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COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 12 

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE AS A TOOL FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEEN HAREDI 
JEWISH CO-PARENTS

KAREN A. KADISH

ABSTRACT 
Domestic violence victims in Haredi Jewish communities face serious 

obstacles to leaving their abusers and escaping domestic violence. Leaving 
their abusers often entails divorce and fierce custody disputes. For many 
Haredi women who have experienced domestic violence, leaving their 
abusers also involves leaving their religious sect or even religious observance 
in general. This paper will explore the dynamics that contribute to these 
concerns for Haredi Jewish domestic violence survivors and address how 
courts deciding child custody can inadvertently perpetuate domestic violence. 
This paper will then recommend changing the courts’ analysis in child custody 
cases to a “friendly religious co-parent” model in order to better protect victims 
of domestic violence.

INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence victims in Haredi1 Jewish communities face serious 

obstacles to leaving their abusers. By the time a domestic violence survivor 
leaves her abuser in these communities, they are likely to be married to 
their abuser with children in common (Pew Research Center, 2015). The 
victim may also face significant community pressures to stay with her2 
abuser (Schneerson & Chabad.org, 2001a; Schneerson & Chabad.org, 
2001b) and within her specific sect of religious practice (Ruz & Pritchard, 
2016). For many of these women, leaving their abusers involves leaving 
their particular religious sect and, in certain cases, they choose to leave 
their religious observance in general (Ausch, 2018). Theoretical models 
relating to domestic violence emphasize that domestic violence is not 
an individual phenomenon, but derives from “structural relationships of 
inequality between women and men. . . . It cuts across both the public and the 
private spheres” (United Nations, 2006). This paper will explore the cultural 
dynamics that make it difficult for Haredi Jewish individuals to leave an 
abusive relationship when the victim shares children with the abuser, as well 
as address how New York State courts deciding child custody can consider 
religion in a way that does not create additional risks of religious domestic 
violence. 

1 “Haredi” signifies “devout” in Hebrew and is used to signify a particular group of traditional 
Orthodox Jews (Shafran, 2020). It is preferred to the more common, pejorative term “ultra-
Orthodox” (Shafran, 2020). 
2 This article will use female pronouns as a default to refer to Haredi Jewish victims of 
domestic violence, because the overwhelming majority are female. 



13 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

This paper does not address cases in which child abuse or neglect exist 
concurrently with domestic violence within a family. Rather, it focuses on 
custody disputes conducted outside of the realm of child protective services, 
as part of a divorce or other civil legal action. Specifically, the paper will 
explore how religious law can be used by abusers to marginalize and control 
Haredi or formerly Haredi female victims of domestic violence in the context 
of a custody dispute. 

 Part One of this paper will discuss the background of religious 
control as a mechanism of domestic violence and how religious control 
manifests in the Haredi Jewish community. This type of control will be 
called “religious domestic violence” in this paper. Part Two of this paper 
will address the ways in which custody orders given by New York State 
courts aimed at maintaining religious stability for children create additional 
difficulties for victims attempting to leave an abusive relationship in which 
religion figures prominently. Part Three of this paper will recommend 
changing the best-interest analysis that courts currently employ when 
considering a child’s religion. This shift will assist in protecting women 
against religious domestic violence.

PART ONE: RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

Religious control can function as a mechanism for domestic violence. 
Religious domestic violence occurs in many different faiths (Fortune, 
Abugideire, & Dratch, 2010; Bent-Goodly & Fowler, 2006; Foss & Warnke, 
2003; Ghafournia, 2017; Nason-Clark, 2004). Most references noted in this 
paper refer to the “big three” monotheistic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam, and of course this paper focuses on a particular group within 
Judaism. Irrespective of religious group, women in observant religious 
communities often face idiosyncratic abuse and barriers to leaving their 
abusers (Fortune, Abugideire, & Dratch, 2010; Bent-Goodly & Fowler, 2006; 
Foss & Warnke, 2003; Ghafournia, 2017; Nason-Clark, 2004). However, 
religiosity and participation in a religious community also serve as a 
protective factor for many women (Fortune, Abugideire, & Dratch, 2010).

While religiosity, in general, is inversely correlated with domestic 
violence, religious fundamentalism and patriarchal religious power models 
are risk factors for domestic violence in religious communities (Warren, 
2015). Control based on religion has been incorporated into one version 
of the power and control wheel that is frequently used to conceptualize 
the power dynamics that exist within an abusive relationship. Specific 
mechanisms of domestic violence that have been identified as common 
to abusers and victims who belong to observant members of all three 
Abrahamic faiths. These mechanisms include a) using religious teachings 
to control sexuality and reproduction; b) using members of the religious 
community as tools for coercing or intimidating the victim; and c) using 
religious teachings to assert gender-based authority over a victim (Rapoport, 
1991; Bent-Goodly & Fowler, 2006).



COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 14 

 The expressions of religious domestic violence in the Haredi Jewish 
communities are idiosyncratic because these communities are small, 
cohesive, and organized around religion.  (Friedman, 1991; Berman, 2000; 
Freund & Band-Winterstein, 2013). Haredi Jewish practice is vulnerable to 
manipulation by abusers because the vast majority of the Haredi community 
feels itself to be bound to Jewish law (“halacha”) and to the rabbinic 
authorities who are the decisors in the Jewish legal system (Pew Research 
Center, 2015). While religious principles are used in religious domestic 
violence in a variety of different faiths, their expression in Haredi Judaism 
has not been extensively explored. Halacha governs almost every aspect of 
a religious Jew’s life (Aiken, 2015). It is often through the use and misuse 
of halacha that abusers in Haredi communities exert religious control 
over their victims (Cares & Cusick, 2012). In Haredi communities, there 
is also a strong societal pressure to adhere to the strictures and traditions 
of the community (Auerbach, n.d.; Schapiro, n.d.). These strictures can 
be additional loci where abusers take control from their victims because 
traditions tend to pass down along the male familial line. While many parts 
of halacha and Jewish tradition could be used for abusive behavior, three 
aspects of halacha are particularly susceptible to being used as mechanisms 
of control by abusers: the laws of modesty, the laws of sexual conduct, and 
the strong value placed on marital harmony (shalom bayit). 3

 The laws of modesty can be used as a mechanism of domestic 
violence because they dictate the social interactions of women and men in 
orthodox Jewish communities. The laws of modesty are primarily thought 
of as a dress code of sorts for Jewish people. Community standards vary, 
but in Haredi communities, married women typically are expected to wear 
clothes that cover their collarbones, their arms past their elbows, and their 
legs to mid-shin. In addition, they almost always cover their hair with a 
wig and often a scarf or hat on top of a wig(Nir, 2016). These laws can be 
used as tools for domestic violence because abusers can control victims’ 
social relationships and access by threatening to expose the victim to 
embarrassment in the community as a whole. Consider, for example, a 
husband who refuses to give his wife money to repair or replace a damaged 
wig. The woman cannot go out in public in her community without wearing 

3 Note that interpretations and implementations of halacha and tradition vary widely 
between communities and between individuals. The discussion of halacha in this paper is 
not intended to give a representation of how halacha functions in any one community, but 
rather to identify the manipulations or extreme interpretations of halacha that exist and can 
be used by abusers. It is particularly not intended as a critique of religious obligations that 
women freely take upon themselves as part of a Haredi community. The use of the religious 
law to exert control are, to the author’s knowledge, atypical even within Haredi communities, 
where religious practice (although strongly reinforced by community norms and expec-
tations) is an individual responsibility and is not subject to coercion by either a person’s 
spouse or their community. See Taubes (2008) (discussing the limited circumstances in 
which an individual is permitted to rebuke another, and emphasizing that religious practice 
is incumbent on the person—not their friends or family—and that rebuke is only appropriate 
when done kindly and when the listener is open to changing their behavior). 



15 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

a wig, so she is forced to choose between wearing a damaged wig and facing 
public embarrassment or staying home. 

Haredi interpretations of modesty laws additionally operate as a barrier 
to women accessing resources in the greater community because women are 
discouraged or prohibited from speaking to men who are unrelated to them 
(Zeveloff, 2011). Even if victims decide to ask a male community figure for 
help, it is likely that there will be no way for the woman to approach him 
or that he will refuse to speak to her because doing so could be considered 
immodest. Abusers can use these laws to cut women off from figures of 
power within the community, especially because the legal decisors are all 
men. Questions to these decisors—and their responses—are expected to be 
conveyed through women’s husbands or fathers, which allows abusers to 
manipulate or invent rabbis’ decrees to control their wives’ behavior.

 Sexual relationships within Jewish marriages are also governed 
by halacha, providing another avenue for abusers to control women’s 
behavior. While a full discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this 
paper, halacha addresses the times when spouses may be intimate with each 
other and the transition between times when spouses can be intimate and 
times when they cannot be intimate (Zimmerman, 2001; Guterman, 2008). 
These laws can lead to religious domestic violence in two major ways: a) 
abusers may pressure their victims to have sex when they are religiously 
prohibited from doing so and b) abusers can misconstrue halacha to try to 
coerce their victim into believing that they are religiously required to have 
sex with their spouse when, in reality, no such obligation exists (Cares & 
Cusick, 2012). This is sexual assault, and also forces the woman to abandon 
her own religious practice and to face the shame and fear of having violated 
a serious religious law (Abusive Husband, 2009). 

 Finally, much religious domestic violence in Haredi communities 
is done under the guise of telling the woman she must create shalom 
bayit—peace in the home. Shalom bayit is considered of central importance 
to Jewish marriages (Maimonides, n.d.). Shalom bayit is cited as the 
justification not only for spouses taking special care for each other, but also 
as a priority of household economic choices and, at its best, the conduit for 
the Divine presence (see Talmud Bavli, Koren, Shabbat 23b; Talmud Bavli, 
Koren, Sotah 17:a in Steinsaltz, n.d.). The laws of shalom bayit apply to both 
men and women (Maimonides, n.d.). However, they are very susceptible to 
manipulation by abusers to control their victims and force them to acquiesce 
to the abuser’s demands. Abusers can tell their victims that they may not 
contradict them or must contribute more labor to the household (even as 
the abuser refuses to do so) in order to maintain shalom bayit. Furthermore, 
rabbinic authorities—either due to bias or ignorance—may tell victims of 
domestic violence to exert more effort to maintain shalom bayit in their 
home instead of helping them to leave abusive relationships (Schneerson 
& Chabad.org, 2001b).

By framing domestic violence in the terms of shalom bayit, abusers 



COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 16 

can place the blame for abuse on a victim’s shoulders. Arguably, shalom 
bayit can be utilized as a religious framework for telling the victim that she 
would not be abused “if only she created shalom bayit”—i.e., fulfilled any 
and all demands of the abuser. Couples going to a rabbinic authority or other 
community resources with marriage troubles often are counseled to stay 
together for the sake of shalom bayit, and to simply “try harder” to achieve 
this illusory peaceful home (Schneerson & Chabad.org, 2001b).

 Jewish law can be misused not only in the perpetration of domestic 
violence but also as a barrier to women’s leaving abusive relationships. 
The prohibition against “mesirah”—turning a Jewish person over to non-
Jewish authorities (Teshuvot HaRosh 17:1), especially given concerns 
about widespread antisemitism and anti-Haredi sentiment—is a significant 
obstacle to victims of domestic violence accessing help from outside of their 
community. In insular Haredi communities, this prohibition is interpreted 
very broadly, which results in almost all legal matters being handled 
within the community (Aviv, 2014). For victims of domestic violence, this 
prohibition means that a victim can face community censure for going to the 
secular police or courts for help. Haredi women may not pursue an order of 
protection in a secular court, because doing so will be considered a betrayal 
of the community. Husbands also have the ability to refuse a religious divorce 
(a get) to their wives. The refusal to grant a get is domestic violence because 
it functions  as a way for abusers to prevent their wives from leaving them 
or the community.  By halacha, women are unable to remarry in a Jewish 
ceremony unless they obtain a Jewish divorce.

PART TWO: RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 

Custody orders aimed at maintaining religious stability for children 
create additional difficulties for victims attempting to leave an abusive 
relationship in which religion is a major factor. Custody disputes may lead 
to further or more severe religious domestic violence because an abuser can 
exert control over a co-parent’s religious practice either individually or by 
channeling the resources of the community, and isolate a co-parent who is 
not following religious law scrupulously, all under the guise of enforcing a 
court order about the best interests of the child. 

 Custody disputes for Haredi couples can be complicated by the 
social and religious implications of childrearing within their communities. 
This is partially due to demographic realities—Haredi couples do not 
live together or have children before marriage (Negiah and Relations for 
Unmarried Couples, 2017). These couples tend to get married earlier 
(Pew Research Center, 2015), and typically begin to have children soon 
after marriage. Child custody disputes are also more common—and more 
intense—because of the social connotations of leaving the Haredi community 
or changing religious practice (Cohen, 2017). Thus, custody disputes are 
not only about the individual parents’ own relationships with the children 



17 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

but also implicate the greater community’s hopes for the children and their 
religious and social education (Fenton & Rickman, 2016; Santo, 2013).

 Courts strive to maintain a “religious status quo” for the child and 
“will consider religion in a custody dispute when a child has developed actual 
religious ties to a specific religion and those needs can be served better by 
one parent than the other.” (Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 2014; Ervin R. v. Phina R., 
2000). This approach is grounded in the broader perspective that a child’s 
best interests are served by maintaining stability in the child’s life (Gribeluk 
v. Gribeluk, 2014). Courts’ concern for the religious status quo of the child 
can be determinative in child-custody cases of Haredi couples, because the 
custodial parent has the right to determine the child’s religious upbringing 
(De Beer v. De Beer, 1990; Stevenot v. Stevenot, 1987). If one parent is now 
practicing the religion in a different way—or not at all—courts may decide 
that the child should stay with the parent whose religious practice has not 
changed in order to maintain the status quo. In a recent case, Etty Ausch, a 
formerly Haredi mother of seven, was severely limited in her visitation of her 
older children and prohibited from seeing her younger children because she 
is no longer religious (Ewing & Grady, 2017). Despite Ms. Ausch’s allegations 
of her ex-husband’s significant sexual abuse against her, the court denied her 
custody of her children and severely limited her visitation (Ewing & Grady, 
2017).

 Courts routinely place religious requirements on Haredi co-parents in 
order to maintain religious stability for Haredi children. They commonly 
require parents to keep kosher and observe the Sabbath when their children 
are with them (Weisberger v. Weisberger, 2018; M.C. v. R.C., 2008). These 
requirements are extremely ambiguous given the diversity of opinions 
within Jewish law regarding what is or is not “kosher” and what constitutes 
a violation of the Sabbath. Because of First Amendment concerns, the 
enforcement of such orders tends to rely on discerning the credibility of the 
parents’ assertions about their religious practice and the parents’ complaints 
about the religious practices of their co-parent rather than an investigation 
into normative religious practice in the community.4 Nonetheless, courts 
continue to use these markers because they are very obvious elements of 
religious Jewish practice and because they directly address the lifestyle 
of the child. Most recently, courts have begun to require parents to adhere 
to children’s “school rules”—the (often-unwritten) comprehensive 
requirements for parents who send their children to Haredi Jewish private 
schools5 (Weisberger v. Weisberger). Arguably, this requirement is especially 

4 Constitutional concerns about the separation of church and state prevent a court from 
issuing a legal decision about which parent is “right” regarding a question of religious law. 
Because of the constitutional concerns, courts are often opaque about their application of 
religious rules to custody and visitation cases. While there may be a constitutional issue with 
requiring non-custodial parents to acquiesce to the custodial parent’s religious standards, 
a constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the constitu-
tional angle, see generally Barshay (1997); Volokh (2006). 
5 These rules are difficult to obtain because Haredi schools rarely have a religious presence, 



COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 18 

vulnerable to manipulation by abusers because courts cannot easily verify 
what the school’s rules are. 

There are three ways in which custody determinations that adhere to 
the religious status quo inquiry in a best-interests analysis create additional 
risks of religious domestic violence or may increase the severity of such 
violence. First, focusing on maintaining the child’s religious status quo by 
mandating certain religious practices or comportment by the victim gives 
the abuser a tool to continue domestic violence by policing the victim’s 
adherence to court orders. Because a victim’s visitation with her children 
or her custody of her children may be contingent on her maintaining the 
religious status quo, abusers can come to court and allege that the victim’s 
religious practices have changed and ask for custody or visitation to be 
modified. While the use of the legal system to perpetuate domestic violence 
is possible in every custody dispute, it is especially problematic in the Haredi 
context because court orders regarding Jewish religious practice generally 
involve practices that are beyond the court’s own understanding.6 Evidence 
regarding religious practice is hard to provide to a court and even hard to 
apply because of constitutional concerns that limit the ways in which 
courts can rule on the validity of a litigant’s religious practice. Therefore, if 
the abuser claims that the victim has violated the court order, the court is 
unable to easily identify whether there has or has not been a violation and 
may end up supporting an abuser’s frivolous or manipulative claim. Even if 
the victim is ultimately able to defend against the abuser’s claim, the abuser 
has still been given a legally-sanctioned way to monitor the victim’s religious 
practice and subject her to traumatic and intrusive legal proceedings. 

These concerns are even greater when a court has ordered both parents 
to maintain the “school rules” of their children. Most children who grow up 
in a Haredi community attend a private Jewish school that adheres to the 
tenets of their sect of Judaism (Pew Research Center, 2015). Haredi schools 
rarely have an online presence, and the school rules are often unwritten or 

the rules are unwritten, and the school operates in Yiddish. However, rules of the school 
Bnos Menachem were circulated in the Jewish community  in 2017 after the school issued 
a letter instructing mothers of students at their school that new school rules for mothers of 
students included “1) Nail polish should be conservative/soft colors; 2) No denim; 3) [Wig] 
length should not exceed the shoulder blades; 4) No tight fitting or provocative clothing; 5) 
No leggings; 6) Elbows, feet, neckline completely covered; 7) Skirts mid-calf ” and asking 
the mothers to sign a statement that they would “do [their] utmost to fulfill them” (Gurary, 
2017). 
6 Consider, for example, the following scenario: An abuser comes in and claims that the vic-
tim is feeding the children “non-kosher” food. The victim explains that the food has kosher 
certification and that it is, indeed, kosher. The abuser responds that he does not think the 
certification is valid and that when they were living together, the family never would have 
considered such food kosher. Both parties have witnesses who can testify to the fact that 
the food is/is not kosher. In such a scenario—or the thousands of possible analogs that could 
come up in religious practice—it will be incredibly difficult for the court to know whose 
claim is correct. The court cannot know which kosher certifications are acceptable to the 
family or the community, and how much the victim’s conduct does or does not deviate from 
the agreed-upon religious practice of “keeping kosher.” 



19 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

even unspoken. By linking child custody or visitation to school rules, the 
court creates an opportunity for the abuser to use the children’s schools as 
a tool of domestic violence. For instance, an abuser can begin to highlight 
examples of school-rules violations that might not get policed by the school 
itself. 

Furthermore, because the school rules generally apply to parents, 
whether their children are with them or not, the school-rules requirement 
invites the abuser to monitor the victim’s conduct even when the children 
are not in her custody. Chava Weisberger was denied custody of her children 
due to her failure to adhere to a religious conduct custody agreement 
until the lower court’s ruling was overturned on appeal in January 2018 
(Weisberger v. Weisberger, 2018). Even to the extent that Ms. Weisberger 
donned religious apparel and abided by the abuser’s religious dictates 
while she was with their children, her irreligiosity was used by the abuser 
to justify intensive monitoring of her behavior and limiting her contact with 
her children, for instance asking that the victim’s visitation be supervised 
by a Haredi relative. Accordingly, abusers can engage in manipulative 
applications of the laws of modesty, the Sabbath, or kashrut in order to 
continue to control the victim even when the victim is not with her children. 

A second problem with using community norms or school rules as a 
conduct-requirement for victims is that courts provide opportunities 
for abusers to channel the resources of the community into controlling 
the decisions of the victim about religious observance. In many Haredi 
communities, there is a very deep fear of people leaving the sect, and the 
community will mobilize in order to convince wavering members to remain 
in the sect (Brodesser-Akner, 2017; Halime, 2015). Therefore, the abuser 
can exert control over the victim by co-opting these communal efforts and 
using the community as a tool for controlling the decisions of the victim. 

Finally, requiring victims to maintain the religious status quo or to 
follow school rules in custody or visitation orders may unintentionally 
isolate victims from resources outside of the religious community. Many 
Haredi communities and schools have a requirement that families refrain 
from having smartphones and refrain from using computers or the Internet if 
they are not required to do so for their jobs (Grynbaum, 2012; Fenton, 2016). 
Therefore, by requiring a victim to maintain the religious status quo or to 
follow the school rules of her children’s schools, a court may unintentionally 
lend state-enforcement to community policies that cut the victim off from 
the nonreligious world at a time when such contact might be especially 
necessary

PART THREE: HOW COURTS CAN AVOID PERPETUATING 
RELIGIOUS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 

Given the impact of the current best-interest analysis that courts 
employ when considering a child’s religion, a change is required to protect 
against religious domestic violence. The best-interests analysis in custody 



COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 20 

disputes is a child-focused analysis (Peskind, 2004). Whereas earlier courts 
focused on a parent’s right to raise their child or on traditional assumptions 
of which gender parent is better for children at different stages of the child’s 
life, courts have moved to a case-by-case and child-by-child approach to 
determining custody (Peskind, 2004). In cases involving domestic violence, 
multiple legislatures have articulated that courts must consider domestic 
violence when determining child custody, and that it is a weighty factor in 
the best-interests analysis.7 

In the context of religious domestic violence, courts should consider the 
ways in which custody orders that address religion in order to maintain the 
child’s religious status quo can intensify or perpetuate domestic violence 
between religious co-parents. Courts should replace the “status quo” model 
with a “friendly religious co-parent” model, in which courts consider which 
parent is more likely to support the child’s own religious choices and to 
foster a relationship with the other parent’s religion.

         That is, one way to prevent abusers from using custody disputes 
as a locus of domestic violence is to change the model that courts use to 
determine the best interests of the child in custody disputes between 
religious co-parents. Due to the dangers inherent to the present model for 
considering religion, it is vital that courts create a model that does not give 
abusers tools to continue religious domestic violence. One potential solution 
is for courts to consider religion in the way that they currently consider each 
parent’s ability to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent. This 
paper proposes this model and calls it the “friendly co-parent” model. Under 
a friendly co-parent model, the court would look into whether each parent is 
willing to allow the other co-parent to have access to the children, whether 
the parent speaks badly of the other parent, or if either parent is trying to turn 
the child away from the co-parent. All of these metrics tend to bias a court 
against a domestic violence survivor who is acting out of a rational fear of her 
abuser. However, while the friendly co-parent model can burden domestic 
violence victims by forcing them to protect their children’s relationship with 
a person who has abused them, using the friendly co-parent model to guide 
decisions about the child and parents’ religious observance does not face 

7 See, e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-404.03 (2015) (“The court shall consider evidence of 
domestic violence as being contrary to the best interests of the child. The court shall con-
sider the safety and well-being of the child and of the victim of the act of domestic violence 
to be of primary importance. The court shall consider a perpetrator’s history of causing 
or threatening to cause physical harm to another person.”); N.D. Cent. Code §14-09-06.2 
(“In determining parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider evidence of 
domestic violence. If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, 
and there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury 
or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence 
within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, this combination creates a rebuttable 
presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded resi-
dential responsibility for the child.”); N.Y. Dom. Rel. §240 (“Where… allegations [of domestic 
violence] are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect 
of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child”). 



21 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

the pitfalls of the religious status quo model, which are discussed above in 
Part Two.

To apply a friendly religious co-parent model, a court should consider 
whether a parent is speaking disparagingly about the other parent’s 
religious practice, whether the parent is supporting the child’s own 
religious development and beliefs, and which parent is open to fostering 
the child’s relationship with the other parent’s religious beliefs. While this 
still is burdensome for a parent who is faced with supporting their child’s 
relationship with a religion that is not (or is no longer) their own practice, 
it does not force victims to support their abuser directly, but rather to 
support the child’s own religious beliefs and the child’s relationship with 
the co-parent’s religion. This mitigates the problem of religious policing by 
the abusive co-parent because the inquiry is framed in terms of the parent 
supporting the child’s needs, rather than the co-parent’s desires regarding 
the victim’s own religious conduct. For example, a mother who feeds her 
child kosher food and supports the child’s observance of the Sabbath, cannot 
be penalized for choosing not to adhere to a Haredi dress code, simply 
because her new mode of dress changes the child’s religious status quo. 

Adopting a model that is focused more on the parent’s ability to 
support the child’s religious development and exposure to each parent’s 
religion minimizes the risk of court-enforced religious domestic violence 
in several ways. First, it limits the abuser’s ability to use the court to monitor 
the victim’s religious behavior and to threaten the victim if she does not 
comply with his religious standards. This model does not dictate parents’ 
own religious conduct. As a result, the abuser cannot use a court order to 
dictate the victim’s religious observance or to control her lack of observance.

Second, it allows parents to consider their children’s own religious 
choices and desires. Therefore, while a custody order may require that 
victims accommodate their children’s own desire to keep kosher or to 
observe the Sabbath, the driving force of religious requirements in the 
parents’ life are the child’s own religious needs and opportunities, not the 
abuser’s mandates for the children. This model is most relevant for children 
who are old enough to verbalize their religious desires and does not fully 
address the problem of religious upbringing for infants or toddlers. However, 
this model  is more consistent with the children’s rights-focus of modern 
family law (Fortin, 2003) and also further distances the victim from her 
abuser’s attempts to control her religious life. 

The religious conduct required of the victim is only the conduct that 
is necessary to support the child’s opportunity to participate in the co-
parent’s religious practices—the victim would no longer be bound to follow 
the abuser’s religion in full, even where the religious observances do not 
impact the child’s own practice of the religion.8 While communal pressures 
8 Consider, for example, a mother who no longer wishes to adhere to the modesty laws of 
their ultraorthodox sect. The mother’s dress has no bearing on the child’s own religious 
practice. However, under the current model, courts could require mothers to maintain their 



COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 | 22 

can still be brought to bear on a mother who chooses to leave the religious 
sect, victims will be protected from having formal court orders that require 
the mother’s own religious conduct. This added level of separation is a small 
change but creates a crucial difference. For a mother who has a court order 
requiring her own religious conduct, her clothing and other choices can be a 
direct violation of the custody order, and per se puts her custody or visitation 
rights at risk. For a mother whose conduct is the subject of social pressure 
but is not violative of a court order, the court can act as a protective factor for 
the mother and protect her custody rights in the face of religious pressure 
regarding the mother’s conduct that goes against community norms but does 
not have a significant impact on her child’s ability to practice religion. 

Third, a model that requires the parents to support the child’s exposure 
to the other parent’s religious practice will protect against abusers that try 
to cut off a victim’s access to her children because of her lack of religiosity. 
Abusers who denigrate their victims for a lack of religiosity or for changing 
their religious practices will no longer be rewarded (as he is under the 
status quo arrangement) and instead will rightfully be seen as alienating 
the children from the victim’s religious practice. 

Finally, adopting this approach to religious differences in custody 
disputes is consistent with the child’s best interest. It would be impossible 
for a secular court to determine what religious practice is best for the 
child. Therefore, the court should look at which parent best provides for 
the religious development of the child, which includes the child being able 
to make their own religious choices (Dwyer, 1994; Kilkelly, 2009). While 
stability is important, the need for stability in religion is outweighed by the 
need for the child to have stable relationships with his or her parent—no 
matter whether the parent and child’s religious paths diverge. Therefore, 
by factoring in which parent is best able to encourage the child’s religious 
growth and accept the child’s involvement with the co-parent’s religious 
practice, courts will be closer to finding the best interest of a child whose 
parents have different religious practices.

CONCLUSION
Haredi victims of domestic violence are vulnerable to continued 

domestic violence during custody disputes with an abusive spouse. Despite 
the grave risks facing such victims, courts consider co-parents’ religious 
practices in a way that is vulnerable to exacerbating the dynamics of 
religious domestic violence. Courts routinely tie child custody or visitation 
to specific types of religious practice and to community norms or children’s 
school rules. In doing so, the court creates a tool for abusers to use to 

ultraorthodox dress code in order to maintain stability for the child or because the court has 
ordered parents to follow school rules. Under a friendly religious co-parent model, the court 
would need to consider whether the mother’s dress is relevant to the child’s own religious 
practice and to consider that the abuser’s attempts to coerce the victim into dressing a cer-
tain way is anathema to the abuser supporting the children’s relationship with the mother’s 
own religious practice. 



23 | COLUMBIA SOCIAL WORK REVIEW, VOL. 18 

continue religious domestic violence—with court enforcement. To mitigate 
the religious domestic violence faced by Haredi domestic violence survivors 
in custody disputes, courts should consider religion not as a question of 
specific practices, but as a question of choice and development. Courts 
should find that it is in the best interest of a child to be placed with a parent 
who is open to accommodating the child’s own religious choices and to the 
child developing a relationship with the co-parent’s religion or lack thereof. 
By changing their consideration of religion in this way, courts can protect 
against custody orders being used to perpetuate religious domestic violence 
and cease to reward abusive religious behavior against Haredi or formerly 
Haredi victims of domestic violence.

 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

 

KAREN KADISH is a student at Columbia Law School and Columbia 
School of Social Work. At Columbia Law School, Karen has served as 
an editor of the Columbia Law Review and a member of the Adolescent 
Representation Clinic. Karen’s work is primarily in public defense, with a 
focus on preventing the separation of families by the foster system. Before 
coming to Columbia, Karen co-founded a program that provides access to 
community resources to low-income middle schools in San Jose, California. 
Karen is from Palo Alto, California, and holds a B.A. in International Studies 
and French Literature from Johns Hopkins University.

 
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