






































 ó 


A Tale of Two Cities: 
The 1999 Philadelphia Mayoral Election 

Jeffrey Kraus 
Wagner College 

Race was the defining issue of the 1999 Philadelphia mayoral election. In an 
overwhelmingly Democratic city, the Democratic candidate, an African-Ameri­
can with two decades of experience in local government, narrowly defeated the 
white Republican candidate with little experience in Philadelphia government. 
Examining the results of the primary and general elections, the author finds 
that the vote was sharply divided along racial lines, even though the candidates 
in the general election rejrainedfrom racial appeals and ran issue-oriented cam­
paigns. In big city politics, race thus still matters. 

The Philadelphia mayoral election of 1999 represented a crossroads for 
the "City of Brotherly Love." For eight years, Philadelphia had been led 
by Edward Rendell, who had been elected Mayor of a city on the verge of 
financial collapse. During his tenure, Rendell stabilized the city's finances, 
encouraged the rebuilding of Philadelphia's "Center City" (Philadelphia's 
downtown), and convinced the Republicans to hold their 2000 National 
Convention in the new "l'irst Union Center."l Despite these successes, 
Philadelphia in many ways was still a city in decline. The city's popula­
tion had continued to fall and the new prosperity of Center City stood in 
stark contrast to the city's poor neighborhoods, where jobs continued to 
disappear, the public education system was in crisis, and violent death 
was still the norm.2 The continued existence of these two Phil adelphi as, 
and Rendell's inability to bring new prosperity to them was chronicled by 
H.C. Bissinger (1997).3 Perhaps the most telling illustration of Rendell's 
failure was that a major issue during the 1999 campaign was the large 
number of abandoned cars on streets in the city's neighborhoods.4 

Philadelphia would not only be electing a new mayor in 1999, but 
there wa~ abu a :slrull~ possibilily lhallhe cily would again elecL an Afri­
can-American mayor. W. Wilson Goode (1984-1992) had preceded 
Rendell. Goode's mayoralty had begun with high hopes, as he had come 
to office after defeating the controversial Frank Rizzo. Rizzo, who de­
scribed himself as the "toughest cop in America," parlayed his law and 
order image into two terms as mayor (1972-1980). Supported by white 
ethnics1 Rizzo's tactics had been denounced by civil rights advocates who 
accused him of polarizing the city along raciallines.s Many hoped that 
the election of Goode, a well-regarded bureaucrat, would restore the coa­
lition of white liberals, blacks, and white elements of the Democratic Party 

71 



that had ended six decades of Republican domination of the city with 
the e1ection in 1951 of Joseph P. Clark.6 

Unfortunately, Goode's mayoralty never recovered from his ill-fated 
decision to bomb the headquarters of an allegedly radical group known 
as MOVE. This action destroyed not just MOVE's building but also 61 
neighboring homes in West Philadelphia.! The later years of Goode's 
administration were marked by the fiscaJ crisis inherited by Rendell. 

While some cities (notably Atlanta, Detroit, Newark, and, Washing 
ton, D.C.) had elected more than one African-American chief executive, 
Philadelphia was one of a number of cities (Baltimore, Chicago, New 
York, and Los Angeles among them) where whites had replaced African­
American mayors. The question remained as to whether the Philadel­
phia electorate would be as racially polarized in 1999 as it had been at 
the time of Goode's first election. 

Did race matter to the Philadelphia electorate in 1999? To answer this 
question, the political landscape, the candidates, the primary election, 
and the general election will be reviewed .. Particular attention will be 
paid to the voting behavior of Philadelphians in the general election. 

Philadelphia's Political Landscape in 1999 

Philadelphia is one of the nation's most heavily Democratic cities. Of 
the 980,768 voters registered in 1999, 75% were Democrats and just 19% 
were Republicans.8 In 1998, Democrats dominated Philadelphia. Bill 
Lloyd, the party's unsuccessful U.S. Senate candidate, defeated incum­
bent Republican Senator Arlen Specter by more than 60,000 votes in the 
city while losing statewide by almost 800,000 votes. Gubernatorial can­
didate Ivan Itkin did even better, winning the city by more than 75,000 
votes. Itkin lost the election to incumbent Republican Governor Tom 
Ridge by more than 750,000 votes. Democrats swept the three state sen­
ate seats and won 22 of the 27 state representative contests (Committee 
of Seventy 1998). Bill Clinton defeated George Bush in Philadelphia by 
301,000 votes in 1992, and he beat Bob Dole by 327,000 votes in 1996 
(Infield 1999). Finally, Philadelphia had not elected a Republican mayor 
since 1947. All things being equal, it would be a safe bet that Philadel­
phians would elect a Democrat to succeed Ed Rendell in 1999. 

The Candidates 

Six Democrats sought to become Mayor of Philadelphia: John F. Street 
Marty Weinberg, Happy Fernandez, Dwight Evans,· Queena R. Bass, and 
John White, Jr. Samuel P. Katz, a one-time Democrat (he had started in 
politics in 1976 as campaign Manager to Philadelphia Congressman Wil 
Ham H. Gray 3rd ) and former member of the Board of Education, was the 
sole Republican.9 

72 



Three of the six Democrats were African-Americans: Street, the Coun­
cil President during Rendell's first seven years in office (he had resigned 
the Council Presidency at the end of 1998 in order to campaign for mayor); 
White, the former head of the Commonwealth Department of Welfare 
and the Philadelphia Housing Authority (during Rendell's first term); 
and Evans, a state legislator who had received 22% of the vote in the 
1994 Democratic Gubernatorial primary.lo The presence of three major 
African-American candidates made victory by a wen-financed white can­
didate, Weinberg (the former City Solicitor and Chairman of the city's 
Democratic Committee during the Rizzo era), a pOSSibility. In January 
1998, a summit of 60 black leaders convened to try to select an African­
American candidate (Infield and Cusick 1999). As late as two and a half 
weeks before the primary, leading members of Philadelphia's black clergy, 
the NAACp, and other groups were holding meetings with representa­
tives of the candidates in an effort to convince at least one African-Ameri­
can candidate to leave the race. The Reverend Vernal Simms, pastor of 
North Philadelphia's Morris Brown A.M.E. Church, said, "1 think the 
reality in Philadelphia is we cannot win with three black candidates" 
(Infield and Cusick 1999). Simms' analysis seemed credible in a primary 
where it was estimated that African-American voters would account for 
between 49 and 54 percent of the turnuut (Davieb 1999).11 The Philudel­
phia Tribune, the city's leading African-American newspaper, published 
an editorial urging Dwight Evans to withdraw (Smith 1999). 

The other serious candidate was Happy Fernandez, a Temple Univer­
sity professor and former city council member who was founder and 
leader of the Parents Union for Public Schools and the Children's Coali­
tion of Greater Philadelphia during the 1970s. She was the first woman 
to launch a major campaign for the office. 

Despite the concerns of the city's African-American leadership, the 
three black candidates remained in the contest and one of them, John 
Street, prevailed. 

About 297,000 of the city's Democrats voted in the primary; a turnout 
of about 40%. Eight years earlier, when Rendell was nominated, turnout 
in the Democratic primary was 45.5% (Goldwyn 1999). 

Weinberg, the white candidate (who had raised $5.3 million, more 
than any of his opponents) aired a number of negative radio and televi­
sion advertisements that targeted Street, the acknowledged frontrunner 
in the Democratic field (he had been endorsed by Rendell). One series of 
ads focused on Street's past financial problems. These problems included 
having filed twice for bankruptcy protection and having tax liens filed 
against him on four separate occasions by the Internal Revenue Service.12 

Another ad featured video of Street shoving a television reporter onto 
his back, an incident that had taken place in Philadelphia's City Hall in 

73 



Table 1 

1999 Philadelphia Democratic Mayoral Primary 

Candidates Votes Percent* 

John F. Street 107,285 36.0 

Marty Weinberg 91,457 31.0 

John White, Jr. 64,657 22.0 

Happy Fernandez 18,200 6.0 

Dwight Evans 13,711 5.0 

Queena R. Bass 1,802 1.0 

*Does not add up to 100% due to rounding. 

Source: City Commissioners, Ninety-Fourth Annual Report of 
the City Commissioners to the People of Philadelphia, 1999 (Phila­
delphia: City of Philadelphia, 2000), p. 25. 

1981. The tone of the ads contributed to the Philadelphia Inquirer's assess­
ment of Weinberg: 

He's a nice man with many friends, but he doesn't belong on 
this stage. His candidacy is a concoction of big money, veiled 
power brokers, glitzy sound bites and divisive tactics. That it 
has worked well enough. to place him second in many polls is 
troubling (Philadelphia Inquirer 1999), 

As Infield and Burton (1999) concluded: 
Weinberg never shook off the rap of being the "white guy can­
didate," who got into the race after former City Controller Tho­
mas Leonard decided not to run. In fact, Weinberg drew criti­
cism early in the campaign for making more appearances in white 
areas than black areas. The label was reinforced when one of his 
backers, Richard Costello, president of the Fraternal Order of 
Polic~, mad~ an intemperate remark about local NAACP Presi­
dent J. Whyatt Mondesire and another African-American leader, 
'lawyer Charles Bowser. 
Weinberg's direct mail also appeared to be divisive. One mailing urged 

voters to "protect your family" by opposing Street, who was accused of 
being "soft on crime." A second mailing was a letter signed by the late 
Frank Rizzo's brother, Joe. While the letter did not mention Street by 
name, it did state that when Weinberg worked for Frank Rizzo, he pro­
tected "people like us" (Bunch 1999a). 

74 



The prim£1ry turn(-·d out to he £1 "tale of two citips" with Wpinbere 

doing well in the white neighborhoods of South Philadelphia, the "river 
wards" adjacent to the Schuykill River, Roxborough, and the Northeast. 
According to the Committee of Seventy, Street received 57% of the vote 
in the 23 wards that were overwhelmingly African-American. Weinberg 
received 2.4% of the vote in these wards. In the 21 predominantly white 
wards, Weinberg polled 72% of the vote, while Street received 8.8% (Com­
mittee of Seventy 1999a). The presence of a second white candidate, 
Fernandez, assured Weinberg's defeat. Her presence in the race siphoned 
enough votes from Weinberg to allow Street to win the primary despite 
the presence of two other major African-American candidates. 

The General Election Campaign 

The general election became Q contest between Katz, the white Re 
publican, and Street, the African-American candidate. It should be em­
phasized that neither candidate ran a racially polarizing campaign. White, 
Street's principal African-American rival, endorsed and actively cam­
paigned on Katz's behalf in the general election. White endorsed Katz 
even though he had been the target of television spots aired by the Re­
publican during the primary that were critical of White's management 
skills. The ads questioned White's stewardship of the Housing Author­
ity and the state Public Welfare Department. "When he tells you what 
he managed," the commercial said, II ask him how he managed" (Panaritis 
and Yant 1999).13 While White endorsed Katz, Weinberg backed Street. 

Both candidates ran issue-oriented campaigns, and they differed 
sharply on school vouchers and the local wage tax. Katz proposed the 
introduction of school vouchers as one of several measures to improve 
the public school system. Street opposed vouchers, contending that Katz's 
support for them proved that he was a radical Republican, not the mod­
erate that he claimed to be. Katz also called for a reduction in the Phila­
delphia wage tax, which Street and Mayor Rendell argued would hobble 
the city's ability to provide services. They also agreed on many issues. 
Each claimed to be the rightful heir to the popular Rendell. 14 Both re­
leased plans to fight gun violence. Both agreed to retain John Timoney 
as police commissioner. 

While Street' 5 campaign message emphasized his party affiliation, the 
Katz campaign rarely mentioned the Republican Party, basing the cam­
paign on his personal appeal to the voters rather than a party appeal. As 
State Representative George Kenney (a Republican) explained, "the na­
tional GOP agenda certainly doesn't play in the City ... we're so outnum­
bered by Democrats that Sam needs a quiet election to win. Just run a 
local race and get out the vote" (Baer 1999). 

75 



Their campaign strategies were similar to those pursued in New York 
City ten years earlier. In 1989, Manhattan Borough President David 
Dinkins (the African-American who had defeated incumbent Mayor 
Edward 1. Koch in the Democratic primary) emphasized his party, 
whereas Rudolph Giuliani downplayed the fact that he was a Republi­
can (McNickle 1993, 293-314). Yet, like Philadelphia a decade later, race 
had an impact on this contest as well (Carsey 1995). 

While the candidates did not overtly play the "race card," it appears 
that race was the unspoken issue of the campaign. A Keystone Poll, con­
ducted October 22-24, 1999 concluded that "candidate support is best 
predicted by race, even when party affiliation is taken into account" (Cen­
ter for Opinion Research 1999). 

Table 2 

1999 Philadelphia Mayoral Election 

Candidates Party Votes Percent 

John F. Street Democrat 222,823 50.7 

Samuel Katz Republican 213,376 48.6 

John P. McDermott Constitutional 2,964 0.7 

Source: City Commissioners, Ninety-Fourth Annual Report of 
the City Commissioners to the People of Philadelphia, 1999 (Phila­
delphia: City of Philadelphia, 2000), p. 6. 

The Outcome 

While Street won, his narrow victory highlighted the city's racial di­
visions. Katz ran well in Northeast Philadelphia and South Philadel­
phia, carrying 28 of the 33 wards in Philadelphia where whites outnum­
bered African-Americans. In 27 of the 28 wards carried by Katz, there 
were mure regbtereu DelnULrat~ than Republil.:alls. In :SOlne of the warus 
carried by Katz, the Democratic to Republican ratio was four-to-one. 
Street prevailed in all 33 wards where African-Americans outnumbered 
whites. The Keystone Poll predicted this outcome, observing, "the great­
est problem for John Street is that nearly three in five white voters who 
are registered as Democrats say they will support Katz" (Center for Opin­
ion Research 1999). 

Katz was also helped by the higher turnout among white voters in 
the general election. According to the City Commissioners, turnout was 
50.2% of the almost 345,000 registered white voters, while turnout was 

76 



47.2% of the 299,000 bJack voters registered in Philadelphia (City Com­
missioners of Philadelphia 2000,9). Although ·white turnout was higher 
than black turnout, it was still not large enough to provide Katz a margin 
of victory. As Larry Ceisler, a Democratic political consultant, explained, 
"lhere wasn't enough turnout in the Northeast, and Street got enough of 
the Democratic vote" (Bunch 1999c). 

Street swept Philadelphia's predominantly black neighborhoods, poll­
ing more than 90% of the vote in North and West Philadelphia. Overall, 
Street took about 94% of the black vote (Macklin 1999). Street's narrow 
victory was due to his ability to attract the votes of Latinos while holding 
some white Democrats who responded to partisan appeals made on Street's 
behalf. White neighborhoods with liberal reputations, such as Mount Airy 
and Chestnut Hull, provided Street with about 30% of their votes. 

Philadelphia was one of three cities (Columbus, Ohio and Indianapo­
lis, Indiana being the other two) targeted by the Democratic National 
COlllmittee (DNC).15 A number of well-known Democrats came to Phi1a­
delphia to campaign for Street, including President Bill Clinton.16 More 
than 5,000 party and union workers staffed Street's get out the vote op­
eration/ and the DNC spent almost $1 million on election day field op­
erations.17 In contrast, Katz could not rely on such an organization/ as 
Republican leaders conceded that there was little or no party presence in 
as many as 700 of the city's 1,700 election districts (Bunch 1999b). 

According to the Committee of Seventy, Street won 15.5% of the vote 
in the city's 21 overwhelmingly white wards, "better than some expected" 
(Committee of Seventy 1999b). Even with White's endorsement Katz 
was unable to make any inroads into the African-American community. 
Katz failed to receive 10% of the vote in 19 of the 66 wards. In on1y one of 
66 wards did Street not poll 10% of the vote. 

Conclusion 

The Philadelphia mayoral election was the most expensive municipal 
election (up to that time) in American history, as the candidates in the 
primary and general election raised and spent more than $25 million 
(Bunch 1999c). It was a race where the major candidates in the gencml 
election ran issues-oriented campaigns. Yet the Philadelphia mayoral 
election of 1999 demonstrates that race still matters in American urban 
politics. 

Generally, the first mayoral election in a city featuring a contest be­
tween an African-American and white candidate is racially divisive 
(McNickle 1993; Sonenshein 1993; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997). 
As Tom Bradley was able to demonstrate in Los Angeles, African-Ameri­
can mayors can attract greater proportions of white support in subse-

77 



quent elections (Judd and Swanstrom 1998, 393-395). [S In Philadelphia, 
the question was whether a second African-American, after a perjod of 
time during which a white had served as mayor, would face a less ra­
cially polarized electorate than the first African-American mayor. 

The Democratic primary, with a number of black and white candi­
dates, was contested on the terrain of racial politics. African-American 
leaders attempted to present a "united front" 50 that a white candidate 
would not be able to capitalize on a fragmented black vote. Ed Rendell 
had been the beneficiary of such a split in 1991, and many in the African­
American community were anxious to avoid a repeat in 1999. The three 
major African-American candidates refused to yield, however, making 
such an outcome likely. 

While African-American leaders were trying to mobilize black voters 
behind one mayoral candidate, the leading white contender offered a 
message designed to appeal to Philadelphia's still substantial white elec­
torate. Weinberg's well-funded candidacy appealed to the same white 
ethnic voters who had supported his mentor, Frank Rizzo, two decades 
earlier. 

It is interesting to note that two of the African-American candidates, 
Street and White, attempted (with limited success) to recreate the bi-ra­
cial coalition that had carried Wilson Goode into office in 1983. Not­
withstanding their efforts, the primary results revealed a city divided in 
two by Broad Street, Philadelphia' 5 major north-south thoroughfare. 
Weinberg carried the overwhelmingly white wards that lie east of Broad 
Street; Street won the black wards west of Broad Street. The general 
election yielded similar results. Despite the absence of explicit racial 
appeals by the candidates, the electorate was sharply divided by race. 
Even when race is not a prominent campaign issue, it often will be the 
decisive factor in voter choice. 

Black voters may have been motivated to support Street because they 
thought the city' 5 media was treating him unfairly (The Philadelphia In­
quirer and the Philadelphia Daily News both endorsed Katz) . Temple Uni­
versity Professor Thad Mathis observed that: 

People have been berated with this idea that they should stop 
thinking about race, but when there's an African American can­
didate who has impeccable qualifications, who has 19 years of 

. experience, the major media in the city endorses a white 
guy .... That just has a bad odor for a lot of people. And so even 
voters who didn't start with that impression started thinking 
about it. And that energized people who might not have been 
enthusiastic about Street (Macklin 1999). 

The lesson of Philadelphia is that bi-racial coalitions are difficult 
to fashion in a racially polarized electorate. Even the best-intentioned 

78 



candidates and campaigns cannot escape the divisive force of race. While 
Street was the second African-American to seek the mayoralty, he faced 
an electoral environment similar to that which confronted Goode 16 years 
earlier. In Goode's case, the campaign had been explicitly racial, as he 
faced a white opponent who made race the paramount issue. In 1999, 
both Street and Katz refrained from explicitly racial appeals, yet the out­
come mirrored Goode's first race. It is clear that, in cities like Philadel­
phia, race still matters. 

Notes 

1. Among the other developments in Center City were the opening of the 
Pennsylvania Convention Center; a Marriott Hotel; the Avenue of the Arts, home 
to many of the City's performing arts and cultural institutions; and new upscale 
retailers, including Banana Republic, Disney, and Tiffany's. 

2. According to the U.s. Census Bureau (2001,37), Philadelphia's population 
declined by 4.3% between 1990 and 2000 to 1,517,550. In 1950, the population 
peaked at 2,071,605. Philadelphia's population continues to decline. The Cen­
sus Bureau estimates that the population of Philadelphia on July I, 2001 was 
1,491,812 (Ginsberg and Dilanian 2002). 

3. Buzz Bissinger, a former reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer, was given 
significant access to Mayor Rendell during his first term in office. A Prayer for the 
City (New York: Random House, 1997) was the product of that access. A critical 
view of Rendell's second term is offered by Fred Siegel and Kay S. Hymowitz, 
"Why Did Ed Rendell Fizzle Out?" City Jouma19 (Autumn 1999). 

4. Both Democratic candidate John Street and his Republican opponent, Sam 
Katz, released plans for removing abandoned cars from the streets. 

5. Prior to becoming Mayor, Rizzo was police commissioner from 1967 to 
1971. For more on Rizzo, see Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, The COv Who 
Would Be King: Mayor Frank Rizzo (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Fred J. Hamilton, 
Rizzo (New York: Viking Press, 1973); and S.A. Paolantonio, Frank Rizzo: the last 
big man in big city America (Philadelphia: Camino Books, 1993). 

6. The last Republican to be elected mayor of Philadelphia was Barney Samuel 
in 1947. For more on the bi-racial coalition that supported Goode, see Richard A. 
Keiser, liThe Rise of a Biracial Coalition in Philadelphia," in Rufus P. Browning, 
Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds., Racial Politics in American Cities 
(New York: Longman, 1997). 

7. For more on the bombing of the MOVE headquarters by the Philadelphia 
Police and Fire Departments, see Philadelphia Special Investigation Commis­
sion, The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Philadelphia Special In­
vestigation Commission, Philadelphia, 1986; John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, 
Burning Down the House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 
1987); Hizkias Assefa, The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia: Extremist Groups and Con­
flict Resolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990); Charles W. 
Bowser, Let the Bunker Burn: the Final Battle With MOVE (Philadelphia: Camino 
Books, 1989); Michael Boyette with Randi Boyette, "Let if Bum!" The Philadelphia 
Tragedy (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989); Margot Harry, Attention, MOVE! 
Thi5 i5 Amcrica! (ChicCl.170; Danner Press, 1987); and Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, 

79 



Discourse and Destruction: the City of Philadelphia versus MOVE (Chicago: Univer­
sity at ChIcago Fress, 1 SlSl4. 

8. Except where noted, all voter registration data and election results cited 
herein are from The City Commissioners of Philadelphiaj Nillety-Fourth Annual 
Report of tile City Commissioners to the Feople of Fi11Iadelpilla, City at Philadelphia, 
January 2000. 

9. Another Republican, former State Boxing Commissioner George Bochetto, 
had aired television commercials during the summer of 1997 in an effort to es­
tablish himself as a serious contender for the Republican nomination to succeed 
Rendell. Bochetto dropped out of the race in October 1998, leaving the field 
open for Katz. 

10. White became Executive Director of the Philadelphia Housing Authority 
(PHA) at the time when Mayor Rendell installed himself as the PHA Chairman. 
This look place afLer Lile U.S. Depcutmeut uf Huusing and Urban Development 
(HUD) ended its one-year takeover of the PHA. For more on the PHA j see 
Bissinger (1997, 244-249). 

11. Whites were estimated to account for between 40% and 45"/0 uf Lhe Demu­
cratic Party primary turnout; with the majority of the remainder Hispanic. 

12. Declaring one's race is now optional on voter registration forms in Penn­
sylvania. Therefore, official registration data can no longer be regarded as en­
tirely accurate with regard to breakdown of voters by race. 

13. Although Weinberg endorsed Street, many of his major donors crossed 
over to Katz. One of the first WUG J uck Wolgin, il developer. Wolgin had donated 
$70,000 to Weinberg. On June 1, 1999, Wolgin gave $100,000 to the Katz cam­
paign (Warner 1999). Many of Weinberg's voters did not join him in moving to 
Street. According to Pennsylvania's Keystone Poll, 83% of the respondents who 
had voted for Weinberg in the Democratic primary intended to vote for Katz in 
the general election. Street faced similar problems with the supporters of at least 
two other primary opponents. Fernandez' voters supported Katz over Street, 
69% to 15%. White's supporters also indicated a preference (albeit less conclu­
sive) for Katz, supporting him over Street, 37% to 24% (Center for Opinion Re­
search 1999). Happy Fernandez also endorsed Katz. After the primary;. she had 
become President of the Moore College of Art and Design, a women's college 
located in Philadelphia. 

14. Rendell endorsed Street donated more than $100,000 to the Street cam­
paign, and taped television commercials for Street. Katz, the ex-Democrat who 
helped Rendell develop his financial recovery plan for the City, cited the number 
of prominent Rendell supporters who were backing his candidacy. Katz's media 
consultant was Neil Oxman, who had been the architect of Rendell's 1991 and 
1995 campaigns. His campaign director was another Democrat, Bob Barnett . 

. 15. Exhibiting a new interest in electing Democratic mayors (probably the 
result of Republicans having been elected mayor in New York City and Los An­
geles, the two largest, and usually reliable Democratic, American cities), the DNC 
created a National Democratic Mayors Campaign Committee. The DNC ini­
tially set aside $250,000 for this initiative. The effort also paid off in Indianapolis, 
where a Democrat (Bart Peterson) was elected for the first time in over 30 years. 

16. Other Democrats who came to Philadelphia to campaign with Street were 
DNC Chair Joe Andrews, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, and Detroit 

80 



Mayor Dennis Archer. In addition, many voters received pre-recorded phone 
messages from either President Clinton or First Lady Hillary Clinton. 

17. The AFL-CIO Philadelphia Council, which had remained neutral in the 
primary, endorsed and actively campaigned for Street in the general election. 
The city's buildings trades unions declared Election Day a holiday, giving their 
members the opportunity to work and vote for Street. 

18 There is also the counter-example of David Dinkins whose white support 
declined when he sought re-election in 1993. His loss of white support was ac­
companied by a decline in turnout among black voters, allowing Giuliani to de­
feat him in a re-match of their 1989 race. For more on the 1993 New York City 
mayoral election, see Lorraine C. Minnite, David K. Park, and Daniel M. 
Slotweiner, "White, Black and Latino Voter Turnout in the 1993 New York City 
Mayoral Election: A Comparison of Ecological Regression Techniques and Exit 
Poll Data," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Boston, September 4, 1998. 

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81 



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