








































Sometimes It Does Matter


COMMONWEALTH, Volume 18, Issue 2 (2016). © 2016 The Pennsylvania Political Science Association.  
ISSN 2469-7672 (online). http://dx.doi.org/10.15367/cjppp.v18i2.118. All rights reserved.

Sometimes It Does Matter

The 2016 Presidential Primary Election  

in Pennsylvania

JOHN J. KENNEDY
West Chester University

Since the first presidential primary was held in Pennsylvania in the spring of 
1912, rarely has the state truly impacted the race. A combination of forces, nota-
bly the rather late date that it has traditionally been scheduled relative to other 
states has all but guaranteed that the presumptive nominees of the Democratic 
and Republican Parties have long ago been selected. As long as this remains the 
case, it’s difficult to imagine the state’s voters ever being able to winnow a field 
of candidates, no matter how large or small it is. However, on rare occasions, the 
lateness of the Pennsylvania’s primary election allows the state’s voters to be one, 
if not the deciding force on who lays final claim to the nomination. Such was the 
case on April 24, 2016, when Pennsylvanians essentially settled the contest on 
both sides, elevating Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump toward their ultimate 
nominations.

ennsylvania’s position in the presidential selection process has been 
a source of consternation for many observers for decades, and why 
shouldn’t it be? The nation’s fifth largest state, one that is still consid-

ered a battleground politically, has been forced to the sidelines while prima-
ries and caucuses in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina’s grab most 
of the attention, not to mention the financial benefits accorded to states that 
hold their primaries early in the season. In recent years, this situation has 

P



Sometimes It Does Matter 47

become more pronounced as an increasing number of states have moved their 
presidential primaries or caucuses to an earlier date on the election calen-
dar, a situation referred to as front- loading (Brewer and Maisel 2016). In fact, 
by 2008, this process had accelerated to the extent that half the states held 
their contests prior to February 5, supplanting the old Super Tuesday in early 
March (Flanigan and Zingale 2014).

However, while there are times that these early states may effectively win-
now the field, they have nevertheless failed to produce a decisive victor. That 
task is then left to the states that follow in the election calendar, one of which 
is Pennsylvania. Such was the case in 2016, when Pennsylvania assumed a 
greater role in the candidate selection process for the two major parties than 
ever in the history of presidential primary elections.

Heading into the April 26 showdown, both of the Democratic and Repub-
lican Party front- runners, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and busi-
nessman Donald Trump, were coming off resounding victories the previous 
week in the New York primary. This appeared to have reversed the losses 
each had suffered the previous weeks, with Vermont senator Bernie Sanders 
winning seven straight primaries or caucuses and Texas senator Ted Cruz 
trouncing Trump in the Wisconsin primary. However, questions remained 
for both since the Empire State was the adopted home for Clinton and the 
life-l ong home for Trump, whose profile in that state looms so large that one 
of New York City’s most famous buildings, Trump Tower, just happens to be 
named in his honor.

Campaigning

Without the home field advantage, all four of these campaigns, along with 
that of Ohio governor John Kasich, who was still competing on the GOP side, 
descended on Pennsylvania. Although there were four other primaries held 
on April 26, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and Rhode Island, the Key-
stone State was unquestionably the biggest prize. Dubbed the “Acela Primary” 
because these five states are linked by Amtrak’s fastest carrier, the number of 
delegates selected in Pennsylvania by both the two parties (281) was only a 
little less than that of the other four combined (355).

For the Democrats, despite his string of recent victories, Sanders remained 
a long shot to grab the nomination. He was within striking distance of Clinton 
among pledged delegates, trailing 1,444 to 1,245, but trailed 502 to 38 among 
unpledged party leaders known as superdelegates, which meant that he was 
now clearly a long shot to amass the 2,382 delegates required to secure the 
Democratic Party nomination. Overall, Clinton had won 21 primaries and 



48 John J. Kennedy

caucuses while Sanders prevailed in 19 prior to Pennsylvania (Couloumbis 
2016a).

On the Republican side, Donald Trump had astounded everyone with his 
success, initially grabbing the lead in public opinion polls during the previ-
ous summer, later surviving a series of debates that drew record television 
audiences, and finally translating that into victory after victory on the GOP 
side. Along the way he was able to marginalize and even humiliate some of 
his political rivals who originally comprised the 17-candidate field, the largest 
ever in modern presidential politics. After rebounding in New York after the 
rocky patch in Wisconsin, April 26 stood as perhaps the last chance for Cruz, 
Kasich, or those within the party who were prepared to support anyone to 
derail his bid. Heading into the “Acela Primary,” Trump had amassed 847 of 
the 1,237 delegates needed to win, while Cruz followed with 560 delegates and 
Kasich just 149. The breakdown of primary, caucus, and convention victories 
at this point was 23 for Trump, 13 for Cruz, and only one, his home state of 
Ohio for Kasich. Senator Marco Rubio, who suspended his campaign follow-
ing his defeat in the March 15 Florida primary, also won two (Couloumbis 
2016b).

In the immediate run up to primary day, Senator Sanders was the first to 
arrive in the state on Tuesday evening attracting a crowd estimated at over 
6,000 supporters at Pennsylvania State University (Table 1). That Sanders 
chose to spend this night in State College, which was also the evening of the 
New York Primary, underscores both the importance he placed upon Pennsyl-
vania for his campaign and what he correctly perceived to be his prospects in 
New York. The same could be said for Senator Cruz, who spent the afternoon 
at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia before a considerably 
smaller crowd of about 100 (Couloumbis 2016a).

Over the course of the week, the five candidates made 24 appearances 
across the Commonwealth. Crowds ranged in size from a few dozen at a diner 
in Philadelphia in which John Kasich made the rounds to approximately 8,500 
at a Sanders rally in Pittsburgh. Prominent surrogates also made a number of 
appearances across the state. Clinton’s campaign used these supporters more 
extensively. Her allies included her husband, President Bill Clinton, New 
Jersey senator Cory Booker, former Arizona congresswoman Gabrielle Gif-
fords, and various state officials from Pennsylvania including Senator Robert 
Casey. Meanwhile, Vermont Ice Cream moguls Ben and Jerry and actresses 
Susan Sarandon and Rosario Dawson stumped for Sanders. Dawson created 
a stir when she raised the name of Monica Lewinsky as someone who has also 
been a victim of bullying by the Clintons. Lewinsky, of course, had an alleged 
affair with the former president while an intern in the White House. Also, an 



Sometimes It Does Matter 49

Table 1. democratic Party Candidate Campaign Appearances, April 19–26, 2016

date Candidates Site City

Tuesday, April 19 Bernie Sanders Pennsylvania State University State College

Ted Cruz National Constitution Center Philadelphia

Wednesday, April 20 Hillary Clinton St. Paul’s Baptist Church Philadelphia

The Fillmore Philadelphia

Ted Cruz Antique Automobile Club Hershey

Thursday, April 21 Bernie Sanders Scranton Cultural Center (a) Scranton

Santander Performing Arts 
Center

Reading

Philadelphia Expo Center Oaks

Donald Trump Farm Show Complex (b) Harrisburg

John Kasich Penn State- Brandywine (c) Media

Friday, April 22 Hillary Clinton Curds and Whey Jenkintown

Bernie Sanders Sharon Baptist Center Philadelphia

Gettysburg College Gettysburg

Ted Cruz Lackawanna Station Hotel (d) Scranton

Saturday, April 23 Ted Cruz Gateway High School (e) Monroeville

Sunday, April 24 Hillary Clinton Triumph Baptist Church Philadelphia

African Episcopal Church of  
St. Thomas

Philadelphia

Monday, April 25 Hillary Clinton Philadelphia City Hall Philadelphia

Bernie Sanders David Lawrence Convention 
Center (f)

Pittsburgh

National Constitution Center Philadelphia

Drexel University Philadelphia

Donald Trump West Chester University West Chester

John Kasich Penrose Diner Philadelphia

Tuesday, April 26 Hillary Clinton Pennsylvania Convention 
Center

Philadelphia

Sources: Philadelphia Inquirer, except as otherwise noted: (a) from times- tribune.com, (b) from mccall.
com, (c) from centredaily.com, (d) from timesleader.com, (e) from wtae.com, (f) from wpxi.com.

endorsement for Sanders from former congressman and Philadelphia mayor 
Bill Green attracted attention. 

The Republican candidates did not use surrogates as extensively, though 
for Trump it probably wasn’t as necessary, as he commanded so much atten-
tion through his own media pronouncements. It was perhaps telling that only 
Hillary Clinton decided that it was in her interest to spend election night in 



50 John J. Kennedy

Philadelphia. The other winner, Donald Trump had already decamped back 
home to Trump Tower in New York where he claimed victory later that night.

The Vote

After the votes were counted, Pennsylvania had delivered a resounding vic-
tory for both Clinton and Trump in their respective primaries. Additionally, 
Clinton won three of the four other states contested on April 26, only losing 
to Sanders in Rhode Island. For Sanders, it made the nomination fight even 
more of an uphill battle, though he would soldier on, hoping that something 
(perhaps a Clinton indictment) could derail her campaign enough to give him 
an opening with the unpledged delegates. For the GOP, however, the race was 
now essentially over. Senator Cruz would make one last-ditch attempt to stop 
Trump, but the momentum that the businessman now possessed propelled 
him to another big victory the following week in Indiana. Following that 
result, Cruz announced that he had suspended his campaign. The following 
day, Governor Kasich followed suit.

On the Democratic Party side, Clinton amassed a plurality of just over 
203,000 votes on her way to securing almost 56% of the vote overall, a 12- point 
victory over her rival (Table 2). She benefited enormously by running up both 

Table 2. democratic and Republican Vote for President in Pennsylvania Primary  
by Region, 2016

Democrats

Clinton Percentage Sanders Percentage Totals

Southeast 420,838 61% 274,675 39% 695,513

Southwest 207,217 56% 163,773 44% 370,990

Northeast 93,649 53% 81,631 47% 175,280

Central “T” 213,403 50% 211,802 50% 425,205

Totals 935,107 56% 731,881 44% 1,666,988

Republicans

Trump Percentage Cruz Percentage Kasich Percentage Totals

Southeast 207,660 53% 75,367 19% 108,787 28% 391,814

Southwest 167,242 58% 60,254 21% 62,090 21% 289,586

Northeast 100,472 67% 28,025 19% 20,880 14% 149,377

Central “T” 427,219 59% 181,860 25% 118,246 16% 727,325

Totals 902,593 57% 345,506 22% 310,003 19% 1,558,102

Source: Raw data were provided by the Pennsylvania Department of State. Regional numbers are based on the 
author’s categorizations. Data are rounded to the nearest whole number.



Sometimes It Does Matter 51

the largest plurality of votes in Philadelphia (89,606) and the largest percent-
age (63%). Combined with its four surrounding suburbs, Clinton collected 
over 146,000 more votes than Sanders and 60% overall in the Philadelphia 
suburbs. Her plurality in this region also accounted for roughly three- quarters 
of her overall statewide victory.1

Heading north, the former Secretary of State also carried both the Lehigh 
Valley (though she narrowly lost Carbon County) and the Scranton- Wilkes 
Barre area, described below as the Northeast. Clinton also dominated the 
southwest, sweeping the nine counties in this traditionally Democratic 
stronghold. Nevertheless, the share of counties carried by the two candidates 
was closer than these overall numbers would indicate, with Clinton winning 
37 counties and Sanders 30. The problem for Sanders was that his support 
tended to be isolated in less populated areas. For example, with 58% of the 
vote, Sanders achieved his largest share in Columbia County, but that netted 
him only 1,097 more votes toward his total. Of the 10 most populous counties 
in the state, Sanders carried just two, Lancaster and Berks (sixth and ninth, 
respectively). In fact, those are the only two counties within the top twenty 
most populous in the state that he was able to win.

Similarly, Sanders’ support was largely isolated in Pennsylvania’s Central 
“T” region, which he narrowly lost by less than 2,000 votes (Figure 1). Simi-
larly, the Vermont senator captured 14 of the top 20 counties in which Repub-
licans have the largest share of registered voters. Many of these counties also 
are more sparsely populated so claiming victory in one might not net many 

Figure 1. Democratic Party Vote for President by County, 2016. (Pennsylvania Department of State.)



52 John J. Kennedy

more votes. Of course, the fact that a candidate has won a particular county 
may not mean much beyond that fact, an example being Clinton’s one vote 
victory in two counties, Bedford and Fulton.

On the Republican side, the magnitude of Donald Trump’s victory in what 
was at the time still a competitive race for his party’s nomination highlights 
why both of his remaining competitors were on the verge of abandoning their 
bids. He dominated each of the state’s geographic regions, scoring a majority 
in each, with a high of 67% in the Northeast. Trump registered over 70% of 
the vote in six counties, including a high of 77% in Luzerne, and over 60% in 
30 additional ones. His competitors kept him below 50% in only four of the 
state’s 67 counties (Centre, Chester, Lancaster, and Montgomery). In fact, the 
44% that Trump received in culturally conservative Lancaster County was 
his lowest overall in the state. The race for second really didn’t matter at this 
point, though for the record Ted Cruz managed 22% to John Kasich’s 19%. 
The former’s strongest showing was in Lancaster County (32%), while 31% in 
Chester County marked a high for the latter.2

Behind Donald Trump’s total sweep of Pennsylvania’s counties, the victo-
ries that both he and Clinton registered over their rivals were otherwise quite 
similar, with the Republican receiving 57% of the vote compared to 56% for 
the Democrat. In raw numbers, Clinton narrowly outpolled Trump by slightly 
under 33,000 votes, which is almost exactly 1% of the 3.2 million votes cast 
combined between the two parties.

The Delegate Battle

In the week prior to primary day there was as much discussion of the way in 
which delegates to the national committee were allocated than actual policy 
issues. In fact, on the GOP side, the delegates, in essence became political 
candidates themselves, holding events, appearing in various news outlets, 
and expending resources in order to generate support for their candidacy. 
To some degree, the contests between these delegates for a coveted spot at the 
national convention competed with the attention afforded the actual presi-
dential contenders.

While the method by which Democrats select their delegates is certainly 
not without its critics, the process on the Republican side is at least more com-
plicated and perhaps more controversial. A product of the State Republican 
Party in Pennsylvania, it has been in existence for decades. Overall, Penn-
sylvania had 71 delegates slated to attend the Republican National Conven-
tion in Cleveland, Ohio. Of those, 17 are selected in a traditional manner 
that many states use, being allocated automatically to the candidate that wins 



Sometimes It Does Matter 53

statewide. These delegates include 14 who are later selected by the Republican 
State Committee and, along with three National Committee members, are 
bound on the first ballot to vote for top vote getter.

What generated all of the attention, however, was the process in how the 
remaining 54 delegates, all unbound, are determined. These 54 delegates 
comprise the largest collection of uncommitted delegates nationally and adds 
an additional layer of politicking. Not just a campaign among the three can-
didates who remained, it also became a contest for the 162 individuals who 
ran for these 54 slots across the state. To make the ballot, all that was required 
was to post 250 signatures. Newspapers, talk- radio hosts, and even national 
cable stations all began identifying who these individuals were in an attempt 
to ascertain who they were supporting. One journalist even personally inter-
viewed 65 of them to find out where they stood (Smith 2016).

Losing some delegate battles to Cruz in the weeks leading up to Pennsyl-
vania only fed into Trump’s claim that the system was “rigged” or “crooked” 
and ultimately played so well into his campaign narrative that it undoubtedly 
contributed to his overwhelming victory. Because of the size of his victory, 
controversy surrounding the delegate selection system was ultimately moot, 
as the New Yorker walked away with 42 of 54 available. Of those, 31 were 
individuals who had declared themselves as Trump supporters prior to the 
primary and an additional 11 who had professed support to the winner of 
their congressional district. Ted Cruz received only 4, while 3 others were 
pledged to the most electable candidate, which was perceived by most as a vote 
for Kasich (Greenpaper.com 2016). At the time this manuscript was submit-
ted, the final five unbound delegates remained uncommitted.

The foremost criticism of the manner in which the Democratic Party 
selects its delegates centers on its unpledged delegates. These superdelegates 
were established in 1982 by the Hunt Commission in an attempt to give party 
leaders a greater say in the selection of their party’s nominee. This came 
after the insurgent candidacies of George McGovern and Jimmy Carter had 
grabbed the party nomination in previous cycles. However, criticism of this is 
leveled at the national party and not at the state Democratic Party, since that 
is where these rules are made. The Democrats send 210 delegates overall to the 
national convention, a figure divided between those categorized as pledged 
and unpledged. Within the pledged category, 189 are allocated to candidates 
based upon the primary returns. Of those, 127 are determined by the propor-
tional vote that each candidate receives in each of the state’s 18 congressio-
nal districts. The 62 pledged delegates that remain are distributed according 
to each candidate’s statewide percentage of the vote. Additionally, there is a 
15% mandatory threshold required of the candidate to receive delegates based 



54 John J. Kennedy

upon those allocated at either the congressional district or statewide level 
(Pennsylvania Democratic Party 2016).

Of those considered part of the unpledged group, 13 are members of the 
Democratic National Committee, while the 6 members of the state’s congres-
sional delegation (1 senator and 5 House members), and the governor, Tom 
Wolf, are designated automatically. Former governor Ed Rendell, chosen as 
the one distinguished party leader rounded out the list of superdelegates 
(Pennsylvania Democratic Party 2016).

Voter Turnout

Other than the size of the victory for the two front- runners, perhaps the big-
gest story of the 2016 presidential primary in Pennsylvania was the dramatic 
difference in turnout recorded between the two parties. As Table 3 indicates, 
51% of Republican Party voters cast their ballot on April 24, the majority of 
whom voted for Donald Trump. In contrast, only 41% of Democrats felt that 
it was worth their effort to cast a ballot for either Hillary Clinton or Bernie 
Sanders. This suggests a large enthusiasm gap between how each of the party’s 
rank and file voters views their candidates, which should be of particular 
concern for Democrats heading into the fall.

Additionally, turnout on the Democratic Party side was largely driven 
by just a few counties, particularly those located in the southeast part of the 
state. Had it not been for these voters, turnout for the Democrats would have 
been nothing short of abysmal, especially in comparison to the GOP turnout. 
While turnout in the southeast was still relatively low at 45% , four points 
less than that on the Republican side, the gap was much smaller than in the 
other regions, where it reached double digits in each. Republican voters were 

Table 3. democratic and Republican Party Turnout for Pennsylvania Primary, 2016

democrats Votes Percentage Republicans Votes Percentage

Southeast 1,558,077 698,831 45% 824,089 402,213 49%

Southwest 908,934 375,364 41% 573,491 294,142 51%

Northeast 466,792 176,920 38% 303,914 151,791 50%

Central “T” 1,122,147 430,312 38% 1,420,625 746,329 53%

Totals 4,055,950 1,681,427 41% 3,122,119 1,594,475 51%

Source: Raw data were provided by the Pennsylvania Department of State. Regional numbers are based on 
the author’s categorizations. Data are rounded to the nearest whole number. 



Sometimes It Does Matter 55

particularly motivated in the Central “T,” where turnout reached 53%, a stag-
gering 15 points higher than Democratic turnout in this 47 county area.3

Additionally, in only 12 of the state’s 67 counties did the Democrats reg-
ister turnout higher than their overall 41% average. This includes those five 
counties in the southeast, along with the Democratic strongholds of Alle-
gheny and Lackawanna Counties. Centre County, where the Democrats hold 
a modest edge, also was above the average. The remaining counties on this 
list are all located along the Susquehanna River (Wyoming, Union, Perry, 
and Cumberland) and are also all staunchly Republican. Conversely, in 49 
counties, turnout was below the overall 41% average, while in 7 others, it was 
the exact average. Overall, turnout among Democrats across the state ranged 
from a high of 50% in Montgomery County to a low of only 29% in Fulton and 
Jefferson Counties (Figure 2).

In comparison, voter turnout on the GOP side, generated primarily by 
Donald Trump, was nothing less than remarkable. At 51%, not only was it 
more than half of registered Republicans statewide, it was also more consis-
tently distributed across the entire Commonwealth. Turnout on the Republi-
can side was above the statewide average in 40 of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties 
and even with the statewide average in another 9 counties. Therefore, in only 
18 counties was it behind the overall average. The highest turnout on the GOP 

Figure 2. Democratic Party Turnout by County, 2016. (Pennsylvania Department of State.)



56 John J. Kennedy

Figure 3. Republican Party Turnout by County, 2016. (Pennsylvania Department of State.)

side was recorded in Wyoming County, located in the far Northeastern part of 
the state, where an astonishing 62% of registered Republicans turned out in a 
primary election. The lowest turnout figure was in Philadelphia, where only 
37% of Republican voted (Figure 3).

Philadelphia was also the only county in the state in which Democratic 
Party turnout eclipsed that of the GOP (44% to 37%). In fact, the Democrats 
in only 10 other counties stayed within single digits of their rivals, and again 
four of those were the suburban Philadelphia counties.

Historical Perspective

Examining Pennsylvania’s 2016 primary turnout from a historical perspec-
tive is also informative. Table 4 lists the Voting Age Population (VAP) turnout 
for the Pennsylvania primary since its inception in 1912. The 31.6% turnout 
in 2016 marks the fourth highest level of turnout in the state’s primary his-
tory, trailing only the 1912, 1980, and 2008 contests. Those are also the only 
four years in which turnout surpassed the 30% mark, and not surprisingly 
these are also the four more contested presidential races in the state’s primary 
history. 



Sometimes It Does Matter 57

Below, Figure 4 illustrates the fluctuation in the VAP that has occurred 
over time.

The first Pennsylvania primary election took place on April 13, 1912, one 
day before the sinking of the Titanic, and it was also one of the most tumultu-
ous contests that the state would ever witness. It was one of 13 states nationally 
that moved to a primary system, opening up the process in some degree to 
each party’s rank and file. This was a significant increase from just four years 
earlier in 1908 when only four states held primaries (Gans 2010).

Figure 4. Voting Age Population Turnout Rates in Pennsylvania Primary since 1912. (For Years  
1912–2008: Curtis Gans, ed., Voter Turnout in the United States, 1788–2009. [Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010]. For years 2012 and 2016: Presidential Primary Vote Turnout, 
USElectionProject.com.)

Table 4. Voting Age Population Turnout Rates in Pennsylvania Primary since 1912

year

VAP 
Turnout 
Rate year

VAP 
Turnout 
Rate year

VAP 
Turnout 
Rate year

VAP 
Turnout 
Rate

2016 31.6% 1988 26.7% 1960 17.8% 1932 11.4%

2012 14.2% 1984 26.0% 1956 24.3% 1928 N/A

2008 33.3% 1980 33.0% 1952 21.1% 1924 3.3%

2004 17.7% 1976 26.2% 1948 9.0% 1920 8.9%

2000 14.7% 1972 19.4% 1944 7.8% 1916 20.4%

1996 15.1% 1968 12.1% 1940 13.2% 1912 30.2%

1992 25.3% 1964 9.9% 1936 21.3%

Sources: For years 1912–2008, Curtis Gans, ed., Voter Turnout in the United States, 1788–2009 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010). For years 2012 and 2016, Presidential 
Primary Vote Turnout, USElectionProject.com.



58 John J. Kennedy

The bitter battle between former president Theodore Roosevelt and his 
running mate, and now president, William Howard Taft, escalated through-
out the primary season and would divide the GOP in Pennsylvania as it had 
throughout the nation. Taft had the support of Republican boss and U.S. 
senator Boies Penrose as well as the powerful Philadelphia machine, while 
Roosevelt efforts were led by former U.S. senator William Flynn of Pittsburgh. 
While Roosevelt won with 60% of the vote and walked off with a majority of 
the delegates, he fell short of the nomination largely due to the national lead-
ership of the GOP ultimately rallying around Taft (“Election Results” 1912). 
At this time, the overwhelming majority of delegates were selected in state 
conventions by state committees and not in primaries.

Through much of this time the impact of the state’s primary was negli-
gible, either because many of the delegates were still selected independently 
of the primary in conventions or because the primary came rather late in the 
calendar. There was also a history of “favorite sons” candidacies up through 
the 1960s, which were commonly used in many states as a way for party lead-
ers to exert greater control over the state delegation process and to also have 
more clout at the national convention.4

Additionally, write- in candidacies were also the norm up until the 1980s. 
In fact, twice, in 1923 and 1964, every candidate was a write- in. In other 
years, such as 1944 (Franklin Roosevelt), 1948 (Harry Truman), 1960 (Rich-
ard Nixon), 1968 (Eugene McCarthy), only one candidate was listed on the 
ballot for each party. Everyone else was a write- in. Even as late as 1976, Ron-
ald Reagan was a write- in, his name not appearing on the ballot. The impact 
of primaries throughout the years was minimal and certainly not the major 
political event that they are today (Gans 2010).

It wasn’t until 1980 that primaries in Pennsylvania began to approach a 
style that would be recognizable today. That year was also the second time 
that turnout reached the 30% mark and stands as the second highest in the 
state’s primary history. Generating this interest was a competitive race for 
both parties. On the GOP side, George Bush’s more moderate stance played 
well among Republican voters and he easily defeated the more conservative 
Ronald Reagan by 8 percentage points. However, the controversy surrounding 
the delegate selection process appeared for the first time after Reagan walked 
off with a majority of the convention delegates. Of course, Reagan also eventu-
ally prevailed, selected Bush as his running mate uniting the party, and went 
on to win in the fall (Gans 2010).

Such was not the case on the Democratic side, in what was one of the most 
acrimonious contests ever to appear in either party’s history, perhaps rivaled 
only by the Roosevelt/Taft fight. Like the 1912 internecine battle, this also 



Sometimes It Does Matter 59

involved a sitting U.S. president; this time Jimmy Carter was challenged from 
the left by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. While Kennedy narrowly 
prevailed in Pennsylvania, thanks in part to a last-minute endorsement by Phil-
adelphia Mayor Bill Green, it still wasn’t enough to prevent the incumbent from 
reclaiming the nomination, thanks in large part to a series of primary victories 
that he had rolled up in the early stages of the campaign. Again, just as in 1912, 
the fissure between the two combatants and their supporters didn’t heal in time 
to prevent the opposition party from winning in November.

The highest primary turnout recorded in Pennsylvania history would 
occur more recently in 2008, when Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama 
squared off against one another in a dramatic primary contest. While this year 
produced intense competition on both sides, what Pennsylvania experienced 
in 2008 on the Democratic side was unparalleled. This was due not only to the 
continuing struggle between the contenders but the sheer amount of time that 
existed between the most recent primary to take place in Mississippi on March 
11. For six weeks, Pennsylvania was the center of the political universe and the 
drama produced by both sides did not disappoint. First, during this time, in 
late March, a video appeared in which the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, pastor 
at Obama’s Chicago church, was caught making particularly incendiary racial 
statements from the pulpit. While Obama rejected these comments, the ques-
tion of whether he was actually in attendance on the day of the service was the 
source of much speculation (“The Wright Controversy” 2008).

Then with two weeks to go before the primary, Obama faced perhaps the 
greatest crisis of his entire campaign. A video was leaked from a fundr aiser 
in San Francisco in which he commented that working-class people “cling to 
guns or religion” because they had been abandoned by their political leaders. 
Both Clinton and the Republicans presented it as evidence that he was elitist 
and condescending to working-class voters. Obama was clearly put on the 
defensive as election day approached. In addition, the Democratic organiza-
tion throughout the state was largely behind Clinton, particularly in vote-r ich 
Philadelphia, where former mayor and then governor Ed Rendell spearheaded 
her efforts (Seelye 2008).

Clinton rode all this to an overwhelming victory in the state, racking up 
55% of the vote. However, unlike this year, it was her opponent who came in 
with the delegate lead, and her victory in Pennsylvania proved to be too little 
too late. However, unlike the Republicans in 1912 and the Democrats in 1980, 
the rift between the two camps largely disappeared by the fall allowing the 
party to regain the presidency. What develops between now and November 
between the Clinton and Sanders factions will certainly impact the final out-
come once again.



60 John J. Kennedy

Turnout Revisited

Another way to address turnout, which can provide further insight on the 
state of this campaign and also the history of the state’s primary selection 
process, is comparing the percentage of voters within the two parties to their 
share of registered voters. Those results, listed in Table 5, examine this aspect 
of turnout since the modern era of presidential primaries began in 1980 and 
provide insight on two fronts. First, it is clearly evident, and not surprising, 
that the competiveness of the nomination fight within a particular party has 
a major impact on the level of overall turnout. For instance, turnout was over 
40% in both the Democratic and Republican primaries three times, 1980, 
1992, and 2016, all years when both sides offered a competitive race for presi-
dent. While the race in 1992 was largely settled by the time the Pennsylvania 
primary arrived in April, interest in politics that year was at a high not seen in 
decades, thanks in part to a recession, and also a compelling third party bid 
initiated by H. Ross Perot. Thus, while Paul Tsongas and Patrick Buchanan’s 
quests were clearly on the verge of coming up short on the Democratic and 
Republican sides, respectively, interest remained high throughout that spring 
in the political process.

The impact that the competiveness of a race can have on turnout is also 
clearly evident when there is an incumbent president unopposed on one 

Table 5. democratic and Republican Party Turnout Compared with Registered Voters

year
Registered 
democrats

Registered 
Republicans

democratic 
Turnout

Republican 
Turnout

democratic 
Turnout 
Percentage

Republican 
Turnout 
Percentage

2016 4,062,360 3,126,164 1,681,427 1,594,475 41.4% 51.0%

2012 4,131,280 3,061,125 616,102 808,115 14.9% 26.4%

2008 4,200,109 3,186,057 2,336,480 816,928 55.6% 25.6%

2004 3,706,122 3,230,496 729,882 861,551 19.7% 26.7%

2000 3,633,822 3,161,402 704,150 643,085 19.4% 20.3%

1996 3,147,836 2,765,840 724,069 684,204 23.0% 24.7%

1992 2,710,389 2,362,748 1,265,495 1,008,777 46.7% 42.7%

1988 2,848,528 2,279,849 1,507,890 870549 52.9% 38.2%

1984 3,176,515 2,230,508 1,597,055 616916 50.3% 27.7%

1980 2,917,087 2,190,441 1,600,820 1,211,222 54.9% 55.3%

Source: Pennsylvania Department of State. Data were tabulated by the author.



Sometimes It Does Matter 61

party column while the other has a contest, albeit one that might be basi-
cally decided by the time of Pennsylvania’s primary. In 1984, the Democratic 
contest between Walter Mondale and Gary Hart was certainly not settled at 
this point, and turnout was 23 points greater than the Republicans who were 
poised to renominate President Reagan. However, there was also roughly a 
12-point differential in 2012 when it was Democratic president Barack Obama 
running unopposed, and it was the Republicans who still had a race, albeit 
one in which by this time it was almost certain that Mitt Romney was the one 
headed toward the nomination.

Additionally, there are also times when a competitive race further down 
the ballot might be credited with producing a spike in turnout. Such was the 
case in 2004, when even though turnout was down overall as the presiden-
tial race was all but decided by April on the Democratic side and President 
George  W. Bush was unopposed, GOP turnout was seven points higher, 
thanks to the competitive primary challenge that Specter faced from Con-
gressman Pat Toomey.

The Contrasting Results of 2008 and 2012

The most compelling data, however, as it pertains to the upcoming election 
this fall is the difference in Democratic and Republican turnout this year as 
it contrasts with the Democratic Party turnout in 2008. Despite more than 
900,000 registered voters statewide, Democrats only outnumbered Republi-
cans heading to the polls on primary day in 2016 by slightly less than 87,000 
voters. Consistent with this data, the percentage difference between the two 
parties was considerable at 9.6%. This “enthusiasm gap” between the two par-
ties should be of particular concern for the Democrats as they head into the 
fall campaign and perhaps portends that Pennsylvania will be one of the key 
battleground states.

What should be of particular concern to Democrats is the turnout lev-
els recorded this spring in their Clinton/Sanders contest, compared with the 
numbers achieved by Clinton eight years ago in her battle with Barack Obama. 
More than 655,000 more Democrats lined up to cast their ballot in 2008 than 
they did this year. Again, the percentage difference follows and produces an 
incredible 14.2% gap between these two electoral cycles. Making this even 
more worrisome is that not only were both still vigorously being fought (thus 
worth comparing) but that they’re the same individual; Hillary Clinton, was 
the eventual winner in both races (and by basically the same margin).



62 John J. Kennedy

Below, Table 6 addresses Clinton’s decline through a different lens, mark-
ing a contrast between her vote totals and overall percentage in each of Penn-
sylvania’s four political regions.

Only in the southeast, was she able to increase both her overall numbers 
(over 40,000 votes) and percentage (11%). This is largely attributable to the 
support that Barack Obama received in these counties, particularly in Phila-
delphia in the 2008 contest. While she was able to maintain the same percent-
age (62%) in the “T,” Clinton’s number did decline by almost 160,000 votes in 
the region. In the southwest and northwest, however, there was a falloff of over 
138,000 and 82,000 votes, respectively, accounting for a sharp decrease of 15 
percentage points in each.

As for individual counties, in 2016, her raw vote increased in only four 
counties, three of which, Chester (187 votes), Dauphin (105), and Delaware 
(3,224) only slightly.5 Only in Philadelphia, where she experienced an increase 
of 65,012 was the difference of any significance. Again, this increase is also 
more likely due to the fact that she wasn’t running against Barack Obama, 
whose support in the African- American community was unrivaled, than it 
was to an sudden jolt of support for Clinton’s own campaign. What should be 
particularly concerning to Clinton’s supporters is the decline she experienced 
in some of the most stalwart Democratic counties in the state, such as over 
45,000 fewer in Allegheny, 20,000 in Lackawanna, and 27,000 in Luzerne. 
Along with more partisan balanced counties such as Bucks and West more-
land, her numbers also slipped considerably by over 24,000 and 26,000, 
respectively. Assuredly, these are the type of places that Trump and the GOP 
will be targeting in the fall.

As for comparing her overall percentages, Clinton was able to increase 
her share in ten counties, Allegheny, Centre, Chester, Dauphin, Delaware, 

Table 6. hillary Clinton’s Vote Comparison between 2008 and 2016 by Pennsylvania 
Political Region

2008 Votes 2016 Votes Votes +/–
2008 
Percentage

2016 
Percentage

Percentage 
+/–

Southeast 379,945 420,838 40,893 48% 59%  11%

Southwest 345,820 207,217 –138,603 70% 55% –15%

Northeast 176,546  93,649 –82,897 68% 52% –15%

Central “T” 372,728 213,403 –159,325 62% 62%   0%

Totals 1,275,039 935,107 –339,932 62% 57%  –5%

Source: Raw data were provided by the Pennsylvania Department of State. Regional numbers are based on 
the author’s categorizations. Data are rounded to the nearest whole number. 



Sometimes It Does Matter 63

Lancaster, Montgomery, Philadelphia, Potter and Union, four of which are 
located in the southeast. The sole county in this region in which her per-
centage declined was in Bucks. Nevertheless, while her percentage share did 
increase overall in 2016, Clinton’s significant 339,451 vote drop indicates some 
weakness and suggests that this percentage increase is probably due more to 
that fact that she was running against a more popular candidate in 2008.

Indeed, as Table 7 illustrates, a comparison of exit poll results follow-
ing Clinton’s 2008 and 2016 Pennsylvania primary victories reveals one of 
her greatest challenges heading into the fall (Trump’s victory was so domi-
nant that the GOP exit polls reveal little). Some variances can be expected, 
such as the shift in voting along racial lines (given her opponent was Obama 

Table 7. exit Poll Results, Pennsylvania democratic Presidential Primary,  
2008 and 2016

2008 2016

number Clinton obama number Clinton Sanders

Gender

Male 42% 49% 51% 40% 49% 50%

Female 58% 59% 41% 60% 60% 39%

Vote by Age

18–29 12% 40% 60% 12% 17% 83%

30–44 19% 47% 53% 24% 47% 53%

45–59 37% 56% 44% 41% 65% 34%

60 and Older 32% 62% 38% 23% 67% 31%

Vote by Race

White 80% 63% 37% 68% 51% 47%

Black 15% 10% 90% 19% 70% 30%

education

No College Degree 53% 58% 42% 45% 55% 45%

College Graduate 47% 51% 49% 55% 56% 43%

Is hillary Clinton honest and Trustworthy? 

Yes 58% 77% 23% 58% 81% 17%

No 40% 23% 77% 38% 18% 82%

Area Type

Urban 29% 40% 60% 48% 57% 43%

Suburban 31% 59% 41% 31% 59% 41%

Rural 20% 63% 37% 21% 48% 50%

Source: CNN.com: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/#PADEM; 
http://www.cnn.com/election/primaries/states/pa/Dem.



64 John J. Kennedy

eight years earlier) and some that might seem surprising, such as how her 
numbers increased overall on the question of trustworthiness. However, the 
most startling contrast within these two sets of exit polls can be traced to 
those Democratic primary voters between the ages of 18–29. Within this sub-
group, Clinton’s support declined from 40% in 2008 to just 17% this year. 
For her to win in November, much will hinge on whether she can win back 
these younger voters who served as the bedrock of Bernie Sanders campaign. 
Whether she is able to attract those voters who opposed her in the primary, 
such as Obama did with her voters eight years ago, will go a long way toward 
deciding not only who grabs Pennsylvania’s 20 electoral votes, but also who 
takes the biggest prize itself.



65

APPENDIX A

Table A.1. Categorization Key for Pennsylvania’s Political Geographic Regions

Southeast (5) Southwest (9) northeast (6) Central “T” (47)

Bucks
Chester
Delaware
Montgomery
Philadelphia

Allegheny
Armstrong
Beaver
Butler
Fayette
Greene
Lawrence
Washington
Westmoreland

Carbon
Lackawanna
Lehigh
Luzerne
Monroe
Northampton

Adams
Bedford
Berks
Blair
Bradford
Cambria
Cameron
Centre
Clarion
Clearfield
Clinton
Columbia
Crawford
Cumberland
Dauphin
Elk
Erie
Forest
Franklin
Fulton
Huntingdon
Indiana
Jefferson
Juniata
Lancaster
Lebanon
Lycoming
McKean
Mercer
Mifflin
Montour
Northumberland
Perry
Pike
Potter
Schuylkill
Snyder
Somerset
Sullivan
Susquehanna
Tioga
Union
Venango
Warren
Wayne
Wyoming
York

Source: Categorizations based upon the author’s groupings were initially presented in John J. Kennedy, 
Pennsylvania Elections Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005.



66

Table B.1. democratic Vote for President in Pennsylvania Primary by County, 2016

County Clinton Percentage Sanders Percentage

Adams 3,863 48% 4,101 51%

Allegheny 123,715 55% 99,078 44%

Armstrong 2,992 48% 3,073 50%

Beaver 13,531 57% 9,873 42%

Bedford 1,388 49% 1,387 49%

Berks 21,063 48% 22,078 51%

Blair 3,965 47% 4,360 52%

Bradford 1,809 49% 1,839 50%

Bucks 46,917 56% 36,173 43%

Butler 8,790 52% 7,833 46%

Cambria 8,507 47% 9,024 50%

Cameron 186 42% 240 54%

Carbon 3,384 49% 3,460 50%

Centre 8,458 45% 10,331 55%

Chester 33,082 56% 26,193 44%

Clarion 1,529 49% 1,511 49%

Clearfield 3,194 47% 3,414 51%

Clinton 1,704 49% 1,739 50%

Columbia 2,504 40% 3,601 58%

Crawford 3,707 49% 3,789 50%

Cumberland 12,421 52% 11,513 48%

Dauphin 18,474 57% 13,787 42%

Delaware 46,252 60% 30,824 40%

Elk 1,601 45% 1,846 52%

Erie 20,395 52% 18,362 47%

Fayette 9,195 58% 6,460 41%

Forest 251 52% 221 46%

Franklin 4,707 52% 4,282 47%

Fulton 366 49% 365 49%

Greene 2,268 53% 1,927 45%

Huntingdon 1,304 43% 1,666 55%

Indiana 4,049 50% 3,839 48%

Jefferson 1,249 44% 1,507 53%

Juniata 664 46% 754 52%

APPENDIX B



67

County Clinton Percentage Sanders Percentage

Lackawanna 23,020 57% 17,308 42%

Lancaster 19,840 48% 21,321 52%

Lawrence 5,845 59% 3,981 40%

Lebanon 4,669 50% 4,599 49%

Lehigh 20,430 52% 18,338 47%

Luzerne 20,542 52% 18,543 47%

Lycoming 3,808 44% 4,730 55%

McKean 1,053 46% 1,190 52%

Mercer 6,530 57% 4,739 41%

Mifflin 1,201 48% 1,242 50%

Monroe 8,169 53% 7,042 46%

Montgomery 75,628 59% 52,132 41%

Montour 846 48% 890 50%

Northampton 18,104 51% 16,940 48%

Northumberland 3,582 49% 3,632 50%

Perry 1,329 43% 1,752 56%

Philadelphia 218,959 63% 129,353 37%

Pike 2,009 51% 1,894 48%

Potter 402 41% 560 57%

Schuylkill 6,534 51% 6,040 47%

Snyder 1,125 50% 1,081 48%

Somerset 3,114 48% 3,206 50%

Sullivan 312 50% 296 48%

Susquehanna 1,680 50% 1,610 48%

Tioga 1,055 43% 1,354 55%

Union 1,626 50% 1,579 49%

Venango 2,020 48% 2,087 50%

Warren 1,836 52% 1,665 47%

Washington 15,872 57% 11,262 41%

Wayne 1,859 47% 2,026 52%

Westmoreland 25,009 54% 20,286 44%

Wyoming 1,156 48% 1,209 50%

York 18,459 51% 17,544 48%

Totals 935,107 56% 731,881 44%

Source: Pennsylvania Department of State. Data are rounded to the nearest whole number. 



68

Table C.1. Republican Vote for President in Pennsylvania Primary by County, 2016

County Trump Percentage Cruz Percentage Kasich Percentage

Adams 9,773 57% 4,076 24% 2,705 16%

Allegheny 61,469 51% 24,091 20% 33,318 28%

Armstrong 7,718 67% 2,205 19% 1,363 12%

Beaver 11,499 57% 4,490 22% 3,747 19%

Bedford 6,577 63% 2,564 25% 963  9%

Berks 29,260 59% 10,622 22% 8,196 17%

Blair 13,178 61% 5,243 24% 2,652 12%

Bradford 6,665 61% 2,415 22% 1,575 14%

Bucks 51,461 57% 17,139 19% 20,240 22%

Butler 20,054 57% 7,813 22% 6,922 20%

Cambria 10,988 65% 3,508 21% 2,077 12%

Cameron 503 58% 195 22% 137 16%

Carbon 6,032 72% 1,433 17% 709  9%

Centre 10,027 49% 5,215 26% 4,569 22%

Chester 35,631 47% 15,038 20% 23,908 31%

Clarion 4,230 61% 1,460 21% 1,026 15%

Clearfield 8,017 67% 2,310 19% 1,423 12%

Clinton 3,236 65% 1,055 21% 550 11%

Columbia 6,071 67% 1,714 19% 1,064 12%

Crawford 7,672 55% 3,617 26% 2,290 16%

Cumberland 22,977 51% 12,200 27% 9,031 20%

Dauphin 21,310 53% 10,200 26% 7,320 18%

Delaware 43,237 52% 13,456 16% 23,640 28%

Elk 2,688 67% 667 17% 577 14%

Erie 16,495 52% 7,856 25% 6,507 21%

Fayette 8,550 70% 2,224 18% 1,327 11%

Forest 598 64% 180 19% 138 15%

Franklin 15,653 58% 6,958 26% 3,671 14%

Fulton 1,779 64% 660 24% 242  9%

Greene 2,532 65% 845 22% 430 11%

Huntingdon 5,236 62% 1,885 22% 981 12%

Indiana 7,743 62% 2,634 21% 1,816 15%

Jefferson 5,222 66% 1,505 19% 1,047 13%

Juniata 2,394 56% 1,163 27% 553 13%

APPENDIX C



69

County Trump Percentage Cruz Percentage Kasich Percentage

Lackawanna 14,430 70% 3,368 16% 2,606 13%

Lancaster 38,257 44% 27,470 32% 18,766 22%

Lawrence 6,969 60% 2,636 23% 1,801 15%

Lebanon 13,694 55% 6,789 27% 3,806 15%

Lehigh 21,383 55% 9,079 24% 7,377 19%

Luzerne 28,680 77% 4,633 13% 3,371  9%

Lycoming 12,917 62% 5,349 26% 2,217 11%

McKean 3,901 63% 1,151 19% 960 16%

Mercer 8,454 55% 3,085 20% 3,429 22%

Mifflin 4,310 59% 1,788 24% 1,041 14%

Monroe 10,252 69% 2,499 17% 1,798 12%

Montgomery 51,593 48% 21,503 20% 31,370 29%

Montour 1,745 59% 617 21% 512 17%

Northampton 19,695 61% 7,013 22% 5,019 16%

Northumberland 8,241 64% 2,865 22% 1,464 11%

Perry 5,519 57% 2,780 29% 1,092 11%

Philadelphia 25,738 57% 8,231 18% 9,629 21%

Pike 5,203 74% 955 14% 779 11%

Potter 2,369 66% 709 20% 399 11%

Schuylkill 16,801 74% 3,085 14% 2,342 10%

Snyder 3,745 54% 2,034 29% 996 14%

Somerset 9,069 64% 3,159 22% 1,540 11%

Sullivan 842 64% 247 19% 183 14%

Susquehanna 5,036 61% 2,067 25% 1,042 13%

Tioga 4,742 61% 1,687 22% 1,140 15%

Union 3,421 52% 1,953 30% 1,020 16%

Venango 4,934 56% 2,389 27% 1,334 15%

Warren 3,771 56% 1,716 25% 1,088 16%

Washington 16,242 61% 5,444 20% 4,670 17%

Wayne 6,395 68% 1,867 20% 959 10%

Westmoreland 32,209 62% 10,506 20% 8,512 16%

Wyoming 3,634 66% 1,110 20% 633 12%

York 41,927 59% 17,086 24% 10,394 15%

Totals 902,593 57% 345,506 22% 310,003 19%

Source: Pennsylvania Department of State. Data are rounded to the nearest whole number.



70

Table d.1. democratic and Republican Party Turnout by County, 2016

County
Registered 
democrats Voters

Percentage 
Turnout

Registered 
Republicans Voters

Percentage 
Turnout

Adams 19,565 8,035 41% 33,678 17,071 51%

Allegheny 520,006 224,612 43% 246,022 120,622 49%

Armstrong 15,832 6,195 39% 20,434 11,525 56%

Beaver 58,855 23,773 40% 38,020 20,111 53%

Bedford 9,598 2,838 30% 20,441 10,426 51%

Berks 115,735 43,563 38% 95,266 49,177 52%

Blair 24,000 8,460 35% 41,835 21,659 52%

Bradford 10,444 3,701 35% 21,363 10,966 51%

Bucks 190,862 83,927 44% 179,940 90,991 51%

Butler 41,167 16,872 41% 65,265 35,453 54%

Cambria 45,529 18,040 40% 29,919 16,933 57%

Cameron 1,220 444 36% 1,636 872 53%

Carbon 18,211 6,945 38% 16,260 8,324 51%

Centre 44,939 18,912 42% 42,673 20,381 48%

Chester 129,234 59,479 46% 149,589 76,240 51%

Clarion 8,086 3,099 38% 12,275 6,896 56%

Clearfield 21,008 6,753 32% 24,863 12,007 48%

Clinton 8,983 3,504 39% 9,348 4,946 53%

Columbia 15,636 6,186 40% 16,917 9,046 53%

Crawford 19,359 7,614 39% 26,219 13,971 53%

Cumberland 53,030 24,102 45% 81,402 45,374 56%

Dauphin 82,783 32,511 39% 73,742 39,844 54%

Delaware 178,249 77,439 43% 168,124 83,132 49%

Elk 9,649 3,519 36% 7,834 4,031 51%

Erie 95,107 39,095 41% 63,012 31,647 50%

Fayette 48,796 15,940 33% 25,120 12,268 49%

Forest 1,294 482 37% 1,711 938 55%

Franklin 24,470 9,107 37% 50,932 27,131 53%

Fulton 2,600 749 29% 5,319 2,770 52%

Greene 12,615 4,316 34% 7,235 3,874 54%

Huntingdon 9,106 3,013 33% 16,542 8,388 51%

Indiana 20,114 8,044 40% 22,148 12,495 56%

Jefferson 9,753 2,846 29% 15,937 7,963 50%

Juniata 3,994 1,456 36% 7,943 4,258 54%

APPENDIX D



71

County
Registered 
democrats Voters

Percentage 
Turnout

Registered 
Republicans Voters

Percentage 
Turnout

Lackawanna 89,887 40,730 45% 40,036 20,710 52%

Lancaster 103,052 41,358 40% 166,930 86,933 52%

Lawrence 27,408 9,968 36% 21,798 11,627 53%

Lebanon 26,149 9,361 36% 44,878 24,874 55%

Lehigh 109,364 38,992 36% 37,516 38,588 50%

Luzerne 105,473 39,547 37% 68,565 37,062 54%

Lycoming 22,073 8,666 39% 35,991 20,941 58%

McKean 7,269 2,280 31% 13,573 6,167 45%

Mercer 33,805 11,459 34% 31,262 15,325 49%

Mifflin 7,519 2,487 33% 14,552 7,320 50%

Monroe 48,931 15,334 31% 33,670 14,839 44%

Montgomery 257,956 128,181 50% 208,044 106,896 51%

Montour 4,679 1,768 38% 5,987 2,950 49%

Northampton 94,926 35,372 37% 68,809 32,268 47%

Northumberland 21,695 7,322 34% 26,122 12,849 49%

Perry 7,155 3,120 44% 17,028 9,650 57%

Philadelphia 801,776 349,805 44% 118,392 44,954 38%

Pike 13,212 3,922 30% 16,471 7,020 43%

Potter 2,903 982 34% 6,696 3,577 53%

Schuylkill 33,902 12,738 38% 41,098 22,627 55%

Snyder 5,391 2,232 41% 13,095 6,972 53%

Somerset 17,997 6,463 36% 25,685 14,176 55%

Sullivan 1,533 622 41% 2,334 1,310 56%

Susquehanna 8,045 3,332 41% 14,330 8,313 58%

Tioga 7,174 2,442 34% 15,156 7,810 52%

Union 6,987 3,220 46% 12,102 6,567 54%

Venango 11,087 4,201 38% 16,567 8,885 54%

Warren 10,626 3,554 33% 14,579 6,790 47%

Washington 66,805 27,639 41% 50,570 26,722 53%

Wayne 10,020 3,919 39% 17,216 9,357 54%

Westmoreland 117,450 46,049 39% 99,027 51,940 52%

Wyoming 5,244 2,398 46% 8,931 5,502 62%

York 98,628 36,393 37% 137,087 71,224 52%

Totals 4,055,950 1,681,427 41% 3,122,135 1,594,475 51%

Source: Pennsylvania Department of State. Data were tabulated by the author.



72

Table 

demo

e.1. Presidential Primary Results in Pennsylvania, 1912–2016

cratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 13, 1912

Wilson 98,000 100.0% Roosevelt 282,853 59.7%

Taft 191,179 40.3%

May 16, 1916

Wilson 142,202 98.7% Brumbaugh** 233,095 86.3%

Others* 1,839 1.3% Ford* 20,265 75.0%

Roosevelt* 12,359 46.0%

Hughes* 1,804 70.0%

Others 2,682 100.0%

May 18, 1920

Palmer** 80,356 73.7% E. Wood** 257,841 92.3%

McAdoo 26,875 24.6% Johnson* 10,869 3.8%

Edwards* 674 0.6% L. Wood* 3,878 1.4%

Others 1,132 0.1% Hoover 2,825 1.0%

Others* 4,059 1.5%

April 22, 1924

McAdoo* 10,376 43.7% Coolidge* 117,262 87.9%

Smith* 9,029 38.0% Johnson* 4,345 330.0%

Others* 4,341 18.3% La Follette* 1,224 90.0%

Others* 10,523 7.9%

April 24, 1928

Smith 24,102 98.1% Hoover 65,480 90.0%

Walsh 420 1.7% Coolidge 4,438 6.1%

Reed 54 0.2% Dawes 1,225 1.7%

Fuller 998 1.4%

Lowden 578 0.8%

April 26, 1932

Roosevelt 133,002 56.6% France 352,092 92.9%

Smith 101,227 43.1% Hoover 20,662 5.5%

Others* 563 0.2% Others 6,126 1.6%

April 28, 1936

Roosevelt 720,309 95.3% Borah 459,982 100.0%

Breckinridge 35,351 4.7%

APPENDIX E



73

democratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 23, 1940

Roosevelt 724,657 100.0% Dewey 52,661 66.7%

Roosevelt 8,294 10.5%

James** 8,172 10.3%

Taft 5,213 6.6%

Vandenberg 2,384 3.0%

Hoover 1,082 1.4%

Willkie 707 0.9%

Others* 463 0.6%

April 25, 1944

Roosevelt 322,469 99.7% Dewey* 146,706 83.8%

Others* 961 0.3% MacArthur* 9,032 5.2%

Roosevelt 8,815 5.0%

Willkie* 3,650 2.1%

Bricker* 2,936 1.7%

Martin** 2,406 1.4%

Stassen* 1,502 0.9%

April 27, 1948

Truman 328,891 96.0% Stassen* 81,242 31.5%

Eisenhower* 4,502 1.3% Dewey* 76,988 29.8%

Wallace* 4,329 1.3% Martin** 45,072 17.5%

Stassen* 1,301 0.4% MacArthur* 18,254 7.1%

MacArthur* 1,220 0.4% Taft* 15,166 5.9%

Others* 2,409 0.7% Vandeberg* 8,818 3.4%

Truman* 4,907 1.9%

Eisenhower* 4,726 1.8%

Wallace* 1,452 0.6%

Others* 1,537 0.6%

April 22, 1952

Kefauver* 93,160 53.3% Eisenhower 863,785 73.6%

Eisenhower* 28,660 16.4% Taft* 178,629 15.2%

Truman 26,504 15.2% Stassen 120,305 10.3%

Taft* 8,311 4.8% MacArthur* 6,028 0.5%

Harriman* 3,745 2.1% Warren* 3,158 0.3%

Stevenson* 3,678 2.1% Truman* 267 0.1%

Russell* 1,691 0.1% Others* 9,026 5.2%

Others* 1,121 0.1%



74

Table e.1 (continued)

democratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 24, 1956

Stevenson 642,172 93.6% Eisenhower 951,932 95.5%

Kefauver* 36,552 5.3% Knowland 43,508 4.4%

Others* 7,482 1.1% Others* 976 0.1%

April 26, 1960

Kennedy* 183,073 71.3% Nixon 968,538 98.1%

Stevenson* 29,660 11.5% Rockefeller* 12,491 13.0%

Nixon* 15,136 5.9% Kennedy* 3,886 0.4%

Humphrey* 13,860 5.4% Stevenson* 428 0.1%

Symington* 6,791 2.6% Goldwater* 286 0.1%

Johnson* 2,918 4.0% Others* 1,202 0.1%

Rockefeller* 1,078 4.0%

Others* 4,297 1.7%

April 28, 1964

Johnson* 209,606 82.8% Scranton* 235,222 51.9%

Wallace* 12,104 4.8% Lodge* 92,712 20.5%

Kennedy* 12,024 4.7% Nixon* 44,396 9.8%

Scranton* 8,156 3.2% Goldwater* 38,669 8.5%

Lodge* 4,895 1.9% Johnson* 22,372 4.9%

Goldwater* 1,731 0.7% Rockefeller* 9,123 2.0%

Nixon* 1,606 0.2% Wallace* 5,105 1.1%

Rockefeller* 576 0.2% Smith* 1,721 0.4%

Stevenson* 332 0.1% Romney* 936 0.2%

Smith* 260 0.1% Kennedy* 661 0.1%

Romney* 66 0.0% Stassen* 280 0.1%

Others* 1,790 0.7% Others* 1,671 0.4%

April 23, 1968

McCarthy 428,259 71.7% Nixon* 171,815 59.7%

Kennedy* 65,430 11.0% Rockefeller* 52,915 18.4%

Humphrey* 51,998 8.7% McCarthy* 18,800 6.5%

Wallace* 24,147 4.0% Wallace* 13,290 4.6%

Johnson* 21,265 3.6% Kennedy* 10,431 3.6%

Nixon* 3,434 0.6% Reagan* 7,934 2.8%

Others* 2,556 0.4% Humphrey* 4,651 1.6%

Johnson* 3,027 1.1%

Shafer 1,223 0.4%

Others* 3,487 1.2%



75

democratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 25, 1972

Humphrey 481,900 35.1% Nixon* 153,886 83.3%

Wallace 292,437 21.3% Wallace* 20,472 11.1%

McGovern 280,861 20.4% Others* 10,443 5.7%

Muskie 279,983 20.4%

Jackson 38,767 2.8%

Chisholm* 306 1.0%

Others* 585 1.0%

April 27, 1976

Carter 511,905 37.0% Ford 733,472 92.1%

Jackson 340,340 24.6% Reagan* 40,510 5.1%

Udall 259,166 18.7% Others* 22,678 2.8%

Wallace 155,902 11.3%

McCormack 38,800 2.8%

Shapp 32,947 2.4%

Bayh 15,320 1.1%

Harris 13,067 0.9%

Humphrey* 12,563 0.9%

Others* 5,032 0.3%

April 22, 1980

Kennedy 736,954 47.2% Bush 628,759 51.9%

Carter 732,332 46.9% Reagan 527,916 43.6%

Brown 93,805 6.0% Baker 30,846 2.5%

Connally 10,056 0.8%

Stassen 6,767 0.6%

Jacobson 4,357 0.4%

Fernandez 2,521 0.2%

April 10, 1984

Mondale 747,267 46.8% Reagan 616,916 100.0%

Hart 551,335 34.5%

Jackson 264,463 16.6%

Cranston 22,829 1.4%

Griser 6,090 0.4%

Askew 5,071 0.3%



76

Table e.1 (continued)

democratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 26, 1988

Dukakis 1,002,480 66.5% Bush 687,323 79.0%

Jackson 411,260 27.3% Dole 103,763 11.9%

Gore 44,542 3.0% Robertson 79,463 9.1%

Hart 20,473 1.4%

Simon 9,892 0.7%

Wesner 7,546 0.5%

Gephardt 7,254 0.5%

Larouche 4,443 0.3%

April 28, 1992

Clinton 715,031 56.5% Bush 774,865 76.8%

Brown 325,543 25.7% Buchanan 233,912 23.1%

Tsongas 161,572 12.8%

LaRouche 21,534 1.7%

Harkin 21,013 1.7%

Kerrey 20,802 1.6%

April 23, 1996

Clinton 666,486 92.1% Dole 435,031 63.6%

LaRouche 57,583 8.0% Buchanan 123,011 18.0%

Forbes 55,018 8.0%

Keyes 40,025 5.9%

Lugar 31,119 4.6%

April 4, 2000

Gore 525,306 74.6% Bush 472,398 73.4%

Bradley 146,797 20.9% McCain 145,719 22.7%

LaRouche 32,047 4.6% Forbes 16,162 2.5%

Bauer 8,806 1.4%

April 27, 2004

Kerry 585,683 74.1% Bush 861,555 100.0%

Dean 79,799 10.1%

Edwards 76,762 1.0%

Kucinich 30,110 0.4%

LaRouche 17,528 0.2%

April 22, 2008

Clinton 1,275,039 54.6% McCain 595,175 72.9%

Obama 1,061,441 45.4% Paul 129,323 15.8%

Huckabee 92,430 11.3%



77

democratic Votes Percentage Republican Votes Percentage

April 24, 2012

Obama 616,102 100.0% Romney 468,374 60.0%

Santorum 149,056 18.4%

Gingrich 84,537 10.4%

Paul 106,148 13.1%

April 26, 2016

Clinton 925,125 55.6% Trump 899,125 56.7%

Sanders 725,042 43.6% Cruz 343,464 21.7%

De La Fuente 14,353 0.9% Kasich 307,473 19.3%

Carson 14,777 0.9%

Rubio 11,870 0.9%

Bush 9,491 0.6%

Source: Deborah Kalb, ed., CQ Guide to US Elections. 7th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2016.

* Denotes “write- in candidate.”

** Denotes “favorite son candidate.”



78

Table F.1. hillary Clinton’s Vote Comparison between 2008 and 2016  
by Pennsylvania County

County
2008 
Votes

2016 
Votes Votes +/–

2008 
Percentage

2016 
Percentage

Percentage 
+/–

Adams 6,567 3,863 –2,704 58.1% 48.1% –10.0%

Allegheny 169,707 123,715 –45,992 54.4% 55.1% 0.7%

Armstrong 7,246 2,992 –4,254 71.5% 48.3% –23.2%

Beaver 28,331 13,531 –14,800 69.8% 56.9% –12.9%

Bedford 3,711 1,388 –2,323 70.1% 48.9% –21.2%

Berks 36,064 21,063 –15,001 58.0% 48.4% –9.6%

Blair 8,875 3,965 –4,910 64.8% 46.9% –17.9%

Bradford 3,877 1,809 –2,068 65.8% 48.9% –16.9%

Bucks 71,757 46,917 –24,840 62.6% 55.9% –6.7%

Butler 15,278 8,790 –6,488 63.3% 52.1% –11.2%

Cambria 23,572 8,507 –15,065 71.8% 47.2% –24.6%

Cameron 409 186 –223 59.3% 41.9% –17.4%

Carbon 7,922 3,384 –4,538 78.1% 48.7% –29.5%

Centre 9,789 8,458 –1,331 39.9% 44.7% 4.8%

Chester 32,895 33,082 187 44.8% 55.6% 10.8%

Clarion 3,417 1,529 –1,888 66.4% 49.3% –17.1%

Clearfield 8,167 3,194 –4,973 68.5% 47.3% –21.2%

Clinton 3,622 1,704 –1,918 68.3% 48.6% –19.7%

Columbia 5,556 2,504 –3,052 60.3% 40.5% –19.8%

Crawford 7,360 3,707 –3,653 62.6% 48.7% –13.9%

Cumberland 15,840 12,421 –3,419 52.7% 51.5% –1.1%

Dauphin 18,369 18,474 105 41.8% 56.8% 15.1%

Delaware 43,028 46,252 3,224 44.4% 59.7% 15.4%

Elk 4,159 1,601 –2,558 64.8% 45.5% –19.3%

Erie 34,922 20,395 –14,527 63.0% 52.2% –10.8%

Fayette 23,095 9,195 –13,900 78.8% 57.7% –21.1%

Forest 613 251 –362 68.3% 52.1% –16.3%

Franklin 7,891 4,707 –3,184 59.1% 51.7% –7.4%

Fulton 962 366 –596 68.0% 48.9% –19.1%

Greene 6,282 2,268 –4,014 75.4% 52.5% –22.9%

Huntingdon 2,957 1,304 –1,653 62.5% 43.3% –19.3%

Indiana 7,901 4,049 –3,852 64.0% 50.3% –13.7%

Jefferson 3,177 1,249 –1,928 63.3% 43.9% –19.4%

Juniata 1,711 664 –1,047 68.6% 45.6% –23.0%

APPENDIX F



79

County
2008 
Votes

2016 
Votes Votes +/–

2008 
Percentage

2016 
Percentage

Percentage 
+/–

Lackawanna 43,243 23,020 –20,223 73.8% 56.5% –17.3%

Lancaster 22,906 19,840 –3,066 45.5% 48.0% 2.6%

Lawrence 13,225 5,845 –7,380 74.2% 58.6% –15.6%

Lebanon 7,611 4,669 –2,942 56.0% 49.9% –6.1%

Lehigh 33,163 20,430 –12,733 60.3% 52.4% –7.9%

Luzerne 48,123 20,542 –27,581 75.0% 51.9% –23.1%

Lycoming 7,950 3,808 –4,142 58.5% 43.9% –14.6%

McKean 2,442 1,053 –1,389 66.2% 46.2% –20.0%

Mercer 14,168 6,530 –7,638 69.1% 57.0% –12.1%

Mifflin 3,000 1,201 –1,799 69.9% 48.3% –21.6%

Monroe 12,487 8,169 –4,318 57.6% 53.3% –4.3%

Montgomery 78,318 75,628 –2,690 50.7% 59.0% 8.3%

Montour 1,481 846 –635 60.4% 47.9% –12.5%

Northampton 31,608 18,104 –13,504 61.3% 51.2% –10.2%

Northumberland 8,559 3,582 –4,977 71.7% 48.9% –22.8%

Perry 2,684 1,329 –1,355 61.5% 42.6% –18.9%

Philadelphia 153,947 218,959 65,012 34.8% 62.6% 27.8%

Pike 3,684 2,009 –1,675 59.1% 51.2% –7.9%

Potter 1,050 402 –648 64.9% 40.9% –24.0%

Schuylkill 15,369 6,534 –8,835 73.6% 51.3% –22.3%

Snyder 1,824 1,125 –699 62.5% 50.4% –12.1%

Somerset 8,525 3,114 –5,411 72.4% 48.2% –24.2%

Sullivan 679 312 –367 68.4% 50.2% –18.2%

Susquehanna 3,334 1,680 –1,654 65.3% 50.4% –14.9%

Tioga 2,255 1,055 –1,200 61.6% 43.2% –18.4%

Union 2,128 1,626 –502 47.9% 50.5% 2.6%

Venango 4,437 2,020 –2,417 68.3% 48.1% –20.2%

Warren 3,996 1,836 –2,160 66.2% 51.7% –14.5%

Washington 31,065 15,872 –15,193 71.3% 57.4% –13.9%

Wayne 3,478 1,859 –1,619 62.0% 47.4% –14.6%

Westmoreland 51,591 25,009 –26,582 69.2% 54.3% –14.9%

Wyoming 2,488 1,156 –1,332 69.0% 48.2% –20.8%

York 29,192 18,459 –10,733 55.3% 50.7% –4.6%

Totals 1,274,558 935,107 –339,451 55.1% 55.6% 0.5%

Source: Pennsylvania Department of State. Data were tabulated by the author.



80 John J. Kennedy

NOTES

Acknowledgment: Special thanks go to Beau Ryck, a former graduate student in the 
West Chester University Department of Geography, who did a great job with the maps.

1. For a guide to how Pennsylvania’s counties are categorized, please see Appendix A. 
These groupings are subjective and reflect those that the author initially developed in his 
book, Pennsylvania Elections (2004).

2. San Diego, California, businessman Rocky De Le Fuente also appeared on the 
Democratic ballot in Pennsylvania receiving slightly less than 1% overall. Additionally, 
three Republican candidates for president who previously dropped out or suspended their 
campaigns, former Florida governor Jeb Bush, Dr. Ben Carson, and Florida senator Marco 
Rubio, also remained on the ballot and received a smattering of votes. Though for clarity 
they are excluded in this text, their final percentages are included in Appendix E.

3. For a complete list of the results in each individual county, please see Appendix D.
4. For a complete list of all results for every Pennsylvania presidential primary since 

1912, please see Appendix E.
5. For a complete list of the results in each individual county, please see Appendix F.

REFERENCES

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results/epolls/#PADEM; http://www.cnn.com/election/primaries/states/pa/Dem.

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———. 2016b. “Cruz Urges Pa. Republicans to Unite behind Him.” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
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sional Quarterly Press.
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April 21. 
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April 22. 

 



Sometimes It Does Matter 81

Olson, Laura, and Steve Esack. 2016. “Donald Trump Rallies in Harrisburg Draws Thou-
sands.” Morning Call, April 21. 

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John J. Kennedy, PhD, is an associate professor of political science at West Chester Uni-
versity. His latest book, Pennsylvania Government and Politics, will be released this fall. 
He is also the author of Pennsylvania Elections, originally published in 2005 and revised 
in 2015, and The Contemporary Pennsylvania Legislature (1999). In 2005, he was selected 
as a featured speaker for the Centennial Celebration of the Pennsylvania State Capital. He 
earned his doctorate from Temple University.


	Structure Bookmarks
	Campaigning
	The Vote
	The Delegate Battle
	Voter Turnout
	Historical Perspective
	Turnout Revisited
	The Contrasting Results of 2008 and 2012




