a   legislative  package  that  will:    enable  the  Deepwater  Horizon   Oil  Spill   response   to  continue  expeditiously,   speed  assistance   to  people  affected  by   this  spill,   and  strengthen  and  update  the  oil  spill  liability  system  to  better  address  catastrophic  events.”).   6. See,  e.g.,  Increased  Safety  Measures  for  Energy  Development  on  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf,   Including  Oversight  of  Recent  Actions  Recommended  by  the  Department  to  Address  the  Safety  of   Offshore  Oil  Development:    Hearing  Before  the  S.  Comm.  on  Energy  &  Natural  Res.,  111th  Cong.   1–2  (2010)  (statement  of  Sen.   Jeff  Bingaman,  Chairman,  S.  Comm.  on  Energy  &  Natural  Res.),   available   at   http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-­‐ 111shrg62344/html/CHRG111shrg62344.htm   (“The   challenge   for   regulators,   and   for   Congress   in   enacting   statutory   responsibilities   and   authorities   to   those   regulators,   is   to   put   appropriate  requirements  in  place  ensuring  that  this  horrible  price  is  not  paid  again.”);  Press   Release,  White  House  Office  of  the  Press  Sec’y,  Weekly  Address:    President  Obama  Establishes   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   265   commissioned   studies,   established   investigatory   boards,   and   debated   legislation.7     Unfortunately,  most   of   the   prevention   efforts   proposed   were   far   too   narrow   in   scope,   focusing   on   the   failed   blowout   preventer   (“BOP”)   aboard   the   Deepwater   Horizon   and   potential   leaks   from  offshore  oil  rigs8   instead  of  broader  regulatory   failures  and  the  lack  of  oversight  in  the  oil  industry  generally.   Oil  and  gas  extraction  is  fundamental  to  the  economy  of  the  United   States,  which   is   the  world’s   largest   consumer  of   crude  oil,   but   only   the  third  largest  producer.9    In  2010,  the  country  consumed  over  2.5   times   as  much  petroleum  as   it   produced.10     As   a   result,   the   oil   and   gas  companies   that  extract   those   resources  domestically   contribute   significantly  to  the  nation’s  economic  success.    Within  the  oil  and  gas   extraction  industry,  offshore  drilling  plays  a  key  role.    Oil  wells  in  the   Gulf   of   Mexico   produce   more   than   1.6   million   barrels   of   crude   oil     Bipartisan  National  Commission  on  the  BP  Deepwater  Horizon  Oil  Spill  and  Offshore  Drilling   (May   22,   2010),   available   at   http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/weekly-­‐address-­‐ president-­‐obama-­‐establishes-­‐bipartisan-­‐national-­‐commission-­‐bp-­‐deepwa   (“We   can   only   pursue  offshore  oil  drilling   if  we  have  assurances   that  a  disaster   like   the  BP  oil   spill  will  not   happen  again.”).   7. For   example,   President  Barack  Obama  established   the  bipartisan  National  Commission   on   the   BP   Deepwater   Horizon   Oil   Spill   and   Offshore   Drilling,   tasked   with   providing   recommendations   for   preventing   and   mitigating   the   impact   of   future   spills   associated   with   offshore   drilling.     See   Press   Release,   White   House   Office   of   the   Press   Sec'y,   supra   note   6.     Relevant   proposed   legislation,   discussed   in   greater   detail   below,   includes   the   Blowout   Prevention  Act  of  2010,  H.R.  5626,  111th  Cong.  (2010),  amended  by  Consolidated  Land,  Energy,   and  Aquatic  Resources   (CLEAR)  Act  of  2009,  H.R.  3534,  111th  Cong.   (2010);   the  Emergency   Relief  Well  Act,  H.R.  5666,  111th  Cong.   (2010)   (amending   the  Outer  Continental   Shelf  Lands   Act);   and   the   Oil   Spill   Prevention   and  Mitigation   Improvement   Act   of   2010,   S.   3497,   111th   Cong.  (2010).   8. See,  e.g.,  H.R.  5626;  H.R.  5666;  S.  3497;  see  also  Kim  Hollaender,  The  BP  Oil  Spill  and  Its   Impact  on  Industry  Players  and  Their  Attorneys,  in  ASPATORE  SPECIAL  REPORT:    UNDERSTANDING  THE   BP  OIL  SPILL  AND  RESULTING  LITIGATION  (Thomson  West  2010)  (describing  proposed  legislation).     9. Countries,  U.S.  ENERGY  INFO.  ADMIN.,  http://www.eia.gov/countries/  (last  visited  Apr.  19,   2012)  (may  sort  by  “consumption”  or  “production”  in  upper-­‐right  corner).     10. In  2009,  the  U.S.  produced  7,513,000  barrels  of  petroleum  (crude  oil,  natural  gas  plant   liquids,   and   other   oils)   per   day,   and   consumed   18,771,000   barrels   per   day.    Oil:     Crude   and   Petroleum   Products   Explained,   U.S.   ENERGY   INFO.   ADMIN.,   http://www.eia.doe.gov/   energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home#tab2   (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2012).     In  2010  alone,   the  U.S.   consumed  98.1   quadrillion  BTU.     Thirty-­‐seven   percent   of   that   consumption  was   oil,   and   twenty-­‐five   percent   was   gas.     Only   seventy-­‐five   quadrillion   BTU   was   produced   domestically,  and,  of  that,  only  nineteen  percent  was  oil  and  twenty-­‐nine  percent  was  gas.    U.S.   Energy   Facts   Explained:     Consumption   and   Production,   U.S.   ENERGY   INFO.   ADMIN.,   http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_home#tab3  (last  visited   Apr.  19,  2012).    BTU  stands  for  “British  thermal  unit,”  and  represents  the  approximate  amount   of   energy   needed   to   heat   one   pound   of   water   one   degree   Fahrenheit.     Energy   Units   and   Calculators   Explained:     British   Thermal   Units   (Btu),   U.S.   ENERGY   INFO.   ADMIN.,   http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_btu  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2012).   266   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   each   day—nearly   a   third   of   the   country’s   total   production.11     As   of   February   1,   2012,   there   were   6729   active   leases   in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico.12     Deepwater   extraction   and   production   is   expanding   worldwide  and  will  likely  continue  to  expand  because  “[m]ost  of  the   big  new  discoveries  lie  deep  beneath  the  world’s  oceans,  including  in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico  .  .  .  .     For   the   oil   companies,   these   reserves  .  .  .   represent  the  industry’s  future.”13   Unfortunately,  appropriately  protective  regulations  directed  at  the   oil   industry   are   usually   only   implemented   after   a   high-­‐profile   accident  inflicts  catastrophic  and  irreparable  harm  to  human  health,   the   environment,   or   the   nation’s   economy.14     The   United   States   is   therefore   in   a   continuous   cycle   of   addressing   the   latest   environmental   disaster   rather   than   anticipating   the   next   potential   threat.15     The   demonstrated   environmental   and   economic   costs   of   accidents   involving   deepwater   drilling   call   for   new   levels   of   collective   involvement   and   control   over   technologies   as   they   develop.   This  Note  argues  that  environmental  disasters  like  the  Deepwater   Horizon   spill  would  be  best  avoided  or  mitigated   if   certain   changes   were   made   to   the   regulation   of   developing   technologies   in   the   oil   industry.     Part   I   discusses   the  Deepwater   Horizon   spill   in   2010,   its   similarities   to   the  Exxon  Valdez   tanker  spill   twenty  years  prior,  and   the  regulatory  shortcomings  that  contributed  to  the  occurrence  and   severity  of  each  spill.    Part  II  argues  that  developing  technologies  are   not   regulated   appropriately   under   the   current   scheme.16     It     11. Clifford  Kraus,  Accidents  Don’t  Slow  Gulf  of  Mexico  Drilling,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Apr.  23,  2010,  at   A17,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/us/23offshore.html.   12. “Active  leases”  are  leased  areas  that  are  subject  to  exploration  or  production.    U.S.  DEP'T   OF   THE   INTERIOR,   OIL   AND   GAS   LEASE   UTILIZATION—ONSHORE   AND   OFFSHORE,   REPORT   TO   THE   PRESIDENT  3  (2011).    For  a   list  of  currently  active   leases,  see  BUREAU  OF  ENERGY  MGMT.,  ACTIVE   LEASES   BY   DESIGNATED   OPERATOR   (2012),   available   at   http://www.data.boem.gov/homepg/pubinfo/repcat/lease/pdf/1360.pdf   (listing   all   active   leases  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  region  as  of  May  1,  2012).   13. Jad  Mouawad,  The  Spill  vs.  a  Need  to  Drill,  N.Y.  TIMES,  May  1,  2010,  at  WK1,  available  at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/weekinreview/02jad.html.   14. The  Deepwater  Horizon  and  Exxon  Valdez  spills,  discussed  herein,  are  but  two  examples.     For  a  discussion  of  other  similar  spills,  see  infra  note  20.   15. Professor   Nancy   Leveson   of   MIT   calls   the   phenomenon   a   “sophisticated   version   of   ‘Whack-­‐a-­‐Mole’  game,  where  symptoms  are   found  and  fixed  but  not   the  processes  that  allow   those  systems  to  occur,”  placing  regulators  and  the  industry  in  a  “continual  firefighting  mode”   and  causing  the  same  accidents  to  occur  over  and  over  again.    NANCY  G.  LEVESON,  ENGINEERING  A   SAFER  WORLD:    SYSTEMS  THINKING  APPLIED  TO  SAFETY  416  (2011).   16. The   scope   of   this  Note   is   limited   to   institutional   solutions,   rather   than   political   ones.     Consequently,  the  politics  of  delay,  as  well  as  concerns  regarding  lobbying  by  the  oil  industry,   are  not  explored  in  depth  here.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   267   concludes   that   modified   requirements   under   the   National   Environmental   Policy   Act   (“NEPA”),   greater   independent   oversight   of   last   resort   protections   prior   to   implementation,   and   decreased   reliance   on   human   triggers   of   last   resort   protective   technologies   would  achieve  an  appropriate  level  of  regulation.   I.    THE  DEEPWATER  HORIZON  SPILL  AND  ITS  CAUSES   Major   accidents   in   the   oil   industry   are   not   limited   to   those   that   attract  national  attention.    In  fact,  the  United  States  has  averaged  792   incidents   each   year   since   2006,17   including   almost   twenty   major   spills  annually.18    Since  1964,  over  eleven  million  gallons  of  oil  have   been  spilled  in  U.S.  waters  on  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf.19    Because   of   the   degree   of   attention   and   study   that   large-­‐scale,   high-­‐profile   accidents   receive,   such  disasters   are   typically   the   catalysts   for  new   or   amended   legislation   affecting   the   energy   industry.     This   Note   begins   with   a   discussion   of   one   such   disaster—the   Deepwater   Horizon  spill  in  2010—and  its  similarities  to  the  Exxon  Valdez  tanker   spill  in  1989.20     17. “Incidents,”  as  used  in  this  statistic,  include  fatalities,  injuries,  loss  of  well  control,  fires,   explosions,   collisions,   spills   greater   than   fifty  barrels,   and  other  operational   issues.     Incident   Statistics   and   Summaries   1996–2011,   BUREAU   OF   OCEAN   ENERGY   MGMT.,   REG.,   &   ENFORCEMENT,   http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm   (last   visited   Apr.   19,   2012).    While   this   marks   a   huge   increase   in   the   number   of   reported   spills   as   compared   to   previous  years,  changes   in  regulations  for   incident  reporting  made  effective  on  July  17,  2006   may  have  contributed  to  the  drastic  increase  in  reported  incidents.    Id.;  see  also  JAMES  R.  CHILES,   INVITING  DISASTER:    LESSONS  FROM  THE  EDGE  OF  TECHNOLOGY  19  (2001)  (“Compared  to  the  twenty-­‐ seven  years  of  the  offshore  oil  industry,  major  rig  mishaps  ha[ve]  been  hitting  historic  highs  in   recent  years  .  .  .  .”).   18. “Major   spills,”   as   used   here,   refers   to   those   greater   than   fifty   barrels.     An   average   of   19.86  spills  have  occurred  each  year  from  2006  to  2010,  as  documented  by  BOEMRE.    BUREAU   OF  OCEAN  ENERGY  MGMT.,  REG.,  &  ENFORCEMENT,  supra  note  17.   19. 11,646,243  gallons,  or  277,291  barrels,  of  oil  were  spilled  in  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf   between  1964  and  2010.    163  of   these  spills  were  of   fifty  or  more  barrels.    BUREAU  OF  OCEAN   ENERGY   MGMT.,   REG.,   &   ENFORCEMENT,   ALL   PETROLEUM   SPILLS   ≥   1   BARREL   FROM   OCS   OIL   &   GAS   ACTIVITIES   BY   SIZE,   CATEGORY,   AND   YEAR,   1964   TO   2010   (2011),   available   at   http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Excel/PetroleumSpillsBySizeCatYearSourceFourTabs.xls   (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2012)  (see  the  second  tab  of  the  spreadsheet).   20. For  a  discussion  of  other  spills,  such  as  the  Santa  Barbara  spill  in  1969,  the  Ixtoc  I  well   blowout   in   1979,   and   the   Ocean   Ranger   capsize   in   1982,   see   President   Richard   Nixon,   Statement   on   Coastal   Oil   Pollution   at   Santa   Barbara,   California   (Feb.   11,   1969),  available   at   http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2330&st=wells&st1;   ERCO/ENERGY   RES.   CO.,   IXTOC   OIL   SPILL   ASSESSMENT   (1982),   available   at   http://invertebrates.si.edu/   mms/reports/IXTOC_exec.pdf;   RESTREPO   &   ASSOCS.,   IXTOC   I   WELL   OIL   SPILL   ECONOMIC   IMPACT   STUDY   (1982),   available   at   http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/3/   3930.pdf   (detailing   the   economic   impacts   of   the   Ixtoc   I   oil   spill);   U.S.   COAST   GUARD,   MARINE   CASUALTY  REPORT:    MOBILE  OFFSHORE  DRILLING  UNIT  (MODU)  OCEAN  RANGER,  O.N.  615641  (1983),   268   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   A.    Background   For  106  days  in  the  summer  of  2010,  crude  oil  gushed  into  the  Gulf   of  Mexico   from  an  extraction  well   that   suddenly   separated   from   its   rig   platform   following   an   explosion   and   fire   aboard   the   rig.21     The   Macondo  well  was  briefly  capped  on  July  15,  2010,  and  a  “static  kill”   procedure  put   in  place  by   the   rig's   owner,  BP,   successfully   shut  off   the   leaking   well   on   August   3,   2010.22     The   ruptured   well   was   ultimately   cemented   shut   and   declared   “effectively   dead”   on   September   19,   2010.23     Long   before   that   date,   however,   the   Deepwater  Horizon  spill  had  become  the  worst   in  American  history,   releasing  4.9  million  barrels  of  crude  oil  into  the  Gulf.24    The  spill  was   the  nation’s  first  declared  Spill  of  National  Significance  (“SONS”);  as  a   result,   the   federal   government   designated   a   National   Incident   Commander  (“NIC”)  to  oversee  the  containment  and  cleanup.25    The   spill’s   SONS   designation   illustrates   not   only   the   magnitude   of   the     available  at  http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/oceanranger.pdf  (detailing  the  impact   of   a   rig   disaster   on  marine   life);   Steven  Mufson,   Since   ‘64,   a   Steady   Stream   of   Oil   Spills   Has   Tainted  Gulf,  WASH.  POST.,  Jul.  24,  2010,  at    A01;  Nat’l  Comm’n  on  the  BP  Deepwater  Horizon  Oil   Spill  and  Offshore  Drilling,  A  Brief  History  of  Offshore  Oil  Drilling  3  (Staff  Working  Paper  No.  1,   2010)   [hereinafter   Staff   Working   Paper],   available   at   http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/document/brief-­‐history-­‐offshore-­‐oil-­‐drilling;   Countermeasures/Mitigation,   NAT’L   OCEANIC   &   ATMOSPHERIC   ADMIN.,   http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/508790  (last  visited  May  5,  2012).   21. For   a   detailed   description   of   the   events   of   the   accident,   see  NAT’L   COMM’N   ON   THE   BP   DEEPWATER  HORIZON  OIL   SPILL  AND  OFFSHORE  DRILLING,  DEEP  WATER:    THE  GULF  OIL  DISASTER  AND   THE  FUTURE  OF  OFFSHORE  DRILLING  87–172  (2011)  [hereinafter  COMMISSION  REPORT],  available  at   http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/   DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf     22. Id.  at  164–67.   23. BP  Oil  Well  ‘Effectively  Dead’  5  Months  After  Spill  Began,  CNN  (Sept.  19,  2010,  12:22  PM),   http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/09/18/gulf.oil.disaster/index.html;   see   also   Press   Release,   White  House  Office  of  the  Press  Sec’y,  Statement  by  President  Obama  on  Final  Termination  of   BP’s   Blown   Out   Well   in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico   (Sept.   19,   2010),   available   at   http://   www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2010/09/19/statement-­‐president-­‐obama-­‐final-­‐ termination-­‐bps-­‐blown-­‐out-­‐well-­‐gulf-­‐mexi.   24. See  Campbell  Robertson  &  Clifford  Krauss,  Gulf  Spill  Is  the  Largest  of  Its  Kind,  Scientists   Say,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug.  2,  2010,  at  A14,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/   03spill.html.   25. U.S.   COAST   GUARD,   BP   DEEPWATER   HORIZON   OIL   SPILL:     INCIDENT   SPECIFIC   PREPAREDNESS   REVIEW   (ISPR)   1   (2011),   available   at   http://cdm15029.contentdm.oclc.org/   cdm/singleitem/collection/p266901coll4/id/3532/rec/9.    A  SONS  designation  refers  to  a  spill   that,   “due   to   its   severity,   size,   location,   actual   or   potential   impact   on   the   public   health   and   welfare   or   the   environment,   or   the   necessary   response   effort,   is   so   complex   that   it   requires   extraordinary  coordination  of  federal,  state,   local,  and  responsible  party  resources  to  contain   and   clean   up   the   discharge.”     Spill   of   National   Significance—Preparing   for   Oil   Spill   Disasters,   NAT’L   OCEANIC   &   ATMOSPHERIC   ADMIN.,   http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/   features/apr10/sons.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2012).   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   269   spill,  but  also  serves  as  an  acknowledgment  by  the  U.S.  government   of   the  extensive   resources  needed   to   clean  up   the  discharged  oil   in   the  Gulf.   The  rig  explosion  and  spill  generated  significant  public  demand  for   government   action   that   would   prevent   a   disaster   of   similar   magnitude   from   occurring   again.     President   Obama   acknowledged   this   goal   in   his   weekly   address   on   May   22,   2010.26    While   no   one   argued   that   prevention   of   additional   disasters   should   not   be   an   important   government   objective,   lawmakers,   victims,   industry   representatives,   political   pundits,   and   the   general   public   disagreed   about   the   best  method   for   avoiding   a   future   catastrophic   accident.     Some  environmental   groups   advocated   an   across-­‐the-­‐board  ban  on   offshore  drilling.27    As  was  the  case  after  prior  high-­‐profile  oil  spills,   such  as  that  off   the  coast  of  Santa  Barbara,  California,   in  1969—the   largest   U.S.   spill   to   date   at   the   time—“correction   rarely   catches   up   with   error   and  .  .  .  even   if   it   had,   it  would   not   have   altered   the   fact   that  a  mass  reaction  set  in  against  offshore  drilling.”28   President   Obama   initially   responded   to   the   outcry   by   ordering   a   halt  on  exploratory  drilling   in   thirty-­‐three  deepwater  oil   rigs   in   the   Gulf  of  Mexico.29    He  also  extended  a  moratorium  on  new  deepwater   wells   for  six  months  and  suspended  the   issuance  of  new  permits  to   drill  new  deepwater  wells.30   Disagreement   about   the   future  of   offshore  drilling,   however,  was   reflected   in   the   Obama   administration’s   inconsistent   treatment   of   the   drilling   moratorium.     Only   weeks   before   the   spill,   President   Obama   had   announced   plans   to   expand   oil   and   natural   gas   exploratory   efforts   in   the   Atlantic   Ocean   and   eastern   Gulf   of     26. See  Press  Release,  White  House  Office  of  the  Press  Sec'y,  supra  note  6.   27. See,   e.g.,   Stop   the   Drill,   OCEANA,   na.oceana.org/en/stopthedrill   (last   visited   Apr.   22,   2012)   (on-­‐line   petition   to   stop   offshore   drilling);   President   Obama:     Ban   Offshore   Drilling!,   350.ORG,   http://act.350.org/sign/offshore_drilling_ban/   (last   visited   Apr.   22,   2012)   (same);   Save  Florida’s  Shores,  ENV’T  FLA.,  http://www.environmentflorida.org/programs/save-­‐floridas-­‐ shores  (last  visited  Apr.  22,  2012)  (campaign  to  stop  efforts  that  would  allow  drilling  closer  to   Florida’s  coasts).   28. JOHN  C.  WHITAKER,   STRIKING   A  BALANCE:     ENVIRONMENT  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCES  POLICY   IN   THE  NIXON-­‐FORD  YEARS  266  (1976).   29. See  President  Barack  Obama,  Remarks  by  the  President  on  the  Gulf  Oil  Spill  at  the  White   House   East   Room   (May   27,   2010),   available   at   http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐ office/remarks-­‐president-­‐gulf-­‐oil-­‐spill;   see   also   Katelyn   Sabochik,   “Whatever   is   Necessary   to   Protect   and   Restore   the   Gulf   Coast,”   THE   WHITE   HOUSE   BLOG   (May   27,   2010,   4:47   PM),   http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/27/whatever-­‐necessary-­‐protect-­‐and-­‐restore-­‐ gulf-­‐coast.   30. See  President  Barack  Obama,  supra  note  29.   270   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   Mexico.31     The   administration   subsequently   realigned   itself   with   these   interests   by   lifting   the   drilling   moratorium   on   October   12,   2010,  seven  weeks  ahead  of  schedule.32    New  rules  were  established   in   its  place,   tightening  standards   for  well  design,  BOPs,  and  worker   training.33    One  account  characterized  this  move  as  providing  the  oil   industry  with  “a  conditional  go-­‐ahead”  by  requiring  the  “reasonable   step”  of  heightened  safety  compliance,  “consistent  with  the  country’s   need  to  continue  exploring  for  sources  of  domestic  oil—but  only  if  it   can  be  done  safely.”34   In  December  2010,  only  months  after  the  establishment  of  the  new   drilling  rules,  the  Obama  administration  once  again  reversed  course   and   announced   a   seven-­‐year   ban   on   drilling   new   exploratory   production   wells   off   the   Atlantic   Coast   and   in   the   eastern   Gulf   of   Mexico.35    Both  the  administration  and  environmental  groups  cited  a   lack   of   effective   regulation   in   justifying   the   decision.36     Louisiana   Governor   Bobby   Jindal   criticized   the   seven-­‐year   ban   on   economic   grounds,  claiming  that  the  moratorium  would  “send  more  economic   capital  and  even  more  jobs  overseas,  in  the  wake  of  those  oil  rigs  that   already   left  our  waters   for  Egypt,   the  Congo  and  Nigeria  during   the   ‘arbitrary   and   capricious’   moratorium   on   deepwater   drilling.”37     Other   state   officials   agreed,   claiming   the   government   made   “an     31. See  Press   Release,   The  White   House   Office   of   the   Press   Sec’y,   Obama   Administration   Announces   Comprehensive   Strategy   for   Energy   Security   (Mar.   31,   2010),   available   at   http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/obama-­‐administration-­‐announces-­‐ comprehensive-­‐strategy-­‐energy-­‐security;  Siobhan  Hughes  &  Stephen  Power,  Offshore  Drilling   Curbed   Again,   WALL   ST.   J.   (Dec.   1,   2010,   10:29   AM),   http://online.wsj.com/article/   SB10001424052748704594804575648623586731384.html.   32. See  Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  of   the   Interior,  Salazar:    Deepwater  Drilling  May  Resume   for   Operators   Who   Clear   Higher   Bar   for   Safety,   Environmental   Protection   (Oct.   12,   2010),   available   at   http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-­‐Deepwater-­‐Drilling-­‐May-­‐ Resume-­‐for-­‐Operators-­‐Who-­‐Clear-­‐Higher-­‐Bar-­‐for-­‐Safety-­‐Environmental-­‐Protection.cfm;   see   also  U.S.  ENERGY  INFO.  ADMIN.,  supra  note  2;  Peter  Baker  &  John  M.  Broder,  White  House  Lifts  Ban   on  Deepwater  Drilling,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  13,  2010,  at  A1,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/   2010/10/13/us/13drill.html.   33. See  Baker  &  Broder,  supra  note  32.   34. Editorial,   A   Conditional   Go-­‐Ahead,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Oct.   12,   2010,   at   A24,   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/opinion/13wed3.html.   35. See  Hughes  &  Power,  supra  note  31;  Obama  Bans  Eastern  Gulf  Drilling  for  7  Years,  CNN   (Dec.  1,  2010,  8:00  PM),  http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/01/obama.gulf.   drilling/index.html?iref=allsearch.   36. See  Hughes  &  Power,  supra  note  31;  Obama  Bans  Eastern  Gulf  Drilling  for  7  Years,  supra   note  35.    The  administration,  however,  did  not  ban  exploration  efforts  in  new  areas  along  the   northern   shores  of  Alaska,  which  may  hold   vast   supplies   of   oil.    See  Hughes  &  Power,   supra   note  31.   37. Obama   Bans   Eastern   Gulf   Drilling   for   7   Years,   supra   note   35   (quoting   Louisiana   Governor  Bobby  Jindal  in  December  2010).     2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   271   irresponsible  and  short-­‐sighted  decision.”38   The   administration   was   also   slow   to   issue   permits   for   drilling   operations   in   the   rest  of   the  Gulf   even  after   lifting   the  moratorium,   with  some  experts  initially  suggesting  that  oil  companies  would  not   receive   approval   to   drill   new   deepwater   wells   until   2012.39     The   delay  had  the  potential  to  affect  not  only  the  oil  industry,  but  also  the   Gulf   Coast   economy   and   U.S.   oil   production   generally.40     The   Department   of   Energy’s   research   section,   the   Energy   Information   Administration,   predicted   that   U.S.   offshore   oil   production   on   the   Outer   Continental   Shelf   would   fall   approximately   thirteen   percent   from  the  previous  year  as  a  result  of  the  moratorium  and  subsequent   sluggish   return   to   drilling.41     The   Bureau   of   Ocean   Energy   Management,  Regulation,  and  Enforcement  (“BOEMRE”),42  however,   granted  Noble  Energy  and  BHP  Billiton  approval  to  begin  operations   in  March  2011,43  and  it  does  not  appear  that  the  moratorium  caused   a  drastic  change  in  domestic  production  of  crude  oil.44     38. Hughes  &  Power,   supra   note  31   (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)   (quoting  Virginia   Governor  Bob  McDonnell).   39. See  Ben  Casselman  &  Daniel  Gilbert,  Drilling  Is  Stalled  Even  After  Ban  Is  Lifted,  WALL  ST.   J.  (Jan.  3,  2011),  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204204004576050451696   859780.html.   40. See  id.   41. See  Impact  of  Limitations  on  Access  to  Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Resources  in  the  Federal  Outer   Continental   Shelf,   U.S.   ENERGY   INFO.   ADMIN.,   http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/   aeo_2009analysispapers/aongr.html  (last  visited  Apr.  22,  2012).   42. Until  October  1,  2011,  BOEMRE  was   the   regulatory  body   that  effectively   replaced   the   Minerals   Management   Service   (“MMS”).     The   Reorganization   of   the   Former   MMS,   BUREAU   OF   OCEAN   ENERGY   MGMT.,   http://www.boem.gov/About-­‐BOEM/Reorganization/   Reorganization.aspx  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2012).    On  October  1,  2011,  BOEMRE  was  replaced   by   the   Bureau   of   Ocean   Energy   Management   (“BOEM”)   and   the   Bureau   of   Safety   and   Environmental   Enforcement   (“BSEE”)   as   part   of   a   major   reorganization.     Id.     BOEM   is   responsible   for  managing  environmentally  and  economically   responsible  development  of   the   nation’s  offshore  resources.    Its  functions  include  offshore  leasing,  resource  evaluation,  review   and   administration   of   oil   and   gas   exploration   and   development   plans,   renewable   energy   development,  NEPA   analysis,   and   environmental   studies.     Id.     BSEE   is   responsible   for   safety   and   environmental   oversight   of   offshore   oil   and   gas   operations,   including   permitting   and   inspections  of  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations.    Id.    Its  functions  include  the  development  and   enforcement   of   safety   and   environmental   regulations,   permitting   offshore   exploration,   development  and  production  inspections,  offshore  regulatory  programs,  oil  spill  response,  and   newly  formed  training  and  environmental  compliance  programs.    Id.   43. The  Obama  Administration  Is  Slowly  Reissuing  Offshore  Drilling  Permits,  INST.  FOR  ENERGY   RES.   (Mar.   23,   2011),   http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/03/23/the-­‐obama-­‐ administration-­‐is-­‐slowly-­‐reissuing-­‐offshore-­‐drilling-­‐permits.   44. See   U.S.   Field   Production   of   Crude   Oil   (Thousand   Barrels),   U.S.   ENERGY   INFO.   ADMIN.,   http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus1&f=a   (last   visited   May  5,  2012).   272   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   B.    Causes   In   response   to   the   spill   and   accompanying   public   demand   for   action,   the   Obama   administration   established   the   National   Commission   on   the   BP   Deepwater   Horizon   Oil   Spill   and   Offshore   Drilling   (“Commission”).45     The   purpose   of   the   Commission  was   to   “examin[e]   all   the   relevant   facts   and   circumstances   concerning   the   root   causes   of   the  Deepwater   Horizon   explosion   and   [to]   develo[p]   options   to   guard   against,   and  mitigate   the   impact   of,   any   oil   spills   associated  with  offshore  drilling  in  the  future.”46    In  its  final  report  to   the   President,   the   Commission   issued   general   recommendations   that,   while   non-­‐binding,   “could   influence   future   court   proceedings   and  energy  policy.”47    While  perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  report   issued   by   the   executive   branch   regarding   the   causes   and   consequences   of   the   spill,   the   Commission’s   report   is   but   one   of   many  issued  by  interested  and  reputable  parties  following  the  spill.48     Together,  these  reports  offer  a  relatively  clear  picture  of  the  primary   failures   that   led   to   the  occurrence  and  magnitude  of   the  Deepwater   Horizon  spill.   1.    The  Blowout  Preventer  and  Other  Technical  Failures   The   most   direct   causes   of   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill   were   perhaps   those   involving   technical   failures.     Pointing   to   a   specific   failure   that   single-­‐handedly   resulted   in   the   spill   and   contributed   to   its   magnitude,   however,   is   neither   a   straightforward   nor   simple   undertaking.     Instead,   the   spill   can   be   traced   to   a   series   of   interconnected   technical   failures   and   missteps   that   were   then   exacerbated  by  human  error.   In  order  to  function  as  intended,  the  various  parts  of  a  deepwater     45. Press  Release,  supra  note  6  (“If  the  laws  on  our  books  are  inadequate  to  prevent  such   an  oil   spill,   or   if  we  didn’t   enforce   those   laws—I  want   to  know   it.     I  want   to  know  .  .  .  where   oversight  of  the  oil  and  gas  industry  broke  down.”    (quoting  President  Obama)).   46. About  the  Commission,  NAT’L  COMM’N  ON  THE  BP  DEEPWATER  HORIZON  OIL  SPILL  &  OFFSHORE   DRILLING,   http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/page/about-­‐commission   (last   visited   Apr.   22,   2012).   47. Ayesha   Rascoe,   Panel   Calls   for   Offshore   Drilling   Reform,   REUTERS   (Jan.   11,   2011,   5:42   PM),   http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE70A3IN20110111?pageNumber=2;   see   also   COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21.   48. See,  e.g.,  CHIEF  COUNSEL,  NAT’L  COMM’N  ON  THE  BP  DEEPWATER  HORIZON  OIL  SPILL  &  OFFSHORE   DRILLING,   MACONDO:     THE   GULF   OIL   DISASTER   (2011)   [hereinafter   CHIEF   COUNSEL’S   REPORT],   available   at   http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/   documents/C21462408_CCR_for_web_0.pdf;  NAT’L  ACAD.  OF  ENG’G  &  NAT’L  RESEARCH  COUNCIL  OF   THE   NAT’L   ACADS.,   INTERIM   REPORT   ON   CAUSES   OF   THE  DEEPWATER   HORIZON   OIL   RIG   BLOWOUT   AND   WAYS  TO  PREVENT  SUCH  EVENTS  (2010)  [hereinafter  NAT’L  ACAD.  REPORT].   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   273   well   system   must   interact   properly,   and   those   supervising   the   system  must  be  able   to  activate  backups  with  sufficient  expediency   in  the  event  of  a  malfunction.    Like  onshore  drills,  offshore  wells  use   drilling  mud49  and  rotary  drill  bits  to  create  a  hole  in  the  earth.50    The   initial   stages   of   this   process   are   relatively   uncomplicated:     because   the   fracture   pressure51   close   to   the   seafloor   is   low,   the   sediment   requires   little   strength   to   be   moved,   and   drilling   mud   is   not   necessary.52    The  rig  crews  are  therefore  not  required  to  monitor  and   adjust  the  mud  weight  to  maintain  an  ideal  pressure,53  rendering  the   process  relatively  automated.    However,  as  the  drill  goes  deeper  into   the   earth,   “[t]he   mud   column   inside   a   well   exerts   downward   hydrostatic  pressure   that  rig  crews  can  control  by  varying   the  mud   weight.”54    During  this  stage,  the  rig  crew  must  add  a  BOP  that  serves   as   “both   a   drilling   tool   and   a   device   for   controlling   wellbore   pressures.”55    As  the  drill  reaches  further  into  the  earth  and  geologic   pressures   increase,   individual  rams   in   the  BOP  stack  may  be  closed   to   prevent   hydrocarbons   from   flowing   up   the   well.56     At   a   certain   depth,   if   the   rig   crew   continues   to   drill   deeper   without   increasing   mud  weight,   fluids,   such  as  hydrocarbons   from   the  deeper  geologic   formation,  will   flow   into   the  well.57    When   the   drill   reaches   such   a   depth   that  mud  can  no   longer  control  pressure  within   the  well,   the   crew  must  stop  drilling  and  set  a  “casing  string,”  made  up  of  twenty-­‐   to  forty-­‐foot  sections  of  steel  pipe,  that  prevents  high-­‐pressure  fluids   like  hydrocarbons   from  entering  the  well.58    The  casing  string  must   then  be  cemented  into  place  in  order  to  seal  the  interior  of  the  well   from   the   formation  outside   the   casing   and   to   structurally   reinforce   the  wellbore  to  give  it  mechanical  strength.59   The   Commission   established   by   President   Obama   found   that   the   immediate   cause   of   the   well   blowout   was   “a   failure   to   contain     49. “Drilling  mud”  is  actually  a  “complex  blend  of  oil-­‐  or  water-­‐based  fluids  and  additives”   that   “must   be   recovered   after   it   is   pumped   down   a   drill   string”   because   it   is   expensive   and   potentially  damaging  to  the  environment  if  released.    CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at   15.     50. Id.   51. “Fracture  pressure”  refers  to  “the  pressure  at  which  the  geologic  formation  will  break   down.”    Id.  at  9.   52. Id.  at  13.   53. Id.   54. Id.  at  9.   55. Id.  at  16.   56. Id.  at  21.   57. Id.  at  10.   58. Id.  at  12.   59. Id.   274   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   hydrocarbon  pressures  in  the  well,”  a  problem  that  could  have  been   controlled   by   several   last   resort   protective   technologies,   including   the  BOP.60    The  Macondo  well  was  outfitted  with  a  BOP  “designed  to   contain  pressure  within   the  wellbore  and  halt  an  uncontrolled   flow   of   hydrocarbons   to   the   rig,”   which  was   standard   in   the   industry.61     The   Commission   found,   however,   that   when   crew   members   attempted  to  engage  the  Deepwater  Horizon’s  emergency  disconnect   system  after  the  initial  explosion,  the  system  did  not  “close  the  blind   shear   ram,”62   nor   did   it   “sever[]   the   drill   pipe,   seal[]   the  well,   [or]   disconnect[]   the  rig   from  the  BOP,”  as   it  should  have.63     It  was  thus   this   series   of   technical   failures,   in   addition   to   the   malfunctioning   BOP,  that  caused  the  Deepwater  Horizon  disaster.   Prior   to  Deepwater  Horizon,   the  worst   oil   spill   originating   in  U.S.   waters  was  the  Exxon  Valdez   tanker  spill.64    On  March  24,  1989,  the     60. See   COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra  note   21,   at   115;   see   also  CHIEF   COUNSEL’S   REPORT,   supra   note  48,  at  203  (describing  the  function  of  a  BOP).    A  preliminary  investigation  into  the  causes   of   the   oil   spill   determined   that   the   failure   of   the   rig’s   BOP   was   the   primary   culprit.     The   National   Academy   of   Engineering   and   the   National   Research   Council   found   that   the   BOP,   “relied  on  as  a  critical  component  for  preventing  uncontrolled  hydrocarbon  flows  and  avoiding   a  catastrophic  blowout  of  a  well,”  did  not  control  the  hydrocarbon  flow  in  the  Macondo  well,   once  activated.    NAT’L  ACAD.  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  12.    However,   some  assigned  blame  to   MMS  because  it  did  not  directly  oversee  any  certification  of  the  BOPs;  instead  the  operator  of   the  Macondo  well  self-­‐certified  the  BOP.    See  John  M.  Broder,  Report  Faults  BP  and  Contractors   for   Rig   Explosion   and   Spill,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Nov.   17,   2010,   at   A18,   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18BP.html   (discussing   reports   that   partially   blamed   MMS);   Holly   Doremus,   A   Great   Case   for   Worst   Case   Analysis,   CTR.   FOR   PROGRESSIVE   REFORM,   http://www.progressivereform.org/printPage.cfm?idBlog=5EA1951E-­‐D646-­‐B25D-­‐ 64CBA328EDB489E2  (last  visited  May  10,  2012);  see  also  NAT’L  ACAD.  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at   18.    Debate  remains  regarding  the  extent  to  which  technical  or  regulatory  failures  contributed   to  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  BOP.   61. COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra  note   21,   at   114.     See   generally   MELVYN   F.  WHITBY,   DRILLING   CONTRACTOR,   DESIGN   EVOLUTION   OF   A   SUBSEA   BOP:     BLOWOUT   PREVENTER   REQUIREMENTS   GET   TOUGHER   AS   DRILLING   GOES   EVER   DEEPER   36–37   (2007),   available   at   http://www.drilling   contractor.org/dcpi/dc-­‐mayjune07/DC_May07_BOP.pdf.   62. Blind  shear  rams  are  “designed  to  cut  drill  pipe   in   the  well  and  shut   in   the  well   in  an   emergency  well  control  situation.    But  even  if  properly  activated,  the  blind  shear  ram  may  fail   to  seal  the  well  because  of  known  mechanical  and  design  limitations.”    CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,   supra   note   48,   at   204   (internal   marks   omitted);   see   also   30   C.F.R.   §   250.442   (2012)   (establishing   requirements   for   blind   shear   rams   within   a   subsea   BOP   system);   30   C.F.R.   §   250.515(b)  (2012)  (establishing  the  minimum  BOP  system  requirements,  including  provisions   for  blind  shear  rams);  30  C.F.R.  §  250.1624(b)(1)  (2012)  (requiring,  at  a  minimum,  that  BOP   stacks  contain  three  hydraulically  operated  preventers,  one  of  which  must  contain  blind  shear   rams).   63. See   COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra   note   21,   at   114   (citing   Hearing   Before   the   Deepwater   Horizon   Joint   Investigation   Team,   111th   Cong.   165   (2010)   (statement   of   Christopher   Pleasant)).   64. See  How  Much  Oil  Really  Spilled  From  the  Exxon  Valdez?,  ON  THE  MEDIA  (June  18,  2010),   http://www.onthemedia.org/2010/jun/18/how-­‐much-­‐oil-­‐really-­‐spilled-­‐from-­‐the-­‐exxon-­‐ 2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   275   Exxon  Valdez  oil  tanker  crashed  into  the  Bligh  Reef  in  Prince  William   Sound  off  the  coast  of  Alaska.65    When  the  tanker  ran  aground,  eight   of  the  ship’s  eleven  cargo  tanks  and  two  of  its  ballast  tanks  ruptured   and  spilled  approximately  eleven  million  gallons  of  crude  oil  into  the   sound.66   Like  the  calls  for  reform  following  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill,  the   public  demanded   investigations   into   the  causes  of   the  Exxon  Valdez   spill  to  ensure  that  a  similar  accident  would  not  occur  again.67    Many   called   for   legislation   requiring   that   all   oil   tankers   be   outfitted  with   double   hulls,  which   “provide[]   a   proven   solution   to   the   problem  of   how  best  to  reduce  oil  leakage  after  a  ship  strikes  another  object  or   touches   the   bottom.”68     While   agreeing   that   “federal   oil   spill   legislation   [wa]s   long   overdue,”   some   argued   that   a   double   hull   requirement   was   “quick-­‐fix   politics.”69     Continued   and   searching   investigations   into   the   causes   of   spills   like   Exxon   Valdez   and   Deepwater   Horizon   are   important.     However,   such   efforts   should   focus  not  only  on  technical   failures  but  also  on  the  degree  to  which   human   interaction   with   the   various   technical   failings   in   a   system   may  have  contributed  to  the  accident’s  occurrence  or  magnitude.   2.    The  Failures  of  MMS  and  Lack  of  Oversight   More  than  just  a  simple  failure  of  the  BOP,  the  Commission  found   that   the   well   blowout   “was   the   product   of   several   individual   missteps  and  oversights  by  BP,  Halliburton,   and  Transocean,  which   government   regulators   lacked   the   authority,   the   necessary   resources,   and   the   technical   expertise   to   prevent.”70     The   Commission   determined   that   the   “root   causes”   of   the   Deepwater     valdez/;  see  also  Robertson  &  Krauss,  supra  note  24  (comparing  the  spill  to  Ixtoc  I).   65. ALASKA  OIL   SPILL   COMM’N,   SPILL:     THE  WRECK   OF  EXXON  VALDEZ   5–14   (1990)   [hereinafter   ALASKA   OIL   SPILL   COMM’N],   available   at   http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_   documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/spill_wreck_ExxonValdez_1990.pdf.   66. Id.    But  see  Elizabeth  Bluemink,  Size  of  Exxon  Spill  Remains  Disputed,  ANCHORAGE  DAILY   NEWS   (June   10,   2010),   http://www.adn.com/2010/06/05/1309722/size-­‐of-­‐exxon-­‐spill-­‐ remains-­‐disputed.html.   67. See,   e.g.,   Steve   Cowper,   Op-­‐Ed.,  An   Oil-­‐Spill   Law—Now,  WASH.  POST,   June   13,   1990,   at   A23.   68. DF  DICKENS  ASSOCS.,  THE  DOUBLE  HULL  ISSUE  AND  OIL  SPILL  RISK  ON  THE  PACIFIC  WEST  COAST   25   (1995),   available   at   http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/eemp/resources/pdf/double_   hull_issue.pdf.     Double   hulls  may   either   be   built   in   new   ships   or   retrofitted   into   existing   oil   tankers.    Id.  at  27.   69. Joseph  Farrell,  Requiring  Double  Hulls  Is  Quick-­‐Fix  Politics,  USA  TODAY,  July  12,  1990,  at   6A.   70. COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra  note   21,   at   115.     Halliburton   and   Transocean  were   service   contractors  involved  in  construction  and  drilling  operations  on  the  Deepwater  Horizon.   276   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   Horizon   spill   were   “overarching   management   failures   by   industry”   and   “regulatory   failures”   by   government   agencies.71     Industry   exacerbated  these  problems  by  devoting  “only  minuscule  amounts  of   money   to  planning   to  control  or  clean  up  after  a   significant   spill.”72     While  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  one  individual  explicitly  deciding   to  save  money  at  the  expense  of  safety,73  the  Commission  identified  a   “culture  of  complacency”  in  the  industry  generally,  and  with  respect   to   BP   in   particular.74     William   K.   Reilly,   the   Commission’s   co-­‐ chairman,  said  that  the  disaster  “was  almost  the  inevitable  result  of   years  of  industry  and  government  complacency  and  lack  of  attention   to  safety.”75   Of   particular   note,   the   Commission’s   Chief   Counsel’s   report   asserted   that   MMS   was   unable   to   maintain   updated   technical   requirements   to   ensure   drilling   safety   as   a   result   of   “industry’s   rapidly   evolving   deepwater   technology.”76     Because   post-­‐accident   investigations   tend   to   focus   on   last   resort   protective   technologies,   these   technologies   are   the   most   likely   to   be   regulated;   developing   technologies,   on   the   other   hand,   usually   escape   regulation.77     For     71. Id.  at  122–27.   72. John  M.  Broder,  Oil  Spill  Findings  Released  by  Panel,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  23,  2010,  at  A24,   available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/science/earth/23spill.html.   73. See   John   M.   Broder,   Investigator   Finds   No   Evidence   That   BP   Took   Shortcuts   to   Save   Money,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Nov.   9,   2010,   at   A16,   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/us/   09spill.html.   74. See   COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra   note   21,   at   ix;   Editorial,   A   Culture   of   Carelessness,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Nov.   15,   2010,   at   A28,   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/opinion/   15mon2.html.   75. Rachel  Streitfeld,  Panel  Calls   for  Drastic  Steps  to  Stop  Future  Deepwater  Oil  Spills,  CNN   (Jan.  11,  2011,  3:37  PM),  http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/11/gulf.oil.spill.report/  (internal   quotation  marks  omitted);  see  also  Editorial,  Failure  in  the  Gulf,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Jan.  7,  2011,  at  A22,   available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/opinion/07fri1.html.   76. CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  251.   77. “Developing  technologies,”  as  used  here,  refers  to  technologies  that  have  been  recently   developed   in   the   industry   and   represent   new   and   generally   untested   (at   least   as   a   practical   matter)  methods   of   extracting   oil.     One   example   of   a   “developing   technology”   that   remains   largely   unregulated   is   hydraulic   fracturing   (“fracking”),   a   natural   gas   extraction   technique   “that   involves   pumping   a   sand-­‐filled,   gel-­‐like   fluid   down   an   extraction   well’s   pipe   at   high   pressure.”    Skip  Hollandsworth,  That’s  Oil,  Folks!,  TEX.  MONTHLY,  Sept.  2010,  at  116,  available  at   http://www.texasmonthly.com/2010-­‐09-­‐01/feature4.php.     In   fact,   fracking   was   exempted   from  most   federal   regulation  under   the  Safe  Drinking  Water  Act  by   the  Energy  Policy  Act  of   2005.      Energy  Policy  Act  of  2005,  42  U.S.C.  §  300h  (2006).    The  exemption  is  commonly  known   as  the  “Halliburton  loophole”  because  Dick  Cheney,  Vice  President  in  2005  and  a  past  CEO  of   Halliburton,  led  the  presidential  task  force  on  energy  policy  that  worked  on  the  Act.    See,  e.g.,   Editorial,   The   Halliburton   Loophole,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Nov.   3,   2009,   at   A28,   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html.     Carbon   capture   and   sequestration   (“CCS”)   is   another   potentially   dangerous   developing   technology   that   remains   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   277   example,   at   the   time  of   the   spill,  MMS  regulations  only   covered   the   most   basic   elements   of   well   design,   and   the   provisions   that   addressed   the   use   of   cement   in   offshore   oil   wells   were   extremely   general.78     Given   the   range   of   possibilities   for   energy   extraction,   it   would  prove  both  costly  and  difficult  for  the  government  to  regulate   every  new   frontier  before   industry  established  new  and  potentially   dangerous   practices.     As   Charles   Perrow   has   stated,   “of   all   the   glorious   possibilities   out   there   to   reach   for,   some   are   going   to   be   beyond   our   grasp   in   catastrophic  ways.”79     The  Deepwater  Horizon   spill,  calling  to  attention  a  relatively  recent  move  toward  deepwater   oil  extraction,  illustrates  exactly  why  this  model  of  regulation  creates   risks  that  are  problematic  if  sustained  in  the  long  term.   Several  key  discoveries  by  oil  companies  in  the  1980s  triggered  an     unregulated.    Many  see  the  technology,  in  which  emissions  from  coal-­‐fired  power  plants  could   be  cleansed  of  their  carbon  dioxide  and  stored  underground,  as  the  key  to  the  future  of  the  coal   industry   in  the  United  States.    See,  e.g.,  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  CARBON   DIOXIDE   CAPTURE   AND   STORAGE   3   (Bert   Metz   et   al.   eds.,   2005),   available   at   http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-­‐reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf.     CCS   also   has   the   potential  to  slow  the  effects  of  climate  change,  but,  in  order  to  do  so,  the  carbon  dioxide  “must   be  stored  for  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years  without  leakage  or  environmental  degradation.”     Cormac   Rea,   Introduction:    What   is   CCS   (Carbon   Capture   and   Storage),   CANADIAN   GEOGRAPHIC   http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/JF08/   indepth/ccs.asp  (last  visited  May  10,  2012).    In  addition  to  its  potential  to  retard  the  impact  of   global  warming,  CCS  may   facilitate  oil   extraction  by  making  underground  oil  more   fluid   and   thus   easier   to   extract  when   the   two   are  mixed.     Kate   Galbraith,  Carbon  Dioxide,   the   Bane   of   Environmentalists,  Is  in  Demand  in  the  Oil  Industry,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Jan.  7,  2011,  at  A17A,  available  at   http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07ttcarbon.html.     It   is   unclear,   however,  whether   the  prevention  of  leakage  is  currently  possible;  the  technology  is  not  currently  operating  on  a   large  commercial   scale,  although  a  number  of  pilot  plants  do  exist,   and  components  are  also   being   tested   in   various   places.     Id.     As   of   mid-­‐2005,   there   were   three   commercial   projects   linking  carbon  dioxide  capture  and  geological   storage,  but  CCS  has  not  yet  been  applied  at  a   large  fossil-­‐fuel  power  plant.    INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  supra,  at  19.    Some   efforts   at   implementing   the   CCS   process   on   a   large   scale   and   similar   suggestions   have   been   made.    See,  e.g.,  ERIC  P.  ROBERTSON,  IDAHO  NAT’L  LAB.,  ENHANCED  COAL  BED  METHANE  RECOVERY  AND   CO2   SEQUESTRATION   IN   THE   POWDER   RIVER   BASIN   1–2   (2010),   available   at   http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/4536713.pdf.     Some   oil   extraction   projects  have  been  delayed  because  they  do  not  have  enough  carbon  dioxide.    Galbraith,  supra.     But   see   CO2   Sequestration:     Facts,   KIEL   MARINE   SCI.,   http://www.ozean-­‐der-­‐ zukunft.de/english/research-­‐areas/greenhouse-­‐oceans/cosub2sub-­‐sequestration/facts/   (last   visited  Apr.  23,  2012)  (“Only  when  the  contribution  of  carbon  binding  in  a  carbon  management   system   has   been   determined,   should   the   use   of   appropriate   political   measures   and   the   introduction  of  incentives  for  carbon  storage  be  examined.”).    A  similar  trend  was  observed  in   nuclear   power   regulation.    See   J.   SAMUEL  WALKER  &  THOMAS  R.  WELLOCK,  NUCLEAR  REGULATORY   COMM’N,   A   SHORT   HISTORY   OF   NUCLEAR   REGULATION,   1946–2009   25–50   (2000),   available   at   http://www.nrc.gov/about-­‐nrc/short-­‐history.html.     78. See  CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  254–55.   79. CHARLES  PERROW,  NORMAL  ACCIDENTS:    LIVING  WITH  HIGH-­‐RISK  TECHNOLOGIES  11  (1984).   278   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   industry-­‐wide  move  into  deepwater.80    This  move  was  “not  gradual,   as   companies   quickly   leapfrogged   each   other   to   go   deeper   and   deeper   for   new   oil   and   gas.”81     The   “special   safety   risks”   of   “harsh   environments   and   remote   locations”   and   the   particular   challenges   posed  by  deepwater  drilling82  did  not  deter   industry  from  pursuing   opportunities  in  this  high-­‐profit  area.    Rather,  “the  world  oil  industry   began  a   radical   restructuring,”   as  many   companies   and   contractors   relocated   to   cities   on   the   Gulf   Coast,   such   as   New   Orleans   and   Houston.83   Government   regulation   did   not   keep   up   with   the   shift   toward   deepwater   drilling.84     As   Congressman   George   Miller   of   California   noted,  “The  industry  convinced  nearly  everyone  in  government  that   what   they  were  doing  was   so   sophisticated   that   it  was  both   totally   safe   and   impossible   for   government   to   understand,   much   less   regulate.”85     Indeed,   “[g]overnment   was   romanced  .  .  .  [a]nd   it   succumbed   to   the   romance,”86   because   of   the   complex   technical   aspects   of   the   new   drilling   mechanisms   and   the   immense   profits   deepwater   drilling   generated.     Similar   government   complacency   regarding   industry   practices  was   also   a   characteristic   of   regulation   prior   to   Exxon   Valdez.     As   was   the   case   in   deepwater   drilling,   the   success  of   the  oil   industry   and   corresponding  profits   resulted   in   “a   general   complacency  .  .  .  [within   government   that]   permeate[d]   the   operation   and   oversight   of   the   entire   system.”87     However,   the   degree   to  which  MMS   ignored   various  warning   signs   regarding   rig   safety   and   the   lack   of   oversight   exercised   by   MMS   in   both   the   planning   and   execution   of   deepwater   drilling   operations   cannot   be     80. Among   these   discoveries   was   the   Auger   Field,   located   136   miles   off   the   coast   of   Louisiana,  and   its  use  of   tension-­‐leg  (non-­‐fixed)  platforms.    See  generally  COMMISSION  REPORT,   supra  note  21,  at  21–54.   81. Staff  Working  Paper,  supra  note  20,  at  10.   82. Such   challenges   include   increased  water   depth,   changing   geological   conditions   at   the   sea   bottom,   different   sedimentary   layers,   and   the   high   pressure   under  which   oil   and   gas   in   deepwater  reservoirs  is  contained.    CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  6,  8.   83. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  43;  see  Brian  Knowlton,  Oil  Growth  Boomerangs  on   Houston,  INT'L  HERALD  TRIB.,  Apr.  9,  2002,  at  1  (describing  Houston  as  the  “capital  of  the  world   petroleum  industry”).   84. See  NAT’L  PETROLEUM  COUNCIL,  HARD  TRUTHS:    FACING  THE  HARD  TRUTHS  ABOUT  ENERGY  26– 27   (2007)   (“Most   energy   technology   is   developed   by   industry   in   response   to   a   resource   opportunity  .  .  .  .     Government   has   a   role   in   creating   new   opportunities   and   developing   the   regulatory  framework  and  infrastructure  needed  to  extract  new  resources.”).   85. Neil  King   Jr.  &  Keith   Johnson,  An  Oil-­‐Thirsty  America  Dived   into   'Dead  Sea,'  WALL  ST.   J.   (Oct.   8,   2010,  6:12  PM),  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870465730457554   0063579696700.html  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   86. Id.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   87. ALASKA  OIL  SPILL  COMM’N,  supra  note  65,  at  5.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   279   excused   merely   because   the   work   at   issue   was   novel   or   overly   technical.   The   increased   drilling   in   the   Gulf   region   stimulated   local   economies,  but  it  also  exposed  the  region  to  potentially  catastrophic   environmental  harms,  in  part  because  drilling  in  deepwater  required   technologies   that   had   never   been   used   previously   in   the   oil   extraction  industry.    Deepwater  drilling  marked  an  entirely  new  and   distinct   method   of   extraction,88   requiring   new   approaches   and   the   application   of   new   technologies.89     As   a   Commission   Staff  Working   Paper   noted,   “Both   the   velocity   and   irregularity   of   underwater   currents   as  well   as   extreme   pressures   and   temperatures   put   extra   stress   on   subsea   equipment   in   the   deep.”90     The   pressure—and   corresponding   danger—became   greater   the   farther   the   companies’   operations   extended   below   the   surface.91     The   Deepwater   Horizon   drilled   the  Macondo  well   at   over   5000   feet   of  water   in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico,   and   then   over   13,000   feet   under   the   sea   floor   to   the   hydrocarbon  reservoir.92    “It  is  a  complex,  even  dazzling  enterprise”   to  drill  this  deep,  but  “the  oil  and  gas  reservoirs,  when  found,  exist  at   even  higher  pressures  .  .  .  compounding  the  risks  if  a  well  gets  out  of   control.”93     Thus,   despite   the   industry’s   dedication   to   developing   appropriate   technologies   for   its   newest   endeavor,94   the   move   into   deepwater  had  the  potential  to  cause  more  detrimental  impacts  than   initially  predicted.95   MMS  did  establish  best  practices  standards  for  the  offshore  drilling     88. See   COMMISSION   REPORT,   supra   note   21,   at   25–27;   Jonathan   Tilove,   New   Permits   for   Shallow-­‐Water  Oil  Wells  Should  Be  Allowed  Amid  Deepwater  Investigation,  Industry  Spokesmen   Say,  NEW  ORLEANS  TIMES-­‐PICAYUNE  (May  20,  2010,  8:17  PM),  http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-­‐ oil-­‐spill/index.ssf/2010/05/new_permits_for_shallow-­‐water.html.   89. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  25–27.   90. Staff  Working  Paper,  supra  note  20,  at  17;  see  also  WILLIAM  L.  LEFFLER  ET  AL.,  DEEPWATER   PETROLEUM  EXPLORATION  &  PRODUCTION:    A  NONTECHNICAL  GUIDE  59,  66–68  (2003).   91. See  Staff  Working  Paper,  supra  note  20,  at  17  (“Pressure  control  becomes  more  difficult   as   the   drill   bit   descends   because   of   the   greater   likelihood   of   encountering   abnormal   geopressures.”).   92. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  viii.   93. Id.  at  viii,  ix.   94. See  generally  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  21–54.   95. See  David  Flesher,  Searching  for  Oil,  Florida’s  Black  Gold:    How  Exploration  Could  Affect   Us   All,   S.   FLA.   SUN-­‐SENTINEL   (Aug.   17,   2008),   http://www.sun-­‐sentinel.com/news/local/   southflorida/sfl-­‐flbdrilling0817sbaug17,0,2778178.story?page=1   (assuaging   fears   of   a   future   catastrophic  spill  by  noting  that  "improved  technology"  and  "the  passage  of  tighter  regulations   since  the  1989  Exxon  Valdez  disaster"  have  decreased  spill  occurrence);  Mike  Salinero,  A  Crude   Awakening,  TAMPA  TRIB.,  Aug.  18,  2006,  at  1  (noting  particular  failure  to  predict  environmental   harm  resulting  from  oil  spills  caused  by  natural  disasters  such  as  hurricanes).     280   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   industry.96     Unfortunately,   these   standards   were   not   adequately   enforced   by   the   agency.97     Indeed,   “[d]espite   the   aspirational   language   of   the   ‘best   available   and   safest   technology’   requirement,   the   Deepwater   Horizon   rig   did   not   include   any   devices   designed   specifically   to   help   rig   personnel   detect   the   presence   of   hydrocarbons   in   the   wellbore.”98     The   general   and   outdated   regulations  imposed  by  MMS  were  even  more  problematic  due  to  the   agency’s  financial  incentive  to  promote  offshore  drilling,99  which  was   “in   tension   with   its   mandate   to   ensure   safe   drilling   and   environmental   protection.”100     For   example,   in   January   1997,   MMS   altered  an  established  policy  that  required  testing  of  undersea  BOPs   weekly   to   one   that   required   testing   every   two   weeks,101   a   change   that  industry  had  pushed  for  because  it  saved  an  average  of  twenty-­‐ five   million   dollars   a   year,   according   to   an   MMS   estimate.102     Although   reorganized   and   renamed   after   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,103  MMS  came  under  “much  deserved  criticism  for   its   failure  to   rein  in  BP’s  avaricious  approach  to  drilling  even  where  it  was  unable   to   respond   to   a   worst-­‐case   scenario   in   a   responsible   and   timely   fashion.”104     Such   criticism   is  warranted   given   that   “MMS   routinely     96. ALYSON   FLOURNEY   ET   AL.,   CTR.   FOR   PROGRESSIVE   REFORM,   REGULATORY   BLOWOUT:     HOW   REGULATORY  FAILURES  MADE  THE  BP  DISASTER  POSSIBLE,  AND  HOW  THE  SYSTEM  CAN  BE  FIXED  TO  AVOID   A   RECURRENCE   13   (2010),   available   at   http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/BP_Reg_Blowout_1007.pdf.   97. Id.   98. CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  257.   99. Id.  at  251.   100. CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  251.   101. Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t   of   the   Interior,  Minerals  Mgmt.   Serv.,   Innovation  16:    MMS   Revises   Testing   Requirements   for   Blowout   Preventers   (Jan.   3,   1997),   available   at   http://bsee.gov/BSEE-­‐Newsroom/Press-­‐Releases/1997/Press-­‐Release-­‐Catalog-­‐1997.aspx   (click  on  press  release  posted  on  Jan.  31,  1997  to  download).   102. King  Jr.  &  Johnson,  supra  note  85.   103. After  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill,  MMS  was  disbanded  and  reorganized  as  the  Bureau   of  Ocean  Energy  Management,  Regulation,  and  Enforcement,  or  BOEMRE.    The  stated  purpose   of   the   reorganization   was   “to   separate   and   reassign   the   responsibilities   that   had   been   conducted   by   MMS   into   new   management   structures   that   will   improve   the   management,   oversight,  and  accountability  of  activities  on  the  [Outer  Continental  Shelf];  ensure  a  fair  return   to  the  taxpayer  from  royalty  and  revenue  collection  and  disbursement  activities;  and  provide   independent   safety   and   environmental   oversight   and   enforcement   of   offshore   activities.”     Frequently   Asked   Questions,   BUREAU   OF   OCEAN   ENERGY   MGMT.,   REG.   &   ENFORCEMENT,   http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/newweb/frequentlyaskedquestions/frequently   askedquestions.htm  (last  visited  May  5,  2012)  (in  response  to  the  question  "Why  is  BOEMRE   reorganizing?").    It  should  be  noted  that  BOEMRE  did  not  truly  replace  MMS.    Rather,  MMS  was   renamed  and  reorganized.    Frequently  Asked  Questions,  BUREAU  OF  OCEAN  ENERGY  MGMT.,  REG.  &   ENFORCEMENT,   http://boem.gov/BOEM-­‐Newsroom/Frequently-­‐Asked-­‐Questions/Frequently-­‐ Asked-­‐Questions.aspx  (last  visited  Apr.  23,  2012).   104. FLOURNEY  ET  AL.,  supra  note  96,  at  1.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   281   accepted  assurances  that  a  blowout  was  unlikely  and  adopted  safety   and   environmental   standards   developed   by   industry”   despite   repeated  warnings,   like   the  U.S.  Coast  Guard’s   in  2002,   that,   absent   greater  regulation,  the  industry  would  not  develop  new  technologies   to  prevent  spills.105   Finally,   after   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   it   became   clear   that   regulators   had   failed   to   consider   several   serious   spills   and   near   misses   in   the   industry,   such   as   a   blowout   in   the   Timor   Sea   and   another   on   the   Louis   Bouzigard   rig   in   the   Gulf.106    When   accidents   occur  in  the  oil  industry,  regulators  are  under  no  statutory  obligation   to   modify   their   procedures   in   light   of   problems   revealed   by   the   accident.107    While  it  is  impossible  to  examine  the  full  implications  of   every  single  spill,  the  government  should  not  ignore  spills  that  tend   to   suggest   ongoing   problems.108     Oil   companies   have   also   been   criticized   for   failing   to   adequately   consider   published   data   on   recurring   problems   in   offshore   drilling.109     To   date,   “[n]o   accident  .  .  .  has   measurably   slowed   the   rate   of   discovery   and   production.”110     Even   after   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   oil     105. Id.;  see  LEVESON,  supra  note  15,  at  6.   106. See  Russell  Gold  &  Ben  Casselman,  Far  Offshore,  a  Rash  of  Close  Calls,  WALL  ST.  J.  (Dec.   8,  2010,  10:35  PM),  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575652714   091006550.html;  Eric  Lichtblau,  Records  Show  Concerns  About  Another  BP  Rig,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Dec.   16,  2010,  at  A26;  Mufson,  supra  note  20.   107. Note,   however,   that   the   companies   are   arguably   exposed   to   tort   liability   if   their   operations  do  not  reflect  the  lessons  of  prior  accidents.   108. The   nuclear   industry   similarly   ignored   other,   smaller   accidents   that   had   occurred   prior   to   Three   Mile   Island   because   no   major   legislation   had   been   passed   to   address   these   accidents  or  the  possibility  that  the  smaller  problems  would  combine  to  create  a  catastrophe   like  Three  Mile  Island.    CHILES,  supra  note  17,  at  16,  21,  141,  45  (“We  know  so  much  about  the   problems   [of   nuclear   accidents]   only   because   the   accident   at   Three   Mile   Island   made   it   a   subject  for  intense  study.”);  see  also  PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  48  (“Two-­‐thirds  of  the  problems   discussed   in   this   issue   are   strikingly   similar   to   ones   previously   reported   in   Nuclear   Safety   [Magazine]  in  the  hope  and  expectation  that  we  will  all  be  able  to  learn  from  the  experience  of   others  .  .  .  .    Operators  should  take  particular  note  of  these  occurrences  so  that  they  can  more   readily   avoid   similar   happenings   in   their   own   plants.”   (internal   quotation  marks   omitted)).     The   Three   Mile   Island   meltdown   was   caused   by   “a   combination   of   events—a   stuck-­‐open   pressure-­‐relief   valve   that   allowed   water   levels   in   the   reactor   to   drop,   thus   uncovering   the   radioactive  core,  plus   indicators   that  showed  the  position  of   the  switch  controlling   the  valve   but  not   the  valve   itself,  plus  operator   training   that   cautioned  operators  about  overfilling   the   reactor  with  water—[that]  destroyed  a  billion  dollar  unit  of  the  plant  and  changed  the  nuclear   power  industry  forever.”    John  S.  Carroll,  Knowledge  Management  in  High-­‐Hazard  Industries,  in   ACCIDENT   PRECURSOR   ANALYSIS   AND   MANAGEMENT:     REDUCING   TECHNOLOGICAL   RISK   THROUGH   DILIGENCE  127,  127  (James  M.  Phimister  et  al.,  eds.  2004).   109. See  Staff  Working  Paper,  supra  note  20  at  17;  see  also  Clifford  Krauss,  Accidents  Don’t   Slow   Gulf   of   Mexico   Drilling,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Apr.   23,   2010,   at   A17,   available   at   http://www.   nytimes.com/2010/04/23/us/23offshore.html.   110. Krauss,  supra  note  109.   282   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   companies   lobbied   for  continued  drilling  “instead  of   focusing  all   [of   their]  energy  on   improving   [their]  capacity   to  prevent  and  respond   to   future   blowouts.”111     While   this   criticism   is   overstated,   as   oil   producers   cannot   focus   all   of   their   efforts   on   spill   prevention,   oil   companies  should  consider  data  on  previous  spills  and  their  causes   with  greater   frequency  and   in   greater  detail   in  order   to  prevent  or   mitigate   future   incidents.     Moreover,   data   detailing   prior   occurrences   should   not   only   be   considered   by   industry   and   regulators,   but   also   by   legislators   and   those   developing   spill   response  plans.   C.    Inadequacies  in  Proposed  and  Existing  Legislation   While   a   public   call   for   new   legislation   and   corresponding   legislative   proposals   immediately   followed   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,  no   law  directly  addressing  prevention  of  similar  disasters  was   adopted.112     This   is   concerning,   as   existing   laws   primarily   focus   on   technical  lessons  learned  from  previous  disasters  (like  the  regulation   of   double   hulls   following   the   Exxon   Valdez   tanker   spill),113   and   therefore,  as  demonstrated  by  Deepwater  Horizon,  make  it  difficult  to   successfully  anticipate  or  mitigate  disastrous  events  that  do  not  have   the   exact   same   technical   causes.     Moreover,   inadequate   and   inconsistent   implementation  of   existing   laws   like  NEPA  and   the  Oil   Pollution   Act   (“OPA”)   has   caused   severe   misunderstandings   regarding   the  potential   for   an   accident   like  Deepwater  Horizon   and   appropriate  response  efforts.114   Of   the   seventy-­‐five   bills   introduced   in   Congress   after   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   most   focused   on   liability   for   the   damage   caused  to  human  health,  the  local  economy,  and  the  environment.115       111. Editorial,  They  Haven’t  Learned,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Dec.  13,  2010,  at  A24,  available  at  http://   www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/opinion/13mon1.html.   112. See  JONATHAN  L.  RAMSEUR,  CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV.,  R42371,  DEEPWATER  HORIZON  OIL  SPILL:     HIGHLIGHTED  ACTIVITIES  2  (2012)  (noting  that   “oil  spill-­‐related   legislative  activity   in   the  112th   Congress   has   diminished   compared   to   the   111th   Congress”),   available   at   http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42371.pdf;   Bruce   Alpert  &   Jonathan   Tilove,  A   Year   After   Gulf  Oil  Spill,  Congress  Is  Sitting  on  Its  Hands,  NEW  ORLEANS  TIMES-­‐PICAYUNE  (Apr.  10,  2011,  6:10   AM),   http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-­‐oil-­‐spill/index.ssf/2011/04/a_year_after_gulf_   oil_spill_co.html.   113. See  supra  Part  I.B.1.   114. See  U.S.   COAST   GUARD,   supra  note   25,   at   3;   Juliet   Eilperin,  U.S.   Exempted   BP’s   Gulf   of   Mexico  Drilling  from  Environmental  Impact  Study,  WASH.  POST,  May  5,  2010,  at  A04,  available  at   http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.h tml.   115. See  Press  Release,  White  House  Office  of  the  Press  Sec’y,  supra  note  5.    The  Senate  bill   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   283   Proposed  legislation  that  did  not  focus  on  liability  generally  focused   on  specific   last  resort  protective   technologies   that  were  believed  to   have   failed   on   the  Deepwater  Horizon,116   responding   to   the   call   for   “some   fundamental   paradigm   shifts”   in   technology   to   deal   with   deepwater  conditions.117    For  example,   the  Blowout  Prevention  Act,   subsequently   incorporated   into   the  Consolidated  Land,  Energy,  and   Aquatic  Resources  (“CLEAR”)  Act,118  set  forth  new  requirements  for   BOPs,  well   design,   and   cementing.119     However,   the   CLEAR  Act   did   not   address   the   extent   to   which   human   triggers   of   last   resort   technologies  need  to  be  examined  or  changed,  nor  did  it  require  any   sort   of   pre-­‐development   environmental   planning   to  modify  NEPA’s     that  attracted  the  most  media  attention  proposed  to  raise  the  cap  on  private  party  liability  in   the   Oil   Pollution   Act   from   seventy-­‐five   million   to   ten   billion   dollars,   and   would   have   been   retroactive   to  before   the  Deepwater  Horizon   spill.    See  Oil  Spill  Response  and  Assistance  Act,   H.R.  5356,  111th  Cong.  (2010);  Lisa  Lerer,  Congress  Prepares  Bill  to  Remove  BP  Liability  Limit,   BLOOMBERG   (June   3,   2010,   12:24   PM),   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/   2010-­‐06-­‐03/democrats-­‐prepare-­‐bill-­‐to-­‐remove-­‐75-­‐million-­‐damages-­‐limit-­‐for-­‐oil-­‐spills.html.     However,  the  proposal  was  met  with  bipartisan  opposition,   including  from  Senator  Landrieu,   who  said,  “We  want  to  be  careful  before  we  change  any  of  these  laws  that  we  don’t  jeopardize   the  operations  of  an  ongoing  industry,  because  there  are  4000  other  wells  in  the  Gulf  that  have   to   go   on.”     Lisa   Lerer,  Effort   to   Increase   Liability   Limit   for   Oil-­‐Spill   Damages   Fails   in   Senate,   BLOOMBERG   (May   14,   2010,   2:09   PM),   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-­‐05-­‐14/effort-­‐ to-­‐increase-­‐oil-­‐spill-­‐liability-­‐after-­‐gulf-­‐disaster-­‐fails-­‐in-­‐senate.html.    Retroactivity  of  such  a  bill   may  also  violate  due  process  and  basic  principles  of  fairness.    See  Deepwater  Horizon  Liability:     Hearing  Before  the  S.  Comm.  on  Energy  &  Natural  Res.,  111th  Cong.  60–61  (2010)  (statement  of   Robert   Meltz,   Legislative   Attorney,   Cong.   Research   Serv.),   available   at   http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-­‐111shrg61828/pdf/CHRG-­‐111shrg61828.pdf   (discussing  a  potential   substantive  due  process  challenge  but   concluding   that   it  would   likely   not  succeed).    Another  such  bill  was  the  Big  Oil  Polluter  Pays  Act,  which  proposed  to  reverse   the  Supreme  Court’s  2008  decision  in  Exxon  Shipping  Co.  v.  Baker,  554  U.S.  471  (2008),  which   slashed  Exxon  Mobil’s  punitive  damages   for   the  Exxon  Valdez   spill.    See  S.  3345,  111th  Cong.   (2010).   116. See  supra  note  7.    The  Oil  Spill  Prevention  and  Mitigation   Improvement  Act  of  2010,   which  would   have   required   oil   companies   to   have   a   viable,   peer-­‐reviewed   response   plan   to   respond   to   a   significant   oil   leak   before   any   new  offshore   drilling   lease   could   be   issued,  was   never  passed.    See  Scott  Brown,  Editorial,  Acting  to  Contain  Disasters,  WORCESTER  TELEGRAM  &   GAZETTE   (June   24,   2010),   http://www.telegram.com/article/20100624/NEWS/6240755/   1054/OPINION&Template=printart.   117. WHITBY,  supra  note  61,  at  37.   118. The  Blowout  Prevention  Act  of  2010,  H.R.  5626,  111th  Cong.  (2010);  the  Consolidated   Land,  Energy,  and  Aquatic  Resources  (CLEAR)  Act,  H.R.  3534,  111th  Cong.  (2010).     119. H.R.   3534.     According   to   Republican   Congressman   Joe   Barton,   the   ranking  minority   leader  on  the  Energy  and  Commerce  Committee  at   the   time  the  Blowout  Prevention  Act  was   proposed,   “[t]he   requirements   in   this   bill   [would]   materially   improve   safety   and   environmental   protection   and   materially   increase   the   probability   that   never   again   will   this   committee  or  Congress  or  the  president  of  the  United  States  have  to  deal  with  a  disaster  of  the   proportion   that   we   have   now   in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico.”     Drilling   Safeguard   Bill   Passes   House   Committee,   22   WESTLAW   J.   UTIL.   INDUSTRY,   no.   3,   Aug.   2010,   at   7   (internal   quotation   marks   omitted).   284   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   environmental   impact   statement   policies   or   OPA’s   response   plan   requirements.120     Although   the   Act   passed   in   the   House,   it   expired   while   awaiting   review   in   the   Senate.121     As   this  Note   goes   to   print,   Congress   has   adopted   no   new   legislation   in   this   area.122     Although   some  slight  regulatory  changes  have  been  made,  Part  II  of  this  Note   will   demonstrate   why   legislative   reform   is   ultimately   necessary   to   prevent  similar  disasters  from  occurring  in  the  future.   Mirroring   the   period   immediately   following   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   the   Exxon   Valdez   disaster   prompted   attempts   at   preventative   legislation   in   Congress,   which   was   characterized   as   unwilling   “to   accept   the   complacency   that   has   settled   over   Washington   about   taking   the   necessary   steps   to   prevent   a   similar   disaster   in   the   future.”123     The   end   result   was   OPA,   which,   among   other  things,  required  the  preparation  of  response  plans  by  various   entities,124   increased   penalties   for   regulatory   noncompliance,   and   preserved  state  authority  to  enact  laws  governing  oil  spills.125    While   OPA  represented  a  response  to  the  Exxon  Valdez  spill,  similar  to  the     120. H.R.  3534.   121. Id.    The  Bill  passed  the  House  209-­‐193,  but  died  in  the  Senate.    Bill  Summary  &  Status:     H.R.  3534,  LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS,  http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php  (select  111th   Congress  and  search  for  bill  number  H.R.  3534)  (last  visited  May  19,  2012).   122. Some   relevant   bills   have   been   proposed   in   both   houses   of   Congress.     The   most   promising  piece  of   legislation  proposed   is   the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Reform  Act  of  2011,  S.   917,   112th   Cong.   (2011).     It   would   “[a]mend[]   the   Outer   Continental   Shelf   Lands   Act   to   prescribe  a  program  of  structural  reform  for  [the]  management  of  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf,   including   establishing   two   bureaus   to   carry   out   leasing,   permitting,   and   safety   and   environmental  regulatory  functions,”  but  has  only  reached  the  hearing  stage  in  the  Senate.    Bill   Summary   &   Status:     S.917,   LIBRARY   OF   CONGRESS,   http://thomas.loc.gov/home/   LegislativeData.php  (select  112th  Congress  and  search  for  bill  number  S  917)(last  visited  May   19,   2012).     The   Implementing   the   Recommendations   of   the   BP   Oil   Spill   Commission   Act   of   2011,   H.R.   501,   112th   Cong.   (2011),  was   introduced   in   the   House   on   January   26,   2011   and   referred   to   the   House   Subcommittee   on  Workforce   Protections   on   February   25,   2011.    Bill   Summary   &   Status:     H.R.   501,   LIBRARY   OF   CONGRESS,   http://thomas.loc.gov/home/   LegislativeData.php   (select   112th   Congress   and   search   for   bill   number   HR   501)(last   visited   May  19,  2012).    Similarly,  the  Offshore  Drilling  Safety  Improvement  Act,  H.R.  1520,  112th  Cong.   (2011),  was   introduced  by  Rep.   Jay  Inslee  (WA)  on  April  13,  2011  and  referred  to  the  House   Subcommittee  on  Energy  and  Power.    Bill  Summary  &  Status:    H.R.  1520,  LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS,   http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php   (select   112th   Congress   and   search   for   bill   number  HR  1520)  (last  visited  May  19,  2012).   123. Steve  Cowper,  Editorial,  An  Oil-­‐Spill  Law—Now,  WASH.  POST,  June  13,  1990,  at  A23  (the   author  was  governor  of  Alaska  at  the  time  of  the  Exxon  Valdez  disaster).   124. See   infra   notes   158–165   and   accompanying   text   for   a   discussion   of   Regional   Contingency  Plans  and  Agency  Contingency  Plans.   125. See  33   U.S.C.   §   2718(a)–(c)   (2006);  Oil   Pollution   Act   Overview,   ENVTL.   PROT.   AGENCY,   http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  24,  2012)   (describing   the   provisions   of   the   Oil   Pollution   Act,   including   a   provision   that   increases   penalties  for  regulatory  noncompliance).   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   285   legislation   proposed   in   the   aftermath   of   Deepwater   Horizon,   the   response   was   limited   in   scope,   focusing   primarily   on   the   establishment   of   two   advisory   programs   in   Alaska   to   monitor   the   terminal   facilities   and   crude   oil   tankers   in   the   Prince   William   Sound126   and   a   schedule   for   phasing   out   older   single   hull   tankers   from  U.S.  ports127    instead  of  robust  preventative  measures.   State   legislation   in   the  aftermath  of  both  disasters  was  also   fairly   limited.     State   legislation   following   the  Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   to   the   extent   that   it   exists,   has   largely   targeted   company   liability   for   environmental   cleanup.128     Demonstrating   a   similar   concern   for   cleanup   costs   after   the   Exxon  Valdez   spill,   California   established   an   oil  spill  cleanup  fund  financed  by  taxing  each  barrel  of  oil  within  the   state.129     Alaska,   on   the   other   hand,   did   act   to   put   in   to   place   preventative   measures,   “announc[ing]  .  .  .  more   stringent   oil-­‐spill   prevention   and   response   standards   governing   tankers,   terminals,   facilities,  and  the  Trans-­‐Alaska  Pipeline  System.”130     The  lack  of  new  legislation  following  Deepwater  Horizon  is  perhaps   surprising,  given  that  the  laws  in  place  prior  to  the  accident  failed  to   adequately   address   disaster   prevention   and   mitigation.     For   example,   the   Environmental   Impact   Statement   (“EIS”)   requirement   of  NEPA  and  the  response  plan  system  established  by  OPA  failed  to   sufficiently   prepare   industry   for   the   worst-­‐case   scenario   that   ultimately  occurred.    Under  NEPA,  a  federal  agency  contemplating  a   major   federal   action   that   may   significantly   affect   the   environment   must  prepare  an  EIS,  or  a  shorter  Environmental  Assessment  (“EA”)   unless  a  categorical  exclusion  (“CE”)  applies.131    An  EIS  requires  the   responsible   federal   agency   involved   to   consider   the   environmental   impacts   of   its   activities   and   alternatives   to   those   activities.132     Typically,  categorical  exclusions  are  applied  to  activities  that  “do  not   individually   or   cumulatively   have   a   significant   effect   on   the  human   environment   and  which   have   been   found   to   have   no   such   effect   in     126. Oil  Pollution  Act  of  1990,  Pub.  L.  No.  101-­‐380,  §§  5001–5002,  104  Stat.  484,  542–53   (1990)  (codified  as  amended  in  scattered  sections  of  33  U.S.C.).   127. 33  U.S.C.  §  4115  (2006).   128. See,   e.g.,   H.B.   1186,   62d   Leg.,   2011   Reg.   Sess.   (Wash.   2011)   (enacted)   (increasing   penalties  for  oil  spilled  within  the  state’s  waters).   129. Oil  Safeguards  Become  Law  in  California,  WASH.  POST,  Sept.  23,  1990,  at  A17.   130. Alaska  Announces  New  Rules  for  Responding  to  Oil  Spills,  WASH.  POST.,  Oct.  27,  1991,  at   A19.   131. 42  U.S.C.  §  4332(C)  (2006);  40  C.F.R.  §  1508.4  (2012).    A  CE  essentially  represents  an   advance   determination   that   a   particular   kind   of   action   will   not   significantly   affect   the   environment.    See  40  C.F.R.  §  1508.4.   132. See  42  U.S.C.  §  4332(C).   286   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   procedures   adopted   by   a   Federal   agency  .  .  .  .”133     Any   procedures   allowing   CEs   must   include   “extraordinary   circumstances,”   under   which  a  CE  would  not  apply.134   Confusion  and  uncertainty  created  by  the  complexity  of  the  NEPA   process  on  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  may  have  contributed  to  the   lack   of   preparedness   for   the   spill.     Prior   to   the   accident,   MMS   employed   a   “tiering”   process,   encouraged   by   NEPA   regulations,   under  which   it   covered   “general  matters   in   broader   environmental   impact   statements  .  .  .  with   subsequent   narrower   statements   or   environmental   analyses  .  .  .  incorporating   by   reference   the   general   discussions   and   concentrating   solely   on   the   issues   specific   to   the   statement   subsequently   prepared.”135     When   tiering   occurs,   “it   is   important   that   decisionmakers   are   made   aware   of   the   relevant   portions   of   the   previous   NEPA   environmental   analysis   to   inform   their   subsequent   decisions,”   but   MMS’s   tiered   analysis   was   not   sufficiently   specific   to   the   “particular   activity,   geography,   and   impacts”   of   the   Outer   Continental   Shelf,   as   required   by   the   tiering   process.136     Reforms   to   this   process   on   the  Outer   Continental   Shelf   would   undoubtedly   reduce   the   level   of   complexity   and   ambiguity   that  characterized  NEPA  review  for  the  Macondo  well.   Each   step   of   the   leasing   process   on   the   Outer   Continental   Shelf   undergoes  NEPA  review  unless  categorically  excluded.137    BP  was  not   required   to  prepare  an  EIS   for   its  exploratory  drilling  operation  on   the  Deepwater  Horizon.138    Instead,  BP  prepared  an  exploration  plan   (“EP”)  and  applied  for  permits  to  drill  the  Macondo  well.139    BP  called     133. 40  C.F.R.  §  1508.4.   134. Id.   135. COUNCIL   ON   ENVTL.   QUALITY,   REPORT   REGARDING   THE   MINERALS   MANAGEMENT   SERVICE’S   NATIONAL   ENVIRONMENTAL   POLICY   ACT   POLICIES,   PRACTICES,   AND   PROCEDURES   AS   THEY   RELATE   TO   OUTER  CONTINENTAL  SHELF  OIL  AND  GAS  EXPLORATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  3  (2010)  [hereinafter  CEQ   REPORT]   (quoting   40   C.F.R.   §   1502.28   (2012)),   available   at   http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-­‐ceq-­‐mms-­‐ocs-­‐ nepa.pdf.     136. Id.  at  23–24.    An  EIS  had,  however,  been  prepared  on  the  leasing  program  for  this  part   of  the  Gulf.    Id.  at  24  n.67  (“As  operations  moved  into  deeper  waters,  MMS  recognized  that  both   the   technologies   used   and   the   potentially   affected   environments   were   not   as   well   known.”   (citing  MINERALS  MGMT.  SERV.,  STRATEGY  FOR  POSTLEASE  NEPA  COMPLIANCE  IN  DEEPWATER  AREAS  OF   THE  GULF  OF  MEXICO)).     137. See  CURRY  L.  HAGERTY  &  JONATHAN  L.  RAMSEUR,  CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV.,  R41262,  DEEPWATER   HORIZON   OIL   SPILL:     SELECTED   ISSUES   FOR   CONGRESS   15   (2010),   available   at   http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41262_20100730.pdf.   138. See  Eilperin,  supra  note  114.   139. CEQ  REPORT,  supra  note  135,  at  18.    MMS  also  prepared  NEPA  reviews  for  the  five-­‐year   nationwide   oil   and   gas   leasing   program   for   the   Outer   Continental   Shelf,   the   planning   of   multiple  proposed  lease  sales  in  the  Central  and  Western  Planning  Areas  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   287   the   prospect   of   an   oil   spill   “unlikely,”   stating   that   “no   mitigation   measures  other  than  those  required  by  regulation  and  BP  policy  will   be   employed   to   avoid,   diminish,   or   eliminate   potential   impacts   on   environmental   resurface.”140     At   a   Congressional   hearing   entitled   “Inquiry  Into  Deepwater  Horizon  Gulf  Coast  Oil  Spill,”  Representative   John   D.   Dingell   of   Michigan   called   this   declaration   “outrageous,”   particularly  because  “there  was  a  new  regime  going  on  [at  BP]   that   was  aware  of  the  environmental  concerns  as  a  Nation  and  the  duties   of  that  organization.”141       MMS   categorically   excluded   the   exploration   plan   submitted   by   BP.142     In   doing   so,   the   agency   prepared   a   categorical   exclusion   review  based  on  CE  15.4(C)(10),   the  exclusion  applicable   to  EPs.143     CE  15.4(C)(10)  is  the  only  exclusion  that  makes  specific  reference  to   an   area  on   the  Outer  Continental   Shelf,   and   it  was   established  well   before   deepwater   drilling   became   widespread.144     A   study   by   the   Congressional  Research  Service  found:     Even  if  a  blowout  scenario  was  not  prepared,  it  seems  there  would  be   significant   amounts   of   oil   released   if   the   worst   case   scenario   of   a   blowout   occurred,   oil   at   quantities   greater   than   considered   in   the   Multisale   EIS   or   the   Lease   Sale   206   EA.     However,   because   a   CE  was   used   for   the   EP,   instead   of   an   EIS   or   an   EA,   a   review   of   the     the  offering  of  a  bundle  of  leases  called  Lease  Sale  206,  see  infra  note  145,  and  the  lease  of  MC   Block   252   (the   area   where   the   Macondo   well   was   located)   to   BP.     Id.     For   copies   of   these   various  documents,  see  MINERALS  MGMT.  SERV.,  U.S.  DEP’T  OF  INTERIOR,  OUTER  CONTINENTAL  SHELF   OIL   &   GAS   LEASING   PROGRAM:     2007–2012   (2007),   available   at   http://www.boemre.gov/5-­‐ year/2007-­‐2012FEIS.htm   (relevant   figures   and   tables   are   available   at   http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2006/2006-­‐062-­‐Vol1.pdf   and   http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2006/2006-­‐062-­‐Vol2.pdf).       140. Inquiry   into   the   Deepwater   Horizon   Gulf   Coast   Oil   Spill,   Before   the   Subcomm.   on   Oversight  and  Investigations  of  the  H.  Comm.  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  111th  Cong.  28  (2010)   (statement  of  Sen.  John  Dingell).   141. Id.  at  28–29.   142. See   KRISTINA   ALEXANDER,   CONG.   RESEARCH   SERV.,   R41265,   THE   2010   OIL   SPILL:     MMS/BOEMRE   AND   NEPA   11–14   (2010),   available   at  www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/27/   document_gw_01.pdf.   143. See  id.  at  12  (the  text  of  CE  15.4(C)(10)  reads:    “Approval  of  an  offshore  lease  or  unit   exploration   development/production   plan   or   a   Development   Operation   Coordination   Document   in   the   central   or   western   Gulf   of   Mexico   (30   CFR   250.2)   except   those   proposing   facilities:     (1)   In   areas   of   high   seismic   risk   or   seismicity,   relatively   untested   deep  water,   or   remote   areas,   or   (2)   within   the   boundary   of   a   proposed   or   established   marine   sanctuary,   and/or  within  or  near   the  boundary  of   a  proposed  or  established  wildlife   refuge  or  areas  of   high   biological   sensitivity;   or   (3)   in   areas   of   hazardous   natural   bottom   conditions;   or   (4)   utilizing  new  or  unusual  technology.”).     144. Id.;  see  CEQ  REPORT,  supra  note  135,  at  20;  see  also  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at   21–54.     288   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   environmental  impacts  for  a  spill  of  this  size  was  not  conducted.    They   were  not  considered  within  the  previous  EISs  or  the  EA  either.145     No   court   has   reviewed   the   CE   that   applied   to   the  Macondo  well,   because   it   has   not   been   challenged,   either   prima   facie   or   as   applied.146     It  has  been  suggested,  however,   that  MMS  was  a   “serial   abuser”   of   the   CE   option   available   under   NEPA,   and   routinely   ignored   the   statute’s   requirement   to   consider   “reasonably   foreseeable   significant   and   adverse   impacts.”147     For   example,   in   2002,  the  Ninth  Circuit  held  that  MMS’s  use  of  a  CE  when  approving   lease   suspensions  was   improper.148     The   court   reasoned   that  MMS   did  not  consider  some  exceptions  to  a  CE  that  could  have  applied.149     Similarly,   several   exceptions,   such   as   effects   on   endangered   species150   and   the   potential   for   unknown   environmental   risks,151   could  have  applied  to  the  Macondo  CE.152     Although   the   “catastrophic   potential”   of   oil   spills   suggests   a   particular  need  for  regulation  and  oversight,153  even  operations  that   are  not  categorically  excluded  from  NEPA  are  no  longer  required  to   analyze   worst-­‐case   scenarios   in   their   EISs.154     The   removal   of   this     145. ALEXANDER,  supra  note  142,  at  14.    The  Multisale  EIS   is   the  EIS  prepared  by  MMS  for   the  eleven  lease  sales  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.    See  MINERALS  MGMT.  SERV.,  PROPOSED  GULF  OF  MEXICO   OCS  OIL   AND  GAS   LEASE   SALE   206,   CENTRAL   PLANNING  AREA,   ENVIRONMENTAL  ASSESSMENT   (2007),   available  at  http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-­‐059.pdf.    Lease  Sale  206  allowed   BP  to  obtain  the  Mississippi  Canyon  Block  252,  the  oil  tract  where  the  Macondo  well  blowout   occurred.    See  ALEXANDER,  supra  note  142  at  1,  4–6.    See  generally  MINERALS  MGMT.  SERV.,  supra   note  139.   146. HAGERTY  &  RAMSEUR,  supra  note  137,  at  14.   147. FLOURNEY  ET  AL.,  supra  note  96,  at  3.   148. California  v.  Norton,  311  F.3d  1162,  1176–77  (9th  Cir.  2002).   149. Id.  at  1177–78.   150. See  Endangered  Species  Act,  43  U.S.C.  §  1334(a)(1)  (2006).   151. See  43  C.F.R.  §  46.215(d)  (2012).   152. HAGERTY  &  RAMSEUR,  supra  note  137,  at  14–15.    The  Ninth  Circuit  suggested  in  another   case   that   a   spill   analysis  might,   in   fact,   be  most   appropriate   in   the  exploration   stage.    Tribal   Village   of   Akutan   v.  Hodel,   869   F.2d   1185,   1192   (9th   Cir.   1988).     Thus,  MMS  perhaps   could   have  prevented  the  spill  itself  and  much  of  BP’s  subsequent  liability  had  it  prepared  a  proper   spill  analysis  for  the  exploratory  well  and  similar  deepwater  leases  in  the  Gulf.    This  conclusion   necessarily   assumes   that   someone   at   MMS   was   reviewing   the   EISs   submitted   for   these   operations  and  analyzing  them  in  some  manner,  although,  given  the  evidence  of  structural  and   managerial  breakdown  at  that  agency,  this  assumption  may  be  unwarranted.   153. PERROW,   supra   note   79,   at   37   (“Shoddy   construction   and   inadvertent   errors,   intimidation  and  actual  deception—these  are  part  and  parcel  of  industrial  life.    No  industry  is   without   these   problems,   just   as   no   valve   can   be   made   failure-­‐proof.     Normally,   the   consequences   are   not   catastrophic.     They   may   be,   however,   if   you   build   systems   with   catastrophic  potential.”).   154. Oil   Spill   Liability   Trust   Fund,   House   Session,   C-­‐SPAN   (June   10,   2010),   http://www.c-­‐ spanvideo.org/appearance/598291017  (statement  of  Sen.  James  L.  Oberstar)  (“Because  of  the   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   289   requirement  in  1986  contributed  to  less  rigorous  planning  by  MMS,   BP,  and  its  industry  colleagues  conducting  deepwater  drilling  in  the   Gulf  and  elsewhere.155    While  BP  did  voluntarily  discuss  a  Worst  Case   Scenario  Response  in  its  initial  EP,  it  only  referred  to  blowouts  in  the   context  of  a  response  plan  and  did  not  include  a  blowout  scenario  in   the  EP.156    Better  planning  for  contingencies  may  have  prevented  the   spill  or  contributed  to  a  more  effective  response.157   Under   the   National   Response   System,   there   are   three   levels   of   contingency   plans—national   (“NCP”),   regional   (“RCP”),   and   area   (“ACP”).158    However,   “while  there   is  ample  guidance   in  the  Code  of   Federal  Regulations  for  the  development  of  the  NCP  and  ACP,  there   is  little  regarding  the  RCP.”159    The  U.S.  Coast  Guard  has  developed  a   “One  Gulf  Plan”  that  “essentially  serves  as  the  RCP.”160    As  stated  in  a   U.S.   Coast   Guard   report,   “[t]his   lack   of   familiarity,   and   the   missed   opportunities   to   contribute   to   its   development,   may   have   complicated   the   execution   of   the   response   effort   to   the  Deepwater   Horizon   incident   because   the   One   Gulf   Plan   is   the   fundamental   response  framework  applicable  to  most  of  the  Gulf.”161    Further,  the   magnitude  of   environmental  harm  and  various   failures   in   response   to  the  spill  revealed  severe  weaknesses  in  the  One  Gulf  Plan.162    The   ACPs  for  the  relevant  areas  were  also  flawed.    They  did  not  contain   worst-­‐case   discharge   scenarios   involving   offshore   oil   exploration   activities,   “resulting   in   a   lack   of   preparedness   for   such   events.”163     The  ACPs  also  did  not  adequately  address  the  potential  for  a  spill  of   the   size   of   the   Deepwater   Horizon   accident,   even   though   BP   anticipated   a   much   larger   spill   in   its   Oil   Spill   Response   Plan   (“OSRP”).164    Further,  some  ACPs  had  entire  sections  labeled  “To  Be   Developed,”   despite   a   decade-­‐long   development   process.165     The     categorical  exclusion,  the  additional  environmental  impacts  for  a  worst  case  scenario  were  not   evaluated.”).   155. FLOURNEY  ET  AL.,  supra  note  96.   156. ALEXANDER,  supra  note  142,  at  13.    BP  had  prepared  a  Worst  Case  Discharge  (“WCD”)   scenario  for  the  well  that  the  Deepwater  Horizon  Mobile  Offshore  Drilling  Unit  (“MODU”)  was   drilling  when  the  loss  of  well  control  occurred,  but  the  scenario  was  couched  mostly  in  terms   of  response,  rather  than  prevention.    See  U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  supra  note  25,  at  28.   157. U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  supra  note  25,  at  30–31.   158. Id.  at  23.   159. Id.   160. Id.   161. Id.   162. Id.   163. Id.  at  16.   164. Id.  at  20.   165. Id.  at  6.   290   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   glaring   inconsistencies   in   the  various  response  plans  suggest   that  a   lack   of   communication   regarding   the   possibility   of   a   worst-­‐case   discharge   and   the   best   approach   for   remedying   such   a   spill   was   a   root  cause  of  the  magnitude  of  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill.   The  current  regulatory  structure  failed  to  anticipate  or  prevent  the   Deepwater   Horizon   disaster,   illustrating   significant   flaws   in   the   system.   Under   the   current   pattern   of   legislative   response   to   deepwater   disasters,   most   new   regulation   is   directed   at   the   technologies  that  failed  in  the  most  recent  environmental  disaster.166     Such   regulation,  demanded  by  a   justifiably  emotional  public   after  a   catastrophic  event,  would  not  be  as  necessary  if  broader  government   oversight   was   established   for   new   technologies   prior   to   implementation,   including   protections   and   tests   for   those   new   technologies  as  they  develop.     166. See,  e.g.,  Oil  Pollution  Act,  33  U.S.C.  §  2718(a)–(c)  (2006)  (provisions  regarding  double   hulls  and  the  area  near  Prince  William  Sound);  Oil  Pollution  Act  Overview,  ENVTL.  PROT.  AGENCY,   http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  24,  2012)   (describing   the   provisions   of   the   Oil   Pollution   Act,   including   a   provision   that   increases   penalties  for  regulatory  noncompliance).   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   291   II.    EXISTING  REGULATIONS  AND  LAWS  MUST  BE  IMPROVED  TO  PREVENT   SPILLS  OF  DISASTROUS  MAGNITUDES  FROM  OCCURRING  IN  THE  FUTURE   Following   high-­‐profile   disasters   like   those   discussed   in   Part   I   of   this  Note,  there  is  never  a  shortage  of  opinion  regarding  what  should   have   been   done   differently   and   what   could   be   done   to   prevent   a   similar  disaster  from  occurring  in  the  future.    This  type  of  discourse   can   encourage   investigation   and   study   that   improves   the   technologies   and   systems   that   failed   in   a   particular   accident.     However,   reactionary  discourse  generally   fails   to  propose  solutions   that   incorporate   developing   or   yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐discovered   technologies.     The  failure  of  post-­‐Exxon  Valdez  legislation  to  prevent  an  accident  of   the   magnitude   of   Deepwater   Horizon   illustrates   the   need   for   a   different   approach   to   regulation.     While   it   is   beneficial   and   instructive   to   study   the   causes   of   past   disasters,   industry   and   legislators   should   work   to   develop   regulations   that   will   create   general,  prospective  oversight  of  the  oil  industry.   Three  steps  are   in  order   to  properly  regulate   the  development  of   new   technologies   in   the   oil   and   gas   extractive   industry.     First,   regulators   and   legislators   should   reconsider   preemptive   requirements   in  NEPA   and  OPA,   particularly   given  MMS’s   abuse   of   categorical   exemptions   in   the   Gulf   of   Mexico   and   the   dangerous   inconsistencies  between  various  response  plans.    Second,  in  order  to   avoid   harms   caused   by   mismanagement   at   the   agency   level   and   abuse   of   industry   power,   an   independent   board   should   be   established   to   facilitate   communication   and   efficient   regulation.     Lastly,   the   complexity   of   energy   extraction   systems   and   the   likelihood   of   human   error   indicate   that   less   reliance   should   be   placed  on  human  triggers  of  last  resort  protective  technologies.   A.    NEPA  and  OPA  Should  Be  Reexamined  to  Require  a  Detailed  EIS   for  Major  Oil-­‐Related  Developments  and  Greater  Consistency   Among  Response  Plans   In   light   of   the   failures   of   MMS,   the   government   should   establish   more   stringent   protocols   for   the   preparation   of   EISs.     Merely   preparing   an   EIS   does   not   guarantee   thoughtful   analysis.167     The     167. See  42  U.S.C.  §  4321  (2006)  (leaving  establishment  of  substantive  EIS  requirements  to   agency   regulations);   see   also   40   C.F.R.   §   1502.14   (2012)   (enumerating   the   substantive   requirements   that   must   be   contained   in   an   EIS).     An   agency’s   decision   to   include   various   alternatives   in  an  EIS   is  bound  only  by  a  rule  of  reason  and  practicality   test   in  most  circuits.     292   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   process  can  potentially  become  a  routine,  box-­‐checking  exercise,  as   courts   “may   not   rule   an   EIS   inadequate   if   the   agency   has  made   an   adequate   compilation   of   relevant   information,   has   analyzed   it   reasonably,   has   not   ignored   pertinent   data,   and   has   made   disclosures   to   the   public.”168     Therefore,   strong   protocols   for   predicting   plausible   accidents,   assessing   their   impacts,   and   preparing   responses   for   those   impacts   are   crucial   alterations   that   must  be  made  to  NEPA  regulations  in  this  industry.  169     While  it  will  likely  be  some  time  before  NEPA  is  used  optimally  to   ensure   safety   in   offshore   drilling   operations,   small   reforms   have   been   made   since   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill.     BOEMRE   has   announced   that   all   plans   submitted   for   approval   proposing   an   activity   involving  a  subsea  BOP  or  surface  BOP  on  a   floating  facility   will  be  subject  to  an  EA.170    While  this  reform  recognizes  the  need  for   greater  review  of  energy  extraction  technologies  under  NEPA,  it  only   addresses   the   last   resort   protective   technology   that   failed   on   the   Deepwater  Horizon:    the  BOP.    Such  a  regulatory  move  is  a  good  first   step  in  the  direction  of  proper  oversight  of  drilling  technologies,  but   more  must  be  done  to  render  oil  and  gas  exploration  safe  while  not   unduly  inhibiting  innovation.     See  e.g.,  Davis  v.  Mineta,  302  F.3d  1104,  1120  (10th  Cir.  2002)  (“An  agency  decision  concerning   which   alternatives   to   consider   is   necessarily   bound   by   a   rule   of   reason   and   practicality”   (internal  citation  omitted));  Ass'n  of  Pub.  Agency  Customers,  Inc.  v.  Bonneville  Power  Admin.,   126   F.3d   1158,   1185   (9th   Cir.   1997)   (“The   ‘rule   of   reason’   guides   both   the   choice   of   alternatives  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  the  Environmental  Impact  Statement  must  discuss   each  alternative.”);  N.  Buckhead  Civic  Ass’n  v.  Skinner,  903  F.2d  1533,  1541  (11th  Cir.  1990)   (“Thus,   an  EIS   is   satisfactory   if   the   treatment   of   alternatives,  when   judged   against   a   ‘rule   of   reason,’  is  sufficient  .  .  .  .");  City  of  New  York  v.  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Transp.,  715  F.2d  732,  742  (2d  Cir.   1983)   (“The   agency   itself   is   responsible   for   determining   the   range   of   alternatives   to   be   considered   and   is   supposed   to   follow  .  .  .  ‘a   rule   of   reason.’”   (internal   citations   omitted));   Grazing  Fields  Farm  v.  Goldschmidt,  626  F.2d  1068,  1074  (1st  Cir.  1980)  (“The  degree  to  which   any  alternative  must  be  discussed  must  be  measured  by  a  ‘rule  of  reason.’”).   168. Sierra   Club   v.   U.S.   Army   Corps   of   Eng's,   701   F.2d   1011,   1029   (2d   Cir.   1983)   (citing   Suffolk   Cnty.   v.   Sec’y   of   the   Interior,   562   F.2d   1368   (2d   Cir.   1977))   (holding   that   a   decision   made  in  reliance  on  false  information  cannot  be  a  reasoned  decision).   169. The   Council   on   Environmental   Quality   has   suggested   that   the   relevant   agency  must   “ensure  that  each  step  of  its  NEPA  process  is  used  to  assist  informed  decisionmaking,  and  that   agency  decisionmakers  have  a  clear  understanding  of  potential  environmental  consequences.”     CEQ  REPORT,  supra  note  135,  at  22.    The  Council  also  recommended  that  BOEMRE  (now  BOEM   and  BSEE)  reexamine  the  use  of  the  tiering  process  to  ensure  tiering  is  clear  and  well  defined.     Id.  at  23.   170. Memorandum   from   Michael   R.   Bromwich,   Dir.,   Bureau   of   Ocean   Energy   Mgmt.,   Enforcement,  &  Regulation,  on  Use  of  Categorical  Exclusions  in  Gulf  of  Mex.  Region  to  Walter   Cruickshank,  Deputy  Dir.,  Bureau  of  Ocean  Energy  Mgmt.,  Enforcement  &  Regulation  (Aug.  16,   2010),   available   at   http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?   csModule=security/getfile&PageID=42011.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   293   New  extraction  projects  within  the  oil  and  gas  industry  should  be   excluded   from   CE   analysis,   and   agencies   analyzing   such   projects   should  be   required   to  consider  worst-­‐case  scenarios.     If  developing   technologies   are   excluded   from   NEPA   analysis,   major   risks   can   go   unnoticed   until   it   is   too   late.     Legislation   such   as   the   Oil   Pollution   Environmental   Review   Act,   which   eliminates   CEs   for   such   operations,   is   therefore  crucial   to  ensure  that  the   industry  operates   in   a   manner   that   is   safe   to   human   health   and   the   environment.171     The   current,   watered-­‐down   guidelines   for   NEPA   and   the   statute   itself   provide   neither   requirements   nor   adequate   incentives   to   consider   worst-­‐case   scenarios,172   which,   as   the  Deepwater   Horizon   spill   illustrates,   are   possible.     Implementing   a   NEPA   worst-­‐case   analysis   requirement,   like   the   requirement   that   existed   in   1978,173     171. See   H.R.   5506,   111th   Cong.   (2010);   see   also   Press   Release,   Congressman   Gerry   Connolly,  Release:    Connolly  Bill  Requires  Full  Environmental  Study  of  Offshore  Drilling  Plans   (June   17,   2010),   available   at   http://connolly.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=   44&parentid=6§iontree=&itemid=364.   172. National  Environmental  Policy  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §§  4321–4370  (2006);  40  C.F.R.  §§  1500– 1506  (2012).    In  2001,  the  Ninth  Circuit  held  that  an  EIS  for  an  oil  and  gas  development  project   off   the  coast  of  Alaska  need  not  contain  a  site-­‐specific  oil  spill   trajectory  analysis,  although  a   spill   response   plan   does   require   various   elements   of   a   worst   case   discharge   scenario.     See   Edwardsen  v.  U.S.  Dep’t  of   the   Interior,  268  F.3d  781,  785–86  (9th  Cir.  2001)  (construing  30   CFR  §  254.26(b)  (2012)).    The  Ninth  Circuit  also  determined  that  the  worst-­‐case  scenario  of  a   100,000-­‐barrel  oil  spill  need  not  be  included  in  an  EIS  at  the  sale  stage  under  OCSLA.    See  Vill.   of  False  Pass  v.  Clark,  733  F.2d  605,  614  (9th  Cir.  1984).    This  principle  has  been  adopted  by   other  circuits.    See,  e.g.,  County  of  Suffolk  v.  Sec’y  of  the  Interior,  562  F.2d  1368,  1378–81  (2d   Cir.  1977),  cert.  denied,  434  U.S.  1064  (1978);  Sierra  Club  v.  Morton,  510  F.2d  813,  828  (5th  Cir.   1975).   173. The  1978  regulation  was  upheld  in  Sierra  Club  v.  Sigler,  695  F.2d  957  (5th  Cir.  1983),   which  held  that  a  proposal  to  allow  oil  tankers  to  operate  in  an  estuary  off  the  coast  of  Texas   had   to   consider   the   “catastrophic   impact   of   a   total   cargo   loss   by   a   supertanker”   and   “the   probability  of   its  occurrence.”     Id.  at  972.     In  a  1981  guidance  document,  CEQ  noted   that   the   rule   as   it   stood   at   the   time   required   “reasonable   projections   of   the   worst   possible   consequences   of   a   proposed   action.”    Memorandum   from  Council   on  Envtl.   Quality   on   Forty   Most   Asked   Questions   Concerning   CEQ’s   NEPA   Regulations   to   Agencies   (Mar.   17,   1981),   reprinted   in   46   Fed.   Reg.   18,026,   18,032   (Mar.   23,   1981).     Rather   than   require   analysis   of   a   worst-­‐case   scenario,   the   current   regulations   require   the   federal   agency   preparing   an   EIS   to   consider  “reasonably  foreseeable  significant  adverse  impacts.”    40  C.F.R.  §  1502.22(b)  (2012).     Those   impacts   do   include   “impacts   which   have   catastrophic   consequences,   even   if   their   probability   of   occurrence   is   low,   provided   that   the   analysis   of   the   impacts   is   supported   by   credible  scientific  evidence,  is  not  based  on  pure  conjecture,  and  is  within  the  rule  of  reason,”   which  falls  short  of  being  a  true  analysis  of  all  worst  case  scenarios.    Id.    The  Supreme  Court   subsequently  upheld  the  regulation,  holding  that  NEPA  does  not  require  a  worst-­‐case  analysis.     See   Robertson   v.   Methow   Valley   Citizens   Council,   490   U.S.   332,   356   (1989).     The   initial   regulation  was  criticized  due  to  the  “limitless  nature  of  the  task  of  conjuring  the  worst  possible   case,”  “the  lack  of  expert  support  for  worst-­‐case  analysis  in  the  growing  field  of  risk  analysis,”   and   the   “minimal  value  of   fanciful  worst-­‐case  analyses   to   federal  decision-­‐makers  who  must   balance  a  full  range  of  proven  competing  interests.”    Vicki  O.  Masterman,  Worst  Case  Analysis:     294   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   would   prohibit   federal   agencies,   often   under   the   influence   of   oil   companies,  from  ignoring  major  foreseeable  risks.174   Better   coordination   in   response   planning   could   also  mitigate   the   effects   of   future   spills.     A   distinct   lack   of   communication   between   various  planning  groups  is  evident  from  the  inconsistencies  between   the   RCPs   and   ACPs   put   forth   by   state   and   local   officials   and   the   OSRPs   developed   by   oil   companies.175     A   more   comprehensive   understanding   of   the   type   of   worst   case   scenario   that   could   occur   would   allow   companies   to   appropriately   allocate   resources   for   preventative   and   responsive   efforts,   better   facilitate   government   oversight   of   industry   activities,   and   allow   the   expectations   of   all   parties  to  converge.   B.    An  Independent  Board  Should  Be  Established  to  Monitor  and   Approve  Developing  Technologies  Before  Implementation   Instead  of  waiting  for  a  disaster  to  occur,   industry  and  regulators   should  cooperate  with  one  another  “long  before  a   fire  or  explosion,   at   the   design   and   planning   stage.”176     An   independent   regulatory   board   tasked   with   overseeing   the   energy   industry   could   monitor   technological  safeguards  aboard  rigs  and  other  extraction  structures,   and   could   enforce   settlement   agreements,   statutory   requirements,   and  industry  standards.177    A  board  empowered  to  work  with  the  oil   industry   to   develop   safe   techniques   for   extraction—especially   a   board   with   power   to   mandate   technological   standards—would   create  more  certainty  for  the   industry  and  for  the  general  public.178       The  Final  Chapter?,  19  ENVTL.  L.  REP.  10,026,  10,029  (1989).    The  Deepwater  Horizon  spill  and   the  proliferation  of  smaller,  yet  all  too  frequent,  oil  spills,  demonstrate  why  these  disasters  can   no  longer  be  considered  “fanciful.”   174. See  Doremus,  supra  note  60.   175. U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  supra  note  25,  at  6.   176. CHILES,  supra  note  17,  at  281.   177. For  example,  in  a  complaint  filed  in  the  Delaware  Chancery  Court  on  May  21,  2010,  the   Southeastern   Pennsylvania   Transportation   Authority   (SEPTA)   argued   that   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill   could   have   been   prevented   if   BP   had   installed   the  mechanical   and   operational   safeguards  it  agreed  to  as  a  part  of  the  2006  settlement  of  a  shareholder  suit  over  a  “massive   oil  spill  and  complete  pipeline  shutdown”  at  Prudhoe  Bay  in  Alaska.    Complaint  at  36,  Se.  Pa.   Transp.   Auth.   v.   Hayward,   No.   CA5511-­‐CC   (Del.   Ch.   May   21,   2010);   see   Stipulation   of   Settlement,   In   re   BP   p.l.c.   Derivative   Litigation,   No.   06-­‐11929C,   2008  WL   8732542   (Alaska   Super.   Ct.   Oct.   5,   2006).     The   type   of   board   proposed   in   this  Note   could   have   enforced   that   settlement   agreement   to   ensure   the   mandated   safeguards   were   implemented   aboard   the   Deepwater  Horizon.   178. Jeffrey  Ball,  Energy  and  the  Environment:    More  Certainty,  More  Innovation,  WALL  ST.  J.   (Nov.   22,   2010),   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870368870457562084   3847497452.html  (reporting  on  CEO  conference  advocating  consistent  federal  energy  policy).   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   295   The   establishment   of   an   independent   board   would   also   greatly   improve   inadequate   government   oversight.179     Combining   the   knowledge   of   industry   with   the   impartiality   of   government   overseers   would   achieve   a   level   of   success   that   “depends   on   the   personal  knowledge  and  involvement  of  experts  and  knowledgeable   individuals,”  while  including  a  viewpoint  that  incorporates  safety  as   much  as  it  does  industry  profit.180   As   part   of   the   process   for   creating   this   board,   the   U.S.   should   examine   successful   systems   abroad   and   in   other   industries   for   models.     U.S.   legislators   and   administrative   officials   should   look   to   Europe  in  particular,  where  there  are  twice  as  many  oil  rigs  and  half   as   many   spills   as   there   are   in   the   Gulf.181     Other   industries   with   potentially  catastrophic  impacts  on  the  environment,  human  health,   and   safety,   such  as   the  airline   industry182   and   the  nuclear   industry,     179. While   this   Note   does   not   necessarily   advocate   additional   oversight,   it   does   suggest   that  existing  levels  of  oversight  would  be  improved  by  establishing  an  independent  board.   180. Carroll,  supra  note  108,  at  130.    While  this  poses  a  significant  risk  of  industry  capture,   a  government  employee  may  develop  the  deep  knowledge  of  an  industry  necessary  to  operate   in   this   capacity   without   unduly   compromising   impartiality.     The   Nuclear   Regulatory   Commission,  which  has  generally  been  free  of  the  agency  capture  issues  confronted  by  MMS— should   be   used   as   a   model   for   the   proposed   board   to   avoid   co-­‐optation   by   industry.     For   example,   none   of   the   current   NRC   Commissioners   appear   to   have   meaningful   ties   to   the   nuclear   industry.     See   Chairman   Gregory   B.   Jaczko,   NUCLEAR   REGULATORY   COMM’N,     http://www.nrc.gov/about-­‐nrc/organization/commission/jaczko.html   (last   updated  Mar.   29,   2012);   Commissioner   William   D.   Magwood,   NUCLEAR   REGULATORY   COMM’N,   http://www.nrc.gov/about-­‐nrc/organization/commission/magwood.html   (last   updated   Mar.   29,   2012);   Commissioner   William   C.   Ostendorff,   NUCLEAR   REGULATORY   COMM’N,   http://www.nrc.gov/about-­‐nrc/organization/commission/ostendorff.html   (last   updated   Apr.   30,   2012);   Commissioner   Kristine   L.   Svinicki,   NUCLEAR   REGULATORY   COMM’N,     http://www.nrc.gov/about-­‐nrc/organization/commission/svinicki.html  (last  updated  Apr.  24,   2012).   181. Rig   Count   Overview   &   FAQ,   BAKER   HUGHES,   http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/   rig_counts/rc_index.cfm  (last  visited  Apr.  24,  2012);  see  also  Offshore  Drilling  Accidents,  OIL  RIG   DISASTERS,   http://www.oilrigdisasters.co.uk/   (last   visited   Apr.   24,   2012).     Among   other   regulations,  Annex  III  of   the  Convention   for   the  Protection  of   the  Marine  Environment  of   the   North-­‐East  Atlantic  requires  contracting  parties  (which  includes  the  EU,  among  others)  to  take   appropriate  measures  to  prevent  pollution  from  oil  rig  accidents.    Sept.  22,  1992,  2354  U.N.T.S.   67.    It  is  a  binding  requirement  of  EU  law.    Id.    Additionally,  the  International  Convention  on  Oil   Pollution   Preparedness,   Response,   and   Cooperation   requires   coordinated   and   approved   oil   pollution   emergency   plans,   prepared   by   the   operator,   and   requirements   for   reporting,   information  sharing,  and  international  cooperation.    Art.  IV,  VII,  X,  Nov.  30,  1990,  1891  U.N.T.S.   78.   182. See  PERROW,   supra  note   79,   at   146   (“In   the   aircraft   system,  more   than   in   any   other   industry  we  shall  consider,  there  has  been  the  time,  incentive,  resources,  and  talent  to  design-­‐ in   buffers   and   safety   devices,   and   provide   comparatively   exemplary   training   for   unusually   expert   operators.”);   see   also   Shelby   Erdman,  U.S.   Airlines   Fly   2   Years  Without   Fatality,   CNN,   http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/01/12/us.air.safety/index.html#cnnSTCText   (last   visited   Apr.   24,   2012).     Cf.  MALCOLM   GLADWELL,   OUTLIERS:     THE   STORY   OF   SUCCESS   221   (2008)   296   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   should  also  serve  as  valuable  models  for  the  energy  industry  because   “disasters   and   near   misses   arising   out   of   one   field   can   provide   valuable  warnings  to  another.”183    One  measure  used   in  the  nuclear   industry   that   could   prove   particularly   beneficial   within   the   oil   industry   is   the   establishment   of   an   independent   commission   that   would  work  with  industry  in  developing  new  technologies.184     Many   other   industries   also   have   administrative   bodies   that   investigate   major   accidents,   a   regulatory   feature   that   should   be   improved   upon   in   the   oil   industry.     For   example,   the   National   Transportation  Safety  Board  investigates  airplane  accidents,  the  U.S.   Bureau   of   Mines   investigates   mining   accidents,   and   mishaps   with   space  missions,   dams,   and   other   systems   are   also   reviewed   at   the   federal  level.185    By  contrast,  the  relatively  private  governance  of  the   oil   industry  allows  it  to  partially  escape  such  scrutiny.186    While  the   U.S.   Chemical   Safety   and   Hazard   Investigation   Board   has   been   established   as   “an   independent,   non-­‐regulatory   federal   agency   charged   by   Congress   with   investigating   major   chemical   accidents   unreported  to  them  [by]  the  public”  and  “conduct[ing]  full  root  cause   investigations   and   then  .  .  .  issu[ing]  .  .  .  safety   recommendations  .  .  .   aimed  at  preventing  similar  events   from  occurring   in  the   future,”187   it   has   been   chronically   understaffed   and   underfunded,   and   its   mandate   does   not   apply   to   all   petroleum-­‐related   incidents.188     Employees   of   MMS,   whose   shortcomings   were   discussed   in   Part   I,   have   also   been   found   to   “[be]   overwhelmed,   insufficiently   trained,   work  without  official  procedures  .  .  .  and  sometimes  have  insufficient   support   from   their   supervisors   for   resisting   industry     (claiming   that   the   single  most   important  variable   in  determining  whether  a  plane   crashes   is   the   culture   the  pilot   comes   from).     Gladwell’s   claim  has   attracted  quite   a   bit   of   controversy.     See,   e.g.,   Alex   Beam,   A   Tipping   Point   for   Gladwell?,   BOSTON   GLOBE,   Dec.   19,   2008,   http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2008/12/19/a_tipping_point_for_gladwell/;   Rob   Verger,  Malcolm   Gladwell   on   Aviation   and   Air   Safety,   WORLDHUM   (Jan.   30,   2009,   2:00   PM),   http://www.worldhum.com/travel-­‐blog/item/malcolm-­‐gladwell-­‐on-­‐aviation-­‐safety-­‐and-­‐ security-­‐20090125.   183. PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  141.   184. See   id.   at   103   (“We   know   so   much   about   nuclear   power   plants   because   there   is   a   government  oversight  agency  with  the  authority  to  inspect  utilities.”).   185. Id.   186. Id.   187. U.S.   CHEM.   SAFETY   &   HAZARD   INVESTIGATION   BD.,   PUBLIC   HEARING   ON   REGULATORY   APPROACHES   TO   OFFSHORE   OIL   AND   GAS   SAFETY   6   (2010),   available   at   http://www.csb.gov/   assets/document/Transcript_of_Public_Meeting_12_15_2010.pdf.   188. See,  e.g.,  Editorial,  Starved  Watchdog:    Plant-­‐Safety  Agencies  Need  More  Funding,  Staff,   HOUS.   CHRON.,   Dec.   17,   2009,   at   B10,   available   at   http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/   editorial/6774204.html.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   297   influence  .  .  .  .”189     A   proper   regulatory   board,   tasked   with   investigating   the   causes   of   accidents   and  working  with   industry   to   adopt   appropriate,   enforceable   standards   for   developing   technologies,   could   prevent   accidents   of   the   magnitude   of   the   Deepwater  Horizon  spill  without  hindering  industry  growth.190   C.    Industry  Should  Rely  Less  on  Human  Triggers  of  Last  Resort   Protective  Technologies   Human   supervision   of   complex   systems,   like   those   present   on   deepwater   oil   rigs,   is   both   essential   and   the   source   of   many   problems.     Greater   automation   within   drilling   systems,   specifically   for   last   resort  protective   technologies,   like   the  BOP,   could  decrease   the   rate   of   system-­‐wide   failures   that   are   inevitably   worsened   by   human  errors.   Following   both   the   Exxon   Valdez   tanker   spill   and   the  Deepwater   Horizon  well  blowout,  public  attention  and   investigations  examined   the   role  of  human  error   in   causing  each  disaster.    Allegations  were   made   that   Joseph  Hazelwood,   the   captain   of   the  Exxon   Valdez,  was   under   the   influence   of   alcohol   at   the   time   of   the   accident.191   Similarly,  investigations  into  the  cause  of  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill   claimed  that  human  error  might  have  been  the  primary  cause  of  the   explosion   aboard   the   rig   and   worsened   the   extent   of   the   environmental   damage.192     In   particular,   the   Commission   blamed   Deepwater  Horizon  workers   for   failing   to  divert   the   flow  of  mud  on   the   rig   overboard   or   activate   the   blind   shear   rams.193     Drilling   experts   agree   that   rig   workers   deserve   much   of   the   fault   for   the   accident,  and  that  “focus  on  blowout  preventers  misses  [the]  bigger   problem[]of  poor  training  .  .  .  .”194     189. Matthew   L.  Wald,  Report   Finds   Oil-­‐Drilling   Inspectors   in   Disarray,   N.Y.   TIMES,   Dec.   8,   2010,  at  A24,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/science/earth/08spill.html.   190. To   further   prevent   the   influence   of   industry   or   corruption   on   the   proposed   board,   leasing   operations   should   be   separate   from   oversight,   so   as   to   avoid   the   possibility   of   inappropriate  links  between  profits  and  approval.   191. See  ALASKA  OIL   SPILL   COMM’N,   supra  note   65,   at   5–11;   see   also   Farrell,   supra   note   69.   Hazelwood   was   subsequently   cleared   of   charges   related   to   his   possible   intoxication.     Oil   Plagues   Sound   20   Years   After   Exxon   Valdez,   MSNBC   (Mar.   24,   2009,   4:18   AM),   http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29838444/ns/us_news-­‐environment.   192. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  121–22;  Ben  Casselman,  Rig  Workers  Had  Chance   to   Prevent   Explosion,   WALL   ST.   J.,   Sept.   11,   2010,   http://online.wsj.com/article/   SB10001424052748704505804575484053238831866.html?KEYWORDS=%22Rig+Workers+ Had+Chance+to+Prevent+Explosion%22.   193. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  121–22.   194. Jennifer  A.  Dlouhy,  Congress  Wants  New  Blowout  Preventer  Rules  to  Shield  Wells,  HOUS.   298   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   For  these  reasons,  limiting  regulation  to  the  failing  technologies  of   a   particular   disaster   is   detrimental   to   industry   and   environmental   safety.    Various   components  of  many   systems   interact   in  ways   that   are  not  always  anticipated  by   the  designers.195    Because   “a   chain   is   only  as  strong  as  its  weakest  link,”196  it  is  vital  that  those  tasked  with   supervising   drilling   operations   are   not   only   aware   of   a   system’s   potential   weaknesses,   but   also   avoid   becoming   the   “weak   link”   themselves.       A   number   of   technical   risk   factors   in   the   design,   execution,   and   testing   of   the  Macondo  well   contributed   to   the  Deepwater   Horizon   disaster.197     Among   the   most   troublesome   of   the   technical   issues   were  the  failure  of  the  cement  pumped  to  the  bottom  of  the  well  to   seal   off   hydrocarbons   and   the   failure   of   rig   workers   to   properly   engage  the  BOP,198  which  takes  anywhere  from  forty  seconds  to  one   minute  to  close  its  rams,  even  after  it  is  activated  by  rig  personnel.199     One   person   familiar   with   the   efforts   required   to   activate   the   BOP   aboard  the  Deepwater  Horizon  said,  “It’s  a  mystery,  a  huge  Apollo  13-­‐ type   mystery.”200     While   this   statement   is   inaccurate   because   the   specific   failures   of   the   BOP   have   since   been   pinpointed,   the   complexity   of   the   systems   aboard   deepwater   drilling   rigs   and   the   reliance   on   the   interaction   between   humans   and   machines   contribute  to  confusion  during  and  immediately  after  any  incident  or   malfunction.     Going   forward,   resource   extraction   technologies   should  generally  be  more  automated   to  avoid  unnecessary   reliance   on   human   understanding   and   potentially   delayed   reactions   to   technical  failures  on  board  rigs.   While  better   training  would   likely   increase   the  speed  and  quality   of   responses   to   accidents   like   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   the   elimination   or   reduction   of   human-­‐triggered,   last   resort   protective   technologies  would  better  address   the  contribution  of  human  error     CHRON.,   Aug.   8,   2010,   at   A1,   available   at   http://www.chron.com/default/article/Congress-­‐ wants-­‐new-­‐blowout-­‐preventer-­‐rules-­‐to-­‐1713696.php.   195. See  PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  4.   196. See  CHILES,  supra  note  17,  at  48  (noting  that  the  three  cooling  systems  for  the  reactor   at  Three  Mile  Island  were  like  a  chain  in  that  each  was  essential  in  preventing  the  reactor  from   overheating).   197. CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  x–xi.   198. Id.  at  x.    See  generally  COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  87–172.   199. CHIEF  COUNSEL’S  REPORT,  supra  note  48,  at  21.   200. Henry  Fountain,  Solution  to  Capping  Well  Stays  Elusive,  N.Y.  TIMES,  May  1,  2010,  at  A10   (internal   quotation   marks   omitted),   available   at   http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/us/   01engineering.html.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   299   to   disasters.201     One   reason   for   this   contribution   is   simply   the   limitations  of  human  nature  in  unexpected  situations.    Where  people   perform  the  same  routine   task  repeatedly,     they  often  rely  on  habit   and   expectations,   a   fact   that   adversely   affects   their   reactions  when   confronted   with   an   accident.202     “People   need   to   have   wall-­‐to-­‐wall   knowledge   of   a   system   before   they   start   disconnecting   safety   systems   in   an   emergency,”   and   given   the   complex   nature   of   most   energy  extraction  systems  and  the  limited  scope  of  any  one  worker’s   job   description,   such   knowledge   is   not   usually   possible.203     Experience   in   a   particular   industry   does   not   guarantee   improved   response   quality,   because   problems   that   arise   in   the   disastrous   situations  examined  here   “may  not  be   identical   from  place   to  place   or  time  to  time,  and  information  may  be  ‘sticky’  or  difficult  to  move   from  one  location  to  another.”204    Even  basic  human  limitations,  such   as  wakefulness,  physical  endurance,  and  muscle  power,  can  interfere   with   a  worker’s   ability   to   respond   to   an   incident.205     Coupled  with   potentially  inadequate  safety  exercises  aboard  offshore  facilities,  the   merits   of   greater   automation   in   disaster   scenarios   become   quite   compelling.     While   offshore   workers   often   complete   simulator   sessions,  which   are   important   tools   for   training,   they   insufficiently   prepare  workers   for   unexpected   emergency   situations,   particularly   given   the   complex   interactions   in   the   types   of   systems206   aboard   deepwater  oil  rigs  and  other  energy  extraction  structures.   Reducing   or   eliminating   the   degree   of   human   interaction   with   a   system   during   potentially   catastrophic   accidents   would   also   prove   beneficial  because  workers  typically  have  only  limited  knowledge  of   complex   system   interactions   at   the   time   of   an   incident.     Given   the   limits   of   human   understanding   and   reflexes,   “if  .  .  .  [an]   operator   is   confronted   by   unexpected   and   usually   mysterious   interactions     201. See  LEVESON,   supra   note  15,   at  230   (arguing   that   correcting  human  errors   cannot  be   done  with   training  alone);   see  also  PERROW,   supra  note  79,   at  351–52   (“Better   training  alone   will  not  solve  the  problem,  or  more  gadgets,  or  promises  that  it  won’t  happen  gain  [sic].”).   202. See,  e.g.,  PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  83  (“In  1977  New  York  City  experienced  a  massive   and  very  costly  blackout.    One  key  contribution  to  the  accident  was  an  operator’s  expectation   about  the  default  reading  for  current  flowing  over  a  particular  line.”).   203. See  CHILES,  supra  note  17,  at  191  (explaining  that  operators  must  have  this  knowledge   to  avert  extreme,  but  rare  disasters).   204. Carroll,   supra   note   108,   at   129–30   (citing   Gabriel   Szulanski,   Exploring   Internal   Stickiness:    Impediments  to  the  Transfer  of  Best  Practices  Within  the  Firm,  17  STRATEGIC  MGMT.  J.   (SPECIAL   WINTER   ISSUE)   27   (1996)   &   Eric   von   Hippel,   “Sticky   Information”   and   the   Locus   of   Problem  Solving:    Implications  for  Innovation,  40  MGMT.  SCI.  429  (1994)).   205. Id.  at  169.   206. Id.  at  126.   300   COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW   [Vol.  37:2   among   failures,   saying   that  he  or  she  should  have  zigged   instead  of   zagged  is  possible  only  after  the  fact.”207    In  investigating  the  causes   of   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill,   the   Commission   similarly   championed   greater   automation,   recognizing   the   limits   of   human   nature  and  the  system’s  complexity:     There   is   no   apparent   reason   why   more   sophisticated,   automated   alarms  and  algorithms  cannot  be  built  into  the  display  system  to  alert   the  driller  and  mudlogger  when  anomalies  arise.    These  individuals  sit   for  12  hours  at  a  time  in  front  of  these  displays.    In  light  of  the  potential   consequences,   it   is   no   longer   acceptable   to   rely   on   a   system   that   requires   the   right   person   to   be   looking   at   the   right   data   at   the   right   time,   and   then   to  understand   its   significance   in   spite  of   simultaneous   activities  and  other  monitoring  responsibilities.208     The   nuclear   accident   on   Three   Mile   Island   provides   another   illustration  of  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge  during  the  chaos   and  uncertainty  of  an  unexpected  accident.209    A  supervisor  at  Three   Mile  Island  testified,     I  think  we  knew  we  were  experiencing  something  different,  but  I  think   each   time   we   made   a   decision   it   was   based   on   something   we   knew   about  .  .  .  .     There  was   logic   at   that   time   for  most   of   the   actions,   even   though  today  you  can  look  back  and  say,  well,  that  wasn’t  the  cause  of   that,  or  that  shouldn’t  have  been  that  long.210       Because  workers  confront  complex  extraction  systems  routinely  in   the   oil   industry,   the   automation   of   certain   processes   is   the   best   option  available  for  preventing  accidents  in  the  future.    It  should  be   noted   that   industry   and   regulators   should   use   caution   against   too   much   automation.     Over-­‐reliance   on   automated   systems   could   lead   to  malfunctions  in  machinery  and  technology.    Greater  automation  in   general,   however,   would   likely   limit   the   occurrence   of   large,   catastrophic   mistakes,   only   rendering   facilities,   tankers,   and   other   structures   involved   in   extracting   and   transporting   oil   and   gas   “vulnerable   to   small   errors.”211     Furthermore,   “in   some   systems,     207. PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  9.   208. COMMISSION  REPORT,  supra  note  21,  at  121.   209. See  Hope  Babcock,  A  Risky  Business:    Generation  of  Nuclear  Power  and  Deepwater   Drilling  for  Offshore  Oil  and  Gas,  37  COLUM.  J.  ENVTL.  L.  63  (2012)  (comparing  government   responses  to  the  Three  Mile  Island  and  Deepwater  Horizon  disasters).       210. PERROW,  supra  note  79,  at  27  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   211. Id.  at  200.   2012]   The  Need  for  Improved  Regulation  of  Deepwater  Drilling   301   automatic   controls   are   necessary   because   there   is   simply   not   sufficient   time   for   operator   reaction.”212     However,   given   the   aforementioned   limits   on   any   individual   worker’s   ability   to   adequately   respond   and   the   role   human   error   played   in   the   environmental  impact  of  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill,  the  oil  industry   should   reduce   reliance   on   human   triggers   of   last   resort   protective   technologies.   III.    CONCLUSION   Action  must   be   taken   to   prevent   a   catastrophic   accident   like   the   Deepwater   Horizon   spill   from   occurring   again.     The   proposed   alterations   to   BOP   design   and   post-­‐spill   liability   schemes   are   good   first  steps  toward  making  necessary  changes  in  the  oil  industry,  but   more  must   be   done   to   alter   the   relationship   between   industry   and   regulators   so   that   the   mistakes   of   Exxon   Valdez   and   Deepwater   Horizon  are  never  repeated.   To   achieve   these   changes   in   a   meaningful   and   lasting   manner,   Congress   should   design   and   pass   legislation   subjecting   energy   extraction   operations   to   heightened   NEPA   scrutiny   and  mandating   greater   coordination   between   drafters   of   OPA   response   plans.     Further,   an   independent   regulatory   board   should   be   established   to   work   with   industry   to   implement   regulations   for   new   extractive   technologies   as   they   develop.     Finally,   last   resort   protective   technologies   aboard   rigs   and   other   structures   should   be   more   automatic,  relying  less  on  human  triggers  that  cannot  anticipate  the   chaos   and   uncertainty   that   occur   when   various   components   in   a   system  fail  to  interact  properly.    While  these  changes  are  likely  to  be   criticized   for   slowing   the   development   of   a   profitable   industry,   the   prevention  of  disasters  similar  to  the  Deepwater  Horizon  spill  should   outweigh  any  significant  inconvenience  to  industry.     212. Id.  at  81.