






































 ó 


State Influence in the Presidential Selection Process: 
Assessing Pennsylvania's Non-Participation in the 

Frontloading Trend 

James E. Vike 
Widener University 

The frontloading trend ill the presidential primary system has been widely 
criticizedfor creating disparities among states in their level of influence over the 
presidential selection process. This article examines the general motivations, 
hel1pfits, fll1d consequences of state participation in frontloading. It focuses upon 
Pen11sylvania, which has not joined the trend. Presidential primaries i11 Penn­
sylvania have become increasingly ul1competitive due to frol1tloading in. other 
states. Comparative analysis with Ohio alldforecastillg ~malysis based 01/ Penn­
sylvania voting history suggest that an earlier presidential primary in Pennsyl­
vania in 2000 would have resulted in not only more candidate competitiveness 
and campaign activity, but also more voter choice and voter turnout. Yet, fear of 
increased administrative burdens and disruption to the electoral status quo 
stopped Pennsylvania's legislators fr0111 adoptill:;? the cha/l:;?e. 

Since the 1968 presidential election cycle, direct primaries have been 
thp dominant mp;m~ hy which tJlP major polit1c<ll parties select their presi­
dential nominees. Following the successful momentum-driven campaign 
of Jimmy Carter in 1976, the nomination stage of this process has addi­
tionally been dominated by precipitous frontloading of the primary cal­
endar. States seeking more influence in the selection process have moved 
up the dates of their presidential preference primaries in a seemingly 
endless race to the front of the primary season. Although this trend was 
visible throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the compression of state 
primary dates at the start of the primary calendar escalated dramatically 
prior to the 1996 and 2000 election cycles. 

The frontloading trend has been widely criticized for contributing 
negatively to the presidential selection process. Chief among the criti­
cisms is the charge that the system creates vast disparities among states 
depending upon their placement on the primary season calendar (Bartels 
1988; Jackson and Crotty 2001; Mayer 2001). Critics contend that states 
with early primary dates benefit from substantially increased levels of 
campaign activity, political competitiveness, voter choice, voter atten­
tiveness, and voter participation over states with later primary dates . 

. The overall effect is to create an imbalance among the states, whereby 
some states have inordinately high influence on the selection process 
while the majority of states exact only moderate influence or none at all. 

51 



The states with the most significant influence on the selection process 
also have been tagged as unrepresentative of the political party rank and 
file and the overall electorate (Jackson and Crotty 2001; Morton and Wil­
liams 2001; Wayne 2001). 

In addition to creating a disparity in influence among the states, the 
frontloaded primary system is criticized for weakening the candidate pool 
and creating inequities among the candidates. Many scholars contend that 
the length and hazards of the process discourage participation among 
qualified candidates and establish distinct advantages for well-known 
and well-financed candidates over unconnected outsiders or candidates 
relying upon a non-front tunner strategy (Buell 2000; Busch 1997; Ceasar 
and Busch 2001; Polsby and Wildavsky 2000; Wayne 2001). Others argue 
that the system stifles the development of voter knowledge. The contin­
ued frontloading of the primary seasonl they claim, erodes the levels of 
citizen education and candidate empathy that naturally arise from a se­
rial election arrangement (Haskell 2000; Morton and Williams 2001). 

The fronHoaded primary process lengthens the overall campaign sea­
son, but it actually shortens the period of competitiveness between as­
piring nominees. l The compressed period of competitiveness offers vot­
ers insufficient time to digest information or make informed decisions, 
and the lengthened campaign season tires candidates and voters, increases 
campaign finance demands, and contrib.utes to increasingly negative 
news coverage of the campaign (Busch 2000; Ceasar and Busch 2001; 
Patterson 1994; Wayne 2001). 

Although it is descriptively and empirically more efficient to exam­
ine the cumulative characteristics and drawbacks of this frontloading 
trend, fully understanding its impact is difficult because frontloading is 
not a collective endeavor. Frontloading behavior is the product of many 
individual states making independent calendar placement decisions 
based upon individualized motivations. When one state chooses to 
frontload its primary date in pursuit of influence and electoral choice, it 
typically does so without considering the potentially detrimental effects 
of its decision on other states or its collective impact on the selection 
process. Pennsylvania is one of several states detrimentally affected by 
these frontloading decisions. The frontloading trend has uniformly eroded 
Pennsylvania's potential position of influence at the primary stage, even 
though it ranks among the top five states in Electoral College power and 
consistently serves as an important battleground state in the general elec­
tion. Pennsylvania's refusal to participate in the frontloading trend has 
caused its primary date to occur comparatively later in the delegate se­
lection sequence each four-year cycle, resulting in primary elections that 
are increasingly plagued by limited voter choices, low levels of competi­
tiveness, and poor voter participation. 

52 



This article focuses on the impact of the frontloading trend on the 
presidential selection process in general and Pennsylvania in particular. 
It examines the implications of this trend by measuring both the extent 
to which the aspirations of frontloading states were realized during the 
2000 primary season and the extent to which these decisiorts detrimen­
tally affected non-frontloaded states such as Pennsylvania. Assessment 
of the impact of Pennsylvania's decision to retain its relatively late posi­
tion in 2000 includes a comparative analysis and forecast of the likely 
changes if Pennsylvania had participated in the frontloading trend by 
moving its primary date up to early March of 2000. 

Understanding Frontloading in 1996 and 2000 

The substantial frontloading in 1996 and 2000 significantly altered the 
pace and sequence of the primary season by placing a much larger num­
ber of delegates up for grabs in the earlier stages of the primary season 
than had occurred in prior years. The effect of the compressed delegate 
dCCUIIlulatiun process is exhibited in Table 1.2 The escalated pace of pri­
maries and the rapid process of delegate accumulation in 1996 can be 
seen in the dramatic increase between 1992 and 1996 in the percentage of 
delegates selected by the end of March. The 30% increase in accumulated 

Table 1 
Delegate Selection Patterns 

in l'residential Primary Seasons, 1976-2000 

Percentage of Delegates Percentage of Delegates 
Selected by Second Week Selected by End of March 

in March 

Democratic Republican Democratic Republican 

1976 9 9 19 19 

1980 14 14 36 30 

1984 18 18 29 26 

1988 42 49 51 54 

1992 31 36 43 46 

1996 44 51 73 77 

2000 65 68 71 72 

Source: Adapted from Mayer (2001) and Morton and Williams 

53 



Democratic and Republican delegates by the end of March is explained 
by 22 states moving up on the primary calendar from where they had 
been in 1992. The large percentage increase for the end of March 1996, 
when compared with the smaller percentage increases by the second week 
of March 1996, shows that most frontloading states selected dates in 
middle or late March, and only a few states (such as Arizona and South 
Carolina) established very early primary dates. Despite the dramatic in­
creases in delegate accumulation in the latter weeks of March 1996, the 
winnowing process in the Republican Party was complete by the second 
week of that month, leaving significant numbers of voters without choices 
and half of the Republican delegates yet to be distributed. 

The compressed primary season trend continued for 2000 when 14 
states held GOP primaries and caucuses and 12 states held Democratic 
primaries on an earlier date than they had scheduled in 1996. The 21% 
increase in Democratic delegate totals and 17% increase in Republican 
delegate totals by the second week of March 2000 indicate that many 
states discovered that an early March date was essential to assure some 
modicum of influence over the winnowing process. The lack of signifi­
cant change in percentages at the end of March shows that most 
frontloading states were moving up from dates previously established 
in middle or late-March. That fully two-thirds of the Republican and 
Democratic delegates were determined by the end of the second week of 
March 2000 indicates the presence of more populous states in the early 
stages of 2000 and highlights the shorter period of competitivenebt>. 

Frontloading Decision Factors 

Several motivations drove particular states to move up on the pri­
mary season calendar in 1996 and 2000. The main reason was the desire 
to increase the state's influence in determining the outcome of the nomi­
nation process. When the winnowing process concludes prior to a state's 
election date, state voters are given no choice and are excluded from any 
role in determining the party's nominee 0 ackson and Crotty 2001; Lengle 
1997). The lack of voter choice or influence contributes to citizen apathy 
and alienation from the political system. These burgeoning levels of alien­
ation are strongly linked to diminished interest in political participation 
(Nye, King, and Zelikow 1997). From the perspective of the individual 
state,' the lack of choice and influence can be remedied only by a move 
forward on the primary calendar. Consistent with this reasoning is the 
suggestion that an earlier primary date is likely to increase voter turnout 
as candidates spend more time campaigning in the state and voters be­
lieve they will have an impact on determining the party nominee (Ceasar 
and Busch 1997; Geer 1989; Lengle 1997). Another motivating factor in 
the decision to move forward on the primary calendar was the belief that 

54 



an earlier primary or caucus date would bring greater candidate atten­
tion to and media coverage of state interests and issues (Cook 1992; Jack­
son and Crotty 2001; T.f'neip 1997; Mayer 19(7) The key to this rationale 

is the understanding that candidate campaign strategies and media at­
tention during the primary season tend to be frontloaded as well. 

A successful campaign strategy must involve a keen focus on the early 
stage of the primary season (Cook 1992; Jackson and Crotty 2001; Mayer 
1997; Wayne 2001). Candidates engage in a retail style of campaigning in 
the earliest contests by spending considerable time face-to-face with po­
tential supporters. As the campaign proceeds, candidates must convert 
to a wholesale· approach in order to reach potential supporters in up­
coming primary states that are spread all across the nation (Haskell 2000; 
Wayne 2001). Given the speed with which the winnowing process oc­
C'llTS, C';::mninates mnst p')(pend resources in early states because there is 

little to be gained from hoarding money or building organizational sup­
port in later states when continued survival is not assured. 

Late primaries and caucuses also receive little media coverage, if any, 
and there is rarely any attention paid to issues distinct or relevant to 
these state. The lack of attention is highlighted by the common media 
practice of discontmuing extensive reports of election results from the 
later states once the nomination has been determined (Lichter 1992; Mayer 
1997). The frontloading effort, as it relates to a desire for increased cam­
paign activity and media coverage, is also linked to hopes that an earlier 
primary date would provide substantial economic benefits as candidates 
and the media poured dollars into thfl statp (MaYPT '19(7). 

Individual states considering moving up on the primary calendar must 
also weigh the negative potential consequences. If the state or party al­
ters the presidential preference primary date, some uncertainty and up­
heaval will inevitably result. Particularly important is the upheaval caused 
by disruption to the established electoral calendar and processes in the 
state. The intensity of the upheaval depends on the date of the relocation 
and the extent to which the primary date was institutionalized in the 
minds of voters and election officials.3 The upheaval occurs through aJ­
terations to electoral procedures and timelines; the uncertainty emerges 
from the unknown impact on turnout and outcomes that may arise from 
separating or pushing forward primary election events. 

There can also be substantial administrative costs associated with a 
significant step forward on the calendar. Most states with early presi­
dential preference primaries separate them from statewide office primary 
elections. For example, of the first 21 GOP presidential preference pri­
maries held in 2000, only three supported joint congressional primary 
elections. This separation mandates addItIOnal spending to support mul­
tiple primary events. Separating the primaries and frontloading the presi-

55 



dentinl event cnn also cnuse cnpncity problems for elections officinls be 
cause of the shorter time spans for attracting workers, the increased bur­
den on volunteers, and greater conflict with end of the year obligations 
during filing and recruitment periods (McCarthy 1999; Race 1999). 

Apart from administrative costs, some states choose to forgo a move 
to the top of the presidential primary calendar because moving up does 
not guarantee influence and might even produce an undesirable out­
come. Just because a state moves to a well-positioned calendar date does 
not mean that the state will attract a full range of candidates. The actual 
influence of early states is vulnerable to manipulation by campaign strat­
egists, who can direct their candidates to bypass a state featuring a 
lfavorite sonl or popular candidate in pursuit of a more appealing future 
confrontation (Polsby and Wildavsky 2001). In other cases, decision mak­
ers may resist a move forward because they fear significant increases in 
participation from non-traditional and less partisan voters, which may 
produce an election outcome far different from what the move's sup­
porters had in mind (Beck and Hershey 2000). 

The major political parties also weighed into the decision making pro­
cess by offering incentives and issuing restrictions to discourage contin­
ued frontloading for the 2000 primary season. The Democratic Party pro­
tected the early positions of Iowa and New Hampshire by restricting 
states from scheduling binding primaries prior to March 7. The GOP took 
a less restrictive approach. It tried to discourage frontloading by adding 
bonus delegate options to states that scheduled later primary dates (Bibby 
1999; Busch 2000; Edw;;trds and Wayne 2000; Hargen and Mayer 2000; 
Jackson and Crotty 2001). 

Assessing Pennsylvania's Decision to Stay Late 

To understand fully the frontloading considerations in Pennsylvania 
prior to the 2000 election, it is important to examine Pennsylvania presi­
dential primaries in a historical context. Pennsylvania has held presi­
dential primary elections for both major political parties since 1968. An 
examination of primary election outcomes since the early 1980s shows 
different trends between the parties but consistency in the general lack 
of competitiveness. Republican Party primaries exhibited one-candidate 
domination in most years since the introduction of primaries.4 The only 
close election occurred in 1980 when the race between Ronald Reagan 
and George H. W. Bush was decided by an eight-point margin of victory. 
The narrowest win since 1980 was the 45 point spread for Bob Dole in 
1996. The recent lack of competitiveness is noteworthy because each pri 
mary season after 1984 included several serious candidates. 

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, routinely sponsored mod­
erately close elections through 1984. These elections were moderately 

56 



competitive because they featured relatively 11ar1'mv margins of victory 
winners that attained only a plurality of the popular vote, and several 
serious candidates actively campaigning for the party nomination. The 
closest Democratic primary eJection occurred in 1980, when the race be­
tween Jimmy Carter and Edward Kennedy was decided by less that 1 %. 
Although Kennedy beat Carter in the popular vote, Carter gained a nar­
row advantage in state delegates. The close outcome in Pennsylvania 
indicated significant competitiveness in the state, but it was of little con­
sequence nationally because Carter' searlier electoral successes had placed 
him well ahead on the pat.h to the nomination. 

The Democratic primaries in 1972, 1976, and 1984 were also moder­
ately competitive. Each ejection featured multiple active campaigns, plu­
rality victories, and margins of victory under 14%. Hubert Humphrey 
won the 1972 Democratic primary election with a 13.8% margin of vic­
tory. Despite his relatively decisive victory, the enhanced voter choice 
and competitiveness of the race is most evident in that four candidates 
each received more than 20% of the vote. Jimmy Carter's 12% margin of 
victory over Henry Jackson in 1976 was another moderately decisive vic­
tory. Voters again were offered greater choice, as shown by four candi­
dates each receiving at least 12% of the vote. Pennsylvania additionally. 
contrihutpd to thp winnowing process in 1976 because Humphrey de­
cided not to enter the primary and Jackson bowed out of the race follow­
ing his loss in Pennsylvania. The 1984 primary featured active campaigns 
by Walter Mondale, Gary Hart, and Jesse Jackson. Mondale's 12% mar­
gin of victory was moderately decisive, yet the nomination was still in 
doubt at the time of the primary. The outcome bolstered the Mondale 
campaign, which had lost seven of the initial 11 primaries (Bartels 1988). 

Election Day competitiveness and voter choice experienced a dramatic 
decay following the 1984 primary. Despite mUltiple candidates appear­
ing on the ballot, the Democratic primaries in 1988 and 1992 featured 
one-candidate dominance. The dominance was exhibited by majority vote 
victories, minimal campaignine from other candidates, and margins of 
victory in excess of 30%. 

The relative competitiveness and enhanced voter choice in early Demo­
cratic party races and the 1980 GOP race is not surprising, given that 
Pennsylvania used to have a relatively early primary date. Pennsylvania 
was the seventh of only 27 states to hold a presidential preference pri­
mary in 1976 and thIrteenth of 32 primary states in 1980. As a result, 
when a nomination actually was contested, Pennsylvania voters were 
given the opportunity to influence the selection process. Reduced com­
petitiveness in more recent election years is expected because the presi­
dential candidate winnowing process was complete prior to each elec­
tion date. Frontloading activity since the 1980s eroded Pennsylvania's 

57 



relative calendar position, to the point that it was twenty-third of 39 GOP 
primary states in 1992 aml Lhirty-fin;i uf 43 GOP ~tates in 1996. 

Hoping to reverse the non-competitive primary trend, while establish­
ing an influential position in the presidential selection process that might 
spark voter interest, numerous sponsors introduced legislation in the Penn­
sylvania House and Senate in early 1999 to alter the 2000 state primary 
date (Cattabiani 1999). Each of the bills called for frontloading by making 
a permanent change forward from the legally mandated primary date of 
the fourth Tuesday in April. The bills varied only in exact placement on 
the calendar and whether or not the presidential preference primary was 
to be separated from the general primary election. Preferred primary dates 
in the bills included the first, second, and third Tuesdays in March.5 

NUlle uf the~e bills was reported out of committee in either chamber of 
the state legislature. They all failed to attract sufficient support from com­
mittee chairs, committee members, and the rank and file to compel even 
a vote atthe committee level (Associated Press State and Local Wire 1999a). 
Although no single alternative sparked overwhelming support, some in­
terest in examining a date change persisted among lawmakers. The legis­
lature finally established a task force charged with examining the impli­
cations of moving Pennsylvania's annual primary date to September, and 
examining the cost and consequences of holding separate primaries dur­
ing presidential election years (Durantine 1999a, 1999b; Race 1999). 

In October 1999; a bill was introduced calling for a one-time calendar 
shift of the 2000 prim.ary from the fourth Tuesday in April to May 2. Spun­
sors introduced the bill in response to pleas from religious leaders and 
local election boards to change the date because it conflicted with a reli­
gious hOliday (Hartzell 1999). The change was widely supported. Follow­
ing a floor amendment changing the primary date from May 2 to April 4, 
the bill was unanimously approved in both chambers and signed into law. 

Although Pennsylvania's legislators refused to act on numerous 
frontloading alternatives, two questions make further scrutiny of the 
impact of this decision worthwhile: what was the impact of staying late 
in 2000, and what might have happened if Pennsy lvania had moved for­
ward to the first Tuesday of March during the 2000 primary season? 

The initial answer lo the first queslion is sllai1:5hlforward amI predict­
able. The results of the 2000 presidential primary indicate a continuation 
of the recent non-competitive trend for both parties. Even though the 
official primary date was moved forward three weeks, Peru1sylvania re­
mained near the end of the primary season and did not leapfrog a single 
state in that jump forward. The 54% margin of victory in the Democratic 
primary and 51 % margin of victory in the Republican primary were un­
derstandably high because Democratic candidate Al Gore and Republi­
can George W. Bush each had secured a suHicient number of delegates to 

58 



win his partys nomination three weeks prior to the election. Further con­
sideration of the first question and initial probing into the second re­
quire a comparison of voter choice and campaign activity in Pennsylva­
nia with that in other states facing similar frontloading decisions in 2000. 

Assessing the Impact of State Frontloading Decisions in 2000 

To identify variations in individual state influence on the presidential 
selection process, I examine a range of variables measuring the actual 
value of individual state decisions to adjust their position on the 2000 
primary calendar. 111 II1t'dtiuring the impact of these state decisions, I fo­
cus on a systematic comparison between states that moved their election 
date from an earlier position in 1996 and states that rejected frontloading 
proposals in favor of retaining their position at the later stages of the 
primary season. Specific measurement variables include voter participa­
tion rates by state/, active candidates on Election Day, candidate cam­
paign stops by state, voter attentiveness at the time of the primary,' com­
petitiveness of elections, and debates by state. 

Table 2 displays the Republican Party campaign activity and election 
outcome results for selected states that moved to an earlier primary date 
and states that resisted the frontloading trend for 2000.8 I refer to the 
former set of states as early 111.0Ver (EM) sLaLes dnd to the latter tiet as 
move resistant (MR) states. Early mover states are those states that moved 
forward on the calendar in search of an exclusive early date or to join a 
bloc primary with other states. In some instances the bloc primary takes 
on a regional character, whereas in other instances the bloc is just a union 
of participating states (Polsby and Wildavsky 2001). Move resistant states 
are those states that rejected pleas to move up in the 2000 primary sea­
son, knowing that they were retaining a calendar date that was very likely 
to fo11ow thp completion of the nomination stage winnowing process. 

The most visible distinguishing characteristic of the early mover states 
in 2000 was size. Compared with other years when smaller states strate­
gically moved forward in search of a unique daLe, Lhe luOuentiul muvers 
in 2000 were mostly large states seeking proportional influence over the 
nomination process similar to what they wielded in the general election. 
The most prominent early mover states in 2000 were Michigan, Wash­
ington, California, and Ohio. Michigan and Washington each moved up 
four weeks to establish distinctive early date Republican Party prima­
ries. California and Ohio moved their unified statewide primaries up 
three weeks and two weeks, respectively, to join the nationwide March 7 
bloc primary The big foul" newcomers to the early primary season com­
bined for a hefty 16% of the total GOP delegates in 2000, which goes a 
long way toward explaining the dramatic increase in the early March 
delegate counts mentioned previously. 

59 



Table 2 
State Influence on the Republican Presidential Selection Process, 2000* 

Primary State Campaign Debates Active Turnout Voter Margin Ivlargin 
Type Visits Campaigns Change mv olvement of Change 

at Primary from 1996 Index Victory from 1996 

California EM 11 1 3 24% 46 24% -24(~ 

Michigan EM 15 1 3 143% 37 8% -9% 

Ohio EM 4 0 3 47% 46 21% -23% 
0 

Washington EM 5 0 3 307% 38 19% -23% 
\.0 

lllinois MR 1 0 1 -10% 27 45% +3% 

New Jersey MR 2 0 1 "1OoA> 20 66% -5% 

Pennsylvania MR 3 0 1 -4% 22 50% +4% 

* EM refers to early mover states and MR refers to move resistant states. Campaign visits were 
tabulated by the author for the year 2000 only, with the count beginning on January 3,2000 and 
ending on the date of the state's primary. Debate totals are talied from December 1999 to the date of 
the state's primary. Voter turnout and margin of victory data were obtained from state election 
bureaus. 



The data relating to the big four early mover states dearly exhibit 
significant beneficial consequences for states moving up on the primary 
calendar. Each state moved up in search of greater voter choice and can­
didate attentiveness, which is exactly what each state received. The states 
offered voters greater candidate choice and potential for influence, while 
also attracting greater attention from the candidates and the media dur­
ing a period when voter attentiveness was at or near its peak.9 Michigan 
(143%) and Washington (307%) experienced exceptionally strong increases 
in voter participation, and California (24%) and Ohio (47%) saw sizeable 
increases as well.lO The frontloading decisions by these states produced 
competitive elections in 2000, which was a substantial improvement over 
1996 when the winnowing process ended prior to each state's primary. 

Table 2 also contains data regarding campaign activity and election 
outcomes in Pennsylvania and two other prominent states that rejected 
appeals to move up significantly their 2000 primary date. The two other 
move resistant states are Illinois, which dismissed legislation to move its 
date from the third Tuesday in March, and New Jersey, which rejected 
legislation to move its date from the first Tuesday in June. Data in Table 2 

indicate that these states had no impact on the winnowing process and 
attracted little campaign attention prior to the election. Low levels of voter 
turnout, uncompetitive elections, and poor voter attentiveness scores are 
all due to nominations having been secured prior to these primaries. 

On the surface, the data from Table 2 indicate that the frontloading 
decision for the early mover states generated substantial rewards for state 
voters and the states as a whole. When directly compared to competi­
tiveness and participation levels in move resistant states, the participa­
tory value of frontloading decisions is obvious. The final outcome of the 
Michigan election, however, highlights the problem of uncertainty that 
can be associated with a date shift. Despite the record primary turnout, 
candidate attentiveness to the state, substantial advertising, and media 
presence, John McCain's victory was in direct contrast with the desired 
intent of the principal supporters of the legislation to move the primary 
date forwardY 

In addition to the basic disparity between early mover states and move 
resistant states, an examination of aggregate election data from the 2000 
GOP primary season further supports the contention that extreme 
frontloading creates vast disparities among states in regard to candidate 
attention and the competitiveness of elections. The relative competitive­
ness of the early presidential preference primaries is indicated by an av­
erage 18.6% margin of victory for COP primaries, up to and including 
the March 7 super primary. This average margin is especially notewor­
thy when compared with the average 60% margin of victory in GOP pri­
maries held after the March 7 primary bloc and the suspension of 

61 



McCain's campaign. 12 The absence of candidate attention to the voters or 
issues in these later states is additionally remarkable because onlv one of 
the 28 states that held primaries on datt~s after March 7, or did not sched­
ule a primary or caucus, had an official candidate visit prior to March 7. 

Comparing Pennsylvania and Ohio 

Examining the impact that a decision to move the primary date for­
ward might have had in Pennsylvania requires comparative analysis. 
Ohio is the ideal state for comparison with Pennsylvania on election 
matters because of its similar size, voting history, and cycle for senatorial 
and gubernatorial elections. Table 3 displays the long-standing similari­
ties between the two states in population and presidential voting prefer­
ences. The two states rank among the largest states in the Union, and 
their diminishing influence in the Electoral College is indicated at nearly 
identical rates. They also produced identical general election outcomes 
in presidential elections from 1972 through 1996. 

Table 3 
Pennsylvania and Ohio: 

Electoral Size and Presidential Election Winners 
Pennsylvania Ohio 

Electoral Election Electoral Election 
Votes Winner Votes Winner 

and Rank and Rank 

1968 29 (3) Humphrey 26 (4) Nixon 

1972 27 (3) Nixon 25 (6) Nixon 

197fi 27 Ci) Cartf'r 2S (fi) Cartf'r 

1980 27 (3) Reagan 25 (6) Reagan 

1984 25 (4) Reagan 23 (6) Reagan 

1988 25 (4) Bush 23 (6) Bush 

1992 23 (5) Clinton 21 (7) Clinton 

1996 23 (5) Clinton 21 (7) Clinton 

2000 23 (5) Gore 21 (7) Bush 

62 



Figure 1: Pennsylvania and Ohio General Election 
Turnouts in Presidential and Gubernatorial Years, 1968 

w~o.-----------------------------------------------~ 

~~r---------~~~~-------'r---------~~---------'M 

~+---------~----~----------~----~----------~--~ 
OH Turnouts 

2~+-------------------------------------------------~ 

1~+-------------------------------------------------~ 

196819701972 19741976197819801982 1984 198619881990 1992 1994 199619982000 

Figure 2: Pennsylvania and Ohio 
Pt"esidential Primary Turnout, 1968 

~~------------------------------------------------~ 

1~+---~~~~----------------------------------~~-; 

1~+-~~------------------------------------------'-; 

500000 +----------------------------------------------1 

1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 

More than size and electoral preferences, the voting patterns and turn­
uut data fur tht: twu ::;tatt:::; ::;huw high conelalions for volel- behavior- over 
time at the general election and primary levels. Figure 1 shows general 
election voter participation in presidential and gubernatorial years.13 The 
correlation between the two states from 1968 to 1998 is a statistically sig­
nificant Pearson's r-value of .861 over 16 election cycles. This represents 
a strong association behveen the two time series, showing substantially 
similar patterns in historical voter participation. Figure 2 shows an equally 
strong association between Pennsylvania and Ohio voter participation 
in presidential primaries from 1968 to 1996. The correlation between the 
two states is a statistically significant Pearson's r-value of .862 over eight 
elections. Both correlation coefficients were statistically significant at the 
.01 level. 

63 



Table 4 
Pennsylvania and Ohio: 

2000 Primary Election Impact 
Pennsylvania Ohio 

Dem Rep Total Dem Rep Total 

Active Campaigns 1 1 2 2 
,.., 

5 .J 

at Primary 

Margin of Victory 53.8% 50.0% 48.9% 21.0(7'0 

Pre-March 7 Visits 0 0 0 4 4 8 

Total Campaign 7 3 10 7 8 15 
Visits 

Turnout Change -2.8% -6.0% -4.3% 26.0% 45.1% 36.6% 
from 1996 

Voter Involvement Index - 22 46 

In addition to the similarities between the two states in size, electoral 
preferences, and voter participation rates, Ohio is particularly useful for 
comparison with Pennsylv;:miCl hecCll1se Ohio approved legislation in 1999 
to move the state primary date from the third Tuesday in March to the 
first Tuesday in March. This legislation followed similar legislation in 
1993 moving the state primary date forward from a long-standing early 
May date. The 1999 frontloading legislation was supported by Republi­
can Party leaders in the state legislature and by Republican Governor 
Robert Taft (Associated Press State and Local Wire 1999b). Many Demo­
crats in the state opposed the move as an attempt to boost the presiden­
tial prospects of Ohio Congressman John Kasich, a Republican (Colum­
bus Dispatch 1999). 

That Ohio moved its primary to an earlier date in the 2000 presiden­
til'll nominl'ltion cycle, one ('onsicleTecl hllt Tejectecl by Pennsylvania legis­
lators, invites further comparison. Table 4 shows several comparative 
indicators of electoral choice, competitiveness, participation, and cam­
paign activity for Ohio and Pennsylvania primaries in 2000. Electoral 
choice and competitiveness differences can be seen in the multiplicity of 
active campaigns in Ohio and lower margins of victory in the Demo­
cratic and GOP primaries. Dramatic differences in voter turnout, candi­
date visits (especially those coming before victory was assured for both 
major party nominees), and voter involvement are additionally evident 
and can easily be attributed to state position on the primary calendar. 

64 



The most dramatic difference in Table 4 is in voter participation. Penn­
sylvania voter turnout in 2000 declined for both parties and declined 
statewide bv 4.3% from 1996 turnout. The 2000 Pennsylvania turnout 

-' . 
figure represents a 40.8% decline from statewide presidential primary 
participation in 1992, and it was 52.1 % under the high participation point 
set during the lYI;O primary. Ohio primary turnout in 2000 improved 
36.6% statewide from 1996 and was almost 25% higher than turnout in 
1992. The 2000 Ohio participation rate was a 9.1 o,{) increase over the record 
statewide primary participation level set in 1988. 

Candidate visits and campaign advertising expenditures also high­
light differences in statewide influence in the selection process and can­
didate attention to state issues and concerns. Although Al Gore and 
George W. Bush made several trips to Pennsylvania during the official 
time period of lhe 2000 primary ~ea~on, no official candidates visited the 
state in 2000 before Bush and Gore had already attained presumptive 
nominee status. Campaign advertising was additionally telling. Bush and 
McCain each spent aggressively on campaign ads in Ohio in the two 
weeks preceding the Super Tuesday primary. Bush spent over $800,000 
and McCain spent over $650,000 (Columbus Dispatch 2000). In contrast 
no official campaign ads ran in major Pennsylvania markets before the 
winnowing process was completely over. 

Although the data in Table 4 show significant differences between the 
two states in competitiveness and participation, the comparison requires 
additional empirical analysis. I employ forecasting analysis to determine 
the impact lhal a firsl Tuesday ill March primary date may have had on 
Pennsylvania voter participation in 2000. The process involves model­
ing historical voter participation rates in Pennsylvania and Ohio, and 
then projecting voter turnout rates for 2000 by using forecasting applica­
tions provided in Autobox version 4.0.14 

Figure 3 depicts 2000 presidential primary forecasts derived after 
modeling participation rates in Pennsylvania from 1968 through 1996. 
The 2000 forecast called for a 16% increase over 1996 turnout. The actual 
2000 vote came in 4.3% under 1996 and 286,341 votes, or 17.5%, under 
the forecast. The actual 2000 vote was within the parameters of the lower 
limit of the forecast. Figure 4 depicts the 2000 presidential primary fore­
cast derived afler modeliI 19 participatiun ri:lte~ in Ohio from 1968 through 
1996. The 2000 forecast called for a 15.9% increase over the actual 1996 
turnout. The actual 2000 Ohio vote came in 36.6% over 1996 and 360)51 
votes, or 17.9%, over the 2000 forecast. The actual participation figures 
from 2000 were 12.4% over the upper limit forecast. 

Because the dramatic increase over forecast participation in Ohio was 
due to the frontloaded date change and the resulting improvements in 
voter choice, competitiveness, interest, and attention, it is logical to ex-

65 



Figure 3: Pennsylvania Presidential Primary Voting 
1968-2000: with 2000 Forecasts 

15000){) 

/"" 
/ ".- ..... - ---...., 

.... 

./ 
"'" 

---e- PA Primary Votes ".... 

/ --.- 2000 forecast ~ 

1 ... upper forecast limit 

" * lower forecast limit 

2500000 

2000000 

500000 

1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 

Figure 4: Ohio Presidential Primary Voting 1968-2000 
with 2000 Forecasts 

~ ~-----------------------------------------------, 

1~J-~~--~============~---------------j 
--e- OH Primary Votes 

1000000 1---------1 --.- 2000 forecast 
... upper forecast limit 

500000 r-______ ~L_-=*_·_·~lo~w:e~r~fu:r:ec~as:t~1i~m~it~------------------~ 

1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 

pect that a similar increase would have resulted from such a change in 
Pennsylvania. By applying the 12.4% increase over the upper limit fore­
cast in Ohio to the Pennsylvania forecast T projPct thM 2.3 million Penn­
sylvanians would have participated in the hypothetical first Tuesday in 
March contest. This figure represents a dramatic 63.9% increase over ac­
t:ual voter participation in the 1996 Pennsylvania presidential primary 
and suggests that 961,000 more voters would have participated in 2000 
than actually did. Although this predicted participation is a dramatic 
increase from 1996, it is only a 1.5% increase over 1992 turnout and is less 
than actual voter turnout in 1988. 

One difference betw·een Pennsylvania and Ohio is that Pennsylvania's 
primaries are closed, whereas Ohio's are open. The early date in Ohio 
might have encouraged a larger number of non-affiliated voters to go to 

66 



the polls than Penn5ylvania's closed primary would have allowed. Al­
though the format difference may have contributed to some variation 
between the states in turnout, closed primaries in P€lU1sylvania would 
not have prevented an upsurge in overall turnout similar to Ohio's. His­
torically, a strong similarity in primary election participation rates has 
existed between the two states (see Figure 2). Despite the difference in 
primary formats, the states exhibited very similar voter participation 
patterns in prior events. Pennsylvania's political culture and registration 
rules also encourage major partisan affiliation. Over 90% of registered 
voters were enrolled as Democrats or Republicans at the time of the 2000 
primary, indicating a high level of party affiliation. This high rate of party 
affiliation, along with state law allowing voters to declare or change party 
affiliation up to thirty days prior to the election, left few potential voters 
excluded from participation on primary day if they were inclined to sup­
port one of the major candidates. 

Increased participation rates in the Republican and Democratic prima­
ries in Ohio fell short of the Secretary of State's projections (Brazaitis 2000). 
Unlike claims from election officials and pundits in New Hampshire and 
Michigan, the post-election analysis of voter turnout rates in Ohio was de­
void of references to dramatic increases in participation due to John McCain's 
appeal to non-traditional primary voters. A range of states holding early 
primaries in 2000 experienced increases in voter participation. The turnout 
increases were not exclusive to open primary states but included equally 
dramatic increases in participation from closed primary states such as Con­
necticut, Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. 

Potential Impact on Other ~tatewide l.Jrimaries 

Although a decision to frontload the 2000 Pennsylvania presidential 
primary date likely would have led to enhanced competitiveness and 
substantially increased actual voter turnout it prompts another ques­
tion. What effect would dramatically improved participation rates have 
had on other races in the state if Pennsylvania had held an early unified 
primary in 2000? Critics of the various legislative proposals in Pennsyl­
vania cited concerns about cost, uncertainty, and disruption to the status 
quo when speaking out against frontloading and splitting the primaries 
(Durantine 1999a; McCarthy 1999; Race 1999; Rubinkam 1999). Many 
Pennsylvania legislators and party officials were willing to consider fu­
ture changes to the primary date, but they feared the impact that changes 
to the primary date might have on state legislative races. Concerns over 
potential disnlption and uncertainty were compelling in 2000 given the 
very narrow partisan distribution in the House and the looming specter 
of redistricting following the 2000 census. The prospect of significant in­
creases in voter partiCipation during the 2000 primary, particularly among 

67 



non-traditional primary voters, did not arouse support from the state­
wide political community. 

My analysis of the potential disruption to the status quo due to in­
creased turnout and an earlier primary date involves scrutiny of Ohio 
and Pennsylvania state senate and state house election results in 2000. To 
assess the potential impact of a frontloaded primary, I first determine the 
extent to which state legislative seats were competitive and contested in 
2000. I then examine election outcomes in the context of voter participa­
tion rates in both states. Potential impact calculations in Ohio assess the 
potential for change in electoral outcomes if turnout had not increased 
significantly in 2000, while potential impact calculations in Pennsylva­
nia evaluate the potential for change in electoral outcomes if turnout had 
increased significantly in 2000. I operationalize potential impact for nar­
row margins of victory (less than 20%) and close races (less than 10%). 
Potential impact for narrow margins is determined by counting the num­
ber of candidates from narrow margin of victory primaries who won or 
were defeated by less than 15% of the vote on general election day. Po­
tential impact for close margins is delennlned by counting the number 
of candidates from close margin of victory primaries who either won or 
were defeated by less than 10% of the vote on general election day. 

The post-election analysis detailed in Table 5 shows that the frontloaded 
primary date and the increased turnout in Ohio had a sizeable potential 
impact on the outcome of races for the state House of Representatives. 
The analysis for narrow margins of victory shows that 28 of the 99 Ohio 
State House races conceivably could have ended with a different victor 
on general election day if voter turnout had been significantly dimin­
ished on the date of the primary. The calculations still show a dramatic 
potential impact of 21 seats out of 99 when the close margin of victory 
::;tamlanl i::; applit!u. Tht! hi~h ratt! uf l:hallt!ugt!u ral:t!o anu lIlultituut! uf 
competitive elections in Ohio is partly attributable to the high number of 
open seat races in the Ohio House. Because of state imposed term limits 
and attrition, only 57 of the 99 races featured incumbents in 2000. 

The potential impact on the Ohio House of Representatives was re­
stricted to the individual candidate level and did not show significant pros­
pects for impact in the partisan make-up or control in the state legislature. 
The pre- and post-election partisan distribution figures showed identical 
levels of GOP domination in each chamber of the legislature. Although 
the close race analysis shows that 21 seats conceivably could have had a 
different winner, only six of the 21 would have resulted in a different party 
huluiIl~ tht! uffil:t!. Similar aIlaly::;b uf tht! Ohiu St!Ilait! raet!::, ohuwo ::;ig! Lifj­

cantly diminished potential impact. When the close margin of victory stan­
dard is applied, only one of the 16 Ohio Senate races would qualify as 
potentially affected if voter turnout were significantly depressed. 

68 



Table 5 
Contested Primaries and Close Elections 

in Pennsylvania and Ohio, 2000 

State Senate State House U.S. Congress 
PA OH PA OH PA OH 

Total Seats Up 25 16 203 99 21 19 
for Election 

Total Potential 50 32 406 198 42 38 
Primaries 

Total Contested 1 5 32 56 7 10 
Primaries (8.0%) (15.6'1'0 ) (7:9%) (28.3%) (16.7%) (26.3%) 

Primaries with 3 3 12 36 4 5 
N arrow Margins (6.0%) (9.4%) (3.0%) (18.2%) (9.5%) (13.2%) 
«20%) 

Primaries with 1 1 5 25 3 3 
Close Margins (2.0%) (3.1%) (1.2%) (12.6%) (7.1%) (9.4%) 
« 10%) 

Potential Impact 1 of 25 2 of 16 8 of 203 28 of 99 2 of2l 1 of 19 
on General seats seats seats seats seats seats 
Election affected affected affected affected affected affected 
Outcomes for (4.0%) (12.5%) (3.9%) (28.3%) (9.5%) (5.3%) 
N arrow Margins 

The analysis of the impact on Pennsylvania state legislature races con­
tained in Table 5 shows an entirely different story. Although partisan 
control of the House of Representatives was up in the air going into the 
2000 election, the limited number of contested primary races and the 
widespread absence of competitiveness were staggering. Of the 406 po­
tentially contested primaries for the 203 seats in the House of Represen­
tatives, only 32 races involved multiple candidates for the party desig­
nation. Of the 32 contested races, only 12 had narrow margins of victory 
and only five involved close races. Potential impact calculations based 
upon the narrow margin of victory standard show that substantial in­
creases in voter participation may have led to a different candidate pre­
vailing in eight of the 203 races. The close margin of victory standard 
shows that only two seats may have had a different outcome if voter 
participation were significantly increased from 0 frontloodcd primary 
date. Table 5 also displays a similar absence of challenges at the primary 
level for the Pennsylvania Senate races, and it shows very limited poten­
tial impact. Even when the narrow margin standard is applied, only one 

69 



of the 25 Pennsylvania Senate races would qualify as potentially affected 
if votPT hlTnOut .crignificantly increased. Given the pre-election partisan 
distribution of 30 Republicans and 20 Democrats, there is no chance that 
increased turnout would have threatened partisan control of the Penn­
sylvania Senate. 

The absence of challenges and the limited competitiveness of Pennsyl­
vania legislative races highlight the importance of incumbency in deter­
mining election competitiveness and outcomes. The entrenchment of in­
cumbents in the Pennsylvania political system (only 11 of the 203 House 
districts featured open seat races) makes voter participation rates some­
what irrelevant, for incumbents are afforded advantages that discourage 
serious challengers and create significant imbalances in campaign re­
sources. It is also unlikely that a legislative change to the 2000 primary 
date would have produced any significant increase in competitive chal­
lenges for House and Senate seats in Pennsylvania. A late decision to 
frontload the primary to early March would most likely have had the op­
posite effect by creating a shorter candidate recruitment period, a narrower 
fund raising window, and compressed petition drive deadlines that would 
have further discouraged challengers and disfavored outsider candidates. 

Table 5 also includes data regarding the competitiveness and potential 
impact of turnout changes on congressional races in Ohio and Pennsylva­
nia. Analysis of the primary outcomes in Ohio shows that significant re­
ductions in voter participation would not have affected the outcome of 
any of the 19 races for the u.s. House of Representatives .. Contested pri­
maries were few and competitiveness was limited because incumbents 
were seeking reelection in 18 of the 19 districts. Scrutiny of the congres­
sional primary races in Pennsylvania shows that significant increases in 
voter participation potentially would have affected only one of the 21 cam­
paigns for the u.s. House of Representatives. The absence of competitive­
ness in Pennsylvania is attributable to incumbents seeking reelection in 19 
of the 21 districts.IS Additional scrutiny of the u.s. Senate races in Penn­
sylvania and Ohio shows that dramatic changes in voter participation rates 
would not have affected the ultimate election outcome in either state. 

Increased voter turnout from a frontloaded primary date in Pennsyl­
vania would have had a little impact on the outcome of elections across 
the state. The paucity of contested primaries and competitive races of­
fered little chance for upheaval from a significant increase in voter turn­
out. Thus, legislators' fears of the potential impact on non-presidential 
races in the state were largely unfounded. Despite the limited potential 
impact, the closeness of the partisan make-up in the House (deadlocked 
at 100 to 100 with three vacancies at the time of the 8pnpra 1 plpction) 

made the possibility of disruption to even one campaign worthy of con­
cern to both political parties. 

70 



Conclusion 

A review ot multiple comparisons between states that participated in 
the frontloading trend for 2000 and states that resisted frontloading clearly 
shows that individual state decisions to select art early date offer greater 
prospects for enhanced voter choice, competitiveness of elections, and 
higher voter participation. Despite this potential, legislators considering 
a move forward on the primary calendar should be aware that 
frontloading does not guarantee successful early influence. The effec­
tiveness of date selection decisions are subject to minimizing influence 
by other frontloading states and avoidance strategies by savvy campaign 
managers. The recent frontloading trend has compressed the early sec­
tion of the primary season so greatly that frontloading states must either 
separate their statewide primaries or hold early unified primaries. When 
they separate their primaries they incur greater administrative and fiscal 
costs and pOlentially diminished voler Lurnoul for non-presidential pri­
maries. When they hold unified primaries they create greater adminis­
trative burdens and face the perceived risk that large increases in voter 
turnout would disrupt the status quo of expected outcomes in non-presi­
dential races. 

Comparative analysis and forecasting analysis between Ohio and 
Pennsylvania show that a significant move forward on the 2000 primary 
calendar by Pennsylvania would have generated significant increases in 
voter participation. Non-participation in the frontloading trend in 2000 
assured that Pennsylvania would miss out on an opportunity for greater 
voter choice, competitiveness, and campaign activity. The politically prag­
matic decision to retain the state's late primary date was a risk aversive 

action that displayed a clear preference for avoiding uncertainty and 
upheaval over pleas for greater political influence and participation. 
Given the 1im.iled nalw"e of compeLitiveness in Pennsylvania primary 
elections, a concern with uncertainty and upheaval is unwarranted. 

71 



Notes 

1. In response to encroachment from states establishing early GOP primrlrips 
or non-binding caucuses, New Hampshire and Iowa moven their dates forward 
on the calendar prior to the 1992 and 2000 primaries. The February I, 2000 New 
Hampshire primary date was a full three weeks earlier than the traditional fourth 
Tuesday of February date of the 1970s and 19805. Since the official 2000 primary 
season still ran into June, the jump forward had the effect of lengthening the 
overall primary season. 

2. I use this format rather than the weekly tally format of Mayer (2001) and 
Morton and Williams (2001) because the movement forward by New Hampshire 
in 1996 and 2000 disrupts the weekly tally comparison between primary sea­
sons. This format more effectively highlights the compressed nature of the del­
egate selection process in the early weeks and months of the primary season. 

3. For example, local elections officials in Pennsylvania and Ohio expressed 
opposition to frontloading proposals for 2000. They criticized the proposals be­
cause the early calendar dates would disrupt established filing deadlines, hinder 
campaign worker recruitment, and place additional stress on election officials 
seeking to complete administrative tasks in a shorter time frame and during the 
holiday season. Pennsylvania election officials were additionally opposed to pro­
posals that would split the primaries. They stated that running two primaries 
would increase costs by over 50% and would minimize essential preparation 
time for the general election (Duran tine 1999a; McCarthy 1999; Race 1999). 

4. The lack of competitiveness in the 1970s and 1980s was mostly due to an ab­
sence of challengers, as the GOP selection process was routinely ceded to incumbent 
presidents running for reelection or incumbent vice-presidents seeking the party nod. 

5. HB 1610 PN 1965 and SB 233 PN 242 each proposed to move the presiden­
tial preference primary to the first Tuesday in March. The Senate version of the 
bill proposed to move the rest of the primaries to September; whereas the House 
bill left the remaining primaries in April. These two bills attracted more co-spon­
sors than any other frontloading bills considered in 1999. SB 91 PN 86 proposed 
moving all primaries up to the second Tuesday in March and SB 258 PN 259 
proposed moving only the presidential primary to the second Tuesday. FinallYI 
lIB 653 f'N 691 proposed moving Lhe pre::>idelltial primary tu the third 1Uesday 
in March but holding all others in September. 

6. My decision to focus on changes in aggregate vote totals between election 
years is predicated on the understanding that determinations of voler lurnuul 
vary substantially across states and even across elections within a single state. 
Using simple vote counts for GOP candidates provides a helpful and basic sum­
'mary of the number of individuals taking part in the election while avoiding 
issues of asymmetry created by using non-uniform measures of voter turnout 
rates. See Beck and Hershey (2001) for an informative discussion of the problems 
inherent in creating uniform determinations of voter turnout across states. 

7. I determine voter attentiveness by the value of the voter involvement in­
dex at the time of the primary (Vanishing Voter Project 2000). The index repre­
sents a compilation of responses to survey questions measuring nationwide voter 
attentiveness and involvement. The index was updated weekly throughout the 
campaign and began the new year at a low of 12% voter involvement. 

72 



8. Since President Clinton competed in the 1996 Democratic primary without 
opposition, the Democratic turnout and competitiveness numbers are mislead­
ing. I use only GOP data in this table to produce more reliable comparisons. 

9. Republican campaign activity in these states pales in comparison to candi­
date activity in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. These states moved 
up their early primary dates from 1996 in an attempt to preserve their early in­
fluence. Iowa had 46 candidate visits and two debates, New Hampshire had 74 
visits and three debates, and South Carolina benefited from 44 candidate visits 
and two debates. 

10. Despite Democratic Party rules restricting states from holding binding 
primary elections prior to March 7, the Democratic party of Washington state 
scheduled a non-binding primary for the same day as the GOP primary. This 
drew the attention of the event-starved Democratic candidates (who scheduled 
10 visits to the state prior to the non-binding primary) and increased statewide 
and national attention to the primary. 

11. Michigan Act 71, of the Public Acts of 1999, was supported by the Gover­
nor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Michigan House of Representa­
tives, and the Michigan Secretary of State. Each of these officials endorsed - Bush 
for the Republican nomination, as did numerous official sponsors of the legisla­
tion. Mid-1999 polling reported overwhelming support for Bush among likely 
Michigan voters (Ceasar and Busch 2001). 

12. Even after a candidate withdraws from the race, in most cases his name re­
mains on subsequent ballots. Non-active candidates still attract a measurable, and 
at times substantial, number at votes, thus preventing unanimous election results. 

13. Total votes cast is superior to voter turnout as a measurement of compari­
son between Pennsylvania and Ohio for this time period. Although both states 
experienced modest population increases between 1960 and 2000, the popula­
tion swings are similar and are much less substantial than changes in numbers of 
registered voters. Voter registration numbers in both states varied dramatically 
over time, causing the turnout calculation as a percentage of registered voter~ to 
be unstable and less reliable than actual participation. That Ohio did not require 
registration or maintain voter registration statistics prior to 1978 further impedes 
a turnout-based comparison. 

14. Autobox Version 4.0 is distributed by Automated Forecasting Systems, 
Inc. of Hatboro, Pennsylvania. 

15. All the illcLllllb~nls seeking reelection in Ohio and Pennsylvania retained 
their seats in the 2000 general election. For a thorough breakdown of incum­
bency advantages that discourage serious challengers and promote high reelec­
tion rates in the u.s. Congress and in state legislatures see Jacobson (2001) and 
Maisel (1999). 

73 



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