





































Solving Pennsylvania's Budget Woes


COMMONWEALTH, Volume 21, Issue 1 (2021). © 2021 The Pennsylvania Political Science Association.  
ISSN 2469-7672 (online). http://dx.doi.org/10.15367/com.v21i1.289. All rights reserved.

Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes

Increased Female Representation

BENJAMIN MELUSKY
Old Dominion University

Pennsylvania has a long history of failing to pass its budget by the start of the next 
fiscal year, often plunging the state in prolonged periods of budget impasse, and 
subjecting the state to a myriad of social, economic, and political consequences. 
This article explores the history of budget impasses in the Commonwealth, includ-
ing their causes and consequences, and advances a growing trend in American 
politics as a potential solution to this problem—the election of more women to 
the General Assembly. I suggest that the addition of more female lawmakers will 
make the budgetary process more collegial as these political actors are prone to 
reach across the aisle and compromise due to patterns of socially reinforced behav-
ioral expectations, thus bringing budgetary stalemates to a quicker resolution. 
The consequences of prolonged impasses on the target populations of importance 
to female lawmakers are explored as an impetus for engaging in this behavior.

Pennsylvania has become infamous for its almost perennial inability to 
pass its budget on time. The ensuing budget impasses have been as brief 
as only a day (2006) or as long as 270 days (2015), causing the state to 

incur a multitude of highly visible and often costly consequences and contribut-
ing to decreased public confidence in its elected officials and increased willing-
ness to vote out the culpable incumbents. Thus, as Pennsylvania inches closer 
to its June 30 deadline each year, the collective eyes of the Commonwealth, 



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 75

surrounding states, and more recently the nation, turn toward Harrisburg, 
wondering whether July 1 will come and go without a new budget in place. In 
this climate of increased partisan division and polarization, many are asking 
what can be done to solve the state’s budget woes—and according to some 
politicians and pundits that solution is to elect more women.

This article examines how gender influences efforts to compromise in 
an increasingly partisan and polarized environment. Budgets are built on 
compromise, without which there are tangible consequences for elected offi-
cials and their constituents. Gender differences in both style and behavior 
(Vinkenburg et al. 2011) characterize women with possessing a willingness to 
engage in consensus building and compromise (Volden, Wiseman, and Wit-
tmer 2013). Pennsylvania has historically underrepresented women in the 
branches concerned with state budgetary negotiations. Thus, electing more 
women into the state government could result in more consensual behavior 
with an emphasis on collegiality and cooperation (Fox and Oxley 2003).

Though compromise is a necessary condition for successful budgeting, 
Pennsylvania’s negotiations are defined by a number of elements known to 
complicate this process, including possessing a full-time legislature, a sizeable 
budget, a history of partisan division, and increasing levels of polarization. 
Thus, in understanding the role women can play in ameliorating the conse-
quences of divided government and polarization, Pennsylvania provides an 
important case study.

This research examines the role of women in the budgetary process and 
operates under the premise that behavioral differences, in combination with 
institutional features, lead to different patterns of lawmaking between men 
and women. In doing so, it considers the potential outcomes associated with 
reducing the underrepresentation of women in political office. In the current 
polarized political climate, most issues would benefit from greater female-
driven cooperation (Bratton and Rouse 2011). This research focuses on passing 
a state’s budget because no government action can occur without it. Budget-
ary negotiations are thus an optimal case for both observing occurrences of, 
and considering if, gendered collaborative behavior can reduce Pennsylvania’s 
propensity for budget impasses.

Late Budgets

History

Harold Lasswell defined politics as a competition over who gets what, when, 
and how. Developing and enacting a public budget is a prime example of pol-
itics because it’s a deliberative process which sets the size and agenda of a 



76 benJamin meluSKy

government by determining overall spending and where revenue is directed 
(Hutchinson and James 1988). Budgeting is highly conflictual with every polit-
ical actor holding a stake in the outcome. Demand will always exceed supply, 
leading to the budget process being viewed as unsatisfactory and ultimately 
flawed in its outcomes (National Conference of State Legislatures 1995).

Difficult budgetary negotiations can result in a state failing to pass its 
budget by the start of the next fiscal year, entering the state into an impasse 
period. In the event of an impasse, a state employs one or more options. In 
11 states temporary appropriations bills are passed. Another 12 states have 
provisions that allow for the continuous payment of funds and services to 
maintain government operations, and 22 states mandate a partial government 
shutdown of nonessential government services (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2010). Late state budgets are not uncommon, with more than 15% 
of budgets from 1961 to 2006 being adopted after the start of the next fiscal 
year (Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012). Pennsylvania itself has a long his-
tory of failing to pass its budget by its July 1 fiscal year deadline (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Pennsylvania Budget Adoption Historical (1961–2018). Note: Positive values denote 
a budget that was signed after the July 1 statutory deadline (a late budget), and negative values 
denote a budget that was signed before the July 1 statutory deadlines (an on-time budget). 
(Source: 1961–2006 adapted from Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler [2012]: 2008–2018 updated 
from https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/CL/Public/cl_view.cfm.)



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 77

Between 1961 and 2018, 25 of Pennsylvania’s 58 budgets (43.1%) were late, 
being passed an average 44.4 days after the start of the fiscal year, with the 
longest impasse (270 days) occurring in 2015. Notable impasses have resulted 
from attempts to increase taxes to meet spending increases or reduce deficits. 
Until recently, Pennsylvania employed a mixture of the aforementioned pro-
cedures in the event of an impasse, passing continuing resolutions and enact-
ing a partial shutdown of nonessential functions.

In 2007 a new interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
advanced by the Rendell administration prohibited noncritical employees 
from performing their duties because the Commonwealth had no authority 
to pay them during a budget impasse (Needles 2009). Budget disputes led to 
the furloughing of 25,000 noncritical employees, prompting an unsuccess-
ful lawsuit for summary relief filed by the state’s major labor unions. When 
budget disputes arose again in 2009, the Rendell administration interpreted 
the prior Commonwealth court decision such that while it could no longer 
furlough state employees, it could, however, order them to work without pay 
during an impasse. As the resulting 101-day impasse stretched on, noncritical 
employees found the words “Budget Impasse Leave without Pay” printed on 
their paychecks.

The act of these “payless paydays” prompted an appeal to the state 
Supreme Court. On December 28, 2009, Chief Justice Castille wrote for the 
6–1 majority that the FLSA’s requirement of timely pay for work performed 
during a budget impasse overrode Pennsylvania’s Constitutional provision 
barring dispersal of funds from the Treasury until they were authorized in 
a budget (Fitzsimmons 2009). This fundamentally changed how the Com-
monwealth would operate during a budget impasse. The decision ensured that 
state workers would no longer face payless paydays, no matter the duration of 
the budget impasse. As a result, most functions the public relies on will con-
tinue as agencies must tap into reserves to pay employees until a new budget 
restores the state funding (Meyer 2015). With nonessential workers no longer 
being furloughed, and the most tangible indicators of an impasse no longer 
in play, only if an impasse languishes on will the general public start to feel an 
impact from the breakdown in budgetary negotiations.

While these procedural changes have altered the way that the Common-
wealth responds to a budget impasse, they have not changed its propensity for 
engaging in fiscal brinksmanship for the duration of these impasses (should 
they occur), as evidenced by the recent 2015 impasses. As such, it is necessary 
to understand why Pennsylvania and other states fail to pass their budgets on 
time, and how they might avert future impasses.



78 benJamin meluSKy

Literature on budget impasses in the American states has shown that a 
variety of institutional, economic, and political factors influence the duration 
of budget impasses. Budget resolution is made more difficult by: the fiscal 
health of the state magnifying divergence over spending priorities (Klarner, 
Phillips, and Muckler 2012), the complexity of a state’s budget (Klarner, Phil-
lips, and Muckler 2012), supermajority requirements for appropriations bill 
adoption (Pulsipher 2004), legislative professionalism allowing for protracted 
budgetary negotiations (Kousser and Phillips 2009), and whether there was 
an attempt to increase taxes (McLaughlin 2012).

Two additional factors are of particular importance for understanding 
budget impasses in Pennsylvania. The first concerns Pennsylvania’s history 
of divided government. Budgetary disputes are exacerbated during times of 
divided government when the most fundamental interests of the governor 
and the legislature now run counter as each branch/party seeks to pursue a 
budget in line with its ideological and policy goals (Bowling and Ferguson 
2001). Figure 2 below allows for an examination of the partisan composi-
tion of Pennsylvania’s government overtime as viewed through the lens of the 
occurrence of budgetary failures.

An important temporal effect is observed in the above table, where prior to 
1972, it was not uncommon to observe a late budget during periods of unified 
government. During this period, disagreements between partisan allies were 
often punished in subsequent elections resulting in the loss of majority con-
trol in the lower chamber. After 1972, the point when the General Assembly 

Figure 2. Historical Partisan Control of Pennsylvania’s Government (1961–2018). Note: Shaded 
cells indicate years that a budget was passed after the start of the fiscal year, i.e., “late.” 
(Source: 1961–2011, adapted from Klarner [2013]: 2012–2018 updated via Council of State 
Government’s Book of the States.)



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 79

began to modernize (McLaughlin 2012), every budget impasse (except 2014) 
has occurred under divided government. This is consistent with prior studies 
of impasses in the era of legislative professionalism which show that divided 
government presents a significant hurdle in the state’s ability to pass its budget 
on time (Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 2012; Kirkland and Phillips 2018).

Second, the trend in ideological polarization is making the budget (and 
policy) process more difficult. Parties at both the national and state levels 
have become more ideologically homogenous (Wright and Birkhead 2014) and 
ultimately more polarized (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). Increasing 
polarization truly is becoming “undeniably the central and most problematic 
feature of contemporary American politics” (Mann and Ornstein 2016, 44), 
as it increases gridlock (Barber and McCarty 2013). When considering bud-
geting, the rise of more ideologically disciplined parties reduces the ability of 
legislators to act as free agents and makes distributive bargaining more dif-
ficult (Binder and Lee 2015). Since voters do not have a negative view of more 
polarized legislatures (Richardson and Milyo 2016) and fail to sanction leg-
islators for ideologically extremity (Rogers 2017), polarization may intensify 
partisan division. Thus, during periods of partisan division when the parties 
are more ideologically disparate, compromise becomes more difficult as posi-
tions within the ideological gap are less tenable. Figures 3 and 4 allow for an 

Figure 3. Pennsylvania General Assembly Ideological Polarization (1996–2016): Chamber 
Medians. (Source: Adapted from Shor and McCarty [2011].)



80 benJamin meluSKy

examination of the increase of ideological polarization by both chamber and 
party, again as viewed through the lens of the occurrence of late budgets.1

Clearly, polarization has increased over time, with the greatest degree of 
polarization occurring in the lower chamber, particularly within the Repub-
lican party. The degree of polarization makes compromise more difficult, in 
particular when attempting to bring an impasse to an end (Birkhead 2016).

Taken together, Pennsylvania is in a difficult position each year result-
ing from a myriad of institutional, economic, and political factors. Given the 
Commonwealth’s propensity for budgetary gridlock, what is a possible solu-
tion for its budget woes?

The Solution: Elect More Women

In American politics, “compromise is difficult, but governing a democracy 
without compromise is impossible” (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 1). The 
American public views compromise as a normatively desirable feature of the 
policymaking process (Gutmann and Thompson 2012). A budget is a mani-
festation of politics that inherently leaves the political actors unsatisfied with 
the outcome. Because particularistic demand exceeds the supply of state fiscal 

Figure 4. Pennsylvania General Assembly Ideological Polarization (1996–2016): Party Medians. 
(Source: Adapted from Shor and McCarty [2011].)



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 81

resources, the passage of a state’s budget requires compromise by these politi-
cal actors. Given this necessary condition, who better to serve than women 
who are viewed by society as natural compromisers (Fox and Oxley 2003)?

Gender stereotypes result from the understanding that differences 
between men and women result from patterns of socialization and normative 
gender structures rather than biological imperatives (Diekman, Eagly, and 
Kulesa 2002). Men and women behave differently in social situations and take 
on different roles due to the expectations that society places upon them (Eagly 
1987), with society establishing the judgment that men should occupy the 
public sphere of politics and be the breadwinners, while women should occupy 
the private sphere of the home and be the caregivers. As such, when women 
cross from the private into the public sphere, beliefs about gender differences 
tend to accompany them, stereotypically characterizing them as being more 
compassionate, collegial, and compromising (Prentice and Carranza 2002). 
Female politicians internalize these expectations and are socially rewarded 
for having these stereotypical traits (Eagly and Karau 2002). Surveys of female 
political officeholders show they believe they possess these interpersonal 
skills, making them more understanding and better at compromising than 
men (Johnson and Carroll 1978). They highlight their domestically honed 
diplomatic skills based on “mutual respect, consensus decision-making, vali-
dation of the feelings of others, and noncompetitive power” (Flammang 1985, 
111). These expectations further shape the policy issues they are concerned 
with, with women more frequently addressing traditional “women’s issues” 
(Holman 2014). Ultimately, because of gendered socialization patterns, these 
shared traits and interests yield a group of lawmakers who are more inclined 
to collaborate with each other and with others in their institutions.

A wide range of behavioral gender differences thus emerges (Eagly and 
Karau 2002). Female politicians report spending more time working to build 
relationships within their party and across party lines and engaging in more 
activities that involve communication and compromise (Carey, Niemi, and 
Powell 1998). Women adopt a more hands-on approach which emphasizes 
collegiality and cooperation (Jewell and Whicker 1994). Further, female poli-
ticians possess distinctive management or leadership styles with an insistence 
on mutual respect, consensus decision making, validation of the feelings of 
others, and noncompetitive power (Flammang 1985). Because of this, the 
inclusion of female politicians can change the agenda, process, and outcomes 
of the political institutions in which they are a part (Cammisa and Reingold 
2004).

There is some reason to question the extent to which women can and 
actually do engage in this behavior. Collaboration and compromise can be 



82 benJamin meluSKy

costly (Kanthak and Krause 2011). As the number of women holding office 
increases, these members may be less successful in achieving their goals (Car-
roll 2001), often facing increased resistance from their male colleagues (Kath-
lene 1994) and even backlash (Yoder 1991). Additionally, the influence and 
power of institutional masculine norms is thought to be more or less severe 
depending on the proportion of men and women in that body (Reingold 2003). 
In Congress, Lawless, Theriault, and Guthrie (2018) find the expectation of 
collaboration and compromise was mainly based on anecdotal evidence.

Yet Reingold (2003) finds that women who have made it into political office 
have broken formidable barriers and thus are capable of resisting and overcom-
ing at least some constraints. While there is widespread agreement that women 
have been excluded from the “inner circles of power” (Mezey 1980, 184–185), 
there is less consensus on the degree to which such obstacles constrain their 
behavior (Gertzog 1984). As noted above, external pressures compel and 
reward women for living gendered stereotypes and behavioral expectations 
(Bauer, Harbridge, and Krupnikov 2017). Simply put, women who are expected 
to be more compromising than their male colleagues can face more punitive 
costs when they do not meet those expectations. Thus, to compensate for a lack 
of other means of accessing power, women work with each other to overcome 
structural and political barriers (Wojcik and Mullenax 2017).

As such, there is potential to observe the benefits of the tendency of women 
to reach across the aisle and collaborate. Journalists, pundits, politicians, and 
scholars have called for a greater presence of female lawmakers to reduce grid-
lock and counteract the rise in ideological polarization (Jackman 2013).

Motivation to Compromise Resulting from Budget Impasses

Beyond merely necessitating compromise, failure to pass a budget by the fis-
cal year deadline has real consequences. It can result in the state incurring a 
variety of monetary costs. Legislatures that must extend the regular session 
or call special sessions to complete the budget process face increased opera-
tional costs (Pulsipher 2004). Additionally, during an impasse a state is unable 
to authorize payments into the next fiscal year and is subject to late fees and 
other penalties from vendors under state contract (Niquette 2009). Further, 
consistently failing to pass a budget in a timely manner can affect a state’s 
credit rating, decreasing bond ratings and increasing interest rates paid by 
states (Pulsipher 2004).

The state government does not solely incur the costs of a late budget. 
Without appropriation details, local governments, school districts, and non-
profit organizations are unable to budget, plan, or deal effectively with their 



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 83

contractual obligations (Pulsipher 2004). In 2009 and 2015, numerous Penn-
sylvania nonprofit groups like domestic violence shelters were compelled to 
furlough, reduce hours, eliminate benefits, and lay off portions of their labor 
force. County child protection service agencies were unable to place at-risk 
children in protective care without state funds (Wetzel 2009). When a state 
fails to pass its budget on time, people dependent on local social welfare pro-
grams, businesses that have contracts with the state, residents expecting a 
state income-tax refund, and college students expecting state grants are all 
left waiting until a new budget is enacted (Sweeney 2009). Additionally, school 
districts, which need a budget in place to receive funding, have made employ-
ees work without pay, considered moving to a four-day schedule, took out 
short-term loans, or threatened to shut their doors completely (Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers Association 2015).

Beyond the significant monetary costs to the states, it is these wider social 
costs that should drive female lawmakers to engage in consensus-oriented 
behavior during budgetary negotiations and avoid lengthy impasse periods. 
As the duration of a budget impasses increases, these populations of both 
descriptive and policy importance to female lawmakers are disproportionately 
harmed (Responsible Budget Coalition 2016). These constituent groups have 
become political bargaining chips in contemporary budget negotiations, as 
programs on which these groups rely are regularly impacted. This point was 
articulated by Governor Wolf who stated “I don’t want to hold the children 
of Pennsylvania hostage because of the inability of people in Harrisburg to 
get the job done” (Lindstrom and Gilliland 2015), and that failure to swiftly 
pass a balanced budget results in “consequences that will be forced upon the 
Commonwealth [which] will be unfortunate and could include impacts to 
programs on which our constituents rely” (Navratil 2017).

Evidence of Compromise

There is precedent to expect that electing women will make the budgetary 
process more collegial and could reduce the duration of an impasse should 
one occur. During the 2013 federal government shutdown, a bipartisan group 
of female U.S. senators held a weekend meeting beyond the eyes and influ-
ence of their party leadership and discussed ways to reopen the government 
(Weisman and Steinhauer 2013). Their male colleagues credited these discus-
sions with shaping the compromise ending the budget impasse (Bassett 2013). 
Interviews with female members of Congress ultimately reveal that they see 
collaboration and collegiality as their greatest strengths (Dittmar, Sanbon-
matsu, and Carroll 2018).



84 benJamin meluSKy

Similarly, in 2018 Louisiana was headed toward a $650 million shortfall 
at the end of the fiscal year and was at the end of its second special session 
attempting to address this problem. It was only because of the failed effort of 
Representative Julie Stokes (R), who was stopped at the microphone by a male 
colleague from calling for a compromise vote earlier in June, and the eventual 
success of Representative Paula Davis’s (R) compromise bill, that the budget 
stalemate was broken (Poche and Sanders 2018). In a legislature composed of 
only 15% women, the efforts of these women and their other female colleagues 
were instrumental in reaching a compromise.

Specifically concerning Pennsylvania, a report by the Pennsylvania Center 
for Women and Politics (2017) revealed that during the 2015 budget impasse, 
many women in the legislature on both sides of the aisle gathered for coffee 
and discussed efforts to end the impasse. This report details that in interviews 
with many female lawmakers, they espoused that the female lawmakers were 
more cooperative, especially during increasingly divided times (Pennsylvania 
Center for Women and Politics 2017; Sweet-Cushman 2020). The substance 
of these interviews is consistent with gender socialization patterns, indicat-
ing that these lawmakers possess the stereotypical shared traits and interests 
that make them more inclined to collaborate. Considering these shared traits, 
many of the women felt that they were more cooperative because women 
worked differently. Senator Judy Schwank (D) and Representative Margo 
Davidson (D) noted that women legislate differently, seeking out likeminded 
legislators with whom to collaborate. Similar to the domestically honed dip-
lomatic skills noted by Flammang (1985), Representative Tina Picket (R) felt 
that a woman’s ability to multitask was comparable to how they juggle various 
household demands. Despite not having a formal women’s caucus, Represen-
tative Davidson noted that they have an informal pact to support each other’s 
policy efforts. Together, in today’s partisan environment, many female law-
makers expressed the necessity of cooperation.

Further, women share common interests, with Representative Donna 
Oberlander (R) noting that they naturally collaborate with one another 
because they share common ground. Women in the legislature focus on 
addressing traditional “women’s issues” which affect key demographics such 
as women, children, and families. Representative Mauree Gingrich (R) noted 
that women needed to tackle these issues because if they didn’t, no one else 
would. Representative Davidson felt that solidarity among women, regardless 
of party, was important because it facilitated greater progress on these key 
issues. Ultimately, Representative Mary Jo Daley (D) expressed that compro-
mising was crucial because it allowed for dialogue on these issues (Pennsylva-
nia Center for Women and Politics 2017; Sweet-Cushman 2020).



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 85

Taken together, this anecdotal and qualitative evidence is illustrative of 
the premise that women possess both the means and motivation to engage 
in collaborative efforts. Yet, given current representation levels, electoral and 
partisan demands, and institutional norms, observing collaboration in the 
passage of a timely budget might not yet be realized. The evidence cited ear-
lier indicates that the optimal time to observe potential collaboration is once 
the fiscal year ends without a new budget in place and the state enters into a 
period of budget impasse (a late budget). This is especially true when impasses 
stretch on, acutely impacting many of the groups and issues traditionally des-
ignated as “woman oriented” (Responsible Budget Coalition 2016).

But evidence beyond anecdotal and qualitative accounts is necessary to 
determine if electing more women to the General Assembly can solve Penn-
sylvania’s budget woes by making the budgetary process more collegial. Com-
parative empirical evidence can offer further support for this behavior during 
periods of budget impasse. I thus examine the duration of budget impasses 
in the American states from 1993 to 2006 taken from Kousser and Phillips 
(2012). Within this period there were 71 late budgets and impasses lasted an 
average of 47.7 days in 18 states. The influence of gender on the length of an 
impasse manifests in both the presence of women within the legislature over-
all—% Legislature Female (–)—and within the political minority—% Legis-
lature Minority Female (–)—coded as the percentage of the state legislature/
minority party represented by women and taken from data collected by the 
Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP).2

Beyond these key variables of interest, several additional factors were con-
sidered. While it is one thing for a woman to be elected, it is another thing 
to be a power player or critical actor (Childs and Krook 2009). As such, lead-
ership positions within the legislative party structure—% Party Leadership 
Female (–)—are coded as the percentage of the party leadership positions held 
by women and taken from data collected by the CAWP. Partisanship and 
polarization should make it more difficult to bring an impasse to conclu-
sion. Under divided government, stalemates occur because the two branches 
cannot agree on the distribution of particularistic and statewide spending 
(Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003). Thus, Divided Government (+) is coded 1 
when both branches of the state government are divided along partisan lines, 
0 otherwise (Klarner 2013). Similarly, the ideological Polarization (+) of the 
legislature will make resolution more difficult. Taken from Birkhead (2016), 
this measure is operationalized from the Shor-McCarty common space scores 
(Shor and McCarty 2011) as a single-dimension indicator, with higher values 
indicating more polarized parties. Additionally, increases in legislative pro-
fessionalization (Squire 2007) afford members a greater degree of patience in 



86 benJamin meluSKy

protracted budget deliberations (Kousser and Phillips 2009). Taken from The 
Book of the States, the number of Days in Session (+) a state legislature meets 
provides an accurate reflection of their level of patience in a budget impasse 
period (Kousser and Phillips 2009).

Finally, several fiscal and institutional features may impact budget resolu-
tion during an impasse. A highly complex budget can make the process more 
difficult (Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012). The state’s total Real General 
Expenditures (+) in a given year, and whether the state operates under a Bien-
nial budget (+), coded 1 if the state budgets biennially and 0 otherwise, both 
increase the complexity of the budget. Data for both variables were taken from 
The Book of the States. Similarly, the fiscal health of the state can influence the 
passage of a state’s budget (Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012). The state’s 
budget Surplus (–), measured as the difference between total expenditures 
and revenues with negative values indicating a budget deficit and lagged one 
period (t–1) and taken from Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2012), and the 
state’s Unemployment rate (–), taken from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics, seasonally adjusted, were included. 
Whether the state requires a partial government Shutdown (–) in the absence 
of a budget is included, coded 1 if the state’s law mandates a government shut-
down and 0 otherwise and was taken from Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 
(2012).

I fit a Cox proportional hazards model to consider the factors that influ-
ence the duration of a budget impasse, with failure specified as when a state 
adopts its budget for the next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an 
end. The results from this analysis are displayed in Table 1.

Hazard ratios are reported allowing for ease of interpretation: values 
greater than 1 imply the hazard rate is increasing such that the presence of 
the indicator increases the probability that the budget impasse will come to 
an end, while values less than 1 imply the opposite. Briefly turning to the 
ancillary covariates of interest, various significant factors explain the dura-
tion of a budget impasse consistent with the prior literature (Polarization, 
Days in Session, and Surplus), whereas other covariates revealed effects con-
sistent with expectations though failing to reach accepted levels of signifi-
cance (Divided Government, Real General Expenditures, Unemployment, and 
Biennial). The only significant result inconsistent with expectations was that 
having a greater presence of women in the party leadership (% Party Leader-
ship Female) increased the length of a budget impasse, increasing the hazard 
rate by 2.4%. But this finding is not entirely surprising given that gender roles 
persist in historically male-dominated institutions where women who seek 
leadership positions must sacrifice much of who they are to overcome many of 



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 87

the obstacles faced by their predecessors (Campbell and Jerry 1988; Marshall 
and Mayhead 2000).

Turning to the role that gender can play during a budget stalemate, 
consistent with expectations, the presence of women in the legislature has 
a significant impact of shortening a budget impasse, should one occur. In 
the legislature overall (% Legislature Female), each additional percent of the 
legislature represented by women increases the likelihood of an impasse com-
ing to an end by 7.6%. Substantively, a 1 standard deviation increase in the 
percentage of women in the legislature is associated with a 32.6% decrease in 
the duration of a budget impasse.3 Further, when a larger number of women 
are in the political minority (% Legislature Minority Female), a similar effect is 
observed, with an increase in their presence increasing the risk of an impasse 
ending by 8.3%, and substantively experiencing a 28.3% decrease in the dura-
tion of a budget impasse. Taken together, irrespective of where women exist 
in the legislature (overall or in the political minority), once a budget impasse 
does occur, an increased female presence benefits the state in reducing the 
length of the duration.

Considered with the above evidence that women in the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly possess the means and motivation to work collaboratively, 
an increased presence of women has the potential to positively influence 
this inherently conflictual process. Pennsylvania thus sits at a crossroads in 

table 1. Factors affecting Duration of budget impasses, 1993–2006

% Legislature Female 1.076* (0.042)

% Legislature Minority Female 1.083** (0.041)

% Party Leadership Female 0.976* (0.013)

Divided Government 0.733 (0.279)

Polarization 0.858† (0.082)

Days in Session 0.991*** (0.003)

Real General Expenditures 0.977 (0.048)

Unemployment 0.975 (0.116)

Surplus 1.036*** (0.013)

Shutdown 0.457 (0.236)

Biennial 0.322*** (0.133)

N 71

Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis. Failure = when a state adopts its 
budget for the next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, 
followed by standard errors in parentheses.

* p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01; †significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test)



88 benJamin meluSKy

its history, faced with a great opportunity to limit its perennial budgeting 
problems.

Problems and Possibilities

The Problem

Women have been significantly underrepresented at every level of govern-
ment throughout Pennsylvania’s history. To date, Pennsylvania has never had 
a female governor, and even though the number of women in the General 
Assembly has quintupled since 1975, in 2018 Pennsylvania was ranked 39th 
in the country for the overall proportion of legislative seats held by women 
(Center for American Women and Politics 2018).

The slow movement of women into political office has been taken as prima 
facie evidence that voters are biased against female candidates. However, 
recent literature on sex-based discrimination offers an optimistic outlook 
such that voters do not appear to factor a candidate’s sex into their decision-
making calculus, with women winning at comparable rates to men (Brooks 
2013). The pattern of women remaining vastly underrepresented in elected 
office is attributed more to women being more averse to seeking office, either 
because they do not consider themselves qualified (Kanthak and Woon 2015) 
or because few people encourage them to run (Lawless and Fox 2010). Even 
if a gender bias exists, increased representation over time has normalized the 
image of women as viable candidates in the mind of the electorate.

2018 saw a record number of women expressing interest in and running 
for elected office, spurring hopes that 2018 could become a new “Year of the 
Woman.” More women ran for state governor than in the last seven years 
combined, and record numbers of women ran for their state’s legislature. In 
Pennsylvania, 126 women ran as major-party candidates for state legislative 
office (88 Democrats and 38 Republicans) and Laura Ellsworth ran for the 
Republican nomination to challenge incumbent governor Tom Wolf. Given 
the historic number of women running across all levels of government, 
numerous polls showed a shift in attitudes toward support for having women 
in elected office, though with some mixed findings in attitudes toward the 
benefits of women on the government (Igielnik and Horowitz 2018).

Possibilities and Challenges

As a result of the 2018 midterm elections, the number of women in the Penn-
sylvania legislature has improved, with 12 women in the state Senate (up from 
seven) and 51 in the state House (up from 42). While these numbers are an 



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 89

improvement, Pennsylvania only increased its rank from 39th in the country 
to 34th (Center for American Women and Politics 2019). Despite becoming 
more diverse, it remains substantially unrepresentative of the female popula-
tion (24.9% compared to 51%). But at what level of representation would the 
benefits of gender on the budgetary process be realized?

Much of the prior research focuses on the concept of critical mass: as 
the number of women grows from a few token members to a certain thresh-
old it can shape the process and policies of that political body. This theory 
assumes a linear relationship between the number of women and the desired 
political outcomes. Various thresholds have been proposed to operationalize 
this relationship, commonly categorized as skewed groups (up to 15%), titled 
groups (15–35%) (Kanter 1977), and the widely used critical cut-point of 30% 
(Dahlerup 1988). Others argue that as the number of women in an organiza-
tion increases, the women will be less successful in achieving their policy 
goals (Carroll 2001), often facing resistance from their male colleagues (Kath-
lene 1994). As such, women might be more effective in the political minor-
ity (Osborn 2014), as they would be in a position in which they must reach 
across party lines to advance their goals (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 
2013). Pennsylvania is in a unique position to evaluate the impact of increased 
women’s representation. Increased representation inches the legislature closer 
to the 30% cut-point, allowing for evaluation of critical mass theories. Fur-
ther, the recent increases have occurred in the Democratic political minority, 
a position necessitating compromise, allowing for evaluation of theories of 
minority representation.

Despite increases in women’s representation, it may take time for Penn-
sylvania to realize these benefits. Critics argue that studies of substantive rep-
resentation perhaps should focus not on what women do but rather on what 
specific actors do (Childs and Krook 2009). Critical Actor Theory suggests 
that it takes time for women to gain seniority and assume positions of power 
in the party leadership and chamber committees. Since 1945, only 10 women 
in the House and 1 in the Senate have ever held leadership positions (Penn-
sylvania Center for Women and Politics 2019), and no woman has ever held a 
top leadership post (e.g., president pro tempore/speaker). Similarly, while the 
number of women holding committee chairs has increased overtime, of the 
94 possible positions, women have only recently held 11 (8 Senate/3 House) 
(Center for American Women and Politics 2017), and no woman has ever 
led the Appropriations Committee in either chamber (Pennsylvania General 
Assembly 2019).

This underrepresentation highlights the fact that women entering into 
the legislature face an institutional culture that upholds masculinity as the 



90 benJamin meluSKy

norm (Thomas 1994). But this is not unique to Pennsylvania, as the political 
world has traditionally been “a man’s business” (Githens and Prestage 1977, 
339), given that there has never been majority female legislative body in the 
United States. Nevada recently made history by becoming the first state in 
which women hold a majority of the seats in the state legislature. Though still 
early in the new legislative session, members acknowledge that the institution 
is already experiencing a culture change, advancing a significant number of 
bills dealing with traditional women’s issues, which state Senator Spearman 
(D) noted in prior legislative sessions “the boys club was like, ‘why do we need 
that,’” yet are now receiving significant attention and support. Ultimately, 
“there’s change in this building that is just this amazing story of transfor-
mation . . . and it really highlights the importance of the female majority 
being not just here, but finally being heard,” said Senator Swank (D) (Wax-
Thibodeaux 2019). With significant gains being made by women in legis-
latures across the country, and with women holding more than 40 percent 
of seats in Nevada, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, scholars’ ability to 
observe potential institutional change may be on the horizon.

This change may not come fast enough for Pennsylvania given that the 
Independent Fiscal Office (IFO) projected that, because the 2015 budget 
impasse fought over tax increases was ended by meeting shortfalls with trans-
fers from other state accounts totaling more than $1 billion, budget shortfalls 
are expected to reoccur every year until fiscal year 2023–2024 (Esack 2018). 
Fiscal year 2020 began with an expected $1.7 billion deficit whereas the ongo-
ing impact and uncertainty caused by COVID-19 resulted in fiscal year 2021 
opening with a $3.2 billion shortfall. These deficits necessitate the Common-
wealth to take a long look at increasing income or sales taxes or reducing 
certain state services. Additionally, the recent Democratic electoral success 
saw the defeat of many moderate Republicans from the Philadelphia suburbs, 
making the ideological distribution of the Republican majorities more conser-
vative. Taken together, Pennsylvania is set up to experience additional budget 
fights for the foreseeable future.

However, the future is bright for Democratic women moving forward. 
While the Republican party has consistently held an advantage in the num-
ber of women in the General Assembly historically, the results of the 2018 
elections have altered this trend. Female candidates in Pennsylvania can 
overcome the challenges in candidate recruitment (see Brown, this volume) 
and emerge as quality contenders for both open-seat contests and against 
entrenched incumbents. Pennsylvania is at a historic crossroads, and how it 
proceeds moving forward will have important implications for the growth 
and prosperity of the Commonwealth.



Solving Pennsylvania’s Budget Woes 91

NOTES

1. Polarization is defined as the average ideological distance between the median 
Democrat and Republican in the state legislature and taken from Shor and McCarty 
(2011).

2. The parenthesis following each covariate reflects the direction of the hypothesized 
relationship: a (+) indicates that it is expected that the variable increases the duration of 
the impasse whereas a (–) indicates a shorter impasse.

3. Increasing the value of % Legislature Female by 1 standard deviation centered on 
the mean, calculated using the unexponentiated coefficient 0.072 or ln(1.075) and the 
expression: exp(0.072 × 18.87) – exp(0.072 × 24.65) / exp(0.072 × 24.65) × 100. This same 
formula was subsequently adjusted for % Legislature Minority Female.

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benjamin melusky is an assistant professor of political science in the Department of 
Political Science & Geography at Old Dominion University. His publications include arti-
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focuses on the subjects of gender, institutional rules, and legislative/executive interactions 
in the American States. 


	Structure Bookmarks
	Late Budgets
	Problems and Possibilities
	NOTES
	REFERENCES


