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LEGISLATIVE CAREERISM, 
INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES, 

AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
INFLUENCE OVER LEGISLATIVE 

POLICY MAKING IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES

JOSHUA OZYMY

Texas A & M University, Corpus Christi

DENIS REY

University of Tampa

SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.
Grove City College

This article augments previous findings regarding the impact of 
legislative professionalization on oversight of state agencies. We examine 
how the twin processes of institutional professionalization and legislative 
careerism condition the power relationship between state legislatures and 
bureaucracies by utilizing individual-level data provided by legislators 
themselves. Our findings suggest that such influence is more nuanced than 
previously believed. The relationship between careerism and bureaucratic 
power over legislative policy making is curvilinear, with administrative 
power varying by the level of professionalism in state houses, and the 
influence of careerism conditioned by the level of professionalization.

Democratically elected legislators are afforded the primary 
responsibility of overseeing the actions of administrative agencies. As this 
authority has remained constant, many state legislatures have become more 
professionalized over the past four decades to bolster oversight capacity of 



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

the bureaucracy (King 2000; Squire 1992). The added resources—better 
pay, benefits, and job prestige—make legislative service more attractive and, 
as a result, enhance legislative careerism (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; 
Rosenthal 1996; Squire 2007). Scholars have found that while an increase 
in institutional resources stemming from institutional professionalization 
enhances legislative influence over agencies, careerism may lessen such 
influence because the personal incentive for oversight wanes with a constant 
focus on reelection (Rosenthal 1981; Woods and Baranowski 2006).

Prior research on the power relationship between legislative principals 
and administrative agents has generally operationalized influence 
through surveys of administrative personnel, such as the American State 
Administrators Project, that ask administrators how much influence 
they perceive legislators to possess over administrative policy making 
(Dometrius, Burke, and Wright 2008; Wright and Cho 2001). These research 
designs implicitly argue that professionalization enhances legislative 
influence that naturally results in lessened agency influence (Reenock and 
Poggione 2004; Woods and Baranowski 2006). Studies have generally 
overlooked how professionalization affects the capacity of administrative 
agencies to influence legislative policy making. By analyzing the interactive 
relationship between institutional and individual-level changes brought 
about by professionalization on administrative influence over legislative 
policy making, this article expands on previous findings that higher degrees 
of institutional-level professionalization result in legislators believing that 
bureaucrats have less influence over legislative policy making.

Professionalization and Power

Since the legislative-reform movement of the 1960s, state legislatures 
have generally experienced an enhanced level of professionalism (King 
2000). Reformers called for increasing the ability of legislators to manage 
budgetary responsibilities, a complex policy environment, and the ever-
growing demands of citizens. The result was increased staff resources, 
longer sessions, and better pay and benefits for legislators who engendered 
higher levels of legislative careerism (Squire 2007). Professionalization 
thus occurred at two levels: at the institutional level in the form of greater 
institutional resources, session lengths, and staff, and at the individual level 
in the form of enhanced legislative careerism (Rosenthal 1996).

The impact of increased professionalism on state legislatures has been 
profound. Scholars have noted its effects in a variety of areas. For example, 
Fiorina (1997) and Dometrius and Ozymy (2006) have demonstrated its 
effect on the partisan distribution of state legislatures. Connections have also 
been drawn between increased professionalism and legislative efficiency 
(Thompson 1986), divided government (Fiorina 1994), increased careerism 



103

JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

(Squire 1988), and public opinion monitoring and policy responsiveness 
(Maestas 2000; 2003).

One important expectation of combining full-time service with enhanced 
legislative resources was an increased capacity to engage in administrative 
oversight (Dometrius, Burke, and Wright 2008; Gerber, Maestas, and 
Dometrius 2005; Reenock and Poggione 2004). Greater service commitments 
provide additional opportunities to monitor agency actions. Enhanced 
institutional resources, such as more funds for legislative and policy staff, 
enable legislators to engage in more stringent oversight. The higher pay, 
benefits, and prestige of service in professional legislatures tends to broaden 
the candidate pool to include more highly educated individuals (Squire 2007). 
These variables provide professional legislators a distinct advantage regarding 
their ability to oversee and influence agency behavior.

Research on how professionalization influences the power relationship 
between state legislatures and administrative agencies tends to focus 
on whether added institutional resources and other variables empower 
legislators (Baranowski 2001; Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius 2005; Ogul 
1976). Little attention is paid to how legislative professionalization affects 
administrative influence over state legislatures. These studies generally 
assume a zero-sum game between actors. Analysis confirming that 
professionalization tilts the balance of power in favor of legislators naturally 
assumes it comes at the expense of agencies. It follows that, holding other 
variables constant, administrative agencies should enhance their ability to 
influence legislative policy making as professionalism wanes.

Previous research demonstrates that increased institutional 
professionalization weakens agency influence over legislative policy 
making (Carey et al. 2006). Theoretically, this result occurs because added 
institutional resources foster a greater legislative ability to hire staff, develop 
expertise, and oversee agency actions that enhances legislative influence 
at the expense of agencies. This work does not go far enough, however, 
as the impact of institutional resources is ultimately conditioned by how 
legislators use these resources.

Legislators do not always possess the appropriate incentives to use 
resources for oversight. Rosenthal (1981) says legislators are likely to 
spend their time on the job choosing activities that accrue credit with their 
constituents and bolster their chances of reelection. Engaging in higher 
levels of casework, constituency service, and campaigning becomes even 
more important as careerism increases and so does the subsequent need 
for constant reelection. Administrative oversight garners little attention 
from the press or constituents. Woods and Baranowski (2006) argue that 
the low visibility of administrative oversight creates a strategic disincentive 
for legislators with career ambitions to engage in the oversight of state 
agencies. They state that “career-oriented legislators tend to be far more 



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

focused on electoral concerns and career advancement than on oversight, 
which is largely ignored by the electorate” (Woods and Baranowski 2006, 
590). In their view, even if institutional professionalization brings a greater 
capacity to engage in agency oversight, careerists may simply deploy those 
resources accordingly. “Although the resources necessary to engage in 
active bureaucratic oversight improve with professionalization,” they note, 
“these resources may increasingly be employed for other purposes” (Woods 
and Baranowski 2006, 591).

Studies suggest that how legislators divide their time on the job is a 
combination of their incentive structure and the institutional resources 
available to them (Maestas 2003). When resources are constrained, 
legislators must make strategic choices about how to allocate their time and 
energy. Careerist legislators will no doubt prioritize activities that bolster 
their chances of reelection. We believe the careerism/oversight trade-off 
should occur only when institutional constraints force legislators to make 
such hard choices. Once institutional resources rise to a certain point, 
legislators should not be forced to make such extreme trade-offs.

High levels of institutional resources, such as policy and administrative 
staff, should allow legislators to balance their career aspirations with other 
less publicly salient activities like administrative oversight. Engaging in 
oversight should lead to greater legislative influence over agencies, and 
increased institutional resources should further reinforce this relationship, 
as long as adequate resources exist to accommodate the electioneering needs 
of careerist legislators. As Squire (2007, 214) notes, “A greater number of 
staff members leads to better-informed legislators, allowing members to 
have greater influence in the policymaking process. . . . A larger staff base 
likely improves re-election prospects by enhancing legislators’ ability to 
provide constituent services.”

A marginal increase in resources in amateur legislatures makes little 
difference to oversight because it is insufficient to reach the minimum 
threshold needed for legislative autonomy. Likewise, a marginal increase in 
resources in highly professional legislatures makes little difference because 
they are already well resourced to compensate for the effects of careerism. 
The largest effect of resources should occur in mid-range professional 
bodies, which contain higher levels of careerism but lack adequate resources 
for taking advantage of greater careerism. Therefore, we expect the effects 
of careerism on administrative power over state legislatures’ policy making 
to be strongest in moderately professional state houses.

Data

Individual-level data are derived from a survey of state legislators 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995). The survey was conducted by mail 



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

and administered to state legislators in all 50 states during the spring of 
1995. Former legislators who served in 1993 or 1994 were also surveyed. 
All members of the upper legislative chambers were surveyed (including 
Nebraska’s unicameral chamber), along with three-quarters of the members 
of the lower house. The survey yielded a response rate of 47% and 3,542 
cases. All states are represented in the survey.1

Measuring Influence

It has become common practice to measure the power relationship 
between state agencies and the legislative and executive branches with 
surveys that ask state administrators to rate the influence of these actors 
on agency discretion. The long-standing American State Administrator’s 
Project (ASAP) is widely used (Dometrius 2002; 2008; Gerber, Maestas, 
and Dometrius 2005; Wright and Cho 2001), but other similar surveys 
have also been implemented (Reenock and Poggione 2004; Woods and 
Baranowski 2006). These studies link individual-level data with data on 
gubernatorial approval ratings (Dometrius 2002), formal legislative powers 
(Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius 2005), and other variables to assess their 
impact on agency discretion.

One section of the survey asks legislators to report the relative influence 
of a variety of actors on the legislative process. Included in this module is 
a question measuring the influence of state agencies: “What do you think 
is the relative influence of the following actors in determining legislative 
outcomes in your chamber?” [Bureaucrats/Civil Servants].2 This variable 
is coded on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 = “no influence” and 7 
= “dictates policy.” We use this variable to measure the balance of power 
between legislators and state agencies (Carey et al. 2006; Carey, Niemi, 
and Powell 1998). Six percent of respondents report that agencies have “no 
influence,” less than 1% respond “dictates policy,” 14% answer “5”, and 
22% answer “2.”

We recognize the cross-level inference problem posed by testing 
institutional-level theoretical constructs with individual-level indicators. 
Although legislators’ perceptions of bureaucratic influence is an imperfect 
measure of bureaucratic influence over the legislature as a whole, in 
this context it is impossible to create a proper measure of influence at 
the institutional level without relying on the evaluations of individual-
level actors. Studies examining formal characteristics of state political 
institutions, such as executive power (Holbrook 1993) and legislative power 
over administrative-agency rulemaking authority (Gerber, Maestas, and 
Dometrius 2005), can measure these institutional-level constructs with 
institutional-level variables. In the case of more subjective measures, such 
as political corruption or interest group influence in state houses, studies 



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

turn to individual-level data derived from state house reporters (Boylan 
and Long 2003) or state legislators (Ozymy 2010) that can best gauge such 
constructs. Our variable for bureaucratic influence falls within these same 
parameters, and we believe that measuring bureaucratic influence over 
legislative policy making as a whole can be adequately represented by those 
who witness this influence first-hand. Moreover, careerism is best measured 
at the individual level, and querying these same individuals about their 
career aspirations and perceptions of administrative influence best captures 
this critical relationship.

Careerism and Resources

As prescribed by Rosenthal (1996) and Woods and Baranowski (2006), 
legislative professionalism is divided into careerism and institutional 
resources. Rosenthal (1996) notes that it is difficult to measure the concept 
of careerism unambiguously, for it is highly multi-faceted. He suggests that it 
should include more direct measures, such as self-identification by legislators, 
as well as indirect measures, such as salary (Rosenthal 1996, 176).

Our data include a question that allows legislators to self-identify as 
careerists, which is our primary indicator of careerism. It asks respondents: 
“Do you think of politics and public office as a career?” This variable is 
coded as a dummy. Given negative public perceptions about careerism in 
politics (as evidenced by the fact that term limits were about to be instituted 
in many states shortly after the survey was completed), respondents may 
be less than forthcoming about identifying themselves as careerists. We 
try to control for this factor with a measure of legislative tenure capturing 
the number of terms served in both upper and lower chambers. Legislative 
salary is included as an indirect measure of careerism. We utilize a measure 
of total compensation (in dollars) that takes into account both salary (in 
dollars) and per diem payments because most state legislators receive some 
or most of their pay from the latter (Dometrius and Ozymy 2006; Fiorina 
1999).

Institutional resources are measured by legislative spending, staff 
resources, and session lengths. Total legislative expenditures (in dollars) 
for 1992 were determined by the survey administrators according to data 
derived from The Book of the States. Staff resources are measured by the 
total number of permanent legislative staff available to each legislature in 
1996. The staffing variable is taken from data on total permanent legislative 
staff in 1996 gathered by the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(2004), with the exception of Massachusetts where a trend estimate over 
time was used because data were unavailable for 1996. Permanent staff 
ranged from 18 in Wyoming to 3,580 in New York. Session length (measured 
by total days in session) is also taken from NCSL (2004).



107

JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

Additional Contributing Factors

Careerism is expected to shift the legislative focus toward electioneering 
activities (Rosenthal 1981). The survey includes questions on the amount of 
time legislators spend campaigning, engaging in casework, and keeping in 
touch with constituents. These questions are derived from a module that 
asks respondents: “How much time do you actually spend on each of the 
following activities?” [Campaigning/fundraising, helping constituents with 
problems with government, keeping up with constituents]. The variable is 
coded on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 where 1 = “hardly any” and 5 = “a great 
deal.” Most legislators claimed they spent little time campaigning (modal 
response = 2), but claimed they spent “a great deal” of time on casework and 
keeping up with constituents. Question responses may be less than candid 
and possibly represent a positive response bias. Caution should be used 
when interpreting results.

Legislative power over agencies can be greatly affected by the amount 
of formal oversight powers possessed by a legislature. We utilize the 
Legislative Administrative Rules Review Indicator (LARRI) developed by 
Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius (2005) to control for this factor. This index 
takes into account the ability of each state legislature to review the rules of 
state agencies. States are coded 0 = “no legislative rule review authority,” 1 
= “advisory authority only,” and 2 = “sanctioning power to change rules.” 
Most states have at least advisory authority, with the modal response being 
“sanctioning power.” The executive branch can also play a considerable 
role in organizing and influencing bureaucratic behavior (Sigelman 
and Dometrius 1988). To control for this factor, we include Holbrook’s 
(1993) measure of gubernatorial power, which captures the appointive, 
organizational, and budgetary powers of the executive branch in each state. 
This index varies in value from the most powerful executive office in Alaska 
(6.70) to the weakest in South Carolina (-7.91). Additionally, we use data 
provided by the survey administrators to control for the average amount of 
legislative turnover from 1992 and 1994, the size of the state’s population, 
and the gender, race, and family income of each legislator. The summary 
statistics for the variables are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.

Results

To test our hypotheses, we model the relationship between 
professionalism and administrative influence across all state legislatures 
to demonstrate the interactive relationship with institutional resources 
and careerism. We then provide additional analysis by modeling this same 
relationship across highly professional, moderately professional, and 
amateur legislatures exclusively. We use a three-part scale constructed by 



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

the NCSL that proves fruitful for this purpose because it takes into account 
legislative compensation, staff resources, and time spent on the job as 
measures of professionalism. This scale yields a three-fold categorization 
of highly professional (Red states), moderately professional (White states), 
and amateur legislatures (Blue states).

According to the NCSL, in 2008 average legislators in Red states spent 
80% of their job time engaged in activities related to legislative service, 
they were compensated at an average pay of $68,599, and they retained an 
average staff size of 8.9 individuals per member. Legislators in White states 
spent an average of 70% of their time on the job, received an average pay of 
$35,326, and had an average of 3.1 staff members. Blue states are part-time 
legislatures (54% of the time spent on the job), with low pay ($15,984), and 
minimal staff (1.2).

Before moving on to hypothesis testing, we consider two important 
assumptions about legislative behavior in this context. Namely, that 
professionalization engenders higher levels of careerism and that careerist 
legislators are likely to spend more time on reelection-oriented activities 
than are non-careerists. We find both these theoretical assumptions to be 
empirically supported by the data.

Figure 1 below compares the level of legislative careerism with 
legislative professionalism, using the careerism self-identification indicator 
and the three-group NCSL categorization for professionalism. The data 
suggest that across the states, legislators are generally more likely to be 
non-careerists than careerists. There does appear, however, to be a marked 
trend toward careerism that increases with professionalization. In amateur 
legislatures 12% of respondents view legislative service as a “career,” 
compared with 20% of respondents in moderately professional legislatures 
and 49% in highly professional legislatures.

Figure 1 
Legislative Careerism versus Legislative Professionalism  

in American State Legislatures.

 
Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995) *Values are rounded/
weighted.



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

We now demonstrate that there are appreciable differences in the amount 
of time that careerists and non-careerists dedicate to electioneering activities. 
Figure 2 compares legislators in the sample who self-identify as careerists 
(versus those who do not) with the amount of casework and campaigning/
fundraising undertaken while in office. Table A2 in the Appendix provides 
fuller analysis of these behavioral differences. The values range on a five-
point scale from legislators who report engaging in “hardly any” to “a great 
deal” of such activities. Careerists are likely to spend much time on casework 
(53%) and keeping up with constituents (49%). A mere 14% report that they 
spend hardly any time fundraising. Fewer careerists also report spending a 
“great deal” of time or close to it studying legislation (28%) and writing new 
legislation (23%). By contrast, non-careerists report spending much less time 
on these activities, with 40% spending a great deal of time on casework, 39% 
keeping in touch with constituents, and 19% seeking pork barrel projects (as 
opposed to 28% of careerists). Twice as many non-careerists as careerists 
engage in campaigning/fundraising (28% versus 14%).

The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 1 below as a set of four 
models. Ordered-logit models are chosen in recognition of the ordinally 
measured dependent variables. Model 1 includes respondents from all 
legislatures and a variable to account for the interactive relationship between 
legislative resources and careerism. Model 2 comprises only legislators 
from amateur legislatures (Blue states). Model 3 comprises legislators from 
moderately professional legislatures (White states). Model 4 comprises 
legislators from highly professional legislatures (Red states).

Figure 2 
Casework and Campaigning Differences Between Careerist and  

Non-Careerist State Legislators.

Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995) *Values are rounded/
weighted.

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Hardly Any 2 3 4 A Great Deal

Careerist Campaigning

Careerist Casework

Non-Careerist Campaigning

Non-Careerist Casework



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Model 1 contains three variables that demonstrate a statistically 
significant relationship with the dependent variable. Two indicators for 
careerism (legislative tenure and total compensation) are not statistically 
significant. Our primary measure of careerism (self-identification) is 
positively related to the dependent variable. As expected, the finding 
suggests that higher levels of careerism result in an increase in administrative 
influence over the legislative process in the states. Moreover, an interactive 
relationship is also present between careerism and institutional resources. 
The combined impact of careerism and resources has a negative impact on 
the dependent variable, suggesting that enough resources may override the 
influence of careerism.

The added effect of careerism and institutional resources thus appears 
to bolster administrative influence over state legislatures. Resources may 
therefore condition the impact of careerism. Increased executive power 
apparently enhances administrative influence over the legislative process. In 
an effort to refine the analysis further, we turn to the three additional models 
that divide the analysis into amateur, moderate, and highly professional 
legislatures. Here we are looking more for the significance of the careerism 
indicators than for the variables for resources. Although legislatures do 
vary in resources within these models, we can better examine resource 
differences (and their interaction with careerism) across models.

The second model for amateur legislatures is quite weak and the 
model itself is not statistically significant. The main indicators of interest 
for careerism and institutional resources are not significant either. Only 
casework and constituent service influence the dependent variable. This 
result is neither surprising nor unexpected since institutional resources do 
not vary greatly in this sample of legislatures and careerism is much more 
prevalent in more professional legislatures, where the incentive for career 
service is greater.



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

Table 1 
Careerism, Legislative Professionalism, and Administrative Influence over 

Legislative Policy Making in American State Houses

Careerism
All 

Legislatures
Amateur 

Legislatures

Moderately 
Professional 
Legislatures

Highly 
Professional 
Legislatures

 Self-identification .35** (.11) .16 (.17) .28** (.13) .01 (.15)

 Lower terms .01 (.01) .00 (.02) .03* (.02) -.05 (.03)

 Higher terms .00 (.01) .01 (.02) .00 (.01) -.02 (.02)

 Total comp. -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00001* (.00006) .00 (.00)

Institutional 
Resources

 Session length .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01** (.00)

 Permanent staff -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .001** (.00) -.00 (.00)

 Expenditures .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00001* (.00001) .00 (.00)

Constituent Service

 Campaigning .02 (.03) .04 (.05) .04 (.04) .03 (.07)

 In touch with 
constituents

-.05 (.05) -.14* (.07) .18** (.08) -.30** (.14)

 Casework .05 (.05) .12* (.07) -.05 (.08) .20 (.13)

Controls

 Legislative rule 
review powers

-.06 (.04) .07 (.13) -.06 (.06) -.26* (.16)

 Executive power .05** (.02) .06 (.04) -.05 (.04) -.01 (.06)

 Turnover -.00 (.01) .01 (.01) -.02* (.01) .05* (.03)

 Population .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .0001** (.00005)
-.00008* 
(.00004)

 Gender -.14* (.08) -.13 (.13) -.20 (.13) -.12 (.18)

 Race .04 (.03) .02 (.07) .01 (.05) .14* (.07)

 Income -.02 (.03) .03 (.05) -.09** (.05) .03 (.07)

 Expenditures 
*Career

-.000003** 
(.000001)

- - -

Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995). Model 1 N = 2,876, 
Model 2 N = 1,114, Model 3 N = 1,166, Model 4 N = 596 ** p< .05 *p< .1 Data are 
weighted. Model 1 �2 =34.34, sig. = .01, Model 3 �2 =42.57, sig. = .001, Model 4 �2 =26.84, 
sig. = .0. We record Model 2 here as a placeholder; it has no statistical significance �2 =18.18, 
sig. = .3777



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

The third and fourth models consider the impact of resources and 
careerism in moderately and highly professional legislatures. These function 
specifically to test our hypothesis that careerism’s impact on agency influence 
over legislatures should be greatest when institutional resources are modest. 
The models confirm this expectation. We find that the careerism effect is 
actually occurring disproportionately in moderately professional legislatures. 
It is absent in highly professional legislatures. This pattern is demonstrated 
with three of our four indicators of careerism, including our direct measure of 
self-identification and two indirect measures (lower terms served in office and 
total compensation). All these variables demonstrate a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable. This result suggests that careerism enhances 
agency influence over the policy-making process in moderately professional 
state legislatures, where higher levels of careerism exist, as opposed to more 
amateur state legislatures; but resources are too modest to compensate for the 
careerism effect, as in highly professional legislatures.

Although not as important for hypothesis testing as the effects of 
careerism, the actual indicators of institutional resources do affect influence 
in these models. The number of permanent staff has a positive relationship 
with administrative influence, and expenditures reduce influence in 
moderately professional legislatures. Expenditures and staff are not 
statistically significant in the fourth model, but session length does affect 
the dependent variable. While resources influence the dependent variable 
in both models, they cannot be interpreted by their coefficients alone. 
Resources do not vary to a high enough degree in many respects because the 
models restrict the cases to legislators in similarly situated legislatures. It is 
more fruitful to compare the impact of careerism across legislative types, of 
which the analysis demonstrates that its effect wanes in highly professional 
legislatures, as expected.

The logit coefficients in Table 1 do not have a direct, interpretable meaning 
in relation to the magnitude of change they cause in the dependent variable. 
One way of considering the magnitude of the effect that logit coefficients 
have on the dependent variable is to use the standard deviation (SD) of the 
independent variables to estimate the odds that a one-SD increase or decrease 
in the value of the standardized independent variable would increase or 
decrease the value of the dependent variable by one unit of measurement.

We use the SPost, post-estimation module (Long and Freese 2005) in 
Stata to create a standardization of the coefficient. Table 2 shows changes 
in the odds. The first model considers these effects within the full sample 
of legislatures. The results suggest that one standard deviation change in 
careerism causes a 15% change in the odds that bureaucratic influence 
would increase. A standard deviation increase in executive power increases 
the odds of bureaucratic influence increasing by 14%.



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

Table 2 
Change in Odds for Standard Deviation Increase in Influence of 

Administrative Agencies on Legislative Policy Making in U.S. State Houses

Careerism
All 

Legislatures

Moderately 
Professional 
Legislatures

Highly Professional 
Legislatures

 Career 1.15 (.42) 1.11 (.40)

 Lower terms 1.10 (2.94)

 Total compensation 1.26 (17,732.71)

Institutional 
Resources

 Session length 1.36 (34.69)

 Permanent staff 1.54 (361.95)

 Expenditures .81 (26,631.94)

Constituent 
Service

 In touch with 
constituents

1.16 (.83) .79 (.76)

Controls

 Legislative rule 
review powers

.81 (.80)

 Power of executive 1.14 (2.56)

 Turnover .90 (6.26) 1.36 (6.29)

 Population .71 (3255.89) .61 (6367.99)

 Gender .94 (.42)

 Race 1.16 (1.06)

 Income .90 (1.19)

 Expenditures
 *Career

1.00 (59267.39)

Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995). Only independent 
effects with at least p<.1 are reported. Data are weighted. Left number represents change in 
odds, and right number is standard deviation. Cells in italics represent negative directional 
relationships. Model 2 is dropped as the model Chi-Square was statistically insignificant.



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Model 2 reports changes in odds for the statistically significant 
independent variables in moderately professional legislatures. Here the 
analysis shows that a standard deviation increase in careerism causes an 
11% increase in bureaucratic influence. The indirect measure of careerism 
(previous terms in office) produces a similar result, with a standard deviation 
increase causing a 10% increase in bureaucratic influence. Resources also 
produce significant impacts in the model, with a standard deviation increase 
in compensation causing a 26% increase in influence.

Taken together, the analysis provides important insights into 
the relationship between legislative professionalism, careerism, and 
administrative influence over policy making by state legislatures. Careerism 
appears in the first model in Table 1 to reduce legislative influence over 
agencies. This finding is, however, only part of the story. Further analysis 
actually reveals that the impact of careerism is felt mostly in moderately 
professional legislatures, as we expected. It is generally absent from 
both amateur and highly professional legislatures. This pattern can be 
attributed in large measure to the prevalence of careerism in moderately 
and highly professional legislatures and to a concomitant lack of resources 
to pursue both the constant reelection type of behaviors required of 
careerism and unrelated activities, such as administrative oversight in 
moderately professional legislatures. This finding is partially obscured 
in the first model. These findings advance our understanding of how the 
institutional- and individual-level changes that have accompanied legislative 
professionalization influence the power relationship between state agencies 
and their legislative principals.

Discussion

This article seeks to provide a better understanding of how legislative 
professionalization affects the power relationship between state 
legislatures and administrative agencies. Specifically, we focus on how the 
interaction between legislator careerism and institutional resources affects 
administrative influence over state legislatures. Our findings suggest that 
such influence appears more nuanced than previously believed.

Past research has found that the effects of careerism may mitigate 
those of enhanced legislative resources where administrative oversight 
is concerned. Woods and Baranowski (2006) have argued that careerism 
tempers professionalization in state legislators when it comes to providing 
oversight because ambitious politicians are more likely to engage in 
behaviors—such as casework and campaigning—that better serve their 
interests. Thus, as professionalization within legislatures increases, so do 



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

careerism and the need to commit resources toward more fruitful activities. 
Yet such findings and their implications have never been applied to 
administrative influence over state legislatures.

Because it utilizes individual-level data provided by state legislators 
themselves, this research is able to measure careerism among respondents 
directly as well as indirectly, thereby providing a better model of careerism 
and explaining its effects on agencies in a way that past research has not 
appreciated. As stated above, we find a curvilinear relationship between 
careerism and bureaucratic power over legislative policy making. In 
moderately professional legislatures, as in the full model, the effects of 
careerism are such that they actually increase administrative power.

Our findings suggest indirectly that the effects of careerism are most 
likely to temper oversight when institutional resources are sufficient enough 
to matter but not excessive. The capacity for stringent oversight in amateur 
legislatures, for instance, is virtually nonexistent because of the lack of 
institutional resources. The incentives for careerism are also small. Similarly, 
within highly professional legislatures we also see that careerism likely has 
no significant effects on a legislator’s capacity to provide oversight. In these 
legislatures institutional resources are so abundant that the ambitions of 
legislators do not lessen bureaucratic oversight, even though legislators may 
strategically target some activities over others. The abundance of resources 
essentially negates the narrowing of focus on electoral concerns and career 
advancement. Resources thus have the effect of lessening administrative 
power in the legislative process.

The evidence presented here shows that the relationship between 
careerism and legislative professionalization is more complex than 
previously thought. The capacity for administrative oversight varies by the 
level of professionalization in state houses, and the influence of careerism 
on such oversight is likewise affected by levels of professionalization. Our 
research suggests at least indirectly that, given enough resources, career-
minded legislators will provide bureaucratic oversight, even though they 
prefer to engage in more self-serving legislative activities. Yet institutional 
resources must be high enough to combat careerism if legislators seek to 
reduce the power of state agencies over legislative policy making.



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Appendix

Table A1 
Summary Statistics.

Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mode

 Careerism self-identifier .23 .43 0

 Lower terms served 4.13 2.88 6

 Higher terms served 6.37 3.54 9

 Total compensation ($) 49,108.19 35,609.23 200

 Session length 85.75 40.83 90

 Permanent staff 565.06 773.34 139

 Legislative expenditures ($) 57,938 70,489 15,956

 Time campaigning 2.5 1.17 2

 Keep in touch with constituents 4.13 .91 5

 Casework 4.15 .93 5

 Rule review authority 1.25 .8 2

 Executive power -.003 2.58 -1.27

 Legislative turnover 26.33 7.82 28

 Population 5044.2 5162.5 125

 Gender 1.76 .43 2

 Race 5.73 1.02 6

 Income 3.5 1.22 3

 Dependent variable 3 1 3

Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995); Gerber, Maestas, and 
Dometrius (2005); Holbrook (1993); NCSL (2004).



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JOSHUA OZYMY, DENIS REY, AND SAMUEL S. STANTON JR.

Table A2 
How Careerists and Non-Careerists Spend their Time in Office.

Frequency %

Careerist Activity Hardly 
Any

A Great 
Deal

N

 Studying legislation 1 7 28 36 28 768

 Developing new legislation 2 9 32 34 23 771

 Building within party coalitions 5 16 36 31 12 765

 Campaigning and fundraising 14 28 31 19 8 767

 Keep in touch with constituents .3 3 15 33 49 771

 Casework 1 5 11 30 53 770

 Securing pork 6 10 25 31 28 767

Frequency %

Hardly 
Any

A Great 
Deal

N

Non-Careerist Activity

 Studying legislation 1 6 24 38 31 2,479

 Developing new legislation 4 15 32 32 18 2,479

 Building within party coalitions 9 18 34 29 10 2,471

 Campaigning and fundraising 28 31 25 11 5 2,468

 Keep in touch with constituents 1 6 19 35 39 2,483

 Casework 1 7 16 37 40 2,483

 Securing pork 11 16 29 25 19 2,478

Source: State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995)

*Values are rounded/weighted

Notes

 1 Legislators were sampled in proportion to the state’s population. The minimum 
sample size for each chamber is 70. For chambers with fewer than 70 legislators, all legislators 
from that chamber were sampled. The survey contains a weight that corrects for response 
biases. When weighted the survey is “representative of the population of all state legislators, 
where each legislator is counted equally” (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1995). All states are 
represented in the survey. The largest representation is New Hampshire at 6.8% (242 cases), 
and the smallest is Nevada at 0.6% (21 cases), with most states constituting between 1% and 
3% of the overall sample (approximately 40–100 cases each). The response totals for each state 
in the survey are as follows: AK (27), AL (73), AR (59), AZ (40), CA (70), CO (45), CT (75), 
DE (27), FL (69), GA (97), HI (31), IA (87), ID (50), IL (69), IN (72), KS (85), KY (66), LA 



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LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES

(39), MA (91), MD (94), ME (110), MI (77), MN (80), MO (80), MS (59), MT (98), NC (115), 
ND (71), NE (26), NH (242), NJ (46), NM (32), NV (21), NY (119), OH (63), OK (63), OR 
(43), PA (103), RI (58), SC (86), SD (52), TN (42), TX (88), UT (54), VA (83), VT (89), WA 
(81), WI (83), WV (64), and WY (44).

 2 Even though the survey question asks legislators how much influence they think 
bureaucrats have on legislative outcomes, an inference can be made that the degree of 
bureaucratic influence directly relates to the amount of control legislators have over executive 
agencies. A large portion of the literature in this area features research designs that implicitly 
argue that influence is a zero-sum game, with greater legislative influence naturally resulting 
in less state agency influence.

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