





































41

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY? 
AGENDA SETTING AND THE 

POLITICS OF ELECTRIC-RATE 
CAPS IN PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL J. MALLINSON

The Pennsylvania State University

Electric-power deregulation policy in the United States has served 
as useful research material for political scientists. This article uses a case 
study of the implementation of electric-rate deregulation in Pennsylvania 
to draw conclusions about broader agenda-setting theory. Case studies are 
useful for testing and improving broad theoretical concepts, particularly 
when deviations from the expectations of those theories occur. There was 
reasonable expectation for a policy punctuation surrounding electric-rate 
mitigation in 2008, but that punctuation never came. This article supports 
the notion that punctuations do not always follow periods of policy 
stability, even if policy has become misaligned with preferences. In this 
case, environmental factors (i.e., economic conditions) served to release 
pressure in the system for policy punctuation. This article also reinforces the 
usefulness of case studies in political science.

The deregulation of electricity supply in the United States has provided 
political scientists with useful research material. For instance, Ka and Teske 
(2002) used deregulation policy to draw conclusions about the influence of 
legislative ideology and bureaucratic professionalism on redistributive and 
technical policies, respectively. Likewise, Andrews (2000) used the spread 
of electric-rate deregulation legislation among the American states in the 
1990s to augment the literature on policy diffusion. A case study of the 
implementation of electric-rate deregulation in Pennsylvania in particular 
tests our current understanding of the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
process and how agenda dynamics drive policy outcomes.

In the midst of expiring electric-rate caps, rising energy prices, active 
policy entrepreneurs, consumer concern, multiple legislative proposals, and 



42

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

a supportive governor, a window was open in Harrisburg in 2008 for policy 
to mitigate the negative effects of the impending expiration of rate caps 
on electricity. But that policy never came. The deep recession triggered by 
the collapse of major financial institutions in 2008 and the protracted state 
budget battle in 2009 substantially altered the policy agenda in Pennsylvania. 
Changes in the political and economic environments acted like a pressure-
release valve, dissipating political pressure for rate-cap mitigation.

This article contributes to the agenda-setting literature in political science by 
presenting a case study of the history of rate caps in Pennsylvania. It illuminates 
four aspects of agenda setting: policy punctuation (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; 
Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998), pressure valves (Berkman and Reenock 
2004), policy windows (Kingdon 2003), and feedback loops contributing to 
the evolutionary nature of policy change (Majone and Wildavsky 1978). Such 
a case study clarifies how these broad theoretical ideas actually operate within 
state government. Additionally, the article shows that sudden changes in either 
the economic or the political environment can act as a safety valve releasing the 
pressure for policy punctuation. This finding is important because it facilitates 
better understanding of punctuated equilibrium.

The article begins with a discussion of these concepts and their 
importance as cornerstones of our understanding of agenda setting. It then 
provides background information on the issue of electric-market regulation 
in Pennsylvania. After setting the stage in terms of theory and history, the 
article addresses the opening and closing of the policy window on rate caps. 
The article ends with conclusions about both the contribution of this case 
study to the literature on agenda setting and the usefulness of case studies 
generally in providing deeper context on broader theoretical concepts.

Agenda Setting and Policy Outcomes

Because the policymaking process in the United States is complex, 
scholars have largely taken a piecemeal approach to ascertaining its 
dynamics (Sabatier 1991), even with the narrow agenda-setting phase of the 
process. Hence, some scholars study issue framing (Rochefort and Cobb 
1994) and media effects (Cook 1989; 2005), whereas others focus on specific 
institutions, such as Congress (Sulkin 2005), the presidency (Beckmann 
2010), and the U.S. Supreme Court (Baird 2006). More recently, scholars 
have developed macro-level models of the process (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 2003). The core argument for 
examining the process of agenda setting is that who sets the agenda—and 
how they do it—provides insight into the question why particular political 
outcomes are produced.

Kingdon (2003) and Baumgartner and Jones (2009) provide different 
explanations for the macro-level dynamics of agenda setting. Starting with 



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DANIEL J. MALLINSON

Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) “garbage can” model of organizational 
choice, Kingdon built a garbage can model of agenda setting through 
detailed interviews of policy actors at the national level. Essentially, the 
model describes a process whereby policy ideas are metaphorically floating 
around in a garbage can. When a policy window is opened by events and 
policy entrepreneurs who draw attention to a problem, legislators reach 
into the garbage can and retrieve a solution to the problem. A significant 
drawback of Kingdon’s model is that it really addresses only substantial 
policy change (i.e., policy punctuations), not incremental changes, which 
are far more frequent. Much past work on policymaking in the United 
States has focused on these incremental changes (see Davis, Dempster, and 
Wildavsky 1966; Lindblom 1959).

Baumgartner and Jones (2009) and Jones and Baumgartner (2005) depart 
from this previous work on agenda setting by fusing both incremental and 
substantial policy change into a single theory of punctuated equilibrium (see 
also Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998). They argue that a key to this pattern 
is the ability of government to process policy information both serially and 
in parallel. Typically, the system processes information in a parallel fashion 
where, for example, Congressional committees pass noncomprehensive policy 
changes or bureaucracies institute new rules that slightly alter existing policy. 
This process continues until policy becomes misaligned with the preferences 
of new or previously marginalized actors. Subsequent mobilization of these 
actors causes pressure to build for a shift from the current equilibrium to a 
new one. To achieve this shift, the legislature must enter a mode of serial 
processing where it focuses attention on a single policy area.

The Affordable Care Act of 2009 (ACA) is a useful example. The 
election of Barack Obama, combined with Democratic control of Congress, 
brought considerable attention to healthcare policy in the United States. 
The government thus devoted substantial political resources to healthcare 
reform, which facilitated passage of comprehensive legislation. The ACA 
altered the policy equilibrium not only for the national government but 
also for the states. One example of serial processing at the state level is the 
occasional use of special legislative sessions to focus governmental attention 
on a particularly pressing problem. Granted, not all special sessions achieve 
their intended policy goals, and given the high resource demand of serial 
processing, such sessions are short lived.

Subsequent research by Berkman and Reenock (2004) adds to the 
macro-level punctuated equilibrium theory by addressing why periods of 
incremental change are not always followed by punctuations. Their work 
examined the reorganization of state administrative agencies over time. 
Although they found both comprehensive and incremental changes to state 
organizational structures, they did not find that incremental changes were 
always followed by punctuations. Instead, they concluded that “incremental 



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WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

steps may be enough of a middle-level response to relieve internal political 
pressure that comes about . . . from the growing misalignment of design 
with demands” (Berkman and Reenock 2004, 810). In this way, incremental 
changes act like a pressure-relief valve instead of contributing to a buildup 
of pressure for punctuated change.

Additionally, the cyclicality of the policy process is widely understood 
and consistently communicated in most courses and textbooks on public 
policy. Indeed, a political matter is not settled merely because a law has 
been passed. Bureaucracies must implement that policy, and policy 
entrepreneurs (and the bureaucrats themselves) continue to work to achieve 
their desired policy outcomes. Moreover, the subsequent success or failure 
of implementation leads to feedback loops where policymakers turn their 
attention to implementation problems and adjust a policy over time. In this 
way, policy has a tendency to evolve after reaching the implementation 
stage and implementation may, in turn, have an effect on agenda setting 
(Majone and Wildavsky 1978; see also Sabatier 1986 and 1991 for reviews 
of the implementation literature).

The work by Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner on punctuated 
equilibrium has gained widespread attention in political science as a 
compelling macro-level explanation of agenda setting. Nonetheless, many 
quirks and deviations in a given macro-theory inevitably appear when 
examining actual cases of a particular process. Closer review permits better 
understanding of the occurrence of deviations that remain unexplained by 
macro-theory. The work of Berkman and Reenock (2004) is a good example. 
Finding both support for the macro-theory of punctuated equilibrium and 
cases where the expected outcome was not realized, they added to our 
understanding of how the theory plays out in real life. That is also the intent 
of this article, which affirms the usefulness of case studies. The contextual 
information they provide, particularly in cases where a macro-theory does 
not play out as expected, can enrich theoretical understanding.

Through use of a case study, the remainder of this article connects the 
process of electric-rate deregulation in Pennsylvania to the relevant literature. 
After first presenting some background information on electric-rate regulation 
in the United States and Pennsylvania, the article then addresses the opening 
and subsequent closing of a policy window for policy intended to mitigate 
rate increases due to the expiration of electric-rate caps, showing how rapid 
changes in the political and economic environments can quickly alter the 
government’s agenda and deflate the pressure for policy punctuation.

Electric-rate Regulation in the United States

Understanding the basic structure of the electric-power market is 
important for understanding how electricity has been regulated and 



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DANIEL J. MALLINSON

deregulated in the United States.1 The electric-power system has three 
primary elements: generation, transmission, and distribution. Generation 
involves the production of electricity from various sources, such as the sun, 
wind, coal, natural gas, and nuclear power. Demand for electricity is spread 
across the United States, but generation tends to be centralized. Therefore, 
the transportation of electric power (i.e., transmission), sometimes across 
great distances, is essential for matching supply with demand. Once the 
electricity arrives at the desired location, it is reduced to a lower voltage 
and distributed to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. 
Traditionally, electric-power companies controlled this entire supply chain 
(referred to as a vertical monopoly).

Regulation of the electric-power industry has its roots in a U.S. Supreme 
Court case about grain elevators (Munn v. Illinois 1877) where the Court 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from regulating 
private property that affects the public interest. Through the Public Utility 
Holding Act of 1935 (PUCHA), regulation of electric power has become a 
shared responsibility of the national government and the states.2 The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates the wholesale market for 
electric power that involves interstate transactions between suppliers and 
retailers of electricity. After retailers procure electric power from wholesale 
markets, they sell it to end users through retail markets that are regulated 
by the individual states. The electric-power industry in Pennsylvania is 
regulated by the state’s Public Utility Commission (PUC). 

More than 40 years after PUCHA subjected electric-utility holding 
companies to increased national and state regulation, the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) started the process of electric-
rate deregulation. PURPA was passed at the beginning of a sustained 
period of deregulation in the United States that touched a broad array of 
industries including transportation, natural gas, financial services, and 
telecommunications. The most significant national step toward electric-
rate deregulation came with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
(EPAct), which opened the wholesale electric-power market to competition 
and encouraged the participation of independent generators of electricity. 
Although FERC could enable “all players to request access to new 
wholesale markets” (Public Utility Commission 1995, 15), it could not 
force deregulation of retail electricity markets that remained under state 
jurisdiction. In essence, states still held power over whether individual 
consumers could shop for their own power.

Competition in Pennsylvania

It did not take long for deregulation of the retail electricity market to 
take hold in Pennsylvania after passage of the EPAct. On April 14, 1994, the 



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WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

Pennsylvania PUC started an investigation into the merits of deregulation 
in the Commonwealth. Before the PUC issued its report, the state’s House 
of Representatives passed what would eventually become the Pennsylvania 
Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act.3 On August 
4, 1995, the PUC released a staff report concluding that partial deregulation 
of the electricity industry was prudent for Pennsylvania. Governor Tom 
Ridge stood behind deregulation and argued that low-cost electricity 
resulting from competition would serve as “an enormously powerful 
economic development tool” (Ridge 1996, 2; Ridge 1997, 2). On November 
25, 1996, the Pennsylvania Senate approved the amended Act, the House 
concurred, and restructuring of the electric-power industry was signed into 
law by the governor on December 3, 1996. Pennsylvania thereby became the 
nation’s fourth state to restructure its electricity markets.

The electric-power market was only partially deregulated (i.e., 
restructured). The Act allows for competition among electric-power 
suppliers, but not for distribution or transmission. Monopoly control of these 
two aspects of electric-power supply and related regulation of distribution 
rates and transmission line sighting by the PUC are still in place. As a result 
of restructuring, the PUC was granted the additional authority to license 
competitive suppliers who wished to enter the marketplace. The PUC also 
negotiated restructuring settlements with each existing electric-power 
supplier in the Commonwealth. A key outcome of these negotiations was 
the implementation of caps on electricity prices charged by these providers 
of last resort. Rate caps were put into place “to ensure that the transition to 
competition didn’t lead to increased rates for consumers” (Ridge 1997, 4). 
In exchange for these caps, utilities were allowed to recover stranded costs 
for investments (e.g., new generation) that would be unwise or unnecessary 
in a newly deregulated environment.

Initially, Pennsylvania enjoyed much success with competition. 
Kiesling (2001) reports that customers saved $3 billion between 1999 
and 2001 as electric-power rates fell by 3%. Kiesling (2001) also reports 
that 130 competitive suppliers operated in Pennsylvania in 2001, and 
600,000 customers had switched to a competitive supplier. That same year, 
Pennsylvania’s deregulation program was ranked number one in the nation 
by the Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets.

Kiesling (2001) credits this success to multiple factors. The first is the 
level at which default-service prices and rate caps were set. Pennsylvania set 
higher default-service prices on the basis of “market models and forecasts” 
to encourage the entry of competitive suppliers (Kiesling 2001, 4). In 
addition, Pennsylvania had a rapid four-year phase-in of competition that 
allowed the benefits of increased competition and lower rates to be realized 
more quickly. Other factors that Kiesling (2001) credits with promoting 
competition were the lack of a divestiture requirement, which would have 



47

DANIEL J. MALLINSON

forced utilities to sell off their generation (although many did anyway), 
and Pennsylvania’s participation in the PJM regional electricity market. In 
2001, the PUC’s chairman, John Quain, noted that “before electric choice, 
Pennsylvania electric-power rates were 15% above the national average, and 
now our rates are 4.4% below the national average” (Office of the Governor 
2001, 2). This success would prove to be short lived.

Rate Mitigation and an Open Window

Even though Pennsylvania enjoyed initial success with electric-power 
competition, the recession in 2001 and rising energy costs drove competitive 
suppliers out of the state. Figure 1 below illustrates this trend using data on 
customer shopping for electric power collected by Pennsylvania’s Office of 
Consumer Advocate. It shows the total number of customers—residential, 
industrial, and commercial—served by alternative suppliers from 1999 to 
2011.4 Competition increased during the first three years of deregulation 
but then steadily declined beginning in 2002.5 Instead of turning to various 
competitors vying for business and providing lower prices, most customers 
simply relied on their original local distributor of electric power (i.e., 
providers of last resort) for purchasing their power.

Complex circumstances led to this situation. One major problem was 
the difficult economic environment that utilities faced after deregulation. 
Munson (2005, 173) writes that the recession that began in 2001 “curtailed 

Figure 1 
Total Number of Customers (All Types) Served by an Alternative Electric 

Supplier, 1999-2011.



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WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

power demand and put enormous financial pressure on entrepreneurs and 
others thinking of entering the power business.” Following directly on the 
coattails of this recession were dramatic increases in the price of fuels like 
natural gas, coal, and oil. This price increases caused a significant rise in 
the cost to produce a kilowatt of electricity (see Edison Electric Institute 
2006a and 2006b; Edison Foundation 2006).6 According to the PUC, while 
natural gas prices increased 88.2% and coal prices rose 91% from 1996 to 
2006, the average price for electricity in Pennsylvania increased only 6.53% 
(Public Utility Commission 2008a). Artificial rate caps thus kept electricity 
prices stable for consumers while simultaneously creating an artificial price 
ceiling that drove out competitive suppliers.

The impact of economic conditions and weak competition on 
electricity rates became clear as rate caps began to expire across the state. 
In 2002, Duquesne Light customers saw a 20% decrease in the cost of their 
electric power when the company’s rate caps expired. The drop was steep 
because Duquesne charged one of the nation’s highest rates for electricity 
until deregulation and thus had an unusually high cap. Furthermore, the 
expiration occurred in the midst of the recession during the early 2000s and 
before the subsequent rise in energy prices. In contrast, by the time Pike 
County Light and Power’s rate caps expired in 2006, competition was tepid 
and energy costs had spiked because of the devastating effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. Consequently, Pike County’s customers saw an increase of roughly 
70% in their electric-power costs. Pennsylvania Power residential customers 
also saw their rates rise 20%–30% after their caps expired in 2006.

These large rate increases occurred during a period of what Baumgartner 
and Jones (2009) call “parallel processing” when multiple smaller organs 
of government are working on an issue and making incremental changes 
within their jurisdiction. Pike County Light and Power’s experience showed 
that the remaining 85% of the state’s consumers who were under rate caps 
could face substantial rate increases in 2010 and 2011 when the remaining 
caps expired. While awareness of this issue increased, parallel processing 
continued. For instance, in the lead up to rate-cap removal the PUC proposed 
a statewide consumer education campaign that would be a joint effort of 
the PUC and default electric-power suppliers. Legislative proposals and 
hearings on strategies for mitigating rate increases became serious after 
Sonny Popowsky, Pennsylvania Consumer Advocate, announced in May 
2008 that rate increases for the five remaining capped companies would 
likely range from 8% to 63% (Levy 2008a).

The growing reality that rate-cap expiration in an unfavorable 
economic environment with limited competition would cause double-digit 
rate increases spurred the state government to consider rate mitigation 
strategies. In fact, Governor Ed Rendell called for a special session on 
energy during the 2007–8 legislative session. The window was open as 



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DANIEL J. MALLINSON

Pennsylvania’s government moved from parallel to serial processing of the 
rate-cap issue. During this time, state officials proposed four approaches 
to rate-cap expiration: reregulation, rate-cap expiration, rate-cap extension, 
and legislative phase-in. Each of these potential solutions is recognizable 
within the agenda setting framework outlined above.

Reregulation

Of the four options, reregulation of the electricity industry most closely 
resembles Baumgartner and Jones’s (2009) idea of policy punctuation. It is 
also a substantial enough policy response that it could be explained using 
the elements of Kingdon’s (2003) garbage can model. Reregulation would 
require considerable state attention and resources and would therefore be 
a major shift in policy. To unwind deregulation completely, utilities would 
have to repurchase electricity generation facilities so that the original 
vertical monopolies could be restored.

Given the political and economic costs, full reregulation was not widely 
promoted in Pennsylvania. Apt, Blumsack, and Lave (2007, 78) argued that 
a return to a fully regulated electric-power industry in Pennsylvania “would 
send electricity prices skyrocketing” because of utility buyback of power 
plants. Moreover, utilities would revert to being fully regulated by the PUC 
and lose the opportunity to earn greater profits in the free market. A profit-
driven corporation clearly would not favor this option. Even though this 
approach would have been a clear punctuation, there was never enough 
political pressure for such a change.

A less drastic option that still includes increased state regulation of the 
electricity market was presented as an alternative to reregulation. It involved 
the creation of a state Power Authority that would essentially become an 
alternative supplier of electricity along with the development of a long-
term plan for financing the construction of new generation in an uncertain 
marketplace. This option garnered more political support in Harrisburg 
than did full reregulation. In fact, Representative Camille “Bud” George 
(D–Clearfield) introduced legislation in 2008 and 2010 that would have 
created such an authority. PUC’s vice-chairman, Tyrone Christy, was a vocal 
proponent of this option (PA House 2009b), but he was fairly alone in the 
endeavor (see, e.g., Powelson 2010).

Rate-cap Expiration

At the opposite end of the policy spectrum from reregulation, the 
second option for the General Assembly was simply to do nothing and allow 
deregulation to run its course. This option would have put state government 
back into a parallel processing of the problem, leaving rate-cap mitigation to 



50

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

agencies like the PUC and related committees in the General Assembly that 
could pass less comprehensive mitigation policy. Utilities were particularly 
supportive of this option, as they would be able to charge market rates for 
power that exceeded their negotiated rate caps. In addition, new suppliers 
were anxious to set up shop in Pennsylvania. In fact, PUC’s chairman, James 
Cawley (2009, 3), reported that “suppliers have told our Commission that 
they are eager to enter . . . service territories in Pennsylvania beginning [in 
2010].” Proponents assumed that competition would drive down electricity 
prices in the medium to long term (Apt, Blumsack, and Lave 2007). 
Accordingly, industry was firmly behind the status quo.

In terms of political support, there were proponents of rate-cap 
expiration on both sides of the aisle in Harrisburg. To be sure, Democrats 
in the House and Senate were more skeptical than Republicans about 
deregulation. Governor Rendell also generally supported the state 
completing the deregulation process, although he saw the need for some 
type of rate increase mitigation. In their testimony before the Assembly, 
PUC’s Chairman Cawley and Commissioner Powelson vigorously supported 
electric-power deregulation. Outside of state government, interest groups 
representing utilities, such as the Electric Power Generators Association, 
actively and vocally advocated deregulation. Altogether, the diverse support 
for deregulation created a large hurdle for advocates of rate increase 
mitigation strategies like rate-cap extension and a state-mandated phase-in.

Rate-cap Extension

The option to extend rate caps resembles the pressure-release-valve idea 
inspired by Berkman and Reenock (2004). It would have provided short-
term mediation of rate increases and given the General Assembly more time 
to develop a long-term solution to volatile electricity rates. The downside 
was that rate caps would remain barriers to entry for alternative suppliers 
and thus inhibit the development of new competition. As PUC’s Chairman 
Cawley noted in testimony, “you can only defy gravity for so long” (General 
Assembly 2008a, 18). He argued that extending rate caps would have made 
the situation worse later. Indeed, others argued that utilities would pay a 
substantial cost for each additional day that rate caps were retained (Fumo 
2008) and that artificially low prices result in the “over-consumption of 
electricity” (Fitzpatrick 2008a).

California was often cited by opponents of rate-cap extension as the 
worst-case scenario of this policy option (see Crutchfield 2008; Fitzpatrick 
2008a; Lesser 2007; Tierney 2008). California has traditionally been a 
net importer of electricity from neighboring states because it uses more 
electricity than it produces. During deregulation the state required utilities 
to divest their generation components and buy power solely from the spot 



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DANIEL J. MALLINSON

market rather than through more stable long-term contracts. By 2001, 
California was facing rising wholesale market prices, increased consumer 
demand, and capped electricity rates that caused utilities to pay more for 
power than they could recover. California was not the only state experiencing 
increased electricity demand. Facing similar difficulties, neighboring 
supplier states could not meet California’s increased demand. Worse, a 
shortage of transmission capacity prevented power from traveling to the 
places where it was needed most. As a result, an electric-power crisis rocked 
California with rolling blackouts and the bankruptcy of major electricity 
distributors (Hirst 2001). Forced to intervene to keep the lights on, the state 
has moved toward reregulation. Although Pennsylvania was arguably in a 
better position in 2008 than California was in 2001 (see EPGA 2001), there 
was fear that “the extension of rate caps . . . would bankrupt the transmission 
and distribution elements of energy, causing undue burden on the industry 
and consumers alike” (Powelson 2008, 6). This fear was pervasive among 
industry leaders and regulators.

Despite opposition from regulators and industry alike, there was political 
support in Harrisburg for rate-cap extension. In 2008, Senate Democrats 
threatened to “pass a bill to continue the freeze of rates at 1990 levels” 
if the utilities did not find a way to provide $5 billion in rate mitigation 
(Levy 2008b).7 Representative George introduced legislation in the House 
that would have extended rate caps for 54 months. Senator Lisa Boscola 
(D–Northampton/Lehigh/Monroe) introduced companion legislation in the 
Senate. Finally, Governor Rendell expressed support for this policy option 
as a last resort if no other rate mitigation strategy was put in place. He 
warned that “if solutions . . . are not approved, the pressure to simply extend 
the current rate caps will be overwhelming, and none of us here today will 
be able to resist that pressure, nor should we. Consumers must be protected 
one way or another. That is our job and we must do it” (General Assembly 
2008b, 12–13). Thus, there was a potential well of political support for rate-
cap extension in both houses of the General Assembly as well as in the 
governor’s mansion.

Legislative Phase-In

On July 1, 2008, State Senate Democrats Vince Fumo (Philadelphia), 
Lisa Boscola, Jim Ferlo (Allegheny), and Sean Logan (Allegheny/
Westmorland) held a press conference at which they proposed an alternative 
pressure-release device to rate-cap extension. It involved a phase-in of 
electric-power rates. According to the senators, “the purpose of the phase-
in is to prevent financial hardship and damage to the state economy” 
(Fumo 2008, 14). A phase-in allows customers to “adjust to higher prices 
gradually by introducing increases over a number of years rather than all 



52

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

at once” (Fitzpatrick 2008b). The Senate Democrats specifically proposed 
a mandatory phase-in of electric-power rates that would last five years and 
would not allow the utilities to recover the revenue lost during the rate-
raising period. The goal was to phase in the rates “without transferring 
additional cost to ratepayers” (Fumo 2008, 14).

Alternatively, while the General Assembly considered a state-mandated 
phase-in, the PUC was allowing utilities to propose their own voluntary 
phase-in plans. Such plans would allow utilities to defer recovery of revenue 
lost during the phase-in and collect interest on the deferred amount. The 
cost of the transition would thus be placed on the ratepayers rather than be 
absorbed by the utilities. The key question in this debate was who would 
pay for the phase-in of rates. The utilities and their supporters made clear 
that they would challenge any mandated phase-in that did not allow them 
to recover full payment for the electric power they supplied (see Dagan 
2008; Fitzpatrick 2008a). For example, in testimony before the House 
Consumer Affairs Committee (2008, 101), Steve Feld of FirstEnergy 
alluded to potential “constitutional issues” arising from a “failure to allow a 
full implementation of the power-procurement costs the utilities will incur 
[from a phase-in of rates].”

Although the utilities supported voluntary phase-in plans, some 
interest groups doubted their effectiveness. Local representatives of the 
American Association for Retired Persons (AARP) testified in support of 
the voluntary phase-in approach, but they regarded it as the minimal policy 
option. They spoke of the extra measures necessary to reach out to elderly 
citizens because “it is difficult for older people to understand [the] options” 
(General Assembly 2009a, 26). Effectively reaching vulnerable populations 
like the poor and elderly was challenging for voluntary phase-in plans run 
by utilities, for such people would not register for a voluntary program that 
would cost them more in the long run as utilities recovered deferred costs.

As a compromise, Philadelphia’s Mayor Michael Nutter suggested a 
state-mandated rate phase-in allowing utilities to collect “the difference 
between the capped rate and the market rate . . . over several future years” 
(Nutter 2008, 3). Consumers would be required to pay interest to utilities 
for deferred costs, but the costs would be spread among all users. Politically, 
Nutter’s proposal appeared to be a good compromise between the competing 
demands of advocates of deregulation and supporters of rate mitigation. 
Alas, changes in the economy and legislative attention rendered such a 
compromise moot.

The Window is Shut

At a legislative hearing in February 2008, Representative Carole 
Rubley (R–Chester/Montgomery) called rate caps on electric power “one of 



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DANIEL J. MALLINSON

the most important issues our residents throughout the state are going to be 
facing in the next few years” (General Assembly 2008b, 75). Not apparent 
at the time was that the substantial recession that had already begun in the 
United States would change the economics and politics of deregulating 
electric power in Pennsylvania. The recession proved to be the release 
required to dissipate political pressure on the rate-cap issue and prevent 
policy punctuation.

The deep global recession in 2008 and 2009 brought a subsequent drop 
in the price of electricity that was particularly stark given the record-setting 
heat of the summer of 2008. Figure 2 below shows a plot of the weighted 
average wholesale price of electricity for PJM West (Pennsylvania) between 
2007 and 2010. A smoothed trend line shows price movement during that 
time. The ramp-up and subsequent collapse of the cost of electric power 
in the wholesale market during 2008 is clear. Overall, the price recovered 
slightly before remaining relatively steady through the expiration of the 
remaining rate caps.

Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate how the recession and changes in the 
wholesale price of electricity affected retail prices in Pennsylvania. Both 
figures are drawn from spot estimates of rate increases for residential 
customers that were calculated by the PUC for the utilities whose rate caps 
expired in 2010 and 2011.8 Figure 3 shows the estimates for each provider 
of last resort. All the territories experienced downward pressure on their 
estimates as a result of the 2008 recession; PECO customers even went from 
estimated double-digit increases to single-digit decreases in their rates. 

Figure 2 
PJM West (Pennsylvania) Weighted Average Prices, 2007-2010.



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WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

Allegheny Power went from the highest estimated increases to the second 
lowest in less than a year.

 Figure 4 shows the average rate increase for residential customers in 
Pennsylvania, as calculated by the PUC. These data clarify how expectations 
for increases in electricity prices changed across the Commonwealth 
following the imposition of rate caps. The average increase dropped 
dramatically from a high of 73% in June 2008 to a range of 8%–20%. 
This rate drop reduced the fear of large increases typified by the OCA’s 
spring 2008 projections. In fact, the PUC encouraged utilities to speed up 
procurement of long-term contracts from the wholesale market to lock in 
favorable prices and thus reduce increases in electric-power rates following 
the imposition of rate caps (Powelson 2009). As a result of all these factors, 
the dire situation that had drawn attention in 2007 and the spring of 2008 
had changed substantially by the fall of 2008.

While rate mitigation continued to receive media and political attention 
in the Commonwealth in 2009 and 2010 (e.g., Tom Knox centered his 2010 
gubernatorial campaign on the issue), most attention rapidly refocused on 
the economic downturn and its effects on state revenues and spending. The 
depth of the recession meant that Harrisburg could not simply spend its 
Rainy Day Fund to ride out the storm. Indeed, deeper cuts were necessary 
across multiple budget years.9

The protracted state budget battle in 2009 is a good example of how the 
poor budgetary environment affected issue attention. The Commonwealth 

Figure 3 
PUC Electric Price Estimates for Residential Customers in Each Service 

Territory.



55

DANIEL J. MALLINSON

faced a projected $3 billion budget deficit and a closely divided government 
with the Senate in Republican control, a slim Democratic majority in the 
House, and lame-duck Democrat Ed Rendell in the governor’s mansion. As 
a result, the Commonwealth endured a 101-day budget impasse between 
Governor Rendell and Senate Republicans. As Senator Pat Vance said in 
November 2009, the budget process “sucked the oxygen out of every issue” 
(Seltzer 2009). Little will was left to tackle major legislation like rate-cap 
mitigation.

Data from the Pennsylvania Policy Agendas Project prove that 
Pennsylvania’s agenda shifted drastically with the recession.10 One of 
the datasets includes a random sample of daily press clippings from the 
governor’s press office that indicates what the press was covering and which 
issues the governor’s office deemed important on a given day. Figure 5 
below tracks attention to economic and energy issues from 2007 to 2010.11 
Figure 5 shows that even though attention to energy issues spiked a bit 
in 2007 and generally remained higher than attention to economic issues 
in fall 2007 and spring 2008, attention clearly shifted to economic issues 
as the recession became more severe in late 2008 and early 2009. The 
economy again becomes highly salient during the budget battle in 2009. 
These data show that attention to the economy far surpassed attention to 
rate-cap mitigation during its most important period. By January 2011 all 
the remaining rate caps had expired.

Although the Commonwealth was unable to pass a comprehensive rate 
increase mitigation strategy, it did not stop working on the issue. In fact, 

Figure 4 
Average PUC Electric Price Estimate, 2008-2010.



56

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

the PUC and relevant committees in the General Assembly continued to 
process the issue jointly, even as the Commonwealth was more attentive 
to economic issues. As can be expected from parallel processing, these 
actions were incremental. For example, the PUC required utilities to provide 
individual education plans to consumers, it encouraged default suppliers to 
speed up their procurement of power contracts after rate caps were imposed 
so as to capitalize on lower electricity prices, and it approved voluntary rate 
phase-in plans proposed by the electric-power companies (see Powelson 
2009; Public Utility Commission 2008b; 2008c; 2009a). These measures 
allowed the PUC to work within its jurisdiction to enact incremental change. 
In addition, the General Assembly passed two laws during the special 
session on energy that concerned the promotion of alternative energy in 
the Commonwealth. Finally, Act 129 of 2008 required electricity utilities 
to create plans for reducing electricity consumption, thus reducing demand 
pressure within the market. All these policies were incremental and promote 
long-term reductions in rates through investment in new technology and 
reduction in demand.

Conclusion

Electric-power deregulation policy in the United States continues to 
provide political scientists with insight into significant theoretical concepts. 

Figure 5 
Media Attention to Economic and Energy Issues as Percent of Total Media 

Coverage, 2007-2010.



57

DANIEL J. MALLINSON

The history of deregulating electric power in Pennsylvania presented here 
leads to important conclusions regarding the broader theories of punctuated 
equilibrium and the interaction between policy implementation and 
agenda setting through feedback loops. In terms of punctuated equilibrium 
theory, Pennsylvania is a case where a reasonable expectation for policy 
punctuation was not realized. After the drastic rate increases experienced by 
Pike County Light & Power and the subsequent dire projections by the OCA 
for the remaining 85% of Pennsylvania’s electricity consumers, Harrisburg 
turned its attention to rate mitigation. With the special session on energy, 
the General Assembly appeared to be in serial processing mode, and calls 
for action were coming from multiple actors. Yet the rapid shift in public 
attention to the economy in the fall of 2008 deflated the apparent pressure 
for punctuation. This finding builds on the idea of Berkman and Reenock 
(2004) that punctuations do not always follow periods of stability where 
policy becomes misaligned with preferences. Indeed, shifting environmental 
factors (e.g., the economy) that are beyond government control can deflate 
this pressure.

This finding also supports aspects of Kingdon’s (2003) garbage can 
model, such as policy windows, entrepreneurs, and focusing events. The 
window for governmental action opened when attention focused on the 
potential for double-digit price increases for electricity after the expiration 
of rate caps. Meanwhile, policy entrepreneurs from inside and outside of 
government worked to draw attention to the four policy options described 
above. Unfortunately, another major focusing event—the recession—
drew governmental attention away from rate caps and slammed the policy 
window shut. Yet that is not the entire story. The PUC and committees of the 
General Assembly were still able to parallel-process the policy and produce 
incremental changes to address rate-cap mitigation, thus confirming the 
argument of Baumgartner and Jones (2009) that models of large policy 
change like Kingdon’s (2003), as well as models of incremental change 
(e.g., Lindblom 1959), do not fully capture the dynamics of attention in 
American policymaking.

Finally, this case study of the implementation of electric-power 
deregulation in Pennsylvania affirms the notion that policy is often 
evolutionary. Indeed, a relationship exists between the final implementation 
stage of the process and the initial agenda-setting stage. In fact, deregulation 
of electricity rates in Pennsylvania is particularly well suited as a case 
study of this phenomenon because there was a 15-year gap between the 
passage of the Choice Act and the expiration of the final rate caps. Even 
though the early process of implementing retail electric-power choice was 
fairly smooth, misalignment between capped and market rates went largely 
undetected until rate caps expired for Pike County Light & Power and 
Pennsylvania Power in 2006. The attention of state government was drawn 



58

WHERE WAS THE ELECTRICITY?

to this potential implementation problem and deregulation found itself back 
on the agenda. Through the incremental policy changes made by the PUC 
and the General Assembly, deregulation evolved somewhat to account for 
this growing problem.

In a field that has most recently been celebrating macro-level theories 
that explain the aggregated actions and outcomes of our political system 
(e.g., Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002), this article shows the continued 
usefulness of the much maligned case study for testing and building on 
broader theory. Although these theories prove to be robust in explaining 
the norm, practical politics is not always normal. This case study reveals 
how policy punctuations do not always occur when expected by examining 
temporal variation in attention (see Gerring 2004). By using a case study 
to determine how deregulation policy and issue attention in Pennsylvania 
changed over time, this article augments broader theories of agenda setting, 
thereby demonstrating that case studies remain an important research 
method in political science.

Notes

 1 For a more comprehensive explanation of the electric-power industry, see Philipson 
and Willis (2006).

 2 PUCHA was a response to the collapse of large electric-utility holding companies 
during the Great Depression. Before the Depression, holding companies had absorbed many 
smaller electric utilities into much larger corporations. This development resulted in fiscal 
mismanagement and high rates for customers, as well as control by 19 holding companies 
of 90% of the electric-power providers in the United States. See Energy Information 
Administration (1993) for a more detailed history of PUCHA.

 3 The law was passed on June 12, 1995, as House Bill 1509.
 4 Discrepancies in totals for April 1, 2003, and October 1, 2003, are due to addition 

errors in OCA reports (see Office of Consumer Advocate 1999–2011).
 5 Two clear outliers require additional explanation. The spike in competition on April 

1, 2001, is the result of PECO’s electric-power restructuring agreement. The plan required that 
300,000 residential customers not already being served by a competitive supplier be randomly 
selected and switched to the New Power Company’s Competitive Discount Service. Customers 
could then either opt out of the program or choose an alternative supplier without any penalty. 
The New Power Company left Pennsylvania in 2002 and PECO absorbed its 180,000 remaining 
customers. The smaller jump, reflected in the OCA report of January 1, 2004, is attributable to 
PECO’s Market Share Threshold Program, which required PECO to “turn over” a portion of 
its customers to a competitive supplier as a stipulation in the settlement of the merger between 
PECO and Unicom (Henderson 2004, 3). This requirement provided a short-term bump in 
competition that returned to the normal rate of decline after customers switched back to PECO.

 6 Fuel prices were not the only driver of increased production costs for electric 
generators. Other factors included environmental regulations, construction costs for new 
generation, infrastructure investment, and political uncertainty regarding proposed regulations 
(see Electric Power Generation Association 2008).

 7 Quotation from Senator Robert J. Mellow (D–Lackawanna).
 8 These are spot estimates rather than projections, meaning that had rate caps 

suddenly been removed in June 2008, for example, electric rates for Allegheny Power’s 



59

DANIEL J. MALLINSON

residential customers would have more than doubled. This does not mean that the PUC was 
projecting in June 2008 that Allegheny’s rates would double in 2011. For this reason, the PUC’s 
spot estimates are useful for tracking how the retail price of electricity in each territory was 
changing between 2008 and 2011. See Public Utility Commission 2009b; 2010).

 9 See Schlosstein (1975) on how state fiscal responses differ according to the depth 
of a recession.

10 The Agendas Project codes 20 topics. I used “Fiscal and Economic Issues,” which is 
issue code 1, and “Energy,” which is issue code 8. See the Pennsylvania Policy Database User 
Guide and Codebook for more detail on the coding scheme and available data. http://www.
temple.edu /papolicy/The%20Pennsylvania%20Policy%20Database%20_UserGuide%20
08221.pdf.

11 Because the number of press clippings varies over time, the absolute number of 
clippings on a given topic is not useful. Therefore, like the Agendas Project recommendation, 
I used the proportion of the total news coverage in a given month for each topic to generate 
Figure 5. See http://www.temple.edu/papolicy/DatasetDescriptions.htm#NewspaperArticles.

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