Thinking about Feminism, Social Justice, and the Place of Feminist Law Journals: A Letter to the Editors


THINKING ABOUT FEMINISM, SOCIAL
JUSTICE, AND THE PLACE OF FEMINIST LAW
JOURNALS: A LETTER TO THE EDITORS

SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG*

Dear Editors:

You, like the editors who came before you, have staked a place in
an invigorating and challenging conversation about the transformative
potential of feminist approaches to social justice.1 As you envision and edit
your journal, fundamental questions about the purpose of feminist
scholarship and the value of retaining an autonomous space for feminist
jurisprudence loom large.

Not surprisingly, The Bluebook will provide little guidance on
these topics. Instead, consistent with the feminist enterprise,2 you will need
to search out sources, both within and outside of the law school library, to
spark your critical thinking. Ideally these will ensure that, through the daily
editorial grind, you keep in mind multiple perspectives regarding the
journal's overarching mission. More specifically, you will likely find
yourself asking what you are doing, why you are doing it, and what you
might accomplish.

With these questions in mind, this essay offers a framework for
thinking about the project of a feminist law journal. 3 The framework builds
on two central beliefs about our journals. First, feminist law journals have a

. Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. Editor in Chief of
the Harvard Women's Law Journal, Volume 13 (1990).

As the "Why a Feminist Law Journal?" symposium illustrated during the

proceedings and through the contents of this volume, feminist visions of social justice are
diverse and, at times, conflicting. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, I Know It When I See It, or
What Makes Scholarship Feminist: A Cautionary Tale, 12 Colum. J. Gender & L. 439
(2003); see also F eminist L egal T heory: A n Anti-Essentialist Reader (Nancy E. D owd &
Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003); Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000). However, under any understanding of feminism, the
questions and framework offered here should be relevant to all feminist law journals that
seek to have an impact beyond the pages of their own and other scholarly journals.

2 For a discussion of feminist methodologies, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist

Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990). See also Feminist Legal Theory, supra note
1; Global Critical Race Feminism, supra note 1.

3 Only one feminist law journal, the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, uses the
word feminism in its title. However, many more journals, including this one, describe in
their mission statement their commitment to a feminist perspective.



2003] Thinking About Feminism

self-consciously normative and transformative purpose. That is, feminist
law journals deliberately set out, at a minimum, to advance views that will
challenge sex and gender stereotyping and other barriers to women's
equality.4 Second, this overt commitment to a vision of social change
distinguishes feminist law journals from many others5 and has important
effects on the journals' styles and contents. To build on the observation of
Emma Coleman Jordan, feminist law journals play an insubordinate role in
response to the subordinating effects of legal academia.6 My argument is
that this role, in turn, plays a part in shaping the journals themselves.

Specifically, the journals' commitment to feminist visions of social
justice affects who is writing for the journals, how we are writing, and what
we are writing about. The essay will look at each of these in turn.

First, consider how the transformative, feminist aim affects who the
journals consider to be among their body of potential authors. An
admittedly unscientific survey of journal mission statements suggests that
although feminist journals characterize their goals in somewhat different
ways, almost all dedicate themselves to creating a forum in which
practicing lawyers and others whose lives or work are affected by the law
can advance their perspectives alongside legal scholars, judges, and law
students.7 This overt embrace of non-academics differs substantially from

4 Again, as noted supra note 1, not all feminist journals or authors would agree on
what would constitute equality for women nor on whether or how that goal can be achieved
in the world today. Still, journals describing themselves as feminist address and respond to
the ways in which concepts of sex and gender play a role in social subordination and
inequality.

5 Most journals do not explicitly embrace a particular, consistent perspective on the
issues they address. Indeed, the subject matter and underlying vision of the pieces published
in a law review typically vary depending on the interests of each new editorial board. This is
true even of many specialty law journals, which, while concentrating on a specific subject
area (such as legislation, cyberlaw, or international law) or an approach to legal analysis (for
example, a history- or economics-focused approach), do not generally commit themselves to
a normative position on issues they cover. Of course, notable exceptions to this general rule
exist, including journals focused on civil rights, among others.

6 During her remarks as a panelist at the symposium, Emma Coleman Jordan

elaborated on how "if the law school is an environment of subordination, then the feminist
law journals, the African American law journals, are structures of insubordination"
(transcript on file with the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law). An important dimension
of this observation, which falls outside this essay's scope, is the role the journals have played
in creating a space in which feminist students can gather, socialize, and strategize, especially
when the surrounding law school does not embrace feminist approaches to legal education.

7 See, e.g., Founding Committee, The Birth of a Journal, 1 Am. U. J. Gender & L.
v (1993); Hastings Women's Law Journal Staff, Preface, I Hastings Women's L.J. n.p.
(1989); Mission Statement, I J. Gender Race & Just. n.p. (1997); Statement of Purpose, 1
Mich. J. Gender & L. n.p. (1993); Statement of Purpose, I Wis. Women's L.J. v (1985);
Why A Women's Law Journal, I Harv. Women's L.J. viii (1978); Berkeley Women's Law
Journal, Home, at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/joumalsfbwlj/ (last visited July 12, 2003);
Cardozo Women's Law Journal, Home, at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cwlj/ (last visited July



Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

the strong preference of most other journals for the scholarly work of law
professors and, to a limited extent, judges and law students over the work of
lawyers in practice.8

Second, we need to consider the ways in which the feminist
commitment to ending subordination based on sex (and often other
characteristics, such as gender identity, race, ethnicity, class, physical
ability, and sexual orientation)9 affects how writers speak in feminist law
journals both in terms of their language use and their writing styles and
formats.

With respect to terminology, the journals have provided a leading
model for the use of non-sexist language. Although many different types of
journals now have style manuals that prefer non-sexist language, the earliest
volumes of feminist law journals had the opportunity to play a critical role
in influencing others' language use. In remarks on the creation of the
Wisconsin Women's Law Journal in 1985, Justice Shirley Abrahamson of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, now Chief Justice, reinforced the potential
for this type of contribution. She observed that the journal had "a valuable
opportunity to accustom its readers to language that is gender-free and to
use words that reflect the realities of society today and reinforce the
aspirations of tomorrow."' For example, she wrote, the journal could "call
homemakers unsalaried, not unemployed.""

In addition to affecting editorial style, the focus on achieving
feminist conceptions of social justice has led feminist law journals to value
articles that do not follow a traditional law review format for their
contribution to scholarly as well as strategic discourse. As a result, many
have self-consciously shed the limitations of traditional legal academic
writing by opening their pages to narratives, literary analysis, and other

12, 2003); Women's Rights Law Reporter, About the Reporter, at
http://www.pegasus.rutgers.edu/-wrlr/index.html (last visited Oct. 2 9, 2 003); Y ale Journal
of Law & Feminism, Fact Sheet at http://www.yale.edu/awnfen/factsheet.html (last visited
July 12, 2003).

8 Of course, interdisciplinary journals also specifically support publication of
scholarly works from disciplines outside law.

9 These are a spects o f identity that manyj ournals already consider part oft heir
focus. See, e.g., Statement of Purpose, Mich. J. Gender & L., supra note 7 ("The Journal is
dedicated to providing a forum for exploring how gender issues, and related issues of race,
class, sexual orientation and culture, impact the lives of women and men."); Berkeley
Women's Law Journal, supra note 7 ("We believe that excellence in feminist legal
scholarship requires critical examination of the intersection of gender with one or more other
axes of subordination, including, but not limited to, race, class, sexual orientation, and
disability.").

'0 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Foreword, I Wis. Women's L.J. 1, 3 (1985).

11 Id.

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Thinking About Feminism

genres that enable deeper exploration of the law's effects on women than
reliance on legal scholarship alone would permit. 2

The commitment to publishing work that has the potential to
meaningfully transform women's lives and achieve greater social justice
also helps explain why feminist law journals have often published legal
briefs, especially including those filed in high-impact cases.' 3 These briefs
are published not only for the practical benefit of others litigating similar
issues, but also for their contributions to the theoretical discussion taking
place among feminist lawyers and academics. They, along with submissions
by practicing lawyers, enable a unique synergy between theory and practice.
And this synergy dovetails neatly with the dual roles of feminist law
journals to support both the development of feminist legal theory and the
thoughtful analysis o f strategies aimed at translating that theory into real
effects on individual lives.

Third, the commitment of feminist law journals to transforming
society as well as academic discourse affects the subjects the journals
address. In 1985 Justice Abrahamson observed, for example, that women's
law journals "can be a forum for speaking on issues that have been labeled
women's issues, such as sexual abuse, sex harassment, child abuse, battered
women. 'A few years ago,' Gloria Steinem has said, such matters 'were just
called life.' ' '

1
4 Nearly two decades later, Abrahamson's list of topics

traditionally associated with women barely begins to describe the wide
array of topics that today's journals, as revealed in their tables of contents,
consider pertinent to women and to their feminist project.' 5

Indeed, it is this diversity that gives rise to this essay's one plea to
the editors of feminist law journals. Since feminist journals, as opposed to
other j ournals that occasionally publish feminist work, take as a primary

12 1 remember the sense of excitement on the editorial board of the Harvard
Women's Law Journal when we created the Law and Literature section in the 1990 volume.
By publishing fiction, literary analysis, and a piece in the words and handwriting of a client,
we felt we had brought the journal a step closer to being a place for well-rounded,
meaningful discussion of women's lives. Editors' Note, 13 Harv. Women's L.J. ix (1990).
Cf Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991) (discussing the
value of feminist narratives).

13 See, e.g., Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom To Marry For Same-Sex Couples:

The Opening Appellate Brief Of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State Of
Vermont, 5 Mich. J. Gender & L. 409 (1999); Lynette Labinger, Respondent's Brief In
Opposition: Brown University v. Cohen, 20 Women's Rights. L. Rep. 97 (Spring/Summer
1999).

14 Abrahamson, supra note 10, at 2.

15 See, e.g., Contents, 13 Yale J. of L. & Feminism n.p. (2001) (including articles
about sexual orientation and voir dire, the federal response to polygamy in the mid-I 800s,
the relationship between women's human rights and tobacco control, the inclusion of
companion animals in protective orders issued in response to domestic violence, and review
of a casebook from the perspective of "Storytelling and Contracts").

2003] 585



Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

goal to foster feminist conversation, the journals might help bring some of
that conversation to bear on specific topics. Although it is always exciting
to see in one place how many different issues feminist journals can address
effectively, having multiple writers bring feminist approaches to a common
topic creates the possibility for synergies and new developments in feminist
thought that might not happen amidst numerous unrelated articles. Whether
the focus is on particular subject areas, such as poverty, the military, legal
education, or marriage, or on doctrinal areas, such as civil procedure or
torts, feminist journals would contribute significantly by bringing some of
these conversations together in the same place and, if in a symposium, at
the same time.

Finally, one additional observation about the meaning and scope of
feminist law journals seems warranted in light of the framework offered
here for thinking about whom, how, and what the journals publish. As we
see in both judicial opinions and the public debate concerning the rights of
transgendered individuals, the identity of "woman" is increasingly
contested, as are the meanings of sex and gender.' 6 Feminist law journals
will need to attend more and more* to these interesting and difficult
definitional questions that implicate the very identities and perspectives that
fall under the rubric of feminism. The challenge will be to do so while also
continuing to think carefully and creatively about eradicating the
harassment, v iolence, and other forms o f" run-of-the-mill" discrimination
against women that remain incessant so many years after the first feminist
law journals were founded to address them.

16 See generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include

Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 Colum. L.
Rev. 392 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Julie A. Greenberg, When
is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a Woman, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 745 (2000); see also
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 16 (1990)
(describing gender as "a complexity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what
is given at any juncture in time. An open coalition . . . will affirm identities that are
alternately instituted and relinquished according to the purposes at hand.").

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