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From Realism to Liberalism: 
George W. Bush’s 

Rhetorical Foreign Policy Transition, 
1999–2004 

 
Nathan R. Shrader 
Suffolk University 

This article examines international relations rhetoric rather 
than foreign policy practice. Between the time of his acceptance of 
the Republican presidential nomination in August 2000 and his 
reelection in November 2004, George W. Bush changed his 
rhetorical focus from “realist” to “liberal internationalist” in an 
effort to sell his foreign policy agenda. This shift is identified 
through an analysis of nine presidential speeches and one excerpt 
from a book Bush wrote prior to becoming president. By exploring 
Bush’s foreign policy pronouncements, the article reveals shifting 
patterns of presidential rhetoric and demonstrates the importance 
of studying presidential rhetoric in international relations theory. 

 
Introduction 

 
The election of Texas Governor George W. Bush to the White 

House in November of 2000 appeared to be the beginning of an 
administration that would focus primarily on domestic issues such 
as Social Security reform, improving education, and shrinking the 
size and cost of the federal government. It did not seem likely that 
foreign policy and international relations would ultimately become 
the focus of the incoming administration. The new president set out 
to pass his No Child Left Behind proposal as well as a series of tax 
cuts. 

Only eight months after Bush’s inauguration, however, he faced 
a situation that ended any notion that his would be a presidency 
devoted simply to addressing domestic concerns. The September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on American soil redirected the focus not 
just of the Bush presidency, but of the entire United States 
government. Domestic policy debates soon turned to foreign policy 
debates. The Bush administration was now faced with planning a 



 

 24  

counter-attack to the deadly actions of the terrorists and developing 
a long-term strategy to combat terrorism. 

Foreign policy and international relations were not completely 
forgotten at either the opening of the Bush presidential campaign or 
in the early days of his presidency. Candidate Bush gave a variety 
of speeches to military and party organizations during the course of 
the campaign, many peppered with typical American presidential 
election chestnuts proclaiming the need to maintain America’s 
strength, to build a more powerful military, and to raise pay for 
military personnel. Because of the problem of terrorism, however, 
Bush’s foreign policy rhetoric eventually changed dramatically. 

This article examines the rhetorical aspects of Bush’s key 
foreign policy speeches and writings between the time of his 
nomination in September 2000 and his reelection in November 
2004.1 These materials were chosen not because of the policies they 
promote, but because of the nature of their political rhetoric. The 
Bush administration’s rhetorical focus shifted from “realist”2 to 
“liberal internationalist”3 during this period because it was engaged 
in a political marketing campaign to brand, package, and sell a 
foreign policy to the American people. Through the use of 
presidential rhetoric, the administration converted Bush from a 
Reaganesque realist to a neo-Wilsonian who relied upon the 
generalities of international institutions and the promotion of 
democracy to achieve a permission slip from the American people 
to expand the overall “War on Terror” to a separate battleground in 
Iraq under the guise of expanding democracy. The result was an 
internationalist liberal rhetorician in the White House and a new 
battle to make the Middle East a breeding ground for democracy. 
By tracing the transition from one school of international relations 
thought to another over a set period of time, the article highlights 
the modern realities of political marketing. 

 
Framework 

 
The Presidency and Political Rhetoric 

  
The importance of presidential rhetoric in guiding and 

formulating public policy is immense. The verbal stimuli that come 
from the President of the United States are intriguing and 
significant to policy makers and rhetoricians solely because the 



 

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public responds when the president speaks about policy problems. 
This attention becomes increasingly important as technology 
advances, making access to the mass public even easier. 
Furthermore, the mass public, to a degree, is psychologically 
dependent upon the president, thus increasing the levels to which 
the public is receptive to a presidential message (Cohen 1995). 
Hence, an issue is elevated when it is on the president’s agenda. His 
attention sends a signal to the public that the issue is of national 
importance. 

Jeffrey Cohen (1995, 93) suggests that “people have been noted 
as being notoriously uninformed and uninterested in international 
affairs” unless a specific event has a tremendous impact on their 
lives. He believes that this lack of interest and attention is good 
news for a president, because he will be more likely to find success 
in framing a message in an area that is neither closely followed nor 
well understood by the public. Cohen also notes that presidential 
rhetoric is persuasive because of the prestige and position of the 
president. This means that scholars carefully watch the president’s 
rhetoric because they are, according to rhetorician Mary Stuckey, 
“sensitive to the nuances of language and how it can be manipulated 
to produce certain results” (1996, 155). 

In an era of instantaneous communication via the World Wide 
Web, 24 hour cable news, opinion polling, and around-the-clock 
attention to politics and politicians, the rhetorical process is 
accelerated tremendously (Gronbeck 1996). The lasting effect of 
this communication boom is that twentieth and 21st century 
presidents, unlike their 19th century counterparts, can go over the 
heads of Congress and take their appeals and policy rhetoric 
directly to the people. For example, Tulis (1996) cites Theodore 
Roosevelt’s campaign to regulate the railroads, Woodrow Wilson’s 
push to enter into the League of Nations, Franklin Roosevelt’s fire-
side chats, Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty, and Ronald Reagan’s 
1981 tax reform and Strategic Defense Initiative. The 20th century 
has taught us that the rhetorical process is more important than ever 
since presidents may choose to use the various and increasingly 
fast-paced mediums of communication to their advantage when 
promoting a policy or a message. As John Kingdon has observed, 
“no other single actor in the political system has quite the capability 
of the president to set agendas in given policy areas for all who deal 
with those policies (Andrade and Young 1996, 202). 



 

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Political Marketing: Selling Candidates and Policy  
 
Politics often defies conventional wisdom because in the 

political world words can speak louder than actions. The growing 
number of ways of communicating with the American public has 
helped to make political rhetoric a more powerful tool for building 
consensus for political messages, selling a candidate, or marketing a 
policy choice. Legendary House Speaker Thomas A. (“Tip”) 
O’Neill is credited for the aphorism that “All politics is local.” In 
the 21st century, it may be possible to state that “all politics is 
marketing,” and political rhetoric is the means by which political 
figures “sell” their political agendas. Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
(2005, 1) suggest that the use of political marketing is a result of 
“qualitative and quantitative marketing research. Commercial 
techniques and strategy have permeated the political arena, in 
response to the rise of more critical, better educated and informed 
electorates.” 

Nicholas O’Shaughnessy believes that rhetoric and 
communication within the political arena today are maximized 
through an increasing attempt to sell public policies through 
political marketing strategies. These marketing strategies are 
typically seen as being most effective when “selling” a candidate to 
the voting public. “The marketing concept is distinguished, above 
all, by the emphasis that is placed on consumer focus. Identifying 
the needs and wants of customers and fashioning the products and 
communications shaped by that understanding is the core of the 
marketing task” (O’Shaughnessy 1999, 728). 

O’Shaughnessy distinguishes political marketing from political 
propaganda, with propaganda being moralistic and marketing being 
consumer-driven and research-defined. In other words, the 
contemporary political system is driven by market-tested, result-
oriented research that can effectively help to “sell” a candidate or a 
policy proposal. This political marketing tells people what they 
wish to hear in a pleasing way. Propaganda differs because it 
attempts to enlighten people with what they ought to know. Hence, 
modern rhetorical political communication closely mirrors the 
political marketing model.  

 
 
 



 

 27 

Defining Liberalism and Realism 
 

Before addressing the presidential rhetoric of George W. Bush, 
it is necessary to define the “realist” and “liberal” schools of 
international relations theory. Following the “War to End All 
Wars,” international relations scholars saw a need to develop a 
theory to prescribe viable solutions to the international problems 
that lingered after the most brutal conflict the world had ever seen. 
The “utopian” school emerged to answer these concerns and 
dominated the landscape of international relations theory after 
World War I. Utopianism can best be described as a society with all 
good and no evil, perfect balance, complete knowledge, and the 
endless meeting of human needs without exertion (Will 2002). 
Utopian scholars and leaders concluded that war is not a part of 
human nature but an action based upon the mistakes and failures of 
politicians. Seeking a more perfect society, they made world peace 
and democracy their touchstone. 

The realist school was founded as a reaction to ideas of the 
“utopians.” Realism has its roots in ancient Greek political thought 
as well as in Machiavellian theories and politics. Realist scholars 
such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau agued that because 
utopians were overly idealistic, they could not address seriously 
issues of power, conflict, and human nature. According to realist 
scholar John J. Mearsheimer, realism takes a vision of the 
international system sharply different from the utopian view. 
Realists share Mearsheimer’s view of survival as the primary 
motivational factor in international relations. Mearsheimer (1994–
95, 9) states that the international arena is “a brutal area where 
states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and 
therefore have little reason to trust each other.” Steven M. Walt 
(1997, 934) calls realism a “simple and powerful way to understand 
relations among political groups.” 

Realists believe that although most people wish for a more 
harmonious world of shared interests, it is not acceptable to use this 
vision as a basis for international relations theory. Carr suggests 
that the utopian appeal to a “harmony of interests” between states is 
actually designed to uphold the status quo and reaffirm the power of 
the dominant states (Burchill 2001). Morgenthau (1972) outlines 
several principles of political realism, the most fundamental being 



 

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that nations have little incentive to adopt a policy unless doing so 
enhances a nation’s power position. 

By contrast, liberalism in international relations theory 
emphasizes institutions, order, and commerce as the backbone of 
international politics. This school of thought seeks to advance the 
ideals of peace and freedom via popular enlightenment, democratic 
government, and free markets for trade. Liberalism’s roots can be 
traced back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776 and to John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty in 1859. While Smith focused on economic 
freedom, Mill stressed democratic institutions and the freedoms of 
speech and press. In defending liberalism, Mill argued that “the 
struggle between liberty and authority is the most conspicuous 
feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, 
particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times 
this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and 
the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the 
tyranny of political rulers” (Mill 1859, 5). Following in the 
footsteps of Smith and Mill, Michael W. Doyle (1986, 1152) argues 
that liberal states respect “individual freedom, political 
participation, private property, and equality of opportunity.” 

Another key element of liberal thought is institutionalism and 
the spread of democracy, as advocated by individuals such as 
Woodrow Wilson and personified by working bodies such as the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. Liberals believe that 
international institutions such as these can prevent the sort of death 
and devastation that occurred during the two World Wars. For 
example, Edward Morse (1970) contends that six characteristics 
befall modern societies: growth of knowledge, increased political 
centralization, politicization of the people, development of wealth, 
urbanization, and adaptation to change rather than the acceptance of 
the status quo. As a result, says John M. Owen (1994), the spread of 
liberal democracies promotes world peace because liberal 
democracies avoid conflict with one other and achieve a “harmony 
of interests” in the interest of self-preservation. Boyd A. Martin 
(1948, 295) sums up the essence of liberalism this way: 

 
Liberalism has had many different meanings 
under different circumstances. At different 
times it has sought, for example, to protect the 
right to acquire property, to shield the 



 

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individual against tyranny, to establish the 
doctrine of inherent rights of men, to organize a 
world market, or to create individualism. In 
most instances, however, the needs of the time 
determine the role of liberalism. 

 
This article thus treats liberalism in the context of commitment 

to institutionalism, an emphasis on free trade, the advance of 
democratic ideals, the rejection of tyranny, political participation, 
collective security, and the pursuit of a harmony of interests. It 
defines realism in the context of the pursuit of power, the defense of 
the national interest, focus on sovereignty and survival, and the 
theory of balance of power politics. 

 
Findings 

 
The underpinnings of George W. Bush’s early realist-leaning 

viewpoints can be found in his 1999 book, A Charge to Keep: My 
Journey to the White House, a typical introductory volume released 
by a candidate prior to the start of a major campaign. Such books 
are designed to raise a candidate’s name identification with voters 
well before the first round of party primaries and caucuses. A 
Charge to Keep focuses on candidate Bush’s personal history, his 
family, and various initiatives that he developed as governor of 
Texas, in addition to presenting his positions on both domestic and 
international issues. The foreign policy section of the book contains 
a discussion of Bush’s view of America’s role in the world and the 
type of foreign policy that he would pursue if elected. Bush states 
that the quest for peace “requires tough realism in our dealings with 
China and Russia. It requires firmness with regimes like North 
Korea and Iraq, regimes that hate our values and resent our success. 
And the foundation of our peace is a strong, capable, and modern 
American military (Bush 1999, 239). 

 
Candidate Bush’s admitted realism may be comparable to what 

Hans Morgenthau (1972) refers to as a public official who discusses 
foreign policy in a manner that will allow the official to appeal to 
the popular opinions of the public in order to gain political support. 
Morgenthau’s reaction to a politician appealing to the opinions of 
the voting public would likely prompt him to reject today’s political 



 

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marketing model, a concept that will be discussed later in this 
article. The proposed Bush policy appears to advocate “peace 
through strength,” a slogan that has helped candidates with the 
electorate since at least the time of Richard Nixon’s landside defeat 
of Senator George McGovern in 1972. Political posturing aside, the 
candidate’s rhetorical commitment to a realist foreign policy also 
reflects the realism advocated by John Mearsheimer, who argues 
that “great powers seek to maximize security by maximizing their 
relative power (Walt 1997, 993). 

 
A second example of candidate Bush’s foreign policy rhetoric 

further reveals his commitment to realist principles. In his 
presidential nomination acceptance speech, delivered in 
Philadelphia on August 3, 2000, Bush declares: 

 
We will give our military the means to keep the 
peace, and we will give it one thing more… a 
commander-in-chief who respects our men and 
women in uniform, and a commander-in-chief 
who earns their respect. . . . A generation 
shaped by Vietnam must remember the lessons 
of Vietnam. . . . When America uses force in 
the world, the cause must be just, the goal must 
be clear, and the victory must be 
overwhelming. . . . I will work to reduce 
nuclear weapons and nuclear tension in the 
world—to turn these years of influence into 
decades of peace. . . . And, at the earliest 
possible date, my administration will deploy 
missile defenses to guard against attack and 
blackmail. . . . Now is the time, not to defend 
outdated treaties, but to defend the American 
people. A time of prosperity is a test of vision. 
And our nation today needs vision.” (Bush 
2000) 

 
Bush’s attack on treaties, a vital component of the liberal 

institutionalism advanced by liberal scholars and post-World War I 
utopians, is very much in sync with the realist scholarship of 
thinkers like Charles Krauthammer. Krauthammer states that 



 

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treaties were the cornerstone of foreign policy during the Clinton 
years. Bush appears to echo Krauthammer’s belief that treaties are 
nothing more than “parchment that is either useless or worse than 
useless” (1999, 24). Aside from using the opportunity to launch a 
political attack on the outgoing Clinton administration, Bush asserts 
his interest in developing a missile defense system and in ensuring 
an overwhelming victory if American force is deployed on his 
watch. Furthermore, his statements on defense and foreign policy 
cited above are among the few to be found in the acceptance 
speech, which consists mostly of partisan pronouncements on a 
plethora of social and economic issues, along with the patriotic 
swooning that is a typical part of such speeches.  

Another aspect of this particular address reflecting a realist 
rhetorical position is the candidate’s lack of specificity. For 
instance, which treaties does he deem to be outdated? What is an 
“overwhelming” victory? What vision is being tested? Realist 
scholars have a tendency to avoid using specific language, and they 
are often quick to see ordinary citizens are nonpolitical beings who 
view foreign policy as remote. Therefore, foreign policy realists 
who hold office and make policy are likely to address these issues 
ambiguously (see Harriot 1993). 

A third example of realist international theory dominating 
Bush’s rhetoric came in his Inaugural Address, given on January 
20, 2001. Emphasizing his belief in a global balance of power 
favoring countries that share the vision of the United States, Bush 
said: 

 
Our national courage has been clear in times of 
depression and war, when defending common 
dangers defined our common good. Now we must 
choose if the example of our fathers and mothers 
will inspire us or condemn us. We must show 
courage in a time of blessing by confronting 
problems instead of passing them on to the future 
generations. (Bush 2001a) 

 
He went on to say: 

 
We will build our defenses beyond challenge, 
lest weakness invite challenge. . . . We will 



 

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confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a 
new century is spared new horrors. . . The 
enemies of liberty and our country should 
make no mistake: America remains engaged in 
the world by history and by choice, shaping a 
balance of power that favors freedom. We will 
defend our allies and our interests. (Bush 
2001a) 

 
Bush’s acknowledgement of a “balance of power that shapes 
freedom” is consistent with the most significant portions of realist 
doctrine as promoted by E.H. Carr who claimed that states pursue 
power vis-à-vis their own national interests and that disputes over 
national interests are unavoidable. Carr believed that the “only way 
to minimize such clashes, and therefore the incidence of war, was to 
ensure that a rough balance of power existed” within the 
international system (Burchill 2001, 75). 

Charles Krauthammer’s realist notion that treaties and 
international agreements are “useless or worse than useless” finds 
support in Bush’s Oval Office. The President’s realist rhetoric was 
clearly on display on May 1, 2001, in his “Remarks to Students and 
Faculty at National Defense University.” Bush began the speech by 
focusing on the historical aspects of the rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union that shaped the Cold War. Bush then 
declared that the United States would soon seek the abrogation of 
the 1972 ABM Treaty. “We need a new framework that allows us to 
build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s 
world,” he said. “To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of 
the 30 year old ABM Treaty” (Bush 2001b). “This treaty does not 
recognize the present, or point us to the future,” Bush continued. “It 
enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing 
today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising 
technology to defend ourselves, our friends, our allies is in our 
interests or the interests of world peace” (Bush 2001b). Realists like 
Morgenthau may not have agreed with a rhetorical policy statement 
of this nature. However, the realist school recognizes that Bush 
would be justified in cancellation the ABM Treaty if it hindered 
American interests. Morgenthau believed very strongly that 
“national interest should be the central concept of international 
relations theory” (Algosaibi 1965, 225.) 



 

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At this point, the overarching policy of the Bush administration 
turned away from realism and toward liberal institutionalism. This 
evolution in Bush’s rhetoric can be seen in his first State of the 
Union Address delivered on January 29, 2002, one year after his 
inaugural pledge to “build defenses beyond challenge” and watch 
the balance of power. Rather than talking tough against other 
powers in the world, as he had done in his pre-election rhetoric, 
Bush called for unity against a common danger—terrorism—by 
erasing “old rivalries.” In his 1999 book, Bush had cited the “tough 
realism” that would be needed to deal with China and Russia. Now, 
he indicated that “America is working with Russia and China and 
India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and 
prosperity” (Bush 2002b). He went on to say that “in every region, 
free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their 
power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from Europe to 
Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the 
forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom” (Bush 
2002b). 

Perhaps the most obvious sign that Bush’s rhetoric had shifted 
away from realism and toward liberalism came during his 
“Graduation Speech at West Point,” delivered on June 1, 2002. 
Bush discussed the concept of fighting for a “just peace,” a cause 
that he claimed had always been central to America’s belief system. 
In order to build this peace, Bush suggested that America build 
alliances with other “great powers” in order to allow for open 
societies across the globe (Bush 2002a). The West Point speech also 
contained a rejection of the realist principles of containment and 
deterrence. Bush claimed that “new threats also require new 
thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against 
nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no 
nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when 
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver 
those weapons on missiles” (Bush 2002a). He advocated 
preemptive action as a form of deterrence and also discussed 
transforming America’s military into a leaner, more rapidly 
responsive instrument for striking at an enemy. With his discussion 
of preemptive military action, Bush seemed about to make a turn 
back to the realist rhetorical camp. Before this turn could be made, 
though, Bush veered sharply back into the liberal rhetorical camp 
by stating: “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or 



 

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impolite to speak the language or right and wrong. I disagree. 
Different circumstances require different methods, but not different 
moralities” (Bush 2002a). 

In continuing defiance of the realist camp, Bush picked up the 
theme of morality. “Moral truth is the same in every culture, in 
every time, and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for 
murder is always and everywhere wrong. Brutality against women 
is always and everywhere wrong. There can be no neutrality 
between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. 
We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call 
evil by its name” (Bush 2002a). Bush also lapsed into a neo-
Wilsonianism that denies the inevitability of war and emphasizes 
the common values that unite “the great powers” of the world. He 
even called for the worldwide elimination of poverty and 
repression. Although Bush had cited earlier a need to strike 
preemptively at perceived threats, he certainly did not advocate a 
unilateral approach to striking at “evil” in the world. In fact, he 
rejected unilateralism and embraces coalition-building: “We must 
build strong and great power relations when times are good; to help 
manage crisis when times are bad. America needs partners to 
preserve the peace, and we will work with ever nation that shares 
this noble goal” (Bush 2002a). 

The West Point speech not only moved Bush’s foreign policy 
rhetoric completely out of the realist school of thought, but it also 
drove the nails into the casket of realist-based rhetoric from his 
administration. Morgenthau says “the realist is not indifferent to 
morality. He believes, however, that universal moral principles 
cannot be realized, but at best approximated” (Algosaibi 1965, 
227). Morgenthau also claims that realism “refuses to identify the 
moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that 
govern the universe” (Algosaibi 1965, 227). He argues further that 
“the fundamental error that has thwarted American foreign policy in 
thought and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral 
principles. The equation of political moralizing with morality and 
political realism is itself untenable” (Morgenthau 1951, 33). 

Writing in the fall of 1946, Percy Bidwell of the Council for 
Foreign Relations attempted to place into perspective the new world 
that had been forged by the Second World War. He skeptically 
analyzed the competing schools of international relations theory: 
the realist school and what he deemed to be the “idealist” camp 



 

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(later revealed to be the liberal school). Bidwell noted that 
“idealists” speak in terms of Wilson and the Atlantic Charter and 
lean heavily on the future of the United Nations. Meanwhile, 
realists contend that “the only objective of American policy worth 
considering is national security” (Bidwell 1946, 480). He stated that 
President Truman, vis-à-vis the Atlantic Charter, spoke in terms of 
democracy being good for all citizens of the world. “If democracy 
is good for the United States, he [Truman] argues, it must be 
equally good for the Romanians and the Argentineans” (Bidwell 
1946, 482). Bidwell rejected such thinking, which realists would 
contend was as applicable to Harry Truman in 1946 as it was to 
George W. Bush in 2002: “Americans who hold these views are 
rarely troubled by political difficulties. They do not stop to consider 
how much they themselves have profited from the traditions of self-
government reaching back to the Magna Carta… nor do they 
remind themselves that democratic institutions in the United States, 
even after a hundred and fifty years of experience, are still far from 
perfect” (Bidwell 1946, 482). 

Fast forward to eight months later and combine Bush’s West 
Point statement with his “Address to the American Enterprise 
Institute,” given on February 26, 2003.  This message is peppered 
with references to a need to prevent citizens of the free world from 
living in fear, while rattling the saber against Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussein. Bush invoked many benefits to a free Iraq, including 
stability in the region and freedom for those living under Hussein’s 
tyranny. He also used the speech to advocate the expansion of 
democracy, stating: 

 
There was a time when many said that the 
cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable 
of sustaining democratic values. Well, they 
were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. 
They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq—with its 
proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled 
and educated people—is fully capable of 
moving toward democracy and living in 
freedom. (Bush 2003b) 

 
Bush concluded that “the world has a clear interest in the spread 

of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed 



 

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the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a 
better life” (Bush 2003b). 

The rhetoric displayed by President Bush in these two speeches 
denotes a remarkable shift in policy, verbiage, and vision. The shift 
from rhetorical realism to adoption of the type of democratization 
policy that liberal scholar John M. Owen (1994) called the “third 
pillar” of Clinton foreign policy is essential to understanding the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy. Owen asserts that 
democratization of nations throughout the world will lead to a 
democratic peace because of respect for the institutions, shared 
values, and ideology possessed by democratic states. His definition 
of liberalism is a recurring rhetorical point in several future Bush 
speeches. Owen defines liberal democracy as “a state that 
instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant 
ideology, and citizens have leverage over war decisions (1994, 
89).” He also links liberal democracy to freedom of speech, 
competitive elections, functional institutions, and the goal of 
preventing hostilities. These concepts echo throughout almost every 
policy speech given by Bush between September 11, 2001, and his 
reelection in November 2004. 

The most illustrative example of Bush’s liberal international 
political rhetoric came in his address at Whitehall Palace in London 
on November 19, 2003. The presidential rhetoric in this speech is 
clearly liberal and highly optimistic about achieving a democratic 
peace; for Bush endorsed Morse’s understanding of modern society, 
and he embraced the core ideas of Owen and Mill. Throughout the 
speech, Bush rallied to the cause of promoting international 
institutions, vouching for the ability of free markets to achieve 
stability and provide encouragement for building democracy. Most 
significant, Bush openly attacked several important tenets of the 
realist school. Sounding like Mill and Smith, Bush said, “We 
believe in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe 
in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We 
believe in economies that reward effort, communities to protect the 
weak, and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of 
all” (Bush 2003a). 

The President emphasized the importance of institutions, 
another essential component of liberalism. “I believe in the 
international institutions and alliances that America helped to form 
and helps to lead,” he said. “The United States and Great Britain 



 

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have labored hard to help make the United Nations what it is 
supposed to be—an effective instrument of our collective security” 
(Bush 2003a). According to liberal scholars such as Michael W. 
Doyle (1983), liberal states are bound by shared values reflected in 
certain institutions. Bush’s endorsement of these institutions, which 
did not necessarily support the United States war effort in Iraq, is 
further confirmation of his shift from realist to liberal foreign policy 
rhetoric. 

Bush also used the address to advance the idea of a democratic 
peace. The United States and Great Britain, he said, share a 
“commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope 
and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability and hatred and 
terror” (Bush 2003a). Military power alone cannot bring about 
lasting security, he added, for “lasting peace is gained as justice and 
democracy advance” (Bush 2003a). Departing sharply from the 
realist rhetoric he invoked during his presidential campaign and in 
his Inaugural Address, Bush also argued that strengthening 
democratic institutions would not only increase the likelihood of 
peace, but would also help “fulfill moral duties” such as fighting 
disease, AIDS, and hunger (Bush 2003a). 

Finally, the speech contained several outright jabs at the 
fundamental concepts of the realist school.  In discussing the need 
to address the issues of famine, disease, and peace, Bush insisted 
that the United States and Great Britain “share a mission in the 
world beyond balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest” 
(Bush 2003a). Similarly, he justified the use of force by the 
democratic powers of the world to help dethrone tyrants. In yet 
anther rebuff of realist rhetoric, Bush warned that in “some cases, 
the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world 
ruled by force” (Bush 2003a). This statement is a far cry from 
realist giant Kenneth Waltz’s theories of an anarchical world 
structure. (Waltz 1979) argues that the anarchical state of world 
affairs is natural, and that states must rely upon the doctrine of self-
help to protect themselves. Bush’s rhetoric seems to reject this 
anarchical view of the international system, for he chides the “old 
elites, who time and time again had put their own self-interest 
above the interest of the people they claim to serve” (Bush 2003a). 

One final speech that clearly indicates a rhetorical shift from 
realism to liberalism in presidential rhetoric is Bush’s “Address to 
the United Nations,” given on September 21, 2004. Bush again 



 

 38  

rejected the core ideas of realist scholars. Dismissing the “balance 
of power” concept on the grounds that today there is no way to 
isolate a nation or hide from terror networks, Bush said: “In this 
young century, our world needs a new definition of security. Our 
security is not merely found in spheres of influence or some balance 
of power, the security of our world is found in the advancing rights 
of mankind” (Bush 2004a). In place of spheres of influence or a 
balance of power, Bush contended that the new definition of 
security should be established by laying the “foundations of 
democracy by instituting the rule of law and independent courts, a 
free press, political parties and trade unions” (Bush 2004a). This is 
certainly not the sort of agenda that would surface in the 
scholarship of Morgenthau, Waltz, Mearsheimer, or Krauthammer. 

 

Conclusion 
 

The transition from realism to liberalism in the foreign policy 
rhetoric of President George W. Bush from the time of his 
candidacy to the present is plain. As a presidential candidate, and in 
the early stages of his administration, Bush used an array of realist 
rhetoric. Eschewing treaty-based diplomacy, Bush instead endorsed 
maintaining a balance of power and serving narrow national 
interests. Within several months of his inauguration, Bush switched 
from a realist-driven rhetorical approach to a liberal-based approach 
when discussing international relations and foreign affairs. His 
major speeches emphasized democratization, fighting tyranny, 
seeking democratic peace, and promoting free trade as an 
instrument of institutional reform rather than as a tool of national 
interest.  All these points represent a clear rejection of the realist 
doctrine. Robert Jervis (2003) claims that Bush’s focus is on the 
total remaking of international politics. He cites the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, as a very important period of change for 
Bush. At the six month anniversary of the tragedy, Bush remarked 
that the world can address the issues facing civilization with unity 
and courage, a remark that Jervis notes is fully in line with 
progressive liberalism. 

This study shows that the post-September 11 President Bush is 
a very different foreign policy rhetorician than the pre-September 
11 President Bush. The Bush administration no longer is adhering 



 

 39 

to a realist approach in foreign policy rhetoric. Peggy Noonan, a 
former speechwriter for President Ronald Reagan and columnist for 
the Wall Street Journal, also sees a shift in the President’s political 
rhetoric. Following Bush’s second inaugural address in January 
2005, Noonan, a pure conservative realist, commented that Bush’s 
speech reflected his “evolving thoughts on freedom in the world” 
(2005, 8). She noted further that the foreign policy battle today is 
fought between realists and moralists, with Bush siding “strongly 
with the moralists, which was not a surprise,” given current events 
(Noonan 2005, 8). There are only two potential rhetorical routes for 
Bush to take. He could continue to proclaim freedom via trade, 
democratization, and open societies. Alternatively, as we drift away 
from the defining moments of his presidency—the September 2001 
terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq—the rhetoric could swing back 
toward the balance of power language that dominated his pre-
September 11 speeches. In light of this study’s findings, it is likely 
that the rhetorical liberalism of President George W. Bush will 
continue. 

The political marketing model would also predict that the 
pattern of rhetorical liberalism will continue. President Bush’s 
rhetorical shift from realism to liberalism occurred because in 
foreign policy liberalism is a more marketable rhetorical product 
than is realism, especially when “selling” a wartime agenda. 
O’Shaughnessy (1999) suggests that political marketing is done 
through consumer-based, market research-oriented strategies. An 
examination of public opinion shows that the Bush administration 
was simply “selling” back policies that the American people already 
appeared to desire. In an April 2002 CBS News poll, 73% of 
Americans approved of U.S. military attacks against nations in 
which it believes terrorists are hiding. A December 2001 Newsweek 
poll found 48% of Americans favoring increased U.S. pressure on 
Middle Eastern nations to expand democracy despite the possibility 
of Islamic fundamentalists rising to power. Finally, an October 
2001 Pew Research Center poll determined that 61% of Americans 
believed the nation should be “very much involved in solving 
international problems” (www.pollingreport.com). 

Public opinion polls also indicate the strength of the Bush 
administration at the time of this rhetorical transition from realism 
to a marketing-friendly liberalism. An October 2001 CBS 
News/New York Times poll found that 88% of Americans approved 



 

 40  

of the administration’s handling of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. The same percentage of respondents in an April 2002 CBS 
News poll approved of the nation’s military operation in 
Afghanistan. Most striking is an April 2002 NBC News / Wall 
Street Journal poll in which 94% of respondents said the nation’s 
war on terrorism had been successful (www.pollingreport.com). 
Clearly, there was potential for the administration to market and sell 
its policies, for consumers were already open to the product. Selling 
the policy rested with substituting liberal rhetoric for realist 
rhetoric. 

Interestingly, the marketing model and the use of political 
rhetoric to “sell” a foreign policy agenda seem tailor-made for 
liberalism. Morgenthau, realism’s heaviest hitter, warned in 1951 
that “the mistaken identification of press, radio, polls, and Congress 
with public opinion has had a distorting as well as paralyzing 
influence upon American foreign policy. It has induced the 
government to pursue mistaken policies, which might not have been 
pursued but for a mistaken notion of what public opinion 
demanded” (1951, 232). 

Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (2001, 80) similarly 
suggest that “balance-of-power calculations are often trumped by 
imperatives rising from economic globalization, political 
democratization, particular belief systems, and the role of 
international law and institutions.” This could be a direct result of 
the marketing approach to political rhetoric and policy. In 
emphasizing freedom, democracy, and institutions, liberalism is a 
more appealing product than the sometimes harsh and brutish 
realism, whose traits are more difficult to market to a public that, as 
Cohen (1995) suggests, is traditionally uninformed about and 
uninterested in foreign policy. From a marketing perspective, if 
people know little about a product, they are likely to buy it if it 
appeals to their emotions and values. Hence, liberalism is the more 
marketable product.  

Legro and Moravcsik suggest that one reason the early Bush 
administration gravitated toward realism and not liberalism is that 
the administration “does indeed place a greater emphasis on 
accumulating and wielding military power. While the threat 
perception of the Bush team is based largely on ideology, it remains 
skeptical of strategy and tactics not closely linked to military 
dominance (2001, 81).” The attraction to realism is significant, they 



 

 41 

argue, because of the two major pillars of early Bush administration 
policy: the Powell Doctrine and missile defense. After the events of 
September 11, the administration’s rhetoric shifted from a realist 
emphasis upon accumulating military power to a liberal concern 
with moral truth, shared values, liberty, open societies, and 
achieving and preserving peace. As Bush said in his remarkably 
liberal speech at West Point, “When it comes to the common rights 
and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations” 
(Bush 2002a). 

The rhetorical record speaks for itself. President Bush the realist 
declared within the first five months of his administration that “I’m 
a straightforward person [and] represent my country’s interests in a 
very straightforward way” (Legro, 2001, 81). He also spoke of 
backing out of international accords, ignoring treaties, adhering to 
the balance of power, and playing power politics. On the campaign 
trail three years later, Bush the realist was talking like Bush the 
liberal institutionalist:  

 
To win the war on terror, America must work 
with allies and lead the world with clarity. And 
that is exactly what we are doing. The flags of 
64 nations fly at U.S. Central Command 
Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, representing 
coalition countries that are working openly 
with us in the war on terror. Dozens more are 
helping quietly in important ways. Today, all 
26 NATO nations have personnel either in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or both. America's allies are 
standing with us in the war on terror, and we 
are grateful. (Bush 2004b) 
 

Realism is a power-based theory that recognizes an 
occasionally brutal, yet ongoing competition for power. Liberalism, 
on the other hand, can be marketed as a values-based approach to 
international relations reflective of American idealism and the 
spread of democratic peace. Perhaps Boyd Martin (1948, 295) put it 
best: liberalism “accepts the contention that progress lies in the free 
exercise, so far as such freedom does no injury to others, of 
individual energy. To increase personal, civil, social, and economic 
liberty of the individual has been a major tenet of liberalism.” 



 

 42  

Liberalism fits into O’Shaughnessy’s political marketing concept of 
determining the customers “latent wants, the underlying desires that 
they cannot articulate fully (1999, 728).” Rhetoric is the vehicle for 
tapping into the “latent wants” of the public, and for the Bush 
administration, international relations liberalism is the product of 
choice. 

Notes 
 

1. The speeches are: “Republican Party Nomination Acceptance Address” 
from August 3, 2000; “Inaugural Address” from January 20, 2001; “Remarks to 
Students and Faculty at National Defense University” from May 1, 2001; “State of 
the Union Address” from January 29, 2002; “Graduation Speech at West Point” 
from June 1, 2002; “Address to the American Enterprise Institute” from February 
26, 2003; “Address on Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace” in London from November 
19, 2003; “Address to the United Nations” from September 19, 2004, and 
“Homeland Security and the Presidential Agenda” from October 18, 2004. The 
single writing is an excerpt from Bush (1999). No speeches were chosen from the 
time period directly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 because they 
were based upon emotional appeals and rhetoric as opposed to political appeals 
and foreign policy rhetoric. Nonetheless, the significance of that tragedy will not 
be ignored in this study. 

2. The “realists” in international relations theory examined in this study are 
E.H. Carr, Charles Krauthammer, Hans Morgenthau, John J. Mearsheimer, 
Stephen M. Walt, and Kenneth Waltz. 

3. The “liberal internationalists” in international relations theory examined 
in this study are Michael Doyle, Boyd A. Martin, John Stuart Mill, Edward Morse, 
and John M. Owen. 

 
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