






































 ó 


T .... zJJo·' -;Jnio:r.:::; and A1"nerican Eledic:u~: 
The Politics of Voter IVlobilization 
in the 2000 Presidential Election 

Donald W. Beachler 
ithaca College 

In 2000, labor unions attempted to enhance their polii"ical iJ~t7uence by il1-
creasing voter tumour mnong union manbers ill support of Al Gore. This strat­
egy'l,vas thought to be especially effective in a polity where voter participation is 
so low. Labor'a political cfforta helped Core to a populm' vote victory, but the 
union political strategy failed because of the dynamics oj the Electoral College 
and low union density in many regions of the United States. 

The Politics of Low Turnout Elections 

As is well known, American politics is characterized by very low rates 
of voter participation. The causes of low voter turnout have been fiercely, 
if inconclusively, debated (Piven and Cloward 1988; Putnam 2001). Less 
attention has been paid to the political consequences of elections in which 
so few voters participate. 

Because of the very low rates of voter pa.rticipation, relatively smnll 
segments of the population can have great influence over elections if they 
vote at a high rate. In presidential elections turnout has ranged from 
49% to 55% of the eligible electorate in recent years. Off year national 
elections have drawn about 36% to 39% of the voting age population to 
the polls. In recent elections, the popular vote for the U.S. House of Rep­
resentatives has been divided near1y evenly between the two parties 
(Rimmerman 2001). Republicans have retained control of the House since 
1994 by winning 1 % to 2% more of the popular vote than the Democrats 
received. Because of low voter turnout, the votes of .36% to .72% of the 
eligible electorate can be vital in determining the outcome of elections. 

Because small increases in voter participation can make a substantial 
difference in election results, interest groups have greater incentives to 
mobilize their members into the electorate in a poBty characterized by 
very low rates of voter participation. This article presents a case study of 
organized labor, an interest group that has been losing membership and 
political influence for decades. In recent elections, labor has attempted 
to compensate for its declining ranks by mobilizing its members to go to 
the polls in greater numbers and to increase the percentage of union 
members voting for union endorsed candidates. The article investigates 
labor's attempt to mobilize its members in a demobilized polity. 

23 



The Politics of a Declining Union Movement 

The decline of organized labor in the United States has been much 
documented and thoroughly debated. The loss of millions of jobs in 
unionized industries cost organized labor millions of members. Ameri­
can labor law, which is hostile to union organizing, has exacerbated such 
losses, and they have been compounded further by the reluctance of com­
placent unions to commit resources to organizing new members. It is 
not possible for this article to delve deeply into the debate over the causes 
of the decline of labor unions in the United States (Goldfield 1987; 
Geoghegan 1991). 

It is important to note that in the 1950s, labor unions represented about 
one-third of the American workforce. By 2000, roughly 13% of U.s. work­
ers belonged to labor unions. Because of a surge in unionization of pub­
lic employees during the last three decades of the twentieth century, by 
2000 just over 9% of private sector workers belonged to labor unions 
(Greenhouse 2001). 

Labor suffered a number of legislative defeats even during the osten­
Sibly friendly Clinton admmistratIon. A filibuster in a JJemocratic con­
trolled Senate defeated legislation banning striker replacement. The AFL­
CIO lost bitter battles in opposition to the Clinton administration over 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and Perma­
nent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000. While unions 
did have some political successes during the Clinton administration, they 
were clearly perceived to be a declining political force (Heberlig 1999). 

Labor was dealt a major political blow when Republicans won ma­
jorities in both houses of Congress in the 1994 elec lions. MallY Ul llUll 

members were disaffected by the Clinton administration's support of 
the NAFTA agreement and the president's embrace of gun control mea­
sures (Reich 1998). Voters from union households constituted just 14% 
of the electorate. The low turnout of union and other blue-collar work­
ers was one reason for the Republicans' historic victory in 1994. 

By the 1990s, the Republican Party was much more hostile to labor 
unions than it had been in the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, 
Nixon, and Ford. President Nixon, for example, believed that the social 
conservatism and nationalism of many union members would lead them 
to support him as he constructed a silent majority of Americans who 
objected to the cultural and socialliberalisrn of elements wllhin lhe Dt:UlU­

cratic party. Nixon did not support the desire of unions for changes in 
American labor law that would make union organizing easier, but he 
was prepared to accept the status quo in American labor relations in 
pursuit of his alliance with union members (Safire 1975; Fry-mer and 
Skrentny 1998). 

24 



In the 1980s, the Reagan administration was distinctly hostile to the 
interests of organized labor, signaling a shift in Republican attitudes to­
ward labor. The l\.eagan administration had an ideological anti-union­
ism that brought a missionary zeal to union busting. Drav,Ting support 
from the conservative Sunbelt regions of the country, Reagan's election 
signaled a distinctly hostile attitude toward union labor (Gross 1995). 

A strongly anti-labor faction dominated the Republican Party that as­
sumed control of the House of Representatives and Senate in January of 
1995. The Republicans wished to deprive unions of their political funds 
by passing "paycheck protection" legislation that would have made it dif­
ficult for unions to raise money to spend in political campaigns. The GOP 
also attempted to lobby the NLRB to restrict what it perceived as the pro­
union bent of the NLRB under the appointees of Bill Clinton (Dark 1999). 

In 1995 John Sweeney, president of the Service Employees Interna­
tional Union (SEIU), mounted an insurgent campaign that ousted AFL­
CIa president Lane Kirkland. Sweeney's challenge was based on the 
notion that labor must aggressively organize new members, especially 
service workers, to reverse the decades long decline in membership that 
organized labor had experienced. Sweeney also argued that labor must 
find new ways to expand its political influence. In pursuit of his goals, 
Sweeney aggre~~ively sought tu Llirect uniun fUIlIi::; tuwaru urgani:dng 
efforts, to expand labor's alliances with progressive interest groups, and 
to inject union funds into campaigns in an effort to undo the damage 
done in the 1994 elections (Sweeney 1996). 

Faced with a hostile Republican Congress, unions attempted to revive 
their political influence in the 1996 election with a two-pronged approach. 
Labor spent $25 million on an independent expenditure campaign of 
media ads that attacked selected Republican representatives for advanc­
ing a radical right wing agenda (Heberlig 1999). In 1996, labor also ex­
panded its efforts to mobilize and educate its own members about candi­
dates and issues. In the closing weeks of the 1996 campaign, the Repub­
lican Party respundeLl with all $8 milliuIl uullar dU verti::;ing campaign 
that condemned the political efforts of "union bosses" (Hershey 1997). 

The renewed electoral efforts of unions met with mixed success. Re­
publicans retained control of the House of Representatives, but labor's 
efforts were credited with defeating several Republican incumbents. 
Twelve of the 24 Republican freshmen targeted by the AFL-CIO lost their 
reelection bids in 1996. Congressional elections scholar Gary Jacobson 
estimated that without the independent expenditures campaign of orga­
nized labor only two of the 24 would have been defeated (Jacobson 1997; 
Jacobson 1999). Union voter turnout increased from 19% to 23% even 
though there was a sharp decrease in the rate of voter participation in 
the electorate as a whole. 

25 



The percentage of union household voters who supported Bill Clinton 
in his successful reelection effort increased slightly from 55% in 1992 to 
59% in 1996 (New York Times, 2000). The AFL-CIO also believed that its 
ads attacking the Republican Congressional agenda were partially re­
sponsible for the moderation in the agenda of the 104th Congress, which 
increased the minimum wage, enacted a provision facilitating health in­
surance portability, and reversed cuts to Medicare and education. 

Labor unions were given considerable credit for the Democrats' sur­
prise showmg in the 1998 congressional elections. With the exception at 
1934, the party of the president had lost House seats in every off-year 
election in the twentieth century. The president's party has often suf­
fered exceptionally large losses in the sixth year of a president's term. In 
1998, Democrats were further burdened with a presidential scandal that 
would shortly lead to the impeachment of President Bill Clinton. De­
spite predictions of political disaster, the Democrats held their 4:5 Senate 
seats and gained five seats ih the House of Representatives. Labor fo­
cused on mobilizing its members to vote, and the percentage of the elec­
torate that resided in a union household increased from 14% in 1994 to 
22%. in 1998 (Heberlig 1999). Sixty-four percent of the union electorate 
reported voting for the Democratic candidate for the U.S. House of Rep­
resentatives as opposed to 60% in 1994 (New York Times 1998; Heberlig 
1999). The marginal improvement in the vote of union members for Demo­
cratic House candidates and the substantial improvement in voter turn­
out among unionists and their families gave labor reason to hope that it 
could be even more successful in 2000. 

2000: Labor Attempts to Elect Al Gore 

The AFL-CIO endorsed Al Gore in the fall of 1999. The fecleration's 
support· for Gore came at a time when he appeared vulnerable to the 
challenge of former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley. Labor provided 
vital assistance to Gore as he extinguished Bradley's quest for the nomi­
nation with victories in the Iowa caucus and the New Hampshire pri­
mary. During the nominating process, some unions, most notably the 
Teamsters and the United Auto Workers, withheld support from Gore 
because of their disagreement with the trade policies of the Clinton ad­
ministration~ Even after Gore had secured the Democratic nomination, 
some labor leaders publicly flirted with the notion of remaininls neutral 
or endorsing Ralph Nader's Green Party candidacy (Corn 2000). After 
the Democratic convention in August 2000, however, virtually the entire 
labor movement united to support Gore's quest for the preSidency 
(Beachler 2001). 

26 



Table 1 

Labor Union Household Voting in Presidential Elections, 1992-2000 
Presidential Vote of Union Members 

% of electorate 
residing in Democratic 

union households Democrat Republican Other* Margin** 

1992 19 55 24 21 31 

1996 23 59 30 9 29 

2000 26 59 37 3 22 

* The other vote was for Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996 and primarily for 
Ralph Nader in 2000. 
** The Democratic margin was calculated by subtracting the Republican 
percentage of the union household vote from the Democratic percentage of 
the union household vote. 

Table 1 shows the voting patterns.of union household members in the 
presidential elections of 1992,199(1, and 2000. It also lists the percentage 
of the electorate residing in union households. The percentage of the 
electorate residing in union households increased substantially in each 
of the three elections examined in Table 1. The focus on increasing labor's 
share of the total electorate was very successful as union turnout increased 
from 19% in 1992, to 23% in 1996, and 26% in 2000. 

Table 1 illustrates that, while labor union members supported Demo­
cratic presidential candidates by large margins, unions cannot be said to 
have had unqualified political success in convincing their members to 
vote for the Democratic nominee. The historical pattern of many union 
household residents voting for the Republican nominee persisted dur­
ing this period. 

In 1992, Bill Clinton took 55% of the union household vote to 24% for 
Bush and 21 % for Perot. In 1996, Perot was a weakened political force 
and received just ~% of the union household vote, while Clinton took 
59% and Dole won 30%. Clinton's margin among union voters was re­
duced by 2% from 1992 to 1996. 

In 2000, labor made a major political effort on behalf of Al Gore's bid 
for the presidency. In the 2000 election, third party candidates were less 
of a factor. Despite a platform that included opposition to trade treaties 
strongly opposed by many unions, and a call for labor law reform that 
would facilitate union organizing, Ralph Nader scored only 3% of the 
vole among union households. Nader's showing among the union elec­
torate was only marginally better than his percentage among non-union 
voters. 

27 



Al Gore won the same 59% of the union electorate that Clinton re­
ceived in 1996. George W. Bush improved on Bob Dole's performance 
among union voters and received 37% of the union vote. In three con­
secutive presidential elections the Democratic margin over the Republi­
can candidate among union voters has actually declined. The Demo­
cratic advantage over the Republican candida~e declined by 9% from 
1992 to 2000. Put another way, in 1992, the percentage of the electorate 
that was from a union household and voting Democratic was 10.45% 
and the percentage of the electorate that was union household and vot­
ing Republican was 4.56%. In 2000, 15.34% of the electorate was union 
household and voting Democratic, while 9.62% of the electorate was union 
household and voting Republican. From 1992 to 2000, Republicans actu­
ally gained support among the union electorate at a faster rate than Demo­
crats. 

By increasing the union percentage of the electorate in 1996 and again 
in 2000, the labor movement clearly aided the Democratic presidential 
nominee. The impact of the labor vote would be even greater if the unions 
were able to persuade more of their members to vote for the union en­
dorsed candidates. It should be noted that the inability to turn out a 
higher percentage of voters for the Democratic candidate is not a new 
problem for unions. Gore's 59% of the vote was exceeded by th4? Demo­
cratic nominee in only three presidential elections since World War II: 
1948, 1960, and 1964 (Leroy 1990). 

Table 2 demonstrates that labor was of vital importance to Gore's ef­
forts in several key states. Two of the most heavily contested \;tates in 
the election were Pennsylvania and Michigan. While unions made a major 
effort to mobilize their members for the Democratic ticket, in both battle­
ground states, they faced difficult challenges. The Clinton-Gore 
campaign's embrace of trade policies that imperiled manufacturing jobs 
dampened enthusiasm for the Democratic ticket among some union 
members and union officials (Greenhouse 2000a). 

The Bush campaign believed that because there were no real differ­
ences between Bush and Gore on the trade issues that were so important 
to autoworkers, steelworkers, and other workers subject to international 
wage competition, the Republicans could appeal to the conservative so­
cial values of some union workers (Dreazen 2000). Many union mem­
bers have conservative views on social issues. For example, in 199434% 
of union voters in Pennsylvania supported the political goals of the Na­
tional Rifle Association (NRA) (Clark and Masters 2001). In 2000, the 
NRA countered labor's efforts among blue-collar workers, by distribut­
ing literature arguing that Gore was a threat to the rights of gun owners 
(Eilperin and Edsall 2000). In response to the NRA campaign, labor dis­
tributed literature in several battleground states that asserted 1/ Al Gore 

28 



Table 2 

Labor Voting in Selected States in 2000 Presidential Election 

% of electorate Union Non-Union 
residing in union households households 

households Democrat Republican Democrat Republican 

Michigan 43 62 35 42 55 

Penn~ylvania 30 65 32 44 54 

Wisconsin 32 55 39 44 52 

Minnesota 30 56 35 44 50 

Washington 27 60 33 46 47 

Oregon 22 58 38 43 51 

California 28 5.9 35 50 46 

Illinois 33 62 36 52 46 

New Jersey 32 64 32 52 44 

Maryland 24 65 33 54 42 

Nevada 33 51 43 42 53 

West Virginia 33 51 47 43 54 

Doesn't Want to Take Away Your Gun. But George W. Bush Wants to 
Take Away Your Union" (Greenhouse 2000b). 

The principal focus of the union effort in several key states was an 
intensive get out the vote effort that emphasized mobilizing union mem­
bers and their families to come to the polls and vote for Gore. In 2000, 
labor expanded its efforts to build voter turnout by having union activ­
ists contact other members of their unions. In 1998, when labor used 
what AFL-CIO political director Steve Rosenthal called, liThe Program," 
75% of the union members contacted voted for the union endorsed can­
didate. In 2000, more than 500 organizers were trained at AFL-CIO head­
quarters and dispatched to 25 states targeted by the AFL-CIO. Speaking 
of the AFL-CIG' s massive get out the vote effort, Rosenthal claimed, "Ba­
sically, it is a throwback to what we were doing in the 1930's and 40's 
when we were at our peak. It is a culture change" (Dreyfus 2000). 

Table 2 demonstrates that labor was able to meet its goals in Michigan 
and Pennsylvania. In Michigan, 21.5% of the workforce belonged to 
unions in 1999. In the 2000 presidential election, 4:3% of Michigan voters 
resided in a union household. Twenty-seven percent of the voters in 

29 



Michigan Wf're actual union mf'mbf'fs. V\Thf'n Wf' consiof'r thM not f'very 
member of the electorate is employed, it is obvious that unions turned 
out their members in numbers far greater than their percentage of the 
voting age population. It is not possible to determine precisely what 
portion of the eligible electorate was in the workforce and what percent­
age of union members were employed in November 2000. Still it is clear 
that union over-representation was quite substantial. 

Not only did labor turn out its members in Michigan, but they voted 
for Gore by a 64% to 32% margin. Gore also won 59% of the vote among 
those voters who resided in a union household, but were not themselves 
union members. The strong labor turnout in a state where the most re­
cent U AW contract with thp rl11tomohilp m::Jnufacturers made election 
day a holiday, enabled Gore to win Michigan by a margin of 5%. 

In the battleground state of Pennsylvania, labor started with a some­
what smaller base, as 17.4°/;'" of Pennsylvania workers belonged to unions 
in 1999. Residents of labor union households 'accounted for 30% of the 
electorate, with union members themselves constituting 17% of the vot­
ers. vVhile the union voter turnout equaled the percentage of the labor 
force that belongs to unions/ it is again important to recall that not all of 
the electorate is employed. In Pennsylvania/ 19% of the voters were over 
the age of 65 and another 9% were between 60 and 64 years of age. Pre­
sumably a significant portion of this population was not employed. While 
the data unfortunately do not permit a predsf' c::Jkll1anon of thp df'3rf'f' 
that labor was over-represented in the electorate in Pennsylvania, it is 
clear that union members turned out at a higher rate than all eligible 
voters. 

In Pennsylvania/ union members voted for Gore by a margin of 67% 
to 29%. Those who resided in a union household/ but were not union 
members themselves supported Gore by a 62% to 36% margin. Labor's 
vigorous efforts in Pennsylvania delivered another key state to Gore. 

Table 2 also indicates that unions were crucial to Gore's victories in 
Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington. In each state, Gore won 
the union household -vote, but lost the non-union household vote. It is 
also reasonable to assume that union voters wl"rp oVl"r-rl"prf'sf'ntf'd in 
the electorate in each of these states. 

Labor was clearly harmed by the Electoral College system because in 
some states with a huge union turnout, Gore won by large margins. For 
example, in New York, 39% of the electorate reported living in union 
households. Gore won the union electorate by 65% to 30% and also cap­
tured the non-union electorate by a 57% to 39% margin. Union voters 
helped Gore to his remarkable 1.7 million popular vote win in New York. 
(Gore's 60% to 35% victory in New York was slightly better than Bush's 
59% to 38% win in Texas). In New Jersey, 32% of the electorate resided in 

30 



union households and these voters bv a tv,iO to one margin. 
• u 

The Democratic candidate also carried the non-union electorate by 8%. 
Similar pattems occurred in California, Maryland: and minois where Gore 
won both the union and non-union electorates. Core's very strong shmv­
ing in union states meant that he won by very large popular vote mar­
gins in these states. Gore's substantial margins of victory in these states 
enabled him to win the popular vote nationally. Unfortunately for Gore, 
and. fur labor uniuns in the United States, the candidate with the most 
popular votes does not necessarily win the election. 

The Regional Structure of the American Labor Movement 

Labor's ability to assist Gore was further restricted by the geographi­
cal disparities in labor union density in the United States. Table 3 lists 
the states won by Gore and Bush and the percentage of the work force in 
each state that belonged to labor unions. Gore won only two states, Ver­
mont and New Mexico, where the union density percentage was signifi­
cantly below the national average of 13.9%. Vermont is an unusual state 
that elects Congress' only avowed democratic SOCialist, and has moved 
leftward as a result of population influx (Barone and Cohen 2002). In 
New Mexico, an electorate that was 32% Latino aids Democrats. In 2000, 
Gore won 66% of this Latino vote as he eked out a 500 vote victory over 
Bush in New Mexico. Gore also won the District of Columbia, which has 
a union density of 13.1 %, but the huge black electorate in the nation's 
capital aided him there. 

Bush was able to win several states where the union percentage was 
above the national Bush won several high union density west­
ern states (Alaska, Nevada, and Montana), where issues such as land use 
and gun control have alienated a majority of voters from the national 
Democratic Party (Barone and Cohen 2002). Bush also won in some high 
union density states such as Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri, which are per­
ceived to be more culturally conservative than the Northeast and West 
Coast states where Gore ran well. 

Finally, Bush won West Virginia, one of the most Democratic states in 
the country in recent presidential elections. Prior to 2000, West Virginia 
had voted Democratic in eight of ten presidential elecbons, a record of 
Democratic fealty exceeded only by Minnesota. Bush's win in vVest Vir­
ginia illustrates the difficulties unions have in maintaining a coalition 
with environmentalists and liberal social issue groups in the Democratic 
party. In West Virginia, the union vote was essentially a dead heat. Union 
vut~rti were turn~d off by Gore's environmentalism, which they feared 
would cost union mining jobs. West Virginia is also a morally conserva­
tive state wher~ there is strong opposition to gun control. Furthermore, 

31 



Table 3 

Gore and Bush States by Union Density 

States Won Union 
by Bush Density 

Alaska 20.4 

Nevada 19.5 

Ohio 17.9 

IndIana 15.7 

Missouri 15.3 
Montana 15.3 

West Virginia 15.2 

Kentucky 11.6 
Alabama 11.0 

New Hampshire 10.6 

Kansas 9.7 

Colorado 9.4 
North Dakota 9.3 
Idaho 9.2 
Wyoming 1.).1 

Nebraska 8.8 

Oklahoma 8.1 

Louisiana 8.1 

Tennessee 7 . .5 

Arkansas 7.5 

Georgia 7.3 
Arizona 6.7 

Virginia 6.6 
Florida 6.5 

Utah 6.4 

Mississippi 6.2 

Texas 6.0 
South Dakota 6.0 

South Carolina 3.5 

North Carolina :1.2 

32 

States Won Union 
by Gore Density 

New York 25.3 

Hawaii 23.2 

Michigan 21.5 

Washington 20.7 

New Jersey 20.5 
Minl1esola 19.3 

Connecticut 18.2 

Wisconsin 18.1 
Illinois 18.0 

Rhode Island 17.4 

Pennsylvania 17.4 

Maine 17.1 
California 16.6 

Massachusetts 16.2 
Oregon 15.2 

Maryland 15.0 

Iowa 13.8 

Delaware 13.8 
District of Columbia 13.2 

New Mexico 9.9 

Vermont 9.7 

.. National percentage of 
union workers = 13.9% 

**Gore states' average union 
density = 17.1% 

***Bush states' average union 
density = 9.91% 



steel jobs in northern \-Vest Virginia were threatened b"y the free trade 
policies of the Clinton administration. Given the demographies and po­
litical climate in V\Test Virginia in 2000, Bush was able to split the union 
vote, carry the state, and in effect, win the presidency (Barone and Cohen 
2002). 

Bush mainly carried states where the union density was below the 
national avcragc. Thc states Bush won had an Llvcrage union density of 
9.9%. Average union membership in Bush states was about 60°,{) of the 
average union density of 17.1 % in states won by Gore. If labor is to have 
more influence in presidential politics, it will need to expand its mem­
bership in states where a disproportionate share of the workforce is un­
organized. The significance of unions in state electoral outcomes in the 
2000 presidential election is evident in Table 4. 

Table 4 
Union Density and Race in the 2000 Presidential Elections 

Gore Popular Vote by State 

Black Population 

Latino Population 

Union Density 

Constant 

Adjusted R2 

.336** 

.106 

.372 

.188 

.116 

.194 

.962*** 

.180 

.622 

28.13~** 

3.128 

.384 

The numbers in each variable column are the regression coefficient, 
standard error and the standardized regression coefficient. 

** si):Jnificant at .01 level 

*** significant at .001 level 

Table 4 is a regression that seeks to measure union influence on state 
results in the 2000 presidential election. The dependent variable in the 
regression was the percentage ot the popular vote received by AJ Gore in 
each state. To control for racial differences in voting, which are very 
significant in the United States, independent variables were included for 

33 



the African-American and Latino percentages of each state's population. 
The third independent variable was the percentage of the state's labor 
force that belonged to a labor union. 

The results of the regression presented in Table 4 indicate that union 
density is an important predictor of a state's percentage voting for Gore. 
While African-American population was positively corrdated with the 
vote for Gore, it is a large union workforce lhal conlribuled IIlU::;t ::;jg-nifi­
cantly to a larger vote for Gore. When we control for the impact of race 
in each state, union density was a strong positive predictor of support 
for Gore in the 200U election. 

The regression in Table 4 demonstrates the price that labor has paid 
for being a highly regionalized factor in American politics. Based on the 
2000 election, it is clear that an expanded union membership would ben­
efit the Democratic Party. Table 4 also demonstrates that if labor wishes 
to hp ;m pven stronger influence in presidential politics, it must expand 
union density in at least some states where it has been weak. 

Conclusion 

In many senses, labor's massive voter mobilization strategy was a 
success. It provided Al Gore with a popular vote victory in the nation. 
Unions helped Gore win the crucial battleground states of Michigan and 
Pennsylvania and were also essential to Gore's wins in 'Minnesota, Wis­
consin, Washington, and Oregon. 

Labor's turnout strategy was limited by several factors. First there is 
a rather seVPTP 3PogrPlphicailimit to labor's ability to influence the re­
sults of presidential elections. Labor's influence is, for the most part, 
concentrated in the Northeastern, upper Midwestern and Pacific coast 
states of the country. In most of the so-called Dush 1/ red zone" of states in 
the South, Great Plains, and Rocky Mountain West, union density is well 
below the national average. With the exception of California, all of the 
states gaining House seats, and therefore electoral votes, as a result of 
the 2000 census were carried by Bush in 2000. Unless they can expand 
union membership in low density states, unions' electoral power will be 
further circumscribed in future presidential elections . 

. Union turnout strategy is further limited by the inability of labor to 
convince a grestpT nllmber of union members and members of their 
households to vote for union endorsed candidates. While it is true that 
empirical research has indicated that union members are far more likely 
to vote for Democrats than are other workers, unions must do a beller 
job of convincing more unionized workers to vote for union endorsed 
candidates. The Democratic margin over Republicans in union house­
hold voting actually declined in each of the three presidential elections 

34 



between 1992 and 2000. If AFL-CIO political director Rosenthal is cor­
rect in his assertion that 75% of union members contacted by activists 
using "The Plan" vote for the union endorsed candidate, then we must 
conclude that a significant number of union workers are not being reached 
hy union po1iiical activists Without revprsing thi.s trend, labor will have 
even less opportunity to determine the outcome of presidential elections. 

Union political power would be enhanced by electoral reforms that 
are unlikely to occur. The Electoral College's "winner-take-all" tradition 
weakens union political influence because in many states union turnout 
efforts increase the margin by which the Democratic candidate wins the 
state. This effect is compounded by the fact that many of the states in 
which union organizing is easiest, such as California and New York, have 
been among the strongest Democratic states in recent elections. In the 
Electoral College, of course, the margin of victory in a state is irrelevant. 
The abolition of the Electoral College and the implementation of a direct 
popul<lr votl" ml"thoa to elect the president would end the wasted votes 
that frustrate labor power. Given the lack of a movement for direct popu­
lar election following the controversial 2000 election, it seems highly 
unlikely that the Electoral College will be altered or abolished. 

If labor is to increase its political impact on elections it will have to 
organize more workers into unions. Despite the call for increased orga­
nizing by AFL-CIO president John Sweeney, individual unions do most 
organizing. While some unions have aggressively recruited new mem­
bers, many others have committed few resources to organizing (Green­
house 2001). Without some vigorous organizing success, labor's attempt 
to expand its political influence will be limited. To increase its political 
influence in pre~identi<ll plectinns, l",hor must also attempt to organize 
workers in states that have relatively low union density. If 10% of Florida's 
workers had been unionized in 2000, as opposed to 6.5%, Al Gore would 
have won the 2000 presidential election. 

Despite George W. Bush's narrow victory in the 2000 presidential elec­
tion, low turnout elections present many opportunities to interest groups 
that work to mobilize theIr members. It was the 50% increase in black 
turnout in Florida that made the election so dose in that state and almost 
certainly would have given Gore a victory there, and thus the presidency, 
had every voter's preference been registered. 

Presidential elections are only one aspect of the electoral universe in 
the United States. Union efforts were critical in the Democrats attaining 
a 50-50 split in the United States Senate in the 2000 election. Democrats 
later gained a slim majority in the Senate when Vermont Republican James 
Jeffords became an independent and cast his vote with the Democrats in 
organizing the Senate. Table 5 demonstrates that in five Senate elections 
in 2000, labor voters were crucial in Democratic victories. 

35 



Table 5 

Union Household Voting in Selected Senate Elections in 2000 

Union Non-Union 
Household Voting Household Voting 

Democrat Republican Democrat RI~publican 

Michigan 63 35 35 59 

Minnesota 56 39 46 47 

Missouri 58 40 47 53 

New Jersey 56 41 48 49 

Washington 59 38 46 53 

It is in the states where unions are already strong that the political 
climate is most hospitable to organizing more workers into unions. Some 
of the most notable union successes in recent decades have come in Cali­
fornia (Myerson 2UU1). Even when they increase voter turnout in states 
such as New York and California, labor has the ability to push politics in 
a leftward direction and to elect pro-labor officials to a plethora of offices 
including the United States Congress. A demobilized polity presents 
special opportunities to those who can and will educate and mobilize 
their members even when that interest group is in decline. 

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