






































 ó 


Would You Vote For Colin Powell? 
White Support for a Not Quite Colorless Black Candidate* 

April Gresham 
Villanova, P A 

Robert Maranto 
Villanova University 

Sigelman et al (1995), Williams (1990), and Sonenshein (1990) find that 
whites stereotype African-American candidates as less competent and more lib­
eral than white candidates. Yet increasing numbers of African-Americans win 
election in white constituencies. We used a natural experiment, the media boom 

• for a Colin Powell presidential bid in 1994, to test the degree to which various 
race-related attitudes affected Powell support among white voters. We con­
dueled a phone 5urvey of 350 while,Perm::;yluaniu resitlentt; from June to No­
vember 1994. Powell had as much support as any Republican. Powell support 
was unrelated to conservatism, party, and affirmative action. For Democrats, 
Powell support was related to attitudes toward NAFTA and immigration. For 
Republicans, Powell support was related to authoritarianism and populism. We 
conclude with speculation about future directions for research. 

Introduction and Hypotheses 

Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1988 73-81) and Thernstrom and 
Thernstrom (1997) report that the percentage of whites willing to vote 
for an African-American presidential candidate rose sharply from the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s, and slowly thereafter. By the early 1980s, 
more than 80% of whites expressed willingness to vote for a black presi­
dential candidate. Further, some African-Americans have won election 
to overwhelmingly white constituencies. These include former Senator 
Carol Moseley Braun (D, IL), former Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder, 
former U.S. Representative Alan Wheat (D, Ma, who lost a 1994 Senate 
race), former U.S. House member Gary Franks (R, CT) and current U.S. 
Representative J.e. Watts (R, OK)(Barone and Ujifusa 1993). 

Yet black candidates in white constituencies still face obstacles. Vot­
ers use personal information about candidates, including ethnicity, to 
make presumptions about political views (Popkin 1992, 63-64, 77-79). 
As Williams (1990) finds, national surveys show that whites assume black 
candidates to have certain generic racial attributes, among them liberal-

... We wish to thank Lafayette College and Villanova University for material sup­
port of this pwject, Paul Snidennan fur hdping U~::;igll mca:surement :strategies, 
and Tali Mendelberg and several anonymous reviewers for their comments. The 
usual caveats apply. 

53 



ism and relative incompetence in office. Using experimental manipula­
tions of the race and ideology of hypothetical candidates, Sigelman et al 
(1995) show that whites assume even conservative African-American 
candidates to be less competent and more sympathetic to disadvantaged 
groups than comparable white candidates. Successful African-Ameri­
can politicians in white constituencies have overcome stereotypes in part 
by empha~izing conservative stands or social characteristics. For example, 
former Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley stressed his background as a 
policeman in early races and his business support in later ones 
(Sonenshein 1990). Similarly, former Massachusetts Senator Edward 
Brooke and Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder emphasized their tough 
stands against crime. Wilder also stressed his southern style and status 
as a military veteran (Sonenshein 1990,1993). 

A natural replication of such research was made possible by the 1994-
95 media boom about a hypothetical presidential bid by former Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, the first ~frican-American (tech­
nically Caribbean American) to hold the post. Though he did not de­
clare his Republican affiliation until October 1995 and had contributed 
campaign money to Democrats and Republicans alike, Powell's military 
career flourished under Republican preSidents, and he was widely as­
sumed to be Republican. Powell's military career appealed more to Re­
publicans than to Democrats, as did his frequent talk on religious issues 
and the need for strong families. Powell was popular among white reli­
gious conservatives, as shown by the Powell biographies frequently fea­
tured at religiOUS bookstores (Interview 1; Woodward 1991). 

Powell was a particularly interesting candidate to examine since pre­
vious black presidential candidates Gesse Jackson, Shirley Chisholm) were 
liberals, while Powell was thought to be moderate or conservative. 

In 1994-1995 draft Powell organizations formed, one led by historian 
and Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose. As Ambrose said, "when 
people look at him [Powell], it makes you proud to be an 
American ... because, like Ike, he makes you believe in the American 
dream" (Elliason 1995). A Times-Mirror survey conducted in August 1994 
showed a Republican Powell beating Clinton by 51 to 41 %. The survey 
also found a 74% Powell approval rating and 8% disapproval. Powell 
himself encouraged presidential speculation, stating, liThe Chairman of 
the JCS is the best job in the world, except for maybe one or two others,"l 
Notably, Powell's perceived success in Operation Desert Storm and the 
status of the military might well inoculate him against racial stereotypes 
of incompetence (Elliason, II All Things Considered," March 31, 1995; 
Interview 1; Raum 1994). Similarly, African-American Republicans in 
general, and former generals in particular, might be immune from ste­
reotypes that they are liberal. We thus propose to test: 

54 



HI: A Powell presidential candiitacy could gaill considerable support among 
whites. 

This is not to say that a Powell candidacy would be race neutral. \Ve will 
explore the possible impact of three different types of racism on voting 
for Powell: modern or symbolic racism, also referred to as encoded rac­
ism; blatant authoritari~n racism; and populist racism based in realistic 
group conflict. 

Modern racism researchers contend that many whites pretend color­
blindness while embracing policies that harm African-Americans; thus 
much of what passes for conservatism is in fact disguised, or "modern" 
racism (McConahay 1986; Sears 1988). Hagen (1995) and Bloom (1995) 
investigate "encoded racism" or "explainable racism/' racism expressed 
by code phrases such as opposition to welfare and concern about crime. 
Their preliminary findings indicate that educated voters in particular 
express such subtle views and vote prejudicially. 

One way to explore this type of racism is by examining the relation­
ship between views of Powell's candidacy and affirmative action. Affir­
mative action could be seen as a racial issue--one of coded or explain­
able racism (Bloom 1995). If so, support for Powell might be inversely 
related to affirmative action opposition. On the other hand, Powell had 
not as of 19941inked himself with affirmative action and seemed conser­
vativ@ on nthpr iSSllPs. Thw;, WI" propnse: 

H2: Views of affirmative action will not be related to white support for a Powell 
candidacy. 

A second type of racism is noted by Sniderman and Piazza (1993), 
who find that many whites still admit blatantly racist views. They also 
find that such racism is not strongly related to ideological conservatism 
but rather to a long-standing personality correlate of prejudice­
authoritarianism (Allport 1954). Notably, this minority of white Ameri­
cans holds authoritarian views on such issues as maintaining respect for 
America's power, strengthening law and order, making sure all people 
acquire similar values and ideals, and teaching children respect for au­
thority. Authoritarians are not conservatives. They endorse conventional 
conservative political views only on law and order issues, and unlike 
other conservatives they negatively stereotype Jews (a group that 
stereotypically embodies the Protestant Work Ethic) as well as African­
Americans. In short, authoritarian opinion denigrates all other races 
(Sniderman and Piazza 1993, 55, ch. 2, 3; Uslaner 2002). Thus, we pre­
dict: 

55 



H3: Powell support will be inversely related to authoritarianism. 

A third type of prejudice is realistic group conflict. According to realistic 
group conflict theory, a stagnant or unstable economy is associated with height­
ened intergroup tensions as groups compete for scarce resources (Bobo 1988; 
Hofstadter 1964; Fritzsche 1990; Uslaner 2002). Immigrants are prime targets of 
prejudice since they represent competitor groups. According to this theory, vot­
ers see wealth as finite. Thus, Americans compete with non-citizens (immi­
grants) for jobs in America, and American workers compete with workers in 
other countries (such as Mexico) in the world market. Such competition is ass0-

ciated with prejudice against members of the competing group(s). 
Two political issues at the time of the survey lent themselves to inves­

tigating realistic group conflict based prejudice: NAFTA and immigra­
tion. These issues highlight a fault line among Republicans. "Optimist" 
conservatives such as Jack Kemp argue that free trade and immigration 
help all Americans; they thus support both NAFTA and immigration. In 
contrast, "Nationalist" conservatives such as, Pat Buchanan see economic 
growth as a zero-sum enterprise: immigration and NAPTA take away 
II American" jobs. More important, immigration could destroy America's 
European based culture, and increase crime and disorder. As Buchanan, 
who other conservatives accuse of racism and anti-Semitism, asks, 
I/[w]hose country is it, anyway?" (Frum 1994; Lind 1993; Buckley 1992). 
(On the relationship between optimism and tolerance, see Uslaner 2002.) 

The contrast between Nationalists and Optimists was especially pro­
nounced in comparisons of the Kemp and Buchanan 1996 presidential 
campaigns. Kemp's standard stump speech urged the GOP to be the 
party of Lincoln, a Biblical good shepherd for every sheep. He noted 
that unemployment in American ghettoes was so high as to justify not 
only riots, but also "the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution" (C­
SPAN 1992). He saw capitalism as so good that the poor needed to be 
part of it. He typically urged his (usually all white) audiences to remem­
ber that blacks had the same aspirations for their children. Once, when a 
hand-shaker urged Kemp to consider Bob Dole for Vice-President, he 
answered "How about Colin Powell?" (C-SPAN 1992). Republican ac­
tivists in Virginia in the months after the 1992 election distributed Kemp­
Powell buttons (C-SPAN 1992; Interview 1). Kemp campaigned against 
the anti-illegal immigrant Proposition 187 in California and dropped out 
of the GOP presidential race after it passed. In sharp contrast, Pat 
Buchanan's 1995 announcement for president denounced moral decay, 
the crimes of illegal aliens, and the greed of such (Jewish named) compa­
nies as Goldman-Sachs that gave executives huge bonuses while laying 
off 2,000 clerks (C-SPAN 1995). Accordingly, we predict that: 

56 



H4: Support for NAFTA and immigration will be directly related to support jar 
Powell. 

Optimists and Nationalists can be likened to the libertarian and popu­
list currents in mass ideology described by Maddox and Lilie (1984). Like 
Optimists, libertarians favor less government regulation in both the eco­
nomic and social-cultural spheres of life. Libertarians also tend to be 
younger, better educated, and relatively optimistic. In contrast popu­
lists are pessimistic about human nature and want a strong government, 
both to control business and social morality and to protect the working 
class. Populists are older, poorer, less educated, more skeptical about 
programs aiding African-Americans, and less trusting generally (Maddox 
and Lilie 1984; Uslaner 2002). . 

Maddox and Lilie suggest that as of 1982, populists and libertarians 
could be found in substantial numbers in each party, unlike liberals and 
conselvatives. Suggesthl.g thal populist-nationalist Dem.ocrats are Inore 
likely to believe in social control,. to stereotype others, and to hold rela­
tively authoritarian views may explain the surprising findings of Sniderman 
et al (1993) that stereotypes about African-Americans were strongly re­
lated to welfare policy views for economic liberals, but not for economic 
conservatives. While conservatives oppose assistance for anyone, high ste­
reotyping liberals oppose assistance targeted to blacks. Perhaps these sup­
posed "liberals" are in fact the populist-nationalists discussed above: eco­
nomically liberal but socially conservative or even authoritarian. Thus: 

H5: Support for Powell will be inversely related to populism. 

Procedure 

Sniderman and Piazza's findings are based on California and Ken­
tucky surveys focusing on racial issues. We have partly replicated 
Sniderman and Piazza's measures of racial stereotyping and authoritar­
ian values using two surveys. Our Racism survey focuses on racial ste­
reotyping and affirmative action, though it also includes a few general 
questions about political attitudes. Our Politics survey uses an embed­
ded design in which a few race-oriented questions are embedded within 
a broader survey of political attitudes. The following analyses use ques­
tions from the Politics survey, except tests of HI (Tables 2-3), which pool 
the data sets.2 

We conducted a phone survey of Pennsylvania's 15th U.S. House dis­
trict (the Lehigh Valley and surrounding area) from June 15 to Novem­
ber 30, 1994. Respondents were normally called three times before being 
counted as refusals or four times before being categorized as unreach­
able. The household and household member to be interviewed were 
selected randomly (Lavrakos 1992). Of the 753 households contacted, 55 

57 



were unable to participate due to inability to speak English or poor hear­
ing. Three hundred and seventy of the remaining 698 potential subjects 
completed the survey, for a 53% completion rate. Of the 370 individuals 
surveyed, 350 (94%) are included in the analyses that follow.3 Of the 
350, 187 completed the Politics survey and 163 completed the Racism 
survey. As Table 1 shows, sample demographics resembled those for the 
15th District as a whole as reported from Barone and Ujifusa (1993,1113). 

Table 1 

Comparing lhe Sample with the 15th U.S. House District 

Attributes Sample 15th District 

Median Household Income $30-45,000 $33,049 

Percent White 94 92 

Percent Over Age 64 16 15 

Percent W / College Degree 36 37 

Percent, Who, in 1992, 
Voted for Clinton-Bush-Perot 41-43-16 41-37-22 

Forty percent of survey respondents report being Democrats and 38% 
call themselves Republican. Official registration figures for the district 
show Democrats with 56% of the two party registration total, though 
registered independents tend to think of themselves as Republicans. This 
is particularly true of the many recent immigrants from New Jersey, an 
open primary state. Many of the newcomers came to escape high taxes, 
high housing costs, and crime. In addition, as explained below, Lehigh 
Valley Democrats increasingly vote Republican (Interview 2). 

The Lehigh Valley is an interesting area in which to study the inter­
section of race, class, and politics. The area is overwhelmingly white but 
ethnically diverse. It was originally settled by British and German im­
migrants whose descendants still make up more than half the popula­
tion. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries came waves of Irish, Ital­
ian, . and Eastern European immigrants. Survey respondents are 36% 
Catholic, 55% Protestant, and 1% Jewish. Immigrants worked in such 
large manufacturing industries as Bethlehem Steel, Dixie Cup, and Mack 
Trucks. These heavy industries hit hard times in the study period, mak­
ing NAFTA a significant political issue. Despite economic change, job­
lessness was near the national average, with new industries moving in 
from New York and New Jersey. In addition, many factory workers (or 
their children) moved down Interstates 78 and 81 to the Sun Belt. Still, 

58 



the Valley remained heavily blue collar and 25% rural, with politically 
significant unions, gun and sportsmen's groups, und ethnic clubs. The 

district had 78,000 veterans, and military issues often figured in local 
politics. Then US. Representative Paul McHale, a Democrat, upset Re­
publican incumbent Don Ritter in 1992 in part by emphasizing his mili­
tary record. In its heavy industry days the district elected Democratic 
US. House members from 1932 to 1978, when Ritter upset a longtime 
incumbent. Later congressional races were closely contested. The dis­
trict was Democratic in state and local elections through the 1970s, but 
since then it has trended Republican because of Cold War issues, eco­
nomic changes, and migration from New Jersey. While Hubert Humphrey 
beat Richard Nixon by a 50% to 46% margin in 1968, George McGovern 
could manage only 40% in 1972. Jimmy Carter won the district with 52% 
in 1976, but Ronald Reagan beat Carter by 50% to 39% in 1980. George 
Bush won 55% in 1988, but in a bad local economy in 1992 he lost to 
Clinton 41 % to 37%, with Perot winning 22%.4 At the same time, from 
1982 to 1994 the GOP narrowed 'the two party registration edge from 
63% to 37% to 56% to 44%. Many of the 15th's Democrats are considered 
"God and country" or "Reagan Democrats" who vote Republican 
nationally on cultural and defense issues but have ethnic and economic 
links to the Democratic party and tend Democratic for local offices. Al­
though Democrats are a plurality in our survey, 51 % of respondents con­
sider themselves conservative-35% liberal. Indeed, the presence of so 
many Reagan Democrats led the Clinton campaign to conduct focus 
groups in Allentown before the 1992 Democratic convention.5 Despite 
the local losses for Bush and U.S. Representative Ritter in 1992, the GOP 
continued its gains in the area. In 1986 Democrats held 14 of the Lehigh 
Valley's 15 state house seats, and all three major city mayor's offices 
(Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton). As of 1994, GOP mayors ran the three 
cities and Republicans held 12 of 15 house seats (Barone and Ujifusa, 
1975, 1981, 1983, 1989, 1993; Interview 2). 

While economic and national issues seemingly dominated area voting 
behavior, race also may have had an impact. Overwhelmingly white, the 
Lehigh Valley has grown more diverse. Hispanics, African-Americans, 
and A~ian Americans made up 8% of the population in the study period, 
and they were even more in the three major cities. Downtown Allentown 
and Easton were widely perceived as unsafe because of ethnic minorities. 
'!he dominant local newspaper gave substantial coverage (often includ­
ing photos) to crimes committed by ethnic minorities and to moves to 
make Allentown an "English only" city (Lehigh Valley Morning Call 1995). 
In addition, most Valley residents watch New York and Philadelphia tele­
vision. Further, as Kinder and Mendelberg (1995) find, racial isolation 
actl1ally f'nhancf's the impact of prejudice on white opinion. Similarly; 

59 



DiolU1e (1991, 88) recalls Nixon campaign speeches denouncing urban 
crime and welfare dependency in such places as New Hampshire. An 
area need not have "urban" problems to see minorities as a threat. In­
deed such appeals work best in white rural areas long fearful of all man­
ner of urban evils (Hofstadter 1964). The Lehigh Valley had an active 
klavern and neo-Nazi groups, one of which came into prominence when 
two brothers in the group killed their religious, racially tolerant parents 
and younger brother. A local Republican political consultant maintained 
that it was difficult for African-Americans to win election in the Lehigh 
Valley, though Colin Powell might be the one exception (Interview 2).6 

In short, while overwhelmingly white, the Lehigh Valley is an inter­
esting place to study whites' willingness to vote for African-Americans. 
Its economic and social transitions and social conservatism make it a 
good place to look for authoritarian and populist tendencies in Ameri­
can politics. 

Testing the Hypotheses 

As Table 2 shows, Hypothesis 1 is consistent with the data. Colin 
Powell would have been a serious presidential candidate, essentially ty­
ing then-Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole as the first GOP choice 
among Lehigh Valley voters, with 23% to Dole's 25%. Powell led all 
other GOP contenders as a second choice and in combined (first and 
second place) support. Of course, one might suspect that as a nonparti­
san figure Powell will have more support among Democrats than other 

"Table 2 

Support for Powell and other GOP Candidates 
in a Hypothetical Presidential Primary 

Candidales Percenl Percent Percents 
Chosen Listing Listing Combined* 
Dole 25 13 20 
Kemp 18 14 16 
Quayle 8 8 8 
Buchanan 2 4 3 
Powell 23 22 23 
Gramm 3 3 3 
Other / Refuse 22 35 

100% 100% 
N=100 N=100 

~Du~:; nut ~yudllIl~dll of flrsllwo l:uluuUls u~l:ause of differenl num­
bers of missing cases. 

60 



Table 3 

Percent Listing Powell as a Preferred 
1996 GOP Presidential Candidate by Party. 

Respondent Self-Rating 
Democrat Independent Republican 

Views of Powell Strong Weak Weak Strong* 

Does Not List Powell 63 69 66 52 66 

Powell Listed as 

Second GOP Choice 14 13 20 17 19 

Powell Listed as 
First GOP Choice 24 19 14 31 15 

Total percentage 100a 100a 100 100 100 

X2(8) =7.75,)2=.46 N=335 

* Total candidatp pf'r('pnta8f'~ in this table are greater than in Table 2 
since this table combines two variables (FIRST and SECOND choice) 
for individual cases: it is additive rather than a mean. 

a Actual percentages add to 100; there is slight inflation in the table 
due to rounding error. 

GOP contenders can muster. In fact, this is not the case. As Table 3 shows, 
relationships with party are not statistically significant. 

Powell seemingly appealed most to weak Republicans, 48% of whom 
list him as either their first or second choice. Only 34% of strong Repub­
licans and 36% of the sample as a whole do suo Sl.rong Rt:publil.:aIU::i pre­
ferred more partisan candidates. Yet we found no clear tendency for 
Powell supporters to back him less against Clinton. On the Politics sur­
vey respondents were asked whether, if the election were held today, 
they would vote for President Clinton or for their favorite Republican. 
Those who choose Powell as their first choice break 63% to 37% for Powell; 
those chOOSing other GOP candidates support them by 75% to 25% mar­
gins, but the differences do not approach statistical significance in the 
small sample, X2(5)=4.01, ns. Naturally those unwilling to choose a Re­
publican backed President Clinton. In short, HI is supported. 

In investigating the other hypotheses, we first examine zero-order cor­
relations bel ween Powell suppurt ami hyputhe:::;i~ed preuidun;; affir­
mative action (H2), authoritarianism (H3), NAFTA and immigration sup­
port (H4), and populism (H5). In addition, we examine the correlations 

61 



Table 4 

Zero-order Correlations between Powell Support and 
Hypothesized Predictors by Education Level 

Education Level 
Hypothesized No College College or More 

Predictor r N r N 

A uthoritarian Scale .02 75 - .26 *** 97 

Support for 
Affirmative Action -.02 77 .08 96 

Conservative Ideology -.08 83 - .05 101 

Anti-Immigration -.17 85 - .17 100 
, 

Pro-NAFTA -.03 83 .25 ** 99 

Pro-Defense Spending .10 84 -.03 101 

Populism Scale .01 85 - .23 ** 101 

N=85 N=101 

**}2<.05, ***}2<.Ol 

between Powell support and two other variables less relevant to our 
hypotheses, ideology and defense spending. 

We present correlations separately for those with no college and those 
with some college or above (See Table 4) since attitude constraint is 
strongly related to education (Devine 1970). Sniderman and Piazza (1993) 
and Uslaner (2002) find education inversely related to authoritarianism. 
In addition, as Popkin (1991) notes, issues important to the more atten­
tive public in the year before a campaign may become important to the 
less attentive in the months of a campaign; thus issue relationships among 
more educated respondents now may predict those among the less edu­
cated in the 1996 campaign season. 

For both groups, there are no relationships between support for Powell 
and general ideology, defense spending, and affirmative action. (Items 
are available on request at robert.maranto@villanova.edu.) Low educa­
ti'on respondents show no relationships between support for Powell and 
measures of authoritarianism, populism, and NAFTA. For both educa­
tion groups, those opposing (legal) immigration are somewhat less likely 
to support Powell, though the relationship attains statistical significance 
only when the two groups are combjned for a higher n, £(186)=-.18,12=.02. 
High education respondents show statistically significant relationships 

62 



Table 5 

Zero-order Correlations between Powell Support and 
Hypothesized Predictors by Respondent Party 

Respondent Party 
Hypothesized Democrat Republican 

Predictor R N r N 

Authoritarian Scale -.10 59 -.23 *72 

Support for 
Affirmative Action .01 59 .03 76 

Conservative Ideology -.07 62 .02 81 

Anti-Immigration -.27 ** 63 -.04 81 

Pro-NAFTA .28 ** 61 .11 78 

Pro-Defense Spending -.04 61 .04 81 

Populism Scale -.03 63 -.20 * 81 

N=63 N=81 

*~ <.08, **~<.05 

between support for Powell and authoritarianism, popUlism, and NAFTA. 
More authoritariah, populist respondents who oppose free trade and 
immigration are less likely to support Powell. In short, correlations tend 
to support H2, H3, and H4, and H5, at least for the educated. Affirma­
tive action support does not predict support for Powell, but support for 
NAFTA and (po~~ihly) immigration do. Gt>nf>ral idt>ology dof'~ not prf'­
diet support for Powell relative to other GOP candidates, nor does de­
fense spending, but authoritarianism and populism do. 

As Table 5 shows, presenting Powell support correlations by party 
tells a somewhat different story. Of the hypothesized variables, for Demo­
crats, only NAFTA and Immigration have statistically significant rela­
tionships with Powell support. For Republicans, authoritarianism and 
populism are nearly significant at .05, with I2.-values of .054 and .078, 
respectively. In short, realistic group conflict variables influence white 
Democratic support; the ideological variables of authoritarianism and 
populism seem to affect white Republican support. Thus, the zero-order 
correlations strongly support H2, work for H3 and perhaps H5 with Re­
publicans, and support H4 for Democrats. 

Zero-order correlations only examine the relationship between the pre­
c1irtor variable ;:mcl Powpl1 ~lJPport without "'lm1l1t;.mf'o1J~ly ("ontmlHn8 

63 



Table 6a 

Final Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary Table 
for Less Educated Respondents. 

Predictor Variables B SEB Beta T-test Sig. T 

Affirmative action -.005 .en -.05 -.33 .742 

Authoritarian scale .006 .01 .06 .46 .645 

Pro-NAFTA .009 .03 .04 .27 .785 

Anti-immigration -.05 .04 -.18 -1.37 .177 

Populism Scale -.05 .10 -.07 -.47 .640 

Constant .87 .80 1.09 .281 

Multiple R=.18354 

R2=.034, E(5,63)=.44 , p=.82 

for other relationships. We used a hierarchical multiple regression to 
determine the pattern of Powell support with each predictor variable 
while taking into account its relationship with other predictors. We en­
tered predictor variables in the following order: affirmative action, 
authoritarianism, NAFTA, Immigration, and Populism. Affirmative ac­
tion was entered first to test H2 and authoritarianism was entered on the 
second step to test H3. Next, views on specific issues were entered, to 
see if they added explanatory power over and above the first two (more 
general) pred.iclors. Finally, pupulblll ~cure::; were entered last tu ::;ee if 
they added any explanation, over and above the other predictors, which 
are better established in the literature. 

This hierarchical multiple regression was run for four separate 
subsamples: respondents with high school education or less (Table 6a), 
those with some college or more (Table 6b), Democrats (Table 6c), and 
Republicans (Table 6d). Tables present the betas and tests for individual 
significance after all variables have been entered into the equation. Al­
though the tables show different patterns for these subsamples, indicat­
ing the necessity of splitting up the sample, lack of power is a problem 
due to small N's. However, multicollinearity is not a problem, as predic­
tors' intercorrelations never reach .3 and are seldom significant. 

As Table 6a indicates, for less educated respondents Powell support 
is not significantly related to any predictors by the end of the analysis. 
None of the E-values for the R2 change approached significance at any 
step-though immigration comes closest-indicating that Powell sup­
port was not related to predictor variables at any step. 

64 



Table 6b 

Final Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary Table 
for Respondents with Some College and Above. 

Predictor Variables B SEB Beta T-test Sig. T 

Affirmative action -.005 .01 -.04 -.43 .666 

Authoritarian scale -.02 .01 -.22 -2.16 .034 

Pro-NAFTA .08 .03 .25 2.55 .0l3 

Anti-immigration -.03 .03 -.09 -.85 .397 

Populism Scale -.19 .08 -.25 -2.44 .017 

Constant 1.81 .58 3.14 .002 

Multiple R=.43261 

R2=.18715 E(5,87)=4.00, 12=.00 

Table 6b tells a more interesting story for the better-educated respon­
dents. Affirmative action was not significant at Step I, but the R2 change 
of .063 was significant for authoritarianism at Step 2, E(2,90)=6.09, 12=.016. 
NAFTA views, entered on the third step, also accounted for a significant 
increase in R2 change of .057, E(3,89)=5.8, ]2.=.018. Immigration (Step 4) 
was non-significant, but populism scores, entered last, accounted a defi­
nite R2 change of .055, £(5,87)=5.95, 12=.017. The £ for the final equation 
was highly significant, f(5,87)~4.01, 12-~.003. 

Democrats, portrayed in Table 6c show very little predictability in 
supporting Powell. The one variable that indicated a significant R2 change 
was NAFTA, entered on Step 3, E(1,54)=2.06, 12=.05. Immigration had 
the next highest T, but did quite not reach significance, £(1,54)=-1.52, 
}2.=.14. The F for the overall equation at that step was not significant; 
neither was the final equation with all five predictors entered.7 

Table 6d shows that for the Republican subsample affirmative action 
is not significant but authoritarianism is. When authoritarianism was 
entered at Step 2, it led to a significant R2 change of .05, E (1,66)=3.95, 
}2.=.051. The other significant predictor is populism, entered last, which 
results in an R2 change of .058, with E (1,66)=4.19, .12=.045. 

Discussion: Not Quite Color Blind 

Survey results must be interpreted with caution. Saying that one will 
vote for an African-American candidate and actually doing so are differ­
ent things. 8 For our findings in particular, the small n of cases limit the 

65 



Table 6c 

Final Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary Table 
for Democrat Respondents 

Predictor Variables B SEB Beta T-test Sig. T 

Affirmative action -.01 .02 -.09 -.64 .527 

Authoritarian scale .002 .01 .02 .17 .865 

Pro-NAI'TA .09 .04 .28 2.06 .045 

Anti-immigration -.07 .04 -.21 -1.52 .136 

Populism Scale -.13 .12 -.15 -1.08 .285 

Constant 1.09 .84 1.29 .202 

Multiple R=.37049 

R2=.136, £:(5,50)=1.59, 12=.18 

power of analyses. Further, the sheer prestige of Colin Powell may limit 
our ability to apply findings for less prominent African-American candi­
dates. Still, our findings accord with a growing literature examining the 
determinants of growing white support for African-American politicians. 
Results suggest that had he run, Colin Powell would have been a formi­
dable presidential candidate. At the time of our survey, in a "Reagan 
Democrat" area, Powell was essentially in a first place tie among white 
voters with then Senate Majority Leader and eventual 1996 Republican 
nominee Robert Dole. Further, in contrast to Bloom (1995) but in line 
with the findings of Sniderman and Piazza (1993), Powell support was 
not generally linked to support for affirmative action. Perhaps actual 
candidates, as opposed to experimental simulations, can overcome ra­
cial stereotypes-at least up to a point. 

Still, race matters. For better-educated respondents and for RepUblicans, 
authoritarianism and popUlism inversely correlated with support for 
PowelP This finding seemingly counters Sniderman et al's (1993) findings 
that race related views have more impact on Democratic than on Republi­
can opinion when considering "liberal" issues like welfare. Yet our finding 
.complements theirs in that Powell-a black Republican candidate-may 
provide more inconsistent cues for high stereotyping Republicans than for 
high stereotyping Democrats. In other words, the minority candidate's 
ideology, like the nexus of issue and party noted by Sniderman et al (1993), 
could moderate the impact of racial beliefs on political behavior. 

For Democrats, support for NAFJA and immigration was associated with in­
creased Powell support, suggesting {he utility of realistic group coriflicl models in 

66 



Table 6d 

Final Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary Table 
for Republican Respondents 

Predictor Variables B SEB Beta T-test Sig. T 

Affirmative action -.04 .Ul .UU2 .U2 .987 

Authoritarian scale -.03 .01 -.26 -2.10 .039 

Pro-NAFTA .03 .04 .09 .73 .468 

Anti-immigration -.008 .05 -.02 -.18 .861 

Populism Scale -.19 .09 -.27 -2.05 .045 

Constant 2.14 .77 2.77 .007 

Multiple R=.36768 

R2=.135, E(5,62)=1.94, J2=.10 

explaining Democratic support. Our finding is somewhat consistent with McLauren 
(1995) who found that holding democratic norms increases benevolence towards 
non-f,uropean immigrants in several European countries. These trends may re­
flect the self-perceived economic vulnerability of white working class Democratic 
constituencies. In short, ideological variables seem best to explain Republican sup­
port for Powell; for Democrats, group conflict variables hold more promise. 

Our finding that populism predicts Powell support for Republicans 
and higher educated respondents shows the potential of a populist-lib­
ertarian dimension for explaining racial attitudes and voting behavior. 
While widely used by political consultants, this dimension is rarely ad­
dressed in the voting behavior literature and needs more research. For 
instance, determining whether the basis for populism lies more in an 
authoritarian Democrat or a working class liberal faced with realistic 
group conflict would provide much needed construct validation. This 
should be a topic of future research. 

The failure of party and general ideology to explain Powell support 
compared to the success of authoritarianism, populism, and NAFTA sug­
gests that, as Sniderman and Piazza show, political scientists should not 
confuse conservatism with racism. Similarly, researchers should he mmE' 
attentive to issue dimensions cutting across the conventionalliberal-con­
servative continuum. Finally, researchers must pay heed to the context 
of issues for different populations. In particular, for losers in the market­
place, realistic group conflict models may have more impact. In short, 
race still matters, though in a more complex manner than in the past. 

67 



Notes 

1. At the 1995 Gridiron dinner in Washington (at which Congress members 
and others hold skits), both the Democratic and Republican presidential race 
skits featured a Powell look-alike adorned with medals and a halo, introduced 
with "Colin Powell, Superstar" to the tune of "Jesus Christ, Superstar" (C-SPAN, 
"Washington Journal," March 27, 1995). 

2. We expected the embedded design to yield ditierent responses on contro­
versial racial issues. In fact it did not, so questions used in both surveys Can be 
pooled for analysis. 

3. Minority respondents included 4 Asians, 4 blacks, 6 Hispanics, 1 Native 
American, 3 multi-racial, and 13 don't know I refuse. The 6 Hispanics and 1 Na­
tive American were included with the 343 whites in all subsequent analyses. 

4. Perot had a strong local organization. In the 1994 House election, Patriot 
Party (Perot) candidate Vic Mazziotti took 5%. Since first term incumbent Paul 
McHale won by only 400 vote~ uut of 150,000 casL and the adiculale Mazziotti 
ran as a fiscal conservative, many local GOP activists felt that Mazziotti kept the 
party from picking up a House seat. Clinton was perceived as unpopular in the 
di~trkt, partil:ularly ,Hllong velelans, gun owners, SeniOl" citizens still resenting 
the 1960s, and Catholics concerned with social issues. Local GOP candidates 
sought to tie local Democrats to Clinton in 1994, and did well (Interview 2). 

5. At one of these focus groups an Allentown woman complained of Clinton's 
credibility, saying, "If you asked him his favorite color, he'd say plaid" (Inter­
view 2). In response, the Clinton campaign carefully crafted the candidate's per­
sonal image in the pre-convention days to emphasize his humble background 
and Arkansas roots. 

6. Similarly; in oux interactions with local political activists of both parties, 
one often hears that it is hard for women to win in the Valley, sometimes fol­
lowed by remarks such as "I think people here might be ready for that now." 
Female politicians of both parties see sexism as an obstacle. The local state legis­
lative delegation of 19 has not included more than three women. A notable ex­
ception was longtime State Senator Jeanette Reibman, a liberal Democrat who 
stressed her strong family and National Rif1p A~~oriat1on mf'mbpr~hlp. 

7. The same hierarchical regression run for Independents had an n of only 34; 
no predictors were significant at any time. 

8. Indeed, as the 1989 Douglas Wilder-Marshall Coleman race for Virginia Gov­
ernor showed, whites commonly lie in exit polls about their willingness to vote for 
black candidates so as not to appear racist -even though some may in fact be racist. 
(We encountered this phenomenon while doing election night comn'1.entary on a 
Virginia radio station-,-pollsters predicted a Wilder landslide, not a 1 % triumph.) 
This is as good an argument as any for the utility of modem racism research. 

9. This correlation may be described best by saying that low authoritarians 
are more likely to vote for Powell, given the high support of Powell among the 
typical category for libertarians - weak Republicans (see Table 3). 

68 



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