






































 ó 


Looking Back on the Legislative Modernization 
Movement in Pennsylvania: 

Remarks of Herbert Fineman, 
Former Speaker 

of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 
Given at the Annual Meeting 

of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, 
April 4, 2003 at Villanova University, 

(with introduction and commentary by Michael Cassidy) 

On April 4, 2003 the Pennsylvania Political Science Association (PPSA) 
hosted a roundtable discussion on "The Legislative Modernization Movement 
in Pennsylvania: A Look Back at the 1960s and the 1970s." The panel included 
Herbert Finemun, furmer Speuker uf the Perm:;ylvuniu Huu:;,e uf Repre::;entu­

tives. Fineman appeared with Franklin Kury, a prominent Harrisburg lobbyist 
andformer Deputy Attorney General, House member, and state Senator known 
for his authorship of landmark public utility regulatory reform and environ­
mental protection legislation in the 1970s. The panel also included Rutgers Uni­
versity Professor Alan Rosenthal, the author of numerous books on state legisla­
tures and a key advisor to state legislatures and national legislative leadership 
organizations. Fineman was the featured speaker. His prepared remarks were 
followed by commentsfrom the other panelists. 

Known as the 'father of the modern Pennsylvania legislature" and the II ar­
chitect of legislative reform," Speaker Fineman was first elected to the House of 
Representatives in 1954 and was elected to the Democratic caucus leadership as 
Whip in 1965. He served as the Democratic Floor Leader from 1967 to 1968 and 
from 1973 to 1974. He was Speaker from 1969 to 1972 and from 1975 to 1977 
(Pennsylvania House ]ounIal 1994; Pennsylvania House of Representatives 
Homepage 2003). 

Fineman's tenure in the House was timed perfectly to allow him to partici­
pate in the nationwide legislatlVe reform movement. The first major concerns 
about the inadequacies of twentieth century state legislatures were expressed 
around the time of Fineman '5 first election to the House (Heard 1966a, 1-4). The 
movement for legislative 111.odernization was strongest nationally from 1965 to 
1980, corresponding closely with Fineman's service in House leadership posi­
tions (Rosenthal 1998, 49). During his time as leader, Fineman rose to promi­
nence in the national reform movement and led Pennsylvania's modemizatio11 
efforts. He shared the goals of that movement and helped shape its proposals. 
Political scientists generally described these goals in terms of the basic functions 
of the legislative branch: representation, lawmaking, and oversight. Thus, re-

87 



formers wanted to provide legislators ,[pith the tools to perform their representa­
tional function, enable them to independently formulate public policy, and em­
power the legislature as a co-equal branch of government (Herzberg and Rosenthal 
1971 , ni-7Jii; Kpp,.fp 1966, 37-47; 1971, 187). Legislative practitioners just wanted 
to build the "competence to meet problems of our society where they arise" 
(Margolis 1971, 25-27). 

In his presentation to the PPSA, Speaker Fi11eman described the need, moti­
vation, challenge, and scope of the reform movement that completely transformed 
the legislative institution in Pennsylvania. His remarks are reprinted here in 
full. The commentary that follows is intended to describe Pennsylvania's reform 
efforts in more detail, to place them in their national context, and to amplify 
Fineman's remarks with some of the comments made by the other panelists. 

Remarks of Speaker Herbert Fineman 

1 W('lS fhst elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for 
the term commencing in 1955, and I continued to serve consecutive terms 
thereafter for a period of 22 years. During that long tour of duty, I expe­
rienced the maturing of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives from 
a totally ineffective, non-analytical, non-originating, non-constituency­
oriented organ of state government to an entity that in 1977 was well on 
its way to becoming that which had been envisioned by the framers of 
our state constitution an equal coordinate branch of government. 

Prior to the onset of structural and procedural reform in the PelU1syl­
vania House of Representatives, its primary role had been merely to give 
its automatic stamp of approval to whatever proposals came forth from 
the office of the state's chief executive. The fact is that the House of Rep­
resentatives existed, not because of any contribution it was making to 
state government or its people, but rather because Article I of the Consti­
tution of 1790 provided that "the legislative power of this Commonwealth 
shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate 
and a House of Representatives." The physical facilities of House mem­
bers were totally in consonance with the House's meaningless status. We 
had no offices, we had no telephones, we had no file cabinets, we had no 
desks except that which was assigned to us on the floor of the House 
Chambers, we had no place to meet with constituents who might come 
to· the Capitol, and no regular secretarial service and we were being 
paid the grand total of $3,000 per annum. 

I must, in all candor, admit that as a newly elected member to the 
house in 1955, I was not immediately able to discern the vastness of those 
shortcomings. I had been so enamored of the fact that, as an unendorsed 
candidate, I had been elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representa­
tives and additionally was so awe-struck by the beauty of the House Cham­
ber itself, that a dear vision or perspective of the then role of the House of 

88 



Representatlves In state government did not manifest itself to me. 
As the years passed, however, and I was able to assume roles of lead­

ership, the myopia cleared and there slowly arose within me a very strong 
desire to be part of an effort to bring the House to that status of being an 
equal coordinate branch of government. I knew that this was a result 
that could ensue only if the House could independently, with its own 
research resources and information, begin to analyze the changing mani­
festations and complexities of state government responsibilities, to more 
clearly discern the escalating needs of our citizenry, and to create pro­
posals to meet those challenges. These ends had to be pursued, not 
through reliance upon the governor, lobbying organizations, or other 
sources, which was so much the case then, but rather through our own 
analysis and research efforts. Only in this manner would the judgments 
to be concluded by us be independently arrived at. This would necessi­
tate research facilities and staff expertise as well as necessary physical 
accommodations and appropriate member compensation, all of which 
would be in consonance with the deep needs of the House. And so we 
embarked on that endeavor. 

When I first became the Democratic Floor Leader in 1967, I sought to 
engage, for the initial time, gualified pru[et;t;iUIliil pert;unnel for my of­
fice and those of other officers of the Democratic Caucus. Subsequently, 
in 1969 when I was elected Speaker, we also engaged staff for all commit­
tee chairmen. It was made emmently clear to all chairmen, however, that 
those to be employed were not to be political patronage appointees, but 
rather the most able' personnel available. These included researchers, at­
torneys, communication personnel, legislative analysts, and administra­
tive assistants. In due course, personnel were also made available for all 
members. 

The real surge in reform efforts took place commencing in the 1969-70 
session. At least 13 new procedural changes were initiated during that 
period, including: 

• Creation of an ethics committee 
• Reduction in the number of House standing committees from 33 

to 21 

• An increase in minority representation on each committee (from 
a 13-6 distribution to 14-9) to reflect more accurately the division 
of the House between majority and minority 

• Limitation on the power of a committee chairman to kill a legis­
lative proposal, either by not calling a meeting or by failing to 
submit a legislative proposal to the committee for consideration 

• Installation of a vote lock system to ensure against absentee voting 
• Opening of all cOl1uniLLee llleetingt; Lu the public 
• Installation of a fiscal note system assessing the cost, on both a 

89 



one-year and a five-year basis, of every legislative proposal on 
the calendar so that House members and the public were more 
fully informed as to costs prior to enactment 

• Establishment of orientation sessions for all new members 
• Creation of a legislative audit advisory commission 
• Employment of public hearings on legislation 
• Synopsis of every bill reported to the calendar for members and 

the press 
Thus, the year 1969 was truly the real starting point of reform in the 

Pennsylvania House of Representatives. In subsequent years, we further 
provided for the establishment of a commonwealth compensation com­
mission. I have already noted that legislative compensation in 1955 was 
$3,000; today a legislator earns $64,638 per annum plus expenses. In a 
span of 48 years base legislative salaries have increased a total of $61,638. 
Since 1995 salaries have been tied to a cost-of-living basis .. 

We also held a greater number of public hearings throughout the Com­
monwealth, provided for public televising of House sessions and public 
hearings, provided for the auditing of legislative accounts by independent 
public accounting firms, and made such audits available to the public. 

One of the 11,me important legislaLive iIUluvatium; was initiated in 
1976 when we created the Legislative Office for Research Liaison, known 
as L.O.R.L. This office was created to make the knowledge and expertise 
of the Commonwealth's uruversities in scientitic and technical matters 
available to legislators on social, physical, and life sciences. Originally, 
six schools participated in this program. Today, at least 20 do. 

The continuing installation of procedural reform was of vital impor­
tance in enabling legislators to be more effective in discharging their vary­
ing responsibilities, which include acting as a representative of and 
spokesman for the needs and desires of constituents; serving as an om­
budsman where injustices occur because of official red tape, rules, and 
regulations; being an iImovalor and IniliaLol of Il(;!W prugrams; and exer­
cising legislative oversight functions. 

While it is true that organizational structures and legislative proce­
dures are important to the quality of legislative performance, procedural 
ref.orm in and of itself does not automatically yield more efficient and 
more effective state government. Nor should a legislature be judged solely 
on the basis of its procedural mechanisms and facilities, as the Citizens 
Conference on State Legislatures had done at one time. Rather, it should 
be judged by how well it represents the heterogeneous population of 
Pennsylvania and by the quality of its legislative output. To do other­
wise would be much like evaluating a football team by the quality of the 
stadium it plays in, or the kiml uf lucker room facilities or equipment 
that are provided, or the uniforms that are furnished. The best equipped 

90 



team is not always. the best performer. The Constitutional Convention 
that penned the U.S. Constitution and the early congresses of the na­
tional e;ovf'rnmf'nt w()ulo inof'f'o r<'ltf' vf'ry l()w in tf'rm~ ()f f<'lcilities ;mo 
organizational structures, but what they produced has endured and 
served us well for over 200 years. 

Resources most certainly are important and vital, but they are not the 
entire story. Conceivably, legislatures that have little may use that little 
very well, and legislatures that have much may use what they have poorly. 
What matters is the degree of commitment to the tasks at hand, and the 
spirit and dedication with which those tasks are undertaken. I believe 
that the benefits of procedural reform, coupled with the enthusiasm for 
the tasks at hand that may be engendered by legislative leaders, can to­
gether make the legislatures true laboratories of democracy. 

Commentary on Speaker Fineman's Remarks by Michael Cassidy 

If Herbert Fineman had not been a panelist on the PPSA roundtable 
on legislative modernization, whoever was on the panel would inevita­
bly discuss Herb Fineman's crucial role in Pennsylvania's efforts and his 
substantial contribution to the national effort, which he omitted from his 
remarks. Of course, Fineman was not solely responsible for legislative 
reform and modernization in Pennsylvania. There were others like Judge 
Robert E. Woodside, author James Michener, lv1ellon Charitable Trust 
president Theodore Hazlett, Jr., and former governors George Leader, 
William Scranton, ,and Raymond Shafer. Other legislative leaders also 
played important roles, especially K. Leroy Irvis, James J. Manderino, 
and Matthew Ryan, all of whom served with Fineman and would follow 
him as Speaker. State Senate leaders, such as former Senate President 
Pro Tempore Henry Hager, also were important. But for the 11 years be­
tween 1967 and 1977, Fineman was the main force and catalyst for legis­
lative modernization as he alternately served as Democratic Floor Leader 
and Speaker. He was the chief point of contact with the national reform 
movement and the leader with the power (sometimes unilateral) to ini~ 
Hate change in Pennsylvania. 

It is obvious from his remarkR that Fineman's major, but not exclu­
sive, focus was internal capacity building described early in the reform 
movement by Donald Herzberg as the "six S's," i.e. "improved staff, ser­
vices, space, salaries, sessions and spirit" (Heard 1966b, 159; Rosenthal 
1998,50-54). Decades later, Herb Fineman still would be remembered for 
his insistence on upgrading the working conditions of the members of 
the General At;sembly. At; Hout;e Democratic Flour Leader Ivan Itkin said 
on June 7, 1994 at the unveiling of Fineman's portrait in the State Capitol 
building, Fineman "gave lawmakers the tools they needed to compre­
hend the issues that crossed their desks." "In fact,'" Itkin added, Fineman 

91 



"gave them the desks and offices in the first place." Matthew Ryan, then 
Republican Floor Leader and a former Speaker, commented on what 
Fineman's national role in the reform movement meant to Pennsylvania: 

It WClb Hero who cuuld be caught researching a new initiative or 
exchanging sought-after innovative ideas from lawmakers na­
tionwide. When Herb Fineman went to NCSL (National Confer­
ence of State Legislatures) or one of the other national legislative 
leadership meetings, it was not as junketeer. He went as an of­
ficer of that group, he went as a player, as a man who was going 
there to contribute to that organization and to take - he was a 
taker. He took the ideas of the other states and brought them 
back to Pennsylvania and really helped to modernize und muke 
this House - and the Senate would steal our ideas - and this 
general legislature better because of what he brought back from 
these other states, and other states better because of what they 
got from him. 

Speaker H. William DeWeese summarized the testimonials given that 
day by thanking Fineman for his "legacy of modernization" (Pennsylva­
nia House Journal 1994, 1067-1073). 

It is difficult Lo overestimaLe Lhe impurtClJll:e uf the rnuderni:.Gatiun ef­
fort on the way legislators and their institution function. Former Senator 
Franklin Kury described his participation in the 2003 PPSA panel as II what 
lawyers call a I competent witness'" to institutional changes in the legisla­
ture. Kury recalled that when elected to the House in 1966, he had little or 
no staff support or even regular access to phones to make long distance 
calls. He recounted how there was no staff to help explain bills in caucus 
meetings or to provide independent analysis of the Governor's budget 
request. Even basic secretarial services were scarce. But some members 
like Kury had an advantage. In the pre-modernization legislature, law­
yers, insurance agents, and other business professionals could rely on their 
private uffices Lu llClIlllle cUIl!;tituent currebpondence and other public busi­
ness, but other legislators could not. As he put it, "Thank God I was a 
lawyer and had a secretary back in the district to put out mail for me." 

Kury was elected to the state Senate in 1972 at a time when staffing 
for individual members of the Senate was just becoming available. In his 
PPSA panel comments, he spoke with great pride of his work in the Sen­
ate made possible, in large part, by his newly-acquired authority to hire 
qualified staff to help develop the major legislation he sponsored to reor­
ganize the Public Utility Commission. "This is what I feel proudest about," 
said Kury. "Until that point in Pennsylvania, whenever the Senate of 
Pennsylvania wanted legislation drafted [on utility issues] we went to 
the lobbybt uf the Electric Association. We didn't do that. We gave him 

92 



our bill and asked for his comments rather than the other way around!" 
Staffing improvements and the other modernization reforms, Kury ar­
gued, gave the Senate the ability to develop its own lPf;islMion (Pennsyl­
vania Political Science Association 2003). 

Kury's and Fineman's recollections were in substantial agreement with 
a 1968 study done by EBS Management Consultants of New York for 
Pennsylvania's Commission on Legislative Modernization. That report 
stated that except for the desks on the chamber floor, lithe average Rep­
resentative does not have a desk or telephone and the average Senator 
finds himself in a room with three other Senators" (Commission on Leg­
islative Modernization 1969/95; also see 56 and 94-102). While these and 
other accounts of the inadequacies of legislative staff and facilities abound/ 
no account from the 1960s seems to exist that argues the opposing propo­
sition. 

Historical Background and Pressures 
for Modernization in Pennsylvania 

After a period of relative legislative supremacy in Pennsylvania and 
nationally, beginning with long fought battles for legislative power in 
tll~ l:ulunial periud that reached their peak during the Revolutionary War 
period, legislatures - the "First Branch" - went into a long period of 
decline after the Jacksonian Era (Advisory Commission on Intergovern­
mental Relations 1985, 31-35; Commission on Legislative Modernization 
1969, 56-62; Wolf 1969, 1-3). In reaction to widespread corruption, 
Pennsylvania's legislature was hobbled by the Constitution of 1 R74, which 
greatly limited legislative powers by making legislative sessions bien­
nial unless called into special session by the Governor, and by limiting 
the legislature's ability to raise revenues. As a "dubious" anti-bribery 
measure, the 1874 document also increased the size of the Senate from 33 
members to 50 and the size of the House from 100 members to 200 (Com­
IIlis~ion on Legislative Modernization 1969, 62-6'1; Wolf 1969, 4-5). These 
anticorruption reforms did not work. The Pennsylvania legislature suf­
fered further degradation under the control of the infamously powerful 
and corrupt Quay / Penrose machine, which used the legislature as its 
powerbase in the decades that bracketed the turn of the century (Beers 
1980, 41-57). Reformers of every stripe would spend nearly a century 
trying to undo the damage. 

Pennsylvania was not alone. After suffering more than a century of 
neglect and worse, state legislatures all over the nation were considered 
inept, antiquated institutions. In 1966 Alexander Heard, a political scien­
tist and Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, wrote his often quoted ob­
servation that "state legislatures may be our most extreme example of 
institutional lag. In their formal qualities they are largely nineteenth cen-

93 



MIry organizations and they must or should. address themselves to twen­
tieth century problems" (Heard 1966a, 3). It \'vas clear to many that these 
nineteenth century institutions would have to undergo significant change 
to meet the challenges from above in the form of new federally-imposed 
responsibilities and from below in the form of increasing expectations 
from voters. 

In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs sig­
naled the quickening of a fundamental shift in the federal-state relation­
ship. Where New Deal programs were administered by new federal bu­
reaucracies, Johnson's "War on Poverty" provided federal money for new 
state and locally administered programs. According to a 1976 report of 
the federBl Arlvl~ory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, fed­
eral aid to the states had increased from $2.9 billion in 1954 to over $60 
billion in 1976 (Shapp v. Sloan 1978, 603). This process of devolution ac­
celerated under the Nixon Administration and culminated in the block 
grant approach used in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
in the first year of the Reagan Administration (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations 1985, ch. 2). 

Even without this push from the federal government, states like Penn­
sylvania were expanding services and budgets to meet growing expecta­
tions in basic education, higher education, labor and safety, highway 
construction, environmental protection, new human services, and struc­
tures for internal accountability. In Pennsylvania, for example, Governor 
John Fine's 1953-54 biennial budget hit $1 billion (Beers 1980, 185). Fed­
eral funding of state programs as we know it today did not exist. In 1971 
the General Assembly passed Governor Milton Shapp's first annual bud­
get, which recommended spending just over $3 billion in state funds plus 
$768 million in federal money (Governor's Executive Budget 1971-1972, 
A17-19). This represented a six fold increase in state spending unly par­
tially explained by a roughly 50% increase in the Consumer Price Index 
between 1955 and 1970 and a 9% increase in Pennsylvania'S population 
from the 1950 to the 1970 census. 

These new federal and homegrown responsibilities for effectively and 
f'fficif'ntly managing programs and money called into question the ca­
pacity of state governmental institutions. Awakening from a period of 

. stagnation that the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (1985, 35) once called "The States Asleep, 1922-1955," a wave 
of reforms transformed both the executive and legislative branches in 
many states. From the 1960s into the 1980s, state legislatures including 
Pennsylvania's underwent a difficult process of modernization tu meet 
these new challenges. Prodded by its legendary House Speaker, Jesse 
Umuh, California led by raising legislative salaries, providing staff and 
offices, and implementing procedural reforms (Rosenthal 1971b, 11). 

94 



A National Movement 

Emulating reforms in California and in Congress, a national move­
ment for legislaLive modernization emerged in the 1960::;. The movemenl 
lacked a single structured leadership or plan (Rosenthal 1998, 50). Many 
groups participated prominently such as the American Assembly, the 
National Conference of State Legislative Leaders (NCSLL), the Ameri­
can Political Science Association (APSA), the federal Advisory Commis­
sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the Council of State Gov­
ernments (CSG), the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL), 
the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University, and various chap­
tpr~ of thp 1.P£lV1P ofWompn Votprs (Advisory Commission on TntPTgov­
ernmental Relations 1985, 68). In addition, the long-standing reform or­
ganization, the National Municipal League, was heavily focused on state 
constitutional reform and revision. The National Legislative Conference, 
a group largely comprised of the staff directors of legislative service agen­
cies, actively pursued a reform agenda and made comprehensive reform 
recommendalions as eady as 1961 (Heard 1966b, 158-162). The shared 
purpose of these groups resulted in strikingly similar recommendations 
and identified best practices. Alan Rosenthal (1971b, 3-4) summarized 
the reform proposals from different organizations into a short list of nine 
general programmatic recommendations: 

1. Elimination of many constitutional limitations on the authority 
of state legislatures, including limits on the taxing power, ear­
marking of revenues, requirements on referenda, and legislator 
compensation. 

2. Increase in the frequency and length of legislative sessions, with­
out limitation on time or subject. 

3. Reduction of the size of legislative bodies so that they are no 
larger than fair representation requires. 

4. Increase in compensation and related benefits, with expenses of 
legislative service fully reimbursed. 

5. Adoption of more rigorous standards of conduct by means of 
codes of ethics and conflict of interest, disclosure, and lobbying 
legislation, as well as ethics committees or commissions with 
some enforcement powers. 

6. Adequate space and facilities for committees and individual 
members, including electronic data processing and roll-call vot­
ing equipment. 

7. Improvement of legislative operations to ensure efficiency in the 
consideration of bills and the widespread dissemination of pro­
cedural and substantive information. 

8. Strengthening of standing committees by reducing their num-

95 



ber, defining their jurisdictions, and improving their procedures. 
9. Increasing the number and competence of legislabve staff work­

ing for leaders, committees, and rank-and-file members. 

Although ostensibly independent on paper, these reform groups were 
interrelated in many respects. For example, Larry Margolis, staff direc­
tor of the CCSL, was the former staff director for California Speaker 
Unruh. The NCSLL, the CCSL, and Unruh worked closely with Donald 
Herzberg and Alan Rosenthal of the Eagleton Institute (Herzberg and 
Ru~eIlthal1971, viii-xii). Speaker Fineman served as an o[ficel~ and ulll­
mately president, of the NCSLL in the early 19705 - a post held in the 
1960s by Speaker Umuh. In addition to the staff of the NCSLL, Fineman 
counted people like Alan Rosenthal of Eagleton and Larry Margolis 
among his close associates. When the NCSLL, the NLC, and other groups 
merged to form the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1976, 
they became a powerful voice for continuing modernization. At the same 
time, the NCSLL spun off the State Legislative Leaders Foundation. 

Thp Tpform pffort!"> of thpsp organizations often shared common pri­
vate funding sources. The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corpora­
tion funded the work of the CCSL and the Eagleton Institute seminar 
series on legislative modernization, as well as many of the National 
Municipal League's efforts at state constitutional reform (Burns 1971, 
preface; Heard 1966b, 158-159; Rosenthal 1998, ix-x; Wolf 1969, iv). Penn­
sylvania was among 13 states receiving grants from the APSA and the 
Ford Foundation for new legislator orientation programs, which were 
first held in December 1970.'Fineman and all future speakers continued 
the new member orientations (Wise 1984, vi). The APSA also sponsored 
a series of books on individual state legislatures to introduce new legis­
lators and the public to the legislative process. The series includprJ Sidnpy 
Wise's 1971 book The Legislative Process in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylva­
nia House published a second edition in 1984. Cross-pollinated, coop­
era live, bipartisan, and largely non-competitive, these groups, along with 
academics and individual state legislative leaders and members, formed 
a national movement dedicated to reforming the institutions of repre­
sentative government. 

. The most effective public campaign was launched by the CCSL, which 
formed in 1965 to evaluate each legislature and make recommendations 
for legislative rules changes and capacity building. It established a de­
tailed set of criteria for use in assessing legislative capability. These crite­
ria were organized under general headings that formed the ::lcronym 
EA.I.I.R - Functionality, Accountability, Information handling capabil­
ity, Independence, and Representativeness. Each of these headings was 
broken down into sub-criteria, such as size of the legislature (a peculiar 
fetish of many reformers), committee structure, staffing, facilities, public 

96 



access to information, internal accountability, fiscal review capabilities, 
conflict of interest rules, and member effectiveness (Burns 1971, 37-150). 
The CCSL also evaluated each legislature according to F.A.I.I.R. criteria, 
it made specific recommendations about each, and it ranked the legisla­
tures in its "complete report" in 1971 (Citizens Conference on State Legis­
latures 1971). The group summarized the results in a 1971 Bantam paper­
back by John Burns targeted to the general public titled The Sometime Gov­
ernments: A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures. California, both 
the poster child and gold standard for reformers, scored first in the over­
all rankings (Burns 1971, 181-6). Pennsylvania, with its reforms only par­
tially complete at the time of the study, ranked 21 among the 50 states. On 
individual criteria, Pennsylvania ranked 37 on Functionality (penalized 
in part for the legislature's large size), 23 on Accountability, 23 on Informed, 
5 on Independence and 36 on Representativeness (Burns 1971,289-94). 

Predictably, these rankings were highly controversial and hotly con­
tested in state legislatures across the country. Speaker Fineman and other 
state legislative leaders railed against the rankings when they were re­
leased. He argued then, as he did years later in his remarks before the 
PPSA panel; that the best equipped legislature is not always the best per­
former. During the PPSA panel discussion, Alan Rosenthal reflected on 
the controversy. He said he had told Margolis that the rankings were "in­
defensible social science." Rosenthal reported that Margolis replied, "if 
you don't give them a number, no one will ever remember it." With the 
advantage of hindsight, Rosenthal says that the ranking system was "ter­
rible social science. It was stupidity. But it was political brilliance." Fair or 
unfair, the numerical rankings were a great motivator for state legislative 
reform efforts. Even Fineman now characterizes his old disagreement with 
Margolis as a disagreement between friends (Pennsylvania Political Sci­
ence Association 2003). In the decades that followed the release of the 
CCSL report, the EA.I.I.R. criteria (it not the rankings) were used by groups 
such as the ACIR to evaluate state legislative capacity (Advisory Com­
mission on Intergovernmental Relations 19t$5, 69-112). 

Constitutional Revision in Pennsyvania 

In 1955 the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, known as 
the Kestnbaum Commission, issued its report to President Eisenhower 
recommending the return of governmental functions to the states, while 
urging sweeping revisions in antiquated state constitutions. This report 
gave a boost to the work of the National Municipal League and reform­
ers at the state level (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela­
tions 1985, 40-61). States also reacted to the landmark "one man, one 
vote" decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (1962) requiring 
states to reapportion their legislatures to ensure equal representation 

97 



based on population. Reapportionment by the new standard often re­
quired constitutional revision; and in many states, such as Pennsylvania, 
it provided an opportunity to redress other state constitutional provi­
sions effecting legislative capacity. 

In 1959 and 1967, in work that was largely completed before Fineman's 
ascendancy, Pennsylvania amended its Constitution of 1874 to remove the 
restrictions on legislative sessions. The 1959 Amendment established an­
nual sessions, with the even year being devoted to budget matters and the 
odd year to other legislation (Legislative H.eterence Bureau 1986, 173-4). 
This Amendment opened the way for a full time legislature, but one that 
still needed the Executive to call special sessions in the "budget years" to 
consider substantive legislation. During the Leader Administration, the· 
General Assembly created the Commission on Constitutional Revision, 
referred to as the "Woodside Commission" after its chairman, former House 
Republican Leader and then Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge Robert 
E. Woodside. In its report, the commission treated the 1959 amendment as 
a half-way measure and recommended that the legislature be a 1/ continu­
ing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected" (Re­
port of the Commission on Constitutional Revision 1959, 19-20). 

The legislatIve workload Juxtaposed with constItutional limitations 
made "special sessions" called by the Governor a practical and constitu­
tional necessity in the 1960s. Seven special sessions were called between 
1959 and 1966 - one by Governor Lawrence and six by Governor 
Scranton. Some of these special sessions were little more than an extra 
rpV] 1ar spssion with <l 1aiindlY list of unrelated topics in thp C;ovprnor's 
session call (Pennsylvania Manual 2001-2002, sec.3, 181-182). During the 
1960s the legislature was in continuing session, albeit without constitu­
tional approbation. 

After three more constitutional study commissions completed their 
work and one attempt to call a general constitutional convention failed, a 
series of significant constitutional changes worked their way though the 
amendment process during the Scranton Administration. The voters 
adopted the Woodside language in 1967 by a margin of two to one, mak­
ing the legislature a 1/ continuing body." Among other changes, the amend­
ments relaxed gubernatorial term limits by allowing the governor to serve 
two conspcutivp tprms rathpr than onp. Thp 1pgislatuTP could now mept in 
two-year sessions without restrictions. Annual budgets have become the 
norm and bills introduced during the first year of the session carryover 
into the second year. Also under the 1967 Amendments, either the Gover­
nor or the General Assembly may call special sessions (Wolf 1969, 8-26). 
Since the legislature is in continuous session, special sessions are used pri­
marily as a political device to focus attention on a particular subject. Since 
1968, special sessions have run concurrently with the regular session. 

98 



Following Governor Scranton's failed attempt, Governor Shafer suc­
ceeded in 1967 in getting a "limited" Constitutional Convention on the 
ballot for voter approval. It was a hard fight for both Scranton and Shafer. 
The Republican leadership was initially skeptical of any convention at 
all, and the Democrats wanted an open (unlimited) convention (Wolf 1969, 
25-33). House Minority Leader Fineman brokered the final deal for a "lim­
ited" convention advocated by Shafer and he provided the legislative votes 
necessary to place the issue on the May primary ballot (Pennsylvania House 
Jouma11967, 215-224). Voters approved a measure authorizing the Con­
vention along with seven constitutional amendments. The Constitutiona1 
Convention of 88 Republican and 74 Democratic delegates (called the "Con 
Con" at the time) met from December 1967 through FebrualT 1968 (Deers 
1980,350-355). Under its mandate to address legislative reapportionment, 
this convention drafted amendments to set up a bipartisan Legislative 
Reapportionment Commission and to bar the creation of multimember 
districts (from which about half of the House members were elected prior 
to the 1966 legislative reapportionment) (Bums 1971, 82-83; Commission 
on Legislative Modernization 1969, 81; Legislative Reference Bureau1986, 
32-34). In all, 85 major changes were made in the old constitution and 
were incorporated into five comprehensive amendments (Beers 1980, 354). 
Former governors Leader and Scranton headed the "Vote Yes" campaign 
(Wolf 1969, 51). The amendments were easily ratified by the voters in 
Apri11968. The Pennsylvania tactic of piecemeal amendment and limited 
convention proved successful in achieving the goals of constitutional re­
vision, whereas similar attempts in neighboring New York and Maryland 
failed (Beers 1980, 351; Penniman 1971, 205-214). 

The "Con Con" also settled one of the most controversial recommen­
dations made by the reform movement in Pennsylvania and elsewhere: 
reducing the size of the legislature. Many proposals to do so had been 
soundly rejected. One proposal to reduce the House by half to 101 mem­
bers lost in the convention by a vote 14-135. City political machines of 
both parties, in concert with widespread rural opposition, trounced by 
margins of 2 to1 several proposals to make more modest reductions (Com­
mission on Legislative Modernization 1969, 14i Wolf 1968, 40-41). Herb 
Fineman (an ex officio convention delegate) refrained from voting on the 
issue and focused instead on taxation and finance issues. His friend and 
siz.e-reductiun i:HlvocaLe, aULhur Ji::unes Michenef who WaS abo Lhe Con­
vention Secretary, repeatedly lost that fight on the Convention floor and 
refused to revisit th~ question later when the Commission on Legislative 
Modernization (1969, 43) addressed it. Delegates and future governors 
Robert P. Casey and Richard Thornburgh voted for most of the more 
modest reductions, as did future Speaker K. Leroy Irvis. (None of them 
voted to cut the House to 101 members.) Republican Leader Lee Donaldson 

99 



and Judge Woodside helped to lend the opposition to any fixed reduction 
in the size of the House. To prevent any future attempt to tamper with the 
size of the legislature by statute, the Convention constitutionally fixed its 
size at 203 representatives and 50 senators (Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1967-1968, 440-520). Soon after the Convention's close, Larry 
Margolis of the CCSL complained bitterly in a paper presented at an 
Eagleton conference. The House's size and the Convention's '/failure" to 
reduce it, he said, "acted against the probability of equipping the mem­
bers of the legislature adequately" (Margolis 1971,32). As it turned out, 
the House's size did not create any important or lasting impediment to 
Pennsy lvania' s reforms. After 1968, attempts to reduce the size of the leg­
islature provided cornie relief but not a serious threat to the status quo. 
Reform efforts to make significant reductions in the size of the legislature 
met similar fates in most other states (Advisory Commission on Inter­
govenunental RelaLions 1985,73-76; Rosenlhal1998, 51). 

Pennsylvania's Commission on Legislative Modernization 

Like Pennsylvania, many states formed their own commissions to 
study their legislatures and some sought academic evaluations from the 
Eagleton Institute. Others relied on and reacted to the ongoing work of 
the CCSL and its final report. 

In 1968 the Pennsylvania General Assembly overwhelming adopted 
House Resolution 207, which established a legislatively appointed Com­
mission on Legislative Modernization. The commission was charged with 
recommending reforms intended "to strengthen the legislative branch 
of State government so that it can maintain its position of co-equality as 
an independent, self-sufficient branch of government." The resolution 
was sponsored by House Republican (Majority) Leader Lee Donaldson 
and co-sponsored by the leadership of both House caucuses. J:iineman 
was a co-sponsor of the resolution and one of the appointing authorities 
named for the commission (History of House Bills and Resolutions 1967-
1968,413). The resolution passed the legislature with the Republicans in 
control of both chambers. 

Fineman would be Speaker the next year when the report was issued, 
and he took on its implementation over the succeeding legislative ses­
sions. The commission was commonly referred to as the "l\1ichener Com­
mission" after its famous co-chairman, James Michener. It was also co­
chaired by Theodore Hazlett, Jr., president of the Mellon Charitable and 
Educational Trust. The commission included former Governor George 
Leader and Judge Woodslde, both of whom had been involved in earlier 
reform efforts (Wise 1984, 14-16). After reviewing preliminary reports 
from management consultants and academics, and hearing testimony 
from legislative leaders and staff, capitol-beat reporters, state organiza;. 

100 



tions like the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, and the League of 
Women Voters, the commission issued its 204 page report in January 1969 
(the year before the final CCSL report). The published report, titled To­
ward Tomorrow's Legislature, made 58 recommendations, all largely re­
flected in Rosenthal's summarized list and in Fineman's remarks. 

As he had done even before the commission issued its report, Fineman 
continued to enhance staff services, office space, salaries, and other fa­
cilities for members. He also moved forcefully to empower committees 
in the legislative process with staff, facilities, and a mandate to deliber­
ate. In this regard, he followed the advice (knowingly or unknowingly) 
given by Rosenthal in his 1971 essays on legislative reform where he 
recommended "some balance in the internal distribution of power" and 
suggested that "those legislatures, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
New York, where power is highly centralized, might devote more atten­
tion to strengthening committees" (Rosenthal 1971a, 81). Committee 
empowerment under Fineman was noticeable. Sidney Wise quotes "a 
longtime lobbyist" before the Commission on Legislative Modernization 
in 1968 as saying "the committee system functions more in name in Penn­
sylvania than it does in actuality," for "the caucus is the controlling body." 
He also quotes a legislative staffer in1971 commenting on the recent 
changes: "In the past few years, certain House committees have become 
much more powerful. ... They write their own bills [and] they could buck 
party leadership and get measures passed" (Wise 1971, 39-41). 

Fineman also championed efforts to m.anage better the time of mem­
bers - another goal of national and state reformers. The CCSL directly 
criticized Pennsylvania for time-management shortcomings in its 1971 
report (Bums 1971, 57-62 and 103; Commission on Legislative Modern­
ization 1969, 10 and 28-30). In 1975 Fineman introduced an innovative 
system that divided the legislative schedule into" committee weeks" and 
"floor weeks." The "committee weeks" provided time for fuller commit­
tee deliberation and hearings prior to floor votes and minimized mem­
ber / committee scheduling conflicts. The "floor weeks" were devoted to 
consideration of legislation by the House itself. In another innovation, 
Fineman changed committee assignment criteria to give newer mem­
bers opportunities to sit on more prestigious committees (Fineman 1976). 
Although these innovations received national attention, they did not all 
survivp intact after his sppakf'rship. Somp vestiges f'Xlst: the House st11l 
does not schedule floor action during weeks in which budget hearings 
are held by the Appropriations Committee, and newer members are still 
granted seats on key committees. 

Revitalizing committees and improving facilities for members did not, 
by anyone's estimation, diminish Fineman's power, which was at its 
height in the early 1970s. As Charles Davis of the NCSLL argued, a weak 

101 



institution would have "leaders in name only," while stronger, more pow­
erfullegislatures would convey that power on its leaders (Davis 1971, 
195-204). In this same vein, Speaker Fineman and other legislative lead­
ers moved forcefully in the 1970s to wrestle appropriations powers back 
from the executive branch. Pennsylvania took a national leadership role 
as ACIR, the NeSL, and others pushed to have state legislatures assert 
control over federal funds then being sent to the states under sole guber­
natorial control. Since 1961, appropriations acts in Pennsylvania had as­
serted the power of the legislature to appropriate federal funds and did 
so in general, all inclusive language. When federal funds hit 25% of the 
state budget in 1975, the legislature moved to appropriate all federal funds 
in program specific line items (Shapp v. Sloan 1978, 600). Democratic Gov­
ernor Milton Shapp denied that there was such legislative authority. In 
1976 the General Assembly, under Democratic controL passed Senate Bill 
1542 (Act 117 of 1976) with only one dissenting vote in the HOllSP. Thp 
legislature then overrode the Governor's veto by votes of 40-10 in the 
Senate and 169-22 in the House (History of Senate Bills and Resolutions 
1975-1976, A200). The low forbode the State Treasurer from expending 
any federal funds not specifically appropriated by the General Assem­
bly. Shapp challenged the law on constitutional grounds. The General 
Assembly intervened to join State Treasurer Grace Sloan as a respon­
dent. Justice Louis Manderino, the brother of the then House Democratic 
(Majority) Leader James Manderino, wrote the opinion of the State Su­
preme Court. Shapp lost his state appeal and the U.s. Supreme Court 
refused to hear his appeal on federal grounds. ACIR, which was refer­
enced in the Court's opinion, hailed the Pennsylvania case as a prpC'P­
dent-setting victory for legislative authority (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations 1985, 9 and 117-122; Shapp v. Sloan 1978, 603 
and 605-606). 

Successful Accommodation of Pennsylvania Traditions 

Sidney Wise (1971, 25) observed in that "there are few states in the 
nation where party caucuses are as important to the legislative process as 
they are in Pennsylvania." In Pennsylvania the party caucus largely con­
trols the committee system and the style and scheduling of floor debate. 
The state's tradition of strong parties tempered the legislature's response 
to reform recommendations. While reformers on state commissions and 
national conferences generally favored nonpartisan staffing, the modern­
ization pattern in Pennsylvania accommodated its traditions of strong 
parties and the informal, but entrenched, four caucus structure in the leg­
islature (Senate "D's and R'sll and House "D's and R's"). For example, 
the Michener Commission recommended that in addition to majority and 
minority committee staffing, bipartisan staff should be added for con-

102 



stituency service and press relations. (the CCSL recommended nonparti­
san staff for almost everything.) Realizing that press releases describing 
member and party positions on bills are inherently political, the legisla­
ture decided to create caucus-based mformatIOn offIces. Constituency 
service was addressed during Fineman's tenure and shortly thereafter by 
adding clerical staff for individual members in Harrisburg and in home 
district offices. Research assistance to members in the House was pro­
vided by central caucus staff controlled by leadership or by L.O.R.L. 

Fineman's remarks and the PPSA panel discussion shed additional 
light on the development of the partisan staffing structure. Speaking 
mostly of the earlier years, Fineman noted that even though he did not 
always have the active participation of other leaders in his reform ef­
forts, he never encountered active opposition. Fineman would often be­
gin by making a unilateral move to staff the House Democratic caucus or 
committees and then invite the other caucuses to join in equal measure, 
which they gladly did. This pattern of funding caucus staff and services 
equally was later formalized in the appropriations process where legis­
lative staff accounts were set up to provide equal funding to both the 
minority and majority caucuses of each house, guaranteeing equal fund­
ing for policy, research, and member support staff (Governor's Execu­
tive Budget 2003-2004, E40.1-40.7). House Republicans, also proactive, 
commissioned the Pennsylvania Economy League to study the issue of 
staff support for the caucus in 1973 (Wise 1984, 16). This caucus-based 
system also had the advantage of providing job security for staff, which 
protected them from swings in legislative control. 

While Fineman was known as a tough partisan leader, he was not nec­
essarily opposed to nonpartisan staff services such as L.O.R.L., which he 
set up as a non-partisan research agency to serve members. In the Fineman 
era and after, however, questions of whether to adopt a partisan staff sup­
port structure or add nonpartisan staff services generally were resolved 
in favor of adding partisan staff. By the end of the 1977-78 legislative 
session, the average Senator had several staff persons working in Harris­
burg and in the district. House freshmen had at least a shared secretary in 
Harrisburg and funding for at least a part-time home office staffer. The 
Michener Commission reported that in 1968 there were 221 Senate em­
ployees and 311 in the House, not including joint service agencies (Wise 
1984, 50). According to historian Paul Beers, 127 of those staff positions 
were created the previous year (Beers 1980, 341). By 1983 the Senate em­
ployed 620 people and the House employed 1,000 (Wise 1994, 50). 

Pennsylvania also made an accommodation between the "small is 
beautiful" approach of many reformers, as applied to the number of stand­
ing committees, and the political reality of the legislative environment. 
The Michener Commission, later supported by the CCSC recommenrlerl 

103 



that the House and Senate establish 13 parallel committees, a mammoth 
political undertaking especially for the House (Bums 1971,291). While 
the commission was completing its report, Speaker Fineman reduced the 
number of substantive committees in the House from 33 to 21 plus Eth­
ics, Rules, and other "housekeeping" and internal oversight committees 
with no original jurisdiction over bills. He did so by consolidating com­
mittees with similar jurisdictions and associated interests. Five commit­
tees dealing with local government matters were combined into two. 
Three transportation-related committees were merged into one. In the 
Senate, 19 standing committees existed, plus Executive Nominations and 
Rules. The number of committees in the Senate had been stable for de­
cades and there was little sentiment for further reduction (Cassidy and 
King 1999,4; Wise 1971,39-45). Fineman and the House Democratic lead­
ership issued a position paper in 1969 recommending further reductions 
tu 15 cummittees beginning with the 1971 session. That reduction did 
not occur, presumably because of opposition from committee chairman 
and legislators hoping to become chairmen, an obvious tactical problem 
recognized by Rosenthal (1971c, 174). 

Overall the Michener Commission's recommendations found wide 
acceptance in the legislature. Wrote Sidney Wise (1984, 15-16): 

suffice it to say that the General Assembly reacted favorably to 
most of the proposals and out of them emerged an agenda for a 
decade. Even more important, the commission created among 
the members of the legislature a realization that the old ways 
were simply inadequate at a time when expectations for legisla­
tive effectiveness were increasing so dramatically - in Pennsyl­
vania and throughout the Nation. 

After Fineman 

At the time of Fineman's departure in 1977, the legislature was well 
on it way in cTPatine cal]cl1s-haseo staff Stlpport for members, commit­

tees, and caucus leadership. The legislature provided funds for caucus­
based district offices in the 1978-79 budget. The last bastions of exclusive 
majority control of chamber-wide services were the offices of the Chief 
'Clerk and Controller of the House and the Secretary of the Senate, which 
had responsibility for payrolls, legislative expenses, and other official 
record keeping (Wise 1~71, 22-25). The unprecedented growth of staff, 
facilities, and member expenses superimposed on an antiquated payroll 
system, in part set by statute and a less than professional management 
system, was a prescription for disaster. 

In April 1978, the House passed House Resolution 122, sponsored by 
Speaker K. Leroy lrvis, Republican Leader Robert Butera, Democratic 
Leader James Manderino, and other leaders. It established a commission 

104 



"to make a comprehensive and impartial study of the organization and 
operation of the Pennsylvania House." The commission was chaired by 
former House member John Pittenger who had been a former Secretary 
of the Pennsylvania Department of Education and would later become 
Dean of the Rutgers School of Law. Adding urgency to the commission's 
dp1ihprMl0ns, thp Philadelphia l11qui1'er published in the summer of 1978 a 
multi-part expose, titled "Pennsylvania's Assembly: How it is out of con­
tro!," attacking the loose management and personnel practices of the 
House and Senate (Wise 1984, 17). 

The commission released its recommendations after the end of the 
legislative session in December 1978. Despite a change in control of the 
House from Democratic to Republican, the recommendations were passed 
unanimously in House Bill 777 (Act 104 of 1979) jointly sponsored by 
Speaker H. Jack Seltzer, the new Republican Floor Leader Matthew Ryan, 
and Democratic Floor Leader K. Leroy Irvis (History of House Bills and 
Resolutions 1979-1980, A97). The legislation created the Bi-partisan Man­
agement Committee (BMC) to oversee House operations induding pay­
rolls, expense accounts, purchasing, personnel, and services. It was also 
empowered to keep the official records of the House. 

The BMC is comprised of the Speaker, the majority and minority lead­
ers, and the majority and minority whips. All decisions of the committee 
require four votes, thereby ensuring some measure of bipartisan agree­
ment. Employees of the BMC, induding those of the Chief Clerk (called 
"Core employees" to distinguish them from caucus staff), were made 
officially non-partisan. When donkeys and elephants were banned from 
offices, some employees adopted the "Pink Panther" as their mascot. 

At the initiative of Senate President Pro Tempore Henry Hager, simi­
lar reforms were unanimously adopted in Senate Bill 7 of 1981 (Act 90 of 
1981) (History of Senate Bills and Resolutions 1981-1982, A2). The Senate 
Committee on Management Operations (COMO) created by the act dif­
fered from its House counterpart in that it requires only a simple major­
ity vote to take an action (Wise 1984, 16-20). As Senate (Republican) mi­
nority leader, Hager later led efforts to strengthen the legislature's over­
sight of adn1inistrative regulations w.ilh the passage of the Ilidepellllent 
Regulatory Review Act in 1982 (Wise 1984, 86-99). 

Continuing Bipartisan Support 

William Keefe (1971, 189-91) once warned that partisanship could be 
an obstacle to reform. In Pennsylvania, Herb Fineman turned partisan­
ship into an ally of reform. Despite Pennsylvania's reputation for stiff 
partisanship, the reform movement was supported by both parties 
throughout the Pf'rioo and aftprwaro. Tn part thp "opal" to fllno eIJllCll1y 
each caucus staff worked in favor of capacity building because the mi-

105 



nority party was given any new capacity enjoyed by the majority party 
and therefore did not oppose the reforms. Perhaps the bipartisan coop­
eration reflected the political realities of the time. In the politically uncer­
tain 19605, 19705, and 19805, all four caucuses would find themselves in 
the minority at some point (Kennedy 1999, 6-8) 

In the mid-1970s, California State Senate Republican Whip H.L. "Bill" 
Richardson (who served in the Califor;nia Senate from 1966 to 1988) lam­
pooned the development of the professional legislature on partisan and 
ideological groundS in his book, W'hat Makes You Think We Read the Bills? 
(Richardson 1978, 90-95) No such opposition could be seen in Pemlsyl­
vania. Matthew Ryan, who was House Republican Whip throughout most 
of the 1970s, Republican Leader in 1978, and Speaker on and of between 
1981 and 2003, consolidated existing reforms and endorsed further im­
provements in member services. Throughout his tenure he never wa­
vered in his support for institutional modernization. 

Some academic criticism of Pennsylvania's reforms surfaced in Charles 
Greenawalt and Terry Madonna's critique liThe Pennsylvania General 
Assembly," suggestively subtitled "The House of III Repute Revisited" 
(Greenawalt and Madonna 1992). It is safe to say, however, that during 
the 1965-1980 period of reform, there was remarkably little internal or 
external opposition to modernization per se in Pennsylvania (excepting 
the perennial press stories decrying any increase in legislative payor 
"perks," actual or perceived). 

In the years since 1980, other states' modernization reforms have been 
challenged and in some' cases rolled back. Even the flagship of the re­
form movement, the California legislature, was repeatedly humbled by 
ballot initiatives in the 19805 and 1990s that reduced the power of the 
Speaker, eliminated the legislative pension system, established term lim­
its, and reduced the size of the legislative staff (Rosenthal 1998, 76-80). 
But there have been no serious attempts to roll back the accomplishments 
of the modernization movement in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania, which 
does not permit ballot initiatives, has retained the internal bipartisan 
commitment to upgrade legislative capacity, most recently in the areas 
of computerization and constituency and media outreach. 

Since Fineman's departure, Pennsylvania's budget and the Federal 
government's share of it continues to grow. The FY 2003-04 General Fund 
Budget as proposed by Governor Edward Rendell is over $20 billion, 
exclusive of federal funds totaling about $13 billion (Governor's Execu­
tive Budget 20ni-2004, CR-9, Ci2).1 The nllmher of ('ommittee~ ha~ crept 
up in the House. Today there are 21 committees plus Rules in the Senate, 
and 23 not necessarily parallel committees plus Rules in the House (Penn­
sylvania Manual 2001-2002, sec.3-37 and 3-184). Legislative staffing and 
facility improvements have continued. The House now employs about 

106 



1600 people, over 80% of whom work for the caucuses as leadership staff, 
committee staff, member staff in Harrisburg and in the districts, or in 
central research, member services, legislative media relations offices, com~ 
puter support, graphics, newsletter production, printing, and mail shops. 
The same services are provided for the 50 Senators by just under 1,000 
staffers.2 The Capitol East Wing was built in the 1980s during the 
Thornburgh Administration to house legislative offices, committee hear­
ing rooms, visitor facilities, and a media center. The Legislature also ex­
panded into three adjoining buildings in the Capitol Complex. The old 
executive office building has been renamed "The Speaker Matthew Ryan 
Building," and the old South Office building, which the legislature shares 
with the courts, has been named after Speaker K. Leroy Irvis. Most re­
cently the legislature has taken over the first two floors of the old North 
Office Building with the expectation that it will someday carry the name 
of a prominent state Senator. 

On the PPSA panel, Alan Rosenthal reiterated the benchmarks he has 
used to judge legislative capacity and the success of the reform move­
Illt!nt; tht! legislature lHU::;t uparlklpale vjguruu::,ly in publlc policy mak­
ing," "review and evaluate the conduct of the administration and the 
effects of state programs," and "represent and help out constituents" 
(Hertzberg and Rosenthal 1971, vii). According to Rosenthal, the reforms 
of the 1960s and 1970s clearly have increased the ability of the nation's 
legislatures to affect public policy, conduct fiscal and programmatic over­
sight of the executive branch, and reach out to and represent constitu­
ents. He also indicated that /I capacity is no longer an issue in most states" 
(Pennsylvania Political Science Association 2003). Furthermore, the re­
forms of the 19605 and 1970s have made legislatures generally more rep­
resentative, open, internally democratic, and responsive (Rosenthal et a1 
2003, 197-198). 

The evidence is equally clear that Herb Fineman's "legacy of mod­
ernization" has had the same effect of empowering the legislature he 
served. In 1994 the members of the House of Representatives assembled 
in observance of the unveiling of Fineman's portrait as Speaker. K. Leroy 
]rvis, who succeeded Fineman as Speaker, told the assembled members 
(only 20 of whom had actually served during Fineman's tenure): "You 
are the voice of the people, and the man who gave you the power of that 
voice is former Speaker Herbert Fineman" (Pennsylvania House Journal 
1994). Although no building in the Capitol Complex carries Fineman's 
name, his vision of a modern, professional legislature is imprinted on 
the institution itself. 

107 



Notes 

1. The General Fund encompasses most government functions but does 
not include other smaller dedicated funds, of which the Motor License Fund is 
the largest. In FY 2003-04 the Motor License Fund proposes to spend $2.9 bil­
lion in state and $1.5 billion in federal funds (Governor's Executive Budget 
2003-2004, C32). 

2. Data provided by the Chief Clerk of the House and the Chief Clerk of 
the Senate, June 2003. 

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Beers, Paul. 1980. Pennsylvania Politics Yesterday and Today: The Tolerable Accommo­
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Burns, John. 1971. The Sometimes Governments: A Critical Study of the 50 American 
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Cassidy, Michael, and Michael King. 1999. /I Are We Really Doing Less With More? 
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Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. 1971. State Legislatures: An Evaluation 
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Herzberg, Donald G., and Alan Rosenthal. 1971. Strel1gthenin8 the States: Essays 
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