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Policy Issue on Emergency Management  2009 PPSA/LORL, PA House of Reps. ISSN 0890-2410

The State Role in Emergency Management:
Significant Challenges

Beverly A. Cigler, PhD
Professor of Public Policy and Administration

Penn State Harrisburg

States and the national government have traditionally performed
facilitating, not dominating, roles in emergency management. After 9/11,
the threat of terrorists on our homeland led to the creation of a new
national structure for responding to disasters and thrust the national
government into a more dominating role. The state’s role within the
emergency management system is both complex and unsettled in this
new era. The “intergovernmental paradox of emergency management”
remains: the governments least likely to perceive the threat of disaster as
a very high priority (local governments) are at center stage in terms of
responsibility and are limited in their capacity – financial, managerial,
technical and political will – to deal with hazards. This places the states
into a pivotal role as a capacity-builder through information generation
and dissemination roles for their local governments, and, perhaps,
regulation. It also means that the states must be ever attentive to their
role in relation to that of the national government.

This essay examines the key roles of state government within the
emergency management system. These are: 1) the facilitation of local
disaster mitigation; 2) assisting the public and elected and appointed
leadership in understanding risk and mitigating disasters; 3) building the
capacity of first responders by strengthening their preparedness and
response capabilities; and 4) paying increased attention to shaping the
environment in which the state and local governments operate within the
federal emergency management system. Much of the state role is direct
capacity-building directed at local governments, citizens, and first
responders. Much involves money and legal issues.



76 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

Disaster Mitigation

Calling a flood an “act of nature” or a “natural disaster” is largely a
misnomer. Floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires, subsidence, drought,
and earthquakes are “natural hazards” but human actions make them
disasters. New Orleans, most of which sits below sea level, is a dramatic
example of placing people and property in harm’s way. Most Americans
live within an easy drive of our hazard-prone coasts and the majority of
our communities are located in floodplains, leaving most of us at risk.
Especially vulnerable are the poor, who don’t have the transportation to
flee harm, money for shelter, and savings to ease unemployment. After a
disaster, rebuilding occurs too often without plans that take into account
the interdependence of the human-built and natural environments.

At risk from many hazards, both human-made and natural,
Pennsylvania is especially prone to flooding, with their toll on lives and
property. Even small floods can have significant cumulative damages
and public safety impacts. New developments often are not compatible
with the floodplain. The National Flood Insurance Program, which offers
individual property owners flood insurance, is underutilized for
purchasing insurance. Without “teeth” in the local ordinances, or strong
enforcement, people and property are left vulnerable.

Dealing with floods requires coming to terms with the
intergovernmental paradox. Floods, as is the case with other disasters,
are low probability, high consequence events. From the national
government's perspective, floods are a major problem. For the state and
local levels, the damages experienced are generally fewer from that level
of government's viewpoint. Local governments are the least likely to
perceive of flooding as important and, thus, give the hazard low priority
on the agenda – until an event occurs.

Structural vs. Non-Structural Mitigation Options

Urban development over many decades has exacerbated the flood
problem, with the rate of urban growth in floodplains far exceeding that
of other areas. It is not nature that is changing; instead, people make the
environment more prone to catastrophic events and themselves more
vulnerable to disasters. Traditional public policy attempts to keep floods
away from people and property through costly flood control structures



Beverly A. Cigler 77

(dams, reservoirs, dikes, levees, floodwalls, channel alterations). Flood
prevention can result from these structural options, which are heavily
funded by the national government. Structural options are not always
reliable – levees can be topped and breached and dams can break. Once
structures are built, a false sense of security results, especially when
maintenance and monitoring are neglected. Despite many successful
structural projects, they can encourage encroachment in other areas,
leading to progressive invasion of floodplains and relentless growth of
per capita flood losses.

A different policy approach, based upon the realistic understanding
that floods are inevitable, aims to use cost-effective measures to keep
people away from waters that may flood. Nonstructural options include
regulations, education, financial incentives, and technical assistance.
Examples are zoning and other land use regulations, elevation and other
flood proofing of buildings, flood insurance, flood warning systems, land
acquisition, permanent property relocation, and improved disaster
preparedness and response planning. Such options aim to reduce the
flood hazard for people and property, with a commitment to long-term
management of all factors that affect flood risk.

A balanced approach toward floodplain "management" through a
wise combination of structural and nonstructural, cost-effective options
is slowly replacing flood "control" as the dominant philosophy. If owners
of buildings in a floodplain assume that risk is minimal and that the costs
of flood proofing through elevation of structures is too high, damages
from the inevitable flood will increase. If flood warning systems or
evacuation routes are neglected, a failed levee or reservoir may have
catastrophic consequences. Floodplain management means that local
governments acquire wetlands to serve as natural flood basins and
require builders to create detention areas for flood waters. Land uses that
are compatible with the floodplain and occasional flood, e.g., parks,
ballfields, greenways, can occur in the floodplain and some floodplain
can be preserved. Floodproofing requirements (privately constructed
detention ponds and placement of buildings on piers) can also help steer
development away from floodprone areas.

Sound land use techniques are an alternative to costly structural
options for flood prevention. Locating people and property away from
harm outside of the floodplain, raising structures on stilts, using
floodplains for uses compatible with floods (such as parks that can dry



78 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

out and not houses to be destroyed by water, mold, and seepage of
toxins), and using stringent building codes are examples. Local
governments are most responsible for sound land use policies but
weakest in capacity, especially political will. It is in the area of hazard
mitigation that the “intergovernmental paradox” is most disconcerting.
And, this is the area is which proactive states can have considerable
impact. Damages caused by natural hazards are inevitable but losses of
lives and property can be reduced. Policymakers need to plan to make
the human-made and natural environments work together to improve
quality of life and public health in equitable ways. The American public
may be tiring of having its federal tax dollar pay for repetitive flood
losses. We may be moving toward a time in which the state and local
governments have little option but to get more serious about land use
measures to mitigate losses.

Natural disasters are inevitable but losses of life and property can be
reduced. Policymakers need to plan to make the human-made and natural
environments work together to improve quality of life and public health
in equitable ways. The state role in mitigation is pivotal. Most local
governments are small and have relatively limited technical and financial
resources, including that for public planning. The states can serve as
information generators and disseminators, as well as regulators
(requiring building codes), if that need is perceived.

Public and Leader Preparedness

A major part of preparing the public for disaster events is to develop
a realistic view of risk. Human tragedy resulting from a disaster event is
often caused by the failure of so many to evacuate the affected area.
Some people don’t hear about an evacuation order. Some are too sick to
comply. Others are without transportation. A small number simply
refuse, not wanting to leave their homes. They may be fearful of losing
their possessions due to the impending emergency or because of
anticipated looting. Some not leaving may feel secure. Others may have
had a negative evacuation experience previously and think they know the
community and its risks but underestimate them.

Mandatory evacuation orders are difficult to implement in our
democracy. Quarantines during a pandemic may be even more
problematic. Some communities use innovative approaches to implement



Beverly A. Cigler 79

evacuation orders, such as the “Magic Marker” strategy of giving
residents a marker and telling them to write their name and social
security number on their bodies so it will be easier to identify fatalities.
The “Good Samaritan” approach expects and urges the most able to take
care of the aged, the disabled, the very young, the poor, etc.
Government’s ability to quarantine effectively on a large scale has not
been tested.

At a time when we must protect against both natural and human-
made disasters, risk perceptions significantly shape policies. Alarm about
terrorist-induced emergencies leads to reluctant sharing of evacuation
plans fully with the general public. A more balanced approach to secrecy
and security needs requires educating the public fully about plans and
working toward their implementation. Many people misperceive risks
from hurricanes and/or floods, which are a greater threat than winds from
hurricanes. Our national government pursued policies after 9/11 that
mitigated against and prepared for terrorist events more than for the more
typical disasters, such as floods that have taken the most lives and
destroyed the most property.

Governments and people underestimate some risks and overestimate
others. An important state role is to provide accurate information to
citizens and to elected and appointed officials about the nature and types
of risk for which citizens are most vulnerable. Pennsylvania’s residents
should know what hazards exist in their area and have a sense of which
are most threatening. As with mitigation, the state role in information
generation and dissemination is paramount.

As a nation, we do not have a strong track record in perceiving risks:
we are getting more obese and fail to link weight gain to adverse health
impacts. Cigarette smokers often don’t perceive the link between their
habits and the risk of lung cancer. Misperceiving risk, many people
habitually drink alcohol and drive. Many motorcyclists choose to drive
without helmets. Our credit card-dependent society has checkbooks that
don’t balance, empty savings accounts, and increased bankruptcy
declarations, in part because economic risks are misperceived.
Americans typically don’t save adequately for their retirements, not
linking living longer to having less financial means. More Americans
than ever live misperceived risks and live in hazard-prone areas.
Floodplain dwellers often don’t purchase floodplain insurance. Those
aging usually don’t purchase long term care insurance.



80 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

Risk perception is influenced by experience and education.
Members of the general public are usually the “first responders” in an
emergency, either as victims or helpers. Each of us has primary
responsibility for ourselves, having to balance our rights with our
responsibilities. In our democracy, we have choice over most of the
decisions we make. One of the most useful actions we can take is to
know our risks and decide how we will deal with them. State government
plays a significant role in using its capabilities to measure risk accurately
and to convey risk in language understandable to the general public.

State government can take care to structure its emergency
management operation to avoid neglect of disasters tied to natural
hazards, compared to the more infrequent human-made terrorist-related
disasters. Post-Katrina, the national government was strongly criticized
for placing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within
the Department of Homeland Security and removing its preparedness
responsibilities, cutting budgets and personnel, and failing to appoint
professional emergency managers to high levels of responsibility,
including direct reporting to the President. While many of the failings
have been reversed, the states need to reconcile their organization for
handling homeland security issues, broadly defined to include national
security and natural hazards.

Building the Capacity of First Responders

During catastrophic events it can seem as if everyone is in charge but
working at cross-purposes. In reality, there is no “one” in charge.
Multiple and diverse people and entities are part of disaster response and
intergovernmental and intersector coordination and collaboration are
necessary but difficult, especially due to the need for quickness. Lost
responsibility and lost accountability result. In the years since Hurricane
Katrina, much attention has rightly been devoted to improving the
intergovernmental response mechanisms to disasters. While all disasters
occur locally and the initial response is local, large scale disasters require
well planned and coordinated actions among a myriad of actors at all
levels.



Beverly A. Cigler 81

Preparedness and Risk

The “first responders” in a disaster are typically characterized as
local law enforcement officers, firefighters, and emergency medical
personnel. Yet, it is the victims caught in the disaster, or those who assist
them, who are the very first responders. They must be prepared to take
major responsibility for the first response to a disaster event. Local
police, fire, and emergency medical personnel must be prepared to take
major responsibility for the first 24 to 72 hours of a disaster event.
Specific actions of potential disaster victims include completion of first
aid training; developing an evacuation plan for leaving one’s home in an
emergency; having a disaster supply kit with water, food, medicine, and
other supplies; selecting a person who lives outside of one’s geographic
region whom family members can contact if they become separated after
an emergency; and establishing a specific meeting place to reunite in the
event that family members cannot return home.

We tend to neglect the need to educate individuals and families both
about the risk of disasters and how they might help when one strikes. We
also tend to overlook the first responder role of planners and
policymakers who can change the relative threat of disaster. Similarly,
we neglect the role of the private sector entities that own approximately
85% of a community’s infrastructure and we pay inadequate attention to
the roles of the large and diverse non-profit community. For all of these
actors, the states, once again, can play major roles in information
generation and dissemination, and in bringing actors together.

Americans now have their lowest fear of terrorist’s attacks since
9/11. A Readiness Quotient survey conducted for National Preparedness
Month in September 2008, found that on a scale of 1 to 10, the nation’s
collective level of preparedness or Readiness Quotient (RQ) decreased
from 4.14 the prior September to 3.57 (http://www.whatsyourrq.org/).
The Council for Excellence in Government developed the online RQ test
to measure our readiness quotient. Americans are not prepared for water
shortages and fuel shortages or for a disaster of any kind. Relatively few
have a specific plan for evacuation and claim to have no supplies for an
emergency. Only 36% of respondents claim to have a disaster supply kit
in a designated place. Just 32% have made a communication plan to keep
in touch with loved ones in case of emergencies. Only 27% have set a
meeting place for family members in case they get separated by a

http://www.whatsyourrq.org/


82 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

disaster. Only 48% know whether their local government has an
emergency or disaster plan.

Business can play an important role in public preparedness. The RQ
survey shows that employees are better prepared if their employer has a
plan and has practiced that plan. If the employer had a plan, individuals
had an average RQ score of 4.0. Those who either didn’t know if their
employer had a plan or whose employer didn’t have a plan had an
average RQ score of 2.7. Seventy-three percent of employees reported
that their employer has an emergency plan. Of those, 65% practiced the
plan in the last year. Schools and daycare centers play a strong role in
public readiness and parents are better prepared if their children’s
schools or daycare centers have a plan that is practiced.

The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention promotes a
range of “Readiness Initiatives” for cities in public health emergencies.
In recent years, the White House has promoted the fostering of a Culture
of Preparedness to permeate all levels of society so that families,
businesses, and government agencies make emergency planning a
routine concern. Most people, however, think that they can judge the risk
of prospective hazards accurately and, thus, don’t take the necessary
precautions. Even when people live close to major hazards, they may not
take an interest in preparedness. Post-9/11 and post-Katrina, half of
survey respondents in an N.Y.U. Center for Catastrophe Preparedness
and Response study in October 2005, said that their level of preparedness
was about the same as before 9/11 and 4 percent claimed to be somewhat
or much less prepared. After Katrina, many Americans lost confidence in
government’s ability to assist in crises. A 2006 N.Y.U. survey found 50
percent of respondents saying they have an emergency supply kit in their
homes but only a third of those had enough food and water to last three
days. Half of the respondents said that if they had to evacuate they would
drive or take a taxi, despite frequent warnings about gridlock. Thirty-six
percent claim to have no household emergency plan at all and no way to
reunite with family or friends during a crisis.

Personal preparedness can – and must – be facilitated by
government. State governments, especially, can work to build the
capacity of businesses, schools, daycare centers, local governments, and
individuals to prepare for emergencies by designing and providing
emergency kits, reviewing plans, and any of a number of other
facilitating, enabling behaviors. At the mitigation or prevention stage of a



Beverly A. Cigler 83

disaster responsibility and accountability, problems arise long before a
hazard creates a disaster event. This can mean the difference between an
emergency and a disaster of catastrophic proportion.

Legal Issues

There are several major areas of concern regarding national/state,
interstate, state/regional, and state/municipal relations in emergency
management that need continuous attention from the states. These
include: 1) sorting out what a catastrophic disaster is; 2) sorting out who
does what and when; and 3) the role of the military in supplementing the
states.

Catastrophic Events

Planning for emergency response too often is based on the last
disaster and not the next one. This is why so much attention has to be
paid to improvements based on after-action reports and studies of
preparedness and response. A pre-condition however, is the need to sort
out what authority is appropriate and applicable for each level of
government in a catastrophe. Only after doing that can unresolved issues
involving communication and coordination problems during response,
and recovery, be addressed.

The magnitude of a threat, the vulnerability to communities and to
the state and nation, and/or the consequence of the disaster in terms of
lives and property lost or national security should be of the highest
concern in shaping the emergency management system. A significant but
little debated consideration is the threshold of severity in terms of size,
scope, nature, and consequences of a disaster event that should define
when the national government should have greater authority. During the
Katrina response, the laws and regulations among and between
governments involved were poorly understood and communicated,
confounding the response. States and the national government were at
odds, for example, over what was requested by the states, what was
possible, and what the conditions of aid would be. The public and media
commentators were confused over the responsibilities and authorities of
the military and federal officials.



84 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

Who Does What Before and After the Disaster

By design and necessity, dealing with emergencies involves complex
relations among all levels of government in sharing responsibilities.
Cooperation is needed along vertical lines (national-state-local) and
along horizontal lines (municipal-municipal, regional). Leadership that
builds collaborative relationships in our decentralized governance system
is required. We expected a greater role for the national government in the
Katrina disaster, especially through its broad authority to respond to a
major disaster through rapid deployment of "key essential resources,"
including medical teams and supplies, food and water, transportable
shelters, and urban search and rescue teams.

Just as the federal role is unsettled for catastrophic events, no single
federal agency has a clear legal mandate to organize the rebuilding or
repair of public housing, federal subsidized rentals, or other affordable
housing. FEMA has more of a mandate and money than the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), but little expertise. On the
other hand, HUD has expertise but no legal mandate. The Stafford Act of
1988 gives FEMA responsibility for housing 18 months after a disaster
declaration but a truly catastrophic event such as Katrina required a
much longer period, especially because low income housing tends to be
older, less sturdy, and not retrofitted, compared to other housing. Just as
the nation attempts to sort our roles and responsibilities among national
actors during recovery, the states need to ensure that such parallel
functions have been sorted out at the state level.

Interest in hazard mitigation has risen with the rising costs of natural
hazard events. With the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Congress
sought to establish a national hazard mitigation program to reduce the
loss of life and property, human suffering, economic disruption, and
resulting disaster assistance costs from natural hazard events, as well as
to provide pre-disaster mitigation funding to assist states and local
governments in implementing mitigation measures. Other measures to
improve state and local hazard mitigation planning were established.
FEMA plays a central role in hazard mitigation through its grants
programs and through various capacity building efforts. A number of
other federal agencies such as the Department of Interior, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and the Corps of Engineers, have
responsibilities related to natural hazard mitigation. The states play a
central role in facilitating sound hazard mitigation policies at that level



Beverly A. Cigler 85

and with their local governments, and must work to establish the
appropriate relationships with the myriad of agencies involved in
mitigation.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions, requires multiple jurisdictions
within a region to jointly administer federal funds for police and fire, for
example. In years past, funds were used for purchasing equipment but
some UASI districts, beginning in fiscal 2008, can be used only for
planning. States can play an important role in helping to establish
mechanisms that allow for joint action via a coordinated response.

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is central to the
communication system needed for response. A longstanding barrier to
the flow of information that ensures timely situational awareness and
allows strategic and tactical orders to reach the appropriate people in
timely ways is interoperability. In part, this is a technical problem that is
being increasingly addressed by the federal government. Interoperability
also requires effective coordination across diverse agencies. Law
enforcement and intelligence units have been working to share
information and tighten coordination since 9/11 through fusion centers.
Among many of the nation’s 60 fusion centers, all hazards approaches
are being embraced. There is no one model for a fusion center’s structure
but data fusion through the exchange of information from various
sources and then analysis turns information and intelligence into
actionable knowledge. Pennsylvania state officials would be wise to
think comprehensively about the types of information they need in the
developing fusion center – antiterrorism intelligence, general law
enforcement, weather reports, etc. Technological sophistication can
move available information and analysis to new levels and deal with
multiple hazards missions.

Military-Civilian Relations

After 9/11, the Department of Defense (DOD) needed a more
integrated military response to an attack on the homeland. The U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established in October 2002 to
provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to
coordinate defense support of civil authorities. While DHS is the lead
federal agency for homeland security, DOD is the lead federal agency for



86 THE STATE ROLE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES

homeland defense, defined as the protection of United States
sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression against the United
States contributes through its military missions overseas and homeland
defense and civil support operations. The current National Response
Framework involves a stepped series of responses to a disaster,
beginning with local authorities, state authorities, and outside assistance
from other states. When those capabilities are exceeded, federal
assistance is involved and the DOD might be asked to provide assistance.
NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility includes all 49 states in North
America and the District of Columbia and it works with other DOD
organizations

NORTHCOM is hampered in executing its plans because DHS and
the states have not provided the necessary information. For example, as
of mid-2008, NORTHCOM had not systematically reviewed state
emergency plans. Few regularly assigned military forces have
traditionally been assigned to NORTHCOM and it has difficulty
monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil support mission.
Neither the DOD nor the states, in fact, have fully determined the
National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) requirements for civil support
operations in the United States In the short term, reform is necessary to
increase coordination among DOD entities and commands, including the
NGB and NORTHCOM, to ensure better national security outcomes.

Planning and funding for civil support missions of the National
Guard (NG) have traditionally been considered a state responsibility,
although the war fighting capabilities provided to the NG are facilitative.
Since 9/11, the NG has been in a key role in responding to catastrophic
natural disasters and for homeland security-related events of national
significance. The state and federal government have a shared interest in
preparing the NG to conduct civil support missions. There is a need to
integrate not just the response to an incident, but also the plans of many
entities at all levels involved in responding to such incidents. The states
need to better coordinate with NORTHCOM and the NGB on a process
for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state emergency
plans and capabilities.

Perhaps the biggest issue regarding the interface between the military
and the state EM community relates to NORTHCOM’s most recent
plans. By 2011, the United States military hopes to activate and train an



Beverly A. Cigler 87

estimated 20,000 service members for specialized domestic operations,
under the direction of NORTHCOM. One unit became operational on
October 1, 2008, with two others expected to be equipped and assigned
by 2011. Already, there are about 80 National Guard and reserve units,
with a total of 6,000 troops, in support of local and state officials
nationwide. All of these and the NORTHCOM units are to be trained to
respond to a domestic, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
high-yield explosive attack (CBRNE).

During Katrina there was substantial confusion regarding its role,
including a slow response. NORTHCOM’s units are intended to assist in
responding to terrorist attacks or disasters stemming from natural
hazards. The units have unique training in logistics and medicine and
consist of medical personnel, chemical decontamination experts,
logistics, and engineering personnel. Groups concerned with guarding
civil liberties, and libertarians, are uneasy about how closely the military
will be involved with law enforcement issues falling under a state’s
jurisdiction, possibly undermining the 130-year federal law that restricts
the military’s role in domestic law enforcement, the Posse Comitatus
Act. Some claim that the new homeland emphasis may strain the
military.

The Obama Administration will have to sort out a clearer mission for
NORTHCOM during catastrophic events and the role of the National
Guard as a support unit to civil authorities. Funding for the changes is
still unclear. The Posse Comitatus Act, as well as numerous powers and
authorities of the states and national government, will likely be revisited
in the near term to forge the role of the military in disaster response and
recovery.

State policymakers must take a proactive role in this debate.
Underlying the role of the military in supplementing the states during a
disaster is that the threshold for military action is unsettled. The
magnitude of a threat, the vulnerability to communities and to the nation,
and/or the consequence of the disaster in terms of lives and property lost
or national security should be of the highest concern in shaping the EM
system. As discussed here, many of the key issues among and between
governments in terms of the threshold of severity – size, scope, nature
and consequences of a disaster event – that should define if and when the
national government should have greater authority – or the military are
unsettled. This is an area ripe for state interest and action.


