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Changes in American family structure – including a rising divorce 
rate, increasing numbers of single parents, and growing numbers 

of same-sex couples with children – are some of the most frequently 
discussed issues in social welfare policy today. Scholars often assert that 
family structures other than the “traditional” family (headed by two married, 
heterosexual parents) are potentially detrimental to children’s well-being. 
Some research has found a correlation between parental marriage and 
positive outcomes for children, especially decreased child poverty rates 
(Brown, 2004; McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994). Based on this association, 
some policy-makers have concluded that social problems such as child 
poverty are at least partially caused by the declining marriage rate. For 
example, the conservative Heritage Foundation states on its Web site that 
“the collapse of marriage is the principal (sic) cause of child poverty in the 
United States” (Heritage Foundation, 2004). The rise of single parenthood 
has also been blamed for social ills ranging from high school dropout rates 
to drug use among youth (Fagan, Rector, Johnson, & Peterson, 2002).

Child poverty is a very complex problem, posing questions to which 
there are no clear-cut answers. However, I would like to present some 
concerns about using marriage as a primary strategy for addressing this 
problem. In this article, I will discuss the proposed Healthy Marriage 
Initiative (HMI), a policy that is intended to reverse the trend of rising 
single-parenthood and improve children’s well-being on all counts. I will 
focus on the HMI’s relationship to child poverty, one of the primary targets 

IS THE HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE 
REALLY HEALTHY FOR FAMILIES?:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Healthy Marriage Initiative is a government proposal to expand 
programs promoting marriage, particularly among low-income families and 
welfare recipients. In this paper, I examine the implications of this proposal 
as it applies to child poverty. I argue that contrary to the claims of its 
proponents, the Healthy Marriage Initiative would not substantially reduce 
child poverty rates, would increase as many unhealthy as healthy marriages, 
and would intrude inappropriately into the lives of poor men and women.

Meg Yardley



44  Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III

is the healthy marriage initiative really healthy?

of this initiative. Finally, I will argue that HMI programs will have limited 
effectiveness in decreasing child poverty and that they are inappropriately 
intrusive and coercive in the lives of poor men and women.

Background

Historically, it is not new for marital status to be a consideration in 
the awarding of social benefits. For example, the widows’ pensions that 
existed in many states prior to the Social Security Act of 1935 were not 
always extended to non-widowed single mothers and could be denied if a 
home was considered “unsuitable” (Trattner, 1994). However, proponents 
of marriage promotion policies claim that recent welfare policy has actually 
benefited single parents, thereby functioning as a disincentive to marry, and 
contributing to the decline of marriage (Besharov & Sullivan, 1996). For 
this reason, the promotion of (heterosexual) marriage has been a stated 
goal of welfare programs since the 1996 “welfare reform” that replaced 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children with the Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF) program. In addition, some individual states have chosen 
to use TANF money to promote marriage (Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 
2002).

The proposed Healthy Marriage Initiative would set aside $100 million 
annually from TANF funds to be used by states for the following activities: 
(a) public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and the skills 
needed to increase marital stability and health; (b) education in high schools 
on the value of marriage, relationship skills, and budgeting; (c) marriage 
education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, that may 
include parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and 
job and career advancement for non-married, pregnant women and non-
married, expectant fathers; (d) pre-marital education and marriage skills 
training for engaged couples and for couples or individuals interested in 
marriage; (e) marriage enhancement and marriage skills training programs 
for married couples; (f) divorce reduction programs that teach relationship 
skills; (g) marriage mentoring programs, which use married couples as role 
models and mentors in at-risk communities; and (h) programs to reduce the 
disincentives to marriage in means-tested, aid programs (ACF, 2004a).

The policy also provides for an additional $102 million annually for 
“research, technical assistance, and demonstration projects” related to the 
above activities (ACF, 2004a). Congress has not yet approved funding for 
the Healthy Marriage Initiative (which is part of the 2006 TANF 
reauthorization bill). However, TANF funds are already being used for 



Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III   45

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marriage promotion in many states (White & Kaplan, 2003).

Marriage and Child Well-Being

The debate over the HMI and other marriage promotion policies 
generally revolves around three questions: first, whether higher marriage 
rates would improve children’s well-being; second, whether government 
policy is able to affect marriage rates; and third, whether government has 
the right to intervene in favor of marriage.

Research in the social sciences has established a clear correlation 
between single parenthood and increased poverty rates (McLanahan & 
Sandefur, 1994). However, the causal direction of this correlation is not 
clear. For one thing, poverty itself can be a factor in marital success; as 
Roberts (2004) points out, stressors associated with poverty may contribute 
to marriage breakups. In addition, a number of researchers hypothesize 
that many of the apparent benefits of marriage are actually brought about 
by selection, or differences between those who choose to marry and those 
who do not. Based on her review of the research, Roberts estimates that 
about half of the alleged economic boost from marriage can be explained by 
selection. Similarly, Acs and Nelson (2004) found that “50 to 80 percent of 
the differences in child well-being between cohabiting and married families 
can be explained by differences in family characteristics, such as parental 
age, education level, and race” (p. 1).  Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan (2002), 
examining data from the Fragile Families study, conclude that differences 
in human capital between married and unmarried adults translate into 
differences in poverty level. The authors note that proponents of marriage 
“are substantially overstating its benefits when they compare the earnings 
or poverty rates of single-mother families to those of married, two-parent 
families” (p. 20). Even many authors who believe marriage has beneficial 
effects acknowledge that these effects may not be very large. According 
to statistical simulations, if all single parents were to marry someone of a
similar background to their own, the child poverty rate would fall 3½-4 
percentage points (Acs & Nelson; Roberts). Although this difference is not
insignificant, it is based on the highly unrealistic scenario of all single 
parents choosing to marry (and staying married) and is therefore not 
particularly helpful in guiding policy.

In addition, the type of family structure may not be as important as the 
quality of relationships in the family. Marriages marked by high levels of 
conflict or domestic violence clearly have negative effects on children’s 
emotional well-being. One study that compared married parents and 



46  Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III 

is the healthy marriage initiative really healthy?

divorced parents found a strong relationship between parental conflict and 
children’s well-being, but none between family structure and children’s 
well-being (Vandewater & Lansford, 1998). Although HMI proponents 
claim the initiative wants to increase only healthy marriages, it is unclear 
whether their proposed activities would be able to increase healthy marriages 
without increasing unhealthy ones as well. Many currently funded marriage 
promotion projects offer marriage skills training (ACF, 2005a). This type 
of program might reduce conflict in some marriages but would not offer 
a solution to relationships marked by domestic violence and might even 
be harmful to victims trying to leave such a relationship. Thus we can see 
that, based on the available research, increased marriage rates might create 
some improvement in children’s economic well-being. However, it would 
probably not be a very large improvement, and it might have negative 
side effects such as increasing children’s exposure to conflict or domestic 
violence.  

Policy Effectiveness

Turning to the question of whether government programs and policies 
will really be able to create the desired change, there is very little empirical 
evidence one way or the other. In particular, there appears to be very little 
research documenting the effectiveness of the above-mentioned marriage 
skills trainings and similar activities among low-income welfare recipients. 
Moore, Jekielek, and Emig (2002) note that although there are “promising 
insights” from research, “there is not yet a proven approach for building 
strong marriages” (p. 7). For example, the authors cite one study that found 
positive short-term results from a marriage skills improvement program. 
However, participants in this study were primarily white, were not 
economically disadvantaged, and were already married prior to the program. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether similar programs would be generalizable 
to the TANF recipients who would be targeted by HMI programs.

An aspect of the HMI that has received a lot of research attention is 
the use of changes in welfare benefits to favor married couples, changes 
which have been implemented in some states (White & Kaplan, 2003). 
One program with positive findings in this area is the Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (MFIP), in which a subsidy of employment earnings 
(without any explicit marriage promotion initiatives) brought about a small 
increase in marriage rates (Ooms, 2002). However, this type of employment-
related subsidy is not part of the proposed HMI. Most research does not 
tend to support the claim that benefit changes have an effect on the marriage 



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Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III   47

rate of welfare recipients. For example, a National Poverty Center working 
paper states that generally, “research has found little to no effect of welfare 
policies on family formation decisions” (Seefeldt & Smock, 2004, p. 10). 
Preliminary analysis of data from the Fragile Families Study indicates that 
more generous welfare benefits correlated with higher rates of cohabitation, 
but had no effect on marriage rates (Mincy & Dupree, 2001). Besharov and 
Sullivan (1996), supporters of marriage promotion, were surprised to find 
that New Jersey’s benefit changes had little or no effect on marriage rates 
among women on welfare.

These findings should not be particularly surprising when we consider 
the research on which factors influence expectations of marriage. For 
example, in communities with high rates of joblessness, partners with low 
earning potential may not be seen as “marriageable.” In Waller’s (2001) 
study of unwed parents, low expectations for marriage were highly correlated 
with factors such as a partner’s drug or alcohol problems, frequent conflict, 
and physical violence in the relationship. Under such circumstances, the 
author notes, encouraging marriage may “not only be inappropriate, it may 
also be detrimental to parents and their children” (p. 482). Despite these 
and other findings, policy-makers continue to rally around the claim that 
the marriage choices of single mothers can – and should – be shaped by 
welfare benefit policy.

Government Intervention

Finally, we must ask: does the government have the right to intervene 
in the marital choices made by individual welfare recipients? United States 
government welfare policy has a history of discriminating against particular 
groups in order to coerce recipients into valued behaviors (as in the earlier 
example of widows’ pensions); however, this does not mean it is right. The 
HMI Web page asserts that the HMI is not coercive because Americans 
already value marriage: “more than 93% of Americans say marital success is 
important to them” (ACF, 2005b). As mentioned earlier, studies have shown 
that welfare recipients’ reasons for not marrying are often factors such as 
the partner’s drug addiction, abusive behavior, or infidelity (Waller, 2001), 
rather than a lack of marriage values. However, administration official 
Wade Horn has asserted that the goal of marriage promotion is “to reinstate 
marriage as an ideal in low-income communities” (1997, p. 43, emphasis 
added), revealing the HMI’s true agenda: to impose specific values onto 
welfare recipients, who are perceived as being anti-marriage.

In addition, the HMI Web site insists that it only wants to help people 



48  Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III 

is the healthy marriage initiative really healthy?

“who choose marriage for themselves [to] acquire the skills and knowledge 
necessary to form and sustain healthy marriages” (ACF, 2005b). This 
argument seems disingenuous, given that the HMI would be directed toward 
welfare recipients, who are vulnerable to government coercion. Also, many 
existing marriage promotion programs recruit participants who are not 
married or engaged. For example, some healthy marriage projects currently 
funded by the Administration for Children and Families recruit unwed 
parents from hospitals through the paternity establishment process (ACF, 
2004b). In addition, the HMI would not be simply a supplement to already-
existing services for TANF recipients, but rather would divert TANF funds 
from other services.

Furthermore, the ideological underpinning of marriage promotion 
policies is marked by an insistence on traditional gender roles; these 
policies encourage job training opportunities for men (to make them more 
“marriageable”) while attempting to move women back into the home. For 
example, Besharov and Sullivan (1996) admiringly describe how if welfare 
benefits are lowered, “a mother who prefers to stay home with her children 
rather than work might trade her now lower-value benefit package for the 
role of housewife, caregiver to her children, and, perhaps, part-time worker” 
(p. 94). In essence, these authors implicitly argue that “mothers should trade 
dependence on welfare for dependence on a husband” (p. 92). Ultimately, 
it is not the government’s duty – or its right – to dictate family structure. 
It is the government’s function to provide as much support as possible for 
all families so that children’s (and adults’) well-being will be improved. 
The Healthy Marriage Initiative inappropriately attempts to take charge of 
individuals’ private decisions about family formation.

Alternative Policy Options

Many other policies could be more directly supportive of family 
and child well-being. Welfare benefits could be marriage-neutral (rather 
than privileging marriage, as encouraged by Horn & Bush, 1997), which 
would allow family structures to be determined by individual families. 
Marriage could also be made available to same-sex couples, who represent 
a significant percentage of cohabiting couples with children (Parke, 2003). 
Universal availability of quality child care would go a long way toward 
reducing poverty among low-income families. With quality child care easily 
accessible, the availability of job training for both men and women would 
allow partners to decide whether one or both of them would choose to work. 
The government could also supplement employment earnings, as in the 



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Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III   49

MFIP. Based on research findings, Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan (2002) 
suggest that it might be more cost-effective to focus on employment than on 
marriage promotion as an anti-poverty strategy.

These are just a few examples of the types of policies that would support 
families and help raise children out of poverty, without coercing families 
into what politicians believe they should be. If TANF funds were used for 
such policies, extensive evaluation should occur to ensure that they were 
actually having positive effects on children’s well-being. Outcomes should 
be measured by children’s financial, physical, and emotional health, not by 
whether or not more parents are getting and staying married. Policies that 
support working families of all kinds would be likely to have beneficial 
effects on children’s economic well-being. In addition, once parents are 
able to provide basic economic support for themselves and their children, 
their own improved well-being will give them greater resources to focus on 
parenting their children and creating healthy relationships.

In contrast, implementation of the Healthy Marriage Initiative would 
take away funding from resources like child care, job training, and other 
services, which are desperately needed by working families (including 
single, cohabiting, and married parents). Although the HMI might increase 
healthy marriages, it might also increase the incidence of marriages plagued 
by conflict or domestic violence, and its effect on child poverty rates might 
be minimal. Far from bringing about its stated goal of reducing poverty, 
the HMI would be likely to further stigmatize single parents and to intrude 
coercively into the lives of poor men and women.

References

Acs, G. & Nelson, S. (2004, May).  What do “I do”s do?: Potential 
benefits of marriage for cohabiting couples with children. New 
Federalism: National Survey of America’s Families Policy Brief No. 
B-59. Retrieved January 18, 2005, from Urban Institute Web site: 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311001

Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2004a).  Healthy 
Marriage Initiative: Healthy marriage matters.  Retrieved January 18, 
2005, from http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
healthymarriage/about/factsheets_hm_matters.html

Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2004b).  Currently 
funded healthy marriage projects: Office of Child Support 
Enforcement. Retrieved February 26, 2005, from  
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/healthymarriage/funding/child_support.html



50  Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III 

is the healthy marriage initiative really healthy?

Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2005a). Healthy 
Marriage Initiative: Funding opportunities.  Retrieved January 18, 
2005, from http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/healthymarriage/funding/index.
html

Administration for Children and Families (ACF) (2005b). Healthy 
Marriage Initiative: Myths and facts about the Healthy Marriage 
Initiative.  Retrieved February 26, 2005, from
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/myths_facts.html

Besharov, D. J. & Sullivan, T. S. (1996). Welfare reform and marriage.  
Public Interest, 125, 81-94.

Brown, S. L. (2004). Family structure and child well-being: The 
significance of parental cohabitation. Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 66, 351-367.

Chase-Lansdale, P. L. & Pittman, L. D. (2002). Welfare reform and 
parenting: Reasonable expectations. The Future of Children, 12(1), 
167-185.

Fagan, P. F., Rector, R. E., Johnson, K. A., & Peterson, A. (2002, April).  
The positive effects of marriage: A book of charts. Retrieved  

       February 26, 2005, from Heritage Foundation Web 
site: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/marriage/ 

Heritage Foundation. (2004). Issues 2004: Marriage promotion.  
Retrieved January 18, 2005, from http://www.heritage.org/research/
features/issues2004/marriagewelfarepoverty.cfm

Horn, W. F. & Bush, A. (1997).  Fathers and welfare reform.  Public 
Interest, 129, 38-49.

McLanahan, S. & Sandefur, G. (1994). Growing up with a single parent: 
What hurts, what helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mincy, R. B. & Dupree, A. T. (2001). Welfare, child support, and family 
formation. Children and Youth Services Review, 23(6/7), 577-601.

Moore, K. A., Jekielek, S. M., & Emig, C. (2002, June). Marriage from 
a child’s perspective: How does marriage affect children, and what 
can we do about it?  Research Brief. Washington, DC: Child Trends.  
Retrieved February 27, 2005, from http://www.childtrends.org/Files/
MarriageRB602.pdf

Ooms, T. (2002). Marriage and government: Strange bedfellows? Center 
for Law and Social Policy, Couples and Marriage Series, Brief No. 
1. Retrieved January 18, 2005, from http://www.clasp.org/
publications/Marriage_Brief1.pdf

Parke, M. (2003, May). Are married parents really better for children?: 
What the research says about the effects of family structure on child 
well-being. Center for Law and Social Policy, Couples and 
Marriage Series, Brief No. 3. Retrieved March 1, 2005, from http://
www.clasp.org/publications/Marriage_Brief3.pdf



Roberts, P. (2004, August). I can’t give you anything but love: Would 
poor couples with children be better off economically if they 
married? Center for Law and Social Policy, Couples and Marriage 
Series, Brief No. 5. Retrieved January 18, 2005, from http://www.
clasp.org/publications/marr_brf_5.pdf

Seefeldt, K. S. & Smock, P. J. (2004). Marriage on the public policy 
agenda: What do policy makers need to know from research? 
National Poverty Center Working Paper Series No. 04-2.  Retrieved 
January 18, 2005, from http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/
workingpaper04/paper2/index.shtml

Sigle-Rushton, W. & McLanahan, S. (2002, July). For richer or for 
poorer?: Marriage as an anti-poverty strategy in the United States.  
Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper #01-17-
FF.  Retrieved March 1, 2005, from http://crcw.princeton.edu/papers.
html

Trattner, W. I. (1994). From poor law to welfare state: A history of social 
welfare in America (5th ed.). New York: Free Press.

Vandewater, E. A. & Lansford, J. E. (1998). Influences of family structure 
and parental conflict on children’s well-being. Family Relations, 
47(4), 323-330.

Waller, M. R. (2001). High hopes: Unwed parents’ expectations about 
marriage. Children and Youth Services Review, 23(6/7), 457-484.

White, D. & Kaplan, J. (2003, June). The states’ role in supporting 
marriage and family formation. Welfare Information Network, Issue 
Notes, 7(8). Retrieved February 27, 2005, from The 
Finance Project Web site: www.financeprojectinfo.org/win/
famformation.asp

Meg Yardley is a second year master’s student concentrating 
in the Advanced Clinical Practice method. Her field of practice 
is Family, Youth, and Children’s Services. She is currently placed 
at the Brooklyn Child and Adolescent Guidance Clinic of the 
Jewish Child Care Association. She holds a bachelor’s degree in 
Comparative Literature from Smith College in Northampton, MA.  
Her email address is mby2101@columbia.edu.

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Journal of Student Social Work, Volume III   51


