





































21

FEDERALISM AND THE 
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE:

PARTISANSHIP AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 

PRIORITIES1

J. WESLEY LECKRONE

Widener University

JUSTIN GOLLOB

Colorado Mesa University

State governments use many tools to convey their policy preferences to the 
federal government. Most studies of these tools focus on intergovernmental 
lobbying groups or individual state representatives in Washington, 
D.C. Though instructive, these studies fail to compare political parties’ 
intergovernmental issue priorities. Our article fills this void by means of 
a longitudinal analysis of legislative resolutions submitted to the federal 
government between 1979 and 2011 by state legislators in Pennsylvania. 
This dataset reveals varying levels of support for federal policy among 
Pennsylvania’s legislators, depending on their partisan affiliation.

Introduction

The primary method of studying state positions on federalism issues 
has been to examine the policy positions of intergovernmental lobbying 
groups (IGR), such as the National Governors Association and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures. This research shows that states have 
difficulty achieving consensus on the details of intergovernmental policy 
issues. The IGR lobby generally seeks federal money and decision-making 
authority, but its members disagree on substantive statements about how 
these resources should be distributed. This disagreement is due primarily 



22

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

to diverse memberships that produce cleavages that divide the IGR lobby. 
State officials construe intergovernmental priorities in light of their own 
personal policy and political goals. Consequently, they interpret federalism 
to suit their partisan views and the needs of their constituents.

This article examines one understudied cleavage that offers promise 
in explaining positions on federalism issues: partisanship. It explores 
the role of partisanship in determining intergovernmental priorities 
by examining 1,773 resolutions to the federal government that were 
introduced in Pennsylvania’s General Assembly between 1979 and 2011. 
The article concludes that partisan issue positions rather than commitment 
to a theoretical concept of federalism is the primary determinant of what 
Pennsylvania’s state legislators have asked of the federal government.

Literature

The division of responsibility for policy in the American federal system 
is fluid and adaptable (Elazar 1962; Grodzins 1966; Wright 1990). Daniel 
Elazar argues that the “federalism of the Constitution was crystal clear, just 
as the division and sharing of powers was left ambiguous” (1988, 43). A 
major issue in understanding American federalism is how states interact 
with Washington on questions of intergovernmental power. Do states prefer 
clearly delineated policy responsibilities so that they can retain decision-
making capabilities without federal interference, or do they prefer federal 
policy intervention? Are positions on intergovernmental issues inherent 
in states, or are they dependent on other explanatory variables, such as 
partisanship?

Literature on Intergovernmental Lobbying

Literature exploring these questions focuses on the agendas of 
intergovernmental lobbying groups like the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) or the National Governors Association (NGA). 
Some studies examine the activities of individual organizations or genres 
of groups, such as regional or professional associations (Arnold and Plant 
1994; Brooks 1961; Hall 1989; Weissert 1983). Others concern IGR 
lobbying on specific issues or during particular eras (Hays 1991; Levine and 
Thurber 1986; Marbach and Leckrone 2002). Case studies based on levels of 
policy conflict also exist (Cammissa 1995 and Haider 1974). Unfortunately, 
these groups have difficulty reaching consensus, not only because their 
memberships are diverse but also because they focus on spatial rather than 
material interests (Cammissa 1995, 129; Haider 1974, 226). Difficulty 
achieving quasi-unanimity on positions means that IGR groups address only 
a small range of issues, and they often do so only in general philosophic 



23

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

terms rather than with concrete policy statements (Haider 1974, 217–18, 
Smith 1998, 356). Accordingly, groups take no positions on issues lacking 
consensus. Even when policy statements pass, the positions expressed do 
not represent state voices that were in the minority.

The IGR Literature and Cleavages among Subnational Officials

Priorities of the IGR lobbies do not accurately portray the multiplicity 
of subnational interests. The IGR lobbying literature, however, provides 
instruction concerning the cleavages preventing these officials from achieving 
consensus on the role of the federal government in intergovernmental 
relations. Elected officials are concerned with policy substance, but their 
primary goals are to ensure that they receive federal money and the authority 
to use funds with minimal restrictions (Cammissa 1995; Farkas 1971, 248–
49; Haider 1974; Wallin 1998, 139–40). Consequently, they accept federal 
activity, seeking advantageous terms rather than rolling back the national 
presence in their policy realms (Nugent 2009, 50). Federal money allows 
state officials to “free ride” off the national government as they claim credit 
for implemented intergovernmental policies in hope of gaining electoral 
advantage (Nicholson-Crotty and Theobald 2010, 247).

This emphasis leads to cleavages as state and local officials attempt 
to reap advantages for their constituent interests. One cleavage is between 
elected and appointed officials (Beer 1978). Both sides advocate for more 
federal funding, but appointed officials prefer specificity from Washington 
to ensure that the money is spent on their policy interests. Conversely, 
elected officials like to use money at their own discretion (Haider 1974, 
223). Most of the cleavages, however, are related to differences in spatial 
representation by subnational officials. Both Haider (1974) and Cammissa 
(1995) show that state and local governments often split over who should 
receive direct funding from Washington and which level of government 
should be assigned decision-making capabilities. Conflict among states is 
also attributable to regional differences (Hall 1989) and to issues related 
to size (Smith 1998, 362). Because this article focuses on a single state 
(Pennsylvania), intrastate cleavages are instructive. Such cleavages include: 
counties versus mayors (Haider 1974, 219; Marbach and Leckrone 2002, 
54); large cities versus small cities (Haider 1974, 284); and rural versus 
suburban versus urban areas (Cigler 1995, 144; Haider 1974, 225–26).

Literature on Partisan Cleavages and Federalism

Unfortunately, the literature on IGR lobbying ignores the potentially 
divisive role that partisanship can play in stifling state consensus on federal 
policy activity. Some literature concerning political parties shows that 



24

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

neither Democrats nor Republicans have defended theoretical federalism or 
the interests of state or local governments in the federal system. Scholarship 
cites three reasons for this anomaly: (1) a lack of centralized programmatic 
parties, (2) candidate-centered elections, and (3) the prevalence of ideology 
in defending the structure of government.

As to the first reason, Grodzins (1960) asserts that the design of 
American government thwarts strong political parties, thus making unlikely 
any coherent platform focusing on the operation of federalism. Parties are 
made national only by joining together in “interstate coalitions” based on 
the collectivization of parochial interests (Elazar 1972, 143). Epstein (1989) 
extends this analysis by arguing that the lack of programmatic parties in the 
United States releases partisans to focus on their discrete local needs rather 
than on more abstract concepts such as federalism.2

Candidate-centered elections encourage elected politicians to adhere 
to a personal agenda rather than to a party platform. Truman (1969, 47) 
contends that the individual ambition of various state and federal elected 
positions leads to the “development of largely independent, hostile, and 
internally cohesive factional groupings” within state parties. Hence, 
federal officials are more concerned with the impact of policy on their own 
ambitions than on the way it affects the powers of their home state. Chubb 
(1985) reinforces this point in noting that members of both political parties 
rely on centralizing power in Washington because the delivery of federal 
largesse to their constituents promotes politicians’ electoral success.

Finally, Nathan (1990, 251–56) finds that partisan belief on issues of 
federalism is more related to ideological goals than to fixed affiliation with 
structures of government interaction. He sees liberal Democrats as generally 
predisposed toward a centralized federalism reminiscent of Grodzins’s 
marble cake model, whereas he believes conservative Republicans favor 
contracting government and thus focus on a scheme of “dual federalism.” 
Adherence to these principles fluctuates, however, depending on which 
political party controls power in Washington. Conservative Republicans 
advocate devolution in times of liberal-Democratic retrenchment, but they 
favor centralization when they are in power so that they can cut the scope of 
the central government.

Many scholars, particularly during the early 1980s, attempted to 
construct voting indices for federalism. Like party support scores, these 
indices were designed to determine what types of legislators supported state 
and local autonomy in the federal system. All the studies using such indices 
found a mild to strong relationship between partisanship and support for 
state and local autonomy. Republicans in both houses of Congress were 
more likely to score higher on the federalism index than were Democrats 
(Schechter 1981; Caraley and Schlussel 1986; Hero 1987, 1989; Malaby 
and Webber 1991). Recent literature has found less support for this partisan 



25

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

theory of federalism, particularly with regard to the last two presidential 
administrations, with both George W. Bush (Conlan and Dinan 2007; Milkis 
and Rhodes 2007) and Barrack Obama (Conlan and Posner 2011) stepping 
out of the usual partisan roles related to intergovernmental relations. 
Support for or opposition to federal intervention on intergovernmental 
issues appears to be based more on policy preference than on theoretical 
federalism (Krane and Koenig 2005; Peterson 2005; Posner 1998, 36–56). 
This tendency receives little attention at the state level, but evidence suggests 
that partisanship and ideology affect opposition to federal mandates within 
state governments (Palazzolo et al. 2008; Regan and Deering 2009). In sum, 
even though neither party appears to be completely “federalism friendly,” 
partisan affiliation may be an important determinant of support for or 
opposition to federal policy activity.3

States as a Testing Ground for Understanding Cleavages

The most useful way to examine these cleavages is to study the 
intergovernmental policy positions of individual states. Scholars have 
generally neglected this topic, although several have made first attempts at 
exploration (Cingranelli 1983; Jensen 2010; Jensen and Emery 2011; Nugent 
2009; Pelissero and England 1987; Smith 1998). These studies have been 
primarily descriptive in examining the activities of individual state lobbying 
or the intergovernmental activities of governors and their staffs. Missing 
from this literature is a longitudinal exploration of the intergovernmental 
priorities of states. This article addresses the scholarly void by using state 
legislative resolutions presented to the federal government to explore the 
specific policy topics important to Pennsylvania. Resolutions are policy 
positions passed by one or both houses of a state legislature that make 
requests of the federal government.4 Such resolutions have received scant 
attention in the literature, but they are a useful tool for understanding the 
intergovernmental policy preferences of states over time (Leckrone and 
Gollob 2010).

Resolutions are designed fundamentally to voice explicit preferences 
either supporting or opposing federal action across a wide range of policy 
issues (see the Appendix for an example). They lack policy content when they 
merely ask Congress to name a bridge or designate a date to commemorate 
a person or event. As the Appendix shows, however, most resolutions 
include serious statements of policy bolstered by solid evidence and a 
policy prescription. Our prior research polled legislators in several states on 
how and why they used resolutions to the federal government (Gollob and 
Leckrone 2011). We found two primary reasons for why legislators used 
resolutions. First, resolutions give state legislators a vehicle for transmitting 
preferences to Congress and entering them in the official record of legislative 



26

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

deliberation.5 Second, resolutions contribute to the larger scope of agenda 
setting and deliberation that occurs in Washington. One state legislator 
said that resolutions might influence the policy agenda if “a critical mass 
of states express the same policy goal.”6 At a minimum, resolutions to the 
federal government help reinforce arguments being concurrently discussed 
by advocates for a state. We are not arguing that these resolutions influence 
Congress or that they affect policy outcomes (although prior research shows 
that state legislators believe resolutions are effective in conveying a policy 
position). At a minimum, resolutions are a valid measure for understanding 
what states want from the federal government.

Research Questions and Data

We assert that partisanship is a significant factor in determining the 
tone and content of state legislators’ statements on federalism. We test this 
proposition by analyzing resolutions introduced in Pennsylvania’s General 
Assembly between 1979 and 2011. Three questions guide our analysis. The 
first compares partisanship to other potential explanatory variables, whereas 
the two others take a more nuanced look at partisanship and federalism.

Our first question asks which of several variables affect Pennsylvania 
legislators’ support for or opposition to federal actions as expressed in 
resolutions. The variables include individual (sponsor partisan identification), 
district (urban/rural dynamics), and state (regional influences) factors. Our 
second question addresses the level of partisan congruence by examining 
the policy issues of resolutions sponsored by Republican and Democratic 
state legislators in Pennsylvania. We analyze whether the rival political 
parties have different policy foci and whether they have differing levels of 
support for federal action across policy categories.

Finally, our third question considers whether partisan alignment between 
Harrisburg and Washington affects support for or opposition to Washington’s 
actions as expressed in resolutions. The literature cited above reaches no 
clear conclusion about the level of congruence on intergovernmental issues 
between members of a state party and their counterparts at the national 
level. Some scholars say state officials band together regardless of party to 
oppose undesired federal action. Others say the ideological predispositions 
of the participants affect their willingness to support a federal role in 
certain areas of policy. We test these ideas by analyzing the relationship 
between partisan support for resolutions and the partisan affiliation of the 
branch of government addressed in the resolution. We do so to determine 
whether partisan identification at the state level translates into support for or 
opposition to partisan policy proposals in Washington.

We answer these questions by using a unique dataset of legislative 
resolutions introduced in both chambers of Pennsylvania’s General 



27

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

Assembly between 1979 and 2011 (the period corresponding to the 96th 
Congress through the first session of the 112th Congress). A total of 1,773 
resolutions to the federal government were culled from Temple University’s 
Pennsylvania Policy Database Project (PPDP). This project, funded by 
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly, includes a usable database containing 
over 100,000 bills, resolutions, governors’ speeches, state supreme court 
decisions, and print articles from the Commonwealth (see McLaughlin et 
al. 2010 and www.temple.edu/papolicy). Each piece of data was coded with 
one of 20 policy topic headings developed by the Policy Agendas Project 
(see Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 29–46 and www.policyagendas.org) and 
adapted to state politics by the PPDP.7

Some of the data provided by the PPDP include the primary sponsor 
of each resolution, the session in which it was introduced, information 
on whether the resolution was passed, and the policy code. The authors 
conducted additional analysis to assess the content and level of support for 
federal policy and mandates. Each resolution was analyzed to determine 
whether it supported or opposed existing policy or actions proposed 
by the federal government. In addition, criteria from the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1994) were used to determine 
whether resolutions mentioned a mandate.8

Between 1979 and 2011, legislators in Pennsylvania’s General 
Assembly introduced 1,773 resolutions addressed to the federal government. 
Representatives introduced 1,288 of them; senators introduced 485. Only 
133 of the resolutions were purely commemorative, meaning that they 
lacked either substantive policy content or policy prescriptions.9 Of the 
1,640 substantive resolutions, 52% were addressed to Congress, 21% 
were directed at the president, and 16.5% spoke to both Congress and the 
president. Only 4.3% were aimed at the U.S. Supreme Court.

The resolutions were largely supportive of federal activity (62.7%). 
Mention of a mandate, however, made legislators less likely to approve of 
Washington’s actions. Of resolutions with a positive tone, 91.4% did not 
mention a mandate. Conversely, 70% of resolutions mentioning a mandate 
opposed federal action.

As shown in Figure 1 below, the resolutions were broadly distributed 
across the policy codes. The codes used most often were for areas where 
federal control of policy is almost complete or where intergovernmental 
relations are extensive. Among the five most often used policy topics, 
defense (#1) and international affairs / foreign aid (#5) are primarily 
federal responsibilities; yet some components of these policy areas affect 
Pennsylvania’s economy. For example, there was a strong focus on defense 
during the rounds of military base reductions that followed the end of the 
Cold War, given the economic consequences that base closures had on 
localities within the Commonwealth.



28

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

Health (#2) and environment (#4) received attention because they are 
important intergovernmental programs. Indeed, health was Pennsylvania’s 
second largest area of expenditure between 1979 and 2011. The budgetary 
importance of this policy topic, along with Medicaid’s status as a shared 
intergovernmental program, helps to explain why state legislators paid 
so much attention to health. The environment was one of the top policy 
topics for a different reason: 46.3% of the introduced resolutions mentioned 
mandates. In fact, this topic had the most references to mandates. Legislators 
used it regularly to deride what they perceived to be federal overreach.

Government operations ranked third among the policy areas used. 
This category includes many topics related to the federal government that 
affect states, such as the census, election procedures, and intergovernmental 
relations. The last of these subcategories accounted for 3.2% of all resolutions 
to the federal government from Pennsylvania because it comprises 
discussion of mandates, block grants, and general state–federal relations. In 
short, the overall record of attention by Pennsylvania’s legislature to these 
specific issues is in line with expectations.

Results

Question 1: Variables Affecting Support for or Opposition to Federal 
Action.

The literature highlights several cleavages that prevent unanimity 
among state officials when creating an intergovernmental agenda. We argue 

Figure 1 
Resolutions Introduced in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1979–2011.

Policy Topic

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J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

that of these variables, partisanship plays a significant role in determining 
state officials’ attitudes toward federal action. We tested this argument by 
using logistic regression with support for federal policy as the dependent 
variable and measures of the contending explanations as the independent 
variables.

The units of analysis are 923 substantive resolutions introduced in 
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly between 1992 and 2011 that address 
the activities of Congress, the president, or both branches. The dependent 
variable is the support for or opposition to (0=opposition, 1=support) 
existing or proposed federal policy as expressed in the resolutions. The 
independent variables include: sponsor party identification (0=Republican, 
1=Democrat); the regional location of the sponsors’ home districts in 
Pennsylvania (southeast, southwest, central, northeast, northwest dummy 
coded); and the percentage of the urban population living in the sponsors’ 
legislative districts (0%–100%).10 Because longitudinal data for some of the 
independent variables are not available before 1992, the analysis includes 
only resolutions submitted between 1992 and 2011.11

Data for the partisan identification of each sponsor were obtained 
through the PPDP. The PPDP provides the name of each resolution’s primary 
sponsor, which we then paired with the sponsor’s partisan affiliation. The 
second independent variable is the regional location of each sponsor’s 
legislative district. The county (or counties) that each sponsor represents 
were identified using the Wilkes University Election Statistics Project (http://
staffweb.wilkes.edu/harold.cox/index.html). The results were then linked 
to a regional location using the county–region alignment adopted by the 
Center for Opinion Research’s Franklin and Marshall Poll of Pennsylvania 
(http://www.fandm.edu /fandmpoll).12

The final independent variable, urban/rural district dynamics, was 
collected through two sources. The first is the Census Bureau (2010), 
which began linking census data to state legislative districts beginning with 
the 2000 census. Using State Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and 
Demographics (Barone, Lilley, and DeFranco 1998), we were able to extend 
our analysis back to 1992.

Results of the logistic regression show that both sponsor party 
identification and the urban characteristics of sponsors’ legislative districts 
exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the tone of resolutions 
introduced in Pennsylvania’s General Assembly. The positive coefficient for 
sponsor partisan identification (B = .417, S.E. = .147, p < .05) shows that 
Democratic sponsors are more likely than Republicans to be positive in their 
tone. The odds ratio of 1.52 indicates that Democrats are more likely than 
Republicans to introduce positive resolutions in the state legislature.

Because urban districts are generally liberal and thus likely to be 
represented by Democrats, state legislators representing urban districts are, 



30

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

unsurprisingly, more positive in their resolutions than are rural legislators 
(B = .006; S.E. = .002; p < .05; Exp(B) 1.006). Although some alignment 
between regional location and urban/rural characteristics exists, the 
regions are large enough to act not simply as another measure of urban 
characteristics. In fact, the regional location of sponsors’ legislative districts 
is not statistically significant.13 These findings suggest that partisanship 
does influence the views of Pennsylvania’s state legislators on federalism, 
whereas regionalism does not.

Question 2: Partisan Congruence by Policy Issue.

The question whether Republicans and Democrats establish areas of 
issue ownership is important to the study of intergovernmental relations. If 
partisanship at the state level influences the content of messages the state 
sends to Washington, it might be possible to predict the future policy foci of 
a state in light of the partisan distribution within its legislature. Our dataset 
allows us to test whether partisanship had an impact on the policy topics 
of resolutions introduced in Pennsylvania’s legislature between 1979 and 
2011. Figure 2 below shows that partisan differences in most policy areas 
are generally small. Policy areas with a differential of less than 5% between 
Republican and Democratic sponsorship include fiscal/economic, health, 
agriculture, education, transportation, and defense.

Where levels of policy activity vary, however, political parties establish 
some areas of issue ownership. For instance, Democrats are more active 

Figure 2 
Party Sponsorship of Resolutions Introduced in the Pennsylvania General 

Assembly, 1979–2011.

Policy Topic

Total
Resolutions

% Republican
Sponsor

% Democrat
Sponsor

%
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ty

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10%
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J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

on energy, social welfare, international affairs, community development 
and housing, law/crime/family, labor/employment/immigration, banking/
finance/domestic commerce, and space/science /communications. 
Republicans are more active on civil rights, environment, state government 
operations, and public lands. Additionally (as previously noted), resolutions 
addressing the environment frequently mentioned federal mandates, a 
tendency that may explain Republicans’ emphasis on this issue. Further 
testing this relationship, a chi-square test shows a statistically significant 
association between sponsors’ party identification and the policy topic 
of their resolutions,14 indicating a relationship between sponsor party 
identification and the policy issues of resolutions.

Partisan divides are more obvious when analyzing the tone of 
resolutions. Each resolution was coded using a measure to determine 
whether it expressed support for or opposition to existing or proposed 
federal policies. Figure 3 below reveals substantial differences between the 
political parties in their respective levels of support for federal action across 
policy domains.

Democrats supported federal activities 66% of the time versus 58% 
for Republicans. The 8% differential between parties is unsurprising given 
Republican ideology and rhetoric about small government and federalism. 

Figure 3 
Partisan Support for Existing or Proposed Federal Policy, 1979–2011.

%
Democrat
Support for
Existing
Policy

%
Republican
Support for
Existing
Policy

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

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Note: * indicates statistical significance of p<.05 for Chi-square test of independence.



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FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

Issue ownership is also supported, for there were statistically significant 
differences between Republicans and Democrats in their support of federal 
policy in the policy areas of environment,  law/family/crime, and labor/
employment/immigration.15

Analysis of support for or opposition to federal mandates provides 
further evidence that resolutions reflect partisan beliefs about the 
appropriate role of the federal government in state affairs. Republicans 
were more likely than Democrats to mention federal mandates (21% versus 
16%). Environmental policy and government operations were the top two 
issues mentioning mandates for both the GOP and the Democrats. Not 
surprisingly, Republicans were also more likely than Democrats to oppose 
the imposition of mandates (89% versus 78%).

Question 3: Partisan Congruence across Levels of Government.

Federal–state relationships could be influenced by the partisan alignment 
between state legislators and the party in power in Washington. At issue is 
whether support for or opposition to federal activities is primarily a result 
of shared partisan priorities between the state and national political parties, 
or whether levels of support/opposition remain constant regardless of which 
party is in power nationally. If partisan alignment between state legislators 
and the federal government has an impact, we would expect to see more 
positive resolutions submitted by state legislators when their party is the 
majority party in Washington and the opposite when their party is in the 
minority there. This expectation is in keeping with the literature showing 
that party is a predictor of support for or opposition to presidential agendas 
(Grose and Middlemass 2010) and individuals’ support for or opposition to 
their party’s legislative program in the states (Jenkins 2008).

Partisan alignment was measured by comparing the partisan identity 
of each resolution’s sponsor with the majority party of the federal branch 
addressed in the resolution. For example, if a Republican state legislator 
introduced a resolution to a Republican president, then their partisanship 
is aligned. If the same sponsor introduced a resolution addressed to a 
Congress controlled by Democrats, then their party identity is not aligned. 
If a Republican state legislator introduced a resolution to both a Republican 
president and a Democratic-controlled Congress, then their party identity is 
split (given that the federal government is divided). The data analyze 1,640 
substantive resolutions introduced in Pennsylvania’s General Assembly 
between 1979 and 2011.

The results in Table 1 below suggest that federal–state partisan 
alignment does not affect the tone of resolutions submitted in Pennsylvania’s 
legislature. State legislators of both parties exhibited only middling support 
of Washington when their party was in control nationally. They were more 



33

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

supportive of Washington when their party dominated there than when it 
did not. Yet a chi-square test found no statistically significant relationship 
between tone and federal–state partisan alignment (sorted by partisan 
affiliation of sponsor).16

Table 1 
PA Sponsor—Washington, D.C., Partisan Alignment on Support of Existing 

or Proposed Federal Policy, 1979–2011.

Partisanship of
Resolution Sponsor

Republicans
Hold D.C. Power

Democrats
Hold D.C. Power

Divided D.C.
Government

Democratic 50.4% Support 52.1% Support 63.5% Support

Republican 46.7% Support 40.6% Support 50.4% Support

The data show that state legislators were most supportive of Washington 
during periods of divided government in the nation’s capital. One plausible 
explanation is that state legislators’ support of their national parties is 
most important during periods of partisan division in Washington. Another 
possibility is that state legislators do not request major changes to the status 
quo regarding federal–state relationships during periods of partisan division 
in the nation’s capital. Instead, they try to protect those attributes of federal–
state relationships that they view as positive. Finally, state legislators may 
attempt to influence divided government more by affirmation than by 
exacerbating existing partisan cleavages in Congress. Though plausible, 
these explanations require further testing before they can be validated.

A similar pattern emerges in substantive resolutions passed by 
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly between 1979 and 2011 (N=710). Table 2 
below examines partisan alignment between Democratic- and Republican-
controlled chambers in Harrisburg and partisan control in Washington.

Table 2 
Harrisburg—Washington, D.C., Partisan Alignment on Support of Existing 

or Proposed Federal Policy, 1979–2011.

Partisan Control of
 PA Legislature

Republicans 
Hold D.C. Power

Democrats
 Hold D.C. Power

Divided D.C.
 Government

Democratic 42.5% Support 61.7% Support 70.7% Support

Republican 51.3% Support 42.2% Support 57.2% Support

Only a weak relationship exists between partisan control of the state 
legislative chamber that passed the resolution and party control of the federal 
branch to which it was addressed. A chi-square test finds a statistically 
significant relationship for Democratic alignment but not for Republican 



34

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

alignment.17 If national party politics influenced the passage of supportive or 
oppositional resolutions at the state level, we would expect to see significantly 
more support when partisanship at the national and state level align. What is 
clear in Table 2 is that support is highest during periods of divided government 
and lowest when state–national partisanship is not aligned.

Conclusions and Future Research

This article has used a new means of assessing the intergovernmental 
agendas of states over time. A database of more than 1,700 resolutions 
introduced in Pennsylvania’s General Assembly between 1979 and 2011 
was constructed to examine the seldom studied topic of the relationship 
between partisanship and intergovernmental relations. State legislative 
resolutions sent to the federal government were used to determine whether 
partisan differences exist in the types of issues states raised with the federal 
government and whether levels of support for federal action vary. The study 
contributes three findings to the existing literature.

First, the dataset as a whole affirms prior research showing that state 
governments have accepted the federal government as the lead partner in 
American intergovernmental relations. Sixty-two percent of all resolutions 
viewed federal policy positively, whereas negative resolutions often related 
to displeasure with federal mandates. State officials thus appear willing to 
work cooperatively with the federal government as long as their authority to 
make decisions is not completely displaced.

Second, partisanship proved to be a statistically significant factor in 
determining support for or opposition to federal policy. Compared with other 
widely accepted explanations, partisanship significantly influenced support 
for or opposition to existing or proposed federal policy. Partisanship also had 
a significant relationship with the policy focus of resolutions. This important 
finding shows there is no innate state position on the policy activities of 
the federal government. Rather, the package of ideological and policy 
predispositions that define partisan differences significantly affects how state 
legislators and legislatures approach issues of intergovernmental relations.

Finally, we found some relationship between state partisanship and 
support for and opposition to party activities in Washington, especially 
when accounting for partisan control of the state legislature. Both political 
parties were more likely to support their own partisans in Washington 
than they were to aid their opponents. This pattern, combined with the 
previous finding, shows an interesting relationship between federalism 
and partisanship. Previous scholarship argued that the decentralized, 
candidate-centered nature of American political parties prevents a 
uniform, programmatic approach by state and federal officials to issues 
of intergovernmental relations. By contrast, our evidence shows that the 



35

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

ideological predispositions of partisan affiliation often trump state officials’ 
spatial identity. The intergovernmental agendas of state and federal officials 
are thus more nationalized than scholars have believed.

Drawing firm and generalizable conclusions from a single case study 
of Pennsylvania’s General Assembly is difficult. Still, our conclusions go 
beyond the existing literature to promote deeper understanding of state 
attention to intergovernmental issues. Studies of national and regional 
intergovernmental organizations allow scholars to explore areas of state 
consensus on federalism issues. Studying state resolutions to the federal 
government provides a more nuanced understanding of federalism issues 
subject to partisan conflict. This method of analysis uncovers issues that 
would not be addressed by peak IGR groups because passage of their policy 
positions requires bipartisan super majorities.

Appendix 
Example of a Resolution to Congress: 

Pennsylvania House Resolution 775 of 2010

A RESOLUTION

Memorializing the Congress of the United States to refrain from 
imposing unfunded mandates on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 
its citizens.

WHEREAS, The taxpayers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are 
already facing the prospect of difficult budget cycles because of diminished 
tax revenues and growing public entitlement obligations; and 

WHEREAS, This situation is expected to grow worse because of:

(1) an end to Federal stimulus money;
(2) unfunded pension obligations;
(3) urgent infrastructure needs;
(4) the General Assembly’s other budgetary obligations; and

WHEREAS, According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 12% of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s population is now enrolled in Medicaid; and 

WHEREAS, This enrollment costs the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
billions in public assistance programs, thus making welfare entitlements 
one of the top spending categories in the State budget; and

WHEREAS, The Urban Institute estimates the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania will see an additional 818,390 people become eligible, 
representing a 25% increase in those enrolled in the Medicaid program if 
Medicaid eligibility is increased to 133% of the Federal Poverty Level as 
contained in HR No. 3590, passed by the United States Senate; and 



36

FEDERALISM AND THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

WHEREAS, On September 9, 2009, the President of the United States 
promised that legislation being considered by the Congress of the United 
States would not add to the Federal deficit but was silent about states bearing 
the weight of unfunded mandates; and

WHEREAS, Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures 
shows the impact on states will be significant from this increase with the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s added matching obligation to total $2.31 
billion in the 2014–2019 period; therefore be it

RESOLVED, That the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania memorialize the Congress of the United States to refrain 
from imposing unfunded mandates on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and its citizens; and be it further 

RESOLVED, That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the office 
of each United States Senator and to the office of each of the members of 
the United States House of Representatives.

Notes

 1 The ordering of the authors’ names is arbitrary, for both contributed equally to 
this article. Previous versions of this work were presented in 2012 at the annual meeting of 
the Southern Political Science Association and the State Politics and Policy Conference. The 
authors would like to thank the discussants and other panelists for their critiques. They would 
also like to thank their research assistant, Katrina Kelly, who collected portions of the dataset. 
Parts of this research were funded through a Widener University Faculty Development Grant.

 2 Epstein implies that one of the reasons for the rise of intergovernmental lobbying 
organizations is the lack of a party devoted to protecting state and local governments.

 3 The literature review focuses on the intergovernmental policy positions of elected 
officials. Additional evidence suggests that partisanship affects the stances of citizens (Kincaid 
and Cole 2008; Malhotra 2008) and scholars (Kincaid and Cole 2002) on issues of federalism. 

 4 Legislative resolutions directed to the federal government are also referred to as 
Memorials. For a more extensive overview of the origins and historical use of resolutions to 
Congress, see Leckrone and Gollob (2010).

 5 Resolutions to Congress are entered in the Congressional Record. Abstracts of the 
resolutions are entered for resolutions submitted to the House of Representatives, whereas the 
full text becomes part of the official record for resolutions received by the Senate. 

 6 Although research on resolutions to the federal government is scarce, this practice 
reinforces conclusions from previous studies on a federal balanced budget amendment (Nice 
1986) and opposition to REAL ID (Regan and Deering 2009).

 7 This coding methodology has been widely used in the policy field, including 
databases such as the Congressional Bills Project (www.congressionalbills.org) and the 
international Comparative Agendas Project (www.comparativeagendas.org). For a bibliography 
of the research employing this coding scheme, see http://www.policyagendas.org/biblio. 

 8 The Pennsylvania Policy Database codes data by reading the abstract of the resolution 
created by the General Assembly’s Legislative Reference Bureau. The abstract contains enough 
information for determining the policy topic of the resolution but not enough to understand 
exactly what is being asked of the federal government or whether a mandate exists. Consequently, 
this project examined the full text of resolutions when coding for tone and mandates. 



37

J. WESLEY LECKRONE AND JUSTIN GOLLOB

 9 The following is an example of a commemorative resolution: “A Resolution 
memorializing AMTRAK to designate the station at 30th and Market Streets in Philadelphia 
as the Pennsylvania Station.”

10 Early analysis examined several models with a variety of independent variables that 
were later dropped from the model used here. Independent variables excluded from this model 
include the average household income in sponsors’ home districts, the average Social Security 
income in sponsors’ home districts, and 10-year party competition in sponsors’ home districts. 
Because turnover is low in Pennsylvania’s General Assembly, sponsor partisan identity was 
highly correlated with the 10-year intradistrict party competition variable. Moreover, the 
region of Pennsylvania was highly correlated with both the average household income and the 
average Social Security income in the sponsors’ home districts. 

11 N= 923 substantive resolutions. The dependent variable included 376 resolutions 
coded as oppose and 547 coded as support. Resolutions were supported by 453 Republicans and 
470 Democrats, with 214 of these representatives representing the southwest region of the state, 
152 the central region, 134 the northwest region, 103 the northeast region, and 320 the southeast 
region. The average percentage of residents living in urban areas for these 923 cases is 66%. 

12 The Franklin and Marshall College Poll treats Philadelphia and Allegheny County 
(Pittsburgh) as their own regions of Pennsylvania. We merged Philadelphia and Allegheny 
County with their appropriate regions (southeast and southwest, respectively). 

13 The pseudo R2 = .03
14 Chi-square test results: χ2= 48.24 (19), p < .01. 
15 Results of chi-square results for Democratic/Republican sponsor and oppose/

support: χ2 = 12.7 (1), p <.000. Results for individual policy topics: Environment χ2 = 3.9 (1), 
p <.05; Labor/Employment/Immigration χ2 = 5.6 (1), p <.05; Law, Family and Crime χ2 = 4.15 
(1), p <.05

16 Chi-square test results: Republicans χ2 = 4.76 (2), p> .05; Democrats χ2 = 5.46 (2), 
p >.05

17 Chi-square test results: Republicans χ2 = 5.08 (2), p> .05; Democrats χ2 = 7.19 (2), 
p <.05

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