ó Looking Back on the Legislative Modernization Movement in Pennsylvania: Remarks of Herbert Fineman, Former Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Given at the Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, April 4, 2003 at Villanova University, (with introduction and commentary by Michael Cassidy) On April 4, 2003 the Pennsylvania Political Science Association (PPSA) hosted a roundtable discussion on "The Legislative Modernization Movement in Pennsylvania: A Look Back at the 1960s and the 1970s." The panel included Herbert Finemun, furmer Speuker uf the Perm:;ylvuniu Huu:;,e uf Repre::;entu­ tives. Fineman appeared with Franklin Kury, a prominent Harrisburg lobbyist andformer Deputy Attorney General, House member, and state Senator known for his authorship of landmark public utility regulatory reform and environ­ mental protection legislation in the 1970s. The panel also included Rutgers Uni­ versity Professor Alan Rosenthal, the author of numerous books on state legisla­ tures and a key advisor to state legislatures and national legislative leadership organizations. Fineman was the featured speaker. His prepared remarks were followed by commentsfrom the other panelists. Known as the 'father of the modern Pennsylvania legislature" and the II ar­ chitect of legislative reform," Speaker Fineman was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1954 and was elected to the Democratic caucus leadership as Whip in 1965. He served as the Democratic Floor Leader from 1967 to 1968 and from 1973 to 1974. He was Speaker from 1969 to 1972 and from 1975 to 1977 (Pennsylvania House ]ounIal 1994; Pennsylvania House of Representatives Homepage 2003). Fineman's tenure in the House was timed perfectly to allow him to partici­ pate in the nationwide legislatlVe reform movement. The first major concerns about the inadequacies of twentieth century state legislatures were expressed around the time of Fineman '5 first election to the House (Heard 1966a, 1-4). The movement for legislative 111.odernization was strongest nationally from 1965 to 1980, corresponding closely with Fineman's service in House leadership posi­ tions (Rosenthal 1998, 49). During his time as leader, Fineman rose to promi­ nence in the national reform movement and led Pennsylvania's modemizatio11 efforts. He shared the goals of that movement and helped shape its proposals. Political scientists generally described these goals in terms of the basic functions of the legislative branch: representation, lawmaking, and oversight. Thus, re- 87 formers wanted to provide legislators ,[pith the tools to perform their representa­ tional function, enable them to independently formulate public policy, and em­ power the legislature as a co-equal branch of government (Herzberg and Rosenthal 1971 , ni-7Jii; Kpp,.fp 1966, 37-47; 1971, 187). Legislative practitioners just wanted to build the "competence to meet problems of our society where they arise" (Margolis 1971, 25-27). In his presentation to the PPSA, Speaker Fi11eman described the need, moti­ vation, challenge, and scope of the reform movement that completely transformed the legislative institution in Pennsylvania. His remarks are reprinted here in full. The commentary that follows is intended to describe Pennsylvania's reform efforts in more detail, to place them in their national context, and to amplify Fineman's remarks with some of the comments made by the other panelists. Remarks of Speaker Herbert Fineman 1 W('lS fhst elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for the term commencing in 1955, and I continued to serve consecutive terms thereafter for a period of 22 years. During that long tour of duty, I expe­ rienced the maturing of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives from a totally ineffective, non-analytical, non-originating, non-constituency­ oriented organ of state government to an entity that in 1977 was well on its way to becoming that which had been envisioned by the framers of our state constitution an equal coordinate branch of government. Prior to the onset of structural and procedural reform in the PelU1syl­ vania House of Representatives, its primary role had been merely to give its automatic stamp of approval to whatever proposals came forth from the office of the state's chief executive. The fact is that the House of Rep­ resentatives existed, not because of any contribution it was making to state government or its people, but rather because Article I of the Consti­ tution of 1790 provided that "the legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The physical facilities of House mem­ bers were totally in consonance with the House's meaningless status. We had no offices, we had no telephones, we had no file cabinets, we had no desks except that which was assigned to us on the floor of the House Chambers, we had no place to meet with constituents who might come to· the Capitol, and no regular secretarial service and we were being paid the grand total of $3,000 per annum. I must, in all candor, admit that as a newly elected member to the house in 1955, I was not immediately able to discern the vastness of those shortcomings. I had been so enamored of the fact that, as an unendorsed candidate, I had been elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representa­ tives and additionally was so awe-struck by the beauty of the House Cham­ ber itself, that a dear vision or perspective of the then role of the House of 88 Representatlves In state government did not manifest itself to me. As the years passed, however, and I was able to assume roles of lead­ ership, the myopia cleared and there slowly arose within me a very strong desire to be part of an effort to bring the House to that status of being an equal coordinate branch of government. I knew that this was a result that could ensue only if the House could independently, with its own research resources and information, begin to analyze the changing mani­ festations and complexities of state government responsibilities, to more clearly discern the escalating needs of our citizenry, and to create pro­ posals to meet those challenges. These ends had to be pursued, not through reliance upon the governor, lobbying organizations, or other sources, which was so much the case then, but rather through our own analysis and research efforts. Only in this manner would the judgments to be concluded by us be independently arrived at. This would necessi­ tate research facilities and staff expertise as well as necessary physical accommodations and appropriate member compensation, all of which would be in consonance with the deep needs of the House. And so we embarked on that endeavor. When I first became the Democratic Floor Leader in 1967, I sought to engage, for the initial time, gualified pru[et;t;iUIliil pert;unnel for my of­ fice and those of other officers of the Democratic Caucus. Subsequently, in 1969 when I was elected Speaker, we also engaged staff for all commit­ tee chairmen. It was made emmently clear to all chairmen, however, that those to be employed were not to be political patronage appointees, but rather the most able' personnel available. These included researchers, at­ torneys, communication personnel, legislative analysts, and administra­ tive assistants. In due course, personnel were also made available for all members. The real surge in reform efforts took place commencing in the 1969-70 session. At least 13 new procedural changes were initiated during that period, including: • Creation of an ethics committee • Reduction in the number of House standing committees from 33 to 21 • An increase in minority representation on each committee (from a 13-6 distribution to 14-9) to reflect more accurately the division of the House between majority and minority • Limitation on the power of a committee chairman to kill a legis­ lative proposal, either by not calling a meeting or by failing to submit a legislative proposal to the committee for consideration • Installation of a vote lock system to ensure against absentee voting • Opening of all cOl1uniLLee llleetingt; Lu the public • Installation of a fiscal note system assessing the cost, on both a 89 one-year and a five-year basis, of every legislative proposal on the calendar so that House members and the public were more fully informed as to costs prior to enactment • Establishment of orientation sessions for all new members • Creation of a legislative audit advisory commission • Employment of public hearings on legislation • Synopsis of every bill reported to the calendar for members and the press Thus, the year 1969 was truly the real starting point of reform in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. In subsequent years, we further provided for the establishment of a commonwealth compensation com­ mission. I have already noted that legislative compensation in 1955 was $3,000; today a legislator earns $64,638 per annum plus expenses. In a span of 48 years base legislative salaries have increased a total of $61,638. Since 1995 salaries have been tied to a cost-of-living basis .. We also held a greater number of public hearings throughout the Com­ monwealth, provided for public televising of House sessions and public hearings, provided for the auditing of legislative accounts by independent public accounting firms, and made such audits available to the public. One of the 11,me important legislaLive iIUluvatium; was initiated in 1976 when we created the Legislative Office for Research Liaison, known as L.O.R.L. This office was created to make the knowledge and expertise of the Commonwealth's uruversities in scientitic and technical matters available to legislators on social, physical, and life sciences. Originally, six schools participated in this program. Today, at least 20 do. The continuing installation of procedural reform was of vital impor­ tance in enabling legislators to be more effective in discharging their vary­ ing responsibilities, which include acting as a representative of and spokesman for the needs and desires of constituents; serving as an om­ budsman where injustices occur because of official red tape, rules, and regulations; being an iImovalor and IniliaLol of Il(;!W prugrams; and exer­ cising legislative oversight functions. While it is true that organizational structures and legislative proce­ dures are important to the quality of legislative performance, procedural ref.orm in and of itself does not automatically yield more efficient and more effective state government. Nor should a legislature be judged solely on the basis of its procedural mechanisms and facilities, as the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures had done at one time. Rather, it should be judged by how well it represents the heterogeneous population of Pennsylvania and by the quality of its legislative output. To do other­ wise would be much like evaluating a football team by the quality of the stadium it plays in, or the kiml uf lucker room facilities or equipment that are provided, or the uniforms that are furnished. The best equipped 90 team is not always. the best performer. The Constitutional Convention that penned the U.S. Constitution and the early congresses of the na­ tional e;ovf'rnmf'nt w()ulo inof'f'o r<'ltf' vf'ry l()w in tf'rm~ ()f f<'lcilities ;mo organizational structures, but what they produced has endured and served us well for over 200 years. Resources most certainly are important and vital, but they are not the entire story. Conceivably, legislatures that have little may use that little very well, and legislatures that have much may use what they have poorly. What matters is the degree of commitment to the tasks at hand, and the spirit and dedication with which those tasks are undertaken. I believe that the benefits of procedural reform, coupled with the enthusiasm for the tasks at hand that may be engendered by legislative leaders, can to­ gether make the legislatures true laboratories of democracy. Commentary on Speaker Fineman's Remarks by Michael Cassidy If Herbert Fineman had not been a panelist on the PPSA roundtable on legislative modernization, whoever was on the panel would inevita­ bly discuss Herb Fineman's crucial role in Pennsylvania's efforts and his substantial contribution to the national effort, which he omitted from his remarks. Of course, Fineman was not solely responsible for legislative reform and modernization in Pennsylvania. There were others like Judge Robert E. Woodside, author James Michener, lv1ellon Charitable Trust president Theodore Hazlett, Jr., and former governors George Leader, William Scranton, ,and Raymond Shafer. Other legislative leaders also played important roles, especially K. Leroy Irvis, James J. Manderino, and Matthew Ryan, all of whom served with Fineman and would follow him as Speaker. State Senate leaders, such as former Senate President Pro Tempore Henry Hager, also were important. But for the 11 years be­ tween 1967 and 1977, Fineman was the main force and catalyst for legis­ lative modernization as he alternately served as Democratic Floor Leader and Speaker. He was the chief point of contact with the national reform movement and the leader with the power (sometimes unilateral) to ini~ Hate change in Pennsylvania. It is obvious from his remarkR that Fineman's major, but not exclu­ sive, focus was internal capacity building described early in the reform movement by Donald Herzberg as the "six S's," i.e. "improved staff, ser­ vices, space, salaries, sessions and spirit" (Heard 1966b, 159; Rosenthal 1998,50-54). Decades later, Herb Fineman still would be remembered for his insistence on upgrading the working conditions of the members of the General At;sembly. At; Hout;e Democratic Flour Leader Ivan Itkin said on June 7, 1994 at the unveiling of Fineman's portrait in the State Capitol building, Fineman "gave lawmakers the tools they needed to compre­ hend the issues that crossed their desks." "In fact,'" Itkin added, Fineman 91 "gave them the desks and offices in the first place." Matthew Ryan, then Republican Floor Leader and a former Speaker, commented on what Fineman's national role in the reform movement meant to Pennsylvania: It WClb Hero who cuuld be caught researching a new initiative or exchanging sought-after innovative ideas from lawmakers na­ tionwide. When Herb Fineman went to NCSL (National Confer­ ence of State Legislatures) or one of the other national legislative leadership meetings, it was not as junketeer. He went as an of­ ficer of that group, he went as a player, as a man who was going there to contribute to that organization and to take - he was a taker. He took the ideas of the other states and brought them back to Pennsylvania and really helped to modernize und muke this House - and the Senate would steal our ideas - and this general legislature better because of what he brought back from these other states, and other states better because of what they got from him. Speaker H. William DeWeese summarized the testimonials given that day by thanking Fineman for his "legacy of modernization" (Pennsylva­ nia House Journal 1994, 1067-1073). It is difficult Lo overestimaLe Lhe impurtClJll:e uf the rnuderni:.Gatiun ef­ fort on the way legislators and their institution function. Former Senator Franklin Kury described his participation in the 2003 PPSA panel as II what lawyers call a I competent witness'" to institutional changes in the legisla­ ture. Kury recalled that when elected to the House in 1966, he had little or no staff support or even regular access to phones to make long distance calls. He recounted how there was no staff to help explain bills in caucus meetings or to provide independent analysis of the Governor's budget request. Even basic secretarial services were scarce. But some members like Kury had an advantage. In the pre-modernization legislature, law­ yers, insurance agents, and other business professionals could rely on their private uffices Lu llClIlllle cUIl!;tituent currebpondence and other public busi­ ness, but other legislators could not. As he put it, "Thank God I was a lawyer and had a secretary back in the district to put out mail for me." Kury was elected to the state Senate in 1972 at a time when staffing for individual members of the Senate was just becoming available. In his PPSA panel comments, he spoke with great pride of his work in the Sen­ ate made possible, in large part, by his newly-acquired authority to hire qualified staff to help develop the major legislation he sponsored to reor­ ganize the Public Utility Commission. "This is what I feel proudest about," said Kury. "Until that point in Pennsylvania, whenever the Senate of Pennsylvania wanted legislation drafted [on utility issues] we went to the lobbybt uf the Electric Association. We didn't do that. We gave him 92 our bill and asked for his comments rather than the other way around!" Staffing improvements and the other modernization reforms, Kury ar­ gued, gave the Senate the ability to develop its own lPf;islMion (Pennsyl­ vania Political Science Association 2003). Kury's and Fineman's recollections were in substantial agreement with a 1968 study done by EBS Management Consultants of New York for Pennsylvania's Commission on Legislative Modernization. That report stated that except for the desks on the chamber floor, lithe average Rep­ resentative does not have a desk or telephone and the average Senator finds himself in a room with three other Senators" (Commission on Leg­ islative Modernization 1969/95; also see 56 and 94-102). While these and other accounts of the inadequacies of legislative staff and facilities abound/ no account from the 1960s seems to exist that argues the opposing propo­ sition. Historical Background and Pressures for Modernization in Pennsylvania After a period of relative legislative supremacy in Pennsylvania and nationally, beginning with long fought battles for legislative power in tll~ l:ulunial periud that reached their peak during the Revolutionary War period, legislatures - the "First Branch" - went into a long period of decline after the Jacksonian Era (Advisory Commission on Intergovern­ mental Relations 1985, 31-35; Commission on Legislative Modernization 1969, 56-62; Wolf 1969, 1-3). In reaction to widespread corruption, Pennsylvania's legislature was hobbled by the Constitution of 1 R74, which greatly limited legislative powers by making legislative sessions bien­ nial unless called into special session by the Governor, and by limiting the legislature's ability to raise revenues. As a "dubious" anti-bribery measure, the 1874 document also increased the size of the Senate from 33 members to 50 and the size of the House from 100 members to 200 (Com­ IIlis~ion on Legislative Modernization 1969, 62-6'1; Wolf 1969, 4-5). These anticorruption reforms did not work. The Pennsylvania legislature suf­ fered further degradation under the control of the infamously powerful and corrupt Quay / Penrose machine, which used the legislature as its powerbase in the decades that bracketed the turn of the century (Beers 1980, 41-57). Reformers of every stripe would spend nearly a century trying to undo the damage. Pennsylvania was not alone. After suffering more than a century of neglect and worse, state legislatures all over the nation were considered inept, antiquated institutions. In 1966 Alexander Heard, a political scien­ tist and Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, wrote his often quoted ob­ servation that "state legislatures may be our most extreme example of institutional lag. In their formal qualities they are largely nineteenth cen- 93 MIry organizations and they must or should. address themselves to twen­ tieth century problems" (Heard 1966a, 3). It \'vas clear to many that these nineteenth century institutions would have to undergo significant change to meet the challenges from above in the form of new federally-imposed responsibilities and from below in the form of increasing expectations from voters. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs sig­ naled the quickening of a fundamental shift in the federal-state relation­ ship. Where New Deal programs were administered by new federal bu­ reaucracies, Johnson's "War on Poverty" provided federal money for new state and locally administered programs. According to a 1976 report of the federBl Arlvl~ory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, fed­ eral aid to the states had increased from $2.9 billion in 1954 to over $60 billion in 1976 (Shapp v. Sloan 1978, 603). This process of devolution ac­ celerated under the Nixon Administration and culminated in the block grant approach used in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 in the first year of the Reagan Administration (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1985, ch. 2). Even without this push from the federal government, states like Penn­ sylvania were expanding services and budgets to meet growing expecta­ tions in basic education, higher education, labor and safety, highway construction, environmental protection, new human services, and struc­ tures for internal accountability. In Pennsylvania, for example, Governor John Fine's 1953-54 biennial budget hit $1 billion (Beers 1980, 185). Fed­ eral funding of state programs as we know it today did not exist. In 1971 the General Assembly passed Governor Milton Shapp's first annual bud­ get, which recommended spending just over $3 billion in state funds plus $768 million in federal money (Governor's Executive Budget 1971-1972, A17-19). This represented a six fold increase in state spending unly par­ tially explained by a roughly 50% increase in the Consumer Price Index between 1955 and 1970 and a 9% increase in Pennsylvania'S population from the 1950 to the 1970 census. These new federal and homegrown responsibilities for effectively and f'fficif'ntly managing programs and money called into question the ca­ pacity of state governmental institutions. Awakening from a period of . stagnation that the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1985, 35) once called "The States Asleep, 1922-1955," a wave of reforms transformed both the executive and legislative branches in many states. From the 1960s into the 1980s, state legislatures including Pennsylvania's underwent a difficult process of modernization tu meet these new challenges. Prodded by its legendary House Speaker, Jesse Umuh, California led by raising legislative salaries, providing staff and offices, and implementing procedural reforms (Rosenthal 1971b, 11). 94 A National Movement Emulating reforms in California and in Congress, a national move­ ment for legislaLive modernization emerged in the 1960::;. The movemenl lacked a single structured leadership or plan (Rosenthal 1998, 50). Many groups participated prominently such as the American Assembly, the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders (NCSLL), the Ameri­ can Political Science Association (APSA), the federal Advisory Commis­ sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the Council of State Gov­ ernments (CSG), the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL), the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University, and various chap­ tpr~ of thp 1.P£lV1P ofWompn Votprs (Advisory Commission on TntPTgov­ ernmental Relations 1985, 68). In addition, the long-standing reform or­ ganization, the National Municipal League, was heavily focused on state constitutional reform and revision. The National Legislative Conference, a group largely comprised of the staff directors of legislative service agen­ cies, actively pursued a reform agenda and made comprehensive reform recommendalions as eady as 1961 (Heard 1966b, 158-162). The shared purpose of these groups resulted in strikingly similar recommendations and identified best practices. Alan Rosenthal (1971b, 3-4) summarized the reform proposals from different organizations into a short list of nine general programmatic recommendations: 1. Elimination of many constitutional limitations on the authority of state legislatures, including limits on the taxing power, ear­ marking of revenues, requirements on referenda, and legislator compensation. 2. Increase in the frequency and length of legislative sessions, with­ out limitation on time or subject. 3. Reduction of the size of legislative bodies so that they are no larger than fair representation requires. 4. Increase in compensation and related benefits, with expenses of legislative service fully reimbursed. 5. Adoption of more rigorous standards of conduct by means of codes of ethics and conflict of interest, disclosure, and lobbying legislation, as well as ethics committees or commissions with some enforcement powers. 6. Adequate space and facilities for committees and individual members, including electronic data processing and roll-call vot­ ing equipment. 7. Improvement of legislative operations to ensure efficiency in the consideration of bills and the widespread dissemination of pro­ cedural and substantive information. 8. Strengthening of standing committees by reducing their num- 95 ber, defining their jurisdictions, and improving their procedures. 9. Increasing the number and competence of legislabve staff work­ ing for leaders, committees, and rank-and-file members. Although ostensibly independent on paper, these reform groups were interrelated in many respects. For example, Larry Margolis, staff direc­ tor of the CCSL, was the former staff director for California Speaker Unruh. The NCSLL, the CCSL, and Unruh worked closely with Donald Herzberg and Alan Rosenthal of the Eagleton Institute (Herzberg and Ru~eIlthal1971, viii-xii). Speaker Fineman served as an o[ficel~ and ulll­ mately president, of the NCSLL in the early 19705 - a post held in the 1960s by Speaker Umuh. In addition to the staff of the NCSLL, Fineman counted people like Alan Rosenthal of Eagleton and Larry Margolis among his close associates. When the NCSLL, the NLC, and other groups merged to form the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1976, they became a powerful voice for continuing modernization. At the same time, the NCSLL spun off the State Legislative Leaders Foundation. Thp Tpform pffort!"> of thpsp organizations often shared common pri­ vate funding sources. The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corpora­ tion funded the work of the CCSL and the Eagleton Institute seminar series on legislative modernization, as well as many of the National Municipal League's efforts at state constitutional reform (Burns 1971, preface; Heard 1966b, 158-159; Rosenthal 1998, ix-x; Wolf 1969, iv). Penn­ sylvania was among 13 states receiving grants from the APSA and the Ford Foundation for new legislator orientation programs, which were first held in December 1970.'Fineman and all future speakers continued the new member orientations (Wise 1984, vi). The APSA also sponsored a series of books on individual state legislatures to introduce new legis­ lators and the public to the legislative process. The series includprJ Sidnpy Wise's 1971 book The Legislative Process in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylva­ nia House published a second edition in 1984. Cross-pollinated, coop­ era live, bipartisan, and largely non-competitive, these groups, along with academics and individual state legislative leaders and members, formed a national movement dedicated to reforming the institutions of repre­ sentative government. . The most effective public campaign was launched by the CCSL, which formed in 1965 to evaluate each legislature and make recommendations for legislative rules changes and capacity building. It established a de­ tailed set of criteria for use in assessing legislative capability. These crite­ ria were organized under general headings that formed the ::lcronym EA.I.I.R - Functionality, Accountability, Information handling capabil­ ity, Independence, and Representativeness. Each of these headings was broken down into sub-criteria, such as size of the legislature (a peculiar fetish of many reformers), committee structure, staffing, facilities, public 96 access to information, internal accountability, fiscal review capabilities, conflict of interest rules, and member effectiveness (Burns 1971, 37-150). The CCSL also evaluated each legislature according to F.A.I.I.R. criteria, it made specific recommendations about each, and it ranked the legisla­ tures in its "complete report" in 1971 (Citizens Conference on State Legis­ latures 1971). The group summarized the results in a 1971 Bantam paper­ back by John Burns targeted to the general public titled The Sometime Gov­ ernments: A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures. California, both the poster child and gold standard for reformers, scored first in the over­ all rankings (Burns 1971, 181-6). Pennsylvania, with its reforms only par­ tially complete at the time of the study, ranked 21 among the 50 states. On individual criteria, Pennsylvania ranked 37 on Functionality (penalized in part for the legislature's large size), 23 on Accountability, 23 on Informed, 5 on Independence and 36 on Representativeness (Burns 1971,289-94). Predictably, these rankings were highly controversial and hotly con­ tested in state legislatures across the country. Speaker Fineman and other state legislative leaders railed against the rankings when they were re­ leased. He argued then, as he did years later in his remarks before the PPSA panel; that the best equipped legislature is not always the best per­ former. During the PPSA panel discussion, Alan Rosenthal reflected on the controversy. He said he had told Margolis that the rankings were "in­ defensible social science." Rosenthal reported that Margolis replied, "if you don't give them a number, no one will ever remember it." With the advantage of hindsight, Rosenthal says that the ranking system was "ter­ rible social science. It was stupidity. But it was political brilliance." Fair or unfair, the numerical rankings were a great motivator for state legislative reform efforts. Even Fineman now characterizes his old disagreement with Margolis as a disagreement between friends (Pennsylvania Political Sci­ ence Association 2003). In the decades that followed the release of the CCSL report, the EA.I.I.R. criteria (it not the rankings) were used by groups such as the ACIR to evaluate state legislative capacity (Advisory Com­ mission on Intergovernmental Relations 19t$5, 69-112). Constitutional Revision in Pennsyvania In 1955 the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, known as the Kestnbaum Commission, issued its report to President Eisenhower recommending the return of governmental functions to the states, while urging sweeping revisions in antiquated state constitutions. This report gave a boost to the work of the National Municipal League and reform­ ers at the state level (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela­ tions 1985, 40-61). States also reacted to the landmark "one man, one vote" decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (1962) requiring states to reapportion their legislatures to ensure equal representation 97 based on population. Reapportionment by the new standard often re­ quired constitutional revision; and in many states, such as Pennsylvania, it provided an opportunity to redress other state constitutional provi­ sions effecting legislative capacity. In 1959 and 1967, in work that was largely completed before Fineman's ascendancy, Pennsylvania amended its Constitution of 1874 to remove the restrictions on legislative sessions. The 1959 Amendment established an­ nual sessions, with the even year being devoted to budget matters and the odd year to other legislation (Legislative H.eterence Bureau 1986, 173-4). This Amendment opened the way for a full time legislature, but one that still needed the Executive to call special sessions in the "budget years" to consider substantive legislation. During the Leader Administration, the· General Assembly created the Commission on Constitutional Revision, referred to as the "Woodside Commission" after its chairman, former House Republican Leader and then Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge Robert E. Woodside. In its report, the commission treated the 1959 amendment as a half-way measure and recommended that the legislature be a 1/ continu­ ing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected" (Re­ port of the Commission on Constitutional Revision 1959, 19-20). The legislatIve workload Juxtaposed with constItutional limitations made "special sessions" called by the Governor a practical and constitu­ tional necessity in the 1960s. Seven special sessions were called between 1959 and 1966 - one by Governor Lawrence and six by Governor Scranton. Some of these special sessions were little more than an extra rpV] 1ar spssion with . July 8. Pennsylvania House Journal. 1967. March 6. __ .1994.June 7. Pennsylvania ManuaL 2001-2002. Vol. 115. Harrisburg, PA: Department of Gen­ eral Services. Pennsylvania Political Science Association. 2003. "Roundtable on Pennsylvania Legislative Modernization." Annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, Villanova UniverSity, April 4. Videotape recording. PA House of Representatives Archives: Harrisburg, PA. Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision. 1959. Harrisburg, PA. Richardson, H.L.1978. What Makes You Think We Read The Bills? Ottawa, Illinois: Green Hill Publishers. Rosenthat Alan. 1971a. "Consequences of Legislative Staffing." In Strengthening the States: Essays on Legislative Reform, ed. Donald G. Herzberg and Alan Rosenthal. New York: Doubleday. __ .1998. The Decline of Representative Democracy: Process, Participation, and Power in State Legislatures. Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly Press. __ . 1971b. "The Scope of Legislative Reform: An Introduction." In Strengthen­ ing the States: Essays on Legislative Reform, ed. Donald G. Herzberg and Alan Rosentha1. New York: Doubleday. __ . 1971 c. "Strategies and Tactics of Reform: An Introduction." In Strengthen­ ing the States: Essays 011 Legislative Reform, ed. Donald G. Herzberg and Alan Rosenthal. New York: Doubleday. Rosenthal, Alan, Burdett A. Loomis, John R. Hibbing, and Karl T. Kurtz. 2003. Republic On Trial: The Case For Representative Democracy. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. lOY Shapp v. Sloan. 1978.391 A.2nd 595 (PA). Wise, Sidney. 1 Y71. The Legislative Frocess 111 Fennsylvania. Washington D.C.: Ameri­ can Political Science Association. 1984. The Legislative Process in Pennsylvania. 2nd ed. Harrisburg, PA: Penn­ sylvania House of Representatives. Wolf, George D. 1969. Constitutional Revision in Penl1sylvania: The Duel Tactic of Amendment and Limited Convention. New York: National Municipal League. 110