ó Nietzsche's Rejection of Wagner: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Politics William F. Byrne The Catholic University of America Nietzsche's late anti-Vvagner tracts receive little attention from political sci­ Cilfists, yet they offer important insights into Nietzsche's philosophical thought ami into the relationship of art to political behavior. For Nietzsche, both the lilli/antic and the 'Christian' elements vf Wuxner'tj vpnutj embudy 1lie 'slave morality' that is characteristic of modernity. 'Decadent' art like Wagner's tends 10 deaden the listener to the moral demands of real life, and instead promotes a longing for a transfigured exterior world. This can be manifested politically in the form of ideological movements that aim to destroy the old order and erect a 11t'W utopian order in its place. In these writings Nietzsche positions himself auainst expansive romanticism and nihilism, and emerges as a surprisingly strong dassieist, albeit an unconventional one. Relationships between great minds are always of interest to scholars, and that between Friedrich Nietzsche and Richard Wagner is of more interest than most because it wat; t;O intent;e, 1:iU well documenLed, and marked by such a dramatic reversal. While as a young man Nietzsche practically worshipped Wagner, he later came to despise the man and his romantic operas. Nietzsche not only included derogatory remarks about Wagner in several of his later works, but also took the extraordi­ nary step of writing two polemical pieces directed specifically against Wagner, his operas, and his influence: The Case of Wagner and Nietzsche (ontra Wagner. While a considerable body of literature exists on the Nietzsche-Wagner relationship, relatively little serious philosophical at­ tention has been devoted to these two late works. However, an analysis of them reveals that despite their polemical style, their lack of structure, ,md their narrow fUl:u1:i OIl Wagller, lhese shorl books are rich in philo­ sophical content. Indeed, because they are directed at the specific 1/ con­ crete" problem of Wagner in considerable detail, they provide a unique window into Nietzsche's thought that complements his broader philO­ sophical writings. -Political theorists in particular (and, in fact, political scientists gener­ ally) can benefit from the study of these two neglected works because in them Ni~tzsche offers important insights into the relationship of aesthet­ ics to ethics and politics. Nietzsche believed that Wagner's work pm­ bodied a particular form of morality characteristic of modernity, and that the. moral framework fostered in part by his influence tended to shape society and politics in particular wayt;. Specifically, Nielzsche seems to 1 have seen in Wagner's work, and in modern romantic and sentimental art generally, the seeds of the kinds of ideological mass movements that would arise in the early twentieth century. This is not because he be­ lieved that these works expressed specific political or ideological views, but because they somehow embodied a "decadent" morality that would en,courage individuals to embrace particular types of politics. Nietzsche's umlen;ldlLuillg uf how ad can serve as a kind of driver for morality and, consequently, for political behavior, has enduring value and demands the attention of political theorists today. To develop a better understanding of Nietzsche's views on art, mo­ rality, and politics, this article will explore some of the philosophical con­ tent of The Case of Wagner and Nietzsche contra Wagner. (Although the latter was billed as a compilation of remarks from various earlier works, it actually incorporates a considerable amount of new or modified mate­ rial.) Preceding this examination will be a brief treatment of Nietzsche's early pro-Wagner views as expressed in The Birth of Tragedy and Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. The purpose of reviewing these works is not to offer anything like a full treatment uf Nidz,::H . .:he'b early aesthetic views bullo . provide a context for the rejection of Wagner that was to follow. Nietzsche's treatments of Wagner are as unsystematic as his more ex­ pressly philosophical works, but it will become evident that despite some noteworthy tensions Nietzsche remains reasonably consistent philosophi­ cally throughout his praise and condemnation of Wagner, although some maturation, refinement, and clarification of his thought are apparent. The bulk of Nietzsche's anti-Wagner remarks may be grouped into two broad areas: a narrower group of criticisms that directly reflect Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity and that focus on I Christian' elements in Wagner's operas, and a broader grouping of criticisms that focus on the romantic uimen:;iurlli uf Wagner's work Il will be demonstrated that Nietzsdle not only saw a very close relationship between romantic art and the llslave morality" he associated with Christianity, but that he was keenly aware of the political dangers which could arise trom this type of I romantic' morality. The Nietzsche that emerges here is a I classicist' of a sortl' and the peculiar brand of classicism that is so strongly evident in these anti­ Wagner works can be seen to permeate Nietzsche's philosophical thought . . Nietzsche's Embrace and Rejection of Wagner Most good biographical and general historical/ philosophical works on Nietzsche provide some treatment of his relationship with Richard Wagner. As a young man Nietzsche became captivated with Wagner's music, and upon meeting Wagner he became captivated with the man as well and grew very close to him. While the literature suggests that per- 2 ~;onalities were probably the most important factor in the intensity of their n:'lationship, it is also clear that a philosophical dimension was present from the beginning. For one thing, when they met both men were very interested in Schopenhauer, although Nietzsche would soon begin to move away from him More importantly, Wagner's music and Hbrettos ~parked Nietzsche's interest in the morat philosophical, and psychologi­ cal dimensions of art, and Nietzsche found Wagner's writings on aes­ thetics useful (Hollingdale 1965, 60). As for Nietzsche's later rejection of Wagner, much of the scholarly speculation has focused on Nietzsche's later psychological state and on various aspects of his personal relation­ !,hips with Wagner and his wife. In addition, some scholars such as Walter Kaufmann point to alarm on Nietzsche's part at Wagner's increasingly public role in promoting anti-Semitism and German imperialism, al­ though Nietzsche mentions these concerns only in passing (Kaufmann ]974,38). In Nietzsche's own view, however, the basis for his rejection of Wagner was largely philosophical. The biographer RJ. Hollinen81f' ;:)r­ gues that Wagner's influence had essentially led Nietzsche astray and contributed to some confusion in his early philosophy, and that in reject­ ing Wagner Nietzsche was coming into his own (Hollingdale 1965, 78). Thus, an exploration of some of the philosophical bases for Nietzsche's reversal highlights important aspects of his mature thought. In Richard Wagner in Bayreuth Nietzsche heaps praise upon Wagner and closely associates his operas with the best of classical Greek tragedy. Nietzsche had already dedicated to Wagner his early work The Birth of Tragedy, in which he attempts to explain the nature and value of Greek tragedy. In that book Nietzsche identifies and describes the two elements that he believes characterize great tragic works, thf' "Apol1onian" and "Dionysian," and he associates these elements with 1/ dream and intoxi­ cation" respectively (Nietzsche 1872, 19). The Apollonian is associated with visual imagery, symbols, an elevating sense of order: " ... Apollo himself may be regarded as the marvelous divine image of the principium individuationis, whose looks and gestures radiate the full delight, wis­ dom, and beauty of 'illusion'" (Nietzsche 1872, 22). In contrast, the Dionysian element shatters the principium individuationis in an ecstatic awareness of life: "50 'stirred, the individual forgets himself completely" (Nietzsche 1872, 22). The Dionysian dimension reflects the fact that one has st:;en, and in a sense one has embraced and been swept up in, all of life, including violence and the inevitability of one's own death. Accord­ ing to Tracy Strong, '''Dionysian' appears to be identified not with the chaos, but rather with knowledge ... of the chaos and of the artifice of human life and importance," and it "sees through the illusion that pro­ vides form and definition of the culture" (Strong 1975, 140-141). The Dionysian offers vitality to the Apollonian element; it represents reality 3 in rl way that the concepts evoked by Apollonian II dream" and "illusion" cannot. The Apollonian makes possible individuation, order, and the creation of beauty, and provides a kind of counter-balance to the Dionysian. For Nictzschc, all art, to be great, must possess properly de­ veloped Apollonian and Dionysian elements, in proper balance. Although the two elements are equally important, what is most often missing in what passes for I art' today is the Dionysian element. While Nietzsche does not quite explicitly use the Apollonian-Dionysian formula in his pro-Wagner Bayreuth essay, it is plainly evident that he finds both ele­ ments to be properly present in Wagnerian opera. The libretto and stag­ ing are primarily associated with the ApollOnian dimension, while the most crucial elempnt, Wrlgnpr's music, represents the Dionysian. Nietzsche recognizes man's existence as inevitably tragic. One com- mentator explains that the know-ledge that W"e need to knoW" the essence the perma­ nent thing-m-itself "behind" the appearances-to make life in­ telligible and meaningful to us and the concomitant knowl­ edge that we cannot possibly know such an essence make our existence contradictory and therefore tragic. Resignation and Dionysian pessimism are the only two possible responses to this existential tension of the human condition, once it is rec­ ognized. The latter is an artistic affirmation in tragic music and nrama of the transient and ultimately unknowable character of life, but also of its beauty and power. (Heilke 1998,56) The young Nietzsche finds that, like Greek tragedy, Wagner's operas feature great heroes involved in deeds ilnd events that strike at the core of one's life, and that in Wagnerian opera one is able to recognize oneself as a tragic character and thereby become ennobled. In the Bayreuth essay Nietzsche describes the effect of the "tragic" element that makes Wagner's work so valuable: With him we ascend to the topmost rung of sensibility and only there do we fancy we have returned to free nature and the realm of freedom; from this height we behold, as though in immense air-drawn reflections, our struggles, victories and defeats as something 'sublime and significant; we have delight in the rhythm of passion and in its victim, with every mighty step the hero takes we hear the dull echo of death and in its proximity we sense the supreme stimulus to life:-thus trans­ formed into tragic men we return to life in a strangely con­ soled mood, with a new feeling of security ... and in any event even nobler than we were before .... (Nietzsche 1876, 225) Tragedy elevates humanity by sharpening the struggles of life, giving them new meaning and allowing them to be seen from a fresh perspec- 4 tiv!.'. The manner in that tragedy helps one to move through and beyond tllP struggles of existence, without rejecting them, suggests something of Nietzsche's later" overman" who continually /I overcomes himself" and "cr~ates beyond himself." By transforming us into "tragic men" vVagne­ I idn opera and classica1 Greek tragedy provide a kind of energizing ef­ !\'Cl, since through our experience of the Dionysian and our vicarious t'ncounter with death we "sense the supreme stimulus to life." The stimu­ itl<'; WP rpC'Pivp, moreover, is of the sort that connects us to life and helps llS to act in the world. As Nietzsche explains it, "the soul of music ... ,;(·eks its path through all of you to visibility in movement, deed, struc­ ture and morality" (Nietzsche 1876, 217)! For Nietzsche, different kinds of art promote different types of char­ .ider. The right kind of art encourages us and enables us to take on the world. Nietzsche sharply contrasts this effect with that of typical J/mod­ \'rn art," that aims at "stupefaction or delirium! To put to sleep or to IIltoxicatel To silence the conscience, by one means or the other" (Nietzsche 1876, 220)! Instead of helping us become morally acute and ready for action, most nineteenth century art ,leads us away from au­ t'hpnhcity imd r:lway from action. It helps us to shut out the hard realities (){ life and to hide from ourselves and from any serious sense of respon­ J,jbilily; it represents an escape. This contrast between two kinds of aes­ thetics is an important part of Nietzsche's thought and it dominates all three of his essays on Wagner. Indeed, it becomes the pivot point for his ft'VersaJ on the question of the merit of Wagner's operas. Over time Nietzsche's conception of these two types of art changes only subtly in the abstract, but what happens in the process is that he reclassifies Wagner fnH11 the 'good art' to the 'bad art' category. In Nietzsche contra Wagner Nietzsche explains that he had previously mistaken Wagner's music" as the expression of a Dionysian powerfulness of soul1/ when in fact it was something very different. Using language sirnilar to that that he had used in Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, he de­ ~ilTibes once again the two kinds of aesthetics, this time grouping Wagner with the 'wrong' kind of art: Every art, every philosophy may be regarded as a medi­ cine and a helping expedient of advancing or decaying life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers. But there are two kinds of sufferers: on the one hand those suffering from the superabundance of life, who want a Dionysian art and simi- . lady a tragic insight and prospect with regard to life,-and on the other hand those suffering from the impoverishment of life, who desire repose, stillness, smooth sea, or else ecstasy. con­ vulsion, intoxication furnished by art and philosophy. (Nietzsche 1895, 72) 5 Nietzsche has decided that Wagner 1 s art is "intoxicating," not lionysian. But on what basis has Nietzsche made this decision? And ,hat, in fact, is the difference between the two concepts? We have seen 1at in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche explicitly associated the Dionysian lement with "intoxication." Now intoxication appears to be exactly what .e is arguing against; is he reversing himself? Nietzsche is perhaps not ctually reversing himself, but a subtle shift has indeed occurred. He is mploying greater caution; he has become more keenly aware that all h.at is "intoxicating" is not Dionysian. In fact, Nietzsche has discovered h.at more often than not, that which is "intoxicating" produces an effect 'ery different from the kind that he desires. One can, and indeed one oust, become intoxicated with life, but in most cases intoxication actu­ LIly represents a flight from life. Nietzsche therefore no longer under­ tands Wagner as an example of the best that art can offer, energizing md equipping us for life. Instead, Wagner's opera becomes the supreme ~xample of "decadent" art, ~educing u~ in the manner of an "opiate," ieadening us to life. The remainder of this article will be devoted to ~xploring philosophical dimensions of the distinctions Nietzsche makes Jetween these two kinds of art, as well as their moral and political impli­ :ations, while addressing the question of precisely why Nietzsche feels :ompelled to reject Wagner so vehemently. Rejecting Wagnerian Christianity For Nietzsche, the flight from life that is characteristic of modern cul­ ture manifests itself in Wagner's operas in various ways. One of the more obvious ways is in a fascination with the supernatural, and, more generally, in Wagner's expression of "Christianity." The extent to which Wagner's work is actually "Christian," as opposed to representing a mis­ use or perversion of Christianity, is open to question but is not a matter for discussion here; neither is the accuracy of Nietzsche's understanding of Christianity itself, as opposed to his treatment of what is offered by Wagner. What is important here is that the "Christian" dimension of Wagner's work is something that Nietzsche seizes upon repeatedly, and it is Wagner's last and most blatantly Christian work ParsifaL that pro·· vokes the strongest reaction from him: "I despise everyone who does not regard Parsifal as an outrage on morals" (Nietzsche 1895, 80). In­ deed, Nietzsche's final philosophical break with Wagner may have been precipitated by the appearance of this last opera. Pars~fal stands out since, while almost all of Wagner's operas incorporate some sort of a super­ natural element, it is focused on in Parsifal in a new way! as a conscious external force directing and controlling the action. The legendary title character may seem like an admirable hero; he 6 i\'lt3inly performs worthy deeds. His name, however, means "pure fooL" I hj~; fool performs feats that other men have been unable to accomplish, bringing salvation and relief to others. It had been foretold that only one \'vith exceptional innocence would be able to accomplish the task, and I '.Ilsifal fits the bill. When Parsifal first appears he actually comes across ,I' .•. limost an idiot, displaying little comprehension of what is going on d rOlmd him. Over the course of the opera, however, he becomes "wise through compassion" as foretold, resists temptation, and, with some su­ pernatural assistance, performs noble deeds (Wagner 1938,429-430). Al­ though Parsifal demonstrates a certain amount of bravery and steadfast­ m'"s, one can see why he would be a particularly dIstasteful hero from Nietzsche's standpoint. For Parsifal begins his adventure as a foot and ,1lhieves what he does in large part because he is a pawn of supernatural fllrces. A voice from the Holy Grail foretelling the arrival of Parsifal re­ h'rs to him as "my chosen tool" (Wagner 1938, 441). Instead of enno­ hling man, the story of Parsifa1 degr;:\c1es m;:\n hy highlighting his small­ lit"':;:' and impotence in the face of the supernatural and by belittling his ,I( hit'vements. The greatest man cannot do deeds as great as those of a ttt\J\ chosen by God. Dy thus erasing the differences between men, Parsifal drags man down and appeals to the ressentiment that is characteristic of niOdem inverted morality. Indeed, it is the supernatural, and not Parsifal himseit, that dominates the opera. The Holy Grail IS featured promi­ twntly, blinding1y illuminated; a "halo of glory pours down over all" (Wagner 1938, 470); the Sacred Spear hovers magically; a castle collapses; ,j white dove descends. At times the performers seem almost insignifi­ \ ,mt in comparison with the supernatural imagery. A flight to the supernahtral1~ .;:\!;~odMpd hy N1Ptzsche with an abdi­ calion of one's responsibility to live one's own life heroically in a world in which God is dead, and one can see in the elevation of the idiot Parsifal ~ Jcmonstration of the inverted "Christian morality" or "slave moral ity" that Nietzsche opposes. Parsifal gains wisdom only through com­ pa~sion, and an emphasis on compassion in place of other virtues is of course associated by Nietzsche with slave morality. It is particularly sig­ njficant that Parsifal's primary assets are his natural innocence, chastity, ~md purity; this amounts for Nietzsche to a rejection of life. He main­ ti1ins that "Parsifal is a work of cunning, of revengefulness, of secret poi­ son-brewing, hostile to the pre-requisites of life; a bad work. -The preach­ ing of chastity is ;m incitement to anti-naturalness./t (Nietzsche 1895, 80). If Parsifal's good qualities are supposed to be natural, why does the op­ t'ra represent an "incitement to anti-naturalness"? Because in Nietzsche's view such "Christian" virtues are not "natural." As will be discussed later, despite his own occasional praise of the "natural" Nietzsche was opposed to the romantic idealization of nature and to what it implies. 7 The language Nietzsche uses to denounce Pa"s~fal sets up obvious ten­ sions with elements of Nietzsche's earlier praise of Wagner. For exampie, the young Nietzsche had remarked: In the Ring des Nibelungen I discover the most moral music I know, for example when Brunnhilde is awoken by Siegfried; here he attains to an elevation and sanctity of mood that makes us think of the glowing ice-and snow-covered peaks of the Alps, so pure, solitary, inaccessible, chaste and bathed in the light of love does nature appear here; clouds and storms, even the sub­ lime itself, are beneath it. (Nietzsche 1876, 202) Here Nietzsche embraced the Ilpure" and" chaste"; why does he now deride it? He has become more sensitive to the fact that purity and chas­ tity come in different forms. A kind of 'purity' and I chastity' can exist in the overman who has embraced life to the fullest,; they become a part of his nature. More often, however, purity and chastity represent a kind of denial of life, and are something externally imposed against one's na­ ture. II is significant that it is Wagner's Freachi1lg of chastity to which , Nietzsche takes exception; to him this reflects a form of hypocrisy or bad faith. Moreover, the innocence of Parsifal may be contrasted with the 'innocence' of Nietzsche's overman. '10 achieve the overman's kind of innocence one must first confront a world without absolutes and take on complete responsibility for one's life. That is, one must in a sense over­ come both one's own impulses and the world's conventions and move through it all to a new kind of innocence. As Zarathustra says, one must become a camel and a lion and then a child (Nietzsche 1883-1892, 55). In contrast, Parsifal was never anything but a child, and his innocence, like that of a child, is the innocence of one who has never assumed real re­ sponsibilily and is incapable of doing so. In celebrating the innocence of Parsifal, Wagner is celebrating an unthinking, unreflective kind of exist­ ence. This is not the life of the overman but that of Nietzsche's "last man." A tension in Nietzsche's thought is also highlighted by his explicit rejection of Wagner's focus on the "transcendent" or on anything exter­ nal to oneself. The earlier Nietzsche of Richard Wagner in Bayreuth main­ tained that if tragedy is to serve its function of helping one to achieve a new perspective and overcome oneself, it must help one look beyond oneself: The individual must be consecrated to something higher lhan himself-that is the meaning of tragedy; he must be free of the terrible anxiety which death and time evoke in the indi­ vidual: for at any moment, in the briefest atom of his life's course, he may encounter something hOly that endlessly out­ weighs all his struggle and all his distress-this is what it means 8 to have a sense for the tragic; all the ennoblement of mankind is enclosed in this supreme task .... (Nietzsche 1876, 213) Clearly Nietzsche here sees a dedication to something beyond one- that is, a kind of reverence, as a path to ennoblement. In this work It\' h(:~izes upon the theme of "selfless loyalty" as fulfilling this function. Lh·votion to something, in this case loyalty, so complete that one may be willing to sacrifice one's life or hopes, serves to help one to overcome uDeself in a way that is vaguely like that of the later overman; it is enno­ hling. Something almost religious appears to be going on here. Indeed, Nietzsche states approvingly that loyalty "it; the most personal primal ('vent that Wagner experiences and reveres like a religious mystery" (Nh,,~tzsche 1876, 203). Even at this stage Nietzsche rejects a supernatural I'i'illity and he is leery of "transcendence" or of reified abstract concepts (If any kind; consequently, he seizes on loyalty as an uplifting theme in Wagner. This is somewhat defensible since ,although 'loyalty' itself may an abstract concept, loyalty to a particular person is not; it is some­ thing that is expressed in concrete meaningful action. Nevertheless, the ilimost religious dimension of the devotion to loyalty, expressed with Nud1 words as "holy" and "consecrated/' seems like something that t>lmuld make Nietzsche uncomfortable. How the later Nietzsche thought "buut this particular issue it; undear, for he does not dit;t..:w;s it in hi::; anti­ WaKner tracts. Instead he focuses there on criticizing more explicit refer­ ('!lees to some kind of "Absolute." However, it is clear that despite Nit'tzsche's rejection of the supernatural he never seems to relinquish tht' belief in the necessity forca sense of "something holy.'" After all, al­ though Zarathustra believes that God is dead, he is "the most pious of all those· who do not believe in God" (Nietzsche 1883-1892, 272). Zarathustra h (I friend to the unemployed pope, for he loves all pious men. Nietzsche ,tOl'S not intend his pjety howpvprr to hp oirp('fpo tOWrlro ,~ rpifipo f'xtpr­ H,d Absolute; one might say that it reflects an awesome reverence for nhm's responsibility and for the power of life. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche maintains, "the noble soul has reverence for itself" (Nietzsche lMtl6, 256). In contrast, the piety of Wagner comes to be perceived by Nietzsche as directing one toward something external and away from 11 f(i. Zarathustra's piety is the sort that highlights one's own responSibil­ ity, while Wagner's represents a flight away from responsibility. Another "Christian" element that is particularly prominent in Parsifal b the theme of salvation. Indeed, Wagner takes pains to highlight connec­ tions between the title character and Christ. Nietzsche, however, discov­ ""j:; salvation to be a dominant theme not just in Parsifal but also in every one of Wagner's operas. Often, "salvation" takes on its religious, super­ lI.ltural form, but that is not always the case. In many operas various characters must be 'saved' in much more mundane ways, but for Nietzsd le 9 this is no better than a focus on Christian salvation. For him anv belief that one must be saved is a reflection of the life-denying slave mo~ality: The need of salvation . .. is the sincerest form of expression of decadence, the most convinced and most painful affirmation of it in sublime symbols and practices. The Christian wishes to get loose from himself .... Noble morality, master morality, has, reversely, its roots in a triumphing self-affirmation, -it is the self-affirming, the self-glorifying of life; it equally needs sublime symbols and practices, but only "because its heart is too full." (Nietzsche 1888, 56) If one desires to be saved, one desires to escape one's present life through the action of another. This is true whether the salvation involves one's immortal soul or whether it involves more mundane aspects of one's life. Such a desire signals an unwillingness to embrace life as it actually exists or to take full responsibility for leading one's own life; it is a kind of giving up, a surrender to an escapist mentality. A better under­ standing of Nietzsche's view of this mentality, and why he believes it to be present in some forms of art and not in others, will be pursued in the next section. The political significance of this mentality will be discussed in the section thereafter. Rejecting Wagnerian Romanticism In The Case of Wagner Nietzsche returns to the discussion of the two types of art, explaining that every age has in its quantum of energy, a quantum determin­ ing what virtues are permitted to it, what virtues are proscribed. It has either the virtues of ascending life, ... or it is itself an epoch of descending life, and then it requires the virtues of decline, then it hates all that justifies itself solely by plenitude, by superabundance of strength. Aesthetics is indissolubly bound up with these biological presuppositions: there is a deca­ dence deslhet1I.:::', i::tlul there .it:; clu::;::;icul destlu~tks . . .. In the narrower sphere of so-called moral values there is no greater cOFltrast than that of master morality and morality according to Christian valuation. . .. The former communicates to things out of its fulness-it glorifies, it embellishes, it rationalises the world, the latter impoverishes, blanches, and mars the value of things, it denies the world. (Nietzsche 1888, 54-55) This passage, similar to a passage that appears in the "What is Ro­ manticism?" aphorism of The Gay Science, is particularly important be­ cause it clearly links Nietzsche's views on aesthetics with his critique of Christian morality. The contrast between Christian morality and 10 Nidzsche's own morality is seen by Nietzsche as essentially a special I..be of the contrast between the modern aesthetics of Wagnerian roman­ ticism (here called "decadence aesthetics") and classical aesthetics. In Niftz,sche contra Wagner the Christian is in fact identified as a "species of ~picurean" that Nietzsche sees as the antithesis of a "Dionysian Greek" (Nit·tzsche 1895, 73). For Nietzsche, ethics and aesthetics are of course Intimately related and could even be considered indistinguishable. There­ fure it should not be surprising that Nietzsche's condemnation of the "slave morality" present in Wagner's work is manifest in large part in .I! tacks on Wagner's brand of romantic aesthetics. In the process of mak­ ing these attacks Nietzsche appears to embrace classical aesthetics to a "h'gf'ee that may seem surprising, given what one may consider to be its l'\'slrictive and limiting nature. One might think that it would be classi­ (\\1 aesthetics that Nietzsche would associate with Christian morality and with the denial of life, and that he would associate expansive Wagnerian Jnrnnnticism with aI/superabundance of strength" and with that which ilglorifies" and "embellishes" the world. But in his anti-Wagner essays Ni{-'t2Schc paints pictures of Wagner's art that at times read like the most hMd-core classicist's disparagement of romanticism: French Romanticism and Richard Wagner are very c10sely connected .... altogether fanatics of expression, great discov­ erer in the domain of the sublime, also of the loathsome and the shocking, still greater discoverer in effect, in display, ... with dismal access to everything that seduces, allures, forces, or upsets, born enemies of logic and the straight line, covetous of the foreign, the exotic, the monstrous, and all opiates of the senses and understanding. On the whole, a rashly-venhlIing, magnificently violent, high-flying, and high up-pulling kind of artists .... (Nietzsche 1895, 76-77) Like a good classicist, Nietzsche complains that Wagner's music pos­ ~1'NSt'S "chaos in place of rhythm" and "just seeks to break up all symme­ try of measure and intensity" (Nietzsche 1895, 68). Wagner promotes """ is by no means identical with traditional classicism as it is usually un\'lt~rstood, for Nietzsche rejects any ontological or metaphysical frame- that presumes the existence of an ordered cosmos. One could per­ say that to a significant degree Nietzsche'S overall project repre­ ',.'nh an attempt to capture the best of the classical spirit and to derive its "Hlul"ordering benefits without reference to an ordered universe. flow exactly for Nietzsche, does the conflict between Wagnerian ro- Hi.mti(,: aesthetics and classical aesthetics tie to that between "Christian" morality and master morality? Nietzsche tells us that 1Nagner tlatters every nihilistic (Buddhistic) instinct and disguises it in music .... [E]verything that has grown up on the soil of impov­ erished life, the entire false coinage of transcendence and an other world, has in Wagner's art its sublimest advocate-not in formulae (Wagner is too prudent to use formulae) but in its persuaSIOn of sensuality, which, in its turn, again makes the mind tender and fatigued. (Nietzsche 1888, 46) 13 Nietzsche understands that art mav in fact be more effective than ex- ~ plidt doctrines or philosophical arguments in promoting a particular type of morality. The' escapist' quality of religion, expressed by Wagner in the "false coinage of transcendence and another worl.d," is mirrored by the escapist quality of "decadent" modern romanticism in general. The very "sensuality" of Wagner's work represents such escapism. Accord­ ing to Nietzsche, "Wagner never calculates as a musician from any kind of musical conscience; he wants effect, he wants nothing but effect" (Nietzsche 1888, 29). As a result, "Wagner's music is never true" (Nietzsche 1888, 30). Why is Wagner's music not "true"? Because in striving for" effect" Wagner is pursuing appearance rather than substance; he ends up mixing noble imagery with "slave morality." His sensuality is not the sort that connects one with life or helps one to experience real­ ity, but that serves as a diversion, a tonic. In contrast, Nietzsche argues that when he listens to Bizet's Carmerz "I become a better man" because Bizet's work is straightforward and "without counterfeit coinage;" it avoids cheap sentimentality and "takes the auditor for an intelligent be­ ing" (Nietzsche 1888, 6). With Wagner, one does not need to confront the facts of life. One need only experience pleasant, thrilling, or uplifting sensations and thereby escape from the realities of life. Therefore, the "decadent" ::;emmali::;t ullilIlald y denIes the world just as much as does one who looks to the transcendent. Since Nietzsche criticizes Wagner's work for the manner in which his opera takes one out ot the real world, It IS not surprising that he speaks derisively of its 'uplifting' quality: "Let us walk above the clouds, let us harangue the infinite, let us surround ourselves with grand symbols" (Nietzsche 1888, 22)! Of course, it has already been shown that in his earlier pro-Wagner essay Nietzsche had used similar language to sing Wagner's praises. At that time Nietzsche praised Wagner because the elevating and sanctifying of man (or at least of some men) was what Nietzsche was fighting for. The later Nietzsche is still, in a sense, fight­ ing for thi::>. H~ has, l~owever, realized that what Wagner offered was not really a path to humanity's ennoblement. What changed was Nietzsche's realization that the "elevation and sanctity of mood" offered by Wagner was, ·in fact, nothing but that: a "mood." While the characters and deeds of the Scandinavian legends may be noble in themselves, Wagner does not present them in a manner that is particularly conducive to their use as models for noble action in the real world. The emphasis is placed so strongly on feeling rather than on action that the opera is more likely to become an "opiate" that actually impairs one's ability to act in the world. In the Bayreuth essay Nietzsche recognized that Wagner's operas took one away from the mundane difficulties and trivialities of one's daily life, but he believed then that one felufneJ enelgized for action, trans- 14 IlltTnl'd into a man" a perspective on one's own ruggles. When Nietzsche rejects Wagner he deddes that most men (and lInen, even more so!) return with a longing to recapture the way they Jvll during the performance but not with a will to truly heroic behavior I H 'l1lselves. Thus Nietzsche says of Wagner, "to look enviously towards l11'\~'ll'r morality, noble morality ... and at the same time to have in his 1I11HIlJI lite conlrary doclline, lhe "Gospel of lhe Lowly/' Lhe need of sdl­ ,Ilion! ... " (Nietzsche 1888, 55-56). Those who return from Wagner's \!1'1'rtls do not want to plunge into their lives but to be saved from them, ! It ',lliened to them. In its effect, "Wagner's influence is like a continuous of alcohol" (Nietzsche 1888, 47). N idzsche originally took Wagner's operas to be something like Greek 1!';i~Wdy in part because the heroic, the beautiful, and the ugly can be in both. Why does Nietzsche later come to believe that the effects of ;/'t'I.,k tragedy and Wagnerian romanticism are so different? In T'wilight 1111' Idols Nietzsche remarks, "What does the tragic artist communicate of Does he not display precisely the condition of fearlessness in the 1"11' lIf llie fearsome dnd questionable?" (Nielzsche 1889, 92). Wagner's till tails to promote "fearlessness" because it is unwilling to confront hll11l'Stly lithe fearsome and questionable" in life; one does not gaze into th,' ,lbyss. Instead there is tlight either to an "Absolute,," which may be ('Itill'!' explicit or vague, or to a kind of mindless sensation, or to some H 1\ III d Y combination of the two. In any case the result is a kind of I good IlTllIlg' that is unreflective, unearned, and empty. Of course, we have n'l\ that the flight to an Absolute and to unreflective sensation or feel- M(' for Niflr7.~('hfl fl~~flnti<'ll1y thfl ~;::tmfl thine;. Hfl ()h;;flrVfl~ th<'lt it is not with music that Wagner has won the youth over to himself, it is with the "Idea": it is the mysteriousness of his dfl, its game of hide-and-seek among a hundred symbols, its polychromy of the ideal, which has led and allured these youths to Wagner! His Wagner's genius for forming clouds .... They hear with trembling how in his art the sublime symbols become dudible with gentle thunder out of the cloudy distance .... (Nietzsche 1888, 37-38) Nietzsche refers to Wagner as Hegel's heir. He tells us that Wagner ·k.mH'd like Hegel that Germans love 'lithe Idea', that is to say, some­ dung nbscure, uncertain, mysterious; that among Gernnans clearness is ,in objPction, and logic a disproof' (Nietzsche 1888, 36-37). God may be but Wagner is offering his followers the I Absolute' on the cheap. Jlhing need be dearly defined or ulLderslandable, bUl only a sense need l.w evoked of transcendence, of something beyond one's everyday con­ I'll' world. The flight to such a sense is for Nietzsch.~ as morally dis­ hl)llt'St as the flight to God, and it is perhaps even more dishonest intel- 15 lectually since it depends upon obscurity to function. \!Vagner "is pos­ sessed of every ambiguity, every equivocation, everything, in fact, which persuades the undecided, without making them conscious what- they are persuaded to" (Nietzsche 1888, 45). This deliberate ambiguity contrasts with the master morality that 11 rationalises the world." The unreflective and anti-intellectual quality of Wagner's work is an element repeatedly seized upon by Nietzsche. He remarks of Wagner: "How he humours every cowardice of modern soul with Siren tonesl­ There was never such a mortal hatred of knowledge" (Nietzsche 1888, 47)! The kind of "knowledge" that Wagner shirks is that required for moral honesty; if one keeps things fuzzy, one need not be pimled down. In criticizing Wagner's lack of clarity Nietzsche places himself on danger­ ous ground, for his early discussions of aesthetics emphasized the im­ portance of the inarticulate, non-rational dimensions of art. Nietzsche had in fact praised Wagner with these words: Now, if the gods and heroes of such mythological dramas as Wagner writes are to communicate also in words, there is no greater danger than that this spoken language will awaken the theoretical man in us and thereby heave us over into the other, non-mythical sphere: so that in the end we should not through the employment of words have understood more clearly what is taking place before us but, on the contrary~ have failed to understand it at all. That is why Wagner has forced language back to a primordial state in which it hardly yet thinks in concepts and in which it is itself still poetry, image and feel­ ing. (Nietzsche 1876, 237) Likewise, in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche denounces "Socratism," that is, the theoretical, metaphysical, logicat abstract focus that emerged in Greek philosophy. He is particularly critical uf the Greek philu::;u­ phers' emphasis on reason and of their equation of virtue with knowl­ edge (Nietzsche 1872, 92-95). Of course, when Nietzsche later criticizes Wagner's ambiguity he is not actually advocating a movement to a highly conceptual "Socratism" but is simply urging a return to something more like Greek tragedy, which did not disingenuously mix noble imagery with slave morality, which did not use ambiguity to hide an Absolute, and which did not emphasize "feeling" and "effect" to the point that they came to obliterate any connection to concrete reality. Nevertheless, a certain tension is evident between Nietzsche's later criticisms of Wagner and his earlier views. Nietzsche had always embraced the spirit of Greek tragedy, but in rejecting Wagner he also seems, in some ways, to have edged a little closer to the Greek philosophers whom he had once criti­ cized. One may speculate that when Nietzsche realized that the perfect blending of the Apollonian and Dionysian which he thought he had found 16 III Wagner was in fact something very different, and when he became ,1 tl u ned to the dangerous effects of "decadent" romanticism, he became lllore circumspect about extolling the virtues of the non-rational and in­ ,11'1 indate over the rational and conceptual. Political Implications What is the effect of Wagner's art on one who i.s raIsed on It? "The \'outh becomes a moon-calf-an 'idealist'" (Nietzsche 1888, 47). Roman­ \11. idealism and an inability to take constructive action tend to go hand­ Ill-hand, and both are symptoms of Wagnerian romanticism's tendency itl disconnect one from real life. Interestingly, while romantic idealism Ill"), impair one's ability to act effectively on a personal level, it may at tlw same time be a spur to another kind of action. Nietzsche sums up the \\i,lgn('rian spirit at one point as "Let us be idealists! ... Let us ... make lll.lllkind better!-one thereby becomes good ... " (Nietzsche 1888, 22- '\), In abandoning classical morality the emphasis of Wagnerian roman­ t It Ism becomes an "idealism" that is externally rather than internally PIH'nted. That is, instead of focusing on the ordering of one's own soul, "Iii' focuses on making mankind as a whole better. And, since romanti­ ,L',m involves a rejection of standards, and romantic idealism encour­ .11'.I'S the view that something is radically wrong with the existing world, lllsiinctive politics results. Nietzsche describes such modern politics in ('/lSI' of Wagner: . "Whence comes all the evil in the world?'" Wagner asks him­ self. From "old conventions" he answered, like every revolu­ tionary ideologist. That means from customs, laws, morals, ,md institutions, from all that the old world, old society rest nn. "How does one do away with old society?" Only by de­ claring war against "conventions" (traditional usage and mo­ rCllity). That is what Siegfried does. (Nietzsche 1888, 14) llere Nietzsche actually places himself in the position of defending Illd '\'ustoms, laws, morals, and institutions" against Wagner's desire to dl .. .;troy them. While this may seem out of character, one can see how ll'l/,s('hf' might find valuE' in old customs, morals, etc., at least for those tlf \p.; who cannot live the life of a full-blown overman. In his early works I It" (lbserved that "in order to act we require the veil of illusion" (Nietzsche ! 51 ), and that" a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only It'll bounded by a horizon" (Nietzsche 1874, 63). The necessary "illu­ ',]tln" contributing to one's horizon is of course represented by the J\ jlollonian "dream" element that comes to be incorporated into il'!zsche's concept of the "Dionysian." Some classicists and tradition­ d lists share with Nietzsche recognition of the importance of this /I dream" 17 element. For example, Babbitt observed that "to say that the classicist .. . gets at his reality with the aid of the imagination is but another way of saying that he perceives his reality only through a veil of illusion" (Bab­ bitt 1919, 102). Nietzsche found that Greek tragedy and culture once helped to provide the right kind of llillusion" or "'horizon." Today we have much less to draw upon, but old customs, morals, traditions, and institutions can still playa role in promoting order and in equipping one for actIOn, Just as for Edmund Burke they made up the "wardrobe of a moral imagination" (Burke 1790,67). Nietzsche sees that in rejecting old ways Wagner is effectively reject­ ing standards. Nietzsche can criticize Wagner for this because he be­ lieves that Wagner does not reject standards in the manner of a true over­ man who has gazed into the abyss. Instead, Wagner's blanket rejection of standards amounts to a denial of the need to work on the ordering of one's own soul. Without the demands imposed on the self by classical standards, virtue loses the meaning it had held in the Greek world and becomes redefined as sympathy for the plight of mankind. Thus, Nietzsche rejects Wagner's "idealistic falsity and softening of conscience" (Nietzsche 1895, 81). Wagner, Nietzsche believes, is not calling for a critical examination of established ways but for their wholesale rejection as the cause of ITlankind's houbles. With .such a I-ejection Wagner is essentially trying to negate the world and to avoid the hard task of actually living in it. Wagner's idealistic dreaming of a new, wholly different world is sim­ ply another manifestation of romantic escapism. Nietzsche's recognition of this dynamic is in fact also a key element behind his condemnation of Rousseau. The imagination by Rousseau and certain other romantics of an idealized "nature," which they oppose to our corrupting culture, rep­ resents to Nietzsche a flight from reality essentially the same as that which he finds in Christianity, and is another manifestation of slave morality. Nietzsche clearly recognized that this phenomenon assumes a political form. According to Adrian Del Caro, the quarrel is with social and political visionaries, types Nietzsche considered to be modern and therefore decadent. They share the belief, which smacks of Rousseau's "snpersn­ tion," that if only the existing order can be brought down, then the nobleness and pride of humanity would rise up. The su­ perstition is this: the original, wondrous nature of man-his innate goodness-iS buried under the corruption in institu­ tions .... (Del Caro 1989, 105-106) While Nietzsche himself sometimes praises the "natural" and de­ nounces much of modern culture, Strong agrees with Del Caro that, un­ like Rousseau, Nietzsche does not believe that a "natural and happy man" would emerge if civilized morality were thrown off (Strong] 975, 49). 18 Once more a contrast is presented between a spirit that embraces life and one that denies it. Instead of undertaking the hard work of improv­ ing oneself and one's actions, one simply rejects this ,vorld and seeks to bring another world into being. In the case of Rousseau, Del Caro finds that "his own shortcomings \,vere his inspiration, insofar as his personal experience was the basis for his blaming society for the decline of cul­ ture. Rousseau, according to Nietzsche, would cure hImself by curing society" (Del Caro 1989, 101). Of course, such a project cannot be suc­ cessful. What is the ultimate result as portrayed by Wagner himself in the Ring series? In the final verSIOn, it ends on a dark note. As Nietzsche puts it, "Everything goes wrong, everything goes to ruin, the new world is as bad as the old .... Brunnhilde, who according to the earlier design had to take leave with a song in honour of free love, solacing the world in anticipation of a Socialistic Utopia in which I all will be well,' now has something else to do. She first has to study Schopenhauer .. . " (Niet7.RChp 1888, 15-16). This unhappy ending is a manifestation of what has been called the "manic-depressive" nature of certain types of romanticism (Ryn 1997). The romantic is unwilling to embrace the world as it is and focus on ordering himself; he dreams instead of a new exterior world. Since this dream is hopeless the romantic may become morose and embittered. This is why so much romanticism has a dark side. In the case of Wagner, "Everything he touches he makes morbid-he has made music morbid" (Nietzsche 1888, 16). His romantic dreams ultimately lead not to happi­ ness but to a despairing .kind of pessimism or nihilism. This phenom­ enon, labeled by Nietzsche "romantic pessimism," most clearly shows the linkage between romanticism and ressentimenl. According to Nietzsche, the desire for destruction, change, and becoming can be an ex­ pression of an overflowing energy that is pregnant with fu­ ture (my term for this is, as is known, "Dionysian,"); but it can a150 be LIte lu:tLreu uf the ilh:uIU:;tituted, dbinherited, and un­ derprivileged, who destroy, must destroy, because what exists, indeed all existence, all being, outrages and provokes them. To understand this feeling, consider our anarchists closely. (Nietzsche 1882, par. 370) Conclusion For Nietzsche, Wagnerian opera came to exemplify some of the worst characteristics of /I decadent" modern culhtre. The kind of sentimental "Christianity" and /I decadent" romanticism that it embraced represented a particular moral outlook and frame of mind. This outlook incorpo­ rated the ressentiment that is characteristic of inverted "slave morality," 19 and, even more importantly, it encouraged dreams of a nevv, idealistic world. Both the sensuality and quasi-religious feeling present in \Vagner' s work acted as lIopiates" to take the listener away from the concerns of the real world, and fostered an unwillingness to assume full responsibil­ ity for one's own life or to engage in the ordering of oneself. As a result, devotees of Wagner (and, to degree, all who are influenced by the II deca­ dent" aspects of modern Western culture) are for Nietzsche operating under a kind of moral impairment. They are not equipped to act in the world in a truly correct manner. Instead, their desire to be "saved" from the real world and to be "uplifted" without personal moral effort sets up a particular political dynamic that may perhaps be best characterized as a kind of I salvific' politics. Such politics, seen by Nietzsche as character­ istic of modernity, tend to foster a shift of responsibility away from the individual and toward the kind of bourgeois state that Nietzsche held in contenl.pt. In its fully developed form this dynamic manifests itself as the revolutionary ideological politics that blossomed in the early twenti­ eth century. Such politics embody an unfulfillable desire to completely abolish the existing order and traditional standards and to erect in their place a new, idealized, uplifting political and social order, the "Socialis­ tic Utopia" of which Nietzsche speaks. In taking a stand against Wagnerian romanticism Nietzsche emerges as a strong' classicist' of a sort. Objections may be raised that the highly I classicist' Nietzsche presented here does not represent the whole of Nietzsche; this is undeniably true. Nevertheless, the Nietzsche that ap­ pears in these anti-Wagner works· should not be ignored when consider­ ing Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole. For example, it becomes clear that what Nietzsche is aiming for with his overman (whether he achieves it or not) is something quite different from romantic expansiveness, simple ego-worship, or surrender to base impulses. The overman incorporates, among other things, a form of discipline, and bears a vague resemblance to the well-ordered soul of the Greek philosophers. The Nietzsche of these particular works is in a special sense highly 'moral' in that he em­ phasizes personal responsibility and rejects approaches that direct man's energies toward control of the exterior world as a method of betterment. Although Significant tensions exist, Nietzsche remains for the most part philosophically consistent throughout his pro- and anti-Wagner writings. While personal issues no doubt played a role, Nietzsche's re­ versal of opinion on Wagner may be attributed in significant part to the maturation of his thought and to his improved perception over time of the effect uf Wagner':::; work un the public. Ultimately it i:::i Nietz:::;che':::; rejection of Wagner, not his early enamorment with him, which appears to be most in keeping with his philosophical views. One may in fact suggest that some clarification of Nietzsche's thought occurred once he 20 no longer felt compelleu to accOIIIlnuudte Wagner's !Ilu:-,ic favorably within it. Nonetheless, Nietzsche's ability to classify W"agnerian opera first as the best manifestation of master morality and then as the worst manifestation of slave morality highlights a problem with the vague and 'slippery' nature of his philosophy. If Nietzsche himself cannot be cer­ tain of what he means by such terms as "Dionysian," how can we? Nev­ ertheless, by wrestling with the practical problem of Wagner Nietzsche helps us to get a better idea of what he means, or at least of what he does not mean, by some of the terms and concepts he uses. Today it is a11 the rage in political science to talk about the importance of culture. It is also a commonplace that the maintenance of a particular kind of political order (such as liberal democracy) requires a citizenry with a particular kind of character. However, the precise nature of the linkage between cultural elements, individual character, and political behavior is not always well understood. While it is not uncommon for political scientists to look for relationships between artistic works and politics, most look only for explicit political or ideological content in a work. Nietzsche displays a more subtle understanding of how art incor­ porates in itself an ethical dimension that can shape individuals' per­ sonal, social, and political behavior. Nietzsche's analysis of Wagnerian opera is particularly valuable to us today because of the insight it offers into how the politics of the modern world may have been influenced - and may continue to be influenced - by cultura.l clements such as the­ ater, music, art, or literature. References Babbitt, Irving. [1919] 1991. Rousseau and Romanticism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Burke, Edmund. [1790] 1987. Reflections 011 the Revolution in France, ed. J. G. A. Pocock. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Del Caro, Adnan. 1989. Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche: Creativity ana the Anti-Ro­ mantic. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Heilke, Thomas. 1998. Nietzsche's Tragic Regime. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. Hollingdale, R. J. [1965] 1999. Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kaufmann, Walter. 1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist: A11tichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1872)1956. The Birth of Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and the Gc:nealogy of lv10rals, tldllB. Frdl1ci5 Golffing. New York Anchor Books! Doubleday. __ . [1874] 1997. On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Cam­ bridge University Press. 21 __ . [1876] 1997. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press. __ . [1882] 1974. The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Ran­ domHouse. __ . [1883-1892J 1969. Thus Spoke Zarathllstra, trans. R. ]. HolHngdale. New York: Penguin Books. __ . [1886J 1989. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. __ . [1888] 1896. The Case o.fWagner, in The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. XI, ed. Alexander Tille, trans. Thomas Common. New York: Macmillan and Co. __ . [1889] 1990. Twilight Of the Idols, in Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin Books. __ . [1895] 1896. Nietzsche contra Wagner, in The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. XI, ed. Alexander Tille, trans. Thomas Common. New York: Macmillan and Co. Ryn, Claes G. 1997. "Imaginative Origins of Modernity: Life as Daydream and Nlohlmale." Humanila:5, Vol. X, No.2. 41-60. Strong, Tracy B. 1975. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. Berke­ ley, CA: University of California Press. Wagner, Richard. 1938. The J1uthel1tic Libretto3 of the' Wagnct Opems (editor and translators not given). New York: Crown Publishers. 22