Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue
Childbearing in Turkey
Serap Kavas
Abstract: It is increasingly acknowledged that gender (in-) equality is one of the
most signifi cant factors underlying change in fertility behavior. Researchers have
extensively studied the link between gender (in-) equality and fertility decision-
making in various settings. However, most of these studies have focused on
industrialized countries in North America, Europe, and East Asia, while very few
examine this relationship in a non-western, developing country context. Employing
individual-level survey data, this paper examines the relationship between parents’
gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions for an additional child in urban
Turkey, surveyed in 2014. The fi ndings of this study show that parents’ attitudes
toward gender roles were not an important predictor of fertility decision-making
in Turkey. This study suggests that the lack of signifi cant fi ndings supporting the
expected association may be related to the measurement of gender role attitudes,
suggesting a need to construct a measure that addresses culture-specifi c aspects
of gender roles. This study contributes to the literature by providing a new data
point, Turkey, and bringing a comparative perspective to the existing research.
Keywords: Gender (in-) equality · Fertility decisions · Survey data · Turkey
1 Introduction
Fertility rates have fallen dramatically over recent decades in many countries
across the world. For example, the phenomenon of “lowest-low fertility levels” has
surfaced in Central and Eastern European countries (Kohler et al. 2002), and East
Asia has also become a region marked by low fertility. Moreover, examples of non-
western low-fertility patterns can be extended to the Middle East. Countries in this
region of the world are at different stages of a transition from high to low fertility,
with total fertility rates hovering around replacement level, such as in Lebanon and
Tunisia (Assaad/Roudi-Fahimi 2007).
Comparative Population Studies
Vol. 46 (2021): 503-532 (Date of release: 24.11.2021)
Federal Institute for Population Research 2021 URL: www.comparativepopulationstudies.de
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2021-18
URN: urn:nbn:de:bib-cpos-2021-18en5
• Serap Kavas504
Many theories have been offered to explain low fertility, including increasing
individual autonomy and increasing age at fi rst marriage (e.g., Caldwell/Schindlmayr
2003); postponement of childbearing due to economic uncertainty, and the
opportunity costs of childbearing (e.g., Kohler et al. 2002). Recent research has
drawn increasing attention to the relationship between gender equality and fertility
behavior. McDonald’s (2000a/b) gender equity theory in particular postulates that
the decline in fertility is largely related to the inconsistency between increased
gender equality in institutions of education and labor markets on the one hand
and relatively low levels of gender equity in family and family-related settings
on the other. Building on the gender equity framework, gender revolution theory
has suggested that gender egalitarianism in both the public and private spheres
will increase fertility in low-fertility countries. In particular, as men increasingly
participate in domestic chores and childcare, and thus share the burden of work and
family life, women will be willing to have more children (Goldscheider et al. 2015).
An extensive literature has studied the association between gender equality and
fertility behavior in various settings, reporting mixed fi ndings (e.g., Arpino et al.
2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Miettinen et al. 2011; Mills et al. 2008; Oláh 2003; Puur et
al. 2008; Torr/Short 2004). The previous literature exploring this association has
focused largely on the European context, though there is also an emerging literature
on non-western settings, most of which focuses on low-fertility countries in East
Asia (e.g., Brinton et al. 2018; Freeman et al. 2018; Kan/Hertog 2017; Yang 2017).
There is a gap in the literature with regard to examining the gender equality-fertility
relationship in more diverse settings with “nation-specifi c contextual explanations”
(Mills et al. 2008). This study builds on the previous literature and expands the
research on the gender equality-fertility relationship by examining Turkey; a new
socio-cultural setting and understudied context.
This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between gender
(in-) equality and low fertility in Turkey, a Muslim country with persistent yet highly
variable gender equality problems. While there have been many political reforms
since the founding of the republic to change women’s societal circumstances, when
it comes to public attitudes on gender roles, Turkey represents a quintessential
example of “the stalled revolution.” The country has had idiosyncratic gender
relationships and declining fertility for the past several decades. Fertility rates are
currently below replacement level, with the western parts of the country already
having experienced below-replacement fertility for the past decade. The persistent
fertility decline has sparked considerable concern among politicians and the public,
leading the current government to expend considerable efforts on encouraging
higher fertility (Kavas 2019). This study focuses on fertility intention, which is an
important motivational antecedent of the fertility-related behaviors of individuals
(Miller 2011: 76). This study contributes to this literature by testing the gender
equality-fertility relationship in an understudied socio-cultural setting, offering a
comparative perspective.
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 505
2 Background
There has been growing interest in the gender ideology-fertility relationship
since Becker’s (1985) “new home economics” paradigm, which pointed to a
strong interaction between women’s increasing labor force participation coupled
with changes in the sexual division of labor and declining fertility. More recently,
McDonald (2000a/b) has provided an explanation of the link between unequal
gender norms and fertility outcomes. In oft-cited works, McDonald suggests that
the decline in fertility to replacement level is linked to an improvement of equity in
the family sphere, where women have achieved the right to control their parenthood
decisions. However, further declines in fertility below replacement levels is related
to the imbalance between high gender equity in institutional settings and the lack of
a corresponding increase of equality in family settings, with the result that women
respond to the disproportionate burden of the “double shift” by limiting their
fertility. McDonald’s theory (2006) sheds some light on the issue of desired/ideal
fertility versus completed fertility, arguing that due to the unintended consequences
of changing social and economic institutions, individuals may not be able to achieve
their ideal fertility. Forgoing their ideal family size, women in particular state that “in
a different institutional setting, they believe they would have had more children”
(McDonald 2006: 485).
2.1 Previous works
Gender equity theory has increasingly attracted demographers’ attention, with
numerous studies testing this theory using either a macro- or micro-level empirical
approach. In general, studies have used survey data to investigate the association
between gender equality and fertility outcomes. These approaches either focus
on the household division of labor or on people’s gender role attitudes, and have
reported mixed fi ndings (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Cooke 2009;
Miettinen et al. 2011; Mills et al. 2008; Mills 2010; Oláh 2003; Puur et al. 2008;
Torr/Short 2004; Westoff/Higgins 2009). Of special interest to demographers in
this tradition has been the variation in the impact of gender equality on fertility
by gender. For example, using the Population Policy Acceptance Study for eight
European countries, Puur et al. (2008) explored the impact of men’s role orientations
on their fertility intentions, fi nding that men with an egalitarian attitude both had
a higher desire to have children and a higher number of children than men with
traditional views did.
For women, egalitarian attitudes may yield higher fertility if it is combined with
men’s increasing participation in household tasks. Cooke (2009) examined two
countries, Italy and Spain, analysing the likelihood of having a second child within
married couple households. The author suggests that when women receive help
from their partner with household chores and childcare tasks, the likelihood of having
a second child increases, although this effect was only signifi cant in Italy. Numerous
other studies have focused on the impact of men’s changing roles in the family,
both on their fertility aspirations as well as their partners’. Overall, these scholars
• Serap Kavas506
draw attention to the notion of “fertility recovery,” which indicates that when there
is equality in the family, with husbands sharing both domestic chores and childcare,
partner relationships become more fulfi lling and consequently partners have an
increased desire to continue childbearing (Brinton et al. 2018; Freeman et al. 2018;
Goldscheider et al. 2015; Kan/Hertog 2017; Oláh 2003).
While ample evidence suggests a positive correlation between egalitarian
gender role attitudes and fertility rates, other studies have found no signifi cant
relationship between the two. Chief among these works is Philipov’s study (2008),
which examined ten European countries and employed three dimensions of gender-
egalitarian attitudes. He found no clear association between the three gender
dimensions and fertility intentions for the second or higher-order parity.
Moreover, some of these studies present contrasting fi ndings, despite largely
using the same data sets and measurement. For example, Puur et al. (2008)’s fi nding
that egalitarian attitudes among men in eight European countries are positively
correlated with higher fertility desire and realization was countered by Westoff
and Higgins’s (2009) recent work, in which the authors designed a similar study
yet found a diametrically opposed relationship between the egalitarian attitudes of
men and their actual fertility outcomes.
2.2 Measuring Gender Equality and Fertility
Empirical studies have provided mixed or confl icting evidence concerning gender
equality and fertility relationship (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2010;
Miettinen et al. 2011). The measurement of gender equality seems to be the most
widely-stated challenge in the literature (Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016;
Davis/Greenstein 2009; Goldscheider et al. 2010; Knight/Brinton 2017; Miettinen et
al. 2011; Puur et al. 2008; Torr/Short 2004; Westoff/Higgins 2009). Some scholars
suggest that widely-used survey indicators may not be measuring gender equality
thoroughly (e.g., Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Mills 2010), while others
argue that the survey indicators may in effect function as a “surrogate” of the
concept (Arpino et al. 2015).
Others draw attention to the complexity and multidimensionality of gender
equality, noting that commonplace approaches of classifying gender role attitudes
as a linear continuum from traditionalism to egalitarianism may not adequately
depict the historical trajectory of change or the cross-cultural distinctions in gender
norms (Knight/Brinton 2017; Brinton/Lee 2016). As Hudde (2018) argues, there is
no reason to construct gender ideologies as binary concepts of either traditional
or egalitarian while societies adopt various gender relations ranging from gender-
symmetric models to alternative forms such as “the one-and-a-half earner model”
or “the returning to the more traditional norms of gender roles”. In line with this, in
a study, Grunow et al. (2018) constructed fi ve gender ideology profi les and found
multidimensional gender ideologies to be more prevalent among the respondents
than unidimensional constructs. The authors also found that egalitarian ideologies,
which refl ect joint spheres of earning and caring, intensive parenting and egalitarian
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 507
essentialism were more prevalent in all the European countries examined in this
study.
Measuring gender equality by attending to cross-cultural variations is crucial in
that it helps us better understand distinctions in gender-role attitudes. For one, not
all countries have the same gender systems; no matter how close geographically or
culturally they are to each other, their norms and practices may still be highly variable
(Goldscheider et al. 2010; Mills et al. 2008). Much evidence exists regarding the
varying nature of gender equality across societies, including its differential effects
on fertility behavior (Arpino et al. 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; Knight/Brinton
2017; Mills 2010; Mills et al. 2008). For example, using data from two countries with
very low fertility (Japan and Spain) and two countries with slightly higher fertility (the
United States and Sweden), Brinton et al. (2018) investigated how gender inequality
may generate a gap between women’s fertility ideals (hypothetical aspirations) and
intentions (realistic aspirations) in all four countries. They found that while American
and Swedish female interviewees were more likely than those in Japan and Spain
to mention unequal gender roles as a reason for their fertility ideals and intentions
gap, gender inequality was more signifi cantly associated with low fertility intentions
among highly educated interviewees in Japan and Spain.
Studies operationalize fertility outcomes differently. While most research focuses
on continued childbearing for different parities (e.g., Cooke 2009; Miettinen et al.
2011; Torr/Short 2004), a large body of literature also examines fertility intentions
(e.g., Brinton et al. 2018; Kan/Hertog 2017; Mills et al. 2008; Mills 2010; Okun/Raz-
Yurovich 2019; Tazi-Preve et al. 2004; Yang 2017). Brinton et al. (2018) draw a fi ne
line between fertility ideals and intentions. The authors describe fertility ideals
as more hypothetical aspirations without consideration of one’s specifi c family
situation, whereas intentions are more realistic plans that include the constraints
that individuals perceive in reaching their ideals. Thus, “fertility intentions lie in-
between family size ideals and completed fertility” (Brinton et al. 2018: 281).
2.3 Gender roles and family life in Turkey
Family relationships and demographic patterns are key areas that clearly display the
continuity and change that characterize social life in Turkey. Since the founding of
the republic in 1923, Turkey has undergone an intensive modernization experience,
which persists to date with Turkey’s ongoing bid to join European Union. The state-
led modernization project led to many changes in demographic and family behaviors,
including increases in the age at fi rst marriage, divorce rates, declines in fertility, more
egalitarian gender roles, and more independence among young people. Regarding
women’s status, in particular, republican reformers staunchly supported improving
women’s circumstances through increasing education, employment, and political
participation. After the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
successive governments maintained his legacy by implementing this modernization/
secularization agenda, which included policy actions aiming to reduce gender
inequalities (Aksoy/Billari 2018). Legal reforms in particular continued in line with
Turkey’s efforts to align with European Union standards. Substantial amendments
• Serap Kavas508
were made to the civil code in 2003, bringing about signifi cant changes with respect
to gender equality. For example, the amended civil code increased the legal age
of marriage to 18 for both sexes, which had previously been 17 for men and 15 for
women. It also introduced the legal basis for the sharing of marital assets in case of
divorce, and adopted the legal measures to ensure equal status of wife and husband
in the family (Ilkkaracan 2007).
Importantly, reforms related to gender roles and family life faced severe opposition
from conservative circles and despite all legal changes and reforms, traditional and
authoritarian family practices remain widespread in the country (Cindoğlu et al.
2008), making hybridity an important feature of family life in Turkey (Kavas/Thornton
2013). Moreover, the current conservative government’s efforts to “protect and
strengthen families” contributed to this hybridity (Yılmaz 2015; Kaya 2015; Yazıcı
2012; also see Aksoy/Billari 2018). For almost two decades, conservative discourse
and political debates about the need to increase fertility, eliminate abortion and
family planning, and traditional norms about women’s roles in the family featured
prominently current government’s policy agenda.
In Turkey, marriage and having children are important pillars of family formation,
and couples without a child do not fi t into the mainstream defi nition of “family”
broadly accepted by the population. Turkish family norms equally denounce being
unmarried and being married and childless, and thus voluntary childlessness is
almost non-existent in Turkey (HUIPS 2014).
The notion of a strong family bond, interdependence among family members,
and a strong generational hierarchy are deeply entrenched, positively valued, and
remain highly prevalent in Turkish society (Sunar/Fisek 2005). Turkish parents are
generally protective of and expect obedience and dependence from their children
(Kağıtçıbaşı 1982), and stay continuously involved in adult children’s decision-making
concerning important family issues (Nauck/Klaus 2008). Parent-child relationships,
particularly in urban middle-class Turkish families, are characterized by emotional
closeness and relatedness, especially between mothers and daughters (Ataca/
Sunar 1999).
In Turkey, young women are socialized into normative gender roles according to
which women are expected to be embedded into a family setting through marriage
and childbearing and play the roles of mothers and wives, while husbands are
the head of the family. In fact, before the 2003 civil code reforms, the traditional
gender roles classifying men as breadwinners and heads of families and women
as homemakers were even legally supported (Ilkkaracan 2012). Marriage is almost
universal, and although the minimum legal age at which marriage can take place is
18, young people can get married at the age of 17 with parental consent, and at the
age 16 with the approval of a judge.
With respect to gender roles, social class and urban-rural variations matter.
Therefore, given the institutional changes over the decades and the great variability
and heterogeneity of women’s status, it would be a mistake to consider women in
Turkey as passive victims of patriarchal norms and social rules (Kağıtçıbaşı 1986;
Cindoğlu et al. 2008). For example, educated and high-income women tend to have
more liberal attitudes toward gender roles, tend to be more resistant to patriarchal
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 509
norms, and more willing to embrace changing social norms. Moreover, studies
reveal that there are changes in attitudes to gender roles, particularly in the urban,
middle-class, and professional population of Turkey (e.g. Aycan 2004; Aycan/Eskin
2005). A study reports that a higher number of men than before share domestic
responsibilities in Turkey (Aycan 2004).
2.4 Statement of the problem and research questions
This study aims to shed light on the gender ideology-fertility relationship in Turkey.
It uses the gender-equity framework, which suggests that the imbalance between
the higher gender equity in the public sphere and lower improvements of equality in
family life leads to fertility decline, with women responding to the disproportionate
burden of domestic works by limiting their fertility (McDonald 2006).
The persistent fertility decline since the 1950s is the central theme in Turkish
demographic discourse (Yavuz 2006). The total fertility rate (TFR) fell from a high of 7.1
children per woman in 1930 to 4.3 in 1978, 3.1 during the late 1980s, 2.1 in 2009, and
most recently below replacement level, at 1.88 in 2019 (Turkish Statistical Institute
(TurkStat) 2020). According to the Demographic and Health Survey (2008), western
regions of the country have already been experiencing below-replacement fertility
for many years, with a TFR of 1.7 in 2008. The reasons for the decline in TFR over the
years are generally explained with the socio-economic development the country
has experienced for the past several decades and the changing status of women,
especially regarding education (Akadlı-Ergöçmen 1997; D’Addato et al. 2007; Yavuz
2006; Koç et al. 2014). For example, Akadlı-Ergöçmen (1997) highlighted a strong
relationship between women’s status and fertility decline. Using demographic and
health survey data, she found that women with fi ve or more years of education, a job
with social security, and a say in their marriage arrangement, as well as increased
age at fi rst marriage, tend to have fewer children. Moreover, a recent study found
a connection between gender inequality and fertility outcomes in Turkey (Kavas 2019).
Using in-depth interviews with mothers, Kavas (2019) found that women’s shouldering
larger shares of housework and childcare seemed to be an important reason for
decreasing fertility in Turkey. In yet another study, the division of housework was
found to be a signifi cant indicator of women’s fertility intentions in Turkey; using
demographic and health survey data Berktaş (2016) found that when having a higher
share of housework responsibilities, women in the 25-34 age group had a lower
desire for more children.
Therefore, given its persistent fertility decline over the years and women’s status
that is replete with ambivalence and paradoxes, Turkey seems to be a relevant place
to study the relationship between gender equity and fertility. Moreover, since much
of the literature on gender equality and fertility focuses on industrialized countries
in the West, where more egalitarian gender roles characterize social life, it would
be interesting to explore this relationship in a non-western developing country
context where there is great variability concerning gender roles, with considerable
continuity and change.
• Serap Kavas510
Toward this end, the fi rst research question of this study is whether there is an
association between parents’ gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions for
an additional child in Turkey. In particular, the study aims to explore the role that
gender egalitarianism plays in fertility decline.
As discussed, this study argues that despite the efforts made since the founding
of the republic to improve women’s status in society, gender inequality persists,
most palpably in the family sphere. With respect to access to education, girls’
primary schooling is universal, and secondary and tertiary net enrolment rates were
66 and 32 percent respectively in 2011 (World Bank, gender equality report, 2012).
However, when it comes to the provision of social policy measures to facilitate work-
family balance, Turkey cannot claim to have a particularly supportive labor market
environment (Ilkkaracan 2012). Housework and childcare are largely women’s
responsibilities, with the most recent nationwide family structure survey reporting
that 86 percent of mothers are the main childcare providers (TurkStat 2016). In
this context, parents with egalitarian attitudes may expect a more supportive
environment with respect to equality in role sharing and public policy and may have
a lower desire to have children than those with traditional views, who tend to take
unequal gender roles for granted.
The second research question asks whether or not the infl uence of gender role
attitudes on fertility persists once background factors are controlled for. According
to Kandiyoti (1995), male dominance in Turkey was redefi ned and renegotiated over
the past decades, with changes depending on geography and socioeconomic status.
As a result, Turkey has become a country where multiple family gender cultures
have coexisted. Parents’ levels of education, employment status, ethnicity, etc. may
play a role in their gender role attitudes. Therefore, it is important to know how
these structural factors interact with gender norms and infl uence fertility decision-
making.
The third research question concerns the extent to which these structural factors,
which are known to affect fertility decision-making generally, infl uence fertility
intentions independently of gender role attitudes in Turkey.
3 Method
3.1 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from a larger survey project titled “Fertility,
Family Life and Developmental Idealism in Urban Turkey”, designed to study views
about fertility and family life in Turkey, which includes a module on gender ideology.
Data were collected in 2014 through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected
men and women of reproductive age (18-49). A multi-stage stratifi ed sampling
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 511
procedure was employed to attain samples in 17 cities.1 Interviews were held with
individuals residing in households located in randomly selected neighborhoods, with
the selected blocks consisting of 20 households. The main rationale for limiting the
sample to cities was the very high costs of national surveys that include rural areas.
This means that the results of this study can be extrapolated only to urban Turkey
and not to the country as a whole. Furthermore, under the assumption that people
in cities likely have more egalitarian attitudes than those in rural areas, the exclusion
of the latter would refl ect higher endorsement of egalitarianism in the urban sample
compared to a national sample. However, it is important to note that with the current
geographical distribution of the population, Turkey’s urban areas are becoming
increasingly heterogeneous by including substantial rural communities. In Turkey, a
massive rural-to-urban migration has characterized the population structure of the
country since the 1950s. It continued for several decades, increasing the percentage
of the population that is urban (Erder 2002). In 2012, the proportion of the population
living in the cities was 77 percent, and currently it is 93 percent (TurkStat 2020).
So, given this heterogeneous geographical distribution of the population, it may
be diffi cult to predict how different the urban results would be from results with a
national sample.
A sample of 2034 individuals from all regions of the country was successfully
interviewed, yielding a response rate of 51 percent. However, due to the research
focus of this study, the sample is limited to married parents between the ages of
18 and 49, reducing the study sample to 1120 respondents. After this restriction,
an analytical sample of 444 men and 676 women was included in the regression
analyses, with slightly fewer observations in the multivariate analyses due to
missing data (Table 4 and 5). Based on the specifi c research questions, the study
prioritized the inclusion of men and women with at least one child. The reason for
not including childless married couples is that the transition to parenthood happens
almost as a matter of course in Turkey. As noted above, lifetime childlessness is
very rare in Turkey, with family norms denouncing childlessness. Parents are
infl uential in reproductive decision-making, typically wanting grandchildren and
exerting pressure on adult children to produce offspring soon after marriage
(Kavas/De Jong 2020; Nauck/Klaus 2008). Thus, as in many other social settings, in
Turkey “the normative pressure to become a parent” (Rindfuss et al. 1988) obliges
married individuals to have a fi rst child early, which obscures other factors that
should shape fertility decision-making. Thus, in a social environment in which
couples are expected to have a child quickly, it is diffi cult to disentangle the effects
of people’s attitudes on gender roles on their fertility decision-making for the fi rst
birth. However, the transition to second or higher-order births is the stage when the
cost and benefi t of having additional children are considered more carefully (Olah
2003), and therefore this life-course transition is more conducive to examining the
1 The sampled cities from different regions of the country are as follows:
Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya,
Malatya, Manisa, Samsun, Şanliurfa, Tekirdağ,Trabzon
• Serap Kavas512
infl uence of gender role attitudes on the decision to have a child. Moreover, because
in Turkey childbearing almost universally takes place within marriage (HUIPS 2014),
the sample consists entirely of married parents.
3.2 Measures
The dependent variable, fertility intention, was measured by asking whether or
not the respondent planned to have (a/another) child sometime in the future, with
the answers categorized as No = 0 and Yes = 1. Pregnant couples were excluded.
Gender role attitudes were measured with twelve statements presented below.
These attitudinal questions on gender ideology evince respondents’ views on
gendered roles in the spheres of work and family, and have been used in several
surveys including the World Values Survey, European Values Study (e.g., 1999),
and other research (e.g., Brinton/Lee 2016; Westoff/Higgins 2009). An exploratory
factor analysis was performed on these twelve categorical variables (Table 1). The
analysis of factor loadings and the conceptual overlap between items led to the
conclusion that there are two main gender ideology clusters, with the items in each
group loading together signifi cantly. The fi rst gender role attitudes scale (GRA-1)
was measured with six statements, with Cronbach’s alpha for these items being .61.
The fi rst three items in the fi rst set of questions seem to address individualism
in general rather than gender equality in particular, they address a women’s
independence as a single mother and whether an individual should be able to choose
to be unmarried and childless. Therefore, they are relevant to women and men living
in society without fi tting a mainstream defi nition of family life, so I believe they still
assess some aspects of gender equality (see Westoff/Higgins 2009). The remaining
items in this scale capture respondents’ gender role attitudes toward husbands’ and
wives’ work roles, including the importance of a job for a woman’s independence,
women’s ability to shoulder both family and work commitments, and whether men
and women should equally contribute to family income.
The second set of questions in the second scale (GRA-2) (all reverse coded)
focuses more on men’s and women’s roles in family life and contains the following
items, with a Cronbach’s alpha score of .51. (Table 1). These questions address gender
roles in family life and stress, for example, women’s “innate” role as caregivers and
housewives, the necessity of having a child to be fulfi lled, the primacy of parenthood
over individual choices, and perceptions of women’s desires to stay at home rather
than work. Also, given the framing of these questions, it seems that these items
tend to measure traditionalism more directly than egalitarianism, in that agreement
with any of these statements will refl ect a traditional attitude (Knight/Brinton 2017).
In sum, while questions in the fi rst gender role attitudes scale (GRA-1) include
items that tap individual choices and gender roles in the public sphere and particularly
women’s labor force participation, the questions in the second gender role attitudes
scale (GRA-2) covers attitudes to familial roles and the private sphere. Moreover, the
fi rst gender role attitudes scale seems to refl ect statements of egalitarianism directly,
while the second gender role attitudes scale measures gender-egalitarianism
indirectly by measuring the degree of adherence to traditional norms.
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 513
While the answers of these questions were categorized with a fi ve-point Likert
scale ranging from (1) “strongly agree” to (5) “strongly disagree,” I recoded the
variables into three answers: (1) “disagree”, (2) “neither”, and (3) “agree”. For each
of the gender role attitudes scales, the range of scores goes from a minimum of
6 (those with the most traditional gender role attitudes) to a maximum 18 (those
with the most egalitarian views on gender roles). The scales in the second set
were reversed so that higher scores also indicate more egalitarian attitudes . For
the analysis, the gender role attitudes measure was divided into three categories:
traditional, intermediate, and egalitarian using K-mean cluster analysis. For the
fi rst gender role attitude scale (GRA-1), cluster one represents “traditional” with
the threshold scores being 6-11, cluster two is labelled “intermediate” with scores
ranging from 12-14, and cluster three is “egalitarian” with scores from 15-18.
For the second gender role attitude scale (GRA-2), the fi rst cluster is “traditional”
from 6-9, the second cluster, “intermediate”, ranging from 10-13 and the fi nal cluster,
“egalitarian”, from 14-18.
Tab. 1: Factor loadings for gender role attitudes items in individualism and
family oriented categories
Gender role attitude 1,
Individualism/work orientation
If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent and she does not want to have
a stable relationship with a man, she should be able to have the child. .347
It is OK for a person to decide not to marry. .836
It is OK for a person to decide not to have children. .795
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work. .598
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person. .421
Both the man and the woman should contribute to the household income. .344
Cronbach’s alpha .61
Gender role attitude 2,
family orientation
A married couple should have at least one child. .383
A person has to have at least one child in order to be fulfi lled. .389
When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they do
not get along. .471
Being a housewife is just as fulfi lling as working for pay. .520
A preschool child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. .611
A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children. .694
Cronbach’s alpha .51
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
• Serap Kavas514
Other variables in the model include standard controls such as age, education,
employment, age at fi rst marriage, having a son, sibling size, number of children,
ethnicity, and religiosity. The education variable (that of respondents and their
spouses) was constructed by dividing education in to three categories based on the
number of years of schooling; 0-8, 9-12, and 13 years and above. Employment status
was created as a binary variable (0 = does not have a job; 1 = has a job). Age, along
with age at fi rst marriage, were included in the analyses as interval variables coded
in years. The number of children is grouped into three categories: one, two, and
three and more children. Religiousness was measured with a single question asking
whether or not the respondents think of themselves as a religious person, with the
answer categories of “no” and “yes” (coded no = 0 and yes = 1.) Two main ethnic
categories were identifi ed, Turks and non-Turks, with non-Turks representing mainly
the Kurdish population which constitutes the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. In
Turkey, fertility patterns vary to a great extent by ethnic identity. In eastern Turkey,
where Kurdish populations predominate, the TFR is on average 3.41 births per
woman (HUIPS 2014).
Also included in the model are the number of siblings and a binary variable
for having a son. The number of siblings is known to correlate with fertility, as
individuals’ family background, i.e. coming either from a large or small family,
may infl uence their family size preferences (Miettinen et al. 2011). The number of
siblings is asked with a question on how many siblings the interviewee had in their
household while growing up (including themselves; the answers are categorized
as fewer than 2 siblings = 0; 2 and more siblings = 1). Studies show that there is
a strong correlation between son preference and fertility intention and behavior.
For example, parents with a son preference may want to have additional children
until the desired gender composition is reached (Park/Cho 1995). This variable is
included in the analyses as a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent has a son.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive table of the sample (Table 2), shows that close to half of the mothers
and slightly more than half the fathers fi t into the egalitarian category. Over one-
third of mothers and one-fourth of fathers are intermediate, while over one-fi fth of
both female and male parents are traditional. In the second gender role attitudes
scale, covering family orientation, the traditional category contains the majority
of respondents. Half of the female parents and more than one-third of the male
parents fi t into the intermediate category and less than 10 percent are egalitarian.
With regard to the demographic variables, Table 2 shows that the mean age of
female interviewees was 35.7 and that of male respondents was 37.8, most likely
because women marry younger than men do. While mothers commonly have
primary education, fathers have secondary and tertiary education more often than
mothers do. Regarding spouses’ education, a similar picture can be observed:
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 515
Female parents’ spouses have a higher share of secondary and tertiary education,
and male parents’ spouses have a lower level of higher education. In sum, men on
average have higher education than women, which is consistent with the general
patterns in Turkey. Almost all of the fathers have a job, as opposed to only one-fi fth
Tab. 2: Sample characteristics (% or mean)
Female parents Male parents
Intention to have another child
Yes 30.2 35.6
No 69.5 64.4
Missing 0.3 –
GRA-1. Individualism/work orientation
Traditional 20.9 22.5
Intermediate 32.5 26.1
Egalitarian 46.6 51.4
GRA-2. Family orientation
Traditional 41.4 58.6
Intermediate 49.6 35.6
Egalitarian 9.0 5.9
Age (years) 35.7 37.8
Age at fi rst marriage (years) 20.3 24.2
Missing % 0.9 2.9
Education (years)
0-8 66.4 48.0
9-12 25.1 34.0
13+ 8.4 18.0
Spouse’s education (years)
0-8 57.5 58.1
9-12 27.4 27.3
13+ 14.5 14.0
Missing 0.6 0.7
Has a job
Yes 16.1 88.1
No 83.9 11.9
Spouse has a job
Yes 87.9 19.1
No 12.1 80.9
Number of Children
1 24.1 27.5
2 42.3 41.0
3+ 33.6 31.5
Has a son
Yes 78.1 77.7
No 21.9 22.3
• Serap Kavas516
of mothers being employed, and this gender gap in employment rates also holds
true when the mothers’ and their spouses are considered. While around one-fourth
of parents have one child, over two-fi fths have two children, and slightly over one-
third have three or more children.
The childbearing patterns of the parents in the study are consistent with the
country’s fertility trends, where the two-child norm has prevailed for the past
several decades. Around four-fi fths of both men and women have at least one son.
An overwhelming majority have more than two children. Almost every third parent
in the sample is not Turkish, with the non-Turks being predominantly Kurdish since
Kurdish people are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, constituting 14 percent
of the country’s population, (Konda 2011). A vast majority of fathers describe
themselves as religious and an even higher share of mothers do so.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the distribution of gender role attitudes
and fertility intentions. The descriptive statistics display no association between
gender role attitudes and the intention to have a child. In the fi rst gender role
attitudes scale (individualism/work orientation), intermediate men seem to intend to
have more children, somewhat more often than traditional and egalitarian men do.
In the second gender role attitudes scale (family orientation), a slightly higher share
of egalitarian men intends to have an additional child. Among female parents across
both gender role attitudes scales, it is somewhat more common that intermediate
mothers intend to have more children than other mothers.
Tab. 2: Continuation
Female parents Male parents
Sibling
Fewer than 2 14.9 10.4
2 and more 84.0 89.2
Missing 1.1 0.4
Ethnicity
Turks 70.3 73.0
Kurds and others 29.7 25.7
Missing – 1.4
Religiosity
Religious 84.8 76.1
Not religious 14.6 23.6
Missing 0.6 0.2
Total N 676 444
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 517
Fig. 1: Basic descriptions of relevant key variables: Intention of having one
more child and gender role attitudes for female and male parents
0
100
200
300
400
No Yes
Male parents
Intention for one more child
0
100
200
300
400
No Yes
Female parents
0
100
200
300
400
Traditional Intermediate Egalitarian
GRA-1. Individualism / work orientation
GRA-2. Family orientation
Male parents
Gender role attitudes
0
100
200
300
400
Traditional Intermediate Egalitarian
Female parents
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
• Serap Kavas518
4.2 Regression analyses
This study draws on cross-sectional data observing individuals at a single point in
time. The study sample included currently married men and women with at least
one child, leading me to use a model that does not censor data. Given that the
dependent variable (intention for one more child) is binary, I used binary logistic
regression models to examine the association between gender role attitudes and
fertility intentions separately among male and female parents. The binary logistic
regression model estimates the probability that parents intend to have an additional
child. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent intends to have
another child and a value of 0 if the respondent does not. Pregnant women are
excluded from the sample, so the beginning of pregnancy is not considered while
constructing the dependent variable. Results are expressed as Average Marginal
Effects (AME); i.e. as the difference in the predicted probability of the variable of
interest relative to its reference category. As a robustness check, estimations are
repeated using a linear probability model (LPM), the results of which are presented
in the appendix.
In line with the fi rst research question of this study, which asks whether there is
an association between parents’ gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions
for an additional child in Turkey, the fi rst three models of Table 4 and Table 5 present
the estimates from the logistic regression models for mothers and fathers. The fi rst
and second models are bivariate analyses with the gender role attitudes scales
included in the models in a stepwise manner. The third model includes a combined
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics of effects of gender role attitudes on intensions to
have more children for both male and female parents
Intends to have a or another child
Male parents Female parents
N % N %
GRA-1. Individualism/work orientation
Traditional 100 34.0 141 30.5
Intermediate 116 41.4 219 35.2
Egalitarian 228 33.3 314 26.8
χ 2(2) 2.313 4.326
p-value 0.315 0.115
GRA-2. Family orientation
Traditional 260 35.0 279 28.0
Intermediate 158 36.1 334 32.3
Egalitarian 26 38.5 61 29.5
χ 2(2) 149 1.399
p-value 0.928 0.497
Source: author’s analysis of survey data from “Fertility, Family Life and Developmental
Idealism in Urban Turkey” (2014)
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 519
model of the two gender role attitudes scales, which cover individualism/work and
family orientations.
Examining the gender role attitudes scale on individualism/work orientation
(GRA-1), the notable results for male interviewees concern the intermediate
category; intermediate men tend to have a 7.2 percentage point higher likelihood
of wanting more children than men with traditional values do (p-value = 0.266).
The results do not reveal an infl uence of egalitarianism on fertility intention, with
egalitarian men being 0.7 percentage points less likely to intend to have more
children (p-value = 0.906), with both results statistically nonsignifi cant.
Examining the gender role attitudes scale on family orientation (GRA-2), the
associations are positive, although they still do not reach statistical signifi cance.
Intermediate men tend to a have 1.1 percentage point higher likelihood of
choosing additional childbirth than traditional men do (p-value = .823), while
egalitarian men are 3.4 percentage points more likely to intend to have more
children (p-value = 0.725). Similar results were obtained when the two gender role
attitudes scales were combined in a third model. Neither the separate analyses nor
the combined model of gender role attitudes for fathers yield substantively and
statistically signifi cant results. However, caution is advised when interpreting the
results, since the confi dence intervals preclude any defi nitive conclusions from
these estimations.
For mothers, being egalitarian seems to be negatively associated with fertility
intentions in the fi rst gender role attitudes scale in Model 1 (AME = -.038,
p-value = .410) and Model 3 (AME = -.036, p-value = .438). Intermediate mothers,
in all three gender role attitude scales (M1-M3), have a 4 percentage point higher
likelihood of planning for more children than traditional women do. However, none
of these estimates reach statistical signifi cance. Moreover, the width of confi dence
intervals for these key variables is notably large and includes zero, suggesting that
one should be cautious to draw a precise conclusion as to the association between
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions.
Overall, the most noticeable result in these estimates is that both egalitarian men
and women tend to have a lower desire for having more children than the traditional
parents do. This is an expected fi nding, which is likely linked to the particular issues
asked of respondents in each gender role attitudes question. I surmise that the items
related to individualism/work orientation, including single parenting, voluntary
childlessness, and women’s independence through employment correspond with
liberal and egalitarian values associated with a modern/western lifestyle. In the
Turkish context, research shows that late and low fertility is also understood as
an attribute of a modern family lifestyle considered prevalent in western countries
(Kavas/Thornton 2019). So, it is likely that people holding egalitarian attitudes may
not have a positive view of a large family and thus they may have a lower intention
for continued childbearing. Taken together, while egalitarian parents’ lower desire
for more children partly supports the outlined expectations, the statistically non-
signifi cant results coupled with the width of confi dence intervals are contrary to
the study hypothesis predicting a strong association. Nevertheless, even though
the data do not provide the statistical power to draw any fi rm conclusions, fi ndings
• Serap Kavas520
M
o
d
e
l 1
M
o
d
e
l 2
M
o
d
e
l 3
M
o
d
e
l 4
M
o
d
e
l 5
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
1
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
0
.0
7
2
0
.2
6
3
-0
.0
5
4
0
.1
9
8
0
.0
7
0
0
.2
8
0
-0
.0
5
7
0
.1
9
8
0
.0
51
0
.3
8
0
-0
.0
6
3
0
.1
6
4
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
-0
.0
0
7
0
.9
0
6
-0
.1
2
0
0
.1
0
7
-0
.0
0
8
0
.8
9
5
-0
.1
2
1
0
.1
0
6
-0
.0
1
0
0
.8
3
5
-0
.1
0
9
0
.0
8
8
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
2
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
0
.0
11
0
.8
2
3
-0
.0
8
4
0
.1
0
5
0
.0
0
1
0
.9
7
9
-0
.0
9
4
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
4
8
0
.2
5
4
-0
.0
3
5
0
.1
3
1
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
0
.0
3
4
0
.7
2
5
-0
.1
5
6
0
.2
2
4
0
.0
2
4
0
.8
0
3
-0
.1
6
6
0
.2
1
5
0
.0
0
6
0
.9
3
9
-0
.1
4
3
0
.1
5
5
A
g
e
(
ye
a
rs
)
-0
.0
2
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
2
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
1
6
A
g
e
a
t
1s
t
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
(
ye
a
rs
)
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
2
5
H
a
vi
n
g
a
s
o
n
(
re
f.
n
o
s
o
n
)
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
s
o
n
-0
.1
0
0
0
.0
2
6
-0
.1
8
9
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
9
2
0
.0
4
2
-0
.1
8
1
-0
.0
0
3
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-0
.0
2
2
0
.6
5
6
-0
.1
1
8
0
.0
74
-0
.0
3
3
0
.5
0
6
-0
.1
2
9
0
.0
6
4
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
-0
.0
2
1
0
.7
51
-0
.1
5
3
0
.1
11
-0
.0
3
4
0
.6
2
0
-0
.1
6
6
0
.0
9
9
S
p
o
u
se
’s
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-0
.0
9
3
0
.0
74
-0
.1
9
4
0
.0
0
9
-0
.1
0
3
0
.0
5
0
-0
.2
0
5
0
.0
0
0
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
-0
.0
9
8
0
.2
0
1
-0
.2
4
9
0
.0
5
2
-0
.1
0
0
0
.1
9
6
-0
.2
5
2
0
.0
5
2
R
e
li
g
io
si
ty
(
re
f.
n
o
t
re
li
g
io
u
s)
R
e
li
g
io
u
s
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
0
2
0
.1
8
0
0
.1
0
7
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
1
5
0
.1
9
9
E
th
n
ic
it
y
(r
e
f.
T
u
rk
s)
n
o
n
-T
u
rk
s
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
3
9
0
.2
3
4
0
.1
3
5
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
3
7
0
.2
3
3
H
a
vi
n
g
j
o
b
(
re
f.
n
o
j
o
b
)
h
a
s
a
jo
b
0
.0
3
2
0
.6
4
9
-0
.1
0
7
0
.1
7
1
0
.0
3
2
0
.6
4
8
-0
.1
0
6
0
.1
7
0
S
p
o
u
se
’s
j
o
b
(
re
f.
n
o
j
o
b
)
h
a
s
a
jo
b
0
.0
8
4
0
.1
1
5
-0
.0
2
1
0
.1
8
9
0
.0
9
0
0
.0
9
2
-0
.0
1
5
0
.1
9
6
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
h
il
d
re
n
(
re
f
o
n
e
c
h
il
d
)
2
c
h
il
d
re
n
-0
.2
2
5
0
.0
0
0
-0
.3
17
-0
.1
3
4
-0
.2
2
6
0
.0
0
0
-0
.3
1
8
-0
.1
3
4
3
+
c
h
il
d
re
n
-0
.3
3
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.4
5
4
-0
.2
0
8
-0
.3
3
7
0
.0
0
0
-0
.4
6
1
-0
.2
1
4
S
ib
li
n
g
s
iz
e
(
re
f.
f
e
w
e
r
th
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s)
m
o
re
t
h
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s
0
.0
8
6
0
.1
0
8
-0
.0
1
9
0
.1
9
0
0
.0
7
8
0
.1
4
6
-0
.0
2
7
0
.1
8
3
N
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
18
4
18
T
a
b
.
4:
In
te
n
ti
o
n
t
o
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
c
h
ild
b
e
a
ri
n
g
f
o
r
m
a
le
p
a
re
n
ts
a
g
e
d
1
8
-4
9
:
lo
g
is
ti
c
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
e
ls
:
av
e
ra
g
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
n
d
s
ig
n
ifi
c
an
ce
l
e
v
e
ls
S
o
u
rc
e
:
au
th
o
r’
s
an
al
y
si
s
o
f
su
rv
e
y
d
at
a
fr
o
m
“
Fe
rt
ili
ty
,
Fa
m
ily
L
if
e
a
n
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
ta
l I
d
e
al
is
m
in
U
rb
an
T
u
rk
e
y
”
(2
0
1
4
)
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 521
M
o
d
e
l 1
M
o
d
e
l 2
M
o
d
e
l 3
M
o
d
e
l 4
M
o
d
e
l 5
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
A
M
E
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
1
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
0
.0
4
4
0
.3
5
9
-0
.0
5
0
0
.1
3
9
0
.0
4
5
0
.3
5
4
-0
.0
5
0
0
.1
4
0
0
.0
3
9
0
.3
6
4
-0
.0
4
5
0
.1
2
2
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
-0
.0
3
8
0
.4
1
0
-0
.1
3
0
0
.0
5
3
-0
.0
3
6
0
.4
3
8
-0
.1
2
8
0
.0
5
5
-0
.0
1
0
0
.8
0
9
-0
.0
9
1
0
.0
7
1
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
2
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
0
.0
4
4
0
.2
3
9
-0
.0
2
9
0
.1
17
0
.0
41
0
.2
7
0
-0
.0
3
2
0
.1
1
4
0
.0
4
0
0
.2
1
5
-0
.0
2
3
0
.1
0
4
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
0
.0
1
6
0
.8
0
7
-0
.1
12
0
.1
4
4
0
.0
2
0
0
.7
5
5
-0
.1
0
8
0
.1
4
9
0
.0
0
3
0
.9
6
2
-0
.1
11
0
.1
17
A
g
e
-0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
1
6
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.0
11
A
g
e
a
t
1s
t
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
0
.0
0
1
0
.8
5
3
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.8
3
1
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
0
H
a
vi
n
g
a
s
o
n
(
re
f.
n
o
s
o
n
)
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
s
o
n
-0
.0
3
6
0
.3
3
9
-0
.1
0
9
0
.0
3
8
-0
.0
3
8
0
.3
0
7
-0
.1
11
0
.0
3
5
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-0
.1
8
6
0
.0
0
0
-0
.2
74
-0
.0
9
7
-0
.1
8
4
0
.0
0
0
-0
.2
7
3
-0
.0
9
5
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
-0
.0
0
8
0
.9
1
0
-0
.1
3
8
0
.1
2
3
-0
.0
0
6
0
.9
2
7
-0
.1
3
7
0
.1
2
5
S
p
o
u
se
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
0
.0
0
6
0
.8
8
7
-0
.0
74
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
0
7
0
.8
7
3
-0
.0
7
5
0
.0
8
8
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
0
.0
7
0
0
.1
8
6
-0
.0
3
4
0
.1
74
0
.0
7
2
0
.1
7
5
-0
.0
3
2
0
.1
7
6
R
e
li
g
io
si
ty
(
re
f.
n
o
t
re
li
g
io
u
s)
re
li
g
io
u
s
0
.1
2
4
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
3
0
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
12
0
.0
2
7
0
.2
1
6
E
th
n
ic
it
y
(r
e
f.
T
u
rk
s)
n
o
n
-T
u
rk
s
0
.0
6
8
0
.0
5
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.1
3
7
0
.0
6
3
0
.0
7
5
-0
.0
0
6
0
.1
3
3
H
a
vi
n
g
j
o
b
(
re
f.
n
o
j
o
b
)
h
a
s
a
jo
b
-0
.0
5
8
0
.1
9
5
-0
.1
4
6
0
.0
3
0
-0
.0
6
4
0
.1
6
0
-0
.1
5
2
0
.0
2
5
S
p
o
u
se
j
o
b
(
re
f.
n
o
j
o
b
)
h
a
s
a
jo
b
-0
.0
4
0
0
.4
4
6
-0
.1
4
2
0
.0
6
3
-0
.0
4
7
0
.3
6
8
-0
.1
5
0
0
.0
5
5
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
h
il
d
re
n
(
re
f.
1
c
h
il
d
)
2
c
h
il
d
re
n
-0
.2
3
8
0
.0
0
0
-0
.3
1
4
-0
.1
6
3
-0
.2
3
9
0
.0
0
0
-0
.3
1
4
-0
.1
6
4
3
+
c
h
il
d
re
n
-0
.3
4
7
0
.0
0
0
-0
.4
3
8
-0
.2
5
7
-0
.3
51
0
.0
0
0
-0
.4
41
-0
.2
6
0
S
ib
li
n
g
s
iz
e
(
re
f.
f
e
w
e
r
th
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s)
m
o
re
t
h
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s
0
.0
5
3
0
.3
1
5
-0
.0
5
0
0
.1
5
7
0
.0
5
8
0
.2
7
5
-0
.0
4
6
0
.1
6
3
N
6
74
6
74
6
74
6
5
8
6
5
8
T
a
b
.
5:
In
te
n
ti
o
n
t
o
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
c
h
ild
b
e
a
ri
n
g
f
o
r
fe
m
a
le
p
a
re
n
ts
a
g
e
d
1
8
-4
9
:
lo
g
is
ti
c
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
e
ls
:
av
e
ra
g
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
n
d
s
ig
n
ifi
c
an
ce
l
e
v
e
ls
S
o
u
rc
e
:
au
th
o
r’
s
an
al
y
si
s
o
f
su
rv
e
y
d
at
a
fr
o
m
“
Fe
rt
ili
ty
,
Fa
m
ily
L
if
e
a
n
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
ta
l I
d
e
al
is
m
in
U
rb
an
T
u
rk
e
y
”
(2
0
1
4
)
• Serap Kavas522
suggest slight variations between the categories of gender role attitudes and their
relations to fertility intentions.
Model 5 estimates the infl uence of the control variables in line with the second
research question which asks whether the infl uence of gender role attitudes on
fertility persists once background factors are controlled for. For both men and
women, the fully controlled model does not yield substantively or statistically
signifi cant results concerning parents’ gender role attitudes and fertility intentions.
However, the results highlight the importance of some of the characteristics of
parents included in these full models (Table 4 and Table 5). For example, fertility
intention was shown to be associated with respondents’ age for both fathers and
mothers, with older parents having a lower desire to have more children (men:
AME = -.022, p-value = 0.000; women: AME = -.016, p-value = .000). Marital
timing seems to be a predictor of fertility intentions, as parents who delayed
marriage seem to plan the transition to higher-order birth 1.4 percentage points
more frequently than early marrying parents do (p-value = .016). Interestingly, this
association is particularly signifi cant for fathers, which may be because men delay
marriage more often than women in Turkey (TurkStat 2020). For fathers, the sex
composition of children appears to be signifi cant; parents who have at least one
son tend to lower their intention for an additional child and this association seems
to be strong (AME = .092, p = .042). This observed association is consistent with
recent work which found that Turkish parents show a strong son preference through
“son-biased fertility behavior,” and are more likely to discontinue childbearing after
a male birth (Altındağ 2015). For mothers, as expected, parents with mid-level
education are 18.4 percentage points less likely to intend for more children than
parents with lower education (p = .000); in an additional analysis that only controls
for age, this negative association becomes even stronger, indicating that part of
the association can be explained with the infl uence of age on respondents’ fertility
intentions. However, having a high level of education does not seem to have a
similar infl uence on fertility (AME = .006, p-value = .927), although this surprising
fi nding may be due to the small sample size for the category (n = 57). Religiosity
is positively associated with higher fertility for both sexes (men: AME = 107,
p-value = .023; women: AME = .122, p-value = .012), which is consistent with the
literature (see Adsera 2006; Philipov/Berghammer 2007 for similar fi ndings). Islam
has explicit rules related to getting married and having children, with large families
and multiple children being encouraged. These discourses permeate norms and
values about family and fertility. Being non-Turk (this predominantly refers to the
Kurdish population) is associated with higher fertility intentions for both fathers
and mothers (men: Exp (B) = .135, p-value = .007; women: Exp (B) = .063,
p-value = .075), although caution is needed when interpreting these results for
women, as the estimate is imprecise. The association between being non-Turk and
having a large family is expected, as Kurds on average have a higher total fertility in
general and the highest third birth risk (Yavuz 2006).
As expected, the number of children is signifi cantly and negatively correlated
with a plan to have more children. For both fathers and mothers, compared to
one-child parents, parents with two children are 22.6 and 23.9 percentage points,
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 523
respectively, less likely to desire more children (p-value = .000) and parents with
three and more children are 33.7 and 35.1 percentage points, respectively, less
likely to plan to continue childbearing (p-value = .000). This result is conceivable
for Turkish parents, as having a large family with three and more children is not
very common. Clearly, for Turkish parents, the fi rst child having a sibling is a more
important determinant for continued fertility than having a larger family, and this
pattern seems to hold for the study sample (see Miettinen et al. 2011 for an example
in Finland).
The third research question of this study is tested in a separate model (Model
4) where demographic variables are explored independently of the gender role
attitudes. The results are largely similar to the fully controlled model (Model 5). The
results in Model 4 further provide some indication that parents’ individual and family
characteristics such as age, marital timing, education, religiosity, ethnicity, number,
and the sex composition of children tend to shape parents’ fertility decision-making
independently of their gender role attitudes.
As further robustness checks, I ran linear regression models, (i.e., a linear
probability model) separately for men and women, estimating both bivariate and
multivariate analyses. These estimations yield almost identical results, which
suggests that the estimates from the logistic models are robust. Tables for the
robustness checks are presented in the appendix.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the relationship between Turkish parents’ gender role attitudes and their
fertility intentions for an additional child is examined. The empirical expectations
were drawn from the theoretical contributions of McDonald (2000a/b, 2006), who
proposed that as societies move from traditional to egalitarian, people’s reproductive
choices change. The timeframe in which gender equality in the institutional sphere is
achieved yet societal adaptation to new changes is ongoing is of particular interest,
with an expectation of fertility decline. In this study, I attempted to investigate this
relationship using individual-level data and studied Turkey, where changes toward
gender equality in the public sphere have not been adopted in the private sphere
with persistent fertility decline accompanying these changes.
Overall, the fi ndings of this study do not provide strong evidence that Turkish
parents’ gender role attitudes are associated with their fertility intentions. In
particular, the results of this study neither support nor contradict the theoretical
framework by McDonald (2000a/b, 2006) about the nexus between gender equity
and fertility in the Turkish setting. The results of this study are consistent with a
previous work by Philipov (2008) who examined gender role-fertility relationships in
ten European countries and found no relationship between the various dimensions
of gender roles and intentions to have or not to have a second- or higher-order child.
The lack of signifi cant fi ndings supporting the expected effects may be related
to the small sample size used in the regression analyses, moreover, it may also
be related to measurement issues, a concern which has been raised in previous
• Serap Kavas524
research (e.g., Arpino et al. 2015; Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Miettinen
et al. 2011; Mills 2010; Westoff/Higgins 2009). The questions used to measure
gender role attitudes are frequently used in other surveys and have been proven to
be reliable and valid (Davis/Greenstein 2009). However, it might be that these survey
items measure gender role attitudes broadly, without addressing relevant aspects
of gender roles in the Turkish setting. Since inequality is particularly evident within
the family in Turkey, survey items that capture attitudes about gender equality in
the family sphere could reveal more relevant aspects of gender roles in Turkey than
those examining the public sphere. These could include questions related to the
division of housework and care between mothers and fathers. Moreover, questions
that tap the degree of adherence to the traditional norms about marriage timing,
divorce, and beliefs regarding “honor” and virginity could unravel a more nuanced
depiction of attitudes about men’s and women’s roles in family and social life. In this
sense, using vignettes that introduce cases closely tailored to the study setting, for
instance, may be a better approach for measuring gender roles and their connection
to fertility decisions in Turkey.
Moreover, in line with the multidimensionality discussions in the literature (e.g.
Brinton/Lee 2016; Knight/Brinton 2017; Hudde 2018), constructing a diverse range
of gender ideology profi les could better measure attitudes regarding gender roles
in Turkey. For example, in a recent work, Lee and Brinton identifi ed “pro-work
conservatism,” which prescribes that women participate in the labor market while
maintaining their primary role in the home. Even though the authors argue that
pro-work conservatism is prevalent in low-fertility countries such as Japan, South
Korea, and several societies in Southern and Eastern Europe, I speculate that a
spectrum of more nuanced gender ideology profi les such as pro-work conservatism
could refl ect gender relations in Turkey more closely. Importantly, the regression
analysis suggests that structural factors were more important driving forces of
Turkish parents’ childbearing plans than their gender role attitudes. The decision to
have an additional child may not be an easy one for Turkish parents, as the cost of
childbearing in Turkey is considerable. Most people are concerned about providing
a decent education, clothing, and food for their children, given Turkey’s economic
uncertainty. Moreover, the current Turkish welfare system does not reach all strata
of society and does not meet peoples’ expectations (Grütjen 2008). Therefore,
under these socio-economic conditions, planning for a larger family requires a very
careful cost-benefi t calculation. On the other hand, Turkey is a patriarchal society
with a diverse ethnic population; therefore, the consistent and signifi cant impact of
ethnicity and son preference on parents’ fertility decision-making is not surprising.
Finally, the observed effect of religiosity on fertility intention is to be expected, since
the conservative Muslim community in Turkey – especially the recent government’s
discourses and policy efforts to return to the traditional family – certainly infl uence
in Turkey today (Kaya 2015; Yazıcı 2012).
This study has a number of limitations. The most relevant one is that the data
come from a sample of urban residents rather than a nationally representative
sample. This limits the generalizability of the study’s results to the entire country.
To the extent that attitudes to gender roles are different in rural and urban contexts,
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 525
the sample results would diverge from national results. However, I argue that the
rapid urbanization in recent decades and currently the substantial rural elements in
urban centres may mediate these limitations to some extent.
Another limitation is that the data used for this study is restricted to currently
married parents at parity 1, 2, 3 and above, aged between 18 and 49. While this data
restriction is based on the research question, a larger sample including people with
different parental and marital status could yield different results.
A third limitation is that the study had to omit variables such as respondents’
income and childcare arrangements. Living in a society with persistent economic
insecurity and a high rate of unemployment, individuals with low income and
precarious job conditions will likely prefer lower fertility than individuals without
these diffi culties. Also, it would have been useful to include the childcare
arrangement as a predictor; it is likely that a lack of affordable and quality public
childcare provision for the employed population forces parents to limit their fertility,
particularly when they don’t have strong support networks (such as grandparents
and other relatives), as is the case with most employed parents in Turkey.
Finally, data for this study was collected from the respondents but not their
spouses, which restricts the empirical analysis in two ways. First, as previous
research has found, fertility decisions are usually taken at the couple level; for
example, when there is no consensus regarding fertility decisions, the likelihood
of having a or another child decreases (e.g. Thomson/Hoem 1998). Second,
discrepant gender role attitudes between partners may infl uence fertility decisions
(Aassve et al. 2014; Arpino et al. 2015; Hudde/Engelhart 2020). For example, similar
or discordant gender role attitudes between partners may lower the risk of the
transition to parenthood (Hudde/Engelhart 2020) as well as having a second child
(Aassve et al. 2014). Future research should expand on the link between gender
relations and fertility intentions by considering couple-level dynamics and their
gender-related attitudinal characteristics.
Acknowledgements
This study was supported by a grant from the Scientifi c and Technological Research
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), (SOBAG 3501, Grant #113K073). I appreciate the staff
including the interviewers and supervisors of research fi rm, Frekans, for their work
in the collection and processing of the data. I thank Dr. Hüseyin Kavas for his input
into the data analysis. Special thanks to Alice Sage and Sue Peters for their editorial
help during the preparation of this article.
References
Aassve, Arnstein; Fuochi, Giulia; Mencarini, Letizia 2014: Desperate housework: relative
resources, time availability, economic dependency, and gender ideology across Europe.
In: Journal of Family Issues 35,8: 1000-1022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X14522248
• Serap Kavas526
Adsera, Alicia 2006: An economic analysis of the gap between desired and actual
fertility: Case of Spain. In: Review of Economics of the Household 4,1: 75-95.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-005-6698-y
Akadlı-Ergöçmen, Banu 1997: An Overview of Women’s Status and Fertility in Turkey.
In: Cosio-Zavala, Maria Eugenia (Ed.): Women and Families: Evolution of the Status of
Women as Factor and Consequence of Changes in Family Dynamics. Paris, CICRED:
79-105.
Aksoy, Ozan; Billari, Francesco 2018: Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertility: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment. In: American Journal of Sociology 123,5: 1296-1340.
https://doi.org/10.1086/696193
Altındağ, Onur 2015: Son Preference, Fertility Decline and Non-Missing Girls of Turkey.
Paper presentation, Population Association of America. San Diego, California.
Arpino, Bruno; Esping-Andersen, Gosta; Pessin, Léa 2015: How do changes in gender
role attitudes towards female employment infl uence fertility? In: European Sociological
Review 31,3: 370-382. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcv002
Assaad, Raugi; Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh 2007: Youth in the Middle East and North Africa:
Demographic Opportunity or Challenge? Washington: Population reference bureau
[https://www.prb.org/youthinmena/, 01.09.2019].
Ataca, Bilge; Sunar, Diane 1999: Continuity and change in Turkish urban family life. In:
Psychology and Developing Societies 11,1: 77-90.
https://doi.org/10.1177/097133369901100104
Aycan, Zeynep 2004: Key success factors for women in management in Turkey. In:
Applied Psychology: An International Review 53,3: 453-477.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2004.00180.x
Aycan, Zeynep; Eskin, Mehmet 2005: Relative Contributions of Childcare, Spousal
Support, and Organizational Support in Reducing Work-Family Conflict for Men and
Women: The Case of Turkey. In: Sex Roles 53: 453-471.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-005-7134-8
Becker, Gary 1985: Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor. In: Journal of
Labor Economics 3: 33-58. https://doi.org/10.1086/298075
Berktaş, Ezgi 2016: Does Housework Rule? Fertility Intentions of Women in Turkey from
a Gender Equity Perspective. European Population Conference (EPC 2016) [https://
epc2016.princeton.edu/papers/160086, 01.11.2021].
Brinton, Mary C.; Lee, Dong-Ju 2016: Gender role ideology, labor market institutions,
and post-industrial fertility. In: Population and Development Review 42,3: 405-433.
https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.161
Brinton, Mary C. et al. 2018: Postindustrial fertility ideals, intentions, and gender
inequality: A comparative qualitative analysis. In: Population and Development
Review 44,2: 281-309. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12128
Caldwell, John C.; Schindlmayr, Thomas 2003: Explanations of the fertility crisis in
modern societies: A search for commonalities. In: Population Studies 57,3: 241-263.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0032472032000137790
Cindoğlu, Dilek et al. 2008: The Family in Turkey: The Battleground of the Modern and
the Traditional. In: Hennon, Charles B.; Wilson, Stephan M. (Eds.): Families in a Global
Context. New York: Routledge: 235-263. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203836941
Cooke, Lynn Prince 2009: Gender equity and fertility in Italy and Spain. In: Journal of
Social Policy 38,1: 123-140. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279408002584
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 527
D’Addato, Agata; Vignoli, Daniele; Yavuz, Sutay 2007: Towards Smaller Family Size
in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey: Overall Change Over Time or Socio-economic
Compositional Effect? MPIDR Working Paper WP-2007-012. Max Planck Institute for
Demographic Research. https://doi.org/10.4054/MPIDR-WP-2007-012
Davis, Shannon N.; Greenstein, Theodore N. 2009: Gender ideology: Components,
predictors, and consequences. In: Annual Review of Sociology 35: 87-105.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-115920
Erder, Nejat 2002: Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Yandas/Seçmen Profi li, 1994-2002.
Istanbul: TUSES Publications.
Fikret-Pasa, Selda; Kabasakal, Hayat; Bodur, Muzaffer 2001: Society, organizations, and
leadership in Turkey. In: Applied Psychology: An International Review 50,4: 559-589.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1464-0597.00073
Freeman, Emily et al. 2018: ‘I couldn’t hold the whole thing’: the role of gender,
individualisation and risk in shaping fertility preferences in Taiwan. In: Asian Population
Studies 14,1: 61-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441730.2017.1386408
Goldscheider, Frances; Oláh, Livia Sz; Puur, Allan 2010: Reconciling studies of men’s
gender attitudes and fertility: Response to Westoff and Higgins. In: Demographic
Research 22: 189-198. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2010.22.8
Goldscheider, Frances; Bernhartd, Eva; Lappegård, Trude 2015: The gender revolution:
a framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior. In:
Population and Development Review 41,2: 207-239.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00045.x
Grunow, Daniela; Begall, Katia; Buchler, Sandra 2018: Gender Ideologies in Europe: A
Multidimensional Framework. In: Journal of Marriage and Family 80:,1 42-60.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12453
Grütjen, Daniel 2008: The Turkish welfare regime: an example of the Southern European
model? The role of the state, market and family in welfare provision. In: Turkish Policy
Quarterly 7,1: 111-129.
HUIPS (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies) 2014: 2013 Turkey
Demographic and Health Survey. Hacettepe University Institute of Population
Studies, T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK. Ankara, Turkey [http://www.hips.
hacettepe.edu.tr/tr/2018_tnsa_analiz_ve_rapor-56, 10.03.2018].
Hudde, Ansgar 2018: Societal Agreement on Gender Role Attitudes and Childlessness
in 38 Countries. In: European Journal of Population 34: 745-767.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-017-9459-8
Hudde, Ansgar; Engelhardt, Henriette 2020: Intra-Couple (Dis)Similarity in Gender Role
Attitudes and the Transition to Parenthood in Germany. In: European Sociological
Review 36,6: 852-867. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa024
İlkkaracan, Pınar 2007: Reforming the Penal Code in Turkey: The Campaign for the
Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective. Institute of Development
Studies.
İlkkaracan, İpek 2012: Work-Family balance and public policy: A cross-country
perspective. In: Development 55,3: 325-332. https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2012.52
Kan, Man-Yee; Hertog, Ekaterina 2017: Domestic division of labor and fertility preference
in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In: Demographic Research 36: 557-588.
https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2017.36.18
• Serap Kavas528
Kandiyoti, Deniz 1995: Patterns of Patriarchy: Notes for an Analysis of Male Dominance
in Turkish Society. In: Tekeli, Şirin (Ed.): Women in Modern Turkish Society. UK: Zed
Books.
Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem 1982: The changing value of children in Turkey (Publ. No. 60-E).
Honolulu: East-West Center.
Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem 1986: Status of women in Turkey. Cross-cultural perspectives. In:
International Journal of Middle East Studies 18,4: 485-499.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800030804
Kavas, Serap 2019: The gendered division of housework and fertility intention in Turkey.
In: Genus 75,1: 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41118-019-0068-8
Kavas, Serap; Thornton, Arland 2013: Adjustment and hybridity in Turkish family change:
Perspectives from developmental idealism. In: Journal of Family History 38,2: 223-
241. https://doi.org/10.1177/0363199013482263
Kavas, Serap; Thornton, Arland 2019: Developmental Idealism and Beliefs About
Marriage and Fertility in Turkey. In: Population Research and Policy Review 39,1: 47-
75. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-019-09525-2
Kavas, Serap; De Jong, Julie 2020: Exploring the mechanisms through which social ties
affect fertility decisions in Turkey. In: Journal of Marriage and Family 82,4: 1250-1269.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12668
Kaya, Ayhan 2015: Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith
and Charity. In: South European Society and Politics 20,1: 47-69.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.979031
Knight, Carly R.; Brinton, Mary C. 2017: One egalitarianism or several? Two decades of
gender-role attitude change in Europe. In: American Journal of Sociology 122,5: 1485-
1532. https://doi.org/10.1086/689814
Koç, İsmet; Türkyılmaz, Ahmet Sinan; Adalı, Tuğba 2014: Fertility, in 2013 Turkey
Demographic and Health Survey. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies,
T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK. Ankara, Turkey: 60-72.
Kohler, Hans-Peter; Billari, Francesco; Ortega, José Antonio 2002: The emergence
of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s’. In: Population and Development
Review 28,4: 641-680. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2002.00641.x
Konda 2011: Kürt Meselesinde Algı ve Beklentiler. Istanbul: İletişim.
McDonald, Peter 2000a: Gender equity in theories of fertility transition. In: Population and
Development Review 26,3: 427-439. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2000.00427.x
McDonald, Peter 2000b: Gender equity, social institutions and the future of fertility. In:
Journal of Population Research 17: 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03029445
McDonald, Peter 2006: Low fertility and the state: the effi cacy of policy. In: Population and
Development Review 32,3: 485-510. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2006.00134.x
Miettinen, Anneli; Basten, Stuart; Rotkirch, Anna 2011: Gender equality and fertility
intentions revisited: Evidence from Finland. In: Demographic Research 24: 469-496.
https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2011.24.20
Miller, Warren B. 2011: Differences between fertility desires and intentions: implications
for theory, research and policy. In: Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 9: 75-98.
https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2011s75
Mills, Melinda et al. 2008: Gender equity and fertility intentions in Italy and the Netherlands.
In: Demographic Research 18,1: 1-26. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2008.18.1
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 529
Mills, Melinda 2010: Gender roles, gender (in) equality and fertility: an empirical test of
fi ve gender equity indices. In: Canadian Studies in Population 37: 445-474.
https://doi.org/10.25336/P6131Q
Nauck, Bernhard; Klaus, Daniela 2008: Family Change in Turkey: Peasant Society, Islam,
and the Revolution from Above. In: Jayakody, Rukmalie; Thornton, Arland; Axinn,
William (Eds.): International Family Change: Ideational Perspectives. NY: Lawrence
Erlbaum: 282-312.
Okun, Barbara S.; Raz-Yurovich, Liat 2019: Housework, gender role attitudes, and
couples’ fertility intentions: Reconsidering men’s roles in gender theories of family
change. In: Population and Development Review 45,1: 169-196.
https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12207
Oláh, Livia Sz. 2003: Gendering fertility: Second births in Sweden and Hungary. In:
Population Research and Policy Review 22,2: 171-200.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025089031871
Park, Chai Bin; Cho, Nam-Hoon 1995: Consequences of son preference in a low-fertility
society: Imbalance of the sex ratio in Korea. In: Population and Development Review
21,1: 59-84. https://doi.org/10.2307/2137413
Philipov, Dimiter 2008: Family-related gender attitudes. The three dimensions: “Gender-
role Ideology”, “Consequences for the Family”, and “Economic Consequences”. In
Höhn, Charlotte; Avramov, Dragana; Kotowska, Irena E. (Eds.): People, population
change and policies. Lessons from the population policy acceptance study. Berlin:
Springer: 153-174. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6611-5_8
Philipov, Dimiter; Berghammer, Caroline 2007: Religion and fertility ideals, intentions
and behaviour: A comparative study of European countries. In: Vienna Yearbook of
Population Research 5: 271-305. https://doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2007s271
Puur, Allan et al. 2008: Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe
at the dawn of the 21st century. In: Demographic Research 19,56: 1883-1912.
https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.56
Rindfuss, Ronald B.; Morgan, Philip; Swicegood, Gray 1988: A Demographic Transition:
First Births in America: Changes in the Timing of Parenthood. Los Angeles: University
of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.242.4876.305
Sunar, Diane; Fisek, Güler Okman 2005: Contemporary Turkish families. In: Gielen, Uwe;
Roopnarine, Jaipaul (Eds.): Families in Global Perspective. Allyn & Bacon/Pearson:
169-183.
Tazi-Preve, Irene M.; Biechlbauer, Dieter; Goujon, Anne 2004: Gender trouble and its
impact on fertility intentions. In: Finnish Yearbook of Population Research 40: 5-24.
https://doi.org/10.23979/fypr.44996
Thomson, Elizabeth; Hoem, Jan 1998: Couple childbearing plans and births in Sweden.
In: Demography 35,3: 315-322. https://doi.org/10.2307/3004039
Torr, Berna Miller; Short, Susan E. 2004: Second births and the second shift: A research
note on gender equity and fertility. In: Population and Development Review 30,1: 109-
130. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2004.00005.x
TurkStat (Turkish Statistical Institute) 2016: Family Structure Survey [https://data.tuik.
gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Aile-Yapisi-Arastirmasi-2016-21869, 01.04.2021].
TurkStat (Turkish Statistical Institute) 2020: Population statistics [http://www.turkstat.
gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist, 01.04.2021].
• Serap Kavas530
United Nations 2013: World fertility report: Fertility at the extreme [https://www.un.org/
en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/worldFertilityReport2013.
pdf, 20.11.2019].
Westoff, Charles; Higgins, Jenny 2009: Relationship between men's gender attitudes
and fertility: Response to Puur et al.'s Men's childbearing desires and views of the
male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century. In: Demographic Research 21,3:
65-74. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2009.21.3
World Bank 2012: Towards gender equality in Turkey [http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/377191468120289049/ Towards-gender-equality-in-Turkey-a-summary-
assessment, 12.05.2019].
Yang, Juhua 2017: Gendered division of domestic work and willingness to have more
children in China. In: Demographic Research 37,62: 1949-1974.
https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2017.37.62
Yavuz, Sutay 2006: Completing the fertility transition: Third birth developments by
language groups in Turkey. In: Demographic Research 15: 435-460.
https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2006.15.15
Yazıcı, Berna 2012: The return to the family: welfare, state, and politics of the family in
Turkey. In: Anthropological Quarterly 85,1: 103-140.
https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2012.0013
Yilmaz, Zafer 2015: “Strengthening the Family” Policies in Turkey: Managing the Social
Question and Armoring Conservative-Neoliberal Populism. In: Turkish Studies 16,3:
371-390. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1067863
Date of submission: 16.10.2020 Date of acceptance: 06.08.2021
Serap Kavas, PhD (). Independent Scholar. Istanbul, Turkey.
E-mail: serapkavas@gmail.com
Gender Role Attitudes and Parents’ Intention to Continue Childbearing in Turkey • 531
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
T
a
b
.
A
1:
In
te
n
ti
o
n
t
o
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
c
h
ild
b
e
a
ri
n
g
f
o
r
m
a
le
p
a
re
n
ts
a
g
e
d
1
8
-4
9
:
lin
e
a
r
p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
m
o
d
e
ls
,
co
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
si
g
n
ifi
c
an
ce
l
e
v
e
ls
M
o
d
e
l 1
M
o
d
e
l 2
M
o
d
e
l 3
M
o
d
e
l 4
M
o
d
e
l 5
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
1
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
.0
74
.2
6
0
-.
0
5
5
.2
0
2
.0
7
2
.2
7
7
-.
0
5
8
.2
0
3
.0
4
7
.4
2
8
-.
0
6
9
.1
6
2
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
-.
0
0
7
.9
0
8
-.
12
0
.1
0
6
-.
0
0
8
.8
9
6
-.
12
1
.1
0
6
-.
0
17
.7
4
0
-.
11
6
.0
8
3
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
1
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
.0
11
.8
2
4
-.
0
8
4
.1
0
6
.0
0
1
.9
7
9
-.
0
9
5
.0
9
8
.0
3
8
.3
8
0
-.
0
4
7
.1
2
3
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
.0
3
5
.7
2
6
-.
1
6
0
.2
2
9
.0
2
5
.8
0
4
-.
17
0
.2
2
0
-.
0
0
2
.9
8
0
-.
17
2
.1
6
7
A
g
e
(
y
e
a
rs
)
-.
0
2
4
.0
0
0
-.
0
3
0
-.
0
17
-.
0
2
4
.0
0
0
-.
0
3
0
-.
0
17
A
g
e
a
t
1s
t
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
(
ye
a
rs
)
.0
1
4
.0
1
3
.0
0
3
.0
2
6
.0
1
4
.0
1
6
.0
0
3
.0
2
5
H
a
vi
n
g
a
s
o
n
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
s
o
n
)
h
a
v
in
g
a
t
le
a
st
a
s
o
n
-.
11
2
.0
2
7
-.
2
11
-.
0
1
3
-.
1
0
5
.0
3
9
-.
2
0
6
-.
0
0
5
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-.
0
2
7
.5
8
8
-.
12
3
.0
7
0
-.
0
3
7
.4
5
6
-.
1
3
5
.0
6
1
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
-.
0
3
1
.6
5
9
-.
17
0
.1
0
7
-.
0
41
.5
6
7
-.
1
8
0
.0
9
9
S
p
o
u
se
's
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f.
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-.
0
8
7
.0
9
6
-.
1
8
9
.0
1
5
-.
0
9
1
.0
8
3
-.
1
9
4
.0
12
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
-.
0
8
9
.2
6
2
-.
2
4
6
.0
6
7
-.
0
8
7
.2
8
0
-.
2
4
4
.0
7
1
R
e
li
g
io
si
ty
(
re
f.
n
o
t
re
li
g
io
u
s)
re
li
g
io
u
s
.0
8
7
.0
6
0
-.
0
0
4
.1
7
7
.0
9
7
.0
4
3
.0
0
3
.1
9
1
E
th
n
ic
it
y
(r
e
f.
T
u
rk
s)
n
o
n
-T
u
rk
s
.1
2
4
.0
1
5
.0
2
4
.2
2
4
.1
2
7
.0
1
4
.0
2
6
.2
2
8
H
a
vi
n
g
a
j
o
b
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
j
o
b
)
h
a
s
a
jo
b
-.
0
0
2
.9
74
-.
1
3
1
.1
2
7
-.
0
0
1
.9
8
7
-.
1
3
0
.1
2
8
S
p
o
u
se
's
j
o
b
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
j
o
b
)
sp
o
u
se
h
a
s
a
jo
b
.0
8
6
.1
3
4
-.
0
2
7
.1
9
9
.0
8
7
.1
3
1
-.
0
2
6
.2
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
h
il
d
re
n
(
re
f.
o
n
e
c
h
il
d
)
2
c
h
il
d
re
n
-.
2
9
5
.0
0
0
-.
4
0
1
-.
1
8
8
-.
2
9
3
.0
0
0
-.
3
9
9
-.
1
8
6
3
a
n
d
m
o
re
c
h
il
d
re
n
-.
3
7
9
.0
0
0
-.
51
2
-.
2
4
5
-.
3
8
5
.0
0
0
-.
51
9
-.
2
51
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ib
li
n
g
(
re
f.
f
e
w
e
r
th
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s)
m
o
re
t
h
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s
.1
1
9
.0
4
2
.0
0
4
.2
3
3
.1
0
9
.0
6
3
-.
0
0
6
.2
2
4
(C
o
n
st
a
n
t)
.3
4
0
.0
0
0
.2
4
6
.4
3
4
.3
5
0
.0
0
0
.2
9
1
.4
0
9
.3
3
9
.0
0
0
.2
41
.4
3
7
.9
51
.0
0
0
.5
3
3
1
.3
7
0
.9
4
7
.0
0
0
.5
1
6
1
.3
7
8
N
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
41
8
41
8
S
o
u
rc
e
:
au
th
o
r’
s
an
al
y
si
s
o
f
su
rv
e
y
d
at
a
fr
o
m
“
Fe
rt
ili
ty
,
Fa
m
ily
L
if
e
a
n
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
ta
l I
d
e
al
is
m
in
U
rb
an
T
u
rk
e
y
”
(2
0
1
4
)
• Serap Kavas532
M
o
d
e
l 1
M
o
d
e
l 2
M
o
d
e
l 3
M
o
d
e
l 4
M
o
d
e
l 5
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
B
P
-v
a
lu
e
[9
5
%
C
I]
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
1
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
.0
4
7
.3
4
7
-.
0
51
.1
4
4
.0
4
7
.3
4
3
-.
0
5
0
.1
4
5
.0
4
9
.2
6
3
-.
0
3
7
.1
3
6
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
-.
0
3
7
.4
2
1
-.
12
9
.0
5
4
-.
0
3
5
.4
5
0
-.
12
7
.0
5
6
-.
0
0
6
.8
8
7
-.
0
8
8
.0
7
6
G
e
n
d
e
r
ro
le
a
ti
tu
d
e
s-
2
(
re
f.
t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
te
.0
4
4
.2
41
-.
0
2
9
.1
17
.0
41
.2
7
2
-.
0
3
2
.1
1
4
.0
3
5
.2
9
4
-.
0
3
0
.1
0
0
E
g
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
.0
1
6
.8
11
-.
11
2
.1
4
3
.0
2
0
.7
5
9
-.
1
0
8
.1
4
8
.0
0
0
.9
9
8
-.
11
6
.1
1
6
A
g
e
(
ye
a
rs
)
-.
0
17
.0
0
0
-.
0
2
2
-.
0
1
3
-.
0
17
.0
0
0
-.
0
2
2
-.
0
12
A
g
e
a
t
1s
t
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
(
ye
a
rs
)
.0
0
1
.8
9
7
-.
0
0
9
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.9
2
2
-.
0
0
9
.0
1
0
H
a
vi
n
g
a
s
o
n
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
s
o
n
)
H
a
s
a
t
le
a
st
a
s
o
n
-.
0
3
2
.4
3
4
-.
11
1
.0
4
8
-.
0
3
5
.3
8
6
-.
11
4
.0
4
4
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f:
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
-.
1
9
1
.0
0
0
-.
2
7
8
-.
1
0
4
-.
1
9
0
.0
0
0
-.
2
7
8
-.
1
0
3
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
.0
0
3
.9
6
1
-.
1
3
7
.1
4
4
.0
0
6
.9
3
5
-.
1
3
4
.1
4
6
S
p
o
u
se
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
(
re
f:
0
-8
y
e
a
rs
)
9
-1
2
y
e
a
rs
.0
0
7
.8
7
2
-.
0
7
5
.0
8
8
.0
0
9
.8
3
5
-.
0
74
.0
9
1
1
3
+
y
e
a
rs
.0
7
9
.1
5
5
-.
0
3
0
.1
8
8
.0
8
2
.1
4
3
-.
0
2
8
.1
9
1
R
e
li
g
io
si
ty
(
re
f:
n
o
t
re
li
g
io
u
s)
R
e
li
g
io
u
s
.1
2
8
.0
0
5
.0
3
8
.2
17
.1
2
6
.0
0
6
.0
3
6
.2
1
6
E
th
n
ic
it
y
(r
e
f.
T
u
rk
s)
N
o
n
-T
u
rk
s
.0
7
3
.0
4
8
.0
0
1
.1
4
5
.0
6
9
.0
6
1
-.
0
0
3
.1
4
2
H
a
vi
n
g
j
o
b
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
j
o
b
)
H
a
s
a
jo
b
-.
0
7
1
.1
1
4
-.
1
5
8
.0
17
-.
0
7
5
.0
9
7
-.
1
6
4
.0
1
4
S
p
o
u
se
j
o
b
(
re
f.
h
a
s
n
o
j
o
b
)
H
a
s
a
jo
b
-.
0
4
9
.3
3
0
-.
1
4
9
.0
5
0
-.
0
5
8
.2
5
5
-.
1
5
8
.0
4
2
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
h
il
d
re
n
(
re
f.
o
n
e
c
h
il
d
)
T
w
o
c
h
il
d
re
n
-.
3
0
2
.0
0
0
-.
3
9
0
-.
2
1
4
-.
3
0
2
.0
0
0
-.
3
9
0
-.
2
1
4
T
h
re
e
a
n
d
m
o
re
c
h
il
d
re
n
-.
4
2
0
.0
0
0
-.
5
2
5
-.
3
1
6
-.
4
2
4
.0
0
0
-.
5
2
9
-.
3
1
9
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
si
b
li
n
g
s
(r
e
f.
f
e
w
e
r
th
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s)
m
o
re
t
h
a
n
2
s
ib
li
n
g
s
.0
6
6
.2
2
8
-.
0
41
.1
7
3
.0
6
6
.2
2
8
-.
0
41
.1
74
(C
o
n
st
a
n
t)
.3
0
5
.0
0
0
.2
2
9
.3
8
1
.2
8
0
.0
0
0
.2
2
6
.3
3
4
.2
8
2
.0
0
0
.1
9
4
.3
7
0
1
.0
4
6
.0
0
0
.7
0
0
1
.3
9
3
1
.0
1
9
.0
0
0
.6
6
3
1
.3
7
5
N
6
74
6
74
6
74
6
5
8
6
5
8
T
a
b
.
A
2
:
In
te
n
ti
o
n
t
o
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
c
h
ild
b
e
a
ri
n
g
f
o
r
fe
m
a
le
p
a
re
n
ts
a
g
e
d
1
8
-4
9
:
lin
e
a
r
p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
m
o
d
e
ls
,
co
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
si
g
n
ifi
c
an
ce
l
e
v
e
ls
S
o
u
rc
e
:
au
th
o
r’
s
an
al
y
si
s
o
f
su
rv
e
y
d
at
a
fr
o
m
“
Fe
rt
ili
ty
,
Fa
m
ily
L
if
e
a
n
d
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
ta
l I
d
e
al
is
m
in
U
rb
an
T
u
rk
e
y
”
(2
0
1
4
)
Published by
Prof. Dr. Norbert F. Schneider
Federal Institute for Population Research
D-65180 Wiesbaden / Germany
2021
Managing Editor
Prof. Dr. Johannes Huinink
Dr. Katrin Schiefer
Editorial Assistant
Beatriz Feiler-Fuchs
Wiebke Hamann
Layout
Beatriz Feiler-Fuchs
E-mail: cpos@bib.bund.de
Scientifi c Advisory Board
Karsten Hank (Cologne)
Michaela Kreyenfeld (Berlin)
Marc Luy (Vienna)
Natalie Nitsche (Rostock)
Zsolt Spéder (Budapest)
Rainer Wehrhahn (Kiel)
Comparative Population Studies
www.comparativepopulationstudies.de
ISSN: 1869-8980 (Print) – 1869-8999 (Internet)
Board of Reviewers
Bruno Arpino (Barcelona)
Kieron Barclay (Rostock)
Laura Bernardi (Lausanne)
Gabriele Doblhammer (Rostock)
Anette Eva Fasang (Berlin)
Michael Feldhaus (Oldenburg)
Tomas Frejka (Sanibel)
Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz (Vienna)
Birgit Glorius (Chemnitz)
Fanny Janssen (Groningen)
Frank Kalter (Mannheim)
Stefanie Kley (Hamburg)
Bernhard Köppen (Koblenz)
Anne-Kristin Kuhnt (Duisburg)
Hill Kulu (St Andrews)
Nadja Milewski (Wiesbaden)
Roland Rau (Rostock)
Thorsten Schneider (Leipzig)
Tomas Sobotka (Vienna)
Jeroen J. A. Spijker (Barcelona)
Heike Trappe (Rostock)
Helga de Valk (The Hague)
Sergi Vidal (Barcelona)
Michael Wagner (Cologne)