








































Governor Wolf’s First Year


COMMONWEALTH, Volume 18, Issue 2 (2016). © 2016 The Pennsylvania Political Science Association.  
ISSN 2469-7672 (online). http://dx.doi.org/10.15367/cjppp.v18i2.113. All rights reserved.

Governor Wolf’s First Year

A Comparative Analysis

PAULA A. DUDA HOLOVIAK
Kutztown University

THOMAS J. BALDINO
Wilkes University

Tom Wolf ’s first year as governor was dominated by the challenges of reaching 
a budget compromise with the Republican- dominated General Assembly. This 
article provides an overview of the difficulties and accomplishments of the first 
year of the Wolf administration. The article draws a historical comparison with 
seven other governors—Leader, Scranton, Shafer, Shapp, Thornburg, Rendell, 
and Corbett—four Republicans and three Democrats, and it concludes with 
some observations drawn from these previous governors’ experiences that may 
inform the Wolf administration as it navigates its remaining years.

By the end of 2015, approximately 30% of the public rated Governor 
Tom Wolf ’s performance either good or excellent. But should the 
public’s approval rating be the only assessment of the Wolf adminis-

tration’s first year in office? To evaluate his achievements, we need to assess 
objectively and carefully his accomplishments from both a legislative and 
managerial perspective and to compare them to his original list of first- year 
goals. Moreover, Governor Wolf ’s performance must be placed in a context 
that allows for comparison with previous governors, as it is important to 
understand the political, social, and economic environments in which a chief 
executive governs.



Governor Wolf’s First Year 33

According to Governor Wolf ’s official blog, his first- year’s theme was 
“jobs that pay, schools that teach and a government that works” (Nicastre 
2016). The governor’s office cites 27 specific accomplishments in his first year. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results by category. Most notably, Gover-
nor Wolf expanded Health Choices to provide 500,000 people with health 
insurance through Medicaid’s expansion. He initiated online voter registra-
tion resulting in 61,000 citizens either switching party or newly registering 
online. He allowed the phaseout of the 171- year- old Capital Stock and foreign 
Franchise Tax, which was implemented under Governor Tom Corbett, and 
he instituted a gift ban for all political appointees and state workers under his 
authority. He also created the Heroin Task Force to address the opioid addic-
tion crisis spreading across the state (Bonner 2016).

Yet by December 2015, only about 30% of Pennsylvanians rated his per-
formance as good or excellent, a rating comparable to those of Governors Ed 
Rendell and Tom Corbett at the conclusion of their first year in office (Nicas-
tre 2015; Giammarise 2016). (See Figure 1 for a comparison of four governors’ 
approval ratings.) Unfortunately for Governor Wolf, his first year accom-
plishments were overshadowed by failure to reach a budget agreement with 
the Republican- controlled General Assembly. Republicans believed that he 
had overused the media, because on many occasions, Wolf held press confer-
ences during which he criticized the Republican leadership. As Senate Major-
ity Leader Jake Corman (R) put it “his staff is still in campaign mode.” The 

Table 1. Governor Wolf’s First- Year Accomplishments

Innovation Online Plow Truck Tracking

Economy Elimination of Capital Stock Tax

Health Care Expansion of Medicaid

Infrastructure Bridge repairs

Transparency Ban on gifts for executive branch employees

Public Safety Heroin Task Force

Improved State Services Elimination of means test for SNAP

Environment Ban on drilling in state forests

Equality Easier access to contract bidding 

Education 76 Schools that Teach visits

Hunger/Homelessness Food Security Partnership

 www.governor.pa.gov/topic/year- review. in- Source: From 

Note: With the exception of the elimination of the Capital Stock Tax, all accomplishments were 
achieved through executive action only.



34 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

staff members referenced by Senator Corman were likely Wolf ’s chief- of-s taff, 
Katie McGinty, and his policy director, John Hangar. Republicans generally 
regarded both as excessively partisan, while many journalists and political 
analysts also noted their ideological passion rather than pragmatism as well 
as their propensity to draw attention to their personal actions rather than 
working quietly and anonymously behind the scenes.

In fact, the majority of Wolf ’s accomplishments involved executive and 
not legislative action (Giammarise 2016; Comisac and Zwick 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d).1

The struggle over the FY16 budget was intense and dramatic and will likely 
be long remembered as a test of political wills between a Republican Party 
holding significantly large majorities in both houses of the General Assembly 
and claiming an electoral mandate for its small government/no taxes agenda 
(but whose leadership was relatively inexperienced),2 and a novice politician 
in Governor Wolf, who also claimed a mandate because of his convincing 
victory over incumbent Governor Corbett. Both sides had reason to dig in 
their heels and test the mettle of the other, for to experience defeat in this 
first major confrontation could result in the losing side feeling marginalized 
and being viewed as weak by the press and the public. The resulting delayed 
budget was not a surprise. Research suggests that the factors most associated 
with late state budgets are divided government, a faltering economy, weak or 
no “shut- down” rules,3 and the governor’s request for higher taxes; all four 
factors were present in Wolf ’s first year (Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2010).4 

Figure 1. Comparison of Pennsylvania Governors’ Job Performance Ratings. (Berwood Yost, 
Franklin and Marshall College Poll, Center for Opinion Research, Floyd Institute for Public Policy, 
Franklin and Marshall College, 2016.)



Governor Wolf’s First Year 35

Governor Rendell experienced his own budget battle with the legislature 
during his first year, 2003. He sent a minimal, first- stage FY04 budget that 
required no new taxes to the Republican- controlled General Assembly in 
order to have a budget submitted on time. He expected that the legislature 
would not act on it until several weeks later when he submitted what was 
effectively a large, supplemental budget proposal that required higher taxes to 
support additional spending, largely for new education and economic devel-
opment programs. To his dismay, the General Assembly passed the frugal 
budget without even holding hearings, embarrassing the new governor. But 
Rendell learned a lesson, recovered, and worked with the legislature to pass 
most of his policy agenda, including tax increases over the next seven years 
(Giammarise 2016).

Compared to Rendell or to any other governor in modern times, Wolf ’s 
first budget proposal was extraordinarily ambitious. A former secretary of 
revenue under Rendell, Wolf sought a large increase in the state’s personal 
income tax, a significant broadening of the sales tax base, the closing of loop-
holes in the state’s business taxes, as well as a new tax on Marcellus Shale. He 
also proposed sweeping property tax relief.

For Wolf, negotiations began cordially with each side presenting its pri-
orities. Some areas for agreement and compromise appeared, particularly 
the desire to provide property tax relief. Important side issues such as priva-
tizing and/or modernizing the state liquor system, addressing the yawning 
unfunded liability in the state’s pension fund as well as reforming the pension 
system, imposing an extraction tax on Marcellus Shale gas, and increasing 
public school funding complicated the budget discussions. Both sides even-
tually agreed that a $1.2 billion budget deficit existed, but there were differ-
ences over how to eliminate the deficit. Republicans argued for more cuts 
in government spending, while Wolf and fellow Democrats in the General 
Assembly supported tax increases and additional state spending, especially to 
support public education. It is important to remember that state funding for 
public schools was the major issue that differentiated Governor Corbett and 
candidate Wolf in the 2014 campaign, with Wolf vowing to restore state school 
funding to the levels Governor Rendell had achieved at the end of his admin-
istration, albeit with the use of one- time federal stimulus aid. Wolf sought to 
add at least $1 billion more to the budget for education. When the budget talks 
stalled, with the threat of a government shutdown looming as the June 30 
deadline approached, Republicans passed their own budget, which, in a highly 
unusual action, Governor Wolf vetoed in its entirety. Republicans claimed to 
be shocked, even though he had indicated that he would veto a Republican 
budget (Scolforo 2015a).



36 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

The 2016 fiscal year began without a budget and talks continued intermit-
tently through the fall and into the winter behind closed doors. In February 
2016, the governor was forced to propose a budget for Fiscal 2017 without 
an enacted budget for Fiscal 2016, the first time such an event had occurred 
since Governor Milton Shapp was forced to do so in 1971. However, Shapp’s 
unfunded budget that year was the one that had been proposed by his pre-
decessor, Governor Shaefer. Wolf is thus the only governor since the 1968 
Constitution to have to propose a new budget with the enactment of his own 
current- year budget.

The governor, his staff, and surrogates criticized the Republicans publicly 
using rather caustic terms. Even more unusual, the governor’s political appa-
ratus began attacking Republican legislators in swing districts with direct 
mail to their constituents, infuriating the GOP caucuses. Republicans felt that 
Wolf ’s tactics violated tradition in Harrisburg and responded with attacks on 
the governor. By December 2015, however, a budget deal between Wolf and 
the Senate’s Republican leadership emerged, but when the House Republican 
leadership presented the budget to its caucus, the most conservative members 
killed the deal, because it would have required higher general fund taxes. Rec-
ognizing that if the budget and required tax legislation were brought to the 
House floor, they might pass with a combination of maverick Republicans and 
solid Democratic votes, Speaker Mike Turzai abruptly recognized a motion to 
adjourn. This time, it was Wolf who felt shocked (Scolforo 2015a).

Without a budget, nonessential state services and operations were halted, 
including funding for public schools. Many school districts were forced to 
borrow money, while others reduced activities. The public backlash against 
the General Assembly and the governor over their failure to deliver a bud-
get was vocal and harsh, but neither side appeared willing to concede. Pres-
sure from parents, school boards, and teachers’ unions moved a bipartisan 
majority of the legislature to pass a $30 billion, no frills budget, with no tax 
increases that became law without the governor’s signature on March 28, an 
embarrassing and unprecedented outcome.5 This made Wolf ’s budget late by 
272 days, the second latest in Pennsylvania since 1956 (Stafford, et al. 2012, 
table B1) and the second to last budget enacted in the nation in FY 2016.6 
Unfortunately, the budget simply delayed the impending deficit for fiscal year 
2017. Currently, Pennsylvania faces a roughly $2 billion deficit for the fiscal 
year ending in June 2017 (Kiefer 2016).

In addition to failing to enact a budget for nearly a year, the governor 
also was unsuccessful on other important issues. His goal of a severance tax 
on natural gas did not materialize; in fact, the 2016 budget contained no new 
taxes. The GOP- controlled General Assembly passed one of its priorities, a 



Governor Wolf’s First Year 37

pension reform bill, but Wolf vetoed it, drawing the ire of Republican leaders 
(Anderson 2015). While education funding did not increase, a revised school 
funding formula developed by a bipartisan legislative commission established 
in the last year of the Corbett administration and cochaired by Republican 
legislators, was passed.7

Beyond the struggle to achieve a budget, Governor Wolf also committed 
several missteps that contributed to his administration’s slow start and rocky 
relationship with Republicans in the legislature. The first was his firing of Eric 
Arneson, Governor Corbett’s appointee to lead the Office of Open Records, 
which administers the right to know law, as well as also recalling 28 nomina-
tions to boards, commissions, and judgeships announced by Corbett shortly 
before he left office (Worden 2015a). Arneson, a former spokesperson for the 
Senate Majority Caucus and a popular figure in the Capitol, was instrumental 
in the design and passage of the Open Records Act in 2008. Arneson sued, and 
his case was heard by the Commonwealth Court, which found for Arneson. 
Of the other 28 Corbett nominees, a compromise with the Republican leader-
ship was achieved and twelve of Corbett’s nominees were approved. However, 
on May 7, 2015, Senate Republicans refused to take action on Wolf ’s nominees 
(Levy 2015; Worden 2015b; Scolforo 2015b). Eventually, an accommodation 
was reached, and Wolf ’s nominees began to be processed and confirmed as of 
this writing as well as more than 30 state judges to fill vacancies.8

The second miscue was naming Marcus Brown to lead the State Police. 
Brown, a state police commander from Maryland, generated controversy 
when he wore the Pennsylvania State Police uniform despite not graduating 
from the state’s police academy and for pulling up lawn signs questioning 
his appointment. The state’s Troopers Association and Senate Republicans 
requested that Wolf withdraw the nominee, but Wolf refused. Then on June 
1, Wolf announced he would withdraw the nomination, but the Senate pro-
ceeded by a vote of 26 to 22 to reject the nominee. As an acting Police Com-
missioner, Wolf was not required to fire Brown, but he later moved Brown to 
the Department of Homeland Security and nominated Col. Tyree Blocker, a 
retired State Police Commander, for the Commissioner’s post (Couloumbus 
and Palmer 2015; Esack, 2015).

So given the political struggles and his unfinished agenda, how does the 
Wolf Administration stand up under historical scrutiny? While the consti-
tutional changes of 1968 altered the budgeting landscape, it is instructive to 
examine more closely several governors prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, viz. Governor George Leader (1955–1959) and Republican governors 
William Scranton (1963–1967) and Raymond Shafer (1967–1971), as well as 
Governors Shapp (1971–1979), Rendell (2003–2011), and Corbett (2011–2015). 



38 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

Leader was included because, like Wolf, he was a Democrat from York County 
who faced a Republican- dominated General Assembly. Scranton and Shafer’s 
administration operated under the pre- 1968 state Constitution, while Shapp 
was the first governor under the current Constitution. Rendell and Corbett, as 
his two immediate predecessors, set the stage for Wolf and, in Corbett’s case, 
dealt with the same political environment in the legislature.

George Leader came to power in an upset victory over the Republican 
lieutenant governor Lloyd H. Wood, winning 54% of the vote, the biggest 
Democratic sweep since 1857. Leader, however, faced deep economic and fis-
cal challenges. The unemployment rate in the state was the highest since the 
Great Depression at 8.8% (and as high as 15% in the coal and steel regions). 
He inherited a $58.2 million budget deficit from the Fine administration, and 
while the Democrats controlled the House during his first two years in office, 
the Republicans remained firmly in control of the Senate. Leader endured 
many epic budget battles during his four years in office. He first tried to 
balance the budget by enacting the highly unpopular personal income tax. 
The fight over the income tax proposal in his first budget went on for 17 
months. During this time, the press turned against the governor, claiming 
the tax would hurt the working class. Finally, in March 1956 a compromise 
was reached. The sales tax was raised to 3%, the corporate net income tax rose 
from 1% to 6%, and the gasoline tax rose one cent to six cents (Beers 1971; 
PHMC 2015).

Leader’s image was that of a progressive intellectual, a proponent of good 
government. He staffed his cabinet with college professors and policy wonks. 
He was a strong supporter of civil rights and the rights of the disabled. He 
angered his party by adding 10,000 civil service jobs to the state roster and 
weakening the patronage system. Among his accomplishments were the 
creation of the Department of Administration, the Pennsylvania Industrial 
Development Authority (PIDA), and reform of the state’s mental health hospi-
tal system. Although author Paul Beers dubs him “Mister Clean,” his admin-
istration was rife with scandal and he lost his bid for the U.S. Senate in 1958 
(Beers 1980).

Governor Scranton came to office after eight years of Democratic domi-
nance of the executive branch as well as much of Pennsylvania and national 
politics. He was adept at melding the image of traditional Republican values 
to a modestly liberal economic agenda. The Republicans retook control of 
both the Senate and House giving Governor Scranton a legislative advantage. 
Scranton wisely allowed the legislature to avoid the issue of a statewide income 
tax. In his first year in office, he increased state spending by 38% and capi-
tal debt by nearly a third, but managed to fund the increased spending with 



Governor Wolf’s First Year 39

politically palatable sales and business taxes, including taxes on liquor and 
cigarettes. With the extra millions, he increased school subsidies and teacher 
salaries, opened vocational technical schools and community colleges, and 
expanded the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority (PIDA). All of 
these legislative victories must be viewed in the light of single party govern-
ment and a very robust Pennsylvania economy. In fact, Pennsylvania gained 
528,000 jobs from 1963 to 1970, with an unemployment rate of 3.6% in 1966. 

Governor Raymond Shafer took office in 1967 with an unblemished polit-
ical career, victorious in elections for district attorney, state senator, lieutenant 
governor, and finally, governor. His last electoral success, however, proved to 
be a failure for the Commonwealth. When Shafer became governor, the state 
was running a $1-million-per-day deficit. Although Shafer had a majority in 
the General Assembly during his first two years in office, he failed to remedy 
the government’s fiscal ills by having a state income tax passed. According to 
statistics from the Pennsylvania Economy League, by 1969 Pennsylvania was 
running a $400 million deficit and was $242 million in debt. Shafer’s experi-
ence mirrors that of the current governor. Shafer was unable to pass a budget 
for 16 months (248 days, second longest after Governor Leader’s first budget), 
and he was unable to convince the General Assembly to increase taxes to close 
the state’s budget deficit. The legislature refused to confirm Shafer’s appoint-
ments. Many blamed his inability to compromise or engage in legislative horse 
trading. But Shafer was unfailingly moderate in his politics, continuing and 
enlarging the Scranton legacy in education, welfare, and conservation. Many, 
however, viewed his administration as a failure, leaving the Commonwealth 
on the brink of bankruptcy. Though Shafer was the major force behind the 
Constitutional Convention of 1968, he wisely chose to have no role at the 
convention (Beers 1980; PHMC 2015).

Following the 1968 constitutional reforms, Milton Shapp became the first 
two-te rm governor in Pennsylvania’s history. An idealist with no elective 
office experience, he was a self- made millionaire. Unfortunately, his admin-
istration, particularly in its second term, was riddled with corruption. Despite 
his tireless efforts in 1972 following the flooding caused by Hurricane Agnes, 
and his ability to handle the financial woes of the Commonwealth, he was 
perceived as an outsider and was highly unpopular within his own party by 
the end of his second term. Nevertheless, he had notable legislative successes, 
including enactment of the first personal income tax; the establishment of a 
state lottery to fund free public transportation for senior citizens and property 
tax relief for low- income seniors; no-f ault auto insurance; strong consumer 
protection laws; legislation to protect the rights of the mentally ill; the estab-
lishment of the “Clean and Green” program to preserve agricultural farmland; 



40 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

and an environmental amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. These 
were all ranked among the most important laws of the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly under the 1968 Constitution in a 2010 Temple survey of current and 
former legislators, political scientists, and journalists. Indeed, the personal 
income tax was ranked the single most important law of the modern era in the 
Temple survey (The Temple Papers on the Pennsylvania General Assembly, 
Volume II). On the other hand, Shapp failed to achieve property tax reform, 
privatize liquor stores, or establish a free Pennsylvania Turnpike.

In 1970 the Democrats attained majorities in both houses of the General 
Assembly, which allowed Shapp to quickly push through his preferred pro-
gressive income tax early; however, it was overturned by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court as a violation of the “uniformity clause” of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution. As noted above, Shapp and the Democratic legislature then 
enacted the flat tax that is still the Commonwealth’s most important revenue 
producer. Pennsylvania was the 43rd state to adopt an income tax. Shapp used 
the veto liberally, but he was also overridden 15 times. Governor Shapp’s bat-
tles with the legislature on everything from abortion restrictions to the death 
penalty continued to the end of his second term (Beers 1980; PHMC 2015). 

Moving to the twenty-f irst century and our two most recent governors, 
we find that the issues remain much the same, but the political arena has 
been forever changed because of the 24/7 news cycle, easier access to pre-
viously unavailable government information, passage of the Open Records 
Act, emergence of social media as a political force, and the increasingly divi-
sive and polarized politics on both left and right. Reforming property taxes, 
achieving equitable funding for basic and higher education, reforming the 
criminal justice system, and protecting the environment persist on Pennsyl-
vania’s twenty- first-c entury political agenda. In the past, governors were bet-
ter able to control the distribution of their messages, as the number of news 
sources that covered Harrisburg were relatively few, while today any person 
or group can gather information and post it online at any time. The rise of 
the Tea Party in Pennsylvania, changing political alignments in Philadelphia’s 
suburban counties, and the rightward drift of previously Democratic counties 
in Southwestern Pennsylvania led to an east/west, conservative/liberal divide.

Governor Ed Rendell faced many of the same problems as his twentieth- 
century predecessors. Confronting a General Assembly in Republican hands, 
his first budget was completed six months late, with the enactment of school 
funding and a personal income tax increase making Pennsylvania the last 
state in the nation to finish its budget. (See discussion of Rendell’s 2003 budget 
above.) In fact, Rendell never managed to complete a budget on time; the 2009 
budget was also the last in the nation to be passed. However, when the ink 



Governor Wolf’s First Year 41

dried on a giant supplemental appropriation that completed the first Rendell 
budget, it included $1 billion in new revenues and a 10% increase in the state 
income tax. Rendell used administrative cuts to create $1.75 billion in savings, 
which he used to increase funding for the state’s public schools. Rendell was 
legendary for his larger than life personality, his willingness to speak frankly 
with the media on nearly any topic, and his ability to wheel and deal with 
the legislature. In the end, despite many political differences with the Gen-
eral Assembly, his accomplishments included eliminating or cutting property 
taxes for the Commonwealth’s senior citizens, bringing casino gambling to 
the state, increasing education funds, particularly for preschool education, 
and bringing Sunday liquor sales to the state store system. 

Despite his many noteworthy successes, however, he failed on several 
major issues that remain unresolved today. He could not expand the sales 
tax, privatize the Pennsylvania Turnpike to raise additional revenue, nor con-
solidate Pennsylvania’s 501 school districts to 100 districts. Perhaps Rendell’s 
most troubling failure was his unwillingness to seek a severance tax on Mar-
cellus Shale gas shortly after the rapid expansion of drilling and production 
from the new wells (PennLive Editorial Board 2015). 

Governor Tom Corbett was elected to office with a reputation as a strong 
state prosecutor and corruption fighter. As Pennsylvania’s attorney gen-
eral, he empaneled a grand jury that indicted legislators of both parties and 
issued a strident—and many thought gratuitous—report blasting the General 
Assembly’s culture and operations. He thus began his term as governor with 
a legislature that, although controlled by his party, regarded him as hostile 
to the institution. His relationships with legislators of both parties remained 
strained throughout his term. He departed office as Pennsylvania’s first gov-
ernor to lose reelection since the 1968 constitutional reforms that allowed 
the state’s governor to serve two terms. He campaigned as a pro business fis-
cal conservative and made the “no new taxes” pledge championed by Grover 
Norquist’s organization, Americans for Tax Reform.

Corbett’s legacy is mixed at best. While he did cut state taxes, he also 
reduced funding for public education and social services in order to balance 
the budget, though in his last year, he did substantially increase the state’s 
subsidy to basic education.9 In the end, he increased a variety of state fees and 
raised the state’s excise tax on auto fuels to fund a $2 billion transportation 
program designed to repair the state’s deteriorating roads and bridges. He also 
accepted the federal offer to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, 
although only after obtaining a waiver that critics said left millions of federal 
dollars on the table and provided far less coverage for poor and working-
class families. Achieving four of his major objectives—pension reform, liquor 



42 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

privatization, property tax elimination or reform, and the sale of the state’s 
lottery system to raise several billion dollars in new revenue—proved elusive, 
however, perhaps because of his reserved character and inability to communi-
cate effectively with the public, at least in the opinion of many Republican leg-
islators. During his administration the state’s credit rating was downgraded 
four times (PennLive Editorial Board 2015).

So what conclusions can we draw from an examination of the accomplish-
ments and failures of the Commonwealth’s governors since the 1950s? The 
following are a few conclusions and observations:

• It does not necessarily appear to be an advantage to present oneself 
as a political outsider. Additionally a successfully business career 
does not appear to translate into a successful political career.

• A working relationship with the General Assembly is critical. Com-
promise is essential, as is a willingness to listen to and accept as 
legitimate the concerns of the legislature’s members. Of course, this 
assumes that members of the General Assembly are willing and able 
to compromise. Knowing when to “hold ’em and fold ’em” is key, 
and having something to trade is even more important.

• Social media’s influence must be considered at every turn. It can 
make or break a governor, and like the forces of nature, it cannot 
be controlled. Every legislative office can be its own public relations 
operation, which makes it very difficult for the governor to con-
trol the message that the public and the traditional media outlets 
receive.

• Government corruption is corrosive and will quickly diminish the 
legitimacy of a governor’s administration and undermine its cred-
ibility with the public.

• While political division is nothing new to Pennsylvania politics, 
the intense polarization confronting the Wolf Administration has 
taken division to a new level. The transformation of the General 
Assembly’s membership since the pay raise vote and the Bonusgate 
scandal of 2006–2007 has dramatically increased the difficulty of 
finding common ground with the legislature.

It should be noted that if a major disaster or tragedy occurs during the 
first few years in office, and if the response to the disaster is handled prop-
erly, a governor may benefit. For example, after just eight months in office, 
Governor Scranton faced a national tragedy and political upheaval with the 
assassination of President Kennedy. Governor Shapp dealt with Hurricane 



Governor Wolf’s First Year 43

Agnes and the total devastation along the Susquehanna River, including the 
flooding of the Governor’s Mansion. Governor Thornburgh experienced the 
nation’s first nuclear disaster at Three Mile Island in 1979. And of course, 
Governor Ridge had to respond to the devastation and the public’s fear fol-
lowing the 9/11 attacks, which included the downing of Flight 93 in Somerset 
County, Pennsylvania. 

During emergencies, the public turns to the governor for leadership and 
will rally behind a governor who demonstrates competence, composure, and 
decisiveness. This improves the governor’s chances of winning a second term. 
However, any natural disaster or emergency disrupts the normal flow of busi-
ness in the Capital and possibly across the entire state, causing a governor to 
delay or entirely eliminate one or more major items from the governor’s policy 
agenda. Few governors would wish for such catastrophes to occur on their 
watch. To date, while Governor Wolf has experienced political challenges, 
most particularly from the Tea Party wing of the Republican- controlled leg-
islature, he has yet to face a significant disaster, tragedy, or even severe eco-
nomic downturn, though a winter snowstorm that stranded motorists on the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike did prove embarrassing.

Governor Wolf’s legacy thus far is mixed. Unless he can resolve some of the 
unfinished business of the Corbett administration, namely pension reform, 
property tax reform, closing the budget deficit, and education funding reform, 
future generations may evaluate the Wolf Administration as less than success-
ful. Political corruption and much-needed campaign finance reform continue 
to dog the system generally as does a largely ineffective legislative branch.

NOTES

1. In fairness, President Obama also has been criticized for attempting to govern by 
executive action, given his difficulties in persuading a Republican Congress to move on 
his legislative agenda, a reflection of the polarized state of American politics.

2. New to their roles were Senate Majority Leader Jake Corman, Whip John Gordner, 
Appropriations Chair Pat Browne, and House Speaker Mike Turzai, Majority Leader Dave 
Reed, and Whip Bryan Cutler.

3. Pennsylvania’s “shut-d own” rules, bringing vital spending to a halt without enacted 
appropriations, were greatly weakened by the 2009 Supreme Court decision, Council 13, 
Ex Rel. Fillman v. Rendell 986 A. 2d 63 (2009), which effectively relieved pressure on the 
governor and legislature to agree on a budget by continuing to fund most state programs.

4. For a fuller overview of the struggle to achieve a state budget, see Comisac and 
Zwick 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, and 2016d.

5. According to the Pennsylvania Policy Database, only four bills since 1979 have 
become law without the governor’s signature, none having the significance of the general 
appropriations act. Such rare actions sometimes reflect a governor’s judgment that a veto 
would be overridden.



44 PAulA A. DuDA HOlOvIAk AND THOmAs J. BAlDINO

6. Only Pennsylvania under Governor Wolf and Illinois under Governor Bruce 
Rauner lacked an FY 2016 state budget in the spring of 2016. Wolf and Rauner were both 
business executives new to elective office, who faced legislatures controlled by the oppo-
sition party. Although most state programs were operating, Rauner’s budget was still 
incomplete at year’s end.

7. The new school funding formula was widely praised by school officials and educa-
tion advocates. The Wolf administration and the advocates lost an effort to delay its imple-
mentation until after the Corbett administration’s school spending cuts were restored. The 
new formula will incrementally increase funding each year, leaving in place large inequi-
ties in the distribution of school resources in Pennsylvania accumulated over many years.

8. An anonymous source within the Wolf administration provided information about 
the agreement between Wolf and Senate Republicans.

9. Governor Corbett argued that his last budget did increase state support for basic 
education to record levels, because he used state money rather than the federal stimulus 
funds as Rendell had. The stimulus money eventually ended, leaving the public schools 
short of money.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Christian. 2015. “Gov. Wolf Says He’ll Veto GOP Pension Bill.” PennLive, July 
9. Available at www.pennlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/gov_wolf_says_hell_veto_
gop_pe.html. Accessed August 1, 2016.

Associated Press. December 25, 2014. Available at www.pennlive.com/politics/index 
.ssf/2014/12/what_will_history_say_of_gov_t.html. Accessed August 1, 2016.

Beers, Paul. 1971. The Republican Years: The Scranton- Shafer Era of Change and Contro-
versy from 1963 through 1970. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books.

———. 1980. Pennsylvania Politics Today and Yesterday: The Tolerable Accommodation. 
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———. 2016c. “Capitolwire: Wolf Year- One Review, Part 3—“Too Many Cooks In the 
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———. 2016d. “Capitolwire: Wolf Year- One Review, Part 4—The Ill- fated Compromise, a 
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Governor Wolf’s First Year 45

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Paula A. Duda Holoviak, PhD, is a professor in the Department of Political Science and 
Public Administration at Kutztown University and the program coordinator for the mas-
ter of public administration degree. Her research interests include state and local govern-
ment with an emphasis on issues in rural Pennsylvania. She is currently completing a 
book on Pennsylvania politics with coauthor Thomas J. Baldino.

Thomas J. Baldino, PhD, is a professor of political science at Wilkes University. He and 
coauthor Kyle L. Kreider of Wilkes University have published three books on voting and 
elections, the most recent of which is an edited volume, Minority Voting in the United 
States. His current book project, with Paula A. Duda Holoviak, concerns Pennsylvania 
government and politics.

       

http://www.governor.pa.gov/blog-looking-back-on-governor-wolfs-first-year/
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http://www.phmc.state.pa/us/bah/dam
http://www.phmc.state.pa/us/bah/dam



