Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990


Comparative Population Studies
Vol. 41, 1 (2016): 3-56 (Date of release: 23.05.2016)

Federal Institute for Population Research 2016  URL: www.comparativepopulationstudies.de
       DOI: 10.12765/CPoS-2016-03en
       URN: urn:nbn:de:bib-cpos-2016-03en8
    

Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 
1990

Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten

Contributing authors

Liga Abolina (University of Latvia), Liili Abuladze (Estonian Interuniversity Popula-
tion Research Centre), Svitlina Aksyonova (Mykhailo Ptukha Institute of Demogra-
phy and Social Research, Kiev), AnĎelko Akrap (University of Zagreb), Ekaterina 
Antipova (Belarusian State University), Mirjana Bobic (University of Belgrade), Ivan 
Čipin (University of Zagreb), Liudmila Fakeyeva (Belarusian State University), Ionut 
Foldes (Babes-Bolyai University), Aiva Jasilioniene (MPIDR), Dora Kostova (MPIDR), 
Irena Kotowska (Warsaw School of Economics), Boris Krimer (Mykhailo Ptukha 
Institute of Demography and Social Research, Kiev), Elena von der Lippe (Robert 
Koch Institute, Berlin), Iryna Kurylo (Mykhailo Ptukha Institute of Demography and 
Social Research, Kiev), Ausra Maslauskaite (Demographic Research Centre of Vy-
tautas Magnus University, Kaunas), Julia Mikolai (University of Liverpool), Cornelia 
Muresan (Babes-Bolyai University), Vasic Petar (University of Belgrade), Michaela 
Potančoková (Vienna Institute of Demography), Tatyana Pronko (UNFPA in Belarus), 
Allan Puur (Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre), Mirjana Rasevic 
(Institute of Social Sciences), Anna Rybińska (University of North Carolina at Chap-
el Hill), Luule Sakkeus (Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre), Jože 
Sambt (University of Ljubljana), Tomáš Sobotka (Vienna Institute of Demography), 
Branislav Šprocha (Slovak Demographic Research Centre), Rebecca Staddon (Uni-
versity of Oxford), Vlada Stankuniene (Demographic Research Centre of Vytautas 
Magnus University, Kaunas), Anna Šťastná (Research Institute for Labour and Social 
Affairs, Prague), Marin Strmota (University of Zagreb), Nada Stropnik (Institute for 
Economic Research, Slovenia), Krzysztof Tymicki (Warsaw School of Economics), 
Anatoly Vishnevsky (Institute of Demography, Higher School of Economics, State 
University, Moscow), Sergei Zakharov (Institute of Demography, Higher School of 
Economics, State University, Moscow), Kryštof Zeman (Vienna Institute of Demog-
raphy), Peteris Zvidrins (University of Latvia)



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten4

Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 
1990

Abstract: This paper examines fertility and family policies in 15 Central and East Eu-
ropean (CEE) countries to establish fi rstly, likely directions of cohort fertility trends 
for the coming decade; and secondly, to provide an overview and analysis of fam-
ily policies in CEE countries, and to assess their impact on cohort fertility trends. 
Demographic analysis suggests that the cohort fertility decline of the 1960s cohorts 
is likely to continue at least among the 1970s birth cohorts; stagnation cannot be 
ruled out. Births that were postponed by women born in the 1970s were not be-
ing replaced in suffi cient numbers for cohort fertility to increase in the foreseeable 
future, and shares of low parity women (childless and one child) were larger than 
shares of high parity women among the late 1960s cohorts than in older cohorts. 
Also, childbearing postponement which started in the 1990s is refl ected in dramatic 
changes of childbearing age patterns. As period fertility rates have been increas-
ing in the late 2000s throughout the region an impression of a fertility recovery has 
been created, however the fi ndings of this project indicate that no such widespread 
childbearing recovery is underway. 

For the fi rst time ever an overview and analysis of CEE family policies is concep-
tualized in this paper. It demonstrates that fertility trends and family policies are a 
matter of serious concern throughout the region. The following family policy types 
have been identifi ed: comprehensive family policy model; pro-natalist policies 
model; temporary male bread-winner model; and conventional family policies mod-
el. The majority of family policies in CEE countries suffer from a variety of shortcom-
ings that impede them from generating enhanced family welfare and from providing 
conditions for cohort fertility to increase. The likely further decline of cohort fertility, 
or its stagnation, may entail long-term demographic as well as other societal conse-
quences, such as continuous declines in total population numbers, changes in age 
structures, as well as implications for health and social security costs. 

Keywords: Fertility · Family policies · Central and Eastern Europe · International 
comparative analysis · Family policy typology



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 5

1 Introduction

The demise of state socialism throughout Central and Eastern Europe had immedi-
ate demographic repercussions. Arguably changes in childbearing during the quar-
ter century since 1990 were among the most palpable and substantial. These fertil-
ity trends attracted a great deal of interest in the scientifi c literature (e.g. Billingsley 
2010; Frejka et al. 2008; Kohler et al. 2002; Kotowska/Jóźwiak 2003; Macura 2000; 
Sobotka 2004, 2011) and the present paper provides an up-to-date, comprehensive 
description and analysis of these developments. This is done in conjunction with 
a fi rst systematic attempt to describe and analyse family policies in CEE countries 
during this period. Our fi ndings are the result of an international comparative pro-
ject of 40 scholars (Appendix 1) from 15 CEE countries1 conducted under the aegis 
of the Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford, UK (Bas-
ten/Frejka 2015).

The two main sections of the study – section 4 discussing fertility trends and sec-
tion 5 focusing on family policies – are intrinsically linked and continuously interact. 
It was the substantial decline in total period fertility rates (TPFRs) during the 1990s 
and beyond which generated a great deal of concern among governments about 
possible consequences. Governments feared the fertility decline could lead to an 
eventual serious lack of human and fi nancial resources to support societal develop-
ment, including rising health and social security costs of an aging population. Such 
fears were among the reasons for expanding, formulating and implementing family 
and related policies. At the same time, fertility trends are central among the indica-
tors which illustrate the success or lack of extant policies.

In section 5 the evolution of the institutional settings for developing family poli-
cies during the societal transformation of the past quarter century, the family policy 
measures and their effects on family life and reproductive behaviour, and the chal-
lenges of implementing family policies are described, discussed and evaluated. The 
experience of individual countries, which is also briefl y outlined, is indispensable 
for understanding the generalizations and fi ndings regarding the contemporary his-
tory of CEE family policies. 

The interaction of fertility trends and family policies takes place within the con-
text of broader social economic, political and cultural trends. Arguably important 
ones are briefl y discussed in the next section.

1 In this paper, similarly as in other analytical demographic literature (Sobotka 2011), Central and 
Eastern Europe is comprised of four regions, namely “Central” Europe, “South-Eastern” Eu-
rope, the “Baltic States” and “Eastern” Europe. The basic criterion for congregating countries 
into these regions is geographic, while historical, linguistic, cultural, economic, political and 
other reasons also play a role. The 15 countries that were included in the project listed by region 
were: Central Europe: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; South-
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia; Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; and Eastern 
Europe: Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine.



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten6

2 Background

The societal transformations from communism to capitalism taking place in CEE 
which started in 1989-19911989-1991 are unique in human history. These transitions entail 
radical, complex and extremely rapid political, social and economic changes (Ekiert/
Hanson 2003). The communist types of centrally planned economies, which had 
never before existed in history, had to be transformed into capitalist economies at 
the same time as the authoritarian systems attempted conversions into democra-
cies. Under such conditions experiences of countries have understandably been 
uneven and varied. Nonetheless, all CEE countries have more or less progressed in 
reforming their societies towards open, market-based, capitalist economies, cou-
pled with changes of political institutions, and with notable improvements in living 
standards in most countries.

Economic reforms have been the most successful in the countries of Central 
Europe and the Baltic States while those of Eastern Europe made the least progress 
(EBRD 2015 and Appendix Table 1). 

Central European and Baltic countries have also made the most progress in im-
proving political conditions and developing democratic institutions (Ekiert et al. 2007 
and Appendix Table 2). Signifi cant political progress had already been achieved by 
2004. In contrast, a few countries have experienced nationalistic authoritarianism 
that mimics democracy. This is particularly the case in Russia, where it has been 
labelled Putinism, and to a lesser degree in some other CEE countries (Nemtsov/
Milov 2008; Rahn 2007; Albanese 2006; Zakharov 1999).

Changes in living standards since the demise of communism are another feature 
refl ecting the fundamental societal restructuring in CEE. In most countries living 
standards increased signifi cantly by 2013 compared to 1990 (Appendix table 3, last 
column). With the exception of Albania, Moldova and Ukraine living standards as 
measured by the per capita gross domestic product based on purchasing power 
parity (GDP per capita based on PPP) grew by between 2.3 times (Czech Republic) 
to 4.0 times (Poland). In almost all CEE countries growth has been faster than in the 
West in the past quarter century. Despite the relatively fast growth in per capita 
GDP, CEE countries have not caught up with Western countries. As of 2013, average 
GDP per person in Central Europe and the Baltic States ranged between 21 and 30 
thousand international dollars per year, however in all Western countries, except 
for Portugal, GDP per capita was considerably higher than that (Appendix table 3).2

The disintegration of the state socialist system had a momentous impact on ba-
sic demographic developments. By 2014 almost every CEE country experienced 
population decline (Table 1). In contrast, almost no country throughout the remain-
der of Europe lost population during the past quarter century. All Baltic States, as 
well as the other countries of the former Soviet Union, had an excess of deaths over 

2 Data in Appendix table 3 also illustrate the extremely diffi cult times experienced immediately 
after the beginning of the transition during the 1990s, and the signifi cant progress made in the 
2000s. 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 7

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•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten8

births, as did Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania 
between 1991 and 2014 (Table 1). Many countries experienced considerable emigra-
tion which in some cases was alleviated by return migration. Taking individual coun-
tries as well as the four CEE regions, natural change and net migration losses were 
important factors generating the declines in total population numbers. Taking the 
CEE region as a whole, it appears as though the main reason for the loss of popula-
tion was negative natural change, the excess of deaths over births. The migration 
losses in the majority of countries were offset by substantial immigration to the 
Russian Federation3 and to a lesser degree by immigration to the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (Table 1). Obviously, Table 1 provides the overall picture and it has its 
limitations. It depicts only basic changes, and it does not inform about various seri-
ous issues, such as that proportionately many more economically active people left 
a number of countries, and that a share of the emigres have not left permanently.

3 Data sources 

The Human Fertility Database (HFD 2015) provides the majority of data required for 
the description and analyses of the fertility trends in CEE countries in section 3. This 
source is supplemented by the Eurostat database and by data provided by country 
co-authors from national statistical institutions’ data banks. In addition some data 
were gleaned from the data bank of the Observatoire Démographique Européen 
(ODE 2012).

It is considerably more diffi cult to assemble data that can be used for the de-
scription and analysis of family policies, particularly for formerly socialist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Several data banks which include family policy indi-
cators have sprouted in recent years, but only a few of them include some CEE data. 
Frequently such data banks contain data only for a few CEE countries or they do not 
include any of these countries. An example of the former was the original version 
of the OECD Family Database (Adema et al. 2009) which was used by Thévenon 
(2011) to conduct an analysis of family policies in OECD countries; it included data 
for a mere four CEE countries. An example of the latter is the Comparative Family 
Policy Database (Gauthier 2002) which covers 22 OECD countries, but none of the 
CEE countries. The present version of the OECD Family Database (2016) contains 
data for 11 CEE countries. Appendix tables 9, 10 and 11 use these data and they are 
supplemented with data provided by country co-authors.

The main source of information for the description and analysis of country family 
policies in our study are comprehensive country reports composed by co-authors. 
These cover a wider range of information than merely the statistical indicators: 
the institutions formulating and implementing family policies, policy documents, 

3 Most of this was a quasi-type of international migration consisting almost entirely of Russians 
that were returning to the Russian Federation from countries that had emerged as a result of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 9

an overview of the instruments, conditions for implementation, the challenges en-
countered in implementing family policies, and an evaluation of the impact of policy 
measures. The country family policy profi les in section 4.3 are an abbreviated ver-
sion of country reports.4

Some tables and fi gures do not contain data for all 15 countries. Two reasons 
account for these omissions. Either the respective data were not available for all 
countries (e.g. Fig. 3) or we decided to include data only for selected countries as 
examples because including more countries would be redundant (e.g. Fig. 4).

4 Fertility trends in Central and East European countries

The updated overview and analysis of CEE fertility trends illustrates some of the 
reasons why governments are concerned and why they attempt to modify these 
trends. We start with a brief description of societal conditions shaping CEE fertility.

4.1 A concise characterization of societal conditions shaping CEE 
fertility 

The implosion of state socialism in CEE in 1989-91 and the ensuing highly differenti-
ated transition to capitalist political and economic conditions entailed a radical and 
rapid transformation of childbearing incentives and deterrents. 

Three mutually reinforcing factors – the technologically lagging and labour in-
tensive ineffi cient socialist economies which generated a continuous demand for 
labour; a pro-natalist ideology and policies; and the authoritarian political system 
restricting personal freedom – created conditions which were generally conducive 
for early and universal childbearing. These conditions included job security, low-
cost housing, free education, free health care, various entitlements associated with 
childbirth and childrearing, as well as limited career opportunities and leisure activi-
ties. The citizens of the state socialist countries had grown accustomed to a relative-
ly stable and predictable existence, although standard living conditions were worse 
than in Western countries, and there were numerous disturbing concomitants to 
this lifestyle, such as curtailed civil liberties and shortages of everyday and long-
lasting consumer goods (Frejka 2008; Sobotka 2004, 2011). 

In contrast, mutually reinforcing features of the transition to contemporary capi-
talism – the quest for maximizing profi ts and productivity, the employment of ad-
vanced increasingly complex technologies, competitive labour markets, a propen-
sity for a low priority for social obligations towards workers and society, as well 

4 More detailed information will be available in country overviews. These will be published as 
“University of Oxford CEE family policy Country Studies” which will contain a breadth of in-
formation concerning family policies [FPs] in individual CEE countries. They will be available 
for download from http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop/about-us/cee-family.html NB ceefamily.info, 
and will be regularly updated to refl ect the latest developments in the respective country’s fam-
ily policies.



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten10

as the spread of modern contraceptives – created considerably more restraining 
conditions for childbearing. These included job and income insecurity, an increas-
ing pressure to acquire more education, expensive housing, lesser and declining 
birth and childrearing entitlements, increased uncertainty of spousal relationships 
as well as expanded personal freedom, the availability of a variety of career oppor-
tunities, consumption attractions and leisure activities. All of a sudden, people were 
exposed to societal conditions which made it more diffi cult to earn a living, more 
demanding to reconcile the family-work confl ict, and under which various costs 
previously borne by the paternalistic state became the responsibility of individuals 
and families (Frejka 2008; Sobotka 2011).

All told, the balance shifted from circumstances generally encouraging early 
marriage and childbearing with a distinct propensity for a two-child family, to cir-
cumstances postponing union formation and childbearing as well as inhibiting fam-
ily size. The propensity for two-child families started to weaken; shares of one-child 
families increased everywhere and even became the most prevalent in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine (cf. Fig. 3).

4.2 Fertility trends facets

4.2.1 Period total fertility rate trends in CEE

Period total fertility rates in CEE countries declined precipitously during the 1990s 
from levels centred around 2.0 in 1990 to previously unexperienced low levels 
mostly within the range of 1.1 – 1.4 births per woman around the year 2000 (Fig. 1). 
This PTFR decline was similar to what had happened earlier elsewhere in Europe. It 
was preceded by the PTFR declines during the late 1960s and the 1970s in Northern 
and Western Europe, and in the German-speaking countries; and in Southern Eu-
rope where the pronounced period fertility decline occurred in the 1980s (Appendix 
Fig. 1). 

While the period fertility decline was a common occurrence in CEE during the 
1990s, there was a great deal of variation between countries, most notably in South-
Eastern Europe (Fig 1, panel C). As supported by the evidence presented below, the 
period fertility decline of the 1990s was engendered by the postponement of child-
bearing into higher ages (Sections 4.2.2 to 4.2.4) combined with a continued decline 
in cohort total fertility rates (Section 4.2.5 and 4.2.6). 

The 2000s were marked by a recovery of PTFRs which was in part shaped by a 
considerable slow-down in childbearing postponement (Section 4.2.7). With the ex-
ception of a few countries, especially the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Lithuania, 
the recovery stalled in the 2010s. Practically everywhere in CEE the period fertility 
recovery of the 2000s was incomplete, i.e. the PTFRs in the 2010s were signifi cantly 
below the levels of around 1990. The stalling of the PTFRs around 2010 was most 
likely also caused by the economic recession in the late 2000s (Sobotka et al. 2011: 
287-290). It was predominantly the childbearing of young women that was affected 
by the recession.



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 11

Fig. 1: Period total fertility rates, Central & East European region, Central, 
South-Eastern, Eastern Europe and Baltic States, country populations 
within regions, 1970-2014

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Central Europe

South-Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe

Baltic States

A - Central and Eastern Europa

Period total fertility rate

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Croatia

Czech Rep

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

B - Central Europe

Period total fertility rate

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Bulgaria

Montenegro

Serbia

Romania

C - South-Eastern Europe

Period total fertility rate

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Belarus

Russia

Ukraine

D - Eastern Europe

Period total fertility rate

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

E - Baltic States

Period total fertility rate

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014, Eurostat 2014, Warsaw School of Economics 
2015



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten12

4.2.2 Period mean age of women at fi rst birth5

Women tended to have their fi rst birth quite early during the communist era, on 
average between 22 and 24 years of age. With the beginning of the transition in the 
early 1990s women started to postpone childbearing and the mean age of women 
at fi rst birth (MAFB) started to rise and did so throughout the remainder of the 1990s 
and the 2000s (Appendix Fig. 2). The increase in the MAFB was most pronounced 
in Central Europe but slow in Eastern Europe. For instance, in the Czech Republic 
the MAFB grew from age 22.5 in 1990 to 27.6 in 2010; in the Russian Federation the 
MAFB increased from 22.7 only to 24.8 during the same period. The growth in the 
MAFB was putting downward pressure on the period TFR trend not only during 
the1990s but also during the recovery of the PTFR in the 2000s. In most countries 
the MAFB rate of growth slackened in the early 2010s (Appendix Fig. 2). 

4.2.3 Period fertility rates of young and older women

The analysis of period fertility rates of young and older women presents an illumi-
nating way to follow the progress of childbearing postponement and recuperation. 
At the same time, this analysis demonstrates the impact of childbearing trends of 
young and older women on trends of the period total fertility rate.

In Bulgaria, for instance, during the 1970s and especially during the 1980s the 
trends in the period age-specifi c fertility rates of young and of older women were 
essentially fl at which resulted in a reasonably steady PTFR trend of around 2.0 births 
per woman (Appendix Fig. 3, panel B). A decline in the period age-specifi c fertility 
rate of women aged 15-26 (PASFR 15-26) during the 1990s illustrated that numbers 
of births of these women were decreasing. The assumption that at least some of 
these births were being postponed is justifi ed. Specifi cally, the PASFR 15-26 de-
clined from 1.5 births per woman in 1988 to 0.8 in 1997. This was refl ected in the 
decline of the PTFR from 2.0 to 1.1 births per woman as also a minor decline in the 
childbearing trend of older women occurred during those years. Some of the births 
that were presumably postponed during the 1990s were subsequently borne by the 
same women when they were older during the 2000s. The PASFR 27-49 increased 
from 0.3 births per woman in 1998 to 0.7 in 2009. This was refl ected in a rise of the 
PTFR from 1.1 births per woman in 1997 to 1.6 in 2009. Variations of these trends of 
the period age-specifi c fertility rates of young (15-26) and of older (27-49) women 
were occurring in all the CEE countries as illustrated by the additional examples of 
the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation and Lithuania in Appendix Figure 3. 

Declines of the PASFRs 15-26 in the mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s in most 
countries are proof that childbearing postponement was continuing, with the ex-
ception of Bulgaria and Eastern Europe (Appendix Table 4). In the latter countries, 
however, the potential for further childbearing postponement is large, because the 

5 It might be preferable to use cohort mean ages of women at fi rst birth for this analysis, but long 
enough series for CEE are not yet available.



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 13

shares of the PASFRs 15-26 around 2010 were high, i.e. young women were still 
bearing about half of all births.

4.2.4 Cohort age patterns of childbearing

Changes in cohort age patterns of fertility demonstrate the rapid pace of childbear-
ing postponement into older ages that occurred during the main years of the soci-
etal transformations in CEE. In the Czech Republic, for instance, there was a sharp 
decline of childbearing of women in their early to mid-twenties from the 1965 to 
the 1970 birth cohort. The next phase was a collapse of the early fertility pattern 
peaking at age 20 in the 1970 birth cohort into a later childbearing pattern of the 
1975 cohort with a peak at age 29. Birth postponement did not stop at that point 
but continued in subsequent cohorts born in the mid to late 1970s (Appendix Fig. 4, 
panel A). The childbearing data for women in their twenties of the 1980 cohorts 
indicate that the new regime of late childbearing was stabilizing.

Such a rapid pace of conversion from an early to a late fertility pattern was typi-
cal for all CEE populations. The majority of births of the cohorts born during the 
late 1960s that started their childbearing during the early to mid-1980s was concen-
trated in their teens and twenties, whereas the women who started childbearing in 
the 1990s were having most of their children later (Appendix Fig. 4). 

The rapid pace of change in CEE cohort age patterns of fertility stands out in 
comparison to what had occurred in Western countries. Typically the conversion 
from an early to a late childbearing pattern started with cohorts born in the late 
1940s and early 1950s as, for instance, in the Netherlands (Appendix Fig. 4, panel E). 
The peak of the age fertility pattern in the 1945 cohort was age 24. From there 
on, changes in the age pattern of fertility occurred gradually with the peak age in 
the 1965 cohort ranging between 29-31 years. Among the next 20 cohorts, i.e. for 
women born between 1965 and 1985, the cohort age patterns of fertility in the Neth-
erlands remained virtually unchanged (not shown). In Austria changes in fertility 
age patterns were even more gradual and continued among the cohorts born in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Appendix Fig. 4, panel F). In western countries changes from 
one cohort to the next were relatively orderly and smooth. In contrast, changes in 
childbearing age patterns in CEE during the societal transformations of the 1990s 
and 2000s were dramatic and tumultuous (Appendix Fig. 4). 

4.2.5 Cohort total fertility trends

At the same time as the radical changes in the timing of childbearing were taking 
place, the quantum of fertility as measured by cohort total fertility rates (CTFRs) 
started to decline. This was apparently also triggered by the societal transforma-
tions in CEE around 1990. CTFR levels among the birth cohorts of the late 1940s and 
the 1950s had been quite stable, close to the replacement level (Fig. 2). A turning 
point occurred among women born around 1960. Without exception the CTFRs at 
age 40 fell among the 1960s cohorts throughout CEE (Fig. 2 and Table 2). 



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten14

Fig. 2: Cohort total fertility rates at age 40, Central & East European region, 
Central, South-Eastern, Eastern Europe and Baltic States, country 
populations within regions, birth cohorts 1935-1975

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Birth cohort

Central Europe

South-Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe

Baltic States

A - Central and Eastern Europa

Cohort total fertility rate at age 40

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Birth cohort

Croatia

Czech Rep

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

B - Central Europe

Cohort fertility rate at age 40total

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Birth cohort

Bulgaria

Serbia

Romania

C - South-Eastern Europe

Cohort fertility rate at age 40total

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Birth cohort

Belarus

Russia

Ukraine

D - Eastern Europe

Cohort fertility rate at age 40total

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Birth cohort

Estonia

Lithuania

E - Baltic States

Cohort fertility rate at age 40total

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014, Observatoire Démographique Européen 2012, 
Warsaw School of Economics 2014: Personal communication



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 15

An investigation of Sobotka and Zeman (2014)6 demonstrated that the cohort 
fertility decline continued among the 1970s cohorts in most CEE countries. These 
authors calculated completed cohort fertility rates for 26 European countries for the 
1965 to 1974 birth cohorts, including eight CEE countries.7 On average, the 1965 
CTFR of 1.93 births per woman for the eight CEE countries declined to 1.71 births 
per woman in the 1974 cohort: an 11 percent decline. 

Myrskylä et al. (2013) prepared a new set of CTFR forecasts for 37 developed 
countries for the 1970s cohorts which included 11 CEE countries. An increase was 
estimated for Lithuania, Russia, East Germany, Slovenia, Estonia and Bulgaria. On 
the other hand, decreases were estimated for Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary. As the declines were larger than the increases, the average 

Tab. 2: Cohort total fertility rates at age 40, selected Central and East European 
countries, birth cohorts 1957 and around 1970

Region, Country Cohort total fertility rate at age 40
1957 Latest recorded 

around 1970 
cohort 

Birth
cohort

Percent change 
1957 to circa 
1970 cohort

Central Europe
Croatia 1.92 1.82 1966 -5
Czech Republic 2.06 1.84 1971 -11
Hungary 2.00 1.87 1969 -7
Poland 2.17 1.66 1972 -24
Slovakia 2.19 1.77 1973 -19
Slovenia 1.93 1.65 1973 -15

South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 2.03 1.67 1969 -18
Serbia 1.81 1.55 1975 -14
Romania 2.23 1.80 1966 -19

Eastern Europe
Belarus 1.91 1.56 1972 -19
Russia 1.86 1.57 1970 -16
Ukraine 1.83 1.52 1971 -17

Baltic States
Estonia 2.01 1.75 1972 -13
Lithuania 1.95 1.69 1970 -13

Source: Human Fertility Database 2015, Observatoire Démographique Européen 2012, 
Warsaw School of Economics 2014: Personal communication

6 Sobotka, Tomáš; Zeman, Kryštof 2014: Personal communication 10 October.
7 The eight CEE countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 

Slovakia and Slovenia.



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten16

1970 CTFR of 1.75 for these countries declined to 1.68 births per woman for the 1979 
birth cohort.

Other evidence validates the assumption of continued declines in CTFRs in most 
CEE countries. In countries with available data for analysis,8 results show that only 
a part of postponed births were being recuperated among the 1970s birth cohorts. 
Such a sequence virtually guarantees that CTFRs of subsequent cohorts will be 
smaller than in preceding cohorts. Table 3 provides an overview of recuperation in-
dices (RI), i.e. of the amounts of childbearing that have been recuperated relative to 
the fertility decline at younger ages9 between the 1970 and the 1975 birth cohorts. 
The recuperation index is usually computed for cohorts that have (almost) com-
pleted their childbearing periods. In Table 3 the RIs are computed for incomplete 
cohorts and the highest ages these cohorts have reached are listed. In other words, 
the RIs are merely an indication of whether eventually the respective cohort might 
recuperate the full amount of postponed births. Taking the example of Poland, if 
by age 36 the 1975 birth cohort has recuperated only 35 percent of the postponed 
births compared to the 1970 cohort, it is almost certain that women born in 1975 
will not recuperate 100 percent of the postponed births by the time they reach the 
end of their reproductive period. The numbers in Table 3 and the graphs in Figure 4 
illustrate that the probability of women in the 1975 birth cohorts recuperating all the 
postponed births in the listed countries is low.10

8 The analysis was carried out only when cohort fertility was registered at least up to the age of 35.
9 For instance, in the Czech Republic minus 0.433 births per woman at age 25 was the difference 

of the cumulated ASFRs between the 1970 and the 1975 cohorts (Fig. 4, panel A). By age 35 
the difference between the two curves was –0.155, which means that 0.278 births per woman 
had been recuperated, thus only 64 percent of the births that were postponed by age 25 were 
recuperated by age 35 [0.433-0.155=0.278/0.433= 0.64] (Table 3).

10 There were two exceptions when the RIs for the 1980 cohort were high, namely in Estonia 
(101 percent) and Belarus (127 percent), and thus in these countries completed cohort fertility 
rates for the 1980 cohort will eventually exceed those of the 1975 cohorts (Fig. 4).

Tab. 3: Recuperation indices (in percent) between birth cohorts 1970 and 1975, 
1970 CTFR (40), selected Central and East European countries

Country Recuperation Index between birth 
cohorts 1970 and 1975

1970 
CTFR at

RI at age age 40

Czech Republic 64 35 1.85
Poland 35 36 1.78
Estonia 77 36 1.82
Belarus 47 36 1.64

Note: The Recuperation Index (RI) measures the degree of fertility recuperation relative to 
the fertility decline at younger ages.

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014, Warsaw School of Economics 2014: Personal 
communication



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 17

4.2.6 Cohort parity distributions

The palpable fertility quantum decline during the CEE societal transitions is also 
illustrated by trends in cohort parity distributions in nine countries (Fig. 3). There 
was a distinct decline in the share of women with two children and an increase in 
the share of women with one child among the 1960s cohorts. Second order parity 
women still dominated in almost all countries in the 1970 birth cohort, although 
there were already more women that had had one rather than two births in Russia 
and Ukraine. It should also be emphasized that shares of women remaining child-
less even in the 1970 cohort remained low, i.e. at around ten percent or less. 

The notable fertility quantum decline between the 1960 and the 1970 cohorts in 
these nine countries is refl ected in a dramatic increase of the ratio of shares of low 
order parities (childless and women with one birth) compared to high order parities 
of women who had borne three or more children (Appendix Table 5). In the Czech 
Republic, for instance, there were about as many low parity women as there were 
women with 3+ children in the 1960 cohort, and this ratio increased to 1.7 in the 
1970 cohort. In Bulgaria, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine among the 1970 cohorts there 
were around four or more times as many women of low order (0 and 1) parity com-
pared to those of high order parity (3+).

4.2.7 The recent slowdown in childbearing postponement

Some evidence indicates fertility postponement was slowing down in the 2010s and 
in the birth cohorts of the 1970s and early 1980s. To begin with, the mean age of 
women at fi rst birth was no longer increasing or had tapered off in South-Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic States, and in some other countries (Appendix Fig. 2). Further, the 
cohort age patterns of childbearing were no longer changing very much among the 
1980s birth cohorts (Appendix Fig. 4). 

The clearest evidence of a slowdown in childbearing postponement is apparent 
in Figure 4. A comparison of the curves of differences between cumulated ASFRs 
of young birth cohorts fi ve years apart shows that the lowest points in the curves 
are diminishing. For instance, the nadir in the difference between the 1970 and the 
1975 cohorts in the Czech Republic was over -0.4 births per woman, whereas for 
the difference between the 1975 and the 1980 cohorts it was less than -0.3 births 
per woman. Except for Lithuania, the same pattern is repeated in all populations in 
Figure 4, as well as in those not included in Figure 4. Furthermore, the downward 
slope of the beginning of the curves of differences between the 1975 and the 1980 
cohorts, as well as differences between the 1980 and the 1985 cohorts are less 
steep than the downward slope for the preceding curves. 

The slowdown in childbearing postponement should pose upward pressure on 
the PTFR. One could hypothesize that the petering out of the PTFR recuperation 
around 2010 was due to a countervailing effect of declining fertility quantum, i.e. of 
the declining CTFRs (Cf. section 4.2.5). 



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten18

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Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 19

4.2.8 National population projections

As discussed in section 2 (Background), populations were shrinking in almost all 
CEE countries during the societal transformations of the 1990s and 2000s. This was 
due to low fertility, often reinforced by emigration and relatively high mortality. Ac-
cording to offi cial population projections prepared by national statistical offi ces, 
population decline is projected to continue in the future11 (Appendix Table 6). 

11 Specifi c data in the medium variant projections prepared by the United Nations Population 
Division (2015) differ, however by the middle of the 21st century decline is projected in all 15 
countries.

Fig. 4: Differences in cumulated age-specifi c cohort fertility rates between 
moving benchmark cohorts and subsequent cohorts fi ve years apart, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, and Belarus, birth cohorts 1970, 1975, 
1980 and 1985

-0.5

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

A - Czech Republic

Births per woman

-0.35

-0.30

-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

B - Poland

Births per woman

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

C - Estonia

Births per woman

D - Belarus

Births per woman

1970 CTFR(40) = 1.85
1970 CTFR(40) = 1.78

1970 CTFR(40) = 1.81

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

1970 CTFR(40) = 1.64

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014; Warsaw School of Economics 2014: Per-
sonal communication



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten20

These projections illustrate the implications of assumptions made by national 
experts about future fertility and migration trends. Although methods used differ 
from one country to another, the projected numbers for the near future (up to 20 
years) indicate the direction of growth reasonably well. A brief discussion of fertil-
ity and migration assumptions enables a better understanding of the projections. 
Nonetheless, as is well known from historical experience, caution is in place when 
dealing with population projections. 

Fertility assumptions necessarily begin with levels from the early 2010s and do 
not change rapidly. It is more likely that migration assumptions do not materialize, if 
for no other reason than that knowledge about actual migration trends is question-
able.

Belarus, Bulgaria and Estonia assume net emigration, which means that project-
ed population decline is reinforced by migration assumptions. The projections for 
the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine assume 
net immigration. These assumptions would partly offset the effect of low fertility as-
sumptions on future population trends. With this knowledge in mind, if immigration 
is weaker or emigration stronger than assumed, projected population numbers for 
the latter countries would be smaller than indicated in Appendix Table 6. 

As it stands, the only population where the projections show any population in-
crease is Slovakia. Slovakia is, however, one of the countries assuming considerable 
immigration inherent in the population projections. Similarly, projections for Russia 
and the Czech Republic assume considerable immigration. In other words, all the 
medium variants of offi cial population projections for the countries in Appendix 
Table 5 indicate the possibility of declining populations in the future, even though 
migration assumptions could prove to be unrealistic. Slovakia might be the excep-
tion because its population age structure contains a growth momentum driven by 
past high fertility. 

In sum, the projections suggest that declining populations can be expected in al-
most all CEE countries while keeping in mind the hypothetical nature of projections. 

5 Family policies in Central and Eastern Europe

5.1 The forming of post-communist family policies

Post-communist family policies in CEE were formed at a time of historic vicissitudes 
in the “indirect and proximate” determinants of fertility (Davis/Blake 1956; Bongaarts 
1978). These were the tumultuous two decades after 1990 of major economic, so-
cial, political and cultural change discussed in preceding sections. Accordingly, the 
“indirect” fertility determinants of that time exerted a strong downward pressure on 
childbearing. At the same time, the means being employed to modify childbearing 
were also undergoing major changes. It was the time when the “abortion culture” 
was being replaced by a rapid introduction of modern contraceptives which in most 
CEE countries were considered a bourgeois feature by the communist establish-
ment. Contraceptive prevalence of modern methods was on the rise, prevalence of 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 21

traditional methods was declining throughout CEE (Appendix table 7), and induced 
abortion rates were abating (Appendix table 8). Period and cohort fertility were de-
clining rapidly (Cf. sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.5).

In the immediate aftermath of the demise of state socialism governments were 
preoccupied with economic and political reforms and did not pay much attention 
to social and family policies. A part of the pro-natalist communist policy measures, 
such as parental leaves and child benefi ts remained in place, but effectiveness was 
waning due to infl ation. Relatively high costs were causing restrictions of child care 
facilities. Other policies were being abandoned altogether, most notably the infl uen-
tial housing policy of preferential assignment of apartments to families with children 
(Frejka 2008; Sobotka 2011). 

As fertility was rapidly declining governments increasingly turned their attention 
to social and family policies. As documented below in section 5.3 Country fam-
ily policy profi les, in several CEE countries governments intended to design and 
implement comprehensive family policies that would minimize the employment-
childrearing dilemma. Documents were formulated, commissions and ministries 
founded to achieve this goal. An examination of the status of family policies around 
2013-2015 in CEE countries points to four types of family policies.

1. Comprehensive family policy model
  Governments have managed to create reasonably favourable conditions for 

women and men to ameliorate the diffi culties associated with taking care of 
children and households, as well as being employed. Not only are fi nancial 
and material benefi ts available for mothers and fathers, but also institutional 
childcare is adequate as are working conditions for mothers. Gender relation-
ships are improving, although a lot still remains to be desired. The overall pic-
ture indicates that Estonia and Slovenia qualify for this model. Interestingly, 
cohort fertility around the 1970 cohort in these two countries was not higher 
than the average in the Baltic and Central European countries. 

2. Pro-natalist policies model
  The pro-natalist model comprises countries in which the main objective of 

family policies is to raise fertility and the principal tools to reach this goal are 
fi nancial. The countries which in one form or another have introduced large 
birth allowances, possibly in combination with increasing other benefi ts and 
with well remunerated parental leaves fi t into this category: the Russian Fed-
eration, Belarus, Ukraine and possibly Bulgaria as well as Latvia. 

3. Temporary male bread-winner model 
  Well-remunerated long parental leaves were common under the state-so-

cialist regimes. In some countries, these were retained and prolonged while 
childcare for small children under age three has dissipated and is virtually 
non-existent. Employers tend to discriminate against mothers and potential 
mothers, and their working conditions make it diffi cult to balance employ-
ment and household responsibilities with scarce possibilities for part-time 
work. This situation is typical in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This model 
might have developed unintentionally, but has become a reality.

4. Conventional family policies model.
  The conventional model consists of a combination of maternal leaves, child 

benefi ts, and child care facilities which provide some support for childrear-



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten22

ing, however the extent of assistance is not suffi cient to alleviate the employ-
ment-childrearing dilemma. That state of affairs persists in Croatia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Serbia, and to some extent in Hungary. The specifi c 
confi guration differs from one country to another. Also the principal circum-
stances that have generated the respective conditions differ. 

5.2 A Brief historical perspective 

Family policies were fi rst comprehensively elaborated in a 1934 book Crisis in the 
Population Question by  Alva and Gunnar Myrdal (1934). Their ideas played a major 
role in designing welfare policies in Scandinavia, and after the Second World War 
in Western Europe. Since then numerous authors have dealt with population and 
family policies in industrialized countries, including Eastern Europe (for instance, 
Besemeres 1980, 24 scholars in Berelson 1974, David and McIntyre 1981, 14 schol-
ars in David 1999, Neyer 2003, about 50 scholars in Frejka et al. 2008). McDonald 
(2002) and Stock et al. (2013) devised frameworks to guide the formulation of con-
temporary family policies.

Family policies of contemporary, mainly western developed countries have also 
been thoughtfully and thoroughly investigated and categorized by Gauthier (2002) 
and Thévenon (2011). However, not a single CEE country was included in Gauthier’s 
analysis and only four CEE countries were included in Thévenon’s.

The present overview and analysis of family policies in the formerly socialist 
countries of CEE constitutes a complement to the extant literature on this subject 
matter. 

5.3 Country family policy profi les

The CEE family policies typology is derived from a thorough analysis of family poli-
cies in the individual countries by teams of country collaborators. Concise descrip-
tions and analyses of family policies in these 15 Central and East European coun-
tries12 follow. 

5.3.1 Belarus

Low fertility is a high priority in both the political and public discourse in Belarus. 
Concern is refl ected in offi cial documents as well as in opinion surveys. The Na-
tional Programme of Demographic Security of Belarus for 2011 – 2015 is the most 
recent in a series promulgated by the government. In it “the demographic situation 
in the country is characterized by a steady depopulation since the early 1990s. The 
main factor of depopulation in the Republic of Belarus is a low birth rate.” Specifi c 
policy measures are centred on child and birth allowances. A lump sum payment 

12 More information is available in Barnett Papers in Social Research 15-01 (Basten/Frejka 2015) 
and detailed descriptions of country family policies will be available in the University of Oxford 
CEEfamily Working Papers (see ceefamily.info).



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 23

is made for each birth. As of 2014, this payment amounts to the equivalent of€828 
for the fi rst birth; for the second and subsequent births it rises to €1159. A universal 
care benefi t for a child under three years is paid at 35 percent of the average wage 
(€408) for the fi rst child (€143 in 2014) and at 40 percent for the second and subse-
quent children (€163). These measures possibly entailed an increase in the period 
TFR which increased from 1.23 in 2004 and 1.50 in 2010 to 1.66 in 2013. 

The main emphasis of family policies is on fi nancial incentives. Little attention is 
devoted to other important family policy issues, such as amelioration of the work/
household responsibilities dilemma of women; gender equity at home and at work; 
institutional child-care; and housing conditions. Altogether family policies in Bela-
rus are of a relatively narrowly conceived pro-natalist nature.

5.3.2 Bulgaria

Bulgaria’s population strategy was set out in a 2005 document National Strategy for 
Demographic Development in the Republic of Bulgaria for the Period 2006 – 2020. 
The goals include: to encourage fertility through providing facilities necessary for 
raising children; to discourage reproductive-aged people from emigrating; to im-
prove reproductive health and to prevent sterility. The following measures were 
considered: further development of gender equality; fi nancial support for raising 
children, especially for a second child; better opportunities for work-family recon-
ciliation; the introduction of services that support raising children in the family en-
vironment; improvements to the educational system; better infrastructure and liv-
ing environments; family planning consultations free of charge; and cultivating the 
two-child family model.

Fertility policies in Bulgaria aim to increase second births. Payments at birth 
differ by parity: 2nd child 600 BGN/€300, €125 for the 1st and €100 for the 3rd child. 
Monthly childcare allowances are higher for the second child than for fi rst or third 
child. Students are encouraged to combine studies with parenting via a high birth 
allowance of €1,440 (for comparison, the average monthly salary in January-Sep-
tember 2014 was 807 BGN/€404). 

Maternity leave is 410 days during which mothers who worked for at least 12 
months prior to the birth receive 90 percent of their gross salary. Following that, 
mothers are entitled to leave with an allowance equal to the minimum monthly 
wage until their child is two years old. Mothers have the legal right to an additional 
year of parental leave without allowance until the child’s third birthday. 

Institutions of childcare consist of public crèches for children aged 10 months – 3 
years, and kindergarten for children aged 3 to 6. Pre-school education is obligatory 
for children above age 5 and is free of charge. In the view of the team of country col-
laborators family policies in Bulgaria are directed towards fi nancial help for families 
with children in need. It is questionable whether the monetary measures fulfi l the 
aim of increasing fertility in Bulgaria. Not enough is done to improve the institutional 
support for parents. In most cities, there are fewer places in nurseries and kinder-
gartens than are needed. Very little is done to reconcile family and work. When 
mothers return to work they work full time. Other work schedules are not tolerated. 



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten24

In sum, the rhetoric of family policies is comprehensive. In reality the focus is 
limited to fi nancial support, including a long maternal and parental leave. Bulgarian 
family policy can therefore be labelled as pro-natalist. Little attention is devoted to 
numerous unresolved issues: insuffi cient infrastructure of childcare; limited atten-
tion to ameliorate the work-family dilemma; high unemployment and low incomes.

5.3.3 Croatia

Since 1995, Croatia has formally ratifi ed several documents concerning demograph-
ic policy with the goal to encourage an increase in fertility. The National Population 
Policy was introduced in 2006. This document was formulated in the spirit of family-
friendly policies with many lofty goals, such as facilitating housing and employment 
for young families, and licensing of trained and available babysitters. The majority 
of these goals proved to be unrealistic. 

Extant family policy measures include: a maternity leave of 180 days; child ben-
efi ts which are somewhat higher for third and fourth births; and childcare facilities 
that are attended by over 40 percent of children of preschool age. Economic diffi cul-
ties are believed to be among the challenges people are facing when deciding about 
having a child, and these are also limiting the government’s resources for social 
policies. A high unemployment rate, uneven regional development and a challeng-
ing investment climate are the main economic problems. Gender equality is advanc-
ing at a slow pace. Housework and child-care are still considered mostly women’s 
responsibilities and women indeed perform most of the housework regardless of 
their employment status.

Ilišin et al. (2013) conducted an extensive study focusing on young people’s 
lives. Respondents were aged 14 to 27, most of them still in school. The share of 
unemployed (approximately one fourth) is almost equal to those with a job (approxi-
mately one third). For the most part, young people live with their parents because 
of insuffi cient fi nancial resources. The main professional goal of young people is to 
fi nd a secure job and many are looking for employment abroad.

In sum, the Croatian government has published several family policy documents 
in recent years, but the majority of policy recommendations proposed have not 
been implemented. This inaction has been attributed to a lack of fi nancial resources 
for families and institutions.

5.3.4 Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic, three periods of implementing family policies after 1989 can 
be distinguished.

1. Policy reorientations in the 1990s:
The pro-natalist nature of family policies was abandoned. Policies became mostly 
based on broader social welfare concerns aimed at reducing income inequality, and 
preventing poverty. Special attention has been devoted to parental leave policies. 
The Czech Republic has one of the longest parental leave periods. It was expanded 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 25

until a child’s 4th birthday in 1995, although it does not align with the length of the 
job protection period fi xed at three years. Low priority was given to women’s em-
ployment with some strengthening of the male breadwinner model and a prefer-
ence for mothers of small children to perform childrearing at home. Public childcare 
for children below age three collapsed in the 1990s as expensive-to-operate crèch-
es faced a declining demand and became a rising fi nancial burden. There was also 
a huge expansion in the availability of contraception. A payment was introduced for 
induced abortions and these declined sharply. Housing was partly privatized and 
was in short supply. 

2. 1998-2008: Gradually increased attention to family policies:
The establishment of the Department of Family Policy and Social Work at the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Affairs demonstrates the Czech Republic’s concern to 
support the EU agenda to promote family policies and gender equality. Birth and 
parental leave allowances were doubled in 2006-7. 

3. 2009-2013: Cuts and reforms of family support:
The amount of birth allowance was curtailed in 2008. Subsequently, it became 
means tested and since 2010 provided only for the fi rst child. On the positive side, 
parents gained more fl exibility in parental leave. Since 2012, they can decide about 
its duration and leave payment period (19-48 months), with a fi xed total sum of 
8,000 EUR (2014) distributed in monthly installments.

The current family policies combine an entitlement for a long period of parental 
leave with a low availability of early childcare, nurturing a de facto male breadwin-
ner model among families with children aged 0-3. There are limited options for par-
ents to reduce work hours or work part-time. The policy of equal opportunities for 
men and women has only minor political and public support. Altogether, this cre-
ates a paradoxical dichotomy for most women experiencing a complete withdrawal 
from the labour market for 3 years after childbirth followed by a return to full-time 
labour participation thereafter. This cycle is typically repeated when another child is 
born and leads to the loss of skills and income among working mothers.

5.3.5 Estonia

A policy document Smart Parents, Great Children, Strong Society: Strategy of Chil-
dren and Families 2012-2020 was ratifi ed in Estonia in 2011. It demonstrates the 
government’s thorough understanding of modern comprehensive family policies. 
The document lists basic demographic challenges: the population is aging; the 
working-age population is decreasing; and the number of births is small. One ap-
proach to cope with these challenges is to make Estonia a family-friendly country. 
The Strategy of Children and Families focuses on prevention and early intervention 
at all levels, which requires an agreement between political parties about the main 
principles that guarantee the wellbeing of children and families. The main objective 
of the strategy is to improve the wellbeing and quality of life of children and fami-



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten26

lies, thereby promoting the birth of children. The strategy aims to narrow the gap 
between the desired and actual number of children born.

Estonia has a universal family benefi ts system. It includes birth allowances, child 
allowances, maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, childcare allowances, a 
variety of targeted family benefi ts, a tax allowance, and childcare facilities. Spend-
ing on social protection benefi ts for families amounted to 2 percent of GDP in 2011, 
slightly less than the EU average of 2.2 percent. In recent years, there has been 
increasing recognition that universal measures should be supplemented with a 
stronger package of means-tested measures to reduce child poverty. 

In the system of policy measures some stand out as being particularly helpful:

Child care facilities: In 2012, 20 percent of 1-year-olds, 70 percent of 2-year-
olds, 90 percent of 3-4-year-olds and more than 90 percent of 5-6-year-olds 
attended public childcare. Children typically attend on a full-time basis, i.e. 
35-40 hours per week. 

Parental leave: New provisions include benefi ts equalling 100 percent of in-
come earned during the calendar year preceding childbirth; the maximum 
amount is three times the average salary. In 2004, the duration of benefi t pay-
ment was set at 11 months following childbirth. In 2006, it was extended to 14 
months, and in 2008 up to 18 months. 

5.3.6 Hungary

Hungarian family policies originated in the pre-transition period. Frequent changes 
in regulations and benefi t levels have occurred, because political parties alternating 
in government had contrasting family policy philosophies. As of 2013, Hungary had 
a complex system of birth and child allowances, as well as a comprehensive system 
of maternity and parental leave. The total entitlement of paid leave for mothers was 
160 weeks, which consisted of 24 weeks of maternal leave and 136 weeks of paren-
tal leave. 

The following specifi c universal benefi ts are available:
Birth grant: a one-off payment of 64,125 HUF/€209. “Baby bond”: a one-off pay-

ment of 42,500 HUF/€168 into a bank account kept until the 18th birthday of the child 
by the Hungarian State Treasury with the option for parents and the government 
to make further payments into this account. Child home care allowance: 28,500 
HUF/€93 per child per month, claimed until the third birthday. Child raising support: 
28,500 HUF/€93 per month for mothers (or fathers) who raise three or more chil-
dren under the age of 18 until the youngest child is three to eight years old. Family 
allowance: A monthly family allowance until the end of a child’s school education, 
at most up to child’s 20th birthday – 12,200 HUF/€40. Family tax allowance: Is sub-
tracted from the tax base; for one or two children a deduction of 10,000 HUF/€33 
per child, for 3+ children a deduction of 33,000 HUF/€107 per child. Public child-
care: For children under the age of 3, nursery is available, although coverage barely 
exceeds 10 percent and facilities tend to be overcrowded. Family day care, where 
a maximum of fi ve children can be taken care of, is for children between 20 weeks 
and 14 years. Moreover, several insurance based benefi ts (e.g. maternity benefi t 
and parental benefi t) are available to women who have been employed for at least 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 27

365 days in the two years preceding the birth of the child. In recent years, eligibility 
criteria for parental benefi t have been extended to include women in higher educa-
tion and those who go back to work after the fi rst birthday of the child.

Spéder and Kamarás (2008) observed that “population policy was basically zig-
zagging in the 15 years following the change of political regime in 1989/1990, and it 
often became the key issue of political struggles (…) a signifi cant fl uctuation charac-
terized Hungarian family policy after 1990; the basic principles of support changed 
often and profoundly. (…) Therefore, family policy and levels of child-related sup-
ports were highly unpredictable.” And continue to be so. 

5.3.7 Latvia

A systematic concern for family policies is evident in Latvia’s recent history. In 2004 
a Ministry for Children and Family Affairs was established and the government 
adopted an action plan “State Family Policy”. The focus on demographic issues 
was strengthened when a Council on Demographic Affairs, chaired by the Prime 
Minister was established in 2011. Family State Policy Guidelines for 2011 – 2017 
were adopted in 2011. The government aims to facilitate family formation, to fortify 
their stability and wellbeing, to increase fertility, as well as to strengthen marriage 
as the best form of family and to improve the value of marriage. In 2014 a focus on 
family policies was strengthened within the framework of the 2015 – 2017 budgetary 
planning. 

Latvia has a universal family benefi ts system. In 2013 public fi nancing for family 
policies in Latvia was 2 percent of GDP, and this is expected to increase to 2.25-
2.5 percent of GDP by 2015. The main benefi ts consist of: a child birth benefi t of € 
421.17; a monthly family state benefi t of € 11.38 for each child aged 1-15 and 15-19 
if in school, twice this amount for the second child and three times for subsequent 
children; a child care benefi t of € 171/month up to age 1.5; € 42.69/month for ages 
1.5-2; a parental benefi t paid to an insured person who is taking care of a child 
younger than 1 or 1.5 years provided this person is employed on the day the benefi t 
is approved and is on leave for child care (the average amount in 2014 was € 501.50); 
a maternity leave granted to expectant mothers who are employed and receive a 
salary, are self-employed, or are spouses of a self-employed person and have vol-
untarily joined the social insurance, the length of maternity leave is 112-140 days. 

Early childhood education which includes safe and quality childcare services 
is provided by local municipalities free of charge for children from 1.5 years until 
compulsory school age (7), but availability does not meet the needs of all parents. A 
variety of fl exible childcare services have been introduced such as private childcare 
institutions. More than 90 percent of the total number of children aged 3–6 were en-
rolled in pre-school education institutions in recent years. Childcare services have 
been provided for more than 23 percent of children under the age of 3. 



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten28

5.3.8 Lithuania

For the past 25 years, the design and implementation of family policies in Lithuania 
has been marked by a struggle of competing ideologies. The support for the male-
breadwinner family model and corresponding fi nancial measures have been sup-
plemented by family policy instruments that reinforce gender equality, work-family 
balance and better employment opportunities. Often the ideological positions and 
implemented policies did not correspond to the traditional political right and left 
wing divide. 

While there is no clear family policy strategy, a parental (maternity/paternity) 
leave benefi t, which has been subject to multiple modifi cations in recent years, 
continues to be the principal measure supporting families with children. Since July 
2011 parents are granted a choice between a one- and a two-year payment period. 
The former provides a benefi t covering 100 percent of the compensatory wage, the 
latter covers 70 percent of the compensatory wage during the fi rst year and 40 per-
cent during the second year. A 2012 survey revealed that the availability and quality 
of formal childcare services, particularly for children under 3 years of age, remains a 
very important territorially highly differentiated issue. Nonetheless, over 30 percent 
of children under the age of three were attending crèches and over 80 percent of 
children aged 3-6 were enrolled in formal childcare.

Findings from surveys conducted between 1994 and 2010 show that not only 
has fertility decreased in Lithuania but citizens’ desires to have children have de-
clined. During the 15 years since the mid-1990s the mean desired number of chil-
dren among the 18-49 year-olds (both men and women) who already have and/or 
desire to have children has fallen from 2.09 in 1994-1995 to 1.99 in 2010. The mean 
number of intended children declined from 1.91 in 2001 to 1.75 in 2010. As the actual 
number of children is usually smaller than the intended number, positive fertility 
changes are hardly to be expected.

As parties have alternated in government and economic conditions have been 
unstable, family policy measures have been subject to frequent adjustments. The 
discontinuity and instability of family policies limited the chances to achieve a posi-
tive effect of the adopted family policy measures. 

5.3.9 Poland

In the 1990s the Polish government’s involvement in family policy regulations was 
to delegate responsibility for family’s wellbeing to parents; to delegate responsibili-
ties for social policies to local governments; and to commercialize social services. 
The fertility decline was initially perceived as a temporary reaction to the transfor-
mation process. Government family policy programmes did not stop the downward 
fertility trend, neither did the reversal of the liberal induced abortion legislation in 
1993 which implied a de facto ban of abortions for most women. Financial support 
was largely restricted to low-income households and family benefi ts were primarily 
a tool to prevent poverty rather than to assist families with their child-related costs.



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 29

During the 2000s, low fertility became a concern addressed in public debate, 
however, there was no common political understanding how to respond to on-
going family changes. Policy changes after 2003 can be viewed as a gradual shift 
towards more generous fi nancial support and towards helping dual-earner families. 
Especially, since 2008 revisions in leave schemes, tax reductions and regulations on 
early education and care provision slightly improved parents’ possibilities to com-
bine work and care obligations. In 2013, an additional family leave of 26 weeks to be 
used after maternity leave, paid at 60 percent of salary, extended possibilities for 
working parents to provide care during the fi rst year of childrearing. Further amend-
ments to the parental leave scheme implemented in July 2015 also aim to make it 
more fl exible for parents and thus easier to reconcile work and care.

Despite these recent changes in family policy, Poland still lacks a stable compre-
hensive family policy that matches the aspirations of its citizens and the needs of 
young people. The family policy programme announced by the President’s offi ce 
in 2013 and the population-related policy proposed by the Government Population 
Council in 2012 haven’t been discussed by the government. However, some meas-
ures implemented by the government recently refl ect their policy recommenda-
tions. 

Referring to the existing fertility gap, scholars identifi ed the main obstacles to 
achieving fertility intentions:

• Diffi culties to reconcile work and family duties due to shortages in early child-
hood education and care services for children aged 0-5; high costs of these 
services which are ill-adjusted to parent’s needs; the way teaching and non-
teaching activities are scheduled in primary schools; non-fl exible work pat-
terns;

• Increasing direct costs of children, affected by both quality shifts in parent’s 
aspiration and rising costs of education;

• Income instability, unemployment threats and diffi culties faced by young 
people in obtaining employment as well as low fi nancial transfers to families;

• Diffi culties obtaining housing;

• Gender gaps in sharing household duties between men and women;

• Insuffi cient knowledge about reproductive health, including lack of support 
for couples facing troubles to become parents.

Altogether, parents are confronted with high direct and indirect costs of children 
while the state’s contribution towards parenthood is still low despite its notable 
increase over the most recent eight years, i.e. since the late 2000s. Moreover, fam-
ily policy is exposed to political instability due to a strong ideological component 
involved in the family policy debates. 

5.3.10 Romania

Romania has been experiencing serious political and economic instability. During 
the past six years, i.e. since 2010, there were seven different governments. In this 
environment only limited attention has been devoted to family policy issues. More-



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten30

over, because childbearing was previously enforced with drastic measures, namely 
the prohibition of contraceptives and induced abortions, the state is reluctant to 
deal with family policy issues. 

The majority of social benefi ts aim to alleviate poverty. The economic decline 
caused a reduction in government revenue and spending. Consequently, funds for 
social policy not oriented towards poverty reduction or economic development are 
scarce. Nonetheless, a range of birth and child allowances are in place, including 
two different ways of receiving parental leave and benefi ts for raising a child. Par-
ents can decide whether they wish to obtain parental leave until the child is either 
12 or 24 months old with a child raising allowance adjusted according to the length 
of the leave.

In 2012, 56.5 percent of mothers with children under six were employed. Formal 
childcare, however, was available in 2011 to merely 2 percent of children under the 
age of three and to 41 percent of children between three and the minimum compul-
sory school age.

Childbearing intentions are low. According to the Generations and Gender 
Survey of 2005, among respondents that already have more than one child, only 
2.6 percent of women and 4.6 percent of men want another child.

Altogether, the existing family policy measures are not suffi ciently effective to 
act as an inducement to childbearing, since they cover only a minor share of the 
costs. Also, adequate attention is lacking to the various issues of a more compre-
hensive substance of family policies, such as gender equality, fl exibility of working 
conditions and dealing with the work/care dilemma.

5.3.11  Russian Federation

Traditionally, material incentives, especially monetary ones, have been and con-
tinue to be the main tool of pro-natalist endeavours within the Russian Federation 
since they were fi rst adopted in the 1930s. As period fertility rates plummeted in the 
1990s, once again, concern for low fertility led president Putin to implement pro-
natalist policies that came into effect on 1 January 2007: 

• A substantial increase in pregnancy, birth, and child benefi ts progressively 
graded by child order;

• A parental leave of over 5 months at 100 percent of annual salary; up to 18 
months of leave partially remunerated; up to 3 years of unpaid leave;

• A “maternal capital” granted to mothers of second and higher-order children 
for the acquisition of housing, the education of children, and to augment the 
mother’s pension. Initially 250,000 rubles, indexed to infl ation which grew 
to 387,640 rubles in 2012, approximately US$12,000 at the then-current ex-
change rate.

The share of family support in GDP roughly doubled, approaching 1 percent. 
The policies did have an immediate effect. The PTFR grew from 1.31 in 2006 to 1.75 
in 2014. The real effect will only become evident in 15-20 years when data become 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 31

available for cohorts that were in the midst of their childbearing in the 2000s, i.e. 
mainly women born during the late 1970s and the 1980s.

There are some signs indicating these policies had only a limited effect:
An analysis of the 2006–14 PTFRs illustrates that the effects appear to be wear-

ing off over time; intentions to have additional children did not change in the three 
waves of the Generations and Gender Survey (2004, 2007, 2011); alternative scenar-
io methods indicated that the number of births per woman for the 1970s and 1980s 
birth cohorts is likely to remain stable rather than resulting in a desired increase; 
analyses revealed that the PTFR growth was due to a slowdown in childbearing 
postponement (Frejka/Zakharov 2013). The overall tentative conclusion is that the 
2007 policy measures did not raise cohort fertility. 

The offi cial position of the Putin administration is that measures to stimulate 
the birth rate have been an unqualifi ed success. However, even experts involved in 
policy making have expressed caution. One of these, Rybakovsky (2012) expressed 
doubt that current pro-natalist measures can continue to deliver results. He pro-
posed to increase the grant for the third child, to introduce measures to lower the 
age at marriage, and to encourage the early birth of the fi rst child. 

5.3.12 Serbia

In Serbia, low fertility has been an enduring concern of the government, the media, 
and the public. The government espoused a Pro-natalist Strategy in 2008 stipu-
lating the goal of reaching a “total fertility cohort rate at the level of 2.1 children 
per woman.” The document outlined a comprehensive programme but it remained 
a declaration and few of the policy recommendations were adopted in practice. 
Similarly, a Council for Population Policy was established but it never functioned in 
reality. Although the leading party is in a fi rm political position, the government is 
confronted with many challenges and a dire economic situation. 

A range of family policy measures are in place: full compensation of salary of 
working mother/father during parental leave for a period of one year for the fi rst 
and second child, and two years for the third and every following child; a parental 
allowance for the fi rst to fourth child; a child allowance for families in need of social 
protection; reimbursement for the cost of preschool establishments for children 
lacking parental care; abortion is available on request up to ten weeks gestation, 
and beyond ten weeks with the approval of a medical commission for women aged 
16 or over; free contraceptive counselling once per year and free pregnancy care 
four times for normal pregnancies. 

Gender relations are improving, but are still laden with male predominance, es-
pecially regarding employment. Young women are signifi cantly hindered in their ac-
cess to the labour market and are the fi rst to be dismissed. Private companies have 
been known to ask potential female employees to sign a declaration they will not 
marry or have a child. Attention to reproductive health has been lacking. Only one 
in fi ve women (18.4 percent) at risk of unplanned pregnancy used modern contra-
ception in 2014. The estimated total abortion rate was approximately 2.80 abortions 
per woman. 



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten32

Finally, no policies have been implemented to improve social and economic con-
ditions of young people. The unemployment rate of young people aged 24-35 was 
33.2 percent in 2012. Many young families reside with parents even after they got 
married and are expecting a child. As many as one in three households contain 
more than one family.

5.3.13 Slovakia

In Slovakia, family policies are marked by two distinct characteristics: Recurrent 
changes by parties alternating in power, and a long maternal leave combined with a 
substantial parental leave. The focus is more on fi nancial transfers than on indirect 
measures of parental support. Persistent changes to various family benefi ts have 
made the system extremely complex. Low levels of stability have made it diffi cult 
for families to plan for the future. 

Throughout the years of independence since 1993, the principal family policy 
measure was the combined long maternal and parental leave. As of 2014, the typi-
cal duration was up to 3 years of age. After frequent changes, there was only one 
amount of the parental allowance for all: €204 per month. Parents can decide to re-
turn to work earlier but in so doing forfeit the parental allowance, and might become 
eligible for a childcare allowance. The refunded amount for documented costs is up 
to €230, however, private childcare institutions are much more expensive than that. 
This policy effectively discourages women from gradually returning to the labour 
market and instead encourages them to remain at home for three or more years if 
they have more than one child. 

There is also a shortage of childcare facilities for young children up to three 
years of age and, moreover, these facilities are expensive. Employers often discrimi-
nate against mothers of small children and against young women because of the 
expected three-year break associated with childbearing. Furthermore, unemploy-
ment of mothers after parental leave is high. These contributing factors lead many 
women to stay at home when they do have children or even discourages them from 
childbearing.

5.3.14 Slovenia

Family policies have attracted considerable attention in Slovenia since independ-
ence in 1990. The National Committee on Demographic Policy was established in 
1994 and a Programme for Children and Youth 2006-2016 adopted in 2006. 

There are three main components of family policy in Slovenia: An extensive and 
very well paid parental leave; a network of childcare facilities and highly subsidised 
programmes, and a relatively high child allowance for children in low-income fami-
lies. Parental leave consists of 105 days of maternity leave, 260 days of parental 
and 90 days of paternity leave. Pre-school childcare almost completely meets the 
demand for children from age one to age six. The child allowance is received by a 
majority of children up to age of 18 and even up to age of 26 for those who are still in 
full-time education. In addition there is a birth grant, textbook funds, scholarships, 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 33

subsidized transport for pupils and students, and subsidized school meals. There is 
also a system of child tax allowances which are progressive according to the num-
ber of dependent children. 

Despite improvements in recent years, the traditional division of gender roles in 
Slovenian families persists, which leads to a “double burden” for employed women 
(Stropnik/Šircelj 2008). 

Even though Slovenia has a relatively well-developed comprehensive family pol-
icy, research has not revealed any impact of individual family policy measures on 
people’s fertility behaviour, except for a short-term effect related to a considerable 
prolongation of parental leave. At the same time, it is questionable what the fertility 
trend would have been in the absence of family policy. Undoubtedly, family policy 
has alleviated poverty in many families with children. 

5.3.15 Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s a series of laws in Ukraine provide evidence that successive 
governments have been concerned with population issues and family policies. A 
key document which systematized and coordinated political and demographic un-
dertakings The strategy of demographic development of Ukraine for 2005-2015 was 
adopted in 2006. 

The birth allowance has been the principal family policy measure. It was in-
creased from an insignifi cant amount in 2001-2002 to heights not seen in any other 
country. In 2014 the birth allowance for a fi rst birth was UAH 30,960 (US$3,259), 
for a second birth UAH 61,920 (US$ 6,441) and for a third birth UAH 123,840 (US$ 
13,067). This was 40 percent higher than the per capita GDP at purchasing power 
parity in 2013.

Increases in the birth allowance along with some improvement in the socioeco-
nomic situation and the recuperation of births that were delayed in the 1990s did 
have an effect on the period TFR; it increased from 1.21 births per woman in 2004 
to 1.53 in 2012. It remains to be seen whether there will also be an effect on cohort 
fertility. The recuperation rates for young cohorts born in 1975 and 1980 (Table 3 
and Fig. 4) indicate there might not be a further decline in cohort TFRs; however any 
increase compared to the 1970 birth cohort, when the CTFR(40) was 1.56 births per 
woman, is also unlikely.

Preschool childcare in public institutions has also been increasing steadily. In 
2013, 62 percent of children attended crèches and kindergartens up from 41 percent 
in 2001. 

An observation generally shared by Ukrainian professionals was formulated by 
Perelli-Harris (2008) who states that “Ukraine has one of the most generous but 
least effective family policies in the world.” An important circumstance for the low 
impact of family policies appears to be the emphasis on material incentives, insuffi -
cient attention to work and family initiatives, and broad social change supportive of 
children and parenting. Moreover, the economic collapse and the grave conditions 
caused by internal strife and the Russian intervention are also being felt in the area 
of social and family policies.



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten34

6 Summaries and conclusions

Meaningful observations and conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of 
fertility trends and family policies in CEE.

6.1 Fertility trends

• In the majority of CEE countries births that were postponed by women born 
during the 1970s were not being replaced in suffi cient numbers for cohort 
fertility to increase in the foreseeable future. A further decline is likely, stag-
nation is possible.

• Shares of low parity women (childless and one child) have become consid-
erably larger than shares of high parity women with three or more children 
among the 1960s birth cohorts and there is no reason to believe this trend 
might be reversed. 

• Shares of two-child families gradually declined, shares of one-child families 
increased and there were few childless women among the 1960s birth co-
horts.

• Cohort childbearing age patterns in all CEE countries have been changing 
dramatically starting with the mid-1960s birth cohorts. These changes are 
continuing albeit at a more moderate pace among the 1970s and early 1980s 
cohorts. 

• The slowdown in childbearing postponement indicates the possibility of co-
hort fertility stagnation.

Overall, cohort fertility in the majority of CEE countries is likely to decline among 
the 1970s birth cohorts. There might be some exceptions and stagnation is possi-
ble. The outlook for a fertility increase in the long run is not favourable. This consti-
tutes a topic of serious concern for governments in the region and as such is among 
the reasons that motivate them to devise and implement family and other policies 
to counteract this development.

6.2 Family policies: Discussion and conclusions

Fertility levels and trends are indeed a matter of serious concern throughout the 
CEE region. Often the concern with inadequate fertility levels is within a broader 
framework of concern for the wellbeing of families and children, or with the objec-
tive of alleviation of poverty. Governments tend to adopt offi cial programme docu-
ments outlining strategies how to deal with these issues. Sometimes institutions 
such as ministries, and committees, have been established to design and imple-
ment family policies. In some countries governments are pursuing at least a partial 
implementation of the enunciated policies. In others the proposed policies were not 
implemented and the intentions have remained unfulfi lled due to political instability, 
ideological disagreements, lack of resources, or competing government priorities.

Issues related to child benefi ts, parental leaves and child care have been dis-
cussed above in the context of individual countries in section 5.3 (Country fam-



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 35

ily policy profi les). In addition, appendix tables 9, 10 and 11 provide overviews of 
parental leaves, and of participation rates in child care for 0-2 and for 3-5 year old 
children. 

The formulation and implementation of worthy family policies is subject to nu-
merous challenges. Quite frequently parties alternating in power have different 
views on what should constitute a family policy. One party advances measures 
tainted by patriarchal attitudes with an emphasis on fi nancial support to enable 
women to stay at home while the man provides for the family. Other political par-
ties in principle promote family policies associated with gender equality, work-life 
balance, convenient employment conditions for women, and adequate institution-
al childcare. As parties alternate in power governments change policy measures 
adopted by previous administrations thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
Such situations were typical in Hungary and Lithuania, although other countries 
also suffered from this syndrome. In Poland the government did not declare an 
offi cial government policy, but since 2008 gradually implemented some measures 
easing tensions between being employed and family care obligations.

In a number of countries family policies have been of low priority for govern-
ments. In particular, in Romania, an unstable political environment with frequently 
changing administrations, combined with a poorly performing economy are among 
the reasons why the government neglected family policies. 

Some countries suffer from a lack of resources available for family policies. Gov-
ernments in Serbia and Croatia expressed great concern about low fertility and the 
wellbeing of families and children. Offi cial documents were drafted and commit-
tees formed, but policies were not implemented. The economies were performing 
poorly in part as a consequence of the wars which followed the disintegration of 
former Yugoslavia. Apparently, suffi cient resources were not available for family 
policies to be implemented.

Frequently political instability has affected family policies. This has been the 
case not only in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland where it was identifi ed as an impor-
tant feature shaping family policies, but also in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, and 
possibly to some extent elsewhere.

Although conclusive fi ndings regarding the effect of family policies on fertil-
ity trends can only be made with a certain lapse of time, preliminary fi ndings are 
emerging. In countries with recent prominent pro-natalist policies – Belarus, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine – period TFRs have increased more than in most 
other countries. In Bulgaria and Latvia, however, even the period TFR trend stalled 
around 2010. Looking ahead, if the pre-1990 experiences are an indication of what 
is transpiring, the period fertility increases might turn out to be temporary, caused 
largely by the advancement of childbearing from future years as usually happened 
in the past. In this case a cohort fertility steadying at a relatively low level or a de-
cline is likely to continue.

In countries with the male breadwinner models – the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia – any notable effect on preventing a cohort fertility decline has not been appar-
ent so far. However, the family policies might well have had other benefi cial effects, 
such as a more just income distribution or poverty alleviation.



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten36

In almost all the remaining countries that for different reasons have weak family 
policies – Poland, Romania, Croatia and Serbia – even period TFRs have experi-
enced only modest growth. Lithuania is the exception with a period TFR at 1.6 in 
2012 which had been increasing since the mid-2000s and with a relatively stable and 
high estimated cohort fertility rate. 

In sum, these fi ndings indicate that there are merely two countries in which fam-
ily policies may have created favourable conditions for cohort fertility to stabilize 
– Estonia and Slovenia. On the other extreme, there are at least fi ve – Croatia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Serbia and Romania – possibly nine populations, if the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Latvia are included, in which family policies have not 
prevented a continued cohort fertility decline. In four populations, if Lithuania is 
added to those with strong pro-natalist policies – Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine –, 
some immediate effects of family policies on period fertility trends have been noted 
however when the respective cohort fertility data will become available, these in-
creases may turn out to have been temporary.

6.3 Overall observations and conclusions

Our research yields two main fi ndings. 

1. Cohort fertility is not likely to increase in the foreseeable future – i.e. among 
the 1970s birth cohorts and possibly beyond – in almost all CEE countries; it 
is more likely to decline; there are some indications of a possible stagnation 
of cohort fertility levels.

2. The majority of extant family policies in CEE countries are facing a variety of 
challenges that impede them from helping to generate optimal family welfare 
and to provide conditions for cohort fertility to increase. There are only two 
countries in which family policies are apparently conducive for a consider-
able advancement of family wellbeing and may have a positive impact on 
cohort fertility trends: Estonia and Slovenia. In addition, in four or fi ve coun-
tries, immediate effects of family policies on period fertility trends have been 
noted, however these may turn out to be temporary with a limited effect on 
cohort fertility.

6.4 Why are these fi ndings important?

Period fertility rates have been increasing in the late 2000s and in some countries 
up until the early 2010s. This has created the impression of a fertility recovery. Find-
ings of this project indicate that no such widespread recovery of childbearing ap-
pears to be underway. Even though it cannot be proven conclusively at the present 
time, cohort fertility does not appear to be increasing. In addition, what exactly will 
happen with period fertility trends depends on trends in childbearing timing. The 
rise in period fertility rates might have been temporary if it turns out that the PTFR 
increases of the late 2000s and early 2010s were driven by a slowing down of child-
bearing postponement or by childbearing advancement. In this case a stagnation or 
period fertility decline can be expected in the mid to late 2010s. However, as there 
are some signs that childbearing postponement is merely slowing down, period 



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 37

fertility stagnation or decline might not occur soon, but in a number of years. Also, 
periodic increases in material incentives to childbearing, provided governments can 
afford to do so, might manage to maintain relatively high period fertility rates for a 
few years. 

The likely future decline of cohort fertility (or its stagnation at relatively low lev-
els) may entail long-term demographic as well as other societal consequences, such 
as continuous declines in total population numbers, changes in age structures, as 
well as implications for health and social security costs. 

This is the fi rst time that a relatively comprehensive analysis of the nature and 
performance of family policies in CEE countries after the collapse of state social-
ism has been performed. We hope that this study will provide governments with 
a realistic overview of existing policies, and what more can be done to tackle the 
abovementioned issues.

Recent research on differences between actual family size and the number of 
children women desire – or consider ideal – provides evidence that fertility could 
increase if appropriate conditions were generated. This would require improved 
general societal conditions for childbearing as well as effective comprehensive fam-
ily policies. Sobotka and Beaujouan (2014: 407) have documented that “a two-child 
ideal has become nearly universal among women in Europe.” Taking the data for 
eight CEE countries in their paper and for fi ve additional ones there is a difference of 
0.49 children per woman between the completed cohort fertility rate (1.64) and the 
mean ideal family size (2.13). If conditions for childbearing were to improve, women 
and couples might have a realistic opportunity to come closer to their ideal family 
size.

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World Bank 2015: International Comparison Program Database, 2015.

Zakharov, Sergei 1999: Fertility, Nuptiality, and Family Planning in Russia: Problems and 
Prospects. In: Demko, George J.; Ioffe, Grigory; Zaionchkovskaya, Zhanna [Eds.]: Pop-
ulation under Duress: the Geodemography of post-Soviet Russia. Boulder-Oxford: 
Westview Press: 41-58.

Date of submission: 21.10.2015  Date of acceptance: 29.03.2016

Dr. Tomas Frejka (). Independent Consultant and Department of Social Policy and 
Intervention, University of Oxford. Oxford, United Kingdom. E-mail: tfrejka@aol.com
URL: https://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/people/profi le/frejka.html

Dr. Stuart Gietel-Basten. Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of 
Oxford. Oxford, United Kingdom. E-mail: stuart.basten@spi.ox.ac.uk
URL: https://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/people/profi le/basten.html



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 41

Country Collaborators

Belarus Ekaterina Antipova, Tatyana Pronko, Liudmila Fakeyeva
Bulgaria Elena von der Lippe, Dora Kostova
Croatia Ivan Cipin, Anđelko Akrap, Marin Strmota
Czech Republic Tomáš Sobotka, Kryštof Zeman, Anna Šťastná
Estonia Luule Sakkeus, Allan Puur, Martin Klesment, Liili Abuladze
Hungary Julia Mikolai
Latvia Peter Zvidrins, Liga Abolina
Lithuania Vlada Stankuniene, Aiva Jasilioniene
Poland Irena Kotowska, Krzysztof Tymicki, Anna Rybińska
Romania Cornelia Muresan, Ionut Foldes
Russian Federation Anatoly Vishnevsky, Sergei Zakharov
Serbia Mirjana Rasevic, Mirjana Bobic, Vasic Petar
Slovakia Michaela Potančoková, Branislav Šprocha
Slovenia Jože Sambt, Nada Stropnik
Ukraine Iryna Kurylo, Svitlana Aksyonova, Boris Krimer
Project coordinators Stuart Gietel-Basten, Tomas Frejka

Appendix

Participating countries and collaborators working on project: Prospects 
for a fertility increase in the formerly socialist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten42

Tab. A1: EBRD economic transition indicators index, Central and Eastern Europe, 
1995, 2005 and 2012

Region, Country EBRD economic transition
indicators index

1995 2005 2012

Central Europe
Croatia 3.0 3.6 3.7
Czech Republic EBRD Donor country as of 2006
Hungary 3.7 4.0 4.1
Poland 3.4 3.9 4.0
Slovakia 3.5 4.0 4.1
Slovenia 3.2 3.6 3.6

South-Eastern Europe
Albania 2.8 3.3 3.5
Bulgaria 2.6 3.6 3.7
Montenegro 1.6 2.9 3.3
Serbia 1.6 2.8 3.2
Romania 2.6 3.4 3.7

Eastern Europe 
Belarus 2.2 1.9 2.2
Moldova 2.9 3.2 3.3
Russia 2.9 3.2 3.3
Ukraine 2.4 3.2 3.3

Baltic States
Estonia 3.6 4.0 4.1
Latvia 3.1 3.8 3.9
Lithuania 3.2 3.9 3.9

Note: The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents 
little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the stand-
ards of an industrialized market economy.

Source: EBRD 2015



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 43

Tab. A2: Political rights index and civil liberties index, Central and Eastern 
Europe, 2004 and 2014

Region, Country 2004 2014
PR CL Status PR CL Status

Central Europe
Croatia 2 2 F 1 2 F
Czech Republic 1 1 F 1 1 F
Hungary 1 1 F 2 2 F
Poland 1 1 F 1 1 F
Slovakia 1 1 F 1 1 F
Slovenia 1 1 F 1 1 F

South-Eastern Europe
Albania 3 3 PF 3 3 PF
Bulgaria 1 2 F 2 2 F
Montenegro .. .. .. 3 2 F
Serbia .. .. .. 2 2 F
Romania 3 2 F 2 2 F

Eastern Europe 
Belarus 7 6 NF 7 6 NF
Moldova 3 4 PF 3 3 PF
Russia 6 5 NF 6 6 NF
Ukraine 4 3 PF 3 3 PF

Baltic States
Estonia 1 1 F 1 1 F
Latvia 1 2 F 2 2 F
Lithuania 2 2 F 1 1 F

Notes: PR – Political rights; CL – Civil liberties; F – Free; PF – Partially free; NF – Not free 
Numerical ratings from 1 to 7 – 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free

Source: Freedom House 2015



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten44

Tab. A3: Annual gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power 
parity, Central and Eastern Europe, and selected Western European 
countries, 1990-2013

Region, Country GDP per capita based on 
PPP in $$

Average annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita 

based on PPP in percent

GDP per capita 
based on PPP 

2013/ 1990

1990 2000 2013 2000/1990 2013/2000

Central Europe
Croatia n.a. 11,057 21,351 n.a. 5.1 n.a.
Czech Republic 12,731 16,287 29,018 2.5 4.4 2.28
Hungary 8,257a 12,073 23,334 4.2 5.1 2.83
Poland 6,003 10,600 23,690 5.7 6.2 3.95
Slovakia 6,997b 11,160 26,497 5.8 6.7 3.79
Slovenia n.a. 17,882 28,859 n.a. 3.7 n.a.

South-Eastern Europe
Albania 2,844 4,249 9,931 4.0 6.5 3.49
Bulgaria 5,410 6,445 15,732 1.8 6.9 2.91
Montenegro n.a. 6,548 14,132 n.a. 5.9 n.a.
Serbia n.a. 5,778 13,020 n.a. 6.2 n.a.
Romania 5,193 5,707 18,974 0.9 9.2 3.65

Eastern Europe 
Belarus 5,230 5,786 17,620 1.0 8.6 3.37
Moldova 4,153 1,840 4,671 -8.1 7.2 1.12
Russia 8,014 6,825 25,248 -1.6 10.1 3.15
Ukraine 6,798 3,818 8,790 -5.8 6.4 1.29

Baltic States
Estonia n.a. 9,709 25,823 n.a. 7.5 n.a.
Latvia 7,829 8,061 22,568 0.3 7.9 2.88
Lithuania 9,324 8,619 25,454 -0.8 8.3 2.73

Selected Western European countries
Norway 17,914 64,406 3.60
United States 23,955 53,042 2.21
Netherlands 18,740 46,162 2.46
Austria 19,514 45,079 2.31
Portugal 11,198 27,804 2.48

a 1991; 
b 1992. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP is gross domestic 

product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in 
the United States.

Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program Database 2015



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 45

Tab. A4: Period total fertility rates, increase or decline of period age-specifi c 
fertility rates, ages 15-26 and ages 27-49, specifi ed periods in 2000-
2012, Central and East European countries by region

Region, Country Period Increase or decrease of 
period age-specifi c fertility 

rate (in percent)

PTFR at end 
of period

Share of period age-
specifi c fertility rate at end 

of period (in percent)
ages 15-26 ages 27-49 ages 15-26 ages 27-49

Central Europe
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic 2004-2012 -14 41 1.45 28 72
Hungary 2003-2009 -18 21 1.32 34 66
Poland 2004-2011 -13 19 1.29 37 63
Slovakia 2003-2012 -14 58 1.46 36 64
Slovenia 2003-2010 -1 49 1.57 26 74

South-Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 2003-2009 8 60 1.57 53 47
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Serbia 2000-2012 -30 33 1.44 40 60

Baltic States
Estonia 2003-2010 -11 47 1.63 36 64
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 2002-2011 -19 82 1.55 36 64

Eastern Europe
Belarus 2004-2012 7 70 1.62 50 50
Russia 2006-2012 10 58 1.69 47 53
Ukraine 2004-2012 3 66 1.53 52 48

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014, Warsaw School of Economics 2014: Personal 
communication



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten46

Tab. A5: Parity distributions, selected Central and East European countries, Birth 
cohorts 1960-1970

Parities share 
(in percent)

Parities 
Ratio 

Parities share 
(in percent)

Parities 
Ratio 

Cohort 0+1 2 3+ 0+1/3+ Cohort 0+1 2 3+ 0+1/3+

Czech Republic Hungary
1960 22 56 23 1.0 1960 27 49 23 1.2
1965 26 55 19 1.3 1965 30 46 24 1.3
1970 29 53 17 1.7 1968 34 42 23 1.5

Slovakia Bulgaria
1960 23 45 32 0.7 1960 25 59 16 1.6
1965 28 46 27 1.0 1965 33 54 13 2.5
1968 31 45 25 1.3 1968 40 49 11 3.5

Estonia Lithuania
1960 29 48 23 1.3 1960 33 49 18 1.9
1965 37 42 21 1.7 1965 39 44 17 2.3
1970 40 38 22 1.8 1970 40 43 17 2.4

Belarus Russia
1960 30 56 14 2.1 1960 34 49 16 2.1
1965 40 49 11 3.5 1965 44 43 13 3.3
1970 45 44 11 4.1 1969 50 38 12 4.1

Ukraine
1960 34 52 14 2.4
1965 43 46 11 3.8
1968 49 40 10 4.8

Note: All calculations performed with unrounded base data. Results may seem inaccurate 
when ratios are calculated with listed numbers, and totals of shares in rows for cohorts 
may not add exactly to 100.

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 47

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•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten48

Tab.A7: Contraceptive prevalence, selected Central and East European 
countries, 1976-2015

Country Year Contraceptive prevalencea (percentage)
Any method Modern methods Traditional methods

Bulgaria 1976 75.1 6.0 69.1
1994 80.1 45.6 34.4
1995 85.9 45.6 40.3
1997 41.5 25.6 15.9
2015 67.4 47.7 19.7

Czech Republic 1977 95.0 49.0 46.0
1993 68.9 44.9 24.0
1994 69.6 48.6 21.0
1997 72.0 62.6 9.4
2015 74.8 69.1 8.7

Hungary 1986 73.1 62.3 10.8
1992/1993 77.4 68.4 9.0

Poland 1977 75.0 26.0 49.0
1991 49.4 19.0 30.4

Romania 1978 58.0 5.0 53.0
1993 57.3 14.5 42.8
1994 60.5 16.3 44.3
1999 63.8 29.5 34.3
2015 69.0 53.7 34.3

Serbia & 1976 55.0 12.0 43.0
Montenegro 2000 58.3 32.8 25.5

a Percentage of women of reproductive age in a marital or consensual union using con-
traception

Source: United Nations 2002 and 2015



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 49

Tab. A8: Legal abortions, selected Central and East European countries, 1996 
and 2003

Country Abortion ratea

1996 2003 Average annual percent change

Belarus n.a. 35 n.a.
Bulgaria 51 22 -11.7
Czech Republic 21 13 -6.9
Hungary 35 26 -4.2
Russian Federation 69 45 -6.0
Slovak Republic 20 13 -6.1
Estonia 56 36 -6.1
Latvia 44 29 -6.0
Lithuania 34 15 -11.0

a Abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44

Source: Sedgh et al. 2007



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten50

Tab. A9: Paid leave entitlements: Full-rate equivalent paid maternity, parental 
and father-specifi c leave, in weeks, selected Central and East European 
countries, 2014a

Country Paid maternity 
leave

Paid parental 
and home care 
leave available 

to mothersd

Total paid leave 
for mothers

Paid leave 
reserved for 

fatherse

1 2 3=1+2 4

Belarus 23.0 144.0 167.0 0.0
Ukraineb 10.0 (18.0) 156.0 166.0 0.0
Slovak Republic 34.0 130.0 164.0 0.0
Estonia 20.0 140.3 160.3 2.0
Hungary 24.0 136.0 160.0 1.0
Bulgaria 58.6 51.9 110.4 2.1
Czech Republic 28.0 82.0 110.0 0.0
Latvia 16.0 78.0 94.0 1.4
Russian Federation 20.0 68.2 82.2 0.0
Lithuaniac 18.0 44.0 (96.0) 62.0 (114.0) 4.0
Romania 18.0 43.0 61.0 1.0
Croatia 30.0 26.0 56.0 8.7
Slovenia 15.0 37.1 52.1 2.1
Serbia 16.0 36.0 52.0 0.0
Poland 26.0 0.0 26.0 2.0
OECD average 17.0 36.7 53.7 9.0

a Entitled weeks of paid leave as of April 2014.
b In Ukraine the “Total paid leave for mothers” (col. 3=166 weeks) consists of 10 weeks 

of “Paid maternity leave” (col. 1) prior to birth plus 156 weeks of monthly payment 
of birth grant. The total paid maternity leave is 18 months as noted in parentheses in 
col. 1.

c In Lithuania parental leave is available not only for mothers but also for fathers, i.e. they 
are equally eligible to take it (not at the same time). Additionally, parents can choose 
between a 44-week parental leave with a benefi t covering 100 percent of the compen-
satory wage and a 96-week parental leave with a benefi t covering 70 percent of the 
compensatory wage in the fi rst 44 weeks and 40 percent in the remaining 52 weeks 
(see also section 5.3.8).

d Parental leave and subsequent periods of paid home care leave to care for young chil-
dren.

e Parental leave that can be used only by father and cannot be transferred to mother.

Source: OECD 2015, country co-author reports



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 51

Tab. A10: Participation rates in childcare and pre-school servicesa for 0-2 year 
olds, selected Central and East European countries, 2006 and 2013

Country Participation rate (in percent)
2006 2013

Slovenia 32.5 45.4
Estonia 18.1 24.3
Latvia 20.0 23.4
Russian Federation 21.2 17.8
Serbia 11.3 16.2
Hungary 10.5 16.1
Ukraine 15.2 15.3
Belarus 11.9 (2005) 15.2 (2012)
Romania 7.9 14.5
Bulgaria 8.7 12.1
Lithuania 8.1 12.1
Croatia n.a. 12.0
Poland 8.6 9.6
Czech Republic 2.6 4.3
Slovak Republic 4.9 3.1
OECD 30 average 28.1 32.9

a Children in daycare centers and pre-school (private and public) and those that are 
cared for by licensed childminders

Source: OECD 2015, country co-author reports



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten52

Tab. A11: Participation rates for 3-5 year olds in pre-primary education or primary 
school,a selected Central and East European countries, 2002 and 2012

Country Participation rate (in percent)
2002 2012

Estonia n.a. 89.6
Slovenia n.a. 88.8
Hungary 86.4 87.7
Latvia 64.3 87.7
Belarus 84.7 (2005) 83.9 (2012)
Russian Federation n.a. 81.0
Bulgaria 73.1 79.6
Ukraine 58.0 78.4
Romania 61.9 77.6
Czech Republic 82.4 76.4
Lithuania 52.8 74.4
Slovak Republic 69.5 72.0
Poland 33.1 69.2
Croatia 41.5 57.7
Serbia 20.2 28.9
OECD 29 average 72.2 82.0

a Children in pre-primary education (public and private), but also in some countries chil-
dren in compulsory primary education

Source: OECD 2015, country co-author reports



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 53

Fig. A1: Period total fertility rates, Central and Eastern Europe, Northern, 
Western, Southern Europe and German-speaking countries, 1970-2013

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year

Northern Europe

Western Europe

German speaking countries

Southern Europe

Central & Eastern Europe

Period total fertility rate

2015

Regions consist of following countries
Central and Eastern Europe: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 

Albania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Belarus, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 

 Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Western Europe: Belgium, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom
German-speaking countries: Austria, Germany, Switzerland
Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain

Source: Human Fertility Database 2015 and Eurostat 2015



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten54

Fig. A2: Mean age of mother at fi rst birth, Central and Eastern Europe, Central, 
South-Eastern, Eastern Europe, and Baltic States, country populations 
within regions, 1960-2013

21.0

22.0

23.0

24.0

25.0

26.0

27.0

28.0

29.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Central Europe

South-Eastern Europe

Baltic States

Eastern Europe

A - Central and Eastern Europa

Mean age of mother at first birth

21.0

22.0

23.0

24.0

25.0

26.0

27.0

28.0

29.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Croatia

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

B - Central Europe

Mean age of mother at first birth

21.0

22.0

23.0

24.0

25.0

26.0

27.0

28.0

29.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Bulgaria

Montenegro

Serbia

Romania

C - South-Eastern Europe

Mean age of mother at first birth

21.0

22.0

23.0

24.0

25.0

26.0

27.0

28.0

29.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Belarus

Russia

Ukraine

D - Eastern Europe

Mean age of mother at first birth

21.0

22.0

23.0

24.0

25.0

26.0

27.0

28.0

29.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

E - Baltic States

Mean age of mother at first birth

Source: Human Fertility Database 2014, Eurostat 2015, Warsaw School of Economics 
2014: Personal communication



Fertility and Family Policies in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990    • 55

Fig. A3: Period total fertility rates (PTFR), period age-specifi c fertility rates of 
young women (PASFR 15-26), and period age-specifi c rates of older 
women (PASFR 27-49), selected Central and East European countries 
1970-2014

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

PTFR

PASFR 15-26

PASFR 27-49

A - Czech Republic

Fertility rate

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

PTFR

PASFR 15-26

PASFR 27-49

B - Bulgaria

Fertility rate

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

PTFR

PASFR 15-26

PASFR 27-49

C - Russian Federation

Fertility rate

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

PTFR

PASFR 15-26

PASFR 27-49

D - Lithuania

Fertility rate

Source: Human Fertility Database 2015, Eurostat 2015, National statistical offi ces 2015



•    Tomas Frejka, Stuart Gietel-Basten56

Fig. A4: Cohort age-specifi c fertility rates, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Russian 
Federation, Lithuania, and Austria, birth cohorts, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 
and 1985, and Netherlands, birth cohorts, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960 and 
1965

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

A - Czech Republic 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

B - Bulgaria 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

C - Russian Federation 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

D - Lithuania 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Age

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

E - Netherlands 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

F - Austria 1965-1985

Age-specific fertility rate

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Age

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Age

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

Source: Human Fertility Database 2015, Eurostat 2015, National statistical offi ces 2015



Published by
Prof. Dr. Norbert F. Schneider

Federal Institute for Population Research 
D-65180 Wiesbaden / Germany

 2016 

Managing Editor 
Frank Swiaczny

Assistant Managing Editor
Katrin Schiefer

Copy Editor 
(Selected Articles in German) 
Dr. Evelyn Grünheid

Layout
Beatriz Feiler-Fuchs

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