





































1

THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS IN 
THE 1838 STATE CONSTITUTION: 

RACISM, POLITICS, OR 
ECONOMICS?—A STATISTICAL 

ANALYSIS

DAVID A. LATZKO

Pennsylvania State University, York Campus

Delegates to Pennsylvania’s state constitutional convention in 1837–38 
approved an amendment limiting the right to vote to “white freemen.” Some 
scholars argue that simple racism explains this decision. Others emphasize 
the partisan nature of the issue of black suffrage or the economic rivalry 
between blacks and whites for jobs. This article quantitatively examines 
the factors affecting how convention delegates voted on black suffrage. The 
delegates’ political affiliation and the share of free blacks in the populations 
of the delegates’ home counties are robust determinants of how the delegates 
voted. Democrats voted to disenfranchise black Pennsylvanians. Delegates 
from counties with proportionally large black populations opposed 
disenfranchisement.

In 1838, Pennsylvania’s voters approved a state constitution that 
restricted the right to vote to “white freemen.” Blacks had voted for many 
years in some parts of the state, but under the new constitution Pennsylvania’s 
black males could no longer vote. Eric Ledell Smith (1998, 279) maintains 
that “scholarship on this topic has failed to give us a complete and cohesive 
picture of why disenfranchisement occurred in Pennsylvania.” Some 
historians argue that simple racism explains why delegates to the state’s 
constitutional convention voted to deny blacks the franchise. For example, 
Mueller (1969, 37) contends that “in the closing days of the convention 
party lines were forgotten, prejudice was appealed to, and the clause was 
altered by the insertion of the word ‘white’ by a large non-partisan vote.” 



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

Brown (1970, 22) similarly notes that the convention vote “seems to have 
been largely a matter of responding to growing race prejudice in the State.” 
Other scholars emphasize the partisan nature of the issue of black suffrage 
in Pennsylvania (Smith 1998). Still others point to the economic rivalry 
“between Negroes and the Irish immigrants for the same menial jobs” as a 
contributing factor (Brown 1970, 27–28).

Because the reasons for disenfranchising blacks in the state constitution 
of 1838 are disputed (Malone 2008), examining the factors that influenced 
the votes of convention delegates on this issue is an important step in 
understanding the state’s political and economic history. Despite the intense 
debate, no scholars have employed formal statistical analyses to test their 
hypotheses about why delegates to the state’s constitutional convention 
voted to strip black males of the franchise. This article offers statistical and 
econometric tests of voting behavior at the constitutional convention.

The 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution gave the right to vote to “every 
freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the state two 
years next before the election, and within that time paid a state or county 
tax, which shall have been assessed at least six months before the election” 
(Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1790, Article III, Section I). In practice, 
voting rights for blacks depended on the policies of local officials, meaning 
that blacks voted in some counties but not in others. “Blacks voted in 
Bucks, York, Dauphin, Cumberland, Juniata, Westmoreland and Allegheny 
Counties, whereas in Philadelphia, the county with the largest black 
population, the officials refused to assess blacks for the purpose of taxation, 
thereby denying them the right to vote” (Price 1976, 357). As a result of such 
policies and the tax requirement, the majority of black men in Pennsylvania 
were not able to vote (Price 1973, 92).

The political status of black Pennsylvanians was not a public issue 
before the state constitutional convention assembled in May 1837. Agitation 
for a new state constitution had erupted periodically over several decades. 
Finally, in 1835, voters approved a referendum calling for a constitutional 
convention. Reformers generally wished to reduce the governor’s 
appointment power, to permit direct election of state officers, and to abolish 
life tenure for judges (Akagi 1924, 309). Reformers also objected to the 
power of the state legislature to charter corporations and to authorize banks 
to issue notes (Snyder 1958, 96).

On May 2, 1837, the 133 delegates to the constitutional convention 
convened in Harrisburg. The delegates included 66 Democrats, 52 Anti-
Masons, and 15 Whigs, giving a narrow majority to the coalition of Anti-
Masons and Whigs. The article on suffrage reported to the convention on 
May 17 was practically the same as the text of the 1790 Constitution, except 
that the tax qualification was removed. Neither the committee report nor the 
report of the committee’s minority contained a racial restriction on voting.



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DAVID A. LATZKO

The suffrage article was taken up on June 19.1 John Sterigere, a Democrat 
from Montgomery County, moved to strike the report of the committee and 
insert instead a clause restricting the franchise to “every free white male 
citizen” who had “paid a State, county, road or poor tax” (Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 2:472). He argued that this racial restriction was 
proper, “as it was the language of some seventeen or eighteen Constitutions 
in the Union” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 2:472).

Phineas Jenks, a Bucks County Whig, moved to eliminate the word 
“white” from Sterigere’s amendment. Jenks said there were black individuals 
in Bucks County worth between $20,000 and $100,000; and it would be 
improper for someone with such a stake in society to be excluded from 
exercising the franchise Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 2:476).

Benjamin Martin, a Democrat from Philadelphia County, opposed the 
motion to strike the word “white” from the amendment, warning that

any attempt to amend the Constitution to place the black 
population on an equal footing with the white population, would 
prove ruinous to the black people. He was certain that in the county 
of Philadelphia any attempt of the black population to exercise 
the right of suffrage would bring ruin upon their own heads. 
(Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 2:477)

James Merrill, an Anti-Mason from Union County, argued that according 
to the U.S. Constitution every man who was not a fugitive from justice was 
a free man. “Was it possible,” Merrill asked, “that freemen who possessed 
property . . . were not allowed to vote, on account of their complexion. If 
there were men in Pennsylvania so situated, he would like to know under 
what sort of Government we had been living––what kind of freedom we 
were supposed to enjoy, and whether we deserved to continue free under 
such an extraordinary state of things” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
1837–38, 2:478). Merrill also worried that because the word “white” was 
vague, too much discretion would fall to the judges of elections. The debate 
ended temporarily when Sterigere withdrew his motion. Edward Price 
(1973, 104) says the proponents of racial exclusion feared that they might 
not be able to win a vote on the amendment.

On June 23, Benjamin Martin moved to amend Sterigere’s proposal by 
adding the provision that “the rights of an elector shall in no case extend 
to anyone but free white male citizens” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
1837–38, 3:83). He argued that his amendment was necessary because 
of the rapid increase in the number of blacks in Pennsylvania. The failure 
to make Native Americans equal to whites, Martin remarked, belied the 
promise to blacks that they could achieve equality with whites. He further 
warned that if Pennsylvania allowed blacks to vote, the state would attract 
free blacks and runaway slaves from the southern states.



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

John Dickey, a Whig from Beaver County, said he was sure his 
constituents did not expect the issue of voting rights for blacks to come 
up; he thus desired no action on it. Yet he demanded that Martin explain 
what he meant by “white” and whether “all the various shades, departing 
from white and carnation, are to be disfranchised” (Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania 1837–38, 3:86). John McCahen, a Philadelphia Democrat, 
noted that at the state constitutional convention in 1790 Albert Gallatin 
“thought that the word ‘white’ was too indefinite; that it might exclude him 
from the enjoyment of the rights of a voter; and upon his suggestion, the 
word was stricken out” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 3:87). 
Charles Brown, a Philadelphia Democrat, countered that other states that 
had restricted the franchise to white males had no difficulty determining 
who was eligible to vote. Besides, Brown contended, the principle had been 
established that “no negro could become a citizen of the United States” 
(Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 3:89).

George Woodward, a Democrat from Luzerne County, objected to 
Martin’s proposal because there was a case currently pending before the 
state supreme court on the question whether blacks had a right to vote under 
the current state constitution (Fogg v. Hobbs).2 He counseled the convention 
delegates to wait for the court’s decision, due the next month, before taking 
up the issue. Brown replied that it was for the people, not the courts, to 
decide who had the right of suffrage.

The amendment to restrict the vote to “free white males” was rejected 
by a vote of 61–49. Twelve Democrats joined a large number of Whigs and 
Anti-Masons to vote “no,” whereas 43 Democrats and 6 members of the 
Anti-Mason/Whig coalition voted to restrict the franchise to white males. 
The voting rights of black Pennsylvanians were temporarily preserved. The 
convention considered other matters up to July 14 when it adjourned until 
October 17, 1837.

On October 10, 1837, the Democratic candidates lost five of six 
electoral contests in Bucks County to their Whig and other anti-Van 
Burenite opponents. Several of the races were exceedingly close; the 
Democratic candidate for auditor lost by just two votes. The Democratic 
Party challenged the results, alleging that the anti-Van Burenite coalition 
prevailed only because of illegal votes by blacks. W.E.B. Du Bois ([1899] 
2007, 258) wrote that the “friends of exclusion now began systematic 
efforts to stir up public opinion.” Public meetings were held throughout the 
county to organize against black suffrage (Rosenberger 1974, 30–31; Smith 
1998, 289–291). Citizens in Bucks County submitted to the constitutional 
convention memorials against black suffrage.

The defeated candidates asked a judge in Bucks County to overturn the 
election results because of the votes of 39 blacks who, the losers alleged, 
had no right to vote. In December 1837 Judge John Fox announced his 



5

DAVID A. LATZKO

ruling (Price 1976, 359). The central question was whether blacks were 
“freemen” under Pennsylvania law. Fox reviewed documents as old as 
William Penn’s original charter and concluded that because there was no 
evidence that blacks had ever been thought to possess the rights of freemen, 
they could not vote.

On November 16, 1837, John Sterigere presented a petition from 
citizens of Bucks County advocating a constitutional provision prohibiting 
black suffrage. Referring to the previous month’s disputed election, 
Sterigere argued that blacks “could not be placed on an equality in political 
and social rights, with white citizens” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
1837–38, 4:414). After some debate over the political status of blacks in 
Pennsylvania, the convention voted overwhelmingly to print the petition. 
Robert Mittrick (1985, 28) notes that “the debate strongly suggested what a 
vote (84–29) in favor of printing the petition confirmed, that the anti-Negro 
forces had indeed gained support and perhaps were now in the majority.”

On January 17, 1838, Benjamin Martin moved to amend the suffrage 
clause by inserting the word “white” before the word “freeman” in the first 
and seventh lines. Martin said he had no

hostility to the coloured man; on the contrary, no person would go 
further to protect them in all their natural rights . . . but to hold out 
to them social rights, or to incorporate them with ourselves in the 
exercise of the right of franchise, is a violation of the law of nature 
and would lead to . . . the resentment of the white population. . . . 
The divisionary line between the races, is so strongly marked by 
the Creator, that it is unwise and cruelly unjust, in any way, to 
amalgamate them, for it must be apparent to every well judging 
person, that the elevation of the black is the degradation of the 
white man; and by endeavoring to alter the order of nature, we 
would, in all probability, bring about a war between the races. 
(Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 9:321)

The debate continued until January 20 with speaker after speaker making 
the same arguments. Opponents of black suffrage continued to insist that 
blacks were not citizens under either the state or the federal constitution and 
therefore did not have the right to vote. Even if they did have that right, public 
opinion demanded that they have it no longer, for white Pennsylvanians 
“are for continuing this commonwealth, what it always has been, a political 
community of white persons”; and they were opposed to “investing our own 
negroes with this valuable right, and to a policy which will bring upon us 
hords [sic] of negroes from other states” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
1837–38, 9:357). Opponents accordingly asserted that a violent backlash 
would be provoked if blacks were granted the franchise. Charles Brown, a 
Democrat representing a district in Philadelphia with 3,000 to 4,000 blacks, 



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

predicted that “in twenty-four hours from the time that an attempt should be 
made by blacks to vote, not a negro house in the city or county would be left 
standing” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 9:393).

Supporters of voting rights for blacks continued to argue that the 
word “white” was too vague, that blacks were freemen and entitled to vote 
under the state constitution, and that violence would not result from blacks 
exercising the right to vote. “Although the arguments had been presented 
before, the debate became extremely emotional, and tensions were at the 
breaking point. The few men who maintained cool heads were unable to 
calm the antagonists” (Price 1973, 115). Finally, the vote was taken and 
the amendment to insert the word “white” was adopted by a vote of 77–45. 
Only three Democrats voted against the motion; 19 Whigs and Anti-Masons 
joined 58 Democrats in supporting it.3 Efforts to soften the restriction 
failed. With the narrow approval of the new state constitution by voters that 
October, black Pennsylvanians lost the right to vote.

Data and Methods

This article examines quantitatively why black voters lost their suffrage 
rights in the 1838 Pennsylvania constitution. Limiting the franchise to 
“white freemen” was part of a package of controversial changes to the state 
constitution submitted to the electorate in October 1838 and approved by a 
vote of 113,971 to 112,759. Indeed, black disenfranchisement was the least 
controversial change proposed by the convention. Charles Snyder (1958, 
105) argues that the “growing force of anti-Negro prejudice in the State 
was clearly revealed by the overwhelming backing which was given to this 
amendment. . . . No other alteration cut so completely across party lines or 
received such decisive support.” The decisive vote to disenfranchise blacks 
occurred at the constitutional convention on January 20, 1838. Explaining 
it requires ascertaining why the 122 delegates voted 77–45 to restrict the 
suffrage to white men. For revealing the relationship between the delegates’ 
personal and constituent interests and their voting on black suffrage, the 
dependent variable is the vote a delegate cast on January 20 on the motion 
to insert the word “white” before the word “freeman” in the suffrage clause 
of the proposed state constitution. The dependent variable has a value of 1 
if the delegate voted in favor of disenfranchising black voters and 0 if the 
delegate voted against the motion.

Voting patterns are estimated using the general specification V = f(P, C), 
where V is the dummy variable representing a delegate’s vote on the black 
disenfranchisement amendment, P is a set of delegate-specific variables, and 
C is a set of measures of the characteristics of the county represented by the 
delegate. Where the delegate represented multiple counties, the variables 
reflect the characteristics of his county of residence.



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DAVID A. LATZKO

Racial prejudice and violence increased in Pennsylvania during the 
1820s and 1830s (Du Bois [1899] 2007, 15–18; Nash 1988, 273–279; 
Winch 1988, 130–152). Much of it was directed against abolitionists, with 
the most notorious event perhaps being the burning of Pennsylvania Hall in 
May 1838 (Brown 1970, 24–28). Radical abolitionists had found it difficult 
to find meeting places because churches and public halls increasingly 
refused them entrance. So a group of Philadelphians built an auditorium 
that would be open to antislavery and other reform groups. The hall opened 
on May 14, 1838. On the evening of May 16 a public meeting devoted to the 
discussion of slavery convened, during which a noted female abolitionist, 
Angelina Grimke Weld, gave an address to a group of men and women of 
both races. It was not regarded as proper at that time for women to give 
speeches to mixed gender audiences. A mob gathered outside the hall to 
shout insults and throw stones at the windows. On May 17 the hall allowed a 
meeting of a national women’s antislavery group. Rumors spread that white 
women had been seen walking arm in arm with black men to and from 
events held at Pennsylvania Hall. A mob once again gathered outside the 
hall. At one point the mayor of Philadelphia appeared in person to plead 
with the mob to disperse. The mob later broke into the building and set fire 
to the hall. Extinguishing only the adjacent buildings, fire companies made 
no effort to save Pennsylvania Hall. The next night more rioting occurred 
outside a building occupied by a newspaper friendly to abolitionists, and a 
black orphanage was burned.

Against this background, the transcript of the debate over ending black 
suffrage cannot be read without concluding that racism played some role in 
the outcome. John Sterigere, the leader of the antiblack delegates, declared 
blacks to be

physically and morally an inferior species of population. They are 
incompetent by nature . . . to exercise this valuable privilege. . . . The 
God of nature has made them a distinct, inferior caste, and placed 
a mark on them too visible to be disregarded. The evidence of their 
inferiority is everywhere. . . . They are also a debased and degraded 
portion of our population. . . . Is it proper to confer this important 
right . . . upon such an inferior, low, degraded and ignorant mass 
as our black population? Is the right of suffrage so little prized by 
us, that we are willing to share it with the scum and outcasts of 
the negro population of other states? If the black population had 
sufficient capacity to exercise the right of voting, their colour and 
other circumstances must prevent any amalgamation or association 
with the white population. . . . It is an insult to the white man to 
propose this association, and ask him to go to the polls, and exercise 
the right of a freeman with negroes. Our antipathies are too great to 



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

allow such an association, and if attempted, will produce conflicts 
and bloodsheds at our elections, where all must meet, and on the 
same day. (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 9:364–65)

According to Edward Turner (1912, 189), “The really decisive factors, 
in the Convention at any rate, were the general dislike of the negro in 
Pennsylvania, and the general prejudice against him.” Speaker after speaker 
echoed the same themes: that blacks were inferior to whites, that racial 
amalgamation was to be feared, that black suffrage would attract southern 
blacks to the state, and that violence against black citizens would result 
from their attempting to vote.

I test six racial variables: the percentage of county population in 1840 
accounted for by free black persons; the growth rate of the free black 
population between 1830 and 1840; the distance from Philadelphia to the 
county seat; a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the county borders 
Delaware, Maryland, or Virginia; a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
if blacks customarily voted in the county; and a variable measuring the 
partisan competitiveness of the county.

Conflict theories of racial prejudice imply that whites perceive the 
heightened presence and visibility of blacks to be a political and economic 
threat (Blalock 1967; Key 1949). Indeed, Marylee Taylor (1998) finds that 
white racial hostility rises as the black population in an area increases. If 
delegate voting behavior reflected the preferences and prejudices of their 
constituents, then both the percentage of free black persons in the county 
population and the growth rate of the free black population are expected to 
increase the probability that a delegate voted to disenfranchise blacks. Just 
over 40% of the state’s free blacks lived in Philadelphia; 58% resided in 
the five counties comprising southeastern Pennsylvania. If the proximity of 
blacks to whites increases white racial prejudice, then this prejudice would 
be strongest in the counties closest to Philadelphia and weaken the farther 
the distance from Philadelphia.

The fear that suffrage rights would attract blacks from the South would 
be most keenly felt in counties along Pennsylvania’s southern border, so 
delegates from these counties ought to have been more likely than other 
delegates to support black disenfranchisement. Blacks had been voting in 
several counties: Allegheny, Bucks, Cumberland, Dauphin, Juniata, Luzerne, 
Westmoreland, and York (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1837–38, 9:380). 
Being accustomed to blacks exercising the right to vote, delegates from 
these counties were perhaps less likely to support black disenfranchisement.

Opponents of black suffrage denied that blacks were equal to whites. 
Such people would not want black votes to determine the outcome 
of elections. Accordingly, the more politically competitive a county 
is, the more decisive are its black voters. I create a variable to measure 



9

DAVID A. LATZKO

the political competition in a county by taking the absolute value of the 
difference between 50 and the percentage of the county vote received by 
the Democratic candidate in the gubernatorial race in 1838. This number 
was then subtracted from 100. The greater the resulting value, the greater 
the political competition in the county. Regardless of political affiliation, 
racial ascriptivists from politically competitive counties were more likely 
than other people to support limiting the vote to white freemen.

Although the standard Pennsylvania history text (Klein and Hoogenboom 
1980, 148) refers to the vote on black suffrage as “nonpartisan,” partisan 
politics figured into the debate over black suffrage (Malone 2008, 72–82; 
Smith 1998, 280). Black votes were alleged to have determined the outcome 
of the 1837 elections in Bucks County (Rosenberger 1974). Democrats 
believed that blacks would overwhelmingly vote for Whigs and Anti-
Masons. John Sterigere asked,

But what is to be [the] effect of this negro suffrage? The memorial 
presented on behalf of the coloured people, says the effect of this 
amendment would be to deprive 40,000 of their rights. I presume 
that is about the number of blacks in this state. That number would 
produce 10,000 voters. These will, in the mass, join one of the great 
political parties, or be controlled by some political demagogue, or 
modern abolitionist, and must become the umpire between the two 
great political parties of the state. (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
1837–38, 9:365)

Democrats, then, would be more likely than non-Democrats to vote in favor 
of eliminating black voting rights. In addition to a dummy variable denoting 
whether the delegate was a Democrat, I test four other political variables. 
One tests for the interaction between the Democrat dummy variable and the 
political-competition variable described above. Democrats from competitive 
areas were likely to support disenfranchisement on partisan political grounds 
rather than on the basis of political philosophy or racial prejudice.

The constitutional convention also voted to retain the tax qualification 
for voters. As Rebecca Keister (2005, 47) notes, both the tax qualification 
and black suffrage votes were concerned with whether “a group of men who 
were neglected members of society, by 1838 standards, should vote.” Those 
delegates favoring elimination of the tax qualification may have possessed 
an inclusive view of citizenship and political rights and may have favored 
black suffrage for philosophical reasons. The variable takes a value of 1 if 
the delegate voted to remove the tax qualification for voting; otherwise, 
its value is 0. I posit a negative relationship between votes on the tax and 
race requirements for voting. That is, those delegates who voted against 
eliminating the tax qualification would be expected to vote in favor of black 
disenfranchisement.



10

DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

I also test the percentage of the county vote for the Democratic 
candidate for governor in the 1838 election and expect it to be positively 
related to support for black disenfranchisement. Another political variable 
measures the percentage of adults in the county, both white and black 
and male and female, that voted in the 1838 gubernatorial election. This 
variable is intended to capture the extent to which citizens participate in 
democratic decision making. I expect it to be negatively related to a vote 
against black suffrage. Communities in which a large fraction of the 
population participates in political activities are less likely to deny some 
of their members their political rights. Blacks did organize to protest and 
prevent disenfranchisement (Smith 1998, 292–96). Mancur Olson’s (1965) 
classic study suggests that collective action is more difficult to organize 
in large groups than in small groups. Population density may strengthen 
the social interactions necessary for collective action. Counties with a high 
black-population density may have experienced more effective black protest 
against disenfranchisement, implying that delegates from these counties 
would have been less likely to support black disenfranchisement.

Economic issues may also have played a role in the vote. Ira Brown 
(1970, 22) writes, “Another factor was the continuing influx to Pennsylvania 
of slaves and freedmen from the states to the south. This element competed 
with recent immigrants from Europe for jobs which were becoming scarcer 
in the wake of the Panic of 1837.” The Panic of 1837 began on May 10 
when banks in New York City refused to redeem their notes in coin. When 
the news reached Philadelphia late that evening, the city’s leading bankers 
met and agreed to suspend specie payments immediately (Cyril 1940, 78). 
Banks needed to reduce the volume of loans and increase reserves until it 
became possible to resume and maintain specie payments. Therefore, both 
money and credit became scarce.

The resulting recession brought prices down to the lowest recorded 
level in the nation’s history (Cyril 1940, 79). Manufacturing output fell. 
In the fall of 1837, 90% of factories in the East were reported closed 
(Rezneck 1935, 665). Annual production at the Baldwin Locomotive 
works in Philadelphia fell nearly by half (Clark 1966, 435). Unemployment 
rose. In August 1837 a New York newspaper reported that 500 men had 
applied in a single day in answer to an advertisement for 20 spade laborers 
(Rezneck 1935, 664). The Baldwin works laid off about one-third of its 300 
workers (Clark 1966, 435). Suffering was extensive. In 1837, a committee 
in Philadelphia recommended that the state set up public granaries and coal 
yards where consumers might purchase those necessities at cost; another 
committee was appointed to beg for the poor who were “dying of want” 
(Rezneck 1935, 667).

I test seven economic variables. The first three are the manufacturing 
density in the county as measured by the total capital invested in 



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DAVID A. LATZKO

manufacturing, the density of agricultural employment in the county, and 
county population density. All densities are per square mile of county area. 
Although most Pennsylvanians were engaged in agriculture at the time, 
manufacturing was expanding rapidly in some areas. In Philadelphia, 
for example, 3.5 people were employed in manufacturing in 1820 for 
every agricultural worker. By 1840, the ratio had risen to nearly eight 
manufacturing workers for each person employed in agriculture. Large 
numbers of workers were employed in iron forges, bloomeries, and flour 
and rolling mills; printing and bookbinding; the construction of carriages 
and wagons; the manufacture of brick, lime, liquor, and machinery; and 
the creation of leather, cotton, and woolen goods (Snyder 1958, 9). The 
industrial workforce consisted of both skilled artisans and unskilled 
wage earners of both races and genders (Sullivan 1955, 59–83). The jobs 
competition hypothesis holds that the competition between blacks and 
whites for scarce jobs during the Panic of 1837 exacerbated racial tensions. 
The Panic of 1837 hit the state’s manufacturing sector much harder than it 
hit its farm sector. The competition for jobs would thus be strongest where 
manufacturing was important and weakest where agriculture dominated. 
Blacks and whites competed for jobs primarily in manufacturing, for “in 
1840 most of the work on the farm, except at hay and small grain harvest, 
was done by the farmer and his family” (Fletcher 1955, 76). Manufacturing 
employment severely contracted during 1837 and 1838. Also, population 
density ought to be positively associated with the size of the potential labor 
force and so with competition for jobs and, therefore, with a vote to deny 
blacks the franchise.

The fourth variable is the county’s population growth rate between 
1830 and 1840. I expect that delegates from fast-growing counties were 
more likely than other delegates to support black disenfranchisement, as 
migration into the county increases competition for jobs. The fifth variable, 
the ratio of manufacturing employment to agricultural employment, ought 
to be positively related to a vote to limit suffrage to whites. The greater this 
ratio, the greater the relative importance of manufacturing to the county 
economy and the greater the competition for jobs. If the jobs competition 
hypothesis has any merit, it would be for those delegates representing 
counties with relatively large black populations. Accordingly, I also test 
a variable measuring the interaction between the free black population 
percentage and the ratio of manufacturing workers to agricultural workers. 
The number of newspapers can be taken as an indicator of the level of 
economic development in the county. Economic development at the time 
related primarily to manufacturing, so delegates from counties with many 
newspapers are expected to have been more likely than other delegates to 
vote to disenfranchise blacks. These economic and population variables are 
taken from the 1830 and 1840 U.S. censuses.



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

I test 19 variables. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable 
and the small number of observations create obvious testing problems. 
Standard statistical methodology, which requires a single simultaneous test 
of all variables, is inapplicable. The power of the test is simply too weak. 
Consequently, I adopt a second-best approach that involves testing the 
variables in a variety of ways and forming conclusions using an accumulation 
of results. These conclusions must be viewed with caution, for the omitted-
variable problem may be a significant yet inescapable source of error. The 
choice is either to test, and acknowledge the existence of possible errors, or 
not to test at all.

Testing the Variables

I begin by testing the racial, political, and economic variables one at 
a time without taking into account inter–relationships among independent 
variables. Table 1 below lists the simple correlations (phi for the binary 
variables and point biserial for the continuous variables) between a 
delegate’s vote on black disenfranchisement and the independent variables. 
The results produced some surprising correlations. Delegates from counties 
with a relatively large black population and delegates from counties along 
the state’s southern border were less likely to have voted to strip blacks of the 
suffrage. Of the 47 delegates from counties in which blacks accounted for 
at least 3% of the population, only 23 voted in favor of disenfranchisement; 
36 of the 48 delegates from counties whose population was less than 1% 
black voted to deny blacks the right to vote. Also, supporters of lifting the 
tax qualification for voting tended to support black disenfranchisement. 
Otherwise, the signs of the coefficients are mostly as expected. Economic 
variables perform least well. The political variables measuring political 
affiliation have the largest correlation coefficients. Of all the convention 
delegates, Democrats and delegates from heavily Democratic counties were 
the most likely to vote to restrict the suffrage to white freemen.



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DAVID A. LATZKO

Table 1 
Individual Tests of the Relationships between the Independent Variable and 

a Delegate’s Vote on Black Disenfranchisement.

Variables Used
Correlation Coefficient with 
a Delegate’s Vote on Black 

Disenfranchisement
Racial Variables
 Free black persons as percent of county 

population
   –.205**

 County politically competitive –.133
 Southern border county –.124
 Black population growth –.104
 Distance from Philadelphia –.092
 Blacks customarily vote in county   .048

Political Variables
 Democrat       .663***

 Democrat * county politically competitive       .662***

 Percentage of county vote for Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate

      .414***

 Opposed tax qualification for voting       .400***

 Percentage of adults voting in 1838 
gubernatorial election

  .032

 Black population density –.026

Economic Variables
 Agricultural density  –.151*

 Number of daily, semi–weekly, and weekly 
newspapers

–.082

 Population growth   .064
 Population density –.025
 Percent black population *    manufacturing/

agriculture employment ratio
–.025

 Manufacturing density –.021
 Ratio of manufacturing to agricultural 

employment
–.011

Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

I next allow the variables to compete against one another in explaining 
black disenfranchisement. Because the dependent variable in my analysis 
is dichotomous, I use logistic analysis to estimate voting patterns. Having 
already ruled out the inclusion of all variables as a useful statistical tool, I use 
stepwise logistic regression. Given the number and nature of the variables 
being tested, a choice has to be made between an arbitrary variable selection 



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

procedure and some formal procedure. Formal procedures like stepwise 
regression have the advantage of making clear the way in which the variables 
are selected. The main disadvantage is that repeated application of tests 
invalidates the probability statements resulting from the tests. I nevertheless 
present these test statistics to illuminate the relative explanatory power of 
the variables, even though the absolute level of significance is meaningless 
when using stepwise regression.

Table 2 below shows the results of a binary logistic regression. I use 
a stepwise backward likelihood ratio procedure to give all the variables 
an opportunity to demonstrate some explanatory power. Variables were 
included in the equation only if they passed a 5% significance test. The 
results confirm that Democrats were more likely than other delegates to 
support black disenfranchisement, with other factors remaining the same. 
Three racial variables have some explanatory power in the joint test. 
Delegates from politically competitive counties were more likely than other 
delegates to support disenfranchisement, which is consistent with a racially 
ascriptivist motive. The other two racial variables with sufficient explanatory 
power are the percentage of free blacks in the county population and the 
county’s distance from Philadelphia. But the hypothesis that a concentration 
of black residents in a county would cause its delegates to vote to restrict 
suffrage to whites is not supported by the findings. In fact, the greater 
the percentages of blacks, the less likely county delegates were to vote to 
disenfranchise them. On the other hand, delegates from counties far from 
Philadelphia were less likely to support disenfranchisement than were those 
from counties close to the state’s largest concentration of black citizens. 
The jobs competition hypothesis is supported by the finding that the greater 
a county’s ratio of manufacturing employment to agricultural employment 
multiplied by its free black population percentage, the more likely were its 
delegates to vote to deny blacks the vote.



15

DAVID A. LATZKO

Table 2 
Summary of Stepwise Regression Results.

Variables Selected Coefficient and
Standard Error

 Intercept –11.585 (6.499)

 Democrat    4.554 (0.859)

 Free black persons as percent of county population  –1.503 (0.380)

 Manufacturing density  –0.001 (0.000)

 Percent black population * manufacturing/agriculture 
employment ratio

   2.091 (0.673)

 Distance from Philadelphia  –0.007 (0.003)

 County politically competitive    0.152 (0.071)

Notes: Variables were included in the equation if they passed a 5% significance test and 
excluded if they failed the test. The Homer and Lemeshow statistic has a significance level 
of 0.461. The Nagekerte R–squared for the equation is 0.696. The variables were removed 
in this order: ratio of manufacturing to agricultural employment, Democrat * county 
politically competitive, blacks customarily vote in county, population density, percentage 
of adults voting in 1838 gubernatorial election, population growth rate, tax qualification 
vote, number of newspapers, percentage of county vote for Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate, agricultural density, black population density, black population growth rate, and 
southern border county.

Knowing the most important variables affecting convention delegates’ 
votes on black disenfranchisement, the worst effects of the omitted variable 
problem can be counteracted by controlling for these variables when 
testing hypotheses. Each of the remaining variables is added separately to 
the equation shown in Table 2, and the resulting coefficient estimates are 
presented in Table 3 below.



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

Table 3 
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors When Each Variable is 

Added Separately to the Regression Equation in which Democrat, Free 
Black Persons as Percent of County Population, Manufacturing Density, 

Percent Black Population * Manufacturing/Agriculture Employment 
Ratio, Distance from Philadelphia, and County Politically Competitive are 

Already Included.

Variables Coefficient and 
Standard Error

Racial Variables

 Southern border county   1.571 (0.994)

 Black population growth  –0.009* (0.005)

 Blacks customarily vote in county –0.096 (0.819)

Political Variables

 Democrat * county politically competitive   0.086 (0.156)

 Percentage of county vote for Democratic
gubernatorial candidate

–0.010 (0.044)

 Opposed tax qualification for voting –0.086 (1.054)

 Percentage of adults voting in 1838
gubernatorial election

  0.039 (0.101)

 Black population density –0.322 (0.335)

Economic Variables

 Agricultural density –0.063 (0.131)

 Population growth –0.004 (0.012)

 Population density –0.019 (0.025)

 Ratio of manufacturing to agricultural 
employment

  1.319 (2.389)

Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

The standard errors are provided solely for judging the explanatory 
power of the variables. The most significant aspect of the results in Table 
3 is the number of times the signs of the coefficients fail to support the 
relevant hypothesis. For the racial variables, one sign in three is incorrect; 
for the political variables, two in five are incorrect; and for the variables 
measuring a county’s economic development, three in five are incorrect. 
The only variable with remotely any explanatory power is the growth rate 



17

DAVID A. LATZKO

of the county’s free black population, which (inconsistent with the racial 
motivation thesis) is negatively related to a vote on disenfranchisement.

Conclusions

The best way to summarize the findings is to classify the variables into 
three groups: (1) those that can be accepted because they are supported 
in both tests, (2) those that can be rejected because no test results support 
them, and (3) those whose significance remains unclear because they are 
not consistent with the test results. The first group includes the delegate’s 
political party affiliation and the percentage of free black persons in the 
county population. These two variables undoubtedly are determinants of 
how convention delegates voted on the issue of black suffrage. Democrats 
were more likely than other delegates to support disenfranchising blacks. 
As Table 2 shows, being a Democrat increases the predicted probability 
of a yes vote from 0.56 to 0.68 for a hypothetical delegate, with average 
values on all other independent variables. Whether this outcome is due to 
partisan electoral concerns or to political philosophy is unclear. The only 
racial variable robustly related to black suffrage rights is the relative size of 
the county’s black population. Unexpectedly, delegates from counties with 
a proportionally large black population were less likely to support the effort 
to disenfranchise black voters. A black population percentage one standard 
deviation above the state average decreases from 0.67 to 0.61 the probability 
that a delegate from that county would vote for black disenfranchisement, 
assuming mean values for other variables. This finding is not consistent 
with a racial motive for denying blacks the right to vote. Perhaps Whigs 
and Anti-Masons from counties with large black populations had developed 
political ties with blacks and were therefore reluctant to deny them the right 
to vote. Of the 30 Whigs and Anti-Masons representing counties in which 
blacks accounted for more than 3% of the population, 23 voted against the 
motion to disenfranchise free black males. Twenty Whigs and Anti-Masons 
came from counties where blacks were less than 1% of the population. Only 
12 of those delegates voted against the race-based voting restriction.

The remaining racial variable and most of the economic variables 
fall into the second group. Their relevance is easily rejected. The political 
variables also tend to fall into the “rejected” group. The tax qualification 
vote changes signs when tested with other variables, and the relevance of 
the interaction between the Democrat dummy variable and the political 
competition variable disappears when the two variables are tested jointly. 
The strong correlations of the political variables in Table 1 likely result from 
their collinearity with party affiliation. Controlling for political party in the 
joint tests eliminates the explanatory power of the other political variables. 



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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK PENNSYLVANIANS

A stepwise discriminant analysis confirms the primacy of a delegate’s 
political affiliation. Even with a generous inclusion-significance criterion 
of 5% and an exclusion criterion of 20%, only the Democrat variable enters 
into the discriminant function. This finding makes it at least plausible that 
Democrats voted to disenfranchise blacks for reasons of political or racial 
philosophy rather than for purely electoral concerns, for even Democrats 
representing overwhelmingly Democratic counties voted to deny blacks the 
right to vote.

As for the third group of variables, two economic variables have some 
explanatory power in the joint tests. Tested individually, though, these 
variables have no correlation with black suffrage votes. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that economic competition between blacks and low status whites 
for jobs contributed to antiblack sentiment, the ratio of manufacturing 
employment to agricultural employment is positively related to black 
disenfranchisement in the joint tests when corrected for the size of the 
black population. Representing a county for which the product of the black 
population percentage and the manufacturing to agricultural employment 
ratio is two standard deviations above the mean increases from 0.64 to 0.82 
the probability that a delegate voted for black disenfranchisement, assuming 
mean values of the other independent variables. Manufacturing density has 
a negative sign in the logistic regression. If this variable is taken as a proxy 
for the level of socioeconomic development, then delegates from the more 
economically advanced counties would have been less likely to vote to 
disenfranchise black Pennsylvanians, everything else being the same.

Two racial variables also have some explanatory power in the joint test 
and both are consistent with a racial motive for denying blacks the right 
to vote. Delegates from areas far from Philadelphia were less likely to 
support disenfranchisement than were delegates representing areas close to 
Philadelphia. A delegate living in a county 200 miles from Philadelphia was 
nearly 2% less likely to support disenfranchisement than was a delegate 
from a county 100 miles from Philadelphia, all things being equal. Also, 
as political competition in a county increased, so too did the probability 
that its delegates, Democrat or Whig or Anti-Mason, voted in favor of 
disenfranchisement.

Taken together, these results fit the broad pattern identified by 
Christopher Malone (2008) that led to the disenfranchisement of blacks in 
Pennsylvania and other northern states before the Civil War. The competition 
between blacks and whites for suddenly scarce jobs inflamed racial prejudice, 
especially in areas around Philadelphia. Opponents of black suffrage found 
overwhelming support in the Democratic Party and enough allies among the 
Whigs and Anti-Masons representing counties with relatively small black 
populations. At the convention, almost all the Democrats and nearly half 
of the Whigs and Anti-Masons voted to deny blacks the suffrage. Blacks in 



19

DAVID A. LATZKO

Pennsylvania would not regain the right to vote until the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1870.

Notes

1 Malone (2008, 91–97), Mittrick (1985, 22–33), and Price (1973, 100–116) each 
provide a summary of the debate at the 1837–38 constitutional convention over the racial 
qualification for voting.

2 In October 1835 William Fogg, a black property owner and taxpayer in Luzerne 
County, was prevented from voting by Hiram Hobbs, the county elections inspector. Fogg 
appealed to the county court of appeals, where Judge David Scott ruled that neither the federal 
nor the state constitution prohibited blacks from voting. Hobbs appealed to the state supreme 
court. The case was argued in July 1837 but the court withheld its decision until 1838, after the 
constitutional convention amended the suffrage article to prohibit blacks from voting. Judge 
John Gibson ruled that because blacks were not freemen under the state’s 1790 constitution, 
they were not entitled to vote. See Smith (1998, 294–95).

3 Eighteen delegates changed their positions on the issue in the time since it had 
been voted on the previous summer. Sixteen delegates, six of whom were Democrats, now 
voted to disenfranchise blacks, and two delegates, one a Democrat, switched from yes to no. 
Of the 23 delegates who did not vote on the amendment the first time, 18 voted in favor of 
disenfranchisement.

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